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
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R. Cudworth, D.D.


THE
WORKS
OF
RALPH CUDWORTH, D.D.

CONTAINING
THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL
SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE,
SERMONS, &c.

A NEW EDITION, WITH REFERENCES TO THE SEVERAL QUOTATIONS IN THE
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM, AND A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,

BY THOMAS BIRCH, M. A. F. R. S.

IN FOUR VOLUMES:
VOL. I.



OXFORD, D. A. TALBOYS.

MDCCCXXIX.



TO THE
RIGHT REVEREND FATHER IN GOD,
JOSEPH,
LORD BISHOP OF BRISTOL,
AND
DEAN OF ST. PAUL'S.

MY LORD,

THE value of the present work is so universally acknowledged, that to offer any thing here in recommendation of it, might seem equally to reflect upon your Lordship's judgment, as on the character of the excellent Author. It will be a sufficient honour and satisfaction to me, to have contributed in any measure to the improvement of the Intellectual System, and to the spreading a performance, one of the noblest of the last age, and at least as necessary to the present, for supporting the grand foundations of all religion and virtue, against ignorance, sophistry, and every pernicious effect of vice and sensuality upon the human understanding. Such a design, I persuade myself, wants

no apology, especially to a person whose writings display the evidence, and whose character exemplifies the beauty and dignity, of Christianity. I shall therefore only add, that, upon these accounts, I am, with the highest esteem and veneration,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most obedient

and most humble servant,

THOMAS BIRCH.

London, Nov. 6, 1742.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE former Edition of the *Intellectual System*, though the most valuable treasure of the ancient theology and philosophy extant in any language, had one considerable defect, (frequent amongst even the best writers of the last age,) that the references of its numerous quotations were very few, and those obscure and imperfect. Such as were wanting are therefore supplied in the present edition with the utmost exactness, chiefly from Dr. Laurence Mosheim's Latin translation of this work; those of the Author are included in [] to render them more clear and determinate.

The dedication to the House of Commons, in 1647, of the sermon on 1 John ii. 3, 4. omitted in the second and third editions, is restored likewise from the first.

To the whole is prefixed a new life of the Author, wherein is given a very particular account of his several excellent works.

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AN
ACCOUNT
OF
THE LIFE AND WRITINGS
OF
R. CUDWORTH, D. D.

DR. Ralph Cudworth was son of Dr. Ralph Cudworth, at first fellow of Emanuel College, in the University of Cambridge, and afterwards minister of St. Andrew's Church in that town, and at last rector of Aller, in Somersetshire, and chaplain to James I.^a He died in August or September, 1624.^b Though he was a man of genius and learning, he published only a supplement to Mr. W. Perkins's Commentary upon St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, of which, as well as several other works of that divine, he was editor.

Our Author's mother was of the family of Machell, and had been nurse to Prince Henry, eldest son of James I. and after Dr. Cudworth's death, married to Dr. Stoughton.^c Our Author himself was born at Aller, in the year 1617, and educated with great care by his father-in-law, Dr. Stoughton; and in 1630 was admitted pensioner in Ema-

^a See Dr. John Laurence Mosheim's preface to his Latin translation of Dr. Cudworth's Intellectual System. The pages of this preface are not numbered.

^b Wood, *Fasti Oxon.* vol. 1. col. 187. second edit. London, 1721.

^c Mosheim *ubi supra.*

nuel College, the Doctor giving him this testimony, "that he was as well grounded in school-learning as any boy of his age, that went to the University." July 5, 1632, he was matriculated as a student in the University, and applied himself to all parts of literature with such vigour, that in 1639, he was created master of arts with great applause. Soon after he was chosen fellow of his college, and became an eminent tutor there, and had at one time eight-and-twenty pupils; an instance scarce ever known before, even in the largest colleges of the University. Among these was Mr. W. Temple, afterwards famous for his embassies and writings. Not long after, he was presented to the rectory of North Cadbury, in Somersetshire, worth three hundred pounds per annum.

In 1642, he published *A Discourse concerning the true Notion of the Lord's Supper*. It was printed at London, in quarto, with only the initial letters of his name. Bochart, Spencer, Selden, and other eminent writers quote this discourse with great commendations; and my most ingenious and learned friend, Mr. Warburton, in a letter of excellent remarks upon our Author, which he favoured me with, styles it a masterpiece in its kind; and observes, that he has undoubtedly given the true nature and idea of the sacrament, and supported it with all his learning. The same year likewise appeared his treatise, intitled, *The Union of Christ and the Church a Shadow*, by R. C. printed at London, in quarto.

He took the degree of batchelor of divinity in the year 1644, upon which occasion he maintained at the commencement in the University the two following theses: 1. *Dantur boni et mali rationes*

æternæ et indispensabiles: II. Dantur substantiæ incorporeæ suâ naturâ immortales. Hence it appears, that even at that time he was examining and revolving in his mind those important subjects, which he so long afterwards cleared up with such uncommon penetration in his Intellectual System, and other works.

In the same year, 1644, he was appointed master of Clare Hall, in Cambridge, in the room of Dr. Paske, who had been ejected by the parliamentary visitors. In 1645, Dr. Metcalf having resigned the regius professorship of the Hebrew tongues, Mr. Cudworth was unanimously nominated Oct. 15, by the seven electors, to succeed him. From this time he abandoned all the functions of a minister, and applied himself only to his academical employments and studies, especially that of the Jewish antiquities. And we find the following passage in a manuscript letter of Mr. John Worthington, afterwards master of Jesus College, dated May 12, 1646. "Our learned friend, Mr. Cudworth, reads every Wednesday in the schools. His subject is, Templum Hierosolymitanum." When his affairs required his absence from the University, he substituted Mr. Worthington in his room. March 31, 1647, he preached before the House of Commons, at Westminster, upon a day of public humiliation, a sermon upon John ii. 3, 4, for which he had the thanks of that House returned him on the same day. This sermon was printed the same year, at Cambridge, in quarto, with the following motto in the title-page, 'Ευσέβει, ὃ τέκνον' ὁ γὰρ εὐσεβῶν ἀκρῶς Χριστιανίζει' and with a dedication to the House of Commons, which was omitted in the second and third edi-

tions, but restored in the present. In 1651, he took the degree of doctor of divinity. Though the places, which he held in the University, were very honourable, yet he found the revenue of them not sufficient to support him; for which reason he had thoughts of leaving Cambridge entirely; and, indeed, actually retired from it, though but for a short time. This appears from two manuscript letters of Mr. Worthington, the former dated Jan. 6. 1651, where he writes thus: "If through want of maintenauce, he (R. C.) should be forced to leave Cambridge, for which place he is so eminently accomplished with what is noble and exemplarily academical, it would be an ill omen." In the latter, dated Jan. 30, 1654, is this passage: "After many tossings, Dr. Cudworth is, through God's providence, returned to Cambridge, and settled in Christ's College, and by his marriage more settled and fixed." For upon the decease of Dr. Sam. Bolton, master of that college, in 1654, our Author was chosen to succeed him, and married the same year. In this station he spent the rest of his life, proving highly serviceable to the University and the whole church of England. In Jan. 1654, he was one of the persons nominated by a committee of the parliament to be consulted about the English translation of the Bible; as appears from the following passage of Whitelocke.^a

"Jan. 16th. At the grand committee for religion, Ordered, that it be referred to a sub-committee to send for, and advise with, Dr. Walton, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Castell, Mr. Clark, Mr. Poulk, Dr. Cudworth, and such others as they shall think fit; and to consider of the translations and

^a Memorials of the English Affairs, p. 654, edit. Lond. 1732, in fol.

impressions of the Bible, and to offer their opinions therein to this committee; and that it be especially commended to the Lord Commissioner Whitelocke to take care of this business.

“ This committee, (says Whitelocke,) often met at my house, and had the most learned men in the oriental tongues to consult with in this great business, and divers excellent and learned observations of some mistakes in the translations of the Bible in English; which yet was agreed to be the best of any translation in the world. I took pains in it; but it became fruitless by the parliament’s dissolution.”

Our Author had a great share in the friendship and esteem of John Thurloe, Esq. secretary of state to the protectors, Oliver and Richard Cromwell, who frequently corresponded with him, and consulted him with regard to the characters of such persons in the University, as were proper to be employed in political and civil affairs. For which purpose, Dr. Cudworth wrote, among others, the following letter.^a

“ HONOURED SIR,

“ I must, in the first place, crave your pardon for the delay of this, my second letter, thus long, (for, I suppose, you have received my former in answer to yours,) which, had not some unavoidable occasions hindered me, had come sooner to your hands. Sir, I think there are divers men in the University at this time, of singular parts and accomplishments for learning; some of which are so farre engaged in divinity, that they cannot well divert themselves to other professions or employ-

^a Thurloe’s Manuscript State Papers, vol. xxxviii. p. 259.

ments; others perhaps so much addicted to a contemplative life, that they could not so well apply themselves to political and civil affairs. But for those, which I conceive to be more free and undetermined, I shall here present you with a catalogue of some of their names, such as I conceive best qualified for civil employments. First, Mr. Page, a fellow of King's Colledge, an excellent Latinist, and one, that hath travelled abroad for above ten yeares together. He is above forty yeares of age; but how he hath been or is affected to the parliament, or present government, I cannot tell. He is now absent from the University, and, I think, at present with the Earle of Devonshire. Secondly, Dr. Bagge, fellow of Caius College, and doctor of physick, a singularly good and ready Latinist; and I beleve there is none of his yeares in England equall to him in the profession of physick. He hath excellent parts, but I know not certainly, whether being so eminent in that way, (though a very young doctor) he would put himselfe upon state-employment; neither do I fully know how he is affected. There are of Trinity Colledge severall, that are very good Latinists, and well furnisht with all the politer learning; as Mr. Valentine (a sober discreet man) and Mr. Linne (well known for an excellent poet.)

“ Mr. Mildmay, of Peter-house, one, whose inclination seems to be peculiarly carried out towards political and civil employments, a scholar and a discreet man.

“ Mr. Croone, of Emanuell Colledge, a young master of arts, of excellent good parts, and a general scholar.

“ Mr. Miles, fellow of Clare-hall, formerly my

pupill; one that hath no mind to professe divinity, but a very good scholar, and also a junior master of arts.

“ Lastly, of Christ Colledge there is a young man, that is master of arts this yeare, one Mr. Leigh, that for his standing is very well accomplished, and I doubt not, but in a very little time, would be exceedinge fitte for any such employment, as you would designe him for.

“ Many more names I could set down; but these may suffice for your choice, and you may, if you thinke good, enquire further concerning any of them from some others, and, if you please, from this gentleman, whom I have for that purpose desired to present this to you, Mr. George Rust,* fellow of Christ Colledge, who can further informe and satisfy you concerning them. He is an understanding, pious, discreet man, and himselfe I know to bee a man of exceeding good parts, and a generalle scholar, but one that seemes not so willing to divert himselfe from preaching and divinity, which he hath of late intended; otherwise I know his parts are such, as would enable him for any employment.

“ If you please to enquire further from him, and by him signify your further pleasure to me, I shall be ready in this or any thing else, that I am able, to expresse my selfe,

“ Sir,

“ Your affectionately devoted friend and servant,

“ R. CUDWORTH.”

Dr. Cudworth likewise recommended^b to the

* Afterwards Dean of Dromore, in Ireland.

^b Thurloe's Manuscript State Papers, vol. xliii. p. 329, of the printed Papers, vol. v. p. 522, 523.

secretary, for the place of chaplain to the English merchants at Lisbon, Mr. Zachary Cradock, afterwards provost of Eton Colledge, and famous for his uncommon genius and learning, and his abilities as a preacher.

In Jan. 1658, he wrote the following letter to Secretary Thurloe, upon his design of publishing some Latin discourses in defence of Christianity against Judaism.*

“ SIR,

“ Having this opportunity offered by Doctour Solater, who desires to waite upon you, upon your kind invitation, which I acquainted him with, I could do no lesse than accompany him with these few lines to present my service to you. I am perswaded, you will be well satisfied in his ingenuity, when you are acquainted with him. Now I have this opportunity, I shall use the freedom to acquaint you with another busines. I am perswaded by friends to publish some discourses, which I have prepared in Latine, that will be of a polemical nature in defense of Christianity against Judaisme, explaining some cheef places of scripture controverted between the Jewes and us, (as Daniel's prophecy of the 70 weekes, never yet sufficiently cleared and improved) and withall extricating many difficulties of chronologie. Which taske I the rather undertake, not onely because it is suitable to my Hebrew profession, and because I have lighted on some Jewish writings upon the argument, as have scarcely ever been seen by any Christians, which would the better inable me fully to confute them ; but also because I conceive it a

* Thurloe's Manuscript State Papers, vol. lxiii. p. 43.

worke proper and suitable to this present age. However, though I should not be able myselfe to be any way instrumental to these great transactions of Providence (not without cause, hoped for of many) amongst the Jews; yet I perswade myselfe my pains may not be altogether unprofitable for the setting and establishing of Christians; or at least I shall give an account of my spending such vacant hours, as I could redeeme from my preaching and other occasions, and the perpetual distractions of the bursarship, which the statutes of this Colledge impose upon me. It was my purpose to dedicate these fruits of my studies to his highnes, (to whose noble father I was much obliged) if I may have leave, or presume so to doe; which I cannot better understand by any than yourselfe, if you shall think it convenient, when you have an opportunity to insinuate any such thing, which I permitte wholly to your prudence. I intend, God willing, to be in London some time in March, and then I shall waite upon you to receive your information. In the mean time craving pardon for this prolixity of mine, and freedom, I subscribe myselfe,

“ Your really devoted friend and humble servant,
“ R. CUDWORTH.”

Jan. 20, 1658, Christ's Coll. Cambr.

The Discourse concerning Daniel's prophecy of the seventy weeks, mentioned in this letter, and which is still extant in manuscript, is highly commended by Dr. Henry More, in his preface, sec. 18. p. xvi. to his Explanation of the grand Mystery of Godliness, printed at London, 1660, in folio, where he observes, that Dr. Cudworth in

that Discourse, which was read in the public schools of the University, had undeceived the world, which had been misled too long by the over-great opinion they had of Joseph Scaliger, and that taking Funccius's Epocha, he had demonstrated the manifestation of the Messiah to have fallen out at the end of the sixty-ninth week, and his passion in the midst of the last, in the most natural and proper sense thereof; "which demonstration of his, is of as much price and worth in theology, as either the circulation of the blood in physic, or the motion of the earth in natural philosophy."

Upon the restoration of Charles II. he wrote a copy of verses, published in *Academiæ Cantabrigiænsis ΣΩΣΤΡΑ, sive ad Carolum II. reduncem de Regnis ipsi, Musis per ipsum restitutis, Gratulatio*, printed at Cambridge, 1660, in quarto. In 1662, he was presented by Dr. Gilbert Sheldon, bishop of London, to the vicarage of Ashwell, in Hertfordshire,^a to which he was admitted on the 1st of December that year.

In the beginning of the year 1665, he had a design to publish a discourse concerning moral good and evil, as appears from the following extracts of letters written by him and by Dr. Henry More, fellow of his college.^b

Dr. Cudworth, in a letter to Dr John Worthington, January, 166⁴.

"You know, I have had this design concerning good and evil, or natural ethicks, a great while; which I begun above a year agoe, (when I

^a Newcourt, Repertorium, vol. ii. p. 462.

^b Communicated by my very learned friend, Mr. John Ward, F.R.S. and professor of Rhetoric in Gresham College.

made the first sermon in the chapel about the argument) to study over anew, and dispatch a discourse about it. No man had so frequently exhorted me to it, and so earnestly, as this friend.— But about three months since unexpectedly he told me on a suddain, he had begun a discourse on the same argument. The next day in writing I imparted my mind more fully and plainly to him. Whereupon he came to me, and told me, he would speak with me about it after a day or two. So he did; and then excused the business; that he could not tell, whether I would dispatch and finish it or no, because I had been so long about it; that Mr. Fullwood and Mr. Jenks, had sollicitated him to do this, and that you were very glad, that he would undertake it. But now he understood I was resolved to go through with it, he was very glad of it, that he would desist, and throw his into a corner. All this I impart to you privately, because a common friend. I have not spoken to any body else but Mr. Standish, and something to Mr. Jenks and Fullwood.”

Dr. H. More, in a letter to Dr. Worthington, Jan. 24, 1663.

“ I understand, by Mr. Standish’s letter, that he, unawares, speaking to the master^a of my *Enchiridion Ethicum*, he shewed again his disgust, &c.—that, if I persisted in the resolution of publishing my book, he would desist in his, though he had most of it then ready to send up to be licensed that week. I pray you, spur him up to set his to the press. For my part, it is well known, I have no designe at all but to serve the publick;

* Dr. Cudworth.

and that I entered upon the task extremely against my own will, and yet I have finished it all but a chapter. Whether, or when, I shall publish it, I shall have leisure enough to consider."

Dr. More, in a letter to Dr. Worthington, Feb. 7, 166 $\frac{2}{3}$.

"Some few friends at Cambridge were exceeding earnest with me to write a short ethicks, alleging no small reason for it. I did not only heartily reject them more than once, but with great zeal, if not rudeness, alleging several things, which were too long to write, indeed in a manner vilifying the project, preferring experience of life before all such fine systems; alleging also, that Dr. Cudworth had a design for the greatest curiosity of that subject. But nothing would content them but my setting upon the work, that it was uncertain, when Dr. Cudworth's would come out, and besides, mine being a small treatise, running through the whole body of ethicks, they would not interfere one with another. For my part, till I had by chance told Dr. Cudworth of my purpose, (which I did simply, thinking nothing) and how many chapters I had finished, I knew nothing either of the time, or the scope of his writing, or if he intended a general ethicks. But the effect of those friends' earnestness (to tell you plainly how the case stood) was this: a day or two after their last importunity, I, waking in the morning, and some of their weightiest allegations recurring to my mind, and also remembering, with what an excessive earnestness one of them solicited me to this work (in which I thought there might be something more than ordinary, and that

he was actuated in this business, I knew not how,) I began seriously to think with myself of the matter, and at last was so conscientiously illa-queated therein, that I could not absolutely free myself therefrom to this very day. Nor was this only an act of mere conscience, but of present self-denial. For it did very vehemently cross other great and innocent pleasures, that I promised myself in a certain order of my studies, which I had newly proposed to myself at that very time. But when I was once engaged, I proceeded not without some pleasure."

Dr. More, in a letter to Dr. Worthington, May 10, 1665.

"I thank you for your freedom both to him and to me. It never came into my mind to print this *Enchiridion*, till his book was out, unless he would have professed his like of the project. I have now transcribed it all. Mr. Jenks and Mr. Fullwood are exceeding earnest to see it, and would transcribe it for their present satisfaction. But, if they should do so, and it be known, it would, it may be, disgust Dr. Cudworth, whom I am very loth any way to grieve. But if yourself have a mind to see it, and could get a fair and true copy transcribed of it, I would willingly pay the transcriber, and the copy should be your's; for I am loth, that what I have writ on so edifying a subject should be lost."

Irreligion began now to lift up its head; but the progress of it was opposed by no person with greater force and learning than by our Author. For this purpose, in 1678, he published at London,

in folio, his *True Intellectual System of the Universe*:—The first part, wherein all the reason and philosophy of atheism is confuted, and its impossibility demonstrated. The imprimatur by Dr. Samuel Parker, chaplain to Archbishop Sheldon, is dated May 29, 1671, seven years before the publication of this work; which met with great opposition from some of the courtiers of King Charles II. who endeavoured to destroy the reputation of it, when it was first published.^a Nor has it escaped the censures of writers of different parties since that time.

The first piece, which appeared against it, was from a Roman catholic, in a *Letter to Mr. R. Cudworth, D. D.* printed at the end of a tract, entitled, *Anti-Haman*; or, an *Answer to Mr. G. Burnet's Mystery of Iniquity Unveiled*; wherein is shewed the Conformity of the Doctrine, Worship, and Practice of the Roman Catholic Church, with those of the purest Times; the Idolatry of the Pagans is truly stated, and the Imputation of Pagan Idolatry clearly confuted; and the Reasons are given, why Catholics avoid the Communion of the Protestant Church. To which is annexed, a *Letter to R. Cudworth, D. D.* by W. E. Student in Divinity. With Leave of Superiors, 1679, in octavo. This writer attacks Dr. Cudworth's assertion, that though very few of the ancient philosophers thought God to be corporeal, as Epicurus, Strato, &c. yet, that the greatest part of them believed him to be a pure spirit, and adored the only true God, under the names of Jupiter, Minerva, Osiris and Venus. In opposition to which, his antago-

^a Vide Joannis Clerici Vitam, ad ann. 1711, p. 129, edit. Amstelod. 1711, in octavo.

nist maintains,^a “that although all Pagans (nay all men) had naturally a knowledge of the true God, yet those they adored, were men;” in support of which, he urges four proofs taken, 1. From the diversity of their sexes; 2. From their generation; 3. From their death; 4. From their rites. He likewise attempts to confute what Dr. Cudworth has strenuously defended throughout his book, that the unity of God was a prime article of the Pagan creed.

But let us now see, in how severe a manner he was treated, even by a Protestant divine, Mr. John Turner, in his discourse of the Messiah.^b He tells us,^c “we must conclude Dr. Cudworth to be himself a Tritheistic; a sect, for which, I believe, he may have a kindness, because he loves hard words, or something else, without either *stick* or *trick*, which I will not name, because his book pretends to be written against it.” And again,^d that, “the most that charity itself can allow the Doctor, if it were to step forth, and speak his most favourable character to the world, is, that he is an Arian, a Socinian, or a Deist.”

Mr. Dryden likewise tells us,^e that our Author “has raised such strong objections against the being of a God and providence, that many think he has not answered them.” And the late earl of Shaftesbury, in his *Moralists*, a rhapsody,^f has the following passage:—“You know the com-

^a P. 335, &c.

^b See p. 16, 17, 19, 162. edit. London, 1685, in 8vo.

^c P. 17.

^d P. 19.

^e Dedication of his translation of Virgil's *Æneid*, vol. ii. p. 378. edit. London, 1730, in 8vo.

^f Part ii. sec. 3. *Characteristics*, vol. ii. p. 262. edit. London, 1737, in 8vo.

mon fate of those, who dare to appear fair authors. What was that pious and learned man's case, who wrote the Intellectual System of the Universe? I confess, it was pleasant enough to consider, that though the whole world were no less satisfied with his capacity and learning, than with his sincerity in the cause of the Deity; yet was he accused of giving the upper hand to the Atheists, for having only stated their reasons and those of their adversaries fairly together."

Such was the treatment, which our great Author received for his immortal volume: wherein, as Mr. Warburton says,^a with a boldness uncommon indeed, but very becoming a man conscious of his own integrity, and of the truth and evidence of his cause, he launched out into the immensity of the Intellectual System; and, at his first essay, penetrated the very darkest recesses of antiquity, to strip Atheism of all its disguises, and drag up the lurking monster to conviction. Where, though few readers could follow him, yet the very slowest were able to unravel his secret purpose—to tell the world—that he was an Atheist in his heart, and an Arian in his book. However, thus ran the popular clamour against this excellent person. Would the reader know the consequence? Why, the zealots inflamed the bigots:—

'Twas the time's plague, when madmen led the blind:—

The silly calumny was believed; the much-injured Author grew disgusted; his ardour slackened; and the rest and far greatest part of the defence never appeared.

The same gentleman, likewise, in his letter to

^a Preface to vol. ii. of his Divine Legation of Moses, p. 10, 11, 12.

me above cited, observes, that among the other excellences of this work, "all his translations from the Greek writers are wonderfully exact, and a vast judgment and penetration shewn in explaining their sense."

In 1706, there was published at London, in two volumes, in quarto, an abridgment of the Intellectual System, under this title:—A Confutation of the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism; being in a great measure, either an abridgment or an improvement of what Dr. Cudworth offered to that purpose in his true Intellectual System of the Universe. Together with an introduction, in which, among accounts of other matters relating to this treatise, there is an impartial examination of what that learned person advanced, touching the Christian doctrine of a trinity in unity, and the resurrection of the body. By Thomas Wise, B. D. fellow of Exeter College, in Oxford, and chaplain to his Grace, the Duke of Ormond.

In the introduction, Mr. Wise styles Dr. Cudworth's book, the vastest magazine of reasoning and learning, that ever singly appeared against Atheism; and then examines his notions concerning the trinity and the resurrection of the body. With regard to the former, he observes, that Dr. Cudworth having laid down a general proposition, that the heathens universally held but one unmade independent God, comes to shew, that the Platonists, in particular, maintained an unity of the Godhead, in their three Divine hypostases, viz. Monad or Good, Mind, and Soul; notwithstanding that they owned these three hypostases to be numerically distinct, or to have distinct singular essences of their own. To vindicate the

Platonists in this point, he tells us, that the ancient orthodox Fathers of the Christian church, were generally of no other persuasion than this—that that essence or substance of the Godhead, which all the three persons, or hypostases agree in, as each of them is God, was not one singular or individual, but only one common or universal essence or substance.

“ This, (says Mr. Wise,) and other assertions of the like nature in Dr. Cudworth’s Intellectual System, have made so much noise in the world, that there has hardly been a pamphlet or book written for some years about the blessed trinity, especially in England, and in the heterodox way, which does not bring in Dr. Cudworth upon the stage, and vouch his name and quotations for its purpose. While, on the other hand, the truly orthodox (though often through a misunderstanding of his sense) do aim at his doctrine, as a mark of their invectives; and others, who call themselves also by that name, entertaining no little veneration for the very words used by the ancient Fathers, especially when repeated and revived by so learned a person as Dr. Cudworth, and resolving, whatever should come of it, to stand by them, have unhappily fallen into a kind of Tritheism.” Mr. Wise therefore endeavours, as much as possible, to clear up and justify our Author’s doctrine. However, Mr. Robert Nelson, in his life of Bishop Bull,* declares, that Dr. Cudworth’s notion, with regard to the Trinity, was the same with Dr. Samuel Clarke’s, and represents it in the following terms:—That the three persons of the trinity are three distinct spiritual substances; but that the

* Sec. lxi. p. 339, 340, edit. London, 1714, in 8vo.

Father alone is truly and properly God ; that he alone, in the proper sense, is supreme ; that absolute supreme honour is due to him only ; and that he, absolutely speaking, is the only God of the universe, the Son and Spirit being God, but only by the Father's concurrence with them, and their subordination and subjection to him. But to return to Mr. Wise : he next considers our Author's opinion about the resurrection, who, as appears from several passages of his Intellectual System, thought, that the resurrection-body will not consist of the same substance with that which was buried ; and that it will not be a body of flesh, but an ethereal one ; and that the present body is only a seed of the resurrection. However, Mr. Wise shews from other passages in his works, that he has as plainly asserted the resurrection of the same numerical body, as in some places he has denied it.

In the year 1703, &c. Monsieur le Clerc gave large extracts of the Intellectual System in his *Bibliothèque Choisie*, tom. i. ii. iii. v. vii. viii. ix. which engaged him in a dispute with Monsieur Bayle, concerning Dr. Cudworth's notion of plastic natures. Monsieur Bayle, in his *Continuation des Pensées diverses sur les Comètes*,^a had observed, that " the Atheists are very much perplexed, how to account for the formation of animals, which they ascribed to a cause which was not conscious of what it did, and yet followed a regular plan, without knowing according to what plan it went to work. But Dr. Cudworth's Plastic Nature, and Dr. Grew's Vital Principle^b are

^a Tom. i. Sec. 21.

^b See Dr. Nehemiah Grew's *Cosmologia Sacra*, printed at London, 1701, in folio.

exactly in the same case; and thus they take away the whole strength of this objection against the Atheists. For if God could communicate such a plastic power, it follows, that it is not inconsistent with the nature of things, that there be such agents. They may therefore exist of themselves, will the adversary say; whence it would also follow, that the regularity which we observe in the universe, may be the effect of a blind cause, which was not conscious of what it did." Mr. Bayle, however, owned, that Dr. Cudworth and Dr. Grew were not aware of the consequence, which, according to him, followed from their system. Monsieur le Clerc returned an answer in the fifth volume of his *Bibliothèque Choisie*;^a wherein he observed, that the plastic or vital natures, which those two writers admit, cannot in the least favour the Atheists; because these natures are only instruments in the hand of God, and have no power or efficacy but what they receive from him, who rules and directs all their actions. That they are only instrumental causes produced and employed by the chief and First Cause; and that it cannot be said, that a palace has been built up without art, because not only hammers, rules, saws, &c. but even the arms of men, which made use of these instruments, are destitute of knowledge. It is sufficient, that the mind of the builder directed all these things, and employed them in the execution of his design. It is therefore plain, that the Atheists, who deny the being of an intelligent Cause, cannot retort the argument of Dr. Cudworth and Dr. Grew upon them. Monsieur Bayle,

^a P. 283, &c.

in his answer,* endeavoured to shew, that if these writers had considered the plastic natures only as instruments in the hand of God, this system would have been exposed to all the difficulties to which the Cartesian hypothesis is liable, and which they intend to avoid. That therefore we must suppose their opinion to have been, that these natures are active principles, which do not want to be continually set on and directed; but that it is sufficient, if God does but put them in a proper situation, and superintend their actions, to set them right, if it be necessary. This being the case, Monsieur Bayle pretends, that the argument may be retorted against those writers. For, says he, since when the order and regularity of this world are alleged as a proof of the being of a God, it is supposed that a being cannot produce a regular work, without having an idea of it; yet, according to Dr. Cudworth, the plastic natures, which produce plants and animals, have not the least idea of what they do. If it be answered, that they have been created with that faculty by a Being, who knows all, and whose ideas they only put in execution; the Stratonician will reply, that if they do it only as efficient causes, this is as incomprehensible as that which is objected to him; since it is as difficult for any being to perform a scheme, which it does not understand, but which another understands, as it is to perform a scheme which no being at all has any notion of. Since you acknowledge, will the Stratonician say, that God could endow some creatures with a power of producing excellent works, though without any knowledge: you must also confess,

* Hist. des Ouvrages des Scavans, Août. 1704. Art. 7, p. 380, &c.

that there is no necessary connexion between the power of producing excellent works, and the idea and knowledge of their essence, and of the manner of producing them: consequently, you ought not to assert, that these things cannot subsist separately in nature, and that nature cannot have of itself what, according to you, the plastic beings received from God. In short, Monsieur Bayle asked, whether these writers maintained, that the plastic and vital natures are only passive instruments in the hand of God, as Monsieur le Clerc seemed to suppose by his comparison of an architect. Monsieur le Clerc answered,* that, according to Dr. Cudworth, the plastic natures were not passive instruments; but that they are under God's direction, who conducts them, though we cannot explain after what manner. Nor can the Atheists, added he, retort the argument, because God is the author of the regularity and order with which the plastic natures act; whereas, according to the Atheists, matter moves of itself, without any cause to direct it, and to give it a power of moving regularly. This dispute was carried on still further, with some warmth, and a great many repetitions on both sides. But what has been said is sufficient to give the reader a notion of this controversy, for the progress of which he may consult the following books:—*Histoire des Ouvrages des Scavans*, Decemb. 1704, art. 12. *Bibliothèque Choisie*, tom. vii. art. 7. *Répons aux Questions d'un Provincial*, tom. iii. chap. 179. *Bibliothèque Choisie*, tom. ix. art. 10. *Réponse pour Mr. Bayle à Mr. Le Clerc*, p. 31, annexed to the fourth volume of the *Répons. aux Quest.*

* *Biblioth. Choisie*, tom. vi. art. 7, p. 422.

d'un Provincial.—Upon the whole, Mr. Warburton, in his letter to me above cited, is of opinion, that our Author's "Plastic Life of Nature is fully overthrown by Monsieur Bayle, whose superiority in that dispute with Monsieur le Clerc, is clear and indisputable."

Monsieur le Clerc^a expressed his wishes, that some man of learning would translate the Intellectual System into Latin; but this design, though resolved upon and attempted by several persons in Germany,^b was never executed till the year 1733, when Dr. Mosheim published his translation of it under the following title:—*Radulphi Cudworth, Theologiæ Doctoris et in Academiâ Cantabrigiensi Professoris, Systema Intellectuale hujus Universi, seu de veris Naturæ Rerum originibus Commentarii; quibus omnis eorum Philosophia, qui Deum esse negant, funditùs evertitur. Accedunt reliqua ejus Opuscula. Joannes Laurentius Moshemius, Theologiæ Doctor, serenissimi Ducis Brunsvicensis à Consiliis Rerum sanctorum. Abbas Cœnobiorum Vallis S. Mariæ et Lapidis S. Michaelis, omnia ex Anglico Latinè vertit, recensuit, variis Observationibus et Dissertationibus illustravit, et auxit. Jenæ, 2 vols. in folio.* Dr. Mosheim, in his preface, represents the difficulties of translating this work to be very great; and observes some mistakes, which Monsieur Le Clerc has committed with regard to the sense of our Author in his extracts in the *Bibliothèque Choisie*. Monsieur Bourdelin, a member of the French Academy of Inscriptions and *Belles Lettres*, had begun a translation of the In-

^a *Biblioth. Choisie*, tom. i. p. 65.

^b See Dr. Mosheim's preface.

tellectual System into French,^a but was prevented from completing it by his death, which happened in May, 1717.

But to return to our Author: in 1678, he was installed prebendary of Gloucester.^b He died at Cambridge, June 26, 1688; and was interred in the chapel of Christ's College, with the following inscription on his monument:—

“Here lyeth the body of Dr. Ralph Cudworth, late Master of Christ's College, about thirty years Hebrew Professor, and Prebendary of Gloucester. He died the 26th of June, 1688, in the seventy-first year of his age.”

He was a man of very extensive learning, excellently skilled in the learned languages and antiquity, a good mathematician, a subtle philosopher, and a profound metaphysician. He embraced the mechanical or corpuscular philosophy; but, with regard to the Deity, intelligences, genii, ideas, and in short the principles of human knowledge, he followed Plato, and even the latter Platonists.^c A great number of writers commend his piety and modesty; and Bishop Burnet^d having observed, that Dr. Henry More studied to consider religion as a seed of a deiform nature, and in order to this, set young students much on reading the ancient philosophers; chiefly Plato, Tully, and Plotin; and on considering the Christian religion as a doctrine sent from God both to elevate and sweeten human nature, tells us, that

^a See his Eloge in *Hist. de l'Academie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres*, tom. ii. p. 562, edit. Amsterdam.

^b *Survey of the Cathedrals of York, &c.* by Browne Willis, Esq. p. 743, edit. London, 1727, in 4to.

^c Mosheim, *ubi supra*.

^d *History of his Own Time*, vol. i. p. 187.

“Dr. Cudworth carried this on with a great strength of genius, and a vast compass of learning;” and that “he was a man of great conduct and prudence; upon which his enemies did very falsely accuse him of craft and dissimulation.” The late earl of Shaftesbury^a styles him an excellent and learned divine, of highest authority at home and fame abroad.

Besides his sermon on 1 John ii. 3, 4, above-mentioned, he published likewise another, on 1 Cor. xv. 57. the third edition of both which was printed at London, 1676, in folio.

He left several posthumous works, most of which seem to be a continuation of his Intellectual System, of which he had given the world only the first part. One of these was published by Dr. Edward Chandler, bishop of Durham, at London, in 1731, under this title, *A Treatise concerning eternal and immutable Morality*. In the preface^b to which, the Bishop observes, that in this book our Author “proves the falseness of the consequences with respect to natural justice and morality in God, which are deducible from the principles of those that maintain the second sort of Fate, denominated by him Theologic. And thus it may be reckoned to be a sequel in part of his first book against Material Fate. Had it come abroad as early as it was written, it had served for a proper antidote to the poison in some of Mr. Hobbes’s, and others writings, who revived in that age the exploded opinions of Protagoras and other ancient Greeks, and took away the essential and eternal discriminations of moral good and

^a Characteristics, vol. iii. chap. 2, p. 64.

^b P. 9, 10, 11.

evil, of just and unjust, and made them all arbitrary productions of Divine or human will. Against the ancient and modern patrons of this doctrine, no one hath writ better than Dr. Cudworth. His book is indeed a demonstration of the truth of the contrary opinion, and is drawn up with that beauty, clearness, and strength, as must delight as well as convince the reader, if I may judge of the affection of others from the effect it had on me. It will certainly give a just idea of the writer's good sense, as well as vast learning. We are not certain, that this treatise is quoted so perfect as the Author designed it; but it appears from the manuscript, that he transcribed the best part of it with his own hand, as if it was speedily to have been sent to the press."

The titles and subjects of the rest of our Author's manuscripts are as follow:

A Discourse of moral Good and Evil, in several folios, containing near 1000 pages.

Heads of the chapters of one of those books.

Chap. 1. The opinions of the ancient adversaries of natural justice explained, p. 1.

2. Objections against morality, p. 11.

3. Answers to the 1st objection, p. 29.

4. Answer to the 2d and 3d objections, p. 45.

5. Inconsistencies with a commonwealth, p. 49.

6. Justice by God's arbitrary command, p. 79.

7. The 6th and 7th objections answered, p. 112.

8. Pleasure; wherein the ancient Hedonic philosophy is explained, and it is largely debated, whether pleasure is the *summum bonum*, p. 117.

9. Answer to the 9th objection, p. 175.

10. Notion of morality settled, p. 198.

11. Happiness ; and the philosophy of Epicurus concerning it examined and refuted, p. 253.

12. True happiness in Divine life, p. 296.

13. Result of the former discourse ; incorporeal substance Deity, p. 303.

14. Controversy of liberty stated. A new philosophical hypothesis, p. 336.

15. Objections against liberty. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν φαινόμενον.

16. Argument from the phenomenon of incontinency, p. 382.

Heads of another book of Morality, wherein Hobbes's philosophy is explained.

Prolegomena ; to shew, that if nothing is naturally just or unjust, nothing can be made so.—Chap. 2. Not by laws.—Chap. 3. Not by laws of nature.—Chap. 4. Not by covenants.—Chap. 5. To explain his doctrine, generally and particularly.—Chap. 6. State of nature.—Chap. 7. Laws of nature.—Chap. 8. Common representative.—Chap. 9. To discover his equivocations.—Chap. 10. About obligation.—Chap. 11. According to him, there can be no Ethic.—Chap. 12. Judgment on his politics, that no politic can be built on these principles.

A Discourse of Liberty and Necessity, in which the grounds of the Atheistical philosophy are confuted, and morality vindicated and explained. This book contains 1000 pages in folio.

Heads of the chapters of one of the books.

Chap. 1. The necessity of all human actions asserted by three sorts of men, and in different ways :—First, Some Christian theologers of the

latter age. Secondly, The old Zenonian Stoics. Thirdly, The Democritical Physiologers or Atheistical Fatalists, p. 1.

2. Christian Fatalists pleading, p. 37.
3. The Stoical Fatalists pleading, p. 70.
4. Atheistical Fatalists pleading, p. 84.
5. Answer to the phenomena objected, p. 119.
6. Of motion and sense, p. 167.
7. Of intellection, p. 196.
8. Answer to Hobbes's Reflections, p. 305.
9. Morality, p. 317.

Heads of the chapters of another book, De libero Arbitrio.

Chap. 1. Dreams.—2. Indifferences.—3. General account.—4. Particular or full account.—5. Definition and particular account.—6. An imperfection not formally in God.—7. Arguments to prove such a thing.—8. That that, which rules all, is not *ανάγκη ἀπαραίτητος*, but *προνοία ἰλασμός*.—9. Answer to the objection, *μηδέν ἀναίτιον*.—10. Contingencies.—11. Argument for necessity, taken from the nature of God.

Upon Daniel's prophecy of the LXX weeks, wherein all the interpretations of the Jews are considered and confuted, with several of some learned Christians. In two volumes, in folio.

Of the verity of the Christian religion against the Jews. Dr. Cudworth mentions this in his MSS. but it is not yet found.

A Discourse of the Creation of the World, and Immortality of the Soul, in 8vo.

Hebrew learning.

An explanation of Hobbes's notion of God, and of the extension of spirits.

Our Author had several sons, who probably died young, but he left one daughter, Damaris, who was second wife to Sir Francis Masham, of Oates, in the county of Essex, Bart.^a by whom she had a son, the late Francis Cudworth Masham, Esq.^b one of the Masters of the High Court of Chancery, and accountant-general of the said Court; and foreign apposer in the Court of Exchequer. This lady had a great friendship with Mr. Locke, who died at her house at Oates, where he had resided for several years before. She was distinguished for her uncommon genius and learning; and in the year 1696 published at London, in 12mo. without her name, *A Discourse concerning the Love of God.*^c She introduces this tract with observing, that “whatever reproaches have been made by the Romanists, on the one hand, of the want of books of devotion in the church of England, or by the dissenters, on the other, of a dead and lifeless way of preaching, it may be affirmed, that there cannot any where be found so good a collection of discourses on moral subjects, as might be made of English sermons, and other treatises of that nature, written by the divines of our church: which books are certainly in themselves of the greatest, and most general use of any; and do most conduce to that, which is the chief aim of Christianity—a good life.” She then animadverts upon those who undervalue morality,^d and others, who strain the duties of it to an impracticable pitch, and pretend to ascend by

^a He died at his seat at Oates, on Sunday, the 3d of March, 1702-3, in the 77th year of his age.

^b He died May 17, 1731.

^c It contains 126 pages, besides the preface.

^d P. 2, 3.

it to something beyond or above it;^a and afterwards proceeds to consider the conduct of those who build their practical and devotional discourses upon principles which will not bear the test, but which oblige them to lay down such assertions of morality, as sober and well-disposed Christians cannot understand to be practicable.^b And here she applies herself to the examination of Mr. John Norris's^c scheme in his *Practical Discourses* and other treatises, wherein he maintains, that "mankind are obliged strictly, as their duty, to love, with desire, nothing but God only, every degree of desire of any creature whatsoever being sinful:" which assertion Mr. Norris defends upon this ground, that God, not the creature, is the immediate efficient cause of our sensations; for whatsoever gives us pleasure has a right to our love: but God only gives us pleasure, therefore he only has a right to our love. This hypothesis is considered with great accuracy and ingenuity by Lady Masham, and the bad consequences of it represented in a strong light. Her Discourse was translated into French by Mr. Peter Coste, and printed at Amsterdam, in 1705. She lies buried in the cathedral church of Bath, where a monument is erected to her memory, with the following inscription:

"Near this place lies Dame DAMARIS MASHAM, daughter of Ralph Cudworth, D. D. and second wife of Sir Francis Masham, of Oates, in the county of Essex, Bart. who to the softness and

^a P. 3, 4, 5, 6:

^b P. 7.

^c This divine borrowed his hypothesis from Father Mallebranche.

elegancy of her own sex added several of the noblest accomplishments and qualities to the other.

“ She possessed these advantages in a degree unusual to either, and tempered them with an exactness peculiar to herself.

“ Her learning, judgment, sagacity, and penetration, together with her candour and love of truth, were very observable to all that conversed with her, or were acquainted with those small treatises she published in her life-time, though she industriously concealed her name.

“ Being mother of an only son, she applied all her natural and acquired endowments to the care of his education.

“ She was a strict observer of all the virtues belonging to every station of her life; and only wanted opportunities to make these talents shine in the world, which were the admiration of her friends.

“ She was born on the 18th of January, 1658, and died on the 20th of April, 1708.”

THE TRUE
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM
OF THE
UNIVERSE.



Γυμνάσιον τῆς φυκῆς Ἡ ἈΝΘΡΩΠΙΝῆ ΣΟΦΙΑ, τέλος δὲ Ἡ ΘΕΙΑ.

ORIGENES.

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

HENEAGE LORD FINCH,

*Baron of Daventry, Lord High Chancellor of England, and
one of his Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council.*

MY LORD,

THE many favours I have formerly received from you, as they might justly challenge, whenever I had a fit opportunity, a public and thankful acknowledgment; so have they encouraged me at this time, to the presumption of this dedication to your Lordship. Whom, as your perspicacious wit and solid judgment, together with your acquired learning, render every way a most accomplished and desirable patron; so did I persuade myself, that your hearty affection to religion, and zeal for it, would make you not unwilling, to take that into your protection, which is written wholly in the defence thereof; so far forth, as its own defects, or miscarriages, should not render it incapable of the same. Nor can I think it probable, that in an age of so much debauchery, scepticism, and infidelity, an undertaking of this kind should be judged by you use-

DEDICATION.

less or unseasonable. And now, having so fit an opportunity, I could most willingly expatiate in the large field of your Lordship's praise, both that I might do an act of justice to yourself, and provoke others to your imitation. But I am sensible, that as no eloquence, less than that of your own, could be fit for such a performance; so the nobleness and generosity of your spirit is such, that you take much more pleasure in doing praiseworthy things, than in hearing the repeated echoes of them. Wherefore, instead of pursuing encomiums, which would be the least pleasing to yourself, I shall offer up my prayers to Almighty God, for the continuation of your Lordship's life and health; that so his Majesty may long have such a loyal subject and wise counsellor; the church of England such a worthy patron; the High Court of Chancery such an oracle of impartial justice; and the whole nation such a pattern of virtue and piety. Which shall ever be the hearty desire of,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most humble, and

Most affectionate servant,

R. CUDWORTH.

PREFACE TO THE READER.*

THOUGH, I confess, I have seldom taken any great pleasure in reading other men's apologies, yet must I at this time make some myself. First, therefore, I acknowledge, that when I engaged the press, I intended only a discourse concerning liberty and necessity, or, to speak out more plainly, against the fatal necessity of all actions and events; which, upon whatsoever grounds or principles maintained, will, as we conceive, serve the design of Atheism, and undermine Christianity, and all religion, as taking away all guilt and blame, punishments and rewards, and plainly rendering a day of judgment ridiculous: and, it is evident, that some have pursued it of late, in order to that end. But afterwards we considered, that this, which is indeed a controversy concerning the True Intellectual System of the Universe, does, in the full extent thereof, take in other things; the necessity of all actions and events being maintained by several persons, upon very different grounds, according to that tripartite fatalism, mentioned by us in the beginning of the first chapter. For first, the Democritic Fate is nothing but the material necessity of all things without a God, in supposing senseless matter, necessarily moved, to be the only original and principal of all things; which therefore is called by Epicurus the Physiological, by us the Athe-

* Preface to the 2d edit. 4to. 1743.

istic Fate. Besides which, the Divine Fate is also bipartite: some Theists supposing God, both to decree and do all things in us (evil as well as good), or by his immediate influence to determinate all actions, and so make them alike necessary to us. From whence it follows, that his will is no way regulated or determined by any essential and immutable goodness and justice; or that he hath nothing of morality in his nature, he being only arbitrary will omnipotent. As also that all good and evil moral, to us creatures, are mere thetical or positive things; νόμος, and not φύσει, by law or command only, and not by nature. This therefore may be called the Divine Fate immoral, and violent. Again, there being other Divine fatalists, who acknowledge such a Deity, as both suffers other things, besides itself, to act, and hath an essential goodness and justice in its nature, and consequently, that there are things, just and unjust to us naturally, and not by law and arbitrary constitution only; and yet nevertheless take away from men all such liberty as might make them capable of praise and dispraise, rewards and punishments, and objects of distributive justice; they conceiving necessity to be intrinsical to the nature of every thing, in the actings of it, and nothing of contingency to be found any where: from whence it will follow, that nothing could possibly have been otherwise, in the whole world, than it is. And this may be called the Divine Fate moral (as the other immoral) and natural (as the other violent); it being a concatenation, or implexed series of causes, all in themselves necessary, depending upon a Deity moral (if we may so speak); that is, such as is essentially good,

and naturally just, as the head thereof; the first contriver and orderer of all. Which kind of Divine Fate hath not only been formerly asserted by the Stoics, but also of late by divers modern writers. Wherefore, of the three fatalisms, or false hypotheses of the universe, mentioned in the beginning of this book, one is absolute Atheism, another immoral Theism, or religion without any natural justice and morality (all just and unjust, according to this hypothesis, being mere theatrical or factitious things, made by arbitrary will and command only); the third and last, such a Theism, as acknowledges not only a God, or omnipotent understanding Being, but also natural justice and morality, founded in him, and derived from him; nevertheless no liberty from necessity any where, and therefore no distributive or retributive justice in the world. Whereas these three things are (as we conceive) the fundamentals or essentials of true religion. First, that all things in the world do not float without a head and governor; but that there is a God, an omnipotent understanding Being, presiding over all. Secondly, that this God, being essentially good and just, there is *φύσει καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον*, something in its own nature immutably and eternally just and unjust; and not by arbitrary will, law, and command only. And, lastly, that there is something *ἐφ' ἡμῖν*, or, that we are so far forth principles or masters of our own actions, as to be accountable to justice for them, or to make us guilty and blameworthy for what we do amiss, and to deserve punishment accordingly. Which three fundamentals of religion are intimated by the author to the Hebrews in these words:—"He that cometh to

God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of those who seek him out." For to seek out God here, is nothing else but to seek a participation of his image, or the recovery of that nature and life of his which we have been alienated from. And these three things, namely, that all things do not float without a head and governor, but there is an omnipotent understanding Being presiding over all; that this God hath an essential goodness and justice; and that the differences of good and evil moral, honest and dishonest, are not by mere will and law only, but by nature; and consequently, that the Deity cannot act, influence, and necessitate men to such things as are in their own nature evil; and, lastly, that necessity is not intrinsical to the nature of every thing, but that men have such a liberty or power over their own actions, as may render them accountable for the same, and blameworthy when they do amiss; and, consequently, that there is a justice distributive of rewards and punishments running through the world: I say, these three (which are the most important things that the mind of man can employ itself upon), taken all together, make up the wholeness and entireness of that which is here called by us the True Intellectual System of the Universe, in such a sense as Atheism may be called a false system thereof; the word Intellectual being added, to distinguish it from the other, vulgarly so called, Systems of the World (that is, the visible and corporeal world), the Ptolemaic, Tyconic, and Copernican; the two former of which are now commonly accounted false, the latter true. And thus our prospect being now enlarged into a threefold fatalism, or

spurious and false hypothesis of the intellectual system, making all things necessary upon several grounds ; we accordingly designed the confutation of them all, in three several books. The first, against Atheism (which is the Democritic Fate), wherein all the reason and philosophy thereof is refelled, and the existence of a God demonstrated ; and so that *ὄλικῇ ἀνάγκῃ*, or material necessity of all things, overthrown. The second, for such a God, as is not mere arbitrary will omnipotent, decreeing, doing, and necessitating all actions, evil as well as good, but essentially moral, good, and just ; and for a natural *discrimen honestorum et turpium*, whereby another ground of the necessity of all human actions will be removed. And the third and last, against necessity intrinsical and essential to all action, and for such a liberty, or *sui-potestas*, in rational creatures, as may render them accountable, capable of rewards and punishments, and so objects of distributive or retributive justice ; by which the now only remaining ground, of the fatal necessity of all actions and events, will be taken away. And all these three under that one general title of the True Intellectual System of the Universe ; each book having, besides, its own particular title : as, against Atheism ; for natural justice and morality, founded in the Deity ; for liberty from necessity, and a distributive justice of rewards and punishments in the world. And this we conceive may fully satisfy, concerning our general title, all those who are not extremely critical or captious, at least as many of them as ever heard of the astronomical systems of the world ; so that they will not think us hereby obliged to treat of the hierarchy

of angels, and of all the several species of animals, vegetables, minerals, &c.; that is, to write *de omni ente*, of whatsoever is contained within the complexion of the universe. Though the whole scale of entity is here also taken notice of; and the general ranks of substantial beings, below the Deity (or trinity of Divine hypostases) considered; which yet, according to our philosophy, are but two; souls of several degrees (angels themselves being included within that number), and body or matter; as also the immortality of those souls proved: which notwithstanding is suggested by us, only to satisfy some men's curiosity. Nevertheless, we confess, that this general title might well have been here spared by us, and this volume have been presented to the reader's view, not as a part or piece, but a whole complete and entire thing by itself, had it not been for two reasons; first, our beginning with those three fatalisms, or false hypotheses of the Intellectual System, and promising a confutation of them all then, when we thought to have brought them within the compass of one volume; and secondly, every other page, throughout this whole volume, accordingly bearing the inscription of book the first upon the head thereof. This is therefore that, which, in the first place, we here apologize for our publishing one part or book alone by itself, we being surprised in the length thereof; whereas we had intended two more along with it. Notwithstanding which, there is no reason why this volume should be therefore thought imperfect and incomplete, because it hath not all the three things at first designed us; it containing all that belongeth to its own particular title and subject, and being

in that respect no piece, but a whole. This indeed must needs beget an expectation of the two following treatises (especially in such as shall have received any satisfaction from this first), concerning those two other fatalisms, or false hypotheses mentioned, to make up our whole Intellectual System complete; the one to prove, that God is not mere arbitrary will omnipotent, (without any essential goodness and justice) decreeing and doing all things in the world, as well evil as good, and thereby making them alike necessary to us; from whence it would follow, that all good and evil moral are mere thetical, positive, and arbitrary things; that is, not nature, but will: which is the defence of natural, eternal, immutable justice or morality. The other, that necessity is not intrinsical to the nature of every thing, God and all creatures, or essential to all action; but, that there is something ἐφ' ἡμῶν, or that we have some liberty or power over our own actions: which is the defence of a distributive or retributive justice, dispensing rewards and punishments throughout the whole world. Wherefore we think fit here to advertise the reader concerning these, that though they were and still are, really intended by us, yet the complete finishing and publication of them will notwithstanding depend upon many contingencies; not only of our life and health, the latter of which, as well as the former, is to us very uncertain; but also of our leisure, or vacancy from other necessary employments.

In the next place, we must apologize also for the fourth chapter; inasmuch as though, in regard of its length, it might rather be called a book, than a chapter, yet it doth not answer all the con-

tents prefixed to it. Here therefore must we again confess ourselves surprised, who, when we wrote those contents, did not suspect in the least, but that we should have satisfied them all within a lesser compass. And our design then was, besides answering the objection against the naturalness of the idea of God, from the Pagan Polytheism (we having then so fit an occasion), to give such a further account of the idolatry and religion of the Gentiles, as might prepare our way for a defence of Christianity, to be subjoined in the close; it being not only agreeable to the sense of ancient doctors, but also expressly declared in the Scripture, that one design of Christianity was to abolish and extirpate the Pagan Polytheism and idolatry. And our reasons for this intended defence of Christianity were, first, because we had observed, that some professed opposers of Atheism had either incurred a suspicion, or at least suffered under the imputation of being mere Theists, or natural religionists only, and no hearty believers of Christianity, or friends to revealed religion. From which either suspicion or imputation therefore we thought it justice to free ourselves, we having so unshaken a belief and firm assurance of the truth of the whole Christian doctrine. But, secondly, and principally, because we had further observed it to have been the method of our modern Atheists, to make their first assault against Christianity, as thinking that to be the most vulnerable: and that it would be an easy step for them, from thence, to demolish all religion and Theism. However, since the satisfying the former part of those contents had already taken up so much room, that the pursuit of the

remainder would have quite excluded our principally-intended confutation of all the atheistic grounds; the forementioned objection being now sufficiently answered, there was a necessity, that we should there break off, and leave the further account of the Pagan idolatry and religion, together with our defence of Christianity, to some other more convenient opportunity.

And now we shall exhibit to the reader's view a brief and general synopsis of the whole following work, together with some particular reflections upon several parts thereof, either for his better information concerning them, or for their vindication; some of which, therefore, will be of greater use, after the book has been read, than before. The first chapter is an account of the Atomic physiology, as made the foundation of the Democritic Fate: where the reader is to understand, that this Democritic Fate, which is one of the three false hypotheses of the Intellectual System, there mentioned, is the very self-same thing with the Atomic Atheism, the only form of Atheism, that hath publicly appeared upon the stage, as an entire philosophic system, or hath indeed been much taken notice of in the world for these two thousand years past. For, though it be true, that Epicurus, (who was also an Atomic Atheist, as is afterwards declared, having, in all probability, therefore a mind to innovate something, that he might not seem to have borrowed all from Democritus,) did by violence introduce liberty of will into his hypothesis; for the solving whereof, he ridiculously devised, that his third motion of Atoms, called by Lucretius—

——Exiguum Clinamen Principiorum:

Yet was this, as Cicero^a long since observed, a most heterogeneous patch, or *assumentum* of his, and altogether as contradictory to the tenor of his own principles, as it was to the doctrine of Democritus himself. There can be nothing more absurd, than for an Atheist to assert liberty of will; but, it is most of all absurd, for an Atomic one. And, therefore, our modern Atheists do here plainly disclaim Epicurus, (though otherwise so much admired by them,) and declare open war against this liberty of will; they apprehending, that it would unavoidably introduce incorporeal substance; as also well knowing, that necessity, on the contrary, effectually overthrows all religion, it taking away guilt and blame, punishments and rewards; to which might be added also prayers and devotions.

And as there was a necessity for us here, to give some account of that ancient Atomic physiology, with which Atheism now became thus blended and complicated; so do we, in this first chapter, chiefly insist upon two things concerning it. First, that it was no invention of Democritus nor Leucippus, but of much greater antiquity; not only from that tradition transmitted by Posidonius, the Stoic, that it derived its original from one Moschus, a Phœnician, who lived before the Trojan wars, (which plainly makes it to have been Mosaical;) but also from Aristotle's affirmation, that the greater part of the ancient philosophers entertained this hypothesis; and further, because it is certain, that divers of the Italics, and particularly Empedocles, before Democritus, physiologized atomically, which is the reason he was so

^a De Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 25.

much applauded by Lucretius. Besides which, it is more than a presumption, that Anaxagoras his Homœomery, or similar Atomology, was but a degeneration from the true and genuine Atomology of the acient Italics, that was an Anomœomery, or doctrine of dissimilar and unqualified atoms. Wherefore all that is true concerning Democritus and Leucippus, is only this, that these men were indeed the first atheizers of this ancient Atomic physiology, or the inventors and broachers of the Atomic Atheism. Which is Laertius his true meaning, (though it be not commonly understood,) when he recordeth of them, that they were the first, who made unqualified atoms the principles of all things in the universe without exception ; that is, not only of inanimate bodies, (as the other ancient religious Atomists, the Italics, before had done,) but also of soul and mind.

And whereas, we conceive this Atomic physiology, as to the essentials thereof, to be unquestionably true, viz.—That the only principles of bodies are magnitude, figure, sight, motion, and rest ; and that the qualities and forms of inanimate bodies are really nothing, but several combinations of these, causing several fancies in us ; (which excellent discovery, therefore, so long ago made, is a notable instance of the wit and sagacity of the ancients ;) so do we in the next place make it manifest, that this Atomic physiology, rightly understood, is so far from being either the mother or nurse of Atheism, or any ways favourable thereunto, (as is vulgarly supposed) that it is indeed the most directly opposite to it of any, and the greatest defence against the same. For, first, we have discovered, that the principle, upon

which this Atomology is founded, and from whence it sprung, was no other than this, nothing out of nothing, in the true sense thereof; or, that nothing can be caused by nothing; from whence it was concluded, that in natural generations there was no new real entity produced, which was not before: the genuine consequence whereof was two-fold; that the qualities and forms of inanimate bodies are no entities really distinct from the magnitude, figure, sight and motion of parts; and that souls are substances incorporeal, not generated out of matter. Where we have shewed, that the Pythagoric doctrine, of the pre-existence of souls, was founded upon the very same principles with the Atomic physiology. And it is from this very principle, rightly understood, that ourselves afterwards undertake to demonstrate the absolute impossibility of all Atheism. Moreover, we have made it undeniably evident, that the intrinsic constitution of this Atomic physiology also is such, as that whosoever admits it, and rightly understands it, must needs acknowledge incorporeal substance; which is the absolute overthrow of Atheism. And from hence alone it is certain to us, without any testimonies from antiquity, that Democritus and Leucippus could not possibly be the first inventors of this philosophy, they either not rightly understanding it, or else wilfully depraving the same; and the Atomic Atheism being really nothing else, but a rape committed upon the Atomic physiology. For which reason, we do by no means here applaud Plato, nor Aristotle, in their rejecting this most ancient Atomic physiology, and introducing again, that unintelligible first matter, and those exploded qualities

and forms, into philosophy. For though this were probably done by Plato, out of a disgust and prejudice against the Atomic Atheists, which made him not so well consider nor understand that physiology; yet was he much disappointed of his expectation herein, that atomology, which he exploded, (rightly understood,) being really the greatest bulwark against Atheism; and, on the contrary, those forms and qualities, which he espoused, the natural seed thereof, they, besides their unintelligible darkness, bringing something out of nothing, in the impossible sense; which we shew to be the inlet of all Atheism. And thus, in this first chapter, have we not only quite disarmed Atheism of Atomicism, or shewed, that the latter, (rightly understood) affordeth no manner of shelter or protection to the former; but also made it manifest, that it is the greatest bulwark and defence against the same; which is a thing afterwards further insisted on.

As to the second chapter, we have no more to say, but only this; that here we took the liberty to reveal the arcana mysteries of Atheism, and to discover all its pretended grounds of reason, that we could find any where suggested in writings, those only excepted, that are peculiar to the Hylozoic form (which is directly contrary to the Atomic), and that to their best advantage too; nevertheless to this end, that these being afterwards all baffled and confuted, Theism might, by this means, obtain the greater and juster triumph over Atheism.

In the third chapter, we thought it necessary, in order to a fuller confutation of Atheism, to consider all the other forms thereof, besides the Ato-

mic. And here do we, first of all, make a discovery of a certain form of Atheism, never before taken notice of by any modern writers, which we call the Hylozoic: which, notwithstanding, though it were long since started by Strato, in way of opposition to the Democritic and Epicurean hypothesis, yet because it afterwards slept in perfect silence and oblivion, should have been here by us passed by silently, had we not had certain knowledge of its being of late awakened and revived by some, who were so sagacious, as plainly to perceive, that the Atomic form could never do their business, nor prove defensible, and therefore would attempt to carry on this cause of Atheism, in quite a different way, by the life and perception of matter; as also that this, in all probability, would, ere long, publicly appear upon the stage, though not bare-faced, but under a disguise. Which Atheistic hypothesis is partly confuted by us, in the close of this chapter, and partly in the fifth.

In the next place, it being certain, that there had been other philosophic Atheists in the world before those Atomics, Epicurus and Democritus; we declare, out of Plato and Aristotle, what that most ancient Atheistic hypothesis was; namely, the education of all things, even life and understanding itself, out of matter, in the way of qualities, or as the passions and affections thereof, generable and corruptible. Which form of Atheism is styled by us, not only Hylopathian, but also Anaximandrian; however, we grant some probability of that opinion, that Anaximander held an Homœomery of qualified atoms, as Anaxagoras afterwards did; the difference between them

being only this, that the latter asserted an unmade mind, whereas, the former generated all mind and understanding out of those qualified atoms, hot and cold, moist and dry, compounded together; because we judged this difference not to be a sufficient ground to multiply forms of Atheism upon. And here do we give notice of that strange kind of religious Atheism, or Atheistic Theogonism, which asserted, not only other understanding beings, superior to men, called by them gods, but also, amongst those, one Supreme or Jupiter too; nevertheless native, and generated at first out of night and chaos (that is, senseless matter), as also mortal and corruptible again into the same.

Besides which, there is yet a fourth Atheistic form taken notice of, out of the writings of the ancients, (though perhaps junior to the rest, it seeming to be but the corruption and degeneration of Stoicism) which concluded the whole world, not to be an animal (as the Pagan Theists then generally supposed), but only one huge plant or vegetable, having an artificial, plantal, and plastic nature, as its highest principle, orderly disposing the whole, without any mind or understanding. And here have we set down the agreement of all the Atheistic forms (however differing so much from one another), in this one general principle, viz.—That all animality, conscious life and understanding, is generated out of senseless matter, and corruptible again into it.

