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
# COMPENDIUM

O F

# LOGIC.



The SECOND EDITION, Enlarged.



L O N D O N:

Printed in the Year M.DCC.LVI.



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# COMPENDIUM of LOGIC.

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## B O O K I.

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### C H A P. I.

#### *Of SIMPLE TERMS.*

##### S E C T. I.

**T**HE Operations of the Mind are three, 1. *Simple Apprehension*, 2. *Judgment*, 3. *Discourse*.

1. *Simple Apprehension* is, The bare conceiving a Thing in the Mind.

2. *Judgment* is, The Mind's determining in itself, that the Things it conceives agree or disagree.

3. *Discourse* is, The Progress of the Mind from one Judgment to another.

But our Apprehension is apt to be *indistinct*, our Judgment *false*, our Discourse *inconclusive*. To prevent this, wise Men prescribed several Rules, which were at length collected into one Body; and termed *Logic*, or The Art of Reasoning.

## SECT. II.

But we cannot express to another, what passes in our own Mind, any otherwise than by *Words*: It is therefore *by teaching us the proper Use of Words*, that *Logic* assists the Mind, 1. To apprehend *distinctly*, 2. To judge *truly*, 3. To discourse *conclusively*.

A Word, that expresses *simple Apprehension*, is called a *simple Word*; one, that expresses *Judgment*, a *complex*, or *compounded Word*; one, that expresses *Discourse*, a *decomplex*, or *twice compounded one*: For every Argument is resolvable into *three Propositions* or *Sentences*; and every Proposition contains *three Words* (in Sense, if not in Number), 1. The *Subject*, or that of which something else is said, 2. The *Predicate*, or that which is said, and 3. The *Copulative*, that stands between the Subject and Predicate, which are therefore called the *Terms* of the Proposition.

## SECT. III.

The first Part of Logic treats of *simple Terms*, that is, of such Words as may *by themselves* be the Subject or Predicate of a Proposition. Of these there are several Divisions; as,

1. A *singular Word*, which expresses one Thing only, as *Socrates*: A *common*, which expresses many and each of them, as, a *Man*.

2. An *infinite Word*, to which the Particle *not* is prefixt, as, *not-a-Man*, which may imply any Thing besides: A *finite*, to which that Particle is not prefixt.

3. A *positive Word*, which expresses a Thing as present: A *privative*, which expresses its Absence from a Subject capable of it: A *negative*, which expresses its Absence from a Subject not capable of it. So, *seeing*, spoken of a *Man*, is a *positive Word*; *blind*, spoken of a *Man*, is a *privative*; spoken of a *Stone*, a *negative Word*.



4. An

4. An *univocal* Word, whose one Signification equally agrees to several Things, as *a Man*: An *equivocal*, whose different Significations agree equally, as *a Foot*: An *analogous*, whose one Signification agrees unequally, as *Knowledge*, applied to God and Man.

5. An *absolute* Word, which expresses a Thing considered as by itself, as *Justice*: A *connotative*, which expresses the same Thing as joined to another, as *just*.

An *absolute* Word, expressing a Thing as separate from its Subject, is also called an *abstract*, as *Justice*: And a *connotative*, expressing it as joined to a Subject, a *concrete* Word, as *just*.

Those *connotative* Words, which imply each other, are termed *Relatives*, as *a Father* and *a Son*.

6. *Consistent* Words, which may at the same Time be affirmed of the same Thing, as *cold* and *dry*: *Opposite*, which cannot, as *black* and *white*.

The *Opposition* of simple Terms is fourfold; 1. *Relative*, between *relative* Terms, as *a Father* and *a Son*: 2. *Contrary*, between *contrary* Terms, that is, *absolute* Words, which expel one another from a Subject capable of either, as *black* and *white*: 3. *Privative*, between a *privative* and a *positive* Word, as *seeing* and *blind*: 4. *Contradictory*, between a *positive* and a *negative* Word, as *a Man* and *not-a-Man*. This is the greatest of all *Oppositions*, as admitting of no *Medium*; neither a *Medium of Participation*, such as is *grey*, between *black* and *white*; nor a *Medium of Abnegation*, such as is *a Stone*, between *seeing* and *blind*. *Relative* *Opposition* (on the other Hand) is the least of all; for *relative* Terms are not *Opposites*, unless they are considered with respect to the same Thing.

## SECT. IV.

An *univocal* Word is otherwise called a *predicable*, or a Word capable of being *predicated*, that is, spoken in the same Sense of several Things.

There are five Sorts of *predicable* Words, 1. A *Genus*, which is predicated of several Things as the common Part of their Essence, as an *Animal*. 2. A *Difference*, which is predicated of several Things as the distinguishing Part of their Essence, as *rational*. 3. A *Species*, which is predicated of several Things as their whole Essence, as *æ Man*. 4. A *Property*, which is predicated of several Things as necessarily joined to their Essence, as *risible*. 5. An *Accident*, which is predicated of several Things as accidentally joined to their Essence, as *tall*, *short*.

## SECT. V.

A *Genus* is either *the highest*, or a *subaltern*: A *Species* is either a *subaltern*, or the *lowest*. The *highest Genus* is that which never is a *Species*; the *lowest Species*, that which never is a *Genus*: A *subaltern Genus* or *Species*, is a *Genus* when predicated of a *lower Species*, as *Every Man is an Animal*; a *Species* when subjected to an *higher Genus*, as *Every Animal is a Substance*.

Wherefore, a *Difference* is either *generic*, which, added to the *Genus*, constitutes a *subaltern Species*, as *sensible*: Or *specific*, which constitutes the *lowest Species*, as *rational*.

A *Property* likewise is either *generic*, which is necessarily joined to the Essence of an *highest* or *subaltern Genus*, as *moveable*: Or *specific*, which is joined to that of a *lowest Species*, as *risible*.

But a *Property* is vulgarly said to be fourfold. 1. Such as belongs to one *Species* only, but not to every Individual  
of



of it; as *To be a Grammarian*. 2. Such as belongs to every Individual of a Species, but not of that Species only, as *To have two Feet*. 3. Such as belongs to one Species and every Individual, but not always, as *To turn Grey-hair'd*. 4. Such as belongs to every Individual of one Species only, and that always, as *Risibility*. It is such a Property as this, which constitutes the *fourth* Predicable.

## S E C T. VI.

To *divide* a common Word is, To enumerate its several Significations. So he is said to *divide* the Word *Animal*, who says, It signifies either *a Man* or *a Brute*.

*Division* is therefore, A distinct Enumeration of the several Things which are signified by a common Word.

