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BEING SELECTIONS FROM THE WRITINGS OF
BENJAMIN WHICHCOTE, JOHN SMITH
AND NATHANAEL CULVERWEL
WITH INTRODUCTION BY

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PREFACE

I have tried to gather from the works of Whichcote, Smith, and Culverwel extracts which should illustrate as fairly as possible the teaching and style of each, and the relation in which they stood to one another. The passages chosen are, most of them, quite complete, and the rest very nearly complete, in themselves; and, though they lose something no doubt by being detached from the books in which they were first printed, it is to be remembered that they formed separate lectures or sermons, and—with the exception of those taken from Culverwel—were not intended by their authors to be parts of a nicely articulated series of discourses, or of a connected treatise.

For Introduction, I have set down summarily such few facts as have been preserved in the history of these writers, and have sketched their characters in outline. But I have essayed no criticism except what selection involves. That was a task for which I knew myself to be ill equipped; and it would have been superfluous to undertake it, since Principal Tulloch's chapters on the Cambridge Platonists in his Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century are as widely known as they are justly admired. There seemed to be a need for a fresh edition of some part at least of the writings of these long neglected men, and this I have attempted to supply.
I have not thought it necessary to modernize the spelling, though here and there I have made slight changes for the sake of clearness: and I have sometimes substituted for a word which seemed certainly to be wrong another (enclosed in square brackets). Two corrections of the text which I saw were required I unfortunately passed over at the last moment:—on p. 94, line 18; and on p. 121, line 21, for Plato, Plotinus ought to be read.

My thanks are due to the readers of the Clarendon Press, but for whose care many errors, which had escaped me, would have remained uncorrected; to Mr. Sutton, Chief Librarian of the City of Manchester, who has put at my service some old and rare books to which I could hardly have had access without his aid; to Mr. Charles Russell, who read through the proofs of the Introduction for me; and most of all, to one of my teachers at Oxford, whose lectures upon another writer of this school first led me to the study of these, and whose name, had my own part of this book been better done, I should have asked leave to put upon it; —to whom I will even now offer it, a stealthy gift, in token of my gratitude.

E. T. C.

Cardiff,
October 1, 1901.
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INTRODUCTION

The selections which make up this volume are taken from Benjamin Whichcote's *Select Sermons and Aphorisms*, from John Smith's *Select Discourses*, and from Nathanael Culverwel's *Discourse of the Light of Nature*. These authors are little known now, and though, within the narrow limits by which their lives were bounded, they exercised a powerful influence, they enjoyed little vogue even in their own day. Not one of them actually published his own work. Culverwel, who left materials which could easily be gathered into a book, may perhaps have intended to publish; but there is no reason to suppose that Whichcote or Smith ever contemplated such a step. At any rate, at their death their writings were found to be in so fragmentary and


2 The basis of the text of Whichcote's *Sermons* was in part his own brief manuscript notes, and in part the fuller memoranda of those who heard him preach and lecture. The difficulties encountered by John Worthington, the first editor of Smith's *Select Discourses*, are illustrated by some correspondence which passed between him and S. Hartlib. Thus Hartlib writes on May 5, 1659, 'I am very glad you are employed in publishing those excellent pieces which Mr. Smith of worthy memory hath left behind him,' and later, on February 13, 1659 (= 1660), 'I am very glad that you have overcome those Herculean labours about Mr. Smith's book.' And so Worthington, writing to commend himself to the favour of Lord Lauderdale in 1670, urges as one of his claims to promotion, 'Heretofore I have endured and gone through some toilsome labours for the public good in preparing the elaborate discourses of Mr. Smith and Mr. Mede for the Press, wherein I consulted the advantage of others more than mine own.' Worthington's edition is
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disordered a state as almost to baffle the patient and 
enthusiastic care of those who thought that they deserved 
such permanence as print might give them.

Why then should these passages be now revived? That 
the inquiry was pertinent was felt by the earliest editor\(^1\) 
of Whichcote's *Select Sermons*, whose preface, written in 
1698, begins with an apology: 'Amongst those many things 
which are made public, it may be thought perhaps, of 
Sermons, that they are of any the least wanted; and, for the 
future, the least likely to be found wanting. Since to that 
rich and inexhaustible store, with which the learned and 
orthodox divines of England have already furnished us, 
there is daily fresh addition from worthy and able hands. 
Neither have we cause to fear a cessation in this kind; 
or that so great a blessing is likely to fail us for the future; 
having such security, not only from the unwearied zeal 
of present Divines (of whom we may always hope a worthy 
succession), but from the just esteem which the publick 
ever fails to show for such pious Discourses. Upon which 
account, we find that many of these are every day made 
publick, and, as it were, forced into the world; notwithstanding the great modesty of their authors, whose humble 
thoughts and devoutly occupied affections lead them not 
towards eminence and advancement in the world.

'It may seem strange, therefore, that, in such an age as 
this, any one should be so officious as to search after and 
publish the sermons of a man long since dead, who (himself) 
ever meant to publish any; or thought so highly of himself 
as that he could benefit the world by such a publication.'

\(^1\) The Earl of Shaftesbury; cf. Wishart's edition, Edinburgh, 1742.
Two centuries have increased the cogency of these words; for though Sermons which may be ranked as literature have never been numerous, and are perhaps rarer at the present time than they were even fifty years ago, there has been no cessation in this kind of writing.

The passages here collected must of course be their own justification, but some claims may be put forward for them in advance. It may be urged that they deserve remembrance for the teaching which they embody, for their style, and most of all, for the revelation which they give of characters of very unusual charm, and perfection.

These authors belong, with Cudworth and More among the greater names and Worthington, Rust, and Norris among the lesser, to the School of the Cambridge Platonists, or as they were called by some of their contemporaries, the Latitudenians. The latter title, which has been less commonly used, was, on the whole, more fitly chosen than the other; for it grants the breadth of view which was never denied them, and yet has a flavour of disapproval which is significant of the estimation in which they were held. The name was first thrown out in gentle censure and afterwards branded upon them in reproach. The former title has survived, though it is not much more than a name now, and is indeed more than a little misleading. Platonism was brought against them as a serious charge, which they were sometimes anxious to rebut. Whichcote defended himself on the ground that he read very little, and owed more to his own 'invention' than to any books. There is no doubt that his idealism, which he imparted to Smith and Culverwel, was deeply inspired by Plato. But they, all three, appropriated Plato's teaching in what, if a choice must be made, may, after all, be the better way, by meditation rather than by a minutely critical study, and they coloured what they borrowed in the rich and mystical light of their own imagination. To Plotinus they owed not a deeper, but a more obvious debt. They seized eagerly upon passages...
which allowed a tolerably clear interpretation, and turned them to their own uses; and they were content to brood over the more numerous passages which defy an exact rendering so long and so lovingly, but again so uncritically, that the mist which lies thick upon his pages spread itself into their own minds, and lent a hazy obscurity which is not without its charm to their own writings.

It may be that they were all indebted (as Culverwel certainly was) in some measure to Bacon for the open-mindedness with which they were prepared to receive whatever science might have to teach; but this obligation, where it existed, may very easily be exaggerated. It must be borne in mind that the traditional scholastic training had not been discarded in Cambridge in the days even of the two younger men. And it is remarkable that (unlike the later writers of the same school, Cudworth and More) they seem to be unacquainted with Hobbes.

Smith was familiar with the work of Des Cartes, and we are told 1 that it was largely due to his influence that this philosopher began to be studied at Cambridge; but Culverwel 2 alone shows himself generally conversant with the philosophical writing of the time.

But we should miss what is most characteristic if we tried to estimate their position simply in the light of such influences as these. For they were essentially children of their own time. They saw England divided into two great conflicting parties, but, while they were strongly affected by both, maintained a serene detachment, and were never soiled by the dust of battle. They cherished practical ambitions and took more note of what the many

1 Cf. Worthington's Diary, i. 300.
2 Cf. Tulloch, Rational Theology in England in Seventeenth Century (of which I have made free use), vol. ii. 420, second edition, 'He deals familiarly with all the great writers of the time, Bacon and Des Cartes (Hobbes had scarcely yet emerged), Selden, Grotius and Salmasius; and amongst smaller philosophers Sir Kenelm Digby and Lord Brooke. He is especially just to the speculations of Suarez and Lord Herbert in the preceding age.' Cf. Hamilton's Reid, p. 782.
were doing than of what the few were writing; but yet stood in the attitude of students and were intent upon seeing what was really needed for themselves and their country—for, as they believed, to see was in some sort to possess—instead of fighting blindly in an ill-considered cause and hurrying to an imperfectly conceived goal.

What was most remarkable in this group of men was the union of original speculative activity with eager and sympathetic, yet always discriminating, interest in the political and ecclesiastical struggles in which their contemporaries were hotly engaged—an interest which was very noble in its scope and not wholly unfruitful in its result, though it never prompted the men whom it inspired to enter into the lists as combatants on this side or on that.

Their efforts were directed towards the discovery of a middle course between the party which was dominated by the ecclesiastical statesmanship of Laud on the one hand, and, on the other, the party which was encumbered by the subtle and formal and all too complete theology of the Puritans. Against the first they urged that conduct and morality were of more moment than Church polity; against the latter they claimed that reason must not be fettered; and against both, that in the conscience of the individual, governed by reason, and illuminated by a revelation which could not be inconsistent with the reason, itself a 'seed of Deiform nature,' lay the ultimate seat of authority in religion. But they were allied to both of these opposing parties.

1 They were not concerned with merely paper controversies, and had nothing to say of Milton. He did not, however, escape the notice of Tuckney, Whichcote's tutor (see p. xx), who speaks of him briefly as 'infamis, et non uno laqueo dignus.'

2 They were thus mystics as well as rationalists; for the foundation of mysticism is the claim of the individual to possess a revelation which is convincing to himself though it may not be capable of demonstration to others. Strictly a School of Mystics is an impossibility; each mystic has his own secret and is sui generis. Whichcote's common sense (as we shall see) kept him from making the mystical element in his philosophy into a principle of estrangement and dissociation; and his immediate followers were equally wise.
Puritans\(^1\) by training, they professed loyalty to the Church from which they never alienated themselves. Men who take a *via media* between noisily conflicting sects may exert a great influence without attracting general notice.

They attempted to effect a union between philosophy and religion, and formulated a kind of ‘moral divinity,’ which found little acceptance at the moment, but which like a stream running underground has, though seldom detected, given a freshness and life to the ground subsequently trodden by those who have pursued either theological or philosophical inquiries.

The question with which all three writers were mainly concerned was that of the relations which subsist between reason and faith. It is a question which had not then, and now still less has, any newness, except that of perennial interest. It has ever called for and eluded an answer; and those who, like the Cambridge Platonists, have been most strongly fascinated by the problem, and most intent upon its solution, have been the readiest to admit to themselves and to others that they must content themselves not with discovery but with continual search. But they have been contented\(^2\) with this, and there is no tone of dull resignation, still less of painful disappointment in their language; on the contrary, they have rather delighted in what they perceived to be the necessary conditions of such inquiry. And they approach this question from a Christian standpoint, though their language was a mosaic of Hebrew, Platonic, Neoplatonist, as well as of Christian elements. In the younger men the several strands of thought were not always harmoniously mixed, though they lent a picturesque and sometimes bizarre distinction in their manner; in

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\(^1\) Cf. Inge, *Bampton Lectures*, 1899, p. 285, footnote; and p. xxi below.

\(^2\) Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* IV. iii. \(1\ \text{περὶ \ ψυχῆς, δοκα \ ἀπορήσαντας δὲ \ εἰς \ εὐπορίαν καταστήματι, ἣ\ αὐτὴς \ ταῖς \ ἀπορίαις \ στάντας \ τὸ \ τούτο \ γὰρ \ κέρδος \ ἔχειν, εἰδέναι \ τὸ \ εἰπτ \ ἀπορῶν, ὀρθῶς \ δὲ \ ἔχοι \ τὴν \ πραγματείαν \ ποίησασθαι.}
Whichcote's work there is more unity, and a more complete, if a simpler perfection.

He speaks as a religious teacher, and his constant theme is that religion is a temper of the mind, a condition in which all the faculties of man are in health\(^1\) and in just relation to each other. No faculty must be mutilated to give an unnatural development to any other. Of all the powers of man reason is most characteristic. It cannot therefore be antagonistic to religion. On the contrary, it must be an essential part of religion; for it gives a man sobriety in belief, and vigour in the performance of duty. On this point Whichcote insists. It is not his belief, and it is not his performance of duty which makes a man's religion; though conduct and belief are both requisite. A man's religion is himself, the sum of his powers, his nature in its ideal perfection. To be religious, a man must realize himself. Reason gives his individuality to a man. But Whichcote does not neglect the social force of religion. He who best realizes himself also best realizes human nature. It is not religion\(^2\) but prejudice which divides men. Healthy people are alike in what is essential; they all have vitality, they all have a fullness and roundness of development, and the fact that their vitality expresses itself in different modes is the condition of their usefulness to society. The unhealthy are differentiated from one another by every variety of disease, and from the healthy by their maimed condition.

'A man should take care,' he says, 'to be always the same. I know there is some difficulty in this because of our bodies. Every man is solicited by his body; and our bodies are overruled by the very temper and variation of the air; and no man can overcome his bodily temper but by great wisdom. Yet this is attainable. For if Reason

\(^1\) Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* VI. ix. 1 καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια δὲ, ὅταν εἰς ἐν συνταξῃ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καλλος, ὅταν ἡ τόδε ἡ μόρια κατασχῆ φῶς; καὶ ἀρετὴ δὲ ψυχῆς, ὅταν εἰς ἐν καὶ εἰς μίαν ὁρμολογίαν ἐνωθῆ, and Whichcote, p. 58.

\(^2\) Cf. Culverwel, p. 312.
were (as it ought to be) the settled Law of life and action, it would then be easy; for Reason is regular, uniform, and always self-consistent. It is Humour that is various and unconstant, that drives a man from himself.' And again, 'Rectitude and Uprightness are the health and purity of a man's Soul. A man is then right and straight; he is whole within himself, and all things are as they should be. There should never be any transporting imaginations; no discomposure of mind, for that is a failure in the government of a man's spirit. There ought to be no eagerness or inordinacy towards the things of this world. We should not be borne down towards the objects of sense. There ought to be serenity and calmness and clear apprehensions, fair weather within; that that the noble Platonist calls Steadiness of mind or understanding, an intellectual calmness; a just balance; an equal poise of a man's mind; no perplexity of soul; no confusion; no provocation; no disturbance; no perturbation. A man should not be borne off from himself, or put out of himself, because things without him are ungoverned and disordered; for these disturbances do unhallow the mind; lay it open; and make it common.'

Many of Whichcote's Aphorisms illustrate his doctrine even more clearly, as well as more succinctly. For example: 'They do not advance Religion who draw it down to bodily acts; or who carry it up highest, into what is mystical, symbolical, emblematical, &c.'

'Christian Religion is not mystical, symbolical, enigmatical, emblematical; but, uncloathed, unbodied, intellectual, rational, spiritual.'

'It is usual in Scripture to sum up all Religion sometimes in a single phrase; other while in one word. The reason may perhaps be because never any of these is alone.'

'Those that differ upon Reason may come together upon Reason.'

'He that gives Reason for what he saith, has done what
is fit to be done; and the most that can be done. He that
gives not Reason, speaks nothing, though he saith never
so much.'

'It is better for us that there should be Difference of
Judgment, if we keep Charity; but it is unmanly to quarrel
because we differ.' (509)

These are characteristic passages, and it is unnecessary
here to add to their number. Everywhere Whichcote
shows the same keenness of spiritual insight, the same
strong commonsense, the same shrewdness, and almost
always the same terse felicity of expression.

The question naturally arises why so powerful and so
acute a thinker as Whichcote exercised an influence so
narrow in its range and so short-lived.

The late Bishop of Durham offers an answer. 'The tran-
sitoriness of Whichcote's influence,' he says, 'may be due
in some degree to political causes; but it is not difficult,
I think, to indicate defects in his teaching which contributed
to his partial failure. He had an imperfect conception
of the corporate character of the Church, and of the Divine
life of the Christian Society. The abstractions of Plotinus
had begun to produce in his case the injurious effects which
were more conspicuous in his followers. He had little or
no sense of the historic growth of the Church. His teaching
on the Sacraments is vague and infrequent.'

This is, no doubt, all true. But it is also true that some
of Whichcote's limitations were deliberately chosen. He
distrusted ordered systems and elaborately articulated forms
of belief, and never attempted to impose them on himself or
on his pupils. But what it was in him to do he did.

Under the pressure of the strong feeling which governed his
thoughts he was able to throw out separate dicta, in each of
which his whole philosophy lies implicit—and his philosophy
was his character—he made aphorisms, which were parables
in brief, of a picturesque quality to charm the imagination,

1 Westcott, Religious Thought in the West, pp. 393, 394.
arresting the attention of the listener by their force, provoking thought by their pregnant suggestiveness, and yet ever baffling the analysis of those who might wish to transmute them into mere formulae. His skill as a teacher was shown precisely in this, that he made men think for themselves; he had not a little of the Socratic irony; he was unwilling to instruct, and would rather pursue an inquiry with, and by the help of, his pupils; and, if from time to time he uttered a phrase which lived in their memory, they found that its vitality was due to the fact that it called for an interpretation which they must get for themselves as they tested his words in the work of life, not from any added words of his, given by way of explanation. His teaching was religious because of practical import; and, because it was religious, necessarily veiled in metaphor; and his sayings remained isolated and fragmentary for his pupils, until they like himself welded them into a synthesis, all the more valuable because never final, by the fire of their imagination and the fervour of their piety.

It may be said that Whichcote's best sayings were, after all, only commonplace. And so they were. He repeated what had been said before; but always in his own way and upon his own conviction; and even when his thought was new, more strictly original, it was so true as to be self-evident, and, put into words, looked like what is called a commonplace. But these commonplaces, to borrow Coleridge's apt word, never wanted 'lustre': for the man who used them was himself their living illustration.

Few words were enough, for he held that the really vital and operative part of all that mass of sentiments and ideas, to which we vaguely give the names of religious and moral, is something simple, and had best be expressed simply and

1 Cf. Culverwel, p. 288.
2 Coleridge, Aids to Reflection, 3. 'To restore a commonplace truth to its first uncommon lustre, you need only translate it into action. But to do this you must first have reflected upon its truth.'
with that reserve which better suits deep feeling than more copious utterance. This clear simplicity and this austerely controlled passion give Whichcote's sentences their poetic rhythm. They reveal their author, a man who was what he taught 1, and whose teaching, being alive, was incapable of formal completeness.

He believed that a system woven by one man could be nothing but a shroud for another, and would only continue to fit the maker, if he never grew.

How well Smith had learnt this lesson may be seen from a passage* in his Discourse concerning the True Way or Method of attaining to Divine Knowledge.

'Divine Truth is better understood,' he says, 'as it unfolds itself in the purity of men's hearts and lives, than in all those subtil niceties into which curious wits may lay it forth. And therefore our Saviour, who is the Great Master of it, would not, while He was here on earth, draw it up into any System or Body, nor would his disciples after Him; He would not lay it out to us in any Canons or Articles of Belief, not being indeed so careful to stock and enrich the world with opinions and notions as with true Piety, and a Godlike pattern of Purity, as the best way to thrive in all spiritual understanding. His main scope was to promote a Holy life, as the best and most compendious way to a right Belief. He hangs all true acquaintance with Divinity upon the doing God's Will; If any man will do His Will he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.'

Again, it may be worth while to note that for popularity and wide renown, a price must be paid which Whichcote was very loth to pay. 'To drudge in the world,' he says, 'is not the adequate employment of an intellectual nature; this is not that which doth employ the highest and noblest part of man.' It must not be supposed that he was of

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what is called an unpractical disposition; on the contrary, he was a diligent tutor, and had aptitude not only for government and discipline but for affairs. But for making a name he had neither care nor skill, and was unwilling to be burdened by those sordid occupations which encumber men who have the art of 'getting on,' a τέχνη χρηματοσκευή for which quite special qualities of character are needed, qualities in which he was signally and beautifully deficient. And the value of a man's work may be at least as well measured by its intensity and finish as by its range. The sphere in which Whichcote moved was not wide; his work was first that of a college tutor, and afterwards that of a parish priest, and it is no disparagement to his powers of mind to admit that they were wholly engrossed in his work, or to his courage and strength of purpose that he never allowed himself to wander from his own province into wider fields. Whichcote held the belief, untainted by morbid self-consciousness, that a man's first concern is himself; and his life was his work. He found 'fit audience, though few.'

Happily, we are able from the funeral sermon preached upon Whichcote's death by Archbishop Tillotson, from one or two passages in Burnet's *History of my own Time*, and from the preface written (1753) by Dr. Salter, Prebendary of Norwich, for an edition of Whichcote's *Aphorisms*, and his correspondence with Tuckney, to gather a pretty complete account of his career, and a clear and vivid picture of his character.

Benjamin Whichcote was born on March 11, 1609, at Whichcote Hall, in the parish of Stoke in Shropshire. We are told by Salter rather vaguely that he came of an 'ancient and honourable family,' but directly we can learn nothing of interest or importance concerning his ancestors, and of his boyhood nothing distinct is to be had. Indirectly we may find an indication as to the traditions in which
he was reared from the fact that he was entered in 1626 at Emmanuel College, Cambridge.

Here, during his first year of residence, he was the pupil of Antony Tuckney; and when Tuckney left Cambridge (1627) he had Thomas Hill, afterwards Master of Trinity, for his tutor. To both of these men Whichcote owed much, and he was very ready to acknowledge his obligation. To Tuckney, though he enjoyed his society and his teaching for so short a time, Whichcote was particularly indebted. Tuckney was ten years older than Whichcote, and had come up to Emmanuel as a scholar, when he was barely fourteen years old, in 1613; 'which shews,' so Salter writes, 'that he had been educated hitherto in a dislike to the Church Establishment; for that College, though it abounded for many years in most excellent scholars, and might therefore very justly be esteemed, and flourish on their account, yet was much resorted to for another reason, about this time; viz. its being generally looked on, from its first foundation, as a Seminary of Puritans.' Whichcote was an apt pupil, and read widely, though not always in Tuckney's judgement with a wise choice of authors. There was, from the earliest day of their association, a divergence, which became more strongly marked with time, between the interests and tendency of the two men. But this divergence would appear only to have served to give emphasis to the strong sympathies which united them: certainly, nothing was ever able to damage the respect and affection which each had for the other.

Tuckney possessed in rare combination, humour and piety, scholarship and common sense, caution and vigour. And, what seems to go with these qualities, he had a faculty of condensed and pregnant speech, which would quickly and deeply stamp itself on the memory of an eager disciple. It cannot be doubted that Tuckney encouraged, perhaps quite unconsciously, the development of some of Whichcote's most salient characteristics. Tuckney was later elected
Master of St. John's. In his election there 'when the President, according to the Cant of the times, would call upon him to have regard to the godly; the Master answered, no one should have a greater regard to the truly godly than himself; but he was determined to choose none but scholars;' adding (very wisely Salter confirms his judgement) 'they may deceive me in their godliness, they cannot in their scholarship.'

Whichcote had a like shrewdness. Again, Tuckney was at once very zealous in the maintenance of his principles, and yet tolerant towards those who differed from him. We learn that as Vice-Chancellor and Master he was 'resolutely disregardful of the arbitrary and irregular commands of those in authority.' He was willing to run risks, and to pay the price of his independence in judgement and action; and yet he was never headstrong, and never lost his balance.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Whichcote, who himself exemplified some of these qualities in his own career, should have felt that he owed much to his first tutor.

In 1629, Whichcote became B.A., and M.A. in 1633, in which year he was appointed to a fellowship at Emmanuel. In the next year, Hill left Cambridge, and Whichcote took up his work as tutor. In this office he continued for nine years—the most important and fruitful of his life. He found little time for reading during this period, and what leisure his engagements with his pupils allowed him he gave rather to meditation than to books.

He had an unusual power of continuous thinking—a gift of intellectual activity accomplished in repose, and yet he was studious to fulfil the duties which his station imposed upon him. So it was rather by what he was than by what he taught that he gained the allegiance and admiration of his pupils, by example more than by instruction, and by stimulus more than by coercion. And yet, like all men whose influence is wholesome, he was diffident of his own
value, and never sought power. He was anxious to get the best out of those with whom he had to do, and to offer them the best of himself; his modesty and his humour helped him in both attempts. He encouraged conversation not only by his own rich and apposite speech, but also by his listening, without condescension or weariness, to those who were quicker to speak, though they might have less to say, than himself. Only of quite idle talk was he impatient. He never took offence, and was able to reprove or censure others without causing it. Tillotson, in the funeral sermon which he preached over Whichcote, gives us a beautiful portrait of the man.

'His conversation was exceeding kind and affable, grave and winning, prudent and profitable. He was slow to declare his judgment, and modest in delivering it. Never passionate, never peremptory; so far from imposing upon others that he was rather apt to yield. And though he had a most profound and well poised judgment, yet was he of all men I knew the most patient to hear others differ from him, and the most easy to be convinced when good reason was offered; and, which is seldom seen, more apt to be favourable to another man's reason than his own.'

Tillotson drew the portrait at a rather later age than that at which we have arrived in this outline of Whichcote's life. But the sketch which he supplies is quite trustworthy as a guide to Whichcote's character during the years of his tutorial work at Emmanuel. So he continues: 'Studious and inquisitive men commonly at such an age (at forty or fifty at the utmost) have fixed and settled their judgments in most points, and, as it were, made their last understanding, supposing they have thought, or read, or heard what can be said on all sides of things; and after that, they grow positive and impatient of contradiction, thinking it a disparagement to them to alter their judgment. But our deceased friend was so wise as to be willing to learn to the last; knowing that no man can grow wiser without
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some change of his mind, without gaining some knowledge which he had not, or correcting some error which he had before.'

These words recall one of Whichcote's own aphorisms, and show how these, and indeed all his dicta are to be estimated. They are not the fruit of mere speculation; they are the canons by which he ruled his own life. 'He that never changed any of his opinions never corrected any of his mistakes; and he, who never was wise enough to find out any mistake in himself, will not be charitable enough to excuse what he reckons mistakes in others.'

To complete the picture, Tillotson adds: 'He very seldom reproved any person in company otherwise than by silence, or some sign of uneasiness, or some very soft and gentle word; which yet from the respect men generally bore him did often prove effectual; for he understood human nature very well, and how to apply himself to it in the most easy and effectual ways.'

It is easy, then, to believe what we are told by Tillotson, and Salter after him, that Whichcote was an excellent tutor.

In 1636 Whichcote was ordained deacon and priest by Williams, Bishop of Lincoln, and immediately began a labour in which he persevered for nearly twenty years, with little interruption; he 'set up' a Lecture in Trinity Church on Sunday afternoons. In these lectures and by the sermons which he delivered as a select preacher before the University, he became more widely known in Cambridge. His addresses, from the outset, attracted attention. His aim was, according to Salter, 'to preserve a spirit of sober piety and rational religion in the University and town of Cambridge in opposition to the fanatic enthusiasm and senseless canting then in vogue,' and we are informed that 'in those wild and unsettled times he contributed more to the forming of the students of that University to a sober sense of religion than any man in that age.'
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Burnet's testimony is in the same sense: 'Whichcote was a man of rare temper; very mild and obliging. He had great credit with some that had been eminent in the late times; but made all the use he could of it to protect good men of all persuasions. He was much for liberty of conscience, and, being disgusted with the dry systematical way of those times, he studied to raise those who conversed with him to a nobler set of thoughts, and to consider Religion as a seed of Deiform nature (to use one of his own phrases). In order to do this he set young students much on reading the ancient philosophers: chiefly Plato, Tully and Plotin; and on considering the Christian religion as a doctrine sent from God both to elevate and sweeten human nature; in which he was a great example, as well as a wise and kind instructor.'

In 1640 he took the degree of B.D. Three years later he went down to North Cadbury in Somerset, where he had been presented to a living in the gift of the college, and about the same time he married. He continued to hold this preferment until 1650, when he was succeeded in it by Ralph Cudworth. But he was quickly recalled to Cambridge and, much against his inclination, was (March 19, 1644) made Provost of King's College in the place of Dr. Collins, who had been ejected by the Parliament. It was characteristic of him to propose an arrangement, which was agreed to by the fellows of the college, for paying half the revenues of his new office to his predecessor as long as he lived: an arrangement, of course, which was not well calculated to recommend him to those to whom his own promotion was due. Moreover, he himself never took the covenant, and secured the same liberty for most of the fellows, while to the few who were ejected with Collins he contrived that their emoluments should be paid for a year after their expulsion.

In 1650–1 he was Vice-Chancellor in succession to

1 History of my own Time, i. 186–7.
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Tuckney, who had returned to Cambridge and been elected to the Mastership of Emmanuel in 1645. To this year belongs the equally interesting and important correspondence between Whichcote and Tuckney. It has been said that there were from the first days of their connexion some differences between the two men. These differences had swelled, and in 1651 Tuckney felt himself bound to expostulate with Whichcote upon the dangerous tendency of his teaching. The letters are valuable for the light they throw upon the character of the two disputants, and still more for the information they give as to the different currents of thought along which men were being carried in Cambridge at that time.

Whichcote wrote throughout with exemplary moderation and gentleness; firmly maintaining his own ground, he was careful to show, both by the general tone of his letters and by repeated expressions of respect, the regard which he entertained for Tuckney; he was always on the defensive, and, though he guarded himself strongly and nimbly, never yielded to the temptation, if he felt it, of taking the offensive against his opponent. Tuckney’s attitude was, of course, that of an expostulating critic; he was making an attack upon a position which he held to be very dangerous both for Whichcote himself, and for the University in which Whichcote’s influence was now powerful; but, except for a few passages in which he shows some heat, and seems to be irritated by the fearless, though modest, defence made by his former pupil, he rivals Whichcote in dignity and good temper. It is difficult in a word or two to describe the nature of the controversy; in a summary of the letters it would be impossible to reproduce anything but the tediousness of the argument (for some parts of it are tedious). But in brief Tuckney’s complaint was that in Whichcote’s teaching Plato and Plotinus were being set above the Gospel, and the reason above the spirit. Whichcote’s

1 Tuckney was elected Master of St. John’s in 1653.
reply to the first part of the accusation has already been named; to the second he said, 'I oppose not rational to spiritual, for spiritual is most rational.' Neither, of course, convinced the other.

At the Restoration he 'was removed from the Provostship by especial order of the King; but, though removed, he was not disgraced or frowned upon.' In 1662 he was appointed to the cure of St. Anne's, Blackfriars, which he held till the church was burnt down in the Great Fire. He then retired to Milton in Cambridgeshire, to a sinecure rectory which Collins had held from his deposition until his death in this year. This preferment Whichcote held as long as he lived. But his migrations were not yet ended. After some years of seclusion at Milton he was presented to the vicarage of St. Lawrence, Jewry, where he regularly preached to a 'small but judicious auditory,' and busily engaged in the work of his parish. He found time, however, to pay occasional visits to Cambridge, and died there in Cudworth's house, at Easter, 1683.

Of the lives of Smith and Culverwel very little can be said with certainty.

Smith was born in 1618, at Achurch, near Oundle in Northamptonshire, and was sent in 1636 to Emmanuel College. In 1640 he took the degree of B.A., and that of M.A. in 1644, when he was appointed to a fellowship at Queens' College. He would no doubt have been chosen a fellow of Emmanuel, but for a regulation forbidding two natives of the same county to hold fellowships at the same time in that college, and Culverwel had already been elected to one. He died on August 7, 1652.

Of Smith's character we are able to learn much from the funeral sermon preached upon him by Patrick, a fellow of Queens' College. This sermon is a remarkable piece

1 Cf. pp. 55 and 57.
2 Afterwards Bishop of Chichester and of Ely successively.
of English writing. It is very difficult for us, whose language is at once more direct and more reserved, to understand how a man could write and speak with so much elaboration and artifice about a friend whom he loved, and a teacher whom he venerated. And yet the sermon is sincere and natural.

There is a long catalogue of virtues which Smith is said to have possessed in a high degree of perfection. We are told of his eminency, sobriety and worth, of his learning, of his wisdom and prudence; his skill in the management of affairs, his humility, his courtesy, gentleness, and meekness, the quiet and tranquillity of his soul, his faith and its effects on his character and life.

'For this indeed was the end of his life, the main design which he carried on, that he might become like to God. So that if we should have asked him that question in Antoninus, τίς σωθήναι τεχνὴ; what is thy art and profession, thy business and employment? He would not have answered, To be a great Philosopher, Mathematician, Historian, or Hebrician (all which he was in great eminency). To be a Physician, Lawyer, General Linguist, which names and many more his general skill deserve. But he would have answered as he doth there, ἀγαθὸν ἔηναι, my Art is to be good.'

In a strain like this Patrick continues his panegyric through page after page, only pausing here and there to exclaim that his own powers are wholly unequal to his high theme, and his words inadequate to express his reverence and affection for a man for whom he claims, 'that he was truly a Father, that he wanted age only to make him Reverend, and that, if he had lived many generations ago, and left us the children of his mind to posterity, he might by this time have been numbered among the Fathers of the Church.'

'The memory of so great a man,' Patrick urges, 'might well be preserved by some annual ceremonial in which his College should express, "all these three, our Respect, Affection, and Sense of our Loss," but;' he goes on, 'let me
tell you, in conclusion of all, that herein would be shewn our greatest love and affection which we bare to him, this would be the greatest honour of him, if we would but express his life in ours, that others might say when they behold us, there walks at least a shadow of Mr. Smith."

This sounds almost like an anti-climax in our ears; for indeed the name of Smith lends itself uncomfortably to long-sustained encomium. But there is no anti-climax in the thought. The portrait which Patrick gives is consistent. It is the portrait of a man of power and learning, and of peculiar skill in teaching, who impressed those who knew him, more than by these gifts, by the purity and quiet strength of his character. This personal influence, due to pre-eminent goodness, is what stands out most clearly.

It has been said that the Oration is full of interest to the student of English prose; it is equally valuable as a piece of character-drawing.

The records of Culverwel's career are very bare. He came, as we have already said, of a Northamptonshire family, and was entered as a pensioner at Emmanuel College in 1633. We do not know how old he was at this time, but may safely conjecture that he was not more than eighteen years of age, and not less than fourteen. He may well have been nearer the lower limit, for in the seventeenth century academic life began for most students at an age at which in our own day school life has yet several years to run. He became B.A. in 1636, and M.A. in 1640, and was elected shortly afterwards (though it is not known precisely in what year) to a fellowship at the same college. It would appear that he died in 1650 or 1651.

These meagre outlines are coloured and enlivened by a short but valuable paragraph which closes Richard Culverwel's preface to his brother's treatise on The Light of Nature. The several sections of the discourse formed, it must be remembered, so many lectures or sermons given
to academic audiences. 'These exercises,' writes Richard Culverwel, 'suit well with the place where, and the audience to whom they were delivered, but, like Aristotle's Physical Lectures (ἀκροάσεις φυσικοί) they are not for vulgar ears. Their lucubrations are so elaborate that they smell of the lamp, "The Candle of the Lord!"' The criticism, so playfully put, is just. And he adds, 'As concerning the author of this treatise, how great his parts were, and how well improved, as it may appear by this work, so they were fully known, and the loss of them sufficiently bewailed by those among whom he lived and conversed; and yet I must say of him he suffered a misfortune incident to man (ἀνθρωπίνον τι ἐπαθεῖν). And as it is hard for men to be under affliction, but they are liable to censure, so it fared with him, who was looked upon by some, as one whose eyes were lofty, and whose eyelids lifted up, who bare himself too high upon a conceit of his parts, although they that knew him intimately are willing to be his compurgators in this particular. Thus prone are we to think the staff under water crooked, though we know it to be straight.'

What this affliction was, we do not know, but it seems, in the last few years of Culverwel's life, to have become almost a mental estrangement.

The undergraduate days of both men fell in the earlier part of the period during which Whichcote was actively occupied with tutorial work in the college. Culverwel was probably, and Smith was certainly, a pupil of Whichcote's, and both came under his influence and caught something of his spirit.

Each of them had originality; and yet nothing is more remarkable in their writing than the intimacy of their connexion with their teacher, and the extent of their in-

1 Culverwel did not forget that he was addressing an academic audience, 'You that are genuine Athenians,' he says to his listeners, 'fill yourselves with noetical delights. . . . Happy Athenians, if you knew your own happiness.' Light of Nature, chap. xvii, 'The Light of Reason a pleasant Light.'
debtedness to him. They added their own to his words; they threw his sentences into a fresh context, and illustrated them with the wealth of their wider erudition and their finer scholarship; but just as, through all the movements of some composition in music, which becomes more and more complex in its successive developments, the ear can catch the simple melody on which the whole is based; so, in all that the younger men wrote, whether they are intent upon their elaborate (and often quite unconvincing) dialectic, or whether they indulge their curious, but fertile and natural imagination in passages of delicate workmanship and fascinating beauty, or give themselves up to the freer and more passionate oratory, in which, for all the silence of print, one seems to be listening to the eloquent voice of living speakers, the reader can hear, as it were in an undertone, the plain, moderate speech of their master.

Verbal resemblances are not uncommon.

So Whichcote writes, 'Heaven is first a Temper, and then a Place,' and again, more fully, 'For we cannot ascend higher in our acting, than we are in our Beings and Understandings; and these men, that think our happiness lies in the sensual objects of Delight, are not capable of understanding either the Reason or necessity of mortification, inward Renewal and Repentance, in order to admittance into Heaven. For they do not look upon Heaven as a State and Temper of mind, which is requisite to be reconciled to the nature of God and to be according to His mind and will;' or once more, 'It is not possible for a man to be made happy, by putting him into a happy place, unless he be in a good state.'

And the echo in Smith is, 'As the Kingdom of Heaven is not so much without men as within, ... so the tyranny of the Devil and Hell is not so much in some external things as in the qualities and dispositions of men's minds. And as the enjoying of God and conversing with Him consists not so much in a change of place as in the
participation of the Divine Nature, and in our assimilation
unto God; so our conversing with the Devil is not so much
by a mutual local presence, as by an imitation of a wicked
and sinful nature derived upon men's own souls.'

Or again, when Whichcote says, 'Sure it is, there is no
genuine and proper effect of religion where the mind of
man is not composed, sedate and calm,' and, 'The longest
sword, the strongest lungs, the most voices are false measures
of Truth.' Smith amplifies the idea thus:

'There is a pompous and popular kind of tumult in the
world which sometimes goes for zeal to God and His
Kingdom against the Devil; whereas men's own pride and
passions dignify themselves under the notions of a Religious
fervency. Some men think themselves the greatest cham-
pions for God and His cause, when they can take the
greatest liberty to quarrel with everything abroad and without
themselves, which is not shaped according to the mould
of their own opinions, their own self-will, humour and
interest; whereas, indeed, the spiritual warfare is not so
much maintained against a foreign enemy, as against those
domestick rebellions that are within; neither is it then
carried on most successfully, when men make the greatest
noise and most of all raise the dust. . . . As Grace and
true Religion is no lazy or sluggish thing, but in perpetual
motion, so all the motions of it are soft and gentle; while it
acts most powerfully within, it also acts most peacefully.'

And the text of Culverwel's whole discourse φῶς κυρίου,
πνεῦ ἀνθρώπου, might with as much propriety have been the
text of Whichcote's sermons. It is a sentence which he
uses in one of his Aphorisms, and his paraphrase contains
in little what Culverwel wrote out at length, 'The spirit
of a man is the Candle of the Lord; lighted by God
and lighting to God—res illuminata, illuminans.' It is not
necessary to give numerous instances of a likeness which
may be traced continually between Culverwel's chapters
and the passages of Whichcote which he had got by heart;
a single example may here stand for many. 'To go against Reason,' wrote Whichcote, 'is to go against God; it is the self-same thing to do that which the Reason of the case doth require, and that which God Himself doth appoint. Reason is the Divine Governor of man's life; it is the very voice of God.' 'So that to blaspheme reason'—so Culverwel repeats the same thought on the very first page of his Discourse—'is to reproach heaven itself, and to dishonour the God of reason, to question the beauty of his image, and, by a strange ingratitude, to slight this great and royal gift of our Creator.' These fundamental similarities must engage the notice of every reader who makes a comparative study of the three authors. But Smith and Culverwel did more than echo Whichcote's thoughts; they amplified them, and pursued them in directions which their master did not himself take.

Smith attempted a philosophy of Religion, and inquired what were the elements of Religion and how to be apprehended. The answers which he offered to these questions may be sufficiently seen in the Extracts. His general position may be summarized here in a sentence or two of his own: 'To seek our Divinity merely in books and writings, is to seek the living among the dead; we do but in vain seek God many times in these, where His truth too often is not so much enshrined as entombed: No, \textit{intra te quaere Deum}, seek for God within thine own soul: He is best discerned, as Plotinus phraseth it, by an intellectual touch of Him; we must "see with our eyes, and hear with our ears, and our hands must handle the Word of Life," that I may express it in St. John's words.'

He postulates and appeals to a spiritual sense, and in the arguments which he uses in support of his position, exhibits a faculty of psychological analysis, the results of

\footnote{1 See especially the \textit{Discourse concerning the True Way or Method of attaining to Divine Knowledge} (pp. 77–98).}
which anticipate in a remarkable way much more modern speculations.

It would appear that Culverwel's discourse is only a fragment of a much larger treatise which he meant to write. In what we have, we find out not a Christian philosophy such as Smith essayed, but an introduction to it, confined almost entirely to more directly philosophical questions.

Culverwel inquires what nature is, and in his answer maintains the view that nature includes the realm of spiritual things, as well as that of physical phenomena; then, in order to prepare himself to meet the question of what the law of nature is, he deals with the nature of law in general, and of the eternal law.

'There are,' he says, 'stamped and printed upon the being of man some clear and indelible principles, some first and alphabetical notions, by putting together of which it can spell out the law of nature'; and he adds, 'Now these first and radical principles are wound up in some such short bottoms as these: "We must seek good and avoid evil," "We must seek happiness," "Do not do to others what you do not wish to have done to yourself." And reason, thus, by warming and brooding upon these first and oval principles of her own laying, it being itself quickened with a heavenly vigour, does thus "Hatch the law of nature." . . .

'You must look, in the next place, to that light of nature, that candle of the Lord by which this law of nature is manifested and discovered.'

He lays in metaphysics the foundations for the system of ethics and religion which he hoped to build, but never accomplished. The result is that what is most interesting to his readers is his theory of knowledge, developed simply by way of preparation for what mainly interested himself.

He insists, as we have seen from the passages just quoted, upon the existence of some primitive elements of knowledge in the mind; but he shows that these principles, though
present, have no true life until they are called into activity by experience. Contact with the world does not create them, but gives them the opportunity for showing themselves.

These elements of original knowledge are universal, and self-evident, and, he urges, it is impossible to think at all without admitting them.

From this he advances to the doctrine that the perception of moral distinctions is also universal; and he goes on to show that the moral law is founded upon the nature of God, and that moral obligation depends upon the will of God.

In the remainder of his treatise he proceeds to discuss the origin and character of this light of nature or reason. His doctrine on each of these topics is exhibited in the selections which follow.

The selections from Culverwel's work have been arranged here after those from Smith, for though Culverwel, senior certainly in academic standing, and probably also in years, may have written his treatise earlier, he yet carries their common principles on to a more purely philosophic development than his friend, just as Smith advanced further in this direction than Whichcote; and the logical order in which the three writers are to be placed is plainly Whichcote, Smith, Culverwel. If we regard the style of the three writers, as well as their matter, this order is confirmed.

That Whichcote had the gift of clear and succinct utterance is clear from his Aphorisms; but the Sermons, pieced together as they are partly from his own scanty notes, and more largely from the notes of his hearers, have less literary excellence than the work of his pupils, though they probably give a quite inadequate representation of the eloquence which is ascribed to him as a preacher. Smith is an elaborate writer, annoyingly pedantic at his worst, too often oppressed by his own learning, and confused by the length and multitude of his quotations—his practice of quotation is a strange lapse upon the traditionalism against which he struggled—but at his best, capable of rising to a very
high plane of genuine oratory, always indeed showing the marks of labour, and calling upon the reader for close attention, but strong, pure and richly ornamented.

Culverwel writes best of all. After the unhappy subtilties of his early pages, he is always lucid and vigorous; he is more orderly than Smith, and far more modern in tone; the language which he uses is well in his command, and he passes smoothly and easily from his more sedate passages to those in which he gives his imagination a loftier flight.
BENJAMIN WHICHCOTE

THE GLORIOUS EVIDENCE AND POWER OF DIVINE TRUTH

*Never Man spake like this Man.*—John vii. 46.

Because there are amongst us, those who are bold to call into question Deity; those who dispute against the main and principal Matters of Christian Faith, under pretence of Reason (the Excellency of God's Creation, by which I will be concluded;) therefore I make choice of these Words to deal with them, with their own Instrument.

*Never any Man spake as our Lord and Saviour.*—I will not lay the Stress of my Argument upon the Credit of those who spake these Words; for they were I know not whom: And I will make no more Advantage than I will give to the Devil himself, who is related to speak many things that are reported in Scripture: But I will found my Argument on the Quality of the Matter.—Yet, it is considerable, that they who are engaged in the contrary [Party] are declared Enemies, and have a contrary Interest; that even they are over-born, and so far subdued, as to make an Acknowledgment.

There are, among us, Persons, that are sensual, and out-right brutish; that put off human Nature, and discharge themselves of Principles of Reason and Understanding. I think no Man doubts of this. It seems to be evident and undeniable. Yea, they themselves are self-condemn'd in what they do: And Men that do distemper themselves, and put themselves out of the Use of their Reason; when they do recover; they wish they could do otherwise.
But, then, there are those that pretend to dispute against Deity; and, under Excuse of Reason, pretend to be Atheists. These make a great Bluster and Noise in the World, and undertake to defend themselves with Show and Colour of Reason and Argument.

And again: There are those who will admit of Principles of Reason to the full, and all the immediate necessary Results and unavoidable Deductions from it; and yet they stick at Reveal’d Truth; pretending Want of Evidence, and a Failure in point of Assurance, and of infallible Conviction and Confirmation. These Men avoid Atheism: But stick in Infidelity.—— [Now] with him that pretends to Atheism, or [who] if he doth acknowledge Deity, is an Infidel and sticks at Reveal’d Truth; these two last I will deal with, from this Scripture: For, [as for] the first sort; they being self-condemn’d, are easily convinc’d.

Among other Excellencies of Divine Truth, this is none of the smallest Weight; that when it is declared, it doth recommend itself to, and satisfies the Mind of Man concerning its Reality and Usefulness. Men are wanting to themselves, that they do not see with their own Eyes; that they do not make a particular Search; that they do not examine; that they do not consider; or, in a word, that they do not use the Judgment of discerning. For we that are of the Reform’d Religion, who deny the infallible visible Judge, we do allow to every Christian a private Judgment of discerning; not [only] as his Privilege that God hath granted him; [but] as his Charge. Where People are of no Education, have no Liberty or Advantage in respect of Leisure, or other Opportunities; we do advise them to use Modesty and Humility, and to be rather Learners than forward to teach. For it is good Counsel, and it is that which is done in all other Affairs: Whosoever he be that hath not the Opportunity to acquaint himself with the Mystery; it is safer for him to make use of other Expedients, than for him
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to be peremptory in a Resolution. But this, for certain, Men are wanting to themselves, if they do not see with their own Eyes; if they do not search and use a Judgment of discerning. For Men attain to no settled State in Religion, no Heights or Excellency of Spirit, who do not make a Discernment by their Judgments: But they run away with Presumptions, Suppositions; with conceited Imaginations, with received Dictates; are Light of Faith, credulous; do comply with others in Sense, in Judgment, in Practice: And it is their Necessity so to do; if they will not make Matters of Knowledge their Business: There cannot be receiving of Truth in the Love of it, and consequently in the certain Obedience of it, where there is not receiving of Truth, in the particular Judgment of the certain Verity of it, and the Sense of the Goodness of it. This Advantage Truth hath: It hath so much of Self-evidence, it is so satisfactory to the Reason of an ingenuous Mind, that it will prevail, unless there be an Indisposition in the Receiver. This I take for the certainest Matter of Experience: All Things are according to the Disposition of the Receiver; one Man will interpret into a Courtesy, that which another turns into an Injury. According as Men are in Preparation and Disposition of Mind, so will Things be entertain'd that are offered to Consideration, and proposed. But Truth, if it doth appear, if it be represented and fairly proposed; it will find Entertainment in a Man's Mind; if a Man's Mind be not by contrary Indisposition made in an Incapacity. Truth is the Soul's Health and Strength, natural and true Perfection. As increated Wisdom speaks to God; (Prov. viii. 30) so Truth speaks the same Language to Man's Soul: I was by him, as one brought up with him, I was daily his Delight. Truth is so near to the Soul; [so much] the very Image and Form of it; that it may be said of Truth; that as the Soul is by Derivation from God, so Truth by Communication. No sooner doth the Truth of God come to our
Soul's Sight, but our Soul knows her, as her first and old Acquaintance: Which, tho' they have been by some Accident unhappily parted a great while; yet having now, through the Divine Providence, happily met, they greet one another, and renew their Acquaintance, as those that were first and ancient Friends.

Truth is of a different Emanation (for I cannot distinguish Truth in itself; but in way of descent to us:) Truth either of first Incription, or of After-revelation from God.

The Truth of first Incription is connatural to Man, it is the Light of God's Creation, and it flows from the Principles of which Man doth consist, in his very first Make: This is the Soul's Complexion.

And Truth of After-revelation is the Soul's Cure, the Remedy for the Mind's Ease and Relief. The great Expectation of Souls, is the Promise of God's Messiah: They wait for the Consolation of Israel. For this hath been the State of the World: Man, in Degeneracy and Apostacy, disabled himself, prejudiced his Interest in God: Losing his Interest, by his Degeneracy and Apostacy, he is in Hope and Expectation of some Revelation from God, concerning Terms of Reconciliation and Recovery: And when these did appear, then [was it] said; Lord now lettest thou thy Servant depart in Peace. Here comes Truth of After-revelation, for the Recovery of Man, when he was Apostatized from the Truth of first Incription.

The former of these, is of things necessary in themselves, in their Nature, and Quality; so, immutable and indispensible. The latter, is the voluntary Results and Determinations of the Divine Will. Things that are of an immutable and indispensible Nature, we have Knowledge of them by the Light of first Impression. The voluntary Results of the Divine Will, we have by Revelation from God.

Man's Observance of God in all Instances of Morality; these are Truths of first Incription; and these have a
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deepener Foundation, greater Ground for them, than that God gave the Law on Mount Sinai; or that he did after ingrave it on Tables of Stone; or that we find the Ten Commandments in the Bible. For God made Man to them, and did write them upon the Heart of Man, before he did declare them upon Mount Sinai, before he ingraved them upon the Tables of Stone, or before they were writ in our Bibles; God made Man to them, and wrought his Law upon Mens Hearts; and, as it were, interwove it into the Principles of our Reason; and the things thereof are the very Sense of Man's Soul, and the Image of his Mind: So that a Man doth undo his own being, departs from himself, and unmakes himself, confounds his own Principles, when he is disobedient and unconfomable to them; and must necessarily be self-condemn'd.—— The Law externally given was to revive, awaken Man, after his Apostacy and Sin, and to call him to Remembrance, Advertency, and Consideration. And, indeed, had there not been a Law written in the Heart of Man; a Law without him, could be to no Purpose. For had we not Principles that are Concreated; did we not know something, no Man could prove any thing. [For] he that knows nothing, grants nothing. Whosoever finds not within himself, Principles suitable to the Moral Law, whence with Choice he doth comply with it; he hath departed from himself, and lost the natural Perfection of his Being: And to be conformable to this, is the Restitution to his State.

Things of Natural Knowledge, or of first Inscription in the Heart of Man by God, these are known to be true as soon as ever they are proposed: And he hath abused himself, and forc'd himself from his Nature, and deformed the Creation of God in him, whosoever doth not take Acquaintance with, subscribe to, make acknowledgment of these great Things, The great Principles of Reverence of Deity: Of Sobriety in the Government of a Man's own Person: Moderate
use of the Pleasures and Contentments of this Life: The great Instances of Righteousness and Justice in Mens Transactions one with another: For they are Connatural to Man.

Then, for Truth of Gospel-Revelation, that, speaks for itself, recommends itself, and shews itself to be of God. In this Case, we may say as the Samaritans to the Woman: They were brought to take Cognizance of our Saviour, by the credible Report of the Woman: But after they had had converse with him; Now, say they, we believe in him, not for thy Words (but we credited thee so far forth as to come and see him:) but because we have seen, and heard, Joh. iv. 42. Such are the Declarations of Faith in God by Jesus Christ, of Remission of Sins, of God's accepting of Sinners upon Repentance, that any Man that is awake to any true Apprehensions of God, he will readily believe them, and embrace them, when they are declared to him by any Instrument. The great Things of Reveal'd Truth, tho' they be not of Reason's Invention, yet they are of the prepar'd Mind readily entertain'd and receiv'd: As for Instance: Remission of Sins to them that repent and deprecate God's Displeasure; it is the most credible Thing in the World: For God made us Creatures fallible, at the best. Now here is finite and fallible;—failing and miscarrying;——repenting and reforming, upon a Declaration from God.——So false is it that the Matter of our Faith is unaccountable; or that there is any thing unreasonable in Religion; that there is no such Matter of Credit in the World as the Matters of Faith; nothing more intelligible. It was a Mystery before; God in Christ reconciling the World: Now all the World is taken into a Possibility of receiving Benefits hereby. Tho' there be nothing of Merit on the Creature's side; nothing that we can do that can deserve; yet it is a Matter of very fair Belief, that the Original of all Beings, the Father of all our Spirits, the Fountain of all Good, will, one way or other, pardon Sin, and do what behoves him, for
the Recovery of his laps'd Creation: And any probable Narration made in the Name of God, of the Way and Means, and the particular Circumstances whereby God will do it. will fairly induce Belief with sober, serious, and considerate Minds: And what have we to do with others, upon the Account of Religion? If they be not serious and considerate, they are not in a Disposition towards Religion. That Promise of the Seed of the Woman breaking the Serpent's Head: God hath been speaking this out further and further, by his various Revelations in the several Successions of Time: He has represented it in divers Shapes: But now we have it expounded. For the Seed of the Woman is, God manifested in the Flesh: And breaking the Serpent's Head is, destroying the Work of the Devil. The Anti-type doth exactly answer the Variety of the Types. All foretold of our Saviour was fulfill'd in him. —— We have many things in prophanè Stories in several Ages that give Testimony and Light to Parts of Reveal'd Truth. Many of their Stories are in Imitation of Scripture History: As Nisus's Hair in Imitation of Sampson's: Deucalion's Flood in Imitation of Noah's: Hercules in Imitation of Joshua, &c. —— Many of the Heathens that were not corrupted by Education, or Interest, or the Strain of the Time, do relate many things that are consistent with those that are in the Bible. St. Austin tells us, he found the Beginning of the first Chapter of St. John's Gospel among the Platonists. Eusebius read in the Commentaries of the Heathens those Circumstances and Matters of Fact that the Evangelists do mention, and also the Signs at our Saviour's Crucifying, as the Eclipse of the Sun, and an Earthquake, and other Accidents. Tertullian speaks of sundry things which Pilate writ to Tiberius, suitable to what the Evangelists relate concerning our Saviour. Yea, Mahomet himself, who is the last great Impostor, doth mention the Soldiers apprehending our Saviour with an Intention to put him to Death:
Archbishoping him to be a great Prophet; but he tells us, when those Soldiers were stricken down, God took him away, and they lighted upon another something like him, and crucify'd him. *Plutarch*, an eminent Author, gives us an Account of *Pan*, the great Daemon of the Heathens, who was heard greatly to complain, that a *Hebrew* Child was born, and they never heard him after; all the Oracles then ceasing. *Porphyry*, tho' of no great Credit, says, that after one whom they called *Jesus*, came to be worshipp'd, they never could receive any more Benefits by any of their Gods. One of the *Roman* Emperors was so possess'd with what was related concerning a Kingly Race among the *Jews*, and was so startled with the Credibleness of the Report, that he set himself to destroy all of the Family. *Publius Lentulus* gives the Senate an Account, that he saw, himself, and was an Eye-witness of the Man *Jesus* among the *Jews*, who cured all Diseases and raised from the Dead: Insomuch, that *Tertullian* bids the Heathen Emperor search their Records: For your own Kalender [says he] recites the Things that are done by our Saviour. This, in the Days of *Julian*, who was turn'd off, by the Feuds and Exasperations, by the Factions and Divisions among those that were call'd Christians: Insomuch, that he hated Christianity; but otherwise, a Man of eminent Justice, and good to the Common-wealth: One who was a Philosopher gives an Account of the Christian Religion: "The Christian Religion (says he) consisting in "Spiritual Worship and Devotion to God, Purity of Mind, "holy and unblameable Conversation; of all things that are "call'd Religion, it is the most Entire, the most Pure; but "only mightily hurt by some who have fill'd it with super-
"stitious Things." *Am. Marcel*.

So that we may resolve, that the Difficulty of Faith arises from the wicked State of the Subject, rather than from the Incredibility of the Object. It is hard to act otherwise than the State from within doth dispose a Man. It is not
imaginable, that any Man can believe contrary to the Life he lives in: When he lives in the State of eternal Death; to believe eternal Life: Or to believe the Pardon of Sin, when he lives in it, and slights the Sin he lives in. For our Saviour says, You cannot believe because of your wicked Hearts. It cannot stand together: To live in Sin; and to look for Pardon of Sin. For God doth not give to any one that is impenitent, the Power of Faith. Be not conform'd to this wicked World, but be ye transform'd by the renewing of your Mind, that you may prove what is the good and acceptable Will of God, Rom. xii. 2. Intimating, that if a Man lead a wicked and ungodly Life; if a Man in respect of State, Complexion, and Constitution of Soul, be in Contradiction to the Principles of Religion, the Principles of God's Creation; he cannot prove what is that good and acceptable and perfect Will of God. They that were in a Religious Disposition did readily believe and entertain our Saviour, and acknowledge him to be the Messiah that was promis'd of old: But those that were perfectly obstinate, in the Pharisaick Disposition, they rejected him. And this is clearly true, that Men cannot believe while they live in Sin, and are in Impenitency, and are under the Commands of their Lusts. For we find that an ingenuous Mind, and one that is a true Penitent, he doth with more Difficulty forgive himself, than God doth. He that is truly affected, and cordially turns to God, he is truly sensible of the Deformity and Impurity of Sin: Though Repentance give Heart's Ease and Satisfaction, and tend to the Quiet of his Mind; yet he doth more hardly excuse himself, than God doth. But a Man that is wedded to the World, that is under the Power of his Lusts, that applauds and magnifies himself in Self-will, is given up to Affectation, Arrogancy, and Self-assuming, how can this Man give himself Satisfaction concerning Pardon of Sin, when he is in a contrary Spirit, in a contrary Disposition? He cannot believe that God
will pardon Sin; because he himself doth not pardon any other Offender. God's Goodness well consider'd, speaks him to be propitious and inclinable to Compassion: But Impenitency speaks a Man's Incapacity of being pardon'd.

This is the Sum. All Divine Truth is of one of these two Emanations:—— Either it flows from God, in the first Instant and Moment of God's Creation; and then it is the Light of that Candle which God set up in Man, to light him; and that which by this Light he may discover, are all the Instances of Morality; of good Affection, and Submission towards God; the Instances of Justice and Righteousness to Men, and Temperance to himself:—— Or else, it is of an after Revelation and Discovery. Man being out of the Way of his Creation, by his Defection from God, is recover'd by this Revelation. Upon this Consideration, that Man was never better than finite and fallible, and considering that we have given an Offence; and [considering] the Relation that God stands in, to his Creatures; and that he is the first and chiefest Goodness; it is [what] may be fairly supposed, that God will recover his Creation, one way or other. Wherefore, that which the New Testament doth discover, is that which was in general Expectation.

Now the Terms of the New Covenant are possible to Sinners:—— They are Just and Fit, Reasonable and Equal:—— They are to us (who are departed from Truth) Restorative:—— They are satisfactory to our Mind, and quieting to our Conscience.—— For if I have offended against the Rule of Right, I ought to repent of it, confess it, be sorry for it, and do my Endeavour to commit it no more. And there is Reason to think that God can pardon. For every one's Right is in his own Power. Every one doth dispose of his Right in that way which he will. Since therefore it is God's Right, upon the Failure of Obedience, to reduce the Creature by Punishment; it is in his Power to abate of Punishment if he pleases, or to remit it. And it is
most reasonable to think, that God should be allow'd to do this in what way he would.

Therefore we conclude, that all the Instances of Christian Doctrine, either they are fairly knowable, if we use our Faculties and Understanding [(and these are the great Instances of Morality and Principles of Reason ;)] or else, if we do consider those Things that are considerable in the Case; the Things of Reveal'd Truth, are of fair and easy Belief. The former of these, the great Principles of Reason, they are [by] awakened Minds easily and readily found out. The latter are, [by] prepar'd Minds, fairly admitted and entertained. This I say against the Atheism of the prophane World, and those that do affect to be Infidels, because they pretend they have not the Assurance of former Times, [nor of] powerful Miracles.

I will now instance in those Assurances that we have, to settle us in the Entertainment of Divine Truth. And they are these Five:

1. They are concurrent with the Sense of the Heathens and Strangers, who do agree with us in all the Instances of Morality; in these we cannot speak beyond them, they speak and act so as to shame us: For how many of us do act below them in these Particulars? and as to many Things of the New Testament concerning Christ, we have great Testimony from them; as was shew'd.

2. The Representation that is made to us by Truth concerning God. He is represented worthy himself, and so as we may credit what is said of him.

3. The ingenuous Operation that Divine Truth hath upon Mens Minds.

4. Its Fitness to Man's State.


I. As to Morals; we have the full Concurrence with us of Heathen Authors, all those that are any whit reform'd. And for the rest, we have a good Rule in Philosophy, which
tells us, that he is incompetent to give Testimony upon account of Morality, that is himself vicious. For he that is vicious, is himself a Moral Monster. And upon a Moral Consideration, every Man is vicious that either is stupidly ignorant, or dissolute or profane; and their Judgment in point of Truth is inconsiderable. In Morals, all those of the Heathens that have attain'd to any Reformation, either to the Improvement of their Intellectuals, or the Refinement of their Morals, they all concur with these immutable and indispensable Verities. And as to those reveal'd; the several Parts of History concur in all the Things that the Evangelists do declare concerning Christ. It is very true, there have been in the World several Persons that have grossly neglected the Materials of Natural Knowledge; so that Men have suffered their Faculties to lie asleep: The Mind and Understanding have been in most Men useless and unemploy'd: And there hath been invincible Ignorance as to the great Points of Reveal'd Truth in several Ages and Places of the World: But this I dare assure you; that there never was any considerable Opposition against the main Principles of Natural or Reveal'd Truth, by those that have any Knowledge of it. No Man of any Competency of Knowledge, or Proportion of Goodness, hath risen up against any of these great Instances of Morality, or the main Articles of Christian Faith: But these have had (as I may say) Universal Acknowledgment. For if any have risen up against them; they have been incompetent; and so of no Moral Consideration: The Universal Acknowledgment of a Thing for Truth doth not ly in every individual Person's receiving it (for then you have nothing that is of Universal Acknowledgment;) but in the due and even Proportion it bears to the Universal Reason of Mankind. This Principle no Man in his Wits will deny, That it is impossible that the same thing should be, and not be, at the same time; yet some were so perverse and cross, absurd, and degenerate from
sober Reason, that they did deny it: And Plutarch saith, 
*That nothing yet was ever in the World so absurd, but some 
have held it.* Therefore we may entertain that which any 
sober Man in the due Use of Reason hath entertain’d, and 
proposed, upon Terms of Reason, for the Satisfaction of 
others. And we may conclude, that the Universal Acknow-
ledgment of a Thing as Truth, it doth not depend upon 
every individual Person’s receiving of it; but upon the even 
and true Proportion that things bear to the Universal 
Reason of Mankind. This is all that can be said, when 
Men pretend to prove any thing by Universal Reason. 
Thus the Being of a God is proved by Universal Reason: 
For except only Monsters (those that are, upon the Account 
of Morality, very Monsters; Persons that have grosly neg-
lected their Understandings, and lived like Beasts;) none 
else but have acknowledged Deity. Men improved in their 
Intellectuals, and refin’d in their Morals, have received and 
entertain’d it on Grounds of Reason.—— It is observable, 
that the great Differences that have been between Men in 
the several Ages of the World, they have not been about 
any necessary and indispensable Truth, nor any thing that 
is declared plainly in any Text of Scripture: But all the 
Differences have been either in Points of very curious and 
nice Speculation, or in Arbitrary Modes of Worship. Now, 
notwithstanding these Differences, I dare say, and give 
assurance, that God gives Men leave, with a safe Con-
science, to live in Peace, and to keep the Communion of 
the Church of God in the World, and to submit to the 
Government. Whosoever hath professed himself a Christian 
doth acknowledge Christ to be the Head. The Christian 
World scattered into particular Ways, and multiplied into 
Sects and Parties, yet do agree in the great and bright 
Truths of Reason and Christianity, such as are fixed, and 
of the greatest Magnitude. The *Mahometans* themselves 
did never charge *Moses, or Christ,* as being Impostors:
For they acknowledge *Moses*, as we do, for a true Prophet; and go along with us in the History of Christ, till the Fourteenth of *John*, and Vers. 16. and there is their first Departure. They acknowledge all that is related concerning Christ: Only they tell us that what Christ said of sending the Spirit, and another Comforter, is meant of *Mahomet*; and they tell us that our Saviour set down his Name; but afterwards his Disciples put it out. They acknowledge Christ to be a true Prophet, and beyond *Moses*; and out of respect to him, they deny all that is said about his Death and Crucifixion.

Reason doth *suppose* two things by which we may be further confirm'd in the Truth of our Religion.

(1st.) That if it had been a Cheat and an Imposture, it would have been deprehended in length of Time; being often told, and in several Ages and Companies, sometimes by parts, sometimes together, and under several Circumstances, and upon several Occasions; there would have been some Differences in the Relations. Had there been any thing false in our Religion, [or that were] not solid, true and substantial; it having past through Sixteen Ages, being above Sixteen hundred Years old, those Men that lived before us being inferiour to none of us for Parts; they would have deprehended it as guilty, and forewarn'd us of it. Therefore we may take it for granted that the great Matters of Natural Knowledge and Faith, that have pass’d through so many Ages and Generations are solid, true, and substantial; and that the Book call’d the *Bible*, which hath run down, from the time of our Saviour and his Apostles, to this Day, may be received with double Assurance, Credit, and Advantage: For Error and Falshood is never long-liv’d: but Truth is Eternal, and that which will continue for ever.