Wherefore, in the close of this third chapter, we insist largely upon an artificial, regular, and plastic nature, devoid of express knowledge and understanding, as subordinate to the Deity; chiefly in way of confutation of those Cosmo-plastic and

Hylozoic Atheisms. Though we had a further design herein also, for the defence of Theism ; forasmuch as without such a nature, either God must be supposed to do all things in the world immediately, and to form every gnat and fly, as it were, with his own hands ; which seemeth not so becoming of him, and would render his providence, to human apprehensions, laborious and distracting ; or else the whole system of this corporeal universe must result only from for tuitous mechanism, without the direction of any mind ; which hypothesis once admitted, would unquestionably, by degrees, supplant and undermine all Theism. And now, from what we have declared, it may plainly appear, that this digression of our's, concerning an artificial, regular, and plastic nature, (subordinate to the Deity) is no wen, or excrescency in the body of this book ; but a natural and necessary member thereof.

In the fourth chapter, after the idea of God fully declared, (where we could not omit his essential goodness and justice, or, if we may so call it, the morality of the Deity, though that be a thing properly belonging to the second book, the confutation of the Divine Fate immoral) there is a large account given of the Pagan Polytheism ; to satisfy a very considerable objection, that lay in our way from thence, against the naturalty of the idea of God, as including oneliness and singularity in it. For had that, upon inquiry, been found true, which is so commonly taken for granted, that the generality of the Pagan nations had constantly scattered their devotions amongst a multitude of self-existent and independent deities, they acknowledging no sovereign Numen ; this would

much have stumbled the naturality of the Divine idea. But now it being, on the contrary, clearly proved, that the Pagan theologers all along acknowledged one sovereign and omnipotent Deity, from which all their other gods were generated or created; we have thereby not only removed the forementioned objection out of the way, but also evinced, that the generality of mankind have constantly had a certain prolepsis or anticipation in their minds, concerning the actual existence of a God, according to the true idea of him. And this was the rather done fully and carefully by us, because we had not met with it sufficiently performed before; A. Steuchus Engubinus having laboured most in this subject, from whose profitable industry, though we shall no way detract, yet whosoever will compare what he hath written with our's, will find no just cause to think our's superfluous and unnecessary, much less, a transcription out of his. In which, besides other things, there is no account at all given of the many Pagan, poetical, and political gods, what they were; which is so great a part of our performance, to prove them really to have been but the polyonymy of one God. From whence it follows, also, that the Pagan religion, though sufficiently faulty, yet was not altogether so nonsensical, as the Atheists would represent it, out of design, that they might from thence infer all religion to be nothing but a mere cheat and imposture; they worshipping only one supreme God, in the several manifestations of his goodness, power, and providence throughout the world, together with his inferior ministers. Nevertheless, we cannot deny, that being once engaged in this subject, we thought

ourselves the more concerned to do the business thoroughly and effectually, because of that controversy lately agitated concerning idolatry (which cannot otherwise be decided, than by giving a true account of the Pagan religion), and the so confident affirmations of some, that none could possibly be guilty of idolatry, in the scripture sense, who believed one God, the creator of the whole world; whereas it is most certain, on the contrary, that the Pagan Polytheism and idolatry consisted, not in worshipping many creators, or uncreated, but in giving religious worship to creatures, besides the Creator; they directing their devotion, (as Athanasius^a plainly affirmeth of them,) ἐνὶ ἀγενήτῳ, καὶ πολλοῖς γενητοῖς, to one uncreated only; but, besides him, to many created gods. But as for the polemic management of this controversy, concerning idolatry, we leave it to other learned hands, that are already engaged in it.

Moreover, we have, in this fourth chapter, largely insisted also upon the Trinity. The reason whereof was, because it came in our way, and our contents engaged us thereunto, in order to the giving a full account of the Pagan theology, it being certain, that the Platonics and Pythagoreans, at least, if not other Pagans also, had their trinity, as well as Christians. And we could not well avoid the comparing of these two together: upon which occasion, we take notice of a double Platonic trinity; the one spurious and adulterated, of some latter Platonists; the other true and genuine, of Plato himself, Parmenides, and the ancients. The former of which, though it be opposed by us to the Christian trinity, and

^a Oratione IV. contra Arianos T. I. Operum, p. 469.

confuted, yet betwixt the latter and that, do we find a wonderful correspondence; which is largely pursued in the Platonic Christian apology. Wherein, notwithstanding, nothing must be looked upon, as dogmatically asserted by us, but only offered, and submitted to the judgment of the learned in these matters; we confining ourselves in this mysterious point of the holy trinity, within the compass of those its three essentials declared:—First, that it is not a trinity of mere names and words, or of logical notions only; but of persons or hypostases.—Secondly, that none of those persons or hypostases are creatures, but all uncreated.—And, lastly, that they are all three, truly and really one God. Nevertheless we acknowledge, that we did therefore the more copiously insist upon this argument, because of our then designed defence of Christianity; we conceiving, that this parallelism, betwixt the ancient or genuine Platonic, and the Christian trinity, might be of some use to satisfy those amongst us, who boggle so much at the trinity, and look upon it as the choak-pear of Christianity; when they shall find, that the freest wits amongst the Pagans, and the best philosophers, who had nothing of superstition to determine them that way, were so far from being shy of such an hypothesis, as that they were even fond thereof. And that the Pagans had indeed such a Cabala amongst them (which some perhaps will yet hardly believe, notwithstanding all that we have said), might be further convinced, from that memorable relation in Plutarch,^a of Thespesius Solensis, who,

^a Libro de his, qui sero à Numine puniuntur, tom. ii. Oper. p. 563. s.

after he had been looked upon as dead for three days, reviving, affirmed, amongst other things, which he thought he saw or heard in the mean time in his ecstasy, this of three gods in the form of a triangle, pouring in streams into one another ; Orpheus his soul being said to have arrived so far ; accordingly as from the testimonies of other Pagan writers we have proved, that a trinity of Divine hypostases was a part of the Orphic Cabala. True, indeed, our belief of the holy trinity is founded upon no Pagan Cabala, but only Scripture revelation ; it being that, which Christians are, or should be, all baptized into. Nevertheless these things are reasonably noted by us to this end, that that should not be made a prejudice against Christianity and revealed religion, nor looked upon as such an affrightful bugbear or *mormo* in it, which even Pagan philosophers themselves, and those of the most accomplished intellectuals, and uncaptivated minds, though having neither councils, nor creeds, nor Scriptures, had so great a propensity and readiness to entertain, and such a veneration for.

In this fourth chapter, we were necessitated, by the matter itself, to run out into philology and antiquity ; as also in the other parts of the book, we do often give an account of the doctrine of the ancients ; which, however, some over-severe philosophers may look upon fastidiously, or undervalue and depreciate, yet as we conceived it often necessary, so possibly may the variety thereof not be ungrateful to others ; and this mixture of philology, throughout the whole, sweeten and allay the severity of philosophy to them ; the main thing, which the book pretends to, in the mean

time, being the philosophy of religion. But, for our parts, we neither call philology, nor yet philosophy, our mistress; but serve ourselves of either, as occasion requireth.

As for the last chapter, though it promise only a confutation of all the Atheistic grounds, yet we do therein also demonstrate the absolute impossibility of all Atheism, and the actual existence of a God. We say demonstrate, not *à priori*, which is impossible and contradictory; but by necessary inference from principles altogether undeniable. For we can by no means grant to the Atheists, that there is no more than a probable persuasion or opinion to be had of the existence of a God, without any certain knowledge or science. Nevertheless, it will not follow from hence, that whosoever shall read these demonstrations of our's, and understand all the words of them, must therefore of necessity be presently convinced, whether he will or no, and put out of all manner of doubt or hesitancy, concerning the existence of a God. For we believe that to be true, which some have affirmed, that were there any interest of life, any concernment of appetite and passion, against the truth of geometrical theorems themselves, as of a triangle having three angles equal to two right, whereby men's judgments may be clouded and bribed, notwithstanding all the demonstrations of them, many would remain at least sceptical about them. Wherefore mere speculation, and dry mathematical reason, in minds unpurified, and having a contrary interest of carnality, and a heavy load of infidelity and distrust sinking them down, cannot alone beget an unshaken confidence and assurance of so high a

truth as this, the existence of one perfect understanding Being, the original of all things. As it is certain, also, on the contrary, that minds cleansed and purged from vice may, without syllogistical reasonings, and mathematical demonstrations, have an undoubted assurance of the existence of a God, according to that of the philosopher, *ἡ κάθαρσις ποιεῖ ἐν γνώσει τῶν ἀριστῶν εἶναι*, Purity possesses men with an assurance of the best things;—whether this assurance be called a vaticination or Divine sagacity (as it is by Plato and Aristotle), or faith, as in the Scripture. For the Scripture faith is not a mere believing of historical things, and upon inartificial arguments or testimonies only; but a certain higher and Divine power in the soul, that peculiarly correspondeth with the Deity. Notwithstanding which, knowledge or science added to this faith, according to the Scripture advice, will make it more firm and stedfast, and the better able to resist those assaults of sophistical reasonings, that shall be made against it.

In this fifth chapter, as sometimes elsewhere, we thought ourselves concerned, in defence of the Divine wisdom, goodness, and perfection against Atheists, to maintain (with all the ancient philosophic Theists) the perfection of the creation also; or, that the whole system of things, taken altogether, could not have been better made and ordered than it is. And, indeed, this Divine goodness and perfection, as displaying and manifesting itself in the works of nature and providence, is supposed in Scripture to be the very foundation of our Christian faith; when that is defined to be the substance and evidence *rerum sperandarum*; that is, of whatsoever is (by a good man) to be hoped for.—

Notwithstanding which, it was far from our intention therefore to conclude, that nothing neither in Nature nor Providence could be otherwise than it is; or that there is nothing left to the free will and choice of the Deity. And though we do, in the third section, insist largely upon that ancient Pythagoric Cábala, that souls are always united to some body or other, as also, that all rational and intellectual creatures consist of soul and body; and suggest several things from reason and Christian antiquity in favour of them both; yet would we not be understood to dogmatize in either of them, but to submit all to better judgments.

Again, we shall here advertise the reader (though we have cautioned concerning it in the book itself), that in our defence of incorporeal substance against the Atheists, however we thought ourselves concerned to say the utmost that possibly we could, in way of vindication of the ancients, who generally maintained it to be unextended (which to some seems an absolute impossibility); yet we would not be supposed ourselves dogmatically to assert any more in this point than what all incorporealists agree in, that there is a substance specifically distinct from body; namely, such as consisteth not of parts separable from one another, and which can penetrate body, and lastly, is self active, and hath an internal energy, distinct from that of local motion. And thus much is undeniably evinced by the arguments before proposed. But whether this substance be altogether unextended, or extended otherwise than body, we shall leave every man to make his own judgment concerning it.

Furthermore, we think fit here to suggest, that whereas throughout this chapter and whole book, we constantly oppose the generation of souls, that is, the production of life, cogitation, and understanding, out of dead and senseless matter; and assert all souls to be as substantial as matter itself: this is not done by us, out of any fond addictedness to Pythagoric whimseys, nor indeed out of a mere partial regard to that cause of Theism neither, which we were engaged in (though we had great reason to be tender of that too); but because we were enforced thereunto, by dry mathematical reason; it being as certain to us, as any thing in all geometry, that cogitation and understanding can never possibly result out of magnitudes, figures, sites, and local motions (which is all that ourselves can allow to body) however compounded together. Nor indeed in that other way of qualities, is it better conceivable how they should emerge out of hot and cold, moist and dry, thick and thin; according to the Anaximandrian Atheism. And they who can persuade themselves of the contrary, may believe, that any thing may be caused by any thing; upon which supposition we confess it impossible to us to prove the existence of a God from the phenomena.

In the close of this fifth chapter, because the Atheists do in the last place pretend, Theism and religion to be inconsistent with civil sovereignty, we were necessitated briefly to unravel and confute all the Atheistic ethics and politics (though this more properly belong to our second book intended); where we make it plainly to appear, that the Atheists artificial and factitious justice is nothing but will and words; and that they give to

civil sovereigns no right nor authority at all, but only belluine liberty and brutish force. But, on the contrary, as we assert justice and obligation, not made by law and commands, but in nature, and prove this, together with conscience and religion, to be the only basis of civil authority, so do we also maintain all the rights of civil sovereigns; giving both to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's.

And now, having made all our apologies and reflections, we have no more to add, but only the retraction or retraction of one passage (Chap. V.); where mentioning that opinion of a modern Atheistic writer, that cogitation is nothing else but local motion, we could not think Epicurus and Democritus to have sunk to such a degree, either of sottishness or impudence, as this; whereas we found cause afterwards, upon further consideration, to change our opinion herein. Forasmuch as when Epicurus derived liberty of will in men, merely from that motion of senseless atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular; it is evident, that, according to him, volition itself must be really local motion. As indeed in the Democritic fate, and material necessity of all things, it is implied, that human cogitations are but mechanism and motion. Notwithstanding which, both Democritus and Epicurus supposed that the world was made without cogitation, though by local motion. So that the meaning of these besotted Atheists (if at least they had any meaning) seems to have been this, that all cogitation is really nothing else but local motion; nevertheless all motion not cogitation, but only in

such and such circumstances, or in bodies so modified.

And now we are not ignorant, that some will be ready to condemn this whole labour of our's, and of others in this kind, against Atheism, as altogether useless and superfluous ; upon this pretence, that an Atheist is a mere chimera, and there is no such a thing any where to be found in the world. And indeed we could heartily wish, upon that condition, that all this labour of our's were superfluous and useless. But as to Atheists, these so confident exploders of them are both unskilled in the monuments of antiquity, and unacquainted with the present age they live in ; others having found too great an assurance, from their own personal converse, of the reality of them. Nevertheless, this labour of our's is not intended only for the conversion of downright and professed Atheists (of which there is but little hope, they being sunk into so great a degree of sottishness), but for the confirmation of weak, staggering, and sceptical Theists. And unless these exploders of Atheists will affirm, also, that all men have constantly an unshaken faith and belief of the existence of a God, without the least mixture of a doubtful distrust or hesitancy (which, if it were so, the world could not possibly be so bad as now it is), they must needs grant, such endeavours as these, for the confirming and establishing of men's minds in the belief of a God, by philosophic reasons, in an age so philosophical, not to be superfluous and useless.

THE TRUE
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM
OF
THE UNIVERSE.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

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THEY, that hold the necessity of all human actions and events, do it upon one or other of these two grounds—either because they suppose, that necessity is inwardly essential to all agents whatsoever, and that contingent liberty is *πρᾶγμα ἀνυπόστατον*, a thing impossible or contradictory, which can have no existence any where in nature; the sense of which was thus expressed by the Epicurean poet,^a

—*Quod res quæque Necessum
Intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agentis, &c.*

That every thing naturally labours under an intestine necessity:—or else, because, though they admit contingent liberty not only as a thing possible, but also as that which is actually existent in the Deity, yet they conceive all things to be so determined by the will and decrees of this Deity, as that they are thereby made necessary to us. The former of these two opinions, that contingent liberty is *πρᾶγμα ἀνυπόστατον*, such a thing as can have no existence in nature, may be maintained

^a Lucret. lib. ii. v. 289, &c.

upon two different grounds: either from such an hypothesis as this, that the universe is nothing else but body and local motion; and nothing moving itself, the action of every agent is determined by some other agent without it; and therefore that *ὕλική ἀνάγκη*, material and mechanical necessity, must needs reign over all things; or else, though cogitative beings be supposed to have a certain principle of activity within themselves, yet that there can be no contingency in their actions, because all volitions are determined by a necessary antecedent understanding.

Plotinus^a makes another distribution of Fatalists, which yet in the conclusion will come to the same with the former; *διττοὺς ἂν τις θέμενος τούτους οὐκ ἀνοίτου ἀληθοῦς ἀποτυγχάνοι, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀφ' ἑνός τινος τὰ πάντα ἀναρτῶσω, οἱ δὲ οὐκ οὕτω*. A man, (saith he) will not do amiss, that will divide all Fatalists first into these two general heads, namely, that they derive all things from one principle or not;—the former of which may be called Divine Fatalists, the latter Atheistical. Which Divine Fatalists he again subdivides into such, as first make God by immediate influence to do all things in us; as in animals the members are not determined by themselves, but by that which is the hegemonic in every one: and, secondly, such as make Fate to be an implexed series or concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, whereof God is the chief. The former seems to be a description of that very Fate, that is maintained by some neoteric Christians; the latter is the Fate of the Stoics.

Wherefore Fatalists, that hold the necessity of all human actions and events, may be reduced to

^a Libro de Fato, Ennead. iii. lib. i. c. 2. p. 230.

these three heads: first, such as, asserting the Deity, suppose it irrespectively to decree and determine all things, and thereby make all actions necessary to us; which kind of Fate, though philosophers and other ancient writers have not been altogether-silent of it, yet it has been principally maintained by some neoteric Christians, contrary to the sense of the ancient church. Secondly, such as suppose a Deity, that, acting wisely, but necessarily, did contrive the general frame of things in the world; from whence, by a series of causes, doth unavoidably result whatsoever is now done in it: which Fate is a concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, and is that which was asserted by the ancient Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus, whom the Jewish Essenes seemed to follow. And, lastly, such as hold the material necessity of all things without a Deity; which Fate Epicurus^a calls *τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν εἰμαρμένην*, the Fate of the Naturalists—that is, indeed, the Atheists, the assertors whereof may be called also the Democritical Fatalists. Which three opinions concerning Fate are so many several hypotheses of the intellectual-system of the universe: all which we shall here propose, endeavouring to shew the falseness of them, and then substitute the true mundane system in the room of them.

II. The mathematical or astrological Fate so much talked of, as it is a thing no way considerable for the grounds of it, so whatsoever it be, it must needs fall under one or other of those two general heads in the Plotinical distribution last mentioned, so as either to derive all things from

^a Vide Epistol. Epicuri ad Menecœum, apud Diogen. Laertium, lib. x. segm. 134, p. 659, edit. Meibomii.

one principle, or not. It seems to have had its first emersion amongst the Chaldeans from a certain kind of blind Polytheism (which is but a better sort of disguised Atheism), but it was afterwards adopted and fondly nursed by the Stoics, in a way of subordination to their Divine Fate; for Manilius, Firmicus, and other masters of that sect, were great promoters of it. And there was too much attributed to astrology also by those that were no Fatalists, both Heathen and Christian philosophers, such as were Plotinus, Origen, Simplicius, and others; who, though they did not make the stars to necessitate all human actions here below, they supposed, that Divine Providence (foreknowing all things) had contrived such a strange coincidence of the motions and configurations of the heavenly bodies with such actions here upon earth, as that the former might be prognostics of the latter. Thus Origen^a determines, that the stars do not make but signify; and that the heavens are a kind of Divine volume, in whose characters they that are skilled may read or spell out human events. To the same purpose, Plotinus,^b *Φέρεται μὲν ταῦτα ἐπὶ σωτηρία τῶν ὅλων, παρέχεσθαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλήν χρεῖαν τὴν τοῦ εἰς αὐτὰ ὥσπερ γράμματα βλέποντας, τοὺς τοιαύτην γραμματικὴν εἰδότητας ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ μέλλοντα ἐκ τῶν σχημάτων κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον μεθοδεύοντας τὸ σημαινόμενον ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι, ἐπειδὴ ὑψηλὸς ὄρνις σημαίνει ὑψηλὰς τινὰς πράξεις.* The motion of the stars was intended for the physical good of the whole; but they afford also another use collaterally in order to prognostication, name-

^a Vide P. Dan. Huetium Origenianor. lib. ii. c. viii. sec. v. p. 129.

^b Libro de Fato, Ennead. iii. lib. i. c. vi. p. 233. videas etiam Ennead. ii. lib. iii. c. i. p. 137, et c. vii. p. 140, 141.

ly, that they who are skilled in the grammar of the heavens may be able, from the several configurations of the stars, as it were letters, to spell out future events, by making such analogical interpretations as they use to do in augury; as when a bird flies high, to interpret this of some high and noble exploit.—And Simplicius,* in like manner, Σύμφωνός ἐστὶν ἡ εἰμαρμένη περιφορὰ τῆ προβολῆ τῶν ψυχῶν τῆ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐρχομένη εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, οὐκ ἀναγκάζουσα μὲν τὰς τῶνδε ὀρέγεσθαι ἢ τῶνδε, σύμφωνος δὲ οὖσα ταῖς ὀρέξεσιν αὐτῶν. The fatal conversion of the heavens is made to correspond with the production of souls into generation at such and such times, not necessitating them to will this or that, but conspiring agreeably with such appetites and volitions of theirs.—And these philosophers were the rather inclinable to this persuasion from a superstitious conceit which they had, that the stars, being animated, were intellectual beings of a far higher rank than men. And since God did not make them, nor any thing else in the world, singly for themselves alone, but also to contribute to the public good of the universe, their physical influence seeming inconsiderable, they knew not well what else could be worthy of them, unless it were to portend human events. This indeed is the best sense that can be made of astrological prognostication; but it is a business that stands upon a very weak and tottering, if not impossible foundation.

III. There is another wild and extravagant conceit, which some of the Pagans had, who, though they verbally acknowledged a Deity, yet sup-

* Comment. in Epictetum, c. i. p. 26, edit. Salmasii.

posed a certain Fate superior to it, and not only to all their other petty gods, but also to Jupiter himself. To which purpose is that of the Greek poet Latinized by Cicero,^a “*Quod fore paratum est, id summum exuperat Jovem;*” and that of Herodotus,^b *Τὴν πεπωμένην μοῖραν ἀδύνατον ἐστὶν ἀποφυγεῖν καὶ τῷ Θεῷ*. It is impossible for God himself to avoid the destined Fate:—and *δοῦλος Θεοῦ ἀνάγκης*,^c God himself is a servant of necessity.—According to which conceit, Jupiter in Homer^d laments his condition, in that the Fates having determined, that his beloved Sarpedon should be slain by the son of Menætius, he was not able to withstand it. Though all these passages may not perhaps imply much more than what the Stoical hypothesis itself imported; for that did also in some sense make God himself a servant to the necessity of the matter, and to his own decrees, in that he could not have made the smallest thing in the world otherwise than now it is, much less was able to alter any thing: according to that of Seneca,^e “*Eadem necessitas et Deos alligat. Irrevocabilis divina pariter atque humana cursus vebit. Ille ipse omnium conditor ac rector scripsit quidem Fata, sed sequitur. Semper paret, semel jussit.*” One and the same chain of necessity ties God and men. The same irrevocable and unalterable course carries on Divine and human things. The very maker and governor of all things, that writ the fates, follows them. He did but once com-

^a De Divinat. lib. ii. c. x. p. 3196, edit. Verburgii.

^b Lib. i. c. xci. p. 38. ed. Gronovii.

^c Vide Menandri et Philemonis reliquias a Jo. Clerico editas, p. 307.

^d Iliad, l. γμ.

^e De Providentia, c. v. p. 195, edit. Jo. Fred. Gronovii.

mand, but he always obeys.—But if there were this further meaning in the passages before cited, that a necessity without God, that was invincible by him, did determine his will to all things; this was nothing but a certain confused and contradictory jumble of Atheism and Theism both together; or an odd kind of intimation, that however the name of God be used in compliance with vulgar speech and opinion, yet indeed it signifies nothing but material necessity; and the blind motion of matter is really the highest numen in the world. And here that of Balbus the Stoic, in Cicero,^a is opportune: “Non est natura Dei præpotens et excellens, siquidem ea subjecta est ei vel necessitati vel naturæ, quâ cœlum, maria, terræque reguntur. Nihil autem est præstantius Deo. Nulli igitur est naturæ obediens aut subjectus Deus.” God would not be the most powerful and excellent being, if he were subject to that either necessity or nature, by which the heavens, seas, and earth are governed. But the notion of a God implies the most excellent being. Therefore, God is not obedient or subject to any nature.—

IV. And now we think fit here to suggest, that however we shall oppose those three Fatalisms beforementioned, as so many false hypotheses of the mundane system and economy, and endeavour to exclude that severe tyranness, as Epicurus calls it, of Universal Necessity reigning over all, and to leave some scope for contingent liberty to move up and down in, without which neither rational creatures can be blameworthy for any thing they do, nor God have any object to display his justice

^a De Nat. Deor. lib. ii. c. xxx. p. 3000.

upon, nor indeed be justified in his providence; yet, as we vindicate to God the glory of all good, so we do not quite banish the notion of Fate neither, nor take away all Necessity; which is a thing the Clazomenian philosopher^a of old was taxed for, affirming μηδὲν τῶν γινομένων γίνεσθαι καθ' εἰμαρμένην, ἀλλὰ εἶναι κενὸν τοῦτο τούνομα. That nothing at all was done by Fate, but that it was altogether a vain name.—And the Sadduceans among the Jews have been noted for the same:^b Τὴν μὲν εἰμαρμένην ἀναρροῦσιν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ταύτην ἀξιούντες, οὔτε κατ' αὐτὴν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τέλος λαμβάνειν, ἅπαντα δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τιθέντες. They take away all Fate, and will not allow it to be any thing at all, nor to have any power over human things, but put all things entirely into the hands of men's own free will.—And some of our own seem to have approached too near to this extreme, attributing perhaps more to the power of free will, than either religion or nature will admit. But the hypothesis, that we shall recommend as most agreeable to truth, of a πρόνοια ἰλάσμος, placable providence—of a Deity essentially good, presiding over all, will avoid all extremes, asserting to God the glory of good, and freeing him from the blame of evil; and leaving a certain proportionate contemperation and commixture of contingency and necessity both together in the world; as nature requires a mixture of motion and rest, without either of which there could be no generation. Which temper was observed by several of the ancients; as the Phari-

^a Anaxagoras, who was censured for this opinion by Alexander Aphrodisiensis de Fato, sec. ii. p. 11, edit. Lond. 1658, in 12mo.

^b Josephi Antiq. Judaic. lib. xiii. c. v. sec. ix. p. 649, tom. i. edit. Havercampi.

saic sect amongst the Jews, who determined,^a τινὰ καὶ οὐ πάντα τῆς εἰμαρμένης εἶναι ἔργον, τινὰ δὲ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν, That some things and not all were the effects of Fate, but some things were left in men's own power and liberty:—and also by Plato^b amongst the philosophers, Πλάτων ἐγκρίνει μὲν εἰμαρμένην ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ψυχῶν καὶ βίων, συνεισάγει δὲ καὶ τὴν παρ' ἡμᾶς αἰτίαν. Plato inserts something of Fate into human lives and actions, and he joins with it liberty of will also.—He doth indeed suppose human souls to have within themselves the causes of their own changes to a better or worse state, and every where declares God to be blameless for their evils; and yet he^c somewhere makes the three fatal sisters, notwithstanding, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, to be busy about them also. For according to the sense of the ancients, Fate is a servant of Divine Providence in the world, and takes place differently upon the different actions of free-willed beings. And how free a thing soever the will of man may seem to be to some, yet I conceive it to be out of question, that it may contract upon itself such necessities and fatalities, as it cannot upon a sudden rid itself of at pleasure. But whatsoever is said in the sequel of this discourse by way of opposition to that Fatalism of the neoteric Christians, is intended only to vindicate what was the constant doctrine of the Christian church in its greatest purity (as shall be made manifest), and not to introduce any new-fangled conceit of our own.

^a Id. *ibid.*

^b Vide Plutarch. de Placitis Philosophorum, lib. i. c. xxvii. p. 844. t. ii. oper. edit. Francof. 1599, fol.

^c Vide Platon, de Republica, l. x. p. 520.

v. We must now proceed to give a more full and perfect account of these three several Fates, or hypotheses of the mundane system beforementioned, together with the grounds of them, beginning first with that, which we principally intend the confutation of, the Atheistical or Democritical Fate; which, as it is a thing of the most dangerous consequence of all, so it seems to be most spreading and infectious in these latter times.

Now this Atheistical system of the world, that makes all things to be materially and mechanically necessary, without a God, is built upon a peculiar physiological hypothesis, different from what hath been generally received for many ages; which is called by some Atomical or corpuscular, by others Mechanical; of which we must therefore needs give a full and perfect account. And we shall do it first in general, briefly, not descending to those minute particularities of it, which are disputed amongst these Atomists themselves, in this manner.

The Atomical physiology supposes, that body is nothing else but *διαστατόν ἀντίτυπον*, that is, extended bulk; and resolves, therefore, that nothing is to be attributed to it, but what is included in the nature and idea of it, viz.—more or less magnitude, with divisibility into parts, figure, and position, together with motion or rest, but so as that no part of body can ever move itself, but is always moved by something else. And consequently it supposes, that there is no need of any thing else besides the simple elements of magnitude, figure, site, and motion (which are all clearly intelligible as different modes of extended substance) to solve the corporeal phænomena by; and therefore, not

of any substantial forms distinct from the matter; nor of any other qualities really existing in the bodies without, besides the results or aggregates of those simple elements, and the disposition of the insensible parts of bodies in respect of figure, site, and motion; nor of any intentional species or shows, propagated from the objects to our senses; nor, lastly, of any other kind of motion or action really distinct from local motion (such as generation and alteration), they being neither intelligible, as modes of extended substance, nor any ways necessary. Forasmuch as the forms and qualities of bodies may well be conceived to be nothing but the result of those simple elements of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, variously compounded together, in the same manner as syllables and words in great variety result from the different combinations and conjunctions of a few letters, or the simple elements of speech; and the corporeal part of sensation, and particularly that of vision, may be solved only by local motion of bodies, that is, either by corporeal effluvia (called *simulacra*, *membranæ*, and *exuvie*) streaming continually from the surface of the objects, or rather, as the later and more refined Atomists^a conceived, by pressure made from the object to the eye, by means of light in the medium. So that^b *ὡς διαβακτηρίας τοῦ ταθέντος ἀέρος τὸ βλέπόμενον ἀναγγέλλεται* the sense taking cognizance of the object by the subtle interposed medium, that is tense and

^a Vide Cartesii Dioptric. c. i. et ii. p. 50. tom. i. oper. ed. Amstelod. 1692, in 4to.

^b Apollodorus apud Diogenem Laertium, lib. vii. segm. 157, p. 466. vide etiam Plutarch. de Placitis Philosophor. lib. iv. c. xv. tom. ii. oper. p. 911.

stretched (thrusting every way from it upon the optic nerves), doth by that as it were by a staff touch it. Again, generation and corruption may be sufficiently explained by concretion and secretion, or local motion, without substantial forms and qualities. And, lastly, those sensible ideas of light and colours, heat and cold, sweet and bitter, as they are distinct things from the figure, site, and motion of the insensible parts of the bodies, seem plainly to be nothing else but our own fancies, passions, and sensations, however they be vulgarly mistaken for qualities in the bodies without us.

vi. Thus much may suffice for a general account of the Atomical physiology. We shall in the next place consider the antiquity thereof, as also what notice Aristotle hath taken of it, and what account he gives of the same. For though Epicurus went altogether this way, yet it is well known, that he was not the first inventor of it. But it is most commonly fathered on Democritus, who was senior both to Aristotle and Plato, being reported to have been born the year after Socrates; from whose fountains Cicero^a saith, that Epicurus watered his orchards, and of whom Sex. Empiricus^b and Laertius^c testify, that he did *ἐκβάλλειν τὰς ποιότητες*, cashier qualities;—and Plutarch,^d that he made the first principles of the whole universe *ἄτόμους ἀπίους, καὶ ἀπαθεῖς*, atoms devoid of all qualities and passions.—But Laertius^e

^a De Nat. Deor. lib. i. c. xliii. p. 2948. t. ix. oper.

^b Lib. ii. adv. Logicos, p. 459. Vide etiam lib. vi. adv. Musicos, p. 367. et lib. i. adv. Logicos, p. 399.

^c Lib. ix. segm. 72. p. 586.

^d Libro adversus Colotem, tom. ii. oper. p. 1110.

^e Lib. ix. segm. 30. p. 567.

will have Leucippus, who was somewhat senior to Democritus, to be the first inventor of this philosophy, though he wrote not so many books concerning it as Democritus did. Aristotle, who often takes notice of this philosophy, and ascribes it commonly to Leucippus and Democritus jointly, gives us this description of it in his *Metaphysics*:^a *Λεύκιππος δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐταῖρος αὐτοῦ Δημόκριτος στοιχεῖα μὲν τὸ πλήρες καὶ τὸ κενὸν εἶναι φασί, λέγοντες οἷον τὸ μὲν ὄν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς αἰτίας τῶν ἄλλων φασί ταύτας μέντοι τρεῖς, σχῆμά τε καὶ τάξιν καὶ θέσιν, διαφέρειν γὰρ τὸ ὄν ῥυσμῶ καὶ διαθιγῆ καὶ τροπῇ.* Leucippus and his companion Democritus make the first principles of all things to be Plenum and Vacuum (body and space), whereof one is Ens, the other Non-ens, and the differences of the body, which are only figure, order, and position, to be the causes of all other things.—Which differences they call by these names, Rysmus, Diathige, and Trope. And in his book, *De Anima*,^b having declared that Democritus made fire and the soul to consist of round atoms, he describes those atoms of his after this manner, *οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τὰ καλούμενα ζύσματα ἐν ταῖς διὰ τῶν θυρίδων ἀκτίσι, ὧν τὴν πανσπερμίαν στοιχεῖα λέγει Δημόκριτος τῆς ὅλης φύσεως, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος.* They are (saith he,) like those ramenta or dusty particles which appear in the sun-beams, an omnifarious seminary whereof Democritus makes to be the first elements of the whole universe, and so doth Leucippus likewise.—Elsewhere^c the same Aristotle tells us, that these two philosophers explained generation and alteration, without forms

^a Lib. i. c. iv. p. 268. tom. iv. oper.

^b Lib. i. cap. ii. p. 4. tom. ii. oper.

^c De Generat. et Corrupt. lib. i. c. ii. p. 700. tom. i. oper.

and qualities, by figures and local motion: Δημόκριτος καὶ Λεύκιππος ποιήσαντες τὰ σχήματα τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἐκ τούτων ποιούσι, διακρίσει μὲν καὶ συγκρίσει γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν, τάξει δὲ καὶ θέσει ἀλλοίωσιν: Democritus and Leucippus having made figures (or variously figured atoms), the first principles, make generation and alteration out of these; namely, generation together with corruption from the concretion and secretion of them, but alteration from the change of their order and position.—Again, he elsewhere^a takes notice of that opinion of the Atomists, that all sense was a kind of touch, and that the sensible qualities of bodies were to be resolved into figures, imputing it not only to Democritus, but also to the generality of the old philosophers, but very much disliking the same:—*Δημόκριτος καὶ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀτοπώτατον τι ποιούσι, πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀπὸ ποιούσι καὶ εἰς σχήματα ἀνάγουσι τοὺς χύμους.* Democritus and most of the physiologers here commit a very great absurdity, in that they make all sense to be touch, and resolve sensible qualities into the figures of insensible parts or atoms.—And this opinion he endeavours to confute by these arguments. First, because there is contrariety in qualities, as in black and white, hot and cold, bitter and sweet, but there is no contrariety in figures; for a circular figure is not contrary to a square or multangular; and therefore there must be real qualities in bodies distinct from the figure, site, and motion of parts. Again, the variety of figures and dispositions being infinite, it would follow from thence, that the species of colours, odours, and tastes should be infinite likewise, and reducible to no

^a De Sensu et Sensibili, c. iv. p. 70. tom. ii. oper.

certain number. Which arguments I leave the professed Atomists to answer. Furthermore, Aristotle somewhere also censures that other fundamental principle of this Atomical physiology, that the sensible ideas of colours and tastes, as red, green, bitter, and sweet, formally considered, are only passions and fancies in us, and not real qualities in the object without. For as in a rainbow there is really nothing without our sight, but a rorid cloud diversely refracting and reflecting the sun-beams, in such an angle; nor are there really such qualities in the diaphanous prism; when refracting the light, it exhibits to us the same colours of the rainbow; whence it was collected, that those things are properly the phantasms of the sentient, occasioned by different motions on the optic nerves; so they conceived the case to be the same in all other colours, and that both the colours of the prism and rainbow were as real as other colours, and all other colours as fantastical as they; and then by parity of reason they extended the business further to the other sensibles. But this opinion Aristotle condemns in these words: *Οἱ πρότερον φυσιολόγοι τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ἔλεγον, λευκὸν οὔτε οὐδὲν οἰόμενοι οὔτε μέλαν ἄνευ ὀψεως, οὔτε χύμον ἄνευ γέυσεως*. The former physiologers were generally out in this, in that they thought there was no black or white without the sight, nor no bitter or sweet without the taste.—There are other passages in Aristotle concerning this philosophy, which I think superfluous to insert here; and I shall have occasion to cite some of them afterward for other purposes.

VII. But in the next place it will not be amiss to

^a De Anima. lib. ii. c. i. p. 43. tom. ii. oper.

shew, that Plato also hath left a very full record of this mechanical or Atomical physiology (that hath hardly been yet taken notice of), which notwithstanding he doth not impute either to Democritus (whose name Laertius^a thinks he purposely declined to mention throughout all his writings,) or to Leucippus, but to Protagoras. Wherefore, in his Theætetus, having first declared in general,^b that the Protagorean philosophy made all things to consist of a commixture of parts (or atoms), and local motion, he represents it, in particular, concerning colours, after this manner; ^c *ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν οὕτωςι κατὰ τὰ ὅματα πρῶτον, ὃ δὲ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκὸν μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων, μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὅμασι, ἀλλὰ μέλαν τε καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ὀτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγεννημένον, καὶ ὃ δὲ ἕκαστον εἶναι φάμεν χρῶμα, οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἐκάστω ἴδιον γεγονός·* First, as to that which belongs to the sight, you must conceive that which is called a white or a black colour not to be any thing absolutely existing, either without your eyes or within your eyes: but black and white, and every other colour, is caused by different motions made upon the eye from objects differently modified: so that it is nothing either in the agent nor the patient absolutely, but something which arises from between them both.—Where it follows immediately, *ἢ σὺ δυσχρήσαιο ἂν ὡς οἶόν σοι φαίνεται ἕκαστον σχρῶμα τοιοῦτον καὶ κνὶ καὶ ὀφροῦν ζῶω;* Can you or any man else be confident, that as every colour appears to him, so it appears just the same to every other man and animal, any more than tastes and touches, heat and cold do?—From whence it

^a Lib. ix. segm. 40. p. 571.^b P. 118.^c Ibid. p. 119.

is plain, that Protagoras made sensible qualities not to be all absolute things existing in the bodies without, but to be relative to us, and passions in us; and so they are called presently after *τίνα ἐν ἡμῖν φάσματα*, certain fancies, seemings, or appearances in us. But there is another passage,^a in which a fuller account is given of the whole Protagorean doctrine, beginning thus; Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἐξ ἧς ἂ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἤρτηται ἢδε αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κινήσις ἦν, καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἶδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἐκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν· ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὀμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται ἕκγονα, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δὲ, τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθησις αἰεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, &c. The principle upon which all these things depend, is this, that the whole universe is motion (of atoms) and nothing else besides; which motion is considered two ways, and accordingly called by two names, action and passion; from the mutual congress, and as it were attrition together of both which, are begotten innumerable offsprings, which though infinite in number, yet may be reduced to two general heads, sensibles and sensations, that are both generated at the same time; the sensations are seeing and hearing, and the like, and the correspondent sensibles, colours, sounds, &c. Wherefore when the eye, or such a proportionate object meet together, both the αἰσθητὸν and the αἰσθησις, the sensible idea of white and black, and the sense of seeing, are generated together, neither of which would have been produced, if either of those two had not met with the other. Καὶ τ' ἄλλα δὲ οὕτω ψυχρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑποληπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν

^a Lib. ix. segm. 40. p. 120.

καθ' αὐτὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμίλῳ, πάντα γίνεσθαι, καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως. The like is to be conceived of all other sensibles, as hot and cold, &c. that none of these are absolute things in themselves, or real qualities in the objects without, but they are begotten from the mutual congress of agent and patient with one another, and that by motion; so that neither the agent has any such thing in it before its congress with the patient, nor the patient before its congress with the agent. Ἐκ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων τοῦ ποιούντος καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος πρὸς τὰ ἄλληλα συγγιγνομένων καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτικτόντων, τὰ μὲν ποῖα ἅττα γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα. But the agent and patient meeting together, and begetting sensation and sensibles, both the object and the sentient are forthwith made to be so and so qualified, as when honey is tasted, the sense of tasting and the quality of sweetness are begotten both together, though the sense be vulgarly attributed to the taster, and the quality of sweetness to the honey.—The conclusion of all which is summed up thus, οὐδὲν εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ, ἀλλὰ τιεὶ αἰεὶ γίνεσθαι, That none of those sensible things is any thing absolutely in the objects without, but they are all generated or made relatively to the sentient.—There is more in that dialogue to this purpose, which I here omit; but I have set down so much of it in the author's own language, because it seems to me to be an excellent monument of the wisdom and sagacity of the old philosophers; that which is the main curiosity in this whole business of the mechanical or Atomical philosophy being here more fully and plainly expressed, than it is in Lucretius himself, viz. that sensible things, according to those ideas that we

have of them, are not real qualities absolutely existing without us, but *ἐν ἡμῖν φάσματα*, fancies or phantasms in us : so that both the Latin interpreters Ficinus and Serranus, though probably neither of them at all acquainted with this philosophy, as being not yet restored, could not but understand it after the same manner ; the one expressing it thus—“Color ex aspectu motuque medium quiddam resultans est. Talis circa oculos passio ;” and the other, “Ex varia aspicientis diathesi, variaque sensilis specie colores varios et videri et fieri, ita tamen ut sint *φανταστά*, nec nisi in animo subsistant.” However, it appears by Plato’s manner of telling the story, and the tenour of the whole dialogue, that himself was not a little prejudiced against this philosophy. In all probability the rather, because Protagoras had made it a foundation both for Scepticism and Atheism.

VIII. We have now learnt from Plato, that Democritus and Leucippus were not the sole proprietaries in this philosophy, but that Protagoras, though not vulgarly taken notice of for any such thing (being commonly represented as a Sophist only) was a sharer in it likewise ; which Protagoras, indeed, Laertius,^a and others, affirm to have been an auditor of Democritus ; and so he might be, notwithstanding what Plutarch tells us,^b that Democritus wrote against his taking away the absolute nature of things. However, we are of opinion, that neither Democritus, nor Protagoras, nor Leucippus, was the first inventor of this philosophy ; and our reason is, because they were all three of them Atheists (though

^a Lib. ix. segm. 50. p. 575, 576. Videas etiam A. Gellium Noct. Attic. lib. v. c. iii. et Suidam voce *Πρωταγόρας*.

^b Libro adversus Colotem, tom. ii. oper. p. 1108, 1109.

Protagoras alone was banished for that crime by the Athenians) and we cannot think, that any Atheists could be the inventors of it, much less that it was the genuine spawn and brood of Atheism itself, as some conceit, because, however these Atheists adopted it to themselves, endeavouring to serve their turns of it, yet, if rightly understood, it is the most effectual engine against Atheism that can be. And we shall make it appear afterwards, that never any of those Atheists, whether ancient or modern (how great pretenders soever to it) did thoroughly understand it, but perpetually contradicted themselves in it. And this is the reason, why we insist so much upon this philosophy here, not only because without the perfect knowledge of it, we cannot deal with the Atheists at their own weapon; but also because we doubt not but to make a sovereign antidote against Atheism out of that very philosophy, which so many have used as a *vehiculum* to convey this poison of Atheism by.

ix. But besides reason, we have also good historical probability for this opinion, that this philosophy was a thing of much greater antiquity than either Democritus or Leucippus. And first, because Posidonius, an ancient and learned philosopher, did (as both Empiricus^a and Strabo^b tell us) avouch it for an old tradition, that the first inventor of this Atomical philosophy, was one Moschus, a Phœnician, who, as Strabo also notes, lived before the Trojan wars.

x. Moreover, it seems not altogether improbable, but that this Moschus, a Phœnician philosopher, mentioned by Posidonius, might be the same with that Mochus, a Phœnician physiologer, in

^a Lib. ix. advers. Mathemat. p.621.

^b Lib. xvi. p. 718.

Jamblichus, with whose successors, priests, and prophets, he affirms that Pythagoras, sometimes sojourning at Sidon (which was his native city), had conversed: which may be taken for an intimation, as if he had been by them instructed in that Atomical physiology, which Moschus, or Mochus, the Phœnician, is said to have been the inventor of. Mochus, or Moschus, is plainly a Phœnician name, and there is one Mochus, a Phœnician writer, cited in Athenæus, whom the Latin translator calls Moschus; and Mr. Seldon approves of the conjecture of Arcerius, the publisher of Jamblichus, that this Mochus was no other man than the celebrated Moses of the Jews, with whose successors, the Jewish philosophers, priests, and prophets, Pythagoras conversed at Sidon. Some fantastic Atomists perhaps would here catch at this, to make their philosophy to stand by Divine right, as owing its original to revelation; whereas philosophy being not a matter of faith, but reason, men ought not to affect (as I conceive) to derive its pedigree from revelation, and by that very pretence, seek to impose it tyrannically upon the minds of men, which God hath here purposely left free to the use of their own faculties, that so finding out truth by them, they might enjoy that pleasure and satisfaction, which arises from thence. But we aim here at nothing more, than a confirmation of this truth, that the Atomical physiology was both older than Democritus, and had no such atheistical original neither. And there wants not other good authority for this, that Pythagoras did borrow many things from the Jews, and translate them into his philosophy.

XI. But there are yet other considerable probabilities for this, that Pythagoras was not unacquainted with the Atomical physiology. And first from Democritus himself, who, as he was of the Italic row, or Pythagoric succession, so it is recorded of him in Laertius,^a that he was a great emulator of the Pythagoreans, and seemed to have taken all his philosophy from them, inso-much that if chronology had not contradicted it, it would have been concluded, that he had been an auditor of Pythagoras himself, of whom he testified his great admiration in a book entitled by his name. Moreover, some of his opinions had a plain correspondency with the Pythagoric doctrines, forasmuch as Democritus^b did not only hold, *φέρεσθαι ἀτόμους ἐν τῷ ὄλῳ δινουμένας*, that the atoms were carried round in a vortex ;—but altogether with Leucippus, *τὴν γῆν ὀχεῖθαι περὶ τὸ μέσον δινουμένην*, that the earth was carried about the middle or centre of this vortex (which is the sun) turning in the meantime round upon its own axis. — And just so the Pythagoric opinion is expressed by Aristotle,^c *τὴν γῆν ἐν τῶν ἀστρῶν οὔσαν κύκλῳ φερομένην περὶ τὸ μέσον νύκτα καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ποιεῖν*. That the earth, as one of the stars (that is a planet), being carried round about the middle or centre (which is fire or the sun), did in the meantime by its circumgyration upon its own axis make day and night.—Wherefore it may be reasonably from hence concluded, that as Democritus's philosophy was Pythagorical, so Pythagoras's philosophy was likewise Democritical, or Atomical.

^a Lib. ix. segm. 38. p. 570.

^b Lib. ix. segm. 44. p. 573. et segm. 30. p. 567.

^c De Cœlo, lib. ii. c. xiii. p. 658. tom. i. oper.

XII. But that which is of more moment yet, we have the authority of Ecphantus, a famous Pythagorean for this, that Pythagoras's Monads, so much talked of, were nothing else but corporeal Atoms. Thus we find it in Stobæus,^a τὰς Πυθαγορικὰς Μονάδας οὗτος πρῶτος ἀπεφήνατο σωματικὰς, Ecphantus (who himself^b asserted the doctrine of Atoms) first declared, that the Pythagoric Monads were corporeal,—i. e. Atoms. And this is further confirmed from what Aristotle^c himself writes of these Pythagoreans and their Monads, τὰς Μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔχειν μέγεθος: they suppose their Monads to have magnitude.—Apd from that he elsewhere^d makes Monads and Atoms to signify the same thing, οὐδὲν διαφέρει Μονάδας λέγειν ἢ σωματῖα σμικρὰ. It is all one to say monades or small corpuscula.—And Gassendus^e hath observed out of the Greek epigrammatist,^f that Epicurus's Atoms were sometimes called Monads too:—

————— μάτην Ἐπίκουρον ἔασον
Ποῦ τὸ κενὸν ζητεῖν καὶ τινες αἱ Μονάδες.

XIII. But to pass from Pythagoras himself; that Empedocles, who was a Pythagorean also, did physiologize atomically, is a thing that could hardly be doubted of, though there were no more proof for it than that one passage of his in his philosophic poems:^g

————— φύσις οὐδένος ἐστίν ἑκάστου
Ἄλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διαλλαξίς τε μιγνόντων

^a Eclog. Phys. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 27. edit. Plantin. 1575. fol.

^b Stob. ubi supra, lib. i. c. xxv. p. 48.

^c Metaphys. lib. xi. c. vi. tom. iv. oper. p. 424.

^d De Anima, lib. ii. c. vi. p. 13. tom. ii. oper.

^e Physics sect. i. lib. iii. c. iv. p. 256. tom. i. oper. et in Notis ad lib. ix. Diog. Laertii, p. 70. tom. v. oper.

^f Antholog. Græcor. Epigram. lib. i. xv. p. 32. edit. Francof. 1600. fol.

^g Vide Plut. de Placitis Philos. lib. i. c. xxx. p. 885. tom. ii. oper.

Nature is nothing but the mixture and separation of things mingled ; or thus, There is no production of any thing anew, but only mixture and separation of things mingled.—Which is not only to be understood of animals, according to the Pythagoric doctrine of the transmigration of souls, but also, as himself expounds it, universally of all bodies, that their generation and corruption is nothing but mixture and separation ; or, as Aristotle^a expresses it, *σύγκρισις καὶ διάκρισις*, concretion and secretion of parts, together with change of figure and order. It may perhaps be objected, that Empedocles held four elements, out of which he would have all other bodies to be compounded ; and that as Aristotle affirms,^b he made those elements not to be transmutable into one another neither. To which we reply, that he did indeed make four elements, as the first general concretions of atoms, and therein he did no more than Democritus himself, who, as Laertius writes,^c did from atoms moving round in a vortex, *πάντα συγκρίματα γεννᾶν πῦρ, ὕδωρ, ἀέρα, γῆν, εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ἐξ ἀτόμων τινῶν συστήματα*, generate all concretions, fire, water, air, and earth, these being systems made out of certain atoms.—And Plato further confirms the same ; for in his book *De Legibus*^d he describes (as I suppose) that very Atheistical hypothesis of Democritus, though without mentioning his name, representing it in this manner ; that by the fortuitous motion of senseless matter were first made those four elements, and then out

^a De Generat. et Corrupt. lib. ii. c. vi. p. 739. tom. i. oper.

^b Ibid. p. 734. et lib. i. c. iii. p. 699.

^c Lib. ix. segm. 44. p. 573.

^d Lib. x. p. 666. oper.

of them afterward sun, moon, stars, and earth. Now both Plutarch^a and Stobæus^b testify, that Empedocles compounded the four elements themselves out of atoms. 'Εμπεδοκλῆς δὲ ἐκ μικροτέρων ὄγκων τὰ στοιχεῖα συγκρίνει ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐλάχιστα, καὶ οἰονεὶ στοιχεῖα στοιχείων' Empedocles makes the elements to be compounded of other small corpuscula, which are the least, and as it were the elements of the elements.—And the same Stobæus again observes,^c 'Εμπεδοκλῆς πρὸ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων θραύσματα ἐλάχιστα' Empedocles makes the smallest particles and fragments of body (that is, atoms), to be before the four elements.—But whereas Aristotle affirms, that Empedocles denied the transmutation of those elements into one another, that must needs be either a slip in him, or else a fault in our copies; not only because Lucretius, who was better versed in that philosophy, and gives a particular account of Empedocles's doctrine (besides many others of the ancients), affirms the quite contrary; but also because himself, in those fragments of his still preserved, expressly acknowledges this transmutation.

Καὶ φθίνειν εἰς ἄλλα, καὶ αὖξεται ἐν μέρει αἴσης.

XIV. Besides all this, no less author than Plato affirms, that according to Empedocles, vision and other sensations were made by ἀπορροαὶ σχημάτων, the defluxions of figures,—or effluvia of atoms (for so Democritus's Atoms are called in Aristotle σχήματα, because they were bodies which had only figure without qualities), he supposing, that some

^a De Placitis Philos. lib. i. c. xvii. p. 883. tom. ii. oper. Vide etiam c. xiii. p. 883.

^b Eclog. Physic. lib. i. c. xx. p. 36.

^c Ibid. lib. i. c. xvii. p. 33.

of these figures or particles corresponded with the organs of one sense, and some with the organs of another. *Ἐμπεδοκλῆα, καὶ πόρους, εἰς οὓς, καὶ δι' ὧν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ πορεύονται, καὶ τῶν ἀπορροῶν τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττειν ἐνίοις τῶν πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἢ μείζους εἶναι*. You say, then, according to the doctrine of Empedocles, that there are certain corporeal effluvia from bodies of different magnitudes and figures, as also several pores and meatus's in us diversely corresponding with them : so that some of these corporeal effluvia agree with some pores, when they are either too big or too little for others.—By which it is evident, that Empedocles did not suppose sensations to be made by intentional species or qualities, but as to the generality, in the Atomical way ; in which notwithstanding there are some differences among the Atomists themselves. But Empedocles went the same way here with Democritus, for Empedocles's ἀπορροαὶ σχημάτων, defluxions of figured bodies,—are clearly the same thing with Democritus's εἰδώλων εἰσκρίσεις, insinuations of simulachra ; or, exuvius images of bodies.—And the same Plato adds further,^b that according to Empedocles, the definition of colour was this, ἀπορροὴ σχημάτων ὅψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητὸς, The defluxion of figures, or figured corpuscula (without qualities) commensurate to the sight and sensible.—Moreover, that Empedocles's physiology was the very same with that of Democritus, is manifest also from this passage of Aristotle,* *Οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆα καὶ Δημοκρίτου λανθάνουσι αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοὺς οὐ γένεσιν ἐξ ἀλλήλων ποιοῦντες, ἀλλὰ φαι-*

* Plato in Menone, p. 14.

^b Ibid.

^c De Coelo, lib. iii. cap. vii. p. 680. tom. i. oper.

νομενην γενεσιν· ένυπάρχον γάρ έκαστον έκκρίνεσθαι φασίν
 ώσπερ έξ άγγείου τής γενέσεως ούσης· Empedocles and
 Democritus deceiving themselves, unawares de-
 stroy all generation of things out of one another,
 leaving a seeming generation only : for they say,
 that generation is not the production of any new
 entity, but only the secretion of what was before
 inexistent ; as when divers kinds of things con-
 founded together in a vessel, are separated from
 one another.—Lastly, we shall confirm all this by
 the clear testimony of Plutarch, or the writer *De
 Placitis Philosophorum* :^a Έμπεδοκλῆς καί Έπίκουρος
 καί πάντες όσοι κατά συναθροισμόν τών λεπτομερών σωμάτων
 κοσμοποιοῦσι, συγκρίσεις μέν καί διακρίσεις είσάγουσι, γενέ-
 σεις δέ καί φθοράς ού κυρίως, ού γάρ κατά ποίον έξ άλλιώ-
 σεως, κατά δέ πόσον ούκ συναθροισμοῦ ταύτας γίνεσθαι· Em-
 pedocles and Epicurus, and all those that com-
 pound the world of small atoms, introduce con-
 cretions and secretions, but no generations or cor-
 ruptions properly so called ; neither would they
 have these to be made according to quality by al-
 teration, but only according to quantity by ag-
 gregation.—And the same writer sets down the
 order and method of the *Cosmopœia*, according to
 Empedocles ;^b Έμπεδοκλῆς, τόν μέν αίθήρα πρώτον διακρι-
 θῆναι, δεύτερον δέ τὸ πῦρ, έφ' ᾧ τήν γῆν έξ άγαν περισφιγγο-
 μένης τῆ ρύμη τής περιφοράς, αναβλύσαι τὸ ὕδωρ, έξ ού θυ-
 μαθῆναι τὸν αίερα, καί γενέσθαι τὸν μέν οὔρανον έκ τοῦ αίθέ-
 ρος, τὸν δέ ἥλιον έκ πυρός· Empedocles writes, that
 ether was first of all secreted out of the confused
 chaos of atoms, afterwards the fire, and then the
 earth, which being constringed, and as it were,
 squeezed by the force of agitation, sent forth wa-
 ter bubbling out of it ; from the evaporation of

^a Lib. i. c. xxiv. p. 884. oper.^b Lib. ii. cap. vi. p. 887.

which did proceed air; and from the ether was made the heavens, from fire the sun.—We see, therefore, that it was not without cause, that Lucretius^a did so highly extol Empedocles, since his physiology was really the same with that of Epicurus and Democritus; only that he differed from them in some particularities, as in excluding a vacuum, and denying such physical minima as were indivisible.

xv. As for Anaxagoras, though he philosophized by Atoms, substituting concretion and secretion, in the room of generation and corruption, insisting upon the same fundamental principle, that Empedocles, Democritus, and the other Atomists did; which was (as we shall declare more fully afterward) that nothing could be made out of nothing, nor reduced to nothing; and therefore, that there were neither any new productions, nor destructions of any substances or real entities: yet, as his Homœomeria is represented by Aristotle, Lucretius, and other authors, that bone was made of bony atoms, and flesh of fleshy, red things of red atoms, and hot things of hot atoms: these atoms being supposed to be endued originally with so many several forms and qualities essential to them, and inseparable from them, there was indeed a wide difference between his philosophy and the Atomical. However, this seems to have had its rise from nothing else but this philosopher's not being able to understand the Atomical hypothesis, which made him decline it, and substitute this spurious and counterfeit Atomism of his own in the room of it.

xvi. Lastly, I might add here, that it is record-

^a Lib. i. vers. 744, 745.

ed by good authors, concerning divers other ancient philosophers, that were not addicted to Democriticism or Atheism, that they followed this Atomical way of physiologizing, and therefore in all probability did derive it from those religious Atomists before Democritus. As for example; Ecphantus, the Syracusian Pythagorist, who, as Stobæus writes, made τὰ ἀδιαίρετα σώματα καὶ τὸ κενόν, indivisible bodies and vacuum, the principles of physiology, and as Theodoret also testifies, taught ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων συνεστάναι τὸν κόσμον, that the corporeal world was made up of atoms; —Xenocrates,^a that made μεγέθη ἀδιαίρετα, indivisible magnitudes, the first principles of bodies; Heraclides,^b that resolved all corporeal things into ψήγματα καὶ θραύσματά τινα ἐλάχιστα, certain smallest fragments of bodies;—Asclepiades,^c who supposed all the corporeal world to be made ἐξ ἀνομοίων καὶ ἀναρμων ὄγκων, not of similar parts (as Anaxagoras) but of dissimilar and inconcinn molecules, i. e. atoms of different magnitude and figures; and Diodorus,^d that solved the material phænomena by ἀμερῆ τὰ ἐλάχιστα, the smallest indivisibles of body. And lastly, Metrodorus^e (not Lampsacenus, the Epicurean, but) Chius, who is reported also to have made indivisible particles and atoms the first principles of bodies. But what need we any more proof for this, that the

^a Vide Georg. Pachymer. libellum περὶ ἀτόμων γράμμων, qui extat inter Aristotelis opera, tom. ii. cap. i. p. 819.

^b Vide Plutarch. de Placitis Philos. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 883. tom. ii. oper.

^c Vide Sextum Empiric. Hypotypos. Pyrrhon. lib. iii. cap. iv. p. 136.

^d Sext. Empiric. lib. i. adv. Physicos, sect. 363. p. 621. vide etiam lib. iii. Hypothēs. cap. iv. p. 136.

^e Vide Stobæi Eclog. Physic. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 27.

Atomical physiology was ancients than Democritus and Leucippus, and not confined only to that sect, since Aristotle himself^a in the passages already cited, doth expressly declare, that besides Democritus, the generality of all the other physiologists went that way; Δημόκριτος καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων, &c. Democritus and the most of the physiologists make all sense to be touch, and resolvesensible qualities, as the tastes of bitter and sweet, &c. into figures.—And again,^b he imputes it generally to all the physiologists that went before him, οἱ πρότερον φυσιολόγοι, the former physiologists (without any exception) said not well in this, that there was no black and white without the sight, nor bitter and sweet without the taste.—Wherefore, I think, it cannot be reasonably doubted, but that the generality of the old physiologists before Aristotle and Democritus, did pursue the Atomical way, which is to resolve the corporeal phænomena, not into forms, qualities, and species, but into figures, motions, and fancies.

XVII. But then there will seem to be no small difficulty in reconciling Aristotle with himself, who doth in so many places plainly impute this philosophy to Democritus and Leucippus, as the first source and original of it; as also in salving the credit of Laertius, and many other ancient writers, who do the like, Democritus having had for many ages almost the general cry and vogue for Atoms. However, we doubt not but to give a very good account of this business, and reconcile the seemingly different testimonies of these ancient writers, so as to take away all contradic-

^a Lib. de Sensu et Sensibili, cap. iv. p. 70. tom. ii. oper.

^b De Animo, lib. ii. cap. i. p. 43. tom. ii. oper.

tion and repugnancy between them. For although the Atomical physiology was in use long before Democritus and Leucippus, so that they did not make it, but find it; yet these two, with their confederate Atheists (whereof Protagoras seems to have been one) were undoubtedly the first, that ever made this physiology to be a complete and entire philosophy by itself, so as to derive the original of all things in the whole universe from senseless atoms, that had nothing but figure and motion, together with vacuum, and made up such a system of it, as from whence it would follow, that there could not be any God, not so much as a corporeal one. These two things were both of them before singly and apart. For there is no doubt to be made, but that there hath been Atheism lurking in the minds of some or other in all ages; and perhaps some of those ancient Atheists did endeavour to philosophize too, as well as they could, in some other way. And there was Atomical physiology likewise before, without Atheism. But these two thus complicated together, were never before Atomical Atheism, or Atheistical Atomism. And therefore, Democritus and his comrade Leucippus, need not be envied the glory of being reputed the first inventors or founders of the Atomical philosophy atheized and adulterated.

XVIII. Before Leucippus and Democritus, the doctrine of Atoms was not made a whole entire philosophy by itself, but looked upon only as a part or member of the whole philosophic system, and that the meanest and lowest part too, it being only used to explain that which was purely corporeal in the world; besides which, they acknow-

ledged something else, which was not mere bulk and mechanism, but life and self activity, that is, immaterial or incorporeal substance; the head and summit whereof, is the Deity distinct from the world. So that there have been two sorts of Atomists in the world, the one Atheistical, the other Religious. The first and most ancient Atomists holding incorporeal substance, used that physiology in a way of subordination to theology and metaphysics. The other, allowing no other substance but body, made senseless atoms and figures, without any mind and understanding (i. e. without any God) to be the original of all things; which latter is that, that was vulgarly known by the name of Atomical philosophy, of which Democritus and Leucippus were the source.

XIX. It hath been indeed of late confidently asserted by some, that never any of the ancient philosophers dreamed of any such thing as incorporeal substance; and therefore they would bear men in hand, that it was nothing but an upstart and new-fangled invention of some bigotical religionists; the falsity whereof, we shall here briefly make to appear. For though there have been doubtless, in all ages, such as have disbelieved the existence of any thing but what was sensible, whom Plato^a describes after this manner; οὐ διαείνουντ' ἂν πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ συμπιέζειν εἶσιν, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐστὶ. That would contend, that whatsoever they could not feel or grasp with their hands, was altogether nothing;—yet this opinion was professedly opposed by the best of the ancient philosophers, and condemned for a piece of sottishness and stupidity. Wherefore, the same

^a In Sophista, p. 160.