The Rules of Division are three :

1. Let the Members of the Division, severally contain *less* (be of a narrower Signification) than the Word divided: 2. Let them conjointly contain *neither more nor less* than the Divided: 3. Let them be *opposite*, i. e. not contained in each other.

## S E C T. VII.

*Definition* follows Division: It is, a Sentence explaining the Word defined: And is either *nominal*, which tells the Derivation of the Word; or *real*, which explains the Nature of the Thing. Again, a real Definition is either *accidental*, which assigns the Properties or Accidents of the Defined; or *essential*, which assigns those Parts that constitute the Essence of it. Lastly, An essential Definition is either *logical*, which assigns the Genus and Difference; or *physical*, which assigns the really distinct Parts of its Essence, for the Genus and Difference are only distinguished by the Understanding.

For

For Example. *Homo* is defined *nominally*, *qui ex humo*; *accidentally*, a two-legg'd unfeather'd Animal; *logically*, a rational Animal; *physically*, a Being consisting of an organized Body and a reasonable Soul.

The Rules of Definition are three: 1. Let the Definition be *adequate* to the Defined: 2. Let it be *clearer* and *plainer* than the Defined: 3. Let it be contained in a *fit Number of proper* (not *figurative*) Words.



## C H A P. II.

### Of PROPOSITIONS.

#### SECT. I.

**T**HE Second Part of Logic treats of *Propositions*, which is Judgment expressed in Words.

A regular Proposition is, An affirmative or negative Sentence, signifying either true or false: Not ambiguous; for then it would be Sentences: Nor maimed; for then it would have no Signification.

It is either *categorical*, which pronounces a Thing absolutely, as *Plato is happy*: Or *hypothetical*, which pronounces conditionally, as *If he is wise, then he is happy*.

Again, a Proposition is either *affirmative* or *negative*; and is either *true* or *false*. This is called the *Quality* of it.

Lastly, it is either *universal*, as *All Men are Animals*: Or, *particular*, as *Some Men are learned*. This is called the *Quantity* of it.

SECT. II.

A is put for an universal affirmative Proposition, E for an universal negative, I for a particular affirmative, O for a particular negative.


In an universal Affirmative, the Subject only is *distributed*, (i. e. taken in its full Sense): In a particular Negative only the Predicate: In a particular Affirmative, neither Term is distributed: In an universal Negative, both.

The *Matter* of a Proposition (i. e. the Manner wherein the Terms cohere) is either, 1. *Necessary*, when they essentially agree; or 2. *Impossible*, when they essentially differ; or 3. *Contingent*, when they agree or differ accidentally.

SECT. III.

Those Propositions are said to be *opposed*, which having the same Subjects and Predicates, yet differ either in Quantity, or in Quality, or both.

The whole Doctrine of Opposition is contained in this Scheme:





Here A. E. I. O. are four Propositions, marked according to their Quantity and Quality, which are t. f. true or false, as the Matter of the Proposition is n. i. c. necessary, impossible, or contingent. Hence it is easy, 1. To enumerate the Species of Opposition, which are *contradictory*, *contrary*, *subcontrary* and *subaltern*. 2. To define each. For Example. Contradictory Opposition, is that which is between two categorical Propositions, differing both in Quantity and Quality, &c. 3. To lay down the Rules of Opposites, as follow:

1. *Contradictory Propositions* are never both true, or both false; but always one true, the other false.

But observe, Four Things are required to make a Contradiction, namely, to speak of the same Thing, 1. In the same Sense: 2. In the same Respect: 3. With Regard to the same third Thing: And, 4. At the same Time. If any of these Conditions be wanting, *is* and *is not* may agree. For Instance. 1. An Opinion *is* and *is not* Faith. It is *dead* Faith; it is not *living* Faith. 2. Zoilus *is* and *is not* red-haired. He is, with Respect to his Head: He is not, with Respect to his Beard. 3. Socrates *is* and *is not* long-hair'd. He is, in Comparison of Scipio: He is not, in Comparison of Xenophon. 4. Solomon *is* and *is not* a good Man. He is, in his Youth: He is not, in his middle Age.

2. *Contrary Propositions* are never both true: But in the Contingent Matter they are both false.

3. *Subcontraries* are never both false: But in the Contingent Matter they are both true.

4. *Subalterns* are sometimes both true, sometimes both false; sometimes one true, the other false.

## SECT. IV.

A Proposition is said to be *converted*, when its Terms are transposed. This is done either, 1. *Simply*, when neither the Quantity nor Quality; Or, 2. *Accidentally*, when the Quantity is changed.

An universal Negative, or a particular Affirmative may be simply converted, and the Inference will hold. An universal Affirmative must be converted accidentally, or the Inference will not hold.



## C H A P. III.

## Of SYLLOGISMS.

## SECT. I.

**T**HE Third Part of Logic treats of *Syllogism*, which is a Discourse expressed in Propositions.

A Syllogism is commonly defined, A Sentence in which something being premised, something else necessarily follows from it.

A *categorical Syllogism*, consists of three categorical Propositions: The two former of which are termed, the *Antecedent*; the third, the *Consequent*; which before it is proved is called a *Problem* or *Question*, afterwards a *Conclusion*.

We must make Use of some *third Term*, in order to find, whether the Subject and Predicate of a Question agree: And that, because of the following Rules, on which the whole Force of Syllogism is founded.

1. Those

1. Those Terms which agree with one and the same Third, agree with one another.
2. Those Terms, one of which agrees, the other disagrees with one and the same Third, differ from one another.
3. Those which do not agree with one and the same Third, do not agree with one another.

## SECT. II.

From these general Principles, the particular Rules of Syllogism are thus deduced.

1. In every Syllogism, there are three, and only three Terms: Two in the Conclusion: And these can neither be proved to agree nor to differ, without one and only one third Term.

The Predicate of the Question is stiled the *major Term*; the Subject, the *minor*; the third Term, the *Medium* or *middle Term*: For the Predicate is commonly more comprehensive than the Medium, as the Medium is than the Minor.

2. In every Syllogism, there are three, and only three Propositions: Two *Premisses*, in which the Medium is compared with the two other Terms severally (the *major Proposition*, in which it is compared with the major Term; the *minor Proposition*, in which it is compared with the minor Term); and the *Conclusion*, in which both those Terms stand together.