(2dly.) I do *suppose* another thing with great Reason; and that is, considering the Goodness of God, the Care he
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has of his Creatures, his Love to Truth, and the Respect that he bears to those that worship him; that he would not suffer the Good Intentions of such to be abused by any Imposture, nor suffer that which is false to take such place in all Times and Ages of the World, without the least Check or Control. — But some may object; if this be so, what say you to the Mahometans, and the great Factions that have been in the World and prevailed? Are not these, Testimonies against the Truth of our Religion? — As for Mahomet; he had only the Assistance of an Apostate Monk who taught him to compound a Religion out of Gentilism and Judaism, and in the Composition that he hath made, so far as he hath added any thing of his own, it is so contemptible to sober Reason, and so contrary to those things that he hath taken out of the Old Testament, that it is not hard to detect him for a Cheat and an Impostor. For devest him but of those things which he stole out of the Bible; and that which is his own will appear base, vile, and contemptible to the Reason of Mankind, and most ridiculous. Now if God had given Testimony to his Religion; it would have been in a way of Reason, and most agreeable to the Understandings of Men; and not in a way of stupid Ignorance: but in such a way as might challenge the greatest Opposers to find any thing contrary to those Principles of Reason and Understanding which he hath planted in Man's Mind. But as to Mahomet; History doth declare him to be a Person of a debauch'd Life; and one that had not Credit in the time of his Life. — As to the great Factions that have been in the several Ages; tho' they have been many Persons; yet they have been but one Party: and one Party is to be consider'd but as one Opinion: for if there be a thousand Men in a Party, it is but one Opinion; and one single Person is as much as a whole Party. All those of a Party are bound up to one Opinion, [and to believe as their Party believes.] Therefore
I except against those that have blindly gone on without Consideration. For these have not acted by the Guidance of Humane Reason.

II. Now I shall give you some *Intrinsic Arguments*, by which I shall convince those of their Wickedness, and Folly, that affect either Atheism, or Infidelity. The first is this, (which is the second Assurance we have of Divine Truth) The Representation that Religion makes to the Mind of Man concerning God, even such a Representation as the Mind of Man, if duly used, and well informed, would conceive concerning him. For God is represented lovely, amiable, and beautiful, in the Eyes of Men; and what is said of God, is worthy of Him, and is consistent with what Man is made to think, or know, concerning him: For this is truly Divine, and God-like, to do Good, to relieve, to compassionate; and on the contrary it is Diabolical, and most opposite to the Divine Nature, to destroy, to grieve, to oppress. And what a relation doth the Bible make of God, to be Merciful, Gracious, Long-suffering, Full of Compassion?—So, [on the other side], how is the Devilish Nature describ'd and represented to us?—The Devilish Nature is hurtful, given to Malice, Hatred, and Revenge; but the Divine Nature is placable, and reconcileable; ready to forgive, full of Compassion, and of great Goodness, and Kindness.

This, for the Representation that both Old and New Testament make of God, and this is agreeable to the Sense of every awaken'd Mind. All that the Gospel requires, is, Repentance from Dead Works, and Faith in our Lord Jesus Christ. And this is the Sum of all that is declared and superadded; and nothing in all the World can be declared or required upon Terms of greater Justice, Reason, and Equity. For will not any one acknowledge, that if an Inferior give Offence to a Superior, he ought to humble himself, and ask Forgiveness? Can any Man's Reason in
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the World be unsatisfied in this?—Then, for Faith in our Lord Jesus Christ; is it not very equal, and fit, that if God will pardon Sin, he should do it in what way he thinks fitting? that if we go to him for Cure, he should take that way to recover us which he thinks best?

So that these [Terms] which are superadded to the Principles of God's Creation, are such, that there were never more equal, fit, and reasonable, proposed to Men: neither is this all; but they are satisfactory to the Reason of our Mind: For this is found to be true upon Experience, that the Mind of an Impenitent cannot receive Satisfaction nor Consolation in any other way. Should all the Men in the World, or an Angel from Heaven speak [Pardon] to an Impenitent; the Sense of Repentance would be better Satisfaction to his Mind; beyond any foreign Testimony whatsoever. Though God should tell me, my Sins were pardon'd; I could not believe it, unless I repent and deprecate God's Displeasure. For Repentance is satisfactory to the Reason of my Mind; is necessary to quiet my Conscience; and I should not be rational or intelligent in Religion unless I satisfied my Mind; which is to do what I can to revoke what I have done amiss, and to deprecate God's Displeasure; and then apply to him for his Grace, in that way which he has declared.

Therefore these [Terms] are not only just and equal in themselves; but tend to the Quiet and Satisfaction of a Man's Mind; [and] are restorative to our Natures.—Now the Representation that is made to us by Divine Truth, either natural, or reveal'd, is that which is satisfactory and consonant to the Reason of our Mind: it is that which doth justly represent God, as he stands in opposition to the Cruel, Devilish, and Apostate Nature, as being Placable, Compassionate, and Reconciling; and so, in the use of true Reason a Man would have thought and imagin'd concerning him; that he would not be wanting to afford unto

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Men fitting Aid and Assistance for their Recovery. And thus is God represented Lovely, Beautiful, and Amiable, in the Eyes of the whole Creation.

III. [Another] Intrinsick Argument (which is the Third Assurance of Divine Truth) is, the ingenuous Operation that Divine Truth, both Natural and Reveal'd, hath upon the Mind and Understanding of Man. For these Truths call Creatures to Self-resignation, to commit themselves to God, to depend upon him. And how doth this tend to the Heart's Ease, [and to the] Quiet, and Satisfaction of a Man's Soul? For we know by Experience that even the best, and wisest of us, are oft times transcended by our Occasions, and at a loss. The Affairs of the World do transcend the Capacities of our Mind and Understanding: Now Religion both Natural, and Reveal'd, doth teach us, that in respect of God we are but Instruments assumed, determin'd, and limited, (and it is no Disparagement to an Instrument if it fail) that we are but Creatures, and have our Dependence upon him. And how doth this tend to the Satisfaction of our Minds! because we know that God is wiser than we, and that he is greater, and every way better than we; [so that if any thing succeed ill]; which either the Honour of God, or the Good of his Creatures, [seemed to] require; then, we being but God's Instruments, and subservient to him, [may] know that we should not have failed, unless God would. Thus our Religion teaches us Submission to God, Acknowledgment of him, Dependence upon him: It assigns to Man his proper place respectively to his true Center; and so lays a Foundation of Heart's Ease, Quiet, Content, and Satisfaction. The Grace of the Gospel, whereby we hope to be saved, doth not only give Continuance, Help, real Furtherance, and Assistance to Natural Truth, (which lost much by Man's Apostacy from God, and so needed a hand to help it up;) but it also doth its own proper Work; by emptying the Mind of Man of Wilfulness,
Presumption, and Self-conceit, which is incident to his Nature; and so making room for the Help of Grace, and Divine Assistance, and Forgiveness.—But to pursue this Argument a little further.

A Gospel-Spirit doth excel in Meekness, Gentleness, Modesty, Humility, Patience, Forbearance; and these are eminent Endowments, and mightily qualify Men to live in the World. This is that which makes Men bear universal Love and Goodwill; and overcomes Evil with Good.—This I dare say, had we a Man among us that we could produce, that did live an exact Gospel-Life; were the Gospel a Life, a Soul, and a Spirit to him, as Principles upon Moral Considerations are; this Man, for every thing that is excellent, and worthy, and useful, would be miraculous and extraordinary in the Eyes of all Men in the World: Christianity would be recommended to the World by his Spirit. Were a Man sincere, honest, and true in the way of his Religion; he would not be grievous, intollerable, or unsufferable to any Body; but he would command due Honour, and draw unto himself Love and Esteem. For the true Gospel-Spirit is transcendentally, and eminently remarkable every way, for those things that are Lovely in the Eyes of Men; for Ingenuity, Modesty, Humility, Gravity, Patience, Meekness, Charity, Kindness, &c.—And for all this that I have said, I will refer you but to that of the Apostle, where he doth set out the Fruits of the Spirit, and the Works of the Flesh: He tells you, that the Works of the Flesh are Hatred, Malice, Emulation, Strife, Sedition, and such like, Gal. v. 20. all of a kind; and all of them do speak Hell broke-loose, and come in upon us in the World: For these are from Hell, and tend to Hell, and represent to us in this World the Hellish State that we dread to meet with hereafter.—But on the other side; the Fruits of the Divine Spirit in Men, they are Love, Joy, Peace, Long-suffering, Meekness, Gentleness, and such like, Gal. v. 22.
And all of these are such lovely things that they make Heaven, in a degree, where they are found. [Whereas] the former turn the World into a kind of Hell.

Such is the Nature of Religion, that it keeps the Mind in a good Frame and Temper; it establishes a healthful Complexion of Soul, and makes it fit to discharge itself duly in all its Offices towards God, with itself, and with Men. Whereas the Mind of a wicked and profane Man, is a very Wilderness, where Lust and exorbitant Passions bear down all before them; and are more fierce and cruel than Wolves and Tygers. So the Prophet, Isaiah lvii. 20. The Wicked is like the raging Sea, always casting forth Mire and Dirt: and Prov. xvii. ver. 12. One had better meet a Bear robbed of her Whelps, than a Fool in his Folly: and you all know who is Solomon's Fool; even every wicked Man.—The Heavenly State consists in the Mind's Freedom from these kind of things. It doth clear the Mind from all impotent and unsatiable Desires, which do abuse a Man's Soul, and make it restless and unquiet: It sets a Man free from eager impetuous Loves; from vain and disappointing Hopes; from lawless and exorbitant Appetites; from frothy and empty Joys; from dismal presaging Fears, and anxious Cares; from inward Heartburnings; from Self-eating Envy, from swelling Pride, and Ambition; from dull and black Melancholly; from boiling Anger, and raging Fury; from a gnawing, aiking Conscience; from Arbitrary Presumption; from rigid Sowrnness, and Severity of Spirit: for these make the Man that is not bias's'd and principled with Religion, inwardly to boil; to be Hot with the Fervours of Hell; and, like the troubled Sea, when it cannot rest, whose waters cast up Mire and Dirt, Isa. lvii. 20.

But on the other side; Things that are connatural in the way of Religion, the Illapses, and Breakings in of God upon us; these require a Mind that is not subject to
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Passion; but in a serene and quiet Posture; where there is no Tumult of Imagination. It is observed among the Rabins that if a Prophet fall into a Rage and Passion, the Spirit of Prophecy leaves him. They say that Moses did not prophesy, after the Spirit of Passion moved him. But sure it is, there is no genuine and proper Effect of Religion, where the Mind of Man is not composed, sedate, and calm. I find among the Philosophers, that they never had Expectation of any Noble Truth, from any Man that was under the Power of Lust, or under the Command of Fancy and Imagination; or that lived in the common Spirit of the World; they thought that God did not communicate himself to such. But this is certain; that no Man that is immers’d in a sensual brutish Life, can have any true Notion of Heaven, or of Glory: These things must signify no more to him, than a local Happiness, and sensual Enjoyment; than the highest and greatest Gratification of the Animal Principle: all that he can think of Heaven is, that it is a Place of great Enjoyment; some local Glory; something that is suitable to the sensual Mind. For we cannot ascend higher in our Actings than we are in our Beings, and Understandings: And these Men that think our Happiness lies in the sensual Objects of Delight, are not capable of understanding either the Reason or Necessity of Mortification, inward Renewal, and Regeneration, in order to admittance into Heaven. For they do not look upon Heaven as a State and Temper of Mind, to which it is requisite to be reconciled to the Nature of God, and to be according to his Mind and Will.—But Religion is the Introduction of the Divine Life into the Soul of Man: and Man cannot possibly be really happy in the separate State, but by these things; by having a Divine Love ruling in their Hearts; by Self-resignation, and Submission to the Divine Will, and by being like unto God.
Things are very well known, what they are in being, by what they are in working; what the Principle of them is, by the Effect that flows from them: Now I may say of Divine Truth, whether Natural, or Reveal'd, that these do satisfy the Mind of Man, and keep him from being barbarous, cruel, and inhumane. Religion doth give such Evidence and Assurance of itself, that if you put it in competition with any thing that any Natural Man, whether Atheist or Infidel doth ever rest upon; it will appear to have a greater Foundation in Nature, and [on] the Grounds and Principles of common Reason, Equity, and Justice, than any thing which can be set up against it, to counter-balance it. And Reveal'd Truth superadded to Natural, doth not only give Assurance to it, and helps to recover that which we know by the Light of God's Creation, (which is weaken'd by Man's Sin, and [his] Apostacy from God) but it doth also do its own proper Work, and teach a Man to return to his own Place, to acknowledge God, depend upon him, and be subservient to him: [It teaches him] to empty his Mind of all Presumption, Pride, Arrogance, and Self-assuming: So that a Man is fit to receive the Grace of Pardon and Forgiveness of Sin, together with all Divine Influence, Concurrence, and Assistance.

But since I have laid so mighty a Weight, and so great a Stress upon this Acknowledgment in the Text; I must needs here prevent an Objection which may be raised; and it is this.—Some may object, and say, you have no Divine Authority for these Words; for tho' they are in the Bible, they are but here related. I confess I have no more Authority from these Words, (being spoken by these Persons of whom they are related) than if they were clean the contrary to what they are. For I do find concerning our Lord and Saviour, that some Persons of like Disposition, say, that he did do his Miracles by Belzebub the Prince of Devils: and if we lay stress upon the Sayers; we must
as well credit them, as these. Therefore I will grant you, that I have no Authority for ought I have said, from these Words materially consider'd, or as related and put down here: Neither do I lay any Weight or Stress on the Sense of these Reporters; for I will grant that it might be haphazard what these Men said; for as much as they did not speak out of any Purpose or Intention, or out of any settled Principle: and such Men have, upon the like Occasion, given a clean contrary Report.—Now I will give you a profitable Observation from hence: Take care how you quote Scripture; for that is Scripture for which you have Divine Authority, not that which is barely related in the Text. For you have the Speeches of the Devil, and the Advice of the worst of Men related in Scripture.—Scripture is only consider'd in the Truth of Matter of Fact, and that these things were done; but it doth not follow from hence that they are materially Good: No Man must pretend to do as Ehud did; because his Action is recorded in Scripture: No Man must pretend to borrowing without Intention of paying, as the Israelites did; for if they had not extraordinary Warrant, they were [to be] condemn'd in their Practice. So, for us, to curse our Enemies, as we read in the Psalms the Prophet did, not knowing in what Spirit it was done; [it] is not warrantable for us to do the like from thence: Neither must we hate any, because the Jews were to hate and to destroy the Seven Nations; which they interpreted a Commission to hate all Mankind but themselves. Therefore in like case, we cannot certainly prove that any thing in the Book of Job is certainly Divine, that was spoken by Job's Friends; because God himself declares, that they had not spoken that which was right concerning him, as his Servant Job had done. Therefore if you will have Divine Authority, see what is said; and think it not enough that it is barely related in the Book: Neither is it enough to pretend to a single Text, nor the
Practice or Perswasion of any Man whatsoever; nor to any thing accidentally spoken, that can amount either to Matter of Faith, or Divine Institution: It must be express Scripture; it must be Scripture in conjunction with Scripture: For Scripture, as a Rule of Faith, is not one Scripture but all. And therefore, tho' I have taken Advantage from these Words, yet all along, I have laid such certain and such infallible Grounds, tending to give Satisfaction in the Matters of Reason and Faith, as the several Points are capable of.

And now I proceed to a fourth Argument, which is this,—

IV. The Suitableness of natural Truth to Man in the State of his Creation; and the Suitableness of Reveal'd Truth to Man in his lapsed and fallen Condition, in order to his Restitution and Recovery.

And first, for the Suitableness of that which we call Natural Religion.——Natural Religion was the very Temper and Complexion of Man's Soul, in the Moment of his Creation; it was his natural Temper, and the very Disposition of his Mind; it was as connatural to his Soul, as Health to any Man's Body: So that Man forc'd himself, offered Violence to himself, and his Principles, went against his very Make and Constitution, when he departed from God, and consented to Iniquity.—It is the same thing in moral Agents, to observe and comply with the Dictates of Reason, as it is with inferior Creatures, to act according to the Sense and Impetus of their Natures. It is the same thing with the World of intelligent and voluntary Agents, to do that which right Reason doth demand and require, as it is in Sensitives, to follow the Guidance of their Senses, or in Vegetatives to act according to their Natures. It is as natural for a Man, in respect of the Principles of God's Creation in him, to live in Regard, Reverence, and Observance of Deity; to govern himself according to the Rule
of Sobriety and Temperance; to live in Love, and to carry himself well in God's Family; this, I say, is as natural for him, as for a Beast to be guided by his Senses, or for the Sun to give Light.—How far therefore are we degenerated and fallen below the State in which God created us; since it is so rare a thing for us to comply with the Reason of things!—Nothing is more certainly true, than that all Vice is unnatural, and contrary to the Nature of Man. All that we call Sin, that which is naught, and contrary to the Reason of Things, is destructive of Human Nature; and a Man forceth himself when he doth it: So that, to comply with those Principles of natural Light and Knowledge which God did implant in us, in the Moment of our Creation; and exactly to be obedient to the Ducture of Reason, is connatural to Man, in respect of the State of God's Creation: And it may be as well expected from an intelligent Agent, to observe God, and to live righteously, and soberly, as from any sensitive Agent, to follow its Appetite.—Humility, Patience, Meekness, and such like Virtues, they do favour Nature; whereas Passion, Pride, and Envy do waste and destroy Nature.—Nature's Desires are all moderate, and limited; but Lust is violent and exorbitant. Nature is content with a very few things; but if a Man give way to inordinate Desires, then there is no Satisfaction to be obtain'd. Lust is not a thing that will be satisfied by adding and adding; but he that would be satisfied, must abate and moderate his Desires, and undue Affections.—It is certain, that all Natural Truth, all that is founded in Reason, and that derives from the Principles of God's Creation; that all of these do agree with Man's Constitution in the State of Innocency.

And for Reveal'd Truth; that fits and supplies Man in his lapsed State.—Every Man that knows his State, feels Want in himself of Health and Strength: And reveal'd Truth is that which doth supply this Want; and
is that which he would have wish'd for from God. In this, he hath Terms proposed to him of Pardon and Reconciliation, upon Repentance, and returning to God. Never did Patient and Physician meet more happily; Disease and Physick; than Man in a lapsed Condition, and the Proposals that are through the Grace of God in the Gospel. In the one there is Man full of Misery; in the other the Grace of God for Mercy and Forgiveness. Man's Language in that State is, O wretched Man, who shall deliver me from this Body of Death! Rom. vii. 24. The Grace of the Gospel puts these Words into his Mouth; I thank God through Jesus Christ my Lord, that he hath delivered me. And he is bid to have no evil Heart of Unbelief. There is a State of Guilt on the one side, a State of Justification on the other: A State of Sin, and a State of Holiness: Fear of eternal Death, and a Promise of eternal Life. So that the Grace of the Gospel is fitted to Man in his lapsed State and Condition, in order to his Restoration and Recovery.

V. The fifth and last Argument is, the Agency of the Divine Spirit, in pursuance of what God hath done in the Way of Divine Truth. For God sends not his Truth into the World alone; but having done one thing, will also do another, to make the former effectual. Now they that have not the Divine Spirit, want the great Commentator upon Divine Truth in the World. And therefore let such Men look after it: For this is a great and a certain Truth; that God, in his Grace and Goodness, will give his Spirit to guide, and teach, and assure the Minds of good Men; tho' none know it but those that feel him. But they who have the Spirit of God, know nothing more certain: For they have Satisfaction, and inward Peace, and Joy in believing; they perceive such Operations of God in themselves, whereof the World cannot receive any Account: The Divine Spirit doth open their Understandings, as it
did the Apostles; brings Things to their Remembrance; makes them consider the Inwards of Things; and calls them to Advertency and Consideration. The great Work of the Divine Spirit is to lead Men into right Apprehensions, and stay a Man's Thoughts in Consideration, till the Principles do receive Admittance, and become a Temper and Constitution, till they infuse and instil themselves, and make a lasting Impression. Tho' for my part, I do believe, that the Scripture is clear and full of Light, as to all Matters of Conscience, as to all Rules of Life, as to all necessary Matters of Faith; so that any well-minded Man that takes up the Bible and reads, may come to Understanding and Satisfaction. And hence it is that we have Sufficiency from God, to preserve us from Cheats of all Sorts. So that a well-minded Man, that hath this Instrument of God, need not be mistaken in any necessary Matters of Faith. For the Bible is sufficient and intelligible in the Way of Religion, and for all the Purposes thereof, as any other Book, for the Learning of any other Art or Science. And upon this account God hath done that which will justify him; and at our Peril be it, if we be found ignorant, or have been deceived: For we needed not ever have been ignorant, or mistaken in any thing that is vital in Religion. And to this Purpose there is also the divine Spirit still to attend upon this Instrument of God: So that they who do acknowledge God, and pray unto him for his Help and Assistance, have the Advantage of being taught by the Spirit, and by means thereof, are in a sure Way of Knowledge, with the consequent Effects of Holiness and Goodness.

By these Five Arguments, a Man may be resolved against the Atheism, Infidelity, and Prophaneness of the World. And from this Discourse, about which I have been long, I do infer,

That Atheism and Infidelity are the most unaccountable
Things in the World, and inexcuseable. The Atheist must be every where self-condemned; and the Infidel within the Pale of the Church. There is nothing that God hath done more in any way whatsoever, than he hath done for the Security of Men against Atheism; for I dare say, if any Man do but think, and use Reason, he may know all natural Truth. And what can a Man do less? How is he a Man, if he do not either of these? Doth any Man know any thing but by Thinking and Considering? Yea, perhaps, this is all that we pretend to; for we are born to nothing else. All Habits and Dispositions, all actual Knowledge, is our own Acquisition (with respect to the Grace of God). No Man is born to any actual Knowledge in the World, or to speak a Word, or understand a Notion; but all Habits and Dispositions are acquired. And therefore an Atheist shall be self-condemned: as one that never used his Reason, nor so much as exercised his own Thoughts. And for the Infidel within the Pale of the Church; if he will but search, and consider, he may find that which will beget Faith and Belief. And therefore the Atheist and the Infidel are the most unaccountable and inexcuseable Persons in the World; for they have done nothing themselves; they have not so much as thought or considered; they have not seen with their own Eyes.—— If a Man living in the World, or in the Church, be either an Atheist, or an Infidel; he hath been an idle Person in the World, and a Sluggard: His Understanding hath received no Culture or Care; he hath made no Improvement of himself, nor done any thing worthy of a Man.
THE VENERABLE NATURE, AND TRANSCENDANT BENEFIT OF CHRISTIAN RELIGION

For I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ: For it is the Power of God unto Salvation, to every one that believeth, to the Jew first, and also to the Greek.—Romans i. 16.

I have declared several Assurances we have of divine Truth, Natural, and Revea’d in Scripture; against Atheists, Infidels, and the Prophane: As,

1. The great Acknowledgment it hath met with, in the several Ages of the World.

2. The Representation that is hereby made of God, [which] is agreeable to what Man is made to know. The Proposals made to us by God, the Invitations made by him, the Prohibitions, Commands, and Promises, all these testify of God, and declare worthily concerning him.

3. The ingenuous Effects and Operations of Divine Truth, upon Mens Spirits, and in their Lives.

4. The Suitableness of Natural Truth to Man in his State of Institution; and of Revea’d Truth, to Man in his lapsed State, in order to his Restitution and Recovery.


Now if [this be] so, we may concur, in sense and Resolution with the Apostle. I am not ashamed of the Gospel, &c.

I am not ashamed.—This intimates, that there is some where Matter of Shame, within the Compass of the Business. Now here Man's Apostacy, and Sin; these are shameful things, which was the Occasion of the Gospel-Revelation.
The Grace of the Gospel, which comes to repair and to restore, puts us in mind of our ruinous and necessitous Condition: So that there is cause of Shame in the Case; though Cause of Glory and Triumph in the Grace of God.

*It is the Power of God unto Salvation.* POWER, not *strictly,* as limiting to one Perfection; but eminently, to attribute to the Efficacy of Divine Grace [these two Things], *vis.* Regeneration, Nativity from above (which is the Salvation of this State;) Glorification, and consummating us in Holiness; which is the Salvation of the Future.

To advance this Grace, and to raise our Apprehensions of it, consider the Author of it; (it is the Effect of the divine Wisdom, the Fruit of the Divine Love:) what it is in itself; and of what Benefit to us.

There must be Greatness of Power to erect such a Fabrick and Structure as the World is; and Excellency of Wisdom to administer the Affairs of it, in all Variety of Cases. Now it is pity any should do the like, that cannot also recover, and restore, if Necessity require: For so should finite and fallible (as we are) if in any Error or Mistake, be under an Impossibility of Redemption. It is according to Nature's Sense, rather never to have been, than for ever to be irrecoverably miserable: Wherefore, if I believe God made me, I will also believe God can restore me.

Nothing is clearer in Reason, nothing is fuller in Scripture, than that God is the first and chiefest Good. In respect of his Relation to his Creatures, earthly Parents do but resemble him: *John iii. 16. God so loved the World, that he gave his only begotten Son,* &c. It must be attributed to his Goodness and Compassion; because it was that which we cannot say he was at all bound to do: It was that which he could not be constrained to do: It was that which he was no Gainer by: For our Righteousness is not
profitable to him.—The Gospel of Christ is no Invention of Human Reason: Man neither prevented God, nor recompenced him after: Only the Necessity of Man's State required it; and God's Goodness afforded it: The Excellencies of Infinite Wisdom, Goodness, and Power, are displayed in it.

'Tis not a Mystery now; though formerly it was hid from Ages and Generations, Col. i. 26. But now it is the Council of God's Will declared.—He that darkens Words without Knowledge, brings us back again to the Infancy of the World. It was the Imperfection and Shortness of the Mosaical Dispensation that it was Typical, Mystical, Ceremonial, Symbolical; full of Shadows, things that did vail and darkly represent. Obscurity is Imperfection, as Darkness in comparison with Light. Life and Immortality, and all [the] Principles of it are brought to Light through the Gospel.

The Gospel is admirable Speculation; excellent Matter of Knowledge: For here is the Revocation of an insolent bold Act of Usurpation upon God, by Christ's full Submission and entire Self-resignation. A Prince and a Saviour is raised up by God, sent into the World, not to make Havock, to ruin and destroy; not as it is 2 Sam. xii. 31. where the People were put under Saws and Harrows of Iron, made to pass through Brick-kilns; a thing intolerable to behold; dreadful to read of; (though in this impotent incompetent World, many great Warriors are made famous for such things, even in unjustifiable War:) But he came to give Repentance and Forgiveness of Sin; He came to seek and to save that which was lost.

The Gospel is a Vital Principle, not of Natural Life, but Divine; as it satisfies the Reason of our Minds by Removal of Fears and Doubts, by the Life of Faith, Affiance, and Trust in God;—and, as it reforms our Spirits and Lives, as conveying and communicating Principles of Goodness
and Righteousness; [by which] we are made Partakers of the Divine Nature.

The Substance of the Gospel is, Repentance from dead Works, and Faith in the Lord Jesus Christ. These do go together, and encourage each other; in as much as no Man repents, who doth not believe; nor can any believe, who doth not repent. To believe, there is requisite an internal Disposition and Preparation of the Subject, as well as a Divine Promise to build upon. Joh. v. 44. Can you believe who receive Honour one of another, and seek not Honour from God? The same is in all Cases of Inordinacy and Sin. Repentance and Faith in the Gospel are indifferently used: He that believeth on the Son hath eternal Life, Joh. iii. 36. Now he doth not really believe, who doth not truly intend to do answerably. The Scripture calls believing on Christ, receiving of him, Joh. i. 12. If we receive him, then we receive him such as he is, and to such Effects and Purposes as God sent him for: Now God sent him to bless us, in turning us from our Iniquities. The Scripture useth Synecdoches: Sometimes Believing is put for the whole of Religion; sometimes Repenting; sometimes Fearing; sometimes Love. If we would not be partial, nor deceive our selves, we must always take in all concomitant Acts. Scripture, as the Rule of Faith, is not one single Text, (which may be short, and intend another thing) but the Fulness of Scripture. In all other Cases, he that believes doth according as he thinks. Faith includes an Intention of new Obedience.

I may with great Reason say, that the Matter of the Gospel is a Vital Principle; as it satisfies the Reason of our Mind, [and] so sets us at Rest and Quietness within ourselves, as thereby seeing and knowing that we are out of danger.—In the intellectual Nature, a Principle of Knowledge, as to the Understanding, is vital; as well as an habitualDisposition, as to the Will. What more Satis-
faction can there be to the Reason of our Minds, [what more] tending to the Quiet of our Consciences, than to be assured, in a Matter of such Importance to us, that God, to whom we are so obnoxious by Transgression and Sin, is most placable and reconcileable of himself, through the Perfection of his own Nature; and that he is absolutely resolv'd and engaged, by his voluntary Determination and Promise, to pardon Sin, in and through Christ, to all who repent and believe the Gospel: And this, and nothing less than this, is the Matter of the Gospel: This is to be accepted in and through Christ, and is the real Explication of Justification by imputed Righteousness. For this being suppos'd, and proving true; We are sure of God,—we know his Terms.—The Terms are fair and equal in themselves; fit and just: For should not an Offender do what is in him to undo what he hath done amiss?—The Terms are good for us; for we cannot be happy by God, in a way of opposition to God, but by Submission and Reconciliation to him.—They are such as are possible, through the Grace and Assistance of God.—So that there is nothing in the whole World that we have more Reason to desire and pray for, than that they be verified, fulfilled and accomplished in us.

There are no two things more inward to us, than Satisfaction to our Reason, that we may be at quiet; and the settling of our Minds in Frame and Temper, that we may enjoy ourselves. In these two the Life of Man consists; and these depend on the Knowledge of the Gospel.

[Now], the Matter of the Gospel is [also] a vital Principle, as it is a Byass upon our Spirits, an habitual Temper and Disposition constantly affecting us, and inclining us Godward, and to ways of Goodness, Righteousness and Truth. For it is inwardly received, so as to dye and colour the Soul; so as to settle a Temper and Constitution: And so
it is restorative to our Natures.—That which we do but indifferently by our Ability, we are able to do dexterously and easily by Custom. Through the Divine Grace and Assistance we are both able and freely willing. The Law of the Spirit of Life in Christ frees us from the Law of Sin and Death. The Principles of the Christian Religion do not only controul intemperate and exorbitant Acts, but regulate the inward Frame and Temper of Mind, the Inclinations, elicit Acts, and first Motions. As Christ said to God, not my Will but thy Will; so we must, through Participation of Christ, be let into a Temper of Meekness and Gentleness to our Fellow-Creatures, and a submissive self-denying Frame in respect of God. Hence our Lives and Manners are of another Fashion. By the Spirit of the Gospel we are transformed into another Nature, Life and Temper. Neither do I terminate the Ultimate Issue of Christ in the happy Effects of Renovation in ourselves, and Reconciliation to God; (tho’ these are Benefits transcendent to all worldly Wealth, Greatness and Power;) but it doth not now appear, neither can we now bear the thought of it, what we may be when God shall be all in all; and all Enmity subdued.—These are two things, and very different; what Man may come to, by the Improvement of himself, in the right use of himself, his natural Power and Faculties, directing himself by his ordinary Rules, [as] he is God’s Creature, and may attain his Natural State and End; and what Man may come to, as he is endued with Power from above; as he is assumed into a Relation to God, by Jesus Christ; as he is a Member of that Body whereof Christ is the Head, as the Adoption of God by Jesus Christ; and as he is so enliven’d by the Divine Spirit, as did not belong to Man in the State of Innocency.—But these are not things of our present State; for even Adam, as he was made, was not fit. For Flesh and Blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God.
The Application now only remains.

Having made appear to you that the Doctrine of the Gospel, both in respect of its proper Vertue and Efficiency, as also in respect of Divine Intention, is effectual to the bringing of Men to Salvation; then are you, first to acquaint yourselves throughly with the Terms of the Gospel, to pass [Judgment] upon it, to consider well all the Circumstances that make up the Case; Our contracted Impotency and great Deformity by our Fall; the Necessity of Recovery and Restoration; the Efficacy and the Freeness of the Grace of God to Conversion. So that we may resolve our Minds; tho' our Case be very forlorn, because of our Defection and Apostacy from the Innocency of our Creation, and self-contracted Misery; yet nothing is desperate, nothing is impossible in the Case; but our Recovery, through the Grace of God, is fairly easy.

And being thus prepar'd by such Knowledge and Apprehensions; pursue the Intent of the Gospel in your own Spirits, and in Conjunction of yourselves with others, by free Communication in Converse; for this is certain, and found by Experience, that the only way to do a Man's self good in Intellectuals and Spirituals, is to do good to others. No Man gains so much as by Teaching. No Man so Improves in Intellectuals, as by Communication; which doth much commend Intellectuals, that they increase by Expence. If a Man hath brought himself to some Perfection by Consideration, he will make himself much more, by free Communication; and in free Communication, you will have another suggest that which, it may be, you did not think of: So he will put you upon further Consideration, or else preserve you from Presumption. None are of such modest Spirits as [they] who live in free Communication and Converse. This I subjoin, for the improving of a Man's self in the way of the Gospel, and answering the vigorous Spirit of the Gospel; be com-
And this is the Purpose of all our Meetings: Free Communication, to answer every Man's Doubts; to give every one Satisfaction. It is the highest Service, and greatestCourtesy we can do one another, freely to tell what we have conceive'd; and we do ourselves most effectual Good, when we carry on others with us, when we do Good unto others.

The first thing in Religion is to teach a Man's own Mind; to satisfy a Man's self, in the Reason of things; to look to the Grounds and Assurance that a Man hath for his Thoughts, Apprehensions and Perswasions: But then it is prodigious and monstrous if that wherein my Reason is resolv'd and satisfied, should not have such an Influence upon my Mind, as to establish me in Life accordingly, and to be a Rule both in Temper and Practice. That which we call in Morals against the Order of Reason, is so much more horrid, unnatural, and prodigious than in inferior Nature, for Sensitives to go against the Guidance of Sense, [or] for Inanimates against the Force of Nature; [it is, I say], so much more unnatural; as Intelligent Agents transcend, in Perfection, Sensitives, and Inanimates: Reason being as proportionable to its Effects, as any Principle in inferior Nature.

There are two Orders or Ranks of Creatures in this visible World; the Order of Sensitives, and of Inanimates: The World of Sensitives, they are true and infallible; they are true to that which is their predominant Principle; that is, Sense; and they never vary: And Inanimates, they certainly tend according to their Nature. Now the Principle in the higher Order of Creatures, viz. of Rational and Intelligent Agents, is Apprehension of the Reason of things. Now the Reasons of things are Eternal; they are not subject to any Power; we practice not upon them: It is our Wisdom to observe them; and our Goodness to comply with them: But they are as much our Rule,
as Sense to Sensitives, and the Impetus of Nature to Inanimates. Now you would think it monstrous, prodigious and unnatural, for the Sun to give over shining, for heavy things to ascend, for light things to descend, for Fire not to burn: Yet it is more prodigious for any one that is an Intelligent Agent and voluntary, not to comply with the Reason of things; because he is a Creature of a higher Order, and his Principle is more excellent. By which you may see the Degeneracy of us Mortals; in that the State below us remains in the same Principle it was created in; but we Men do neither find out the Reasons of things, nor comply with them. Our Deformity is more; because our Perfection is more, and the Order of our Being is higher; and we were made more sufficient to our Con-natural Acts, than either Sensitives, or Inanimates to their proper Acts; and we use to say, the Fault is greater in him that is in a higher State.

This is to awaken Men to understand the Reason of the Gospel, and to consider it; that it may become the Reason of our Mind: And if it be the Reason of our Mind, it will be a vital Principle of Life.

The Intent of the Gospel being such as it is, (viz. the greatest Good possible;) and it being the Enquiry of all Mortals, Who will shew us any Good? it is matter of great Astonishment, that it should be so neglected; so much being done on God's part towards Man's Salvation, and so much Reason for it on Man's part.

1st, So much being done on God's part. For, Man's Salvation doth import Man's Happiness. Salvation from first to last, doth include the several Stages and Progressions in the passing from the Death of Sin, from the Carnal Mind, from the Corrupt Nature, into a Spiritual State and Divine Life. This is the Salvation of this State: And the Consummation of this is the Salvation of the
other. Do but consider how much God hath done upon this Account. Consider the many Promises and pathetical Invitations God hath made to Sinners; Promises to receive them; Promises to enable them; Promises to reward them. How did our Saviour mourn over Jerusalem? How did God by the Prophets everywhere complain, upon Man's Remissness?

2dly, Considering there is so much Reason for it on Man's part; that it is not only just, and fit in itself; but good for us. It is just and fit, to repent: For can any one think that it is reasonable, by an After-Act, to justify an Act of Arrogance? If he doth not, he must repent: For whosoever commits a Sin, and doth not repent of it, he lives to justify it.—— Repentance is good for us; for without it, we are self-condemn'd, and in an Incapacity of Happiness. Self-condemnation I take to be the very Life of Hell: And a Man must be self-condemn'd, unless he repent, after the committing of Sin.—— Repentance doth ease a Man's Mind. He that doth repent, would make Satisfaction, and doth recal it, what he can. It is not possible for a Man to be made happy, by putting him into a Happy Place, unless he be in a Good State. A Man is not happy in the State wherein he is not qualified. We are not capable of Happiness, unless we be restored to Innocency by Repentance. The Gospel is the Restitution of us to the State of our Creation, to the use of our Principles, to our healthful Constitution, and to Acts con-natural to us; and, under the Grace of God, is not only possible, but a thing of easy and fair Performance: For though without God, we are insufficient to do any thing; yet through the Grace of God, we are enabled to do all things that the Gospel requires. In this way, the Mind of Man may have Assurance and Satisfaction. It is a compassionate Case for him that is Supreme and Sovereign, to pity an unavoidable Necessity and Misery,
and to pardon so far as the Case is compassionate. Now we are in the Hands of him that is primarily and originally good: And he will certainly commiserate every Case, so far as it is compassionate. Now the Case of a Sinner is compassionate, if he be penitent; because he was never better than finite and fallible. Nothing is more credible than that the first and chiefest Goodness will save to the utmost Extent of Disposition in the Subject.

On the other side, consider we God as the first and chiefest Goodness; it is worthy of him, and in itself good, that Evil be controuled: Therefore I cannot conceive, but that the Goodness of God must engage him to punish obstinate Sinners. Parents think it becoming, to punish an obstinate Child.—— Consider we him also in a relative Capacity, as he is the Governor of the World: He is engaged to maintain Order, so it is not comely in God to pass over Contumacy in Sin without challenging or controuling. So that as I do easily see, that the Case of a Sinner that is penitent is compassionate; so on the other side, I cannot conceive that a contumacious impenitent Sinner can be pardoned; since it is in itself good, and also worthy God (either considered absolutely in himself, as the first and chiefest Good; or relatively, as the Governor of the World) to controul and challenge wilful and pertinacious Transgressors.

Consider we, the Unreasonableness of Sin in Three Particulars.

1st, In Acts of Impiety against God. Can any Reason be imagined for these? For, God being the Original of Man's Being; the Center of his Soul; his ultimate End, and every Way well deserving of him; Can any give a Reason why any Man should be rebellious against him? Is there any Temptation to sober Reason unto Impiety? What can be alleged to induce Men to affront and offer Contempt to God?
2dly, What can be allledged for Intemperance; since Nature is content with very few things? Why should any one over-do in this kind? A Man is better in Health and Strength, if he be temperate. We enjoy ourselves more in a sober and temperate Use of ourselves. What Aches, Diseases, Pains, and Sicknesses doth a Man bring upon himself, if he be intemperate? How many of these are founded in Excess?

3dly, Sins of Unrighteousness; —— whosoever doth an unrighteous Act, he doth justify all the Villanies in the World, even Highway-men and Robbers: For it is the same thing; you are Sinners in the same kind; for all is Unrighteousness; there is Difference only in Degree. One may offend more in human Laws: But the Offence is the same in righteous Laws.——Besides, what Confidence can we ourselves have in respect of others? For no man will think better of others than of himself. He that is guilty of Unrighteousness, cannot but be jealous, and think the same of others: So that he can have no Confidence in others.

Thus you see the Unreasonableness of Sin. Yet because of ill Use, Custom, and Practice, Difficulty is pretended [and it is thought hard], to be vertuous. Do not Beasts observe the Rules of their Nature?——That which Religion requires, is to find out the Reason of Things, and to comply with it; to move according to the Dictates of Reason; and to observe the Order of the End; to avoid such things as will do us harm; in short, to live according to the Difference of Good and Evil; to do the one, and to avoid the other; which are not positive and arbitrary Impositions; but they arise from Conveniencies, and from Inconveniencies of our Natures, States, and Relations. So that the Sinner is a Person of violent Practice, and one who doth unnatural Acts. And an Impenitent is one of a senseless and stupid Mind.
The Things that are the Bane of Mankind, and that do alienate us from God, are Sensuality, Worldly-mindedness and Wickedness. The two former of these do sink the Creation of God below itself; so that it doth not continue the same that God made it. A Man, by these, is rendred utterly unfit for Converse and Communication with God. For, by these, he sinks himself below his Kind, and makes himself equal to the Beast that perishes. And by the latter ([viz.] Wickedness) Man passeth into a clean contrary nature, becomes an Enemy to God, and makes God an Enemy to him.

Against Sensuality and Worldliness, I propose for Remedy, the Application of the Principles of Reason and Vertue, and the applying of our highest Faculties to their End and Object. For while the Mind is employed in heavenly Meditation, or in extracting spiritual Notions from material Things; it is employed worthy of intellectual Nature: And our proper Business is to be thus employed: By which the Concerns of the Body will be either laid aside, or moderately engaged in, and regarded. Whereas this Power of our Souls is, as it were lost, where Men use themselves as if they had no Spirits, but were altogether Body; or as if the Body were the principal or governing Part. And in such a Condition are they, who cannot understand what we mean when we bid them lift up their Hearts to God. For the Candle of God's lighting within them, whereby they are qualified to find God out in his Works, and to follow him in his Ways, either it burns so dim that they cannot see by it, or it is quite put out. For it is found by Experience, that the Malignity of the Heart doth blind the Understanding: And true Wisdom will never abide in a malicious and wicked Soul.——There are indeed Souls that are [so] active and so well acquainted with heavenly Meditation; that they very well know what is the Food of Souls, and have the Fore-taste of the Delight and Pleasure of the other
World. And certainly, these Men have the greatest Satisfaction in their Lives of any other Persons. For there is more Satisfaction in Meditation, in Reading, in Conference about Divine Things, in Application to God by Prayer, and other holy Exercises, than in any bodily Pleasure whatsoever. For all *bodily Exercise* comes off with Disquiet of Spirit: Whereas in the other Way there is Refreshment every Moment; there is new Acquisition: For if there be any thing like Infinite in the Creation under God, it is in Invention, and the Power of Thinking. This is the Advantage of *Intellectual* Exercise, above *Bodily* Exercise. The one works inwardly, is still on the getting hand, and is still in use; for what this Man gets, he hath still in Store; and that which is got in this way of intellectual Employment, will still improve by Use; and what we get, we always keep; for Knowledge is no burden: whereas in things of the Body, *use, and Want:* Spend, and be ever after without. But it is no wonder, that they who never acquainted themselves with retiring from the World, know not what these Things mean; who mind only worldly Things, and know no more than what belongs to the animal Life. But, on the other Side, if a Man make Application to God, he acts with all his Might; he recollects himself, and gathers himself into himself, that he may receive from God, what God hath to communicate. And the Things that God hath and doth offer, are so great and glorious, that our narrow Vessels had need be wholly emptied to make room for them.

Therefore the Minds Substraction from the World is necessary, by way of Preparation and holy Meditation, to beget in us such a Disposition, by which we may receive from God. A Man that can enjoy himself alone, by Consideration, and exercising his Faculties, may run thro', as it were, all times: For a Man may live *before* he lives, and *after*, in this way: He may, by reading, acquaint himself with what was in former Times; and by what
Things are, he may guess what are to come. If he reflect upon Things past, and view Things that are present, and take a Prospect of Things to come, as the Effect of Causes that are in being; in this way rational Faculties have sufficient Employment; whereas they that are always drudging in the Affairs of the World, and never enjoy themselves alone; will find little Satisfaction in these Things.

It is the proper Work of Reason in Man, to find God out in his Works, and to follow him in his Ways.

It is the proper Employment of our intellectual Faculties, to be conversant about God, to conceive aright of him; and then to resemble and imitate him. Religion is an Obligation upon us to God. The first Motion of Religion is to understand what is true of God: And the second is to express it in our Lives, and to copy it out in our Works. The Former is our Wisdom; and the Latter is our Goodness. In these two consist the Health and Pulchritude of our Minds. For Health to the Body, is not more, than Vertue is to the Mind. A depraved and vicious Mind is as really the Sickness and Deformity thereof, as any foul and loathsome Disease is to the Body. And as really as these tend to the Death and Dissolution of the Soul and Body; so the Vices of the Mind tend to the Separation of God and the Soul.

What is short and inferior to Converse with God, doth require a Recess from worldly Business and Employment. A Man can hardly compose an ordinary Poem without this: But for the noblest Employment receiving from God, and making Acknowledgement to him; is a Man fit for this, in the Hurry of Business, and Confusion of Things? It is also observed, that this Life of Privacy, and Retirement is either the best, or the worst Life: For, in it, we do as God doth; or we imitate the Devil. He who can be alone to his own Content, in Measure and Degree, is as God is: For what
other Employment had God from Eternity, but satisfying himself in his own Goodness? But as [this] may be the best; so it may be the worst Life: For a Man may be employed in contriving Mischief as the Devil is, whose Work is said to be to bring Men into Condemnation. If therefore [we are] alone to ill Purposes and Designs; then, Solitariness and Retirement do make the worst Life. [But] if [Man] be retired and alone, and not intellectually employed; then through Stupidity and Dulness, he sinks down into the State of a Beast: For take it for a certain Truth, to be Well and Unactive do not consist together. No Man is well without Action; nothing is more irksome than Idleness. A Man must use his Faculties, and put himself upon Action. Therefore, if he be alone and unactive, he cannot be well. In all honest Labour there is Satisfaction; whereas Sluggishness and Neglect are unaccountable, and unsatisfactory.

The Mind diverted from God, wanders in Darkness and Confusion: But being directed to him, soon finds its Way, and doth receive from him in a Way that is abstracted from the Noise of the World, and withdrawn from the Call of the Body; having shut the Doors of our Senses, to recommend ourselves to the Divine Light, which readily enters into the Eye of the Mind that is prepar'd to receive it. For there is Light enough of God in the World, if the Eye of our Minds were but fitted to receive it, and let it in. It is the Incapacity of the Subject, where God is not; for nothing in the World is more knowable than God. God only is absent to them that are indisposed, and disaffected: For a Man cannot open his Eye, nor lend his Ear, but every thing will declare more or less of God. It is our Fault that we are estranged from him: For God doth not withdraw himself from us, unless we first leave him: The Distance is occasioned through our unnatural Use of ourselves.
CHRISTIAN RELIGION

They who live the Life of Sense, are apt to be beaten off from all Regard to God, by those Occurrences that discompose their Minds. [But] they who are separated from Body, who sit loose to earthly Things [which] obstruct the Mind, do easily receive the Divine Light. Whereas those that are in Prison in gross Bodies, need the Fire of Divine Affection to quicken them. And this I understand in the Language of the Scripture, to be Baptizing with Fire, Mat. iii. 11. when Divine Affection burns up all contrary Principles in the Soul, and brings the Soul into a Likeness and Similitude to God. For, the Divine Light received into the Mind, doth first irradiate and clear the Mind from its gross and thick Darkness, whereby it was unexercised and unemploy'd about God: And this is the first Work; Mental Illumination; raising right Notions of God, and Things in our Minds; [scattering] the Mists of Darkness. [Yet] Light alone works not a Change: But there must be holy Affection. Knowledge is the first Step to Virtue: But [Goodness] is not but by Delight and Choice.

It is a mighty unequal and unaccountable Distribution of Time, for a Man to lay out himself for his Body; and to neglect his Mind, to feed the Beast (for so the Body [is], in respect of the Mind: [It] is but the Beast that carries the Soul:) And this for these Reasons: Because the Mind is so much annoyed and disturbed by Body: I speak not now of the Body, as sinning and distemper'd: But in ordinary Cases, take the Body in all its Advantages, 'tis an Incumbrance to the Mind: For when the Mind raiseth itself to Contemplation of immaterial Things; the Imagination doth suggest the Management of corporeal; which are things of an inferior Nature. Bodily Sense reacheth but a little Way, whether by the Eye, or by the Ear, or any other Sense. That which is equal, just, [and] fit; [that] wherein we are most concerned, in point of Goodness, Wisdom, and Happiness; these are all imperceptible Notions to every
Thing of Body. What is fit, what is just, what is equal, what is good and excellent, what is reasonable: of these no bodily Sense doth judge. And, yet, these are the Things that we are most concern’d in, upon account of our Happiness.

A Mind subdued and subordinate to God, in all its Actions and Motions, is as the sublunary Bodies here below, which are subject to the heavenly Bodies above; as Wax under the Seal, or Clay in the Potter’s Hand. The Motion is a great deal more noble and generous, because it is in a higher Order, by Illumination and Conviction, by Perswasion and mental Satisfaction; but it is not less effectual to [its] Intent and Purpose. Religion puts the Soul in a right Posture towards God; for we are thereby renewed in the Spirit of our Minds. The Soul of Man to God is as the Flower to the Sun; it opens at its Approach, and shuts when it withdraws. Religion in the Mind is as a Biass upon the Spirit, inclines it in all its Motions; tho’ sometimes it be jogg’d and interrupted, yet it comes to itself. It is a Rule within, a Law written in Man’s Heart; it is the Government of his Spirit. We say, Men shew their Spirit, by their Carriage, Behaviour and Words; and it is true. The good Man is an Instrument in Tune; Excite a good Man, give him an Occasion, you shall have from him savoury Speeches out of his Mouth, and good Actions in his Life. Religion contains and comprehends in it all good Qualities and Dispositions of Mind; it doth take in all the Virtues that human Nature is capable of, which are the Qualifications and Ornaments thereof, and which are the Mind’s Instruments for good Actions. Religion is rational, accountable, and intelligible: The Difference is not more sensible between a Man that is weak and strong, a Man that is sick and in Health, [than between a Man that is truly Religious, and one falsly so]. You may observe it, if you put them upon Action. So, a Man that is
truly Religious, if you put him in Motion, he will acquit and approve himself so: If he be false in his Religion, you will see it by his Failing and Miscarriage of Life.

Such is the Christian Religion, in respect of the Nature and Quality of it, all the Principles of it, all the Exercises and Performances that it puts Men upon; it is so sovereign to our Natures; so satisfactory to the Reason of our Minds; so quieting unto, and of such Security against the Molestation of our Consciences; so sanitary, so full for our Recovery, that none who knows, or doth seriously consider, would chuse to have his Obligation to Religion either released, cancell'd, or discharged.

To conclude, How inexcusable, how unaccountable are they who have turn'd the Doctrine of the Gospel, or the Grace of God into Lasciviousness; and to use St. Paul's Phrase, have made void the Law through Faith. He represents it as the most sad Miscarriage, to disoblige a Man in Morals; to set a Man at Liberty [as] to those things that are reasonable and necessary. For the Law of God's Creation is no way damnified, but restor'd, and secured by the Doctrine of the Gospel; yet these excuse themselves from strict Morality, and conscientious Living, which the better Sort of Heathens thought themselves obliged unto.

— We prejudice ourselves miserably by Mistakes. Some think that the hellish State is the Product of Omnipotency and Sovereignty, the Effect of God's Power; and they think of God, that he useth his Creatures as he will; giving no Account of any of his Matters to Principles of Reason and Righteousness. But certainly the Ways of God are most accountable of any thing, to Rules of Righteousness. These are injurious Apprehensions of God, and dishonourable to him; and are disclaimed by him every where in Scripture; and God owns no such Power; neither doth he look upon it as a Privilege; nor doth he clothe himself with such a Prerogative.——Here is the Truth of the Case: Misery
doth arise out of ourselves; and Misery and Iniquity have the same Foundation. Hell (for the main of it) is our Guiltiness and Conscience of it: So that a Sinner is in a self-condemned State, without Relief.—These two are the Ingredients of the hellish State; Self-condemnation from the Guilt of a Man's Conscience, that is not removed by Repentance; and God's Refusal upon a righteous Cause, because the Sinner would not come within the Latitude of a compassionate Case.
THE WORK OF REASON

Think on these Things.—PHILIP. iv. 8.

I have treated (as you know) of the several Perfections and Accomplishments that are charged upon us here by the Apostle upon account of Religion, and have given you an account what those things are that the Apostle doth recommend, as the necessary Qualifications and due Endowments of a Christian Spirit.

In the first place we had, Whatsoever Things are true. Religion requires Simplicity, Ingenuity, Sincerity, Integrity, Uprightness in our Profession.

2. Whatsoever Things are grave, venerable, seemly, comely, honourable, unto the Person. Religion requires good Behaviour, fair Depoartment of our selves, such demeanour and carriage as may gain Reverence and Esteem, and bear off all Contempt and Disrespect.

3. Whatsoever things are just or equal. Religion holds us to Rules of Right; and if Equity require that which is better and exceeds Right, we are to do the thing that is equal, to consider all compassionable Cases as God does, to make allowance as far as Reason may require.

4. Whatsoever Things are pure or holy. A Person of Religion is truly devout; affected towards God, and the things wherein he may observe him and shew his regard towards him: He is no trifler nor dallier with God, nor a prophaner of holy Things.

5. Whatsoever Things are lovely. A Person of Religion is for the nobler and worthier part, in all competition of Things and Actions.
6. **Whatsoever Things are of good report.** A Person of Religion approves himself to all Rules and Laws of Reason and of Righteousness; is irreprovable in the judgment of sober and impartial Men.

7. **If there be any Virtue.** Whatsoever Virtue there is, in account, or esteem, amongst Men; A Person of Religion is prepared to all good Offices, he is for all good Purposes, he is a Person exercised in all the several Virtues and Accomplishments of Humane Nature; he is baptized into, and sanctified by the Virtues, as the Moralist speaks.

8. And lastly, **If there be any Praise.** A Person of Religion employs himself in things that are commendable and praiseworthy. Of all these I have given you some Account.

And now here, upon the whole Matter he doth enjoyn them all together by superadding these Words, *Think on these Things.* The English Translation abates of the Emphasis that is in the Greek; for if you read them according to the Greek, it is, *In the use of your Reason and Understanding think these things to be reasonable;* use your own Faculties; use Mind and Understanding, and you will be satisfied that all these things are worthy of you, and becoming you; they will be suitable to your Reason. A Person of Religion is, First, all this in his Judgment and internal Sense.

2dly, He is all this in his Temper, and the disposition of his Mind, the settled complexion and constitution of his Soul.

3dly. He is so in his Life and Practice, and in his whole Conversation with Men; he is not only so now and then, and as we say, by fits and starts, on occasion, when he is specially engaged; but the very Reason of his Mind is reconciled to the Rule and measure of Things and Actions.

Now this is that which I am to recommend to you, not
only that these things should have an Obligation upon you at some times, (for that is but dull), but that you should be reconciled to all these things in the Reason of your Minds, that these things should become natural to you, a Frame and Temper, a Complexion and Constitution of Soul. Apply these things to the Reason of your Minds, and you cannot but be convinced of the reasonableness of them; for the Materials of Religion do exercise, teach, and satisfie.

That which is the Height and Excellency of Humane Nature, viz. our Reason, is not laid aside nor discharged, much less is it confounded by any of the Materials of Religion; but awakened, excited, employed, directed, and improved by it: For the Mind and Understanding of Man, is that Faculty, whereby Man is made capable of God, and apprehensive of him, receptive from him, and able to make returns upon him, and acknowledgments to him. Bring that with you, or else you are not capable Receivers: Unless you drink in these Moral Principles; unless you do receive them by Reason, the Reason of Things by the Reason of your Mind, your Religion is but shallow and superficial. For this you are to understand, that Man is a Compound of different things, hath several sorts of Faculties, above any Creature in this visible World. He hath an immortal Spirit, as well as a bodily Substance: And though the Spirit of Man in this State be joyned to a Body, and made a Member of this material visible World, yet it self doth belong to another Country. I say, a Man is a Compound of different and several things; he hath several sorts of Faculties, which we are wont in our Philosophy to call his upper and his lower Powers; and by these he doth converse with things of a very different order. By the higher Powers, he is able to converse both with God and things Spiritual and Celestial; and by the lower Powers, with Terrene and Earthy. As to Instance:
By Mind, and Understanding, and Will, he hath intercourse and communion with God, and things invisible; and by these he is fitted to the improving all the lower Objects to Heavenly Ends and Purposes. But then, by Sense, Imagination and bruitish Affection, we can only maintain Acquaintance with this outward and lower World. But by this Principle of Reason and Understanding, we are made capable of Religion. So that Man's peculiar Object and proper Business, is in things of the Mind; and therefore he ought to use those high Faculties of his Soul, to enquire after God, and find out Truth, and the Reason of Things; and consequently after such enquiry, to determine himself in his Resolution and Choice, to Things according to their intrinsick worth and value.

Two things here I say. 1st, No Man is born to be idle in the World: For tho' it is the privilege of some particular persons, that they who were born before them have provided for all Comforts, Necessities, and Conveniences of Life; so that they have enough to enjoy, with a Superfluity and abundance: Yet this I will say of all Men, and indifferently of all our Ancestors, that though they might acquire Inheritances and worldly Conveniencies, yet they could not acquire for, or leave to any of us, mental Endowments, no habitual Dispositions: But in respect of these 'tis true, that every body is Master of his own Fortune under God; Every Man hath himself, as he useth himself. He that by Motion upwards contemplates God, converses with things Spiritual and Immaterial, he doth fit himself more for attendance upon God, and converses with Angels and separate Souls; but he that through Bruitishness and Sensuality sinks into this lower World, and lives to grow less, he will finally shrivel up and come to nothing.

Now here is that, which I recommend to you all; Work for the Mind; and this is that which is most peculiar and
THE WORK OF REASON

proper to Humane Nature. No one is born to this, more than another: But if you will be intellectually improved, if you will be refined in your Spirits, refined in your Morals; if you will be more than the vulgus Hominum; you must set your selves in the ways of Reading, Meditation and Conference, and Self-reflection, and awaken your Intellectuals; or else you shall come to nothing.

2. That which in the second place I superadd, is this: That the first Operation in Religion, is Mental and Intellectual, (viz.) Consideration, Discussion, Examination, Self-reflection, approving the Reason of Things to the Reason of our Minds as the proper Rule. This is a Notion worthy of your Consideration. In all Things of weight, in the great Points of Conscience, in the great Materials of Religion, there is a Reason in the Things, that doth enforce them, and enjoin them upon us, and require them of us. As, if I be God's Creature, stand in relation to him, am capable of him; I am naturally and unavoidably under an obligation of Duty and Affection to him; and I am bound to serve him, honour, and live in regard of him. Here is the Reason of the Thing; And the Reason of your Mind is to find it out; which a Beast cannot do; therefore is uncapable of Religion. But this is that which you are to do; and there is no Religion but in this. I say, if so be a Man doth not admit what he receives, with satisfaction to the Reason of his Mind; he doth not receive it as an intelligent Agent, but he receives it as a Vessel receives Water; he is continuens rather than recipiens. But this is the peculiarity of Humane Nature, that through the Reason of his Mind he may come to understand the Reason of Things: And this is that you are to do; and there is no coming to Religion but this way. Wherefore they begin at the wrong end, who do not set themselves at first thus to work; and so are not at all likely to hold out, or go on; or if they
do continue to retain a certain Mode or way of Religion, they are not likely to bring any thing in Religion to perfection; For the Mind’s Satisfaction and Resolution is the first and principal: And if we leap over this, and jump into a profession of Religion without this Consideration, Discussion, Examination, Self-reflection, and approving the Reason of our Minds to the Reason of Things as the proper Rule; we shall be ever lame in our way, and slight in our business. We shall not build upon a Rock; we shall not lay a solid Foundation. Our Saviour therefore bids us, before we engage to build a Tower, to sit down, consider, and recount whether we shall be able to finish it, Luke 14, 26, to the 32. For, assure your selves, whatsoever is rashly begun, it uncertainly goes on, and foolishly deceives, either in Religion or any thing else.

Of all Impotencies in the World, Credulity in Religion is the greatest. This Solomon hath observed, that simple, weak, shallow Heads are foolish, and believe that which any one saith; sail with every Wind that blows. Prov. 14, 15. The Simple believeth every word; but the prudent Man looketh well about him. When a Man hath made a deliberate Act of Judgment in a Case, upon consideration of Reason, Grounds and Principles; he hath always ever after within him, whereby to encourage him to go on, and answer all Objections as they shall arise. Whereas he that begins not thus; upon all contrary appearances, he will be unsettled and unstable in all his ways: But the Person of Examination and Consideration, that begins upon Discussion, &c, and so comes to well-grounded Resolution; he is encouraged from the memory of the Motives that made him begin, the Motives that set him at work; and the prospect of the End at which he did aim, and which he did design, and which he hath also constantly in his Eye. But he that begins inconsiderately, he is so weak in his way, that there is little expectation
of his holding out. And truly this is a just account of all the shameful and horrid Apostacy of all formal Professors; they did never weigh and examine, they did never reconcile their Religion to the Reason of their Minds; so that really they have but an external Denomination from their Profession.

Man is not at all settled or confirmed in his Religion, until his Religion is the self-same with the Reason of his Mind; that when he thinks he speaks Reason, he speaks Religion; or when he speaks religiously, he speaks reasonably; and his Religion and Reason is mingled together; they pass into one Principle; they are no more two, but one: just as the light in the Air makes one illuminated Sphere; so Reason and Religion in the Subject, are one Principle.

To hold this forth more fully, I will lay it out in four Propositions.

First, It is Lowness and Imperfection in Religion, to drudge in it; and every Man drudges in Religion, that takes up Religion as a Task, carries it as a Burden; and doth it, because he must do it, or because his Superiours require it of him, or because time, and place, and custom calls for it; because the Day requires it, or because it is such an Hour, because he is now up, or because he must now go to bed. If this be the best Motive a Man hath, his Religion is but a Burthen. But they who are come to any growth in Religion, are free spirited in it, and do it with inward Satisfaction, Pleasure and Content: They harmonize with it: They understand it is in it self best, and fit so to do; and that it is also good in it self, and good for them; worthy in respect of God, and becoming them in the relation they stand in to him; tends to their Perfection, and will bring them to Happiness.

A Man hath this at least by his Religion, that if by accident he admits of Sin, he never does it with pleasure;
he doth not, like the Ox, drink Iniquity like Water, as Eliphas elegantly expresses it; But this is his Temper, and he hath Joseph’s Resolution, How can I do this great Wickedness and sin against God? I say again, he hath this advantage by his Religion, that if by Temptation, by Surprize, or violent Assault, he happens to admit any evil, he doth it with displacency, he offends himself as well as God: And he hath a Principle within him of Self-recovery, viz. that which St Paul speaks of Rom. 7, 23, the Law of his Mind: So that, as Water, if it chance to be sullied, hath in it a Principle to work the Dregs to the bottom; so will this Man by Repentance and Ingenuity recover himself to his Innocency; And this is that which our Saviour means by pure in Heart; and in this he hath a convinced, satisfied Judgment, because he hath an internal Principle. The reason of his Mind is taught and illuminated; he is in this condemned in his own Conscience, and he will hasten to make his Peace with himself as well as with God.

And indeed I tell you by the way, it is a harder matter for a truly good Man, of honest Principles, to forgive himself, than to obtain forgiveness of God; though I make no question but that God, according to his Promise, doth presently forgive every true Penitent, if he go to God according to his direction.

I say in this case he is condemned of himself, and therefore he will hasten to set all things right and streight within himself, and be at peace with his own Mind; and that is by revocation of what was done amiss; by deprecating God’s Displeasure, by asking God forgiveness, by crying him Mercy, by double Diligence and Watchfulness and Resolution never to do the like again.

Secondly, The Seat of Religion is the inward Man; it is first the sense of a Man’s Soul, the Temper of his Mind, the Pulse of his Heart. You have always in intellectual
Nature, the elicit Acts, as we call them; that is, mental and internal Acts; and they always precede and go before imperative Acts, that is, external Acts. The elicit Acts of the Mind, they are first. It lies first within the Mind; after that, it doth appear externally, in Speeches, Gestures, Actions, and the Effects of all good Self-government.

In rational and in all intellectual Nature, you have first that which we call the speech of a Man's Mind with itself; the Mind doth parly with it self, debates the thing throughly; then you have the Overt-Acts, and afterwards you have the Mind's Sense put into Language. This is the way of Operation in intellectual Natures, to speak with our selves before we speak with others; and it doth not become us to make too much haste with the latter, before the former be over; it is just as Solomon hath observed it, Eccl. 10, 14. The Fool is full of Words, but the Wiseman is not so; at least he thinks before he speaks.

My Third Proposition is this, That in the state of Religion, Spirituals and Naturals joyn and mingle in their Subjects; so that if a Man be once in a true State of Religion, he cannot distinguish between Religion and the Reason of his Mind; so that his Religion is the Reason of his Mind, and the Reason of his Mind is his Religion. They are not two things now; they do not go two several ways, but concur and agree; they both run into one Principle, they make one Spirit, make one Stream. The Effects and Products of his Reason and Religion are the same, in a Person that is truly religious; his Reason is sanctified by his Religion, and his Religion helps and makes use of his Reason: So that in the subject it is but one thing; you may call it, if you will, religious Reason, and Reason made religious; they are not divided or separated; but the Union is more intimate and near, as these Principles are more Immaterial and Spiritual;
whereas gross and material things keep at a distance, because of the impossibility of penetration.

_Fourthly_ and lastly. Religion doth us great Service, great Pleasure both for Mind and Body.

1. For our Mind, immediately by its formal Presence and Residence.

2. For our Body, by the good Consequences that follow upon the Minds good Government.

In particular. Your Religion is the Mind’s Health and good Temper, and it doth help to conserve the Bodies Strength: As for instance, Sobriety, Gentleness, Temperance, Meekness, Modesty, Humility, which are the materials of Religion; all these do spare and favour the Body: On the contrary, Pride, Arrogance, Haughtiness, Presumption, Fierceness, Intemperance, which are things contrary to Religion, these waste and spoil the Body. Also Faith and Affiance in God, Love of God, Goodness and Complacence with God, harmony with him, delight in him; these do maintain and keep up Mens Spirits; and you know Mens Spirits do strongly resist all manner of Disease: On the contrary, Male-content, Distrust, Despair, Diffidence, Sowerness, Peevishness, Wrathfulness, Anger, Displeasure; these do hurt our Minds, spoil all our Mettle, and abate our Courage. Wherefore you see God hath given us Religion altogether for our advantage, not only for the future Estate, but also for the present: The Souls Safety, the Bodies better Security.

To go on further: How doth Malice, Envy, and purpose of Revenge, prey upon the Body, spend Mens Spirits? whereas they who live in Love and Good-will, are of gentle and quiet Spirits, they favour their Bodies; the Body is wasted under the former, but bodily strength is maintained under these. _Psal. 55, 23, The bloody and deceitful Men do not live out half their days._ And it is observed by _Solomon, Prov. 3, 13._ _Happy is the man that findeth_
Wisdom: Wisdom is Religion in his Sense. And verse 16, Length of days are in her Right-hand, and in her Left-Hand Riches and Honour. Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are Peace. Farther; in ways of Temperance there is Health, Strength, and long Life: Whereas the Licentious and Exorbitant Livers, they do load themselves with Distempers, and often die before the time. Wherefore Solomon advises, Eccl. 7, 17. Be not over-much wicked, neither be thou foolish; why shouldst thou die before thy time? Wherefore you see Religion is good for the Purposes of this Life, as well as for the State of Eternity.

I hasten now to a Conclusion, and will conclude with a double Exhortation.

1st. If you love your selves, either Bodies or Souls, acquaint your selves with Religion.