Plato tells us, that there had been always, as well as then there was, a perpetual war and controversy in the world, and, as he calls it, a kind of gigantomachy betwixt these two parties or sects of men; the one, that held there was no other substance in the world besides body; the other, that asserted incorporeal substance. The former of these parties or sects is thus described by the philosopher; Οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἔλκουσι ταῖς χερσὲν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρυὲς περιλαμβάνοντες, τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων, δισχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προςβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταυτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὀριζόμενοι· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴτις φησὶ μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν· These (saith he) pull all things down from heaven and the invisible region, with their hands to the earth, laying hold of rocks and oaks; and when they grasp all these hard and gross things, they confidently affirm, that that only is substance, which they can feel, and will resist their touch; and they conclude, that body and substance are one and the self-same thing; and if any one chance to speak to them of something which is not body, i. e. of incorporeal substance, they will altogether despise him, and not hear a word more from him. And many such the philosopher there says he had met withal. The other he represents in this manner; Οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἀνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου τόπου ἀμύνονται νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη, βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἀπλετος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τις αἰεὶ ξυνέστηκε· The adversaries of these Corporealists do cautiously and piously assault them from the invisible region, fetching all things from above by way of descent, and by strength of

reason convincing, that certain intelligible and incorporeal forms are the true or first substance, and not sensible things. But betwixt these two there hath always been (saith he) a great war and contention.—And yet in the sequel of his discourse, he adds, that those Corporealists were then grown a little more modest and shame-faced than formerly their great champions had been, such as Democritus and Protagoras; for however they still persisted in this, that the soul was a body, yet they had not, it seems, the impudence to affirm, that wisdom and virtue were corporeal things, or bodies, as others before and since too have done. We see here, that Plato expressly asserts a substance distinct from body, which sometimes he calls *οὐσίαν ἀσώματον*, incorporeal substance,—and sometimes *οὐσίαν νοητήν*, intelligible substance,—in opposition to the other which he calls *αἰσθητήν*, sensible.—And it is plain to any one, that hath had the least acquaintance with Plato's philosophy, that the whole scope and drift of it, is to raise up men's minds from sense to a belief of incorporeal things as the most excellent: *τὰ γὰρ ἀσώματα κάλλιστα ὄντα καὶ μέγιστα λόγῳ μόνον, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί, σαφῶς δείκνυται*, as he writes in another place;^a for incorporeal things, which are the greatest and most excellent things of all, are (saith he) discoverable by reason only, and nothing else.—And his subterraneous cave, so famously known, and so elegantly described by him,^b where he supposes men tied with their backs towards the light, placed at a great distance from them, so that they could not turn about their heads to it neither, and therefore could see nothing but the shadows

^a In Politico, p. 182. oper.

^b De Repub. lib. vii. p. 482.

(of certain substances behind them) projected from it, which shadows they concluded to be the only substances and realities, and when they heard the sounds made by those bodies that were betwixt the light and them, or their reverberated echoes, they imputed them to those shadows which they saw; I say, all this is a description of the state of those men, who take body to be the only real and substantial thing in the world, and to do all that is done in it; and therefore often impute sense, reason, and understanding, to nothing but blood and brains in us.

xx. I might also shew in the next place, how Aristotle did not at all dissent from Plato herein, he plainly asserting,^a *ἄλλην οὐσίαν παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ*, another substance besides sensibles,—*οὐσίαν χωριστήν καὶ κεχωρισμένην τῶν αἰσθητῶν*, a substance separable and also actually separated from sensibles,—*ἀκίνητον οὐσίαν*, an immoveable nature or essence—(subject to no generation or corruption) adding, that the Deity was to be sought for here: nay, such a substance, *ἣν μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἀμερῆς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστι*, as hath no magnitude at all, but is impartible and indivisible.—He also blaming Zeno (not the Stoic, who was junior to Aristotle, but an ancients philosopher of that name) for making God to be a body, in these words; ^b *αὐτὸς γὰρ σῶμα λέγει εἶναι τὸν Θεόν· εἴτε δὲ τὸδε τὸ πᾶν, εἴτε ὅτι δήποτε αὐτὸς λέγων· ἀσώματος γὰρ ὦν πῶς ἂν σφαιροειδὴς εἴη; ὅταν οὕτως οὐτ' ἂν κινῶιτο, οὐτ' ἂν ἡρεμοῖ, μηδαμοῦ τε ὦν· ἐπεὶ δὲ σῶμά ἐστι, τί ἂν αὐτὸ κωλύει κινεῖσθαι*.

^a Metaphys. lib. xiv. cap. vii. p. 480. tom. iv. oper. et in multis aliis locis.

^b Libro de Zenone, Xenophane, et Gorgia, cap. iv. p. 844. tom. ii. oper.

Zeno implicitly affirms God to be a body, whether he mean him to be the whole corporeal universe, or some particular body; for if God were incorporeal, how could he be spherical? nor could he then either move or rest, being not properly in any place: but if God be a body, then nothing hinders but that he may be moved.— From which and other places of Aristotle, it is plain enough also, that he did suppose incorporeal substance to be unextended, and as such, not to have relation to any place. But this is a thing to be disputed afterwards. Indeed some learned men conceive Aristotle to have reprehended Zeno without cause, and that Zeno made God to be a sphere, or spherical, in no other sense, than Parmenides did in that known verse of his :^a

Πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρας ἐναλιγκιον ὄγκω.

Wherein he is understood to describe the Divine eternity. However, it plainly appears from hence, that according to Aristotle's sense, God was *ἀσώματος*, an incorporeal substance distinct from the world.

xxi. Now this doctrine, which Plato especially was famous for asserting, that there was *οὐσία ἀσώματος*, incorporeal substance,—and that the souls of men were such, but principally the Deity; Epicurus taking notice of it, endeavoured with all his might to confute it, arguing sometimes after this manner :^b There can be no incorporeal God (as Plato maintained), not only because no man can frame a conception of an incorporeal

^a Apud Aristot. in libro jam laudato, cap. iv. p. 843. tom. ii. oper. et apud Platonem in Sophista, et veterum alios.

^b Cicero de Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xii. p. 2897. tom. ix. oper.

substance, but also because whatsoever is incorporeal must needs want sense, and prudence, and pleasure, all which things are included in the notion of God; and therefore, an incorporeal Deity is a contradiction.—And concerning the soul of man: *οἱ λέγοντες ἀσώματον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ματαιάζουσι*, &c. They who say, that the soul is incorporeal, in any other sense, than as that word may be used to signify a subtile body, talk vainly and foolishly; for then it could neither be able to do nor suffer any thing. It could not act upon any other thing, because it could touch nothing; neither could it suffer from any thing, because it could not be touched by any thing; but it would be just like to vacuum or empty space, which can neither do nor suffer any thing, but only yield bodies a passage through it.—From whence it is further evident, that this opinion was professedly maintained by some philosophers before Epicurus's time.

XXII. But Plato and Aristotle were not the first inventors of it; for it is certain, that all those philosophers, who held the immortality of the human soul, and a God distinct from this visible world (and so properly the Creator of it and all its parts), did really assert incorporeal substance. For that a corporeal soul cannot be in its own nature immortal and incorruptible, is plain to every one's understanding, because of its parts being separable from one another; and whosoever denies God to be incorporeal, if he make him any thing at all, he must needs make him to be either the whole corporeal world, or else a part of it.—Wherefore, if God be neither of these, he must then be an incorporeal substance. Now Plato

^a Vide Diog. Laert. lib. x. segm. 67, 68. p. 630.

was not the first who asserted these two things, but they were both maintained by many philosophers before him. Pherecydes Syrus, and Thales, were two of the most ancient philosophers among the Greeks; and it is said of the former of them,^a that by his lectures and disputes concerning the immortality of the soul, he first drew off Pythagoras from another course of life to the study of philosophy. Pherecydes Syrus (saith Cicero)^b “*primus dixit animos hominum esse sempiternos.*” And Thales, in an epistle,^c directed to him, congratulates his being the first, that had designed to write to the Greeks concerning Divine things; which Thales also (who was the head of the Ionic succession of philosophers, as Pythagoras of the Italic) is joined with Pythagoras and Plato, by the writer “*De Placitis Philosophorum,*”^d after this manner, οὔτοι πάντες οἱ προτεταγμένοι ἀσώματον τὴν ψυχὴν ὑποτίθενται, φύσει λέγοντες αὐτοκίνητον καὶ οὐσίαν νοητὴν. All these determined the soul to be incorporeal, making it to be naturally self-moving (or self-active) and an intelligible substance,—that is, not sensible. Now he, that determines the soul to be incorporeal, must needs hold the Deity to be incorporeal much more. “*Aquam dixit Thales esse initium rerum (saith Cicero), Deum autem eam mentem, quæ ex aqua cuncta fingeret.*” Thales said that water was the first principle of all corporeal things, but that God was that mind, which formed all things out of water.

^a Vide Augustin. cap. cxxxvii. p. 308. tom. ii. oper.

^b Tusculan. Quæst. lib. i. c. xvi. p. 2586. tom. viii. oper.

^c Apud Diogen. Laert. lib. i. segm. 43. p. 25.

^d Lib. iv. cap. iii. p. 908.

^e De Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. x. p. 2694. tom. ix. oper.

—For Thales was a Phœnician by extraction, and accordingly seemed to have received his two principles from thence, water, and the Divine Spirit moving upon the waters. The first whereof is thus expressed by Sanchoniathon,^a in his description of the Phœnician theology, *χάος θολερόν, ἐρεβώδες*, a turbid and dark chaos;—and the second is intimated in these words, *ἠράσθη τὸ πνεῦμα τῶν ἰδίων ἀρχῶν*, the Spirit was affected with love towards its own principles;—perhaps expressing the force of the Hebrew word, *Merachepeth*, and both of them implying an understanding prolific goodness, forming and hatching the corporeal world into this perfection; or else a plastic power, subordinate to it. Zeno (who was also originally a Phœnician) tells us,^b that Hesiod's chaos was water; and that the material heaven as well as earth was made out of water (according to the judgment of the best interpreters) is the genuine sense of Scripture, 2 Pet. iii. 5. by which water some perhaps would understand a chaos of atoms confusedly moved. But whether Thales were acquainted with the Atomical physiology or no,^c it is plain that he asserted, besides the soul's immortality, a Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

We pass to Pythagoras, whom we have proved already to have been an Atomist; and it is well known, also, that he was a professed Incorporealist. That he asserted the immortality of the soul, and consequently its immateriality, is evi-

^a Apud Euseb. de Præparatione Evangelica, lib. ii. cap. x. p. 33.

^b Vide Scholiast. in Apollon. Argonautic. lib. iv. vers. 676. s. citatum ab Hug. Grotio, in Notis ad lib. i. de Veritate Relig. Christ. sec. xvi. p. 30, 31.

^c Vide Plutarch. de Placitis Philos. lib. i. cap. xvi. p. 883.

dent from his doctrine of pre-existence and transmigration: and that he likewise held an incorporeal Deity distinct from the world, is a thing not questioned by any. But if there were any need of proving it (because there are no monuments of his extant), perhaps it might be done from hence, because he was the chief propagator of that doctrine amongst the Greeks, concerning three hypostases in the Deity.

For, that Plato and his followers held, *τρῆς ἀρχικὰς ὑποστασεῖς*, three hypostases in the Deity, that were the first principles of all things—is a thing very well known to all; though we do not affirm, that these Platonic hypostases are exactly the same with those in the Christian trinity. Now Plato himself sufficiently intimates this not to have been his own invention; and Plotinus tells us, that it was *παλαιὰ δόξα*, an ancient opinion before Plato's time, which had been delivered down by some of the Pythagorics. Wherefore, I conceive, this must needs be one of those Pythagoric monstrosities, which Xenophon covertly taxes Plato for entertaining, and mingling with the Socratical philosophy, as if he had thereby corrupted the purity and simplicity of it. Though a Corporealist may pretend to be a Theist, yet I never heard that any of them did ever assert a trinity, respectively to the Deity, unless it were such an one as I think not fit here to mention.

xxiii. That Parmenides, who was likewise a Pythagorean, acknowledged a Deity distinct from the corporeal world, is evident from Plato.^a And Plotinus tells us also, that he was one of them that asserted the triad of Divine hypostases.

^a In Parmenide.

Moreover, whereas there was a great controversy amongst the ancient philosophers before Plato's time,^a between such as held all things to flow (as namely Heraclitus and Cratylus), and others, who asserted that some things did stand, and that there was *ἀκίνητος οὐσία*, a certain immutable nature—to wit, an eternal mind, together with eternal and immutable truths (amongst which were Parmenides and Melissus); the former of these were all Corporealists (this being the very reason why they made all things to flow, because they supposed all to be body), though these were not, therefore, all of them Atheists. But the latter were all both Incorporealists and Theists; for whosoever holds incorporeal substance, must needs, according to reason, also assert a Deity.

And although we did not before particularly mention Parmenides amongst the Atomical philosophers, yet we conceive it to be manifest from hence, that he was one of that tribe, because he was an eminent assessor of that principle, *οὐδὲν οὔτε γίνεσθαι οὔτε φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων*, that no real entity is either made or destroyed, generated or corrupted.—Which we shall afterwards plainly shew, to be the grand fundamental principle of the Atomical philosophy.

xxiv. But whereas we did evidently prove before, that Empedocles was an Atomical physiologist, it may, notwithstanding, with some colour of probability, be doubted, whether he were not an Atheist, or at least a Corporealist, because Aristotle accuses him of these following things. First,^b of making knowledge to be sense, which is, in-

^a Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 130, 131.

^b Aristot. de Anima, lib. iii. cap. iii. p. 45. tom. ii. oper.

deed, a plain sign of a Corporealist; and, therefore, in the next place also,^a of compounding the soul out of the four elements, making it to understand every corporeal thing by something of the same within itself, as fire by fire, and earth by earth; and lastly,^b of attributing much to fortune, and affirming, that divers of the parts of animals were made such by chance, and that there were at first certain mongrel animals, fortuitously produced, that were βουγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωρα, such as had something of the shape of an ox, together with the face of a man (though they could not long continue);—which seems to give just cause of suspicion, that Empedocles atheized in the same manner that Democritus did.

To the first of these we reply, that some others, who had also read Empedocles's poems, were of a different judgment from Aristotle as to that, conceiving Empedocles not to make sense but reason the criterion of truth. Thus Empiricus informs us:^c Others say, that, according to Empedocles, the criterion of truth is not sense, but right reason; and also that right reason is of two sorts, the one θεῖος, or Divine, the other ἀνθρώπινος, or human: of which the Divine is inexpressible, but the human declarable.—And there might be several passages cited out of those fragments of Empedocles's poems yet left, to confirm this; but we shall produce only this one:

Γούων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ' ἢ δῆλον ἕκαστον.^d

To this sense; Suspend thy assent to the corpo-

^a Arist. lib. i. cap. ii. p. 5. tom. ii. oper.

^b Id. de Partibus Animal. lib. i. cap. i. p. 470. tom. ii. oper. et Physicor. lib. ii. cap. viii. p. 475. et 477.

^c Lib. vii. adv. Math. sec. 122. p. 396.

^d Ib. sec. 125. p. 347.

real senses, and consider every thing clearly with thy mind or reason.

And as to the second crimination, Aristotle^a has much weakened his own testimony here, by accusing Plato also of the very same thing. Πλατωνὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ, γινώσκειται γὰρ ὁμοίῳ ὁμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι. Plato compounds the soul out of the four elements, because like is known by like, and things are from their principles.—Wherefore it is probable, that Empedocles might be no more guilty of this fault (of making the soul corporeal, and to consist of earth, water, air, and fire) than Plato was, who, in all men's judgments, was as free from it as Aristotle himself, if not more. For Empedocles^b did, in the same manner as Pythagoras before him, and Plato after him, hold the transmigration of souls, and consequently both their future immortality and pre-existence; and therefore must needs assert their incorporeity: Plutarch^c rightly declaring this to have been his opinion; Εἶναι καὶ τοὺς μηδέπω γεγονότας καὶ τοὺς ἤδη τεθνηκότας. That as well those who are yet unborn, as those that are dead, have a being.—He also asserted human souls to be here in a lapsed state;^d μετανάστας, καὶ ξένους, καὶ φυγάδας, wanderers, strangers, and fugitives from God; declaring, as Plotinus tells us,^e that it was a Divine law, ἀμαρτανούσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς πεσεῖν ἐνταῦθα, that souls sinning should fall down into these earthly bodies. But the fullest record of the

^a De Anima, l. i. c. ii. p. 5. tom. ii. op.

^b Diogen. Laert. lib. viii. segm. 78. p. 359. et Plut. de Solertia Animal. tom. ii. p. 964. oper.

^c Libro Adv. Colotem, p. 1113. tom. ii. oper.

^d Plutarch. de Exilio, p. 607.

^e De Animæ Descensu in Corpora, En. iv. lib. viii. cap. i. p. 468.

Empedoclean philosophy concerning the soul is contained in this of Hierocles,^a Κάτεισι καὶ ἀποπίπτει τῆς εὐδαίμονος χώρας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησιν ὁ Πυθαγόρειος, —φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης Νείκει μαινομένην πίνυνοσ.—^aΑνεισι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἔξιν ἀπολαμβάνει,

Εἰ φεύξει τὰ περὶ γῆν καὶ τὸν ἀτερεπία χῶρον,
Ἐνθα φόνος τε κίτος τε καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα κηρῶν.

Εἰς ὃν οἱ ἐκπεσόντες—^aἌτης

—ἀνὰ λειμῶνα τε καὶ σκότος ἠλάσκουσιν.

Ἡ δὲ ἔφεσις τοῦ φεύγοντος τὸν τῆς Ἄτης λειμῶνα πρὸς τὸν τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπίγεται λειμῶνα, ὃν ἀπολιπὼν τῇ ὀρμῇ τῆς πτερορρύθησεως εἰς γήινον ἔρχεται σῶμα, Ὀλβίου—αἰῶνος ἀμελθεῖς. Man falleth from his happy state, as Empedocles the Pythagorean saith,—by being a fugitive, apostate, and wanderer from God, actuated with a certain mad and irrational strife or contention.—But he ascends again, and recovers his former state,—if he decline, and avoid these earthly things, and despise this unpleasant and wretched place, where murder, and wrath, and a troop of all other mischiefs reign. Into which place, they who fall, wander up and down through the field of Ate and darkness. But the desire of him that flees from this field of Ate carries him on towards the field of truth; which the soul at first relinquishing, and losing its wings, fell down into this earthly body, deprived of its happy life.—From whence it appears that Plato's πτερορρύθησις was derived from Empedocles and the Pythagoreans.

Now, from what hath been already cited, it is sufficiently manifest, that Empedocles was so far from being either an Atheist or Corporealist, that he was indeed a rank Pythagorist, as he is here called. And we might add hereunto, what Cle-

^a In Aurea Pythagoræ Carmina, p. 186.

mens Alexandrinus observes,^a that, according to Empedocles, ἦν ὁσίως καὶ δικαίως διαβιώσωμεν, μακάριοι μὲν ἐνταῦθα, μακαριώτεροι δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἐνθὲνδε ἀπαλλαγὴν· οὐ χρόνῳ τιγὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔχοντες, ἀλλὰ ἐν αἰῶνι ἀναπαύεσθαι δυνάμενοι, Ἐθανάτοις ἄλλοισιν ὁμέστιοι, ἐν δὲ τραπέζαις, &c. If we live holily and justly, we shall be happy here, and more happy after our departure hence; having our happiness not necessarily confined to time, but being able to rest and fix in it to all eternity; feasting with the other immortal beings, &c.—We might also take notice, how, besides the immortal souls of men, he acknowledged demons or angels; declaring that some of these fell from heaven, and were since prosecuted by a Divine Nemesis. For these in Plutarch^b are called οἱ θεήλατοι καὶ οὐρανοπετεῖς ἐκεῖνοι τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους δαίμονες. Those Empedoclean demons lapsed from heaven, and pursued with Divine vengeance;—whose restless torment is there described in several verses of his.^c And we might observe, likewise, how he acknowledged a natural and immutable justice, which was not topical and confined to places and countries, and relative to particular laws, but catholic and universal, and every where the same, through infinite light and space; as he expresses it with poetic pomp and bravery:

^d Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον, διὰ τ' εὐεμεδοντος
 Αἰθέρος, ἰνεκίως τέταται, διὰ τ' ἀπλήτου αἰγῆς.

And the asserting of natural morality is no small argument of a Theist.

But what then shall we say to those other things, which Empedocles is charged with by

^a Stromatum, lib. v. p. 722.

^b De vitando ære alieno, tom. ii. oper. p. 830.

^c Apud Plut. de Exilio, t. ii. oper. p. 607.

^d Apud Aristot. Rhetoric, lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 737. tom. iii. oper.

Aristotle, that seem to have so rank a smell of Atheism? Certainly those mongrel and biform animals, that are said to have sprung up out of the earth by chance, look as if they were more akin to Democritus than Empedocles; and probably it is the fault of the copies, that it is read otherwise, there being no other philosopher that I know of, that could ever find any such thing in Empedocles's poems.^a But for the rest, if Aristotle do not misrepresent Empedocles, as he often doth Plato, then it must be granted, that he being a mechanical physiologer, as well as theologer, did something too much indulge to fortuitous mechanism; which seems to be an extravagancy, that mechanical philosophers and Atomists have been always more or less subject too. But Aristotle doth not charge Empedocles with resolving all things into fortuitous mechanism, as some philosophers have done of late, who yet pretend to be Theists and Incorporealists, but only that he would explain some things in that way. Nay, he clearly puts a difference betwixt Empedocles and the Democritic Atheists, in these words subjoined;^b *Εἰσὶ δὲ τινές*, &c. which is as if he should have said, "Empedocles resolved some things in the fabric and structure of animals into fortuitous mechanism; but there are certain other philosophers, namely, Leucippus and Democritus, who would have all things whatsoever in the whole world, heaven, and earth, and animals, to be made by chance and the fortuitous motion of atoms, without a Deity." It seems very plain, that Empedo-

^a Some verses of Empedocles, wherein he expressly maintains that opinion, are extant in Ælian de Natura Animalium, lib. xvi. c. xxix.

^b Physicor. lib. ii. cap. iv. p. 470. oper.

cles's *Philia* and *Neikos*, his friendship and discord, which he makes to be the *ἀρχὴ δραστήριος*, the active cause,—and principle of motion in the universe, was a certain plastic power, superior to fortuitous mechanism: and Aristotle himself acknowledges somewhere as much. And Plutarch tells us,^a that, according to Empedocles, the order and system of the world is not the result of material causes and fortuitous mechanism, but of a Divine wisdom, assigning to every thing *οὐκ ἦν ἡ φύσις δίδωσι χώραν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἡ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἔργον ποθεῖ σύνταξις*. not such a place as nature would give it, but such as is most convenient for the good of the whole.—Simplicius,^b who had read Empedocles, acquaints us, that he made two worlds, the one intellectual, the other sensible; and the former of these to be the exemplar and archetype of the latter. And so the writer *De Placitis Philosophorum* observes,^c that Empedocles made *δύο ἡλίους, τὸν μὲν ἀρχέτυπον, τὸν δὲ φαινόμενον*, two suns, the one archetypal and intelligible, the other apparent or sensible.—

But I need take no more pains to purge Empedocles from those two imputations of Corporealism and Atheism, since he hath so fully confuted them himself in those fragments of his still extant. First, by expressing such a hearty resentment of the excellency of piety, and the wretchedness and sottishness of Atheism in these verses:

*Ἄλβιος δὲ θεῖον πραπίδων ἐκτίσατο πλοῦτον,
Δειλὸς δ' ὅ σκωτέεσσα θεῶν πέρι δόξα μέμνηεν.*

^a *Symposiac. lib. i. Quæst. ii. p. 618.*

^b *Commentar. ad Aristot. libr. Physicor. p. 74. b. edit. Græc. Aldinæ.*

^c *Lib. ii. cap. xx. p. 900. tom. ii. oper. Plutarchi.*

^d *Apud Clement. Alexandrin. Stromat. lib. v. cap. xiv. p. 733.*

To this sense: He is happy, who hath his mind richly fraught and stored with the treasures of Divine knowledge; but he miserable, whose mind is darkened as to the belief of a God.—And, secondly, by denying God to have any human form, or members,

^a Οὐ μὲν γὰρ βροτεῆ κεφαλῆ κατὰ γῆα κέμασται, &c.

Or otherwise to be corporeal,

^b Οὐκ ἔστιν πελάσασθ' οὐδ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἐφικτὸν
'Ημετέροις, ἢ χερεσὶ λαβεῖν.

And then positively affirming what he is,

^c Ἄλλὰ φρὴν ἰερὴ καὶ ἀβίσφατος ἔπλετο μοῦνον,
Φροντίσι κόσμον ἅπαντα καταίσοῦσα θεῶσιν.

Only a holy and ineffable mind, that by swift thoughts agitates the whole world.—

xxv. And now we shall speak something also of Anaxagoras, having shewed before, that he was a spurious Atomist. For he likewise agreed with the other Atomists in this, that he asserted incorporeal substance in general, as the active cause and principle of motion in the universe, and particularly an incorporeal Deity distinct from the world; affirming, that there was besides atoms, Νοῦς ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, (as it is expressed in Plato^d) An ordering and disposing mind, that was the cause of all things.—Which mind (as Aristotle tells us^e) he made to be *μόνον*

^a Apud Tzetz. Chiliad. xiii. Hist. cccclxiv. v. 80. et Ammonium in Comment. in Aristotel. *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, fol. 107. edit. Aldin.

^b Apud Clem. Alexandr. *Stromat. lib. v. p. 694.*

^c Apud Tzetz. et Ammonium, ubi supra.

^d In *Phædon. p. 393. oper.*

^e De *Anima, lib. i. cap. ii. p. 6. tom. ii. oper.*

τῶν ὄντων ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀμιγῆ καὶ καθαρὸν, the only simple, unmixed, and pure thing—in the world. And he supposed this to be that, which brought the confused chaos of omnifarious atoms into that orderly compages of the world that now is.

xxvi. And by this time we have made it evident, that those Atomical physiologers, that were before Democritus and Leucippus, were all of them Incorporealists: joining theology and pneumatology, the doctrine of incorporeal substance and a Deity, together with their Atomical physiology. This is a thing expressly noted concerning Ecphantus, the Pythagorean, in Stobæus,^a Ἐκφαντος ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀτόμων συνεστάναι τὸν κόσμον, διοικεῖσθαι δὲ ἀπὸ προνοίας. Ecphantus held the corporeal world to consist of atoms, but yet to be ordered and governed by a Divine providence:—that is, he joined atomology and theology both together. And the same is also observed of Arcesilaus, or perhaps Archelaus, by Sidonius Apollinaris;^b

Post hos Arcesilaus divina mente paratam
Conjicit hanc molem, confectam partibus illis,
Quas atomos vocat ipse leves.

Now, I say, as Ecphantus and Archelaus asserted the corporeal world to be made of atoms, but yet, notwithstanding, held an incorporeal Deity distinct from the same, as the first principle of activity in it; so in like manner did all the other ancient Atomists generally before Democritus, join theology and incorporealism with their Atomical

^a Eclog. Physic. lib. i. cap. xxv. p. 48.

^b Carm. xv. in Epithalamio Polemi et Araneolæ, v. 94. p. 132. edit. Savaronis.

physiology. They did atomize as well as he, but they did not atheize; but that Atheistical atomology was a thing first set on foot afterward by Leucippus and Democritus.

XXVII. But because many seem to be so strongly possessed with this prejudice, as if Atheism were a natural and necessary appendix to Atomism, and therefore will conclude, that the same persons could not possibly be Atomists, and Incorporealists or Theists, we shall further make it evident, that there is not only no inconsistency betwixt the Atomical physiology and theology, but also that there is, on the contrary, a most natural cognation between them.

And this we shall do two manner of ways; first, by inquiring into the origin of this philosophy, and considering what grounds or principles of reason they were, which first led the ancients into this Atomical or mechanical way of physiologizing. And secondly, by making it appear, that the intrinsical constitution of this physiology is such, that whosoever entertains it, if he do but thoroughly understand it, must of necessity acknowledge, that there is something else in the world besides body.

First, therefore, this Atomical physiology seems to have had its rise and origin from the strength of reason, exerting its own inward active power and vigour, and thereby bearing itself up against the prejudices of sense, and at length prevailing over them, after this manner. The ancients considering and revolving the ideas of their own minds, found that they had a clear and distinct conception of two things, as the general heads and principles of whatsoever was in the universe;

the one whereof was passive matter, and the other active power, vigour, and virtue. To the latter of which belongs both cogitation, and the power of moving matter, whether by express consciousness or no. Both which together may be called by one general name of life; so that they made these two general heads of being or entity, passive matter and bulk, and self-activity or life. The former of these was commonly called by the ancients the τὸ πάσχον, that which suffers and receives,—and the latter the τὸ ποιοῦν, the active principle,—and the τὸ ὅθεν ἢ κίνησις, αἴτιον δραστή-
ριον καὶ ποθη-
τὸν. Philo. that from whence motion springs.

—“ In rerum natura (saith Cicero^a according to the general sense of the ancients) duo quærenda sunt; unum, quæ materia sit, ex qua quæque res efficiatur; alterum, quæ res sit quæ quicque efficiat:” There are two things to be inquired after in nature; one, what is the matter out of which every thing is made; another, what is the active cause or efficient.—To the same purpose Seneca,^b “ Esse debet aliquid unde fiat, deinde à quo fiat; hoc est causa, illud materia:” There must be something out of which a thing is made, and then something by which it is made; the latter is properly the cause, and the former the matter.—Which is to be understood of corporeal things and their differences, that there must be both matter, and an active power, for the production of them. And so also that of Aristotle,^c οὐσης αἰτίας μίας μὲν ὅθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι φάμεν τῆς κινήσεως,

^a De Finibus bonorum et malorum, lib. i. cap. vi. p. 2346. tom. viii. oper.

^b Epistol. lxxv. tom. ii. oper. p. 160.

^c Physicor. lib. ii. cap. iii. p. 463. tom. i. oper.

μῆς δὲ τῆς ὕλης· That, from whence the principle of motion is, is one cause, and the matter is another.—Where Aristotle gives that name of cause to the matter also, though others did appropriate it to the active power. And the writer *De Placitis Philosophorum*^a expresses this as the general sense of the ancients: ἀδύνατον ἀρχὴν μίαν ὕλην τῶν ὄντων ἐξ ἧς τὰ πάντα ὑποστῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ποιῶν αἴτιον χρῆ ὑποτιθεῖναι, οἷον οὐκ ἀργυρος ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἔκπωμα γενέσθαι ἂν μὴ καὶ τὸ ποιῶν ἢ, τουτέστιν ὁ ἀργυροκόπος, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαλκοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ξύλου, καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ὕλης· It is impossible, that matter alone should be the sole principle of all things, but there must of necessity be supposed also an agent or efficient cause: as silver alone is not sufficient to make a cup, unless there be an artificer to work upon it. And the same is to be said concerning brass, wood, and other natural bodies.—

Now as they apprehended a necessity of these two principles, so they conceived them to be such, as could not be confounded together into one and the same thing or substance, they having such distinct ideas and essential characters from one another; the Stoics being the only persons, who, offering violence to their own apprehensions, rudely and unskilfully attempted to make these two distinct things to be one and the same substance. Wherefore, as the first of these, viz. matter, or passive extended bulk, is taken by all for substance, and commonly called by the name of body; so the other, which is far the more noble of the two, being that, which acts upon the matter, and hath a commanding power over it, must needs be substance too, of a different kind from

^a Lib. i. cap. iii. p. 876. tom. i. oper. Plutarchi.

matter or body; and therefore immaterial or incorporeal substance. Neither did they find any other entity to be conceivable, besides these two, passive bulk or extension, which is corporeal substance, and internal self-activity or life, which is the essential character of substance incorporeal; to which latter belongs not only cogitation, but also the power of moving body.

Moreover, when they further considered the first of these, the material or corporeal principle, they being not able clearly to conceive any thing else in it, besides magnitude, figure, site, and motion or rest, which are all several modes of extended bulk, concluded therefore, according to reason, that there was really nothing else existing in bodies without, besides the various complexions and conjugations of those simple elements, that is, nothing but mechanism. Whence it necessarily followed, that whatsoever else was supposed to be in bodies, was, indeed, nothing but our modes of sensation, or the fancies and passions in us begotten from them, mistaken for things really existing without us. And this is a thing so obvious, that some of those philosophers, who had taken little notice of the Atomical physiology, had notwithstanding a suspicion of it; as for example, Plotinus,^a who, writing of the criterion of truth, and the power of reason, hath these words, *Καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἃ δὲ δοκεῖ πιστῶν ἔχειν ἐναρξιστάτην, ἀπιστεῖται μήποτε οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἔχη τὴν δοκοῦσαν ὑπόστασιν, καὶ νοῦ δεῖ ἢ διανοίας τῶν κρινόντων.* Though the things of sense seem to have so clear a certainty, yet, notwithstanding, it is doubted

^a Libro, quod intelligibilia non sint extra intellectum, Enncad. v. lib. v. cap. i. p. 520.

concerning them, whether (the qualities of them) have any real existence at all in the things without us, and not rather a seeming existence only, in our own passions; and there is need of mind or understanding to judge in this case, and to determine the controversy, which sense alone cannot decide.—But the ancient physiologists concluded without any hesitancy, *ὄν τὸ αὐτὸ ἔστι τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκάζεσθαι με, καὶ τὸ ἀψίνθιον τῷ πικράζεσθαι*, That the nature of honey in itself, is not the same thing with my being sweetened, nor of wormwood with that sense of bitterness which I have from it;—*διαφέρειν δὲ τὸ πάθος τοῦ ἑκτὸς ὑποκειμένου, καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, τὰ μὲν ἑκτὸς ὑποκείμενα οὐ καταλαμβάνειν, μόνα δὲ εἰ ἄρα τὰ ἑαυτῶν πάθη*. But that the passion of sense differed from the absolute nature of the thing itself without; the senses not comprehending the objects themselves, but only their own passions from them.—

I say, therefore, that the ancients concluded the absolute nature of corporeal things in themselves to be nothing but a certain disposition of parts, in respect of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, which in tastes cause us to be differently affected with those senses of sweetness and bitterness, and in sight with those fancies of colours, and accordingly in the other senses with other fancies; and that the corporeal world was to be explained by these two things, whereof one is absolute in the bodies without us, the various mechanism of them; the other relative only to us, the different fancies in us, caused by the respective differences of them in themselves. Which fancies, or fantastic ideas, are no modes of the bodies without us, but of that only in ourselves, which is cogita-

tive or self-active, that is, incorporeal. For the sensible ideas of hot and cold, red and green, &c. cannot be clearly conceived by us as modes of the bodies without us, but they may be easily apprehended as modes of cogitation, that is, of sensation, or sympathetical perception in us.

The result of all which was, that whatsoever is either in ourselves, or the whole world, was to be reduced to one or other of these two principles; passive matter and extended bulk, or self-active power and virtue; corporeal or incorporeal substance; mechanism or life; or else to a complication of them both together.

XXVIII. From this general account, which we have now given of the origin of the Atomical physiology, it appears, that the doctrine of incorporeal substance sprung up together with it. But this will be further manifest from that which follows. For we shall in the next place shew, how this philosophy did, in especial manner, owe its original to the improvement of one particular principle of reason, over and besides all the rest; namely, that famous axiom, so much talked of amongst the ancients,

* De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti;

That nothing can come from nothing, nor go to nothing.—For though Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius abused this theorem, endeavouring to carry it further than the intention of the first Atomists, to the disproving of a Divine creation of any thing out of nothing by it; “Nullam rem à nihilo gigni divinitus unquam;”^b and consequently of

* Persii Satir. iii. ver. 84.

^b Lucret., lib. i. ver. 151.

a Deity : yet as the meaning of it was at first confined and restrained, that nothing of itself could come from nothing, nor go to nothing, or that according to the ordinary course of nature (without an extraordinary Divine power) nothing could be raised from nothing, nor reduced to nothing ; it is not only an undoubted rule of reason in itself, but it was also the principal original of that Atomical physiology, which, discarding forms and qualities, acknowledged really nothing else in body besides mechanism.

Wherefore, it was not in vain, or to no purpose, that Laertius, in the life of Democritus,^a takes notice of this as one of his Dogmata, μηδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μη ὄντος γίνεσθαι, μηδὲ εἰς τὸ μη ὄν φθείρεσθαι, that nothing was made or generated out of nothing, nor corrupted into nothing ;—this being a fundamental principle, not only of his Atheism, but also of that very Atomical physiology itself, which he pursued. And Epicurus, in his epistle to Herodotus,^b plainly fetches the beginning of all his philosophy from hence : Πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐδὲν γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μη ὄντος, καὶ οὐδὲν φθείρεται εἰς τὸ μη ὄν. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο τὸ ἐκφαινόμενον ἐκ τοῦ μη ὄντος, πᾶν ἐκ πάντος ἐγένετ' ἂν, σπερμάτωνγε οὐδὲν προσδεόμενον· καὶ εἰ ἐφθείρετο δὲ τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον εἰς τὸ μη ὄν, πάντα ἂν ἀπολώλει τὰ πράγματα οὐκ ὄντων τῶν εἰς ἃ διελύετο· We fetch the beginning of our philosophy (saith he) from hence, that nothing is made out of nothing or destroyed to nothing ; for if things were made out of nothing, then every thing might be made out of every thing, neither would there be any need of seeds. And if whatsoever is corrupted were destroyed to no-

^a Lib. ix. segm. 44. p. 572.

^b Apud Diog. Laert. lib. x. segm. 38, 39. p. 619, &c.

thing, then all things would at length be brought to nothing.—Lucretius in like manner beginning here, insists more largely upon those grounds of reason hinted by Epicurus. And first, that nothing can be made out of nothing he proves thus:

^a Nam si de nihilo fierent, ex omnibus rebus
 Omne genus nasci posset: nil semine egeret:
 E mare primum homines et terra posset oriri
 Squamigerum genus, &c.
 Nec fructus iidem arboribus constare solerent,
 Sed mutarentur: ferre omnes omnia possent.
 Præterea cur vere rosam, frumenta calore,
 Vites autumnò fundi suadente videmus? &c.
 Quod si de nihilo fierent, subito exorerentur
 Incerto spatio atque alienis partibus anni.

In like manner he argues, to prove that nothing is corrupted into nothing:

^b Huc accedit uti quicque in sua corpora rursum
 Dissolvat natura; neque ad nihilum interimatres:
 Nam si quid mortale a cunctis partibus esset,
 Ex oculis res quæque repente erepta periret.
 Præterea quæcunque vetustate amovet ætas,
 Si penitus perimit, consumens materiam omnem,
 Unde animale genus generatim in lumina vitæ
 Redducit Venus? aut reductum Dædala tellus
 Unde alit atque auget? generatim pabula præbens, &c.
^c Haud igitur penitus pereunt quæcunque videntur,
 Quando aliud ex alio reficit natura; nec ullam
 Rem gigni patitur nisi morte adjutam aliena.

In which passages, though it be plain, that Lucretius doth not immediately drive at Atheism, and nothing else, but primarily at the establishing of a peculiar kind of Atomical physiology, upon which indeed these Democritics afterward endeavoured to graft Atheism; yet, to take away that suspicion, we shall in the next place shew, that,

^a Lucret. lib. i. ver. 160, &c.

^b Id. lib. i. ver. 216, &c.

^c Id. lib. i. ver. 263, &c.

generally, the other ancient physiologers also, who were Theists, did likewise build the structure of their philosophy upon the same foundation, that nothing can come from nothing, nor go to nothing: as, for example, Parmenides, Melissus, Zeno, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles. Of Parmenides and Melissus Aristotle thus writes,^a οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίνεσθαι φασιν οὐδὲ φθίρεισθαι τῶν ὄντων. They say that no real entity is either generated or corrupted,—that is, made anew out of nothing, or destroyed to nothing. And Simplicius tells us,^b that Parmenides gave a notable reason for the confirmation of this assertion, that nothing in nature could be made out of nothing, αἰτίαν τοῦ δεῖν πάντως ἐξ ὄντος, γίνεσθαι τὸ γινόμενον, θαυμαστῶς ὁ Παρμενίδης προστίθηκεν, ὅλως γὰρ φησιν, εἰ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, τίς ἢ ἀποκλήρασις τοῦ τότε γενέσθαι ὅτε ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον. Because if any thing be made out of nothing, then there could be no cause, why it should then be made, and neither sooner nor later.—Again Aristotle^c testifies of Xenophanes and Zeno, that they made this a main principle of their philosophy, μὴ ἐνδεχέσθαι γίνεσθαι μηδὲν ἐκ μηδενός, that it cannot be, that any thing should be made out of nothing:—and of this Xenophanes, Sextus the philosopher tells us,^d

^a De Coelo, lib. iii. cap. i. p. 668. tom. i. oper.

^b Commentar. in Libros physicos Aristot. fol. 22. b. edit. Græc.

^c Libro de Xenophane, Gorgia, et Zenone, cap. i. p. 834. tom. ii. oper.

^d Dr. Cudworth was led into a mistake by Henry Stephens, who, in his *Poesis Philosophica*, p. 36, where he states this opinion of Xenophanes concerning the Deity, and produces the verses which contain it, tells us, that he had borrowed them from Sextus the philosopher, by whom he undoubtedly means Sextus Empiricus. But though this latter writer, in his *Hypotypos. Pyrrhon. lib. i. cap. xxxiii. p. 59.* gives a large account of Xenophanes's opinion concerning God; yet we do

that he held ἄτι εἷς καὶ ἀσώματος θεός· That there was but one God, and that he was incorporeal,—speaking thus of him :

Εἷς θεὸς ἔντε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,
Οὔτε δέμας θητόσιν ὁμοίος, οὔτε νοῦμα.

Aristotle^a also writes in like manner concerning Empedocles, ἅπαντα ταῦτα κάκεινος ὁμολογεῖ ὅτι ἐκ τε μὴ ὄντος ἀμήχανόν ἐστι γενέσθαι, τό τε ὄν ἰξόλλυσθαι ἀνήνυστον καὶ ἄρρηκτον. Empedocles acknowledges the very same with other philosophers, that it is impossible any thing should be made out of nothing, or perish into nothing.—And as for Anaxagoras, it is sufficiently known to all, that his Homœome-ria, or doctrine of similar atoms (which was a certain spurious kind of Atomism) was nothing but a superstructure made upon this foundation. Besides all which, Aristotle^b pronounces universally concerning the ancient physiologers, without any exception, that they agreed in this one thing, περὶ ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης οἱ περὶ φύσεως, ὅτι τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον· The physiologers generally agree in this (laying it down for a grand foundation) that it is impossible, that any thing should be made out of nothing.—And again, he calls this κοινὴν δόξαν τῶν φυσικῶν, the common opinion of naturalists ;—intimating, also, that they concluded it the greatest absurdity, that any physiologer could be guilty of, to lay down such principles, as from whence it would follow, that any

not find in any part of his writings what is quoted from him by Stephens, who should have cited to that purpose Clemens Alexandrin. Stromat. lib. v. c. xiv. p. 714.

^a De Xenophane, &c. cap. ii. p. 836.

^b Physicor. lib. i. cap. v. p. 451. tom. i. oper.

real entity in nature did come from nothing, and go to nothing.

Now, it may well be supposed, that all these ancient physiologers (the most of which were also Theists) did not keep such a stir about this business for nothing; and therefore we are in the next place to shew, what it was that they drove at in it. And we do affirm, that one thing, which they all aimed at, who insisted upon the forementioned principle, was the establishing some Atomical physiology or other, but most of them at such as takes away all forms and qualities of bodies (as entities really distinct from the matter and substance), and resolves all into mechanism and fancy. For it is plain, that if the forms and qualities of bodies be entities really distinct from the substance, and its various modifications, of figure, site, and motion, that then, in all the changes and transmutations of nature, all the generations and alterations of body (those forms and qualities being supposed to have no real existence any where before), something must of necessity be created or produced miraculously out of nothing; as likewise reduced into nothing in the corruptions of them, they having no being any where afterward. As for example; whenever a candle is but lighted or kindled into a flame, there must needs be a new form of fire, and new qualities of light and heat, really distinct from the matter and substance, produced out of nothing, that is, created; and the same again reduced into nothing, or annihilated, when the flame is extinguished. Thus, when water is but congealed at any time into snow, hail, or ice, and when it is again dissolved; when wax is by liquefaction made soft and trans-

parent, and changed to most of our senses ; when the same kind of nourishment taken in by animals is turned into blood, milk, flesh, bones, nerves, and all the other similar parts ; when that which was in the form of bright flame, appears in the form of dark smoke ; and that which was in the form of vapour, in the form of rain or water, or the like ; I say, that in all these mutations of bodies, there must needs be something made out of nothing. But that in all the Protean transformations of nature, which happen continually, there should be real entities thus perpetually produced out of nothing and reduced to nothing, seemed to be so great a paradox to the ancients, that they could by no means admit of it. Because, as we have already declared, first they concluded it clearly impossible by reason, that any real entity should of itself rise out of nothing ; and secondly, they thought it very absurd to bring God upon the stage, with his miraculous extraordinary power, perpetually at every turn ; as also, that every thing might be made out of every thing, and there would be no cause in nature for the production of one thing rather than another, and at this time rather than that, if they were miraculously made out of nothing. Wherefore they sagaciously apprehended, that there must needs be some other mystery or intrigue of nature in this business, than was commonly dreamed of, or suspected ; which they concluded to be this, that in all these transformations there were no such real entities of forms and qualities distinct from the matter, and the various disposition of its parts, in respect of figure, site, and motion (as is vulgarly supposed) produced and destroyed ; but that all these feats

were done, either by the concretion and secretion of actually in-existent parts, or else by the different modifications of the same pre-existent matter, or the insensible parts thereof. This only being added hereunto, that from those different modifications of the small particles of bodies (they being not so distinctly perceived by our senses), there are begotten in us certain confused phas-mata or phantasmata, apparitions, fancies, and pas-sions, as of light and colours, heat and cold, and the like, which are those things, that are vulgarly mistaken for real qualities existing in the bodies without us; whereas, indeed, there is nothing ab-solutely in the bodies themselves like to those fantastic ideas that we have of them; and yet they are wisely contrived by the Author of nature for the adorning and embellishing of the corporeal world to us.

So that they conceived, bodies were to be con-sidered two manner of ways, either as they are absolutely in themselves, or else as they are relatively to us: and as they are absolutely in themselves, that so there never was any entity really distinct from the substance produced in them out of nothing, nor corrupted or destroyed to nothing, but only the accidents and modifica-tions altered. Which accidents and modifications are no entities really distinct from their substance; forasmuch as the same body may be put into several shapes and figures, and the same man may successively stand, sit, kneel, and walk, without the production of any new entities really distinct from the substance of his body. So that the generations, corruptions, and alterations of inanimate bodies are not terminated in the pro-

duction or destruction of any substantial forms, or real entities distinct from the substance, but only in different modifications of it. But secondly, as bodies are considered relatively to us, that so besides their different modifications and mechanical alterations, there are also different fancies, seemings, and apparitions begotten in us from them; which unwary and unskilful philosophers mistake for absolute forms and qualities in bodies themselves. And thus they concluded, that all the phenomena of inanimate bodies, and their various transformations, might be clearly resolved into these two things; partly something that is real and absolute in bodies themselves, which is nothing but their different mechanism, or disposition of parts in respect of figure, site, and motion; and partly something that is fantastical in the sentient.

That the Atomical physiology did emerge after this manner from the principle of reason, that nothing comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing, might be further convinced from the testimony of Aristotle,* writing thus concerning it: 'Εκ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀλλήλων τ' ἀναντία ἐνυπῆρχεν ἄρα· εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι ἢ ἐξ ὄντων ἢ ἐξ μὴ ὄντων· τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν, ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον, περὶ γὰρ ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης ἅπαντες οἱ περὶ φύσεως· τὸ λείπον ἦδε συμβαίνειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐνόμισαν· ἐξ ὄντων μὲν καὶ ἐνυπαρχόντων γίνεσθαι, διὰ δὲ σμικρότητα τῶν ὄγκων ἐξ ἀναισθήτων ἡμῖν. The ancient physiologers concluded, that because contraries were made out of one another, that therefore they were fore (one way or other) inexistent; arguing in manner, that if whatsoever be made, r

* Physicor. lib. i. cap. v. p. 13.

be made out of something or out of nothing, and this latter (that any thing should be made out of nothing) is impossible, according to the general consent of all the ancient physiologers; then it follows of necessity, that all corporeal things are made or generated out of things that were really before and inexistent, though by reason of the smallness of their bulks they were insensible to us.—Where Aristotle plainly intimates, that all the ancient philosophers, whosoever insisted upon this principle, that nothing comes from, nor goes to nothing, were one way or other Atomical, and did resolve all corporeal things into ὄγκους τινας διὰ τὴν μικρότητα ἀναισθήτους ἡμῖν, certain molecularæ or corpuscula, which by reason of their smallness were insensible to us,—that is, into atoms. But yet there was a difference between these Atomists, forasmuch as Anaxagoras was such an Atomist, as did notwithstanding hold forms and qualities really distinct from the mechanical modifications of bodies. For he not being able (as it seems) well to understand that other Atomical physiology of the ancients, that, exploding qualities, solved all corporeal phenomena by mechanism and fancy; and yet acknowledging, that that principle of their's, which they went upon, must needs be true, that nothing could of itself come from nothing, nor go to nothing, framed a new kind of atomology of his own, in supposing the whole corporeal world or mass of matter to consist of similar atoms, that is, such as were originally endued with all those different forms and qualities that are vulgarly conceived to be in bodies, some bony, some fleshy, some fiery, some white, some black, some bitter,

some sweet, and the like, so that all bodies whatsoever had some of all sorts of these atoms (which are in a manner infinite) specifically differing from one another in them. *ἅπαν ἐν παντί μεμίχθαι, διότι πᾶν ἐκ παντός γίνεται, φαίνεσθαι δὲ διαφέροντα, καὶ προσαγορεύεσθαι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐκ τοῦ μάλιστα ὑπερέχοντος διὰ τὸ πλήθος ἐν τῇ μίξει τῶν ἀπείρων, &c.* That all things were in every thing mingled together, because they saw, that every thing was made of every thing; but that things seemed to differ from one another, and were denominated to be this or that, from those atoms, which are most predominant in the mixture, by reason of their multiplicity:—whence he concluded, that all the generations, corruptions, and alterations of bodies were made by nothing but the concretions and secretions of in-existent and pre-existent atoms of different forms and qualities, without the production of any new form and quality out of nothing, or the reduction of any into nothing. This very account Aristotle gives of the Anaxagorean hypothesis: *ἔοικε Ἀναξαγόρας οὕτως ἀπειρα οἰηθῆναι τὰ στοιχεῖα, διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν, τὴν κοινὴν δόξην τῶν φυσικῶν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὡς οὐ γινομένου οὐδενός ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.* Anaxagoras seemeth, therefore, to make infinite atoms endued with several forms and qualities to be the elements of bodies, because he supposed that common opinion of physiologers to be true, that nothing is made of nothing.—But all the other ancient physiologers that were before Anaxagoras, and likewise those after him, who, insisting upon the same principle of nothing coming from nothing, did not Anaxagorize, as Empedocles, Democritus, and Protagoras, must needs make *ὄγκους*

^a Ibid.

ἀνομοίους, dissimilar moleculæ, and *ἀτόμους ἀποίους*, atoms unformed and unqualified, otherwise than by magnitude, figure, and motion, to be the principles of bodies, and cashiering forms and qualities (as real entities distinct from the matter), resolve all corporeal phenomena into mechanism and fancy. Because, if no real entity can come from nothing, nor go to nothing, then one of these two things is absolutely necessary, that either these corporeal forms and qualities, being real entities distinct from the matter, should exist before generations and after corruptions, in certain insensible atoms originally such, according to the Anaxagorean doctrine; or else, that they should not be real entities distinct from the matter, but only the different modifications and mechanisms of it, together with different fancies. And thus we have made it evident, that the genuine Atomical physiology did spring originally from this principle of reason, that no real entity does of itself come from nothing, nor go to nothing.

XXIX. Now we shall in the next place shew, how this very same principle of reason, which induced the ancients to reject substantial forms and qualities of bodies, and to physiologize atomically, led them also unavoidably to assert incorporeal substances; and that the souls of men and animals were such, neither generated nor corrupted. They had argued against substantial forms and qualities, as we have shewed, in this manner, that since the forms and qualities of bodies are supposed by all to be generated and corrupted, made anew out of nothing, and destroyed to nothing, that therefore they could not be real

entities distinct from the substance of matter, but only different modifications of it in respect of figure, site, and motion, causing different sensations in us; and were all to be resolved into mechanism and fancy. For as for that conceit of Anaxagoras, of pre and post-existent atoms, endued with all those several forms and qualities of bodies ingenerably and incorruptibly, it was nothing but an adulteration of the genuine Atomical philosophy, and a mere dream of his, in which very few followed him. And now they argue contrariwise for the souls of men and animals, in this manner; because they are plainly real entities distinct from the substance of matter and its modification; and men and brutes are not mere machines, neither can life and cogitation, sense and consciousness, reason and understanding, appetite and will, ever result from magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions; that therefore they are not corporeally generated and corrupted, as the forms and qualities of bodies are. Ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαι τι ἐκ μηδενὸς προϋπάρχοντος. It is impossible for a real entity to be made or generated from nothing pre-existing. —Now, there is nothing of soul and mind, reason and understanding, nor indeed of cogitation and life, contained in the modifications and mechanism of bodies; and, therefore, to make soul and mind to rise out of body whensoever a man is generated, would be plainly to make a real entity to come out of nothing, which is impossible. I say, because the forms and qualities of bodies are generated and corrupted, made and unmade, in the ordinary course of nature, therefore they concluded, that they were not real entities distinct from the substance of body and its various modi-

fications; but because soul and mind is plainly a real entity distinct from the substance of body, its modification and mechanism; that therefore it was not a thing generated and corrupted, made and unmade, but such as had a being of its own, a substantial thing by itself. Real entities and substances are not generated and corrupted, but only modifications.

Wherefore these ancients apprehended, that there was a great difference betwixt the souls of men and animals, and the forms and qualities of other inanimate bodies, and consequently betwixt their several productions: forasmuch as in the generation of inanimate bodies there is no real entity acquired distinct from the substance of the thing itself, but only a peculiar modification of it. The form of stone, or of timber, of blood, flesh, and bone, and such other natural bodies generated, is no more a distinct substance or entity from the matter, than the form of a house, stool, or table is: there is no more new entity acquired in the generation of natural bodies, than there is in the production of artificial ones. When water is turned into vapour, candle into flame, flame into smoke, grass into milk, blood, and bones, there is no more miraculous production of something out of nothing, than when wool is made into cloth, or flax into linen; when a rude and unpolished stone is hewn into a beautiful statue; when brick, timber, and mortar, that lay together before disorderly, is brought into the form of a stately palace; there being nothing neither in one nor other of these, but only a different disposition and modification of pre-existent matter. Which matter of the universe is always substantially the same,

and neither more nor less, but only Proteanly transformed into different shapes. Thus we see, that the generation of all inanimate bodies is nothing but the change of accidents and modifications, the substance being really the same, both before and after. But in the generations of men and animals, besides the new disposition of the parts of matter and its organization, there is also the acquisition and conjunction of another real entity or substance distinct from the matter, which could not be generated out of it, but must needs come into it some other way. Though there be no substantial difference between a stately house or palace standing, and all the materials of the same ruined and demolished, but only a difference of accidents and modifications; yet, between a living man and a dead carcass, there is, besides the accidental modification of the body, another substantial difference, there being a substantial soul and incorporeal inhabitant dwelling in the one and acting of it, which the other is now deserted of. And it is very observable, that Anaxagoras^a himself, who made bony and fleshy atoms, hot and cold, red and green, and the like, which he supposed to exist before generations and after corruptions, always immutably the same (that so nothing might come from nothing, and go to nothing), yet he did not make any animalish atoms sensitive and rational. The reason whereof could not be, because he did not think sense and understanding to be as real entities as hot and cold, red and green; but because they could not be supposed to be corporeal forms and qualities, but

^a Vide Aristot. de Anima, lib. i. cap. ii. p. 5. tom. ii. et Metaphysic. lib. i. c. iii. tom. iv. p. 266.

must needs belong to another substance that was incorporeal. And therefore Anaxagoras could not but acknowledge, that all souls and lives did pre and post-exist by themselves, as well as those corporeal forms and qualities, in his similar atoms.

xxx. And now it is already manifest, that from the same principle of reason before mentioned, that nothing of itself can come from nothing, nor go to nothing, the ancient philosophers were induced likewise to assert the soul's immortality, together with its incorporeity or distinctness from the body. No substantial entity ever vanisheth of itself into nothing; for if it did, then in length of time all might come to be nothing. But the soul is a substantial entity, really distinct from the body, and not the mere modification of it; and, therefore, when a man dies, his soul must still remain and continue to have a being somewhere else in the universe. All the changes that are in nature, are either accidental transformations and different modifications of the same substance, or else they are conjunctions and separations, or anagrammatical transpositions of things in the universe; the substance of the whole remaining always entirely the same. The generation and corruption of inanimate bodies is but like the making of a house, stool, or table, and the unmaking or marring of them again; either different modifications of one and the same substance, or else divers mixtures and separations, concretions and secretions. And the generation and corruption of animals is likewise nothing but

— *μήεις τε διάλλαξις τε μίγντων,*

The conjunction of souls together with such particular bodies, and the separation of them again

from one another,—and so as it were the anagrammatical transposition of them in the universe. That soul and life, that is now fled and gone from a lifeless carcass, is only a loss to that particular body or compages of matter, which by means thereof is now disanimated ; but it is no loss to the whole, it being but transposed in the universe, and lodged somewhere else.

XXXI. It is also further evident, that this same principle, which thus led the ancients to hold the soul's immortality, or its future permanency after death, must needs determine them likewise to maintain its *προῦπαρξίς*, or pre-existence, and consequently its *μετενσωμάτωσις*, or transmigration. For that which did pre-exist before the generation of any animal, and was then somewhere else, must needs transmigrate into the body of that animal where now it is. But as for that other transmigration of human souls into the bodies of brutes, though it cannot be denied but that many of these ancients admitted it also, yet Timæus Locrus,^a and divers others of the Pythagoreans, rejected it, any otherwise than as it might be taken for an allegorical description of that beastly transformation that is made of men's souls by vice. Aristotle tells us again,^b agreeably to what was declared before, *ὅτι μάλιστα φοβούμενοι διετέλησαν οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸ ἐκ μηδενὸς γίνεσθαι τι προῦπάρχοντος* that the ancient philosophers were afraid of nothing more than this one thing, that any thing should be made out of nothing pre-existent:—and therefore they must needs conclude, that the souls of all

^a De Anima Mundi et Natura, inter Scriptorum Mythologicorum a Th. Gale editos, p. 566.

^b De Generatione et Corruptione, lib. i. cap. iii. p. 704. tom. i. oper.

animals pre-existed before their generations. And indeed it is a thing very well known, that, according to the sense of philosophers, these two things were always included together in that one opinion of the soul's immortality, namely, its pre-existence as well as its post-existence. Neither was there ever any of the ancients before Christianity, that held the soul's future permanency after death, who did not likewise assert its pre-existence; they clearly perceiving, that if it were once granted, that the soul was generated, it could never be proved but that it might be also corrupted. And, therefore, the assertors of the soul's immortality commonly begun here: first, to prove its pre-existence, proceeding thence afterward to establish its permanency after death. This is the method used in Plato,^a ἦν που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἶδει γενέσθαι, ὥστε καὶ ταύτη ἀθάνατόν τι ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι. Our soul was somewhere, before it came to exist in this present human form; and from thence it appears to be immortal, and such as will subsist after death.—And the chief demonstration of the soul's pre-existence to the ancients before Plato, was this, because it is an entity really distinct from body or matter, and the modifications of it; and no real substantial entity can either spring of itself out of nothing, or be made out of any other substance distinct from it, because nothing can be made ἐκ μηδενὸς ἐνυπάρχοντος ἢ προϋπάρχοντος, from nothing either in-existing or pre-existing;—all natural generations being but the various dispositions and modifications of what was before existent in the universe. But there was nothing of soul and

^a In Phædone, p. 382.

mind in-existing and pre-existing in body before, there being nothing of life and cogitation in magnitude, figure, site, and motion. Wherefore this must needs be, not a thing made or generated, as corporeal forms and qualities are, but such as hath a being in nature ingenerably and incorruptibly. The mechanism of human body was a thing made and generated, it being only a different modification of what was before existent, and having no new entity in it distinct from the substance: and the totum or compositum of a man or animal may be said to be generated and corrupted, in regard of the union and disunion, conjunction and separation of those two parts, the soul and body. But the soul itself, according to these principles, is neither a thing generable nor corruptible, but was as well before the generation, and will be after the deaths and corruptions of men, as the substance of their body, which is supposed by all to have been from the first creation, and no part of it to be annihilated or lost after death, but only scattered and dispersed in the universe. Thus the ancient Atomists concluded, that souls and lives being substantial entities by themselves, were all of them as old as any other substance in the universe, and as the whole mass of matter, and every smallest atom of it is: that is, they who maintained the eternity of the world, did consequently assert also *æternitatem animorum* (as Cicero calls it), the eternity of souls and minds. But they, who conceived the world to have had a temporary beginning or creation, held the coevity of all souls with it, and would by no means be induced to think, that every atom of senseless matter and particle of dust had such a

privilege and pre-eminency over the souls of men and animals, as to be the senior to them. Synesius, though a Christian, yet having been educated in this philosophy, could not be induced by the hopes of a bishopric to stifle or dissemble this sentiment of his mind,^a ἀμέλει τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀζώσω ποτὲ σώματος ὑστερογενῆ νομίζειν. I shall never be persuaded to think my soul to be younger than my body.—But such, it seems, was the temper of those times, that he was not only dispensed withal as to this, but also as to another heterodoxy of his concerning the resurrection.

XXXII. It is already plain, also, that this doctrine of the ancient Atomists concerning the immateriality and immortality, the pre and post-existence of souls, was not confined by them to human souls only, but extended universally to all souls and lives whatsoever; it being a thing that was hardly ever called into doubt or question by any before Cartesius, whether the souls of brutes had any sense, cogitation, or consciousness in them or no: Now all life, sense, and cogitation was undoubtedly concluded by them to be an entity really distinct from the substance of body, and not the mere modification, motion, or mechanism of it; life and mechanism being two distinct ideas of the mind, which cannot be confounded together. Wherefore they resolved, that all lives and souls whatsoever, which now are in the world, ever were from the first beginning of it, and ever will be; that there will be no new ones produced, which are not already, and have not always been, nor any of those, which now are, de-

^a Epistol. cv. p. 249. oper.

stroyed, any more than the substance of any matter will be created or annihilated. So that the whole system of the created universe, consisting of body, and particular incorporeal substances or souls, in the successive generations and corruptions, or deaths of men and other animals, was, according to them, really nothing else but one and the same thing perpetually anagrammatized, or but like many different syllables and words variously and successively composed out of the same pre-existent elements or letters.

xxxiii. We have now declared, how the same principle of reason, which made the ancient physiologists to become Atomists, must needs induce them also to be Incorporealists; how the same thing, which persuaded them, that corporeal forms were no real entities distinct from the substance of the body, but only the different modifications and mechanisms of it, convinced them likewise, that all cogitative beings, all souls and lives whatsoever, were ingenerable and incorruptible, and as well pre-existent before the generations of particular animals, as post-existent after their deaths and corruptions. Nothing now remains but only to shew more particularly, that it was *de facto* thus; that the same persons did, from this principle (that nothing can come from nothing, and go to nothing), both atomize in their physiology, taking away all substantial forms and qualities, and also theologize or incorporealize, asserting souls to be a substance really distinct from matter, and immortal, as also to pre-exist. And this we shall do from Empedocles, and first from that passage of his cited before in part:

^a Ἄλλο δὲ σοὶ ἔρεω, φύσις οὐδενός ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ
 ὄντων, οὐδὲ τις οὐλομένη θανάτοιο γενέθλη (al. lect. τελεύτη),
 ἄλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξις τε μιγέντων
 Ἔστί, φύσις δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισι.

Which I find Latined thus :

Ast aliud dico ; nihil est mortalibus ortus,
 Est nihil interitus, qui rebus morte panatur ;
 Mistio sed solum est, et conciliatio rerum
 Mistilium ; hæc dici solita est mortalibus ortus.