3. An *equivocal* Medium proves Nothing. For this is not one and the same Third.

4. An *undistributed* Medium is equivocal. Therefore

5. The Medium must be distributed in one of the *Premisses*.

6. The

6. The Process from a Term not distributed in the Premiss, to the same distributed in the Conclusion is irregular.

7. Negative Premisses prove Nothing: For in this Case a third is brought, from which both the Terms differ.

8. If either of the Premisses is negative, so is also the Conclusion.

9. And, if the Conclusion be negative, so is also one of the Premisses.

10. Particular Premisses prove Nothing.

11. If either of the Premisses be particular, so is also the Conclusion.

### SECT. III.

It remains to enquire, how many Ways three categorical Propositions can be joined together, so as to compose a regular Syllogism. In which Enquiry, two Things are to be considered.

1. The *Mood*, or the Variation of the Propositions according to their Quantity and Quality:

2. The *Figure*, or the Manner of comparing the Medium, with the Terms of the Conclusion.

There are sixty four Moods. For the Major of a Syllogism may be either A. E. I. or O. To each of these a fourfold Minor may be annexed, whence arise sixteen Pair of Premisses. And to each of these sixteen, a fourfold Conclusion may be subjoined, thus,

B

AAA.



AAA. AAE. AAI. AAO: AEA. AEE. AEI. AEO:  
 AIA. AIE. AII. AIO: AOA. AOE. AOI. AOO.  
 EAA. EAE. EAI. EAO: EEA. EEE. EEI. EEO.  
 EIA. EIE. EII. EIO: EOA. EOE. EOI. EOO.  
 IAA. IAE. IAI. IAO: IEA. IEE. IEI. IEO:  
 IIA. IIE. III. IIO: IOA. IOE. IOI. IOO.  
 OAA. OAE. OAI. OAO: OEA. OEE. OEI. OEO.  
 OIA. OIE. OII. OIO: OOA. OOE. OOI. OOO.

But sixteen of these are excluded by the seventh Rule, because their Premisses are negative, viz. EEA. EEE. EEI. EEO: EOA. EOE. EOI. EOO: OEA. OEE. OEI. OEO: OOA. OOE. OOI. OOO: Twelve by the tenth Rule, because their Premisses are particular, viz. IIA. IIE. III. IIO: IOA. IOE. IOI. IOO: OIA. OIE. OII. OIO: Twelve by the eighth Rule, because one of the Premisses is negative and not the Conclusion; AEA. AEI: AOA. AOI: EAA. EAI: EIA. EII: IEA. IEI: OAA. OAI: Eight by the eleventh Rule, because one of the Premisses is particular, and not the Conclusion; AIA. AIE: AOE: EIE: IAA. IAE: IEE: OAE: Lastly, Four by the ninth Rule, because the Conclusion is negative, but neither of the Premisses; AAE. AAO. AIO: IAO.

Therefore fifty two Moods are excluded, many of which offend against several Rules. There remain twelve, which only are useful in Syllogism; AAA. AAI: AEE. AEO: AII: AOO: EAE. EAO: EIO: IAI: IEO: OAO.

#### SECT. IV.

The *Figures* of Syllogism are four: For the Medium is either subjected to the major, and predicated of the minor Term, which is the first Figure; or predicated of both, which is the second; or subjected to both, which is the third; or predicated of the major, and subjected to the minor, which is the fourth; as appears in the following Scheme, wherein A is the Major Term, B the Medium, C the Minor:

B. A



1 Fig.	2 Fig.	3 Fig.	4 Fig.
B. A.	A. B.	B. A.	A. B.
C. B.	C. B.	B. C.	B. C.
C. A.	C. A.	C. A.	C. A.

Wherefore of the twelve remaining Moods, each Figure excludes six: Namely,

1. Because of the undistributed Medium, the first, two, IAI: OAO: The second, four, AAA. AAI: AII: IAI: The fourth, two, AII: AOO.

2. Because of the irregular Process of the major Term, the first Figure excludes four Moods, AEE. AEO: AOO: IEO: The second, two, IEO: OAO: The third, four, AEE. AEO: AOO: IEO: The fourth, two, IEO: OAO.

3. Because of the irregular Process of the minor Term, the third, two, AAA: EAE: The fourth, two, AAA. EAE.

There remain *twenty four* conclusive Moods, *six* in each Figure.

### The FIRST FIGURE.

- bAr Every wicked Man is miserable;  
 bA Every Tyrant is a wicked Man; Therefore  
 rA Every Tyrant is miserable.
- cE No discontented Man is a happy Man;  
 lA Every wicked Man is discontented; Therefore  
 rEnt No wicked Man is a happy Man.
- dA All the Faithful are dear to God;  
 rI Some, that are afflicted, are faithful; Therefore  
 I Some, that are afflicted, are dear to God.

- fE No Virtue is an Evil; .  
 rI Some difficult Things are Virtues; Therefore  
 O Some difficult Things are not Evils.
- A Every wicked Man is miserable;  
 A All Tyrants are wicked Men; Therefore  
 I Some Tyrants are miserable.
- E No discontented Man is a happy Man;  
 A Every wicked Man is discontented; Therefore  
 O Some wicked Men are not happy Men.

## The SECOND FIGURE.

- cEs No happy Man is discontented;  
 A Every wicked Man is discontented; Therefore  
 rE No wicked Man is a happy Man.
- cAm Every wicked Man is discontented;  
 Es No happy Man is discontented; Therefore  
 trEs No happy Man is a wicked Man.
- fEs No Evil is a Virtue;  
 tI Some difficult Things are Virtues; Therefore  
 nO Some difficult Things are not Evils.
- bAr Every good Man is afflicted;  
 Ok Some rich Men are not afflicted; Therefore  
 O Some rich Men are not good Men.
- E No happy Man is discontented;  
 A Every wicked Man is discontented; Therefore  
 O Some wicked Men are not happy Men.
- A Every wicked Man is discontented;  
 E No happy Men are discontented; Therefore  
 O Some happy Men are not wicked Men.

The THIRD FIGURE.

- dAr All the Faithful are dear to GOD;  
 Ap All the Faithful are afflicted; Therefore  
 tI Some, that are afflicted, are dear to GOD.
- dIs Some Faithful are afflicted;  
 Am All the Faithful are dear to GOD; Therefore  
 Is Some, that are dear to GOD, are afflicted.
- dAt All the Faithful are dear to GOD;  
 Is Some of the Faithful are afflicted; Therefore  
 I Some, that are afflicted, are dear to GOD.
- fEl No Virtue is an Evil;  
 Ap All Virtues are difficult; Therefore  
 tOn Some difficult Things are not Evils.
- bOk Some Christians are not true Believers;  
 Ar All Christians profess Faith; Therefore  
 dO Some, who profess Faith, are not true Believers.
- fEr No Virtue is an Evil;  
 Is Some Virtues are difficult; Therefore  
 On Some difficult Things are not Evils.