2dly. If you would be religious, be intelligent and rational in your Religion; or else your Religion may be only a denomination, and not sovereign to you.

1st. If you love your selves, either in respect of the present or future State, acquaint your selves with Religion.

2dly. If you meddle with Religion, be intelligent and rational in your Religion; study Religion till the Reason of your Minds receive Satisfaction; for till then you cannot account it your own, neither call it your own; neither hath it security and settlement in its Subject.

And till this be, Men will not be friendly to their Religion, they will not make it their Choice; but rather look upon it as their Exactor, their Tormentor, the Troubler of their Liberty: It will be a Taskmaster, they will carry it as their Burthen, which a Man will throw off as soon as he hath opportunity.

Now I dare undertake to shew, that all true Reason is for Religion, and nothing of Truth against it; and this I will shew thus. There are but two things that are sincere and solid, real and substantial in the World, The
Reason of the Thing, for the Rule; and the Reason of the Subject, for the discerning Faculty. Now the Reason of the Thing, that is certainly for Religion; and the Reason of the Thing is as infallible a Rule, and as certain as the Law of Heaven. For the Reason of the Thing, if it be in Institutes, it is according to the Revelation of the Divine Will; and if it be in Necessaries, it is according to the Nature of God himself. In things depending upon Will and Pleasure revealed from God, it is according to the Divine Will; In things that are in themselves necessary, it is according to the nature of God. Therefore the Reason of the Thing, that is certainly for Religion. Now the Reason of the Subject, either it is blind or byassed, prepossest or corrupted, if it be against it; that for certain. Now if it be so, here is our great Challenge; The Reason of the Thing, That is made to our hands; the Use of our Faculties, that is to find it out. The Reason of the Thing, it is a Rule to the Reason of the Subject; if it varies, it is to be rectified, corrected by the Rule. The Reason of the Thing is always for Religion; if the Reason of the Subject is to comply with the Rule, then a Man's Reason and his Religion will accord and meet. If we be in the true use of Reason, we may see cause for what we do in the way of Religion; but if we be ignorant, we are neither rational nor religious.

Where a Man hath not weighed and considered, searched and examined, he is no body. If he be rational, then he discerns the reason of the thing; and the reason of the thing, if he comply with it, is Religion. Blind Presumption and Suspicion, are very sorry things, and have no place any where; for Prepossession and Anticipation shew Men to be of a Party, but no true Discerners of Truth.

In the close of all, let me advise you to clear Understanding, true Perception, and right apprehensions of Things, that you charge your selves with upon account
of Religion: I would never advise a Man to be light of
Faith in matters of Religion, or to run away with Supposi-
tions, or dully to refer himself or compromise with any
Party; but so far as he thinks Religion concerns him, let
him take to himself leisure and opportunity; let him weigh
and consider, and let him use his Faculties, as he may do:
This is the direction in Religion; use your Reason so far
as you may have perception of these things, and such a
Sensation of them that you may receive satisfaction. If
you do not do so, really you do not come within the
compass of Religion. A Man may admit that which is
a true Principle upon account of Religion; yet because
he doth not receive it upon account of its own Evidence,
Light and Truth, he doth not entertain that of Religion
as a point of Religion; but he believes it as he believes
a Story that he hears a Man tell, but never considers it
whether it be true or false.

Religion is not a thing that can be made up of ignorant
Well-meanings, or of fond or slight Imaginations, credulous
Suspicion, or fond Conceit; such are the Suppositions
of all Superstition; But of deliberate Resolutions, and diligent
Searches into the Reason of Things, and into the rational
Sense of Holy Scripture.

We have cause to give God thanks, that so far as
Revelation is necessary to convey any thing by way of
Superaddition to the Light of God's Creation; to the
Principles whereof, God made us in the moment of his
Creation; God hath not left us to vain Supposition, nor
to the ungrounded guesses of fond Minds; but you have
it clearly plainly, fully, satisfactorily laid down in Holy
Scripture; so that Religion is the clearest and most self-
evident thing in the World; But if a Man do not enquire
into the Reason and Grounds of his perswasion; if he
gives himself up to drudge in the World, and refer himself
in his Religion to other Mens Sense, delivering himself
to a Party; I will assure him he is not religious, not in that which he receives, though it may be materially true in Religion: For he doth not receive it as becomes a Disciple of Reason, much less of Religion; for it might have been false, or the contrary, for any thing he knows; and for the selfsame Reason that he admitted this as Truth, he might have admitted the contrary, if so be the Party, with which he doth compromise, had offered it.

The truly religious are not idle Bodies, but they do exercise themselves in the highest and noblest Employment; and their work is to affect the inward Man; and we are wont to say, that in competition the Body is nothing, it is but the Souls Mansion-House; every Man's Mind is the Man.

I will conclude all in a few Words, to recommend Religion to the reason of your Minds.

1st. It doth relieve us in the case of the greatest Evils that we are in danger of; and the greatest Evils we are exposed to, are the guiltiness of our Consciences, and malignity in our Minds.

2dly. Religion doth possess us of the truest inward Good.

3dly. It restores us to the object of our Happiness, and to our ultimate end.

First, Religion doth relieve us in respect of the greatest inward Evils that we are liable to, vis. guiltiness in our Conscience, and Malignity in our Minds; which, if not removed, we must of necessity be miserable, as a Man must be miserable tho' he lie upon a Bed of Down, if he be sick and distempered, and cannot be cured of internal Malady. Now these two are internal Evils, that are greater than any other internal Evils in the World: A wound in the Conscience, guiltiness in the Mind; the worm of Conscience, the sting of Sin; these two are the Life of Hell. And then the other great Evil is Malignity,
Rancour, Malice and Poison in the Mind; And this mars our Natures, spoils our Dispositions and Tempers, and puts us at a distance and abhorrence of God and Goodness, and makes us harmonize with the Devil and Sin. Now there is no way to be relieved in respect of these internal Evils but in the way of Religion, and by the Blood of sprinkling, for the cleansing our Consciences by way of atonement, and by the Operation of the Spirit, for the renewing, repairing and restoring our Natures: That's the first.

Secondly. It possesses us of the truest inward Good, and that in three Particulars.

1. Satisfaction to a Man's Mind; and content, all the World will say, is one of the greatest Goods; What is better to a Man, than his Mind's satisfaction? And in the way of Religion, a Man's Mind is satisfied; for he understands upon what Grounds and in what way; And he sees before him, and knows what he is to trust to.

2. Religion is restaurative to the Nature of Man; And what is more to any Man than to be internally whole? If a Man hath an internal Disease, an internal Wound, or any inward Ulcer in his Mind; to restore him to perfect health and strength, this is done in the way of Religion.

3. It is pacifying to a Man's Conscience: For what is more dreadful than the Torments of a Man's own Breast? When a Man's Heart akes, though he be applauded and adored by By-standers, yet his Heart akes because of his Guilt; he finds internal Wounds. He may fly from the World, but he cannot fly from himself; *The wicked flees when no Man pursues*: And it is observed, That Guilt in a Man's Breast, is a Prophet that foretells future Evils; *Art thou come to call my Sins to remembrance?* But Innocency is stout, rises up in its own defense: But when a Man is faulty, his Heart will not serve him.

Thirdly and lastly, Religion restores us to the Object
of our Happiness, to our ultimate End. So saith the Psalmist, Psalm 17, 15. *I will behold thy Face in Righteousness: I shall be satisfied when I awake with thy Likeness.* We must be reconciled in Temper and Disposition, to the Nature, Mind and Will of God, and the Law of everlasting Goodness, Righteousness and Truth; or else it will come to what Solomon saith, *Can two walk together that are not agreed?*

Thus have I given you an account of this full and pregnant Scripture, that doth contract and epitomize our Religion, comprehends the Moral part of Religion, that which in part will make us like God; and if these things be received into a Temper, Complexion and Constitution of Soul, we shall become God-like, and partakers of the very Nature of God.
MORAL AND RELIGIOUS APHORISMS

If there be no Knowledge, there is no Beginning of Religion; if there be no Goodness, there is no Sincerity of Religion; but a Contradiction to it; by 'holding the Truth in Unrighteousness.'

Knowledge alone doth not amount to Virtue; but certainly there is no Virtue, without Knowledge. Knowledge is the first Step to Virtue and Goodness: but Goodness is not without Delight and Choice.

It is the work and business of Religion, and of our Lives, to Reconcile the Temper of our Spirits to the Rule of Righteousness; and to incorporate the Principles of our Religion, into the Complexion of our Minds.

This is to be done, 1. By searching into the Nature of Things, and the Reason of our Duty; that our Judgment may be such, as to approve the Laws of our Religion: 2. By practising according to our right Apprehensions of things; till it becomes easy and delightful to us: 3. By persisting in this Course all our days; ever designing and meaning Righteousness; and ever retracting and correcting what is Unrighteous.

Did Christians live according to their Religion; They would do nothing, but what Truth, Righteousness, and Goodness do; according to their Understanding, and Ability: and then one man would be a God unto another.

When the Principles of our Religion become the Temper of our Spirits, then we are truly religious; and the only way to make them become so, is, to reason ourselves into an Approbation of them: for nothing, which is the Reason

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of Things, can be refused by the Reason of Man; when understood.

The Rule of Right is the Reason of Things; the Judgment of Right is the Reason of our Minds, perceiving the Reason of things.

Men have an itch rather to make Religion, than to use it: but we are to use our Religion; not to make it.

To use Power, to controul the Principles of Human Nature; (the Use of Reason, the Exercise of Liberty) is as strange a Phenomenon, as to cross or pervert the common Course of Natural Agents; to bring the Sun back again, or to make it fill the world with darkness. God does not this: if he did, he would contest with himself; his Power would rise-up against his Wisdom; and he would disparage and frustrate his own workmanship. Why should We think to do that, which God will not do—to over-bear Reason with Violence!

There is no solid Satisfaction; but in a mental Reconciliation with the Nature of God, and the Law of righteousness.

He that never changed any of his opinions, never corrected any of his Mistakes: and He, who was never wise enough, to find out any mistakes in Himself; will not be charitable enough, to excuse what he reckons mistakes in Others.

A man must cultivate his Mind, by enquiries after the Measures and Reasons of his duty; by Reconciliation of his Temper to those Measures, upon those Reasons: and he must cultivate his Life, by acting according to the Improvement of his Mind.

We are only so Free; that Others may be free, as well as We.

Those that differ upon Reason, may come together by Reason.

Conscience, without Judgment, is Superstition; Judgment without Conscience, is Self-condemnation.
Every man is Born with the Faculty of Reason, and the Faculty of Speech: but why should he be able to Speak, before he has any thing to say?

It is not to be expected, that another man should Think as I would, to please me; since I cannot think as I would, to please myself; it is neither in His nor My power, to think as we will; but as we see reason, and find cause.

To go against Reason, is to go against God: it is the self same thing, to do that which the Reason of the Case doth require; and that which God Himself doth appoint: Reason is the Divine Governor of Man's Life; it is the very Voice of God.

When the Doctrine of the Gospel becomes the Reason of our Mind, it will be the Principle of our Life.

If Reason may not command, it will condemn.

Reason discovers what is Natural; and Reason receives what is Supernatural.

Nothing is worse done than what is ill done for Religion. That must not be done, in the Defence of Religion, which is contrary to Religion.

I will not make a Religion for God: nor suffer any to make a Religion for me.

Nothing spoils human Nature more than false Zeal. The Good-nature of an Heathen is more God-like than the furious Zeal of a Christian.

Our Fallibility and the Shortness of our Knowledge should make us peaceable and gentle: because I may be Mistaken, I must not be dogmatical and confident, peremptory and imperious. I will not break the certain Laws of Charity, for a doubtful Doctrine or of uncertain Truth.

Certainly our Saviour accepts of no other Separation of His Church from the other part of the world than what is made by Truth, Virtue, Innocency, and Holiness of Life.

Religion itself is always the same: but Things about Religion are not always the same. These have not in them
the power or virtue of Religion, they are not of a sanctifying nature; they do not purify our Minds, as the things of a Moral nature do; so that Religion may stand without them.

A Rule in Practice is a Notion incarnate, made like to us.

Obligation to divine Truth is Religious Liberty; Obligation to the contrary error is Superstitious Vassalage.

There cannot be Receiving Truth in Love, where there is not receiving it in Judgment.

Vice is contrary to the Nature of Man, as Man; for it is contrary to the order of Reason, the peculiar and highest Principle in Man: nor is any thing in itself more unnatural or of greater Deformity in the whole world than that an Intelligent Agent should have the Truth of Things in his Mind, and that it should not give Law and Rule to his Temper, Life and Actions.

The first act of Religion is to Know what is True of God; the second act is to Express it in our Lives.

The Moral part of Religion never alters. Moral Laws are Laws of themselves, without Sanction by Will; and the Necessity of them arises from the Things themselves. All other things in Religion are in Order to These. The Moral Part of Religion does sanctify the Soul; and is Final both to what is Instrumental and Instituted.

Hypocrites, and men of carnal Spirits, desire Abatement in Morals; though they Allow for it in Rituals.

Truth is connatural to a man's Soul; and, in Conjunction with it, becomes the mind's Temper and Complexion and Constitution.

Religion doth not destroy Nature; but is built upon it.

Religion in the Subject is not a Notion; but the Frame and Temper of our Minds, and the Rule of our Lives: a man is not well settled in his Religion until it is become the self-same with the Reason of his Mind.
Ignorance is no Principle of any Action. No Ignorance can excuse Immorality, in any Instance whatsoever: but invincible Ignorance doth excuse Infidelity, in the chiefest Point.

Ignorance of mere Institutes may be invincible: because Institutes must be declared, by some Instrument of God; [by Revelation] whereof the party may have no notice: but, in Morals, we are made to know and judge and determine; and the light of God's Creation is sufficient thereto: So that here there is no invincible and consequently inculpable Ignorance.

It is the chiefest of Good Things for a Man to be Himself.

The first operation of Truth, in any Subject, is upon the Subject itself.

If you only say, you have a Revelation from God; I must have a Revelation from God too, before I can believe you: as St. Peter and Cornelius.

Heaven is first a Temper, and then a Place.

The longest Sword, the strongest Lungs, the most Voices, are false measures of Truth.

Let all Uncertainties lie by themselves, in the catalogue of Disputables; matters of farther inquiry: Let the Certains of Religion settle into Constitution; and issue in Life and Practice.

Truth is first in Things, and then the Truth is in our Understanding. Things give Law to Notion, and Apprehension.

Morals are enforced by Scripture; but were before Scripture: they were according-to the nature of God.

He that is full of him-self, goes out of company as wise as he came in.

Sin is an Attempt to controul the immutable and unalterable Laws of everlasting Righteousness, Goodness and Truth, upon which the Universe depends.
Fair construction and courteous Behaviour are the greatest Charity.

There is nothing more Unnatural to Religion than Contentions about it.

Things are greater than we, and will not comply with us; we, who are less than Things, must Comply with them.

Reverence God in thyself: for God is more in the Mind of Man than in any part of this world besides; for we (and we only here) are made after the Image of God.

That Faith, which is not a Principle of Life, is a Nullity in Religion.

That action is ill, wherein we lose our selves: and there is no Recompense for the loss.

The Laws of God are not Impositions of Will or Power and Pleasure; but the Resolutions of Truth, Reason and Justice.

God is to us, according to our Capacity. Objects affect, as Subjects are capable.

That is good, as a Means, which doth promote the End. There is the Religion of the Means; and there is the Religion of the End. There is in Religion, what is Instrumental; and what is Final.

Nothing without Reason is to be proposed; nothing against Reason is to be believed: Scripture is to be taken in a rational sense.

Fallibility is a Reason for Modesty.

A great Faction is many Persons, yet but one Party; and that is but one Opinion: such a Faction is but one man, in point of Judgment: one free-spirited man is, in this particular, equal to a whole Faction.

The Spirit of a Man is the Candle of the Lord; Lighted by God, and Lighting us to God. Res illuminata, illuminans.

The Sense of the Church is not a Rule; but a thing Ruled. The Church is bound unto Reason and Scrip-
aphorisms

ture, and governed by them, as much as any particular Person.

Where there is a Principle of Nature, there will be Progress to Perfection; unless there be the Impediment of Violence.

As great a mind as God hath to Convert Sinners, He never did Force them; but doth Persuade, and deal with them according to the Principles of their Make.

To Impose what is Unreasonable is to Usurp upon the Creation of God.

Our moral actions are the foundation of our future condition.

Nothing is more Spiritual than that which is Moral.

He that believes what God saith, without Evidence that God says it, doth not believe God, while he believes the Thing, which comes from God.

Then you have hear'd a thing often enough, when what you have hear'd is pass'd into a Principle, and makes a Constitution of Mind, and is seen in Practice.

Determinations, beyond Scripture, have indeed enlarged Faith; but lessened Charity, and multiplied Divisions.

Some are the worse for their Religion; but such Religion is certainly bad. If this Notion be not understood and admitted; 'that Difference of Opinion, in some matters about Religion, shou'd not make Difference in Affection;' We shall All be the worse for our Religion.

Religion is not a Hear-say, a Presumption, a Supposition; is not a customary Pretension and Profession; is not an Affectation of any Mode; is not a Piety of particular Fancy; consisting in some pathetic Devotions, vehement Expressions, bodily Severities, affected Anomalies and Aversions from the innocent Usages of others: but consisteth in a profound Humility, and an universal Charity.

Several Forms of words in Scripture express the same State, and so vary only the notion; and σχέσεις differ not
materially; but in Substance are the same. To stand upon
nice and accurate Distinctions of them is needless; useless;
since Scripture uses them *indifferently.* [Regeneration &c.]
This is fit to be known; to avoid troublesome multiplicity
in Religion, and the possessing the minds of men with
thoughts, that Religion is more intricate and voluminous
than indeed it is: whereas Truth lies in a *little* compass,
and *narrow* room. *Vitals* in Religion are *Few.*

It is not *Morally* good to forbear the Use, or abandon
the Possession, of what is *Naturally* good: *Mortification*
is not denying our Bodies; but denying our Lusts: Con-
tempt of the World is not *Piety*; but Contempt of those
that have the World, is *Pride.* And indeed, Pride and
Humility are not distinguished by Wealth and Poverty.

As Sin is a Vitiating the Reason of Man; the Restaura-
tion must be by the Reason of God; by Christ, δ λόγος.

How much *Easier* is it quietly to enjoy, than eagerly
to contest! How vastly *wiser!*

Allow for difference of *Temper,* before you consider the
*Religion* of the party. The activity of Choler shou'd not
have the esteem of Divine Zeal; the mild Sanguine com-
plexion shou'd not have the honor of Christian Meekness;
the black Melancholy shou'd not be condemned, for the
heart of Unbelief; the dullness of Phlegm shou'd not fall
under the censure of Dead-heartedness towards God.

It is a great Performance, *Hoc agere*; to mind and
attend-to what we are about: He, who hath not a certain
mark in his Eye, will shoot at Rovers. *Anima, quae ubique
est, nullibi est:* He, that thinks of every thing, thinks of
no thing. The most Buisy men make the least Riddance
of Work. It is not within our measure and proportion
to be good at every thing.

The Materiality of *Vice* is in the Complexion of the
Body; the Formality of Vice is in the Consent of the
Mind.
The self-same thing in man is the **Matter of Virtue** and of **Vice**; when the Consent of the Mind is the **Form** of Vice, the Dissent of the Mind is the Form of Virtue; and **vice versa**. There was in Man's Nature, at the Creation, the Matter of Vice, as well as of Virtue; the one cou'd not have been, without the other: for the same thing is the Matter of either. And as this was in Man, so it was in the World: and the Matter of Evil is not Evil.

**Conscience** is God's Vice-gerent; Θεός ἱεροκός the God, dwelling within us.

To **lessen** the number of things **lawfull in themselves** brings the Consciences of men into Slavery, multiplies Sin in the world, makes the way Narrower than God has made it, occasions Differences among men, discourages Comers to Religion, rebuilds the Partition-Wall, is an Usurpation upon the Family of God, challenges successive Ages backward and forward, assigns New Boundaries in the world, takes away the opportunity of Free-Will Offerings.

It is a thing of the greatest Importance, upon what **Authority** we Believe.

Among **Politicians** the Esteem of Religion is profitable: the Principles of it are troublesom.

**Weigh** every matter of Religion, till the mind receives Satisfaction about it: God gives this Allowance; and will stay for Observance, in that particular, till it be done.

If you **See** not well, **Hear** the better; if you see not far, hear the more: the Consequence of Truth is **great**; therefore the Judgment about it must not be **negligent**.

The **state** of Religion, in it's Subject, consists of **three** parts; 1. the due Composure of the mind; it's calm and quiet Temper, it's settlement in Peace through the established Government of sober principles of Reason and Understanding over Sense and brutish Affection. 2. an universal Reconciliation with the whole Creation of God; particularly, a living in Concord and good Will with those
made in our Image and Likeness; a hearty and true Endeavor to promote and advance the general good of Mankind. 3. the Mind being united to God, by Faith and good Affection.

In worldly and material things, what is Used is spent: in intellectuals and spiritual things, what is not Used is not Had.

Men are in Thought and Apprehension such, as they are in Temper and Affection.

It is a wonder, any shou’d think; That might be done by Sacrifice, which cou’d not be done by mental Devotion. Nothing in Sacrifice cou’d be acceptable to God, but the meaning of the Sacrificer.

God hath rejected His own Institutions; when they have been made Final, put in competition with Morals, or made compensations for Morals—Isa. i. xi—lv. 3. Mic. vi. 7, 8. Jer. vii. 4, 5. Amos v. 21. Isa. lxiv. 6. Rom. xii. 1. Eph. v. 27. Rev. xix. 8. 1 John iii. 7, 8, 9. Rom. viii. 2. Institutes have their foundation in the Will of God; and the matter of them is alterable: Morals have their foundation in the Nature of God; and the matter of them is necessary and unalterable.

Take-away the Self-conceited; and there will be Elbow-room in the world. The Lesson given by Wisdom is Ἱγεῖ αἰσθάνοντα, and none have learned it, but the Wise.

Platonists’ principle of Creation, Ἕρως and Πνεία: the Activity of divine Love; the Non-entity of all Creatures. The grossest Errors are but Abuses of some noble Truths.

Some run abroad, to fetch nothing home: some are so ever a-doing, that nothing is done: some can not Do, for want of Thinking; and can not Think, for Thinking.

Some speak, only because they will not hold their Tongue: making Speech an End, not a Means. If we cannot Govern our tongues, we may Imprison them. Ἐρχεθι διόντων.
APHORISMS

He, that neither knows himself, nor thinks he can learn of others, is not Fit for Company.

No Sign can warrant our Belief, unless it be in conjunction with a Doctrine worthy of God.

Enthusiastic Doctrines—good things strained out of their Wits. Among Christians, those, that pretend to be Inspired, seem to be Mad: among the Turks, those, that are Mad, are thought to be Inspired.
A DISCOURSE Concerning The true WAY or METHOD of attaining to DIVINE KNOWLEDGE.

Psal. 3. 10. The Fear of the Lord is the Beginning of Wisdom: a good Understanding have all they that doe his Commandments.

John 7. 17. If any man will doe his Will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God—

Clem. Alexandr. Strom. 3. Πῶς δὲ ἐστι δυνάτον, ἡττηδέντα τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν, ἑξομολογθαι τῷ Κυρίῳ, ἐγνώσῃν ἐχειν Θεοῦ; — Θεοῦ δε γνῶσιν λαβεῖν τοῖς ἐγι ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν ἀγομένως, ἀδύνατον—

Τὰ τῆς πολιτείας ἑλέγχει σαφῶς τοὺς ἐγνωκότας τὰς ἐντολάς. ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν τὸ δέντρον, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθών καὶ πετάλων, γνωρίζεται. ἡ γνῶσις οὖν ἐν τῷ καρπῷ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας, οὐκ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ ἀνθως.
A PRAEFATORY DISCOURSE

CONCERNING

THE TRUE WAY OR METHOD OF ATTAINING TO

DIVINE KNOWLEDGE

Section I. That Divine things are to be understood rather by a Spiritual Sensation then a Verbal Description, or meer Speculation. Sin and Wickedness prejudicial to True Knowledge. That Purity of Heart and Life, as also an Ingenuous Freedome of Judgment, are the best Grounds and Preparations for the Entertainment of Truth.

Sect. II. An Objection against the Method of Knowing laid down in the former Section, answered. That Men generally, notwithstanding their Apostasie, are furnished with the Radical Principles of True Knowledge. Men want not so much Means of knowing what they ought to doe, as Wills to doe what they know. Practical Knowledge differs from all other Knowledge, and excells it.

Sect. III. Men may be consider'd in a Fourfold capacity in order to the perception of Divine things. That the Best and most excellent Knowledge of Divine things belongs onely to the true and sober Christian; and That it is but in its infancy while he is in this Earthly Body.

SECTION I.

It hath been long since well observed, That every Art and Science hath some certain Principles upon which the whole Frame and Body of it must depend; and he that will fully acquaint himself with the Mysteries thereof, must come furnish'd with some Praecognita or προλήψεως, that I may speak in the language of the Stoicks. Were I indeed
to define Divinity, I should rather call it a Divine life, then a Divine science; it being something rather to be understood by a Spiritual sensation, then by any Verbal description, as all things of Sense and Life are best known by Sentient and Vital faculties; γνώσει ἐκάστων ὑπὸ ὁμοίουμον γινεται, as the Greek Philosopher hath well observed, Every thing is best known by that which bears a just resemblance and analogie with it: and therefore the Scripture is wont to set forth a Good life as the Prolepsis and Fundamental principle of Divine Science; Wisdome hath built her an house, and hewed out her seven pillars: But the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdome, the Foundation of the whole fabrick.

We shall therefore, as a Prolegomenon or Preface to what we shall afterward discourse upon the Heads of Divinity, speake something of this True Method of Knowing, which is not so much by Notions as Actions; as Religion it self consists not so much in Words as Things. They are not alwaies the best skill'd in Divinity, that are the most studied in those Pandects which it is sometimes digested into, or that have erected the greatest Monopolies of Art and Science. He that is most Practical in Divine things, hath the purest and sincerest Knowledge of them, and not he that is most Dogmatical. Divinity indeed is a true Efflux from the Eternal light, which, like the Sun-beams, does not only enlighten, but heat and enliven; and therefore our Saviour hath in his Beatitudes connex Purity of heart with the Beatifical Vision. And as the Eye cannot behold the Sun, ἡλιοειδῆς μὴ γνώμενος (Plotin. En. 1. 6. 9), unless it be Sunlike, and hath the form and resemblance of the Sun drawn in it; so neither can the Soul of man behold God, θεουειδῆς μὴ γνώμενη, unless it be Godlike, hath God formed in it, and be made partaker of the Divine Nature. And the Apostle S. Paul, when he would lay open the right way of attaining to Divine Truth, he saith that Knowledge puffeth up, but it
is *Love that edifieth*. The knowledge of Divinity that appears in *Systems* and *Models* is but a poor wan light, but the powerful energy of Divine knowledge displaies it self in purified Souls: here we shall finde the true πεδίον ἀληθείας, as the antient Philosophy speaks, the land of Truth.

To seek our Divinity meerly in Books and Writings is to seek the living among the dead: we doe but in vain seek God many times in these, where his Truth too often is not so much enshrin'd, as entomb'd: no; *intra te quare Deum*, seek for God within thine own soul; he is best discern'd νοερᾷ ἑπαφῇ, as Plotinus phraseth it, by an Intellectual touch of him: we must see with our eyes, and hear with our ears, and our hands must handle the word of life, that I may express it in S. John's words. "Εστι καὶ ψυχῆς ἀισθησίς τις, The Soul it self hath its sense, as well as the Body: and therefore David, when he would teach us how to know what the Divine Goodness is, calls not for *Speculation* but *Sensation*, *Tast* and see how good the Lord is. That is not the best and truest knowledge of God which is wrought out by the labour and sweat of the Brain, but that which is kindled within us by an heavenly warmth in our Hearts. As in the natural Body it is the Heart that sends up good Blood and warm Spirits into the Head, whereby it is best enabled to its several functions; so that which enables us to know and understand aright in the things of God, must be a living principle of Holiness within us. When the Tree of Knowledge is not planted by the Tree of Life, and sucks not up sap from thence, it may be as well fruitful with evil as with good, and bring forth bitter fruit as well as sweet. If we would indeed have our Knowledge thrive and flourish, we must water the tender plants of it with Holiness. When Zoroaster's Scholars asked him what they should doe to get winged Souls, such as might soar aloft in the bright beams of

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Divine Truth, he bids them bathe themselves in the waters of Life: they asking what they were; he tells them, the four Cardinal Vertues, which are the four Rivers of Paradise. It is but a thin, airy knowledge that is got by meer Speculation, which is usher'd in by Syllogisms and Demonstrations; but that which springs forth from true Goodness, is θειότερόν τι πάσης ἀποδείξεως, as Origen speaks, it brings such a Divine light into the Soul, as is more clear and convincing then any Demonstration. The reason why, notwithstanding all our acute reasons and subtile disputes, Truth prevails no more in the world, is, we so often disjoyn Truth and true Goodness, which in themselves can never be disunited; they grow both from the same Root, and live in one another. We may, like those in Plato's deep pit with their faces bended downwards, converse with Sounds and Shadows; but not with the Life and Substance of Truth, while our Souls remain defiled with any vice or lusts. These are the black Lethe-lake which drench the Soules of men: he that wants true Vertue, in heavn's Logick is blind, and cannot see afar off (2 Pet. 1. 9). Those filthy mists that arise from impure and terrene minds, like an Atmospheare, perpetually encompass them, that they cannot see that Sun of Divine Truth that shines about them, but never shines into any unpurged Souls; the darkness comprehends it not, the foolish man understands it not. All the Light and Knowledge that may seem sometimes to rise up in unhallowed mindes, is but like those fuliginous flames that arise up from our culinary fire, that are soon quench'd in their own smoak; or like those foolish fires that fetch their birth from terrene exudations, that doe but hop up and down, and flit to and fro upon the surface of this earth where they were first brought forth; and serve not so much to enlighten, as to delude us; nor to direct the wandring traveller into his way, but to lead him farther out of it. While we lodge any filthy vice in us, this will be perpetually
twisting up itself into the thread of our finest-spun Speculations; it will be continually climbing up into the ὑγμονικόν, the Hegemonical powers of the Soul, into the bed of Reason, and defile it: like the wanton Ivy twisting it self about the Oak, it will twine about our Judgments and Understandings, till it hath suck'd out the Life and Spirit of them. I cannot think such black oblivion should possess the Mindes of some as to make them question that Truth which to Good men shines as bright as the Sun at noon-day, had they not foully defil'd their own Souls with some hellish vice or other, how fairly soever it may be they may dissemble it. There is a benumming Spirit, a congealing Vapour that ariseth from Sin and Vice, that will stupifie the senses of the Soul; as the Naturalists say there is from the Torpedo that smites the senses of those that approach to it. This is that venemous Solanum, that deadly Nightshade, that derives its cold poyson into the Understandings of men.

Such as Men themselves are, such will God himself seem to be. It is the Maxim of most wicked men, That the Deity is some way or other like themselves: their Souls doe more then whisper it, though their lips speak it not; and though their tongues be silent, yet their lives cry it upon the house-tops, and in the publick streets. That Idea which men generally have of God is nothing else but the picture of their own Complexion: that Archetypall notion of him which hath the supremacie in their mindes, is none else but such an one as hath been shap'd out according to some pattern of themselves; though they may so cloathe and disguise this Idol of their own, when they carry it about in a pompous Procession to expose it to the view of the world, that it may seem very beautiful, and indeed any thing else rather then what it is. Most men (though it may be they themselves take no great notice of it) like that dissembling Monk, doe aliter sentire in Scholis, aliter in
Museis, are of a different judgment in the Schools from what they are in the retirements of their private closets. There is a double head, as well as a double heart. Mens corrupt hearts will not suffer their notions and conceptions of divine things to be cast into that form that an higher Reason, which may sometime work within them, would put them into.

I would not be thought all this while to banish the belief of all Innate notions of Divine Truth: but these are too often smother'd, or tainted with a deep dye of mens filthy lusts. It is but lux sepulta in opaci materia, light buried and stifled in some dark body, from whence all those colour'd, or rather discoulour'd, notions and apprehensions of divine things are begotten. Though these Common notions may be very busie somtimes in the vegetation of divine Knowledge; yet the corrupt vices of men may so clog, disturb and overrule them, (as the Naturalists say this unruly and masterless, matter doth the natural forms in the formation of living creatures) that they may produce nothing but Monsters miserably distorted and misshapen. This kind of Science, as Plotinus speaks, τῷ ὀλυκῷ πολλῷ συνούσα, καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν εἰσδεξαμένη, εἴδος ἔτερον ἥλλαζατο κράσει τῇ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον,companying too familiarly with Matter, and receiving and imbibing it into it selfe, changeth its shape by this incestuous mixture. At best, while any inward lust is harboured in the minds of men, it will so weaken them, that they can never bring forth any masculine or generous knowledge; as Ælian observes of the Stork, that if the Night-owle chanceth to sit upon her eggs, they become presently as it were ὄπηνέμα, and all incubation rendred impotent and ineffectual. Sin and lust are alway of an hungry nature, and suck up all those vital affections of mens Souls which should feed and nourish their Understandings.

What are all our most sublime Speculations of the Deity, that are not impregnated with true Goodness, but insipid
things that have no taste nor life in them, that do but swell like empty froath in the souls of men? They doe not feed mens souls, but onely puffe them up and fill them with Pride, Arrogance and Contempt and Tyrannie towards those that cannot well ken their subtile Curiosities: as those Philosophers that Tully complains of in his times, qui disciplinam suam ostentationem scientiae, non legem vitae, putabant, which made their knowledge onely matter of ostentation, to venditate and set off themselves, but never caring to square and govern their lives by it. Such as these doe but Spider-like take a great deal of pains to spin a worthless web out of their own bowels, which will not keep them warm. These indeed are those silly Souls that are ever learning, but never come to the knowledge of the Truth. They may, with Pharaoh's lean kine, eat up and devour all Tongues and Sciences, and yet when they have done, still remain lean and ill-favour'd as they were at first. Jejune and barren Speculations may be hovering and fluttering up and down about Divinity, but they cannot settle or fix themselves upon it: they unfold the Plicatures of Truth's garment, but they cannot behold the lovely face of it. There are hidden Mysteries in Divine Truth, wrapt up one within another, which cannot be discern'd but onely by divine Epoptists.

We must not think we have then attained to the right knowledge of Truth, when we have broke through the outward Shell of words and phrases that house it up; or when by a Logical Analysis we have found out the dependencies and coherencies of them one with another; or when, like stout champions of it, having well guarded it with the invincible strength of our Demonstration, we dare stand out in the face of the world, and challenge the field of all those that would pretend to be our Rivalls.

We have many Grave and Reverend Idolaters that worship Truth onely in the Image of their own Wits; that
could never adore it so much as they may seem to doe, were it any thing else but such a Form of Belief as their own wandring speculations had at last met together in, were it not that they find their own image and superscription upon it.

There is a knowing of the truth as it is in Jesus, as it is in a Christ-like nature, as it is in that sweet, mild, humble, and loving Spirit of Jesus, which spreads itself like a Morning-Sun upon the Soules of good men, full of light and life. It profits little to know Christ himself after the flesh; but he gives his Spirit to good men, that searcheth the deep things of God. There is an inward beauty, life and loveliness in Divine Truth, which cannot be known but onely then when it is digested into life and practice. The Greek Philosopher could tell those high-soaring Gnosticks that thought themselves no less then Jovis alites, that could (as he speaks in the Comedy) ἀεροβατέων καὶ περιφρονεών τῶν ἥλιων, and cried out so much βλέπε πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. look upon God, that ἀνει ἀρετῆς Θεὸς ὄνομα μόνον, Without Virtue and real Goodness God is but a name, a dry and empty Notion. The profane sort of men, like those old Gentile Greeks, may make many ruptures in the walls of God's Temple, and break into the holy ground, but yet may finde God no more there then they did.

Divine Truth is better understood, as it unfolds itself in the purity of mens hearts and lives, then in all those subtil Niceties into which curious Wits may lay it forth. And therefore our Saviour, who is the great Master of it, would not, while he was here on earth, draw it up into any Systeme or Body, nor would his Disciples after him; He would not lay it out to us in any Canons or Articles of Belief, not being indeed so careful to stock and enrich the World with Opinions and Notions, as with true Piety, and a Godlike pattern of purity, as the best way to thrive in all spiritual understanding. His main scope
was to promote an *Holy life*, as the best and most compendious way to a *right Belief*. He hangs all true acquaintance with Divinity upon the doing Gods will, *If any man will doe his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God*. This is that alone which will make us, as S. Peter tells us, that we shall not be *barren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour*. There is an inward sweetness and deliciousness in divine Truth, which no sensual minde can tast or rellish: this is that ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος, that *natural man* that savours not the things of God. Corrupt passions and terrene affections are apt of their own nature to disturb all serene thoughts, to precipitate our Judgments, and warp our Understandings. It was a good Maxime of the old Jewish Writers, that the Holy Spirit dwells not in terrene and earthly passions. Divinity is not so well perceiv'd by a subtile wit, ὁσερ αὐθήναι καταδραμένη as by a *purified sense*, as Plotinus phraseth it.

Neither was the antient Philosophy unacquainted with this Way and Method of attaining to the knowledge of Divine things; and therefore Aristotle himself (*Eth. Nic. l. i*) thought a Young man unfit to meddle with the grave precepts of Morality, till the heat and violent precipitancy of his youthful affections was cool'd and moderated. And it is observed of *Pythagoras*, that he had several waies to try the capacity of his Scholars, and to prove the *sedateness* and *Moral* temper of their minds, before he would entrust them with the sublimer Mysteries of his Philosophy. The *Platonists* were herein so wary and solicitous, that they thought the Mindes of men could never be purg'd enough from those earthly dregs of Sense and Passion, in which they were so much steep'd, before they could be capable of their divine *Metaphysics*: and therefore they so much soliciete a χωρισμός ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, as they are wont to phrase it, a *separation from the Body*, in all those that
would καθαρῶς φιλοσοφεῖν, as Socrates speaks, that is indeed, sincerely understand Divine Truth; for that was the scope of their Philosophy. This was also intimated by them in their defining Philosophy to be μελέτη θεανότου a Meditation of Death; aiming herein at onely a Moral way of dying, by loosening the Soul from the Body and this Sensitive life; which they thought was necessary to a right Contemplation of Intelligible things: and therefore besides those ἄρετα καθαρτικά by which the Souls of men were to be separated from sensuality and purged from fleshly filth, they devised a further way of Separation more accommodated to the condition of Philosophers, which was their Mathemata, or Mathematical Contemplations, whereby the Souls of men might farther shake off their dependency upon Sense, and learn to go as it were alone, without the crutch of any Sensible or Material thing to support them; and so be a little inur’d, being once got up above the Body, to converse freely with Immaterial natures, without looking down again and falling back into Sense. Besides many other waies they had, whereby to rise out of this dark Body; ἀναβάσως ἐκ τοῦ σφηλαίου, as they are wont to call them, several steps and ascents out of this miry cave of mortality, before they could set any sure footing with their Intellectual part in the land of Light and Immortal Being.

And thus we should pass from this Topick of our Discourse, upon which we have dwelt too long already, but that before we quite let it goe, I hope we may fairly make this use of it farther (besides what we have openly driven at all this while) which is, To learn not to devote or give up our selves to any private Opinions or Dictates of men in matters of Religion, nor too zealously to propugne the Dogmata of any Sect. As we should not like rigid Censurers arraign and condemn the Creeds of other men which we comply not with, before a full and mature understanding
of them, ripened not onely by the natural sagacity of our own Reasons, but by the benign influence of holy and mortified Affection: so neither should we over-hastily credere in fidel alienam, subscribe to the Symbols and Articles of other men. They are not alwaies the Best men that blot most paper; Truth is not, I fear, so Voluminous, nor swells into such a mighty bulk as our Books doe. Those mindes are not alwaies the most chast that are most parturient with these learned Discourses, which too often bear upon them a foulest stain of their unlawfull propagation. A bitter juice of corrupt affections may sometimes be strain'd into the inke of our greatest Clerks, their Doctrines may tast too sovre of the cask they come through. We are not alwaies happy in meeting with that wholsome food (as some are wont to call the Doctrinal-part of Religion) which hath been dress'd out by the cleanest hands. Some men have too bad hearts to have good heads: they cannot be good at Theorie who have been so bad at the Practice, as we may justly fear too many of those from whom we are apt to take the Articles of our Belief have been. Whilst we plead so much our right to the patrimony of our Fathers, we may take too fast a possession of their Errors as well as of their sober opinions. There are Idola specus, Innate Prejudices, and deceitfull Hypotheses, that many times wander up and down in the Mindes of good men, that may flie out from them with their graver determinations. We can never be well assur'd what our Traditional Divinity is; nor can we securely enough addict our selves to any Sect of men. That which was the Philosopher's motto, 'Ελεώθερον ἐναι δὲ τῇ γνώμῃ τῶν μέλλουσα φιλοσοφεῖν, we may a little enlarge, and so fit it for an ingenuous pursuuer after divine Truth: He that will finde Truth, must seek it with a free judgment, and a sanctified minde: he that thus seeks, shall finde; he shall live in Truth, and that shall live in him; it shall be like a stream of living waters issuing out of
his own Soule; he shall drink of the waters of his own cisterne, and be satisfied; he shall every morning finde this Heavenly Manna lying upon the top of his own Soule, and be fed with it to eternal life; he will finde satisfaction within, feeling himself in conjunction with Truth, though all the World should dispute against him.

SECTION II.

And thus I should again leave this Argument, but that perhaps we may all this while have seemed to undermine what we intend to build up. For if Divine Truth spring onely up from the Root of true Goodness; how shall we ever endeavour to be good, before we know what it is to be so? or how shall we convince the gainsaying world of Truth, unless we could also inspire Vertue into it?

To both which we shall make this Reply, That there are some Radical Principles of Knowledge that are so deeply sunk into the Souls of men, as that the Impression cannot easily be obliterated, though it may be much darkned. Sensual baseness doth not so grosly sully and blemire the Souls of all Wicked men at first, as to make them with Diagoras to deny the Deity, or with Protagoras to doubt of, or with Diodorus to question the Immortality of Rational Souls. Neither are the Common Principles of Vertue so pull'd up by the roots in all, as to make them so dubious in stating the bounds of Vertue and Vice as Epicurus was, though he could not but sometime take notice of them. Neither is the Retentive power of Truth so weak and loose in all Scepticks, as it was in him, who being well scourg'd in the streets till the blood ran about him, question'd when he came home, whether he had been beaten or not. Arrianus hath well observed, That the Common Notions of God and Vertue imprest upon the Souls of men, are more clear and perspicuous then any else; and that if they have not more certainty, yet have they more evidence,
and display themselves with less difficulty to our Reflexive Faculty than any Geometrical Demonstrations: and these are both availeable to prescribe out waies of Vertue to mens own souls, and to force an acknowledgment of Truth from those that oppose, when they are well guided by a skilfull hand. Truth needs not any time flie from Reason, there being an Eternal amitie between them. They are onely some private Dogmata, that may well be suspected as spurious and adulterate, that dare not abide the tryall thereof. And this Reason is not every where so extinguishe'd, as that we may not by that enter into the Souls of men. What the Magnetical virtue is in these earthly Bodies, that Reason is in mens Mindes, which when it is put forth, draws them one to another. Besides in wicked men there are sometimes Distasts of Vice, and Flashes of love to Vertue; which are the Motions which spring from a true Intellect, and the faint struglings of an Higher life within them, which they crucifie again by their wicked Sensuality. As Truth doth not alwaies act in good men, so neither doth Sense alwaies act in wicked men: they may sometimes have their lucida intervalla, their sober fits; and a Divine spirit blowing and breathing upon them may then blow up some live sparks of true Understanding within them; though they may soon endeavour to quench them again, and to rake them up in the ashes of their own earthly thoughts.

All this, and more that might be said upon this Argument, may serve to point out the Way of Vertue. We want not so much Means of knowing what we ought to doe, as Wills to doe that which we may know. But yet all that Knowledge which is separated from an inward acquaintance with Vertue and Goodness, is of a far different nature from that which ariseth out of a true living sense of them, which is the best discerner thereof, and by which alone we know the true Perfection, Sweetness, Energie, and Loveliness
of them, and all that which is ἀρχέων, ἀρχεῖα γραπτῶν, that
which can no more be known by a naked Demonstration,
then Colours can be perceived of a blinde man by any
Definition or Description which he can hear of them.

And further, the clearest and most distinct Notions
of Truth that shine in the Souls of the common sort of
men, may be extremly clouded, if they be not accompanied
with that answerable practice that might preserve their
integrity: These tender Plants may soon be spoild by
the continual droppings of our corrupt affections upon
them; they are but of a weak and feminine nature, and
so may be sooner deceived by that wily Serpent of Sen-
suality that harbours within us.

While the Soul is πλήρης τοῦ σώματος, full of the Body,
while we suffer those Notions and Common Principles of
Religion to lie asleep within us; that γενειοφόρος δύναμις,
the power of an Animal life, will be apt to incorporate
and mingle it self with them; and that Reason that is
within us, as Plotinus hath well express'd it, becomes more
and more σύμφωνος κακάς ταύτας ἐπιγνωμέναις δόξαις, it will
be infected with those evil Opinions that arise from our
Corporeal life. The more deeply our Souls dive into our
Bodies, the more will Reason and Sensuality run one into
another, and make up a most dilute, unsavourie, and
muddie kinde of Knowledge. We must therefore en-
deaour more and more to withdraw our selves from these
Bodily things, to set our Souls as free as may be from
its miserable slavery to this base Flesh: we must shut
the Eyes of Sense, and open that brighter Eye of our
Understandings, that other Eye of the Soul, as the
Philosopher calls our Intellectual Faculty, ἢν ἔχει μὲν πᾶς,
χρώνας δὲ ἀλήγου, which indeed all have, but few make use
of it. This is the way to see clearly; the light of the
Divine World will then begin to fall upon us, and those
sacred ἐλλάμψεις, those pure Coruscations of Immortal and
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Ever-living Truth will shine out into us, and in God's own light shall we behold him. The fruit of this Knowledge will be sweet to our taste, and pleasant to our palates, sweeter then the honey or the honey-comb. The Priests of Mercury, as Plutarch tells us, in the eating of their holy things, were wont to cry out γλυκόν ἡ ἀλήθεια, Sweet is Truth. But how sweet and delicious that Truth is which holy and heaven-born Souls feed upon in their mysterious converses with the Deity, who can tell but they that tast it? When Reason once is raised by the mighty force of the Divine Spirit into a converse with God, it is turn'd into Sense: That which before was one only Faith well built upon sure Principles, (for such our Science may be) now becomes Vision. We shall then converse with God τοῦ νόημα, whereas before we convers'd with him only τῇ διάνοιᾳ, with our Discursive faculty, as the Platonists were wont to distinguish. Before we laid hold on him only λόγῳ ἀποδεικτικῷ, with a strugling, Agonistical, and contentious Reason, hotly combating with difficulties and sharp contests of divers opinions, and labouring in it self, in its deductions of one thing from another; we shall then fasten our minds upon him λόγῳ ἀποφασικῷ, with such a serene Understanding, γαλήνῃ νοερᾷ, such an Intellectual calmness and serenity as will present us with a blissful, steady, and invariable sight of him.

SECTION III.

And now if you please, setting aside the Epicurean herd of Brutish men, who have drowned all their own sober Reason in the deepest Lethe of Sensuality, we shall divide the rest of Men into these Four ranks, according to that Method which Simplicius upon Epictetus hath already laid out to us, with a respect to a Fourfold kind of Knowledge, which we have all this while glanced at.

The First whereof is "Ἄνθρωπος συμπεφυμένος τῇ γενέσει,"
or, if you will, ἄνθρωπος ὁ πολύς, that Complex and Multi-
various man that is made up of Soul and Body, as it were
by a just equality and Arithmetical proportion of Parts
and Powers in each of them. The knowledge of these
men I should call ἄμοιρον δόξαν, in Plutarch's phrase;
a Knowledge wherein Sense and Reason are so twisted
up together, that it cannot easily be unravel'd, and laid
out into its first principles. Their highest Reason is
δυσδοξος τῶς αἰσθήσεως, complying with their senses, and
both conspire together in vulgar opinion. To these that
Motto which the Stoicks have made for them may very well
agree, βίος ὑπόληψις, their life being steer'd by nothing else
but Opinion and Imagination. Their higher notions of
God and Religion are so entangled with the Birdlime of
fleshly Passions and mundane Vanity, that they cannot
rise up above the surface of this dark earth, or easily
entertain any but earthly conceptions of heavenly things.
Such Souls as are here lodg'd, as Plato speaks, are ὅπωσο-
βαρέως, heavy behinde, and are continually pressing down
to this world's centre: and though, like the Spider, they
may appear sometime moving up and down aloft in the
aire, yet they doe but sit in the loome, and move in that
web of their own gross fancies, which they fasten and
pin to some earthly thing or other.

The Second is Ἀνθρωπος κατὰ τὴν λογικὴν ζωὴν ὑπομένως,
The man that looks at himself as being what he is rather
by his Soul then by his Body; that thinks not fit to view
his own face in any other Glass but that of Reason and
Understanding; that reckons upon his Soul as that which
was made to rule, his Body as that which was born to obey,
and like an handmaid perpetually to wait upon his higher
and nobler part. And in such an one the Communes
notitia, or common Principles of Vertue and Goodness,
are more clear and steady. To such an one we may allow
τράνεστέραν καὶ ἐμφανεστέραν δόξαν, more clear and distinct
Opinions, as being already ἐν καθάρσει, in a Method or course of Purgation, or at least fit to be initiated into the Mysteria minora, the lesser Mysteries of Religion. For though these Innate notions of Truth may be but poor, empty, and hungry things of themselves, before they be fed and fill'd with the practice of true Vertue; yet they are capable of being impregnated, and exalted with the Rules and Precepts of it. And therefore the Stoick suppos'd ὅτι τοιοῦτο προσήκουσιν αἱ θύκαι καὶ πολιτικαὶ ἀρεταὶ, that the doctrine of Political and Moral vertues was fit to be delivered to such as these; and though they may not be so well prepared for Divine Vertue (which is of an higher Emanation) yet they are not immature for Humane, as having the Seeds of it already within themselves, which being water'd by answerable practice, may sprout up within them.

The Third is Ἀνθρωπὸς ἡδη κεκαθαρμένος, He whose Soule is already purg'd by this lower sort of Vertue, and so is continually flying off from the Body and Bodily passion, and returning into himself. Such in S. Peter's language are those who have escaped the pollutions which are in the world through lust. To these we may attribute a νόθη ἐπιστήμη, a lower degree of Science, their inward sense of Vertue and moral Goodness being far transcendent to all meer Speculative opinions of it. But if this Knowledge settle here, it may be quickly apt to corrupt. Many of our most refined Moralists may be, in a worst sense then Plotinus means, πληρωθέντες τῇ ἐναρχῇ φύσει, full with their own pregnancy; their Souls may too much heave and swell with the sense of their own Vertue and Knowledge: there may be an ill Ferment of Self-love lying at the bottome, which may puffe it up the more with Pride, Arrogance, and Self-conceit. These forces with which the Divine bounty supplies us to keep a stronger guard against the evil Spirit, may be abus'd by our own rebellious Pride,
enticing of them from their allegiance to Heaven, to strengthen it self in our Souls, and fortifie them against Heaven: like that supercilious Stoick, who when he thought his Minde well arm'd and appointed with Wisdome and Vertue, cry'd out, \textit{Sapiens contendet cum ipso Jove de felicitate.} They may make an airy heaven of these, and wall it about with their own Self-flattery, and then sit in it as Gods, as \textit{Cosroes} the Persian king was sometime laughed at for enshrining himself in a Temple of his own. And therefore if this Knowledge be not attended with Humility and a deep sense of Self-penury and Self-emptiness, we may easily fall short of that True Knowledge of God which we seem to aspire after. We may carry such an Image and Species of our Selves constantly before us, as will make us lose the clear sight of the Divinity, and be too apt to rest in a meer Logical life (it's Simplicius his expression) without any true participation of the Divine life, if we doe not (as many doe, if not all, who rise no higher) relapse and slide back by vain-glory, popularity, or such like vices, into some mundane and externall Vanity or other.

The Fourth is \textit{'Aνθρωπος θεωρητικός,} The true Metaphysical and Contemplative man, δι τὴν ἐαυτοῦ λογικὴν ζωὴν ἑπετρέχων, ὅλωσ εἶναι βούλεται τῶν κρειττῶν, who running and shooting up above his own Logical or Self-rational life, pierceth into the Highest life: Such a one, who by Universal Love and Holy affection abstracting himself from himselfe, endeavours the nearest Union with the Divine Essence that may be, κέντρον κέντρῳ συνάψας, as Plotinus speaks; knitting his owne centre, if he have any, unto the centre of Divine Being. To such an one the Platonists are wont to attribute θεῖαν ἐπιστήμην, a true Divine wisedome, powerfully displaying it self ἐν νοερᾷ ζωῇ in an Intellectual life, as they phrase it. Such a Knowledge they say is alwaies pregnant with Divine Vertue, which ariseth out of an happy Union of Souls with God, and is nothing
ATTAINING TO DIVINE KNOWLEDGE

else but a living Imitation of a Godlike perfection drawn out by a strong fervent love of it. This Divine Knowledge καλὸς καὶ ἑρατῶς ποιεῖ &c as Plotinus speaks; makes us amorous of Divine beauty, beautifull and lovely; and this Divine Love and Purity reciprocally exalts Divine Knowledge; both of them growing up together like that ἕρως and ἀνάμνησις that Pausanias sometimes speaks of. Though by the Platonists leave such a Life and Knowledge as this is, peculiarly belongs to the true and sober Christian who lives in Him who is Life it self, and is enlightened by Him who is the Truth it self, and is made partaker of the Divine Unction, and knoweth all things, as S. John speaks. This Life is nothing else but God’s own breath within him, and an Infant-Christ (if I may use the expression) formed in his Soul, who is in a sense ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξας, the shining forth of the Father’s glory. But yet we must not mistake, this Knowledge is but here in its Infancy; there is an higher knowledge or a higher degree of this knowledge that doth not, that cannot, descend upon us in these earthly habitations. We cannot here see in Speculo lucido; here we can see but in a glass, and that darkly too. Our own Imaginative Powers, which are perpetually attending the highest acts of our Souls, will be breathing a grosse dew upon the pure Glasse of our Understandings, and so sully and besmear it, that we cannot see the Image of the Divinity sincerely in it. But yet this Knowledge being a true heavenly fire kindled from God’s own Altar, begets an undaunted Courage in the Souls of Good men, and enables them to cast a holy Scorn upon the poor petty trash of this Life in comparison with Divine things, and to pity those poor brutish Epicureans that have nothing but the meer husks of fleshly pleasure to feed themselves with. This Sight of God makes pious Souls breath after that blessed time when Mortality shall be swallowed up of Life, when they shall no more behold
the Divinity through those dark Mediums that eclipse the
blessed Sight of it.

The two discourses which follow next are entitled 'Of
Superstition' and 'Of Atheism.' They are not unimpor-
tant, though tedious. Space could be found for them here
only at the sacrifice of passages which seem to be at once
more characteristic of the author and more interesting.
Smith's analysis of his arguments on these subjects is,
however, worth notice.

**OF SUPERSTITION.**

The true Notion of Superstition well expressed by Δεισιδαιμονία, i.e. an
over-timidous and dreadful apprehension of the Deity.
A false Opinion of the Deity the true Cause and Rise of Superstition.
Superstition is most incident to such as Convers not with the Goodness
of God, or are conscious to themselves of their own unlikeness to him.
Right apprehensions of God beget in man a Nobleness and Freedom of
Soul.
Superstition, though it looks upon God as an angry Deity, yet it counts
him easily pleas'd with flattering Worship.
Apprehensions of a Deity and Guilt meeting together are apt to excite
Fear.
Hypocrites to spare their Sins seek out waies to compound with God.
Servile and Superstitious Fear is increased by Ignorance of the certain
Causes of Terrible Effects in Nature, &c. as also by frightful
Apparitions of Ghosts and Spectres.
A further Consideration of Superstition as a Composition of Fear and
Flattery.
A fuller Definition of Superstition, according to the Sense of the Ancients.
Superstition doth not always appear in the same Form, but passes from
one Form to another, and sometimes shrouds it self under forms
seemingly Spiritual and more refined.

**A SHORT DISCOURSE OF ATHEISM.**

That there is a near Affinity between Atheism and Superstition.
That Superstition doth not only prepare the way for Atheism, but
promotes and strengthens it.
That Epicurism is but Atheism under a mask.
A Confutation of Epicurus his Master-notation, together with some other
pretences and Dogmata of his Sect.
The true knowledge of Nature is advantageous to Religion.
That Superstition is more tolerable than Atheism.
That Atheism is both ignoble and uncomfortable.
What low and unworthy Notions the Epicureans had concerning Man's
Happiness: and What trouble they were put to How to define, and
Where to place true Happinesse.
A true belief of a Deity supports the Soul with a present Tranquillity
and future Hopes.
Were it not for a Deity, the World would be uninhabitable.
A Discourse demonstrating
THE
IMMORTALITY
OF
THE SOUL.

Phocylides.
Σῶμα γὰρ ἐκ γαῖς ἔχομεν, καὶ πάντες ἐσ ἄυτὴν
Λυόμενοι κόμις ἐσμέν· ἀὴρ δ' ἀνὰ πνεῦμα δέδεκται.

Epicharmus apud Clem. Alex. Strom. 4.
Εἴσεβης νῦν πεφυκὼς, οὐ πάθοις γ' ἀν οὐδὲν κακὸν κατ-
θανὼν· ἀνω τὸ πνεῦμα διαμένει κατ' οὐρανόν.

Plotin. Ennead. 4. 1. 4. c. 45.
Ὁ ἀγαθὸς οὐ δεῖ ἄπεισι, καὶ γινώσκει πρὶν ἀπιέναι,
οὐ θανάκη αὐτῷ ἔλθοντι ὀικεῖν, καὶ εὐελπίς ἐστὶν,
ὡς μετὰ θεῶν ἐσοίτο.

Hierocl. in Pythag. aur. carm.
Ὁ βουλέται ὁ κακὸς ἀθάνατον εἶναι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχήν.
A DISCOURSE OF THE
IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

CHAPTER I.

The First and main Principles of Religion, viz. 1. That God is. 2. That God is a rewardeer of them that seek him: Wherein is included the Great Article of the Immortality of the Soul. These two Principles acknowledged by religious and serious persons in all Ages. 3. That God communicatethimself to mankind by Christ. The Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul discoursed of in the first place, and why?

Having finish'd our two short Discourses concerning those two Anti-Deities, viz. Superstition and Atheism; we shall now proceed to discourse more largely concerning the maine Heads and Principles of Religion.

And here we are to take Notice of those two Cardinal points which the Author of the Epistle to the Hebrews makes the necessary Foundations of all Religion, viz. That God is, and That He is a rewardeer of them that seek him. To which we should addde, The Immortality of the Reasonable Soul, but that that may seem included in the former: and indeed we can neither believe any Invisible reward of which he there speaks, without a Prolepsis of the Soul's Immortality; neither can we entertain a serious belief of that, but the notions of Poena and Praemium will naturally follow from it; we never meet with any who were perswaded of the former, that ever doubted of the latter: and therefore the former two have been usually taken alone for the First principles of Religion, and have been most
insisted upon by the Platonists; and accordingly a novel Platonist writing a Summary of Plato’s Divinity, intitiles his book, *De Deo et Immortalitate Anima*. And also the Stoical Philosophy requires a belief of these as the Prolepses of all Religion, of the one whereof Epictetus himself assures us, ἵσθι ὅπι τὸ κατωτάτον, &c. Know that the main Foundation of Piety is this, ὑπὸ ὅρθος ὑπολήψεως right opinions and apprehensions of God, viz. That he is, and that he governs all things καλῶς καὶ δικαιῶς. And the other is sufficiently insinuated in that Cardinal distinction of their τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, and τὰ μὴ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, and is more fully express’d by Simplicius. For however the Stoicks may seem to lay some ground of suspicion, as if they were dubious in this point, yet I think that which Tully and others deliver concerning their opinion herein, may fully answer all scruples, viz. That as they made certain Vicissitudes of Conflagrations and Inundations whereby the World should perish in certain periods of time; so they thought the Souls of men should also be subject to these periodical revolutions; and therefore though they were of themselves immortal, should in these changes fall under the power of the common fate.

And indeed we scarce ever finde that any were deem’d Religious, that did not own these two Fundamentals. For the Sadducees, the Jewish Writers are wont commonly to reckon them among the Epicureans, because though they held a God, yet they denied the Immortality of mens Souls, which the New Testament seems to include, if not especially to aime at, in imputing to them a denial of the Resurrection; which is therefore more fully explained in the Acts¹, where it is added that they held there was neither Angel nor Spirit. And these two Principles are chiefly aimed at in those two Inscriptions upon the Temple at Delphos, the one, ΕΙ, referring to God, by which Title those that came in to worship were supposed to invoke him, acknowledging

¹ Cap. 38. ² Chap. 23. 8.
his Immutable and Eternal nature; the other, \( \Gamma \Nic\ \Xi\\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\nu\chi\o\nu\lambda\iota \), as the admonition of the Deity again to all his worshippers, to take notice of the dignity and Immortality of their own Souls, as Plutarch and Tully, as also Clemens Alexandr. expound them.

But if we will have the Fundamental Articles of Christian Religion, we must add to the former, The Communication of God to Mankind through Christ; which last the Scripture treats of at large, so far as concerns our practice, with that plainness and simplicity, that I cannot but think, that whosoever shall ingenuously and with humility of Spirit addressing himself to God, converse therewith, will see the bright beams of Divinity shining forth in it, and it may be find the Text itself much plainer then all those Glosses that have been put upon it; though it may be it is not so clear in matters of Speculation, as some Magisterial men are apt to think it is.

Now for these three Articles of Faith and Practice, I think if we duly consider the Scriptures, or the Reason of the thing itself, we shall easily find all Practical Religion to be referr'd to them, and built upon them: The Nature of God and of our own Immortal Souls both shew us what our Religion should be, and also the Necessity of it; and the Doctrine of Free grace in Christ, the sweet and comfortable means of attaining to that perfection and Blessedness which the other Belief teaches us to aim at.

In pursuing of these we shall first begin with The Immortality of the Soul, which if it be once cleared, we can neither leave any room for Atheism (which those I doubt are not ordinarily very free from that have gross material notions of their own Souls) nor be wholly ignorant what God is: for indeed the chief natural way whereby we can climb'upe to the understanding of the Deity is by a Contemplation of our own Souls. We cannot think of him but according to the measure and model of our own Intellect,
or frame any other Idea of him then what the impressions of our own Souls will permit us: and therefore the best Philosophers have alwaies taught us to inquire for God within our selves; Reason in us, as Tully tells us, being participata similitudo rationis internae: and accordingly some good Expositours have interpreted that place in S. John's Gospel chap. i. He is that true light which enlightens every man that cometh into the world; which it I were to gloss upon in the language of the Platonists, I should doe it thus, λόγος θεοῦ φῶς ἡμῶν, the Eternal Word is the light of Souls, which the Vulgar Latine referr'd to in Signatum est supra nos lumen vultus tu, Domine¹, as Aquinas observes. But we shall not search into the full nature of the Soul, but rather make our inquiry into the Immortality of it, and endeavour to demonstrate that.

CHAPTER II.

Some Considerations preparatory to the proof of the Soul's Immortality.

But before we fall more closely upon this, viz. the demonstrating the Soul's Immortality, we shall premise three things.

1. That the Immortality of the Soul doth not absolutely need any Demonstration to clear it by, but might be assumed rather as a Principle or Postulatum, seeing the notion of it is apt naturally to insinuate it self into the belief of the most vulgar sort of men. Mens understandings commonly lead them as readily to believe that their Souls are Immortal, as that they have any Existence at all. And though they be not all so wise and Logical, as to distinguish aright between their Souls and their Bodies, or tell what kind of thing that is that they commonly call their Soul; yet they are strongly inclined to believe that some part of them shall survive

¹ Psal. 4. 7.
another, and that that Soul, which it may be they conceive by a gross Phantasm, shall live, when the other more visible part of them shall moulder into dust. And therefore all Nations have consented in this belief, which hath almost been as vulgarly received as the belief of a Deity; as a diligent converse with History will assure us, it having been never so much questioned by the Idiotical sort of men, as by some unskilful Philosophers, who have had Wit and Fancy enough to raise doubts, like Evil Spirits, but not Judgment enough to send them down again.

This Consensus Gentium Tully thinks enough to conclude a Law and Maxim of Nature by, which though I should not universally grant, seeing sometimes Error and Superstition may strongly plead this Argument; yet I think for those things that are the matter of our first belief, that Notion may not be refused. For we cannot easily conceive how any Prime notion that hath no dependency on any other antecedent to it, should be generally entertain'd; did not the common dictate of Nature or Reason acting alike in all men move them to conspire together in the embracing of it, though they knew not one anothers minds. And this it may be might first perswade Averroes to think of a Common Intellect, because of the uniform judgments of men in some things. But indeed in those Notions which we may call notiones ortae, there a communis notitia is not so free from all suspicion; which may be cleared by taking an Instance from our present Argument. The notion of the Immortality of the Soul is such an one as is generally owned by all those that yet are not able to collect it by a long Series and concatenation of sensible observations, and by a Logical dependence of one thing upon another deduce it from sensible Experiments; a thing that it may be was scarce ever done by the wisest Philosophers, but is rather believed with a kind of repugnancy to Sense, which shews all things to be mortal, and which would have been too apt to have
deluded the ruder sort of men, did not a more powerful impression upon their own Souls forcibly urge them to believe their own Immortality. Though indeed if the common notions of men were well examined, it may be some common notion adherent to this of the Immortality may be as generally received, which yet in itself is false; and that by reason of a common prejudice which the earthly and Sensual part of man will equally possess all men with, untill they come to be well acquainted with their own Souls; as namely a notion of the Souls Materiality, and it may be it's Traduction too, which seems to be as generally received by the vulgar sort as the former. But the reason of that is evident, for the Souls of men exercising themselves first of all κυνήσει προβατικῷ, as the Greek Philosopher expresseth, meerly by a Progressive kind of motion, spending themselves about Bodily and Material acts, and conversing onely with Sensible things; they are apt to acquire such deep stamps of Material phantasms to themselves, that they cannot imagine their own Being to be any other then Material and Divisible, though of a fine Aethereal nature: which kind of conceit, though it be inconsistent with an Immortal and Incorr uptible nature, yet hath too much prevalencie in Philosophers themselves, their Minds not being sufficiently abstracted while they have contemplated the highest Being of all. And some think Aristotle himself cannot be excused in this point, who seems to have thought God himself to be nothing else but μέγα ζων, as he styles him. But such Common Notions as these are, arising from the deceptions and hallucinations of Sense, ought not to prejudice those which not Sense, but some Higher power begets in all men. And so we have done with that.

The second thing I should premise should be in place of a Postulatum to our following Demonstrations, or rather a Caution about them, which is, That, to a right conceiving
the force of any such Arguments as may prove the Souls Immortality, there must be an antecedent Converse with our own Souls. It is no hard matter to convince any one by clear and evident principles, fetch'd from his own sense of himself, who hath ever well meditated the Powers and Operations of his own Soul, that it is Immaterial and Immortal.