The full sense whereof is plainly this, that there is no φύσις, or production of any thing, which was not before ; no new substance made, which did not really pre-exist ; and, therefore, that in the generations and corruptions of inanimate bodies, there is no form or quality really distinct from the substance produced and destroyed, but only a various composition and modification of matter. But in the generations and corruptions of men and animals, where the souls are substances really distinct from the matter, that there, there is nothing but the conjunction and separation of souls and particular bodies, existing both before and after, not the production of any new soul into being, which was not before, nor the absolute death and destruction of any into nothing.— Which is further expressed in these following verses :

^b Νήπιοι, οὐ γὰρ σφιν δολιχόφρονες εἰσὶ μέριμναι,
 Οἱ δὲ γίνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἐν ἐλπίζουσιν,
 ἥτοι καταθήσκειν τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἀπάντη.

To this sense ; that they are infants in understanding, and short-sighted, who think any thing to be

^a Apud Plutarch. advers. Colotem, p. iv. tom. ii. oper. et ex parte apud Aristot. de Generatione et Corruptione, lib. i. c. i. p. 698. tom. i. oper.

^b Apud Plutarch. adv. Colotem, p. 1113. tom. ii. oper.

made, which was nothing before, or any thing to die, so as to be destroyed to nothing.—Upon which Plutarch glosses after this manner: οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ γενέσειν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, οὐδὲ φθορὰν ἀλλὰ τὴν πάντη, τουτέστι τὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀπολύουσαν. Empedocles does not here destroy generation, but only such as is out of nothing; nor corruption, but such as is into nothing.—Which, as we have already intimated, is to be understood differently in respect to inanimate and animate things; for in things inanimate, there is nothing produced or destroyed, because the forms and qualities of them are no entities really distinct from the substance, but only diverse mixtures and modifications. But in animate things, where the souls are real entities really distinct from the substance of the body, there is nothing produced nor destroyed neither, because those souls do both exist before their generations, and after their corruptions; which business, as to men and souls, is again more fully expressed thus:—

• Οὐκ ἂν ἀνὴρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ μαρτυροῖται,
 “Ὡς ὄφρα μὲν τε βιῶσι, τὸ δὲ βίοντον καλέουσι,
 Τόφρα μὲν οὖν εἰσι, καὶ σφὴ πάρα δεινὰ καὶ ἰσθλὰ,
 Πρὶν δὲ παγέντε βροτοὶ καὶ λυθίντες οὐδὲν ἄρ’ εἰσί.

That good and ill did first us here attend,
 And not from time before, the soul descend;
 That here alone we live, and when
 Hence we depart, we forthwith then
 Turn to our old non-entity again; .
 Certes ought not to be believed by wise and learned men.

Wherefore, according to Empedocles, this is to be accounted one of the vulgar errors, that men then only have a being and are capable of good

• Apud Plutarch. adv. Colotem, p. 1113. tom. ii. oper.

and evil, when they live here that which is called life; but that both before they are born, and after they are dead, they are perfectly nothing.

And besides Empedocles, the same is represented by the Greek tragedian also,^a as the sense of the ancient philosophers;

Θήσκει δ' οὐδὲν τῶν γινομένων,
 Διακρινόμενον δ' ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο
 Μόρφην ἑτέραν ἀπίδειξεν.

That nothing dies or utterly perisheth; but things being variously concreted and secreted, transposed and modified, change their form and shape only, and are put into a new dress.—

Agreeably whereunto, Plato also tells us,^b that it was παλαιὸς λόγος, an ancient tradition or doctrine before his time, τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι, οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεώτας ἐκ τῶν ζώντων that as well the living were made out of the dead, as the dead out of the living;—and that this was the constant circle of nature. Moreover, the same philosopher acquaints us, that some of those ancients were not without suspicion, that what is now called death, was to men more properly a nativity or birth into life, and what is called generation into life, was comparatively rather to be accounted a sinking into death; the former being the soul's ascent out of these gross terrestrial bodies to a body more thin and subtile, and the latter its descent from a purer body to that which is more crass and terrestrial. *τίς οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστι*

^a Euripid. in Chryippo apud Clement. Alexandr. Stromat. lib. vi. p. 750.

^b In Phædone, p. 381.

^c This passage of Euripides is cited by many of the ancients, as Plato, Cicero, Clemens Alex. and Sextus Empiricus. See the notes of Dr.

καθαεῖν; τὸ καθαεῖν δὲ ζῆν· who knows whether that which is called living be not indeed rather dying; and that which is called dying, living?—

Moreover, that this was the doctrine of Pythagoras himself, that no real entity perishes in corruptions, nor is produced in generations, but only new modifications and transpositions made; is fully expressed by the Latin poet,^a both as to inanimate, and to animate things. Of the first thus :

Nec perit in tanto quicquam (mibi credite) mundo,
Sed variat, faciemque novat: nascique vocatur
Incipere esse aliud, quam quod fuit ante; morique
Desinere illud idem. Cum sint huc forsitan illa,
Hæc translata illuc: summa tamen omnia constant.

Of the second, that the souls of animals are immortal, did pre-exist and do transmigrate, from the same ground, after this manner :

Omnia mutantur; nihil interit: errat et illinc,
Huc venit, hinc illuc, et quoslibet occupat artus
Spiritus, eque feris humana in corpora transit,
Inque feras noster, nec tempore deperit ullo.
Utque novis facilis signatur cera figuris,
Nec manet ut fuerat, nec formas servat easdem,
Sed tamen ipsa eadem est; animam sic semper eandem
Esse, sed in varias doceo migrare figuras.

Wherefore though it be a thing, which hath not been commonly taken notice of, of late, yet we conceive it to be unquestionably true, that all those ancient philosophers, who insisted so much upon this principle, οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων· that no real entity is either generated or

Potter, now Archbishop of Canterbury, on Clem. Alexand. Stromat. lib. iii. cap. iii. p. 517. et Jo. Albert Fabricius on Sextus Empiric. Hypotyp. Pyrrhon. lib. iii. cap. xxiv. p. 185.

^a Ovid. Metam. lib. xv. ver. 254. et ver. 165.

corrupted,—did therein at once drive at these two things : first, the establishing of the immortality of all souls, their pre and post-existence, forasmuch as being entities really distinct from the body, they could neither be generated nor corrupted; and secondly, the making of corporeal forms and qualities to be no real entities distinct from the body and the mechanism thereof, because they are things generated and corrupted, and have no pre and post-existence. Anaxagoras, in this latter, being the only dissenter; who supposing those forms and qualities to be real entities likewise, distinct from the substance of body, therefore attributed perpetuity of being to them also, pre and post-existence, in similar atoms, as well as to the souls of animals.

And now we have made it sufficiently evident, that the doctrine of the incorporeity and immortality of souls, we might add also, of their pre-existence and transmigration, had the same original, and stood upon the same basis with the Atomical physiology; and therefore it ought not at all to be wondered at (what we affirmed before) that the same philosophers and Pythagoreans asserted both those doctrines, and that the ancient Atomists were both Theists and Incorporalists.

xxxiv. But now to declare our sense freely concerning this philosophy of the ancients, which seems to be so prodigiously paradoxical, in respect of that pre-existence and transmigration of souls; we conceive indeed, that this ratiocination of theirs from that principle, that nothing naturally or of itself, comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing, was not only firmly conclusive against sub-

stantial forms and qualities of bodies, really distinct from their substance, but also for substantial incorporeal souls, and their ingenerability out of matter, and particularly for the future immortality or post-existence of all human souls. For since it is plain, that they are not a mere modification of body or matter, but an entity and substance really distinct from it, we have no more reason to think, that they can ever of themselves vanish into nothing, than that the substance of the corporeal world, or any part thereof, can do so. For that, in the consumption of bodies by fire, or age, or the like, there is the destruction of any real substance into nothing, is now generally exploded as an idiotical conceit; and certainly it cannot be a jot less idiotical to suppose, that the rational soul in death is utterly extinguished.

Moreover, we add also, that this ratiocination of the ancients would be altogether as firm and irrefragable likewise for the pre-existence and transmigration of souls, as it is for their post-existence and future immortality, did we not (as indeed we do) suppose souls to be created by God immediately, and infused in generations. For they being unquestionably a distinct substance from the body, and no substance, according to the ordinary course of nature, coming out of nothing, they must of necessity either pre-exist in the universe before generations, and transmigrate into their respective bodies; or else come from God immediately, who is the fountain of all, and who at first created all that substance that now is in the world besides himself. Now the latter of these was a thing, which those ancient philosophers would by no means admit of; they

judging it altogether incongruous to bring God upon the stage perpetually, and make him immediately interpose every where, in the generations of men and all other animals, by the miraculous production of souls out of nothing. Notwithstanding which, if we well consider it, we shall find, that there may be very good reason on the other side for the successive Divine creation of souls; namely, that God did not do all at first, that ever he could or would do, and put forth all his creative vigour at once, in a moment, ever afterwards remaining a spectator only of the consequent results, and permitting nature to do all alone, without the least interposition of his at any time, just as if there were no God at all in the world. For this may be and indeed often hath been, the effect of such an hypothesis as this, to make men think, that there is no other God in the world but blind and dark nature. God might also, for other good and wise ends unknown to us, reserve to himself the continual exercise of this his creative power, in the successive production of new souls. And yet these souls nevertheless, after they are once brought forth into being, will, notwithstanding their juniority, continue as firmly in the same, without vanishing of themselves into nothing, as the substance of senseless matter, that was created many thousand years before, will do.

And thus our vulgar hypothesis of the new creation of souls, as it is rational in itself, so it doth sufficiently solve their incorporeity, their future immortality, or post-eternity, without introducing those offensive absurdities of their pre-existence and transmigration.

xxxv. But if there be any such, who, rather

than they would allow a future immortality or post-existence to all souls, and therefore to those of brutes, which consequently must have their successive transmigrations, would conclude the souls of all brutes, as likewise the sensitive soul in man, to be corporeal, and only allow the rational soul to be distinct from matter ; to these we have only thus much to say, that they, who will attribute life, sense, cogitation, consciousness, and self-enjoyment, not without some footsteps of reason many times, to blood and brains, or mere organized bodies in brutes, will never be able clearly to defend the incorporeity and immortality of human souls, as most probably they do not intend any such thing. For either all conscious and cogitative beings are incorporeal, or else nothing can be proved to be incorporeal. From whence it would follow also, that there is no Deity distinct from the corporeal world. But though there seem to be no very great reason, why it should be thought absurd, to grant perpetuity of duration to the souls of brutes, any more than to every atom of matter, or particle of dust that is in the whole world ; yet we shall endeavour to suggest something towards the easing the minds of those, who are so much burthened with this difficulty ; viz. that they may, if they please, suppose the souls of brutes, being but so many particular emanations or effluxes from that source of life above, whensoever and wheresoever there is any fitly prepared matter capable to receive them, and to be actuated by them, to have a sense and fruition of themselves in it, so long as it continues such ; but as soon as ever those organized bodies of theirs, by reason of their indisposition, become

incapable of being further acted upon by them, then to be resumed again and retracted back to their original head and fountain. Since it cannot be doubted, but what creates any thing out of nothing, or sends it forth from itself by free and voluntary emanation, may be able either to retract the same back again to its original source, or else to annihilate it at pleasure.

And I find, that there have not wanted some among the gentile philosophers themselves, who have entertained this opinion, whereof Porphyry is one : *λέγεται ἐκάστη δύναμις ἄλογος εἰς τὴν ὅλην ζωὴν τοῦ πάντος*, every irrational power is resolved into the life of the whole.—

xxxvi. Neither will this at all weaken the future immortality or post-eternity of human souls. For if we be, indeed, Theists, and do in very good earnest believe a Deity, according to the true notion of it, we must then needs acknowledge, that all created being whatsoever owes the continuation and perpetuity of its existence, not to any necessity of nature without God, and independently upon him, but to the Divine will only. And, therefore, though we had never so much rational and philosophical assurance, that our souls are immaterial substances, distinct from the body, yet we could not, for all that, have any absolute certainty of their post-eternity, any otherwise than as it may be derived to us from the immutability and perfection of the Divine nature and will, which does always that which is best. For the essential goodness and wisdom of the Deity is the only stability of all things. And for aught we mortals know, there may be good reason, why that grace or favour of future immorta-

lity and post-eternity, that is indulged to human souls, endued with reason, morality, and liberty of will (by means whereof they are capable of commendation and blame, reward and punishment), that so they may be objects for Divine justice to display itself upon after this life, in different retributions, may, notwithstanding, be denied to those lower lives and more contemptible souls of brutes, alike devoid both of morality and liberty.

xxxvii. But if any, for all this, will still obstinately contend for that ancient Pythagoric and Empedoclean hypothesis, that all lives and souls whatsoever are as old as the first creation, and will continue to eternity, or as long as the world doth, as a thing more reasonable and probable than our continual creation of new souls, by means whereof they become juniors both to the matter of the world and of their own bodies, and whereby also (as they pretend) the Divine creative power is made too cheap and prostituted a thing, as being famulative always to brutish, and many times to unlawful lusts and undue conjunctions; but especially than the continual de-creation and annihilation of the souls of brutes; we shall not be very unwilling to acknowledge thus much to them, that, indeed, of the two, this opinion is more reasonable and tolerable than that other extravagancy of those, who will either make all souls to be generated, and consequently to be corporeal, or at least the sensitive soul, both in men and brutes. For, besides the monstrosity of this latter opinion, in making two distinct souls and perceptive substances in every man, which is a thing sufficiently confuted by internal

sense, it leaves us also in an absolute impossibility of proving the immortality of the rational soul, the incorporeity of any substance, and, by consequence, the existence of any Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

And as for that pretence of theirs, that senseless matter may as well become sensitive, and, as it were, kindled into life and cogitation, as a body, that was devoid of life and heat, may be kindled into fire and flame; this seems to argue too much ignorance of the doctrine of bodies in men otherwise learned and ingenious; the best naturalists having already concluded, that fire and flame is nothing but such a motion of the insensible parts of a body, as whereby they are violently agitated, and many times dissipated and scattered from each other, begetting in the meantime those fancies of light and heat in animals. Now, there is no difficulty at all in conceiving, that the insensible particles of a body, which were before quiescent, may be put into motion; this being nothing but a new modification of them, and no entity really distinct from the substance of body, as life, sense, and cogitation are. There is nothing in fire and flame, or a kindled body, different from other bodies, but only the motion or mechanism, and fancy of it. And, therefore, it is but a crude conceit, which the Atheists and Corporealists of former times have been always so fond of, that souls are nothing but fiery or flammeous bodies. For, though heat in the bodies of animals be a necessary instrument for soul and life to act by in them, yet it is a thing really distinct from life; and a red-hot iron hath not, therefore, any nearer approximation to life

than it had before, nor the flame of a candle than the extinguished snuff or tallow of it; the difference between them being only in the agitation of the insensible parts. We might also add, that, according to this hypothesis, the souls of animals could not be numerically the same throughout the whole space of their lives; since that fire, that needs a pabulum to prey upon, doth not continue always one and the same numerical substance. The soul of a new-born animal could be no more the same with the soul of that animal several years after, than the flame of a new-lighted candle is the same with that flame that twinkles last in the socket; which, indeed, are no more the same than a river or stream is the same at several distances of time. Which reason may be also extended further to prove the soul to be no body at all, since the bodies of all animals are in a perpetual flux.

xxxviii. We have now sufficiently performed our first task, which was to shew, from the origin of the Atomical physiology, that the doctrine of incorporeal substance must needs spring up together with it. We shall, in the next place, make it manifest, that the inward constitution of this philosophy is also such, that whosoever really entertains it, and rightly understands it, must of necessity admit incorporeal substance likewise. First, therefore, the Atomical hypothesis, allowing nothing to body, but what is either included in the idea of a thing impenetrably extended, or can clearly be conceived to be a mode of it, as more or less magnitude, with divisibility, figure, site, motion, and rest, together with the results of their several combinations, cannot possibly make life and cogitation to be qualities of body; since

they are neither contained in those things before-mentioned, nor can result from any *συνυγίαι*, or conjugations of them. Wherefore it must needs be granted, that life and cogitation are the attributes of another substance distinct from body, or incorporeal.

Again, since according to the tenour of this physiology, body hath no other action belonging to it but that of local motion, which local motion, as such, is essentially heterokinesy, that which never springs originally from the thing itself moving, but always from the action of some other agent upon it; that is, since no body could ever move itself, it follows undeniably, that there must be something else in the world besides body, or else there could never have been any motion in it. Of which we shall speak more afterwards.

Moreover, according to this philosophy, the corporeal phenomena themselves cannot be solved by mechanism alone without fancy. Now fancy is no mode of body, and therefore must needs be a mode of some other kind of being in ourselves, that is, cogitative and incorporeal.

Furthermore, it is evident from the principles of this philosophy, that sense itself is not a mere corporeal passion from bodies without, in that it supposeth, that there is nothing really in bodies like to those fantastic ideas that we have of sensible things, as of hot and cold, red and green, bitter and sweet, and the like, which, therefore, must needs owe their being to some activity of the soul itself; and this is all one as to make it incorporeal.

Lastly, from this philosophy, it is also manifest, that sense is not the *κριτήριον* of truth con-

cerning bodies themselves, it confidently pronouncing, that those supposed qualities of bodies, represented such by sense, are merely fantastical things; from whence it plainly follows, that there is something in us superior to sense, which judges of it, detects its fantasy, and condemns its imposture; and determines what really is and is not, in bodies without us, which must needs be a higher self-active vigour of the mind, that will plainly speak it to be incorporeal.

XXXIX. And now this Atomical physiology of the ancients seems to have two advantages or pre-eminences belonging to it, the first whereof is this, that it renders the corporeal world intelligible to us; since mechanism is a thing that we can clearly understand, and we cannot clearly and distinctly conceive any thing in bodies else. To say that this or that is done by a form or quality, is nothing else but to say, that it is done we know not how; or, which is yet more absurd, to make our very ignorance of the cause, disguised under those terms of forms and qualities, to be itself the cause of the effect.

Moreover, hot and cold, red and green, bitter and sweet, &c. formally considered, may be clearly conceived by us as different fancies and vital passions in us, occasioned by different motions made from the objects without upon our nerves; but they can never be clearly understood as absolute qualities in the bodies themselves, really distinct from their mechanical dispositions; nor is there, indeed, any more reason, why they should be thought such, than that, when a man is pricked with a pin, or wounded

with a sword, the pain which he feels should be thought to be an absolute quality in the pin or sword. So long as our sensible ideas are taken either for substantial forms or qualities in bodies without us, really distinct from the substance of the matter, so long are they perfectly unintelligible by us. For which cause, Timæus Locrus,^a philosophizing (as it seemeth) after this manner, did consentaneously thereunto determine, that corporeal things could not be apprehended by us, otherwise than *αἰσθήσει καὶ νόθῳ λογισμῶ*; by sense and a kind of spurious or bastardly reason;—that is, that we could have no clear conceptions of them in our understanding. And, for the same reason, Plato^b himself distinguisheth betwixt such things as are *νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτά* comprehensible by the understanding with reason,—and those which are only *δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου*, which can only be apprehended by opinion, together with a certain irrational sense;—meaning plainly, by the latter, corporeal and sensible things. And accordingly the Platonists frequently take occasion, from hence, to enlarge themselves much in the disparagement of corporeal things, as being, by reason of that smallness of entity that is in them, below the understanding, and not having so much *οὐσίαν* as *γένεσιν*,^c essence as generation,—which, indeed, is fine fancy. Wherefore, we must either, with these philosophers, make sensible things to be *ἀκατάληπτα* or

^a De Anima Mundi, inter Scriptor. Mytholog. a Tho. Gale editos. p. 545.

^b Vide Theætetum, p. 139. s. oper. Sophistam. p. 166, 167. et de Repub. lib. vii. p. 484.

^c Plato de Republica, ubi supra.

ἀπερίληπτα, altogether incomprehensible and inconceivable—by our human understandings (though they be able, in the meantime, clearly to conceive many things of a higher nature), or else we must entertain some kind of favourable opinion concerning that which is the ancientest of all physiologies, the Atomi- cal or mechanical, which alone renders sensible things intelligible.

XL. The second advantage, which this Atomi- cal physiology seems to have, is this, that it pre- pares an easy and clear way for the demonstra- tion of incorporeal substances, by settling a dis- tinct notion of body. He that will undertake to prove, that there is something else in the world besides body, must first determine what body is, for otherwise he will go about to prove, that there is something besides he knows not what. But now, if all body be made to consist of two sub- stantial principles, whereof one is matter devoid of all form (and therefore of quantity as well as qualities), from whence these philoso- phers* themselves conclude, that it is incorporeal; the other, form, which, being devoid of all matter, must needs be incorporeal likewise. (And thus Sto- bæus^a sets down the joint doctrine both of Plato and Aristotle; *ὃν τρόπον τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὕλης ἀφαιρεθὲν ἀσώματον, οὕτως και τὴν ὕλην τοῦ εἶδους χωρισθέντος οὐ σῶμα εἶναι, δεῖν γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τῆς συνόδου, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑπόστασιν*. That in the same manner, as form alone separated from matter is incorporeal, so neither is matter alone, the form being separated from it, body. But there is need of the joint concurrence of both these, matter and form together,

* *ἀσώματος δὲ και ἡ ὕλη*—
Matter is in-
corporeal.
Plotin. p.
164.

^a Eclog. Phys. lib. i. cap. xiv. p. 29.

to make up the substance of the body.)—Moreover, if to forms qualities be likewise superadded, of which it is consentaneously also resolved by the Platonists, *ὅτι αἱ ποιότητες ἀσώματοι*, that qualities are incorporeal,—as if they were so many spirits possessing bodies; I say, in this way of philosophizing, the notions of body and spirit, corporeal and incorporeal, are so confounded, that it is impossible to prove any thing at all concerning them; body itself being made incorporeal (and therefore every thing incorporeal); for whatsoever is wholly compounded and made up of incorporeals, must needs be itself also incorporeal.

Alcinous,
cap. 11. [In-
trod. in Phi-
los. Platon.
p. 479.]

Furthermore, according to this doctrine of matter, forms, and qualities in body, life and understanding may be supposed to be certain forms or qualities of body. And then the souls of men may be nothing else but blood or brains, endued with the qualities of sense and understanding; or else some other more subtle, sensitive, and rational matter, in us. And the like may be said of God himself also; that he is nothing but a certain rational, or intellectual, subtile and fiery body, pervading the whole universe; or else that he is the form of the whole corporeal world, together with the matter making up but one substance. Which conceits have been formerly entertained by the best of those ancients, who were captivated under that dark infirmity of mind, to think, that there could be no other substance besides body.

But the ancient Atomical philosophy, settling a distinct notion of body, that it is *διασπάρδον ἀντίτροπον*, a thing impenetrably extended,—which hath nothing belonging to it but magnitude, figure, site,

rest, and motion, without any self-moving power, takes away all confusion; shews clearly how far body can go, where incorporeal substance begins; as also, that there must of necessity be such a thing in the world.

Again, this discovering not only that the doctrine of qualities had its original from men's mistaking their own fancies for absolute realities in bodies themselves; but also, that the doctrine of matter and form sprung from another fallacy or deception of the mind, in taking logical notions, and our modes of conceiving, for modes of being, and real entities in things without us; it shewing, likewise, that because there is nothing else clearly intelligible in body, besides magnitude, figure, site, and motion, and their various conjunctions, there can be no such entities of forms and qualities really distinct from the substance of body; makes it evident, that life, cogitation, and understanding can be no corporeal things, but must needs be the attributes of another kind of substance distinct from body.

XLI. We have now clearly proved these two things: first, that the physiology of the ancients, before, not only Aristotle and Plato, but also Democritus and Leucippus, was Atomical or mechanical. Secondly, that as there is no inconsistency between the Atomical physiology and theology, but indeed a natural cognation: so the ancient Atomists, before Democritus, were neither Atheists nor Corporealists, but held the incorporeity and immortality of souls, together with a Deity distinct from the corporeal world. Wherefore, the first and most ancient Atomists did not make *ἀτόμους ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄλων*, they never endea-

voured to make up an entire philosophy out of Atomology; but the doctrine of Atoms was to them only one part or member of the whole philosophic system, they joining thereunto the doctrine of incorporeal substance and theology, to make it up complete; accordingly, as Aristotle hath declared in his *Metaphysics*, that the ancient philosophy consisted of these two parts, *φυσιολογία* and *θεολογία* or *ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία*, physiology, and theology or metaphysics. Our ancient Atomists never went about, as the blundering Democritus afterwards did, to build up a world out of mere passive bulk, and sluggish matter, without any *ἀρχαὶ δραστήριοι*, any active principles, or incorporeal powers; understanding well, that thus they could not have so much as motion, mechanism, or generation in it; the original of all that motion that is in bodies springing from something that is not body, that is, from incorporeal substance. And yet, if local motion could have been supposed to have risen up, or sprung in upon this dead lump and mass of matter, nobody knows how, and without dependence upon any incorporeal being, to have actuated it fortuitously; these ancient Atomists would still have thought it impossible for the corporeal world itself to be made up, such as now it is, by fortuitous mechanism, without the guidance of any higher principle. But they would have concluded it the greatest impudence or madness, for men to assert, that animals also consisted of mere mechanism; or, that life and sense, reason and understanding, were really nothing else but local motion, and consequently, that themselves were but machines and automata. Wherefore, they joined

both active and passive principles together, the corporeal and incorporeal nature, mechanism and life, Atomology and Pneumatology; and, from both these united, they made up one entire system of philosophy, correspondent with, and agreeable to, the true and real world without them. And this system of philosophy, thus consisting of the doctrine of incorporeal substance (whereof God is the head), together with the Atomical and mechanical physiology, seems to have been the only genuine, perfect, and complete.

XLII. But it did not long continue thus; for, after a while, this entire body of philosophy came to be mangled and dismembered, some taking one part of it alone, and some another; some snatching away the Atomical physiology, without the pneumatology and theology; and others, on the contrary, taking the theology and doctrine of incorporeals, without the Atomical or mechanical physiology. The former of these were Democritus, Leucippus, and Protagoras, who took only the dead carcass or skeleton of the old Moschical philosophy, namely, the Atomical physiology; the latter, Plato and Aristotle, who took, indeed, the better part, the soul, spirit, and quintessence of it, the theology and doctrine of Incorporeals, but unbodied, and divested of its most proper and convenient vehicle, the Atomical physiology, whereby it became exposed to sundry inconveniences.

XLIII. We begin with Leucippus and Democritus; who, being atheistically inclined, quickly perceived, that they could not, in the ordinary way of physiologizing, sufficiently secure themselves against a Deity, nor effectually urge Athe-

ism upon others ; forasmuch as Heraclitus and other philosophers, who held that all substance was body, as well as themselves, did, notwithstanding, assert a corporeal Deity, maintaining, that the form of the whole corporeal world was God, or else that he was ὅλη πῶς ἔχουσα, a certain kind of body or matter, as (for example) a methodical and rational fire, pervading (as a soul) the whole universe ; the particular souls of men and animals being but, as it were, so many pieces cut and sliced out of the great mundane soul : so that, according to them, the whole corporeal universe, or mass of body, was one way or other a God, a most wise and understanding animal, that did frame all particularities within itself in the best manner possible, and providently govern the same. Wherefore, those Atheists now apprehending, upon what ticklish and uncertain terms their Atheistical philosophy then stood, and how that those very forms and qualities, and the self-moving power of body, which were commonly made a sanctuary for Atheism, might, notwithstanding, chance to prove, contrariwise, the latibulum and asylum of a Deity, and that a corporeal God (do what they could) might lie lurking under them, assaulting men's minds with doubtful fears and jealousies ; understanding, moreover, that there was another kind of physiology set on foot, which, banishing those forms and qualities of body, attributed nothing to it but magnitude, figure, site, and motion, without any self-moving power ; they seemed presently to apprehend some great advantage to themselves and cause from it ; and therefore, greedily entertained this Atomical or mechanical physiology, and violently cutting it

off from that other part, the doctrine of Incorporals, which it was naturally and vitally united to, endeavoured to serve their turns of it. And now joining these two things together, the Atomical physiology, which supposes, that there is nothing in body but magnitude, figure, site, and motion, and that prejudice or prepossession of their own minds, that there was no other substance in the world besides body; between them both they begat a certain mongrel and spurious philosophy, atheistically Atomical, or atomically Atheistical.

But though we have so well proved, that Leucippus and Democritus were not the first inventors, but only the depravers and adulterators of the Atomical philosophy; yet, if any will, notwithstanding, obstinately contend, that the first invention thereof ought to be imputed to them, the very principles of their Atheism seeming to lead them naturally to this, to strip and divest body of all those forms and qualities, it being otherwise impossible for them, surely and safely, to exclude a corporeal Deity; yet so, as that the wit of these Atheists was also much to be admired, in the managing and carrying on of those principles in such a manner, as to make up so entire a system of philosophy out of them, all whose parts should be so coherent and consistent together; we shall only say thus much: that if those Atheists were the first inventors of this philosophy, they were certainly very unhappy and unsuccessful in it, whilst endeavouring by it to secure themselves from the possibility and danger of a corporeal God, they unawares laid a foundation for the clear demonstration of an

incorporeal one, and were indeed so far from making up any such coherent frame as is pretended, that they were forced every where to contradict their own principles. So that nonsense lies at the bottom of all, and is interwoven throughout their whole Atheistical system; and that we ought to take notice of the invincible power and force of truth, prevailing irresistibly against all endeavours to oppress it; and how desperate the cause of Atheism is, when that very Atomical hypothesis of their's, which they would erect and build up for a strong castle to garrison themselves in, proves a most effectual engine against themselves, for the battering of all their Atheistical structure down about their ears.

XLIV. Plato's mutilation and interpolation of the old Moschical philosophy was a great deal more excusable, when he took the theology and metaphysics of it, the whole doctrine of Incorporeals, and abandoned the Atomical or mechanical way of physiologizing. Which in all probability he did, partly because those forementioned Atheists having so much abused that philosophy, adopting it as it were to themselves, he thereupon began to entertain a jealousy and suspicion of it; and partly, because he was not of himself so inclinable to physiology as theology, to the study of corporeal as of Divine things; which some think to be the reason, why he did not attend to the Pythagoric system of the corporeal world, till late in his old age. His genius was such, that he was naturally more addicted to ideas than to atoms, to formal and final than to material causes. To which may be added, that the way of physiologizing by matter, forms, and qualities, is a more huffy

and fanciful thing than the other ; and lastly, that the Atomical physiology is more remote from sense and vulgar apprehension, and therefore not so easily understood. For which cause many learned Greeks of later times, though they had read Epicurus's works, and perhaps Democritus's too, yet they were not able to conceive, how the corporeal and sensible phenomena could possibly be solved without real qualities ; one instance whereof might be given in Plutarch, writing against Colotes, the Epicurean. Wherefore Plato, that was a zealous assertor of an incorporeal Deity, distinct from the world, and of immortal souls, seriously physiologized only by matter, forms, and qualities, generation, corruption, and alteration ; and he did but play and toy sometimes a little with atoms and mechanism ; as where he would compound the earth of cubical, and fire of pyramidal atoms, and the like. For that he did therein imitate the Atomical physiology, is plain from these words of his ; *πάντα οὖν δέϊ ταῦτα διανοεῖσθαι σμικρὰ οὕτως, ὡς καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον οὐδὲν ὁρώμενου ὑφ' ἡμῶν, συναθροισθέντων δὲ πολλῶν, τοὺς ὄγκους αὐτῶν ὁρᾶσθαι*. All these cubical and pyramidal corpuscula of the fire and earth, are in themselves so small, that by reason of their parvitude, none of them can be perceived singly and alone, but only the aggregations of many of them together.—

XLV. And Aristotle here trod in Plato's footsteps, not only in the better part, in asserting an incorporeal Deity, and an immoveable First Mover ; but also in physiologizing by forms and qualities, and rejecting that mechanical way by atoms,

* In *Timæe*. p. 537. oper.

which had been so generally received amongst the ancients. Wherefore, though the genius of these two persons was very different, and Aristotle often contradicteth Plato, and really dissents from him in several particularities; yet, so much I think may be granted to those reconcilers (Porphyry, Simplicius, and others), that the main essentials of their two philosophies are the same.

Now, I say, the whole Aristotelical system of philosophy is infinitely to be preferred before the whole Democritical; though the former hath been so much disparaged, and the other cried up of late amongst us. Because, though it cannot be denied, but that the Democritic hypothesis doth much more handsomely and intelligibly solve the corporeal phenomena, yet in all those other things, which are of far the greatest moment, it is rather a madness than a philosophy. But the Aristotelic system is right and sound here, as to those greater things; it asserting incorporeal substance, a Deity distinct from the world, the naturality of morality, and liberty of will. Wherefore, though a late writer of politics does so exceedingly disparage Aristotle's Ethics, yet we shall do him this right here to declare, that his ethics were truly such, and answered their title; but that new model of ethics, which hath been obtruded upon the world with so much fastuosity, and is indeed nothing but the old Democritic doctrine revived, is no ethics at all, but a mere cheat, the undermining and subversion of all morality, by substituting something like it in the room of it, that is a mere counterfeit and changeling, the design whereof could not be any other than to debauch the world.

We add further, that Aristotle's system of phi-

osophy seems to be more consistent with piety, than the Cartesian hypothesis itself, which yet plainly supposeth incorporeal substance. Forasmuch as this latter makes God to contribute nothing more to the fabric of the world, than the turning round of a vortex or whirlpool of matter; from the fortuitous motion of which, according to certain general laws of nature, must proceed all this frame of things that now is, the exact organization and successive generation of animals, without the guidance of any mind or wisdom. Whereas Aristotle's nature is no fortuitous principle, but such as doth nothing in vain, but all for ends, and in every thing pursues the best; and therefore can be no other than a subordinate instrument of the Divine wisdom, and the manuary opificer or executioner of it.

However, we cannot deny, but that Aristotle hath been taxed by sundry of the ancients, Christians and others, for not so explicitly asserting these two things, the immortality of human souls, and providence over men, as he ought to have done, and as his master Plato did. Though to do him all the right we can, we shall observe here, that in his Nicomachian Ethics,^a he speaks favourably for the latter; *εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εὐλογον χαίρειν αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο γὰρ εἶη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαποῦντας μάλιστα καὶ τοὺς τιμῶντας ἀντεπιοιῖν, ὅς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένοις, ὀρθῶς τε καλῶς πράττοντας.* If God take any care of human things, as it seems he doth, then it is reasonable to think also, that he is delighted with that which is the best, and nearest akin to himself (which is

^a Lib. x. cap. ix. p. 185. tom. iii. oper.

mind or right reason), and that he rewards those who most love and honour it (as taking care of such things as are most pleasing to him), in doing rightly and honestly.—A very good sentence, were it not ushered in with too much of scepticism. And as for the point of the soul's immortality, it is true, that whereas other philosophers, before Aristotle, asserted the pre-existence, incorporeity, and immortality of all souls, not only the rational, but the sensitive also (which in men they concluded to be one and the same substance), according to that of Plato's *πάσα ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος*, every soul is immortal, —they resolving that no life nor cogitation could be corporeal; Aristotle, on the contrary, doth expressly deny the pre-existence, that is, the separability, incorporeity, and immortality, of all sensitive souls, not in brutes only, but also every where, giving his reason for it in these words; *ὅτι μὲν οὐχ οἷόν τε πάσας προὔπαρχειν, φανερόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων, ὅσων γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐνέργεια σωματικὴ, δῆλον ὅτι ταύτας ἄνευ σώματος ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν, οἷον βαδιῶν ἄνευ ποδῶν ὥστε καὶ θύραθεν εἰσιέναι ἀδύνατον ὅτε γὰρ αὐτὰς καθ' ἑαυτὰς εἰσιέναι οἷόν τε ἀχωρίστους οὐσας, οὐτ' ἐν σώματι εἰσιέναι.* That all souls cannot pre-exist, is manifest from hence, because those principles, whose action is corporeal, cannot possibly exist without the body, as the power of walking without the feet. Wherefore it is impossible, that these sensitive souls (pre-existing) should come into the body from without, since they can neither come alone by themselves naked and stripped of all body, they being inseparable from it: neither can they come in with a body, that is, the seed.—This is Aristotle's argument, why all sensitive souls must needs

* *De Generat. et Corruptione*, lib. ii. cap. iii. p. 618. tom. ii. oper.

be corporeal, because there is no walking without feet, nor seeing without eyes. But at the same time he declares, that the mind or intellect does pre-exist and come in from without, that is, is incorporeal, separable, and immortal, giving his reason for it in like manner: ^a *λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισίεναι, καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια*. It remains, that the mind or intellect, and that alone (pre-existing) enter from without, and be only Divine; since its energy is not blended with that of the body's, but it acts independently upon it.—Notwithstanding which, Aristotle elsewhere^b distinguishing concerning this mind or intellect, and making it to be twofold, agent and patient, concludes the former of them only to be immortal, but the latter corruptible; *τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίων, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτὸς*, the agent intellect is only immortal and eternal, but the passive is corruptible:—where some interpreters, that would willingly excuse Aristotle, contend, that by the passive intellect is not meant the patient, but the fantasy only, because Aristotle should otherwise contradict himself, who had before affirmed the intellect to be separable, unmixed, and inorganic, which they conceive must needs be understood of the patient. But this salvo can hardly take place here, where the passive intellect is directly opposed to the agent. Now what Aristotle's agent understanding is, and whether it be any thing in us, any faculty of our human soul or no, seems to be a thing very questionable, and has therefore caused much dispute amongst his interpreters; it being resolved by many of them to be the Divine intellect, and

^a Ibid.^b De Anima, lib. iii. cap. vi. p. 50. tom. ii. oper.

commonly by others, a foreign thing. Whence it must needs be left doubtful, whether he acknowledged any thing incorporeal and immortal at all in us. And the rather because, laying down this principle, that nothing is incorporeal, but what acts independently upon the body, he somewhere plainly determines, that there is no intellection without corporeal phantasms. That, which led Aristotle to all this, positively to affirm the corporeity of sensitive souls, and to stagger so much concerning the incorporeity of the rational, seems to have been his doctrine of forms and qualities, whereby corporeal and incorporeal substance are confounded together, so that the limits of each could not be discerned by him. Wherefore we cannot applaud Aristotle for this; but that which we commend him for, is chiefly these four things: first, for making a perfect incorporeal intellect to be the head of all; and secondly, for resolving, that nature, as an instrument of this intellect, does not merely act according to the necessity of material motions, but for ends and purposes, though unknown to itself; thirdly, for maintaining the naturalness of morality; and lastly, for asserting the τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, autexousy, or liberty from necessity.

CHAPTER II.

In this chapter are contained all the grounds of reason for the Atheistic hypothesis.—1. That the Democritic philosophy, which is made up of these two principles, Corporealism and Atomism complicated together, is essentially Atheistical.—2. Though Epicurus, who was an Atomical Corporealism, pretended to assert a democracy of gods, yet he was, for all that, an absolute Atheist; and that Atheists commonly equivocate and disguise themselves.—3. That the Democritical philosophy is nothing else but a system of Atheology, or Atheism swaggering under the glorious appearance of philosophy. And, though there be another form of Atheism, which we call Stratonical, yet the Democritic Atheism is only considerable; all whose dark mysteries will be here revealed.—4. That we being to treat concerning the Deity, and to produce all that profane and unhallowed stuff of Atheists in order to a confutation, the Divine assistance and direction ought to be implored.—5. That there are two things here to be performed; first, to shew what are the Atheists' pretended grounds of reason against the Deity; and, secondly, how they endeavour either to solve or confute the contrary phenomena. The first of those grounds, that no man can have an idea or conception of God, and that he is an incomprehensible nothing.—6. The second Atheistic argument, that there can be no creation out of nothing, nor no omnipotence, because nothing can come from nothing; and, therefore, whatsoever substantially is, was from eternity self-existent, and uncreated by any Deity.—7. The third pretended reason against a Deity, that the strictest notion of a God implying him to be incorporeal, there can be no such incorporeal Deity, because there is no other substance but body.—8. The Atheists' pretence, that the doctrine of incorporeal substances sprung from a ridiculous mistaking of abstract names and notions for realities. They impudently make the Deity to be but the chief of spectres; and an Oberon or prince of fairies and fancies. Their fourth argument against a Deity, that to suppose an incorporeal mind to be the original of all things, is but to make a mere accident and abstract notion to be the first cause of all.—9. Their fifth argument; a confutation of a corporeal Deity from the principles of Corporealism

itself, that matter being the only substance, and all other differences of things nothing but accidents, generable and corruptible, no living understanding being can be essentially incorruptible. The Stoical God incorruptible, only by accident.—10. Their sixth ratiocination from a complication of Atomicism; that the first principle of all things whatsoever in the universe is Atoms, or corpuscula devoid of all qualities, and consequently of sense and understanding (which spring up afterwards from a certain composition of them), and therefore mind or Deity was not the first original of all.—11. In the seventh place they disprove the world's animation, or its being governed by a living, understanding, animalish nature, presiding over the whole; because sense and understanding are a peculiar appendix to flesh, blood, and brains, and reason is no where to be found but in human form.—12. The eighth Atheistic ground, that God being taken by all for a most happy, eternal, and immortal animal (or living being), there can be no such thing, because all living beings are concretions of atoms, that were at first generated, and are liable to death and corruption by the dissolution of their compages. And that life is no simple primitive nature, but an accidental modification of compounded bodies, which, upon the disunion of their parts, vanisheth into nothing.—13. The ninth pretended Atheistic demonstration, that by God is meant a first cause or mover, which was not before moved by any thing else without it; but nothing can move itself, and therefore there can be no unmoved mover, nor any first in the order of causes, that is, a God.—14. Their further proof of this principle, that nothing can move itself, with an Atheistic corollary from thence, that no thinking being could be a first cause, no cogitation arising of itself without a cause; which may be reckoned a tenth argument.—15. Another mystery of Atheism, that all knowledge and mental conception is the information of the things themselves known, existing without the knower, and a passion from them; and, therefore, the world must needs be before any knowledge or conception of it, and no knowledge or conception before the world, as its cause.—16. The twelfth argumentation, that things could not be made by a God, because they are so faulty and ill made, that they were not contrived for the good of man; and that the deluge of evils, that overflows all, shews that they did not proceed from any Deity.—17. The thirteenth instance of the Atheists against a Deity, from the defect of Providence, that, in human affairs, all is Tohu and Bohu, chaos and confusion.—18. The fourteenth Atheistic ground, that it is not possible for any one being to animad-

vert and order all things in the distant places of the whole world at once: but, if it were possible, that such infinite negotiosity would be absolutely inconsistent with happiness.—19. Several bold but slight queries of Atheists, why the world was not made sooner? and what God did before? why it was made at all, since it was so long unmade? and, how the architect of the world could rear up so huge a fabric?—20. The Atheists' pretence, that it is the great interest of mankind, that there should be no God; and that it was a noble and heroic exploit of the Democritics, to chase away that affrightful spectre out of the world, and to free men from the continual fear of a Deity and punishment after death, embittering all the pleasures of life.—21. Another pretence of their's, that Theism is inconsistent with civil sovereignty, it introducing a fear greater than the fear of the leviathan; and that any other conscience allowed of besides the civil law (being private judgment), is, *ipso facto*, a dissolution of the body politic, and a return to the state of nature.—22. The Atheists' conclusion from the former premises, as set down in Plato and Lucretius, that all things sprung originally from nature and chance, without any mind or God, that is, proceeded from the necessity of material motions, undirected for ends; that infinite atoms, devoid of life and sense, moving in infinite space from eternity, by their fortuitous rencounters and entanglements, produced the system of the whole universe, and as well animate as inanimate things.

I. HAVING, in the former chapter, given an account of the genuine and primitive Atomical philosophy, which may be called the Moschical; we are, in the next place, to consider the Democritical, that is, the atheized and adulterated Atomology: which had its origin from nothing else but the joining of this heterogeneous and contradictory principle to the Atomical physiology, that there is no other substance in the world besides body. Now we say, that that philosophy, which is thus compounded and made up of these two things, Atomism and Corporealism complicated together, is essentially Atheistical, though neither of them alone be such. For the Atomical physiology, as we have declared already, is in its

own nature sufficiently repugnant to Atheism. And it is possible for one, who holds, that there is nothing in the world besides body, to be persuaded, notwithstanding, of a corporeal Deity, and that the world was at first framed and is still governed by an understanding nature lodged in the matter. For thus some of these Corporealists have fancied the whole universe itself to be a God, that is, an understanding and wise animal, that ordered all things within itself, after the best manner possible, and providently governed the same. Indeed, it cannot be denied, but that this is a very great infirmity of mind, that such persons lie under, who are not able to conceive any other substance besides body, by which is understood that which is impenetrably extended, or else, in Plato's language, which hath *προεβολήν καὶ ἐπαφήν*, that thrusts against other bodies, and resists their impulse;—or, as others express it, which is *τόπου πληρωτικόν*, that so fills up place—as to exclude any other body or substance from co-existing with it therein; and such must needs have, not only very imperfect, but also spurious and false conceptions of the Deity, so long as they apprehend it to be thus corporeal; but yet it does not, therefore, follow, that they must needs be accounted Atheists. But, whosoever holds these two principles (before-mentioned) together, that there is no other substance besides body, and that body hath nothing else belonging to it but magnitude, figure, site, and motion, without qualities: I say, whosoever is that confounded thing of an Atomist and Corporealist jumbled together, he is essentially and unavoidably that which is meant by an Atheist, though he

should in words never so much disclaim it, because he must needs fetch the original of all things from senseless matter; whereas, to assert a God, is to maintain, that all things sprung originally from a knowing and understanding nature.

II. Epicurus, who was one of those mongrel things before-mentioned (an Atomical Corporealist, or Corporeal Atomist), did, notwithstanding, profess to hold a multifarious rabble and democracy of gods, such as though they were ἀνθρωπόμορφοι,^a of human form,—yet were so thin and subtile, as that, comparatively with our terrestrial bodies, they might be called incorporeal; they having not so much *carnem* as *quasi-carnem*, nor *sanguinem* as *quasi-sanguinem*, a certain kind of aerial or ethereal flesh and blood; which gods of his were not to be supposed to exist any where within the world, upon this pretence, that there was no place in it fit to receive them :

^b Illud item non est, ut possis credere sedes
Esse Deum sanctas, in mundi partibus ullis.

And, therefore, they must be imagined to subsist in certain intermundane spaces, and Utopian regions without the world, the deliciousness whereof is thus elegantly described by the poet :

^c Quas neque concutiunt venti, neque nubila nimbis
Adspargunt, neque nix acri concreta pruina
Cana cadens violat, semperque innubilus æther
Integit, et large diffuso lumine ridet.

Whereunto was added, that the chief happiness of these gods consisted “ in omnium vacatione

^a Vide Ciceron. de Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xviii. p. 2907. tom. ix. oper.

^b Lucret. lib. v. ver. 147.

^c Id. lib. iii. ver. 19.

munerum," in freedom from all business and employment,—and doing nothing at all, that so they might live a soft and delicate life. And, lastly, it was pretended, that though they had neither any thing to do with us, nor we with them, yet they ought to be worshipped by us for their own excellent natures' sake and happy state.

But whosoever had the least sagacity in him could not but perceive, that this theology of Epicurus was but romantical, it being directly contrary to his avowed and professed principles, to admit of any other being, than what was con- creted of atoms, and consequently corruptible; and that he did this upon a politic account, thereby to decline the common odium, and those dangers and inconveniences which otherwise he might have incurred by a downright denial of a God, to which purpose it accordingly served his turn. Thus Posidonius^a rightly pronounced, "Nul- los esse deos Epicuro videri; quæque is de diis immortalibus dixerit, invidiæ detestandæ gratia dixisse." Though he was partly jocular in it also, it making no small sport to him, in this manner, to delude and mock the credulous vulgar;^b "Deos jocandi causa induxit Epicurus perlucidos et perflabiles, et habitantes tanquam inter duos lucos, sic inter duos mundos propter metum rui- narum." However, if Epicurus had been never so much in earnest in all this, yet, by Gassendus's leave, we should pronounce him to have been not a jot the less an Atheist, so long as he maintain- ed, that the whole world was made *μηδενός διατά-*

^a Apud Ciceron. de Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xliv. p. 2949. tom. ix. oper.

^b Cicero de Divin. I. ii. c. xvii. p. 3202. tom. ix. oper.

τοντος ἢ διατάξοντος τὴν πᾶσαν μακαριότητα ἔχοντος μετὰ ἀφθαρσίας, without the ordering and direction of any understanding being, that was perfectly happy and immortal;—and fetched the original of all things in the universe, even of soul and mind, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀτόμων σωμάτων ἀπρονόητον καὶ τυχαίαν ἔχόντων τὴν κίσησιν, from senseless atoms fortuitously moved.—He, together with Democritus, hereby making the world to be, in the worst sense, ὠὸν τῆς νυκτός, an egg of the night,—that is, not the offspring of mind and understanding, but of dark, senseless matter, of Tohu and Bohu, or confused chaos; and deriving the original of all the perfections in the universe from the most imperfect being, and the lowest of all entities, than which nothing can be more atheistical. And as for those romantic monogramous gods of Epicurus, had they been seriously believed by him, they could have been nothing else but a certain kind of aerial and spectrous men, living by themselves, nobody knows where, without the world: Ἐπίκουρος ὡς μὲν πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀπολείπει Θεὸν ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὸν φύσιν πραγμάτων οὐδαμῶς. Epicurus, according to vulgar opinion, leaves a God; but, according to the nature of things, none at all.—

And as Epicurus, so other Atheists, in like manner, have commonly had their vizards and disguises; Atheism, for the most part, prudently choosing to walk abroad in masquerade. And, though some over-credulous persons have been so far imposed upon hereby, as to conclude, that there was hardly any such thing as an Atheist any where in the world, yet they that are sagacious may easily look through these thin veils and

^a Vide Sext. Empir. adv. Mathemat. lib. ix. p. 565. edit. Fabricii.

disguises, and perceive these Atheists oftentimes insinuating their Atheism even then, when they most of all profess themselves Theists, by affirming, that it is impossible to have any idea or conception at all of God; and that, as he is not finite, so he cannot be infinite, and that no knowledge or understanding is to be attributed to him; which is, in effect, to say, that there is no such thing. But whosoever entertains the Democritic principles, that is, both rejects forms and qualities of body, and makes all things to be body, though he pretend never so much to hold a corporeal Deity, yet he is not at all to be believed in it, it being a thing plainly contradictory to those principles.

III. Wherefore, this mongrel philosophy, which Leucippus, Democritus, and Protagoras were the founders of, and which was entertained afterwards by Epicurus, that makes (as Laertius writes)^a ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄλων ἀτόμους, senseless atoms to be the first principles—not only of all bodies (for that was a thing admitted before by Empedocles and other Atomists that were Theists), but also of all things whatsoever in the whole universe, and therefore of soul and mind too; this, I say, was really nothing else but a philosophical form of Atheology, a gigantical and Titanical attempt to dethrone the Deity, not only by solving all the phenomena of the world without a God, but also by laying down such principles, from whence it must needs follow, that there could be neither an incorporeal nor corporeal Deity. It was Atheism openly swaggering under the glorious appearance of wisdom and philosophy.

^a Lib. x, segm. 41. p. 620. et alias.

There is, indeed, another form of Atheism, which (insisting on the vulgar way of philosophizing by forms and qualities) we, for distinction sake, shall call *Stratonical*; such as, being too modest and shamefaced to fetch all things from the fortuitous motion of atoms, would, therefore, allow to the several parts of matter a certain kind of natural (though not animal) perception, such as is devoid of reflexive consciousness, together with a plastic power, whereby they may be able artificially and methodically to form and frame themselves to the best advantage of their respective capabilities; something like to Aristotle's nature, but that it hath no dependance at all upon any higher mind or Deity. And these Atheists may be also called *Hylozoic* (as the other *Atomic*), because they derive all things in the whole universe, not only sensitive, but also rational souls, together with the artificial frame of animals, from the life of matter. But this kind of Atheism seems to be but an unshapen embryo of some dark and cloudy brains, that was never yet digested into an entire system, nor could be brought into any such tolerable form, as to have the confidence to shew itself abroad in full and open view. But the *Democritic* and *Atomic* Atheism, as it is the boldest and rankest of all Atheisms, it not only undertaking to solve all phenomena by matter fortuitously moved, without a God, but also to demonstrate, that there cannot be so much as a corporeal Deity; so it is that alone, which, pretending to an entire and coherent system, hath publicly appeared upon the stage, and therefore doth, in a manner, only deserve our consideration.

And now we shall exhibit a full view and

prospect of it, and discover all its dark mysteries and profundities; we being much of this persuasion, that a plain and naked representation of them will be a great part of a confutation at least; not doubting but it will be made to appear, that though this monster, big swoln with a puffy shew of wisdom, strut and stalk so gigantically, and march with such a kind of stately philosophic grandeur, yet it is, indeed, but like the giant *Orgoglio*, in our English poet, a mere empty bladder, blown up with vain conceit, an *Empusa*, phantasm, or spectre, the offspring of night and darkness, nonsense and contradiction.

And yet, for all that, we shall not wrong it the least in our representation, but give it all possible advantages of strength and plausibility, that so the Atheists may have no cause to pretend (as they are wont to do, in such cases) that either we did not understand their mysteries, nor apprehend the full strength of their cause, or else did purposely smother and conceal it. Which, indeed, we have been so far from, that we must confess we were not altogether unwilling this business of their's should look a little like something, that might deserve a confutation. And whether the Atheists ought not rather to give us thanks for mending and improving their arguments, than complain that we have any way impaired them, we shall leave it to the censure of impartial judgments.

iv. Plato^a tells us, that even amongst those Pagans in his time there was generally such a religious humour, that πάντες ὅσοι κατὰ βραχὺ σωφροσύνης μετέχουσι, ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὀρμῇ καὶ σμίκρον καὶ μεγάλου πράγμα-

^a In *Timæo*, p. 235.

τος, Θεὸν αἰὶ που ἐπικαλοῦσι. Whosoever had but the least of seriousness and sobriety in them, whensoever they took in hand any enterprise, whether great or small, they would always invoke the Deity for assistance and direction.—Adding moreover, that himself should be very faulty, if in his Timæus, when he was to treat about so grand a point, concerning the whole world, εἰ γέγονεν ἢ καὶ ἀγενής ἐστὶ, whether it were made or unmade,—he should not make his entrance thereinto by a religious invocation of the Deity. Wherefore certainly it could not be less than a piece of impiety in a Christian, being to treat concerning the Deity itself, and to produce all that profane and unhallowed stuff of Atheists out of their dark corners, in order to a confutation, and the better confirmation of our faith in the truth of his existence, not to implore his direction and assistance. And I know no reason, but that we may well do it in that same litany of Plato's, κατὰ νοῦν ἐκείνω μὲν μάλιστα, ἐπομένως δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν, that we may first speak agreeably to his own mind, or becomingly of his nature, and then consentaneously with ourselves.

v. Now there are these two things here to be performed by us, first to discover and produce the chief heads of arguments, or grounds of reason, insisted on by the Atheists, to disprove a Deity, evincing withal briefly the ineffectualness and falseness of them: and secondly, to shew how they endeavour either to confute or solve, consistently with their own principles, all those phenomena, which are commonly urged against them to prove a Deity and incorporeal substance; manifesting likewise the invalidity thereof.

The grounds of reason alleged for the Atheist-

ical hypothesis are chiefly these that follow. First, That we have no idea of God, and therefore can have no evidence of him; which argument is further flourished and descanted upon in this manner; That notion or conception of a Deity, that is commonly entertained, is nothing but a bundle of incomprehensibles, unconceivables, and impossibles; it being only a compilement of all imaginable attributes of honour, courtship, and compliment, which the confounded fear and astonishment of men's minds made them huddle up together, without any sense or philosophic truth. This seems to be intimated by a modern writer* in these words: "The attributes of God signify not true nor false, nor any opinion of our brain, but the reverence and devotion of our hearts; and therefore they are not sufficient premises to infer truth, or convince falsehood." And the same thing again is further set out, with no small pretence to wit, after this manner: "They that venture to dispute philosophically, or reason of God's nature from these attributes of honour, losing their understanding in the very first attempt, fall from one inconvenience into another, without end, and without number; in the same manner, as when one, ignorant of the ceremonies of court, coming into the presence of a greater person than he is used to speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himself from falling, lets slip his cloak, to recover his cloak lets fall his hat, and with one disorder after another, discovers his astonishment and rusticity." The meaning of which, and other like passages of the same writer, seems to be this; that the attributes of God (by which his nature

* Hobbes.

is supposed to be expressed) having no philosophic truth or reality in them, had their only original from a certain rustic astonishment of mind, proceeding from excess of fear, raising up the phantasm of a Deity, as a bugbear for an object to itself, and affrighting men into all manner of confounded nonsense, and absurdity of expressions concerning it, such as have no signification, nor any conception of the mind answering to them: This is the first argument, used especially by our modern Democritics, against a Deity, that because they can have no fantastic idea of it, nor fully comprehend all that is concluded in the notion thereof, that therefore it is but an incomprehensible nothing.

VI. Secondly, another argument much insisted on by the old Democritic Atheists, is directed against the Divine omnipotence and creative power, after this manner. By God is always understood a creator of something or other out of nothing. For however the Theists be here divided amongst themselves, some of them believing, that there was once nothing at all existing in this whole space, which is now occupied by the world, besides the Deity, and that he was then a solitary being, so that the substance of the whole corporeal universe had a temporary beginning, and novelty of existence, and the duration of it hath now continued but for so many years only: others persuading themselves, that though the matter and substance at least (if not the form also) of the corporeal world, did exist from eternity, yet nevertheless, they both alike proceeded from the Deity by way of emanation, and do continually depend upon it, in the same manner as light, though co-

eval with the sun, yet proceeded from the sun, and depends upon it, being always, as it were, made anew by it; wherefore, according to this hypothesis, though things had no antecedent non-entity in time, yet they were as little of themselves, and owed all their being as much to the Deity, as if they had been once actually nothing, they being, as it were, perpetually created out of nothing by it. Lastly, others of those Theists resolving, that the matter of the corporeal universe was not only from eternity, but also self-existent and uncreated or independent upon any Deity as to its being; but yet the forms and qualities of all inanimate bodies, together with the souls of all animals in the successive generations of them (being taken for entities distinct from the matter), were created by the Deity out of nothing. We say, though there be such difference among the Theists themselves, yet they all agree in this, that God is, in some sense or other, the creator of some real entity out of nothing, or the cause of that which otherwise would not have been of itself, so that no creation out of nothing (in that enlarged sense), no Deity. Now it is utterly impossible, that any substance or real entity should be created out of nothing, it being contradictory to that indubitable axiom of reason, *de nihilo nihil*, from nothing nothing. The argument is thus urged by Lucretius, according to the minds of Epicurus and Democritus :

^a Principium hinc cujus nobis exordia sumet,
Nullam rem e nihilo gigni divinitus unquam.
Quippe ita formido mortales continet omnes,
Quod multa in terris fieri cœloque tuentur,

^a Lib. i. vers. 150, &c.

Quorum operum causas nulla ratione videre
 Possunt, ac fieri divino numine rentur :
 Quas ob res, ubi viderimus nil posse creari
 De nihilo, tum quod sequimur, jam tutius inde
 Perspicimus, et unde queat res quæque creari,
 Et quo quæque modo fiant opera sine divum.

It is true, indeed, that it seems to be chiefly levelled by the poet against that third and last sort of Theists before-mentioned, such as Heraclitus and the Stoics (which latter were contemporary with Epicurus), who held the matter of the whole world to have been from eternity of itself uncreated, but yet the forms of mundane things in the successive generations of them (as entities distinct from the matter) to be created or made by the Deity out of nothing. But the force of the argument must needs lie stronger against those other Theists, who would have the very substance and matter itself of the world, as well as the forms, to have been created by the Deity out of nothing. Since nothing can come out of nothing, it follows, that not so much as the forms and qualities of bodies (conceived as entities really distinct from the matter), much less the lives and souls of animals, could ever have been created by any Deity, and therefore certainly not the substance and matter itself. But all substance and real entity, whatsoever is in the world, must needs have been from eternity, uncreated and self-existent. Nothing can be made or produced but only the different modifications of pre-existent matter. And this is done by motions, mixtures, and separations, concretions and secretions of atoms, without the creation of any real distinct entity out of nothing; so that there needs no Deity for the effecting of it, according to that of Epicurus, *ἡ θεία φύσις πρὸς ταῦτα*

μηδαμῆ προσαγίσθω, no Divine power ought to be called in for the solving of those phenomena.—To conclude, therefore, if no substance, nor real entity can be made, which was not before, but all whatsoever is, will be, and can be, was from eternity self-existent; then creative power, but especially that attribute of omnipotence, can belong to nothing; and this is all one as to say, there can be no Deity.

VII. Thirdly, the Atheists argue against the stricter and higher sort of Theists, who will have God to be the creator of the whole corporeal universe and all its parts out of nothing, after this manner: that which created the whole mass of matter and body, cannot be itself body; wherefore this notion of God plainly implies him to be incorporeal. But there can be no incorporeal Deity, because by that word must needs be understood, either that which hath no magnitude nor extension at all, or else that which is indeed extended, but otherwise than body. If the word be taken in the former sense, then nothing at all can be so incorporeal, as to be altogether unextended and devoid of geometrical quantity, because extension is the very essence of all existent entity, and that which is altogether unextended is perfectly nothing. There can neither be any substance, nor mode or accident of any substance, no nature whatsoever unextended. But if the word incorporeal be taken in the latter sense, for that which is indeed extended, but otherwise than body, namely so as to penetrate bodies and co-exist with them, this is also a thing next to nothing; since it can neither act upon any

other thing, nor be acted upon by, or sensible of, any thing; it can neither do nor suffer any thing.

* Nam facere et fungi nisi corpus nulla potest res.

Wherefore, to speak plainly, this can be nothing else but empty space, or vacuum, which runs through all things, without laying hold on any thing, or being affected from any thing. This is the only incorporeal thing, that is or can be in nature, space, or place; and therefore to suppose an incorporeal Deity is to make empty space to be the creator of all things.

This argument is thus proposed by the Epicurean poet:

b ———— Quodcunque erit esse aliquid, debet id ipsum
 Augmine vel grandi vel parvo———
 Cui si tactus erit, quamvis levis exiguusque,
 Corporum augebit numerum summamque sequetur:
 Sin intactile erit, nulla de parte quod ullam
 Rem prohibere queat per se transire meantem,
 Scilicet hoc id erit vacuum quod inane vocamus.

Whatsoever is, is extended or hath geometrical quantity and mensurability in it; which, if it be tangible, then it is body, and fills up a place in the world, being part of the whole mass; but if it be intangible, so that it cannot resist the passage of any thing through it, then it is nothing else but empty space or vacuum.—There is no third thing besides these two, and therefore whatsoever is not body, is space or nothing:

c ———— Præter inane et corpora tertia per se,
 Nulla potest rerum in numero natura relinqui.

* Lucret. lib. i. vers. 444, &c.

b Id. lib. i. vers. 434, &c.

c Id. lib. i. vers. 446.

Thus the ancient Epicureans and Democritics argued; there being nothing incorporeal but space, there can be no incorporeal Deity.

But, because this seems to give advantage to the Theists, in making space something, or that which hath a real nature or entity without our conception, from whence it will follow, that it must needs be either itself a substance, or else a mode of some incorporeal substance; the modern Democritics are here more cautious, and make space to be no nature really existing without us, but only the phantasm of a body, and, as it were, the ghost of it, which has no reality without our imagination. So that there are not two natures of body and space, which must needs infer two distinct substances, one whereof must be incorporeal, but only one nature of body. The consequence of which will be this, that an incorporeal substance is all one with an incorporeal body, and therefore nothing.

VIII. But because it is generally conceived, that an error cannot be sufficiently confuted, without discovering τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ψεύδους, the cause of the mistake;—therefore, the Atheists will, in the next place, undertake to shew likewise the original of this doctrine of incorporeal substances, and from what misapprehension it sprung; as also take occasion, from thence, further to disprove a Deity.