The FOURTH FIGURE.

- brAm Every Tyrant is a wicked Man;  
 An Every wicked Man is miserable; Therefore  
 tIp Some, that are miserable, are Tyrants.
- cAm Every wicked Man is discontented;  
 En No discontented Man is a happy Man; Therefore  
 Es No happy Man is a wicked Man.
- dIm Some afflicted are faithful;  
 Ar All the Faithful are dear to GOD; Therefore  
 Is Some, that are beloved of GOD, are afflicted.

fEs No Evil is a Virtue;  
 Ap All Virtues are difficult; Therefore  
 O Some difficult Things are not Evils.

frEs No Evil is a Virtue;  
 Is Some Virtues are difficult; Therefore  
 On Some difficult Things are not Evils.

A Every wicked Man is discontented;  
 E No discontented Man is a happy Man; Therefore  
 O Some happy Men are not wicked Men.

### SECT. V.

The four first of these Moods need nothing to make the Force of the Inference evident, but what is expressed in the Premises. Whereas all the rest do. These therefore are stiled *perfect*, those *imperfect* Moods.

An *imperfect* Mood is said to be *reduced*, when it is changed into a *perfect* one: In order to shew evidently, either that the Conclusion is so, which is termed *ostensive Reduction*: Or, that it cannot be otherwise, which is called *Reduction ad impossibile*.

The Method of Reducing is taught by the Names of the Moods: In which the Vowels are the Propositions marked with their Quantity and Quality: The initial Consonants, B. C. D. F. shew to what Mood in the first Figure the Reduction is to be made: S. P. shew that the Proposition which the preceding Vowel stands for, is to be converted, either *simply* or *per accidens*: M, that the Premises are to be transposed: K, that the Reduction is to be *ad impossibile*; *i. e.* that for the Premis to whose Sign it adheres, the Contradictory of the Conclusion is to be placed: Which being done, you will have in the first Figure, a Conclusion, either the same with that Premis, or one convertible into it, or its Contradictory. Thus,

1. cEs No

1. cEs No happy Man is discontented ;  
 Ar Every wicked Man is discontented ; Therefore  
 E No wicked Man is an happy Man.

Reduce this to

- cE No discontented Man is a happy Man ;  
 IA Every wicked Man is discontented ; Therefore  
 rEnt No wicked Man is a happy Man.

2. dIs Some good Men are Papists ;  
 Am Every good Man is saved ; Therefore  
 Is Some that are saved are Papists.

Reduce this to

- dA Every good Man is saved ;  
 rI Some Papists are good Men ; Therefore  
 I Some Papists are saved.

3. bAr Every good Man is afflicted ;  
 Ok Some rich Men are not afflicted ; Therefore  
 O Some rich Men are not good Men.

Reduce this to

- bAr Every good Man is afflicted ;  
 bAr Every rich Man is a good Man——  
 A

The manifest Falshood of which proves as manifestly the Truth of its Contradictory.

SECT. VI.

From what has been said, it is evident, that there can be no more Moods than these twenty four. They are therefore mistaken, who having transposed the Premisses, or converted the Conclusion of a Syllogism, imagine they have found out a new Mood or Figure: To convince them of which, you need only refer to the Definition of a Mood,



a Mood, a Figure, of a major, a minor, a middle Term, and of a major and minor Proposition.

But there are some Sorts of Arguments, which, though not strictly regular, yet need not be wholly rejected. Such are,

1. An *Enthymeme*, one Premis of which is wanting, whether the Major or Minor, the Conclusion shews. As, *He is a good Man: Therefore he is happy.*

Sometimes the whole Argument lies in one Sentence: As, *Being mortal, do not bear immortal Hatred.*

2. An *Induction*, in which what is granted of several Particulars, is then affirmed universally: As, *This and this and that Loadstone attracts Iron: Therefore, Every Loadstone does.* It is therefore a Sort of *Enthymeme*; a *Syllogism* in *Barbara*, whose Minor is understood.

3. An *Example*, wherein what is granted of a known Instance, is presumed of an unknown that resembles it: As, *Sylla and Marius tore the Common-wealth: Therefore so will Cæsar and Pompey.* Here also the Minor is understood. Therefore the Conclusion is only presumed, not proved.

4. A *Sorites*, in whose Antecedent every preceding Term is subjected to the following, 'till you come from the Subject of the Conclusion to the Predicate of it: As, *Every Man is an Animal; Every Animal is a living Creature; Every living Creature is a Substance: Therefore, Every Man is a Substance.* In a *Sorites* as many *Syllogisms* are understood, as there are intermediate Propositions.





## C H A P. IV.

## Of HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS.

## S E C T. I.

**T**HAT is a *hypothetical Syllogism*, in which one or more of the Propositions are hypothetical. The most common (of which alone we now speak) is that, whose major Proposition is hypothetical.

A hypothetical Proposition is either *conditional*; as, *If he is wise, he is happy*: Or, *disjunctive*; as, *Either it is Day or Night*.

In a *conditional* Proposition, the *Condition* itself is called the *Antecedent*; the Assertion, the *Consequent*; the Connexion between them, the *Consequence*.

The Rules of conditional Propositions are three:

1. If the Antecedent be granted, so is the Consequent.
2. If the Consequent be taken away, so is the Antecedent.
3. Nothing can be inferred, either from the taking away the Antecedent, or granting the Consequent.

There are therefore only two Terms of conditional Syllogism:

The

The *constructive*; as,

If CD, then  $\kappa\Delta$ : But CD: Therefore  $\kappa\Delta$ .

And the *destructive*; as,

If CD, then  $\kappa\Delta$ : But not  $\kappa\Delta$ : Therefore not CD.

## SECT. II.

Every conditional Syllogism is either equivalent to a categorical, or wholly to be rejected. For in every conclusive Conditional, there is a Categorical implied, in which the same Argument would prove the same Conclusion.

For in all hypothetical Syllogisms, the major Proposition consisting of two Categoricals, the Minor is either one of these, or the Contradictory to it, in order to infer, either the other, or its Contradictory. In either Case an Enthymeme will be proposed, whose Force lies in the conditional Proposition, and which is not conclusive, unless from that Proposition there can be drawn a *Completo*ry, that is, the Premis which is wanting in an Enthymeme, to complete the Syllogism.