But those very Arguments that to such will be Demonstrative, to others will lose something of the strength of Probability: For indeed it is not possible for us well to know what our Souls are, but onely by their κυκλικαὶ κυκλικαί, their Circular and Reflex motions, and Converse with themselves, which onely can steal from them their own secrets. All those Discourses which have been written of the Soul's Heraldry, will not blazon it so well to us as it self will doe. When we turn our own eyes in upon it, it will soon tell us it's own royal pedigree and noble extraction, by those sacred Hieroglyphicks which it bears upon it self. We shall endeavour to interpret and unfold some of them in our following Discourse.

3. There is one thing more to be considered, which may serve as a common Basis or Principle to our following Arguments; and it is this Hypothesis, That no Substantial and Indivisible thing ever perisheth. And this Epicurus and all of his Sect must needs grant, as indeed they doe, and much more then it is lawful to plead for; and therefore they make this one of the first Principles of their Atheistical Philosophy, Ex nihil fieri nil, et in nihilum nil posse reverti. But we shall here be content with that sober Thesis of Plato in his Timaeus, who attributes the Perpetuation of all Substances to the Benignity and Liberality of the Creatour, whom he therefore brings in thus speaking to the Angels, those νέοι θεοὶ, as he calls them, ὅμεισ ὁκ ἐστὶ ἀθανάτοι οὐδὲ ἀληθοῦ, &c. You are not of your selves immortal, nor indissoluble; but would relapse and slide back
from that Being which I have given you, should I withdraw the influence of my own power from you: but yet you shall hold your Immortality by a Patent of meer grace from my self. But to return, Plato held that the whole world, howsoever it might meet with many Periodicall mutations, should remain Eternally; which I think our Christian Divinity doth no where deny: and so Plotinus frames this general Axiom, ὅτι τοῦ ὄντος ἀπολαῖται, that no Substance shall ever perish. And indeed if we collate all our own Observations & Experience with such as the History of former times hath delivered to us, we shall not find that ever any substance was quite lost; but though this Proteus-like Matter may perpetually change its shape, yet it will constantly appear under one Form or another, what art soever we use to destroy it: as it seems to have been set forth in that old Gryphe or Riddle of the Peripatetick School, Aelia Laelia Crispis, nec mas, nec foemina, nec androgyna, nec casta, nec meretrix, nec pudica; sed omnia, &c. as Fortunius Licetus hath expounded it. Therefore it was never doubted whether ever any piece of Substance was lost, till of latter times some hot-brained Peripateticks, who could not bring their fiery and subtile fancies to any cool judgment, began rashly to determine that all Material Forms (as they are pleas'd to call them) were lost. For having once jumbled and crouded in a new kind of Being, never ancietly heard of, between the parts of a Contradiction, that is Matter and Spirit, which they call Material Forms, because they could not well tell whence these new upstarts should arise, nor how to dispose of them when Matter began to shift herself into some new garb, they condemn'd them to utter destruction; and yet lest they should seem too rudely to controul all Sense and Reason, they found out this common tale which signifies nothing, that these Substantial Forms were educed ex potentia Materiae, whenever Matter began to appeare in
any new disguise, and afterwards again returned *in gremium Materiae*; and so they thought them not quite lost. But this Curiosity consisting onely of words fortuitously packt up together, being too subtile for any sober judgment to lay hold upon, and which they themselves could never yet tell how to define; we shall as carelesly lay it aside, as they boldly obtrude it upon us, and take the common distinction of all *Substantiall Being* for granted, viz. That it is either *Body*, and so *Divisible*, and of three Dimensions; or else it is something which is not properly a *Body* or *Matter*, and so hath no such Dimensions as that the Parts thereof should be crouding for place, and justling one with another, not being all able to couch together or run one into another: and this is nothing else but what is commonly called *Spirit*. Though yet we will not be too Critical in depriving every thing which is not grossly corporeal of all kind of *Extension*.

**Chapter III.**

*The First Argument for the Immortality of the Soul. That the Soul of man is not Corporeal.* The gross absurdities upon the Supposition that the Soul is a Complex of fluid Atomes, or that it is made up by a fortuitous Concourse of Atomes: which is Epicurus his *Notion concerning Body*. The *Principles and Dogmata of the Epicurean Philosophy in opposition to the Immateriall and Incorporeal nature of the Soul*, asserted by Lucretius; but discover'd to be false and insufficient. That Motion cannot arise from Body or Matter. Nor can the power of Sensation arise from Matter: Much less can Reason. That all Humane knowledge hath not its rise from Sense. The proper function of Sense, and that it is never deceived. An Addition of Three Considerations for the enforcing of this first Argument, and further clearing the Immateriality of the Soul. That there is in man a Faculty which 1. controls Sense: and 2. collects and unites all the Perceptions of our several Senses. 3. That Memory and Prevision are not explicable upon the supposition of Matter and Motion.
We shall therefore now endeavour to prove That the Soul of man is something really distinct from his Body, of an Indivisible nature, and so cannot be divided into such Parts as should flit one from another; and consequently is apt of it's own Nature to remain to Eternity, and so will doe, except the Decrees of Heaven should abandon it from Being.

And first, we shall prove it ab absurdo, and here doe as the Mathematicians use to doe in such kind of Demonstrations: we will suppose that if the Reasonable Soul be not of such an Immaterial Nature, then it must be a Body, and so suppose it to be made up as all Bodies are: where because the Opinions of Philosophers differ, we shall only take one, viz. that of Epicurus, which supposeth it to be made up by a fortuitous Concourse of Atomes; and in that demonstrate against all the rest: (for indeed herein a particular Demonstration is an Universal, as it is in all Mathematical Demonstrations of this kind.) For if all that which is the Basis of our Reasons and Understandings, which we here call the Substance of the Soul, be nothing else but a meer Body, and therefore be infinitely divisible, as all Bodies are; it will be all one in effect whatsoever notion we have of the generation or production thereof. We may give it, if we please, finer words, and use more demure and smooth language about it then Epicurus did, as some that, lest they should speak too rudely and rustically of it by calling it Matter, will name it Efflorescentia Materiae; and yet lest that should not be enough, adde Aristotle's Quintessence to it too: they will be so trim and courtly in defining of it, that they will not call it by the name of Aer, Ignis, or Flamma, as some of the ancient vulgar Philosophers did, but Flos flammae: and yet the Epicurean Poet could use as much Chymistry in exalting his fansy as these subtile Doctors doe; and when he would dress out the Notion of it more
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

raudily, he resembles it to 'Flos Bacchi, and Spiritus unguentii suavis. But when we have taken away this disguise of wanton Wit, we shall find nothing better then meer Body, which will be recoiling back perpetually into it's own inert and sluggish Passiveness: though we may think we have quicken'd it never so much by this subtile artifice of Words and Phrases, a man's new-born Soul will for all this be but little better then his Body; and, as that is, be but a rasura corporis alieni, made up of some small and thin shavings pared off from the Bodies of the Parents by a continuall motion of the several parts of it; and must afterwards receive its augmentation from that food and nourishment which is taken in, as the Body doth. So that the very Grass we walk over in the fields, the Dust and Mire in the streets that we tread upon, may, according to the true meaning of this dull Philosophy, after many refinings, macerations and maturations, which Nature performs by the help of Motion, spring up into so many Rational Souls, and prove as wise as any Epicurean, and discourse as subtily of what it once was, when it lay drooping in a sensless Passiveness. This conceit is so gros, that one would think it wanted nothing but that witty Sarcasm that Plutarch cast upon Nicocles the Epicurean, to confute it, ἥ μήτηρ ἀτόμοις ἵσχεν ἐν αὐτῇ τοσαίτας, οἷοι συνελθούσαι σοφῶν ἐν ἐγέννηται.

But because the heavy minds of men are so frequently sinking into this earthly fancy, we shall further search into the entrails of this Philosophy; and see how like that is to a Rational Soul, which it pretends to declare the production of. Lucretius first of all taking notice of the mighty swiftness and celerity of the Soul in all its operations, lest his Matter should be too soon tired and not able to keep pace with it, he first casts the Atomes prepared for this purpose into such perfect Sphaerical and small figures as

1 Lucret. lib. 3.
might be most capable of these swift impressions; for so he, lib. 3.

At, quod mobile tantopere est, constare rotundis
Perquam seminibus debit, perquamque minutis,
Momine uti parvo possint impulsa moveri.

But here before we goe any further, we might inquire what it should be that should move these small and insensible Globes of Matter. For Epicurus his two Principles, which he calls Plenum and Inane, will here by no means serve our turn to find out Motion by. For though our communes notitiae assure us that whereever there is a Multiplicity of parts, (as there is in every Quantitative Being) there may be a Variety of application in those parts one to another, and so a Mobility; yet Motion it self will not so easily arise out of a Plenum, though we allow it an empty Space and room enough to play up and down in. For we may conceive a Body, which is his Plenum, onely as trinè dimensum, being longum, latum et profundum, without attributing any motion at all to it: and Aristotle in his De Caelo doubts not herein to speak plainly, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος κίνησις οὐκ ἐγγίσεται, that Motion cannot arise from a Body. For indeed this Power of motion must needs argue some Efficient cause, as Tully hath well observed, if we suppose any Rest antecedent; or if any Body be once moving, it must also find some potent Efficient to stay it and settle it in Rest, as Simplicius hath somewhere in his Comment upon Epictetus wisely determin’d. So that if we will suppose either Motion or Rest to be contein’d originally in the nature of any Body; we must of necessity conclude some potent Efficient to produce the contrary, or else attribute this Power to Bodies themselves; which will at last grow unbounded and infinite, and indeed altogether inconsistent with the nature of a Body.

But yet though we should grant all this which Lucretius contends for, how shall we force up these particles of Matter
into any true and real *Perceptions*, and make them perceive their own or others motions, which he calls *Motus sensiferi*? For he having first laid down his Principles of all Being, as he supposeth (neither is he willing to leave his Deities themselves out of the number) he only requires these *Postulata* to unfold the nature of all by "Concursus, motus, ordo, positura, figurai.* But how any such thing as *sensation*, or much lesse *Reason*, should spring out of this barren soil, how well till'd soever, no composed mind can imagine. For indeed that infinite variety which is in the *Magnitude* of parts, their *Positions, Figures* and *Motions*, may easily, and indeed must needs, produce an infinite variety of *Phaenomena*, which the *Epicurean* philosophy calls *Eventa*. And accordingly where there is a *Sentient faculty*, it may receive the greatest variety of Impressions from them, by which the *Perceptions*, which are the immediate result of a Knowing faculty, will be distinguish'd: Yet cannot the Power it self of *Sensation* arise from them, no more then *Vision* can rise out of a Glasse, whereby it should be able to perceive these *Idola* that paint themselves upon it, though it were never so exactly polish'd, and they much finer then they are or can be.

Neither can those small *corpuscula*, which in themselves have no power of *sense*, ever produce it by any kind of *Concourse* or *Motion*; for so a Cause might in its production rise up above the height of its own nature and virtue; which I think every calm contemplator of Truth will judge impossible: for seeing whatsoever any Effect hath, it must needs derive from its Causes, and can receive no other tincture and impression then they can bestow upon it; that Signature must first be in the Cause it self, which is by it derived to the Effect. And therefore the wisest Philosophers amongst the Ancients universally concluded that there was some higher Principle then meer

\[1\text{ Lib. i.}\]
Matter, which was the Cause of all Life and Sense, and that to be Immortal: as the Platonists, who thought this reason sufficient to move them to assert a Mundane Soul. And Aristotle, though he talks much of Nature, yet he delivers his mind so cloudily, that all that he hath said of it may passe with that which himself said of his Acro- tici Libri, or Physicks, that they were ἐκδεδομένοι καὶ μὴ ἐκδεδομένοι. Nor is it likely that he who was so little satisfied with his own notion of Nature as being the Cause of all Motion and Rest, as seemingly to desert it while he placeth so many Intelligences about the Heavens, could much please himself with such a gross conceit of meer Matter, that that should be the true Moving and Sentient Entelech of some other Matter; as it is manifest he did not.

But indeed Lucretius himself, though he could in a jolly fit of his over-flush'd and fiery fancy tell us (Lib. 1),

Et ridere potest non ex ridentibus factus,
Et sapere, et doctis rationem reddere dictis,
Non ex seminibus sapientibus, atque disertis:

yet in more cool thoughts he found his own common notions too sturdy to be so easily silenc'd; and therefore sets his wits a-work to find the most Quintessential particles of Matter that may be, that might doe that feat, which those smooth Spherical bodies, Calor, Aer and Ventus (for all come into this composition) could not doe: and this was of such a subtile and exalted nature, that his earthly fansy could not comprehend it, and therefore he confesses plainly he could not tell what name to give it, though for want of a better he calls it Mobilem vim, as neither his Master before him, who was pleased to compound the Soul (as Plutarch\(^1\) relates) of four ingredients, ἐκ ποιοῦ πυρόδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ ἀερόδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ πνευματικοῦ, ἐκ τετάρτου τινὸς ἀκατονομάστου ὅ ἦν αὐτῷ αἰσθητικόν. But because this

\(^1\) Lib. 4. de placitis Philosophorum.
Giant-like Proteus found himself here bound with such strong cords, that notwithstanding all his struggling he could by no means break them off from him, we shall relate his own words the more largely. I find them lib. 3.

Sic calor, atque aer, et venti caeca potestas
Mista creant unam naturam, et mobilis illa
Vis, initum motus abs se quae dividit ollis:
Sensifer unde ortur primum per viscera motus.
Nam penitus prorsum latet haec natura, subestque;
Nec magis hac infra quidquam est in corpore nostro;
Atque anima'st animae proporr'd totius ipsa.
Quod genus in nostris membris et corpore toto
Mista latens animi vis est, animaeque potestas,
Corporibus quia de parvis paucisque creata est.
Sic tibi nominis haec expers vis, facta minutis
Corporibus, latet—

Thus we see how he found himself overmaster'd with difficulties, while he endeavoured to find the place of the Sensitive powers in Matter: and yet this is the highest that he dares aim at, namely to prove that Sensation might from thence derive its Original, as stiffly opposing any Higher power of Reason; which we shall in lucro ponere against another time.

But surely had not the Epicureans abandoned all Logick together with some other Sciences (as Tully and Laertius tell us they did) they would here have found themselves too much prest with this Argument, (which yet some will think to be but levis armaturae in respect of some other) and have found it as little short of a Demonstration to prove the Soules Immortality as the Platonists themselves did: But herein how they dealt, 1 Plotinus hath well observed of them all who denied Lives and Souls to be immortal, which he asserts, and make them nothing but Bodies, that when they were pinch'd with the strength of

1 Enn. 4. l. 7. c. 4.

1 2
any Argument fetch’d from the φύσις δραστήριος of the Soul, it was usuall amongst them to call this Body πνεῦμα πῶς ἔχων, or Ventus certo quodam modo se habens; to which he well replies, τι τὸ πολυθρύλητον αὐτῶς πῶς ἔχων, εἰς ἀκαταφεύγουσιν ἀναγκαζόμενοι τίθεσθαι ἄλλην παρὰ τὸ σῶμα φύσιν δραστήριον. Whereby by this φύσις δραστήριος seems to be nothing meant but that same thing which Lucretius called vim mobilem, and he would not allow it to be any thing else but a Body, though what kind of Body he could not tell: yet by it he understands not meerly an Active power of motion, but a more subtile Energie, whereby the force and nature of any motion is perceived and insinuated by its own strength in the bodies moved; as if these sorry Bodies by their impetuous justling together could awaken one another out of their drowsie Lethargie, and make each other hear their mutuall impetuous knocks: which is as absurd as to think a Musical instrument should hear its own sounds, and take pleasure in those harmonious aires that are plai’d upon it. For that which we call Sensation, is not the Motion or Impression which one Body makes upon another, but a Recognition of that Motion; and therefore to attribute that to a Body, is to make a Body privy to its own acts and passions, to act upon itself, and to have a true and proper self-feeling virtue; which 1 Porphyrie hath elegantly expressed, ὅταν τὸ ἔρινα αἰσθάνηται, ἐπικεν ἢ μὲν ψυχῇ ἄρμονίᾳ χαρμοστῇ ἐξ εὐαντῆς τὰς χορδὰς κυνούσῃ ἡμοσεμέναστῇ δὲ ἐν ταῖς χορδαῖς ἄρμονία ἀχορίστω τὸ σῶμα, In the sensations of living creatures the Soul moves, as if unbodied Harmony her self should play upon an Instrument, and smartly touch the well-tuned strings: but the Body is like that Harmony which dwells inseparably in the strings themselves which have no perception of it.

Thus we should now leave this Topick of our Demonstration, onely we shall adde this as an Appendix to it,

1 In his Tract, Ἀφορμα τὲ νηστά.
which will further manifest the Souls *Incorporeal* and *Immaterial* nature, that is, That there is a *Higher* Principle of knowledge in man then meer *Sense*, neither is that the sole Original of all that Science that breaks forth in the minds of men; which yet *Lucretius* maintains, as being afraid lest he should be awaken'd out of this pleasant dreame of his, should any Higher power rouse his sleepy Soul: and therefore he thus layes down the opinion of his Sect:\(^1\)

\[
\text{Invenies primis ab sensibus esse creatam}\\
\text{Notitiam veri, neque sensus posse refelli:}\\
\text{Nam majore fide debet reperirier illud,}\\
\text{Sponte sua veris quod possit vincere falsa.}
\]

But yet this goodly Champion doth but lay siege to his own Reason, and endeavour to storm the main fort thereof, which but just before he defended against the *Scepticks* who maintained that opinion, *That nothing could be known*; to which he having replied by that vulgar Argument, *That if nothing can be known, then neither doe we know this* *That we know nothing*; he pursues them more closely with another, *That neither could they know what it is to know, or what it is to be ignorant,*

\[
\text{Quaeram, quom in rebus verinil viderit ante;}\\
\text{Unde sciat, quid sit scire, et nescire vicissim:}\\
\text{Notitiam veri quae res falsique creari.}
\]

But yet if our *Senses* were the onely *Judges* of things, this *Reflex* knowledge whereby we know what it is to know, would be as impossible as he makes it for *Sense* to have *Innate Ideas* of its own, antecedent to those stamps which the Radiations of external Objects imprint upon it. For this knowledge must be antecedent to all that judgment which we pass upon any *Sensatum*, seeing except we first know what it is to know, we could not judge or determine

\(^1\) Lib. 4.
aright upon the approach of any of these *Idola* to our Senses.

But our Author may perhaps yet seem to make a more full confession for us in these two points.

First, That no sense can judge another's objects, nor convince it of any mistake,

*Non possunt alios alii convincere sensus,*
*Nec porro poterunt ipsi reprehendere se.*

If therefore there be any such thing within us as controls our *Senses*, as all know there is; then must that be of an Higher nature then our *Senses* are.

But secondly, he grants further, That all our *Sensation* is nothing else but *Perception*, and therefore wheresoever there is any hallucination, that must arise from something else within us besides the power of sense,

*— quoniam pars horum maxima fallit*
*Propter opinatus animi, quos addimus ipsi,*
*Pro visis ut sint, quae non sunt sensibu' visa.*

In which words he hath very happily lighted upon the proper function of *Sense*, and the true reason of all those *mistakes* which we call the *Deceptions of Sense*, which indeed are not truely so, seeing they arise onely from a Higher Faculty, and consist not in *Sensation* it self, but in those deductions and Corollaries that our Judgments draw from it.

We shall here therefore grant that which the *Epicurean* philosophy, and the *Peripatetick* too, though not without much caution, pleads for universally, *That our Senses are never deceived*, whether they be *sani* or *laesi*, sound or distempered, or whatsoever proportion or distance the *Object* or *medium* bears to it: for if we well scan this business, we shall find that nothing of *Judgment* belongs to *Sense*, it consisting onely *εν αλοθηηρίω πάθει*, in Perception; neither can it make any just observation of those Objects that are without, but onely discerns its own
passions, and is nothing else but \( \gamma \nu \omega \varsigma \tau \omega \nu \pi \alpha \theta \omega \nu \), and tells how it finds itself affected, and not what is the true cause of those impressions which it finds within it self; (which seems to be the reason of that old Philosophical maxim recited by Aristotle l. 3. de Anima, cap. 2. \( \sigma \nu \tau \sigma \tau \varepsilon \mu \lambda \alpha \nu \varepsilon \iota \nu \alpha \nu \delta \psi \varepsilon \omega \varsigma \), \( \sigma \nu \delta \chi \mu \mu \nu \alpha \nu \gamma \nu \sigma \sigma \varepsilon \omega \varsigma \), that these \( \text{Simulachra} \) were only in our Senses; which notion a late Author hath pursued:) and therefore when the Eye finds the Sun's circle represented within itself of no greater a bigness then a foot-diameter, it is not at all herein mistaken; nor a distempered Palate, when it tastes a bitterness in the sweetest honey, as Proclus a famous Mathematician and Platonist hath well determined, in Plat. Tim. \( \alpha \iota \gamma \nu \alpha \lambda \beta \gamma \varepsilon \beta \iota \sigma \varepsilon \iota \sigma \iota \alpha \), \( \kappa \alpha \iota \sigma \tau \eta \chi \varepsilon \sigma \iota \iota \alpha \), \( \tau \varepsilon \sigma \alpha \gamma \gamma \gamma \varepsilon \lambda \lambda \varepsilon \iota \iota \sigma \varsigma \), \( \kappa \alpha \iota \sigma \tau \eta \chi \varepsilon \sigma \iota \iota \alpha \), \( \kappa \alpha \iota \sigma \tau \eta \chi \varepsilon \sigma \iota \iota \alpha \). The Senses in all things of this nature doe but declare their own passions or perceptions, which are alwaies such as they seem to be, whether there be any such \( \text{parallelum signaculum} \) in the Object as bears a true analogie with them or not: and therefore in truth they are never deceived in the execution of their own functions. And so doth Aristotle l. 3 de Anima, c. 3. conclude, That errour is neither in Sense nor Phantasy, \( \sigma \nu \delta \nu \varepsilon \iota \sigma \tau \sigma \tau \varepsilon \mu \mu \nu \kappa \alpha \iota \sigma \tau \eta \chi \varepsilon \sigma \iota \iota \alpha \), \( \kappa \alpha \iota \sigma \tau \eta \chi \varepsilon \sigma \iota \iota \alpha \), \( \tau \varepsilon \sigma \alpha \gamma \gamma \gamma \varepsilon \lambda \lambda \varepsilon \iota \iota \sigma \varsigma \), \( \kappa \alpha \iota \sigma \tau \eta \chi \varepsilon \sigma \iota \iota \alpha \), \( \kappa \alpha \iota \sigma \tau \eta \chi \varepsilon \sigma \iota \iota \alpha \). Though it be as true on the other side, that Epicurus and all his Sect were deceived, while they judged the Sun and Moon and all the Starrs to be no bigger then that Picture and Image which they found of them in their own Eyes; for which silly conceit though they had been for many Ages sufficiently laugh'd at by wise men, yet could not Lucretius tell how to enlarge his own fancy, but believes the \( \text{Idolum} \) in his own Visive organ to be adequate to the Sun it self, in despight of all Mathematicall demonstration; as indeed he must needs, if there were no \( \text{Higher} \) principle of knowledge then Sense is, which is the most indisciplinable thing that may be, and can never be taught that Truth which
Reason and Understanding might attempt to force into it. Though Reason inculcates this notion ten thousand times over, That the Sun is bigger then the Earth, yet will not the Eye be taught to see it any bigger then a foot breadth: and therefore he rightly calls it, as all the Platonical and Stoical philosophie doth, ἄλογόν τι, and it may well be put among the rest of the Stoicks ἄλογα πάθη.

Thus I hope by this time we have found out κρείττονά τινα τῆς αἰσθήσεως δύναμιν, some more noble Power in the Soul then that is by which it accommodates it self to the Body, and according to the measure and proportion thereof converseth with External Matter. And this is the true reason why we are so apt to be mistaken in Sensible objects, because our Souls sucking in the knowledge of external things thereby, and not minding the proportion that is between the Body and them, mindless of its own notions, collates their corporeal impressions with externall objects themselves, and judgeth of them one by another. But whensoever our Souls act in their own power and strength, untwisting themselves from all corporeal complications, they then can find confidence enough to judge of things in a seeming contradiction to all those other visa corporea.

And so I suppose this Argument will amount to no lesse then a Demonstration of the Soul's Immateriality, seeing to all sincere understanding it is necessary that it should thus abstract it self from all corporeal commerce, and return from thence nearer into it self.

Now what we have to this purpose more generally intimated, we shall further branch out in these two or three Particulars.

First, That that Mental faculty and power whereby we judge and discern things, is so far from being a Body, that it must retract and withdraw it self from all Bodily operation
whensoever it will nakedly discern Truth. For should our Souls alwaies mould their judgment of things according to those παθήματα and impressions which seem to be framed thereof in the Body, they must then doe nothing else but chain up Errors and Delusions one with another in stead of Truth: as should the judgments of our Understandings wholly depend upon the sight of our Eyes, we should then conclude that our meer accesses and recesses from any Visible Object have such a Magical power to change the magnitudes of Visible Objects, and to transform them into all varieties of figures and fashions; and so attribute all that variety to them which we find in our corporeal perceptions. Or should we judge of Gustables by our Tast, we should attribute to one and the self-same thing all that variety with we find in our own Palates. Which is an unquestionable Argument That that Power whereby we discern of things and make judgments of them different and sometimes contrary to those perceptions that are the necessary results of all Organical functions, is something distinct from the Body; and therefore though the Soul, as Plato hath well observed, be μεριστῇ περὶ τὰ σώματα, various and divisible accidentally in these Sensations and Motions wherein it extends and spreads it self as it were upon the Body, and so according to the nature and measure thereof perceives its impressions; yet it is ἐν οὐτῇ ἀμερίστῃ indivisible, returning into it self. Whence it will speculate Truth it self, it will not then listen to the several clamours and votes of these rude Senses which alwaies speak with divided tongues; but it consults some clearer Oracle within it self: and therefore Plotinus, Enn. 4. l. 3. hath well concluded concerning the Body, ἐν τῷ ἔκθεσιν προσχρόν, should a man make use of his Body in his Speculations, it will entangle his mind with so many contradictions, that it will be impossible to attain to any true knowledge of things.
We shall conclude this therefore, as Tully doth his Contemplation of the Soules operations about the frame of Nature, the fabrick of the Heavens and motions of the Stars, Animus qui haec intelligit, similis est ejus qui ea fabricatus in coelo est.

Secondly, We also find such a Faculty within our own Souls as collects and unites all the Perceptions of our several Senses, and is able to compare them together; something in which they all meet as in one Centre: which Plotinus hath well expressed, δει τούτο ὅπερ κέντρον εἶναι γραμμάς δὲ συλλαβοῦσας ἐκ περιφερείας κύκλου, τὰς πανταχόθεν αἰσθήσεις πρὸς τούτο περαίνειν, καὶ τοῦτον τὸ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον εἶναι ἐν ὀντός, That in which all those several Sensations meet as so many Lines drawn from several points in the Circumference, and which comprehends them all, must needs be One. For should that be various and consisting of several parts, which thus receives all these various impressions, then must the sentence and judgment passed upon them be various too. Aristotle in his de Anima, Δει τὸ ἐν λέγειν δὲ τὸ ἐπερον, That must be one that judgeth things to be diverse; and that must judge too ἐν ἄχωρίστω χρόνῳ, setting all before it at once. Besides we could not conceive how such an immense variety of impressions could be made upon any piece of Matter, which should not obliterate and deface one another. And therefore Plotinus hath well disputed against them who make all Sensation τυπώσεις καὶ ἐνσφαγόσεις ἐν ψυχῇ which brings me to the Third.

Thirdly, That Knowledge which the Soul retains in itself of things past, and in some sort Prevision of things to come, whereby many grow so sagacious in fore-seeing future Events, that they know how to deliberate and dispose of present affairs, so as to be ready furnished and prepared for such Emergencies as they see in a train and Series of Causes which sometimes work but contingently: I cannot

1 Enn. 4. l. 7. c. 6.
think Epicurus himself could in his cool thoughts be so unreasonable as to persuade himself, that all the shuffling and cutting of Atomes could produce such a Divine piece of Wisdome as this is. What Matter can thus bind up Past, Present and Future time together? which while the Soul of man doth, it seems to imitate (as far as its own finite nature will permit it to strive after an imitation of) God's eternity: and grasping and gathering together a long Series of duration into it self, makes an essay to free it self from the rigid laws of it, and to purchase to it self the freedome of a true Eternity. And as by its χρονικοὶ πρόδοτοι (as the Platonists are wont to speak) its Chronical and successive operations, it unravels and unfolds the contexture of its own indefinite intellectual powers by degrees; so by this Memory and Prevision it recollects and twists them up all together again into it self. And though it seems to be continually sliding from it self in those several vicissitudes and changes which it runs through in the constant variety of its own Effluxes and Emanations; yet is it alwaies returning back again to its first Original by a swift remembrance of all those motions and multiplicity of operations which have begot in it the first sense of this constant flux. As if we should see a Sun-beam perpetually flowing forth from the bright body of the Sun, and yet ever returning back to it again; it never loseth any part of its Being, because it never forgets what it self was: and though it may number out never so vast a length of its duration, yet it never comes nearer to its old age, but carrieth a lively sense of its youth and infancy, which it can at pleasure lay a fast hold on, along with it.

But if our Souls were nothing else but a Complex of fluid Atomes, how should we be continually roving and sliding from our selves, and soon forget what we once were? The new Matter that would come in to fill up that Vacuity which the Old had made by its departure, would never
know what the Old were, nor what that should be that would succeed that: ὁσπερ ἔγνῃ ψυχή αὐτῇ ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ ἐστιν, ἐν ἡ ἑτέρα οἶδε, καὶ ὁσπερ ὁ ἄλλος ὄγκος ἕμοι, that new pilgrim and stranger-like Soul would alwaies be ignorant of what the other before it knew, and we should be wholly some other bulk of Being then we were before, as Plotinus hath excellently observed Enn. 4. l. 7. c. 5. It was a famous speech of wise Heraclitus, ἐς τὸν ἀνὴν ποταμὸν δὶς σοκ ἐν ἐμβάθης, a man cannot enter twice into the same River: by which he was wont symbolically to express the constant flux of Matter, which is the most unstable thing that may be. And if Epicurus his Philosophy could free this Heap of refined Atomes, which it makes the Soul to be, from this inconstant and flitting nature, and teach us how it could be μόνην ῥ ῥ some stable and immutable thing, alwaies resting entire while it is in the Body; though we would thank him for such a goodly conceit as this is, yet we would make no doubt but it might as well be able to preserve it self from dissolution and dissipation out of this gross Body, as in it: seeing it is no more secured from the constant impulses of that more gross Matter which is restlesly moving up and down in the Body, then it is out of it: and yet for all that we should take the leave to ask Tully's question with his sober disdain, Quid, obseiro, terrâne tibi aut hoc nebuloso et caliginoso coeno aut sata aut concreta videtur tanta vis memoriae? Such a jewel as this is too precious to be found in a dunghill: meer Matter could never thus stretch forth its feeble force, and spread it self over all its own former praeexistencies. We may as well suppose this dull and heavy Earth we tread upon to know how long it hath dwelt in this part of the Universe that now it doth, and what variety of Creatures have in all past Ages sprung forth from it, and all those occurrences and events which have all this time happened upon it.
Chapter IV.

The second Argument for the Immortality of the Soul. Actions either Automatical or Spontaneous. That Spontaneous and Elicite Actions evidence the Distinction of the Soul from the Body. Lucretius his Evasion very slight and weak. That the Liberty of the Will is inconsistent with the Epicurean principles. That the Conflict of Reason against the Sensitive Appetite argues a Being in us superior to Matter.

We have done with that which we intended for the First part of our Discourse of the Soul's Immortality: we have hitherto look'd at it rather in Concreto then in Abstracto, rather as a Thing complicated with and united to the Body; and therefore considered it in those Operations, which as they are not proper to the Body, so neither are they altogether independent upon it, but are rather of a mixt nature.

We shall now take notice of it in those Properties, in the exercise whereof it hath less commerce with the Body, and more plainly declares its own high descent to us, That it is able to subsist and act without the aid and assistance of this Matter which it informes.

And here we shall take that course that Aristotle did in his Books de Anima, and first of all inquire, Whether it hath ῥιζων τι, some kind of Action so proper and peculiar to it self, as not to depend upon the Body. And this soon offers it self in the first place to us in those Elicit motions of it, as the Moralists are wont to name them, which though they may end in those they call Imperate acts, yet have their first Emanation from nothing else but the Soul it self.

For this purpose we shall take notice of Two sorts of Actions which are obvious to the experience of every one that observes himself, according to a double Source and emanation of them, which a late Philosopher hath very happily suggested to us. The first are those Actions which
arise up within us without any Animadversion; the other are those that are consequent to it.

For we find frequently such Motions within our selves which first are, before we take notice of them, and which by their own turbulency and impetuousness force us to an Advertency: as those Fiery spirits and that inflamed Blood which sometimes fly up into the head; or those gross and Earthly Fumes that disturb our brains; the stirring of many other Humours which beget within us Grief, Melancholy, Anger, or Mirth, or other Passions; which have their rise from such Causes as we were not aware of, nor gave no consent to create this trouble to us. Besides all those Passions and Perceptions which are begotten within us by some externall motions which derive themselves through our Senses, and fiercely knocking at the door of our Minds and Understandings force them sometimes from their deepest debates and musings of some other thing, to open to them and give them an audience.

Now as to such Motions as these are, it being necessary for the preservation of our Bodies that our Souls should be acquainted with them, a mans Body was so contrived and his Soul so united to it, that they might have a speedy access to the Soul. Indeed some ancient Philosophers thought that the Soul descending more deeply into the Body, as they expresse it, first begot these corporeal motions unbeknown to it self by reason of its more deep immersion, which afterwards by their impetuousness excited its advertency. But whatsoever truth there is in that Assertion, we clearly find from the relation of our own Souls themselves that our Soul disowns them, and acknowledgeth no such Motions to have been so busy by her commission; neither knows what they are, from whence they arise, or whither they tend, untill she hath duly examined them. But these Corporeal motions as they seem to arise from nothing else but meerly from the Machina of the
Body itself; so they could not at all be sensated but by the Soul.

Neither indeed are all our own Corporeal actions perceived by us, but only those that may serve to maintain a good correspondence and intelligence between the Soul and Body, and so foment and cherish that Sympathy between them which is necessary for the subsistence and well-being of the whole man in this mundane state. And therefore there is very little of that which is commonly done in our Body, which our Souls are informed at all of. The constant Circulation of Blood through all our Veins and Arteries; the common motions of our Animal spirits in our Nerves; the maceration of Food within our Stomachs, and the distribution of Chyle and nourishment to every part that wants the relief of it; the constant flux and reflux of more sedate Humours within us; the dissipations of our corporeal Matter by insensible Transpiration, and the accesses of new in the room of it; all this we are little acquainted with by any vital energie which ariseth from the union of Soul and Body: and therefore when we would acquaint our selves with the Anatomy and vital functions of our own Bodies, we are fain to use the same course and method that we would to find out the same things in any other kind of Animal, as if our Souls had as little to doe with any of these in our own Bodies, as they have in the Bodies of any other Brute creature.

But on the other side, we know as well, that many things that are done by us, are done at the dictate and by the commission of our own Wills; and therefore all such Actions as these are, we know, without any great store of Discoursive inquiry, to attribute to their own proper causes, as seeing the efflux and propagation of them. We doe not by a naked speculation know our Bodies first to have need of nourishment, and then by the Edict of our Wills injoyn our Spirits and Humours to put themselves into an hungry
and craving posture within us by corroding the Tunicles of
the Stomach; but we first find our own Souls sollicited by
these motions, which yet we are able to gainsay, and to
deny those petitions which they offer up to us. We know
we commonly meditate and discourse of such Arguments
as we our selves please: we mould designs, and draw up
a plot of means answerable thereto, according as the free
vote of our own Souls determines; and use our own Bodies
many times, notwithstanding all the reluctancies of their
nature, onely as our Instruments to serve the will and
pleasure of our Souls. All which as they evidently manifest
a true Distinction between the Soul and the Body, so they
doe as evidently prove the Supremacy and dominion which
the Soul hath over the Body. Our Moralists frequently
dispute what kind of government that is whereby the Soul,
or rather Will, rules over the Sensitive Appetite, which they
ordinarily resolve to be Imperium politicum; though I
should rather say, that all good men have rather a true
despotic power over their Sensitive faculties, and over the
whole Body, though they use it onely according to the laws
of Reason and Discretion. And therefore the Platonists
and Stoicks thought the Soul of man to be absolutely freed
from all the power of Astral Necessity, and uncontrollable
impressions arising from the subordination and mutual
Sympathie and Dependance of all mundane causes, which
is their proper notion of Fate. Neither ever durst that bold
Astrologie which presumes to tell the Fortunes of all
corporeal Essences, attempt to enter into the secrets of
man's Soul, or predict the destinies thereof. And indeed
whatever the destinies thereof may be that are contained
in the vast volume of an Infinite and Almighty Mind, yet
we evidently find a τὸ ἐφ’ ᾑμῖν, an αὐτεξούσιον, a liberty of
Will within our selves, maugre the stubborn malice of all
Second Causes. And Aristotle, who seems to have disputed
so much against that αὐτοκυνησία of Souls which his Master
before him had soberly maintained, does indeed but quarrel with that common sense and Experience which we have of our Souls; this \( \alpha \iota \rho \omega \kappa \iota \nu \varphi \eta \sigma \alpha \) of the Soul being nothing else but that Innate force and power which it hath within it, to stir up such thoughts and motions within it self as it finds it self most free to. And therefore when we reflect upon the productions of our own Souls, we are soon able to find out the first Efficient cause of them. And though the subtility of some Wits may have made it difficult to find out whether the Understanding or the Will or some other Facultie of the Soul be the First Mover, whence the \textit{motus primo primus} (as they please to call it) proceeds; yet we know it is originally the Soul it self whose vital acts they all are: and although it be not \( \alpha \iota \tau \omicron \omicron \theta \epsilon \nu \ \pi \rho \omega \tau \gamma \eta \) the First Cause as deriving all its virtue from it self, as Simplicius distinguisheth in \textit{i. de An. cap. i.} yet it is \( \epsilon \nu \ \tau \omicron \omicron \ \pi \rho \omega \tau \gamma \omicron \omicron \ \phi \nu \omicron \kappa \eta \), vitally co-working with the First Causes of all. But on the other side, when we come to examine those Motions which arise from the Body, this stream runs so far under ground, that we know not how to trace it to the head of it; but we are fain to \textit{analyse} the whole artifice, looking from the \textit{ Spirits} to the \textit{Blood}, from that to the \textit{Heart}, viewing all along the \textit{Mechanical contrivance} of \textit{Veins} and \textit{Arteries}: neither know we after all our search whether there be any \textit{Perpetuum mobile} in our own Bodies, or whether all the motions thereof be onely by the redundancy of some external motions without us; nor how to find the First mover in nature; though could we find out that, yet we know that there is a Fatal determination which fits in all the wheels of meer Corporeal motion; neither can they exercise any such noble freedome as we constantly find in the Wills of men, which are as large and unbounded in all their Elections as Reason it self can represent Being it self to be.

\textit{Lucretius}, that he might avoid the dint of this Argument,
according to the *Genius* of his Sect feigns this *Liberty* to arise from a *Motion of declination*, whereby his *Atoms* alwaies moving downwards by their own weight towards the Centre of the World, are carried a little obliquely, as if they tended toward some point different from it, which he calls *clinamen principiorum*. Which riddle though it be as good as any else which they, who held the *Materiality* and *Mortality* of Souls in their own nature, can frame to salve this difficulty; yet is of such a *private interpretation*, that I believe no *Oedipus* is able to expound it. But yet by what we may guesse at it, we shall easily find that this insolent conceit (and all else of this nature) destroys the *Freedome of Will*, more then any *Fate* which the severest censours thereof, whom he sometimes taxeth, ever set over it. For how can any thing be made subject to a free and impartial debate of Reason, or fall under the Level of Free-will, if all things be the meer result either of a Fortuitous or Fatal motion of Bodies, which can have no power or dominion over themselves? and why should he or his great Master find so much fault with the *Superstition* of the world, and condemn the Opinions of other men when they compare them with that transcendent sagacity they believe themselves to be the Lords of, if all was nothing else but the meer issue of *Material* motions; seeing that *necessity* which would arise from a *different concourse and motion of several particles of Matter* begetting that *diversity of Opinions* and *Wills*, would excuse them all from any blame?

Therefore to conclude this Argument, Whatsoever Essence finds this *Freedome* within it self, whereby it is absolved from the rigid laws of *Matter*, may know it self also to be *Immaterial*; and having dominion over its own actions, it will never desert it self: and because it finds it self *non vi alienâ sed sub moveri*, as *Tully* argues, it feels it self able to preserve it self from the forrein force of *Matter*, and can say of all those assaults which are at any time made against
those sorry mud-walls which in this life inclose it, ὀδὸν πρὸς ἑυεί, as the Stoick did, all this is nothing to me, who am yet free and can command within, when this feeble Carkass is able no longer to obey me; and when that is shattered and broken down, I can live any where else without it; for I was not That, but had onely a command over It, while I dwelt in it.

But before we wholly desert this Head, we may adde some further strength to it, from the Observation of that Conflict which the Reasons and Understandings of men maintain against the Sensitive appetite: and wheresoever the Higher powers of Reason in a man’s Soul prevail not, but are vanquish’d by the impetuousness of their Sensual affections through their own neglect of themselves; yet are they never so broken, but they may strengthen themselves again; and where they subdue not men’s inordinate Passions and Affections, yet even there will they condemn them for them. Whereas were a Man all of one piece, and made up of nothing else but Matter; these Corporeal motions could never check or controul themselves, these Material dimensions could not struggle with themselves, or by their own strength render themselves any thing else then what they are. But this ἀνεκχονων ζωή, as the Greeks call it, this Self-potent Life which is in the Soul of man, acting upon it self and drawing forth its own latent Energie, finds it self able to tame the outward man, and bring under those rebellious motions that arise from the meer Animal powers, and to tame and appease all those seditions and mutinies that it finds there. And if any can conceive all this to be nothing but a meer fighting of the male-contented pieces of Matter one against another, each striving for superiority and preeminence; I should not think it worth the while to teach such an one any higher learning, as looking upon him to be indued with no higher a Soul then that which moves in Beasts or Plants.
Chapter V.

The third Argument for the Immortality of the Soul. That Mathematical Notions argue the Soul to be of a true Spiritual and Immaterial Nature.

We shall now consider the Soul awhile in a further degree of Abstraction, and look at it in those Actions which depend not at all upon the Body, wherein it doth τὴν ἑαυτοῦ συννοσιάν ἀεισέκοθαι, as the Greeks speak, and converseth only with its own Being. Which we shall first consider in those λόγοι μαθηματικοὶ or Mathematical notions which it conteins in it self, and sends forth within it self; which as they are in themselves Indivisible, and of such a perfect nature as cannot be received or immersed into Matter; so they argue that Subject in which they are seated to be of a true Spiritual and Immaterial nature. Such as a pure Point, Linea ἀκμή, Latitude abstracted from all Profundity, the Perfection of Figures, Equality, Proportion, Symmetry and Asymmetry of Magnitudes, the Rise and propagation of Dimensions, Infinite divisibility, and many such like things; which every ingenuous Son of that Art cannot but acknowledge to be the true characters of some Immaterial Being, seeing they were never buried in Matter, nor extracted out of it: and yet these are transcendently more certain and infallible Principles of Demonstration then any Sensible thing can be. There is no Geometrician but will acknowledge Angular sections, or the cutting of an Arch into any number of parts required, to be most exact without any diminution of the whole; but yet no Mechanical art can possibly so perform either, but that the place of section will detracts something from the whole. If any one should endeavour to double a Cube, as the Delian Oracle once commanded the Athenians, requiring them to duplicate the dimensions of Apollo's Altar, by any Mechanicall subtilty; he would find it as impossible as they did, and
be as much laugh'd at for his pains as some of their Mechanicks were. If therefore no Matter be capable of any Geometrical effects, and the Apodictical precepts of Geometry be altogether unimaginable in the purest Matter that Phansie can imagine; then must they needs depend upon something infinitely more pure than Matter, which hath all that Stability and Certainty within itself which it gives to those infallible Demonstrations.

We need not here dispute with Empedocles,

Γάγη μὲν γὰρ γὰράν ὀρέωμαν, Ἰδαρί ὀ ὀδώρ, &c.

We know earth by earth, fire by fire, and water by water, that is, by the Archetypal Idea's of all things in our own Souls; though it may be it were no hard matter to prove that, as in this case S. Austin did, when in his Book de Quant. animae, he would prove the Immortality of the Soul from these notions of Quantity, which come not by any possible Sense or Experience which we can make of bodily Being, and therefore concludes they must needs be immediately ingraven upon an Immaterial Soul. For though we could suppose our Senses to be the School-Dames that first taught us the Alphabet of this learning; yet nothing else but a true Mental Essence could be capable of it, or so much improve it as to unbody it all, and strip it naked of any Sensible garment, and then onely, when it hath done it, embrace it as its own, and commence a true and perfect understanding of it. And as we all hold it impossible to shrink up any Material Quality, which will perpetually spread it self commensurably to the Matter it is in, into a Mathematical point: so is it much more impossible to extend and stretch forth any Immaterial and unbodied Quality or notion according to the dimensions of Matter, and yet to preserve the integrity of its own nature.

Besides, in these Geometrical speculations we find that our Souls will not consult with our Bodies, or ask any leave of our Fansies how or how far they shall distribute their
own notions by a continued progress of Invention; but spending upon their own stock, are most free and liberal, and make Fansie onely to serve their own purpose in painting out not what Matter will afford a copie of, but what they themselves will dictate to it; and if that should be too busie, silence and controul it by their own Imperial laws. They so little care for Matter in this kind of work, that they banish it as far as may be from themselves, or else chastise and tame the unruly and refractory nature of it, that it should yield it self pliable to their soveraign commands. These Embodied Bodies (for so this present Argument will allow me to call them) which our Senses converse with, are perpetually justling together, contending so irresistably each for its own room and space to be in, and will not admit of any other into it, preserving their own intervals: but when they are once in their Unbodied nature entertained into the Mind, they can easily penetrate one another ὅλα ὅλα. The Soul can easily pyle the vastest number up together in her self, and by her own force sustain them all, and make them all couch together in the same space: she can easily pitch up all those Five Regular Bodies together in her own Imagination, and inscribe them one in another, and then entring into the very heart and centre of them, discern all their Properties and several Respects one to another; and thus easily find her self freed from all Material or Corporeal confinement; shewing how all that which we call Body, rather issued forth by an infinite projection from some Mind, then that it should exalt it self into the nature of any Mental Being; and, as the Platonists and Pythagoreans have long since well observed, how our Bodies should rather be in our Souls, then our Souls in them. And so I have done with that Particular.
Chapter VI.

The Fourth Argument for the Immortality of the Soul. That those clear and stable Ideas of Truth which are in Man's Mind evince an Immortal and Immaterial Substance residing in us, distinct from the Body. The Soul more knowable then the Body. Some passages out of Plotinus and Proclus for the further confirming of this Argument.

And now we have traced the Immortality of the Soul, before we were aware, through those Three Relations or σχέσεως, or (if you will) Degrees of knowledge, which Proclus in his Comment upon Plato's Timaeus hath attributed to it, which he calls τῶν γνωστικῶν δυνάμεων σειράν. The First is ἀοιδής ἀλογος, a naked perception of Sensible impressions, without any work of Reason. The Second, δόξα μετὰ λόγον, a Miscellaneous kind of knowledge arising of a collation of its Sensations with its own more obscure and dark Idea's. The Third, διάνοια καὶ λόγος, Discourse and Reason, which the Platonists describe Mathematical knowledge by, which, because it spins out its own notions by a constant series of Deduction, knitting up Consequences one upon another by Demonstrations, is by him call'd νόης μεταβατικὴ, a Progressive kind of knowledge; to which he addes a Fourth, which we shall now make use of for a further Proof of the Immortality of the Soul. There is therefore Fourthly νόης ἀμετάβατος, which is a naked Intuition of Eternal Truth which is alwaies the same, which never rises nor sets, but alwaies stands still in its Vertical, and fills the whole Horizon of the Soul with a mild and gentle light. There are such calm and serene Idea's of Truth, that shine onely in pacate Souls, and cannot be discerned by any troubled or fluid Fancy, that necessarily prove a μόνιμον καὶ στάσιμον τι, some Permanent and Stable Essence in the Soul of man, which (as Simplicius on Epictet. well observes) ariseth onely ἀπὸ αἰκνήτου τινός, καὶ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἀμεταβλήτου αἰτίας,
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τῆς δὲι καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὁμοίως ἔχουσθ, from some immovable and unchangeable Cause which is always the same. For these Operations about Truth we now speak of, are not χρονικαὶ ἐνέργειαι any Chronical Energies, as he further expresses it, but the true badges of an Eternal nature, and speak a ταυτότης and στάσει (as Plato is wont to phrase it) in man's Soul. Such are the Archetypall Idea's of Justice, Wisdome, Goodness, Truth, Eternity, Omnipotency, and all those either Morall, Physicall, or Metaphysical notions, which are either the First Principles of Science, or the Ultimate complement and final perfection of it. These we alwaies find to be the same, and know that no Exorcisms of Material mutations have any power over them: though we our selves are but of yesterday, and mutable every moment, yet these are Eternall, and depend not upon any mundane vicissitudes; neither could we ever gather them from our observation of any Material thing where they were never sown.

If we reflect but upon our own Souls, how manifestly doe the Species of Reason, Freedome, Perception, and the like, offer themselves to us, whereby we may know a thousand times more distinctly what our Souls are then what our Bodies are? For the former we know by an immediate converse with our selves, and a distinct sense of their Operations; whereas all our knowledge of the Body is little better then meerly Historicall, which we gather up by scraps and piecemeals from more doubtfull and uncertain experiments which we make of them: but the notions which we have of a Mind, i.e. something within us that thinks, apprehends, reasons, and discourses, are so clear and distinct from all those notions which we can fasten upon a Body, that we can easily conceive that if all Body-Being in the world were destroyed, yet we might then as well subsist as now we doe. For whensoever we take notice of those Immediate motions of our own Minds whereby they make themselves known to
us, we find no such thing in them as Extension or Divisibility, which are contained in every Corporeal essence: and having no such thing discovered to us from our nearest familiarity with our own Souls, we could never so easily know whether they had any such things as Bodies joyned to them or not, did not those extrinsecal impressions that their turbulent motions make upon them admonish them thereof.

But as the more we reflect upon our own Minds, we find all Intelligible things more clear, (as when we look up to the Heavens, we see all things more bright and radiant, then when we look down upon this dark Earth when the Sun-beams are drawn away from it:) so when we see all Intelligible Being concentrering together in a greater Oneness, and all kind of Multiplicity running more and more into the strictest Unity, till at last we find all Variety and Division suck'd up into a perfect Simplicity, where all happily conspire together in the most undivided peace and friendship; we then easily perceive that the reason of all Diversity and Distinction is (that I may use Plotinus his words not much differently from his meaning) μετάβασις ἀπὸ νοῦ εἰς λογοσμόν. For though in our contentious pursuits after Science, we cast Wisdome, Power, Eternity, Goodness and the like into several formalities, that so we may trace down Science in a constant chain of Deductions; yet in our naked Intuitions and visions of them, we clearly discern that Goodness and Wisdome lodge together, Justice and Mercy kiss each other: and all these and whatsoever pieces else the crak'd glasses of our Reasons may sometime break Divine and Intelligible Being into, are fast knit up together in the invincible bonds of Eternity. And in this sense is that notion of Proclus descanting upon Plato's riddle of the Soul, ὡς γεννητῷ καὶ ἀγέννητος, as if it were generated and yet not generated] to be understood; χρόνος ἄμα καὶ αἰών περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, the Soul partaking of Time in its broken and
particular conceptions and apprehensions, and of Eternity in its comprehensive and stable contemplations. I need not say that when the Soul is once got up to the top of this bright Olympus, it will then no more doubt of its own Immortality, or fear any Dissipation, or doubt whether any drowsie Sleep shall hereafter seize upon it: no, it will then feel it self grasping fast and safely its own Immortality, and view it self in the Horizon of Eternity. In such sober kind of Ecstasies did Plotinus find his own Soul separated from his Body, as if it had divorc'd it for a time from it self: πολλάκις ἐγερόμενος εἶς ἐμαυτὸν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ γενόμενος τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἡμῶν, ἐμαυτὸν δὲ εἶσω, θαυμαστῶν ἡλίκων ὅρων κάλλος, &c. I being often awakened into a sense of my self, and being sequestred from my body, and betaking my self from all things else into my self; what admirable beauty did I then behold, &c. as he himself tells us, En. 4. l. 8, c. i. Thus is that Intelligence begotten which Proclus l. 2. in Plat. Tim. calls a Correction of Science: his notion is worth our taking notice of, and gives us in a manner a brief recapitulation of our former discourse, shewing how the higher we ascend in the contemplation of the Soul, the higher still we rise above this low sphere of Sense and Matter. His words are these, Αὐτῇ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ὡς μὲν εἴν ψυχᾶς ἀνέλεγκτος ἐστιν, ἐλέγχεται δ' ἀπὸ νοῦ, &c. that is, Science as it is in the Soul (by which he means the Discoursive power of it) is blameless, but yet is corrected by the Mind; as resolving that which is Indivisible, and dividing Simple Being as if it were Compounded: as Fansy corrects Sense for discerning with passion and material mixture, from which that purifies its object; Opinion corrects Fansy, because it apprehends things by forms and phantasms, which it self is above; and Science corrects Opinion, because it knows without discerning of causes; and the Mind (as was insinuated) or the Intuitive faculty corrects the Scientifical, because by a Progressive kind of Analysis it divides the Intelligible
Object, where it self knows and sees things together in their undivided essence: wherefore this onely is Immoveable, and Science or Scientifical reason is inferiour to it in the knowledge of true Being. Thus he.

But here we must use some caution, lest we should arrogate too much to the power of our own Souls, which indeed cannot raise up themselves into that pure and steddy contemplation of true Being; but will rather act with some Multiplicity or ἀπόρια (as they speak) attending it. But thus much of its high original may appear to us, that it can (as our Author told us) correct it self, for dividing and disjoyning therein, as knowing all to be every way One most entire and simple: though yet all men cannot easily improve their own Understandings to this High degree of Comprehension; and therefore all ancient Philosophers and Aristotle himself made it the peculiar priviledge of some men more abstracted from themselves and all corporeall commerce.

Chapter VII.

What it is that, beyond the Highest and most subtile Speculations whatsoever, does clear and evidence to a Good man the Immortality of his Soul. That True Goodness and Vertue begetsthe most raised Sense of this Immortality. Plotinus his excellent Discourse to this purpose.

And now that we may conclude the Argument in hand, we shall adde but this one thing further to clear the Soul's Immortality, and it is indeed that which breeds a true sense of it, viz. True and reall goodness. Our highest speculations of the Soul may beget a sufficient conviction thereof within us, but yet it is onely True Goodness and Vertue in the Souls of men that can make them both know and love, believe and delight themselves in their own Immortality. Though every good man is not so Logically subtile as to be able by fit mediums to demonstrate his own Immortality, yet
he sees it in a higher light: His Soul being purged and enlightned by true Sanctity is more capable of those Divine irradiations, whereby it feels it self in conjunction with God, and by a συναϊγευα (as the Greeks speak) the Light of divine goodness mixing it self with the light of its own Reason, sees more clearly not onely that it may, if it please the supreme Deity, of its own nature exist eternally, but also that it shall doe so: it knows it shall never be deserted of that free Goodness that alwaies embraceth it: it knows that Almighty Love, which it lives by, to be stronger then death, and more powerful then the grave; it will not suffer those holy ones that are partakers of it to lie in hell, or their Souls to see corruption; and though worms may devour their flesh, and putrefaction enter into those bones that fence it, yet it knows that its Redeemer lives, and that it shall at last see him with a pure Intellectual eye, which will then be clear and bright, when all that earthly dust, which converse with this mortal body filled it with, shall be wiped out: It knows that God will never forsake his own life which he hath quickned in it; he will never deny those ardent desires of a blissful fruition of himself, which the lively sense of his own Goodness hath excited within it: those breathings and gaspings after an eternal participation of him are but the Energy of his own breath within us; if he had had any mind to destroy it, he would never have shewn it such things as he hath done; he would not raise it up to such Mounts of Vision, to shew it all the glory of that heavenly Canaan flowing with eternal and unbounded pleasures, and then tumble it down again into that deep and darkest Abyss of Death and Non-entity. Divine goodness cannot, it will not, be so cruel to holy souls that are such ambitious suitors for his love. The more they contemple the blissfull Effuxes of his divine love upon themselves, the more they find themselves strengthned with an undaunted confidence in him; and
look not upon themselves in these poor bodily relations and dependences, but in their eternal alliances, ὡς κόσμων, ὡς νικὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, (as Arrianus sometimes speaks) as the Sons of God who is the Father of Souls, Souls that are able to live any where in this spacious Universe, and better out of this dark and lonesome Cell of Bodily matter, which is always checking and clogging them in their noble motions, then in it: as knowing that when they leave this Body, they shall then be received into everlasting habitations, and converse freely and familiarly with that Source of Life and Spirit which they conversed with in this life in a poor disturbed and streightened manner. It is indeed nothing else that makes men question the Immortality of their Souls, so much as their own base and earthly loves, which first makes them wish their Souls were not immortal, and then to think they are not: which Plotinus hath well observed, and accordingly hath soberly pursued this argument.

I cannot omit a large recital of his Discourse, which tends so much to disparage that flat and dull Philosophy which these later Ages have brought forth; as also those heavy-spirited Christians that find so little divine life and activity in their own Souls, as to imagine them to fall into such a dead sleep as soon as they leave this earthly tabernacle, that they cannot be awakened again, till that last Trumpet and the voice of an Archangel shall rouse them up. Our Authors discourse is this, Enn. 4. lib. 7. c. 10. having first premised this Principle, That every Divine thing is immortal, λάβων δὲ ψυχήν, μὴ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι, &c. Let us now consider a Soul (saith he) not such an one as is immerst into the Body, having contracted unreasonable Concupiscence and Anger (ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ θυμός, according to which they were wont to distinguish between the Irascible and Concupiscible faculty) and other Passions; but such a one as hath cast away these, and as little as may be communicates with the Body: such a one as this will sufficiently
manifest that all Vice is unnaturall to the Soul, and something acquired onely from abroad; and that the best Wisdome and all other Vertues lodge in a purged Soul, as being allied to it. If therefore such a Soul shall reflect upon it self, how shall it not appear to it self to be of such a kind of nature as Divine and Eternall Essences are? For Wisdome and true Vertue being Divine Effluxes can never enter into any unhallowed and mortal thing: it must therefore needs be Divine, seeing it is fill'd with a Divine nature δια συγγένεων καὶ τὸ διοοόνον by its kindred and consanguinity therewith. Whoever therefore amongst us is such a one, differs but little in his Soul from Angelicall essences; and that little is the present inhabitation in the Body, in which he is inferior to them. And if every man were of this raised temper, or any considerable number had but such holy Souls, there would be no such Infidels as would in any sort disbelieve the Soul's Immortality. But now the vulgar sort of men beholding the Souls of the generality so mutilated and deform'd with Vice and Wickedness, they cannot think of the Soul as of any Divine and Immortall Being; though indeed they ought to judge of things as they are in their own naked essences, and not with respect to that which extraessentially adheres to them; which is the great prejudice of knowledge. Contemplate therefore the Soul of man, denuding it of all that which it self is not, or let him that does this view his own Soul; then he will believe it to be Immortall, when he shall behold it ἐν τῷ νοστῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ, fixt in an Intelligible and pure nature; he shall then behold his own Intellect contemplating not any Sensible thing, but Eternall things, with that which is Eternall, that is, with it self, looking into the Intellectual world, being it self made all Lucid, Intellectual, and shining with the Sun-beams of eternall Truth, borrowed from the First Good, which perpetually rayeth forth his Truth upon all Intellectual Beings. One thus qualified may seem without any arrogance to take up that saying of
Empedocles, Χαίπερ, ἔγὼ δὲ μὴν θεὸς ἀμβροσός.—Farewell all earthly allies, I am henceforth no mortal wight, but an Immortall Angel, ascending up into Divinity, and reflecting upon that likeness of it which I find in my self. When true Sanctity and Purity shall ground him in the knowledge of divine things, then shall the inward Sciences, that arise from the bottome of his own Soul, display themselves; which indeed are the onely true Sciences: for the Soul runs not out of it self to behold Temperance and Justice abroad, but its own light sees them in the contemplation of its own Being, and that divine essence which was before enshrined within it self.

I might after all this adde many more Reasons for a further confirmation of this present Thesis, which are as numerous as the Soul's relations and productions themselves are; but to every one who is willing to doe his own Soul right, this Evidence we have already brought in is more than sufficient.

Chapter VIII.

An Appendix containing an Enquiry into the Sense and Opinion of Aristotle concerning the Immortality of the Soul. That according to him the Rational Soul is separable from the Body and Immortall. The true meaning of his Intellectus Agens and Patiens.

Having done with the several Proofs of the Soul's Immortality (that great Principle of Naturall Theology, which if it be not entertain'd as a Communis Notitia, as I doubt not but that it is by the Vulgar sort of men, or as an Axiome, or, if you will, a Theoreme of free and impartial Reason, all endeavours in Religion will be very cool and languid) it may not be amiss to enquire a little concerning His opinion whom so many take for the great Intelligencer of Nature and Omniscient Oracle of Truth; though it be too manifest that he hath so defaced the sacred Monuments
of the ancient Metaphysical Theology by his profane hands, that it is hard to see that lovely face of Truth which was once engraven upon them (as some of his own Interpreters have long agoe observed) and so blurr'd those fair Copies of divine learning which he received from his Predecessours, that his late Interpreters (who make him their All) are as little sometime acquainted with his meaning and design, as they are with that Elder philosophy which he so corrupts: which indeed is the true reason they are so ambiguous in determining his Opinion of the Soul's immortality; which yet he often asserts and demonstrates in his Three Books de Anima. We shall not here traverse this Notion through them all, but onely briefly take notice of that which hath made his Expositours stumble so much in this point; the main whereof is that Definition which he gives of the Soul, wherein he seems to make it nothing else for the Genus of it, but an Entelechia or Informative thing, which spends all its virtue upon that Matter which it informs, and cannot act any other way then meerly by information; being indeed nothing else but some Material εἴδος, like an impression in wax which cannot subsist without it, or else the result of it: whence it is that he calls onely either Material Forms, or the Functions and Operations of those Forms, by this name. But indeed he intended not this for a general Definition of the Soul of man, and therefore after he had lai'd down this particular Definition of the Soul, lib. 2. cap. 1. he tells us expressly, That that which we call the Rational Soul is χωριστή or separable from the Body, διὰ τὸ μηδενὸς εἶναι σώματος ἐνελέχειαν, because it is not the Entelech of any Body. Which he laies down the demonstration of in several places of all those Three books, by enquiring ἐὰν τι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ παθημάτων ἰδιών, as he speaks, lib. 1, cap. 1. whether the Soul hath any proper function or operation of its own, or whether all be compounded and result from the Soul and Body together:
and in this inquirie finding that all *Sensations* and *Passions* arise as well from the *Body* as from the *Soul*, and spring out of the conjunction of both of them (which he therefore calls *ἐννοια λόγοι*, as being begotten by the Soul upon the Body) he concludes that all this savours of nothing else but a *Material* nature, *inseparable* from the Body. But then finding acts of Mind and Understanding, which cannot be propagated from *Matter*, or *causally* depend upon the *Body*, he resolves the Principles from whence they flow to be *Immortal*; which he thus sets down *lib. 2. cap. 2.* ἔρι ἐὰν οὐ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικής δυνάμεως, οὐδέποτε φανερόν, ἀλλ' ἓκκεν ψυχῆς γένος ἐτερον εἶναι, &c. that is, *Now* as for the *Mind* and *Theoretical power*, it *appears not*, viz. that they belong to that Soul which in the former Chapter was defined by *ἐντελέχεια*, *but it seems to be another kind of Soul*, and that *only* is separable from the Body, as that which is *Eternal* and *Immortal* from that which is *Corruptible*. *But the other Powers or Parts of the Soul* (viz. the *Vegetative* and *Sensitive*) *are not separable*, *καθάπερ φασί τωσ, as some think*. Where by these *τωσ some* which he here refutes, he manifestly means the *Platonists* and *Pythagoreans*, who held that all kinds of Souls were immortal, as well the Souls of beasts as of men; whereas he upon that former enquirie concluded that nothing was immortal, but that which is the Seat of Reason and Understanding; and so his meaning is, that this Rational Soul is altogether a distinct *Essence* from those other; or else that glory which he makes account he reaps from his supposed victory over the other Sects of Philosophers will be much eclipsed, seeing they themselves did not so much contend for that which he decries, *vis.* an exercise of any such *Informative faculties* in a state of Separation, neither do we find them much more to reject one part of that complex *Axiome of* ¹ his, τὸ μὲν αἰσθητικόν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος,

¹ *Lib. 3. c. 4.*
That which is sensitive is not without the Body, but the Intellect or Mind is separable, then they doe the other.

The other difficulty which Aristotle's opinion seems to be clogg'd withall is that Conclusion which he laies down lib. 3. c. 5. ὅ ἐν νοῦς χωριστὸς, which is commonly thus expounded, Intellectus patiens est corruptibilis. But all this difficulty will soon be cleared, if once it may appear how ridiculous their conceit is, that from that Chapter fetch that idle distinction of Intellectus Agens and Patiens; meaning by the Agens, that which prepares phantasmes, and exalts them into the nature of intelligible species, and then propounds them to the Patiens to judge thereof: whereas indeed he means nothing else by his νοῦς παθητικός, but onely the Understanding in potentia, and by his νοῦς πονητικός, the same in actu or in habitu, as the Schoolmen are wont to phrase it; and accordingly thus laies down his meaning and method of this notion. In the preceding Chapter of that Book, he disputes against Plato's Connate species, as being afraid, lest if the Soul should be prejudiced by any home-born notions, it would not be indifferent to the entertaining of any other Truth. Where, by the way, we may observe how unreasonable his Argument is: for if the Soul hath no such stock of principles to trade with, nor any proper notions of its own that might be a κρενήμον of all Opinions, it would be so indifferent to any, that the foulest Errour might be as easily entertained by it as the fairest Truth; neither could it ever know what guest it receives, whether Truth, or Falshood. But yet our Author found himself able to swallow down this absurdity, though when he had done he could not well digest it. For he could not but take notice of that which was obvious for any one to reply, That πᾶς νοῦς ἐστι νοητός, and so reflecting upon it self, may find matter within to work upon; and so laies down this scruple in a way not much
different from his Masters, καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ νοητός ἐστιν, ὡσπερ τὰ νοητά, &c. but the Soul it self is also intelligible, as well as all other intelligible natures are; and in those Beings which are purely abstracted from Matter, that which understands is the same with that which is understood. Thus he. But not being Master of this notion, he finds it a little too unruly for him, and falls to enquire why the Soul should not then alwaies be in actu; quitting himself of the whole difficulty at once by telling us, that our souls are here clogg'd with a Hyle or Matter that cleaveth to them, and so all the matter of their knowledge is contained in sensible objects, which they must extract out of them, being themselves onely ἐν δυνάμει or in potentia ad intelligendum. Just as in a like argument (Chap. 8.) he would needs perswade us, That the Understanding behold all things in the glass of Phansie; and then questioning how our πρῶτα νοηματα or First principles of knowledge should be Phantasmes, he grants that they are not indeed phantasmes, ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἀνευ φαντασμάτων, but yet they are not without phantasmes; which he thinks is enough to say, and so by his meer dictate without any further discussion to solve that knot: whereas in all Reflex acts, whereby the Soul reviews its own opinions, and finds out the nature of them, it makes neither use of Sense or Phantasmes; but acting immediately by its own power, finds it self ἀνευμάτων καὶ χωροτήν σωμάτων, as Simplicius observes.