Wherefore they say, that the original of this doctrine of incorporeal substances proceeded chiefly from the abuse of abstract names, both of substances (whereby the essences of singular bodies, as of a man or a horse, being abstracted from those bodies themselves, are considered uni-

versally) as also of accidents, when they are considered alone without their subjects or substances. The latter of which is a thing, that men have been necessitated to in order to the computation or reckoning of the properties of bodies, the comparing of them with one another, the adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing of them; which could not be done, so long as they are taken concretely together with their subjects. But yet, as there is some use of those abstract names, so the abuse of them has been also very great; forasmuch as, though they be really the names of nothing, since the essence of this and that man is not any thing without the man, nor is an accident any thing without its substance, yet men have been led into a gross mistake by them, to imagine them to be realities existing by themselves. Which infatuation hath chiefly proceeded from scholastics, who have been so intemperate in the use of these words, that they could not make a rational discourse of any thing, though never so small, but they must stuff it with their quiddities, entities, essences, hæcceities, and the like. Wherefore, these are they, who, being first deluded themselves, have also deluded the world, introducing an opinion into the minds of men, that the essence of every thing is something without that thing itself, and also eternal; and, therefore, when any thing is made or generated, that there is no new being produced, but only an antecedent and eternal essence clothed (as it were) with a new garment of existence; as, also, that the mere accidents of bodies may exist alone by themselves without their substances. As, for example, that the life, sense, and understanding

of animals, commonly called by the names of soul and mind, may exist without the bodies or substances of them by themselves, after the animals are dead ; which plainly makes them to be incorporeal substances, as it were the separate and abstract essences of men. This hath been observed by a modern writer in these words :—

“ *Est hominum abstractorum tum in omni vita, tum in philosophia, magnus et usus et abusus. Abusus in eo consistit, quod cum videant aliqui, considerari posse, id est, inferri in rationes, accidentium incrementa et decrementa, sine consideratione corporum, sive subjectorum suorum (id quod appellatur abstrahere), loquuntur de accidentibus, tanquam possent ab omni corpore separari: hinc enim originem trahunt quorundam metaphysicorum crassi errores. Nam ex eo, quod considerari potest cogitatio, sine consideratione corporis, inferre solent non esse opus corporis cogitantis.*” It is a great abuse, that some metaphysicians make of these abstract names, because cogitation can be considered alone without the consideration of body, therefore, to conclude, that it is not the action or accident of that body that thinks, but a substance by itself.—And the same writer elsewhere observes, that it is upon this ground, that when a man is dead and buried, they say his soul (that is, his life) can walk, separated from his body, and is seen by night amongst the graves.—By which means the vulgar are confirmed in their superstitious belief of ghosts, spirits, demons, devils, fairies, and hobgoblins, invisible powers and agents, called by several names, and that by those persons whose work it ought to be, rather to free men from such super-

stition. Which belief at first had another original, not altogether unlike the former; namely, from men's mistaking their own fancies for things really existing without them. For, as in the sense of vision, men are commonly deceived, in supposing the image behind the glass to be a real thing existing without themselves, whereas it is, indeed, nothing but their own fancy: in like manner, when the minds of men, strongly possessed with fear, especially in the dark, raise up the phantasms of spectres, bugbears, or affrightful apparitions to them, they think them to be objects really existing without them, and call them ghosts and spirits, whilst they are indeed nothing but their own fancies; so the phantasm, or fancy of a Deity (which is, indeed, the chief of all spectres), created by fear, has upon no other account been taken for a reality. To this purpose, a modern writer, "From the fear, that proceeds from the ignorance itself, of what it is that hath the power to do men good or harm, men are inclined to suppose and feign to themselves several kinds of powers invisible, and to stand in awe of their own imaginations, and in time of distress to invoke them, as also in the time of an unexpected good success to give them thanks, making the creatures of their own fancies their gods." Which, though it be prudently spoken in the plural number, that so it might be diverted and put off to the heathen gods; yet he is very simple, that does not perceive the reason of it to be the same concerning that one Deity which is now commonly worshipped; and that, therefore, this also is but the creature of men's fear and fancy, the chief of all fantastic ghosts and spectres, as it were an

Oberon or prince of fairies and fancies. This (we say) was the first original of that vulgar belief of invisible powers, ghosts, and gods; men's taking their own fancies for things really existing without them. And as for the matter and substance of these ghosts, they could not, by their own natural cogitation, fall into any other conceit, but that it was the same with that which appeareth in a dream to one that sleepeth, or in a looking-glass to one that is awake, thin aeriell bodies, which may appear and vanish when they please. But the opinion, that such spirits were incorporeal and immaterial, could never enter into the minds of men by nature, unabused by doctrine; but it sprung up from those deceiving and deceived literati, scholastics, philosophers, and theologers, enchanting men's understandings, and making them believe, that the abstract notions of accidents and essences could exist alone by themselves, without the bodies, as certain separate and incorporeal substances.

To conclude, therefore, to make an incorporeal mind to be the cause of all things, is to make our own fancy, an imaginary ghost of the world, to be a reality; and, to suppose the mere abstract notion of an accident, and a separate essence, to be not only an absolute thing by itself, and a real substance incorporeal, but also the first original of all substances, and of whatsoever is in the universe. And this may be reckoned for a fourth Atheistic ground.

ix. Fifthly, the Atheists pretend further to prove, that there is no other substance in the world besides body: as also, from the principles of Corporealism itself to evince, that there can

be no corporeal Deity after this manner. No man can devise any other notion of substance, than that it is a thing extended, existing without the mind, not imaginary, but real and solid magnitude; for, whatsoever is not extended, is no where and nothing. So that *res extensa* is the only substance, the solid basis and *substratum* of all. Now this is the very self-same thing with body; for *ἀντιπνία*, or resistance, seems to be a necessary consequence and result from extension, and they that think otherwise can shew no reason why bodies may not also penetrate one another, as some Corporealists think they do; from whence it is inferred, that body or matter is the only substance of all things. And whatsoever else is in the world, that is, all the differences of bodies, are nothing but several accidents and modifications of this extended substance, body, or matter. Which accidents, though they may be sometimes called by the names of real qualities and forms, and though there be different apprehensions concerning them amongst philosophers, yet generally they agree in this, that there are these two properties belonging to them; first, that none of them can subsist alone by themselves, without extended substance or matter, as the basis and support of them; and, secondly, that they may be all destroyed without the destruction of any substance. Now, as blackness and whiteness, heat and cold, so likewise life, sense, and understanding, are such accidents, modifications, or qualities of body, that can neither exist by themselves, and may be destroyed without the destruction of any substance or matter. For if the parts of the body of any living animal be disunited and separated

from one another, or the organical disposition of the matter altered, those accidents, forms, or qualities of life and understanding, will presently vanish away to nothing, all the substance of the matter still remaining one where or other in the universe entire, and nothing of it lost. Wherefore, the substance of matter and body, as distinguished from the accidents, is the only thing in the world that is incorruptible and undestroyable. ~~And of this it is~~ to be understood, that nothing can be made out of nothing, and destroyed to nothing, i. e. that every entire thing, that is made or generated, must be made of some pre-existent matter; which matter was from eternity self-existent and unmade, and is also undestroyable, and can never be reduced to nothing. It is not to be understood of the accidents themselves, that are all makeable and destroyable, generable and corruptible. Whatsoever is in the world is but *ὅλη πῶς ἔχουσα*, matter so and so modified or qualified, all which modifications and qualifications of matter are in their own nature destroyable, and the matter itself (as the basis of them, not necessarily determined to this or that accident) is the only *ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον*, the only necessarily existent. The conclusion, therefore, is, that no animal, no living understanding body, can be absolutely and essentially incorruptible, this being an incommunicable property of the matter; and, therefore, there can be no corporeal Deity, the original of all things, essentially undestroyable.

Though the Stoics imagined the whole corporeal universe to be an animal or Deity, yet this corporeal God of theirs was only by accident in-

corruptible and immortal ; because they supposed that there was no other matter, which, existing without this world, and making inroads upon it, could disunite the parts of it, or disorder its compages. Which, if there were, the life and understanding of this Stoical God, or great mundane animal, as well as that of other animals in like cases, must needs vanish into nothing. Thus, from the principles of Corporealism itself, it plainly follows, that there can be no corporeal Deity, because the Deity is supposed to be *ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον*, a thing that was never made, and is essentially undestroyable, which are the privileges and properties of nothing but senseless matter.

x. In the next place, the Atheists undertake more effectually to confute that corporeal God of the Stoics and others, from the principles of the Atomical philosophy, in this manner. All corporeal Theists, who assert, that an understanding nature or mind, residing in the matter of the whole universe, was the first original of the mundane system, and did intellectually frame it, betray no small ignorance of philosophy and the nature of body, in supposing real qualities, besides magnitude, figure, site, and motion, as simple and primitive things, to belong to it ; and that there was such a quality or faculty of understanding in the matter of the whole universe, co-eternal with the same, that was an original thing uncompounded and underived from any thing else. Now, to suppose such original qualities and powers, which are really distinct from the substance of extended matter and its modifications, of divisibility, figure, site, and motion, is really to suppose so many distinct substances, which, therefore, must needs be

incorporeal. So that these philosophers fall unawares into that very thing, which they are so abhorrent from. For this quality or faculty of understanding, in the matter of the universe, original and underived from any other thing, can be indeed nothing else but an incorporeal substance. Epicurus suggested a caution against this vulgar mistake, concerning qualities, to this purpose:—
 “Non sic cogitandæ sunt qualitates, quasi sint quædam per se existentes naturæ seu substantiæ, siquidem id mente assequi non licet; sed solummodo ut varii modi sese habendi corporis considerandæ sunt.”

Body, as such, hath nothing else belonging to the nature of it, but what is included in the idea of extended substance, divisibility, figure, site, motion, or rest, and the results from the various compositions of them, causing different fancies. Wherefore, as vulgar philosophers make their first matter (which they cannot well tell what they mean by it), because it receives all qualities, to be itself devoid of all quality; so we conclude, that atoms (which are really the first principles of all things) have none of those qualities in them, which belong to compounded bodies; they are not absolutely of themselves black or white, hot or cold, moist or dry, bitter or sweet, all these things arising up afterwards from the various aggregations and contextures of them, together with different motions. Which Lucretius confirms by this reason, agreeable to the tenour of the Atomical philosophy, that if there were any such real qualities in the first principles, then, in the various corruptions of nature, things would at last be reduced to nothing:

- ^a Immutabile enim quiddam superare necesse est,
 Ne res ad nihilum redigantur funditus omnes ;
 Proinde colore cave contingas semina rerum,
 Ne tibi res redeant ad nilum funditus omnes.

Wherefore, he concludes, that it must not be thought, that white things are made out of white principles, nor black things out of black principles :

- ^b ——— Ne ex albis alba rearis
 Principiis esse, ———
 Aut ea quæ nigrant, nigro de semine nata :
 Neve alium quemvis, quæ sunt induta, colorem,
 Propterea gerere hunc credas, quod materiai
 Corpora consimili sint ejus tincta colore ;
 Nullus enim color est omnino materiai
 Corporibus, neque par rebus, neque denique dispar.

Adding, that the same is to be resolved likewise concerning all other sensible qualities as well as colours :

- ^c Sed ne forte putes solo spoliata colore
 Corpora prima manere ; etiam secreta teporis
 Sunt, ac frigoris omnino, calidique vaporis :
 Et sonitu sterila, et succo jejuna feruntur,
 Nec jaciunt ullum proprio de corpore odorem.

Lastly, he tells us, in like manner, that the same is to be understood also concerning life, sense, and understanding ; that there are no such simple qualities or natures in the first principles, out of which animals are compounded, but that these are in themselves altogether devoid of life, sense, and understanding :

^a Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 750, 751. 754, 755.

^b Id. lib. ii. ver. 730, &c.

^c Id. lib. ii. ver. 841, &c.

* Nunc ea, quæ sentire videmus cunque, necesse 'st
 Ex insensilibus tamen omnia confiteare
 Principiis constare: neque id manifesta refutant,
 Sed magis ipsa manu ducunt, et credere cogunt,
 Ex insensilibus, quod dico, animalia gigni.
 Quippe videre licet, vivos existere vermes
 Stercore de tetro, putrorem cum sibi nacta 'st
 Intempestivis ex imbribus humida tellus.

All sensitive and rational animals are made of irrational and senseless principles, which is proved by experience, in that we see worms are made out of putrefied dung, moistened with immoderate showers.—

Some, indeed, who are no greater friends to a Deity than ourselves, will needs have that sense and understanding, that is in animals and men, to be derived from an antecedent life and understanding in the matter. But this cannot be, because if matter as such had life and understanding in it, then every atom of matter must needs be a distinct percipient animal and intelligent person by itself; and it would be impossible for any such men and animals as now are to be compounded out of them, because every man would be *variorum animalculorum acervus*, a heap of innumerable animals and percipients.

Wherefore, as all the other qualities of bodies, so likewise life, sense, and understanding arise from the different contextures of atoms devoid of all those qualities, or from the composition of those simple elements of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, in the same manner as from a few letters variously compounded all that infinite variety of syllables and words is made:

* Id. lib. ii. ver. 684, &c.

- a Quin etiam refert nostris in versibus ipsis
 Cum quibus et quali positura contineantur ;
 Namque eadem coelum, mare, terras, flumina, solem
 Significant, eadem, fruges, arbusta, animantes ;
 Sic ipsis in rebus item jam materiai
 Intervalla, viae, connexus, pondera, plagæ,
 Concursus, motus, ordo, positura, figuræ,
 Cum permutantur, mutari res quoque debent.

From the fortuitous concretions of senseless un-
 knowing atoms did rise up afterwards, in certain
 parts of the world called animals, soul, and mind,
 sense and understanding, counsel and wisdom.
 But to think, that there was any animalish nature
 before all these animals, or that there was an ante-
 cedent mind and understanding, counsel and wis-
 dom, by which all animals themselves, together
 with the whole world, were made and contrived,
 is either to run round in a senseless circle, making
 animals and animality to be before one another
 infinitely ; or else to suppose an impossible be-
 ginning of an original understanding quality in the
 matter. Atoms in their first coalitions together,
 when the world was making, were not then di-
 rected by any previous counsel or preventive un-
 derstanding, which were things as yet unborn and
 unmade,

- b Nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum
 Ordine se quæque atque sagaci mente locarunt,
 Nec quos quæque darent motus, pepigere profecto.

Mind and understanding, counsel and wisdom, did
 not lay the foundations of the universe ; they are
 no archical things, that is, they have not the na-
 ture of a principle in them ; they are not simple,
 original, primitive, and primordial, but as all other

a Id. lib. ii. ver. 1012.

b Id. lib. i. ver. 1020.

qualities of bodies, secondary, compounded, and derivative, and therefore they could not be architectonical of the world. Mind and understanding is no God, but the creature of matter and motion.

The sense of this whole argument is briefly this. The first principle of all things in the whole universe is matter, or atoms devoid of all qualities, and consequently of all life, sense, and understanding; and therefore the original of things is no understanding nature, or Deity.

xI. Seventhly, the Democritic Atheists argue further after this manner: they who assert a Deity, suppose *ἐμψυχον εἶναι τὸν κόσμον*, the whole world to be animated,—that is, to have a living, rational, and understanding nature presiding over it. Now it is already evident from some of the premised arguments, that the world cannot be animated, in the sense of Platonists, that is, with an incorporeal soul, which is in order of nature before body, it being proved already, that there can be no substance incorporeal; as likewise that it cannot be animated neither in the Stoical sense, so as to have an original quality of understanding or mind in the matter; but yet nevertheless some may possibly imagine, that as in ourselves and other animals, though compounded of senseless atoms, there is a soul and mind, resulting from the contexture of them, which being once made, domineers over the body, governing and ordering it at pleasure; so there may be likewise such a living soul and mind, not only in the stars, which many have supposed to be lesser deities, and in the sun, which has been reputed a principal deity; but also in the whole mundane system, made up

of earth, seas, air, ether, sun, moon, and stars altogether; one general soul and mind, which, though resulting at first from the fortuitous motion of matter, yet being once produced, may rule, govern, and sway the whole, understandingly, and in a more perfect manner than our souls do our bodies; and so long as it continues, exercise a principality and dominion over it. Which, although it will not amount to the full notion of a God, according to the strict sense of Theists, yet it will approach very near unto it, and endanger the bringing in of all the same inconveniences along with it. Wherefore they will now prove, that there is no such soul or mind as this (resulting from the contexture of atoms), that presides over the corporeal universe, that so there may not be so much as the shadow of a Deity left.

It was observed before, that life, sense, reason, and understanding, are but qualities of concreated bodies, like those other qualities of heat and cold, &c. arising from certain particular textures of atoms. Now as those first principles of bodies, namely, single atoms, have none of those qualities in them, so neither hath the whole universe any (that it can be denominated from) but only the parts of it. The whole world is neither black nor white, hot nor cold, pellucid nor opaque, it containing all those qualities in its several parts. In like manner, the whole has no life, sense, nor understanding in it, but only the parts of it, which are called animals. That is, life and sense are qualities, that arise only from such a texture of atoms as produceth soft flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized, with head, heart, bowels, nerves, muscles, veins, arteries, and the like:

* —————Sensus jungitur omnis
Visceribus, nervis, venis, quæcunque videmus,
Mollia mortali consistere corpore creta ;

And reason and understanding, properly so called, are peculiar appendices to human shape ;^b “ Ratio nusquam esse potest nisi in hominis figura.” From whence it is concluded, that there is no life, soul, nor understanding acting the whole world, because the world hath no blood nor brains, nor any animalish or human form.^c “ Qui mundum ipsam animantem sapientemque esse dixerunt, nullo modo viderunt animi naturam, in quam figuram cadere posset.” Therefore the Epicurean poet concludes upon this ground, that there is no Divine sense in the whole world :

^d Dispositum videtur ubi esse et crescere possit
Seorsim anima atque animus ; tanto magis inficiandum,
Totum posse extra corpus formamque animale,
Putribus in glebis terrarum, aut solis in igni,
Aut in aqua durare, aut altis ætheris oris.
Haud igitur constant divino prædita sensu,
Quandoquidem nequeunt vitaliter esse animata.

Now if there be no life nor understanding above us, nor round about us, not any where else in the world, but only in ourselves and fellow-animals, and we be the highest of all beings ; if neither the whole corporeal system be animated, nor those greater parts of it, sun, moon, nor stars, then there can be no danger of any Deity.

XII. Eighthly, the Democritic Atheists dispute further against a Deity in this manner : the Deity

^a Id. lib. ii. ver. 903, &c.

^b Velleius apud Ciceron. de Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. xviii. p. 2907.

^c Id. ibid. lib. i. cap. x. p. 2893. tom. ix. oper.

^d Lucret. lib. v. ver. 143, &c.

is generally supposed to be ζῶν μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον, a perfectly happy animal, incorruptible and immortal. Now there is no living being incorruptible and immortal, and therefore none perfectly happy neither. For, according to that Democritic hypothesis of atoms in vacuity, the only incorruptible things will be these three: first of all vacuum or empty space, which must needs be such, because it cannot suffer from any thing, since it is *plagarum expers*,

• Et manet intactum, nec ab ictu fungitur hilum.

Secondly, the single atoms, because by reason of their parvitude and solidity they are indivisible: and lastly, the *summa summarum* of all things, that is, the comprehension of all atoms dispersed every where throughout infinite space.

• ————— Quia nulla loci stat copia certum
Quo quasi res possint discedere dissoluique.

But according to that other hypothesis of some modern Atomists (which also was entertained of old by Empedocles) that supposes a plenty, there is nothing at all incorruptible, but the substance of matter itself. All systems and compages of it, all συγκρίματα and ἀθροίσματα, all concretions and coagmentations of matter divided by motion, together with the qualities resulting from them, are corruptible and destroyable: *quæ est coagmentatio rerum non dissolubilis?* Death destroys not the substance of any matter; for as no matter came from nothing, but was self eternal, so none of it

• Id. lib. v. vers. 358. Addas etiam lib. iii. vers. 814.

• Id. lib. iii. vers. 815.

• Cicero de Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. viii. p. 2891. tom. ix. oper.

can ever vanish into nothing; but it dissolves all the aggregations of it.

^a Non sic interimit mors res, ut materiai
Corpora conficiat, sed coetum dissipat ollis.

Life is no substantial thing, nor any primitive or simple nature; it is only an accident or quality arising from the aggregation and contexture of atoms or corpuscula, which when the compages of them is disunited and dissolved, though all the substance still remain scattered and dispersed, yet the life utterly perishes and vanisheth into nothing. No life is immortal; there is no immortal soul, nor immortal animal, or Deity. Though this whole mundane system were itself an animal, yet being but an aggregation of matter, it would be both corruptible and mortal. Wherefore, since no living being can possibly have any security of its future permanency, there is none that can be perfectly happy. And it was rightly determined by our fellow-atheists, the Hedonics and Cyrenaics,^b *εὐδαιμονία ἀνύπαρτον*, perfect happiness is a mere notion,—a romantic fiction, a thing which can have no existence any where. This is recorded to have been one of Democritus's chief arguments against a Deity, because there can be no living being immortal, and consequently none perfectly happy. “Cum Democritus, quia nihil semper suo statu maneat, neget esse quicquam sempiternum, nonne Deum ita tollit omnino, ut nullam opinionem ejus reliquam faciat?”

XIII. A ninth pretended demonstration of the

^a Lucret. lib. ii. vers. 1001.

^b Diog. Laert. lib. ii. segm. 94. p. 135.

^c Cicero de Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. xii. p. 2897.

Democritic Atheists is as followeth. By God is understood a first cause or mover, which being not before acted upon by any thing else, but acting originally from itself, was the beginning of all things. Now it is an indubitable axiom, and generally received among philosophers, that nothing can move itself, but *quicquid movetur, ab alio movetur*, whatsoever is moved, is moved by something else;—nothing can act otherwise than it is made to act by something without it, acting upon it. The necessary consequence whereof is this, that there can be no such thing as any first mover, or first cause, that is, no God. This argument is thus urged by a modern writer,^a agreeably to the sense of the ancient Democritics; “*Ex eo quod nihil potest movere seipsum, non inferretur, id quod inferri solet, nempe Eternum Immobile, sed contra Æternum Motum, siquidem ut verum est, nihil moveri a seipso, ita etiam verum est nihil moveri nisi a moto.*” From hence, that nothing can move itself, it cannot be rightly inferred, as commonly it is, that there is an eternal immoveable mover (that is, a God), but only an eternal moved mover; or that one thing was moved by another from eternity, without any first mover. Because as it is true, that nothing can be moved from itself; so it is likewise true, that nothing can be moved but from that which was itself also moved by something else before:—and so the progress upwards must needs be infinite, without any beginning or first mover. The plain drift and scope of this ratiocination is no other than this, to shew that the argument commonly taken from motion, to prove

^a Hobbes's Element. Philosoph. part iv. sive Physic. cap. xxvi. sec. i. p. 204.

a God (that is, a first mover or cause), is not only ineffectual and inconclusive ; but also that, on the contrary, it may be demonstrated from that very topic of motion, that there can be no absolutely first mover, no first in the order of causes, that is, no God.

XIV. Tenthly, because the Theists conceive that though no body can move itself, yet a perfect cogitative and thinking being might be the beginning of all, and the first cause of motion ; the Atheists will endeavour to evince the contrary, in this manner. No man can conceive how any cogitation, which was not before, should rise up at any time, but that there was some cause for it, without the thinker. For else there can be no reason given, why this thought rather than that, and at this time rather than another, should start up. Wherefore this is universally true of all motion and action whatsoever, as it was rightly urged by the Stoics, that there can be no *κίνησις ἀνάγκη*, no motion without a cause, i. e. no motion, which has not some cause without the subject of it, or, as the same thing is expressed by a modern writer, " Nothing taketh beginning from itself, but from the action of some other immediate agent without it." Wherefore, no thinking being could be a first cause, any more than an automaton or machine could. To this purpose, it is further argued, that these two notions, the one of a knowing understanding being, the other of a perfectly happy being, are contradictory, because all knowledge essentially implies dependance upon something else, as its cause ; " *scientia et intellectus signum est potentiae ab alio dependentis, id quod non est beatissimum.*" They conclude, that cogitation, and all

action whatsoever, is really nothing else but local motion, which is essentially heterokinesy, that which can never rise of itself, but is caused by some other agent without its subject.

xv. In the eleventh place, the Democritic Atheists reason thus : if the world were made by any antecedent mind or understanding, that is, by a Deity ; then there must needs be an idea, platform, and exemplar of the whole world before it was made ; and consequently actual knowledge, both in order of time and nature, before things. But all knowledge is the information of the things themselves known ; all conception of the mind is a passion from the things conceived, and their activity upon it ; and is therefore junior to them. Wherefore, the world and things were before knowledge and the conception of any mind, and no knowledge, mind, or Deity before the world as its cause. This argument is thus proposed by the Atheistic poet :

▪ Exemplum porro gignundis rebus et ipsa
Notities hominum Di vis unde insita primum,
Quid vellent facere, ut scirent, animoque viderent?
Quove modo est unquam vis cognita principiorum,
Quidnam inter sese permutato ordine possent,
Si non ipsa dedit specimen natura ereandi ?

How could the supposed Deity have a pattern or platform in his mind, to frame the world by, and whence should he receive it? How could he have any knowledge of men before they were made, as also what himself should will to do, when there was nothing? How could he understand the force and possibility of the principles, what they would

▪ Lucret. lib. v. ver. 182.

produce when variously combined together, before nature and things themselves, by creating, had given a specimen?—

XVI. A twelfth argumentation of the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists against a Deity is to this purpose: that things could not be made by a Deity, that is supposed to be a being every way perfect, because they are so faulty and so ill made: the argument is thus propounded by Lucretius:^a

Quod si jam rerum ignorem primordia quæ sint,
Hoc tamen ex ipsis cœli rationibus ausim
Confirmare, aliisque ex rebus reddere multis,
Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam
Naturam rerum, tanta stat prædita culpa.

This argument, *a cœli rationibus*, from astronomy, or the constitution of the heavens, is this:^b that the mundane sphere is so framed, in respect of the disposition of the equator and ecliptic, as renders the greatest part of the earth uninhabitable to men and most other animals; partly by that excess of heat in the torrid zone (containing all between the tropics), and partly from the extremity of cold in both the frigid zones, towards either pole. Again, whereas the Stoical Theists contemporary with Epicurus concluded, that the whole world was made by a Deity, only for the sake of men,

^c ————— Horum omnia causa
Constituisse Deum fingunt—————

it is urged on the contrary, that a great part of the habitable earth is taken up by seas, lakes, and

^a Lib. ii. ver. 177. et lib. v. ver. 196.

^b Vid. Lucret. lib. v. ver. 205, 206, et Cicer. in Somnio Scipionis cap. vi. p. 3981. tom. xi. oper.

^c Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 174, 175.

rocks, barren heaths and sands, and thereby made useless for mankind ; and that the remainder of it yields no fruit to them, unless expunged by obstinate labour ; after all which, men are often disappointed of the fruits of those labours by unseasonable weather, storms, and tempests. Again, that nature has not only produced many noxious and poisonous herbs, but also destructive and devouring animals, whose strength surpasseth that of men's ; and that the condition of mankind is so much inferior to that of brutes, that nature seems to have been but a step-mother to the former, whilst she hath been an indulgent mother to the latter. And to this purpose, the manner of men's coming into the world is thus aggravated by the poet :

^a Tum porro puer, ut sævis projectus ab undis
 Navita, nudus humi jacet, infans, indigus omni
 Vitai auxilio, cum primum in luminis oras
 Nixibus ex alvo matris natura profudit :
 Vagituque locum lugubri complet, ut æquum 'st,
 Quoi tantum in vita restet transire malorum.

But on the contrary, the comparative advantages of brutes and their privileges, which they have above men, are described after this manner :

At variæ crescunt pecudes, armenta, feræque :
 Nec crepitacula eis opu' sunt nec quouquam adhibenda 'st
 Almæ nutricis blanda atque infracta loquela ;
 Nec varias quærunt vestes pro tempore cœli.
 Denique non armis opus est, non mœnibus altis,
 Queis sua tutentur, quando omnibus omnia large
 Tellus ipsa parit, naturaque Dædala rerum.

And lastly, the topic of evils in general, is insisted upon by them, not those which are called

^a Id. lib. v. ver. 223.

^b Id. ibid.

culpa, evils of fault (for that is a thing which the Democritic Atheists utterly explode in the genuine sense of it), but the evils of pain and trouble; which they dispute concerning, after this manner. ^aThe supposed Deity and maker of the world was either willing to abolish all evils, but not able; or he was able, but not willing; or thirdly, he was neither willing nor able; or else lastly, he was both able and willing. This latter is the only thing that answers fully to the notion of a God. Now that the supposed creator of all things was not thus both able and willing to abolish all evils, is plain, because then there would have been no evils at all left. Wherefore, since there is such a deluge of evils overflowing all, it must needs be, that either he was willing and not able to remove them, and then he was impotent; or else he was able and not willing, and then he was envious; or lastly, he was neither able nor willing, and then he was both impotent and envious.

XVII. In the twelfth place, the Atheists further dispute in this manner. If the world were made by any Deity, then it would be governed by a providence; and if there were any providence, it must appear in human affairs. But here it is plain, that all is Tohu and Bohu, chaos and confusion; things happening alike to all, to the wise and foolish, religious and impious, virtuous and vicious. (For these names the Atheist cannot choose but make use of, though, by taking away natural morality, they really destroy the things.) From whence it is concluded, that all things float up and down, as they are agitated and driven by

^a Vide Lactat. de Ira Dei. cap. xiii. p. 942. edit. Walchii.

the tumbling billows of careless fortune and chance. The impieties of Dionysius,^a his scoffing abuses of religion, and whatsoever was then sacred, or worshipped under the notion of a God, were most notorious; and yet it is observed, that he fared never a jot the worse for it. “Hunc nec Olympius Jupiter fulmine percussit, nec Æsculapius misero diurnoque morbo tabescentem interemit; verum in suo lectulo mortuus, in Tympanidis rogam illatus est, eamque potestatem, quam ipse per scelus nactus erat, quasi justam et legitimam, hæreditatis loco tradidit:” Neither did Jupiter Olympius strike him with a thunderbolt, nor Æsculapius inflict any languishing disease upon him; but he died in his bed, and was honourably interred, and that power, which he had wickedly acquired, he transmitted, as a just and lawful inheritance, to his posterity.—And Diogenes the Cynic, though much a Theist, could not but acknowledge, that Harpalus, a famous robber or pirate in those times, who, committing many villanous actions, notwithstanding lived prosperously, did thereby “Testimonium dicere contra deos,” bear testimony against the gods.^b—Though it has been objected by the Theists, and thought to be a strong argument for providence, that there were so many tables hung up in temples, the monuments of such as, having prayed to the gods in storms and tempests, had escaped shipwreck; yet, as Diagoras observed, “Nusquam picti sunt, qui naufragium fecerunt,” there are no tables extant of those of them who were shipwrecked.^c—Wherefore, it was not considered by these Theists,

^a Cicer. de Nat. Deor. lib. iii. cap. xxxv. p. 3101.

^b Id. ib. cap. xxxiv. p. 3099.

^c Ibid. cap. xxxviii. p. 3104.

how many of them that prayed as well to the gods, did notwithstanding suffer shipwreck; as also how many of those, which never made any devotional addresses at all to any Deity, escaped equal dangers of storms and tempests.

Moreover, it is consentaneous to the opinion of a God, to think, that thunder, rattling in the clouds with thunderbolts, should be the immediate significations of his wrath and displeasure: whereas it is plain that these are flung at random, and that the fury of them often lights upon the innocent, whilst the notoriously guilty escape untouched; and therefore we understand not; how this can be answered by any Theists.

^a Cur, quibus incautum scelus aversabile cumque est,
Non faciunt, icti flammæ ut fulguris halent,
Pectore perfixo; documen mortalibus acre?
Et potius nullæ sibi turpis conscius reii,
Volvitur in flammis innoxius, inque peditur,
Turbine cœlesti subito correptus, et igni?

Now the force of this argument appears to be very powerful, because it hath not only staggered and confounded Theists in all ages, but also hath effectually transformed many of them into Atheists. For Diagoras Melius^b himself was once a superstitious religionist, insomuch that, being a dithyrambic poet, he began one of his poems with these words, *κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ τύχην πάντα τελεῖται*, all things are done by God and fortune.—But, being injured afterwards by a perjured person, that suffered no evil nor disaster thereupon, he therefore took up this contrary persuasion, that there was no Deity. And there have been innu-

^a Lucret. lib. vi. ver. 389, &c.

^b Vide Sext. Empiric. lib. ix. adver. Mathematic. sec. liii. p. 561.

merable others, who have been so far wrought upon by this consideration, as if not absolutely to disclaim and discard a Deity, yet utterly to deny providence, and all care of human affairs by any invisible powers. Amongst whom the poet was one, who thus expressed his sense:

* Sed cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi
Aspicerem, lætosque diu florere nocentes,
Vexarique pios, rursus labefacta cadebat
Relligio, causæque viam non sponte sequer
Alterius, vacuo quæ currere semina motu
Affirmat, magnumque novas per inane figuras,
Fortuna, non arte regi; quæ numina sensu
Ambiguo vel nulla putat, vel nescia nostri,

XVIII. A thirteenth argumentation of the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, is to this purpose: that whereas the Deity is supposed to be such a being, as both knows all that is done every where in the most distant places of the world at once, and doth himself immediately order all things; this is, first, impossible for any one being thus to animadvert and order all things in the whole universe:

‡ Quis regero immensi summam, quis habere profundi
Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?
Quis pariter cœlos omnes convertere? et omnes
Ignibus ætheriis terras suffire feraceis?
Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore præsto;
Nubibus ut tenebras faciat, cœlique serena
Concutiat sonitu? &c.

And, secondly, if it were supposed to be possible, yet such infinite negotiosity would be absolutely inconsistent with a happy state; nor could

* Claudian. in Rufinum, lib. i. ver. 12, &c.

‡ Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 1094, &c.

such a Deity ever have any quiet enjoyment of himself, being perpetually filled with tumult and hurliburly: ^aοὐ συμφωνοῦσι πραγματεῖαι καὶ φροντίδες καὶ ὄργαι καὶ χάριτες μακαριότητι, ἀλλ' ἀσθενεία καὶ φόβῳ καὶ προσδεήσει τῶν πλησίων ταῦτα γίνεται. Distraction of business and solicitous cares, displeasures and favours, do not at all agree with happiness, but they proceed from imbecility, indigency, and fear: —^bΤο μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει, οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει, ὥστε οὔτε ὄργαις οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται, ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον. That which is happy and incorruptible, would neither have itself any business to do, nor create any to others; it would neither have displeasure nor favour towards any other persons, to engage it in action; all this proceeding from indigency.—That is, favour and benevolence, as well as anger and displeasure, arise only from imbecility. That which is perfectly happy, and wanteth nothing, ὅλον ὄν περὶ τὴν συνοχὴν τῆς ἰδίας εὐδαιμονίας, being wholly possessed and taken up in the enjoyment of its own happiness—would be regardless of the concernments of any others; and mind nothing besides itself, either to do it good or harm. Wherefore, this *curiosus et plenus negotii deus*,^c this busy, restless, and pragmatistical Deity, that must needs intermeddle and have to do with every thing in the whole world, is a contradictory notion, since it cannot but be the most unhappy of all things.

xix. In the next place, the Atheists dispute further by propounding several bold queries,

^a Epicur. in Epist. ad Herodotum apud Diog. Laert. lib. x. segm. 77. p. 634.

^b Vide Diog. Laert. lib. x. segm. 139. 661.

^c Velleius apud Cicero. de Natur. Dcor. lib. i. cap. xx. p. 2911.

which they conceive unanswerable, after this manner. If the world were made by a Deity, why was it not made by him sooner? or, since it was so long unmade, why did he make it at all? “*Cur mundi ædificator repente extiterit, innumerabilia ante sæcula dormierit?*” How came this builder and architect of the world to start up upon a sudden, after he had slept for infinite ages—and bethink himself of making a world? For, certainly, if he had been awake all that while, he would either have made it sooner, or not at all; because, there was either something wanting to his happiness before, or nothing: if there had been any thing wanting before, then the world could not have been so long unmade; but, if he were completely happy in himself without it, then *μηδὲν ἐλλείπων κεναῖς ἐμελλεν ἐπιχειρεῖν πράξεισι*, wanting nothing, he vainly went about to make superfluous things.—All desire of change and novelty argues a fastidious satiety, proceeding from defect and indigency:

^b *Quidve novi potuit tanto post, ante quietos
Inlicere, ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?
Nam gaudere novis rebus debere videtur
Quoi veteres obsunt; sed quoi nil accidit ægri
Tempore in anteacto, cum pulchre degeret ævum,
Quid potuit novitatis amorem accendere tali?*

Did this Deity, therefore, light up the stars, as so many lamps or torches, in that vast abyss of infinite darkness, that himself might thereby have a more comfortable and cheerful habitation? Why would he then content himself from eternity, to dwell in such a melancholic, horrid, and forlorn dungeon?

^a *Id. ibid. lib. i. cap. ix. p. 2891.*

^b *Lucret. lib. v. ver. 169, &c.*

^a An, credo, in tenebris vita et macerare jacebat,
Donec diluxit rerum genialis origo?

Was company and that variety of things, by which heaven and earth are distinguished, desirable to him? Why then would he continue solitary so long, wanting the pleasure of such a spectacle? Did he make the world and men in it to this end, that himself might be worshipped and adored, feared and honoured by them? But what could he be the better for that, who was sufficiently happy alone in himself before? Or did he do it for the sake of men, to gratify and oblige them?

^b ————At quid immortalibus atque beatis
Gratia nostra queat largiri emolumentum,
Ut nostra quicquam causa gerere aggrediantur?

Again, if this were done for the sake of men, then it must be either for wise men or for fools; if for wise men only, then all that pains was taken but for a very few; but if for fools, what reason could there be, why the Deity should seek to deserve so well at their hands? Besides this, what hurt would it have been to any of us (whether wise or foolish) never to have been made?

^c Quidve mali fuerat nobis non esse creatis?
Natus enim debet quicumque est, velle manere
In vita, donec retinebit blanda voluptas:
Qui nunquam vero vitæ gustavit amorem,
Nec fuit in numero, quid obest non esse creatum?

Lastly,^d if this Deity must needs go about in-
liminously to make a world, ἐργάτου δίκην καὶ τέκτο-

^a Id. *ibid.* ver. 175, 176.

^b Id. *ibid.* ver. 166.

^c Id. *ibid.* ver. 177, &c.

^d Vide Ciceron. de Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. viii. p. 2890.

roc, like an artificer and carpenter,--what tools and instruments could he have to work withal? what ministers and subservient opificers? what engines and machines for the rearing up of so huge a fabric? How could he make the matter to understand his meaning, and obey his beck? how could he move it, and turn it up and down? for if incorporeal, he could neither touch nor be touched, but would run through all things, without fastening upon any thing; but if corporeal, then the same thing was both materials and architect, both timber and carpenter, and the stones must hew themselves, and bring themselves together, with discretion, into a structure.

xx. In the last place, the Atheists argue from interest (which proves many times the most effectual of all arguments) against a Deity; endeavouring to persuade, that it is, first, the interest of private persons, and of all mankind in general; and, secondly, the particular interest of civil sovereigns, and commonwealths, that there should neither be a God, nor the belief of any such thing entertained by the minds of men; that is, no religion. First, they say, therefore, that it is the interest of mankind in general; because, so long as men are persuaded, that there is an understanding being infinitely powerful, having no law but his own will (because he has no superior), that may do whatever he pleases at any time to them, they can never securely enjoy themselves or any thing, nor be ever free from disquieting fear and solicitude. What the poets fable of Tantalus in hell, being always in fear of a huge stone hanging over his head, and ready every moment to tumble down upon him, is nothing to that true fear, which

men have of a Deity, and religion, here in this life, which, indeed, was the very thing mythologized in it :

^a Nec miser impendens magnum timet aere saxum
Tantalus, (ut fama est) cassa formidine torpens :
Sed magis in vita, divum metus urget inanis
Mortales, casumque timent, quemcumque ferat fors.

For, besides men's insecurity from all manner of present evils, upon the supposition of a God, the immortality of souls can hardly be kept out, but it will crowd in after it ; and then the fear of eternal punishments after death will unavoidably follow thereupon, perpetually embittering all the solaces of life, and never suffering men to have the least sincere enjoyment.

^b ——— Si certum finem esse viderent
Ærumnarum homines, aliquo ratione valerent
Religionibus, atque minis obsistere vatum.
Nunc ratio nulla est restandi, nulla facultas :
Æternas quoniam pœnas in morte timendum.
Ignoratur enim, quæ sit natura animai,
Nata sit, an contra nascentibus insinuetur ;
Et simul intereat nobiscum morte dirempta,
An tenebras Orci visat vastasque lacunas.

Wherefore it is plain, that they who first introduced the belief of a Deity and religion, whatever they might aim at in it, deserved very ill of all mankind, because they did thereby infinitely debase and depress men's spirits under a servile fear :

^c Efficiunt animos humiles, formidine divum,
Depressosque premunt ad terram :

As also cause the greatest griefs and calamities, that now disturb human life,

^a Lucret. lib. iii. ver. 993. ^b Id. lib. i. ver. 108, &c.
^c Id. lib. vi. ver. 51.

^a *Quantos tum gemitus ipsi sibi, quantoque nobis
Volnera, quas lachrymas peperere minoribu' nostris?*

There can be no comfortable and happy living, without banishing from our mind the belief of these two things, of a Deity, and the soul's immortality ;

^b *Et metus ille foras præceps Acheruntis agendus
Funditus, humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo,
Omnia suffundens mortis nigrore, neque ullam
Esse voluptatem liquidam puramque relinquit.*

It was, therefore, a noble and heroical exploit of Democritus and Epicurus, those two good-natured men, who, seeing the world thus oppressed under the grievous yoke of religion, the fear of a Deity, and punishment after death, and taking pity of this sad condition of mankind, did manfully encounter that affrightful spectre, or empusa, of a providential Deity ; and, by clear philosophic reasons, chase it away, and banish it quite out of the world ; laying down such principles, as would solve all the phenomena of nature without a God :

^c *Quæ bene cognita si teneas, natura videtur
Libera continuo, dominis privata superbis,
Ipsa sua per se sponte omnia dis agere expers.*

So that Lucretius does not, without just cause, erect a triumphal arch or monument to Epicurus, for this conquest or victory of his obtained over the Deity and religion, in this manner :

^d *Humana ante oculos foede quum vita jaceret
In terris, oppressa gravi sub religione,
Quæ caput a cœli regionibus ostendebat,
Horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans ;*

^a Id. lib. v. ver. 1195.

^b Id. lib. iii. ver. 37.

^c Id. lib. ii. ver. 1089.

^d Id. lib. i. ver. 63.

Primum Graius homo mortales tendere contra
 Est oculos ausus, primusque obsistere contra ;
 Quem nec fama deum nec fulmina, nec minitanti
 Murmure compressit coelum, &c.

xxi. That it is also the interest of civil sovereigns and of all commonwealths, that there should neither be Deity nor religion, the Democratic Atheists would persuade in this manner: A body politic or commonwealth is made up of parts, that are all naturally dissociated from one another, by reason of that principle of private self-love, who therefore can be no otherwise held together than by fear. Now, if there be any greater fear than the fear of the leviathan, and civil representative, the whole structure and machine of this great coloss must needs fall a-pieces and tumble down. The civil sovereign reigns only in fear; wherefore, unless his fear be the king and sovereign of all fears, his empire and dominion ceases. But, as the rod of Moses devoured the rods of the magicians, so certainly will the fear of an omnipotent Deity, that can punish with eternal torments after death, quite swallow up and devour that comparatively petty fear of civil sovereigns, and consequently destroy the being of commonwealths, which have no foundation in nature, but are mere artificial things, made by the enchantment and magical art of policy. Wherefore, it is well observed by a modern writer, That men ought not to suffer themselves to be abused by the doctrine of separated essences and incorporeal substances (such as God and the soul), built upon the vain philosophy of Aristotle, that would fright men from obeying the laws of their country, with empty names (as

of hell, damnation, fire, and brimstone), as men fright birds from the corn with an empty hat, doublet, and a crooked stick. And again: if the fear of spirits (the chief of which is the Deity) were taken away, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience.

Moreover, the power of civil sovereigns is perfectly indivisible; it is either all or nothing; it must be absolute and infinite, or else it is none at all. Now it cannot be so, if there be any other power equal to it, to share with it, much less if there be any superior (as that of the Deity) to check it and control it. Wherefore, the Deity must of necessity be removed and displaced, to make room for the Leviathan to spread itself in.

Lastly, it is perfectly inconsistent with the nature of a body politic, that there should be any private judgment of good or evil, lawful or unlawful, just or unjust allowed. But conscience (which Theism and religion introduces) is private judgment concerning good and evil; and therefore the allowance of it, is contradictory to civil sovereignty and a commonwealth. There ought to be no other conscience (in a kingdom or commonwealth) besides the law of the country; the allowance of private conscience being, *ipso facto*, a dissolution of the body politic, and a return to the state of nature. Upon all these accounts it must needs be acknowledged, that those philosophers, who undermine and weaken Theism and religion, do highly deserve of all civil sovereigns and commonwealths.

xxii. Now from all the premised considerations, the Democritics confidently conclude against a Deity; that the system and compages of the uni-

verse had not its original from any understanding nature; but that mind and understanding itself, as well as all things else in the world, sprung up from senseless nature and chance, or from the unguided and undirected motion of matter. Which is therefore called by the name of nature, because whatsoever moves is moved by nature and necessity; and the mutual occurrences and rencounters of atoms, their *plugæ*, their strokes and dashings against one another, their reflections and repercusions, their cohesions, implexions, and entanglements, as also their scattered dispersions and divulsions, are all natural and necessary; but it is called also by the name of chance and fortune, because it is all unguided by any mind, counsel, or design.

Wherefore, infinite atoms of different sizes and figures, devoid of all life and sense, moving fortuitously from eternity in infinite space, and making successively several encounters, and consequently various implexions and entanglements with one another, produced first a confused chaos of these omnifarious particles, jumbling together with infinite variety of motions, which afterward, by the tugging of their different and contrary forces, whereby they all hindered and abated each other, came, as it were, by joint conspiracy, to be conglomerated into a vortex or vortexes; where, after many convolutions and evolutions, molitions and essays (in which all manner of tricks were tried, and all forms imaginable experimented), they chanced, in length of time, here to settle, into this form and system of things, which now is, of earth, water, air, and fire; sun, moon, and stars; plants, animals, and men; so that senseless atoms, fortuit-

ously moved, and material chaos, were the first original of all things.

This account of the *cosmopœia*, and first original of the mundane system, is represented by Lucretius^a according to the mind of Epicurus, though without any mention of those vortices, which were yet an essential part of the old Democritic hypothesis.

Sed quibus ille modis conjectus materiai
Fundarit coelum, ac terram, pontique profunda,
Solis, lunai cursus, ex ordine ponam.
Nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum
Ordine se quæque atque sagaci mente locarunt:
Nec, quos quæque darent motus, pepigere profecto.
Sed quia multa modis multis primordia rerum,
Ex infinito jam tempore percita plagis,
Ponderibusque suis consuerunt concita ferri,
Omni-modisque coire, atque omnia pertentare,
Quæcunque inter se possent congressa creare:
Propterea fit, uti magnum volgata per ævum,
Omnigenos coetus, et motus experiundo,
Tandem ea conveniant, quæ ut convenere, repente
Magnarum rerum fiant exordia sæpe,
Terrai, maris, et coeli, generisque animantum.

But because some seem to think that Epicurus was the first founder and inventor of this doctrine, we shall here observe, that this same Atheistic hypothesis was long before described by Plato, when Epicurus was as yet unborn; and therefore doubtless according to the doctrine of Leucippus, Democritus, and Protagoras; though that philosopher, in a kind of disdain (as it seems) refused to mention either of their names: ^b πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα, φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασι· τέχνη δὲ οὐδεν τούτων. καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα αὐτῶν σώματα, γῆς τε καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, ἀστρων τε περί, διὰ τούτων γεγονέναι,

^a Lib. v. ver. 417, &c.

^b Plato, de Legibus, lib. x. p. 666. oper.

παντελῶς ὄντων ἀψύχων. τύχη δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμειως ἕκαστα ἐκάστων, ἢ ζυμπέπτωκεν, ἀροτόντα οἰκείως πως, &c. ταύτη καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτω γεγεννηκέναι τὸν τε οὐρανὸν ὅλον καὶ πάντα ὅποσα κατ' οὐρανόν· καὶ ζῶα αὐτὰ καὶ φυτὰ ζύμπαντα, ὡρῶν πασῶν ἐκ τούτων γενομένων· οὐδὲ διὰ νοῦν (φασιν) οὐδὲ διὰ τινα θεὸν, οὐδὲ διὰ τέχνην, ἀλλὰ, ὃ λέγομεν, φύσει καὶ τύχῃ, τέχνην δὲ ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων ὕστεραν γενομένην, &c. The Atheists say, that fire, water, air, and earth (i. e. the four elements) were all made by nature and chance; and none of them by art or mind (that is, they were made by the fortuitous motion of atoms, and not by any Deity), and that those other bodies, of the terrestrial globe, of the sun, the moon, and the stars (which by all, except these Atheists, were, in those times, generally supposed to be animated, and a kind of inferior Deities), were afterwards made out of the aforesaid elements, being altogether inanimate. For they being moved fortuitously, or as it happened, and so making various commixtures together, did, by that means, at length produce the whole heavens and all things in them, as likewise plants and animals here upon earth; all which were not made by mind, nor by art, nor by any God; but, as we said before, by nature and chance; art, and mind itself, rising up afterwards from the same senseless principles in animals.

CHAPTER III.

An introduction to the confutation of the Atheistic grounds, in which is contained a particular account of all the several forms of Atheism.

—1. That the grounds of the Hylozoic Atheism could not be insisted on in the former chapter, together with those of the Atomic, they being directly contrary each to other; with a further account of this Hylozoic Atheism.—2. A suggestion, by way of caution, for the preventing of all mistakes, that every Hylozoist must not therefore be condemned for an Atheist, or a mere counterfeit historical Theist.—3. That, nevertheless, such Hylozoists as are also Corporealists, can by no means be excused from the imputation of Atheism, for two reasons.—4. That Strato Lampsacenus, commonly called Physicus, seems to have been the first assessor of the Hylozoic Atheism, he holding no other God but the life of nature in matter.—5. Further proved, that Strato was an Atheist, and that of a different form from Democritus, he attributing an energetic nature, but without sense and animality, to all matter.—6. That Strato, not deriving all things from a mere fortuitous principle, as the Democritic Atheists did, nor yet acknowledging any one plastic nature to preside over the whole, but deducing the original of things from a mixture of chance and plastic nature both together in the several parts of matter, must therefore needs be an Hylozoic Atheist.—7. That the famous Hippocrates was neither an Hylozoic nor Democritic Atheist, but rather an Heraclitic corporeal Theist.—8. That Plato took no notice of the Hylozoic Atheism, nor of any other than what derives the original of all things from a mere fortuitous nature; and, therefore, either the Democritical or the Anaximandrian Atheism, which latter will be next declared.—9. That it is hardly imaginable, there should have been no philosophic Atheists in the world before Democritus and Leucippus, there being in all ages, as Plato observes, some or other sick of the Atheistic disease. That Aristotle affirms many of the first philosophers to have assigned only a material cause of the mundane system, without either efficient or intending cause; they supposing matter to be the only substance, and all things else nothing but the passions and accidents of it, generable and corruptible.—10. That the doctrine of these Materialists will be more fully understood from the exceptions which Aristotle makes against them: his first exception, that they assigned no cause of motion, but introduced it into the world unaccountably.—11. Aristotle's second exception, that these Materialists did assign no cause $\tau\omega\ \epsilon\upsilon\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omega\varsigma$, of well and fit, and give no account

of the orderly regularity of things. That Anaxagoras was the first Ionic philosopher who made mind and good a principle of the universe.—12. Concluded, that Aristotle's Materialists were downright Atheists, not merely because they held all substance to be body, since Heraclitus and Zeno did the like, and yet are not therefore accounted Atheists (they supposing their fiery matter to be originally intellectual, and the whole world to be an animal); but because these made stupid matter, devoid of all understanding and life, to be the only principle.—13. As also, because they supposed every thing besides the substance of matter, life and understanding, and all particular beings, to be generable and corruptible, and, consequently, that there could be no other God, than such as was native and mortal. That those ancient Theologers, who were Theogonists, and generated all the gods out of night and chaos, were only verbal Theists, but real Atheists; senseless matter being to them the highest Numen.—14. The great difference observed betwixt Aristotle's Atheistical Materialists and the Italic philosophers, the former determining all things, besides the substance of matter, to be made or generated, the latter, that no real entity was either generated or corrupted; thereupon both destroying qualities and forms of body, and asserting the ingenerability and incorporeity of souls.—15. How Aristotle's Atheistic Materialists endeavoured to baffle and elude that axiom of the Italic philosophers, that nothing can come from nothing nor go to nothing; and that Anaxagoras was the first amongst the Ionics, who yielded so far to that principle, as from thence to assert incorporeal substance, and the pre-existence of qualities and forms in similar atoms, forasmuch as he conceived them to be things really distinct from the substance of matter.—16. The error of some writers, who, because Aristotle affirms, that the ancient philosophers did generally conclude the world to have been made, from thence infer, that they were all Theists, and that Aristotle contradicts himself in representing many of them as Atheists. That the ancient Atheists did generally *κοσμοποιεῖν*, assert the world to have been made, or have had a beginning; as also some Theists did maintain its eternity, but in a way of dependency upon the Deity. That we ought here to distinguish betwixt the system of the world, and the substance of the matter, all Atheists asserting the matter to have been, not only eternal, but also such independently upon any other being.—17. That Plato and others concluded this Materialism, or Hylopathian Atheism, to have been at least as old as Homer, who made the ocean (or fluid matter) the father of all the gods. And that this was indeed the ancientest of all Atheisms, which, verbally acknowledging gods, yet derived the original of them all from night and chaos. The description of this Atheistic hypothesis in Aristophanes, that night and chaos first laid an egg, out of which sprung forth love, which afterwards mingling with chaos, begat heaven and earth, animals, and all the gods.—18. That, notwithstanding

ing this, in Aristotle's judgment, Parmenides, Hesiod, and others, who made love, in like manner, senior to all the gods, were to be exempted out of the number of Atheists; they understanding this love to be an active principle, or cause of motion in the universe, which therefore could not rise from an egg of the night, nor be the offspring of chaos, but must be something in order of nature before matter. Simmias Rhodius's Wings, a poem in honour of this heavenly love. This not that love which was the offspring of Penia and Porus in Plato. In what rectified sense it may pass for true theology, that love is the supreme Deity and original of all things.—19. That though Democritus and Leucippus be elsewhere taxed by Aristotle for this very thing, that they assigned only a material cause of the universe; yet they were not the persons intended by him in the fore-cited accusation, but certain ancients philosophers, who also were not Atomists, but Hylopathians.—20. That Aristotle's Atheistic Materialists were all the first Ionic philosophers before Anaxagoras, Thales being the head of them. But that Thales is acquitted from this imputation of Atheism by several good authors (with an account how he came to be thus differently represented); and, therefore, that his next successor, Anaximander, is rather to be accounted the prince of this Atheistic philosophy.—21. A passage out of Aristotle objected, which, at first sight, seems to make Anaximander a Divine philosopher, and therefore hath led both modern and ancient writers into that mistake. That this place well considered proves the contrary, that Anaximander was the chief of the old Atheistic philosophers.—22. That it is no wonder, if Anaximander called senseless matter the *τὸ θεῖον*, or God, since to all Atheists that must needs be the highest Numen; also how this is said to be immortal, and to govern all; with the concurrent judgment of the Greek scholiasts upon this place.—23. A further account of the Anaximandrian philosophy, manifesting it to have been purely Atheistical.—24. What ill judges the vulgar have been of Theists and Atheists; as also that learned men have commonly supposed fewer Atheists than indeed there were. Anaximander and Democritus Atheists both alike, though philosophizing different ways. That some passages in Plato respect the Anaximandrian form of Atheism, rather than the Democritical.—25. Why Democritus and Leucippus new modelled Atheism into the Atomic form.—26. That besides the three forms of Atheism already mentioned, we sometimes meet with a fourth, which supposes the universe, though not to be an animal, yet a kind of plant or vegetable, having one plastic nature in it, devoid of understanding and sense, which disposes and orders the whole.—27. That this form of Atheism, which makes one plastic life to preside over the whole, is different from the Hylozoic, in that it takes away all fortuitousness, and subjects all to the fate of one plastic methodical nature.—28. Though it be possible, that some in all ages might have entertained this Atheistical conceit, that things

are dispensed by one regular and methodical, but unknowing senseless nature, yet it seems to have been chiefly asserted by certain spurious Heraclitics and Stoics. And, therefore, this form of Atheism, which supposes one cosmoplastic nature, may be called Pseudo-Zenonian.—29. That, besides the philosophic Atheists, there have been always enthusiastic and fanatical Atheists, though in some sense all Atheists may be said also to be both enthusiasts and fanatics, they being led by an *ὄρεσις ἀλογος*, or irrational impetus.—30. That there cannot easily be any other form of Atheism, besides those four already mentioned, because all Atheists are Corporealists, and yet all Corporealists not Atheists, but only such as make the first principle of all things not to be intellectual.—31. A distribution of Atheisms producing the former quaternio, and shewing the difference between them.—32. That they are but bunglers at Atheism who talk of sensitive and rational matter; and that the canting astrological Atheists are not at all considerable, because not understanding themselves.—33. Another distribution of Atheisms; that they either derive the original of things from a merely fortuitous principle, the unguided motion of matter, or else from a plastic and methodical, but senseless nature. What Atheists denied the eternity of the world, and what asserted it.—34. That of these four forms of Atheism, the Atomic or Democritical, and the Hylozoic or Stratonical, are the chief; and that these two being once confuted, all Atheism will be confuted.—35. These two forms of Atheism being contrary to one another, how we ought in all reason to insist rather upon the Atomic; but that afterwards we shall confute the Hylozoic also, and prove against all Corporealists, that no cogitation nor life belongs to matter.—36. That, in the meantime, we shall not neglect any form of Atheism, but confute them all together, as agreeing in one principle; as also shew, how the old Atomic Atheists did sufficiently overthrow the foundation of the Hylozoists.—37. Observed here, that the Hylozoists are not condemned merely for asserting a plastic life, distinct from the animal (which, with most other philosophers, we judge highly probable, if taken in a right sense), but for grossly misunderstanding it, and attributing the same to matter. The plastic life of nature largely explained.—38. That though the confutation of the Atheistic grounds, according to the laws of method, ought to have been reserved for the last part of this discourse; yet we having reasons to violate those laws, crave the reader's pardon for this preposterousness. A considerable observation of Plato's, that it is not only moral vitiosity, which inclines men to atheize, but also an affectation of seeming wiser than the generality of mankind; as likewise, that the Atheists, making such pretence to wit, it is a seasonable undertaking to evince, that they fumble in all their ratiocinations. That we hope to make it appear, that the Atheists are no conjurors; and that all forms of Atheism are nonsense and impossibility.

making this a sun, and that an earth or planet, and fabricating the bodies of animals most artificially, but also can improve itself into sense and self-enjoyment; it may as well be thought able to advance itself higher, into all the acts of reason and understanding in men; so that there will be no need either of an incorporeal immortal soul in men, or a Deity in the universe. Nor indeed is it easily conceivable, how any should be induced to admit such a monstrous paradox as this is, that every atom of dust or other senseless matter is wiser than the greatest politician and the most acute philosopher that ever was, as having an infallible omniscience of all its own capabilities and congruities; were it not by reason of some strong prepossession, against incorporeal substance and a Deity: there being nothing so extravagant and outrageously wild, which a mind once infected with atheistical sottishness and disbelief will not rather greedily swallow down, than admit a Deity, which to such is the highest of all paradoxes imaginable, and the most affrightful bugbear. Notwithstanding all which, it may not be denied, but that it is possible for one, who really entertains the belief of a Deity and a rational soul immortal, to be persuaded, first, that the sensitive soul in men as well as brutes is merely corporeal; and then that there is a material plastic life in the seeds of all plants and animals, whereby they do artificially form themselves; and from thence afterward to descend also further to Hyløzoism, that all matter, as such, hath a kind of natural, though not animal life in it: in consideration whereof, we ought not to censure every Hylozoist, professing to hold a Deity and a rational soul immortal, for

a mere disguised Atheist, or counterfeit histrionic Theist.

III. But though every Hylozoist be not therefore necessarily an Atheist, yet whosoever is an Hylozoist and Corporealist both together, he that both holds the life of matter in the sense before declared, and also that there is no other substance in the world besides body and matter, cannot be excused from the imputation of Atheism, for two reasons; first, because though he derive the original of all things, not from what is perfectly dead and stupid as the Atomic Atheist doth, but from that which hath a kind of life or perception in it, nay an infallible omniscience, of whatsoever itself can do or suffer, or of all its own capabilities and congruities, which seems to bear some semblance of a Deity; yet all this being only in the way of natural, and not animal perception, is indeed nothing but a dull and drowsy, plastic and spermatic life, devoid of all consciousness and self-enjoyment. The Hylozoists' nature is a piece of very mysterious nonsense, a thing perfectly wise, without any knowledge or consciousness of itself; whereas a Deity, according to the true notion of it, is such a perfect understanding being, as with full consciousness and self-enjoyment is completely happy. Secondly, because the Hylozoic Corporealist, supposing all matter, as such, to have life in it, must needs make infinite of those lives, (forasmuch as every atom of matter has a life of its own) co-ordinate and independent on one another, and consequently, as many independent first principles, no one common life or mind ruling over the whole. Whereas, to assert a God, is to derive all things ἀπ' ἐνός τινος, from some one principle,—or

I. WE have now represented the grand mysteries of Atheism, which may be also called the mysteries of the kingdom of darkness; though indeed some of them are but briefly hinted here, they being again more fully to be insisted on afterward, where we are to give an account of the Atheists' endeavours to solve the phenomenon of cogitation. We have represented the chief grounds of Atheisms in general, as also of that most notorious form of Atheism in particular, that is called Atomical. But whereas there hath been already mentioned another form of Atheism, called by us Hylozoical; the principles hereof could not possibly be insisted on in this place, where we were to make the most plausible plea for Atheism, they being directly contrary to those of the Atomical, so that they would have mutually destroyed each other. For, whereas the Atomic Atheism supposes the notion or idea of body to be nothing but extended resisting bulk, and consequently to include no manner of life and cogitation in it; Hylozoism, on the contrary, makes all body, as such, and therefore every smallest atom of it, to have life essentially belonging to it (natural perception and appetite) though without any animal sense or reflexive knowledge, as if life, and matter or extended bulk, were but two incomplete and inadequate conceptions of one and the same substance, called body. By reason of which life (not animal, but only plastical), all parts of matter being supposed able to form themselves artificially and methodically (though without any deliberation or attentive consideration) to the greatest advantage of their present respective capabilities, and therefore also sometimes by organization to improve

themselves further into sense and self-enjoyment in all animals, as also to universal reason and reflexive knowledge in men; it is plain, that there is no necessity at all left, either of any incorporeal soul in men to make them rational, or of any Deity in the whole universe to solve the regularity thereof. One main difference betwixt these two forms of Atheism is this, that the Atomical supposes all life whatsoever to be accidental, generable, and corruptible; but the Hylozoic admits of a certain natural or plastic life, essential and substantial, ingenerable and incorruptible, though attributing the same only to matter, as supposing no other substance in the world besides it.