Now, as an Enthymeme is only one Premis with the Conclusion of a Syllogism, it has three and only three Terms. Suppose two of them are D and  $\Delta$ , and C the third Term. The other Premis, whose Terms are D and  $\Delta$ , is wanting. Hence it follows, that according to the various Disposition of the Terms, there are four Forms of Enthymeme: Each of which will admit of a twofold *Completo*ry, as in this Scheme.

The Enthymeme.    The *Completo*ry D.  $\Delta$ .     $\Delta$ . D.

CD.	therefore C $\Delta$ .	The Major	in Fig. I.	in Fig. II.
DC.			in Fig. III.	in Fig. IV.
CD.	therefore $\Delta$ C.	The Minor	in Fig. IV.	in Fig. II.
DC.			in Fig. III.	in Fig. I.

Wherefore

Wherefore as there are twenty four possible Moods of categorical Syllogism, and fourteen unexceptionable ones; and as each Figure may be applied twice, to compleat an Enthymeme; there will be forty eight possible Ways of compleating it, twenty eight unexceptionable. And as many Ways as an Enthymeme may be compleated, so many and no more, a Man may argue with a Syllogism, whose Major is conditional.

## S E C T. III.

The Directions given for *conditional* Propositions, serve equally for *disjunctive*. For any Disjunctive is easily turned into a Conditional. For Instance, if it runs thus,

It is either Day, or Night.  
 But it is Day: Therefore it is not Night.  
 But it is Night: Therefore it is not Day.  
 It is not Day: Therefore it is Night.  
 It is not Night: Therefore it is Day.

Instead of this, it is easy to say,

If it is Day, then it is not Night.  
 If it is Night, then it is not Day.  
 If it is not Day, then it is Night.  
 If it is not Night, then it is Day.

## S E C T. IV.

There remains only a Kind of redundant hypothetical Syllogism called a *Dilemma*, which proposes two (or more) Things to your Choice, by accepting either of which, you lose the Cause. Such is that of *Bias*: *If you marry a beautiful Woman, she will be κωνή; if an ugly one, στωνή. Therefore marry none.*

A Dilemma is of no Force, unless, 1. One or the other Part must be accepted; 2. Either one or the other prove  
 the

the Point; and, 3. It cannot be retorted. If *Bias* had observed these Things. he would have been less pleased with his own; for it fails in every Particular. For, 1. A Wife may neither be *beautiful* nor *ugly*. Therefore neither Part of the Dilemma need be accepted. 2. Neither is every beautiful Woman *common*, nor every ugly one a *Plague*. Therefore neither Part of it proves the Point. 3. It may be retorted, thus: If I marry the *one*, at least she will *not* be common; if the *other*, she will *not* be a Plague.

A Dilemma is only a kind of negative Induction, in which the major Proposition is conditional: As, *If at all, then thus, or thus, or thus*. To turn this into a categorical Syllogism, is so easy, it needs no Direction.







A

# COMPENDIUM of LOGIC.

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## B O O K II.

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### C H A P. I.

*Of SYLLOGISM, as to its Matter.*

#### S E C T. I.

**H**ITHERTO we have spoken of Syllogism as to its *Form*. It remains, to speak of it, as to its *Matter*; that is, the *Certainty* and *Evidence* of the Propositions, whereof it is composed.

That is a *certain* Proposition, against which Nothing occurs, or Nothing of Weight, as, *Man is risible*: That is an *evident* one, which extorts the Assent, as soon as it is understood, as, *The whole is greater than its Part*: That is a *doubtful* one, in which we know not how to determine, as, *The Stars influence Men*.

If any Thing occurs, whereby the Mind inclines to either Side, that which was doubtful before, becomes *probable*. Such an Assent is termed *Opinion*.

C

*Opinion*

*Opinion* therefore respects a barely probable Proposition, and implies no Certainty at all. Yet there are several Degrees whereby it approaches toward Certainty; and the highest Degree of Probability is not far distant from it.

## SECT. II.

*Certainty* is twofold: 1. That of the *Object*, the Thing to be perceived; and 2. That of the *Subject*, the Understanding which perceives it. And both have their Degrees. That is more certain, in the former Sense, to which there *is* the least Objection; that, in the latter Sense, to which the least Objection *appears*. Evidence also is either of the *Object* or of the *Subject*. And both of these have their Degrees: According as that which is perceived, *is* more or less Self-evident; or *appears* to be one or the other.

We might enumerate many Degrees of *Evidence*. But it may suffice to observe, it is either, 1. That of a Self-evident Axiom; or, 2. That of a Conclusion regularly deduced therefrom. This Logicians term *Science*, which accordingly they define, An Assent to a certain and evident Conclusion, regularly deduced from certain and evident Premises. The Certainty and Evidence here supposed, is that, both of the *Object*, and of the *Subject*: For by the former, Science is distinguished from *Error*; by the latter, from *Opinion*. Without the Evidence of the *Subject*, there can be no *Science*; and this without the other, is but imaginary Evidence.

## SECT. III.

We need not *prove*, that there is such a Thing as Certainty; seeing all reasonable Men allow it. We freely assent to what is affirmed by a wise and good Man: And more freely, if he confirms it by Reason. Some Things we are taught by Nature itself: And some by Divine Revelation.

velation. And of all these we have sufficient Certainty, altho' in various Degrees.

To assent to Testimony is the same as to *believe*: And such an Assent is termed *Faith*. *Divine* Faith depends on the Testimony of God: *Human* Faith, on the Testimony of Man. What Nature dictates, we may be said to *perceive*; what Reason teaches us, to *know*.

God can neither deceive nor be deceived: Men are often deceived, and often deceive. Reason and Nature are not often deceived, and seldom deceive their Followers. Nothing therefore is more firm than *divine* Faith; Nothing less so than *human*. In what we *perceive* or *know*, there is often no *Fear*, always some *Danger* of being deceived. Hence there is the highest Rest for the Mind in *divine* Faith; the lowest of all in *human*. In what we *know* or *perceive*, there are various Degrees of Rest, according to the various Evidence, Certainty, or Probability.

If therefore we were to make a Sort of *Scale of Assent*, it might consist of the following Steps: 1. *Human Faith*, an Assent to a doubtful Proposition: 2. *Opinion*, to a probable: 3. What we may term *Sentiment*, an Assent to a certain Proposition: 4. *Science*, to a certain and evident Conclusion: 5. *Intelligence*, to a Self-evident Axiom: 6. *Divine Faith*, to a Divine Revelation.