But to return, This Hyle or Matter which our Author supposeth to hinder a free and uninterrupted exercise of Understanding, is indeed nothing else but the Souls potentiality; and not any kind of divisible or extended nature. And therefore when he thus distinguisheth between his Intellectus Agens and Patiens, he seems to mean almost nothing else but what our ordinary Metaphysitians doe in their distinction of Actus and Potentia, (as Simplicius hath truly observed) when they tell us, that the finest
created nature is made up of these two compounded together. For we must know that the genius of his Philosophy led him to fancy an ῥηχωρευτος της, a certain subject or obediential power in every thing that fell within the compass of Physical speculation, or that had any relation to any natural body; and some other power which was εἰδωλουην, that was of an active and operating nature: and consequently that both these Principles were in the Soul itself, which as it was capable of receiving impressions and species from the Phansie, and in a posse to understand, so it was Passive; but as it doth actually understand, so it is πνευματος or Active. And with this Notion he begins his 5. Chap. Ἡττα δε ουκερ εν ἀκάδημῃ της φύσιν ἴστι πολύν ἦλθη ἀκάδημῳ γένει, &c. that is, Seeing that in every nature there is something which as a First subject is all things potentially, and some Active principle which produceth all things, as Art doth in Matter; it is necessary that the Soul also partake of these differences. And this he illustrates by Light and Colours; resembling the Passive power of the Intellect to Colours, the Active or Energetical to Light: and therefore he saies, it is χωριστος, καλ ἀμεγης, καὶ ἀπαθης, separable, unmixt, and impassible; and so at last concludes, χωριστος δε ἴσι μονον τουθ ἵπτο ἴσι, in the state of Separation this Intellect is alwaies that which it is (that is, it is alwaies Active and Energetical, as he had told us before, της ουσιας δεν ηνεργεια, the essence of it being activity) καὶ τουτο μονον ἀθανατον καὶ δεδομων, oυ μνημωνομεν δε ἵπτο τουτο μον ἀπαθης, and this onely is immortal and eternal, but we doe not remember because it is impassible. In which last words he seems to disprove Plato's Reminiscentia, because the Soul in a state of Separation being alwaies in act, the Passive power of it, which then first begins to appear when it is embodied, could not represent or contain any such Traditionall species as the Energetical faculty acted upon before; seeing there was then no Phansie to retain them in, as
Simplicius expounds it, διὰ τὴν περὶ τῶν μνημονευτῶν νοημῶν, δεόμεθα πάνω τού μέχρι φαντασίας προϊόντος λόγου, because in all remembrance we must reflect upon our Phantzie. And this our Author seems to glance at, it being indeed never out of his eye, in these words we have endeavoured to give an account of, δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρθός, καὶ ἀνεν τοῦτον οἴθην νοεῖ, But the Passive intellect is corruptible, and without this we can understand nothing in this life. And thus our forenamed Commentator doubts not to glosse on them.

Chapter IX.

A main Difficulty concerning the Immortality of the Soul [viz. The strong Sympathy of the Soul with the Body] answered. An Answer to another Enquiry, viz. Under what account Impressions deriv'd from the Body do fall in Morality.

We have now done with the Confirmation of this Point, which is the main Basis of all Religion, and shall not at present trouble our selves with those difficulties that may seem to incumber it; which indeed are onely such as beg for a Solution, but doe not, if they be impartially considered, proudly contest with it: and such of them which depend upon any hypothesis which we may apprehend to be laid down in Scripture, I cannot think them to be of any such moment, but that any one who deals freely and ingenuously with this piece of God's truth, may from thence find a far better ansa of answering, then he can of moving of any scruples against the Souls Immortality, which that most strongly every where supposes, and does not so positively and ἤττᾶς lay down, as presume that we have an antecedent knowledge of it, and therefore principally teaches us the right Way and Method of providing in this life for our happy subsistence in that eternal estate. And as for what pretends to Reason or Experience, I think it
may not be amiss briefly to search into one main difficulty concerning the Soul's Immortality: and that is, That strange kind of dependency which it seems to have on the Body, whereby it seems constantly to comply and sympathize therewith, and to assume to itself the frailties and infirmities thereof, to laugh and languish as it were together with that: and so when the Body is compos'd to rest, our Soul seems to sleep together with it; and as the Spring of bodily Motion seated in our Brains is more clear or muddy, so the conceptions of our Minds are more distinct or disturbed.

To answer this difficulty, it might be enough perhaps to say, That the Sympathy of things is no sufficient Argument to prove the Identity of their essences by, as I think all will grant; yet we shall endeavour more fully to solve it.

And for that purpose we must take notice, that though our Souls be of an Incorporeal nature, as we have already demonstrated, yet they are united to our Bodies, not as Assisting forms or Intelligences, as some have thought, but in some more immediate way; though we cannot tell what that is, it being the great arcanum in Man's nature, that which troubled Plotinus so much, when he had contemplated the Immortality of it, that, as he speaks of himself, *Enn. 4. lib. 8. c. 1, εἰς λογομόν ἀπὸ νοῦ καταβάς, ἀπορώ τῶς ποτὲ καὶ νῦν καταβαίνω, καὶ ὅπως ποτὲ μοι ἔνδον ἡ ψυχὴ γεγένηται τοῦ σώματος, τοῦτο οἷον οἷον ἐφάνη καθ' ἐαυτὸν, καίπερ οὖσα εἰ σώματι. But indeed to make such a Complex thing as Man is, it was necessary that the Soul should be so united to the Body, as to share in its passions and infirmities so far as they are void of sinfulness. And as the Body alone could not perform any act of Sensation or Reason, and so it self become a ζωον πολιτικόν, so neither would the Soul be capable of providing for the necessities of the Body, without some way whereby a feeling and sense of them might be conveyed to it; neither could it take sufficient
care of this corporeal life, as nothing pertaining to it, were it not sollicited to a natural compunction and compassion by the indigencies of our Bodies. It cannot be a meer Mental Speculation that would be so sensibly affected with hunger or cold or other griefs that our Bodies necessarily partake of, to move our Souls to take care for their relief: and were there not such a commerce between our Souls and Bodies, as that our Souls also might be made acquainted by a pleasurable and delightful sense of those things that most gratifie our Bodies, and tend most to the support of their Crasis and temperament; the Soul would be apt wholly to neglect the Body, and commit it wholly to all changes and casualties. Neither would it be any thing more to us then the body of a Plant or Star, which we contemplate sometimes with as much contentment as we do our own bodies, having as much of the Theory of the one as of the other. And the relation that our Souls bear to such peculiar bodies as they inhabite, is one and the same in point of notion and speculation with that which they have to any other body: and therefore that which determines the Soul to this Body more then that, must be some subtire vinculum that knits and unites it to it in a more Physical way, which therefore Proclus sometimes calls πνευματικὸν ὀξύμα τῆς ψυχῆς, a spiritual kind of vehicle, whereby corporeal impressions are transferr'd to the Mind, and the dictates and decrees of that are carried back again into the Body to act and move it. Heraclitus wittily glancing at these mutual aspects and entercourses, calls them ἄμοιβὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, the Responsals or Antiphons wherein each of them catcheth at the others part and keeps time with it; and so he tells us that there is ὅσον ἄνω καὶ κάτω, a way that leads upwards and downwards between the Soul and Body, whereby their affairs are made known to one another. For as the Soul could not have

1 Plotin. Enn. 4. 1. 8. c. 1.
a sufficient relation of the state and condition of our Bodies, except it received some impressions from them; so neither could our Souls make use of our Bodies, or derive their own virtue into them as they doe, without some intermediate motions. For as some motions may seem to have their beginning in our Bodies, or in some external mover, which are not known by our Souls till their advertency be awakened by the impetuousness of them; so some other motions are derived by our own Wills into our Bodies, but yet in such a way as they cannot be into any other body; for we cannot by the meer Magical virtue of our Wills move any thing else without our selves, nor follow any such virtue by a concurrent sense of those mutations that are made by it, as we doe in our own Bodies.

And as this Conjugal affection and sympathy between Soul and Body are thus necessary to the Being of Man-kind; so we may further take notice of some peculiar part within us where all this first begins: which a late sagacious Philosopher hath happily observed to be in that part of the Brain from whence all those Nerves that conduct the Animal spirits up and down the Body take their first Original; seeing we find all Motions that first arise in our Bodies, to direct their course straight up to that, as continually respecting it, and there onely to be sensated, and all the imperate motions of our Wills issuing forth from the same consistory. Therefore the Animal spirits, by reason of their constant mobility and swift motion, ascending to the place of our Nerves origination, move the Soul, which there sits enthron'd, in some mysterious way; and descending at the beck of our Wills from thence, move all the Muscles and joynts in such sort as they are guided and directed by the Soul. And if we observe the subtile Mechanicks of our own Bodies, we may easily conceive how the least motion in these Animal Spirits will, by their relaxing or distending the Nerves, Membranes
and Muscles, according to their different quantity or the celerity and quality of their motions, beget all kind of motions likewise in the Organical part of our Bodies. And therefore that our Souls may the better inform our Bodies, they must perceive all their varieties; and because they have such an immediate proximity to these Spirits, therefore also all the Motions of our Souls in the highest way of Reason and Understanding are apt to stir these quick and nimble spirits alwaies attending upon them, or else fix them too much. And thus we may easily see that should our Souls be alwaies acting and working within us, our Bodies could never take that rest and repose which is requisite for the conservation of Nature. As we may easily perceive in all our studies and meditations that are most serious, our Spirits are the more fix'd, attending the beck of our Minds. And except this knot whereby our Souls are wedded to our Bodies were unloosed that our Souls were loose from them, they could not act, but presently some Motion or other would be imprest upon our Bodies: as every Motion in our Bodies that is extraordinary, when our Nerves are distended with the Animal spirits, by a continual communication of it self in these Nerves like so many intended Chords to their original, moves our Souls; and so though we alwaies perceive that one of them is primarily affected, yet we also find the other presently by consent to be affected too.

And because the Soul hath all Corporeal passions and impressions thus conveyed to it, without which it could not expresse a due benevolence to that Body which peculiarly belongs to it; therefore as the Motions of these Animal Spirits are more or less either disorderly and confus'd, or gentle and compos'd, so those Souls especially who have not by the exercise of true Vertue got the dominion over them, are also more or less affected proportionably in their operations. And therefore indeed
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to question whether the Soul, that is of an Immortal nature, should entertain these corporeal passions, is to doubt whether God could make a Man or not, and to question that which we find by experience in our selves; for we find both that it doth thus, and yet that the Original of these is sometimes from Bodies, and sometimes again by the force of our Wills they are impress'd upon our Bodies.

Here by the way we may consider in a moral way what to judge of those Impressions that are derived from our Bodies to our Souls, which the Stoicks call ἀλογα πάθη not because they are repugnant to Reason, or are aberrations from it; but because they derive not their original from Reason, but from the Body, which is ἀλογόν τι and are by Aristotle, more agreeably to the ancient Dialect, called ἐνλοι λόγου material or corporeal Idea's or impressions. And these we may safely reckon, I think, amongst our Adiaphora in Morality, as being in themselves neither good nor evil, (as all the antient Writers have done) but onely are form'd into either by that stamp that the Soul prints upon them, when they come to be entertain'd into it. And therefore whereas some are apt in the most severe way to censure τὰς πρώτας κατὰ φύσιν ὀρμάς, all those Commotions and Passions that first affect our Souls; they might doe well more cautelously to distinguish between such of these motions as have their origination in our Bodies, and such as immediately arise from our Souls: else may we not too hastily displacethe antient termini, and remove the land-marks of Vertue and Vice? For seeing the Soul could not descend into any corporeal act, as it must doe while it is more present to one body then another, except it could partake of the griefs and pleasures of the Body; can it be any more sinful for it to sensate this, then it is for it to be united to the Body? If our Soul could not know what it is to eat or drink, but onely
by a meer ratiocination, collecting by a drie syllogisticall discourse [That meats and drinks preserve the health and fabrick of the Body, repairing what daily exhales from it] without sensating any kind of grief in the want, or refreshment in the use, of them; it would soon suffer the Body to languish and decay. And therefore as these Bodily infirmities and passions are not evil in themselves; so neither are they evil as they first affect our Souls. When our Animal Spirits, begot of fine and good blood, gently and nimbly play up and down in our Brains, and swiftly flye up and down our whole Bodies, we presently find our Phansies raised with mirth and chearfulness: and as when our Phansies are thus exalted, we may not call this the Energy of Grace; so if our Spleen or Hypochondria, swelling with terrene and sluggish Vapours, send up such Melancholick fumes into our heads as move us to sadness and timorousness, we cannot justly call that Vice; nor when the Gall does degurgitate its bitter juye into our Liver, which mingling it self with the blood, begets fiery Spirits that presently fly up into our Brain, and there beget impressions of Anger within us. The like we may say of those Corporeal passions which are not bred first of all by any Peccant humours or distemperatures in our own bodies, but are excited in us by any External objects which by those idola and images that they present to our Senses, or rather those Motions they make in them, may presently raise such commotions in our Spirits: For our Body maintains not onely a conspiration and consent of all its own parts, but also it bears a like relation to other mundane bodies with which it is conversant, as being a part of the whole Universe. But when our Soul, once mov'd by the undisciplin'd petulancy of our Animal spirits, shall foment and cherish that Irrational Grief, Fear, Anger, Love, or any other such like Passions contrary to the dictates of Reason; it then sets the stamp of sinfulness
upon them. It is the consent of our own Wills that by brooding of them brings forth those hatefull Serpents. For though our Souls be espoused to these Earthly Bodies, and cannot but in some measure sympathize with them, yet hath the Soul a true dominion of its own acts. It is not the meer passion, if we take it in a Physicall sense, but rather some inordinate action of our own Wills that entertain it: and these passions cannot force our Wills, but we may be able to chastise and allay all the inordinacy of them by the power of our Wills and Reasons: and therefore God hath not made us under the necessity of sin, by making us men subject to such infirmities as these are which are meerly ςωια μακάρωυ, as the Greek Philosopher hath well called them, the blossomings and shootings forth of bodily life within us; which is but τὸ ἀνθρώπων or Humanity.

And, if I mistaknot, our Divinity is wont sometimes to acknowledge some such thing in our Saviour himself, who was in all things made like to us, our sinfulness excepted. He was a man of sorrows and acquainted with griefs, as the Prophet Esay speaks of him: and when he was in bodily agonies and horrours, the powerfull assaults thereof upon his Soul moved him to petition his Father, that if it were possible, that bitter Cup might pass from him; and the sense of death so much afflicted him, that it bred in him the sad griefs which S. Peter expresseth by ἀσθίας τοῦ θαυμάτου Act. 2. the pangs or throes of death, and that fear that extorted a desire to be freed from it, as it is insinuated by that in Heb. 5. 7. he was delivered from what he feared; for so the words, being nothing else but an Hebraism, are to be rendred, ἐλευθεροθείς ἀπὸ τῆς καθαρείας. And we are wont to call this the language and dictate of Nature which lawfully endeavours to preserve it self, though presently an higher principle must bring all these under a subjection to God, and a free submission to his good pleasure: as it
was with our Saviour, who moderated all these passions by a ready resignment of himself and his own Will up to the Will of God; and though his Humanity crav'd for ease and relaxation, yet that Divine Nature that was within him would not have it with any repugnancy to the supreme Will of God.
A DISCOURSE Concerning THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD.

Agapetus ad Justinianum.

'O γὰρ ἐαυτὸν γνῶς, γνώςται θεόν· θεὸν δὲ ὁ γνῶς, ὁ μοιοιός τις θεῷ· ὁ μοιοιός τις de θεῷ, ὁ ἀξίος γενόμενος θεῷ· ἀξίος de γίνεται θεῷ, ὁ μηδέν ἀνάξιον πράττον θεῷ, ἀλλὰ φρονῶν μὲν τὰ αὐτοῦ, λαλῶν de ἀ φρονεῖ, ποιῶν de ἀ λαλεῖ.

M. T. Cicero l. i. De Legibus.

Ex tot generibus nullum est animal prater hominem quod habeat notitiam aliquam Dei: ipsiqve in hominibus nulla gens est neque tam immanisuta, neque tam fera, que non, etiam si ignorer qualem habere Deum decreat, tamen habendum sciat.
OF THE EXISTENCE

AND

NATURE OF GOD

CHAPTER I.

That the Best way to know God is by an attentive reflexion upon our own Souls. God more clearly and lively pictur'd upon the Souls of Men, then upon any part of the Sensible World.

We shall now come to the other Cardinal Principle of all Religion, and treat something concerning God. Where we shall not so much demonstrate That he is, as What he is.

Both which we may best learn from a Reflexion upon our own Souls, as Plotinus hath well taught us, εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐνιαυτῶν, εἰς ἑαυτόν ἐνιαυτῆς, He which reflects upon himself, reflects upon his own Original, and finds the clearest Impression of some Eternall Nature and Perfect Being stamp'd upon his own Soul. And therefore Plato seems sometimes to reprove the ruder sort of men in his times for their contrivance of Pictures and Images to put themselves in mind of the Θεόλ or Angelicall Beings, and exhorts them to look into their own Souls, which are the fairest Images not onely of the Lower divine Natures, but of the Deity it self; God having so copied forth himself into the whole life and energy of man's Soul, as that the lovely Characters of Divinity may be most easily seen and read of all men within themselves: as they say Phidas the famous Statuary, after he had made the Statue of Minerva with the greatest
exquisiteness of Art to be set up in the Acropolis at Athens, afterwards impress’d his own Image so deeply in her buckler, ut nemo delere posset aut divellere, qui totam statuam non imminueret. And if we would know what the Impresse of Souls is, it is nothing but God himself, who could not write his own name so as that it might be read but onely in Rationall Natures. Neither could he make such without imparting such an Imitation of his own Eternall Understanding to them as might be a perpetuial Memorial of himself within them. And whenever we look upon our own Soul in a right manner, we shall find an Urim and Thummim there, by which we may ask counsel of God himself, who will have this alway borne upon its breastplate.

There is nothing that so embases and enthralls the Souls of men, as the dismall and dreadfull thoughts of their own Mortality, which will not suffer them to look beyond this short span of Time, to see an houres length before them, or to look higher then these materiall Heavens; which though they could be stretch’d forth to infinity, yet would the space be too narrow for an enlightened mind, that will not be confined within the compass of corporeal dimensions. These black Opinions of Death and the Non-entity of Souls (darker then Hell it self) shrink up the free-born Spirit which is within us, which would otherwise be dilating and spreading it self boundlesly beyond all Finite Being: and when these sorry pinching mists are once blown away, it finds this narrow sphear of Being to give way before it; and having once seen beyond Time and Matter, it finds then no more ends nor bounds to stop its swift and restless motion. It may then fly upwards from one heaven to another, till it be beyond all orbe of Finite Being, swallowed up in the boundless Abyss of Divinity, ὑπεράνω τῆς ὀβσίας, beyond all that which darker thoughts are wont to represent under the Idea of Essence. This is that θεῖον σκότος which the Areopagite speaks of, which the higher our Minds soare
into, the more incomprehensible they find it. Those
dismall apprehensions which pinion the Souls of men to mortalit,
curlishly check and starve that noble life thereof,
which would alwaies be rising upwards, and spread it self in
a free heaven: and when once the Soul hath shaken off
these, when it is once able to look through a grave, and see
beyond death, it finds a vast Immensity of Being opening
it self more and more before it, and the ineffable light and
beauty thereof shining more and more into it; when it can
rest and bear up it self upon an Immaterial centre of
Immortality within, it will then find it self able to bear
it self away by a self-reflexion into the contemplation of an
Eternall Deity.

For though God hath copied forth his own Perfections in
this conspicable and sensible World, according as it is
capable of entertaining them; yet the most clear and
distinct copy of himself could be imparted to none else
but to intelligible and inconspicable natures: and though the
whole fabrick of this visible Universe be whispering out
the notions of a Deity, and alway inculcates this lesson to the
contemplators of it, ὡς ἐμὲ πεποίηκε δὸ θεὸς, as Plotinus
expresseth it; yet we cannot understand it without some
interpreter within. The Heavens indeed declare the glory of
God, and the Firmament shews his handy-work, and the
τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, that which may be known of God, even
his eternal power and Godhead, as S. Paul tells us, is to be
seen in these externall appearances: yet it must be some-
thing within that must instruct us in all these Mysteries,
and we shall then best understand them, when we compare
that copie which we find of them within our selves, with
that which we see without us. The Schoolmen have well
compared Sensible and Intelligible Beings in reference to
the Deity, when they tell us that the one doe onely repre-
sent Vestigia Dei, the other Faciem Dei. We shall therefore
here enquire what that Knowledge of a Deity is which
a due converse with our own naked Understandings will lead us into.

CHAPTER II.


It being our design to discourse more particularly of that knowledge of the Deity that we may learn immediately from our selves, we shall observe,

1. First, There is nothing whereby our own Souls are better known to us then by the Properties and Operations of Reason: but when we reflect upon our own Idea of Pure and Perfect Reason, we know that our own Souls are not it, but onely partake of it; and that it is of such a Nature that we cannot denominate any other thing of the same rank with our selves by; and yet we know certainly that it is, as finding from an inward sense of it within our selves that both we and other things else beside our selves partake of it, and that we have it κατὰ μήθειν and not κατ' οὐκίαν—neither doe we or any Finite thing contain the source of it within our selves: and because we have a distinct Notion of the most Perfect Mind and Understanding, we own our deficiency therein. And as that Idea of Understanding which we have within us points not out to us This or That Particular, but something which is neither This nor That, but Totall, Understanding; so neither will any elevation of it serve every way to fit and answer that Idea. And therefore when we find that we cannot attain to Science but by a Discursive deduction of one thing from another, that our knowledge is confined, and is not fully adequate and commensurate to the largest Sphaere of Being, it not running quite through it nor filling the whole area of it; or that our
knowledge is *Chronical* and *successive*, and cannot grasp all things at once, but works by intervals, and runs out into *Division* and *Multiplicity*; we know all this is from want of Reason and Understanding, and that a *Pure and Simple Mind* and *Intellect* is free from all these restraints and imperfections, and therefore can be no less then *Infinite*. As this *Idea* which we have of it in our own Souls will not suffer us to rest in any conception thereof which represents it less then *Infinite* : so neither will it suffer us to conceive of it any otherwise then as *One Simple Being* : and could we multiply Understandings into never so vast a number, yet should we be again collecting and knitting them up together in some Universal one. So that if we rightly reflect upon our own *Minds* and the *Method* of their *Energies*, we shall find them to be so framed, as not to admit of any other then *One Infinite* source of all that *Reason* and *Understanding* which themselves partake of, in which they live, move and have their Being. And therefore in the old Metaphysical Theology, an Originall and Uncreated *Mons* or *Unity* is made the Fountain of all Particularities and Numbers which have their Existence from the Efflux of its Almighty power.

2. And that is the next thing which our own Understandings will instruct us in concerning God, viz. *His Eternall Power*. For as we find a *Will* and *Power* within our selves to execute the Results of our own *Reason* and *Judgment*, so far as we are not hindred by some more potent Cause : so indeed we know it must be a mighty inward strength and force that must enable our Understandings to their proper functions, and that Life, Energy and Activity can never be separated from a *Power of Understanding*. The more *unbodied* any thing is, the more *unbounded* also is it in its *Effective power*: *Body* and *Matter* being the most sluggish, inert and unwieldy thing that may be, having no power from it self nor over it self: and therefore the *Purest Mind*
must also needs be the most *Almighty Life and Spirit*; and as it comprehends all things and sums them up together in its Infinite knowledge, so it must also comprehend them all in its own life and power. Besides, when we review our own Almighty Souls and their dependency upon some Almighty Mind, we know that we neither did nor could produce our selves; and withall know that all that Power which lies within the compass of our selves, will serve for no other purpose then to apply several preexistent things one to another, from whence all *Generations* and *Mutations* arise, which are nothing else but the *Events* of different applications and complications of Bodies that were existent before: and therefore that which produced that Substantial Life and Mind by which we know our selves, must be something *much more Mighty* then we are, and can be no less indeed then *Omnipotent*, and must also be the First architect and εὐμορφος of all other Beings, and the perpetuall Supporter of them.

3. We may also know from the same Principles, That an *Almighty Love*, every way commensurate to that most Perfect Being, eternally rests in it, which is as strong as that is Infinite, and as full of Life and Vigour as that is of Perfection. And because it finds no Beauty nor Loveliness but onely in that and the issues thereof, therefore it never does nor can fasten upon any thing else. And therefore the Divinity alwaies enjoies it self and its own Infinite perfections, seeing it is that Eternall and stable Sun of goodness that neither rises nor sets, is neither eclipsed nor can receive any encrease of light and beauty. Hence *the Divine Love* is never attended with those turbulent passions, perturbations, or wrestlings within it self, of *Fear, Desire, Grief, Anger*, or any such like, whereby *our Love* is wont to explicate and unfold its affection towards its Object. But as *the Divine Love* is perpetually most infinitely *ardent* and *potent*, so it is always *calm* and *serene,*
unchangeable, having no such ebbings and flowings, no such diversity of stations and retrogradations as that *Love* hath in us which ariseth from the weakness of our Understandings, that do not present things to us alwaies in the same Orient lustre and beauty: neither we nor any other mundane thing (all which are in a perpetual flux) are alwaies the same. Besides, though our *Love* may sometimes transport us and violently rend us from our selves and from all Self-enjoyment, yet the more forcible it is, by so much the more it will be apt to torment us, while it cannot centre it self in that which it so strongly endeavours to attract to it; and when it possesseth most, yet is it alwaies hungry and craving, as *Plotinus* hath well express'd it, *πάντοτε πληρούταi καὶ πάντοτε ἔρημοι*, it may alwaies be filling it self, but, like a leaking vessel, it will be alwaies emptying it self again. Whereas the Infinite ardour of the *Divine Love* arising from the unbounded perfection of the Divine Being, alwaies rests satisfied within it self, and so may rather be defin'd by a *στάσις* then a *κίνησις*, and is wrapt up and rests in the same Centrall Unity in which it first begins. And therefore I think some men of later times have much mistaken the nature of the *Divine Love*, in imagining that *Love* is to be attributed to God, as all other Passions are, rather *secundum effectum* then *affectum*: whereas S. *John*, who was well acquainted with this noble Spirit of *Love*, when he defin'd God by it, and calls him *Love*, meant not to signifie a bare nothing known by some Effects, but that which was infinitely such as it seems to be. And we might well spare our labour, when we so industriously endeavour to find something in God that might produce the Effects of some other Passions in us, which look rather like the Brats of Hell and Darkness then the lovely offspring of Heaven.

4. When we reflect upon all this which signifies some *Perfect Essence*, as a *Mind*, *Wisdome*, *Understanding*,
Omnipotency, Goodness, and the like, we can find no such thing as Time or Place, or any Corporeal or Finite properties which arise indeed not ex plenitudine, but ex inopia entitatis; we may also know God to be Eternall and Omnipresent, not because he fills either Place or Time, but rather because he wanteth neither. That which first begets the Notion of Time in us, is nothing else but that Succession and Multiplicity which we find in our own Thoughts, which move from one thing to another, as the Sun in the Firmament is said to walk from one Planetary house to another, and to have his several Stages to pass by. And therefore where there is no such Vicissitude or Variety, as there can be no sense of Time, so there can be nothing of the thing. Proclus hath wittily observ'd that Saturne, or (as the Greeks call'd him) Krônos, was the first of the òvì ìpikósmon or Mundane Gods, óti ópou γένεως, kai προηγεῖται χρόνος, because Time is necessarily presuppos'd to all Generation, which proceeds by certain motions and intervals. This World is indeed a great Horologe to it self, and is continually numbring out its own age; but it cannot lay any sure hold upon its own past revolutions, nor can it gather up its infancy and old age, and couple them up together. Whereas an Infinitely-comprehensive Mind hath a Simultaneous possession of its own never-fitting life; and because it finds no Succession in its own immutable Understanding, therefore it cannot find any thing to measure out its own duration. And as Time lies in the Basis of all Finite life, whereby it is enabled by degrees to display all the virtue of its own Essence, which it cannot doe at once: so such an Eternity lies at the foundation of the Divinity, whereby it becomes one without any shadow of turning, as S. James speaks, without any Variety or Multiplicity within himself, which all created Beings that are carried down in the current of Time partake of. And therefore the Platonists were wont to attribute Aiôn or
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Eternity to God, not so much because he had neither beginning nor end of days, but because of his Immutable and Uniform nature, which admits of no such variety of Conceptions as all Temporary things doe: And Time they attributed to all created Beings, because there is a γένεσις or constant generation both of and in their essence, by reason whereof we may call any of them, as Proclus tells us, by that borrowed expression, ἐνν καὶ νέον old and new, being every moment as it were re-produced, and acting something which it did not individually before. Though otherwise they supposed This World, constantly depending upon the Creatour's Omnipotency, might from all Eternity flow forth from the same Power that still sustains it, and which was never less potent to uphold it then now it is: notwithstanding this piece of it which is visible to us, or at least this Scheme or fashion of it, they acknowledged to have been but of a late date.

5. Now thus as we conceive of God's Eternity, we may in a correspondent manner apprehend his Omnipresence; not so much by an Infinite Expanse or Extension of Essence, as by an unlimited power, as Plotinus hath fitly express'd it, λατρείαν δὲ καὶ ἀπειρον αὐτῶν οὐ τῷ ἀνεξετήτῳ ἢ τῷ μεγαλόν ἢ τῷ ἁρμόν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπειρίκητῳ τῆς δυνάμεως. For as nothing can ever stray out of the bounds or get out of the reach of an Almighty Mind and Power; so when we barely think of Mind or Power, or any thing else most peculiar to the Divine Essence, we cannot find any of the Properties of Quantity mixing themselves with it: and as we cannot confine it in regard thereof to any one point of the Universe, so neither can we well conceive it extended through the whole, or excluded from any part of it. It is alwaies some Material Being that contends for Space: Bodily parts will not lodge together, and the more bulky they are, the more they justle for room one with another; as Plotinus tells us, τὰ μὲν ἐνταῦθα μεγάλα ἐν ὄγκῳ,
Bodily Beings are great only in bulk, but Divine Essences in virtue and power.

6. We may in the next place consider that *Freedome and Liberty* which we find in our own Souls, which is founded in our *Reason and Understanding*; and this is therefore *Infinite* in God, because there is nothing that can bound the *First Mind*, or disobey an *Almighty power*. We must not conceive God to be the *freest* Agent, because he can doe and prescribe what he pleaseth, and so set up an Absolute will which shall make both Law and Reason, as some imagine. For as God cannot *know* himself to be any other then what indeed he is; so neither can he *will* himself to be any thing else then what he is, or that any thing else should swerve from those Laws which his own Eternall Nature and Understanding prescribes to it. For this were to make God free to dethrone himself, and set up a *Liberty* within him that should contend with the royall prerogative of his own boundless Wisdome.

To be short; When we converse with our own Souls, we find the *Spring* of all *Liberty* to be nothing else but *Reason*; and therefore no *Unreasonable* creature can partake of it: and that it is not so much any *Indifference* in our Wills of determining without, much less against, *Reason*, as the *liberall Election of*, and *Complacency in*, that which our *Understandings* propound to us as *most expedient*: And our *Liberty* most appears, when our *Will* most of all congratulates the results of our own Judgments; and then shews it self most vigorous, when either the *Particularness* of that Good which the Understanding converseth with, or the weak knowledge that it hath of it, restrains it not. Then is it most pregnant and flows forth in the fullest stream, when its Object is most full, and the acquaintance with it most ample: all *Liberty* in the Soul being a kind of *Liberality* in the bestowing of our affections, and the want or scarce measure of it *Parsimoniousness* and *Nig-
gardïse. And therefore the more the Results of our Judgments tend to an Indifference, the more we find our Wills dubious and in suspense what to chuse; contrary inclinations arising and falling within enterchangeably, as the Scales of a Ballance equally laden with weights; and all this while the Soul's Liberty is nothing else but a Fluctuation between uncertainties, and languisheth away in the impotency of our Understandings. Whereas the Divine Understanding beholding all things most clearly, must needs beget the greatest Freedome that may be; which Freedome as it is bred in it, so it never moves without the Compass of it. And though the Divine Will be not determin'd alway to this or that particular, yet it is never bereft of Eternall Light and Truth to act by: and therefore though we cannot see a Reason for all Gods actions, yet we may know they were neither done against it nor without it.

**Chapter III.**
How the Consideration of those restless motions of our Wills after some Supreme and Infinite Good, leads us into the knowledge of a Deity.

We shall once more take a view of our own Souls, and observe how the Motions thereof lead us into the knowledge of a Deity. We alwaies find a restless appetite within our selves which craves for some Supreme and Chief good, and will not be satisfied with any thing less then Infinity it self; as if our own Penury and Indigency were commensurate to the Divine fulness: and therefore no Question has been more canvas'd by all Philosophy then this, De summo hominis bono, and all the Sects thereof were antiently distinguish'd by those Opinions that they entertain'd De finibus Boni et Mali, as Tully phraseth it. But of how weak and dilute a Nature soever some of them may have conceived that Summum Bonum, yet they could not so
satisfie their own inflamed thirst after it. We find by Experience that our Souls cannot live upon that thin and spare diet which they are entertain’d with at their own home; neither can they be satiated with those jejune and insipid morsels which this Outward world furnisheth their Table with. I cannot think the most voluptuous Epicurean could ever satisfie the cravings of his Soul with Corporeal pleasure, though he might endeavour to perswade himself there was no better: nor the most Quintessential Stoicks find an αὐτάρκεια and ἀταξία a Self-sufficiency and Tranquillity within their own Souls, arising out of the pregnancy of their own Mind and Reason; though their sullen thoughts would not suffer them to be beholden to an Higher Being for their Happiness. The more we endeavour to extract an Autarchy out of our own Souls, the more we torment them, and force them to feel and sensate their own pinching poverty. Ever since our Minds became so dim-sighted as not to pierce into that Original and Primitive Blessedness which is above, our Wills are too big for our Understandings, and will believe their beloved prey is to be found where Reason discovers it not: they will pursue it through all the vast Wilderness of this World, and force our Understandings to follow the chase with them: nor may we think to tame this violent appetite or allay the heat of it, except we can look upward to some Eternal and Almighty goodness which is alone able to master it.

It is not the nimbleness and agility of our own Reason which stirs up these hungry affections within us, (for then the most ignorant sort of men would never feel the sting thereof) but indeed some more Potent nature which hath planted a restless motion within us that might more forcibly carry us out to it self; and therefore it will never suffer it self to be controll’d by any of our thin Speculations, or satisfied with those aerie delights that our Fancies may offer to it: it doth not, it cannot, rest it self any
where but upon the Centre of some Almighty good, some solid and substantial Happiness; like the hungry childe that will not be still'd by all the mother's musick, or change its sower and angry looks for her smiling countenance; nothing will satisfie it but the full breasts.

The whole work of this World is nothing but a perpetuall contention for True Happiness, and men are scatter'd up and down the world, moving to and fro therein, to seek it. Our Souls by a Naturall Science as it were feeling their own Originall, are perpetually travailing with new designs and contrivances whereby they may purchase the scope of their high ambitions. Happiness is that Pearl of price which all adventure for, though few find it. It is not Gold or Silver that the Earthlings of this world seek after, but some satisfying good which they think is there treaur'd up. Neither is it a little empty breath that Ambition and Popularity soars after, but some kind of Happiness that it thinks to catch and suck in with it.

And thus indeed when men most of all flie from God, they still seek after him. Wicked men pursue indeed after a Deity in their worldly lusts; wherein yet they most blaspheme; for God is not a meer empty Name or Title, but that Self-sufficient good which brings along that Rest and Peace with it which they so much seek after, though they doe most prodigiously conjoin it with something which it is not, nor can it be, and in a true and reall strain of blasphemy, attribute all that which God is to something else which is most unlike him, and, as S. Paul speaks of those infatuated Gentiles, turn the glory of the uncorruptible God into the image of corruptible man, of birds and four-footed beasts and creeping things.

God is not better defin'd to us by our Understandings then by our Wills and Affections: He is not onely the Eternal Reason, that Almighty Mind and Wisdome which

1 Rom. 1.
our Understandings converse with; but he is also that unstained Beauty and Supreme Good which our Wills are perpetually catching after: and wheresoever we find true Beauty, Love and Goodness, we may say, Here or there is God. And as we cannot understand any thing of an Intelligible nature, but by some primitive Idea we have of God, whereby we are able to guess at the elevation of its Being and the pitch of its Perfection; so neither doe our Wills embrace any thing without some latent sense of Him, whereby they can tast and discern how near any thing comes to that Self-sufficient good they seek after: and indeed without such an internal sensating Faculty as this is we should never know when our Souls are in conjunction with the Deity, or be able to relish the ineffable sweetness of true Happiness. Though here below we know but little what this is, because we are little acquainted with fruition and enjoyment; we know well what belongs to longings and languishment, but we know not so well what belongs to plenty and fulness; we are well acquainted with the griefs and sicknesses of this in-bred love, but we know not what its health and complacencies are.

To conclude this particular, μεγάλας ἐχει κινήσεις ἡ ψυχή, the Soul hath strong and weighty motions, and nothing else can bear it up but something permanent and immutable. Nothing can beget a constant serenity and composedness within, but something Supreme to its own Essence; as if having once departed from the primitive Fountain of its life, it were deprived of itself, perpetually contesting within it self and divided against it self: and all this evidently proves to our inward sense and feeling, That there is some Higher Good then our selves, something that is much more amiable and desirable, and therefore must be loved and preferred before our selves, as Plotinus hath excellently observ'd, τῶν ἀντών ἔκαστον ἐφιμενον τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ, βουλεται ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἡ ὁ ἐστιν εἰναι, &c.
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Every thing that desires the enjoyment of the First good, would rather be That then what it is, because indeed the nature of that is much more desirable then its own. And therefore the Platonists, when they contemplate the Deity under these three notions of τὸ ἐν, τὸ ὃν and τὸ ἀγαθὸν, and question which to place first in order of understanding, resolve the preeminence to be due to the τὸ ἀγαθὸν, as Simplicius tells us, because That is first known to us as the Architect of the world, and, we may adde, as that which begets in us this ἐρωτικὸν πάθος, these strong passionate desires whereby all sorts of men (even those that are rude and illiterate) are first known to themselves, and by that knowledge may know what diminutive, poor and helpless, things themselves are, who can never satiate themselves from themselves, and what an Excellent and Soveraign goodness there is above them which they ought to serve, and cannot but serve it, or some filthy idol in stead of it; though this mental Idolatry be like that gross and external in this also, that howsoever we attend it not (and so are never the more blameless) yet our worship of these images and pictures of Goodness rests not there, it being some all-sufficient Good that (as we observed before) calls forth and commands our adorations.
THE
Excellency and Nobleness
of
TRUE RELIGION,

1. In its Rise and Original.
2. In its Nature and Essence.
3. In its Properties and Operations.
4. In its Progress.
5. In its Term and End.

Psalm 16. 3.
To the Saints that are in the earth, and to the excellent, in whom is all my delight.

Greg. Nazianzenus in Orat. 11.
Εὐγένεια δὲ ἡ τῆς δείκνυσιν, καὶ ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἀρχετυπὸν ἐξομοίωσις, ἣν ἐργάζεται λόγος καὶ ἀρετή.

Idem in Orat. 23.
Εὐγένειαν δὲ λέγω, οὐχ ἣν οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν. Ἀπαγε. ἄλλ' ἣν εὐσέβεια χαρακτηρίζει καὶ τρόπος, καὶ ἡ πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἁγαθὸν ἄνωθεν.

Nec sit Religio nostra personas accipere, nec conditiones hominum sed animos inspicit singulorum; Servum et Nobilem de moribus pronunciavit. Sola apud Deum Libertas est non servire peccatis: Summa apud Deum est Nobilitas clarum esse virtutibus.
THE

EXCELLENCY AND NOBLENESSE

OF

TRUE RELIGION

CHAPTER I.

1. The Nobleness of Religion in regard of its Original
and Fountain: it comes from Heaven and moves towards
Heaven again. God the First Excellency and Primitive
Perfection. All Perfections and Excellencies in any kind
are to be measured by their approach to, and Participation
of, the First Perfection. Religion the greatest Participation
of God: none capable of this Divine Communication but
the Highest of created Beings: and consequently Religion
is the greatest Excellency. A twofold Fountain in God
whence Religion flows, viz. 1. His Nature. 2. His Will.
Of Truth Natural and Revealed. Of an Outward and
Inward Revelation of God's Will.

We begin with the First, viz. True Religion is a Noble
thing in its Rise and Original, and in regard of its Descent.
True Religion derives its pedigree from Heaven, is βλάστημα
τοῦ οὐρανοῦ: it comes from Heaven, and constantly moves
toward Heaven again: it's a Beam from God, as every good
and perfect gift is from above, and comes down from the
Father of lights, with whom is no variableness nor shadow
of turning, as S. James speaks. God is the First Truth
and Primitive Goodness: True Religion is a vigorous Efflux
and Emanation of Both upon the Spirits of men, and
therefore is called 1 a participation of the divine Nature.
Indeed God hath copyed out himself in all created Being,
having no other Pattern to frame any thing by but his own
Essence; so that all created Being is umbratilis similitudo

1 2 Peter i.

N 2
entis increati, and is, by some stamp or other of God upon it, at least remotely allied to him: But True Religion is such a Communication of the Divinity, as none but the Highest of created Beings are capable of. On the other side Sin and Wickedness is of the basest and lowest Original, as being nothing else but a perfect degeneration from God and those Eternal Rules of Goodness which are derived from him. Religion is an Heaven-born thing, the Seed of God in the Spirits of men, whereby they are formed to a similitude and likeness of himself. A true Christian is every way of a most noble Extraction, of an heavenly and divine pedigree, being born ἀνωθεν from above, as it is express'd Joh. 3.

Thus much for a more general discovery of the Nobleness of Religion as to its Fountain and Original; We may further and more particularly take notice of this in reference to that Twofold fountain in God, from whence all true Religion flows and issues forth, viz. 1. His Immutable Nature. 2. His Will.

1. The Immutable Nature of God. From thence arise all those Eternal Rules of Truth and Goodness which are the Foundation of all Religion, and which God at the first Creation folded up in the Soul of man. These we may call the Truths of Natural inscription; understanding hereby either those Fundamental principles of Truth which Reason by a naked intuition may behold in God, or those necessary Corollaries and Deductions that may be drawn from thence. I cannot think it so proper to say, That God ought infinitely to be loved because he commands it, as because he is indeed an Infinite and Unchangeable Goodness. God hath stamp'd a Copy of his own Archetypal Loveliness upon the Soul, that man by reflecting into himself might behold there the glory of God, intra se videre Deum, see within his Soul all those Ideas of Truth which concern the Nature and Essence of God, by reason of its own resemblance of God; and so beget within himself the most
free and generous motions of Love to God. Reason in
man being \textit{Lumen de Lumine}, a Light flowing from the
Fountain and Father of Lights, and being, as \textit{Tully} phraseth
it, \textit{participata similitudo Rationis aeternae} (as the Law of
Nature, the \textit{nòmos grappòs}, the Law written in man's Heart,
is \textit{participatio Legis aeternae in Rationi creatura}) it was
to enable Man to work out of himself all those Notions
of God which are the true Ground-work of Love and
Obedience to God, and conformity to him: and in molding
the inward man into the greatest conformity to the Nature
of God was the Perfection and Efficacy of the Religion
of Nature. But since Man's fall from God, the inward
virtue and vigour of Reason is much abated, the Soul
having suffered a \textit{πτωσις}, as \textit{Plato} speaks, a \textit{defluvium
pennarum}: those Principles of Divine truth which were
first engraven upon man's Heart with the finger of God
are now, as the Characters of some ancient Monuments,
less clear and legible than at first. And therefore besides
the \textit{Truth of Natural inscription},

2. God hath provided the \textit{Truth of Divine Revelation},
which issues forth from his own free \textit{Will}, and clearly
discovers the way of our return to God, from whom we
are fallen. And this Truth, with the Effects and Pro-
ductions of it in the Minds of men, the Scripture is wont
to set forth under the name of \textit{Grace}, as proceeding merely
from the free bounty and overflowings of the Divine Love.
Of this Revealed \textit{Will} is that of the Apostle to be under-
stood, \textit{rò τὸν θεὸν ὁδεῖς οἶδεν}, \textit{None hath known the things of
God}; \textit{οἴδεις, None}, neither Angel nor Man, could know the
Mind of God, could unlock the Breast of God, or search
out the Counsels of his Will. But God out of the infinite
riches of his Compassions toward mankind is pleas'd to
unbosom his Secrets, and most clearly to manifest \textit{the way
into the Holiest of all}, and bring to light life and immortality.
and in these last ages to send his Son, who lay in his bosom from all Eternity, to teach us his Will and declare his Mind to us. When we look unto the Earth, then behold darkness and dimness of anguish, that I may use those words of the Prophet Esay: But when we look towards Heaven, then behold light breaking forth upon us, like the Eye-lids of the Morning, and spreading its wings over the Horizon of mankind sitting in darkness and the shadow of death, to guide our feet into the way of peace.

But besides this Outward revelation of God's will to men, there is also an Inward impression of it on their Minds and Spirits, which is in a more special manner attributed to God. We cannot see divine things but in a divine light: God only, who is the true light, and in whom there is no darkness at all, can so shine out of himself upon our glassy Understandings, as to beget in them a picture of himself, his own Will and Pleasure, and turn the Soul (as the phrase is in Job 38.) like wax or clay to the Seal of his own light and love. He that made our Souls in his own image and likeness, can easily find a way into them. The Word that God speaks having found a way into the Soul, imprints itself there as with the point of a diamond, and becomes λόγος ἐγγεγραμμένος ἐν τῷ θεόν φύσι, that I may borrow Plato's expression. Men may teach the Grammar and Rhetorick, but God teaches the Divinity. Thus it is God alone that acquaints the Soul with the Truths of Revelation: and he also it is that does strengthen and raise the Soul to better apprehensions even of Natural Truth: God being that in the Intellectual world which the Sun is in the Sensible (ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὁ ἥλιος, τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς θεός) as some of the ancient Fathers love to speak, and the ancient Philosophers too, who meant God by their Intellectus Agens, whose proper work they supposed to be not so much to enlighten the Object, as the Faculty.
CHAPTER II.

The Nobleness of Religion in respect of its Nature, briefly discovered in some Particulars. How a man actuated by Religion 1. lives above the world; 2. converses with himself, and knows how to love, value and reverence himself, in the best sense; 3. lives above himself, not being content to enjoy himself, except he may enjoy God too, and himself in God. How he denies himself for God. To deny a mans self, is not to deny Right Reason, for that were to deny God, in stead of denying himself for God. Self-love the only Principle that acts wicked men. The happy privileges of a Soul united to God.

We have done with the first Head, and come now to discourse with the like brevity on another (our purpose being to insist most upon the third Particular, viz. The Nobleness of Religion in its Properties, after we have handled the Second) which is The Excellency and Nobleness of Religion in regard of its Nature, whether it be taken in abstracto or in concreto; which we shall treat of promiscuously, without any rigid tying of our selves to exact Rules of Art: and so we shall glance at it in these following Notions, rising as it were step by step.

1. A good man, that is actuated by Religion, lives above the World and all Mundane delights and excellencies. The Soul is a more vigorous and puissant thing, when it is once restored to the possession of its own Being, then to be bounded within the narrow Sphere of Mortality, or to be streightned within the narrow prison of Sensual and Corporeal delights; but it will break forth with the greatest vehemency, and ascend upwards towards Immortality: and when it converses more intimately with Religion, it can scarce look back upon its own converses (though in a lawfull way) with Earthly things, without a being touch'd with an holy Shamefac'dness and a modest Blushing; and, as Porphyry speaks of Plotinus, ἕκει μὴν αἰσχυνόμενα ὅτι ἐν σώματι εἶη,
it seems to be ashamed that it should be in the Body. It is only True Religion that teaches and enables men to dye to this world and to all Earthly things, and to rise above that vaporous Sphere of Sensual and Earthly pleasures, which darken the Mind and hinder it from enjoying the brightness of Divine light; the proper motion of Religion is still upwards to its first Original. Whereas on the contrary the Souls of wicked men ὑποβροχιαί συμπεριφέρονται, as Plato¹ somewhere speaks, being moistned with the Exudations of their Sensual parts become heavy and sink down into Earthly things, and couch as near as may be to the Centre. Wicked men bury their Souls in their Bodies: all their projects and designes are bounded within the compass of this Earth which they tread upon. The Fleshly mind never minds any thing but Flesh, and never rises above the Outward Matter, but alwaies creeps up and down like Shadows upon the Surface of the Earth: and if it begins at any time to make any faint assays upwards, it presently finds it self laden with a weight of Sensuality which draws it down again. It was the Opinion of the Academicks that the Souls of wicked men after their death could not of a long season depart from the Graves and Sepulchers where their Mates were buried; but there wandred up and down in a desolate manner, as not being able to leave those Bodies which they were so much wedded to in this life.

2. A Good man, one that is actuated by Religion, lives in converse with his own Reason; he lives at the height of his own Being. This a great Philosopher makes the Property of a Good man, μόνος ὁ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐχὼν ἐαυτῷ συγγίνεσθαι δύναται, καὶ στέργειν ἐαυτῶν. He knows how to converse with himself, and truly to love and value himself: he measures not himself, like the Epicure, by his inferior and Earthly part, but by an Immortal Essence and that of him which is from above; and so does ἐὰν τὴν ἐν ἐαυτῷ ἀρχήν ἀναβάινειν, ¹ Phaedr. 248 A.
climbe up to the height of that Immortal principle which is within him. The Stoicks thought no man a fit Auditor of their Ethicks, till he were dispossess'd of that Opinion, That Man was nothing but συμπλοκή ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, as professing to teach men how to live only κατὰ λόγον, as they speak. Perhaps their Divinity was in some things too rigid; but I am sure a Good man acts the best of this their doctrine in the best sense, and knows better how to reverence himself, without any Self-flattery or admiration, then ever any Stoick did. He principally looks upon himself1 as being what he is rather by his Soul then by his Body: he values himself by his Soul, that Being which hath the greatest affinity with God; and so does not seek himself in the fading Vanities of this life, nor in those poor and low delights of his Senses, as wicked men doe; but as the Philosopher doth well express it, ὅση δύναμις φεύγειν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος βούλεται, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν σωματικῶν παθῶν εἰς έαυτὸν συνεῖναι and when the Soul thus retires into it self, and views its own worth and Excellency, it presently finds a chast and Virgin-love stirr'd up within it self towards it self, and is from within the more excited and obliged εἰς τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ οἴκειου ἀξιώματος, as Simplicius speaks, to mind the preserving of its own dignity and glory. To conclude this Particular, A Good man endeavours to walk by Eternal and Unchangeable Rules of Reason; Reason in a Good man sits in the Throne, and governs all the Powers of his Soul in a sweet harmony and agreement with it self: whereas Wicked men live only ζωῆς δοξαστικῆς, being led up and down by the foolish fires of their own Sensual apprehensions. In wicked men there is a Democracy of wild Lusts and Passions, which violently hurry the Soul up and down with restless motions. All Sin and Wickedness is στάσις καὶ ὑβρὶς τῆς ψυχῆς, a Sedition stirred up in the Soul by the Sensitive Powers against Reason. It was one

1 Κατὰ τὴν λογικὴν ζωῆς οὕσωμάνως, Simplic. in Epict.
of the great Evils that Solomon saw under the Sun, Servants on horseback, and Princes going as servants upon the ground. We may find the Moral of it in every wicked man, whose Souls are only as Servants to wait upon their Senses. In all such men the whole Course of Nature is turned upside down, and the Cardinal points of Motion in this little world are changed to contrary positions: But the Motions of a Good man are Methodical, Regular and Concentrical to Reason. It's a fond imagination that Religion should extinguish Reason; whenas Religion makes it more illustrious and vigorous; and they that live most in the exercise of Religion, shall find their Reason most enlarged. I might adde, that Reason in relation to the capacitating of Man for converse with God was thought by some to be the Formal Difference of Man. Plutarch after a large debate whether Brutes had not Reason in them as well as Man, concludes it negatively upon this ground, Because they had no knowledge and sense of the Deity, οἵον ἤγινεν τῷ θεῷ νόημα. In Tully's account this Capableness of Religion seem'd to be nothing different from Rationality, and therefore he doubts not to give this for the most proper Characterism of Reason, That it is Vinculum Dei et Hominis. And so with them (not to name others of the same apprehensions) animal Rationale and animal capax Religionis seem'd to be of the like importance; Reason as enabling and fitting Man to converse with God by knowing him and loving him, being a character most unquestionably differencing Man from Brute creatures.

3. A Good man, one that is informed by True Religion, lives above himself, and is raised to an intimate Converse with the Divinity. He moves in a larger Sphere then his own Being, and cannot be content to enjoy himself, except he may enjoy God too, and himself in God.

This we shall consider two ways.

1 Eccles. x.
1. In the _Self-denial_ of Good men; they are content and ready to deny themselves for God. I mean not that they should _deny_ their own _Reason_, as some would have it; for that were to deny a Beam of Divine light, and so to deny God, in stead of denying our selves for him. It is better resolved by some Philosophers in this point, that ἐπεσθαί λόγῳ _to follow_ Reason is ἐπεσθαί θεῷ _to follow_ God; and again, Λόγῳ δὲ ὀρθῶ _πείθεσθαι_ καὶ θεῷ, ταῦτάν ἐστί. But by _Self-denial_ I mean, the Soul’s quitting all its own interest in it self, and an entire Resignation of it self to him as to all points of service and duty: and thus the Soul loves it self in God, and lives in the possession not so much of its own Being as of the Divinity; desiring only to be great in God, to glory in his Light, and spread it self in his Fulness; to be fill’d alwaies by him, and to empty it self again into him; to receive all from him, and to expend all for him; and so to live not as its own, but as God’s. The highest ambition of a Good man is to serve the Will of God: he takes no pleasure in himself nor in any thing within himself further then he sees a stamp of God upon it. Whereas wicked men are imprisoned within the narrow circumference of their own Beings, and perpetually frozen into a cold _Self-love_ which binds up all the Innate vigour of their Souls, that it cannot break forth or express it self in any noble way. The Soul in which Religion rules, saies as S. Paul did, _I live; and yet not I, but Christ liveth in me_. On the contrary, a Wicked man swells in his own thoughts, and pleaseth himself more or less with the imagination of a _Self-sufficiency_. The Stoicks, seeing they could not raise themselves up to God, endeavour to bring down God to their own Model, imagining the Deitie to be nothing else but some greater kind of _Animal_, and a Wise man to be almost one of his _Peers_. And this is more or less the

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1 *Sapiens cum Diis ex pari vivit, Deorum socius, non supplex,* Sen. in _Ep. 52 and 31_.

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Genius of Wicked men, they will be something in themselves, they wrap up themselves in their own Being, move up and down in a Sphere of *Self-love*, live a professed Independency upon God, and maintain a *Meum et Tuum* between God and themselves. It's the Character only of a Good man to be able to deny and disown himself, and to make a full surrender of himself unto God; forgetting himself, and minding nothing but the Will of his Creator; triumphing in nothing more then in his own *Nothingness*, and in the *Allness* of the Divinity. But indeed this his being Nothing is the only way to be all things; this his having nothing the truest way of possessing all things.

2. As a Good man lives above himself in a way of *Self-denial*, so he lives also above himself as he lives in the *Enjoyment of God*: and this is the very Soul and Essence of True Religion, to unite the Soul in the nearest intimacy and conjunction with God, who is πηγῇ ζωῆς, πηγῇ νοῦ, ἰδία ψυχῆς, as Plotinus speaks. Then indeed the Soul lives most nobly, when it feels it self to live and move and have its Being in God; which though the Law of Nature makes the Common condition of all created Being, yet it is only True Religion that can give us a more feeling and comfortable sense of it. God is not present to Wicked men, when his Almighty Essence supports them and maintains them in Being; ἀλλ' ἐστὶν τῷ δυναμίνῳ βγεῖν παρόν, but he is present to him that can touch him, hath an inward feeling knowledge of God and is intimately united to him; καὶ δὲ δυνατοῦντι φίλον πάρον, but to him that cannot thus touch him he is not present.

Religion is Life and Spirit, which flowing out from God who is that Άτρόκωμη that hath life in himself, returns to him again as into its own Original, carrying the Souls of Good men up with it. The Spirit of Religion is alwayes ascending upwards, and spreading it self through the whole Essence

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1 Plotin. in En. 6. 1. 9. c. 7.
of the Soul, loosens it from a Self-confinement and narrowness, and so renders it more capacious of Divine Enjoyment. God envies not his people any good, but being infinitely bountifull is pleased to impart himself to them in this life, so far as they are capable of his Communications: they stay not for all their happiness till they come to heaven. Religion alwaies carries its reward along with it, and when it acts most vigorously upon the Mind and Spirit of man, it then most of all fills it with an inward sense of Divine sweetness. To conclude, To walk with God is in Scripture made the Character of a Good man, and it's the highest perfection and privilege of Created Nature to converse with the Divinity. Whereas on the contrary Wicked men converse with nothing but their Lusts and the Vanities of this fading life, which here flatter them for a while with unhallowed delights and a mere Shadow of Contentment; and when these are gone, they find both Substance and Shadow too to be lost Eternally. But true Goodness brings in a constant revenue of solid and substantial Satisfaction to the Spirit of a good man, delighting alwaies to sit by those Eternal Springs that feed and maintain it: the Spirit of a Good man (as it is well express'd by the Philosopher) ἄκαμπτος ἐνίδρυται ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῆς θείας ἀγάθωτητος, and is alwaies drinking in Fountain-Goodness, and fills it self more and more, till it be filled with all the fulness of God.

CHAPTER V.

The Third Property or Effect discovering the Nobleness of Religion, viz. That it directs and enables a man to

1 In cc. III and IV two other 'properties' of Religion have been discussed:—

1. 'Religion enlarges all the Faculties of the Soul, and begets a true Ingenuity, Liberty and Amplitude, the most Free and Generous
propounded to himself the Best End, _vis._ The Glory of God, and his own becoming like unto God. _Low and Particular Ends and Interests both debase and straighten a man's Spirit: The Universal, Highest and Last End both ennobles and enlarges it._ A man is such as the End is he aims at. _The great power the End hath to mold and fashion man into its likeness._ Religion obliges a man (not to seek himself, nor to drive a trade for himself; but) to seek the Glory of God, to live wholly to him; and guides him steadily and uniformly to the One Chief Good and Last End. _Men are prone to flatter themselves with a pretended aiming at the Glory of God._ A more full and distinct explication of what is meant by a man directing all his actions to the Glory of God. _What it is truly and really to glorify God._ God's seeking his Glory in respect of us in the flowing forth of his Goodness upon us: _Our seeking the Glory of God is our endeavouring to partake more of God, and to resemble him (as much as we can) in true Holiness and every Divine Virtue._ That we are not nicely to distinguish between the Glory of God and our own Salvation. _That Salvation is nothing else for the main but a true Participation of the Divine Nature._ To love God above our selves, is not to love him above the Salvation of our Souls; but above our particular Beings and above our sinfull affections, &c. _The Difference between Things that are Good relatively, and those that are Good absolutely and Essentially:_ That in our conformity to these God is most glorified, and we are made most Happy.

The Third _Property or Effect_ whereby Religion discovers its own _Excellency_, is this, _That it directs and enables a man to propound to himself the Best End and Scope of life, _viz._ The Glory of God the Highest Being, and his own assimilation or becoming like unto God._

That Christian in whom Religion rules powerfully, is not so low in his ambitions as to pursue any of the things

_Spirit in the Minds of good men_ (III); and _a. 'It restores man to a just power and dominion over himself, enables him to overcome his Self-will and Passions'_ (IV).
of this world as his *Ultimate End*: his Soul is too big for earthly designs and interests; but understanding himself to come from God, he is continually returning to him again. It is not worth the while for the Mind of Man to pursue any Perfection lower then its own, or to aim at any *End* more ignoble then it self is. There is nothing that more *straightens* and *confines* the free-born Soul then the *particularity, indigency and penury* of that *End* which it pursues: when it complies most of all with this lower world, τὸ μᾶλλον τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἄμφωςβητήσιμον ζχει, as is well observed by an excellent Philosopher, the true *Nobleness* and *Freedom* of it is then *most disputable*, and the Title it holds to true *Liberty* becomes most litigious. It never more slides and degenerates from itself, then when it becomes enthral'd to some *Particular interest*: as on the other side it never acts more *freely* or *fully*, then when it extends itself upon the most *Universal End*. Every thing is so much the more Noble, *quo longiores habet fines*, as was well observ'd by *Tully*. As low *Ends* debase a mans spirit, supplant and rob it of its birth-right; so the *Highest and Last End* raises and *ennobles* it, and *enlarges* it into a more Universal and comprehensive Capacity of enjoying that one Unbounded Goodness which is God himself: it makes it spread and dilate itself in the Infinite Sphere of the Divine Being and Blessedness, it makes it live in the *Fulness of Him that fills all in all.*

Every thing is most properly such as the *End* is which is aim'd at: the Mind of man is alwaies shaping it self into a conformity as much as may be to that which is his *End*; and the nearer it draws to it in the achievement thereof, the greater likeness it bears to it. There is a Plastick *Virtue*, a *Secret Energy* issuing forth from that which the Mind propounds to itself as its *End*, to mold and fashion it according to its own *Model*. The Soul is alwaies stamp'd with the same Characters that are engraved
upon the *End* it aims at; and while it converses with it, and sets it self before it, it is turned as *Wax to the Seal*, to use that phrase in *Job*. Man's Soul conceives all its Thoughts and Imaginations before his *End*, as *Laban's Ewes* did their young before the Rods in the watering troughs. He that pursues any *worldly interest or earthly thing* as his *End*, becomes himself also *γεώδης Earthly*: and the more the Soul directs it self to God, the more it becomes *θεοίδες God-like*, deriving a print of that glory and beauty upon it self which it converseth with, as it is excellently set forth by the Apostle\(^1\), *But we all with open face, beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory*. That Spirit of *Ambition and Popularity* that so violently transports the Minds of men into a pursuit of *Vain-glory*, makes them as *vain* as that *Popular air* they live upon: the Spirit of this world that draws forth a mans designes after worldly interests, makes him as unstable, unconstant, tumultuous and perplex'd a thing as the world is. On the contrary, the Spirit of true Religion steering and directing the Mind and Life to God, makes it an *Uniform, Stable and quiet thing*, as God himself is: it is only true Goodness in the Soul of man guiding it steddily and uniformly towards God, directing it and all its actions to the one Last End and *Chief Good*, that can give it a true consistency and composedness within it self.

All *Self-seeking and Self-love* do but *imprison* the Soul, and *confine* it to its own home: the Mind of a Good man is too Noble, too Big for such a *Particular* life; he hath learn'd to despise his own Being in comparison of that *Uncreated Beauty and Goodness* which is so infinitely transcendent to himself or any created thing; he reckons upon his choice and best affections and designes as too

\(^1\) Genesis xxx. \(^2\) 1 Cor. iii.
choice and precious a treasure to be spent upon such a poor sorry thing as himself, or upon any thing else but God himself.

This was the life of Christ, and is in some degree the life of every one that partakes of the Spirit of Christ. Such Christians seek not their own glory, but the glory of him that sent them into this world: they know they were brought forth into this world, not to set up or drive a trade for themselves, but to serve the will and pleasure of him that made them, and to finish that work he hath appointed them. It were not worth the while to have been born or to live, had it been only for such a penurious End as our selves are: it is most God-like and best suits with the Spirit of Religion, for a Christian to live wholly to God, to live the life of God, having his own life hid with Christ in God; and thus in a sober sense he becomes Deified. This indeed is such a Deification as is not transacted merely upon the Stage of Fancy by Arrogance and Presumption, but in the highest Powers of the Soul by a living and quickning Spirit of true Religion there uniting God and the Soul together in the Unity of Affections, Will and End.

I should now pass from this to another Particular; but because many are apt to misapprehend the Notion of God's glory, and flatter themselves with their pretended and imaginary aiming at the Glory of God, I think it may be of good use, a little further and more distinctly to unfold the Designe that a Religious mind drives on in directing it self and all its actions to God. We are therefore to consider, that this doth not consist in some Transient thoughts of God and his Glory as the End we propound to our selves in any Undertakings: a man does not direct all his actions to the Glory of God by forming a Conception in his Mind, or stirring up a strong Imagination upon any Action, That that must be for the Glory of God: it is not the thinking of God's glory that is glorifying of him. As all other parts of
Religion may be apishly acted over by Fancy and Imagination, so also may the Internal parts of Religion many times be acted over with much seeming grace by our Fancy and Passions; these often love to be drawing the pictures of Religion, and use their best arts to render them more beautifull and pleasing. But though true Practical Religion derives its force and beauty through all the Lower Powers of a mans Soul, yet it hath not its rise nor throne there: as Religion consists not in a Form of Words which signifie nothing, so neither doth it consist in a Set of Fancies or Internal apprehensions. Our Saviour hath best taught what it is to live to God's glory, or to glorifie God, viz. to be fruitfull in all holiness, and to live so as that our lives may shine with his grace spreading it self through our whole man.

We rather glorifie God by entertaining the Impressions of his Glory upon us, then by communicating any kind of Glory to him. Then does a Good man become the Tabernacle of God wherein the Divine Shechinah does rest, and which the Divine glory fills, when the frame of his Mind and Life is wholy according to that Idea and Pattern which he receives from the Mount. We best glorifie him when we grow most like to him: and we then act most for his glory, when a true Spirit of Sanctity, Justice, Meekness, &c. runs through all our actions; when we so live in the World as becomes those that converse with the great Mind and Wisdom of the whole World, with that Almighty Spirit that made, supports and governs all things, with that Being from whence all good flows, and in which there is no Spot, Stain or Shadow of Evil; and so being captivated and overcome by the sense of the Divine loveliness and goodness, endeavour to be like him, and conform our selves as much as may be to him.