II. Now to prevent all mistakes, we think fit here by way of caution to suggest, that as every Atomist is not therefore necessarily an Atheist, so neither must every Hylozoist needs be accounted such. For whoever so holds the life of matter, as notwithstanding to assert another kind of substance also, that is immaterial and incorporeal, is no ways obnoxious to that foul imputation. However, we ought not to dissemble, but that there is a great difference here betwixt these two, Atomism and Hylozoism, in this regard; that the former of them, namely Atomism (as hath been already declared) hath in itself a natural cognation and conjunction with Incorporeism, though violently cut off from it by the Democritic Atheists; whereas the latter of them, Hylozoism, seems to have altogether as close and intimate a correspondence with Corporealism; because, as hath been already signified, if all matter, as such, have not only such a life, perception, and self-active power in it, as whereby it can form itself to the best advantage,

mo?" Shall I endure either Plato, or the Peripatetic Strato, whereof the one made God to be without a body, the other without a mind?—In which words Seneca taxes these two philosophers, as guilty of two contrary extremes; Plato, because he made God to be a pure mind, or a perfectly incorporeal being; and Strato, because he made him to be a body without a mind, he acknowledging no other Deity than a certain stupid and plastic life, in all the several parts of matter, without sense. Wherefore, this seems to be the only reason, why Strato was thus sometimes reckoned amongst the Theists, though he were indeed an Atheist, because he dissented from that only form of Atheism, then so vulgarly received, the Democritic and Epicurean, attributing a kind of life to nature and matter.

v. And that Strato was thus an Atheist, but of a different kind from Democritus, may further appear from this passage of Cicero's;*

“Strato Lampsacenus negat opera deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum; quæcunque sint docet omnia esse effecta natura, nec ut ille, qui asperis, et lævi-

* Acad.
Quæst. l. 4
cap. 38.
p. 2318.
tom. viii.
oper.

bus, et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta hæc esse dicat, interjecto inani; somnia censet hæc esse Democriti, non docentis, sed optantis.” Strato denies, that he makes any use of a God, for the fabricating of the world, or the solving the phenomena thereof; teaching all things to have been made by nature; but yet not in such a manner, as he who affirmed them to be all concreted out of certain rough and smooth, hookey and crooked atoms, he judging these things to be nothing but the mere dreams and dotages of Demo-

critus, not teaching but wishing.—Here we see, that Strato denied the world to be made by a Deity or perfect understanding nature, as well as Democritus: and yet that he dissented from Democritus notwithstanding, holding another kind of nature, as the original of things, than he did, who gave no account of any active principle and cause of motion, nor of the regularity that is in things. Democritus's nature was nothing but the fortuitous motion of matter; but Strato's nature was an inward plastic life in the several parts of matter, whereby they could artificially frame themselves to the best advantage, according to their several capabilities, without any conscious or reflexive knowledge. “*Quicquid aut sit aut fiat, (says the same author)^a naturalibus fieri, aut factum esse docet ponderibus et motibus.*” Strato teaches whatsoever is, or is made, to be made by certain inward natural forces and activities.—

VI. Furthermore it is to be observed, that though Strato thus attributed a certain kind of life to matter, yet he did by no means allow of any one common life, whether sentient and rational, or plastic, and spermatic only, as ruling over the whole mass of matter and corporeal universe; which is a

thing in part affirmed by Plutarch,* and may in part be gathered from these words of his; *τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν οὐ ζῶον εἶναι φησι, τὸδε κατὰ φύσιν ἔπείσθαι τῷ κατὰ τύχην, ἀρχὴν γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τὸ αὐτόματον, εἶτα οὕτω*

περαίνεσθαι τῶν φυσικῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον. Strato affirmeth that the world is no animal (or god), but that what is natural in every thing, follows something fortuitous antecedent, chance first beginning, and na-

* Advers.
Colotem.
p. 1115.
tom. ii.
oper.

^a Ibid.

to suppose one perfect living and understanding being to be the original of all things, and the architect of the whole universe.

Thus we see, that the Hylozoic Corporealist is really an Atheist, though carrying more the semblance and disguise of a Theist, than other Atheists, in that he attributes a kind of life to matter. For indeed every Atheist must of necessity cast some of the incommunicable properties of the Deity, more or less, upon that which is not God, namely, matter; and they, who do not attribute life to it, yet must needs bestow upon it necessary self-existence, and make it the first principle of all things, which are the peculiarities of the Deity. The Numen, which the Hylozoic Corporealist pays all his devotions to, is a certain blind she-god or goddess, called Nature, or the life of matter; which is a very great mystery, a thing that is perfectly wise, and infallibly omniscient, without any knowledge or consciousness at all; something like to that τῶν παίδων αἴνιγμα (in* Plato) *De Rep. l. 5. *περὶ τοῦ εὐνούχου βολῆς τῆς νυκτερίδος*, that P. 468. vulgar enigma or riddle of boys concerning an eunuch striking a bat; a man and not a man, seeing and not seeing, did strike and not strike, with a stone and not a stone, a bird and not a bird, &c. the difference being only this, that this was a thing intelligible, but humorsomely expressed; whereas the other seems to be perfect nonsense, being nothing but a misunderstanding of the plastic power, as shall be shewed afterwards.

IV. Now the first and chief assertor of this Hylozoic Atheism was, as we conceive, Strato Lamp-sacenus,^a commonly called also Physicus, that had

^a Vide Diogen. Laert. segm. 58. p. 298.

been once an auditor of Theophrastus, and a famous Peripatetic, but afterwards degenerated from a genuine Peripatetic into a new-formed kind of Atheist. For Velleius, an Epicurean Atheist in Cicero, reckoning up all the several sorts of Theists, which had been in former times, gives such a character of this Strato, as whereby he makes him to be a strange kind of Atheistical Theist, or Divine Atheist, if we may use such a contradictory expression: his words are these,

* “Nec audiendus Strato, qui Physicus

* De Nat. De. appellatur, qui omnem vim divinam in
l. 1. cap. xiii.
p. 2902.

natura sitam esse censet, quæ causas
gignendi, augendi, minuendive habeat,
sed careat omni sensu.” Neither is Strato, commonly called the Naturalist or Physiologist, to be heard, who places all Divinity in nature, as having within itself the causes of all generations, corruptions, and augmentations, but without any manner of sense.—Strato’s Deity therefore was a certain living and active, but senseless nature. He did not fetch the original of all things, as the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, from a mere fortuitous motion of atoms, by means whereof he bore some slight semblance of a Theist; but yet he was a downright Atheist for all that, his God being no other than such a life of nature in matter, as was both devoid of sense and consciousness, and also multiplied together with the several parts of it. He is also in like manner described by

† De Civ. Dei,
l. 6. c. 10.
sec. i. p. 122.
tom. vii. oper.
ed. Benedict.

Seneca in St. Augustine† as a kind of mongrel thing, betwixt an Atheist and a Theist; “Ego feram aut Platonem, aut Peripateticum Stratonem, quorum alter deum sine corpore fecit, alter sine ani-

ture acting consequently thereupon.—The full sense whereof seems to be this, that though Strato did not derive the original of all mundane things from mere fortuitous mechanism, as Democritus before him had done, but supposed a life and natural perception in the matter, that was directive of it; yet, not acknowledging any one common life, whether animal or plastic, as governing and swaying the whole, but only supposing the several parts of matter to have so many plastic lives of their own, he must needs attribute something to fortune, and make the mundane system to depend upon a certain mixture of chance and plastic or orderly nature both together, and consequently must be an Hylozoist. Thus we see, that these are two schemes of Atheism, very different from one another; ^a that, which fetches the original of all things from the mere fortuitous and unguided motion of matter, without any vital or directive principle; and that, which derives it from a certain mixture of chance and the life of matter both together, it supposing a plastic life, not in the whole universe, as one thing, but in all the several parts of matter by themselves; the first of which is the Atomic and Democritic Atheism, the second the Hylozoic and Stratonic.

VII. It may perhaps be suspected by some, that the famous Hippocrates, who lived long before Strato, was an assertor of the Hylozoic Atheism, because of such passages in him as these, ἀπαίδευτος ἡ φύσις ἐκ τοῦ σάου* μαθοῦσα τὰ δεόντα ποιεῖν. Nature is unlearned or untaught, but it learneth from itself what things it ought to do:—and again

VI. Epidem. sect. 5. sect. 2. tom. ii. oper. p. 1184.

* Al. lect. καὶ οὐ μαθοῦσα, τὰ δεόντα ποιεῖ.

^a Vide Lactant. de Ira Dei, cap. x. p. 918.

ἀνευρίσκει ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ ἑαυτῇ τὰς ἐφόδους, οὐκ ἐκ διανοίας.
 Nature finds out ways to itself, not by ratiocination.—But there is nothing more affirmed here concerning nature by Hippocrates, than what might be affirmed likewise of the Aristotelic and Platonic nature, which is supposed to act for ends, though without consultation and ratiocination. And I must confess, it seems to me no way misbecoming of a Theist, to acknowledge such a nature or principle in the universe, as may act according to rule and method for the sake of ends, and in order to the best, though itself do not understand the reason of what it doth; this being still supposed to act dependently upon a higher intellectual principle, and to have been first set a work and employed by it, it being otherwise nonsense. But to assert any such plastic nature, as is independent upon any higher intellectual principle, and so itself the first and highest principle of activity in the universe, this indeed must needs be, either that Hylozoic Atheism already spoken of, or else another different form of Atheism, which shall afterwards be described. But though Hippocrates were a Corporealist, yet we conceive he ought not to lie under the suspicion of either of those two atheisms; forasmuch as himself plainly asserts a higher intellectual principle, than such a plastic nature, in the universe, namely an Heraclitic corporeal God, or understanding fire; immortal, pervading the whole world, in these words; *Δοκέει δέ μοι ὁ καλούμεν θερμόν, ἀθάνατόν τε εἶναι, καὶ νοεῖν πάντα, καὶ ὄρην, καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ εἶδέναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσσεσθαι.* It seems to me, that that which is called heat or fire is immortal and om-

De Princip.
 aut Carnibus.
 sect. 1. P.
 249. tom. i.
 oper.

niscient, and that it sees, hears, and knows all things, not only such as are present, but also future.—Wherefore, we conclude, that Hippocrates was neither an Hylozoic nor Democritic Atheist, but an Heraclitic corporeal Theist.

VIII. Possibly it may be thought also, that Plato, in his Sophist, intends this Hylozoic atheism, where he declares it as the opinion of many, *τὴν φύσιν πάντα γεννᾶν, ἀπὸ τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φουούσης*. That nature generates all things from a certain spontaneous principle, without any reason and understanding.—But here the word *αὐτομάτης* may be as well rendered fortuitous as spontaneous; however, there is no necessity, that this should be understood of an artificial or methodical unknowing nature. It is true, indeed, that Plato himself seems to acknowledge a certain plastic or methodical nature in the universe, subordinate to the Deity, or that perfect mind, which is the supreme governor of all things; as may be gathered from these words of his, *τὴν φύσιν μετὰ λόγου καὶ σὺν λόγῳ καὶ νῶ τὰ πάντα διακοσμεῖν* that nature does rationally (or orderly) together with reason and mind, govern the whole universe.—Where he supposes a certain regular nature to be a partial and subordinate cause of things under the Divine intellect. And it is very probable, that Aristotle derived that whole doctrine of his concerning a regular and artificial nature, which acts for ends, from the Platonic school. But as for any such form of Atheism, as should suppose a plastic or regular, but senseless nature either in the whole world, or the several parts of matter by themselves, to be the highest principle of all things,

* P. 168. oper.

we do not conceive, that there is any intimation of it to be found any where in Plato. For in his *De Legibus*, where he professedly disputes against Atheism, he states the doctrine of it after this man-

Lib. 10. p.
665, 666.

ner, τὰ μὲν μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι φύσιν καὶ τύχην, τὰ δὲ μικρότερα τέχνην that nature and chance produceth all the first, greatest, and most excellent things, but that the smaller things were produced by human art.—The plain meaning whereof is this, that the first original of things, and the frame of the whole universe, proceeded from a mere fortuitous nature, or the motion of matter unguided by any art or method. And thus it is further explained in the following words, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασί· τέχνη δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων, &c. That the first elements, fire, water, air, and earth, were all made by nature and chance, without any art or method; and then, that the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, and the whole heavens, were afterward made out of those elements, as devoid of all manner of life,—and only fortuitously moved and mingled together; and lastly, that the whole mundaue system, together with the orderly seasons of the year, as also plants, animals, and men, did arise after the same manner, from the mere fortuitous motion of senseless and stupid matter. In the very same manner does Plato state this controversy again, betwixt Theists and Atheists, in his

Philebus; Πότερον, ὦ Πρωτάρχε, τὰ ζύμπαντα, P. 28. ed. Ser. καὶ τόδε τὸ καλούμενον ὅλον, ἐπιτροπεύειν φῶμεν τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῆ δύναμιν, καὶ τὰ ὅπη ἔτυχεν; ἢ τάναντία, καθάπερ οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν ἔλεγον, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν τινα ἁυμαστὴν συντάττουσαν διακυβερνᾶν; Whether shall we say, O Protarchus, that this whole uni-

verse is dispensed and ordered, by a mere irrational, temerarious, and fortuitous principle, and so as it happens; or contrariwise (as our forefathers have instructed us) that mind, and a certain wonderful wisdom, did at first frame, and does still govern all things?—

Wherefore we conclude, that Plato took no notice of any other form of Atheism, as then set on foot, than such as derives all things from a mere fortuitous principle, from nature and chance; that is, the unguided motion of matter, without any plastic artificialness or methodicalness, either in the whole universe, or the parts of it. But because this kind of Atheism, which derives all things from a mere fortuitous nature, had been managed two manner of ways, by Democritus in the way of Atoms, and by Anaximander and others in the way of Forms and Qualities (of which we are to speak in the next place); therefore the Atheism, which Plato opposes, was either the Democritic or the Anaximandrian Atheism; or else (which is most probable) both of them together.

IX. It is hardly imaginable, that there should be no philosophic Atheists in the world before Democritus and Leucippus. Plato^a long since concluded, that there have been Atheists, more or less, in every age, when he bespeaks his young Atheist after this manner; Οὐ σὺ μόνος οὐδὲ σοὶ φίλοι πρῶτοι καὶ πρῶτον ταύτην δόξαν περὶ θεῶν ἔσχετε, γίνονται δὲ αἰεὶ πλείους ἢ ἐλάττους ταύτην τὴν νόσον ἔχοντες. The full sense whereof seems to be

^a De Legibus, lib. x. p. 665.

this: Neither you, my son, nor your friends (Democritus, Leucippus, and Protagoras) are the first, who have entertained this opinion concerning the gods, but there have been always some more or less sick of this atheistic disease.—Wherefore, we shall now make a diligent search and inquiry, to see if we can find any other philosophers, who atheized before Democritus and Leucippus, as also what form of Atheism they entertained.

Aristotle, in his *Metaphysics*, speaking of the quaternio of causes, affirms, that many of those, who first philosophized, assigned only a material cause of the whole mundane system, without either intending or efficient cause. The reason whereof he intimates to have been this, because they asserted matter to be the only substance; and that whatsoever else was in the world, besides the substance or bulk of matter, were all nothing else but πάθη, different passions and affections, accidents and qualities of matter, that were all generated out of it, and corruptible again into it; the substance of matter always remaining the same, neither generated nor corrupted, but from

* Lib. 1. c. 3.
tom. iv. oper.
p. 264.

eternity unmade; Aristotle's words are* these: τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοφησάντων οἱ πλείστοι τὰς ἐν ὕλης εἶδει μόνον ᾤθησαν ἀρχὰς εἶναι πάντων, ἐξ οὗ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἅπαντα τὰ ὄντα, καὶ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται πρῶτον, καὶ εἰς ὃ φθίρεται τελευταῖον, τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ὑπομενούσης, τοῖς δὲ πάθεσι μεταβαλλούσης, τοῦτο στοιχείον, καὶ ταύτην τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀρχὴν φασὶν εἶναι. Most of those, who first philosophized, took notice of no other principle of things in the universe, than what is to be referred to the material cause; for that,

out of which all things are, and out of which all things are first made, and into which they are all at last corrupted and resolved, the substance always remaining the same, and being changed only in its passions and qualities; this they concluded to be the first original and principle of all things.—

x. But the meaning of these old Material philosophers will be better understood by those exceptions, which Aristotle makes against them, which are two: first, that because they acknowledged no other substance besides matter, that might be an active principle in the universe, it was not possible for them to give any account of the original of motion and action. *Ei*

γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα πᾶσα φθορὰ καὶ γένεσις ἔκ τινος, ὡς ἐνὸς ἢ καὶ πλείονων ἐστίν, διὰ τί τοῦτο συμβαίνει, καὶ τί τὸ αἴτιον; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε ὑποκείμενον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτό· λέγω δὲ οἶον, οὔτε τὸ ξύλον, οὔτε τὸ χαλκὸς αἴτιον τοῦ μεταβάλλειν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν· οὐδὲ ποιεῖ τὸ μὲν ξύλον κλίνην, ὁ δὲ χαλκὸς ἀνδριάнта, ἀλλ' ἕτερόν τι τῆς μεταβολῆς αἴτιον· τὸ δὲ τοῦτο ζητεῖν ἐστι τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ζητεῖν ἀρχὴν, ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς φαίημεν, ὅθεν ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως.

Arist. Met.
l. 1. c. 3. p.
265.

Though all generation be made never so much out of something as the matter, yet the question still is, by what means this cometh to pass, and what is the active cause which produceth it? because the subject matter cannot change itself; as, for example, neither timber, nor brass, is the cause, that either of them are changed; for timber alone does not make a bed, nor brass a statue, but there must be something else as the cause of the change; and to inquire after this is to inquire after another princi-

ple besides matter, which we would call that, from whence motion springs.—In which words Aristotle intimates, that these old Material philosophers shuffled in motion and action into the world unaccountably, or without a cause; forasmuch as they acknowledged no other principle of things besides passive matter, which could never move, change, or alter itself.

XI. And Aristotle's second exception against these old Material philosophers is this: that since there could be no intending causality in senseless and stupid matter, which they made to be the only principle of all things, they were not able to assign τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτίαν, any cause of well and fit,—and so could give no account of the regular and

orderly frame of this mundane system; Met. I. 1. c. 3. p. 266.

τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς τὰ μὲν ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ γέγενεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, ἴσως οὔτε γῆν, οὔτ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐθέν, εἰκὸς αἰτίον εἶναι· οὐδ' αὐτῶ· αὐτομάτω, καὶ τύχη τοσοῦτον ἐπιτρέψαι πρᾶγμα καλῶς ἔχει· That things partly are so well in the world, and partly are made so well, cannot be imputed either to earth or water, or any other senseless body; much less is it reasonable to attribute so noble and excellent an effect as this to mere chance or fortune.—Where Aristotle again intimates, that as these Material philosophers shuffled in motion into the world without a cause, so likewise they must needs suppose this motion to be altogether fortuitous and unguided; and thereby in a manner make fortune, which is nothing but the absence or defect of an intending cause, to supply the room both of the active and intending cause, that is, efficient and final. Whereupon Aristotle subjoins a commendation of Anax-

agoras, as the first of the Ionic philosophers, who introduced mind or intellect for a principle in the universe; that in this respect he alone seemed to be sober and in his wits, comparatively with those others that went before him, who talked so idly and atheistically. For Anaxagoras's principle was such, saith Aristotle, as was *ἀμα τοῦ καλῶς αἰτία, καὶ τοιαύτη ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ὑπάρχει*, at once a cause of motion, and also of well and fit;—of all the regularity, aptitude, pulchritude, and order, that is in the whole universe. And thus it seems Anaxagoras himself had determined:

Ἀναξαγόρας τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς νοῦν λέγει, Anaxagoras saith, that mind is the only cause of right and well;—this being proper to mind to aim at ends and good, and to order one thing fitly for the sake of another. Whence it was, that Anaxagoras concluded good also, as well as mind, to have been a principle of the universe, *Ἀναξαγόρας ὡς κινῶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχὴν, ὁ γὰρ νοῦς κινεῖ, ἀλλὰ κινεῖ ἕνεκά τινος, ὥστε ἕτερον*. Anaxagoras makes good a principle, as that which moves; for, though mind move matter, yet it moves it for the sake of something, and being itself, as it were, first moved by good: so that good is also a principle.—And we note this the rather, to shew how well these three philosophers, Aristotle, Plato, and Anaxagoras, agreed all together in this excellent truth, that mind and good are the first principle of all things in the universe.

Arist. de An.
lib. 1. c. 2. p.
5. tom. ii.
oper.

Arist. Met. I.
14. c. 10. p.
485. tom. iv.
oper.

XII. And now we think it is sufficiently evident, that these old Materialists in Aristotle, whoever they were, were downright Atheists; not

so much because they made all substance to be body or matter, for Heraclitus first, and after him Zeno, did the like, deriving the original of all things from fire, as well as Anaximenes did from air, and Thales is supposed by Aristotle^a to have done from water, and that with some little more seeming plausibility, since fire, being a more subtle and moveable body than any other, was therefore thought by some ancients to be *ἀσωματώτατον*, the most incorporeal of all bodies, as earth was for that cause rejected by all those corporeal philosophers from being a principle, by reason of the grossness of its parts. But Heraclitus and Zeno, notwithstanding this, are not accounted Atheists, because they supposed their fiery matter to have not only life, but also a perfect understanding originally belonging to it, as also the whole world to be an animal: whereas those Materialists of Aristotle made senseless and stupid matter, devoid of all understanding and life, to be the first principle and root of all things. For, when they supposed life and understanding, as well as all other differences of things, to be nothing but mere passions and accidents of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it, and indeed to be produced, but in a secondary way, from the fortuitous commixture of those first elementary qualities, heat and cold, moist and dry, thick and thin, they plainly implied the substance of matter in itself to be devoid of life and understanding. Now, if this be not Atheism, to derive the original of all things, even of life and mind itself, from

^a Metaphysic. lib. i. c. iii. p. 265. tom. iv. oper.

dead and stupid matter fortuitously moved, then there can be no such thing at all.

XIII. Moreover, Aristotle's Materialists concluded every thing besides the substance of matter (which is in itself indifferent to all things), and consequently all particular and determinate beings, to be generable and corruptible. Which is a thing, that Plato takes notice of as an Atheistic principle, expressing it in these words: ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτε οὐδέν, αἰεὶ δὲ γίγνεται, that no-
In Theæt.

thing ever is, but every thing is made and generated.—Forasmuch as it plainly follows, from hence, that not only all animals and the souls of men, but also if there were any gods, which some of those Materialists would not stick, at least verbally, to acknowledge (meaning thereby certain understanding beings superior to men), these likewise must needs have been all generated, and consequently be corruptible. Now, to say that there is no other God, than such as was made and generated, and which may be again unmade, corrupted, and die, or that there was once no God at all till he was made out of the matter, and that there may be none again, this is all one as to deny the thing itself. For a native and mortal God is a pure contradiction. Therefore, whereas Aristotle, in his *Metaphysics*, tells us of certain theologers, Lib. 14. c. 6. p. 477. οἱ ἐκ

νυκτὸς πάντα γεννῶντες, such as did generate all things (even the gods themselves) out of night and chaos,—we must needs pronounce of such theologers as these, who were Theogonists, and generated all the gods (without exception) out of senseless and stupid matter, that they were but a kind of atheistical Theologers, or theological

Atheists. For, though they did admit of certain beings, to which they attributed the name of gods, yet, according to the true notion of God, they really acknowledged none at all (i. e. no understanding nature as the original of things), but Night and Chaos, senseless and stupid matter, fortuitously moved, was to them the highest of all Numens. So that this theology of their's was a thing wholly founded in atheistical nonsense.

XIV. And now we think it seasonable here to observe, how vast a difference there was betwixt these old Materialists in Aristotle, and those other philosophers, mentioned before in the first chapter, who determined, *οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων*. That no real entity at all was generated or corrupted,—for this reason, because nothing could be made out of nothing. These were chiefly the philosophers of the Italic or Pythagoric succession; and their design in it was not, as Aristotle was pleased somewhere to affirm, *ἀνελεῖν πᾶσαν τὴν γένεσιν*, to contradict common sense and experience, in denying all natural generations and alterations; but only to interpret nature rightly in them, and that in way of opposition to those Atheistic Materialists, after this manner: that in all the mutations of nature, generations, and alterations, there was neither any new substance made, which was not before, nor any entity really distinct from the pre-existing substances, but only that substance which was before, diversely modified; and so nothing produced in generations, but new modifications, mixtures, and separations of pre-existent substances.

Now this doctrine of their's drove at these two things: first, the taking away of such qualities

and forms of body, as were vulgarly conceived to be things really distinct from the substance of extended bulk, and all its modifications of more or less magnitude, figure, site, motion, or rest. Because, if there were any such things as these, produced in the natural generations and alterations of bodies, there would then be some real entity made *ἐκ μηδενός ἐνυπάρχοντος ἢ προϋπαρχοντος*, out of nothing inexistent or pre-existent.—Wherefore they concluded, that these supposed forms and qualities of bodies were really nothing else but only the different modifications of pre-existent matter, in respect of magnitude, figure, site and motion, or rest; or different concretions and secretions, which are no entities really distinct from the substance, but only cause different phas-mata, fancies, and apparitions in us.

The second thing, which this doctrine aimed at, was the establishing the incorporeity and ingenerability of all souls. For, since life, cogitation, sense, and understanding, could not be resolved into those modifications of matter, magnitude, figure, site, and motion, or into mechanism and fancy, but must needs be entities really distinct from extended bulk, or dead and stupid matter; they concluded, that therefore souls could not be generated out of matter, because this would be the production of some real entity out of nothing inexistent or pre-existing; but that they must needs be another kind of substance incorporeal, which could no more be generated or corrupted, than the substance of matter itself; and, therefore, must either pre-exist in nature, before generations, or else be divinely created and infused in them.

It hath been already proved in the first chapter, that the upshot of that Pythagoric doctrine, that nothing could be generated out of nothing pre-existing, amounted to those two things mentioned, viz. the asserting of the incorporeity and ingenerability of souls, and the rejecting of those fantastic entities of forms and real qualities of bodies, and resolving all corporeal phenomena into figures or atoms, and the different apparitions or fancies caused by them. But the latter of these may be further confirmed from this passage of Aristotle's, where, after he had declared that Democritus and Leucippus made the soul and fire to consist of round atoms or figures, like those

ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ζύσματα, those *ramenta* that appear in the air when the sunbeams are transmitted through crannies; he adds, ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῶν Πυθαγορείων λεγόμενον, τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διάνοιαν, ἔφασαν γάρ τινες αὐτῶν, ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ζύσματα, οἱ δὲ, τὸ ταῦτα κινοῦν. And that which is said amongst the Pythagoreans seems to have the same sense, for some of them affirm, that the soul is

those very ζύσματα, *ramenta*, or atoms; but others of them, that it is that which moves them:—which latter doubtless were the genuine Pythagoreans. However, it is plain, from hence, that the old Pythagoreans physiologized by ζύσματα, as well as Democritus; that is, figures and atoms, and not qualities and forms.

But Aristotle's Materialists, on the contrary, taking it for granted, that matter, or extended bulk, is the only substance, and that the qualities and forms of bodies are entities really distinct from those modifications of magnitude, figure,

Nat. Ausc. l. 1. c. 2. [This reference is a mistake, for the passage is lib. 1. de Anima, cap. ii. p. 4. tom. ii. oper.]

site, motion, or rest; and finding also, by experience, that these were continually generated and corrupted, as likewise that life, sense, and understanding were produced in the bodies of such animals, where it had not been before, and again extinguished at the death or corruption of them, concluded, that the souls of all animals, as well as those other qualities and forms of bodies, were generated out of the matter, and corrupted again into it; and, consequently, that every thing that is in the whole world, besides the substance of matter, was made or generated, and might be again corrupted.

Of this Atheistic doctrine, Aristotle L. 3. c. 1. p. 668. tom. i. oper. speaks elsewhere, as in his book *De*

Cælo. εἰσι γὰρ τινες οἱ φασίν, οὐθὲν ἀγέννητον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι· μάλιστα μὲν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον, εἶτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ πρῶτοι φυσιολογήσαντες· οἱ δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα γίνεσθαι τε φασί, καὶ ρεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐθέν. ἐν δὲ τι μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν. There are some who affirm, that nothing is ingenerable, but that all things are made; as Hesiod especially, and also among the rest they who first physiologized, whose meaning was, that all other things are made (or generated) and did flow, none of them having any stability; only that there was one thing (namely, matter) which always remained, out of which all those other things were transformed and metamorphosed.—Though, as to Hesiod, Aristotle afterwards speaks differently. So likewise in his *Physics*, after he had declared, that some of the ancients made air, some water, and some other matter, the principle of * L. 2. c. 1. p. 463. oper. all things; he adds, *τοῦτο καὶ τοσαύτην

φασίν εἶναι τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα πάθη τούτων, καὶ ἕξεις, καὶ διαθέσεις· καὶ τούτων μὲν ὅτιοῦν εἶναι αἰδίων· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι ἀπειράκις· This they affirmed to be all the substance or essence that was; but all other things, the passions, affections, and dispositions of it; and that this, therefore, was eternal, as being capable of no change, but all other things infinitely generated and corrupted.—

xv. But these Materialists being sometimes assaulted by the other Italic philosophers, in the manner before declared, that no real entities, distinct from the modifications of any substance, could be generated or corrupted, because nothing could come from nothing, nor go to nothing; they would not seem plainly to contradict that theorem, but only endeavoured to interpret it into a compliance with their own hypothesis, and distinguish concerning the sense of it in this manner: that it ought to be understood only of the substance of matter, and nothing else, viz. that no matter could be made or corrupted, but that all other things whatsoever, not only forms and qualities of bodies, but also souls; life, sense, and understanding, though really different from magnitude, figure, site, and motion, yet ought to be accounted only the πάθη, the passions and accidents of this matter, and therefore might be generated out of it, and corrupted again into it, and that without the production or destruction of any real entity, matter being the only thing that is accounted such. All this we learn from these words of

Metaph. l. 1.
c. 3. p. 264.
tom. iv. oper.

Aristotle, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε γίγνεσθαι οὐθὲν οἴονται, οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὡς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως αἰὲν σωζομένης. ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν Σωκράτη φα-

μὲν οὔτε γίνεσθαι ἀπλῶς, ὅταν γίγνεται καλὸς ἢ μουσικός, οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὅταν ἀποβάλλῃ ταύτας τὰς ἕξεις, διὰ τὸ ὑπομένειν τὸ ὑποκείμενον, τὸν Σωκράτη αὐτὸν, οὔτως οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν· δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τινα φύσιν, ἢ μίαν, ἢ πλείους μᾶς, ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται τὰ ἄλλα, σωζομένης ἐκείνης· The sense whereof is this: And, therefore, as to that axiom of some philosophers, that nothing is either generated or destroyed, these Materialists admit it to be true in respect of the substance of matter only, which is always preserved the same; as, say they, we do not say, that Socrates is simply or absolutely made, when he is made either handsome or musical, or that he is destroyed when he loseth those dispositions, because the subject Socrates still remains the same; so neither are we to say, that any thing else is absolutely either generated or corrupted, because the substance or matter of every thing always continues. For there must needs be some certain nature, from which all other things are generated, that still remaining one and the same.—

We have noted this passage of Aristotle's the rather, because this is just the very doctrine of Atheists at this day; that the substance of matter or extended bulk is the only real entity, and therefore the only unmade thing, that is neither generable nor creatable, but necessarily existent from eternity; but whatever else is in the world, as life and animality, soul and mind, being all but accidents and affections of this matter (as if therefore they had no real entity at all in them), are generable out of nothing and corruptible into nothing, so long as the matter, in which they are, still remains the same. The result of which is no less than this, that there can be no other gods

or god, than such as was at first made or generated out of senseless matter, and may be corrupted again into it. And here indeed lies the grand mystery of Atheism, that every thing besides the substance of matter is made or generated, and may be again unmade or corrupted

However, Anaxagoras, though an Ionic philosopher, and therefore, as shall be declared afterward, successor to those Atheistic Materialists, was at length so far convinced by that Pythagoric doctrine, that no entity could be naturally generated out of nothing, as that he departed from his predecessors herein, and did for this reason acknowledge mind and soul, that is, all cogitative being, to be a substance really distinct from matter, neither generable out of it nor corruptible into it; as also that the forms and qualities of bodies (which he could not yet otherwise conceive of than as things really distinct from those modifications of magnitude, figure, site, and motion), must for the same cause pre-exist before generations in certain similar atoms, and remain after corruptions, being only secreted and concreted in them. By means whereof he introduced a certain spurious Atomism of his own; for whereas the genuine Atomists before his time had supposed ὄγκους ἀνομοίους, dissimilar atoms,—devoid of all forms and qualities, to be the principles of all bodies, Anaxagoras substituted in the room of them his ὁμοιομέρεια, his similar atoms,—endued from eternity with all manner of forms and qualities incorruptibly.

XVI. We have made it manifest, that those Material philosophers, described by Aristotle, were absolute Atheists, not merely because they made body

to be the only substance, though that be a thing, which Aristotle himself justly reprehends them for also in these words of his, *ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἔν τε τὸ πᾶν καὶ μίαν εἶναι τινα φύσιν, ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν, καὶ μέγεθος ἔχουσαν, δῆλον ὅτι πολλαχῶς ἀμαρτάνουσι, τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων τὰ στοιχεῖα τιθέασι μόνον, τῶνδε ἀσωμάτων οὐ, ὄντων καὶ ἀσωμάτων.* They who suppose the world to be one uniform thing, and acknowledge only one nature as the matter, and this corporeal or indued with magnitude, it is evident, that they err many ways, and particularly in this, that they set down only the elements of bodies, and not of incorporeal things, though there be also things incorporeal.—I say, we have not concluded them Atheists, merely for this reason, because they denied incorporeal substance, but because they deduced all things whatsoever from dead and stupid matter, and made every thing in the world, besides the bare substance of matter, devoid of all quality, generable and corruptible.

Now we shall take notice of an objection, made by some late writers, against this Aristotelic accusation of the old philosophers, founded upon a passage of Aristotle's own, who elsewhere, in his book *De Cælo*, speaking of the heaven or world, plainly affirms, *γενόμενον μὲν οὖν ἅπαντες εἶναι φύσιν*, that all the philosophers before himself did assert the world to have been made, or have had a beginning.—From whence these writers infer, that therefore they must needs be all Theists, and hold the Divine creation of the world; and consequently, that Aristotle contradicts himself, in representing many of them as Atheists, acknowledging only

Metaph. l. 1.
c. 7. p. 274.
tom. iv. oper.

L. 1. c. 10.
p. 632. tom.
i. oper.

one material principle of the whole universe, without any intending or efficient cause. But we cannot but pronounce this to be a great error in these writers, to conclude all those, who held the world to have been made, therefore to have been Theists; whereas it is certain on the contrary, that all the first and most ancient Atheists did (in Aristotle's language) *κοσμοποιεῖν ἢ γεννᾶν τὸν κόσμον*, make or generate to the world,—that is, suppose it not to have been from eternity, but to have had a temporary beginning; as likewise that it was corruptible, and would, some time or other, have an end again. The sense of which Atheistic philosophers is represented by Lucretius in this manner :^a

Et quoniam docui, mundi mortalia templa
Esse, et nativo consistere corpore cœlum,
Et quæcunque in eo fiunt, fientque, necesse
Esse ea dissolvi.

And there seems to be indeed a necessity, in reason, that they, who derive all things from a fortuitous principle, and hold every thing besides the substance of matter to have been generated, should suppose the world to have been generated likewise, as also to be corruptible. Wherefore, it may well be reckoned for one of the vulgar errors, that all Atheists held the eternity of the world.

Moreover, when Aristotle subjoins immediately after, *ἀλλὰ γενόμενον, οἱ μὲν ἀίδιον, οἱ δὲ φθαρτὸν*, that though the ancient philosophers all held the world to have been made, yet, notwithstanding, they were divided in this, that some of them supposed, for all that, that it would continue to eternity such

^a Lib. vi. ver. 43. Adde lib. v. ver. 236.

as it is, others, that it would be corrupted again; the former of these, who conceived the world to be *γενόμενον*, but *αἰδίων*, made, but eternal, were none of them Atheists, but all Theists. Such as Plato, whom Aristotle seems particularly to perstringe for this, who in his *Timæus* introduceth the supreme Deity bespeaking those inferior gods, the sun, moon, and stars (supposed by that philosopher to be animated) after this manner :

ἃ δὲ ἐμοῦ γέγονενα, ἅλυστα, ἐμοῦγε θέλοντος, τὸ Timæ. p. 41. Ser.
 μὲν οὖν δεθὲν πᾶν λυτόν· τόγε μὴν καλῶς ἀρμολο-
 σθὲν καὶ ἔχον εὖ, λύειν ἐθέλειν, κακοῦ· δι' ἃ καὶ ἐπίπερ γεγέν-
 ησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστέ, οὐδ' ἅλυστοι τὸ πάμπαν. οὔτι μὲν
 δὴ λυθήσεσθέ γε, οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας· τῆς ἐμῆς βου-
 λήσεως μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριωτέρου λαχόντες. Those things, which are made by me, are indissoluble by my will; and though every thing which is compacted, be in its own nature dissolvable, yet it is not the part of one that is good, to will the dissolution or destruction of any thing that was once well made. Wherefore, though you are not absolutely immortal, nor altogether indissolvable, yet notwithstanding you shall not be dissolved, nor ever die; my will being a stronger band to hold you together, than any thing else can be to loosen you.—Philo and other Theists followed Plato in this, asserting, that though the world was made, yet it would never be corrupted, but have a post-
 eternity. Whereas all the ancient Atheists, namely, those who derived the original of things from nature and fortune, did at once deny both eternities to the world, past and future. Though we cannot say, that none but Atheists did this; for Empedocles and Heraclitus, and afterward the Stoics, did not only suppose the world likewise generated,

and to be again corrupted, but also that this had been, and would be done over and over again, in infinite vicissitudes.

Furthermore, as the world's eternity was generally opposed by all the ancient Atheists, so it was maintained also by some Theists, and that not only Aristotle,^a but also before him, by Ocellus Lucanus^b at least, though Aristotle thought not fit to take any notice of him; as likewise the latter Platonists universally went that way, yet so, as that they always supposed the world to have as much depended upon the Deity, as if it had been once created out of nothing by it.

To conclude, therefore: neither they, who asserted the world's generation and temporary beginning, were all Theists, nor they, who maintained its eternity, all Atheists; but before Aristotle's time, the Atheists universally, and most of the Theists, did both alike conclude the world to have been made; the difference between them lying in this, that the one affirmed the world to have been made by God, the other by the fortuitous motion of matter.

Wherefore, if we would put another difference betwixt the Theists and Atheists here, as to this particular, we must distinguish betwixt the system of the world and the substance of the matter. For the ancient Atheists, though they generally denied the eternity of the world, yet they supposed the substance of the matter, not only to have been eternal, but also self-existent and independent upon any other Being; they making it the first principle and original of all things, and con-

^a Physic. Auscultat. lib. viii.

^b *περι πάντων φύσεως*, inter Scriptor. Mythol. a Tho. Gale editos, p. 501.

sequently the only Numen. Whereas the genuine Theists, though many of them maintained the world's eternity, yet they all concluded, both the form and substance of it to have always depended upon the Deity, as the light doth upon the sun; the Stoics with some others being here excepted.

xvii. Aristotle tells us, some were of opinion, that this Atheistic philosophy, which derives all things from senseless and stupid matter in the way of forms and qualities, was of great antiquity, and as old as any records of time amongst the Greeks; and not only so, but also that the ancient

Theologers themselves entertained it: *Εἰσι* Met. l. 1. c. 3. tom. iv. oper. p. 265.

δέ τινες, οἱ καὶ τοὺς παμπαλαίους, καὶ πολὺ πρὸ τῆς νῦν γενέσεως, καὶ πρώτους θολογήσαντας, οὕτως οἴονται, περὶ τῆς φύσεως διαλαβεῖν. Ὠκεανὸν τε γὰρ καὶ Τήθην ἐποίησαν τῆς γενέσεως πατέρας, καὶ τὸν ὄρκον τῶν θεῶν ὕδωρ, τὴν καλουμένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν Στύγα τῶν ποιητῶν. τιμώτατον μὲν γὰρ τὸ πρεσβύτατον· ὄρκος δὲ τὸ τιμώτατόν ἐστιν. There are some who conceive, that even the most ancient of all, and the most remote from this present generation, and they also who first theologized, did physiologize after this manner; forasmuch as they made the Ocean and Tethys to have been the original of generation; and for this cause the oath of the gods is said to be by water (called by the poets Styx), as being that from which they all derived their original. For an oath ought to be by that, which is most honourable; and that which is most ancient, is most honourable.—In which words it is very probable, that Aristotle aimed at Plato; however, it is certain, that Plato, in his *Theætetus*,^a affirms this Atheistic doctrine to have been very ancient, *ὅτι πάντα ἔκγονα ροῆς τε καὶ*

^a P. 118.

κινήσεως, that all things were the offspring of flux and motion,—that is, that all things were made and generated out of matter ; and that he chargeth Homer with it, in deriving the original of the gods themselves in like manner from the Ocean (or floating matter) in this verse of his,

ἽΩκεαῖόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν, καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν,

The father of all gods the Ocean is,
Tethys their mother.

Wherefore, these indeed seem to have been the ancientest of all Atheists, who, though they acknowledged certain beings superior to men, which they called by the name of gods, did notwithstanding really deny a God, according to the true notion of him, deriving the original of all things whatsoever in the universe from the ocean, that is, fluid matter, or, which is all one, from night and chaos ; and supposing all their gods to have been made and generated, and consequently to be mortal and corruptible. Of which Atheistic theology Aristophanes gives us the description in his *Aves*,^a after this manner: “ That at first was nothing but Night and Chaos, which laying an egg, from thence was produced Love, that mingling again with Chaos, begot heaven, and earth, and animals, and all the gods.”

Χάος ἦν, καὶ νύξ, ἔρεβός τε μέλαν πρῶτον, καὶ Τάρταρος εὐρύς.
Γῆ δ', οὐδ' ἀήρ, οὐδ' οὐρανός ἦν· ἑρέβους δ' ἐν ἀπέροσι κόλπαις
τίθειε πρώτιστον ὑπνέμιον νύξ ἢ μελανόπτερος ὄν.
Ἐξ οὗ περιτελλομένηαις ὄραις ἔβλασταν Ἔρως ὁ ποθεινός.
Στίλβων νῶτον πτερόγωνι χρυσαῖν· εἰκῶς ἀνεμῶκεσι δίναις.
Οὗτος δὲ χάει πτερόεντι μιγείει νυχίῳ, κατὰ Τάρταρον εὐρύν,
Ἐνεόττευσε γένος ἡμέτερον, καὶ πρῶτον ἀνήγαγεν ἐς φῶς,
Πρότερον δ' οὐκ ἦν γένος ἀθανάτων, πρὶν Ἐρως συνέμιξεν ἅπαντα.

^a Ver. 694. p. 404. edit. Kusteri.

First, all was chaos, one confused heap ;
 Darkness enwrapt the disagreeing deep ;
 In a mixt crowd the jumbling elements were,
 Nor earth, nor air, nor heaven did appear ;
 Till on this horrid vast abyss of things,
 Teeming Night, spreading o'er her coal-black wings,
 Laid the first egg ; whence, after time's due course,
 Issu'd forth Love (the world's prolific source)
 Glistening with golden wings ; which fluttering o'er
 Dark Chaos, gendered all the numerous store
 Of animals and gods, &c.

And whereas the poet there makes the birds to have been begotten between love and chaos before all the gods ; though one might think this to have been done jocularly by him, merely to humour his plot ; yet Salmasius^a conceives, and not without some reason, that it was really a piece of the old Atheistic cabala, which therefore seems to have run thus: That chaos or matter confusedly moved being the first original of all, things did from thence rise up gradually from lesser to greater perfection. First, inanimate things, as the elements, heaven, earth, and seas ; then brute animals ; afterwards men, and last of all the gods. As if not only the substance of matter, and those inanimate bodies of the elements, fire, water, air, and earth, were, as Aristotle somewhere speaks, according to the sense of those Atheistic theologers, * *φύσει πρότερα τοῦ θεοῦ, θεοὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα*, first in order of nature before God, as being themselves also gods,—but also brute animals at least, if not men too. And this is the Atheistic creation of the world, gods and all, out of senseless and stupid matter, or dark chaos, as the only original Numen ; the perfectly inverted order of the universe.

* De Gen. et
 Cor. lib. 2. c.
 6. p. 735.
 tom. i. oper.

^a Exercit. Plinian. in Solinum, tom. i. p. 309.

XVIII. But though this hypothesis be purely atheistical, that makes Love, which is supposed to be the original Deity, to have itself sprung at first from an egg of the night; and, consequently, that all deity was the creature or offspring of matter and chaos, or dark fortuitous nature; yet Aristotle somewhere conceives, that not only Parmenides, but also Hesiod, and some others, who did in like manner make Love the supreme deity, and derive all things from Love and Chaos, were to be exempted out of the number of those Atheistic Materialists before described; forasmuch as they seemed to understand by love, an active principle and cause of motion in the universe; which, therefore, could not spring from an egg of the night, nor be the creature of matter, but must needs be something independent on it, and in order of nature before it: ὑποπτεύσειε δ' ἄν τις, Ἡσίοδον πρῶτον ζητῆσαι τὸ τοιοῦτον, καὶν εἴ τις ἄλλος, Ἐρωτα ἢ Ἐπιθυμίαν, ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἔθηκεν ὡς ἀρχὴν, οἷον καὶ Παρμενίδης. Καὶ γὰρ οὗτος κατασκευάζων τὴν τοῦ παντὸς γίνεσιν,

Πρώτιστον μὲν (φυσὴν) ἔρωτα θεῶν μάλιστα πάντων.

Ἡσίοδος δέ,

Πάντων μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γένετ'· αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
Γαί' εὐρύστερνος, —————
Ἡδ' ἔρος, ὃς πάντεσσι μεταπέρεπει ἀθανάτοισιν.

ὡς δέον ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν τινὰ αἰτίαν, ἥτις κινήσει καὶ συνέξει τὰ πράγματα. τούτους μὲν οὖν πῶς χρὴ διανοῦμαι περὶ τοῦ τις πρώτος, ἐξέστω κρίνειν ὑστερον. One would suspect, that Hesiod, and if there be any other

* Aristot. Metaphys. lib. i. cap. iv. p. 267.

who made love or desire a principle of things in the universe, aimed at this very thing (namely, the settling of another active principle besides matter): for Parmenides, describing the generation of the universe, makes Love to be the senior of all the gods; and Hesiod, after he had mentioned chaos, introduced Love as the supreme Deity. As intimating herein, that besides matter, there ought to be another cause or principle, that should be the original of motion and activity, and also hold and conjoin all things together. But how these two principles are to be ordered, and which of them was to be placed first, whether Love or Chaos, may be judged of afterwards.—In which latter words Aristotle seems to intimate, that Love, as taken for an active principle, was not to be supposed to spring from Chaos, but rather to be in order of nature before it; and, therefore, by this Love of their's must needs be meant the Deity. And, indeed, Simmias Rhodius, in his Wings, a hymn made in honour of this Love, that is senior to all the gods, and a principle in the universe, tells us plainly, that it is not Cupid, Venus's soft and effeminate son, but another kind of love:

Οὐτί γε Κύπριδος παῖς
 Ὀκυπέτας δ' αὐτὸς Ἔρως καλεῦμαι
 Οὔτι γὰρ ἔκρινα βιάζειν, παράγω δὲ πειθοῖ.
 Γαῖα, θαλάσσας τε μυχροί, οὐρανίων πᾶς τε θεός μοι ἔκει.
 Τῶν δ' ἔγων ἔκνοσφισάμην ὠγύγιον σκᾶπτρον, ἔκρανά τέ σφιν θέμιστας.

I'm not that wanton boy,
 The sea-froath goddess's only joy.
 Pure heavenly Love I hight, and my
 Soft magic charms, not iron bands, fast tye
 Heaven, earth, and seas. The gods themselves do readily
 Stoop to my laws. The whole world dances to my harmony.

Moreover, this cannot be that Love neither, which is described in Plato's *Symposium* (as some learned men have conceived), that was begotten between Penia and Porus, this being not a divine but demoniac thing (as the philosopher there declares), no God, but a demon only, or of a middle nature. For it is nothing but φιλοκαλία, or the love of pulchritude as such, which, though rightly used, may perhaps wing and inspire the mind to noble and generous attempts, and beget a scornful disdain in it of mean, dirty, and sordid things; yet is capable of being abused also, and then it will strike downward into brutishness and sensuality. But at best it is an affection belonging only to imperfect and parturient beings; and therefore could not be the first principle of all things. Wherefore, we see no very great reason but that, in a rectified and qualified sense, this may pass for true theology; that Love is the supreme Deity and original of all things; namely, if by it be meant eternal, self-originated, intellectual Love, or essential and substantial goodness, that having an infinite overflowing fulness and fecundity, dispenses itself uninviciously, according to the best wisdom, sweetly governs all, without any force or violence (all things being naturally subject to its authority, and readily obeying its laws), and reconciles the whole world into harmony. For the Scripture telling us, that God is love, seems to warrant thus much to us, that love in some rightly qualified sense is God.

XIX. But we are to omit the fabulous age, and to descend to the philosophical, to inquire there, who they were among the professed philosophers, who atheized in that manner before described. It

is true, indeed, that Aristotle, in other places, accuses Democritus and Leucippus of the very same thing, that is, of assigning only a material cause of the universe, and giving no account of the original of motion; but yet it is certain, that these were not the persons intended by him here; those which he speaks of being *τινὲς τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοφησάντων*, some of the first and most ancient philosophers of all.—Moreover, it appears by the description of them, that they were such as did not philosophize in the way of atoms, but resolved all things whatsoever in the universe into *ὑλη* and *πάθη τῆς ὑλης*, matter, and the passions or affections, qualities and forms of matter; so that they were not Atomical, but Hylopathian philosophers. These two, the old Materialists and the Democritics, did both alike derive all things from dead and stupid matter, fortuitously moved; and the difference between them was only this, that the Democritics managed this business in the way of atoms, the other in that more vulgar way of qualities and forms: so that, indeed, this is really but one and the same Atheistic hypothesis, in two several schemes. And as one of them is called the Atomic Atheism, so the other, for distinction sake, may be called the Hylopathian.

xx. Now Aristotle tells us plainly, that these Hylopathian Atheists of his were all the first philosophers of the Ionic order and succession, before Anaxagoras. Wherefore Thales being the head, he is consentaneously thereunto by Aristotle made to be *ἀρχηγος τῆς τοιαύτης φιλοσοφίας*, the prince and leader of this kind of Atheistical philosophy,—he deriving all things whatsoever, as Homer had done before him, from water, and ac-

knowledging no other principle but the fluid matter.

Notwithstanding which accusation of Aristotle's, Thales is far otherwise represented by good authors: Cicero^a telling us, that, besides water, which he made to be the original of all corporeal things, he asserted also mind for another principle, which formed all things out of the water; and Laertius^b and Plutarch^c recording, that he was thought to be the first of all philosophers, who determined souls to be immortal. He is said also to have affirmed,^d that God was *πρεσβύτατον πάντων*, the oldest of all things, and that the world was *ποιήμα θεοῦ*, the workmanship of God.—Clemens^e likewise tells us, that being asked, *εἰ λανθάνει τὸ θεῖον πράσσων τι ὁ ἄνθρωπος; καὶ πῶς, εἶπεν, ὅσγε οὐδε διανοούμενος*: whether any of a man's actions could be concealed from the Deity? he replied, not so much as any thought.—Moreover, Laertius^f further writes of him, that he held *τὸν κόσμον ἔμφυχον καὶ δαιμόνων πλήρη*, that the world was animated, and full of demons.—Lastly, Aristotle^g himself elsewhere speaks of him as a Theist; *καὶ ἐν τῷ ὄλῳ δέ τινες ψυχὴν μεμίχθαι φασίν. ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς ὠήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι*. Some think (saith he) that soul and life is mingled with the whole universe; and thence, perhaps, was that of Thales, that all things are full of gods. Wherefore, we conceive,

^a De Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. x. p. 2894. tom. ix. oper.

^b Lib. i. segm. 24. p. 16.

^c De Placit. Philos. lib. iv. cap. ii. p. 908. tom. ii. oper.

^d Diog. Laert. lib. i. segm. 35. p. 21. et Plutarch. in Convivio septem sapientum, p. 153. tom. ii. oper.

^e Clemens Alex. Stromat. lib. v. p. 704. edit. Potteri.

^f Lib. i. segm. 27. p. 18.

^g De Anima, lib. i. cap. v. p. 17. tom. ii. oper.

that there is very good reason, why Thales should be acquitted from this accusation of Atheism. Only we shall observe the occasion of his being thus differently represented, which seems to have been this; because, as Laertius^a and Themistius^b intimate, he left no philosophic writings or monuments of his own behind him (Anaximander being the first of all the philosophic writers): whence probably it came to pass, that, in after times, some did interpret his philosophy one way, some another; and that he is sometimes represented as a Theist, and sometimes again as a downright Atheist.

But, though Thales be thus by good authority acquitted, yet his next successor, Anaximander, can by no means be excused from this imputation; and, therefore, we think it more reasonable to fasten that title upon him, which Aristotle bestows on Thales, that he was ἀρχηγος τῆς τούτης φιλοσοφίας, the prince and founder of this Atheistic philosophy;—who derived all things from matter, in the way of forms and qualities; he supposing a certain infinite *materia prima*, which was neither air, nor water, nor fire, but indifferent to every thing, or a mixture of all, to be the only principle of the universe, and leading a train of many other Atheists after him, such as Hippo, surnamed ἄθεος by Simplicius and others, Anaximenes, and Diogenes Apolloniates, and many more; who, though they had some petty differences amongst themselves, yet all agreed in this one thing, that matter, devoid of understanding and life, was the first principle of

^a Lib. i. segm. 23. p. 15.

^b Orat. xxvi. p. 317. edit. Harduin.

all things; till at length Anaxagoras stopped this Atheistic current amongst these Ionic philosophers, introducing mind as a principle of the universe.

XXI. But there is a passage in Aristotle's Physics, which seems at first sight to contradict this again; and to make Anaximander also not to have been an Atheist, but a Divine philosopher: where, having declared that several of the ancient physiologers made *ἄπειρον*, or Infinite, to be the principle of all things, he subjoins these words, *διὸ καθάπερ λέγομεν, οὐ ταύτης ἀρχῆς, ἀλλ' αὐτῆ τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι δοκεῖ. Καὶ περιέχειν ἅπαντα καὶ πάντα κυβερνᾶν, ὡς φασὶν ὅσοι μὴ ποιοῦσι παρὰ τὸ ἄπειρον ἄλλας αἰτίας, οἷον νοῦν, ἢ φιλίαν. Καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ θεῖον, ἀθάνατον γὰρ καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, ὡσπερ φησὶν ὁ Ἀναξίμανδρος καὶ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων.* Therefore, there seems to be no principle of this Infinite, but this to be the principle of other things, and to contain all things, and govern all things, as they all say, who do not make, besides infinite, any other causes, such as mind or friendship; and that this is the only real Numen or God in the world, it being immortal and incorruptible, as Anaximander affirms, and most of the physiologers.—From which place some late writers have confidently concluded, that Anaximander, with those other physiologers there mentioned, did, by Infinite, understand God, according to the true notion of him, or an Infinite Mind, the efficient cause of the universe, and not senseless and stupid matter; since this could not be said to be immortal, and to govern all things; and, consequently, that Aristotle grossly contradicts himself, in making all those Ionic philosophers before Anaxagoras to

have been mere Materialists or Atheists. And it is possible, that Clemens Alexandrinus also might from this very passage of Aristotle's, not sufficiently considered, have been induced to rank Anaximander amongst the Divine philosophers, as he doth in his Protreptic to the Greeks; where, after he had condemned certain of the old philosophers as Atheistic Corporealists, he subjoins these words: * τῶν δὲ ἄλλων φιλοσόφων, ὅσοι τὰ στοιχεῖα ὑπερβάντες, ἐπολυπραγμότησάν τι ὑψηλότερον καὶ περιττότερον, οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν τὸ ἄπειρον καθύμνησαν, ὧν Ἀναξίμανδρος ὁ Μιλήσιος ἦν, καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ὁ Κλαζομένιος, καὶ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος Ἀρχέλαος. But of the other philosophers, who, transcending all the elements, searched after some higher and more excellent thing, some of them praised Infinite, amongst which was Anaximander the Milesian, Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, and the Athenian Archelaus.—As if these three had all alike acknowledged an incorporeal Deity, and made an infinite mind, distinct from matter, the first original of all things.

* Clem. Prot.
p. 43. cap. v.
p. 57. tom. i.
oper.

But that forecited passage of Aristotle's alone, well considered, will itself afford a sufficient confutation of this opinion; where Anaximander, with those other physiologers, is plainly opposed to Anaxagoras, who, besides infinite senseless matter, or similar atoms, made mind to be a principle of the universe, as also to Empedocles, who made a plastic life and nature, called friendship, another principle of the corporeal world; from whence it plainly follows, that Anaximander and the rest supposed not infinite mind, but infinite matter, without either mind or plastic matter, to

have been the only original of all things, and therefore the only Deity or Numen.

Moreover, Democritus being linked in the context with Anaximander, as making both of them alike, τὸ ἄπειρον, or Infinite, to be the first principle of all; it might as well be inferred from this place, that Democritus was a genuine Theist, as Anaximander. But as Democritus's only principle was infinite atoms, without any thing of mind or plastic nature; so likewise was Anaximander's an infinity of senseless stupid matter; and, therefore, they were both of them Atheists alike, though Anaximander, in the cited words, had the honour (if it may be so called) to be only named, as being the most ancient of all those Atheistical physiologers, and the ringleader of them.

XXII. Neither ought it at all to seem strange, that Anaximander, and those other Atheistical Materialists, should call infinite matter, devoid of all understanding and life, the τὸ θεῖον, the Deity or Numen, since to all those, who deny a God (according to the true notion of him), whatsoever else they substitute in his room, by making it the first principle of all things, though it be senseless and stupid matter, yet this must needs be accounted the only Numen, and divinest thing of all.

Nor is it to be wondered at neither, that this infinite, being understood of matter, should be said to be, not only incorruptible, but also immortal, these two being often used as synonymous and equivalent expressions. For thus in Lucretius,^a

^a Lib. i. vers. 672.

the corruption of all inanimate bodies is called death :

———Mors ejus quod fuit ante ;

And again,

^a Quando aliud ex alio reficit natura, nec ullam
Rem gigni patitur, nisi morte adjutam aliena.

In like manner mortal is used by him for corruptible :

^b Nam siquid mortale a cunctis partibus esset,
Ex oculis res quæque repente erepta periret.

And this kind of language was very familiar with Heraclitus,^c as appears from these passages of his, *πυρὸς θάνατος, ἀέρι γένεσις· καὶ ἀέρος θάνατος ὕδατι γένεσις·* The death of fire is generation to air; and the death of air is generation to water;—that is, the corruption of them. And again, *ψυχῆσιν θάνατος, ὕδωρ γενέσθαι· ὕδατι δὲ θάνατος, γῆν γενέσθαι·* It is death to vapour or air, to be made water; and death to water, to be made earth.—In which Heraclitus did but imitate Orpheus, as appears from this verse of his, cited by Clemens Alexandrinus :^d

**Ἔστιν ὕδωρ ψυχῆ, θάνατος δ' ὑδάτεσσιν ἀμοιβή·*

Besides which, there are many examples of this use of the word *ἀθάνατος*, in other Greek writers, and some in Aristotle^e himself, who, speaking of the heavens, attributes *ἀθανασία* and *ἀδιότης* to them, as one and the same thing; and also affirms, that the ancients therefore made heaven to be the seat of the Deity, *ὡς ὄντα μόνον ἀθάνατον*, as being only immortal,—that is, incorruptible.

^a Lib. i. vers. 264, 265.

^b Lib. i. vers. 219.

^c Vide Henr. Stephan. in Poesi Philosophic. p. 137.

^d Stromat. lib. vi. cap. ii. p. 476.

^e De Cœlo, lib. i. cap. iii. p. 614, 615. tom. i. oper.

Indeed, that other expression, at first sight, would stagger one more, where it is said of this *ἄπειρον*, or infinite,—that it doth not only contain, but also govern all things: but Simplicius^a tells us, that this is to be understood likewise of matter, and that no more was meant by it, than that all things were derived from it, and depended on it, as the first principle; ὁ δὲ λόγος τοῖς τοιούτοις περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν ἀρχῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ περὶ τῶν ὑπερ φύσιν, εἰ δὲ καὶ περιέχειν ἔλεγον καὶ κυβερνᾶν οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ περιέχειν ὑπάρχει τῷ ὑλικῷ αἰτίῳ, ὡς διὰ πάντων χωροῦντι, τὸ δὲ κυβερνᾶν ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα αὐτοῦ, τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενομένων. These philosophers spake only of natural principles, and not of supernatural; and though they say, that this infinite of their's does both contain and govern all things, yet this is not at all to be wondered at; forasmuch as containing belongs to the material cause, as that which goes through all things, and likewise governing, as that from which all things, according to a certain aptitude of it, are made.—Philoponus^b (who was a Christian) represents Aristotle's sense in this whole place more fully, after this manner: “Those of the ancient physiologers, who had no respect to any active efficient cause, as Anaxagoras had to mind, and Empedocles to friendship and contention, supposed matter to be the only cause of all things; and that it was infinite in magnitude, ingenerable and incorruptible, esteeming it to be a certain Divine thing, which did govern all, or preside over the compages of the universe, and

^a Commentar. in octo Libros Physic. Auscultat. Aristot. lib. i. cap. iii. p. 32. edit. Aldin.

^b Comment. in iv. primos Libros Physicor. lib. i. cap. iii. a. 10. Adde cap. i. edit. Græcæ Venet. 1535. fol.

to be immortal, that is, undestroyable. This Anaximenes said to be air, Thales to be water, but Anaximander, a certain middle thing; some one thing, and some another." Καὶ οὐδέν γε θαυμαστόν φησιν, ἐν τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς περιόδῳ τοὺς πρώτους μὴ ἐπιστήσαντας τῇ ἐφεστηκυῖα τῶν ὄλων δυνάμει, ἐν τῶν στοιχείων, ὅπερ ἂν ὑπόπτειεν ἕκαστος, αἴτιον τοῖς ἄλλοις τε εἶναι, τοῦτο εὐθὺς καὶ Θεὸν ὑπονοῆσας. And Aristotle in this passage tells us, that it is no wonder, if they, who did not attend to the active cause, that presides over the universe, did look upon some one of the elements (that which each of them thought to be the cause of all other things) as God. But as they, considering only the material principle, conceived that to be the cause of all things; so Anaxagoras supposed mind to be the principle of all things, and Empedocles, friendship and contention.—

XXIII. But to make it further appear, that Anaximander's philosophy was purely Atheistical, we think it convenient to shew what account is given of it by other writers. Plutarch, in his *Placita Philosophorum*, does at once briefly represent the Anaximandrian philosophy,

and censure it after this manner: Ἀναξίμανδρός φησι, τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον, ἐκ γὰρ τούτου πάντα γίνεσθαι, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο πάντα φθίρεσθαι, διὸ καὶ γεννᾶσθαι ἀπείρους κόσμους, καὶ πάλιν φθίρεσθαι· λέγει οὖν διὰ τι ἄπειρόν ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ ἐλλείπη ἢ γένεσις ἢ ὑφισταμένη· ἀμαρτάνει δὲ οὗτος, τὴν μὲν ὕλην ἀποφαινόμενος, τὸ δὲ ποιῶν αἴτιον ἀναιρῶν, τὸ δὲ ἄπειρον οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἢ ὕλη ἐστίν. οὐ δύναται δὲ ἢ ὕλη εἶναι ἐνέργεια, εἰ μὴ τὸ ποιῶν ὑποκέηται. Anaximander the Milesian affirms Infinite to be the first principle; and that all things are generated out of it, and

corrupted again into it ; and therefore that infinite worlds are successively thus generated and corrupted. And he gives the reason why it is infinite, that so there might be never any fail of generations. But he erreth in this, that assigning only a material cause, he takes away the active principle of things. For Anaximander's Infinite is nothing else but matter; but matter can produce nothing, unless there be also an active cause.— Where he shews also, how Anaximenes followed Anaximander herein, in assigning only a material cause of the universe, without any efficient; though he differed from him, in making the first matter to be air, and deriving all things from thence by rarefaction and condensation. Thus, we see, it is plain, that Anaximander's Infinite was no infinite mind, which is the true Deity, but only infinite matter, devoid of any life or active power.