#### SECT. IV.

To each of these there belong certain Principles, which are peculiarly proper to produce it. The *Principles* of *Divine Faith* are those, and those only, which are contained in the Scriptures: Of *Intelligence*, those which are properly termed Axioms: Of *Science*, the Conclusions regularly deduced from them.

An *Axiom* is, a Proposition which needs not, and cannot be proved. Such the following seem to be.

From *Natural Divinity*. 1. GOD cannot deceive or be deceived. Whence flow these certain and evident Conclusions: 2. Absolute Faith is due to the Testimony of GOD: 3. Revelation never contradicts either Sense or Reason. It may indeed *transcend* both. But it cannot possibly *contradict* either, rightly employed about its proper Object.

From *Mathematicks*. The Whole is greater than each of its Parts; equal to them all. But Mathematicians frequently lay down as such, what are not Axioms, properly speaking.

From *Metaphysicks*. It is impossible for the same Thing, at the same Time, to be, and not to be. Some affirm this to be the only Axiom in the World: A Point not worth the Disputing.

From *Logic*. Terms which agree in one and the same Third, agree with one another.

## SECT. V.

Many believe, that there are no Axioms to be found in the other Arts and Sciences. But such Principles at least are found therein, as produce *Sentiment*, if not Science. Such are these. Nothing (naturally) springs from Nothing. Nothing is the Cause of itself. What you would not have another do to you, you ought not to do to another.

The Principles that serve to produce *Opinion*, are usually styled Maxims. They commonly hold, but not always. To this Class those properly belong, which are, as it were, in the middle Way, between doubtful and certain.

The Uncertainty of human Faith arises hence. In order to produce a firm Assent of this Kind, a competent Witness must know what he says, and say what he knows, and both be apparent to him that believes it. But this is rarely



rarely the Case. Wherefore we have always Reason to suspect what we have no other Proof of, than human Testimony. Even when there appears no more Reason to doubt thereof, than of a mathematical Demonstration.

## S E C T. VI.

According to these five Degrees of Assent, Syllogism might have been divided, with regard to its Matter, into infallible, scientific, certain, probable and doubtful. But as the two first of these produce *Science*, and any Assent short of this, is loosely speaking, termed *Opinion*; it is usually divided only into two Sorts: 1. That which produces *Science*; and this is stiled *scientific*, otherwise *demonstrative*, and often *Demonstration*: 2. That which produces *Opinion* (any Assent short of *Science*) and is termed *dialectical*; i. e. arguing probably.

There are two Species or *Demonstration*. The first demonstrates, *That a Thing is*; proving, either directly, That it is so; (and this is called *direct Demonstration*;) or that if it be not, some Absurdity will necessarily follow. This is usually called *Demonstratio ab absurdo*. We may properly term it *oblique*.

We demonstrate directly, either, 1. By proving a Thing from its *Effect*; as, *The Sun is black: Therefore it is eclipsed*. Or, 2. By proving it from its *remote Cause*; as, *The Moon is diametrically opposite to the Sun: Therefore it is eclipsed*. But if we prove this, from the Earth's being interposed between them, this is

The second Sort of *Demonstration*, which demonstrates *Why a Thing is*, by assigning its *proximate* and *immediate Cause*.

But there may be a proximate, which is not the *prime Cause*, that is self-evident and indemonstrable, whose Evidence is therefore preferred before all other, as needing no Light, but from itself.



There are then four Degrees of Demonstration, The *oblique* Demonstration is good: But the *direct* is preferable to it. Demonstration by the *proximate Cause* is better still; but the *prime Cause*, best of all.



## CHAP. II.

### Of FALLACIES.

THERE is yet another Species, or Shadow rather, of Syllogism, which is called a *Fallacy*. It is; An Argument intended to deceive. Such is,

1. The Fallacy of *Equivocation*, arising either from an equivocal Word, or from the ambiguous Structure of the Sentence. As, All that *believe* shall be saved. The Devils *believe*. Therefore the Devils shall be saved. This offends against the very first Rule of Syllogism. For it has four Terms.

2. The Fallacy of *Composition*, where what is granted of several Things separately, is inferred of them conjointly. As, *Two and three* are even and odd. Five is *two and three*. Therefore, five is even and odd.

3. The Fallacy of *Division*, when what is granted of Things taken conjointly, is inferred of them, taken separately. As, *The Planets* are seven: The Sun and Moon are *Planets*: Therefore, the Sun and Moon are seven. In both these Syllogisms there are four Terms.

4. The Fallacy of the *Accident*; when some accidental Circumstance is confounded with what is essential: As, *What destroys Men* ought to be prohibited. Wine *destroys Men*.

*Men.* Therefore Wine ought to be prohibited. The major Proposition must mean, What necessarily destroys *Men*: Otherwise it is not true: The minor, Wine accidentally destroys *Men*. Therefore here also there are four Terms.

5. The Fallacy of arguing from a *Particular* to a *General*: As, He that is *white as to his Teeth* is white. A Blackamoor is *white as to his Teeth*. Therefore, a Blackamoor is white. Here is a palpable Breach of the sixth Rule of Syllogism.

6. The Fallacy *Ignoratiois Elenchi*. An *Elenchus* is, A Syllogism that confutes the Opponent. Therefore he falls into this Fallacy, who thinks he confutes his Opponent, without observing the Rules of Contradiction.

7. The Fallacy of *begging the Question*, that is, taking for granted the very Thing which ought to be proved. This is done, 1. When we attempt to prove a Thing by itself; or, 2. By a synonymous Word; or, 3. By something equally unknown; or, 4. By something more unknown; or, 5. By arguing in a Circle: As in the famous Argument of the Papists, who prove the Scriptures from the Authority of the Church, and the Church from the Authority of the Scriptures.

3. The Fallacy of *several Questions*: As, Are Honey and Gall sweet? It is solved, by answering to each Branch distinctly.

Many more Fallacies than these might be reckoned up. For there are as many Fallacies, as there are Ways of breaking any of the Rules of Syllogism without being observed. But one who is thoroughly acquainted with those Rules, will easily detect them all.





## C H A P. III.

## Of M E T H O D.

## S E C T. I.

**M**ETHOD is, Such a Disposition of the Parts of any Art or Science, that the whole may be more easily learned.

It is twofold, 1. *Method of Invention*, which finds out the Rules of an Art or Science; 2. *Method of Teaching*, which delivers them. The former proceeds from sensible and particular Things, to intelligible and universal; the latter, from intelligible and universal Things, to sensible and particular.