1 Joh. 15. 8. Herein is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit.
2 As it is said of the Material Tabernacle, Exodus 25.
When God seeks his own Glory, he does not so much endeavour any thing without himself. He did not bring this stately fabrick of the Universe into Being, that he might for such a Monument of his mighty Power and Beneficence gain some Panegyricks or Applause from a little of that fading breath which he had made. Neither was that gracious contrivance of restoring lapsed men to himself a Plot to get himself some Eternal Hallelujahs, as if he had so ardently thirsted after the layes of glorified spirits, or desired a Quire of Souls to sing forth his praises. Neither was it to let the World see how Magnificent he was. No, it is his own Internal Glory that he most loves, and the Communication thereof which he seeks: as Plato sometimes speaks of the Divine love, it arises not out of Indigency, as created love does, but out of Fulness and Redundancy; it is an overflowing fountain, and that love which descends upon created Being is a free Efflux from the Almighty Source of love: and it is well pleasing to him that those Creatures which he hath made should partake of it. Though God cannot seek his own Glory so as if he might acquire any addition to himself, yet he may seek it so as to communicate it out of himself. It was a good Maxime of Plato, τὸ θεῖον οὖσα φθόνον: which is better stated by 1 S. James, God giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not. And by that Glory of his which he loves to impart to his Creatures, I understand those stamps and impressions of Wisdom, Justice, Patience, Mercy, Love, Peace, Joy, and other Divine gifts which he bestows freely upon the Minds of men. And thus God triumphs in his own Glory, and takes pleasure in the Communication of it.

As God's seeking his own Glory in respect of us, is most properly the flowing forth of his Goodness upon us: so our seeking the Glory of God is most properly our endeavouring a Participation of his Goodness, and an earnest uncessant
pursuing after Divine perfection. When God becomes so great in our eyes, and all created things so little, that we reckon upon nothing as worthy of our aims or ambitions but a serious Participation of the Divine Nature, and the Exercise of divine Vertues, Love, Joy, Peace, Long-suffering, Kindness, Goodness, and the like; When the Soul beholding the Infinite beauty and loveliness of the Divinity, and then looking down and beholding all created Perfection mantled over with darkness, is ravish'd into love and admiration of that never-setting brightness, and endeavours after the greatest resemblance of God in Justice, Love and Goodness; When conversing with him ἐν ἡσύχῳ ἔπαθεν, by a secret feeling of the virtue, sweetness and power of his Goodness, we endeavour to assimilate our selves to him: Then we may be said to glorifie him indeed. God seeks no glory but his own; and we have none of our own to give him. God in all things seeks himself and his own glory, as finding nothing Better then himself; and when we love him above all things, and endeavour to be most like him, we declare plainly that we count nothing Better then He is.

I doubt we are too nice Logicians sometimes in distinguishing between the Glory of God and our own Salvation. We cannot in a true sense seek our own Salvation more then the Glory of God, which triumphs most and discovers it self most effectually in the Salvation of Souls; for indeed this Salvation is nothing else but a true Participation of the Divine Nature. Heaven is not a thing without us, nor is Happiness any thing distinct from a true Conjunction of the Mind with God in a secret feeling of his Goodness and reciprocation of affection to him, wherein the Divine Glory most unfolds it self. And there is nothing that a Soul touch'd with any serious sense of God can more earnestly thirst after or seek with more strength of affection then This. Then shall we be happy, when God comes to be all in all in us. To love God above our selves is not indeed so
properly to love him *above the salvation of our Souls*, as if these were distinct things; but it is to love him *above all our own sinfull affections*, and *above our particular Beings*, and to conform our selves to him. And as that which is

1 *Good relatively, and in order to us*, is so much the Better, by how much the more it is commensurate and conformed to us: So on the other side, that which is *good absolutely and essentially*, requires that our Minds and Affections should, as far as may be, be commensurate and conform'd to it: and herein is God most glorified, and we made Happy. As we cannot truly love the First and Highest Good while we serve a designe upon it, and subordinate it to our selves: so neither is our own Salvation consistent with any such sordid, pinching and particular love. We cannot be compleatly blessed, till the *Idea Boni*, or the *Ipsum Bonum*, which is God, exercise its Soveraignty over all the Faculties of our Souls, rendring them as like to it self as may consist with their proper Capacity.

2 [See more of this in the Discourse *Of the Existence and Nature of God*, Chap. 4. and more largely in that Latine Discourse, shortly to be printed, *Pietati studere ex intuitu mercedis non est illicitum*.]

Chapter X.

4. The Excellency of Religion in regard of its Progress, as it is perpetually carrying on the Soul towards Perfection.

Every Nature hath its proper Centre which it hastens to. *Sin and Wickedness is within the attractive power of Hell*, and hastens thither: *Grace and Holiness is within the Central force of Heaven*, and moves thither. *'Tis not the Speculation of Heaven as a thing to come that satisfyes the desires of Religious Souls, but the real Possession of it even in this life*. *Men are apt to seek after Assurance of Heaven as a thing to come, rather then after Heaven it*

1 See the Discourse *Of the Existence and Nature of God*. Chap. ix (not printed in this selection, but see p. 201, footnote).

2 Cf. p. 201, footnote.
self and the inward possession of it here. How the Assurance of Heaven rises from the growth of Holiness and the powerful Progress of Religion in our Souls. That we are not hastily to believe that we are Christ's, or that Christ is in us. That the Works which Christ does in holy Souls testify of him, and best evidence Christ's spiritual appearance in them.

We have consider'd the Excellency of True Religion 1. in regard of its Descent and Original; 2. in regard of its Nature; 3. in regard of its Properties and Effects. We proceed now to a Fourth Particular, and shall shew 4. That Religion is a generous and noble thing in regard of its Progress; it is perpetually carrying on that Mind in which it is once seated toward Perfection. Though the First appearance of it upon the Souls of good men may be but as the Wings of the Morning spreading themselves upon the Mountains, yet it is still rising higher and higher upon them, chasing away all the filthy mists and vapours of Sin and Wickedness before it, till it arrives to its Meridian altitude. ¹ There is the strength and force of the Divinity in it; and though when it first enters into the Minds of men, it may seem to be sown in weakness, yet it will raise it self in power. As Christ was in his Bodily appearance, he was still increasing in wisedome and knowledge and favour with God and man, untill he was perfected in glory: so is he also in his Spiritual appearance in the Souls of men; and accordingly the New Testament does more then once distinguish of Christ in his several ages and degrees of growth in the Souls of all true Christians. Good men are always walking on from strength to strength, till at last they see God in Zion. Religion though it hath its infancy, yet it hath no old age: while it is in its Minority, it is always in motu; but when

¹ Prov. 4. 18. The path of the just is as the shining light, that shineth more and more unto the perfect day.
it comes to its Maturity and full age, it will always be in quiete, it is then always the same, and its years fail not, but it shall endure for ever. Holy and religious Souls being once toucht with an inward sense of Divine Beauty and Goodness, by a strong impress upon them are moved swiftly after God, and (as the Apostle expresses himself) 1 forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, they press toward the Mark, for the prise of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus; that so they may attain to the resurrection of the dead.

Where a Spirit of Religion is, there is the Central force of Heaven it self quickening and enlivening those that are informed by it in their motions toward Heaven. As on the other side all unhallowed and defiled minds are within the attractive power of Hell, and are continually hastening their course thither, being strongly pressed down by the weight of their Wickedness. Αἰτί τινας ἐχει κοινήως ἡ φύσις, as Plutarch hath well observ'd, Every nature in this world hath some proper Centre which it is always hastening to. Sin and Wickedness does not hover a little over the bottomless pit of Hell, and onely flutter about it; but it's continually sinking lower and lower into it. Neither does true Grace make some feeble assaies toward Heaven, but by a mighty Energy within it self it's always soaring up higher and higher into heaven. A good Christian does not onely court his Happiness, and cast now and then a smile upon it, or satisfy himself merely to be contracted to it; but with the greatest ardours of Love and Desire he pursues the solemnity of the just Nuptials, that he may be wedded to it and made one with it. It is not an aiery speculation of Heaven as a thing (though never so undoubtedly) to come, that can satisfy his hungry desires, but the reall possession of it even in this life. Such an

1 Phil. 3.
2 So we read Joh. 6. 54. hath eternal life; and 1 Ep. Jo. ch. 5. 11, 13.
Happiness would be less in the esteem of Good men, that were onely good to be enjoyed at the end of this life when all other enjoyments fail him.

I wish there be not among some such a light and poor esteem of Heaven, as makes them more to seek after Assurance of Heaven onely in the Idea of it as a thing to come, then after Heaven it self; which indeed we can never well be assured of, untill we find it rising up within our selves and glorifying our own Souls. When true Assurance comes, Heaven it self will appear upon the Horizon of our Souls, like a morning light chafing away all our dark and gloomy doubtings before it. We shall not need then to light up our Candles to seek for it in corners; no, it will display its own lustre and brightness so before us, that we may see it in its own light, and our selves the true possessours of it. We may be too nice and vain in seeking for signes and tokens of Christ's Spiritual appearances in the Souls of men, as well as the Scribes and Pharisees were in seeking for them at his First appearance in the World. When he comes into us, let us expect till the works that he shall doe within us may testify of him; and be not over-cre dulous, till we find that he doth those works there which none other could doe. As for a true well-grounded Assurance, say not so much, Who shall ascend up into heaven, to fetch it down from thence? or who shall descend into the deep, to fetch it up from beneath? for in the Growth of true internal Goodness and in the Progress of true Religion it will freely unfold it self within us. Stay till the grain of Mustard-seed it self breaks forth from among the clods that buried it, till through the descent of the heavenly dew it sprouts up and discovers it self openly. This holy Assurance is indeed the budding and blossoming of Felicity in our own Souls; it is the inward sense and feeling of the true life, spirit, sweetness and beauty of Grace powerfully expressing its own Energy within us.
Briefly, True Religion in the Progress of it transforms those Minds in which it reigns from glory to glory: it goes on and prospers in bringing all enemies in subjection under their feet, in reconciling the Minds of men fully to God; and it instates them in a firm possession of the Supreme Good. This is the Seed of God within holy Souls, which is always warring against the Seed of the Serpent, till it prevail over it through the Divine strength and influence. Though Hell may open her mouth wide and without measure, yet a true Christian in whom the seed of God remaineth, is in a good and safe condition; he finds himself borne up by an Almighty arm, and carried upwards as upon Eagles wings; and the Evil one hath no power over him, or, as S. John expresseth it, ὁ ἔχων ὄψιν προσεύξεται ἁγιά, the Evil one toucheth him not, 1 Ep. chap. 5. v. 18.

Throughout this discourse Smith repeats much of what he had said in sections, not here reprinted, of the Discourse of the Existence and Nature of God. The Synopsis of chap. iv of that discourse runs thus:—'That all Divine productions are the free Effluxes of Omnipotent Love and Goodness. The true Notion of God's glory what it is. Men very apt to mistake in this point. God needs not the Happiness or Misery of his Creatures to make himself glorious by. God does most glorifie himself by communicating himself: we most glorifie God when we most partake of him and resemble him most.'

Chap. ix is called 'An Appendix concerning the Reason of Positive Laws.' The following passage sufficiently illustrates Smith's argument: 'Some things are so absolutely, and some things are so only relatively. That which is absolutely good is every way Superior to us and we ought alwales to be commanded by it, because we are made under it: But that which is relatively good to us may sometime be commanded by us. Eternall Truth and Righteousness are in themselves perfectly and absolutely good, and the more we conform our selves to them, the better we are. But those things that are only good relatively and in order to us, we may say of them, that they are so much the better, by how much the more they are conform'd to us . . . and such indeed is the matter of all Positive Laws, and the Symbolicall or Rituall part of Religion.'
Chapter XI.

5. The Excellency of Religion in regard of its Term and End, viz. Perfect Blessedness. How unable we are in this state to comprehend and describe the Full and Perfect state of Happiness and Glory to come. The more Godlike a Christian is, the better may he understand that State. Holiness and Happiness not two distinct things, but two several Notions of one and the same thing. Heaven cannot so well be defined by any thing without us, as by something within us. The great nearness and affinity between Sin and Hell. The Conclusion of this Treatise, containing a Serious Exhortation to a diligent minding of Religion, with a Discovery of the Vanity of those Pretenses which keep men off from minding Religion.

We come now to the Fifth and Last Particular, viz.

5. The Excellency of Religion in the Term and End of it, which is nothing else but Blessedness itself in its full maturity. Which yet I may not here undertake to explain, for it is altogether ἰδρονία τύλινος, nor can it descend so low as to accommodate itself to any humane style. Accordingly S. John tells us, it does not yet appear what we shall be; and yet that he may give us some glimpse of it, he points us out to God, and tells us, ὅμως αὐτῷ ἐκοίμηθα, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is. Indeed the best way to get a discovery of it, is to endeavour as much as may be to be Godlike, to live in a feeling converse with God and in a powerful exercise and expression of all Godlike dispositions: So shall our inner man be best enabled to know the breadth and length, the depth and height of that Love and Goodness which yet passeth all knowledge. There is a State of Perfection in the life to come so far transcendent to any in this life, as that we are not able from hence to take the just proportions of it, or to form a full and comprehensive notion of it. We are unable to comprehend the vastness and fullness of that Happiness which
the most purifyed Souls may be raised to, or to apprehend how far the mighty power and strength of the Divinity deriving it self into created Being, may communicate a more Transcendent life and blessedness to it. We know not what latent powers our Souls may here contain within themselves, which then may begin to open and dilate themselves to let in the full streams of the Divine Goodness when they come nearly and intimately to converse with it; or how Blessedness may act upon those Faculties of our Minds which we now have. We know not what illapses and irradiations there may be from God upon Souls in Glory, that may raise them into a state of Perfection surpassing all our imaginations.

As for Corporeal Happiness, there cannot be any thing further added to the Pleasure of our Bodies or Animal part, then a restoring it from disturbing Passion and Pain to its just and natural constitution; and therefore some Philosophers have well disputed against the opinion of the Epicureans that make Happiness to consist in Bodily pleasure, ἵνα τὰ πολλαπλάσιον ἔχει τὸ λυπηρὸν προηγούμενον and when the molestation is gone, and the just constitution of Nature recovered, Pleasure ceaseth. But the highest Pleasure of Minds and Spirits does not onely consist in the relieving of them from any antecedent pains or grief, or in a relaxation from some former molesting Passion: neither is their Happiness a mere Stoical ἀταπαξία: as the Happiness of the Deity is not a mere Negative thing, rendring it free from all disturbance or molestation, so that it may eternally rest quiet within it self; it does not so much consist in Quiete, as in Actu et vigore. A Mind and Spirit is too full of activity and energy, is too quick and potent a thing to enjoy a full and complete Happiness in a mere Cessation; this were to make Happiness an heavy Spiritless thing. The Philosopher hath well observ'd, that τὰ ἄληθινα ἀγαθὰ σύνεστιν ἡ ἄληθινὴ ἡδονή, there is infinite
power and strength in Divine joy, pleasure and happiness commensurate to that Almighty Being and Goodness which is the Eternal source of it.

As Created Beings, that are capable of conversing with God, stand nearer to God or further off from him, and as they partake more or less of his likeness; so they partake more or less of that Happiness which flows forth from him, and God communicates himself in different degrees to them. There may be as many degrees of Sanctity and Perfection, as there are of States and Conditions of Creatures: and that is properly Sanctity which guides and orders all the Faculties and Actions of any Creature in a way suitable and correspondent to that rank and state which God hath placed it in: and while it doth so, it admits no sin or defilement to it self, though yet it may be elevated and advanced higher; and accordingly true Positive Sanctity comes to be advanced higher and higher, as any Creature comes more to partake of the life of God, and to be brought into a nearer conjunction with God: and so the Sanctity and Happiness of Innocency it self might have been perfected.

Thus we see how True Religion carries up the Souls of Good men above the black regions of Hell and Death. This indeed is the great ἀποκατάστασις of Souls, it is Religion it self, or a reall participation of God and his Holiness, which is their true restitution and advancement. All that Happiness which Good men shall be made partakers of, as it cannot be borne up upon any other foundation then true Goodness and a Godlike nature within them; so neither is it distinct from it. Sin and Hell are so twined and twisted up together, that if the power of Sin be once dissolv'd, the bonds of Death and Hell will also fall asunder. Sin and Hell are of the same kind, of the same linage and descent: as on the other side True Holiness or Religion and True Happiness are but
two severall Notions of one thing, rather then distinct in themselves. Religion delivers us from Hell by instating us in a possession of True Life and Blisse. Hell is rather a Nature then a Place: and Heaven cannot be so truly defined by any thing without us, as by something that is within us.

Thus have we done with those Particulars wherein we considered the Excellency and Nobleness of Religion, which is here exprest by ד⁴ מ⁴ נ The way of life, and elsewhere is stiled by Solomon ד⁴ מ⁴ נ A tree of life: true Religion being an inward Principle of life, of a Divine life, the best life, that which is Life most properly so called: accordingly in the Holy Scripture a life of Religion is stiled Life, as a life of Sin and Wickedness is stiled Death. In the ancient Academical Philosophy it was much disputed whether that Corporeal and Animal life, which was always drawing down the Soul into Terrene and Material things, was not more properly to be Stiled Death then Life. What sense hereof the Pythagoreans had may appear by this practise of theirs, They were wont to set up κενόμα Empty coffins in the places of those that had forsaken their School and degenerated from their Philosophy and good Precepts, as being Apostates from life it self, and dead to Vertue and a good life, which is the true life, and therefore fit only to be reckoned among the dead.

For a Conclusion of this Discourse; The Use which we shall make of all shall be this, To awaken and exhort every one to a serious minding of Religion: as Solomon doth earnestly exhort every one to seek after true Wisedome, which is the same with Religion and Holiness, as Sin is with Folly; Prov. 4. 5. Get Wisedome, get understanding; and v. 7. Get Wisedome, and with all thy getting get understanding. Wisedome is the principal thing. This is the summe of all, the Conclusion of the whole matter, Fear God, and keep his Commandements; for this is the
whole (duty, business and concernment) of man. Let us not trifle away our time and opportunities which God hath given us, wherein we may lay hold upon Life and Immortality, in doing nothing, or else pursuing Hell and Death. Let us awake out of our vain dreams; Wisedome calls upon us, and offers us the hidden treasures of Life and Blessedness: Let us not perpetually deliver over our selves to laziness and slumbering. Say not, There is a lion in the way; say not, Though Religion be good, yet it is unattainable: No, but let us intend all our Powers in a serious resolv'd pursuance of it, and depend upon the assistance of Heaven which never fails those that soberly seek for it. It is indeed the Levity of mens spirits, their heedlessness and regardlessness of their own lives, that betrays them to Sin and Death. It is the general practice of men ἀτονοχεδιάζων τὸν βίον, extempore vivere, as the Satyrist speaks; they ordinarily ponderate and deliberate upon everything more then how it becomes them to live, they so live as if their Bodies had swallowed up their Souls: their lives are but a kind of Lottery: the Principles by which they are guided are nothing else but a confused multitude of Fancies rudely jumbled together. Such is the life of most men, it is but a meer Casual thing acted over at peradventure, without any fair and calm debates held either with Religion, or with Reason which in it self, as it is not distorted and depraved by corrupt men, is a true Friend to Religion, and directs men to God and to things good and just, pure, lovely and praise-worthy; and the directions of this Inward guide we are not to neglect. Unreasonableness or the smothering and extinguishing the Candle of the Lord within us is no piece of Religion, nor advantageous to it: That certainly will not raise men up to God, which sinks them below men. There had never been such an Apostasy from Religion, nor had such a Mystery of iniquity (full of deceiveableness
and imposture) been revealed and wrought so powerfully in the Souls of some men, had there not first come an Apostasy from sober Reason, had there not first been a falling away and departure from Natural Truth.

It is to be feared our nice speculations about a τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν in Theology have tended more to exercise mens Wits then to reform their lives, and that they have too much descended into their practice, and have tended rather to take men off from minding Religion, then to quicken them up to a diligent seeking after it. Though the Powers of Nature may now be weakned, and though we cannot produce a living form of Religion in our own Souls; yet we are not surely resolved so into a sluggish Passiveness, as that we cannot, or were not in any kind or manner of way to seek after it. Certainly a man may as well read the Scriptures as study a piece of Aristotle, or of Natural Philosophy or Mathematicks. He that can observe any thing comely and commendable, or unworthy and base, in another man, may also reflect upon himself, and see how face answers to face, as Solomon speaks Proverbs 27.19. If men would seriously commune with their hearts, their own Consciences would tell them plainly, that they might avoid and omit more evil then they doe, and that they might doe more good then they doe: and that they doe not put forth that power which God hath given them, nor faithfully use those Talents nor improve the advantages and means afforded them.

I fear the ground of most mens Misery will prove to be a Second fall, and a Lapse upon a Lapse. I doubt God will not allow that Proverb, The Fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the childrens teeth are set on edge, as not in respect of Temporal misery, much less will he allow it in respect of Eternal misery, much less will he allow it in respect of Eternal. It will not be so much because our First parents incurred God’s displeasure, as because we have neglected what might have been done by us
afterwards in order to the seeking of God, his face and favour, while he might be found.

Up then and be doing; and the Lord will be with us. He will not leave us nor forsake us, if we seriously set our selves about the work. Let us endeavour to acquaint our selves with our own lives, and the true Rules of life, with this which Solomon here calls the Way of Life: let us inform our Minds as much as may be in the Excellency and Loveliness of Practical Religion; that beholding it in its own beauty and amiableness, we may the more sincerely close with it. As there would need nothing else to deterr and affright men from Sin but its own ugliness and deformity, were it presented to a naked view and seen as it is: so nothing would more effectually commend Religion to the Minds of men, then the displaying and unfolding the Excellencies of its Nature, then the true Native beauty and inward lustre of Religion it self: οὐθέν ἐκπερούς, οὐθέν ἐφός οὐτῳ βαυμαστός; neither the Evening nor the Morning-Star could so sensibly commend themselves to our bodily Eyes, and delight them with their shining beauties, as True Religion, which is an undefiled Beam of the uncreated light, would to a mind capable of conversing with it. Religion, which is the true Wisedome, is (as 1 the Author of the Book of Wisedome speaks of Wisedome,) a pure influence flowing from the glory of the Almighty, the brightness of the Everlasting light, the unsotted mirrour of the power of God, and the image of his Goodness: She is more beautiful then the Sun, and above all the order of Stars; being compared with the light, she is found before it.

Religion is no such austere, sour and rigid thing, as to affright men away from it: No, but those that are acquainted with the power of it, find it to be altogether sweet and amiable. An holy Soul sees so much of the

1 Chap. 7.
glory of Religion in the lively impressions which it bears upon it self, as both wooes and winns it. We may truly say concerning Religion to such Souls as S. Paul spake to the Corinthians 1, Needs it any Epistles of Commendation to you? Needs it any thing to court your affections? Ye are indeed its Epistle, written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God.

Religion is not like the Prophet's roll, sweet as honey when it was in his mouth, but as bitter as gall in his belly. Religion is no sullen Stoicisme, no sour Pharisaisme; it does not consist in a few Melancholy passions, in some dejected looks or depressions of Mind: but it consists in Freedom, Love, Peace, Life and Power; the more it comes to be digested into our lives, the more sweet and lovely we shall find it to be. Those spots and wrinkles which corrupt Minds think they see in the face of Religion, are indeed nowhere else but in their own deformed and misshapen apprehensions. It is no wonder when a defiled Fancy comes to be the Glass, if you have an unlovely reflection. Let us therefore labour to purge our own Souls from all worldly pollutions; let us breath after the aid and assistance of the Divine Spirit, that it may irradiate and inlighten our Minds, that we may be able to see Divine things in a Divine light: let us endeavour to live more in a real practice of those Rules of Religious and Holy living commended to us by our ever-Blessed Lord and Saviour: So shall we know Religion better, and knowing it love it, and loving it be still more and more ambitiously pursuing after it, till we come to a full attainment of it, and therein of our own Perfection and Everlasting Bliss.

1 2 Cor. iii.
AN ELEGANT
And Learned
DISCOURSE
OF THE
Light of Nature,
With severall other
TREATISES:
Viz. { The Schisme.  
      The Act of Oblivion.  
      The Childs Returne.  
      The Panting Soul.  
      Mount Ebal.  
      The White Stone.  
      Spiritual Opticks.  
      The Worth of Souls.  

By Nathanael Culverwel, Master of Arts, and lately Fellow of Emanuel College in Cambridge.

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A

DISCOURSE

Of the Light of Nature

PROVERBS xx. 27.

Mens hominis lucerna Domini; The understanding of a man is the Candle of the Lord.

Chapter I.

The Porch, or Introduction.

It is a work, that requires our choicest thoughts, the exactest discussion, that can be; a thing very material, and desirable, to give unto Reason the things, that are Reason's, and unto Faith the things, that are Faith's, to give Faith her full scope, and latitude, and to give Reason also her just bounds, and limits; this is the first-borne, but the other ha's the blessing. And yet there is no such a vast hiatus neither, such a μέγα χάσμα between them, as some would imagine: there is no such implacable antipathy, no such irreconcileable jarring between them, as some do fancy to themselves; they may very well salute one another ἀγία φιλήματι, osculo Pacis; Reason, and Faith may kiss each other. There is a twin-light springing from both, and they both spring from the same Fountain of light, and they both sweetly conspire in the same end, the glory of that being, from which they shine, and the welfare, and happiness of that being, upon which they shine. So that to blaspheme
Reason, 'tis to reproach Heaven it self, and to dishonour the
God of Reason, to question the beauty of his Image, and
by a strange ingratitude to slight this great and Royal gift
of our Creatour. For 'tis he, that set up these two great
Luminaries in every Heavenly soul, the Sun to rule the day,
and the Moon to rule the night, and though there be some
kind of creatures, that will bark at this lesser light, and
others so severely critical, as that they make Mountains of
those spots, and freckles, which they see in her face; yet
others know how to be thankfull for her weaker beams, and
will follow the least light of God's setting up, though it be
but the Candle of the Lord.

But some are so strangely prejudiced against Reason (and
that upon sufficient reason too, as they think, which yet
involves a flat contradiction) as that they look upon it not as
the Candle of the Lord, but as on some blazing Comet, that
portends present ruine to the Church, and to the soul, and
carries a fatal, and venemous influence along with it. And
because the unruly head of Socinus, and his followers; by
their meer pretenses to Reason, have made shipwrack of
Faith, and have been very injurious to the Gospel; there-fore these weak, and staggering apprehensions are afraid of
understanding any thing; and think, that the very name of
Reason, especially in a Pulpit, in matters of Religion, must
needs have at least a thousand Heresies couched in it. If
you do but offer to make a Syllogism, they'll straightway cry
it down for carnal reasoning. What would these men have?
Would they be banished from their own essences? Would
they forfeit, and renounce their understandings? or have
they any to forfeit, or disclaim? Would they put out this
Candle of the Lord, intellectu als of his own lighting? or have
they any to put out? would they creep into some lower
species, and go a grazing with Nebuchadnessar among the
beasts of the field? or are they not there already? Or, if
they themselves can be willing to be so shamefully degraded,
do they think, that all others too are bound to follow their example? Oh, what hard thoughts have these of Religion? do they look upon it only as on a bird of prey, that comes to peck out the eyes of men? Is this all the nobility, that it gives, that men by vertue of it must be beheaded presently? do's it chop off the intellectuels at one blow? Let's hear awhile what are the offences of Reason? are they so heinous, and capital? what ha's it done? what laws ha's it violated? whose commands ha's it broken? what did it ever do against the Crown, and Dignity of Heaven, or against the peace, and tranquility of men? Why are a weak, and perverse Generation, so angry, and displeased with it? Is it because this Daughter of the morning is fallen from her primitive glory? from her original vigour, and perfection? Far be it from me to extenuate that great, and fatal overthrow, which the sons of men had in their first, and original Apostasie from their God; that, under which the whole Creation sighs, and groans: but, this we are sure, it did not annihilate the soul, it did not destroy the essence, the powers, and faculties, nor the operations of the soul; though it did defile them, and disorder them, and every way indispose them.

Well then, because the eye of Reason is weakned, and vitiated, will they therefore pluck it out immediately? and must Leah be hated upon no other account, but because she is bleary-eyed? The whole head is wounded, and akes, and is there no other way, but to cut it off? The Candle of the Lord do's not shine so clearly, as it was wont, must it therefore be extinguished presently? Is it not better to enjoy the faint and languishing light of this Candle of the Lord, rather then to be in palpable, and disconsolate darkness? There are indeed but a few seminal sparks left in the ashes, and must there be whole floods of water cast on them to quench them? 'Tis but an old imperfect Manuscript, with some Broken periods, some ters worn out;
must they therefore with an unmerciful indignation rend it, and tear it asunder? 'Tis granted, that the picture has lost its gloss, and beauty, the orienacy of its colours, the elegancy of its lineaments, the comliness of its proportion; must it therefore be totally defac'd? must it be made one great blot? and must the very frame of it be broken in pieces? Would you perswade the Lutanist to cut all his strings in sunder, because they are out of Tune? And will you break the Bowe upon no other account, but because it's unbended? because men have not so much of Reason as they should, will they therefore resolve to have none at all? Will you throw away your Gold, because it's mix'd with dross? Thy very Being, that's imperfect too, thy graces, they are imperfect; wilt thou refuse these also? And then consider, that the very apprehending the weakness of Reason, even this in some measure comes from Reason. Reason, when awakned, it feels her own wounds, it hears her own jarrings, she sees the dimness of her own sight. 'Tis a glass, that discovers its own spots, and must it therefore be broke in pieces? Reason herself has made many sad complaints unto you; she ha's told you often, and that with tears in her eyes, what a great shipwrack she has suffered, what goods she ha's lost, how hardly she escaped with a poor decayed Being; she ha's shewn you often some broken reliques, as the sad remembrancers of her former ruines; she told you how that, when she swam for her life, she had nothing, but two, or three Jewels about her, two, or three common notions; and would you rob her of them also? Is this all your tenderness, and compassion? Is this your kindness to your friend? Will you trample upon her now she is so low? Is this a sufficient cause to give her a Bill of Divorcement, because she ha's lost her former beauty, and fruitfulness?

Or is Reason thus offensive to them, because she cannot grasp, and comprehend the things of God? Vain men,
will they pluck out their eyes, because they cannot look upon the Sun in his brightness, and glory? What, though Reason cannot reach to the depths, to the bottomes of the Ocean, may it not therefore swim, and hold up the head, as well as it can? What, though it cannot enter into the Sanctum Sanctorum, and pierce within the Veil; may it not, notwithstanding, ly in the Porch, at the gate of the Temple called Beautiful, and be a Door-keeper in the House of its God? Its wings are clipt indeed, it cannot flie so high, as it might have done; it cannot flie so swiftly, so strongly, as once it could: will they not therefore allow it to move, to stir, to flutter up and down, as well as it can? The Turrets, and Pinnacles of the stately structure are fallen: will they therefore demolish the whole Fabrick, and shake the very Foundations of it, and down with it to the ground? Though it be not a Jacob's Ladder to climbe up to Heaven by, yet may they not use it as a staff to walk upon Earth withall? And then Reason it self knows this also, and acknowledges, that 'tis dazled with the Majesty, and Glory of God; that it cannot pierce into his mysterious, and unsearchable ways; it never was so vain, as to go about to measure immensity by its own finite Compass, or to span out absolute Eternity by its own more imperfect duration. True Reason did never go about to comprize the Bible in its own Nut-shel. And, if Reason be content with its own Sphere, why should it not have the liberty of its proper motion?

Is it, because it opposes the things of God, and wrangles against the Mysteries of Salvation, is it therefore excluded? An heinous and frequent accusation indeed; but nothing more false, and injurious: and if it had been an open Enemy, that had done her this wrong, why then she could have borne it; but it's thou, her friend, and companion, ye have took sweet counsel together, and have entred into the House of God as friends, 'tis you, that have your dependance
upon her; that cannot speak one word to purpose against her, without her help, and assistance. What mean you thus to revile your most intimate, and inseparable self? why do you thus slander your own Beings? would you have all this to be true, which you say? Name but the time if you can, when ever right Reason did oppose one jot, or apex of the word of God. Certainly, these men speak of distorted Reason all this while. Surely they do not speak of the Candle of the Lord, but of some shadow, and appearance of it. But if they tell us, that all Reason is distorted, whether then is theirs so, in telling us so? if they say that they do not know this by Reason, but by the Word of God, whether then is that their Reason, when it acknowledges the Word of God? whether is it then distorted, or no? Besides, if there were no right Reason in the World, what difference between sobriety, and madness, between these men, and wiser ones? how then were the Heathen left without excuse, who had nothing to see by, but this Candle of the Lord? and how do's this thrust men below sensitive creatures? for better have no Reason at all, then such as do's perpetually deceive them, and delude them.

Or do's Reason thus displease them, because the blackest Errors sometimes come under the fair disguise of so beautiful a name, and have some tincture of Reason in them? But truly this is so far from being a disparagement to Reason, as that 'tis no small commendation of it: for πρόσωπον χρηθείμην τηλαυγίς, Men love to put a plausible title, a winning frontispiece upon the foulest Errors. Thus Licentiousness would fain be called by the name of Liberty; and all Dissoluteness would fain be countenanced, and secured under the Patronage, and Protection of free-Grace. Thus wickedness would willingly forget its own name, and adopt it self into the family of goodness. Thus Arminianism pleads for it self under the specious notion of God's love to Mankind. Thus that silly Error of
Antinomianism will needs stile it self an Evangelical Honeycomb. Thus all irregularities, and anomalies in Church Affairs, must pride themselves in those glittering titles of a New Light, A Gospel-way, An Heaven upon Earth. No wonder then that some also pretend to Reason, who yet run out of it, and beyond it, and besides it; but must none therefore come near it? because Socinus ha’s burnt his wings at this Candle of the Lord, must none therefore make use of it?

May he not be conquer’d with his own weapons, and beat out of his own strong holds, and may not the head of an uncircumcised Philistine be cut off with his own sword?

Or lastly, are they thus afraid of Reason, because by vertue of this, men of wit, and subtilty, will presently argue, and dispute them into an Errour, so as that they shall not be able to disintangle a Truth, though in it self it be never so plain, and unquestionable? But first, Reason it self tells them, that it may be thus, and so prepares, and fortifies them against such a tryal; and then, this only shews, that some mens Reason is not so well advanc’d and improv’d, either as it might be, or as others is; a sharper edge would quickly cut such difficulties a sunder. Some have more refined and clarifi’d intellectuels, more vigorous and sparkling eyes than others, and one soul differs from another in glory; and that reason, which can make some shift to maintain Errour, might with a great deal less sweat, and pains, maintain a Truth.

There’s no question, but that Bellarmine, and the rest of the learned Papists could have, if they had pleased, far more easily defended the Protestant Religion, than that of their own. Besides, the vigour, and triumph of Reason is principally to be seen in those first-born-beams, those pure and unspotted irrigations, that shine from it; I mean those first bblings up of common Principles, that are own’d, and acknowledg’d by all; and those evident, and
kindly derivations, that flow from them. _Reason_ shews her face more amiably and pleasantly in a pure and clear stream, then in those muddied and troubled waters, in which the Scholemen (that have leasure enough) are always fishing. Nay, some of their works are like so many raging Seas, full of perpetual tossings, and disquietings, and foamings, and sometimes casting up mire, and dirt; and yet these vast and voluminous _Leviathans_ love to sport therein, and that, which is most intolerable, these grand _σοφοὶ_, that seem'd so zealous for _Reason_, at length in express terms disclaim it; and in a most blindfold, and confused manner, cry up their great _Diana_, their Idol of Transubstantiation; and the _Lutherans_ are very fierce against _Reason_ too, much upon the same account, because it would never allow of that their monstrous and mis-shapen lump of Consubstantiation.

But why have I all this while beaten the air, and spilt words upon the ground? why do I speak to such, as are incurable, and incapable? for if we speak _Reason_ to them, that's that, which they so much disclaim: if we do not speak _Reason_ to them, that were to disclaim it too.

But I speak to men, to Christians, to the friends of learning; to the professours of _Reason_: to such as put _this Candle of the Lord_ into a golden Candlestick, and pour continual Oil into it. Yet lest any among you, _Athenians_, should erect an Alter to an unknown God; lest you should ignorantly worship him, we will declare him to you.

And that, which we have now said, may serve as a Porch, and Preamble, to what we shall speak hereafter out of those words,

Where we shall see,

First, _How The understanding of a man is the Candle of the Lord_.

Secondly, _What this Candle of the Lord discovers; where we shall finde_,
DISCOURSE OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE

First, That all the Moral Law is founded in natural, and common light of Reason.

Secondly, That there’s nothing in the mysteries of the Gospel contrary to the light of Reason; nothing repugnant to this light, that shines from the Candle of the Lord.

CHAPTER III.

What Nature is.

The words being to be understood of Lumen Naturale according to the minds of the best, and most Interpreters, it will be very needful to enquire what Nature is, and here we will be sure not to speak one word for Nature, which shall in the least measure tend to the eclipsing of Grace; nay, nothing, but what shall make for the greater brightening, and amplifying of the free-Grace, and distinguishing goodness of God in Christ; and nothing, but what an Augustine, or a Bradwardine, those great Patrons of Grace, would willingly set their seals unto.

Well then, as for Nature, though it be not far from any one of us, though it be so intimate to our very Beings, though it be printed, and engraved upon our essences, and not upon ours onely, but upon the whole Creation, and though we put all the letters, and Characters of it together, as well as we can: yet we shall find it hard enough, to spell it out, and read what it is. For, as it is in corporeal vision, the too much approximation, and vicinity of an object, do’s stop up, and hinder sight: so ’tis also many times in Intellectual Opticks, we see some things better at a distance; the Soul cannot so easily see its own face, nor so fully explain its own nature. We need some Scholiast, or Interpreter, to comment upon our own Beings, and to acquaint us with our own Idioms: and I meet with many Authors, that speak of the Light of Nature; but I can scarce finde one,

1 Ch. II, on 'The Explication of the Words,' is omitted.
that tells us what it is. Those famous, and learned Triumviri; Selden, that ha's made it his work to write De Jure Naturali; and Grotius, that ha's said somewhat of it in his Book De Jure Belli et Pacis; and Salmasius, that ha's touch'd it in his late Treatise De Coma, and in his little Dialogue subordinate to it, in either of which, if he had pleased, he might have described it without a digression: yet none of these (as far as I can find) give us the least adumbration of it; which notwithstanding was the rather to be expected from them, because the Philosophers had left it in such a cloudy, and obscured manner, as if they had never seen Nature face to face, but onely through a glass darkly, and in a Riddle. And, as we read of a Painter, that represented Nature appearing to Aristotle with a Veil, and Mask upon her face: so truly Aristotle himself painted her, as he saw her, with her Veil on; for he shews her onely wrapped up, and muffled in matter, and form; whereas, methinks, he, that could set Intelligences to the wheel to spin out time, and motion, should have allowed them also some natural ability for performing so famous a task, and employment, which his head set them about. And truly why Angelical Beings should be banished from the Commonwealth of Nature; nay; why they should not properly belong to Physicks, as well as other particular Beings; or why Bodies onely should engross, and monopolize Natural Philosophy, and why a Soul cannot be admitted into it, unless it bring a Certificate, and Commendamus from the Body, is a thing altogether unaccountable, unless it be resolved into a meer Arbitrary Determination, and a Philosophical kind of Tyranny.

And yet Aristotle's Description of Nature ha's been held very sacred, and some of the Scholemen do even dote upon it. Aquinas tells us in plain Terms; Deridendi sunt, qui volunt Aristotelis definitionem corrigere. The truth is, I make no question, but that Aristotle's Definition is very commen-
surate to what he meant by *Nature*; but, that he had the true, and *adequate notion* of *Nature*, this I think *Aquinas* himself can scarce prove: and I would fain have him to explain what it is for a thing *innosere lumine Naturre*, if *Nature* be onely *principium motus et quietis*. Yet *Plutarch* also in this point seems to compromise with *Aristotle* and after a good, specious, and hopeful *Preface*, where he saith, that he must needs tell us what *Nature* is, after all this preparation he do's most palpably restrain it to *corporeal Beings*, and then votes it to be ἀρχή κυνήσεως καὶ ἐρημίας. And *Empedocles*, (as he is quoted by him) will needs exercise his *Poetry*, and make some *Verses* upon *Nature*, and you would think, at the first dash, that they were in a good lofty strain; for thus he sings,

--- φύσις οὐδενός ἕστω ἐκάστου

Θυγτῶν, οὐδὲ τις οὐλομένη θανάτου γενέθλη.

'Twas not of a mortal, withering off-spring, nor of a fading *Genealogy*; but yet truely his *Poetical raptures* were not so high, as to elevate him above a body, for he presently sinks into ἀληθεία, he falls down into *matter*, and makes *Nature* nothing else, but that which is *ingenerable*, and *incorruptible* in *material Beings*; just as the *Peripatetics* speak of their *Materia prima*. But *Plato*, who was more spiritual in his *Philosophy*, chides some of his Contemporaries, and is extremately displeased with them, and that very justly, for they were degenerated into a most stupid *Atheism*, and resolved all *Beings* into one of these three *Originals*, that they were either διὰ φύσιν, διὰ τόχην, διὰ τέχνην. They were either the workmanship of *Nature*, or of *Fortune*, or of *Art*. Now as for the first, and chief *corporeal Beings*, they made them the productions of *Nature*, that is, (say they) they sprung from eternity into *Being* by their own *impetus*, and by their own virtue, and efficacy, ἀπὸ τινὸς αἰτίας αὐτομάτης, like so many natural *automata*,...
they were the **Principles** of their own **Being**, and **Motion**; and this they lay down for one of their **Axioms**; ὅτα μὲν μέγιστα, καὶ καλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι φόσον, καὶ τόχην τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα τέχνην. *All the Master-pieces of Being, the most lovely, and beautiful Pictures were drawn by Nature, and Fortune; and Art only could reach to some poor rudiments, to some shadows, and weaker imitations*: which you will be somewhat amazed at, when you hear by and by what these τὰ σμικρότερα were.

The foundation of **Being**, that they said was **Natural**, the mutation, and disposing of **Being**, that they made the employment of **Fortune**; and then they said the work of **Art** was to finde out **Laws**, and **Morality**, and **Religion**, and a **Deity**; these were the τὰ σμικρότερα they spake of before.

But that **Divine Philosopher** do's most admirably discover the prodigious folly of this opinion, and demonstrate the impossibility of it in that excellent Discourse of his, in his tenth Book *De Legibus*, where he do's most clearly, and convincingly shew, That those things, which they say were framed by Art, were in duration infinitely before that, which they call *Nature*; That Ψυχὴ ἐστι προσβετέρα σώματος that spirituals have the seniority of corporeals. This he makes to appear by their (1) πρωτοκυνησία, (2) αὐτοκυνησία, (3) ἀλλοκυνησία. For these three, though they be not expressly mentioned in him, yet they may very easily be collected from him. **Souls** they move themselves, and they move **Bodies** too, and therefore must needs be *first* in motion, so that νοῦς, καὶ τέχνη, καὶ νόμος, τῶν σκληρῶν, καὶ μαλακῶν, καὶ βαρέων, καὶ κοινῷ πρώτερα δυνέναι. **Reason**, and **Religion**, **Laws** and **Prudence** must needs be before **Density**, and **Rarity**, before **Gravity**, and **Levity**, before all **conditions**, and **dimensions** of **Bodies**. And **Laws**, and **Religion**, they are indeed τοῦ νοῦ γεννήματα: that is, the contrivances, and **productions** of that eternal νοῦς, and λόγος, the **wisdom** of God himself.
DISCOURSE OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE

So that all, that *Plato* will allow to *Nature*, amounts to no more, then this, that it is not δημοιογός, ὀρίφεξ rerum, but onely Δει δημοιογούντος σαμυλα, et ministra. *As the eyes of a Servant wait upon his Master, and as the eyes of an Handmaiden look up to her Mistress; so wait her eyes upon the Lord her God.* And he doth fully resolve, and determine, that *God* is the *soul* of the world, and *Nature* but the *body*; which must be took onely in *sensu florido*, in a flourishing, and *Rhetorical* sense: that *God* is the *fountain of Being*, and *Nature* but the *channel*; that he is the *Kernel of Being*, and *Nature* but the *shell*. Yet herein *Plato* was defective, that he did not correct, and reform the abuse of this word *Nature*; that he did not scruie it up to an higher, and more spiritual notion. For 'tis very agreeable to the *choicest, and suprest Being*; And the *Apostle* tells us of ἡ θεία φύσις. So that 'tis time at length to draw the veil from *Nature's* face, and to look upon her beauty.

And first, 'tis the usual language of many, both *Philosophers* and others, to put *Nature* for *God* himself, or at least for the *general Providence* of *God*; and this, in the *Schoolemen's* rough and unpolish'd *Latin*, is stiled *Natura naturans*; thus *Nature* is took for that constant, and Catholick *Providence*, that spreads its wings over all *created Beings*, and shrouds them under its warm, and happy protection. Thus that elegant *Moralist, Plutarch*, speaks more like to himself, then in his former Description; Πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἀκριβῆς, καὶ φιλοτεχνος, ἀνελλωπής, καὶ ἀπερίφημης. *Nature is in all things accurate, and punctual, 'tis not defective nor parcimonious, nor yet sprouting, and luxuriant.* And consonant to this is that sure *Axiom*; *Natura nihil facit frustra*. Thus *God* set up the world, as a fair, and goodly *Clock*, to strike in time, and to move in an orderly manner; not by its own weights (as *Durand* would have it) but by fresh influence from himself, by that inward, and intimate spring of immediate concourse, that

*CAMPAGNAC*
shall supply it in a most uniform, and proportionable manner.

Thus God framed this great Organ of the world, he turned it, yet not so, as that it could play upon itself, or make any Musick by virtue of this general composure, (as Durand fansies it) but that it might be fitted, and prepared for the finger of God himself, and at the presence of his powerful touch might sound forth the praise of its Creatour, in a most sweet, and harmonious manner.

And thus Nature is that regular Line, which the wisdom of God himself ha's drawn in Being: τὰξις γάρ, ἢ τὰξιός ἐγρον, ἢ φώνη, as he speaks; whereas that, which they miscall'd Fortune, was nothing but a line fuller of windings, and varieties. And, as Nature was a fixed, and ordinary kinde of Providence; so Fortune was nothing, but a more abstruse, and mysterious, and occult kinde of Providence: and therefore Fortune was not blinde, as they falsely painted, and represented her; but they themselves were blinde, and could not see into her. And in this sense that speech of that grave Moralist, Seneca, is very remarkable; Providentia, Fatum, Natura, Casus, Fortuna, sunt ejusdem Dei varia nomina.

But then, secondly, Nature, as 'tis scattered, and distributed in particular Beings, so 'tis the very same with Essence it self; and therefore Spirituals, as they have their Essence, so they have their Nature too: and, if we gloried in names, it would be easie to reap up a multitude of testimonies, in which these two must needs be λόγοναμωντα. And thus Nature speaks these two things.

1. It points out Originem entis, 'tis the very Genius of Entity, 'tis present at the nativity of every Being, nay, 'tis Being it self. There is no moment, in which you can imagine a thing to be, and yet to be without its Nature.

2. It speaks Operationem entis, and 'tis a Principle of working in spirituals, as well as Principium motus et quietis in corporeals.
All Essence bubbles out, flows forth, and paraphrases upon itself in operations. Hence it is, that such workings, as are facilitated by custom, are esteemed natural. Hence that known speech of Galen; 'Επικτητος φύσις τὰ θυτή. Customs are frequently adopted, and ingrafted into Nature. Hence also our usual Idiom calls a good Disposition a good Nature. Thus the Moralists express Virtues, or Vices, that are deeply rooted, by this term πεφυσωμένα.

And so some, and Grotius amongst the rest, would understand that place of the Apostle, Do's not even Nature it self teach you; of a general custom: but that word Αὐτῇ ἡ φύσις do's plainly refuse that interpretation; and the learned Salmassius do's both grant, and evince, that it cannot be meant of custom there. And thus, having seen what Nature is, 'twill be very easie, in the next place, to tell you what the Law of Nature is.

**CHAPTER IV.**

**Of the nature of a Law in general.**

Before we can represent unto you the Law of Nature, you must first frame, and fashion in your minds the just notion of a Law in general. And Aquinas gives us this shadowy representation of it; Lex est quaedam regula, et mensura, secundum quam inducitur aliquis ad agendum, vel ab agendo retrahitur. But Suarez [is] offended with the latitude of this Definition, and esteems it too spreading, and comprehensive, as that, which extends to all Naturals, ay, and to Artificials to; for they have regulas, et mensuras operationum. Thus God ha's set a Law to the Waves, and a Law to the Winds; nay, thus Clocks have their Laws, and Lutes have their Laws, and whatsoever ha's the least appearance of motion, ha's some rule proportionable to it. Whereas these workings were always reckoned to be at the most but inclinationes, et pondera, and not the fruits of a
legislative power. But yet the Apostle Paul, to stain the pride of them, that gloriéd in the Law, calls such things by the name of Law, as were most odious, and anomalous. Thus he tells us of Νόμος θανάτου, and Νόμος ἀμαρτίας, though sin be properly ἀνοίγα. Thus he mentions Legem membrorum the same, which the Scholemen call Legem fomitis.

And yet this is sure, that a rational Creature is only capable of a Law, which is a moral restraint, and so cannot reach to those things, that are necessitated to act ad extremum virium.

And therefore Suarez do's give us a more refined Description, when he tells us, that Lex est mensura quaedam actuum moralium, ita ut, per conformitatem ad illam, Rectitudinem moralem habeant, et, si ab illa discordent, obligui sint. 'A Law is such a just, and regular turning of Actions, as that, by virtue of this, they may conspire into a moral Musick, and become very pleasant, and harmonious.' Thus Plato speaks much of that Εὐρυμέλα, and συμφωνία, that is in Laws, and in his second Book De Legibus he do's altogether discourse of Harmony, and do's infinitely prefer mental, and intellectual Musick, those powerful, and practical strains of goodness, that spring from a well-composed spirit, before those delicious blandishments, those soft, and transient touches, that comply with sense, and salute it in a more flattering manner: and he tells you of a spiritual Dancing, that is answerable to so sweet a Musick, to these τὰ θεωτὰ αἴλόματα. 'Whilst the Laws play in consort, there is a Chorus of well-ordered affections, that are raised, and elevated by them.

And thus, as Aristotle well observes, some Laws were wont to be put in Verse, and to be sung, like so many pleasant Odes, that might even charm the people into obedience.

'Tis true, that learned Philosopher gives this reason of it, they were put into Verse, ὅπως μὴ ἐπιλάθωνται, that they
might remember them the better: but why may not this reason also share with it, that they might come with a greater grace, and allurement, that they might hear them as pleasantly, as they would do the voice of a Viol, or an Harp, that ha's Rhetorick enough to still, and quiet the evil spirit? But yet this do's not sufficiently paint out the being of a Law, to say, that 'tis onely regula, et mensura; and Suares himself is so ingenuous, as to tell us, that he cannot rest satisfied with this Description, which he drew but with a Coal, as a Rudiment rather, then a full portraicture; and therefore we'll give him some time to perfect it, and to put it into more orient Colours.

And, in the mean time, we'll look upon that speculative Lawgiver, Plato I mean, who was always new-modelling of Laws, and rolling Political Ideas in his minde.

Now you may see him gradually ascending, and climbing up to the Description of a Law by these four several steps, and yet he do's not reach the top, and ἀκμή of it neither. First, he tells us, that Laws are τὰ Νομιζόμενα, such things, as are esteemed fitting; but because this might extend to all kind of Customs too, his second thoughts limit, and contract it more, and tell us, that a Law is Δόγμα πόλεως, Decretum civitatis; yet, because the mass, and bulk of people, the rude head, and undigested lump of the multitude may seek to establish τὸ Δόγμα πονηρῶν, as he calls it, therefore he bethinks himself how to clarifie a Law, how to purge out the dross from it, and tells us in the next place, that it is τοῦ ὄντος ἐξουρέσεις, inventio ejus, quod verē est, where it is very remarkable what this Philosopher means by τὸ ὄν, by which he is wont usually to point out a Deity, which is stiled by Aristotle ὅν ὄντων but it is not capable of this sense here; for thus Laws are not τοῦ ὄντος ἐξουρέσεις, but rather τοῦ ὄντος ἐφώματα. Lex est inventio, vel donum Dei, as the Oratour speaks. Τὸ ὄν therefore in this place speaks these two Particulars.
1. Τὸ ὁρθὸν for all rectitude ha's a Being, and flows from the fountain of Being; whereas obliquities, and irregularities are mere privations, and non entities; and 'tis a notable speech of Plato, Τὸ μὲν ὁρθὸν νόμος ἐστὶ Βασιλικὸς, the very same expression, which the Apostle gives to the Law of God, when he calls it the royal Law.

2. Τὸ ὅν implies τὸ χρηστὸν, every thing, that is profitable, ha's a being in it; but you can gather no fruit from a privation: there is no sweetness in an obliquity, and therefore a Law is an wholesome mixture of that, that is just, and profitable, and this is τέλος τοῦ νόμου, as Plutarch speaks. Whereas turpe praeceptum non est lex, sed iniquitas; for obligation, that's the very form, and essence of a Law: Now every Law obligat in Nomine Dei; but so glorious a name did never binde to any thing, that was wicked and unequal. Πᾶν δίκαιον ἡδύ, and πᾶν δίκαιον ὀφέλμον, and that onely is countenanced from heaven. The golden Chain of Laws, 'tis tied to the chair of Jupiter, and a command is onely vigorous, as it issues out, either immediately, or remotely, from the great Sovereign of the world. So that τὸ ὅν, is the sure bottome and foundation of every Law.

But then, because he had not yet express'd, who were the competent searchers out of this τὸ ὅν, therefore he tells you in the last place, that Laws are πολιτικὰ συγγράμματα, which he clears by other things; for λατρικὰ συγγράμματα are λατρικοὶ νόμοι, and γεωμετρικὰ συγγράμματα are γεωμετρικοὶ νόμοι. And he resolves it into this, that in all true kinds of government there is some supreme power, derived from God himself, and fit to contrive Laws, and Constitutions agreeable to the welfare, and happiness of those, that are to be subject to them; and οἱ κρείττονες (as he speaks) are the fittest makers of Law.

Yet you must take notice here of these two things.

(1) That he did not lay stress enough upon that binding virtue, which is the very sinew, nay, the life, and soul of a Law.
(2) That these three Descriptions, τὰ νομιζόμενα, δόγμα τόλεως, πολιτικὰ συγγράμματα, intend only humane Laws, and so are not boil'd up to the purer notion of a Law in general.

And, though that same other branch τοῦ ὀντος ἔξεύρεσις may seem to reach farther yet, 'tis too obscure, too much in the clouds, to give a clear manifestation of the nature of a Law. And yet Aristotle do's not in this supply Plato's defects, but seems rather to paraphrase upon these Descriptions of humane Laws, and tells in more enlarged language, that, 'Ὁ νόμος ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁμομένος καθ' ὁμολογίαν κοινῆν τόλεως, μηνῶν τῶς δεὶ πράττειν ἐκαστα. Where yet he cannot possibly mean, that every individual should give his suffrage; but certainly the representative consent of the whole will content him.

But I see these antient Philosophers are not so well furnish'd, but that we must return to the Scholemen again, who by this time have lick'd their former Descriptions into a more comely form. We will look upon Aquinas his, first.

Lex (saith he) est ordinatio rationis ad bonum commune ab eo, qui curam habet Communitatis, promulgata. 'It is a rational Ordinance for the advancing of publick good, made known by that power, which ha's care, and tuition of the publick.' And Suarez his picture of a Law, now that 'tis fully drawn, hath much the same aspect. Lex est commune praeceptum, justum, ac stabile, sufficienter promulgatum. A Law is a publick command, a just, and immovable command, lifting up its voice like a Trumpet: and, in respect of the Law-giver, though it do praesupponere actum intellectus, as all acts of the Will do; yet it do's formally consist in actu voluntatis: not the Understanding, but the Will of a Law-giver makes a Law. But in respect of him, that is subject to the Law, it do's consist in actu rationis,
'tis required onely, that he should know it; not in actu voluntatis, it do's not depend upon his obedience. The want of his Will is not enough to enervate, and invalidate a Law, when 'tis made; all Laws then would be abrogated every moment. His Will indeed is required to the execution, and fulfilling of the Law, not to the validity, and existence of the Law: and thus all the Laws of God do not at all depend upon the will of man, but upon the power, and will of the Law-giver. Now in the framing of every Law there is to be

I. Intentio boni communis, and thus that Speech of Carneades, Utilitas justi prope mater, et aequi, if it be took in this sense, is very commendable: whereas in that other sense (in which 'tis thought he meant it) it is not so much as tolerable. Law-givers should send out Laws with Olive-branches in their mouths, they should be fruitful, and peaceable; they should drop sweetness and fatness upon a Land. Let not then Brambles make Laws for Trees; lest they scratch them, and tear them, and write their Laws in blood. But Law-givers are to send out Laws, as the Sun shoots forth his beams, with healing under their wings: and thus that elegant Moralist, Plutarch speaks. 'God (saies he) is angry with them, that counterfeit his Thunder, and Lightning, οὗ σκηντρόν, ὃ κεραυνόν, ὃ τριλαυν, his Scepter, and his Thunderbolt, and his Trident, he will not let them meddle with these. He do's not love they should imitate him in his absolute dominion, and sovereignty; but loves to see them darting out those warm, and amiable, and cherishing αἰτινοβολαία, those beamings out of Justice, and Goodness, and Clemency. And as for Laws, they should be like so many green, and pleasant Pastures, into which these ποιμένες λαῶν are to lead their flocks, where they may feed sweetly, and securely by those refreshing streams of Justice, that run down like water, and Righteousness like a mighty Torrent. And this considera-
tion would sweep down many *cobweb-Laws*, that argue onely the venome, and subtily of them, that spin them; this would sweep down many an *Achitophel’s web*, and many an *Haman’s web*, many an *Herod’s web*, every *Spider’s web*, that spreads Laws onely for the catching, and entangling of weaker ones. Such Law-givers are fit to be *Domitian’s play-fellows*, that made it his Royal sport, and pastime to catch *Flies*, and insult over them, when he had done. Whereas a Law should be a *Staff for a Common-wealth* to lean on, and not a *Reed* to pierce it through. Laws should be *cords* of love, not *nets*, and *snares*. Hence it is, that those Laws are most radical, and fundamental, that principally tend to the conservation of the *vitals*, and *essentials* of a Kingdom; and those come nearest the Law of God himself, and are participations of that eternal Law, which is the spring, and original of all inferiour, and derivative Laws. Τὸν ἀπιστητὸν ἐνεκά πάντα τὰ νόμιμα, as *Plato* speaks; and there is no such publick benefit, as that, which comes by *Laws*; for all have an equal interest in them, and priviledge by them. And therefore, as *Aristotle* speaks most excellently, *Νόμος ἐστὶν ἂνευ δρέσινων*. A Law is a pure intellect, not onely *without a sensitive appetite*, but without a *will*. 'Tis pure judgment without affections, a Law is impartial, and makes no factions; and a Law cannot be bribed, though a Judge may. And that great *Philosopher* do’s very well prosecute this; 'If you were to take *Physick*, (saies he) then indeed 'tis ill being determined by a Book, 'tis dangerous taking a printed *Recipe*, you had better leave it to the breast of the *Physician*, to his skill, and advice, who mindes your health, and welfare, as being most for his gain, and credit. But in point of *Justice* the case is very different; you had better here depend upon a *Rule*, then to leave it to the arbitrary power of a *Judge*, who is usually to decide a controversie between two; and, if left to himself, were apt
to be swayed, and biassed by several interests, and engagements, which might encline him to one, more then another.' Nay, now that there is a fix'd Rule, an immoveable Law, yet there is too much partiality in the application of it, how much more would there be, if there were no Rule at all?

But the truth is, the Judge should only follow the ultimum et practicum dictamen legis; his Will, like a coeca potentia, is to follow the novissimum lumen intellectus of this Noôs, that is to rule, and guide him: and therefore Justice was painted blinde, though ipsa lex be oculta, for Noôs ὧρ, Noôs ἀκούει, and the Will is to follow the ultimum nutum capitis, the meaning of the Law in all circumstances.

II. In a Law-giver there is to be judicium, et prudentia Architectonica ad ferendas leges. The Egyptiâna Hieroglyphick for Legislative power was Oculus in sceptro; and it had need be such an eye, that can see both πρόσωπω καὶ ὄπλωσω. It had need have a full, and open prospect into publick affairs, and to put all advantages into one scale, and all inconveniences into another.

To be sure the Laws of God, they flow from a fountain of wisdom, and the Laws of men are to be lighted at this Candle of the Lord, which he ha's set up in them, and those Laws are most potent, and prevalent, that are founded in light; ή τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀγωγὴ χρυσῆ, καὶ ἱερά. Other Laws are σκληροί καὶ σιδηροί, they may have an iron and adamantine necessity; but the others have a soft and downy perswasion going along with them, and therefore as he goes on, τοῦ λογισμοῦ καλοῦ μὲν ὄντος, πρέον δὲ, καὶ οὗ βιῶν, Reason is so beautiful, as that it wins, and allureth, and thus constrains to obedience.

III. There is to be sigillum legis, I mean, Electio et Determinatio Legis. After a sincere aim at publick good, and a clear discovery of the best means to promote it, there comes then a fix'd, and sacred resolution; Volumus
et statuimus; this speaks the will of the Law giver, and breaths life into the Law, it adds vigour, and efficacy to it. But yet notwithstanding,

IV. There must be vox tubae, that is, promulgatio et insinuatio Legis. The Law, 'tis for a publick good, and is to be made known in a publick manner: for as none can desire an unknown good, so none can obey an unknown Law; and therefore invincible Ignorance do's excuse; for else men should be bound to absolute impossibilities. But whether it be required to the publishing of a Law, that it should be in way of Writing, which is more fix'd, and durable, or whether the manifestation of it in a Vocal, and Oral manner will suffice, (which yet is more transient, and uncertain) I leave the Lawyers, and Schole-men to dispute it. This I am sure, that all the Laws of God are proclaimed in a most sufficient, and emphatical manner.

CHAPTER V.

Of the Eternal Law.

Having thus look'd upon the being of a Law in general, we now come to the spring and original of all Laws, to the eternal Law, that fountain of Law, out of which you may see the Law of Nature bubbling and flowing forth to the sons of men. For, as Aquinas do's very well tell us, the Law of nature is nothing but participatio Legis aeternae in Rationali creatura, the copying out of the eternal Law, and the imprinting of it upon the breast of a Rational Being. That eternal Law was in a manner incarnated in the Law of Nature. Now this eternal Law, it is not really distinguished from God himself. For Nil est ab aeterno, nisi ipse Deus; so that 'tis much of the same nature with those Decrees of his, and that Providence, which was awake from everlasting.
For, as God, from all eternity, by the hand of infinit wisdom, did draw the several faces, and lineaments of Being, which he meant to shew in time: So he did then also contrive their several frames with such limits, and compass, as he meant to set them; and said to every thing, Hither shalt thou go, and no farther.

This the Platonists would call ἴδεαν τῶν νόμων, and would willingly head such honourable Titles as these upon it, Ὠ νόμος ἀρχηγός, πρωτοπρογός, αὐτοδίκαος, αὐτόκαλος, αὐτοάγαθος, δ ὄντως νόμος, ὁ νόμος σπηρματικός. and the greatest happiness the other Laws can arrive unto is this; that they be Νόμοι δουλεύοντες, καὶ υπηρετοῦντες, ministring, and subservient Laws, waiting upon this their Royal Law; Or, as they would choose to stile them, Ξιαὶ νόμοι, Νομοεδεῖς, some shadows, and appearances of this bright, and glorious Law; Or, at the best, they would be esteemed by them but Νόμοι ἔγγονοι, the noble off-spring, and progeny of Laws; blessing this womb, that bare them, and this breast, that gave them suck.

And thus the Law of Nature would have a double portion, as being Lex primogenita, the first-born of this eternal Law, and the beginning of its strength. Now, as God himself shews somewhat of his face in the glass of Creatures; so the beauty of this Law gives some representations of it self in those pure derivations of inferior Laws, that stream from it. And, as we ascend to the first, and supreme Being by the steps of Second Causes; so we may climb up to a sight of this eternal Law by those fruitful branches of secondary Laws, which seem to have their root in earth, when as indeed it is in Heaven; and that I may vary a little that of the Apostle to the Romanes, The invisible Law of God, long before the creation of the World, is now clearly seen, being understood by those Laws, which do appear; so that τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ νόμου, is manifested in them, God having shown it to them. Thus, as the
Scholemen say very well, *Omnis lex participata supponit legem per essentiam*. Every impression supposes a Seal, from whence it came; every ray of light puts you in minde of a Sun, from which it shines. Wisdom and Power, these are the chief Ingredients into a Law; now where do's Wisdom dwell, but in the head of a Deity? and where do's power triumph, but in the arm of Omnipotency?

A Law is born *ex cerebro Jovis* and it is not *brachium saeculare*, but *coeleste*, that must maintain it; even humane Laws have their virtue *radicaliter, et remotè* (as the Scholes speak) from this *eternal Law*. Thus that famous, and most renowned *Oratour*, and *Patriot* (*Tully* I mean) do's most admirably express the linage, and descent of Laws in this golden manner. *Hanc video Sapientissimorumuisse sententiam, Legem neque hominum ingenii excogitatam, neque scilum aliquod esse Populorum; sed aeternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret, imperandi, prohibendique sapientiā. Itā principem illam Legem, et ultimam mentem, dicerant omnia ratione aut cogentis, aut vetantis Dei;* which I shall thus render; Wise men did ever look upon a Law, not as on a spark struck from humane Intellectuals, not blown up, or kindled with popular breath; but they thought it an eternal light shining from God himself, irradiating, guiding, and ruling the whole Universe; most sweetly, and powerfully discovering what ways were to be chosen, and what to be refused. And the *mind* of God himself is the *centre* of Laws, from which they were drawn, and into which they must return.

Thus also that florid *Moralist*, *Plutarch*, resolves all Law and Justice, into that Primitive, and eternal Law, even God himself, for even thus he tells us, *Justice* (saies he) *do's not onely sit like a Queen at the right hand of Jupiter, when he is upon his Throne; but she is always in his bosom, and one with himself*; and he closes it up with this, *That God himself is τῶν νόμων προβίτατος, καὶ τελεύτατος*. As he is the most *Antient of Days*, so also he is the most antient
of Laws, as he is the perfection of Beings, so is he also the Rule of operations.

Nor must I let slip that Passage of Plato, where he calls a Law ᾽ἄρθρον ἐκ γῆς τοima, the golden Scepter, by which God himself rules, and commands; for, as all true Government ha’s a bright stamp of divine Sovereignty, so every true Law ha’s a plain superscription of his Justice. Laws are anointed by God himself, and most precious Oil drops down upon them to the skirts of a Nation; and the Law of Nature had the Oil of gladness poured out upon it above its fellows.

So then, that there is such a prime, and supreme Law is clear, and unquestionable; but who is worthy to unseal, and open this Law? and who can sufficiently display the glory of it? We had need of a Moses, that could ascend up into the Mount, and converse with God himself, and yet when he came down, he would be fain to put a veil upon his face, and upon his expressions too, lest otherwise he might too much dazzle inferior understandings: but, if the Schoolemen will satisfy you, (and you know some of them are stiled Angelical, and Seraphical) you shall hear, if you will, what they’ll say to it.

Now this Law, according to them, is Aeterna quaedam ratio practica totius dispositionis, et gubernationis Universi. ’Tis an eternal Ordinance made in the depth of God’s infinite wisdom, and counsel, for regulating, and governing of the whole World; which yet had not its binding virtue in respect of God himself, who ha’s always the full, and unrestrained liberty of his own essence, which is so infinite, as that it cannot binde it self, and which needs no Law; all goodness, and perfection being so intrinsecal, and essential to it: but it was a binding determination in reference to the creature, which yet, in respect of all irrational Beings, did onely fortiter inclinare; but, in respect of Rationals, it do’s formaliter obligare.