Ev. Præp.
lib. 1. p. 15.
ed. Steph.

Eusebius is more particular in giving an account of Anaximander's *Cosmopœia*; τὸ ἄπειρον φάναι τὴν πᾶσαν αἰτίαν ἔχειν τῆς τοῦ παντος γενέσεώς τε καὶ φθορᾶς, ἐξ οὗ δὴ φησι τοὺς τε οὐρανοὺς ἀποκεκρίσθαι, καὶ καθόλου τοὺς ἅπαντας ἀπείρους ὄντας κόσμους· φησὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ αἰδίου γόνιμον θερμοῦ τε καὶ ψυχροῦ, κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου ἀποκριθῆναι, καὶ τινα ἐκ τούτου φλογὸς σφαῖραν περιφυῆναι τῷ περὶ τὴν γῆν ἄερι, ὡς τῷ δένδρῳ φλοιόν. ἢς τινος ἀπορραγείσης, καὶ εἰς τινας ἀποκλεισθείσης κύκλους, ὑποστῆναι τὸν ἥλιον, καὶ τὴν σελήνην, καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας· Anaximander affirms Infinite (matter) to be the only cause of the generation and corruption of all things; and that the heavens, and infinite worlds, were made out of it, by way of secretion or segregation. Also that those generative principles of heat and cold, that were contained in it from eter-

nity, being segregated, when this world was made, a certain sphere of flame or fire did first arise and encompass the air, which surrounds this earth (as a bark doth a tree), which being afterwards broken, and divided into smaller spherical bodies, constituted the sun and moon and all the stars.—

Which Anaximandrian Cosmogonia was briefly hinted at by Aristotle in these words,

*οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός, ἐνούσας τὰς ἐναντιότητας, ἐκ-
κρίνουσιν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξίμανδρός φησι.* Phys. l. 1. c. 4.

Some philosophers generate the world by the secretion and segregation of in-existent contrarieties, as Anaximander speaks.—And elsewhere in his Me-
ταφυσικῶν, he takes notice of Ἀναξίμαν- L. 14. c. 4.

δρου τὸ μίγμα, Anaximander's mixture of things.—

Whence we conclude, that Anaximander's Infinite was nothing else but an infinite chaos of matter, in which were either actually or potentially, contained all manner of qualities; by the fortuitous secretion and segregation of which, he supposed infinite worlds to be successively generated and corrupted. So that we may now easily guess, whence Leucippus and Democritus had their infinite worlds, and perceive how near akin these two Atheistic hypotheses were. But it will not be amiss to take notice also of that particular conceit, which Anaximander had, concerning the first original of brute animals, and mankind. Of the former, Plutarch gives us this account :

Ἀναξίμανδρος ἐν ὑγρῷ γεννηθῆναι τὰ πρῶτα ζῶα, Pla. Ph. l. 5.
c. 19. p. 908.
φλοιῶς περιεχόμενα ἀκανθώδεσι, προβαίνουσης tom. ii. oper.
δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἀποβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὸ ξηρότερον, καὶ

περιρρηγνυμένου τοῦ φλοιοῦ, ἐπὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον μεταβιῶναι
That the first animals were generated in moisture, and encompassed about with certain thorny barks,

by which they were guarded and defended; which, after further growth, coming to be more dry and cracking, they issued forth, but lived only a short time after.—And as for the first original of men,

Eusebius represents his sense thus: 'Εξ

E. P. l. 1.

ἀλλοειδῶν ζώων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐγεννήθη, ἐκ τοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα δι' ἐαυτῶν ταχὺ νέμεσθαι, μόνον δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον πολυχρονίου δεῖσθαι τήθησσεως, διὸ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἄν ποτε τοιοῦτον ὄντα διασωθῆναι. Men were at first generated in the bellies of other animals, forasmuch as

all other animals, after they are brought forth, are quickly able to feed and nourish themselves, but man alone needs to be nursed up a long time; and therefore could not be preserved at first, in any other way.—But Plutarch expresseth

Symp. lib. 8.
Q. 8. p. 730.
tom. ii. oper.

this something more particularly: 'Αναξίμανδρος ἐν ἰχθύσιν ἐγγενέσθαι τὸ πρῶτον ἀνθρώπους ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ τραφέντας καὶ γενομένους

ικανοὺς ἐαυτοῖς βοηθεῖν, ἐκβληθῆναι τηνικαῦτα καὶ γῆς λαβέσθαι. Anaximander concludes, that men were at first generated in the bellies of fishes, and being there nourished, till they grew strong, and were able to shift for themselves, they were afterward cast out upon dry land.—Lastly, Anaximander's theology is thus both represented to us,

De Nat. D.
lib. 1. c. x.
p. 2894.
tom. ix. oper.

and censured, by Velleius, the Epicurean philosopher in Cicero: "Anaximandri opinio est nativos esse deos, longis intervallis orientes occidentesque, eosque innumerabiles esse mundos: sed nos deum nisi sempiternum intelligere quæ possumus?" Anaximander's opinion is, that the gods are native, rising and vanishing again, in long periods of times; and that these gods are innumerable worlds: but how can we conceive that to be a God, which is not

eternal?—We learn from hence, that Anaximander did indeed so far comply with vulgar opinion, as that he retained the name of gods; but, however, that he really denied the existence of the thing itself, even according to the judgment of this Epicurean philosopher. Forasmuch as all his gods were native and mortal, and indeed nothing else, but those innumerable worlds, which he supposed in certain periods of time to be successively generated and destroyed. Wherefore, it is plain, that Anaximander's only real Numen, that is, his first principle, that was ingenerable and incorruptible, was nothing but infinite matter, devoid of all understanding and life, by the fortuitous secretion of whose in-existent qualities and parts, he supposed, first, the elements of earth, water, air, and fire, and then, the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, and both bodies and souls of men and other animals, and lastly, innumerable or infinite such worlds as these, as so many secondary and native gods (that were also mortal), to have been generated, according to that Atheistical hypothesis described in Plato.*

XXIV. It is certain, that the vulgar in all ages have been very ill judges of Theists and Atheists, they having condemned many hearty Theists, as guilty of Atheism, merely because they dissented from them in some of their superstitious rites and opinions. As for example; Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, though he was the first of all the Ionic philosophers (unless Thales ought to be excepted) who made an infinite mind to be a principle, that is, asserted a Deity, according to the true notion

* De Legibus, lib. x. p. 666.

of it ; yet he was, notwithstanding, generally cried down for an Atheist, merely because
 Plá. Apol. he affirmed the sun to be *μύδρον διάπυρον*,
 Socr. p. 362. a mass of fire, or a fiery globe, and the moon to be an earth ;—that is, because he denied them to be animated and endued with understanding souls, and consequently to be gods. So likewise Socrates was both accused, and condemned, for atheistical impiety, as denying all gods, though nothing was pretended to be proved against him, but only this, that he did *θεοὺς διδάσκειν μὴ νομίζειν, οὗς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια*
 Plat. Apol. *καὶνὰ εἰσφέρειν*, teach that those were not true gods which the city worshipped, and in the room thereof introduce other new gods.—And lastly, the Christians in the primitive times, for the same reason, were vulgarly traduced for Atheists by the Pagans, as Justin Martyr declares in his Apology,^a *ἄθεοι κεκλήμεθα, καὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν τῶν τοιούτων νομιζομένων θεῶν ἄθεοι εἶναι*. We are called Atheists ; and we confess ourselves such, in respect of those gods which they worship, but not of the true God.—And as the vulgar have unjustly condemned many Theists for Atheists, so have they also acquitted many rank Atheists from the guilt of that crime, merely because they externally complied with them, in their religious worship, and forms of speech. Neither is it only the vulgar, that have been imposed upon herein, but also the generality of learned men, who have been commonly so superficial in this business, as that they have hardly taken notice of above three or four Atheists, that ever were in former times, as, namely, Diagoras, Theodorus, Eudemus, and Protagoras ; whereas

^a P. 56. oper.

Democritus and Anaximander were as rank Atheists as any of them all, though they had the wit to carry themselves externally with more cautiousness. And indeed it was really one and the self-same form of Atheism, which both these entertained, they deriving all things alike, from dead and stupid matter fortuitously moved, the difference between them being only this, that they managed it two different ways; Anaximander in the way of qualities and forms, which is the more vulgar and obvious kind of Atheism; but Democritus in the way of atoms and figures, which seems to be a more learned kind of Atheism.

And though we do not doubt at all, but that Plato, in his tenth *De Legibus*, where he attacks Atheism, did intend the confutation as well of the Democritic as the Anaximandrian Atheism; yet whether it were, because he had no mind to take any notice at all of Democritus, who is not so much as once mentioned by him any where, or else because he was not so perfectly acquainted with that Atomic way of physiologizing, certain it is, that he there describes the Atheistic hypothesis more according to the Anaximandrian than the Democritic form. For when he represents the Atheistic generation of heaven and earth, and all things in them, as resulting from the fortuitous commixture of hot and cold, hard and soft, moist and dry corpuscula; this is clearly more agreeable with the Anaximandrian generation of the world, by the secretion of in-existent contrarieties in the matter, than the Democritic *Cosmopœia*, by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, devoid of all manner of qualities and forms.

Some indeed seem to call that scheme of Athe-

ism, that deduces all things from matter, in the way of qualities and forms, by the name of Peripatetic, or Aristotelic Atheism; we suppose for this reason, because Aristotle physiologized in that way of forms and qualities, educing them out of the power of the matter. But since Aristotle himself cannot be justly taxed for an Atheist, this form of Theism ought rather, as we conceive, to be denominated from Anaximander, and called the Anaximandrian Atheism.

xxv. Now the reasons, why Democritus and Leucippus new-modelled Atheism, from the Anaximandrian and Hylopathian into the Atomic form, seem to have been chiefly these:—first, because they, being well instructed in that Atomic way of physiologizing, were really convinced, that it was not only more ingenious, but also more agreeable to truth; the other, by real qualities and forms, seeming a thing unintelligible. Secondly, because they foresaw, as Lucretius intimates, that the production of forms and qualities out of nothing, and the corruption of them again into nothing, would prepare an easy way for men's belief of a Divine creation and annihilation. And lastly, because, as we have already suggested, they plainly perceived, that these forms and qualities of matter were of a doubtful nature; and therefore, as they were sometimes made a shelter for Atheism, so they might also prove, on the contrary, an asylum for Corporeal Theism; in that it might possibly be supposed, that either the matter of the whole world, or else the more subtile and fiery part of it, was originally endued with an understanding form or quality, and consequently, the whole an animal or god. Wherefore, they took another

more effectual course, to secure their Atheism, and exclude all possibility of a corporeal God, by deriving the original of all things from atoms, devoid of all forms and qualities, and having nothing in them, but magnitude, figure, site, and motion, as the first principles; it following unavoidably from thence, that life and understanding, as well as those other qualities, could be only accidental and secondary results from certain fortuitous concretions and contextures of atoms; so that the world could be made by no previous counsel or understanding, and therefore by no Deity.

xxvi. We have here represented three several forms of Atheism—the Anaximandrian, the Democritical, and the Stratonical. But there is yet another form of Atheism, different from them all, to be taken notice of, which is such, as supposes one kind of plastic and spermatic, methodical and artificial nature, but without any sense of conscious understanding, to preside over the whole world, and dispose and conserve all things, in that regular frame in which they are. Such a form of Atheism as this is hinted to us in that doubtful passage of Seneca's;

“Sive animal est mundus, (for so it ought to be read, and not *anima*) sive corpus natura gubernante, ut arbores, ut sata;” whether the whole world be an animal (i. e. endued with one sentient and rational life), or whether it be only a body governed by (a certain plastic and methodical, but senseless) nature, as trees, and other plants or vegetables.—In which words are two several hypotheses of the mundane system, sceptically proposed by one, who was a Corporealist, and took it for granted that all was body. First, that the whole world,

Nat. Quest.
l. 3. sect. 29.

though having nothing but body in it, yet was notwithstanding an animal, as our human bodies are, endued with one sentient or rational life and nature, one soul or mind, governing and ordering the whole. Which corporeal Cosmo-zoism we do not reckon amongst the forms of Atheism, but rather account it for a kind of spurious Theism, or Theism disguised in a Paganic dress, and not without a complication of many false apprehensions, concerning the Deity, in it. The second is, that the whole world is no animal, but, as it were, one huge plant or vegetable, a body endued with one plastic or spermatic nature, branching out the whole, orderly and methodically, but without any understanding or sense. And this must needs be accounted a form of Atheism, because it does not derive the original of things in the universe from any clearly intellectual principle or conscious nature.

XXVII. Now this form of Atheism, which supposes the whole world (there being nothing but body in it) not to be an animal, but only a great plant or vegetable, having one spermatic form, or plastic nature, which, without any conscious reason or understanding, orders the whole, though it have some nearer correspondence with that Hylozoic form of Atheism before described, in that it does not suppose nature to be a mere fortuitous, but a kind of artificial thing; yet it differs from it in this, that the Hylozoic supposing all matter, as such, to have life essentially belonging to it, must therefore needs attribute to every part of matter (or at least every particular totum, that is one by continuity) a distinct plastic life of its own, but acknowledge no one common life, as ruling over

the whole corporeal universe; and consequently impute the original of all things (as hath been already observed) to a certain mixture of chance, and plastic or methodical nature, both together. Whereas the cosmo-plastic Atheism quite excludes fortune or chance, subjecting all things to the regular and orderly fate of one plastic or plantal nature, ruling over the whole. Thus that philosopher before mentioned concludes, that whether the world were an animal (in the Stoical sense) or whether it were a mere plant or vegetable, “*Ab initio ejus usque ad exitum, quicquid facere, quicquid pati debeat, inclusum est. Ut in semine, omnis futuri ratio hominis comprehensa est. Et legem barbæ et canorum nondum natus infans habet; totius enim corporis, et sequentis ætatis, in parvo occultoque lineamenta sunt. Sic origo mundi non magis solem et lunam, et vices syderum, et animalium ortus, quam quibus mutarentur terranea, continuit. In his fuit inundatio, quæ non secus quam hyems, quam æstas, lege mundi venit.*” Whatsoever, from the beginning to the end of it, it can either do or suffer, it was all at first included in the nature of the whole; as in the seed is contained the whole delineation of the future man, and the embryo or unborn infant hath already in it the law of a beard and grey hairs; the lineaments of the whole body, and of its following age, being there described as it were in a little and obscure compendium. In like manner, the original and first rudiments of the world contained in them not only the sun and moon, the courses of the stars, and the generation of animals, but also the vicissitudes of all terrestrial things; and every deluge or inundation of wa-

Nat. Q. l. 3.
c. 29.

ter comes to pass no less by the law of the world (its spermatic or plastic nature) than winter and summer doth.

XXVIII. We do not deny it to be possible, but that some in all ages might have entertained such an Atheistical conceit as this, that the original of this whole mundane system was from one artificial, orderly, and methodical, but senseless nature lodged in the matter; but we cannot trace the footsteps of this doctrine any where so much as among the Stoics, to which sect Seneca, who speaks so waveringly and uncertainly in this point (whether the world were an animal or a plant), belonged. And, indeed, divers learned men have suspected, that even the Zenonian and Heraclitic Deity itself, was no other than such a plastic nature or spermatic principle in the universe, as in the seeds of vegetables and animals doth frame their respective bodies orderly and artificially. Nor can it be denied, but that there hath been just cause given for such a suspicion; forasmuch as the best of Stoics, sometimes confounding God with nature, seemed to make him nothing but an artificial fire, orderly and methodically proceeding to generation. And it was familiar with them, as Laertius^a tells us, to call God *σπερματικὸν λόγον τοῦ κόσμου*, the spermatic reason, or form of the world.—Nevertheless, because Zeno^b and others of the chief Stoical doctors did also many times assert, that there was *φύσις νοερά καὶ λογική*, a rational and intellectual nature (and therefore not a plastic principle only) in the matter of the universe; as, likewise, that the whole

^a Lib. vii. scgm. 136. p. 450.

^b Vide Diog. Laert. lib. vii. p. 148. p. 459.

world was an animal, and not a mere plant; therefore, we incline rather to excuse the generality of the first and most ancient Stoics from the imputation of Atheism, and to account this form of Atheism, which we now speak of, to be but a certain degeneracy from the right Heraclitic and Zenonian cabala, which seemed to contain these two things in it; first, that there was an animalish, sentient, and intellectual nature, or a conscious soul and mind, that presided over the whole world, though lodged immediately in the fiery matter of it; secondly, that this sentient and intellectual nature, or corporeal soul and mind of the universe, did contain also under it, or within it, as the inferior part of it, a certain plastic nature, or spermatic principle, which was properly the fate of all things. For thus Heraclitus^a defined Fate, *λόγον τὸν διὰ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ παντός διήκοντα, ἢ αἰθέριον σῶμα, σπέρμα τῆς τοῦ παντός γενέσεως*. A certain reason passing through the substance of the whole world, or an ethereal body, that was the seed of the generation of the universe.—And Zeno's^b first principle, as it is said to be an intellectual nature, so it is also said to have contained in it *πάντας τοὺς σπερματικούς λόγους, καθ' οὓς ἕκαστα καθ' εἰμαρμένην γίγνεται*, all the spermatic reasons and forms, by which every thing is done according to fate.—However, though this seem to have been the genuine doctrine, both of Heraclitus and Zeno, yet others of their followers afterwards divided these two things from one another, and taking only the latter of them, made the plastic

^a Apud Plutarch. de Placitis Philosophor. lib. i. cap. xxviii. p. 885. tom. ii. oper.

^b Vide Plutarch. ubi supra. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 881.

or spermatic nature, devoid of all animality or conscious intellectuality, to be the highest principle in the universe. Thus Laertius tells us,* that Boethus, an eminent and famous Stoical doctor, did plainly deny the world to be an animal, that is, to have any sentient, conscious, or intellectual nature presiding over it; and, consequently, must needs make it to be but "*corpus natura gubernante, ut arbores, ut sata,*" a body governed by a plastic or vegetative nature, as trees, plants, and herbs.—And as it is possible, that other Stoics and Heraclitics might have done the like before Boethus, so it is very probable, that he had after him many followers; amongst which, as Plinius Secundus may be reckoned for one, so Seneca himself was not without a doubtful tincture of this Atheism, as hath been already shewed. Wherefore this form of Atheism, which supposes one plastic or spermatic nature, one plantal or vegetative life in the whole world, as the highest principle, may, for distinction sake, be called the Pseudo-Stoical, or Stoical Atheism.

XXIX. Besides these philosophic Atheists, whose several forms we have now described, it cannot be doubted, but that there have been in all ages many other Atheists that have not at all philosophized, nor pretended to maintain any particular Atheistic system or hypothesis, in a way of reason, but were only led by a certain dull and sottish, though confident disbelief of whatsoever they could not either see or feel; which kind of Atheists may, therefore, well be accounted enthusiastical or fanatical Atheists. Though

* Lib. vii. segm. 143. p. 455.

it be true, in the meantime, that even all manner of Atheists whatsoever, and those of them, who most of all pretend to reason and philosophy, may, in some sense, be justly styled also both enthusiasts and fanatics. Forasmuch as they are not led or carried on, into this way of atheizing, by any clear dictates of their reason or understanding, but only by an *ὁρμηὶ ἀλογος*, a certain blind and irrational impetus;—they being, as it were, inspired to it by that lower earthly life and nature, which is called in the Scripture oracles, *τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου*, the spirit of the world, or a mundane spirit,—and is opposed to the *τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ*, the Spirit that is of God.—For, when the apostle speaks after this manner, “We have not received the spirit of the world, but the Spirit that is of God,” he seems to intimate thus much to us, that as some men were led and inspired by a Divine spirit, so others again are inspired by a mundane spirit, by which is meant the earthly life. Now the former of these two are not to be accounted enthusiasts, as the word is now commonly taken in a bad sense; because the Spirit of God is no irrational thing, but either the very self-same thing with reason, or else such a thing as Aristotle (as it were vaticinating concerning it) somewhere calls *λόγου τι κρείττον*, a certain better and diviner thing than reason;—and Plotinus, *ρίζαν λόγου*, the root of reason.—But, on the contrary, the mundane spirit, or earthly life, is irrational sottishness; and they, who are atheistically inspired by it (how abhorrent soever they may otherwise seem to be from enthusiasm and revelations), are notwithstanding really no better than a kind of bewitched enthusiasts and blind spiritati,

that are wholly ridden and acted by a dark, narrow, and captivated principle of life, and, to use their own language, in-blown by it, and by it bereft, even in speculative things, of all free reason and understanding. Nay, they are fanatics too, however that word seems to have a more peculiar respect to something of a Deity; all Atheists being that blind goddess Nature's fanatics.

xxx. We have described four several forms of Atheism:—first, the Hylopathian or Anaximandrian, that derives all things from a dead and stupid matter, in the way of qualities and forms, generable and corruptible: secondly, the Atomical or Democritical, which doth the same thing in the way of atoms and figures: thirdly, the Cosmo-plastic or Stoical Atheism, which supposes one plastic and methodical but senseless nature, to preside over the whole corporeal universe; and, lastly, the Hylozoic or Stratonical, that attributes to all matter, as such, a certain living and energetic nature, but devoid of all animality, sense, and consciousness. And as we do not meet with any other forms or schemes of Atheism besides these four, so we conceive, that there cannot easily be any other excogitated or devised; and that upon these two following considerations: first, because all Atheists are mere Corporealists, that is, acknowledge no other substance besides body or matter. For as there was never any yet known, who, asserting incorporeal substance, did deny a Deity; so neither can there be any reason, why he that admits the former should exclude the latter. Again, the same dull and earthly disbelief or confounded sottishness of mind, which makes men deny a God, must needs incline them

to deny all incorporeal substance also. Wherefore, as the physicians speak of a certain disease or madness, called hydrophobia, the symptom of those that have been bitten by a mad dog, which makes them have a monstrous antipathy to water; so all Atheists are possessed with a certain kind of madness, that may be called Pneumatophobia, that makes them have an irrational but desperate abhorrence from spirits or incorporeal substances, they being acted also, at the same time, with an Hylomania, whereby they madly doat upon matter, and devoutly worship it as the only Numen.

The second consideration is this, because, as there are no Atheists but such as are mere Corporealists, so all Corporealists are not to be accounted Atheists neither: those of them, who, notwithstanding they make all things to be matter, yet suppose an intellectual nature in that matter to preside over the corporeal universe, being in reason and charity to be exempted out of that number. And there have been always some, who, though so strongly captivated under the power of gross imagination, as that an incorporeal God seemed to them to be nothing but a God of words (as some of them call it), a mere empty sound or contradictory expression, something and nothing put together; yet, notwithstanding, they have been possessed with a firm belief and persuasion of a Deity, or that the system of the universe depends upon one perfect understanding being as the head of it; and thereupon have concluded that ἡ πρώτη οὐσία, a certain kind of body or matter is God.—The grossest and most sottish of all which Corporeal Theists seem

to be those, who contend, that God is only one particular piece of organized matter, of human form and bigness, which, endued with perfect reason and understanding, exerciseth an universal dominion over all the rest. Which hypothesis, however it hath been entertained by some of the Christian profession, both in former and later times, yet it hath seemed very ridiculous, even to many of those Heathen philosophers themselves, who were mere Corporealists, such as the Stoics, who exploded it with a kind of indignation, contending earnestly, *ἢ μὴ εἶναι θεὸν ἀνθρωπόμορφον*, that God (though corporeal) yet must not be conceived to be of any human shape. And Xenophanes,^b an ancient philosophic poet, expresseth the childishness of this conceit after this manner :

*Ἄλλ' εἴτοι χεῖράς γ' εἶχον βόες ἢ λέοντες,
ἢ γράψαι χεῖρεσσι, καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἄπορ ἀνδρες,
καὶ καθεῶν ἰδίας ἔγραφον, καὶ σώματ' ἐποίουν
Ταυτῶ' οἷον περ καὶ αὐτοὶ δέμας εἶχον ὁμοῖον.*

If oxen, lions, asses, and horses, had all of them a sense of a Deity, and were able to limn and paint, there is no question to be made, but that each of these several animals would paint God according to their respective form and likeness, and contend, that he was of that shape and no other.—But that other corporeal Theism seems to be of the two rather more generous and genteel, which supposes the whole world to be one animal, and God to be a certain subtile and ethereal, but intellectual matter, pervading it as a soul: which was the doctrine of others before the

* These are the words of Clemens Alexandrinus concerning Xenophanes, Stromat. lib. v. p. 714.

^b Apud Clem. Alex. ubi supra. p. 715.

Stoics, τὸ πῦρ θεὸν ὑπελήφατον Ἰππασός τε ὁ Μεταπόντινος καὶ ὁ Ἐφέσιος Ἡράκλειτος, Hippasus of Metapontus, and Heraclitus the Ephesian, supposed the fiery and ethereal matter of the world to be God.—However, neither these Heraclitics and Stoics, nor yet the other Anthropomorphites, are by us condemned for downright Atheists, but rather looked upon as a sort of ignorant, childish, and unskilful Theists.

Wherefore we see, that Atheists are now reduced into a narrow compass, since none are concluded to be Atheists, but such as are mere Corporealists; and all Corporealists must not be condemned for Atheists neither, but only those of them, who assert, that there is no conscious intellectual nature, presiding over the whole universe. For this is that, which the adepti in Atheism, of what form soever, all agree in, that the first principle of the universe is no animalish, sentient, and conscious nature, but that all animality, sense, and consciousness, is a secondary, derivative, and accidental thing, generable and corruptible, arising out of particular concretions of matter, organized and dissolved together with them.

XXXI. Now if the first principle and original of all things in the universe be thus supposed to be body or matter, devoid of all animality, sense, and consciousness, then it must of necessity be either perfectly dead and stupid, and without all manner of life; or else endued with such a kind of life only, as is by some called plastic, spermatical, and vegetative, by others the life of nature,

* Idem in Protreptico, cap. v. p. 65.

or natural perception. And those Atheists, who derive all things from dead and stupid matter, must also needs do this, either in the way of qualities and forms, and these are the Anaximandrian Atheists; or else in the way of atoms and figures, which are the Democritical. But those, who make matter endued with a plastic life to be the first original of all things, must needs suppose either one such plastic and spermatic life only in the whole mass of matter or corporeal universe, which are the Stoical Atheists; or else all matter as such to have life and an energetic nature belonging to it (though without any animal sense or self-perception), and consequently all the particular parts of matter, and every totum by continuity, to have a distinct plastic life of its own, which are the Stratonian Atheists. Wherefore, there does not seem to be any room now left for any other form of Atheism, besides these four, to thrust in.

And we think fit here again to inculcate, what hath been already intimated, that one grand difference amongst these several forms of Atheism is this, that some of them attributing no life at all to matter, as such, nor indeed acknowledging any plastic life of nature, distinct from the animal, and supposing every thing whatsoever is in the world, besides ἄλη ἀποιος, the bare substance of matter considered as devoid of all qualities (that is, mere extended bulk), to be generated and corrupted; consequently resolve, that all manner of life whatsoever is generable and corruptible, or educible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again; and these are the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheisms. But the

other, which are the Stoical and Stratonical, do, on the contrary, suppose some life to be fundamental and original, essential and substantial, ingenerable and incorruptible, as being a first principle of things; nevertheless, this not to be any animal, conscious, and self-perceptive life, but a plastic life of nature only; all Atheists still agreeing in those two fore-mentioned things: first, that there is no other substance in the world besides body; secondly, that all animal life, sense, and self-perception, conscious understanding and personality, are generated and corrupted, successively educed out of nothing and reduced into nothing again.

xxxii. Indeed we are not ignorant that some, who seem to be well-wishers to Atheism, have talked sometimes of sensitive and rational matter, as having a mind to suppose, three several sorts of matter in the universe, specifically different from one another, that were originally such, and self-existent from eternity; namely, senseless, sensitive, and rational: as if the mundane system might be conceived to arise from a certain jumble of these three several sorts of matter, as it were scuffling together in the dark, without a God, and so producing brute animals and men. But as this is a mere precarious hypothesis, there being no imaginable account to be given, how there should come to be such an essential difference betwixt matters, or why this piece of matter should be sensitive, and that rational, when another is altogether senseless; so the suggestors of it are but mere novices in Atheism, and a kind of bungling well-wishers to it. First, because, according to this hypothesis, no life would be pro-

duced or destroyed in the successive generations and corruptions of animals, but only concreted and secreted in them; and, consequently, all human personalities must be eternal and incorruptible: which is all one, as to assert the pre and post-existence of all souls from eternity to eternity, a thing that all genuine and thorough-paced Atheists are in a manner as abhorrent from, as they are from the Deity itself. And secondly, because there can be no imaginable reason given by them, why there might not be as well a certain Divine matter perfectly intellectual and self-existent from eternity, as a sensitive and rational matter. And, therefore, such an hypothesis as this can never serve the turn of Atheists. But all those that are masters of the craft of Atheism, and thoroughly catechised or initiated in the dark mysteries thereof (as hath been already inculcated), do perfectly agree in this, that all animal, sentient, and conscious life, all souls and minds, and consequently all human personalities, are generated out of matter, and corrupted again into it, or rather educed out of nothing, and reduced into nothing again.

We understand also, that there are certain canting astrological Atheists, who would deduce all things from the occult qualities and influences of the stars, according to their different conjunctions, oppositions, and aspects, in a certain blind and unaccountable manner. But these being persons devoid of all manner of sense, who neither so much as pretend to give an account of these stars, whether they be animals or not, as also whence they derive their original (which, if they did undertake to do atheistically, they must needs

resolve themselves at length into one or other of those hypotheses already proposed), therefore, as we conceive, they deserve not the least consideration. But we think fit here to observe, that such devotees to the heavenly bodies, as look upon all the other stars as petty deities, but the sun as the supreme deity and monarch of the universe, in the meantime conceiving it also to be perfectly intellectual (which is in a manner the same with the Cleanthean hypothesis) are not so much to be accounted Atheists, as spurious, paganical, and idolatrous Theists. And upon all these considerations, we conclude again, that there is no other philosophic form of Atheism, that can easily be devised, besides these four mentioned, the Anaximandrian, the Democritical, the Stoical, and the Stratonical.

xxxiii. Amongst which forms of Atheism, there is yet another difference to be observed, and accordingly another distribution to be made of them. It being first premised, that all these fore-mentioned sorts of Atheists (if they will speak consistently and agreeably to their own principles) must needs suppose all things to be one way or other necessary. For though Epicurus introduced contingent liberty, yet it is well known, that he therein plainly contradicted his own principles. And this, indeed, was the first and principal thing intended by us, in this whole undertaking, to confute that false hypothesis of the mundane system, which makes all actions and events necessary upon Atheistic grounds, but especially in the mechanic way. Wherefore, in the next place, we must observe, that though the principles of all Atheists introduce necessity, yet the

necessity of these Atheists is not one and the same, but of two different kinds; some of them supposing a necessity of dead and stupid matter, which is that, which is commonly meant by *ὕλική ἀνάγκη*, or material necessity, and is also called by Aristotle, an absolute necessity of things; others, the necessity of a plastic life, which the same Aristotle calls an hypothetical necessity. For the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheists do both of them assert a material and absolute necessity of all things; one in the way of qualities, and the other of motion and mechanism: but the Stoical and Stratonical Atheists assert a plastical and hypothetical necessity of things only.

Now one grand difference betwixt these two sorts of Atheisms and their necessities lies in this, that the former, though they make all things necessary, yet they suppose them also to be fortuitous; there being no inconsistency between these two. And the sense of both the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheisms seems to be thus described by Plato,^a *πάντα κατὰ τύχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεκράσθη*, All things were mingled together by necessity according to fortune.—For that nature, from whence these Atheists derived all things, is at once both necessary and fortuitous. But the Plastic Atheisms suppose such a necessary nature for the first principle of things, as is not merely fortuitous, but regular, orderly, and methodical; the Stoical excluding all chance and fortune universally, because they subject all things to one plastic nature ruling over the whole universe, but the Stratonical doing it in part only, because they

^a De Legibus, lib. x. p. 666. oper.

derive things from a mixture of chance and plastic nature both together.

And thus we see, that there is a double notion of nature amongst Atheists, as well as Theists; which we cannot better express than in the words of Balbus the Stoic, personated by Cicero: “Alii naturam censent esse vim quandam sine ratione, cientem motus in corporibus necessarios; alii autem vim participem ordinis, tauquam via progredientem. Cujus solertiam, nulla ars, nulla manus, nemo opifex, consequi potest imitando; seminis enim vim esse tantam, ut id quanquam perexiguum, nactumque sit materiam, quo ali auge-rique possit, ita fingat et efficiat, in suo quidque genere, partim ut per stirpes alantur suas, partim ut movere etiam possint, et ex se similia sui generare.” Some by nature mean a certain force without reason and order, exciting necessary motions in bodies; but others understand by it such a force, as participating of order proceeds as it were methodically. Whose exquisiteness, no art, no hand, no opificer can reach to by imitation. For the force of seed is such, that though the bulk of it be very small, yet if it get convenient matter for its nourishment and increase, it so forms and frames things in their several kinds, as that they can partly through their stocks and trunks be nourished, and partly move themselves also, and generate their like.—And again: “Sunt qui omnia naturæ nomine appellant, ut Epicurus; sed nos, cum dicimus natura constare administrarique mundum, non ita dicimus, ut glebam, aut fragmentum lapidis, aut aliquid ejusmodi, nulla co-hærendi natura; sed ut arborem, ut animalia, in

De Nat. De.
l. 2. cap.
xxxii. p.
3001. tom. ix.
oper.

quibus nulla temeritas, sed ordo apparet et artis quædam similitudo." There are some, who call all things by the name of nature, as Epicurus; but we, when we say that the world is administered by nature, do not mean such a nature, as is in clods of earth and pieces of stone, but such as is in a tree or animal, in whose constitution there is no temerity, but order and similitude of art.—Now, according to these two different notions of nature, the four forementioned forms of Atheism may be again dichotomized after this manner—into such as derive all things from a mere fortuitous and temerarious nature, devoid of all order and methodicalness; and such as deduce the original of things from a certain orderly, regular, and artificial, though senseless nature in matter. The former of which are the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheisms, the latter the Stoical and Stratonical.

It hath been already observed, that those Atheisms, that derive all things from a mere fortuitous principle, as also suppose every thing, besides ὕλη ἄπλοια, the bare substance of matter—or extended bulk, to be generated and corrupted; though they asserted the eternity of matter, yet they could not, agreeably to their own hypothesis, maintain the eternity and incorruptibility of the world. And accordingly hereunto, both the Anaximandrian^a and Democritic^b Atheists did conclude the world to be *γενόμενον καὶ φθαρτόν*, such as was at first made, and should be again corrupted.—And upon this account, Lucretius concerns himself highly herein, to prove both the novelty of the

^a Vide Diog. Laert. lib. ix. segm. 44. p. 573.

^b Vide eundem lib. ii. segm. 1, 2. p. 78, 79.

world, and also its future dissolution and extinction, that

Totum nativum mortali corpore constat.

But instead of the world's eternity, these two sorts of Atheists introduced another paradox, namely an ἀπειρία κόσμων, an infinity of worlds;—and that not only successive, in that space, which this world of our's is conceived now to occupy, in respect of the infinity of past and future time, but also a contemporary infinity of coexistent worlds, at all times, throughout endless and unbounded space.

However, it is certain, that some persons Atheistically inclined, have been always apt to run out another way, and to suppose, that the frame of things, and system of the world, ever was from eternity, and ever will be to eternity, such as now it is, dispensed by a certain orderly and regular, but yet senseless and unknowing nature. And it is prophesied in Scripture, that such Atheists as these, should especially abound in these latter days of our's; “There shall come in the last days (ἐμπαΐκται) atheistical scoffers, walking after their own lusts, and saying, Where is the promise of his coming? For since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation.” Which latter words are spoken only according to the received hypothesis of the Jews, the meaning of these Atheists being quite otherwise, that there was neither creation nor beginning of the world; but that things had continued, such as now they are, from all eternity. As appears also from what the apostle there adds by way of confutation, that they “were wilfully ignorant of this, that by the word of

^{2 Pet. 3.}

God the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water and in the water; and that as the world, that then was, overflowing with water perished, so the heavens and earth, which now are, by the same word are kept in store, and reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men." And it is evident; that some of these Atheists, at this very day, march in the garb of enthusiastical religionists, acknowledging no more a God than a Christ without them, and allegorizing the day of judgment and future conflagration into a kind of seemingly mystical, but really atheistical nonsense. These, if they did philosophize, would resolve themselves into one or other of those two hypotheses before mentioned; either that of one plastic orderly and methodical, but senseless nature, ruling over the whole universe; or else that of the life of matter, making one or other of these two natures to be their only God or Numen; it being sufficiently agreeable to the principles of both these Atheistic hypotheses (and no others) to maintain the world's both antè and post-eternity; yet so as that the latter of them, namely, the Hylozoists, admitting a certain mixture of chance together with the life of matter, would suppose, that though the main strokes of things might be preserved the same, and some kind of constant regularity always kept up in the world, yet that the whole mundane system did not in all respects continue the same, from eternity to eternity, without any variation.

Strab. l. 1.

But as Strabo tells us, that Strato Physicus maintained, the Euxine sea at first to have had no outlet by Byzantium into the Mediterranean, but that by the continual running in of ri-

vers into it, causing it to overflow, there was in length of time a passage opened by the Propontis and Hellespont; as also that the Mediterranean sea forced open that passage of the Herculean straits, being a continual isthmus or neck of land before; that many parts of the present continent were heretofore sea, as also much of the present ocean habitable land:—so it cannot be doubted, but that the same Strato did likewise suppose such kind of alterations and vicissitudes as these, in all the greater parts of the mundane system.

But the Stoical Atheists, who made the whole world to be dispensed by one orderly and plastic nature, might very well, and agreeably to their own hypothesis, maintain, besides the world's eternity, one constant and invariable course or tenor of things in it, as Plinius Secundus doth, who, if he were any thing, seems to have been one of these Atheists; “Mundum et hoc Nat. H. l. 2. c. 1. quod nomine alio cœlum appellare libuit, (cujus circumflexu reguntur cuncta) Numen esse, credi par est, æternum, immensum, neque genitum, neque interiturum——Idem rerum naturæ opus, et rerum ipsa natura.” The world, and that which by another name is called the heavens, by whose circumgyration all things are governed, ought to be believed to be a Numen, eternal, immense, such as was never made, and shall never be destroyed.—Where, by the way, it may be again observed, that those Atheists, who denied a God, according to the true notion of him, as a conscious, understanding being, presiding over the whole world, did notwithstanding look upon either the world itself, or else a mere senseless plastic nature in it, as a kind of Numen or Deity,

they supposing it to be ingenerable and incorruptible. Which same Pliny, as, upon the grounds of the Stoical Atheism, he maintained against the Anaximandrians and Democritics, the world's eternity and incorruptibility; so did he likewise, in way of opposition to that *ἀπειρία κόσμων*, that infinity of worlds—of their's, assert, that there was but one world, and that finite. In like manner we read concerning that famous Stoic, Boethus, whom Laertius affirms to have denied the world to be an animal (which, according to the language and sense of those times, was all one as to deny a God); that he also maintained, contrary to the received doctrine of the Stoics, the world's ante-èternity and incorruptibility; Philo, in his treatise *περὶ ἀφθαρσίας κόσμου*, or the Incorruptibility of the World,—testifying the same of him.

Nevertheless it seems, that some of these Stoical Atheists did also agree with the generality of the other Stoical Theists, in supposing a successive infinity of worlds generated and corrupted, by reason of intervening periodical conflagrations; though all dispensed by such a stupid and senseless nature, as governs plants and trees. For thus much we gather from those words of Seneca before cited, where, describing this Atheistical hypothesis, he tells us, that though the world were a plant, that is, governed by a vegetative or plastic nature, without any animality, yet notwithstanding, “*ab initio ejus usque ad exitum,*” &c. it had both a beginning, and will have an end; and from its beginning to its end, all was dispensed by a kind of regular law, even its successive conflagrations too, as well as those inundations or deluges, which have sometimes happened. Which yet they un-

derstood after such a manner, as that in these several revolutions and successive circuits or periods of worlds, all things should be ἀπαράλλακτα, exactly alike, to what had been infinitely before, and should be again infinitely afterwards. Of which more elsewhere.

XXXIV. This quadripartite Atheism, which we have now represented, is the kingdom of darkness divided, or labouring with an intestine seditious war in its own bowels, and thereby destroying itself. Insomuch that we might well save ourselves the labour of any further confutation of Atheism, merely by committing these several forms of Atheism together, and dashing them one against another, they opposing and contradicting each other, no less than they do Theism itself. For first, those two pairs of Atheisms, on the one hand the Anaximandrian and Democritic, on the other the Stoical and Stratonical, do absolutely destroy each other; the former of them supposing the first principle of all things to be stupid matter devoid of all manner of life, and contending, that all life as well as other qualities is generable and corruptible, or a mere accidental thing, and looking upon the plastic life of nature as a figment or fantastic capricio, a thing almost as formidable and altogether as impossible as a Deity; the other, on the contrary, founding all upon this principle, that there is a life and natural perception essential to matter, ingenerable and incorruptible, and contending it to be utterly impossible to give any account of the phenomena of the world, the original of motion, the orderly frame and disposition of things, and the nature of animals, without this fundamental life of nature.

Again, the single Atheisms belonging to each of

these several pairs quarrel as much also between themselves. For the Democritic Atheism explodes the Anaximandrian qualities and forms, demonstrating that the natural production of such entities out of nothing, and the corruption of them again into nothing, is of the two rather more impossible than a Divine creation and annihilation. And, on the other side, the Anaximandrian Atheist plainly discovers, that, when the Democritics and Atomics have spent all their fury against these qualities and forms, and done what they can to solve the phenomena of nature without them another way, themselves do notwithstanding, like drunken men, reel and stagger back into them, and are unavoidably necessitated at last to take up their sanctuary in them.

In like manner, the Stoical and Stratonical Atheists may as effectually undo and confute each other; the former of them urging against the latter, that, besides that prodigious absurdity of making every atom of senseless matter infallibly wise or omniscient, without any consciousness, there can be no reason at all given by the Hylozoists, why the matter of the whole universe might not as well conspire and confederate together into one, as all the single atoms that compound the body of any animal or man; or why one conscious life might not as well result from the totum of the former, as of the latter; by which means the whole world would become an animal, or God. Again, the latter contending, that the Stoical or Cosmo-plastic Atheist can pretend no reason, why the whole world might not have one sentient and rational, as well as one plastic soul in it, that is, as well be an animal as a plant:

moreover, that the sensitive souls of brute animals, and the rational souls of men, could never possibly emerge out of one single, plastic, and vegetative soul in the whole universe: and, lastly, that it is altogether as impossible, that the whole world should have life in it, and yet none of its parts have any life of their own, as that the whole world should be white or black, and yet no part of it have any whiteness or blackness at all in it. And, therefore, that the Stoical Atheists, as well as the Stoical Theists, do both alike deny incorporeal substance but in words only, whilst they really admit the thing itself; because one and the same life, ruling over all the distant parts of the corporeal universe, must needs be an incorporeal substance, it being all in the whole, and all acting upon every part, and yet none of it in any part by itself; for then it would be many, and not one. From all which it may be concluded, that Atheism is a certain strange kind of monster, with four heads, that are all of them perpetually biting, tearing, and devouring one another.

Now, though these several forms of Atheism do mutually destroy each other, and none of them be really considerable or formidable in itself, as to any strength of reason which it hath; yet, as they are compared together among themselves, so some of them may be more considerable than the rest. For, first, as the qualities and forms of the Anaximandrian Atheist, supposed to be really distinct from the substances, are things unintelligible in themselves; so he cannot, with any colour or pretence of reason, maintain the natural production of them out of nothing, and the reduction of them again into nothing, and yet withstand a

Divine creation and annihilation, as an impossibility. Moreover, the Anaximandrian Atheism is as it were swallowed up into the Democritic, and further improved in it; this latter carrying on the same design, with more seeming artifice, greater plausibility of wit, and a more pompous show of something, where, indeed, there is nothing. Upon which account, it hath for many ages past beaten the Anaximandrian Atheism in a manner quite off the stage, and reigned there alone. So that the Democritic or Atomic Atheism seems to be much more considerable of the two, than the Anaximandrian or Hylopathian.

Again, as for the two other forms of Atheism, if there were any life at all in matter, as the first and immediate recipient of it, then in reason this must needs be supposed to be after the same manner in it, that all other corporeal qualities are in bodies, so as to be divisible together with it, and some of it be in every part of the matter; which is according to the hypothesis of the Hylozoists. Whereas, on the contrary, the Stoical Atheists supposing one life only in the whole mass of matter, after such a manner, as that none of the parts of it by themselves should have any life of their own, do thereby, no less than the Stoical Theists, make this life of their's to be no corporeal quality or form, but an incorporeal substance; which is to contradict their own hypothesis. From whence we may conclude, that the Cosmo-plastic or Stoical Atheism is, of the two, less considerable than the Hylozoic or Stratonical.

Wherefore, amongst these four forms of Atheism, that have been propounded, these two, the Atomic or Democritical, and the Hylozoic or

Stratonical are the chief. The former of which, namely, the Democritic Atheism, admitting a true notion of body, that (according to the doctrine of the first and most ancient Atomists) it is nothing but resisting bulk devoid of all manner of life; yet, because it takes for granted, that there is no other substance in the world besides body, does, therefore, conclude, that all life and understanding in animals and men is generated out of dead and stupid matter, though not as qualities and forms (which is the Anaximandrian way), but as resulting from the contextures of atoms, or some peculiar composition of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions; and, consequently, that they are themselves really nothing else but local motion and mechanism; which is a thing, that some time since was very pertinently and judiciously both observed and perstringed by the learned author^a of the *Exercitatio Epistolica*,
Sect. 4. c. 3.
 now a reverend bishop. But the latter, namely, the Hylozoic, though truly acknowledging, on the contrary, that life, cogitation, and understanding are entities really distinct from local motion and mechanism, and that therefore they cannot be generated out of dead and stupid matter, but must needs be somewhere in the world, originally, essentially, and fundamentally: yet, because they take it also for granted, that there is no other substance besides matter, do thereupon adulterate the notion of matter or body, blending and confounding it with life, as making them but two inadequate conceptions of substance, and concluding that all matter and substance, as such, hath

^a Dr. Seth Ward, Savilian Professor of Astronomy in the University of Oxford; and successively Bishop of Exeter and Salisbury.

life and perception, or understanding, natural and unconscious, essentially belonging to it; and that sense and conscious reason or understanding in animals, arises only from the accidental modification of this fundamental life of matter by organization.

We conclude, therefore, that if these two Atheistic hypotheses, which are found to be the most considerable, be once confuted, the reality of all Atheism will be *ipso facto* confuted; there being indeed nothing more requisite to a thorough confutation of Atheism, than the proving of these two things: first, that life and understanding are not essential to matter, as such; and, secondly, that they can never possibly rise out of any mixture or modification of dead and stupid matter whatsoever. The reason of which assertion is, because all Atheists, as was before observed, are mere Corporealists, of which there can be but these two sorts; either such as make life to be essential to matter, and therefore to be ingenerable and incorruptible; or else such as suppose life and every thing besides *ἄλη ἀποιος*, the bare substance of matter, or extended bulk, to be merely accidental, generable, or corruptible, as rising out of some mixture or modification of it. And as the proving of those two things will overthrow all Atheism, so it will likewise lay a clear foundation for the demonstrating of a Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

xxxv. Now that life and perception, or understanding, should be essential to matter, as such, or that all senseless matter should be perfectly and infallibly wise (though without consciousness) as to all its own congruities and capabilities, which

is the doctrine of the Hylozoists; this, I say, is an hypothesis so prodigiously paradoxical, and so outrageously wild, as that very few men ever could have Atheistic faith enough, to swallow it down and digest it. Wherefore, this Hylozoic Atheism hath been very obscure ever since its first emersion, and hath found so few fautors and abettors, that it hath looked like a forlorn and deserted thing. Neither indeed are there any public monuments at all extant, in which it is avowedly maintained, stated, and reduced into any system. Inso-much that we should not have taken any notice of it at this time, as a particular form of Atheism, nor have conjured it up out of its grave, had we not understood, that Strato's ghost had begun to walk of late; and that among some well-wishers to Atheism, despairing in a manner of the Atomic form, this Hylozoic hypothesis began already to be looked upon, as the rising sun of Atheism, —“*Et tanquam spes altera Trojæ,*” it seeming to smile upon them, and flatter them at a distance, with some fairer hopes of supporting that ruinous and desperate cause.

Whereas, on the contrary, that other Atomic Atheism, as it insists upon a true notion of body, that it is nothing but resisting bulk; by which means we, joining issue thereupon, shall be fairly conducted on to a clear decision of this present controversy, as likewise to the disentangling of many other points of philosophy; so it is that, which hath filled the world with the noise of it, for two thousand years past; that, concerning which several volumes have been formerly written, in which it hath been stated and brought into a kind of system; and which hath of late obtained

a resurrection amongst us, together with the Atomic physiology, and been recommended to the world anew, under a specious shew of wit and profound philosophy.

Wherefore, as we could not here insist upon both these forms of Atheism together, because that would have been to confound the language of Atheists, and to have made them, like the Cadmean offspring, to do immediate execution upon themselves; so we were in all reason obliged to make our first and principal assault upon the Atomic Atheism, as being the only considerable, upon this account, because it is that alone, which publicly confronts the world, and like that proud uncircumcised Philistine, openly defies the hosts of the living God; intending nevertheless in the close of this whole discourse (that is, the last book), where we are to determine the right intellectual system of the universe, and to assert an incorporeal Deity, to demonstrate, that life, cogitation, and understanding do not essentially belong to matter, and all substance, as such, but are the peculiar attributes and characteristics of substance incorporeal.

xxxvi. However, since we have now started these several forms of Atheism, we shall not in the mean time neglect any of them neither. For in the answer to the second Atheistic ground, we shall confute them altogether at once, as agreeing in this one fundamental principle, That the original of all things in the universe is senseless matter, or matter devoid of all animality or conscious life.—In the reply to the fourth Atheistic argumentation, we shall briefly hint the grounds of reason, from which incorporeal substance is de-

monstrated. In the examination of the fifth, we shall confute the Anaximandrian Atheism there propounded, which is, as it were, the first sciography and rude delineation of Atheism. And in the confutation of the sixth, we shall shew, how the ancient Atomic Atheists did preventively overthrow the foundation of Hylozoism. Besides all which, in order to a fuller and more thorough confutation, both of the Cosmo-plastic and Hylozoic Atheisms, we shall in this very place take occasion to insist largely upon the plastic life of nature, giving in the first place a true account of it; and then afterwards shewing, how grossly it is misunderstood, and the pretence of it abused, by the assertors of both these Atheistic hypotheses. The heads of which larger digression, because they could not be so conveniently inserted in the contents of the chapter, shall be represented to the reader's view at the end of it.

xxxvii. For we think fit here to observe, that neither the Cosmo-plastic or Stoical, nor the Hylozoic or Stratonical Atheists, are therefore condemned by us, because they suppose such a thing as a plastic nature, or life distinct from the animal; albeit this be not only exploded, as an absolute nonentity, by the Atomic Atheists, who might possibly be afraid of it, as that which approached too near to a Deity, or else would hazard the introducing of it; but also utterly discarded by some professed Theists of later times, who might notwithstanding have an undiscerned tang of the Mechanic Atheism hanging about them, in that their so confident rejecting of all final and intending causality in nature, and admitting of no other causes of things, as philosophical, save the mate-

rial and mechanical only ; this being really to banish all mental, and consequently Divine causality, quite out of the world ; and to make the whole world to be nothing else, but a mere heap of dust fortuitously agitated, or a dead cadaverous thing, that hath no signatures of mind and understanding, counsel and wisdom at all upon it ; nor indeed any other vitality acting in it, than only the production of a certain quantity of local motion, and the conservation of it according to some general laws ; which things the Democritic Atheists take

for granted, would all be as they are,

De Cæl. l. 2.
c. 12. p. 656.
tom. i. oper.

though there were no God. And thus

Aristotle describes this kind of philosophy, that it made the whole world to

consist, *ἐκ σωμάτων μόνον, καὶ μονάδων τάξιν μὲν ἔχόντων, ἀψύχων δὲ πάμπαν*, of nothing but bodies and monads (that is, atoms, or small particles of matter) only ranged and disposed together into such an order, but altogether dead and inanimate.—

2. For unless there be such a thing admitted as a plastic nature, that acts *ἕνεκά του*, for the sake of something, and in order to ends, regularly, artificially and methodically, it seems, that one or other of these two things must be concluded ; that either in the efformation and organization of the bodies of animals, as well as the other phenomena, every thing comes to pass fortuitously, and happens to be as it is, without the guidance and direction of any mind or understanding ; or else, that God himself doth all immediately, and, as it were, with his own hands, form the body of every gnat and fly, insect and mite, as of other animals in generations, all whose members have so much of contrivance in them, that Galen professed he could never

enough admire that artifice, which was in the leg of a fly (and yet he would have admired the wisdom of nature more, had he been but acquainted with the use of microscopes): I say, upon supposition of no plastic nature, one or other of these two things must be concluded; because it is not conceived by any, that the things of nature are all thus administered, with such exact regularity and constancy every where, merely by the wisdom, providence, and efficiency of those inferior spirits, demons, or angels. As also, though it be true, that the works of nature are dispensed by a Divine law and command, yet this is not to be understood in a vulgar sense, as if they were all effected by the mere force of a verbal law or outward command, because inanimate things are not commendable nor governable by such a law. And therefore, besides the Divine will and pleasure, there must needs be some other immediate agent and executioner provided, for the producing of every effect; since not so much as a stone, or other heavy body, could at any time fall downward, merely by the force of a verbal law, without any other efficient cause; but either God himself must immediately impel it, or else there must be some other subordinate cause in nature for that motion. Wherefore, the Divine law and command, by which the things of nature are administered, must be conceived to be the real appointment of some energetic, effectual, and operative cause for the production of every effect.

3. Now to assert the former of these two things, that all the effects of nature come to pass by material and mechanical necessity, or the mere fortuitous motion of matter, without any guidance or

direction, is a thing no less irrational than it is impious and atheistical. Not only because it is utterly inconceivable and impossible, that such infinite regularity and artificialness, as is every where throughout the whole world, should constantly result out of the fortuitous motion of matter; but also because there are many such particular phenomena in nature, as do plainly transcend the powers of mechanism, of which therefore no sufficient mechanical reasons can be devised—as the motion of respiration in animals: as there are also other phenomena, that are perfectly cross to the laws of mechanism; as, for example, that of the distant poles of the equator and ecliptic, which we shall insist upon afterward. Of both which kinds there have been other instances proposed by my learned friend, Dr. More, in his *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, and very ingeniously improved by him to this very purpose, namely, to evince, that there is something in nature besides mechanism, and consequently substance incorporeal.

Moreover, those Theists, who philosophize after this manner, by resolving all the corporeal phenomena into fortuitous mechanism, or the necessary and unguided motion of matter, make God to be nothing else in the world, but an idle spectator of the various results of the fortuitous and necessary motions of bodies; and render his wisdom altogether useless and insignificant, as being a thing wholly enclosed and shut up within his own breast, and not at all acting abroad upon any thing without him.

Furthermore, all such Mechanists as these, whether Theists or Atheists, do, according to that

judicious censure passed by Aristotle, De Part. An. l. 1. c. 1. p. 473. tom. ii. oper. long since, upon Democritus, but substitute as it were *χείρα ξυλίην τέκτονος*, a carpenter's or artificer's wooden hand, moved by strings and wires, instead of a living hand.—They make a kind of dead and wooden world, as it were a carved statue, that hath nothing neither vital nor magical at all in it. Whereas to those, who are considerative, it will plainly appear, that there is a mixture of life or plastic nature, together with mechanism, which runs through the whole corporeal universe.

And whereas it is pretended, not only that all corporeal phenomena may be sufficiently solved mechanically, without any final, intending, and directive causality, but also that all other reasons of things in nature, besides the material and mechanical, are altogether unphilosophical, the same Aristotle^a ingeniously exposes the ridiculousness of this pretence after this manner: telling us, that it is just as if a carpenter, joiner, or carver should give this account, as the only satisfactory, of any artificial fabric or piece of carved imagery, *ὅτι ἐμπεσότος τοῦ ὀργάνου τὸ μὲν κοῖλον ἐγίνετο, τὸ δὲ ἰπίπεδον*, that because the instruments, axes and hatchets, planes and chisels, happened to fall so and so upon the timber, cutting it here and there, that therefore it was hollow in one place, and plain in another, and the like; and by that means the whole came to be of such a form.—For is it not altogether as absurd and ridiculous, for men to undertake^b to give an account of the formation and organization of the bodies of animals, by mere fortuitous mechanism, without any final or intending

^a Ubi supra. ^b Vide Cartes. libr. de Homine, et de Formatione Foetus:

causality, as why there was an heart here, and brains there; and why the heart had so many and such different valves in the entrance and outlet of its ventricles; and why all the other organic parts, veins and arteries, nerves and muscles, bones and cartilages, with the joints and members, were of such a form? Because forsooth, the fluid matter of the seed happened to move so and so in several places, and thereby to cause all those differences, which are also diverse in different animals; all being the necessary result of a certain quantity of motion at first indifferently impressed upon the small particles of the matter of this universe turned round in a vortex. But, as the same Aristotle adds; no carpenter or artificer is so simple, as to give such an account as this, and think it satisfactory, but he will rather declare, that himself directed the

* De Part.
An. l. 1. c. 1.

motion of the instruments, after such a manner, and in order to such ends: * Βέλτιον ὁ τέκτων, οὐ γὰρ ἰκανὸν ἔσται αὐτῷ, τὸ τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἐμπεσόντος τοῦ ὄργανου, &c. ἀλλὰ διότι τὴν πληγὴν ἐποίησατο τοιαύτην, καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα, ἐρεῖ τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅπως τοιόνδε ἢ τοιονδήποτε τὴν μορφήν γένηται. A carpenter would give a better account than so, for he would not think it sufficient to say, that the fabric came to be of such a form, because the instruments happened to fall so and so, but he will tell you that it was because himself made such strokes, and that he directed the instruments and determined their motion after such a manner, to this end, that he might make the whole a fabric fit and useful for such purposes.—And this is to assign the final cause. And certainly there is scarcely any man in his wits, that will not acknowledge the reason of the different valves in the heart from the

apparent usefulness of them, according to those particular structures of their's, to be more satisfactory, than any which can be brought from mere fortuitous mechanism, or the unguided motion of the seminal matter.

4. And as for the latter part of the disjunction, that every thing in nature should be done immediately by God himself; this, as, according to vulgar apprehension, it would render Divine Providence operose, solicitous, and distractious, and thereby make the belief of it to be entertained with greater difficulty, and give advantage to Atheists; so, in the judgment of the writer *De Mundo*, it is not so decorous in respect of God neither, that he should *αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα*, set his own hand, as it were, to every work, and immediately do all the meanest and triflingest things himself drudgingly, without making use of any inferior and subordinate instruments. *Εἴπερ ἄσεμνον* Cap. 7.

ἦν αὐτὸν δοκεῖν Ξέρξην αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα, καὶ διατελεῖν ἂ βούλοιο, καὶ ἐφιστάμενον διοικεῖν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀπρεπὲς ἂν εἴη τῷ θεῷ. Σεμνότερον δὲ καὶ προπρωδέστερον τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, διὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου διηκούσαν, ἥλιον τε κινεῖν καὶ σελήνην, &c. If it were not congruous in respect of the state and majesty of Xerxes, the great king of Persia, that he should condescend to do all the meanest offices himself; much less can this be thought decorous in respect of God. But it seems far more august and becoming of the Divine Majesty, that a certain power and virtue, derived from him, and passing through the universe, should move the sun and moon, and be the immediate cause of those lower things done here upon earth.—

Moreover, it seems not so agreeable to reason

neither, that nature, as a distinct thing from the Deity, should be quite superseded or made to signify nothing, God himself doing all things immediately and miraculously; from whence it would follow also, that they are all done either forcibly and violently, or else artificially only, and none of them by any inward principle of their own.

Lastly: this opinion is further confuted by that slow and gradual process, that is in the generations of things, which would seem to be but a vain and idle pomp, or a trifling formality, if the agent were omnipotent: as also by those *ἀμαρτήματα* (as Aristotle calls them) those errors and bungles, which are committed, when the matter is inept and contumacious; which argue the agent not to be irresistible, and that nature is such a thing, as is not altogether incapable (as well as human art) of being sometimes frustrated and disappointed, by the indisposition of matter. Whereas an omnipotent agent, as it could dispatch its work in a moment, so it would always do it infallibly and irresistibly; no ineptitude or stubbornness of matter being ever able to hinder such a one, or make him bungle or fumble in any thing.

5. Wherefore, since neither all things are produced fortuitously, or by the unguided mechanism of matter, nor God himself may reasonably be thought to do all things immediately and miraculously; it may well be concluded, that there is a plastic nature under him, which, as an inferior and subordinate instrument, doth drudgingly execute that part of his providence, which consists in the regular and orderly motion of matter; yet so as that there is also, besides this, a higher Providence to be acknowledged, which, presiding over

it, doth often supply the defects of it, and sometimes over-rule it; forasmuch as this plastic nature cannot act electively, nor with discretion. And by this means the wisdom of God will not be shut up nor concluded wholly within his own breast, but will display itself abroad, and print its stamps and signatures every where throughout the world; so that God, as Plato^a (after Orpheus^b) speaks, will be not only the beginning and end, but also the middle of all things; they being as much to be ascribed to his causality, as if himself had done them all immediately, without the concurrent instrumentality of any subordinate natural cause. Notwithstanding which, in this way it will appear also to human reason, that all things are disposed and ordered by the Deity, without any solicitous care or distractive providence.

And indeed those mechanic Theists, who, rejecting a plastic nature, affect to concern the Deity as little as is possible in mundane affairs, either for fear of debasing him, and bringing him down to too mean offices, or else of subjecting him to solicitous encumberment; and for that cause would have God to contribute nothing more to the mundane system and economy, than only the first impressing of a certain quantity of motion upon the matter, and the after conserving of it, according to some general laws; these men, I say, seem not very well to understand themselves in this. Forasmuch as they must of necessity, either suppose these their laws of motion to execute themselves, or else be forced perpetually to concern the Deity in the immediate motion of every atom of matter throughout the universe, in order to the

^a De Leg. lib. iv. p. 600. oper.

^b Vide Apul. de Mundo, p. 25.

execution and observation of them. The former of which being a thing plainly absurd and ridiculous, and the latter that, which these philosophers themselves are extremely abhorrent from, we cannot make any other conclusion than this, that they do but unskilfully and unawares establish that very thing, which in words they oppose; and that their laws of nature concerning motion are really nothing else but a plastic nature, acting upon the matter of the whole corporeal universe, both maintaining the same quantity of motion always in it, and also dispensing it (by transferring it out of one body into another) according to such laws, fatally impressed upon it. Now, if there be a plastic nature, that governs the motion of matter every where, according to laws, there can be no reason given, why the same might not also extend farther to the regular disposal of that matter, in the formation of plants and animals, and other things, in order to that apt coherent frame and harmony of the whole universe.

6. And as this plastic nature is a thing, which seems to be in itself most reasonable, so hath it also had the suffrage of the best philosophers in all ages. For, first, it is well known, that Aristotle concerns himself in nothing more zealously than this, that mundane things are not effected merely by the necessary and unguided motion of matter, or by fortuitous mechanism; but by such a nature as acts regularly and artificially for ends; yet so as that this nature is not the highest principle neither, or the supreme Numen, but subordinate to a perfect mind or intellect; he affirming, that *νοῦς αἴτιον καὶ φύσις τοῦδε τοῦ παντός*, that mind, together with nature, was the cause of this universe;

—and that heaven and earth, plants and animals, were framed by them both; that is, by mind as the principal and directive cause, but by nature as a subservient or executive instrument; and elsewhere joining in like manner God and nature both together, as when he concludes, That God and nature do nothing in vain.