Method of Teaching is either *perfect* or *imperfect*. The former is either, 1. *Universal*, by which a whole Art or Science, or 2. *Particular*, by which a Part of it only is taught. Both are either, 1. *Synthetical*, which is used in Sciences, and beginning with the Subject of a Science, treats of its Principles and Affections, and then of its several Species, 'till from the highest Genus it descends to lowest Species: Or, 2. *Analytical*, which is of Use in Arts; and beginning with the End or Design of an Art, next explains, the Subject of it, and lastly, the Means conducive to that End.

The general Rules of Method are these:

In delivering an Art or Science, 1. Let Nothing be wanting or redundant: 2. Let all the Parts be consistent with each other: 3. Let Nothing be treated of, which is not homogeneous to the End of the Art, or the Subject  
of

of the Sciences: 4. Let the Parts be connected by easy Transitions: 5. Let that precede, without which, the Things that follow cannot be understood; but which itself cannot be understood without them.

The particular Rules are these: 1. The Unity of a Science depends on the Unity of its Subject; the Unity of an Art, on the Unity of its End. 2. Let the more general Parts precede the less general.

The *imperfect* Method is arbitrary and popular; being no other than the Method of Prudence or Common Sense.


## SECT. II.

Mathematicians in all their Writings follow this Method, 1. They fix the Meaning of their Words, defining their Terms, each in their Place, and make it an invariable Rule, never afterwards to use any Term, but in the Sense to which it is limited by that Definition: 2. They lay down the Axioms which there will be Occasion to use in the Course of their Work: 3. They add their *Postulata*, which also they demand to be granted, as being evident of themselves: 4. They then demonstrate their Propositions, in order, and as far as may be, affirmatively: Contenting themselves with this Rule, That whatsoever they have to prove, they take Care to prove it from some of the Truths, which have been granted or proved before.

If the same Method cannot be strictly observed in other Sciences, yet doubtless it may be imitated. And the nearer any Method approaches to this, the more perfect and useful it is.







# A P P E N D I X.

## *Of the Manner of using* LOGIC.

Extracted from Bishop SANDERSON.

### SECT. I.

#### *Of Treating on a simple Theme.*

**W**E may use the Rules of Logic in treating either on a simple Theme, or a Problem or Proposition.

In treating logically on a simple Term, we are to explain both the *Name* and the *Thing*. And,

I. The *Name*, by 1. Pointing out the Ambiguity of the Term (if there be any), recounting its various Meanings, and fixing on that particular Meaning in which we at present take it: 2. Shewing its various Apellations both in our own, and in other Tongues: 3. Observing whence it is derived, with the more remarkable Words of the same Derivation. Not that all this is necessary to be done, at all Times; and on every Theme: But there is Need of Judgment and Choice, that those  
Particulars



Particulars only may be noted, which conduce to the Explication of the Thing.

II. The *Thing* is explained, both by *assigning* its *Attributes*, and *distributing* or dividing it into its *Parts*. The *Attributes* are either *essential* or *non-essential*. By *essential* we understand, not only those which properly constitute its *Essence*, the *Genus* and *Difference*, but also the *Properties* of *Substances*, the *Subjects* and *Objects* of *Accidents*, with the *efficient* and *final Causes* of both.

The *Genus* should be assigned in the first Place, and that the *nearest* which can be found, tho' premising, if Occasion be, those which are more *remote*. The *Difference* comes next; the Want of which is supplied, and the Nature more fully explained by *Properties*. And here may be added, the *efficient, principal, impulsive* and *instrumental Causes*, with the *remote* or *proximate Ends*. Here also in treating on an *Accident* may be subjoined, its proper *Subject* and adequate *Object*. But these more or less, as Need shall require; which are to be closed with a compleat *essential Definition* of the Thing.

III. The *Theme* is next to be *distributed* into its several *Species* or *Parts*, just to name which is generally sufficient. From *Distribution* we proceed to the *non-essential Attributes*, whether *Effects*, *Cognates* or *Opposites*.

IV. Such *Effects* as are trivial or commonly known may either be just mentioned or passed over in Silence. Those which are more noble, and less commonly known, may be ranged under proper Heads. This is also the Place for citing *Examples*.

*Cognate Words* are those which are compared with the *Theme* as agreeing with it: *Opposite*, as differing from it. A *Theme* is explained by comparing it with its *Cognates*, when Things are mentioned which are in some *Respects* the same or like it, and it is shewn wherein that *Sameness* or *Likeness* lies, and also wherein the *Unlikeness* or *Difference* between them.

We

We in the last Place compare the Theme with its *Opposites*; for even *Opposites* cast Light upon each other. There are four Species of these; but the *Contradictory* is usually too vague and indefinite to be of any Service: And the *relative Opposite* has been mentioned before, among the essential Attributes. Therefore the *privative* and *contrary* Opposites only, have Place here, and very properly close the Treatise.

To give an Instance of this. Suppose the simple Theme to be treated of be ENVY.

I am, I. *First*, To consider the *Name*; and here I observe,

1. It may *mean* either actively or passively: As, “ He is full of Envy;” that is, He envies others. “ A rich Man is much exposed to Envy;” that is, to be envied by others. We here take it in the former Sense.

2. This is in *Latin* termed *Invidia*, a Word which has been borrowed by many modern Languages. The *Romans* also termed it *Livor*.

3. The Word *Invidia* is supposed to be *derived* from two *Latin* Words, that imply the *looking much* upon another, which the Envious are apt to do: The Word *Livor* from the *livid* Complexion which usually attends an envious Temper.

There are two Words of the same Derivation, which are frequently confounded with each other, namely, *Invidious* and *Envious*; and yet the Signification of the one is widely different from that of the other. An *envious* Man, is one who is under the Power of Envy: An *invidious* Office, one that is apt to raise Envy or Dislike.

II. In explaining the *Thing*, I observe, *first*, The *essential Attributes*: As,

The *Genus*: To premise the more *remote*; it is a Passion, a Sort of Grief: But the *nearest Genus* is, A vicious Grief.

I next observe, The *Difference*, taken

1. From the *Subject*, which are almost all Mankind; but chiefly those who are ignorant of God, and consequently unable to govern themselves.

2. From the *Object*, which is twofold; of the *Thing*, or of the *Person*. The Thing envied, may be good of any Kind; apparent or real, useful or pleasant; of Mind, Body or Fortune. The Person envied, may be any other Man, superior, equal, or inferior: Only not at an immense Distance, either of Time, of Place, or of Condition. For few envy them that have been long dead, them that live in *China* or *Japan*; or those who are above or beneath them beyond all Degrees of Comparison.