By this great, and glorious Law every good action was
commanded, and all evil was discountenanc'd, and forbidden from everlasting. According to this righteous Law all rewards, and punishments were distributed in the eternal thoughts of God. At the command of this Law all created Beings took their several ranks, and stations, and put themselves in such operations, as were best agreeable, and conformable to their Beings. By this Law all essences were ordained to their ends by most happy, and convenient means. The Life, and vigour of this Law sprang from the Will of God himself, from the voluntary decree of that eternal Law-giver, minding the publick Welfare of Being; who, when there were heaps of varieties, and possibilities in his own most glorious thoughts, when he could have made such, or such Worlds, in this, or that manner, in this, or that time, with such, and such species, that should have had more, or fewer individuals, as he pleased, with such operations, as he would allow unto them; he did then select, and pitch upon this way, and method, in which we see things now constituted, and did binde all things according to their several capacities, to an exact, and accurate observation of it.

So that by this you see how those eternal Ideas in the minde of God, and this eternal Law do differ. I speak now of Ideas not in a Platonical sence, but in a Scholastical, (unless they both agree, as some would have them.) For Idea est possibilium, Lex tantum futurorum. God had before him the picture of every possibility, yet he did not intend to binde a possibility, but onely a futurity. Besides, Ideas, they were situated onely in the understanding of God; whereas a Law ha's force, and efficacy from his will; according to that much commended Saying, In Coelestii et Angelica curia voluntas Dei Lex est. And then an Idea do's magis respicere artificem, it stays there where first it was; but a Law, do's potius respicere subditum, it calls for the obedience of another: as Suarez do's very well difference them.
Neither yet is this eternal Law the same with the Providence of God, though that be eternal also. But, as Aquinas speaks, *Lex se habet ad Providentiam, sicut principium generale ad particulares conclusiones*; or, if you will, *Sicut principia prima practica ad prudentiam*: his meaning is this, that Providence is a more punctual, and particular application of this binding rule, and is not the Law itself, but the superintending power, which looks to the execution, and accomplishment of it; or, as the most acute Suarez ha's it, *Lex dicit jus in communi constitutum: Providentia dicit curam, quae de singulis actibus haberidebet*. Besides, a Law, in its strict, and peculiar notion, do's onely reach to rational Beings; whereas Providentia do's extend, and spread it self over all. But that, which vexes the Scholemen most, is this, that they, having required promulgation as a necessary condition to the existence of a Law, yet they cannot very easily shew how this eternal Law should be publish'd from everlasting. But the most satisfactory account, that can be given to that, is this; that other Law-givers being very voluble, and mutable before their minde, and will be fully, and openly declared, they may have a purpose indeed, but it cannot be esteem'd a Law. But, in God there being no variableness, nor shadow of turning, this his Law ha's a binding virtue, as soon as it ha's a Being, yet so as that it do's not actually, and formally oblige a Creature, till it be made known unto it, either by some revelation from God himself, which is possible onely, and extraordinary; or else by the mediation of some other Law, of the Law of Nature, which is the usual, and constant way, that God takes for the promulgation of this his eternal Law. For that νόμος γραπτός, that sacred Manuscript, which is writ by the finger of God himself in the heart of man, is a plain transcript of this original Law, so far as it concerns man's welfare. And this you see do's most directly bring me to search out the Law of Nature.
Chapter VI.

Of the Law of Nature in general, its subject, and nature.

The Law of Nature is that Law, which is intrinsical, and essential to a rational Creature; and such a Law is as necessary as such a Creature: for such a Creature, as a Creature, hath a superiour, to whose Providence, and disposing it must be subject: and then, as an Intellectual Creature, 'tis capable of a moral government, so that 'tis very suitable, and connatural to it to be regulated by a Law; to be guided, and commanded by one, that is infinitely more wise, and intelligent, then it self is, and that mindes its welfare more, then it self can. Insomuch that the most bright, and eminent Creatures, even Angelical Beings, and glorified Souls are subject to a Law, though with such an happy priviledge, as that they cannot violate, and transgress it; whereas the very dregs of entity, the most ignoble Beings are most incapable of a Law, for you know inanimate beings are carried on onely with the vehemency, and necessity of natural inclinations; nay, sensitive Beings cannot reach or aspire to so great a perfection, as to be wrought upon in such an illuminative way, as a Law is: they are not drawn with these cords of men, with these moral Engagements, but in a more impulsive manner driven, and spurred on with such impetuous propensions, as are founded in matter; which yet are directed by the wise, and violent eye, and by the powerful hand of a Providence, to a more beautiful, and amiable end, then they themselves were acquainted with.

A Law, 'tis founded in Intellectuals, in נפש, not in גוף: it supposes a noble, and free born Creature; for where there is no Liberty, there's no Law, a Law being nothing else, but a Rational restraint, and limitation of absolute Liberty. Now all Liberty is Radicaliter in Intellectu; and
such Creatures, as have no light, have no choice, no Moral variety.

The first, and supreme Being ha’s so full, and infinite a liberty, as cannot be bounded by a Law; and these low, and slavish Beings have not so much liberty, as to make them capable of being bound. Inter Bruta silent leges. There is no Turpe, nor Honestum amongst them: no duty, nor obedience to be expected from them; no praise, or dispraise due to them; no punishment, nor reward to be distributed amongst them.

For Punishment, in its formal notion, is διαφημίατος ἐκδίκησις (as the Greek Lawyers speak) or, as the forementioned Author¹ describes it, 'tis malum Passionis, quod infigitur ob malum Actionis. In all punishment there is to be some ἀντάλλαγμα, and ἀμωβή, so that every Damnnum, or Incommodum is not to be esteem’d a punishment, unless it be in vindictam culpae.

Neither yet can the proper end of a Punishment agree to sensitive Creatures; for all Punishment is ἐνεκα τοῦ ἄγαθον, as Plato speaks ὀψ ἐνεκα τοῦ κακουργήσατο, οὐ γὰρ τὸ γεγονὸς ἀγέννητον ἐσται ποτέ. 'Tis not in the power of Punishment to recall what is past, but to prevent what’s possible. And that wise Moralist, Seneca, does almost translate Plato verbatim, Nemo prudens punit, guia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur: Renocari enim praeterita non possunt; futura prohibentur.

So that the end of all Punishment is either in compensationem, which is κακοῦ ἀνταπόδοσις εἰς τὸ τιμωροῦντος συμφέρον ἀναφερομένη, 'tis in utilitatem ejus, contra quem peccatum est: or else tis in emendationem, and so in utilitatem peccantis; in respect of which that elegant Moralist Plutarch, stiles punishment ἀπερεῖαν ψυχῆς, and Hierocles calls it ιατρικὴν τονωσίας: or else it is in exemplium, in utilitatem aliorum; ἵνα ἄλλοι πρόνοιοι τοιώνται, καὶ φοβῶνται, as the Greek

¹ Grotius.
Oratour speaks; the same, which God speaks by Moses, that Israel may hear, and fear: and thus Punishment does παραδειγματίζειν.

But none of these ends are applicable to sensitive Creatures; but there is no more satisfaction to Justice in inflicting an evil upon them, then there is in the ruining of inanimate Beings, in demolishing of Cities, or Temples for Idolatry, which is only for the good of them, that can take notice of it: for otherwise, as that grave Moralist, Seneca, has it, Quam stultum est his irasci, quae iram nostram nec meruerunt, nec sentiunt: No satisfaction is to be had from such things, as are not apprehensive of Punishment. And therefore Annihilation, though a great evil, yet wants this sting, and aggravation of a Punishment; for a Creature is not sensible of it.

Much lesse can you think, that a Punishment has any power to mend, or meliorate sensitive Beings, or to give Example to others amongst them.

By all this you see, that amongst all irrational Beings there is no ἄρωπia, and therefore no ἀμορφία, and therefore no τυφωπία: from whence it also flows, that the Law of Nature is built upon Reason.

There is some good so proportionable, and nutrimental to the Being of man, and some evil so venemous, and destructive to his Nature, as that the Good of Nature does sufficiently antidote, and fortifie him against the one, and does maintain, and sweeten his Essence with the other. There is so much Harmony in some actions, as that the Soul must needs dance at them: and there is such an harsh discord, and jarring in others, as that the Soul cannot endure them.

Therefore the learned Grotius does thus describe the Law of Nature; Jus Naturale est dictatum rectae Rationis, indicans, actui alicui, ex ejus convenientia, vel disconvenientia cum ipsa natura Rationali, inesse Moralem turpitudinem, aut necessitatem Moralem; et consequenter ab Authore Naturae,
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*ipso Deo, talem actum aut vetari, aut praecipi.* Which I shall thus render; 'The Law of Nature is a streaming out of Light from the Candle of the Lord, powerfully discovering such a deformity in some evil, as that an intellectual eye must needs abhor it; and such a commanding beauty in some good, as that a rational Being must needs be enamour'd with it; and so plainly shewing, that God stamp'd and seal'd the one with his command, and branded the other with his disliking.'

Chrysostome makes mention of this Νόμος φυσικός, and does very Rhetorically enlarge himself upon it in his twelfth, and thirteenth *Orations II* Ἐρι Ανδριάντων* where he tells us, that it is αὐτοδίδακτος ἡ γνώσις τῶν καλῶν, καὶ τῶν οὐ τοιούτων* a Radical, and fundamental knowledge, planted in the Being of Man, budding, and blossoming in first principles, flourishing, and bringing forth fruit, spreading it self into all the fair, and goodly branches of Morality, under the shadow of which the Soul may sit with much complacency and delight. And, as he pours out himself very fluently, Οὐ χρεία τῶν λόγων, οὐ τῶν διδασκάλων, οὐ τῶν πόνων, οὐ καμάτων* There's no need of Oratory to allure men to it, you need not heap up Arguments to convince them of it: No need of an Interpreter to acquaint them with it: No need of the mind's spinning, or toying, or sweating for the attaining of it; it grows spontaneously, it bubbles up freely, it shines out cheerfully, and pleasantly; it was so visible, as that the most infant-age of the World could spell it out; and read it without a Teacher: οὐ Μωϋσῆς, οὐ προφηταί, οὐ δικασταί, as he goes on: 'twas long extant before Moses was born, long before Aaron rung his golden Bells, before there was a Prophet, or a Judge in Israel. Men knew it οὐκάθεν παρὰ τοῦ συνεδρότος διδαχθέντες. They had a Bible of God's own printing, they had this Scripture of God within them. By this Candle of the Lord, Adam and Eve discovered their own folly and nakedness; this Candle flamed in Cain's
conscience, and this Law was proclaimed in his heart with as much terror, as 'twas publish'd from Mount Sinai, which fill'd him with those furious reflexions for his unnatural Murder. Enoch, when he walk'd with God, walk'd by this light, by this rule. Noah, the Preacher of Righteousnesse, took this Law for his Text. Nay, you may see some print of this Law upon the hard heart of a Pharaoh, when he cries out, The LORD is righteous, but I and my people have sinned. Hence it was, that God, when he gave his Law afresh, gave it in such a compendious Brachygraphy; he wrot as it were in Characters, Oυ φωνεύεις, Oυ μοιχεύεις, Oυ κλάψεις, without any explication, or amplification at all. He onely enjoyed it with an Imperatorious brevity, he knows there was enough in the breasts of men to convince them of it, and to comment upon it, onely in the Second Command there is added an enforcement; because his people were excessively prone to the violation of it; and in that of the Sabbath there is given an exposition of it, because in all its circumstances it was not founded in Natural Light. So that in Plutarch's language the Decalogue would be call'd νόμος σφυρήλατος, Gold in the Lump; whereas other Lawgivers use to beat it thinner. Of this Law, as 'tis printed by Nature, Philo speaks very excellently; Νόμος δ' ἀφένεις ὁ δρόθος λόγος, οὐκ ὑπ' τού δεινός, ἢ τοῦ δεινός θνητοῦ φθαρτός ἐν χαρτιδίως ἡ στῆλαις δύσχοις, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀθανάτου φύσεως ἀφθαρτος ἐν ἀθανάτῳ διανοίᾳ τυπωθεῖς. 'Right reason (saith he) is that fix'd, and unshaken Law, not writ in perishing paper by the Hand, or Pen of a Creature, nor graven like a dead letter upon livelesse, and decaying Pillars; but written with the point of a Diamond, nay, with the finger of God himself in the heart of man.' A Deity gave it an Imprimatur; and an eternal Spirit grav'd it in an immortal mind. So as, that I may borrow the expression of the Apostle, the mind of man is στίλος, καὶ ἐδραῖομα τῆς ἀληθείας ταύτης. And I take it in the very same sense,
as tis to be took of the Church; Tis a Pillar of this Truth, not to support it, but to hold it forth; Neither must I let slip a passage in Plutarch, which is very near of kin to this of Philo; 'Ο Νόμος, οὐκ εν βιβλίοις ἔσω γεγραμμένος, οὐδὲ των ξύλων, ἀλλ' ἐμψυχος ὅν ἐαυτῷ λόγος ἀεὶ συνοικῶν, καὶ παραφυλάττων, καὶ μηδέποτε τὴν ψυχὴν ἑών ἐρωμον ἡγεμονίας. You may take it thus: 'This Royal Law of Nature was never shut up in a Paper-prison, was never confind, or limited to any outward surface; but it was bravely situated in the Centre of a Rational Being, alwaies keeping the Soul company, guarding it, and guiding it; ruling all its Subjectes, (every obedient Action) with a Scepter of Gold, and crushing in pieces all its enemies (breaking every rebellious Action) with a Rod of Iron.' You may hear the Lyrick singing out the praises of this Law in a very lofty strain: Νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνατῶν ὑ, καὶ ἀθανάτων, οὗτος ἀγεί βιαῖος τὸ δυσκαυότατον ὑπερτάτα χειρί. 'This Law, which is the Queen of Angelical, and Humane Beings, does so rule, and dispose of them, as to bring about Justice with a most high, and powerful, and yet with a most soft, and delicate hand.'

You may hear Plato excellently discoursing of it, whilst he brings in a Sophister disputing against Socrates, and such an one, as would needs undertake to maintain this Principle, Ταῦτα ἐναντία ἄλληλοις ἐστίν, ἢ τε φύσις, καὶ ο νόμος. That there was an untunable antipathy between Nature, and Law; That Laws were nothing but hominum infirmiorum commenta: That this was Τὸ λαμπρότατον τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον; the most bright, and eminent Justice of Nature, for men to rule according to Power, and according to no other Law; That ὁ λαχνροτερος was ὁ κρείτων, and ὁ βελτίων. That all other Laws were παρὰ φύσιν ἀπαντεῖς. Nay he calls them cheatings and bewitchings, οὐκ ἕδαι, ἀλλ' ἐπεδαι, they come (saies he) like pleasant Songs, when as they are meer Charms, and Incantations. But Socrates, after he had stung this same Callicles with a few quick Interrogations,
pours out presently a great deal of honey and sweetnesse, and plentifully shews that most pleasant, and conspiring Harmony, that is between *Nature*, and *Law*; That there's nothing more κατὰ φύσιν then a *Law*; That *Law* is founded in *Nature*; That it is for the maintaining, and ennobling, and perfecting of *Nature*. Nay, as Plato tells us elsewhere, There's no way for men to happinesse, unless they follow τὰ ἱκανὰ τῶν λόγων, these steps of Reason, these foot-steps of Nature. This same Law Aristotle does more then once acknowledge, when he tells us of Νόμος ἴδιος, and Νόμος κοινός. a Positive Law with him is a more private Law, καθ' ὅν γεγραμμένων πολιτεύονται: but Nature's Law is a more publick, and Catholic Law, ὥσα ἀγραφα παρὰ τάσιν ὄμολογίασθαι δοκεῖ, which he proves to be a very Sovereign, and commanding Law, for thus he saies, Ὁ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἐχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὃν ἐν τυχόνοις φρονήσεως καὶ νου. The Law, that is most filled with Reason, must needs be most victorious, and triumphant.

The same Philosopher, in his tenth book *de Republica*, hath another distinction of Laws; one branch whereof does plainly reach to the Law of Nature.

There are, saies he, Νόμοι κατὰ γράμματα, which are the same with those, which he call'd Νόμοι ἴδιοι before; and then there are Νόμοι κατὰ τὰ ἔθη, which are all one with that he stil'd before Νόμος κοινός. Now, as he speaks, these Νόμοι κατὰ τὰ ἔθη are κυριώτεροι, Laws of the first Magnitude, of a Nobler Sphere, of a vaster, and purer influence. Where you see also, that he calls the Law of Nature the Moral Law; and the same, which the Apostle calls Νόμος γραπτός, he, with the rest of the Heathen, calls Ἀγραφα νόμμα, couching the same sense in a seeming contradiction.

The Oratour has it expressly; *Non scripta*, sed *nata Lex*.

And amongst all the Heathen I can meet with none,
that draws such a lively portraiture of the *Law of Nature*, as that *Noble Oratour* does.

You may hear him thus pleading for it: *Nec, si, regnante Tarquinio, nulla erat scripta Lex de Stupris, &c.* 'Grant (saies he) that *Rome* were not for the present furnish'd with a *Positive Law* able to check the lust, and violence of a *Tarquin*; yet there was a *Virgin-Law of Nature*, which he had also ravish'd, and deflour'd: there was the beaming out of an *eternal Law*, enough to revive a modest *Lucretia*, and to strike terror into the heart of so licentious a *Prince*:

for, as he goes on, *Est quidem vera Lex Recta Ratio, Naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna; quae vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraud deterrebat; quae tamen probos, neque frustra, jubet, aut vetat, nec improbos jubendo, aut vetando movet. Huic Legi nec propagari fas est, neque derogari ex hac alicquid licet, neque tota abnegari potest: nec vero aut per Senatum, aut per Populum solvi hac Lege possumus, neque est quaerendus explanator, aut interpres eius alius. Non erat alia Romae, alia Athenis; Alia nunc, alia posthac: sed et omnes gentes, omni tempore, Vna Lex, et sempiterna, et immutabilis continebit, unusque erit quasi communis Magister, et Legislator omnium Deus: Ille Legis hujus Inventor, Disceptator, Lator, cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, et Naturam hominis aspernabitur. Hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiam si caetera supplicia, quae putantur, effugerit.*

His meaning is not much different from this:

'Right Reason is a beautiful Law; a Law of a pure complexion, of a natural colour, of a vast extent, and diffusion, its colour never fades, never dies. It encourages men in obedience with a smile, it chides them, and frowns them out of wickednesse. Good men hear the least whispering of its pleasant voice, they observe the least glance of its lovely eye; but wicked men sometimes will not hear it, though it come to them in Thunder, nor take the least notice of it, though it should flash out in Lightning.
None must enlarge the *Phylacteries* of this Law, nor must any dare to prune off the least branch of it. Nay, the malice of man cannot totally deface so indelible a beauty. No *Pope*, nor *Prince*, nor *Parliament*, nor *People*, nor *Angel*, nor *Creature* can absolve you from it. This *Law* never *paints* its face, never changes its colour, it does not put on one Aspect at *Athens* and another face at *Rome*: but looks upon all Nations, and Persons with an impartial eye, it shines upon all Ages, and Times and Conditions with a perpetual Light, *it is yesterday, and to day, the same for ever*. There is but one Law-giver, one Lord, and supreme Judge of this Law, *God blessed for evermore*. He was the Contriver of it, the Commander of it, the Publisher of it, and none can be exempted from it, unless he will be banish'd from his own *essence*, and be excommunicated from *Humane Nature*. This Punishment would have sting enough, if he should avoid a thousand more, that are due to so foul a transgression.

Thus you see, that the *Heathen* not onely had this *Nòmos* γραπτός upon them, but also they themselves took *special* notice of it, and the more *refined* sort amongst them could discourse very admirably about it, which must needs leave them the more *inexcusable* for the violation of it.

We come now to see where the strength of the *Law of Nature* lies, where its *nerves* are, whence it hath such an efficacious influence, such a binding virtue.

And I find *Vasquez* somewhat singular, and withall erroneous in his opinion, whilst he goes about to shew, that the *formality* of this *Law* consists onely in that *harmony*, and *proportion*, or else that *discord*, and *disconvenienc*, which such and such an *object*, and such and such an *action* has with a *Rational Nature*; for (saies he) every *Essence* is *Mensura Boni et Mali* in respect of it self.

Which, as he thinks, is plainly manifested, and discovered also in *Corporeal Beings*, which use to fly onely from such
things, as are destructive to their own forms, and to embrace all such neighborly and friendly Beings, as will close, and comply with them. But he might easily have known, that as these material Beings were never yet so honoured, as to be judg'd capable of a Law; so neither can any naked Essence, though never so pure, and noble, lay a Moral engagement upon it self, or bind its own Being: for that would make the very same Being superior to it self, as it gives a Law, and inferior to it self, as it must obey it.

So that the most high, and sovereign Being, even God himself, does not subject himself to any Law; though there be some Actions most agreeable to his Nature, and others plainly inconsistent with it, yet they cannot amount to such a power, as to lay any obligation upon him, which should in the least Notion differ from the liberty of his own Essence.

Thus also in the Commonwealth of Humane Nature that proportion, which Actions bear to Reason, is indeed a sufficient foundation for a Law to build upon, but it is not the Law it self, nor a formal obligation.

Yet some of the Schoolmen are extreme bold, and vain in their Suppositions, so bold, as that I am ready to question whether it be best to repeat them: yet thus they say,

Si Deus non esset, vel si non uteretur Ratione, vel si non recte judicaret de rebus; si tamen in homine idem esset dictamen Rectae Rationis quod nunc est, haberet etiam eandem Rationem Legis, quam nunc habet.

But what are the goodly spoils, that these men expect, if they could break through such a crowd of Repugnancies, and Impossibilities? The whole result, and product of it will prove but a meer Cypher; for Reason, as tis now, does not bind in its own name, but in the name of its supreme Lord, and Sovereign, by whom Reason lives, and moves, and has its being.

For, if onely a Creature should bind it self to the observa-
tion of this Law, it must also inflict upon itself such a punishment, as is answerable to the violation of it: but no such Being would be willing, or able to punish itself in so high a measure, as such a transgression would meritoriously require; so that it must be accountable to some other Legislative power, which will vindicate its own commands, and will by this means engage a Creature to be more mindful of its own happiness, then otherwise it would be.

For though some of the Gallenter Heathen can brave it out sometimes in an expression, that the very turpitude of such an Action is punishment enough, and the very beauty of Goodness is an abundant reward, and compensation; yet we see, that all this, and more then this, did not efficaciously prevail with them for their due conformity, and full obedience to Nature's Law; such a single cord as this will easily be broken.

Yet there is some truth in what they say; for thus much is visible, and apparent, that there is such a Magnetical power in some good, as must needs allure, and attract a Rational Being; there is such a native Fairness, such an intrinsecal loveliness in some objects, as does not depend upon an external command, but by its own worth must needs win upon the Soul: and there is such an inseparable deformity, and malignity in some evil, as that Reason must needs loath it, and abominate it.

Insomuch as that, if there were no Law, or Command, yet a Rational Being, of its own accord, out of meer love, would espouse it self to such an amiable good, 'twould clasp, and twine about such a precious object, and, if there were not the least check, or prohibition, yet, in order to its own welfare, 'twould abhor, and flie from some black evils, that spit out so much venome against its Nature.

This is that, which the Schoolmen mean when they tell us, Quaedam sunt mala, quia prohibentur; sed alia prohibentur, quia sunt mala: that is, in positive Laws, whether
Divine or Humane, Acts are to be esteem'd evil upon this account, because they are forbidden; but in the Law of Nature such an evil was intimately, and inevitably an evil, though it should not be forbidden.

Now that there are such Bona per se, and Mala per se, (as the Schools speak) I shall thus demonstrate: Quod non est malum per se, potuit non prohiberi; for there is no reason imaginable, why there should not be a possibility of not prohibiting that, which is not absolutely evil, which is in its own nature indifferent.

But now there are some evils so excessively evil, so intolerably bad, as that they cannot but be forbidden; I shall onely name this one, Odium Dei; for a Being to hate the Creatour, and cause of its Being, if it were possible for this not to be forbidden, it were possible for it to be lawful; for Ubi nulla Lex, ibi nulla praevariatio: Where there's no Law, there's no 'Aropia, where there's no Rule, there's no Anomaly; if there were no prohibition of this, 'twould not be sin to do it. But that to hate God should not be sin, does involve a whole heap of contradictions; so that this evil is so full of evil, as that it cannot but be forbidden; and therefore is an evil in order of Nature before the Prohibition of it. Besides, as the Philosophers love to speak, Essentiae rerum sunt immutabiles, Essences neither ebb nor flow, but have in themselves a perpetual Unity, and Identity: and all such Properties, as flow, and bubble up from Beings, are constant, and unvariable; but, if they could be stopt in their motion, yet that state would be violent, and not at all connatural to such a subject.

So that grant onely the Being of Man, and you cannot but grant this also; That there is such a constant Conveniency, and Analogy, which some Objects have with its Essence, as that it cannot but encline to them; and that there is such an irreconcileable Disconveniency, such an
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Eternal Antipathy between it and other Objects, as that it must cease to be what it is, before it can come near them.

This Suarez terms a Natural Obligation, and a just foundation for a Law. But now, before all this can rise up to the height and perfection of a Law, there must come a Command from some Superior Power, from whence will spring a Moral Obligation also, and make up the formality of a Law.

Therefore God himself, for the brightening of his own Glory, for the better regulating, and tuning of the World, for the maintaining of such a choice piece of his workmanship, as Man is, has publish'd this his Royal Command, and proclaim'd it by that principle of Reason, which he has planted in the Being of Man: which does fully convince him of the righteousness, and goodness, and necessity of this Law, for the materials of it; and of the validity, and authority of this Law, as it comes from the Mind, and Will of his Creator. Neither is it any eclipse, or diminution of the Liberty of that first Being, to say, that there is some evil so foul, and ill-favour'd, as that it cannot but be forbidden by him; and that there is some good so fair, and eminent, as that he cannot but command it.

For, as the Schoolmen observe, Divina voluntas, licet simpliciter libera sit ad extra, ex suppositione tamen unius Actus liberi, potest necessitari ad alium.

Though the Will of God be compleatly free in respect of all his looks, and glances towards the Creature, yet notwithstanding, upon the voluntary, and free precedency of one Act, we may justly conceive him necessitated to another, by virtue of that indissoluble connexion, and concatenation between these two Acts, which does in a manner knit, and unite them into one.

Thus God has an absolute liberty, and choice, whether he will make a promise, or no; but if he has made it, he
cannot but fulfill it. Thus he is perfectly free, whether he will reveal his mind, or no; but, if he will reveal it, he cannot but speak truth, and manifest it as it is.

God had the very same liberty, whether he would create a World, or no; but, if he will create it, and keep it in its comeliness, and proportion, he must then have a vigilant, and providential eye over it; and, if he will provide for it, he cannot but have a perfect, and indefective Providence agreeable to his own wisdom, and goodness, and Being: so that if he will create such a Being, as Man, such a Rational Creature, furnish'd with sufficient knowledge to discern between some good, and evil; and, if he will supply it with a proportionable concourse in its operations, he cannot then but prohibit such acts, as are intrinsically prejudicial, and detrimental to the Being of it: neither can he but command such acts, as are necessary to its preservation and welfare.

God therefore, when from all Eternity in his own glorious Thoughts he contriv'd the Being of Man, he did also with his piercing eye see into all conveniences and disconveniencies, which would be in reference to such a Being, and by his eternal Law did restrain, and determine it to such acts, as should be advantageous to it, which in his wise Oeconomy and dispensation, he publish'd to man by the voice of Reason, by the mediation of this Natural Law.

Whence it is, that every violation of this Law is not only an injury to man's being; but, ultra nativam rei malitiam, (as the Scholes speak) 'tis also a virtual and interpretative contempt of that supreme Law-giver; who, out of so much wisdom, love and goodness did thus bind man to his own happinesse.

So much then, as man does start aside and apostatize from this Law; to so much misery, and punishment does he expose himself: though it be not necessary that the Candle of Nature should discover the full extent and
measure of that Punishment, which is due to the breakers of this Law; for to the nature of Punishment non requiritur, ut praecognita sit poena, sed ut fiat actus dignus tali poena.

The Lawyers and Schoolmen both will acknowledge this Principle. For, as Suarez has it, Sequitur reatus ex intrinsecus conditione culpae; ita ut, licet poena per Legem non sit determinata, arbitrio tamen competentis Judicis puniri possit. Yet the Light of Nature will reveal, and disclose thus much; That a Being totally dependent upon another, essentially subordinate, and subject to it, must also be accountable to it for every provocation, and rebellion; And, for the violation of so good a Law, which he has set it, and for the sinning against such admirable Providence and Justice, as shines out upon it, must be lyable to such a Punishment, as that glorious Law-giver shall judge fit for such an offence; who is so full of Justice, as that he cannot, and so great in Goodnesse, as that he will not, punish a Creature above its desert.

CHAPTER VII.


There are stamp'd and printed upon the Being of Man some clear and indelible Principles, some first and Alphabetical Notions; by putting together of which it can spell out the Law of Nature.

There's scatter'd in the Soul of man some seeds of Light, which fill it with a vigorous pregnancy, with a multiplying fruitfulness, so that it brings forth a numerous, and sparkling posterity of secondary Notions, which make for the crowning, and encompassing of the Soul with happinesse.
All the fresh Springs of Common and Fountain-Notions are in the Soul of Man, for the watering of his Essence, for the refreshing of this heavenly Plant, this Arbor inversa, this enclosed Being, this Garden of God.

And, though the wickedness of man may stop the pleasant Motion, the clear and Chrystalline progress of the Fountain; yet they cannot hinder the first risings, the bubbling endeavours of it. They may pull off Nature's leaves, and pluck off her fruits, and chop off her branches, but yet the root of it is eternal, the foundation of it is inviolable.

Now these first, and Radical principles are winded up in some such short bottoms as these: Bonum est appetendum, malum est fugiendum; Beatitudo est quaerenda; Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris. And Reason thus ὑπόθετω τὸν νόμον, incubando super haec ova; by warming, and brooding upon these first and Oval Principles of her own laying, it being it self quicken'd with an heavenly vigour, does thus hatch the Law of Nature.

For, you must not, nor cannot think that Nature's Law is confin'd, and contracted within the compasse of two, or three common Notions; but Reason, as with one foot it fixes a Center, so with the other it measures, and spreads out a Circumference, it draws several Conclusions, which do all meet, and crowd into these first, and Central Principles. As in those Noble Mathematical Sciences there are not onely some first axioms, which are granted as soon as they are ask'd, if not before; but there are also whole heaps of firm, and immovable Demonstrations, that are built upon them: in the very same manner, Nature has some Postulata, some προλήψεις, (which Seneca renders Praesumptiones, which others call Anticipationes Animi,) which she knows a Rational Being will presently and willingly yield unto; and therefore, by virtue of these, it does engage and oblige it to all such commands, as
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shall by just result, by genuine production, by kindly and evident derivation flow from these.

For men must not onely look upon the Capital Letters of this Νόμος γραπτός, but they must read the whole context and coherence of it; they must look to every jot and Apex of it: for Heaven and Earth shall sooner pass away, then one Jot or Title of this Law shall vanish.

They must not onely gaze upon two or three Principles of the first Magnitude; but they must take notice of the lesser Celestial Sporades: for these also have their light, and influence.

They must not onely skim off the Cream of first Principles; but whatsoever sweetness comes streaming from the Dug of Nature, they must feed upon it, they may be nourish’d with it.

Reason does not onely crop off the tops of first Notions, but does so gather all the Flowers in Nature’s Garden, as that it can bind them together in a pleasant Posy, for the refreshment of it self and others.

Thus, as a Noble Author of our own does well observe, Tota ferè Ethica est Notitia communis: All Morality is nothing, but a collection and bundling up of Natural Precepts. The Moralists did but πλατύνει φυλακτήρα, enlarge the fringes of Nature’s Garment: they are so many Commentatours and Expositours upon Nature’s Law. This was his meaning, that stil’d Moral Philosophy, ἣ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων Φιλοσοφία, that Philosophy, which is for the maintaining and edifying of Humane Nature. Thus Nature’s Law is frequently call’d the Moral Law. But the Schoolmen in their rougher Language make these several ranks and distributions of Natural Precepts. Τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν. First, there come in the front Principia Generalia, (as some call them) per se nota: ut, Honestum est faciendum; Pravum vitandum. Then follow next Principia particularia et magis determinata; ut, Justitia

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est servanda; Deus est colendus; Vivendum est temperat. At length come up in the rear, Conclusiones evidentem illatae, quae tamen cognoscere nequeunt nisi per discursum; ut, Mendacium, Furtum et similia prava esse.

These, though they may seem somewhat more remote, yet being fetch'd from clear, and unquestionable Premises, they have Nature's Seal upon them; and are thus far sacred, so as to have the usual privilege of a Conclusion, to be untouch'd and undeniable.

For though that learned Author, whom I mention'd not long before, do justly take notice of this, that Discourse is the usual inlet to Error, and too often gives an open admission, and courteous entertainment to such falsities, as come disguis'd in a Syllogistical form, which by their sequacious windings and gradual insinuations twine about some weak understandings: yet, in the nature of the thing it self, 'tis as impossible to collect an Error out of a Truth, as 'tis to gather the blackest Night out of the fairest Sunshine, or the foulest wickedness out of the purest goodness. A Conclusion therefore, that's built upon the Sand, you may very well expect its fall; but that, which is built upon the Rock, is impregnable and immovable: for, if the Law of Nature should not extend it self so far, as to oblige men to an accurate observation of that, which is a, remove or two distant from first Principles, 'twould then prove extremely defective in some such Precepts, as do most intimately and intensely conduce to the welfare and advantage of an Intellectual Being.

And these first Notions would be most barren, ineffectual Speculations, unless they did thus increase and multiply, and bring forth fruit with the blessing of Heaven upon them.

So that there is a necessary connexion and concatenation between first Principles, and such Conclusions. For, as Suarez has it, Veritas Principii continetur in Conclusione:
so that he, that questions the Conclusion, must needs also strike at the Principle. Nay, if we look to the notion of a Law, there is more of that to be seen in these more particular Limitations, then in those more universal Notions; for Lex est proxima Regula operationum. But now Particulars are nearer to existence and operation, then Universals: and in this respect do more immediately steer and direct the motions of such a Being. The one is the bending of the Bow; but the other is the shooting of the Arrow.

Suarez does fully determine this in such words as these, Haec omnia Praecepta (he means both Principles and Conclusions) prodeunt a Deo, Auctore Naturae, et tendunt ad eundem finem, nimirum ad debitam conservationem, et naturalem perfectionem, seu felicitatem Humanae Naturae.

This Law of Nature, as it is thus branch'd forth, does bind in foro Conscientiae: for as that Noble Author, (whom I more then once commended before) speaks very well in this: Natural Conscience, 'tis Centrum Notitiae communium, and tis a kind of Sensus communis in respect of the inward Faculties, as that other is in respect of the outward Senses. 'Tis the competent Judge of this Law of Nature: 'tis the natural Pulse of the Soul, by the beating, and motion of which, the state, and temper of men is discernible. The Apostle Paul thus felt the Heathen's pulse, and found their Consciences sometimes accusing them, sometimes making Apology for them. Yet there's a great deale of difference between Natural Conscience, and the Law of Nature; for (as the Scholemen speak) Conscience, 'tis Dictatum Practicum in particulari; 'tis a prosecution, and application of this Natural Law, as Providence is of that eternal Law.

Nay, Conscience sometimes does embrace onely the shadow of a Law, and does engage men, though erroneously, to the observation of that, which was never dictated by any just Legislative power. Nor is it content to glance
only at what's to come, but Janus-like, it has a double aspect, and so looks back to what's past, as to call men to a strict account for every violation of this Law:

Which Law is so accurate, as to oblige men not only ad actum, but ad modum also: it looks as well to the inward form and manner, as to the materiality and bulk of outward Actions: for every Being owes thus much kindnesse, and courtesie to it self, not onely to put forth such acts, as are essential and intrinsecal to its own welfare; but also to delight in them and to fulfill them with all possible freeness and alacrity, with the greatest intenseness and complacency. Self-love alone might easily constrain men to this natural obedience. Humane Laws indeed rest satisfied with a visible, and external obedience; but Nature's Law darts it self into the most intimate Essentials, and looks for entertainment there.

You know that amongst the Moralistsonely such acts are esteem'd Actus Humani, that are Actus Voluntarii. When Nature has tun'd a Rational Being, she expects that every String, every Faculty should spontaneously and chearfully sound forth his praise.

And the God of Nature, that has not chain'd, nor fetter'd, nor enslav'd such a Creature; but has given it a competent liberty and enlargement, the free diffusion and amplification of its own Essence, he looks withall, that it should willingly consent to its own happiness, and to all such means, as are necessary for the accomplishment of its choicest end: and that it should totally abhor whatsoever is destructive, and prejudicial to its own Being; which if it do, 'twill presently embrace the Law of Nature, if either it loves its God, or it self; the command of its God, or the welfare of it self.

Nay, the Precepts of this Natural Law are so potent and triumphant, as that some acts, which rebel against it, become not only Illiciti, but Irriti, as both the Scholemen
and Lawyers observe; they are not only irregularities, but meer nullities: and that either ob defectum Potestatis, et Incapacitatem Materiae; as if one should go about to give the same thing to two several Persons, the second Donation is a Moral Non-entity: or else Propter perpetuam rei Indecentiam, et Turpitudinem durantem; as in some anomalous and incestuous Marriages. And this Law of Nature is so exact, as that 'tis not capable of an ἐπεικεία, which the Lawyers call Emendatio Legis: but there is no mending of Essences, nor of Essential Laws; both which consist in Puncto, in Indivisibili, and so cannot Recipere magis et minus: nor is there any need of it; for in this Law there's no Rigour at all, 'tis pure Equity, and so nothing is to be abated of it. Neither does it depend only à mente Legislatoris, which is the usual Rise of Mitigation; but 'tis conversant about such acts, as are per se tales, most intrinsically and inseparably.

Yet notwithstanding this Law does not refuse an Interpretation, but Nature her self does gloss upon her own Law, as in what circumstances such an Act is to be esteem'd Murder, and when not; and so in many other Branches of Nature's Law, if there be any appearance of intricacy, any seeming knot and difficulty, Nature has given edge enough to cut it asunder.

There is another Law bordering upon this Law of Nature, Jus Gentium, Juri Naturali propinquum et consanguineum; and 'tis Medium quoddam inter Jus Naturale, et Jus Civile. Now this Jus Gentium is either per similitudinem et concomitantiam, when several Nations, in their distinct conditions, have yet some of the same positive Laws: or else (which indeed is most properly Νόμων ιθνικών) per communicationem et societatem, which, as the learned Grotius describes, Ab omnium, vel multarum gentium voluntate vim obligandi accepit: that is, when all, or many of the most refined Nations, bunching and clustering
together, do binde themselves by general compact to the observation of such Laws, as they judge to be for the good of them all; as the Honourable entertainment of an Embassadour, or such like.

So that 'tis Jus humanum non scriptum. 'Tis ἐν θρώπω καὶ ἡρῴῳ. For, as Justinian tells us, Usu exigente, et Humanis necessitatibus Gentes humanae quaedam sibi jura constituerunt. Whereas other Humane Laws have a narrower Sphere and compass, and are limited to such a state, which the Orator stiles Leges populares, the Hebrews call their positive Laws סיפת, sometimes סיפת, though the one do more properly point at Ceremonials, the other at Judicials. The Septuagint render them ἐναλαί, some others call them τὰ ἀν διευρεπόνως: as they call Natural Laws ἦν, which the Hellenists render δικαίωμα. But, according to the Greek Idiom, these are termed τὰ ἐν φύσε, and the others τὰ ἐν τάξει.

Now, though the formality of Humane Laws do flow immediately from the powers of some particular men; yet the strength and sinew of these Laws is founded in the Law of Nature: for Nature does permissively give them leave to make such Laws, as are for their greater convenience; and when they are made, and whilst they are in their force, and vigour, it does oblige and command them not to break, or violate them: for they are to esteem their own consent as a sacred thing; they are not to contradict their own Acts, nor to oppose such Commands, as ex pacto were fram'd and constituted by themselves.

Thus much for the Law of Nature in general. We must look in the next place to that Lumen Naturae, that Candle of the Lord, by which this Law of Nature is manifested and discovered.
Chapter VIII.

How the Law of Nature is discovered; not by Tradition.

God having contrived such an admirable and harmonious Law for the guiding and governing of his Creature, you cannot doubt, but that he will also provide sufficient means for the discovery and publishing of it; Promulgation being pre-requir'd, as a necessary condition, before a Law can be valid and vigorous. To this end therefore he has set up an Intellectual Lamp in the Soul, by the light of which it can read this Νόμος γραπτός, and can follow the Commands of its Creator.

The Scholemen, with full and general consent, understand that place of the Psalmist of this Lumen Naturale, and many other Authors follow them in this too securely. Nay, some Critical Writers quote them, and yet never chide them for it. The words are these, Νόμος γραπτός, and many other Authors follow them in this too securely.

The words are plainly put up in the form of a Petition to Heaven, for smiles of love, for some propitious and favourable glances, for God's gracious presence, and acceptance. And they amount to this sense; If one Sun do but shine upon me, I shall have more joy than worldlings have, when all their Stars appear.

But to let these passe with the Errors of their Vulgar
Latine; I meet with one more remarkable, and of larger influence: I mean that of the Jews, who (as that worthy Author of our own, in his learned Book De Jure Naturali secundum Hebraeos, makes the report) do imagine, and suppose, that the light of Nature shines onely upon themselves originally and principally, and upon the Gentiles onely by way of participation and dependance upon them; they all must light their Candles at the Jewish Lamp. Thus they strive, as much as they can, to engross and monopolize this Natural Light to themselves; onely it may be sometimes, out of their great liberality, they will distribute some broken Beams of it to the Gentiles. As if these Præcepta Noachidarum had been lock'd up and cabinetted in Noah's Ark, and afterwards kept from the profane touch of a Gentile: as if they had been part of that Bread, which our Saviour said was not to be cast unto Dogs; and therefore they would make them glad to eat of the Crumbs, that fall from their Master's Table: as if they onely enjoyed a Goshen of Natural Light, and all the rest of the world were benighted in most palpable, and unavoidable Darkness: as if the Sun shin'd onely upon Canaan: as if Canaan onely flow'd with this Milk and Honey: as if no drops of Heaven could fall upon a Wilderness, unless an Israelite be there: as if they had the whole impression of Nature's Law: as if God had not dealt thus with every Nation: as if the Heathen also had not the knowledge of this Law. 'Tis true, they had the first Beauty of the rising Sun, the first peepings out of the Day, the first dawnings of Natural Light; for there were no other, that it could then shine upon: but do they mean to check the Sun in its motion, to stop this Giant in his race, to hinder him from scattering rayes of Light in the world? Do they think, that Nature's Fountain is enclos'd, that her Well is seal'd up, that a Jew must onely drink of it, and a Gentile must die for Thirst? O!
but they tell you they are λαός περιουσίων, a Darling, and peculiar Nation.

We shall fully acknowledge with the Hebrew of Hebrews, Πολὺ τὸ περιουσίων τοῦ Ἰσραήλ, though not in respect of Natural Light, which, doubtlesse, is planted by Nature in the heart both of Jew and Gentile, and shines upon both with an equal and impartial Beam. And yet this must not be denied, that the Jews had even these Natural Notions much clarified, and refined from those clouds, and mists, which Original Sin had brought upon them, and this by means of that pure, and powerful Beam of heavenly Truth, which shined more peculiarly upon them. Those Laws, which Nature had engraven εν δέλτοις φρενῶν, upon the Tables of their Hearts, Sin like a Moth had eaten and defaced (as in all other men it had done), but in them those fugitive Letters were call’d home again, and those many Lacunae were supplied and made good again by comparing it with that other Copy (of God’s own writing too) which Moses received in the Mount; and besides, they had a great number of revealed Truths discovered to them, which were engraffed indeed upon the stock of Nature, but would never have grown out of it: so that this second Edition was Auctor also, as well as Emendator; but yet, for all this, they have no greater a portion of the Light of Nature, then all men have. Thus Christians also are Ἰσραήλ, and yet in respect of their natural condition, have no more then others.

Now, if the Jews have so many priviledges, why are not they content? Why do not they rest satisfied with them? Why will they thus be claiming, and arrogating more then their due?

Are they the first-born, and have they a double-portion, and do they envy their younger Brethren their Birth, and Being? Have they a bright, and eminent Sun-shine; and do they envy a Gentile the Candle of the Lord?
No (as that learned Author tells us) they will grant, that the Gentiles had their Candle and their Torch; but it was lighted at the Jew's Sun. They must have some Bottles of Water to quench their thirst; but they must be fill'd at their streams, ἐκ τῶν Ἑβραϊκῶν ναμάτων, ex fluentis Hebraicos.

This indeed must be granted, that the whole generality of the Heathen went a gleaning in the Jewish fields. They had some of their grapes, some ears of Corn, that dropp'd from them. Pythagoras and Plato especially were such notable gleaners, as that they stole out of the very sheaves, out of those Truths, that are bound up in the Sacred volume. Yet all this while they ne're stole first Principles, nor Demonstrations; but they had them ὀίκοδει, and needed not to take such a long Journey for them.

Give then unto the Jew the things of the Jews; and to the Gentile the things that are the Gentiles; and that, which God has made common, call not thou peculiar. The Apostle Paul's Question is here very seasonable; Ἡ Ἰουδαίων ὁ Θεὸς μόνον; οὐκὶ δὲ καὶ ἑκάτων; ναι, καὶ ἑκάτων.

There was never any partition-wall between the Essence of Jew, and Gentile. Now the Law of Nature 'tis founded in Essentials. And that which is inconvenient to that Rational Nature, which is in a Jew, is as opposite and disagreeable to the same Nature in a Gentile; as that good, which is suitable and proportionable to a Jew in his Rational Being, is every way as intrinsecal to the welfare of a Gentile, that does not differ essentially from him. So likewise for the promulgation of this Law, being it does equally concern them both, and equally oblige them both; it is also by Nature equally publish'd and manifested to them both. So that what the Apostle speaks in respect of the freeness of Evangelical Light, we may say the very same in respect of the commonnesse of Natural Light;
Chapter IX.

The Light of Nature.

This Law of Nature, having a firm and unshaken Foundation in the necessity and conveniency of its materials, becomes formally valid and vigorous by the mind and command of the Supreme Law-giver, so as that all the strength and nerves and binding virtue of this Law are rooted and fasten’d partly in the excellency and equity of the commands themselves. But they principally depend upon the Sovereignty and Authority of God himself, thus contriving, and commanding the welfare of his Creature, and advancing a Rational Nature to the just perfection of its Being. This is the rise and original of all that obligation, which is in the Law of Nature. But the publishing and manifestation of this Law, which must give notice of all this, does flow from that heavenly Beame, which God has darted into the Soul of Man; from the Candle of the Lord, which God has lighted up for the discovery of his own Laws; from that intellectual eye, which God has fram’d and made exactly proportionable to this Light.

Therefore we shall easily grant that the obligation of this Law does not come from this Candle of the Lord; and others, I suppose, will deny that the Manifestation of this Law does come from this Candle of the Lord, that the promulgation of this Law is made by the voice of Reason.

In order of Nature, this Law, as all others, must be made, before it can be made known, Entity being the just root and bottom of Intelligibility. So that Reason does not facere, or ferre legem; but onely invenire: as a Candle does not produce an Object, but onely present it to the
eye, and make it visible. All Veritie, 'tis but the gloss of Entity: there's a loving Union and Communion between them, as soon as Being is, it may be known.

So that Reason is the Pen, by which Nature writes this Law of her own composing. This Law, 'tis publish'd by Authority from Heaven, and Reason is the Printer. This eye of the Soul, 'tis to spy out all dangers and all advantages, all conveniences and dis conveniences in reference to such a Being, and to warn the Soul in the name of its Creator, to fly from such irregularities, as have an intrinsic and implacable malice in them, and are prejudicial and destructive to its Nature; but to comply with, and embrace all such acts, and objects, as have a native comeliness and amiableness, and are for the heightning and ennobling of its Being.

Hierocles does most excellently set forth this, whilst he brings that golden verse of Pythagoras to the Touchstone:

Μὴ ἀλογίστως σαυτὸν ἐχειν περὶ μηδὲν ἐθίου,

and does thus brighten it and display it in its full glory, Ὅς γὰρ πρὸς κανόνα τὴν οὐσίαν ἡμῶν ἀποβλέποντες, τὸ δέν ἐν πᾶσιν εὐφάρσκομεν. κατὰ τὸν ὅρθον λόγον, συμφώνως τῇ ἐαυτῶν οὐσίᾳ διαζύωμεν. His meaning is this: 'there is a kind of a Canon-Law in the essences of men, and a Rational Tuning all their faculties according to those Lessons, which Nature has set; it does σὺν συμφώνως, with a most grateful and harmonious life, pleases both itself, and others. So, whilst he weighs that other golden Verse in the Balance, he speaks very high,

Βουλεύον δὲ πρὸ ἐργον ὅπως μὴ μώρα πέληται:

he gives us this learned accompt of it; Δόγμα δ' ὀρθῶς πείθεσθαι, καὶ Θεῷ ταύτων ἔστιν τὸ γὰρ λογικὸν γένος, εἰμιωθέν τῆς οἰκείας ἐλάμψεως, ταῦτα βούλεται, ἄν θεῖος ὀρθῶς νόμος· καὶ γίνεται σύμψηφοι Θεῷ ἡ κατὰ Θεόν διακειμένη φυσις· καὶ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ λαμπρὸν ἀποβλέπουσα πράττει ἄν πράττῃ. ἦ δὲ
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That wise Heathen, Socrates, was of the very same mind, in whose mouth that speech was so frequent and usual, ὿δὲ ἦκ τοι ἐπιθεται πλὴν τῷ ὑβῆ λόγῳ. 'Tis vain to trust any thing, but that which Reason tells you has the Seal of God upon it. Thus that Heathen Oratour, very fully and Emphatically; Nos Legem bonam a mala, nulla alia, nisi Naturali norma, dividere possumus. Nec solūm Ius, et Injurias natura duidicantur, sed omnino omnia Honesta et Turpia. Nam et communis Intelligentia nobis Res notas efficit, ea quae in animis nostris inchoavit, ut Honesta in virtute ponantur, in vitii Turpia. That is, Nature has distinguish'd Good from Evil by these indelible stamps and impressions, which she has graven upon both; and has set Reason, as a competent Judge, to decide all Moral Controversies: which by her first seeds of Light plainly discovers an honourable Beauty in Goodness, and an inseparable Blot in Wickednesse. Hence these three, Ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν, ζῆν
NATHANAEL CULVERWEL

κατὰ λόγον, ζῶν κατὰ Θεόν, are esteem'd equivalencies by that Emperour and Philosopher, Marcus Antoninus. But yet the Jews will by no means yield that there is light enough in the dictates of Reason, to display Common Notions; for they look upon it as a various and unsatisfactory light, mix'd with much Shadow and Darkness, labouring with perpetual inconstancy and uncertainty. What, are first Principles become so mutable and treacherous? Are Demonstrations such fortuitous and contingent things? Had I met with this in a fluctuating Academick, in a rowling Sceptick, in a Sextus Empyricus, in some famous Professour of Doubts, I should then have look'd upon it, as a tolerable expression of their trembling and shivering opinion. But how come I to find it among those Divers into the depths of Knowledge, who grant a certainty, and yet will not grant it to Reason? I would they would tell us then, where we might hope to find it. Surely not in an Oriental Tradition, in a Rabbinical Dream, in a dusty Manuscript, in a remnant of Antiquity, in a Bundle of Testimonies; and yet this is all you are like to get of them: for they tell you this Story, that these Natural Precepts tum in ipsis rerum initiis, tum in ea, quae fuit post Diluvium, instauratione, Humano generi ipsâ sanctissimâ Numinis voce fuisse imperata, atque ad Posteros per Traditionem solùm inde manasse; that is, that 'These Commands were proclaim'd by the voice of God himself, first to Adam in the first setting out of the World; and then they were repeated to Noah, when there was to be a reprinting and new Edition of the World after the Deluge; and thus were in way of Tradition to be propagated to all Posterity. O rare and admirable foundation of Plerophory! O incomparable method, and contrivance to find out certainty, to rase out first Principles, to pluck down Demonstrations, to demolish the whole structure, and fabrick of Reason, and to build upon the word of two or three Hebrew Doctours, that
tell you of a voice, and that as confidently as if they had heard it, and they are entrusted with this voice, they must report, and spread it unto others, though they do it, like unfaithful Echoes, with false and imperfect rebound!

This is to tell you, that Men have no Candle of the Lord within them; but onely there must be Traditio Lampadis, a general and publick Light, that must go from one hand to another. This is to blot out the Νόμος γραπτός, to leave out Canonical Scripture, and to give you Apocrypha in the room of it. 'Tis to set a Jew in the chair, dictating the Law of Nature, with the very same Infallibility, that the Pope promises himself in determining all points of Religion. Therefore some it may be will have recourse to such an Intellectus Agens, as must clear up all things.

It should seem by that eminent Writer of our own, that Fryer Bacon was of the same mind too, for whose words these are quoted, amongst many others, out of an Oxford-Manuscript; Deus respectu animae est sicut Sol respectu Oculi temporalis, et Angeli sicut stellae. Now what Angels they were, that this Roger Bacon fix'd his eye upon, whether they were not fallen stars, let others examine. I should think that Cardan's Intellectus Agens and his were both much of the same colour.

But this you may perceive in him, and the rest of the great Pleaders for an Intellectus Agens, that they found all their Arguments in a pretty similitude of an Eye, and Light, and Colours; as if this were some inconquerable Demonstration: whereas that great Master of Subtleties, whom I have more than once nam'd before, has made it appear, that the whole Notion of an Intellectus agens is a meer fancy and superfluity.

Yet this may be granted to all the forementioned Authors, and this is the onely spark of Truth, that lies almost buried in that heap of Errors; That God himself, as he does supply
every Being, the Motion of every Creature, with an intimate and immediate concourse every way answerable to the measure and degree of its Entity; so he does in the same manner constantly assist the Understanding with a proportionable Co-operation. But then, as for any such Irradiations upon the Soul, in which that shall be meerly patient; God indeed, if he be pleas'd to reveal himself in a special, and extraordinary manner, he may thus shine out upon it, either immediately by his own light, or else drop Angelical Influence upon it: but that this should be the natural and ordinary way, necessarily required to Intellectual workings, is extremely prejudicial to such a noble Being, as the Soul of man is, to which God gave such bright participations of himself, and stamp'd his Image upon it, and left it to its own workings, as much as any other created Being whatsoever. Nay, as Scaliger does most confidently object it to Cardan, you will not have one Argument left, by which you can evince the Immortality of the Soul, if you shall resolve all the excellency of its Being, and Operations into an Intellectus agens really distinct from it.

But then to make this Νοις ποιητικός and παθητικός onely the various Aspects, and different relations of the same Soul, is but a weak and needlesse device; and, if 'twere Aristotle's, to be sure 'twas none of his Master-pieces; for 'tis built upon, I know not what Phantasms and false Appearances.

Whereas those species and Colours, those Pictures and Representations of Being, that are set before an Intellectual Eye, carry such a light and beauty in themselves, as may justly en gratiate them with the Understanding. And though some tell us, that they have too much drosse and impurity, that they are too muddy and feculent, not proportionable to the purity of a reasonable Soul; yet let them but think of those many strainers they have gone through, those double refinings and clarifying, that they have had from so many percolations: and withall they may,
know, that the Understanding can drink in the most pure, and flourishing part of the Species, and can leave the dregs at bottom. Have you not thus often seen a Seal stamping it self upon the Wax, and yet not communicating the least particle of matter, but only leaving a form, and impression upon it?

However, there is as much proportion between these Species, and an Intellectus Patiens; as between these, and an Intellectus Agens. Nay, there is more proportion between these species, and the Understanding, then between the Soul, and Body, which yet are joyned, and married together in a most loving and conjugal Union.

Chapter X.

Of the Consent of Nations.

Though Natur's Law be principally proclaim'd by the voice of Reason; though it be sufficiently discover'd by the Candle of the Lord; yet there is also a secondary and additional way, which contributes no small light to the manifestation of it: I mean the Harmony and joint consent of Nations; who, though there be no κοινωνία, nor συντήρησις, no communion, nor commerce, nor compact between them, yet they do tacitly and spontaneously conspire in a dutiful observation of the most radical and fundamental Laws of Nature.

So that, by this pleasant consort of theirs, you may know, that the same Nature did tune them all. When you see the same prints and impressions upon so many several Nations, you easily perceive that they were stamp'd eodem communi Sigillo, with the same publick Seal. When you see the very same seeds thrown in such different soils; yet all increasing and multiplying, budding and blossoming,
branching out and enlarging themselves into some fruitful expressions; you know then, that 'twas Natur's hand, her bountiful and successful Hand, that scatter'd such seminal Principles amongst them; you presently know, that 'tis no enclosed way, 'tis a Via Regia, in which you meet with so many Travellers, such a concourse and confluence of a People.

Amongst many others, the learned Grotius is full and express for searching out the Law of Nature in this manner. You shall hear his own words, which he speaks in that excellent work of his De Iure Belli et Pacis. Esse aliquid Juris Naturalis probari solet tum ab eo, quod prius est; tum ab eo, quod posterius: quorum probandi Rationum illa subtilior est, haec popularior. A priori, si ostendatur Rei alicujus convenientia aut disconveniens necessaria cum Natura Rationali ac Sociali. A posteriori verbo, si non certissima fide, certè probabiliter admodum, Juris Naturalis esse colligitur id, quod apud gentes omnes, aut moraliores omnes, tale esse creditur. And he does annex this reason of it: Universalis effectus Universalem requiritis causam. When you see such fresh Springs and streams of Justice watering several Kingdoms and Nations, you know, that they are participations of some rich Fountain, of a vast Ocean. When you see so many Rays of the same Light shooting themselves into the several Corners of the world, you presently look up to the Sun, as the glorious Original of them all.

Let me then a little vary that place in the Acts of the Apostles: You may hear every man in his own Language, in his own Dialect and Idiom, speaking the same works of Nature: Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites, and the Dwellers in Mesopotamia, and in Judea, and Cappadocia, in Pontus, in Asia, Phrygia, and Pamphylia, in Egypt, and in the parts of Lybia about Cyrene, and strangers of Rome, Jews, and Proselytes, Cretes, and Arabians, you may hear them speak in their Tongue the wonderful works of God, and Nature.
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For whatsoever is Natural and Essential, is also Universal in order to such a Species. The Philosopher speaks to this very pertinently; Τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον, καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡκεί δύναμιν, ἠποτέρ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καὶ τι. That is, 'Whatsoever is Natural is immovable, and in the same manner perpetually energetical: as fire does not put on one colour amongst the Grecians, and paint its face otherwise among the Persians; but it has always the same ruddiness and purity, the same zeal and vehemency.'

As Nature shews choice variety and Needle-work in this, in that she works every Individual with several flourishes, with some singular and distinguishing notes: So likewise she plainly aspires to concord and unity, while she knits all together in a common and specific Identity. Not only in the faces of men, but in their Beings also, there is much of Identity, and yet much of Variety.

You do not doubt, but that in all Nations there is an exact likeness and agreement in the fabric and composure of men's Bodies in respect of Integrals; excepting a few Monsters and Heteroclites in Nature: nor can you doubt, but that there is the very same frame and constitution of men's spirits, in respect of Intrinsecals; unless in some prodigious ones, that in the Philosopher's Language are Ἀμαρτήματα τῆς φύσεως. As face answers face, so does the heart of one man the heart of another; even the Heart of an Athenian the Heart of an Indian.

Wherefore the Votes and Suffrages of Nature are no contemptible things.

Φήμη δ' οὕτω πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἦντινα λαοὶ πολλοὶ φημίζοντες

as the Poet sings. This was the mind of that grave Moralist, Seneca: as appears by that speech of his; Apud nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri.
But the Oratour is higher and fuller in his expression; Omni autem in re, Consensio omnium Gentium Lex Naturae putanda est. And that other Oratour, Quintilian, does not much differ from him in this; Pro certis habemus ea, in quae communi opinione concessum est. Or if the judgment of a Philosopher be more potent and prevalent with you, you may hear Aristotle telling you; Κράτιστον πάντας ἀνθρώποις φαίνεται συνομολογοῦτας τοῖς ἴηθοσμένοις. You may hear Heraclitus determining, that ὁ λόγος ἔννοις is an excellent κριτήριον of Truth; and therefore he was wont to lay down this for a Maxime, Τὰ κανὴ φανόμενα πιστά: which may be rendred Vox Populi, vox Dei; yet, upon this condition, that it be took with its due restraints and limitations. If you would have a sacred Author set his seal to all this, Tertullian has done it, Quod apud multitum unum inventur, non est erratum, sed traditum.

Surely, that must needs be a clear convincing light, that can command respect and adoration from all beholders; it must be an Orient Pearl indeed, if none will trample upon it. It must be a conquering and triumphant Truth, that can stop the mouths of Gain-sayers, and pass the world without contradiction: surely that's pure Gold, that has been examin'd by so many several Touchstones, and has had approbation from them all: certainly, 'tis some transcendent beauty, that so many Nations are enamour'd withall. 'Tis some powerful Musick, that sets the whole world a Dancing. 'Tis some pure, and delicious Relish, that can content and satisfie every palate. 'Tis some accurate piece, that passes so many Criticks without any Animadversions, without any variae Lectiones. 'Tis an elegant Picture, that neither the eye of an Artist, nor yet a popular eye can find fault withall. Think but upon the several tempers and dispositions of men; how curious are some! how censorious are others! how envious and malicious are some! how various and mutable are others! how do some love to be singular!
others to be contentious! how doubtful and wavering is one! how jealous and suspicious is another! and then tell me, whether it must not be some Authentical, unquestionable Truth, that can at all times have a Certificate and Commentamus from them all.

Then look upon the diversities of Nations, and there you will see a rough and barbarous Scythian, a wild American, an unpolish'd Indian, a superstitious Egyptian, a subtle Ethiopian, a cunning Arabian, a luxurious Persian, a treacherous Carthaginian, a lying Cretian, an elegant Athenian, a wanton Corinthian, a desperate Italian, a fighting German, and many other heaps of Nations, whose titles I shall now spare: and tell me, whether it must not be some admirable and efficacious Truth, that shall so over-power them all, as to pass current amongst them, and be owned and acknowledged by them.

Yet, notwithstanding, as we told you before, that the obligation of Nature's Law did not spring from Reason; so much lesse does it arise from the consent of Nations. That Law indeed, which is peculiarly term'd Νόμος, Jus Gentium, has its vigour and validity from those mutual and reciprocal compacts, which they have made amongst themselves: but the meeting of several Nations in the observation of Nature's Law has no binding or engaging virtue in it any otherwise, then in an exemplary way; but yet it has a confirming and evidencing power, that shews, that they were all obliged to this by some supreme Authority, which had such an ample influence upon them all. Thus you know the sweetness of Honey, both by your own tast, and by the consent of Palates too: yet neither the one nor the other does drop any sweetness or lusciousness into the Honey-comb. Thus you see the beauty and glory of Light, and you may call most men in the World to be eye-witnesses of it; yet those several eyes add no gloss or lustre to it, but onely take notice of it.
Man being ζωον πολυτικόν, and ζωον ἡμερον, as the Philosopher stiles him, a sociable and peaceable Creature; ἀγαλαστικόν, καὶ σύννομον ζωον, as that sacred Orator terms him, a congregating Creature, that loves to keep company, he must needs take much delight and complacency in that, in which he sees the whole Tribe and species of Mankind agreeing with him.

Why then do the Jews look upon the Ἰδὴ with such a disdaining and scornful eye, as if all the Nations, in comparison of them, were no more then (what the Prophet saies they are in respect of God), as the drop of a Bucket, as the dust of the Balance, that cannot incline them one way, or other?

Do but hear a while how that learned and much honoured Author of our own¹ does represent their mind unto you. Gentium (saies he) sive omnium, sive complurium opiniones, mores, constitutiones, mensurae apud Hebraeos, in eo decernendo, quod jus esse velit Naturale, seu Universale, locum habent nullum. These are the Contents of that Chapter, which he begins thus: Quemadmodum ex aliorum animantium actibus, aut usu, jus aliquod Naturale disci, aut designari nolunt Hebraei; ita neque ex aliarum, sive omnium, sive plurimarum Gentium usu, ac moribus, de Jure Naturali, seu hominum Universali decerni volunt. It seems the Jews look upon the Gentiles, as if they differ'd specifically from them: as they do not search for the Law of Nature amongst sensitive Beings, so neither amongst other Nations.

But I had thought, that the Jewish Writers had promis'd the Heathens an Angel, an Intelligence, to irradiate and illuminate them, and does he shine upon them no clearer? does he perform his office no better? The Jews told us, that they themselves were to inform them and instruct them, and have they taught them their Lessons no better? They mention'd a voice that came to Adam and to Noah, and have they whisper'd it onely in one another's ear?

¹ Selden, De Jure Heb.
Why have they not proclaimed it to the rest of the world? How sad were the condition of the Gentiles, if they were to live upon the Jews' courtesy and benevolence, that would strip them of Nature, plunder them of their essences, rob them of their first principles and common notions? But God has not left them, like orphans, to such unmerciful guardians. He himself has taken care of them, and has made better provision for them.

Now these several nations are to be consider'd either in the common bulk and heap of them; or else in the major part of them, or in the noblest and most refined sort amongst them; either of πάντες and οἱ πολλοί, or οἱ συγγενεῖτεροι and φρονιμισθεροι.

If we take them in the fullest universality of them, then that worthy author of our own saies truely; Nec olim, nec hactenus, aut qualesnam, aut quot sint, fuerintos, est ab aliquo satis exploratum. Nor indeed is it at all material in respect of this, whether we know them, or no; but having the formal consent of so many, and knowing, that there is Par ratioreliquorum, being that they have the same natural engagements and obligations upon them, we cannot justly distrust, but that, if there should new nations, nay, if there should new worlds appear, that every rational nature amongst them would comply with, and embrace the several branches of this law: and as they would not differ in those things, that are so intrinsic to sense; so neither in those, that are essential to the understanding. As their corporal eye would be able to distinguish between beauty and deformity: so their intellectual eye would as easily discern some goodness from some kind of wickedness.

But are there not many nations of them, that live in the perpetual violation of nature's law? If you speak of the more capital letters of this Νόμος γραπτός, you find no nation so barbarous, but that it can read them, and observe them. I never heard of a nation apostatizing
from Common Notions, from these first Principles. But, if you mean the whole context and coherence of Nature's Law, if you speak of those Demonstrations, that may be built upon these fundamental Principles, of those kindly Derivations and Conclusions, that flow from these fountain-Notions, then this indeed must be granted, that tis the condemning sin of the Heathen; That so many of them imprison this Natural Light and extinguish this Candle of the Lord.

There are many wild and Anomalous Individuals amongst them, or πόρρω βάρβαροι, θηριώδεις, ἄλγωντοι, as Aristotle calls them, or διεφθαρμένοι, as others term them: but are there not such also even amongst Jews? nay, amongst such as call themselves Christians, that are laps'd, and fallen below themselves? many Natural Precepts are violated even amongst them. Have you weeds and Bryers and Thorns in a Garden? no wonder then, that you meet with more in a Wilderness? Are there some Prodigies in Europe? you may very well look for more Monsters in Africa. Do Christians blur and blot the Law of Nature? no wonder then, that an American seeks quite to rase it out. Does an Israelite put Truth sometimes in Prison? no wonder then, that an Egyptian puts it in a Dungeon. Yet, notwithstanding amongst all those, that have had so much Culture and Morality, as to knit and embody and compact themselves into a Common-wealth, to become τοῖς νόμοις ὑποκείμενοι, to be regulated by a Legal Government, you will scarce find any Nation, that did generally and expressly, and for long continuance, either violate, or countenance the violation of, any Precept clearly Natural.

This is that, in which the learned Grotius satisfies himself, that Omnes Gentes Morales et Illustriores gave due obedience and conformity to Nature's Law, so that all Testimonies, fetch'd from them, are to have an high price, and esteem put upon them.
DISCOURSE OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE 281

But the famous Salmastius, in his late Tractate De Coma, goes a far different way; and tells us, that he had rather search for Nature's Law in a naked Indian, then in a spruce Athenian; in a rude American, rather then in a gallant Roman; in a meer Pagan, rather then in a Jew, or Christian. His words are these, Quanto magis Barbari, tantö felicius faciliusque Naturam Ducem sequuntur. Eam detorquent, aut ab ea magis recedunt politiores Gentes.

Those Nations, that have more of Art and improvement amongst them, have so painted Nature's face, have hung so many Jewels in her Ear, have put so many Bracelets upon her Hand, they have clothed her in such soft and silken rayments as that you cannot guess at her so well, as you might have done, if she had nothing, but her own simple and neglected beauty: you cannot taste the Wine so well, because they have put Sugar into it, and have brib'd your Palate.

So that the learned Salmastius will scarce go about to fetch the Law of Nature from the Jews principally: you see he chooses to fetch it rather from a Scythian, from a Barbarian; there he shall see it without any Glosses, without any Superstructures, without any carving and gilding, a Νόμος γραπτός plainly written, without any flourishes and amplifications. Yet the Author, whom I but now commended (Salmastius I mean) neither could, nor would go about to vindicate all those Nations from some notorious Rebellions against Nature's Law; but he would rather choose (as much as he could) to abstract their Intellectuals from their Practicals, and would look to their Opinions and Laws, rather then to their Life and Conversation.

Indeed Aristotle tells us; Πολλα των θυην προς το κτειναι και ανθρωποφαγιαν ειχερως ιχει. That same Phrase, ειχερως ιχει, does onely speak a propensity, and inclination in their vile affections to such wickednesses as these were, which
sometimes also they acted in a most violent, and impetuous manner. Though, to be sure, they could not be long a Nation, if they did thus kill, and eat up, and devour one another.

But, let us suppose, that they dealt thus with their enemies, yet, can it be shewn us, that they establish'd Anthropophagy by a Law? That their Natural Conscience did not check them for it? Or, if their Reason did connive at them; yet how comes it to passe, that their Angel did not jog them all this while; that their Intellectus Agens did not restrain them?

But, out of what Antiquity doth it appear, that any Nation did favour Atheism by a Law? that any Kingdom did licence Blasphemy by a Statute; or countenance Murder by a Law? Out of what Author can they shew us a Nation, that ever did allow the breaches of solemn Compacts, the dishonouring of Parents; that ever made a Law for this, that there should be no Law or Justice amongst them?

Till all this can appear, let the Testimonies of Gentiles be esteem'd somewhat more then the barking of Dogs. Methinks, if they were meer Cyphers, yet the Jews going before them, they might amount to somewhat. Let the prints of Nature in them be accounted sacred: a Pearl in the head of an Heathen, some Jewels hid in the rubbish of Nations; let them be esteemed precious. Whatsoever remains of God's Image upon them; let it be lov'd, and acknowledg'd. Their darkness and misery is great enough; let not us aggravate it, and make it more. To mix the light of their Candle with that light, which comes shining from the Candle of an Heathen, is no disparagement to Jew, nor Christian.

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Chapter XI.

The light of Reason is a Derivative light.

Now the Spirit of man is the Candle of the Lord.

First, as Lumen derivatum, φῶς ἐκ φωτός. Surely there's none can think, that Light is primitively and originally in the Candle; but they must look upon that onely as a weak participation of something, that is more bright and glorious. All created Excellency shines with borrowed Beames; so that Reason is but Scintilla divinae lucis, 'tis but Divinae particula auriæ. This was the very end, why God framed intellectual Creatures, that he might communicate more of himself to them, then he could to other more drossie and inferiour Beings, and that they might in a more compleat and circular manner redire in principium suum, (as the Schoolmen speak) that they might return into the bosome of the first and supreme Cause, by such operations, as should in some measure imitate and represent the working of God himself; who, being a most free and Intellectual Agent, would have some Creature also, that should not onely take notice of these his perfections, so as to adore and admire them, but should also partake of them, and should follow the Creatour in his dispensations and workings, though still at an infinite distance and disproportion.

This moved him to stamp upon some Creatures Understanding and Will, which in themselves make up one simple, and entire print, and signature of Reason, though we break the Seal for the better opening of them, and part them into two several Notions. To this end he fill'd the highest part of the World with those Stars of the first Magnitude, I mean those Orient and Angelical Beings, that dwell so near the fountain of Light, and continually drink in the Beams of Glory; that are exactly conformable to
their **Creator** in all his **motions**: for the same end he furnished and beautified this **lower part** of the **World** with **Intellectual Lamps**, that should shine forth to the **praise** and **honour** of his **Name**, which totally have their **dependence** upon him, both for their **Being**, and for their **perpetual continuation** of them in their **Being**. 'Twas he, that lighted up these **Lamps** at first; 'tis he, that drops the **golden oyl** into them. Look then a while but upon the **parentage** and **original** of the **Soul** and of **Reason**, and you'll presently perceive, that it was the **Candle of the Lord**. And if you have a mind to believe **Plato**, he'll tell you such a **feigned story** as this; That there were a goodly company of **Lamps**, a multitude of **Candles**, a set number of **Souls** lighted up altogether, and afterwards sent into **Bodies**, as into so many **Dark Lanthorns**. This **stock and treasure** of **Souls** was reserved and **cabinetted** in I know not what **Stars**; perhaps, that they might the better **calculate** their own **Incarnation**, the time when they were to descend into **Bodies**, and, when they came there, they presently sunk into θανατός, they slip'd into λίθος, which he terms ἐνσωτήματα ἀποβολή, the putting off of knowledge for a while, the clouding, and burying of many sparkling and twinkling **Notions**, 'till by a **waking Reminiscence**, as by a joyful **Resurrection**, they rise out of their graves again. **Plato**, it seems, look'd upon the body as the **blot** of **Nature**, invented for the defacing of this Νόμος γραμματείας, or at the best, as an impertinent tedious **Parenthesis**, that check'd and interrupted the **Soul** in her former **Notions**, that eclipsed and obscured her antient glory, which sprung from his ignorance of the **Resurrection**; for, had he but known what a **glory** the **Body** was capable of, he would have entertained more honourable thoughts of it.

Yet **Origen** was much taken with this **Platonical Notion**, it being indeed a pretty piece of **Philosophy** for him to pick **Allegories** out of. And, though he do a little vary from **Plato** in a **circumstance** or two; yet in recompense of that,
he gives you this addition and enlargement, That, according to the carriage and behaviour of these naked Spirits before they were embodied, there were prepared answerable mansions for them: That such a Soul as had walk'd with God acceptably, was put into a fairer Prison, was clothed with an amiable and elegant Body; but that Soul, which had displeased and provoked its Creatour, was put into a darker Dungeon, into a more obscure and uncomely Body: That Candle, which had shined clearly, was honoured with a golden Candlestick; That, which had soiled its Light, was condemned to a Dark-Lanthorn. One would think by this, that Origen had scarce read Genesis; he doth in this so contradict the Sacred History of the Creation. Nor is this the just product of Plato's Opinion, but 'tis pregnant with much more folly; he returns him his own with usury, gives him this, as the just ῥόκος, and improvement of it.

Aquinas doth clash in pieces all these Platonical fictions in his two Books Contra Gentiles; yet upon this sinking and putrid foundation was built the tottering Superstructure of connate Species. For when Plato had laid down this Error for a Maxime, Πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς, ἢν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή, that The Souls of men were long extant before they were born; then, that other Phancie did presently step in, Ηπιγενέσθαι καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι, that The Soul was very speculative and contemplative, before it was immers'd in the Body; which made way for the next Conceit, that The Soul brought many of its old Notions along with it into the Body: many faithful Attendants that would bear the Soul company in her most withering condition, when other more volatile and fugitive Notions took wing to themselves, and flew away: many a precious Pearl sunk to the bottom of Lethe, but some Reliques of Notions floated upon the top of the Waters, and in the general Deluge of Notions there was an Ark prepared for some select Principles, some praecepta Noachidarum, which were to increase,
and multiply, and supply the wants of the Intellectual World.

This makes the Platonists look upon the Spirit of Man as the Candle of the Lord for illuminating and irradiating of objects, and darting more light upon them, then it receives from them. But Plato, as he failed in corporeal Vision, whilst he thought, that it was per extramissionem radiorum: so he did not ab errore suo recedere in his intellectual Opticks; but, in the very same manner, tells us, that spiritual Vision also is per emissionem radiorum. And, truely, he might as well phansie such implanted Ideas, such seeds of Light in his external Eye, as such seminal Principles in the Eye of the mind. Therefore Aristotle (who did better clarifie both these kinds of Visions) pluck'd these Motes out of the sensitive Eye, and those Beams out of the intellectual. He did not antedate his own Knowledge, nor remember the several postures of his Soul, and the famous exploits of his Mind, before he was born; but plainly profess'd, that his Understanding came naked into the World. He shews you an ἄγωστος γραμμάτειον, an abrasa tabula, a Virgin-soul espousing it self to the Body, in a most entire, affectionate and conjugal Union, and, by the blessing of Heaven upon this loving pair, he did not doubt of a Notional off-spring and posterity. This makes him set open the windows of sense, to welcome and entertain the first dawnings, the early glimmerings of morning light.

——Clarum Mane fenestras
Intrat, et angustas extendit lumine rimas.

Many sparks, and appearances fly from variety of Objects to the Understanding; the Mind, that catches them all, and cherishes them, and blows them; and thus the Candle of Knowledge is lighted. As he could perceive no connate Colours, no Pictures, or Portraictures in his external Eye: so neither could he find any signatures in his Mind, till
some outward Objects had made some impression upon his voice of sē̂ma, his soft and pliable Understanding, impartially prepared for every Seal. That this is the true method of Knowledge he doth appeal to their own Eyes, to their own Understandings. Do but analyse your own thoughts; do but consult with your own Breasts; tell us, whence it was, that the Light first sprang in upon you. Had you such Notions as these when you first peep'd into Being? at the first opening of the Soul's eye? in the first exordium of Infancy? had you these connate Species in the Cradle? and were they rock'd asleep with you? or did you then meditate upon these Principles; Totum est majus parte, and Nihil potest esse et non esse simul. Ne're tell us, that you wanted Organical Dispositions; for you plainly have recourse to the sensitive powers, and must needs subscribe to this, that all knowledge comes flourishing in at these Lattices. Why else should not your Candle enlighten you before? who was it, that chained up and fettered your Common Notions? Who was it, that restrained and imprisoned your connate Ideas? Me thinks, the working of a Platonist's Soul should not all depend on φυσικά, and why had you no connate Demonstrations, as well as connate Principles? Let us but see a catalogue of all these Truths you brought with you into the World. If you speak of the Principles of the Laws of Nature, you shall hear the Scholemen determining: Infans pro illo statu non obligatur lege Naturali; quia non habet usum Rationis et Libertatis. And a more Sacred Author saies as much; Lex Naturae est lex Intelligentiae, quam tamen ignorant Pueritia, nescit Infanta. There's some time to be allowed for the promulgation of Nature's Law by the voice of Reason. They must have some time to spell the Νόμος γραπτός, that was of Reason's writing. The Mind, having such gradual and climbing accomplishments, doth strongly evince, that the true rise of Knowledge is from the observing, and comparing
of Objects, and from thence extracting the Quintessence of some such Principles, as are worthy of all acceptation; that have so much of certainty in them, that they are near to a Tautology and Identity: for this first Principles are.

These are the true and genuine σωφρονεία of these are the λόγοι σπερματων of these are the props of Reason's contriving, upon which you may see her leaning, about which you may see her turning, and spreading, and enlarging herself. That learned Knight¹, in his Discourse concerning the Soul, doth at large shew the manner how the Minde thus goes a gathering of Knowledge; how, like a Bee, it goes from flower to flower, from one entity to another; how it sucks the purest and sweetest of all; how it refuses all that is distastful to it, and makes a pleasant composition of the rest; and thus prepares Honey-combs for it self to feed on.

But, if it were at all to be granted, that the Soul had any stamps and characters upon it, that it had any implanted and ingrafted Species; 'twere chiefly to be granted, that it hath the connate Notion of a Deity, that pure and infinitely-refined Entity, abstracted from all appearance of Matter. But mark, how the great Doctor of the Gentiles convinces them of the τὸ γνώστων τοῦ Θεοῦ he doth not set them a searching their connate Species; but bids them look into the glass of the Creatures. O, but! (might some Platonist say) why? he is all Spirit, and an invisible Being, what shall we find of him amongst material objects? Yes, (saies the Apostle) τὰ ἀποκαλύφτων τοῦ Θεοῦ, the invisible things of God are made known by the things that do appear; for a Being, endowed with such a Soul as Man is, can easily in a discursive way, by such eminent steps of Second Causes, ascend to some knowledge of a prime and supreme Being; which doth fully explain, that he means by his Νόμος γραπτός those clear dictates of Reason, fetched from the several workings of the Understanding, that have sealed and printed

¹ Sir Kenelm Digby.
such a truth upon the *Soul*; so that no other *innate light*,
but onely the *power and principle of Knowing and reason-
ing* is the *Candle of the Lord*.

Yet there is a *Noble Author* of our own, that hath both
his *truth*, and his *error*, (as he hath also writ about both)
who pleads much for his *Instinctus naturales*, so as that,
at the first dash, you would think him in a *Platonical*
strain; but, if you attend more to what he says, you will
soon perceive, that he prosecutes a far different *Notion*,
much to be preferred before the other *phancy*.

For he doth not make these *instincts* any *connate Ideas*,
and *representations of Things*; but tells us, that they are
*powers and faculties of the Soul*, the *first-born faculties*
and *beginning of the Soul's strength*, that are presently
*espoused to their Virgin-objects* closing and complying with
them, long before *Discourse* can reach them; nay, with
such objects, as *Discourse* cannot reach at all in such
a *measure and perfection*: these *Instincts* he styles *Naturae
dotes, et providentiae Divinae universalis Idea, et typus
optimus*. Some of these are to be found in the lowest
*inanimate Beings*, which yet have no *connate Species* among
them; though they have *powers*, and propension to their
own welfare, a blind *tendency* and *inclination* to their own
security: for thus he speaks; *Instinctus, ille Naturalis in
quovis inarticulato licet et incauto elemento, sapiens est ad
carationem proprietam*: and such a *noble Being*, as *Man*
is, must needs have it in a more *sublime* and *eminent* manner.

Therefore he terms these *Instincts in Man facultates
noeticae, et facultates Deo analogae*; whereas those other
*inferiour faculties* are esteem'd *facultates analogae mundo*;
his words, being somewhat *cloudy*, I shall thus *paraphrase*
on them. The *Soul*, 'tis made with a *through light*,
with a *double Window*; at *one Window* it looks upon

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1 Lord Herbert, *De Veritate* and *De Religione Gentilium et Errorum
apud eos Causis*.  

CAMPAGNAC
corporeals, at the other it hath a fair prospect upon spirituals. When it takes notice of the material world, it looks out at the window of Sense, and views the putamina et cortices rerum, the outward husks and shells of Being; but not at all pleas'd or contented with them, those higher powers, those purer faculties of the Soul unclasp and disclose themselves, and extend themselves for receiving some delight more precious and satisfactory, being made in as harmonious proportion suitable to spiritual Objects, as the Eye is to Colours, or the Ear to Sounds. And, as you know, a corporeal Eye is so fashioned and organized; that, though it have no connate species of the Sun, yet 'tis pleasant to behold it: so the Eye of the soul doth willingly open itself to look upon God per modum objecti, and has all per receptionem from him, fixing its Eye upon so transcendent and beautiful an Object, and viewing all those streamings out of Light, those beamings out of eternal and universal Notions, that flow from him, as the Fountain of Lights, where they have dwelt from everlasting, which now appear to it in time with a most powerful and enamouring ray, to direct the Soul to that happiness it longed for, and to guide and conduct it in all its operations. If you ask when these highest faculties did first open and display themselves, he tells you, 'tis then when they were stimulated, and excited by outward Objects, and it may be upon this account, that, when the Soul can find nothing there worthy one glance, one cast of its Eye, impatient of such empty and shadowy sights, it opens itself to the ra ānu, and warms it self in those everlasting Sun beams: but, when it comes down from the Mount, it puts on the veil of Sense, and so converses with material objects.

Yet I do not here positively lay down this for a Truth in all the branches of it; but onely represent the mind of the forementioned Author, who himself doth acknowledge, that the rise of these first Principles is very cryptical and
mysterious. His words are these: *Vos interea non morari debet, quod quomodo eliciantur istae Notitiae Communes nesciatis.* *Satis, superque diximus, vos nescire quomodo fiat Gustus, Odoratus, Tactus, &c.* By which you cannot but perceive that he makes the *conformity* of such a Faculty with such an *Object* the *spring* and *Original* of *common Notions*. Yet this then had deserved a little clearing, whence the difficulty of understanding *Spirituals pro hoc statu* does arise, if there be such a *present* and *exact analogy* between them; whereas the *intuitive knowledge* of *God*, and viewing those *goodly Notions*, that are steep’d in his *essence*, uses to be reserved as a *privileged* of a *glorified* Creature. Yet this, I suppose, may be said, that herein is the *Soul’s Imperfection*, that it cannot sufficiently attend both to *spirituals* and *corporeals*; and therefore *Sense* being so *busie* and *importunate* for the *prosecution* of her *Objects*; no wonder, that these *noetical Faculties* do *faint* and *languish*. So that, if there be any, whom the former *Discursive* way will not suffice, it seems better for them to have recourse to an *innate power of the Soul*, that is fitted and fashioned for the receiving of *Spirituals*, *quatenus Spirituals*, then to fly to I know not what *connette Species*, of I know not how long *duration* before the *Soul* was acquainted with the *Body*. Yet that other *Noble Author*¹ of our own, that has the same *Title of Truth*, not without a competent mixture of *Error* too, doth choose to resolve all into a *Platonical Remembrance*: which yet that *acute Answerer*² of him doth shew to be a *meer vanity*; for, as for matters of *fact*, to be sure, they have no *implanted Ideas*: and, if *Historical Knowledge* may be acquired without them, why then should *discursive knowledge* have such a *dependence* upon them? And, I wish, that the *Platonists* would but once determine,

¹ Lord Brooke, *The Nature of Truth.*
whether a Blind Man be a competent Judge of Colours by virtue of his connate Species; and whether, by supply of these Ideas, a Deaf Man may have the true notion of Musick, and Harmony? If not, then they must ingenuously confesse, that the Soul, for the present, wants so much of Light, as it wants of the window of Sense. But, if they tell us, that some outward Objects must jog and waken these drowsie, and slumbering Notions, they then lay the Foundation in Sensitives: and, withall, let them shew us, why the generality of men in their Intellectuals are not equally improved; whereas they have the same Objects to quicken and enflame them? In the mean time we will look upon the Understanding, as speculum non coloratum, a Glasse not prejudic'd, nor prepossess'd with any connate Tinctures; but nakedly receiving, and faithfully returning all such colours, as fall upon it. Yet the Platonists in this were commendable, that they look'd upon the Spirit of a Man as the Candle of the Lord; though they were deceiv'd in the time when 'twas lighted.

Nor is this Candle lighted out of the Essence of God himself. 'Twere a far more tolerable Error to make the light of a Candle a piece of the Sun's Essence, then to think that this intellectual Lamp is a particle of the Divine Nature. There is but one ἀπαίγωσα τὴς δόξης, καὶ χαρακτῆρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, I mean the wonderful ὁ λόγος: not a Candle, but a Sun that shined from everlasting. But I find the Stoicks challenged for this Error, that they thought there was a real emanation and traduction of the Soul out of God, ex ipsa Dei substantia. And the Gnosticks, the Manichees, and Priscillianists are look'd upon as their Successours in this folly.

Now as for the Stoicks, you'll scarce find evidence enough to prove them guilty of this Opinion. They have indeed some doting, and venturing Expressions, when they amplify and dignifie the nobility of the Soul; and will needs have
some of the Royal Blood to run in every vein and faculty of it: nor are the Platonists defective in this, but lift up the soul to as high a pitch of Perfection, as the Stoicks ever did: yet surely both of them but as a limited and dependant Being infinitely remote from the fulness of a Deity.

I know not whether you can, I am sure I cannot, sufficiently perceive, that the generality of the Heathen did think that every Soul was immediately created by God himself, but onely, that, at the first, there was bestowed more then ordinary workmanship upon them, which they knew principally by those generous motions, which they found working in their own Souls; and partly by some reliques of Mosaical History, that were scattered amongst them.

Thus then I have represented unto you, as indifferently as I can, the state of this great Controversie; and, though I could easily tell you, which part I do most easily incline to; yet I shall rather refer it to your own thoughts, with this intimation, that a modest hesitancy may be very lawful here: for, if you will believe Gregory the Great he tells you its a Question which cannot be determined in this Life. However 'tis enough for us, that the Spirit of a Man, either by virtue of its constant Creation, or by virtue of its first Creation, is the Candle of the Lord.

As the Soul is the shadow of a Deity, so Reason also is a weak and faint resemblance of God himself, whom therefore that learned Emperour, M. Antoninus, calls λόγος οπερματικός. 'Tis God, that plants Reason, 'tis he, that waters it, 'tis he, that gives it an increase. Ο λόγος ἀνθρώπων πέφυκεν ἀπὸ θεῖου λόγου. The Title of δ λόγος belongs to Christ himself; in whom are hid the treasures of Wisdom and Knowledge. Reason first danced and triumphed in those eternal Sun-beams, in the thoughts of God himself, who is the fountain and original of Reason. And, as his Will is the rule of Goodnesse; so his Understanding is the rule of Reason. For God himself is a most knowing and
intellectual Being, he is the first mover of Entity, and does determinate tendere in aliquem finem, which speaks an Intelligent Agent. He does propound most choice designes, and blessed ends to himself; and is not that a worke of Reason? He does contrive, and dispose, and order means for accomplishing of them, and doth not that require Understanding? He makes all Beings instrumental and subordinate to him, he moves all inferior Wheels in a regular manner; he moves all the spheres of second Causes in an Harmonical way; such blind Entities, as want intellectual eyes, he himself doth lead them and conduct them; and to others he gives an eye for their guidance, and direction. Now he, that hath framed an intellectual Eye, shall not he see? he, that hath cloathed the Soul with light, as with a garment, shall not he much more be cloathed himself with a fuller and purer brightness? In that which we esteem Reason amongst Men, there are many clouds and blemishes, many dark spots and wrinkles, that are scattered and conquered by this more glorious light. The Soul, 'tis fain to climb up and ascend to knowledge by several steps and gradations; but his Understanding is all at the same height and eminency. Man's Reason is fain to spend time in knitting a Proposition, in spinning out a Syllogism, in weaving a Demonstration; but he is infinitely beyond and above these first Draughts and Rudiments of knowledge; he sees all ἐν ἰπή ὁθβαλμοί, at the first opening of his Eye from everlasting, with one intellectual glance he pierceth into the whole depth of Entity, into all the dimensions of Being. Man's Understanding is fain to borrow a Species from the Object, which presents to the Mind the Picture and Portraiture of it self, and strikes the intellectual Eye with a colour suitable and proportionable to it: but the Divine Understanding never receives the least Tincture from an Object, no Species ab extra, but views all things in the pure Chrystal of his own Essence; he does not at all see himself
in the glasse of the Creatures, as we see him, but he sees Creatures in the glasse of his own Being: how else should he see them from everlasting, before they were extant, before they were visible by any Species of their own? God therefore doth primarily and principally look upon himself; for he is nobilissimum intelligibile, he cannot have a more beautiful and satisfying Object to look upon, then his own face. τὸ γνώσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ is an object fit to enamour all Understanding: for the more any Being is abstracted from Materiality, the more 'tis refin'd from material conditions, the more graceful and welcome it is to the Understanding; for matter does cloud and darken the glosse of Being; it doth eclipse an Object, and is no friend to intelligibility. So that God, being a pure and immaterial Spirit, must needs be praestantissimum intelligibile; and a most adaequate Object for his own eye to look upon. And this Understanding is himself, it being actio immanens, always dwelling with him; Dei scientia est Dei essentia, (as the Scholemen speak) God is ὅλος ὁθαλμός, ὅλον φῶς, he is both all Eye, and all Light: as suppose, the bright body of the Sun had a visive faculty, so as it could view and survey its own light and beams, and could by virtue of them look upon all other things, which its own Light does unveil and discover, 'twould then give some languishing adumbration of a Deity, who is always looking upon his own perfections and seeing Creatures by his own light, by his own uncreated beams: for Species et similitudo omnium est in Dei essentia. Thus God, looking upon his own omnipotency, knows all possibilities; viewing his own determinations, he sees all Futurities; looking upon his own wisdom, he beholds all varieties, all degrees and differencies of Being: which yet put not the least shadow of difference in him; because the excellencies of all Beings are treasured up in him onely by way of Transcendency, not per modum compositionis, sed per modum perfectionis (as the Scholes have it). So that, when God beholds all created
Beings by virtue of his own essence, yet you must not imagine, that the formality of a Creature is contained in an uncreated Being; but onely, that there is enough of Being there to give a representation of all Being whatsoever. As when a glass reflects a face, there's not the least mutation in the glasse, much less is the face any part of the Glasse's essence, though the glasse give a sufficient resemblance of it. Yet herein there's this disparity, that the glasse of God's essence did represent a Creature, before any created face could look into it; for God, looking upon himself from eternity, did then know quot modis aliquid assimilari potuit ipsius essentiae, and did know how far such a Being would imitate his essence, and how far it would fall short of it. He saw, that this Being would come nearer, that that Being would be more distant and remote from him; this Picture would be liker him, that would shew very little of him. Now the actuality and existence of such an Object is not requisite to the understanding of it; for how then could we conceive of the privation of a non-Entity? How can we otherwise apprehend them, then by framing the notion of something positive in our mindes, and supposing a total deficiency from it? Thus, as they use to speak, Rectum est index sui et obliqui; and Nobilissimum in unoque genere est mensura et exemplar reliquorum: that first and supreme Being, by the great example and pattern of himself, can judge of all inferiour and imperfect Beings. Nor could he see them ab aeterno any otherwise, then in himself; there being nothing else eternal but himself, and in himself he could clearly see them, as we see Effects in their Cause. All created Beings were eminently contained in the Centre of one indivisible Essence; who, by his infinite virtue, was to produce them all; who, being an intelligent Centre, did see those several Lines that might be drawn from him; and withall, being a free and a voluntary Centre, did know how many Lines he meant to draw for himself. Now you know amongst
men a Demonstration a priori is esteemed most certain and scientific: Scire est per causas cognoscere. God thus knew Creatures, perfectly knowing himself, who was the first cause of them all. This doth much speak the immutability of the eternal Reason and Wisdom in the mind of God, and doth remove all imperfections from it. For you see, he did not move in an axiomatical way, per compositionem et divisionem; for he saw things by his own uncompounded and indivisible essence; much lesse did his knowledge improve it self in a Syllogistical way, deducing and collecting one thing out of another. This is the Scholemens meaning, when they tell us, Cognitio Dei non est ratiocinativa, that is, non est discursiva. They that will light a Candle may strike such sparks: but the Sun and Stars want no such light. Angels are above Syllogismes, how much more is God himself? Nay, even amongst men, first Principles are above Disputings, above Demonstrations; now all things are more naked in respect of God himself, then common Notions are to the sight of men. 'Tis a modus testudineus, a tardy and tedious work, a fetching a compass, to gather one thing out of another; 'tis the slow pace of a limited Understanding. But there's no succession in God, not in the knowledge of God. There's no prius et posterius; no Premisses, or Conclusions; no transitus ab uno ad alium, no externum medium: for he does not cognoscere per aliud medium a seipso distinctum. There's a compleat simultaneity in all his knowledge; his Essence is all together, and so is his Knowledge. Plurality of Objects will confound a finite Understanding, for they must be presented by different species, and a created Eye cannot exactly view such different Faces at once, such several Pictures at once. The Understanding sometimes loses it self in a crowd of objects; and when such a multitude comes thronging upon it, it can scarce attend to any of them. But God, seeing them all per unicum speciem, per unicum operationem, takes notice of them all with an infinite delight and facility. For
he loves to attend to his own Essence, which doth so admirably represent them all: hence his Knowledge is always in act; because his Essence is a pure act. Humane Understandings have much of their knowledge stor'd up in Habits; but there are no Habits in a Deity: for Knowledge is dormant in an Habit, but his Understanding never slumbers nor sleeps. There's no Potentiality in him, but hee's always in ultima perfectione, he is semper in actu intelligendi; as Sol is semper in actu lucendi. Humane Understandings are fain to unbend themselves sometimes, as if they were faint and weary: but Divinity is always vigorous, and Eternity can never languish. The Understanding of God thus being fill'd with light, his Will also must needs be rational, non coeca, sed oculata notitia. This makes the Scholemen very well determine, That, though there cannot be causa divinae voluntatis, yet there may be assign'd ratio divinae voluntatis. There can be no cause of his Will; for then there would be a cause of his Essence, his Will being all one with his Essence: but there cannot be causa prior prima. Yet this account may be given of his Will, that bonum intellectum est fundamentum voliti; so that as God does primarily intelligere seipsum, so he does understand other things only per seipsum; so likewise he does principally and necessarily velle seipsum, and does will other things secondarily, and out of a choice, propter seipsum. And, as God hath set all other Beings a longing after the perfections, and conservations of their own Beings, and has in a special manner stamp'd upon a rational Nature an intellectual appetite of its own well-fare, and happiness, so as that it cannot but propound an ultimate scope and end to it self, and bend and direct all its desires for the hitting and attaining of it: so he himself also sets up himself, as the most adequate and amiable end of all his workings and motions, and does bend the whole creation, does shoot every Being, and order it to his own glory. Now how rational is that Will of his, that does chiefly fix it self
upon the fairest good, and wills other things onely as they are subservient to it. *Deus vult bonitatem suam tanquam finem, et vult omnia alia tanquam media ad finem.* Out of the intense and vehement willing of himself, he wills also some prints and resemblances of himself. The beauty of his own face, of his own goodnesse is so great as that he loves the very picture of it: and, because one picture cannot sufficiently expresse it, therefore he gives such various and numerous representations of it. As when men cannot express their mind in one word, they are willing to rhetoricate, and enlarge themselves into more. God doth give many similitudes of himself, for the greater explication of his own essence. His essence in itself not being capable of augmentation or multiplications; he loves to see some imitations and manifestations of it, to make known his own power and perfection in a way of causality. Now the Understanding of God being so vast and infinite, and his Will being so commensurate and proportion'd to it, nay, all one with it; all those Decrees of his, that are the Eternal product and results of his Mind and Will, must needs be rational also. For in them his Understanding and Will met together, his Truth and Goodness kissed each other. And though these Decrees of God must be resolved into his absolute supremacy and dominion, yet that very Sovereignty of his is founded upon so much reason, and does act so wisely and intelligently, as that no created Understanding can justly question it, but is bound obediently to adore it. The Prosecution and Application of these Decrees, 'tis accompanied with the very same wisdome and reason: for what's Providence, but *Oculus in Sceptro,* a rational guiding and ruling all affairs in the World? 'tis *ipsa ratio divina in summo Principe constituta; 'tis ratio ordinandorum in finem*; that, which in Man is called Prudence, in God is called Providence; the right tuning and regulating of all circumstances, and making them to conspire and contribute to his own end and glory. And,
if man could but rightly interpret and comment upon Providence, what fresh discoveries, what bright displayings of divine Reason would they all continually meet with all? What shinings and sparklings of Divine Wisdom are there in some remarkable providential passages? You, that are most acquainted with the ways of God, tell us if you did ever find any thing unreasonable in them. Enquire still more into his dealings, and you'll see more of Reason in them. Could you search deeper into the rich Mine of his counsell, you would still meet with more precious veins of Wisdom. The depth of his Counsels, what are they but the very profoundness of his Reason? τὰ βάθη τοῦ θεοῦ, they are τὰ βάθη τοῦ λόγου. And whenssoever this secret counsel of his issues out, and bubbles forth, it is in most rational manifestations. His Commands are all rational, his Word is the very pith and marrow of Reason. His Law is the quickening and wakening of men's Reason; his Gospel, 'tis the flowing out of his own Reason; 'tis the Quintessence of wisdome from above; his spirit is a rational Agent; the motions of the holy Ghost are rational Breath; the revelations of the Holy Ghost, a rational Light, as rational as a Demonstration: the Apostle calls them so. As when the Spirit of God overpowers the Will, it makes a willingness there, where there was an absolute nolency, an obstinate refusal before; so, when it over-powers the Mind, it makes it understand that, which it did not, which it could not understand before; Spiritual irradiations stamp new light, create new reason in the Soul. Nothing comes to Man with the superscription of a Deity; but that, which hath upon it some signature of Wisdom. God himself is an intelligent worker in his dealing with all Beings, how much rather in his dealing with rational Beings? By all this you see, that God himself is the Eternal Spring and Head of Reason; and that humane Wisdome is but a created and an imperfect Copy of his most perfect and original Wisdom.
Now Philosophy could dictate thus much; Τέλος ἀπάρτων ἴπτεσθαι τοὺς Θεοῖς. God loves to see such a noble Creature, as Man is, to follow and imitate him in his Reason; Omnia intendunt assimilari Deo; as the Scholemen have it. Now men cannot be more assimilated unto God, then by moving as Intelligent Agents. Does God himself work according to Reason from eternity to eternity? And has he made a Creature in time, whose very essence is Reason? Why then does it not open its Eyes? why does it not use its Lamp? and though it cannot discover all, yet let it discern as much as it can. Let it not act in the choicest points of Religion out of blind and implicit Principles, and huddle up its chiefest operations in I know not what confused, and obscure, and undigested manner. This neither becomes Sons of Light, nor works of Light. The more men exercise Reason, the more they resemble God himself; who has but few Creatures, that can represent him in so bright an excellency as this; onely Angels and Men: and therefore he expects it the more from them. And the more they exercise their own Reason, the more they will admire and adore his. For none can admire Reason, but they that use some Reason themselves. And this may suffice for the first Particular, that The Candle of the Lord, 'tis lumen derivatum, it was first lighted at a Sun-beam.

Chapter XV.1

The Light of Reason is directive.

Τ'is Lumen dirigens, this νόμος γραπτός, 'tis a Light for the Feet and a Lanthorn for the Paths. For the Understanding, 'tis the τὸ ἱερεμονίκων, the leading and guiding Power of the Soul. The Will looks upon that, as Leander

1 In chapter xii, Culverwel speaks of the Light of Reason as 'A Diminutive Light'; in xiii, as 'Discovering Present Things not Future'; in xiv, as 'A Certain Light.'
in Musaeus look'd up to the Tower for Hero's Candle, and calls it, as he doth there,

\[\Deltaσχ\nuν \varepsilonμο indifference, \phiα\varepsilonφο\varepsilonν \ ήμερον\].

Reason doth facem praeferre, it carries a Torch before the Will, nay, more then so, 'tis an Eye to the Blinde; for otherwise 'twere in vain to light up a Candle for a Caeca potentia to see withall. Intellectuals are first in motion. Αι πύλαι φωτός, these Gates of Light, must first be set open, before any glorious and beautiful Object can enter in, for the Will to court and embrace. The Will doth but echo to the Understanding, and doth practically repeat the last syllable of the ultimum dictamen; which makes the Moralist well determine, Virtutes Morales non possunt esse sine Intellectualibus: for to the presence of Moral Virtues there are necessarily pre-required Intelligencia et Prudentia; the one being the knowledge of Principia speculativa, as the other of Principia operativa. That Action must needs be hopeful and promising, when the Understanding aims before the Will shoots; but he, that in an implicite way rushes upon any performance, though the action it self should prove materially good, yet such an one deserves no more commendation for it, then he would do, that first put out his Eyes, and then contingently hit the Mark. Other Creatures indeed are shot more violently into their ends: but Man hath the skill and faculty of directing himself, and is (as you may so imagine) a rational kind of Arrow, that moves knowingly and voluntarily to the Mark of its own accord. For this very end God hath set up a distinct Lamp in every Soul, that men might make use of their own Light. All the works of men, they should olere lucernam, smell of this Lamp of the Lord, that is to illuminate them all. Men are not to depend wholly upon the courtesie of any fellow-creature; not upon the dictates of men; nay, not upon the Votes and determinations of Angels: for, if an Angel from
Heaven should contradict first Principles, though I will not say in the Language of the Apostle, Let him be accursed; yet this we may safely say, that all the Sons of men are bound to dis-believe him.

All Arguments drawn from Testimony and Authority (created Authority I mean) were always look'd upon as more faint and languishing, then those that were fetch'd from Reason. Matters of fact, indeed, do necessarily depend upon Testimony: but in Speculations and Opinions none is bound so far to adore the Lamp of another, as to put out his own for it. For when any such Controversie is mov'd, when any Author is quoted and commended, all the credit and esteem, that is to be given him, is founded either in the Reason, which he doth annex to his Assertion; or else in this more remote and general Reason, that such an one had a very clear, and bright Lamp, that the Candle of the Lord did shine very eminently in him: therefore what he says is much to be attended to; for in his words, though there should not be ratio explicata, yet it is to be suppos'd, that there's ratio subintellecta. So that the assent here is ultimately resolv'd into the Reason of him that speaks, and the other that receives it; for he, that complies with a naked Testimony, makes a tacit acknowledgment of thus much, that he is willing to resign up himself to another's Reason, as being surer and fuller then his own; which temper and frame of Spirit is very commendable in a state of inchoation: for Χρη τῶν μαθητῶν τιμηθεῖται. Knowledge in the Cradle cannot feed it self. Knowledge, in its infancy, must suck at the Breasts of another. And Babes in Intellectuals must take in the ἀδόλον γάλα, those spoonfuls of Knowledge, that are put in their mouths by such as are to nurse and to educate them. Paul, when he sits at the feet of Gamaliel, must observe the prints and footsteps of the Hebrew Doctour, and must roll himself in pulvere sapientium. Knowledge, in its non-age, in its pupil-
age, and minority, must hide it self under the wing and protection of a Guardian. Men use at first to borrow light, and to light their Candle at the light of another; yet here I find some Licence and encouragement given to these first-beginners, to these setters up in Learning, to be modestly inquisitive into the grounds and Reasons of that which is delivered to them.

Thus that Sacred Writer, Hierom, commends Marcella, though one of the weaker Sex, upon this account, that she was wont to search and to examine his Doctrine: Ita ut me sentirem (saies he) non tam Discipulum habere, quam Iudicem. Nay, a far greater then Hierom, honours the Bereans with the Title of ευνευερετοι, a more noble and generous sort of Christians, that would bring even Apostolical words to the Touch stone. Why is it not then lawful for them, that are in statu adulto, that are come to some pregnancy and maturity in knowledge, to look upon the stamp and superscription of any Opinion, to look any Opinion in the face? The great and noble Verulam much complains (and not without too much cause) of those sad obstructions in Learning, which arose upon the extreme doting upon some Authors, which were indeed men of rare accomplishments, of singular worth and excellency, and yet but men, though, by a strange kind of Αφιεναι, a great part of the world have worship'd them as Gods. The Canonizing of some profane Authours, and esteeming all others as Apocryphal, hath blasted many buds of Knowledge, it has quench'd many sparks and beams of Light, which otherwise would have gilded the World with an orient and unspotted lustre. Far be it from me to drop one word, that should tend to the staining and eclipsing of that just glory, that is due to the immortal name of Aristotle. There are those, that are envious and ungrateful enough; let them do it if they please; yet this I shall say, and it shall be without any injury to him, that to set him up as a Pope in Philosophy, as a Visible Head of the Truth
militant, to give him a Negative Voice, to give him an Arbitrary power, to quote his Texts as Scripture, to look upon his Works as the irreversible Decrees of Learning; as if he had seal'd up the Canon, so that who'e're adds to him, or takes one word from him, must be struck with a present Anathema: to condemn all for Hereticks, that oppose him; for Schismaticks, that depart from him; for Apostates, that deny him; what's all this but to forget, that he was but the Candle of the Lord, and to adore him as a Sun in the Firmament, that was set to rule the day of Knowledge? 'Tis to make him an ἐν πρώτῳ, the Causa prima, the first Mover of Learning; or, at least, 'twas to make him such an Intellectus Agens, as Averroes would have, that must enforme and quicken all, that come after him. Could that modest Philosopher have foreseen and prophesied that the World would thus flatter him, 'tis to be fear'd, that he would have thrown his Works also, his legible self, into Euripus, rather then they should have occasioned such excessive Idolatry and partiality: yet 'tis no fault of his, if the World would over-admire him; for that, which first inhand'd the price and esteem of Aristotle, was that rich vein of Reason that ran along and interlin'd most of his Works. Let this therefore, and this onely commend him still; for this is of indelible and perpetual duration; yet, if these blind Admirers of him could have followed him fully and entirely, they might have learn'd of him a braver liberty and independency of spirit: for he scorned to enslave and captivate his thoughts to the Judgment of any whatsoever; for though he did not deal violently and dis-ingenuously with the Works of his Predecessours, (as some affirm) yet he dealt freely with them, and was not over-indulgent to them. He came like a Refiner amongst them, he purged away their Drosse, he boyld away their froth and scum, he gathered a Quintessence out of their rude and elementary Principles. How impartially did he deal with his Master Plato, and not favour
him in any of his Errors! And his words are answerable to his practises; you may hear him what he saith and professes, Τῶν παλαιῶν αἰδεύων μὲν δίκαιον, φρίκεων δὲ φίλοις, to have a reverend esteem of Antiquity is but fitting and equal; but to stand in awe of it, is base and unworthy. Potestas Senatoria is very honourable and beneficial; but Dictatoria Potestas is not to be allowed in the Commonwealth of Learning; yet such hath been the intolerable Tyranny and Oppression of the Roman Faction, as that they have enjoyn'd and engaged as many as they could to screw and torture their Wits for the maintaining of whatever such an one as pleaseth them shall please to say: for they care not how prejudicial or detrimental they prove to Learning; so that they may but train up their Scholars in an implicit faith, in a blind obedience, in a slavish acknowledgment of some infallible Judge of Controversies, and may shut up and imprison the generality of people in a dark and benighted condition; not so much as allowing them the light of their own Candle, this Lamp of the Lord, that ought to shine in them. That great Advancer of Learning, whom I commended before, takes notice, that by such unhappy means as these, the more noble and liberal Sciences have made no progress proportionable to that, which more inferior and Mechanical Arts have done: for in these later ingenia multorum in unum coeunt; whereas in the former, ingenia multorum sub uno succubuerunt. What brave improvements have been made in Architecture, in Manufactures, in Printing, in the Pyxis Nautica? For here's no limiting and restraining men to Antiquity, no chaining them to old Authours, no regulating them to I know not what prescribed Forms and Canons: no such strange voices as these; You must not build better then your Predecessors have done; you must not Print fairer then the first Tullie's Offices, that e're was printed. Tis not look'd upon as a transgression and a piaculum, if they should
chance to be a little more accurate than they were that went before them. But in Speculatives, in meer Mathematicks (which one would think were far enough from any breach of Faith or Manners, yet here) if a Galilaeus should but present the world with an handful of new Demonstrations, though never so warily and submissively; if he shall but frame and contrive a Glass for the discovery of some more Lights: all the reward he must expect from Rome is to rot in an Inquisition for such unlicensed Inventions, for such venturous undertakings. The same strain of Cruelty hath march'd more vehemently and impetuously in sacred and religious matters: for here Babylon hath heated her Furnace seven times hotter, whilst under the pompous name of a Catholick Church, under the glittering pretences of Antiquity and Authority, they have, as much as they could, put out all the Lamps of the Lord, and that Bestian Empire hath transform'd all its Subjects into sensitive and irrational Creatures. A noble Author¹ of our own tells us in his Book De Veritate, that he for his part takes them for the Catholick Church, that are constant and faithful to first Principles; that Common Notions are the bottom and Foundation, upon which the Church is built. Excuse our diffidence here, great Sir: the Church, 'tis built upon a surer and higher Rock, upon a more Adamantine and precious Foundation; yet thus much is acceptable, and undeniable, that who e're they are, that by any practises, or Customes, or Traditions, or Tenents, shall stop the passage of first Principles, and the sound Reason that flows from them, they are in this farther from a Church, then the Indians or the Americans, whilst they are not onely Anti-Christian, but unnatural. And, of the two, the Church hath more security in resting upon genuine Reason, then in relying upon some spurious Traditions; for think but a while upon those infinite deceits and uncertainties, that such Historical conveyances are liable

¹ Lord Herbert.
and exposed to. I always except those sacred and heavenly Volumes of Scripture, that are strung together as so many Pearls, and make a Bracelet for the Spouse to wear upon her Hands continually. These Writings the Providence of God hath deeply engaged it self to keep as the Apples of his own Eye. And they do not borrow their certainty or validity from any Ecclesiastical or universal Tradition (which is at the most but previous and preparatory) but from those prints of Divinity in them, and specially from the seal of the same Spirit, that endited them, and now assures the Soul that they were Oracles breathed from God himself. As for all other sacred Antiquity, though I shall ever honour it as much as any either did, or can do justly, and with sobriety; and shall always reverence a gray-headed Truth: yet, if Antiquity shall stand in competition with this Lamp of the Lord (though genuine Antiquity would never offer to do it) yet, if it should, it must not think much, if we prefer Reason, a daughter of Eternity, before Antiquity, which is the off-spring of Time. But, had not the spirit of Anti-Christianism, by its early twinings and insinuations, wound and wrought it self into the most flourishing and Primitive Times, into the bosom of a Virgin-Church, and had it not offered violence to the works of some sacred Writers, by detracting and augmenting, according to its several exigencies; by feigning and adulterating; by hiding and annihilating some of them, as much as they could, (the ordinary tricks of Anti-Christ, which he used always more subtilly, though of late more palpably) had it not been for such devices as these, Antiquity had come flowing to us in purer and fuller streams, in more fair and kindly derivations, and so might have run down more powerfully and victoriously, then now it will. But Anti-Christ hath endeavoured to be the Abaddon and the Apollyon of all sacred Antiquities, though the very Reliques of those shining and burning Lights, that adorn'd the Church of God, have
splendour enough to scatter the darkness of Popery, that empty shadow of Religion, that arises ob defectum Luminis: yet Antiquity (setting aside those that were peculiarly θεόναντοι) was but the first dawning of Light, which was to shine out brighter and brighter till perfect day. Let none therefore so superstitiously look back to former ages as to be angry with new Opinions and displayings of Light, either in Reason or Religion. Who dares oppose the goodnesse and wisdom of God; if he shall enamour the World with the beauty of some Pearls and Jewels, which, in former times, have been hid or trampled upon? if he shall discover some more light upon Earth, as he hath let some new stars be found in the Heavens? This you may be sure and confident of, that 'tis against the mind and meaning of Antiquity, to stop the progress of Religion and Reason. But I know there are some will tell us of a visible Tribunal, of an infallible Head of the Church, born to determine all Controversies, to regulate all Men, 'tis a wonder they do not say Angels too; others more prudently and equally resolve the final judgment of Controversies into a general and Oecumenical Council: but I shall speak to them all in the language of the Philosopher, Δὲ τὸν νόμον ἄρχειν πάντων, and I shall explain it according to the minde of the learned Davenant in his Discourse De Judice ac norma fidei et cultus Christiani. God onely is to rule his own Church αὐτοκρατικῶς καὶ νομοθετικῶς, judicio auctoritativo, by a determining and Legislative power: men, that are fitted by God himself, are to guide and direct it ἐπιρρητικῶς καὶ ἐρμηνευτικῶς, judicio ministeriali, in way of subserviency to him, by an explication of his mind; yet so as that every one may judge of this ἰδιωτικῶς καὶ ἀκριτικῶς, judicio privato et practicae discretionis, by acts of their own Understanding illuminated by the spirit of God; for there are no representatives in Intellectuals and Spirituals. Men may represent the bodies of others, in Civil and Temporal
Affairs, in the acts of a Kingdom; and thus a bodily obedience is always due to just Authority: but there is none that can always represent the mind and judgment of another in the vitals and inwards of Religion; for I speak not of representations in outward Order and Discipline. A General Council does and may produce iudicium forense; but still there is reserved to every single individual iudicium rationale: for can you think that God will excuse any one from Error upon such an account as this, Such a Doctour told me thus; Such a piece of Antiquity enform'd me so; Such a General Council determin'd me to this. Where was thine own Lamp all this while? Where was thy Ratio illuminata et governata secundum normas bona et necessariae consequentiae rationali creaturae impressas? Yet this must be gratefully acknowledged, that these General Councils have been of publick influence, of most admirable use and advantage to the Church of God; though they are not of the very Essence of it: for tis well known, that there were none of them till the days of Constantine. But herein is the benefit of Councils, that they are (or ought to be) a comparing and collecting of many Lights, an uniting and concentricating of the Judgments of many holy, learned, wise Christians with the Holy Ghost breathing amongst them; though not always so fully and powerfully, as that they shall be sure to be privileged from every Error: but being all of them subject to frailty and fallibility, and sometime the major part of them proving the pejor part, there is none bound to give an extemporary assent to their Votes and Suffrages, unless his mind also concur with theirs. That worthy Divine of our own, whom I mentioned before, speaks very fully and clearly to this, Ad nudam praescriptionem aut determinationem alterius, sine lumine privati iudicii, nemo est, qui credere potest, etiamsi cupiat maxime. The most eminent Mirandula will give you the reason of

1 Davenant.
it; For (saies he) *Nemo credit aliquid verum praecise quia vult credere illud esse verum: non est enim in potentia hominis facere aliquid apparere intellectui suo verum, quando ipse voluerit*. But, before there can be Faith in any Soul, there must be *cognitio propositionis credendae*, and there must be *inclinatio intellectus ad assentiendum huic propositioni revelatae et cognitae*. Before you understand the terms of any *Proposition*, you can no more believe it, then if it came to you in an *unknown Tongue*. *A Parrot* may repeat the *Creed* thus—

\begin{quote}
Corvos\textsuperscript{1} poetas et poetridas picas
Cantare credas Pegaseium nectar.
\end{quote}

Though such at length may very safely conclude, as that *talkative Bird* is reported to have done by an *happy and extemporary contingency*; *Operam et oleum perdidi*. This is the misery of those *implicite believers* amongst the *Papists* (‘tis well, if not among some *Protestants* too) that do *in aliorum sententias pedibus potius quam cordibus ire*; dancing in a *circular* kind of Faith; they believing as the *Church* believes, and the *Church* believing as they believe, &c., and this is with them the whole *perfection* of a *Roman Catholic*.

But *Religion*, fram’d according to the *Gospel*, did always *scorn* and *refuse* such *carnal supports* as these are. That *Truth*, that must look the *Sun* in the *face* for ever, can you think, that it will fear a *Candle*? must it stand in the *presence of God*, and will it not endure the *tryal of Men*? Or can you imagine that the *Spouse of Christ* can be so unmerciful as to *pull out* her *Children's Eyes*? though she may very well *restrain* their *Tongues* sometimes, and their *Pens*, if they be too *immodest* and *unruly*. I shall need to say no more then this, that true *Religion* never *was*, nor *will be*, nor *need* be shy of *sound Reason*, which is thus far *Lumen*

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{1} Persius, *Prolog.*, 13, 14.
\end{footnote}
dirigens, as that 'tis oblig'd by the will and command of God himself not to entertain any false Religion, nor any thing under pretense of Religion, that is formally and irreconcileably against Reason; Reason being above humane Testimony and Tradition, and being only subordinate to God himself, and those Revelations that come from God. Now 'tis express blasphemy to say that either God, or the Word of God did ever, or ever will, oppose Right Reason.

CHAPTER XVI.

The Light of Reason is calm and peaceable.

Tis Lumen tranquillum et amicum; 'tis a Candle, not a Comet; it is a quiet and peaceable Light. And though the Candle of the Lord may be too hot for some, yet the Lamp, tis onely maintain'd with soft and peaceable Oyl. There is no jarring in pure Intellectuals; if men were tun'd and regulated by Reason more, there would be more Concord and Harmony in the World. As Man himself is a sociable Creature; so his Reason also is a sociable Light. This Candle would shine more clearly and equally, if the Windes of Passions were not injurious to it. 'Twere a commendable piece of Stoicism, if men could always hush and still those Waves that dash and beat against Reason. If they could scatter all those Clouds that soil and discolour the face and brightnesse of it: would there be such factions and commotions in the State; such Schisms and Ruptures in the Church; such hot and fiery persecutions of some trifling Opinions? If the soft and sober voice of Reason were more attended to, Reason would make some differencies kiss and be friends, 'twould sheath up many a Sword, 'twould quench many a flame, 'twould bind up many a Wound. This Candle of the Lord, 'twould scatter many
a dark suspicion, many a sullen jealousie. Men may fall out in the dark sometimes, they cannot tell for what: if the Candle of the Lord were but amongst them, they would chide one another for nothing then but their former breaches. τὴν ἡπωτήμην ἱστησα τὴν ψυχὴν it calms and composes a Soul; whereas Passion (as the grand Stoick, Zeno, paints it) is ὅρμη πλεονάζουσα, καὶ παρὰ φόσον τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησις an abounding and over-boying impetus, a praeternatural agitation of Soul; animi commotio aversa a recta ratione, et contra naturam, as the Oratour stiles it. The Soul, 'tis toss'd with Passion; but it anchors upon Reason. This gentleness and quietness of Reason doth never commend it self more, then in its agreeing and complying with Faith; in not opposing those high and transcendent Mysteries, that are above its own reach and capacity: nay, it had always so much humility and modesty waiting and attending upon it, that it would always submit and subordinate it self to all such Divine Revelations, as were above its own Sphere. Though it could not grasp them, though it could not pierce into them; yet it ever resolv'd with all gratitude to admire them, to bow its head and to adore them. One Light does not oppose another. Lumen fidei et Lumen rationis, may shine both together; though with far different brightnesse. The Candle of the Lord, tis not impatient of a superiour Light; 'twould both ferre parem et priorem. The light of the Sun, that indeed is Lumen Monarchicum, a supreme and sovereign Light; that with its golden Scepter rules all created Sparkles, and makes them subject and obedient to the Lord and Rule of Light. Created Intellectuals depend upon the brightness of God's Beams, and are subordinate to them. Angelical Star-light is but Lumen Aristocraticum; it borrows and derives its glory from a more vast and majestical Light. As they differ from one another in glory; so all of them infinitely differ from the Sun in glory. Yet 'tis far above
the *Lumen Democraticum*, that Light, which appears unto the *Sons of men*; 'tis above their *Lamps* and *Torches*, poor and contemptible Lights, if left to themselves. For do but imagine such a thing as this, that this external and corporeal *World* should be adjudg'd never to see the *Sun* more, never to see one *Star* more; if *God* should shut all the *Windows of Heaven*, and spread out nothing but *clouds* and *curtains*, and allow it nothing but the light of a *Candle*: how would the *World* look like a *Cyclops* with its *Eye* put out? 'Tis now but an obscure prison with a few *grates* to look out at; but what would it be then, but a *capacious Grave*, but a *nethermost Dungeon*? Yet this were a more grateful Shade, a *pleasant* and more *comely Darkness*, then for a *Soul* to be condemned to the solitary Light of its own *Lamp*, so as not to have any supernatural irradiations from its God. *Reason* does not refuse any auxiliary *Beams*; it joys in the company of its fellow-*Lamp*, it delights in the presence of an intellectual *Sun*, which will so far *favour* it, as that 'twill *advance* it and *nourish* it and *educate* it; 'twill *encrease* it and *inflame* it, and will by no means *put it out*. A *Candle* neither can, nor will put out the *Sun*: and an intellectual *Sun* can, but will *not* put out the *Lamp*. The light of *Reason* doth no more prejudice the light of *Faith*, then the light of a *Candle* doth extinguish the light of a *Star*. The *same Eye* of a *Soul* may look sometimes upon a *Lamp*, and sometimes upon a *Star*; one while upon a *first Principle*, another while upon a *revealed Truth*; as hereafter it shall always look upon the *Sun*, and see God face to face. *Grace* doth not come to pluck up *Nature* as a *Weed*, to root out the *Essences of Men*; but it comes to graft *Spirituals* upon *Morals*, that so, by their *mutual supplies* and *intercourse*, they may produce *most noble* and *generous fruit*. Can you tell me why the *Shell* and the *Kernell* may not dwell together? why the *Bodies* of *Nature* may not be quickened
by the *Soul of Grace?* Did you never observe an *Eye* using a *Prospective Glasse* for the *discovering* and *amplifying* and *approximating* of some *remote* and yet *desireable Object*? and did you perceive any *opposition* between the *Eye* and the *Glass*? Was there not rather a *loving correspondence* and *communion* between them? Why should there be any *greater strife* between *Faith* and *Reason*; seeing they are *Brethren*? Do they not both *spring* from the same *Father of Lights*? and can the *Fountain of Love* and *Unity* send forth any *irreconcileable streams*? Do you think that *God did ever intend to divide a rational Being, to tear and rend a Soul in pieces, to scatter Principles of discord and confusion* in it? If *God be pleased to open some other passage* in the *Soul*, and to give it another *Eye*, does that *prejudice* the former? *Man*, you know, is *ordained* to a *choice end*, to a *nobler happiness*, then for the *present* he can *attain unto*, and therefore he cannot expect that *God should now communicate* himself in such *bright* and *open discoveries*, in such *glorious manifestations* of himself as he means to give *hereafter*. But he must be content, for the *present*, to behold those *infinite treasures* of reserved *Love*, in a *darker* and more *shadowy way* of *Faith*, and not of *Vision*. *Nature* and *Reason* are not sufficiently *proportion'd* to such *blessed Objects*: for there are such *weights of Glory* in them as do *opprimere ingenium humanum*; there are such *Depths*, such *Pleonasm's*, such *Oceans* of all *Perfections* in a *Deity*, as do infinitely exceed all *Intellectual capacity*, but its *own*. The most that *Man's Reason* can do, is to fill the *Understanding* to the *brim*; but *Faith, that throws the Soul into the Ocean*, and *lets it roll, and bath itself in the vastnesse and fulnesse* of a *Deity*. Could the *Sons of men* have extracted all the *Spirits of Reason*, and made them *meet and jump* in one *Head*; nay, could *Angels* and *Men* have *united* and *concentricated* all their *Reason*: yet they would never have been able to *spy out* such *pr-
found and mysterious excellencies; as Faith beholds in one twinkling of her Eye. Evangelical Beauties shine through a veyl that's upon their face; you may see the precious Objects of Faith, like so many Pearls and Diamonds, sparkling and glittering in the Dark. Reveal'd Truths shine with their own Beams, they do not borrow their Primitive and original Lustre from this Candle of the Lord, but from the purer Light, wherewith God hath cloathed and attir'd them, as with a Garment. God crowns his own Revelations with his own Beams. The Candle of the Lord, it doth not discover, it doth not oppose them, it cannot eclipse them. They are no sparks of Reason's striking; but they are flaming Darts of Heaven's shooting, that both open and enamour the Soul. They are Stars of Heaven's lighting. Men behold them at a great distance twinkling in the Dark. Whatsoever comes in God's name does aut invenire viam aut facere. Whatever God reveals in his Word, tis supra providentiam rerum communem constitutum. Tis not the road of Nature; and therefore, for the welcoming and entertaining of it (as a Noble Author of our own doth very well observe) explicatur sensus quidam supernaturalis, et θαυμάως, there's an opening of a new Window in the Soul, an Intellectual Eye looks out at the Window, and is much pleased and affected with the oriency of that Light, that comes springing and rushing in upon it. As there's a νόμος γραπτός: so there's an εφαγμένον γραπτόν too: the one 'tis written by the Pen of Nature; the other by the finger of the Spirit: for ubi definit Natura, ibi incipit Gratia; and this Second Edition set out by Grace, 'tis auctior et emendator, yet so as it doth not at all contradict the first Edition, that was set out by Nature; for this is the voice of Nature it self, that Whatsoever God reveals must needs be true, and this Common Principle is the bottom and foundation of all Faith to build upon. The

1 Lord Brooke (Brown).
Soul desires no greater satisfaction, then an 'Aντίς ἐφη' for, if God himself say it, who can question it? who dare contradict it? Reason will not, Reason cannot; for it does most immovably acknowledge a Deity and the unquestionable Truth of a Deity. In all believing there is an assent, a yielding, to him that speaks, by virtue of his own Authority, though he don't prove it, though he don't evince it. Now men themselves look upon it as a contempt and injury, not to have their words taken; and Reason it self dictates thus much, that we are to believe such an one whom we have no reason to distrust: for without some Faith there would be no commerce, nor trafficking in the World; there's no trading without some trusting. A general and total Incredulity would threaten a present and fatal dissolution to humane Society. Matters of fact are as certain in being and reality, as Demonstrations; yet in appearance most of them can never be prov'd or evinced any other way, then by meer Testimony. . . . So that all the stresse and difficulty will be to know whether God reveals such a thing or no, for here Reason (corrupt Reason I mean,) is wont to slip and evade, and when it cannot frame a conceit adequate and commensurate to some transcendent and superlative Mysteries, it would then fain cloud them and eclipse them, that it may quench and avoid the dazzling brightness of them. It would fain make them stoop and condescend to its own capacity, and therefore it puts some inferior Notion upon them. When it cannot grasp what God saith, it then presently questions, whether God say so, or no; whether that be the mind of his Word. . . . But the Law of sound reason and Nature does oppose such unworthy dealings as these are: for men look upon't very heinously to have their words mis-interpreted, to have their meaning wrested and violenc'd. Can you think that the Majesty of Heaven will allow or endure, that a Creature should study, or busie it self in perverting his Words, in
corrupting his meaning, in blending it and mixing it with the crude imaginations of their own Brain? That Spirit, which breath'd out the Word at first, and which convinces and satisfies the Soul, that 'tis the Word of God; the very same Spirit is the Interpreter of it, he is the Commentator upon it. The Text is his and the Gloss is his, and whoever shall call this a private Spirit, must needs be a bold Blasphemer, a Jesuit, an Atheist. But they, that know what the Spirit of God is, will easily grant, that the Spirit of God unsheathes his own Sword; that he polishes Evangelical Pearls; that he anoints and consecrates the eye of the Soul for the welcoming and entertaining of such precious Objects. Tis true, indeed, that some Explications are so impertinent and distorted, as that a profane and carnal Eye may presently discern, that there was either some violence or deceit used in them; as who cannot tell when any Author is extremely vex'd and wrong'd? But, if there be any such obscurity as may give just occasion of doubting and diffidence; who then can be fitter to clear and unfold it then the Author himself? nay, who can explain his mind certainly, but he himself? Is it not thus in Spirituals much rather? When God scatters any Twilight, any Darkness there, is it not by a more plentiful shedding abroad of his own Beams? Such a Knot, as a created Understanding cannot untie, the edge of the Spirit presently cuts asunder. Nor yet is Providence wanting in external means, which by the goodnesse and power of God were annexed, as sigilla verbi: miracles I mean, which are upon this account very suitably and proportionably subservient to faith, they being above natural power, as revealed Truths are above natural Understanding. The one's above the hand of Nature, as the other's above the head of Nature. But Miracles, though they be very potent, yet they are not always prevalent, for there were many spectatours of Christ's miracles, which yet, like so
many Pharaohs, were hardened by them, and some of them, that beheld them, were no more moved by them, then some of them, who onely hear of them, will not at all attend to them. So that onely the seal of the Spirit can make a firm impression upon the Soul, who writes his own Word upon the soul with a conquering and triumphant Sun-beam, that is impatient either of cloud or shadow. Be open therefore, ye everlasting Doors, and stand wide open, ye intellectual Gates, that the spirit of Grace and Glory, with the goodly train of his revealed Truths, may enter in. There's foundation for all this in a Principle of Nature; for we must still put you in mind of the concord that is betwixt Faith and Reason. Now this is the voice of Reason, that God can, and that none but God can, assure you of his own mind; for if he should reveal his mind by a Creature, there will still be some tremblings and waverings in the Soul, unlesse he does withall satisfy a Soul, that such a Creature does communicate his mind truly and really, as it is: so that ultimately the Certainty is resolv'd into the voice of God, and not into the courtesie of a Creature. This Holy Spirit of God creates in the Soul a Grace answerable to these transcendent objects: you cannot but know the name of it, tis called Faith, Supernaturalis forma fidei, as Mirandula the Younger stiles it, which closes and complies with every word, that drops from the voice or pen of a Deity, and which facilitates the Soul to assent to revealed Truths, so as that with an Heavenly inclination, with a delightful propension it moves to them, as to a Centre. Reason cannot more delight in a Common Notion or a Demonstration, then Faith does in revealed Truth. As the Unity of a Godhead is demonstrable and clear to the Eye of Reason: so the Trinity of Persons, that is, three glorious relations in one God, is as certain to an Eye of Faith. Tis as certain to this eye of Faith that Christ is truly God; as it was visible to an
eye both of Sense and Reason, that he is truly Man. Faith spies out the Resurrection of the Body; as Reason sees the immortality of the Soul. I know there are some Authors of great worth, and Learning, that endeavour to maintain this Opinion, that Revealed Truths, though they could not be found by Reason; yet, when they are once revealed, that Reason can then evince them and demonstrate them. But I much rather encline to the Determinations of Aquinas and multitudes of others, that are of the same Judgment, that humane Reason, when it has stretch'd it self to the utmost, is not at all proportion'd to them; but, at the best, can give onely some faint illustrations, some weak adumbrations of them. They were never against Reason, they were always above Reason. 'Twill be employment enough, and 'twill be a noble employment too, for Reason to redeem and vindicate them from those thorns and difficulties, with which some subtle ones have vex'd them and encompass'd them. Twill be honour enough for Reason to shew, that Faith does not oppose Reason; and this it may shew, it must shew this; for else of òεω, those that are within the inclosure of the Church, will never rest satisfied; nor of òεω, Pagans, Mahumitans, Jews, will never be convinc'd. God, indeed, may work upon them by immediate revelation; but man can onely prevail upon them by reason: yet 'tis not to be expected, nor is it required, that every weak and new-born Christian, that gives real assent and cordial entertainment to these mystical Truths, should be able to deliver them from those seeming contradictions, which some cunning Adversaries may cast upon them. There are some things demonstrable, which to many seem impossible; how much more easily may here be some matters of Faith, which every one cannot free from all difficulties? Tis sufficient therefore for such, that they so far forth understand them, as to be sure, that they are not against Reason, and that principally upon this
account, because they are sure God has revealed them. And others, that are of more advanced and elevated intellectual, may give such explications of them, as may disentangle them from all Repugnancy, though they cannot display them in their full glory. . . . You see there are mutual embraces 'twixt the Law and the Gospel: Nature and Grace may meet together; Reason and Faith have kissed each other.
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