3. From the *efficient Cause*. The *principal internal Cause in him that envies*, is Pride and inordinate Self-love. The *impulsive external Cause* may be various, either *in him that is envied*, if he be an Enemy, a Rival, a vain Boaster; or *in some third Person*, as Contempt, Flattery, Whispering; any of which may stir up Envy.

We may therefore *define* Envy, either more briefly, A vicious Grief at the Good of another; or more fully, An evil Sadness of Mind, whereby a Man, from inordinate Self-love, is troubled at the Good which he sees another enjoy, or foresees he will enjoy, as he imagines it will lessen or obscure his own Excellency.

III. There are three *Species* of Envy, each worse than the preceding: The first, When a Man is pained at another's enjoying some Good (in *Kind* or *Degree*) which he cannot himself attain: The second, When a Man is pained at another's having what he himself has, but wants to have alone: Both these are exemplified in *Cæsar*, who  
world

would bear no Superior, and *Pompey*, who would bear no Equal. The third, is, When a Man cannot or will not enjoy his own Good, lest another should enjoy it with him. It is well known, how many in the Learned World are infected with this evil Disease.

IV. The *Effects* of Envy are three, 1. It torments the Mind continually, and spreads Inquietude thro' the whole Life. 2. It wastes even the bodily Strength, and drinks up the Spirits. A most just Evil, which is at once a Sin and a Punishment, and not less a Scourge than it is a Vice. 3. It incites a Man to all Manner of Wickedness; Detraction, Calumny, Strife, Murder.

Its most remarkable *Cognates* are, 1. *Hatred*, which agrees with *Envy* in its *Subject*; for he who envies another, cannot but hate him; and in its *efficient, internal Cause*, which in both is Pride and blind Self-love. 2. *Rejoicing in Evil*: This also agrees with Envy both in its *Subject*, (for he that grieves at another's Happiness, cannot but rejoice in his Misery) and in its *efficient Cause*.

And yet Hatred differs from Envy, 1. In the *Thing* hated or envied. For Good only is envied; but either Good or Evil may be hated. 2. In the *Person*. For we envy Men only, not God; and not ourselves, but others: But we may hate, both other Men, and ourselves; both other Creatures, and God Himself.

*Rejoicing in Evil* differs likewise from Envy, 1. In the *Genus*: For the Genus of the latter is Sorrow, of the former Joy. 2. In the *Object*, which in the one is *Evil*, in the other *Good*.

The grand *Opposite* to Envy is *Benevolence*, a tender Goodwill to all Men, which constrains us to wish well to all, and seriously to rejoice in all the Good that befalls them.



## SECT. II.

*Of treating on a Problem.*

A *Problem* is, A Proposition to be proved. It is sometimes fully proposed, whether positively, as, "*Logic is an Art,*" which is called a *Thesis*; or interrogatively, as, "*Is Logic an Art?*" Sometimes imperfectly, when the Subject only is mentioned, the Predicate being left in Question, as, "*Of the Genus of Logic.*"

In a regular Treatise on a Problem there are three Parts, The stating the Question, proving the Truth, and answering Objections. To which may be premised, The Introduction, concerning the Importance of the Question, and the Occasion of its being first disputed; and the Conclusion, containing a Recapitulation of the whole, with the Corollaries arising therefrom.

I. In the Introduction may be shewn, that the Point in Debate, is not of little or no Moment, but either apparently of the highest Concern, or if not so important in itself, yet absolutely necessary to be understood, in order to understand or explain those which are confessedly of the highest Moment. Next should be pointed out the Occasion of the Doubt, and the Origin of the Error; what gave the first Rise to this Dispute; and how the Mistake began and increased. But this must be done nakedly and simply, in a logical, not rhetorical Manner.

II. After a short Preface, the Problem is not immediately to be proved, (unless where the Terms are quite clear, and the Point little controverted) but first the Terms of the Question are to be explained, both the Subject and the Predicate. The various Senses of these should be observed, and the Definitions given, particularly of the Predicate. We then proceed to explain the true State of the Controversy, by shewing what is granted on each Side, and what disputed. For in every Controversy, there is  
Something



Something wherein both Parties agree, and Something wherein they differ. In reciting the Points wherein we and our Opponents agree, we may add, if Need be, a short Explanation or Proof of them: And then shew, wherein the proper Difference, the very Point of Controversy, lies. If this be accurately shewn, the Business is in a Manner done; for it is scarce credible, how much Light this throws both on the Proof of the Truth, and the answering Objections.

III. In *proving the Truth*, if it be a plain simple Problem, it may suffice briefly to propose our Judgment in a single affirmative or negative Thesis, and to confirm it by a few well-chose Arguments. But if it be more complex, it will be expedient to comprize our Defence of it in several Propositions; beginning with those wherein we remove the Opinions of others, and then going on to establish our own; after every Proposition placing the Arguments by which it is confirmed. But it does not suffice, barely to mention these; they are also to be strongly pressed and defended, and the Evasions and Cavils of all Adversaries, to be examined and overturned.

IV. Next follows the *answering of Objections*. These may either be subjoined to the several Opinions of our Opponents, and so answer'd severally; or all placed together, after we have proved the Point in Question, and so answer'd all together.

In order to do this effectually, we should observe, *first*, Is not the *Conclusion* advanced against me, wide of the Mark? Frequently the Objection may be allowed, and it does not overturn any Conclusion, which we have advanced. Nay, sometimes it may be retorted, as proving just the contrary of what it was intended for.


If the Conclusion do really contradict any of ours, we are, *secondly*, to examine the *Form* of the Argument, according to the general and particular Rules of Syllogism; and to point out that Rule against which it offends.

If the *Form* be unexceptionable, it remains, *thirdly*, to consider the *Matter* of the Objection from the *Premisses*. And it will generally be found, that either one of the *Premisses* is *false*, (or at least, *not sufficiently proved*) or that there is a latent *Ambiguity* in the Subject, the Predicate, or the Medium. In this Case, we are to fix upon that Term, and shew the Ambiguity of it.

V. We may close the whole by repeating the Sum of what has been proved; unless when some useful Observations or Corollaries, either directly, or by easy Consequence, follow from the Conclusions before established. These we are not to prove again, but briefly and nakedly to set them down, as naturally deducible from those Propositions which have been proved before.

*The Sermon on the Means of Grace, in the first Volume of Mr. Wesley's Sermons, is a Treatise of this Kind.—  
The Sermon on Enthusiasm, in the third Volume, is another Example of a simple Theme.*

F I N I S.





*E R R A T A.*

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*lowest Species; insert the.*

Page 33. Line 4. *dele not.*