Neither was Aristotle the first broacher or inventor of this doctrine, Plato before him having plainly asserted the same. For in a passage already cited, he affirms, that nature, together with reason, and according to it, orders all things; thereby making nature, as a distinct thing from the Deity, to be a subordinate cause under the reason and wisdom of it. And elsewhere he resolves, that there are *ἐμφρονος φύσεως αἰτίαι, αἷς ὑπηρετούσαις ὁ θεὸς χρῆται*, certain causes of a wise and artificial nature, which the Deity uses as subservient to itself;—as also, that there are *ξυναίτια οἷς ξυνεργοῖς θεὸς χρῆται*, con-causes, which God makes use of, as subordinately co-operative with himself.

Moreover, before Plato, Empedocles philosophized also in the same manner, when, supposing two worlds, the one archetypal, the other ectypal, he made *φιλία* and *νεῖκος*, friendship and discord, to be the *ἀρχὴ δραστήριος*, the active principle and immediate operator in this lower world; he not understanding thereby, as Plutarch^a and some others have conceited, two substantial principles in the world, the one of good, the other of evil; but only a plastic nature, as Aristotle in sundry

^a De Iside et Osiride, p. 370. tom ii. oper.

places intimates; which he called by that name, partly because he apprehended, that the result and upshot of nature in all generations and corruptions amounted to nothing more than mixtures and separations, or concretion and secretion of pre-existent things; and partly because this plastic nature is that, which doth reconcile the contrarieties and enmities of particular things, and bring them into one general harmony in the whole. Which latter is a notion, that Plotinus, describing this very seminary reason or plastic nature of the world (though taking it in something a larger

En. 3. 1. 2.
sec. 16. p.
267. oper.

sense than we do in this place), doth ingeniously pursue after this manner: 'Αντιθεῖς δὲ ἀλλήλοις τὰ μέρη, καὶ ποιήσας ἐνδεᾶ, πολέμου καὶ μάχης σύστασιν καὶ γένεσιν ἐργάσατο· καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν εἰς πᾶς, εἰ μὴ ἐν εἴῃ· γινόμενον γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τοῖς μέρεσσι πολέμιον, οὕτως ἐν ἐστὶ καὶ φίλον, ὡς περὶ ἂν εἰ δράματος λόγος εἷς, ὁ τοῦ δράματος, ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ πολλὰς μάχας· τὸ μὲν οὖν δράμα τὰ μεμαχημένα, οἷον εἰς μίαν ἀρμονίαν, ἄγει σύμφωνον.—ὡς τε μᾶλλον ἂν τις τῇ ἀρμονίᾳ τῇ ἐκ μαχομένων εἰκάσειε. The seminary reason or plastic nature of the universe, opposing the parts to one another, and making them severally indigent, produces by that means war and contention. And, therefore, though it be one, yet, notwithstanding, it consists of different and contrary things. For there being hostility in its parts, it is nevertheless friendly and agreeable in the whole; after the same manner as in a dramatic poem, clashings and contentions are reconciled into one harmony. And, therefore, the seminary and plastic nature of the world may fitly be resembled to the harmony of disagreeing things.—Which Plo-

tinic doctrine may well pass for a commentary upon Empedocles, accordingly as Simplicius briefly represents his sense, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δύο κόσμους συνίστησι, τὸν μὲν ἡνωμένον καὶ νοητὸν, τὸν δὲ διακεκριμένον καὶ αἰσθητὸν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ κόσμῳ τὴν ἔνωσιν ὄρα καὶ τὴν διάκρισιν. Empedocles makes two worlds, the one united and intelligible, the other divided and sensible; and in this lower sensible world, he takes notice both of unity and discord.—

In Arist. de Cœl. l. 1. c. 10. p. 71. edit. Græc. Venet. 1526. fol.

It was before observed, that Heraclitus likewise did assert a regular and artificial nature, as the fate of things in this lower world; for his “reason passing through the substance of all things,” or “ethereal body, which was the seed of the generation of the universe,” was nothing but that spermatic or plastic nature which we now speak of. And whereas there is an odd passage of this philosopher’s recorded, ^a κόσμον τόνδε οὔτε τις θεῶς οὔτ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησε, that neither any God nor man made this world,—which, as it is justly derided by Plutarch for its simplicity, so it looks very atheistically at first sight; yet, because Heraclitus hath not been accounted an Atheist, we therefore conceive the meaning of it to have been this, that the world was not made by any whatsoever, after such a manner as an artificer makes a house, by machines and engines, acting from without upon the matter, cumbersomely and moliminously, but by a certain inward plastic nature of its own.

And as Hippocrates followed Heraclitus in this (as was before declared), so did Zeno and the Stoics also; they supposing, besides an intel-

^a Apud Plutarch. de Animæ Procreat. ex Timæo, tom. ii. oper. p. 1014. et apud Clement. Alexandrin. Stromat. lib. v. cap. xiv. p. 711.

lectual nature, as the supreme architect and master-builder of the world, another plastic nature as the immediate workman and operator: which plastic nature hath been already described, in the words of Balbus, as a thing, which acts not fortuitously, but regularly, orderly, and

* In Vita
Zen. lib. vii.
segm. 148. p.
459.

artificially. And Laertius tells* us, it was defined by Zeno himself after this manner: ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις ἐξ αὐτῆς κινουμένη

κατὰ σπερματικούς λόγους, ἀποτελοῦσά τε καὶ συνέχουσα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐν ὀρισμένοις χρόνοις, καὶ τοιαῦτα δρῶσα ἀφ' οἴων ἀπεκρίθη. Nature is a habit moved from itself, according to spermatic reasons or seminal principles, perfecting and containing those several things, which in determinate times are produced from it, and acting agreeably to that from which it was secreted.—

Lastly, as the latter Platonists and Peripatetics have unanimously followed their masters herein, whose vegetative soul also is no other than a plastic nature; so the chemists and Paracelsians insist much upon the same thing, and seem rather to have carried the notion on further, in the bodies of animals, where they call it by a new name of their own—the Archeus.

Moreover, we cannot but observe here, that, as amongst the ancients they were generally condemned for downright Atheists, who acknowledged no other principle besides body or matter, necessarily and fortuitously moved, such as Democritus and the first Ionics: so even Anaxagoras himself, notwithstanding that he was a professed Theist, and plainly asserted mind to be a principle, yet, because he attributed too much to material necessity, admitting neither this

plastic nature nor a mundane soul, was severely censured, not only by the vulgar (who unjustly taxed him for an Atheist), but also by Plato and Aristotle, as a kind of spurious and imperfect Theist, and one who had given great advantage to Atheism. Aristotle, in his *Metaphysics*, thus represents his philosophy:*

* L. 1. c. 4.
pag. 267.
tom. iv. oper.

Ἀναξαγόρας τε γὰρ μηχανῆ χρήται τῷ νοῦ, πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιίαν, καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ, τότε ἔλκει αὐτόν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτιάται τῶν γινομένων ἢ νοῦν. Anaxagoras useth mind and intellect, that is, God, as a machine in the Cosmopœia; and when he is at a loss to give an account of things by material necessity, then, and never but then, does he draw in mind or God to help him out; but otherwise he will rather assign any thing else for a cause than mind.—Now, if Aristotle censure Anaxagoras in this manner, though a professed Theist, because he did but seldom make use of a mental cause for the solving of the phenomena of the world, and only then when he was at a loss for other material and mechanical causes (which it seems he sometimes confessed himself to be), what would that philosopher have thought of those our so confident Mechanists of later times, who will never vouchsafe so much as once to be beholden to God Almighty for any thing in the economy of the corporeal world, after the first impression of motion upon the matter?

Plato, likewise, in his *Phædo*,^a and elsewhere, condemns this Anaxagoras by name for this very thing, that though he acknowledged mind to be

^aP. 393.

a cause, yet he seldom made use of it for solving the phenomena; but in his twelfth *De Legibus*, he perstringeth him unnamed, as one who, though a professed Theist, had, notwithstanding, given great encouragement to Atheism, after

* P. 967.
Steph.

this manner: * Λέγοντες ὡς νοῦς εἶη ὁ διακοσμητικὸς πάνθ' ὅσα κατ' οὐρανὸν, αὐτοὶ δὲ πάλιν ἀμαρτάνοντες ψυχῆς φύσεως, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον εἶη σωμάτων, ἅπανθ' ὡς εἶπεν ἔπος, ἀνέτρεψαν πάλιν, τὰ γὰρ δὲ πρὸ τῶν ὀμμάτων πάντα, αὐτοῖς ἐφάνη, τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν φερόμενα, μεστὰ εἶναι λίθων, καὶ γῆς, καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων ἀψύχων σωμάτων, διανεμόντων τὰς αἰτίας παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου, ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ τότε ἐξεργασμένα πολλὰς ἀθεότητος. Some of them, who had concluded that it was mind that ordered all things in the heavens, themselves erring concerning the nature of the soul, and not making that older than the body, have overturned all again; for heavenly bodies being supposed by them to be full of stones, and earth, and other inanimate things (dispensing the causes of the whole universe), they did by this means occasion much Atheism and impiety.—

Furthermore, the same Plato there tells us, that in those times of his, astronomers and physiologists commonly lay under the prejudice and suspicion of Atheism amongst the vulgar, merely for this reason, because they dealt so much in material causes: Οἱ πολλοὶ διανοοῦνται τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα μεταχειρισμένους, ἀστρονομία τε καὶ ταῖς μετὰ ταύτης ἀναγκαίαις ἄλλαις τέχναις, ἀθέους γίγνθαι, καθεωρακότας ὡς οἴοντε γιγνόμενα ἀνάγκαις τὰ πράγματ', ἀλλ' οὐ διανοίαις βουλήσεως ἀγαθῶν πέρι τελουμένων. The vulgar think, that they who addict themselves to astronomy and physiology, are made Atheists thereby, they seeing as much as is possible, how things come to

pass by material necessities, and being thereby disposed to think them not to be ordered by mind and will, for the sake of good.—From whence we may observe, that, according to the natural apprehensions of men in all ages, they who resolve the phenomena of nature into material necessity, allowing of no final nor mental causality (disposing things in order to ends), have been strongly suspected for friends to Atheism.

7. But because some may pretend, that the plastic nature is all one with an occult quality, we shall here shew, how great a difference there is betwixt these two. For he that asserts an occult quality for the cause of any phenomenon, does indeed assign no cause at all of it, but only declare his own ignorance of the cause: but he that asserts a plastic nature, assigns a determinate and proper cause, nay, the only intelligible cause, of that which is the greatest of all phenomena in the world, namely, the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, the orderly, regular, and artificial frame of things in the universe, whereof the mechanic philosophers, however, pretending to solve all phenomena by matter and motion, assign no cause at all. Mind and understanding is the only true cause of orderly regularity; and he that asserts a plastic nature, asserts mental causality in the world; but the fortuitous Mechanists, who, exploding final causes, will not allow mind and understanding to have any influence at all upon the frame of things, can never possibly assign any cause of this grand phenomenon, unless confusion may be said to be the cause of order, and fortune or chance of constant regularity; and, therefore, themselves must resolve it into an occult quality. Nor, indeed,

does there appear any great reason, why such men should assert an infinite mind in the world, since they do not allow it to act any where at all, and therefore must needs make it to be in vain.

8. Now, this plastic nature being a thing, which is not without some difficulty in the conception of it, we shall here endeavour to do these two things concerning it: first, to set down a right representation thereof; and then afterwards to shew how extremely the notion of it hath been mistaken, perverted, and abused by those Atheists, who would make it to be the only God Almighty, or first principle of all things.

How the plastic nature is in general to be conceived, Aristotle instructs us in these words: * *εἰ ἐνῆν ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ ἢ ναυπηγικὴ ὁμοίως ἂν τῇ φύσει ἐποίει*. If the naupegeical art, that is, the art of the shipwright, were in the timber itself operatively and effectually, it would there act just as nature doth.—And the case is the same for all other arts. If the œconomical art, which is in the mind of the architect, were supposed to be transfused into the stones, bricks, and mortar, there acting upon them in such a manner as to make them come together of themselves, and range themselves into the form of a complete edifice, as Amphion was said, by his harp, to have made the stones move, and place themselves orderly of their own accord, and so to have built the walls of Thebes; or if the musical art were conceived to be immediately in the instruments and strings, animating them as a living soul, and making them to move exactly, according to the laws of harmony, without any external impulse; these, and such like instances,

* Phys. l. 2.

c. 8. pag. 447.

tom. i. oper.

words: * *εἰ ἐνῆν ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ ἢ ναυπηγικὴ ὁμοίως ἂν τῇ φύσει ἐποίει*. If the naupegeical art,

in Aristotle's judgment, would be fit iconisms or representations of the plastic nature, that being art itself acting immediately upon the matter as an inward principle in it. To which purpose the same philosopher adds, that this thing might be further illustrated by another instance or resemblance: *μάλιστα δὲ δῆλον, ὅταν τις ἰατρῆει αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν, τούτῳ γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις.* Nature may be yet more clearly resembled to the medicinal art, when it is employed by the physician in curing himself.—So that the meaning of this philosopher is, that nature is to be conceived as art, acting not from without and at a distance, but immediately upon the thing itself which is formed by it. And thus we have the first general conception of the plastic nature, that it is art itself, acting immediately on the matter as an inward principle.

9. In the next place, we are to observe, that though the plastic nature be a kind of art, yet there are some considerable pre-eminences which it hath above human art; the first whereof is this, that whereas human art cannot act upon the matter otherwise than from without and at a distance, nor communicate itself to it, but with a great deal of tumult and hurliburly, noise and clatter, it using hands and axes, saws and hammers, and after this manner, with much ado, by knockings and thrustings, slowly introducing its form or idea (as, for example, of a ship or house) into the materials; nature, in the mean time, is another kind of art, which, insinuating itself immediately into things themselves, and there acting more commandingly upon the matter as an inward principle, does its work easily, cleverly, and silently. Nature is art as it were incorporated and embo-

died in matter, which doth not act upon it from without mechanically, but from within vitally and magically; οὔτε χεῖρες ἐνταῦθα, οὔτε πόδες, οὔτε τι ὄργανον ἐπακτὸν ἢ σύμφυτον, ὕλης δὲ δεῖ ἐφ' ἧς ποιήσει, καὶ ἦν ἐν εἶδει ποιῆ, πάντιπου δῆλον. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μοχλεύειν ἀφελεῖν ἐκ τῆς φυσικῆς ποιήσεως. ποῖος γὰρ ὠθισμός, ἢ τίς μοχλεία, &c. Here are no hands, nor feet, nor any instrument, connate or adventitious, there being only need of matter to work upon, and to be brought into a certain form, and nothing else. For it is manifest that the operation of nature is different from mechanism, it doing not its work by trusion or pulsion, by knockings or thrustings, as if it were without that which it wrought upon.—But as God is inward to every thing, so nature acts immediately upon the matter, as an inward and living soul, or law in it.

10. Another pre-eminence of nature above human art is this, that whereas human artists are often to seek and at a loss, and therefore consult and deliberate, as also upon second thoughts mend their former work; nature, on the contrary, is never to seek what to do, nor at a stand; and for that reason also (besides another that will be suggested afterwards) it doth never consult nor deliberate. Indeed Aristotle intimates, as if this had been the grand objection of the old Atheistic philosophers against the plastic nature, that because we do not see natural bodies to consult or deliberate, therefore there could be nothing of art, counsel, or contrivance in them; but all came to pass fortuitously.—But he confutes it after this manner: "Ατοπον δὲ τὸ μὴ οἶεσθαι ἕνεκά του γίνεσθαι, εἰάν μὴ ἴδωσι τὸ κινουῦν βουλευσάμενον, καίτοι καὶ ἡ τέχνη οὐ βουλεύεται." It is

Phys. l. 2. c.
8. p. 477. tom.
i. oper.

absurd for men to think nothing to be done for ends, if they do not see that which moves to consult, although art itself doth not consult.— Whence he concludes, that nature may act artificially, orderly, and methodically, for the sake of ends, though it never consult or deliberate. Indeed human artists themselves do not consult properly as they are artists, but whenever they do it, it is for want of art, and because they are to seek, their art being imperfect and adventitious: but art itself, or perfect art, is never to seek, and therefore doth never consult or deliberate; and nature is this art, which never hesitates nor studies, as unresolved what to do, but is always readily prompted; nor does it ever repent afterwards of what it had formerly done, or go about, as it were, upon second thoughts, to alter and mend its former course; but it goes on in one constant unrepenting tenor, from generation to generation, because it is the stamp or impress of that infallibly omniscient art of the Divine understanding, which is the very law and rule of what is simply the best in every thing.

And thus we have seen the difference between nature and human art: that the latter is imperfect art, acting upon the matter from without, and at a distance; but the former is art itself, or perfect art, acting as an inward principle in it. Wherefore, when art is said to imitate nature, the meaning thereof is, that imperfect human art imitates that perfect art of nature, which is really no other than the Divine art itself; as, before Aristotle, Plato had declared in his Sophist,^a in these

^a P. 168. oper.

words: τὰ φύσει λεγόμενα ποιῆσθαι θεία τέχνη. Those things, which are said to be done by nature, are indeed done by Divine art. —

11. Notwithstanding which, we are to take notice in the next place, that as nature is not the Deity itself, but a thing very remote from it, and far below it, so neither is it the Divine art, as it is in itself pure and abstract, but concrete and embodied only; for the Divine art considered in itself, is nothing but knowledge, understanding, or wisdom in the mind of God. Now knowledge and understanding, in its own nature, is *κεχωρισμένον τι*, a certain separate and abstract thing,—and of so subtile and refined a nature, as that it is not capable of being incorporated with matter, or mingled and blended with it, as the soul of it. And therefore Aristotle's second instance, which he propounds as most pertinent to illustrate this business of nature by, namely, of the physician's art curing himself, is not so adequate thereunto; because when the medicinal art cures the physician, in whom it is, it doth not there act as nature, that is, as concrete and embodied art, but as knowledge and understanding only, which is art naked, abstract, and unbodied; as also it doth its work ambagiously, by the physician's willing and prescribing to himself the use of such medicaments, as do but conduce, by removing of impediments, to help that, which is nature indeed, or the inward archeus, to effect the cure. Art is defined by Aristotle^a to be *λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ἀνευ ὕλης*, the reason of the thing without matter;—and so the Divine art or knowledge in the mind of God, is unbodied reason; but nature is *ratio mersa et confusa*,

^a De Partib. Animal. lib. i. cap. i. p. 472. tom. ii. oper.

reason immersed and plunged into matter, and, as it were, fuddled in it, and confounded with it. Nature is not the Divine art archetypal, but only ectypal; it is a living stamp or signature of the Divine wisdom; which, though it act exactly according to its archetype, yet it doth not at all comprehend nor understand the reason of what itself doth. And the difference between these two may be resembled to that between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος; the reason of the mind and conception,—called *verbum mentis*, and the λόγος προφορικός, the reason of external speech;—the latter of which, though it bear a certain stamp and impress of the former upon it, yet itself is nothing but articulate sound devoid of all understanding and sense. Or else we may illustrate this business by another similitude, comparing the Divine art and wisdom to an architect, but nature to a manuary opificer; the difference betwixt which two is thus set forth by Aristotle pertinently to our purpose:

τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ ἕκαστον τιμωτέρους καὶ Met. l. 1. c. 1.
p. 260. tom.
iv. oper.
μᾶλλον εἰδέναι νομίζομεν τῶν χειροτέχνῶν, καὶ
σοφωτέρους, ὅτι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ποιουμένων ἴσασιν.

οἱ δ' ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἔνια, ποιεῖ μὲν, οὐκ εἰδότα δὲ ποιεῖ, οἷον καίει τὸ πῦρ. τα μὲν οὖν ἀψυχα φύσει τιμι ποιεῖν τούτων ἕκαστον· τοὺς δὲ χειροτέχνας δι' ἔθος. We account the architects in every thing more honourable than the manuary opificers, because they understand the reason of things done; whereas the other, as some inanimate things, only do, not knowing what they do; the difference between them being only this, that inanimate things act by a certain nature in them, but the manuary opificer by habit.—Thus nature may be called the *χειροτέχνης*, or manuary opificer, that acts subserviently under the archi-

tectonical art and wisdom of the Divine understanding,^a ἢ ποιεῖ μὲν οὐκ εἰδυῖα, which does do without knowing the reason of what it doth.—

12. Wherefore, as we did before observe the pre-eminences of nature above human art, so we must here take notice also of the imperfections and defects of it, in which respect it falls short of human art, which are likewise two; and the first of them is this, that though it act artificially for the sake of ends, yet itself doth neither intend those ends, nor understand the reason of that it doth. Nature is not master of that consummate art and wisdom, according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and a drudging executioner of the dictates of it. This difference betwixt nature

and abstract art or wisdom is expressed
En. 4.1. 4. c. 13. p. 467. by Plotinus in these words: τί διοίσει τῆς λεγομένης φύσεως φρόνησις; ὅτι ἡ μὲν φρόνησις πρῶτον, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἔσχατον, ἵνδαλμα γάρ φρονήσεως ἡ φύσις, καὶ ψυχῆς ἔσχατον ὄν, ἔσχατον καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐλλαμπόμενον λογὸν ἔχει. οἷον εἰ ἐν κηρῷ βαθεῖ, δικνεῖτο εἰς ἔσχατον ἐπὶ θάτερα ἐν τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ τύπος· ἐνάργους μὲν ὄντος τοῦ ἄνω, ἰχνοῦς δὲ ἀσθενοῦς ὄντος τοῦ κάτω, ὅθεν οὐδὲ οἶδε φύσις, μόνον δὲ ποιεῖ. How doth wisdom differ from that which is called nature? verily in this manner, that wisdom is the first thing, but nature the last and lowest; for nature is but an image or imitation of wisdom, the last thing of the soul, which hath the lowest impress of reason shining upon it; as when a thick piece of wax is thoroughly impressed upon by a seal, that impress, which is clean and distinct in the superior superficies of it, will in the lower side be weak and obscure; and such is the stamp

^a Plotin. libro utrum Stellæ aliquid agant. Ennead. ii. lib. iii. cap. xvii. p. 147.

and signature of nature, compared with that of wisdom and understanding, nature being a thing, which doth only do, but not know.—And elsewhere the same writer declares the difference between the spermatic λόγοι, or reasons, and knowledges or conceptions of the mind in this

manner: Πότερα δὲ οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι οἱ ἐν ψυχῇ En. 2. l. 3. s. 17. p. 147. νοήματα; ἀλλὰ πῶς κατὰ τὰ νοήματα ποιήσει;

ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἐν ὕλῃ ποιεῖ, καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν φυσικῶς, οὐ νόησις, οὐδὲ ὄρασις, ἀλλὰ δύναμις τρεπτικὴ τῆς ὕλης, οὐκ ἐδύια, ἀλλὰ δρωσα μόνον, οἷον τύπον καὶ σχῆμα ἐν ὕδατι. Whether are these plastic reasons or forms in the soul knowledges? but how shall it then act according to those knowledges? for the plastic reason or form acts or works in matter, and that which acts naturally is not intellection nor vision, but a certain power of moving matter, which doth not know, but only do, and makes as it were a stamp or figure in water.

And with this doctrine of the ancients, a modern judicious writer, and sagacious inquirer into nature, seems fully to agree, that nature is such a thing as doth not know, but only do; for after he had admired that wisdom and art, by which the bodies of animals are framed, he concludes that one or other of these two things must needs be acknowledged, that either the vegetative or plastic power of the soul, by which it fabricates and organizes its own body, is more excellent and Divine than the rational; or else, “*In naturæ operibus neque prudentiam nec intellectum inesse, sed ita solum videri conceptui nostro, qui secundum artes nostras et facultates, seu exemplaria a nobismetipsis mutuata, de rebus naturæ divinis judi-*

Harv. de Gen. Animal. Ex. 49.

camus; quasi principia naturæ activa effectus suos eo modo producerent, quo nos opera nostra artificialia solemus:" That in the works of nature there is neither prudence nor understanding, but only it seems so to our apprehensions, who judge of these Divine things of nature according to our own arts and faculties, and patterns borrowed from ourselves; as if the active principles of nature did produce their effects in the same manner as we do our artificial works.—Wherefore we conclude, agreeably to the sense of the best philosophers, both ancient and modern, that nature is such a thing, as, though it act artificially, and for the sake of ends, yet it doth but ape and mimic the Divine art and wisdom, itself not understanding those ends which it acts for, nor the reason of what it doth in order to them; for which cause also it is not capable of consultation or deliberation, nor can it act electively, or with discretion.

13. But because this may seem strange at the first sight, that nature should be said to act *ἐνεκά του*, for the sake of ends,—and regularly or artificially, and yet be itself devoid of knowledge and understanding, we shall therefore endeavour to persuade the possibility, and facilitate the belief of it, by some other instances; and first by that of habits, particularly those musical ones of singing, playing upon instruments, and dancing. Which habits direct every motion of the hand, voice, and body, and prompt them readily, without any deliberation or studied consideration, what the next following note or motion should be. If you jog a sleeping musician, and sing but the first words of a song to him, which he had either himself composed, or learned before, he will presently take it

from you, and that perhaps before he is thoroughly awake, going on with it, and singing out the remainder of the whole song to the end. Thus the fingers of an exercised lutanist, and the legs and whole body of a skilful dancer, are directed to move regularly and orderly, in a long train and series of motions, by those artificial habits in them, which do not themselves at all comprehend those laws and rules of music or harmony, by which they are governed. So that the same thing may be said of these habits, which was said before of nature, that they do not know, but only do. And thus we see there is no reason, why this plastic nature (which is supposed to move body regularly and artificially) should be thought to be an absolute impossibility, since habits do, in like manner, gradually evolve themselves in a long train or series of regular and artificial motions, readily prompting the doing of them, without comprehending that art and reason, by which they are directed. The forementioned philosopher illustrates the seminary reason and plastic nature of the universe, by this very instance : ἡ τοίνυν ἐνέρ-

γεια αὐτῆς τεχνική ὡς περ ἂν ὁ ὀρχούμενος, κινούμενος εἴη. ὁ γὰρ ὀρχιστής, τῇ οὕτω τεχνικῇ En. 3. 1. 2.
c. 16. p. 267.
oper.

ζωῇ ἔοικεν αὐτός, καὶ ἡ τέχνη αὐτὸν κινεῖ, καὶ οὕτω κινεῖ, ὡς τῆς ζωῆς αὐτῆς τοιαύτης πῶς οὕσης. The energy of nature is artificial, as when a dancer moves; for a dancer resembles this artificial life of nature, forasmuch as art itself moves him, and so moves him as being such a life in him.—And agreeably to this conceit, the ancient mythologists represented the nature of the universe, by Pan playing upon a pipe or harp, and being in love with the nymph, Echo; as if nature did, by a kind

of silent melody, make all the parts of the universe every where dance in measure and proportion, itself being, as it were, in the mean time, delighted and ravished with the re-echoing of its own harmony. Habits are said to be an adventitious and acquired nature, and nature was before defined by the Stoics^a to be ἔξις, or a habit: so that there seems to be no other difference between these two, than this, that whereas the one is acquired by teaching, industry, and exercise; the other, as was expressed by Hippocrates,^b is ἀπαίδευτος καὶ οὐκ μαθούσα, unlearned and untaught,—and may in some sense also be said to be αὐτοδίδακτος, self-taught,—though she be indeed always inwardly prompted, secretly whispered into, and inspired by the Divine art and wisdom.

14. Moreover, that something may act artificially and for ends, without comprehending the reason of what it doth, may be further evinced from those natural instincts that are in animals, which without knowledge direct them to act regularly, in order both to their own good, and the good of the universe. As for example: the bees in mellification, and in framing their combs and hexagonal cells, the spiders in spinning their webs, the birds in building their nests, and many other animals in such like actions of their's, which would seem to argue a great sagacity in them, whereas, notwithstanding, as Aristotle observes,^c οὔτε τέχνη, οὔτε ζητήσαντα, οὔτε βουλευσάμενα ποιεῖ. They do these things, neither by art, nor by counsel, nor by any

^a Apud Diogen. Laert. lib. vii. segm. 148. p. 459.

^b Epidemicor. lib. vi. sect. v. p. 509. tom. i. edit. Vander Linden. Vide etiam eundem περὶ τρεφῆς. Sec. viii. p. 597. tom. i. oper.

^c Physicor. lib. ii. cap. x. p. 476. tom. i. oper.

deliberation of their own ;—and, therefore, are not masters of that wisdom, according to which they act, but only passive to the instincts and impresses thereof upon them. And indeed to affirm, that brute animals do all these things by a knowledge of their own, and which themselves are masters of, and that without deliberation and consultation, were to make them to be endued with a most perfect intellect, far transcending that of human reason ; whereas it is plain enough, that brutes are not above consultation, but below it, and that these instincts of nature in them are nothing but a kind of fate upon them.

15. There is, in the next place, another imperfection to be observed in the plastic nature, that as it doth not comprehend the reason of its own action, so neither is it clearly and expressly conscious of what it doth ; in which respect, it doth not only fall short of human art, but even of that very manner of acting, which is in brutes themselves, who, though they do not understand the reason of those actions, that their natural instincts lead them to, yet they are generally conceived to be conscious of them, and to do them by fancy ; whereas, the plastic nature in the formation of plants and animals seems to have no animal fancy, no express *συναίσθησις*, con-sense, or consciousness of what it doth. Thus the often commended philosopher : *ἡ φύσις οὐδὲ φαντασίαν ἔχει, ἡ δὲ νόησις φαντασίας κρείττων, φαντασία δὲ μεταξύ φύσεως τύπου καὶ νόησεως ἡ μὲν γὰρ οὐθενὸς ἀντίληψιν οὐδὲ σύνεσιν ἔχει.* Nature hath not so much as any fancy in it ; as intellection and knowledge is a thing superior to fancy, so fancy is superior to the impress of nature, for nature hath no

En. 4. l. 4.
s. 13. lib. ii.
de Dubitat.
Animæ.
P. 407.

apprehension nor conscious perception of any thing. In a word, nature is a thing, that hath no such self-perception or self-enjoyment in it, as animals have.

16. Now we are well aware, that this is a thing, which the narrow principles of some late philosophers will not admit of, that there should be any action distinct from local motion besides expressly conscious cogitation. For they making the first general heads of all entity to be extension and cogitation, or extended being and cogitative; and then supposing, that the essence of cogitation consists in express consciousness, must needs by this means exclude such a plastic life of nature, as we speak of, that is supposed to act without animal fancy or express consciousness. Wherefore, we conceive, that the first heads of being ought rather to be expressed thus; resisting or antitypous extension, and life, (i. e. internal energy and self-activity;) and then again, that life or internal self-activity is to be subdivided into such as either acts with express consciousness and *synæsthesis*, or such as is without it; the latter of which is this plastic life of nature: so that there may be an action distinct from local motion, or a vital energy, which is not accompanied with that fancy, or consciousness, that is in the energies of the animal life; that is, there may be a simple internal energy, or vital autokinesy, which is without that duplication, that is included in the nature of *συναίσθησις*, con-sense and consciousness,—which makes a being to be present with itself, attentive to its own actions, or animadversive of them, to perceive itself to do or suffer, and to have a fruition or enjoyment of itself. And indeed it must be granted,

that what moves matter or determines the motion of it vitally, must needs do it by some other energy of its own, as it is reasonable also to conceive, that itself hath some vital sympathy with that matter, which it acts upon. But we apprehend, that both these may be without clear and express consciousness. Thus the philosopher :

πάσα ζωὴ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ φαύλη, ἐνέργεια δὲ, οὐχ ὡς τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς, καὶ μὴ αἰσθησίς τις παρῆ, κινήσις τις οὐκ εἰκῆ.

En. 3. l. 2.
c. 16. lib. i.
de Provid.
p. 267.

Every life is energy, even the worst of lives, and therefore that of nature ; whose energy is not like that of fire, but such an energy, as though there be no sense belonging to it, yet is it not temerarious or fortuitous, but orderly and regular.—

Wherefore this controversy, whether the energy of the plastic nature be cogitation or no, seems to be but a logomachy, or contention about words. For if clear and express consciousness be supposed to be included in cogitation, then it must needs be granted, that cogitation doth not belong to the plastic life of nature ; but if the notion of that word be enlarged, so as to comprehend all action distinct from local motion, and to be of equal extent with life, then the energy of nature is cogitation.

Nevertheless, if any one think fit to attribute some obscure and imperfect sense or perception, different from that of animals, to the energy of nature, and will therefore call it a kind of drowsy, unawakened, or astonished cogitation, the philosopher before mentioned will not very much gainsay it: Εἴτις βούληται σύνεσιν τινα ἢ αἰσθησιν αὐτῇ διδόναι, οὐχ οἷαν λέγομεν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὴν αἰσθησιν ἢ τὴν σύνησιν, ἀλλ' οἷον εἴτις τὴν τοῦ ὕπνου τῆ τοῦ ἐργηγορότος

En. 3. lib. 8.
s. 3. Libro
de Natura,
contemplat.
et uno, p.
345. s.

προσεκασίει. If any will needs attribute some kind of apprehension or sense to nature, then it must not be such a sense or apprehension, as is in animals, but something that differs as much from it, as the sense or cogitation of one in a profound sleep differs from that of one who is awake.— And since it cannot be denied, but that the plastic nature hath a certain dull and obscure idea of that, which it stamps and prints upon matter, the same philosopher* himself sticks not to call this idea of nature, θέαμα and θεώρημα, a spectacle and contemplation, as likewise the energy of nature towards it, θεωρία ἄψοφος, a silent contemplation;—nay, he allows, that nature may be said to be, in some sense, φιλοθεάμων, a lover of spectacles or contemplation.—

17. However, that there may be some vital energy without clear and express συναίσθησις, conscience and consciousness, animadversion, attention, or self-perception, seems reasonable upon several accounts. For, first, those philosophers themselves, who make the essence of the soul to consist in cogitation, and again, the essence of cogitation in clear and express consciousness, cannot render it any way probable, that the souls of men in all profound sleeps, lethargies, and apoplexies, as also of embryos in the womb, from their very first arrival thither, are never so much as one moment without expressly conscious cogitations; which, if they were, according to the principles of their philosophy, they must, *ipso facto*, cease to have any being. Now, if the souls of men and animals be at any time without con-

* Ubi supra.

sciousness and self-perception, then it must needs be granted, that clear and express consciousness is not essential to life. There is some appearance of life and vital sympathy in certain vegetables and plants, which, however called sensitive-plants and plant-animals, cannot well be supposed to have animal sense and fancy, or express consciousness in them; although we are not ignorant, in the mean time, how some endeavour to solve all those phenomena mechanically. It is certain, that our human souls themselves are not always conscious of whatever they have in them; for even the sleeping geometrician hath, at that time, all his geometrical theorems and knowledges some way in him; as also the sleeping musician, all his musical skill and songs; and, therefore, why may it not be possible for the soul to have likewise some actual energy in it, which it is not expressly conscious of? We have all experience, of our doing many animal actions non-attendingly, which we reflect upon afterwards; as, also, that we often continue a long series of bodily motions, by a mere virtual intention of our minds, and as it were by half a cogitation. That vital sympathy, by which our soul is united and tied fast, as it were with a knot, to the body, is a thing that we have no direct consciousness of, but only in its effects. Nor can we tell, how we come to be so differently affected in our souls, from the many different motions made upon our bodies. As, likewise, we are not conscious to ourselves of that energy, whereby we impress variety of motions and figurations upon the animal spirits of our brain in our fantastic thoughts. For, though the geometrician perceive himself to make lines,

triangles, and circles in the dust with his finger, yet he is not aware, how he makes all those same figures first upon the corporeal spirits of his brain, from whence, notwithstanding, as from a glass, they are reflected to him, fancy being rightly concluded by Aristotle^a to be a weak and obscure sense. There is also another more interior kind of plastic power in the soul (if we may so call it), whereby it is formative of its own cogitations, which itself is not always conscious of; as when, in sleep or dreams, it frames interlocutory discourses betwixt itself and other persons, in a long series; with coherent sense and apt connections, in which oftentimes it seems to be surprised with unexpected answers and repartees, though itself were all the while the poet and inventor of the whole fable. Not only our nictations for the most part when we are awake, but also our nocturnal volutations in sleep, are performed with very little or no consciousness. Respiration, or that motion of the diaphragma and other muscles which causes it (there being no sufficient mechanical account of it), may well be concluded to be always a vital motion, though it be not always animal; since no man can affirm, that he is perpetually conscious to himself of that energy of his soul, which does produce it when he is awake, much less when asleep. And, lastly, the Cartesian^b attempts to solve the motion of the heart mechanically, seem to be abundantly confuted by autopsy and experiment, evincing the systole of the heart to be a muscular constriction, caused

^a Lib. iii. de Anima, cap. iii. iv. p. 45. s. tom. ii. oper.

^b Vide Cartes. Libr. de Homine et de Formatione Foetus, p. ii. p. 195. s.

by some vital principle, to make which, nothing but a pulsific corporeal quality in the substance of the heart itself, is very unphilosophical and absurd. Now, as we have no voluntary imperium at all upon the systole and diastole of the heart, so are we not conscious to ourselves of any energy of our own soul that causes them; and therefore we may reasonably conclude from hence also, that there is some vital energy, without animal fancy or synæsthesis, express consciousness and self-perception.

18. Wherefore, the plastic nature, acting neither by knowledge nor by animal fancy, neither electively nor hormetically, must be concluded to act fatally, magically, and sympathetically. And thus that curious and diligent inquirer into nature, before commended, resolves: “*Natura tanquam fato quodam, seu manda-* Harvey de
Gen. An. *to secundum leges operante, movet;*”

Nature moveth as it were by a kind of fate or command, acting according to laws.—Fate, and the laws or commands of the Deity, concerning the mundane economy (they being really the same thing), ought not to be looked upon, neither as verbal things, nor as mere will and cogitation in the mind of God, but as an energetical and effectual principle, constituted by the Deity, for the bringing of things decreed to pass. The Aphrodisian philosopher,^a with others of the ancients, have concluded, that fate and nature are but two different names for one and the same thing; and that *τότε εἰμαρμένον κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν εἰμαρμένον*, both that which is done fatally is done naturally, and also whatever is done naturally is

^a *Libr. de Fato, sec. 6. p. 25. edit. Londin.*

done fatally:—but that which we assert in this place is only this, that the plastic nature may be said to be the true and proper fate of matter, or the corporeal world. Now, that which acts not by any knowledge or fancy, will or appetite, of its own, but only fatally, according to laws and impresses made upon it (but differently in different cases), may be said also to act magically and sympathetically. Ἡ ἀληθινὴ μαγεία (saith the philosopher*) ἢ ἐν τῷ παντὶ φιλία καὶ νεῖκος, The true magic is the friendship and discord that is in the universe.—And again, magic is said to be founded, ἐν τῇ συμπαθείᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν δυνάμεων τῶν πολλῶν ποικιλίᾳ πρὸς ἐν ζῶον συντελούντων, in the sympathy and variety of diverse powers conspiring together into one animal.—Of which passages, though the principal meaning seem to be this, that the ground of magical fascinations is one vital unitive principle in the universe; yet they imply also, that there is a certain vital energy, not in the way of knowledge and fancy, will and animal appetite, but fatally sympathetic and magical. As, indeed, that mutual sympathy, which we have constant experience of, betwixt our soul and our body (being not a material and mechanical, but vital thing), may be called also magical.

19. From what hath been hitherto declared concerning the plastic nature, it may appear, that though it be a thing that acts for ends artificially, and which may be also called the Divine art, and the fate of the corporeal world; yet, for all that, it is neither god nor goddess, but a low and imperfect creature. Forasmuch as it is not master

* Plotin. lib. ii. de Dubit. Animæ, Ennead. iv. lib. v. cap. xl. p. 434.

of that reason and wisdom, according to which it acts, nor does it properly intend those ends, which it acts for; nor, indeed, is it expressly conscious of what it doth, it not knowing, but only doing, according to commands and laws impressed upon it. Neither of which things ought to seem strange or incredible, since nature may as well act regularly and artificially, without any knowledge and consciousness of its own, as forms of letters compounded together may print coherent philosophic sense, though they understand nothing at all; and it may also act for the sake of those ends, that are not intended by itself, but some higher being, as well as the saw or hatchet in the hand of the architect or mechanic

doth: τὸ σκέπαρον ἐνεκά του πελεκᾶ, ἀλλ' οὐ προλογοῦμενον, ἀλλὰ τῷ προλογοῦμένῳ ὑπηρετοῦν; the axe cuts for the sake of some-

Simplic. in
Arist. Phys.
l. 2. p. 33.
edit. Græc.

thing, though itself does not ratiocinate, nor intend nor design any thing, but is only subservient to that which does so.—It is true, that our human actions are not governed by such exact reason, art, and wisdom, nor carried on with such constancy, evenness, and uniformity, as the actions of nature are; notwithstanding which, since we act according to a knowledge of our own, and are masters of that wisdom, by which our actions are directed, since we do not act fatally only, but electively and intendingly, with consciousness and self-perception, the rational life that is in us ought to be accounted a much higher and more noble perfection than that plastic life of nature. Nay, this plastic nature is so far from being the first and highest life, that it is indeed the last and lowest of all lives, it being really the same thing with the

vegetative, which is inferior to the sensitive. The difference betwixt nature and wisdom was before observed, that wisdom is the first and highest thing, but nature the last and lowest; this latter being but an umbratile imitation of the former. And to this purpose, this plastic nature is further described by the same philosopher, in these

En. 3. l. 2.
c. 16. libr. i.
de Providentia, p.
267.

words: ἔστι τοίνυν οὗτος ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἄκρατος νοῦς, οὐδ' αὐτονοῦς, οὐδέγε ψυχῆς καθαρᾶς τὸ γένος· ἠρτημένος δὲ ἐκείνης, καὶ οἷον ἔκλαμψις ἐξ ἀμφοῖν νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ ψυχῆς κατὰ νοῦν διακειμένης γεννησάντων τὸν λόγον τοῦτον. The

spermatic reason or plastic nature is no pure mind or perfect intellect, nor any kind of pure soul neither; but something which depends upon it, being as it were an effulgency or radiation from both together, mind and soul, or soul affected according to mind, generating the same as a lower kind of life.—

And though this plastic nature contain no small part of Divine providence in it; yet, since it is a thing that cannot act electively nor with discretion, it must needs be granted, that there is a higher and Diviner providence than this, which also presides over the corporeal world itself;

which was a thing likewise insisted upon by that philosopher: Γίνεται τὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ οὐ κατὰ σπερματικούς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγους περιληπτικούς, καὶ τῶν προτέρων, ἢ κατὰ τοῦς τῶν σπερμολόγων λόγους, οὐ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σπερματικοῖς λόγοις ἐνι, καὶ τῶν γενομένων, παρὰ τοῦς σπερματικούς αὐτοῦς λόγους. The things in the world are not administered merely by spermatic reasons, but by perileptic (that is, comprehensive, intellectual reasons), which are in order of nature before

En. 4. l. 4.
c. 39. libr.
ii. de Dub.
Animæ, p.
433.

the other, because in the spermatic reasons cannot be contained that which is contrary to them, &c.—Where, though this philosopher may extend his spermatic reasons further than we do our plastic nature in this place (which is only confined to the motions of matter), yet he concludes, that there is a higher principle presiding over the universe than this. So that it is not *ratio mersa et confusa*, a reason drowned in matter, and confounded with it,—which is the supreme governor of the world, but a providence perfectly intellectual, abstract, and released.

20. But, though the plastic nature be the lowest of all lives, nevertheless, since it is a life, it must needs be incorporeal; all life being such. For body being nothing but antitypous extension, or resisting bulk, nothing but mere outside, *aliud extra aliud*, together with passive capability, hath no internal energy, self-activity, or life belonging to it; it is not able so much as to move itself, and therefore much less can it artificially direct its own motion. Moreover, in the efformation of the bodies of animals, it is one and the self-same thing that directs the whole. That which contrives and frames the eye, cannot be a distinct thing from that which frames the ear; nor that which makes the hand, from that which makes the foot; the same thing, which delineates the veins, must also form the arteries; and that which fabricates the nerves, must also project the muscles and joints; it must be the same thing that designs and organizes the heart and brain, with such communications betwixt them; one and the self-same thing must needs have in it the entire idea, and the complete model or platform of the

whole organic body. For the several parts of matter distant from one another, acting alone by themselves, without any common directrix, being not able to confer together, nor communicate with each other, could never possibly conspire to make up one such uniform and orderly system or compages, as the body of every animal is. The same is to be said likewise concerning the plastic nature of the whole corporeal universe, in which *ἅπαντα πρὸς ἓν συντέτακται*, all things are ordered together conspiringly into one.—It must be one and the same thing, which formeth the whole, or else it could never have fallen into such an uniform order and harmony. Now that which is one and the same, acting upon several distant parts of matter, cannot be corporeal.

Indeed Aristotle is severely censured by some learned men for this, that though he talk every where of such a nature as acts regularly, artificially, and methodically, in order to the best, yet he does no where positively declare, whether this nature of his be corporeal or incorporeal, substantial or accidental; which yet is the less to be wondered at in him, because he does not clearly determine these same points concerning the rational soul neither, but seems to stagger uncertainly about them. In the mean time it cannot be denied, but that Aristotle's followers do for the most part conclude this nature of his to be corporeal; whereas, notwithstanding, according to the principles of this philosophy, it cannot possibly be such: for there is nothing else attributed to body in it, besides these three, matter, form, and accidents; neither of which can be the Aristotelic nature. First, it cannot be matter; because nature, ac-

According to Aristotle, is supposed to be the principle of motion and activity, which matter in itself is devoid of. Moreover, Aristotle concludes,^a that they, who assign only a material cause, assign no cause at all *τοῦ εὔ και καλῶς*, of well and fit, of that regular and artificial frame of things which is ascribed to nature; upon both which accounts, it is determined by that philosopher,^b that *ἡ φύσις μᾶλλον ἀρχὴ και αἰτία τῆς ὕλης*, nature is more a principle and cause than matter;—and therefore it cannot be one and the same thing with it. Again, it is as plain, that Aristotle's nature cannot be the forms of particular bodies neither, as vulgar Peripatetics seem to conceive, these being all generated and produced by nature, and as well corruptible as generable. Whereas nature is such a thing as is neither generated nor corrupted, it being the principle and cause of all generation and corruption. To make nature, and the material forms of bodies, to be one and the self-same thing, is all one, as if one should make the seal (with the stamper too) to be one and the same thing with the signature upon the wax. And, lastly, Aristotle's nature can least of all be the accidents or qualities of bodies; because these act only in virtue of their substance, neither can they exercise any active power over the substance itself in which they are; whereas the plastic nature is a thing that domineers over the substance of the whole corporeal universe, and which, subordinately to the Deity, put both heaven and earth in this frame in which now it is. Wherefore,

^a Metaphys. lib. i. cap. iii. p. 266. tom. iv. oper.

^b De Partib. Animal. lib. i. cap. i. p. 475. tom. ii. oper. Vide etiam Physicor. lib. ii. cap. i. p. 462.

since Aristotle's nature can be neither the matter, nor the forms, nor the accidents of bodies, it is plain, that, according to his own principles, it must be incorporeal.

21. Now, if the plastic nature be incorporeal; then it must of necessity be either an inferior power or faculty of some soul, which is also conscious, sensitive, or rational; or else a lower substantial life by itself, devoid of animal consciousness. The Platonists seem to affirm both these together, namely, that there is a plastic nature lodged in all particular souls of animals, brutes, and men, and also that there is a general plastic or spermatic principle of the whole universe distinct from their higher mundane soul, though subordinate to it, and dependant upon it:^a ἡ λεγομένη φύσις γέννημα ψυχῆς προτέρας δυνατώτερον ζώσης, That which is called nature, is the offspring of an higher soul, which hath a more powerful life in it.—And though Aristotle do not so clearly acknowledge the incorporeity and substantiality of souls, yet he concurs very much with this Platonic doctrine, that nature is either a lower power, or faculty of some conscious soul, or else an inferior kind of life by itself, depending upon a superior soul.

And this we shall make to appear from his book *De Partibus Animalium*, after we have taken notice of some considerable preliminary passages in it in order thereunto. For having first declared, that besides the material cause, there are other causes also of natural generations, namely, these two, ἥτε οὐ ἕνεκα καὶ ὄθεν ἡ

^a Plotin. Libr. de Natura, Contemplatione, et Uno, Ennead. iii. lib. viii. cap. iii. p. 345. oper.

ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, that for whose sake (or the final cause), and that from which the principle of motion is,—or the efficient cause; he determines, that the former of these two is the principal: φαίνεται δὲ πρώτη ἢν λέγομεν ἕνεκά τινος. λόγος γὰρ οὗτος, ἀρχὴ δὲ ὁ λόγος, ὁμοίως, ἔντε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς φύσει συνεστηκόσιν. The chiefest of these two causes seems to be the final or the intending cause; for this is reason, and reason is alike a principle in artificial and in natural things.—Nay, the philosopher adds, excellently, that there is more of reason and art in the things of nature, than there is in those things that are artificially made by men: μᾶλλον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς φύσεως ἔργοις, ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τέχνης. There is more of final or intending causality, and of the reason of good, in the works of nature, than in those of human art.—After which he greatly complains of the first and most ancient physiologers, meaning thereby Anaximander, and those other Ionics before Anaxagoras, that they considered only τὴν ὑλικὴν ἀρχὴν, the material principle and cause of things,—without attending to those two other causes, the principle of motion, and that which aims at ends; they talking only of fire, water, air, and earth, and generating the whole world from the fortuitous course of these senseless bodies. But at length Aristotle falls upon Democritus, who, being junior to those others before-mentioned, philosophized after the same Atheistical manner, but in a new way of his own, by atoms; acknowledging no other nature, neither in the universe, nor in the bodies of animals, than that of fortuitous mechanism, and supposing all things to arise from the different compositions of magnitudes, figures,

sites, and motions. Of which Democritic philosophy he gives his censure in these following words: *εἰ μὲν οὖν τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῷ*

De Part. An.
lib. 1. c. 1,

χρώματι ἕκαστόν ἐστι, τῶν τε ζώων καὶ τῶν μορίων, ὁρθῶς ἂν Δημόκριτος λέγοι, &c. If animals and their several parts did consist of nothing but figure and colour, then indeed Democritus would be in the right; but a dead man hath the same form and figure of body, that he had before, and yet for all that he is not a man; neither is a brazen or wooden hand a hand, but only equivocally, as a painted physician, or pipes made of stone, are so called. No member of a dead man's body is that which it was before, when he was alive, neither eye, nor hand, nor foot. Wherefore, this is but a rude way of philosophizing, and just as if a carpenter should talk of a wooden hand. For thus these physiologers declare the generations and causes of figures only, or the matter out of which things are made, as air and earth. Whereas, no artificer would think it sufficient to render such a cause of any artificial fabric, because the instrument happened to fall so upon the timber, that therefore it was hollow here, and plane there; but rather because himself made such strokes, and for such ends, &c.

Now, in the close of all, this philosopher at length declares, that there is another principle of corporeal things, besides the material, and such as is not only the cause of motion, but also acts artificially in order to ends, *ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον ὃ δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν φύσιν*, there is such a thing as that which we call nature;—that is, not the fortuitous motion of senseless matter, but a plastic regular and artificial nature, such as acts for ends and good; de-

clarifying, in the same place, what this nature is; namely, that it is ψυχὴ, ἢ ψυχῆς μέρος, ἢ μὴ ἀνευ ψυχῆς, soul, or part of soul, or not without soul;—and from thence inferring, that it properly belongs to a physiologer, to treat concerning the soul also. But he concludes afterwards, οὐδὲ πᾶσα ψυχὴ φύσις, that the whole soul is not nature;—whence it remains, that, according to Aristotle's sense, nature is ἢ ψυχῆς μέρος, ἢ μὴ ἀνευ ψυχῆς, either part of a soul, or not without soul;—that is, either a lower part or faculty of some conscious soul; or else an inferior kind of life by itself, which is not without soul, but subordinate to it, and dependent on it.

22. As for the bodies of animals, Aristotle^a first resolves in general, that nature in them is either the whole soul, or else some part of it; φύσις ὡς ἡ κινουῖσα, καὶ ὡς τὸ τέλος τοῦ ζώου, ἢτοι πᾶσα ἢ ψυχὴ, ἢ μέρος τι αὐτῆς. Nature, as the moving principle, or as that which acts artificially for ends (so far as concerns the bodies of animals), is either the whole soul, or else some part of it.—But afterward he determines more particularly, that the plastic nature is not the whole soul in animals, but only some part of it; οὐ πᾶσα ψυχὴ φύσις, ἀλλὰ τι μέρος αὐτῆς, that is, nature in animals, properly so called, is some lower power or faculty lodged in their respective souls, whether sensitive or rational.

And that there is plastic nature in the souls of animals, the same Aristotle elsewhere affirms and proves after this manner: τί De An. l. 2. c. 4. p. 26. s. tom. ii. oper. τὸ συνέχον εἰς τ' ἀναντία φερόμενα, τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὴν γῆν· διασπασθήσεται γὰρ εἰ μῆτι ἔσται τὸ κωλύσον, εἰδ' ἔστι, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἢ ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ἀνξάνεσθαι καὶ τρέφεσθαι. What is that, which, in the bo-

^a De Partib. Animal. lib. i. cap. i. p. 473.

dies of animals, holds together such things as, of their own nature, would otherwise move contrary ways, and fly asunder, as fire and earth, which would be distracted and dissipated, the one tending upwards, the other downwards, were there not something to hinder them? Now if there be any such thing, this must be the soul, which is also the cause of nourishment and augmentation.—Where the philosopher adds, that though some were of opinion, that fire was that, which was the cause of nourishment and augmentation in animals, yet this was indeed but *συναίτιον πῶς, οὐ μὴν ἀπλῶς γε αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ μάλλον ἢ ψυχὴ*, only the concause or instrument, and not simply the cause, but rather the soul.—And to the same pur-

De Resp. c. 8.
p. 141. tom.
ii. oper.

pose he philosophizeth elsewhere, *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἢ πέψις δι' ἧς ἢ τροφή γίνεται τοῖς ζώοις οὔτε ἄνευ ψυχῆς, οὔτε θερμότητός ἐστι, πυρὶ γὰρ ἐργάζεται πάντα*. Neither is concoction, by which nourishment is made in animals, done without the soul, nor without heat, for all things are done by fire.

And certainly it seems very agreeable to the phenomena, to acknowledge something in the bodies of animals superior to mechanism, as that may well be thought to be, which keeps the more fluid parts of them constantly in the same form and figure, so as not to be enormously altered in their growth by disproportionate nourishment; that, which restores flesh that was lost, consolidates dissolved continuities, incorporates the newly-received nourishment, and joins it continuously with the pre-existent parts of flesh and bone; which regenerates and repairs veins consumed or cut off; which causes dentition in so regular a manner, and that, not only in infants, but also adult

persons; that which casts off excrements, and dischargeth superfluities; which makes things seem ungrateful to an interior sense, that were notwithstanding pleasing to the taste: that nature of Hippocrates,* that is the curatrix of diseases, αἱ φύσεις τῶν νοσέων ἰητροὶ, and that archeus of the chymists or Paracelsians, to which all medicaments are but subservient, as being able to effect nothing of themselves without it: I say, there seems to be such a principle as this in the bodies of animals, which is not mechanical but vital; and therefore, since entities are not to be multiplied without necessity, we may with Aristotle conclude it to be μέρος, or μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς, a certain part of the soul of those animals, or a lower unconscious power lodged in them.

23. Besides this plastic nature, which is in animals, forming their several bodies artificially, as so many microcosms, or little worlds, there must be also a general plastic nature in the macrocosm, the whole corporeal universe, that which makes all things thus to conspire every where, and agree together into one harmony. Concerning which plastic nature of the universe, the author *De Mundo*^b writes after this manner: καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διεκόσμησε μία ἢ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα δύναμις, one power passing through all things ordered and formed the whole world.—Again, he calls the same^c πνεῦμα, καὶ ἔμφυχον, καὶ γόνιμον οὐσίαν, a spirit, and a living and generative nature;—and plainly declares it to be a thing distinct from the Deity, but subordinate to it and dependent on it. But Aristotle himself in that genuine work of his be-

* Epidemic. lib. vi. sect. v. p. 809. tom. i. oper. edit. Vander Linden.

^b Cap. v. p. 856. inter Arist. opera, tom. i. ^c Ib. cap. iv. p. 852.

fore-mentioned, speaks clearly and positively concerning this plastic nature of the universe, as well as that of animals, in these words:—

De Part. An.
lib. 1. c. 1.
p. 474.

φαίνεται γὰρ ὡς περ ἐν τοῖς τεχναστοῖς ἢ τέχνη, οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς πράγμασιν ἄλλη τις ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τοιαύτη ἣν ἔχομεν, καθάπερ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐκ τοῦ παντός· διὸ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν γεγενῆσθαι ὑπὸ τοιαύτης αἰτίας, εἰ γέγονε, καὶ εἶναι διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν μᾶλλον, ἢ τὰ ζῶα τὰ θνητά· τὸ γοῦν τεταγμένον καὶ ὠρισμένον πολὺ μᾶλλον φαίνεται ἐν τοῖς οὐρανόις, ἢ περὶ ἡμᾶς· τὸ δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε, περὶ τὰ θνητά μᾶλλον· οἱ δὲ τῶν μὲν ζώων ἕκαστον φύσει φασιν εἶναι καὶ γενέσθαι τὸν δ' οὐρανὸν ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου τοιοῦτον συστήναι, ἐν ᾧ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἀταξίας οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν φαίνεται· It seemeth, that as there is art in artificial things, so in the things of nature there is another such like principle or cause, which we ourselves partake of; in the same manner as we do of heat and cold, from the universe. Wherefore, it is more probable, that the whole world was at first made by such a cause as this (if at least it were made) and that it is still conserved by the same, than that mortal animals should be so; for there is much more of order and determinate regularity in the heavenly bodies than in ourselves; but more of fortuitousness and inconstant irregularity among these mortal things. Notwithstanding which, some there are, who, though they cannot but acknowledge, that the bodies of animals were all framed by an artificial nature, yet they will needs contend, that the system of the heavens sprung merely from fortune and chance; although there be not the least appearance of fortuitousness or temerity in it.— And then he sums up all into this conclusion: ὡστε εἶναι φανερόν ὅτι ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον ὃ δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν

φύσιν: Wherefore, it is manifest, that there is some such thing as that which we call nature;—that is, that there is not only an artificial, methodical, and plastic nature in animals, by which their respective bodies are framed and conserved; but also, that there is such a general plastic nature likewise in the universe, by which the heavens and whole world are thus artificially ordered and disposed.

24. Now whereas Aristotle, in the forecited words, tells us, that we partake of life and understanding from that in the universe, after the same manner as we partake of heat and cold from that heat and cold that is in the universe; it is observable, that this was a notion borrowed from Socrates (as we understand both from Xenophon and Plato); that philosopher having used it as an argumentation to prove a Deity. And the sense of it is represented after this manner by the Latin poet:*

Principio cœlum ac terram, camposque liquentes,
Lucentemque globum lunæ, Titaniaque astra,
Spiritus intus alit, totosque infusa per artus,
Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.
Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitæque volantium.

From whence it may be collected, that Aristotle did suppose this plastic nature of the universe to be ἡ μέρος ψυχῆς, ἢ μὴ ἄνευ ψυχῆς, either part of some mundane soul,—that was also conscious and intellectual (as that plastic nature in animals is), or at least some inferior principle, depending on such a soul.—And indeed whatever the doctrine of the modern Peripatetics be, we make no doubt at all but that Aristotle himself held the world's animation, or a mundane soul: forasmuch as he plainly

* Virgil. Æneid. lib. vi. vers. 724.

declares himself concerning it elsewhere in his book *De Cælo*, after this manner:—

Lib. 2. c. 12.
p. 656. tom.
i. oper.

ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ὡς περὶ σωμάτων μόνον αὐτῶν, καὶ μονάδων, τάξιν μὲν ἔχόντων, ἀψύχων δὲ πάντων, διανοοῦμεθα· δεῖ δὲ ὡς μετεχόντων ὑπολαμβάνειν πράξεως καὶ ζωῆς· But we commonly think of the heavens as nothing else but bodies and monads, having only a certain order, but altogether inanimate; whereas we ought, on the contrary, to conceive of them as partaking of life and action:—that is, as being indued with a rational or intellectual life. For so Simplicius^a there rightly expounds the place; δεῖ δὲ ὡς περὶ ἐμψύχων αὐτῶν συλλογίζεσθαι, καὶ λογικὴν ἔχόντων ψυχὴν, ὡς καὶ πράξεως καὶ ζωῆς λογικῆς μετέχειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ψυχῶν κατηγοροῦμεν, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἀψύχων σωμάτων, τὸ δὲ πράττειν κυρίως κατὰ τῶν λογικῶν ψυχῶν κατηγοροῦμεν· But we ought to think of the heavens as animated with a rational soul, and thereby partaking of action and rational life. For (saith he) though ποιεῖν be affirmed not only of irrational souls, but also of inanimate bodies, yet the word πράττειν does only denominate rational beings.—But further, to take away all manner of scruple or doubt concerning this business, that philosopher before, in the same book^b ῥητῶς affirmeth, ὅτι ὁ οὐρανὸς ἐμψυχος, καὶ ἀρχὴν κινήσεως ἔχει; that the heaven is animated and hath a principle of motiou within itself:—where, by the heaven, as in many other places of Aristotle and Plato, is to be understood the whole world.

There is indeed one passage in the same book *De Cælo*, which, at first sight, and slightly consi-

^a Comment. in Libr. de Cælo, f. 126.

^b Aristot. de Cælo, lib. ii. cap. ii. p. 642. tom. i. oper.

dered, may seem to contradict this again; and therefore probably is that, which hath led many into a contrary persuasion, that Aristotle denied the world's animation: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε ὑπὸ ψυχῆς εὐλογον ἀναγκαζούσης μένειν αἰδίων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς οἶον τ' εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην ζωὴν ἄλυπον καὶ μακαρίαν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ τὴν κίνησιν μετὰ βιᾶς οὔσαν, πεφυκότος τοῦ πρώτου σώματος ἄλλως καὶ κινεῖν συνεχῶς, ἄσυχον εἶναι, καὶ πάσης ἀπηλλαγμένη ραστώνης ἔμφρονος· εἴγε μὴδ' ὥσπερ, τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ τῶν θνητῶν ζώων ἐστὶν ἀνάπαυσις ἢ περὶ τὸν ὕπνον γινομένη τοῦ σώματος ἄνεσις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον Ἰξιονός τινος μοῖραν κατέχειν αὐτὴν αἰδίων καὶ ἄτρυτον· But it is not reasonable neither to think, that the heavens continue to eternity, moved by a soul necessitating, or violently compelling them. Nor indeed is it possible, that the life of such a soul should be pleasurable or happy: forasmuch as the continual violent motion of a body (naturally inclining to move another way) must needs be a very unquiet thing, and void of all mental repose, especially when there is no such relaxation as the souls of mortal animals have by sleep; and therefore such a soul of the world as this, must of necessity be condemned to an eternal Ixionian fate.—But in these words Aristotle does not deny the heavens to be moved by a soul of their own (which is positively affirmed by him elsewhere), but only by such a soul as should violently and forcibly agitate, or drive them round, contrary to their own natural inclination, whereby, in the mean time, they tended downwards of themselves towards the centre. And his sense concerning the motion of the heavens, is truly represented by Simplicius, in this manner: τὸ δὲ ὅλον φύσικον καὶ ἔμφυχον, ὑπὸ ψυχῆς κυρίως κινεῖται, διὰ μέσης

L. 2. c. 1.
p. 640. tom.
i. oper.

τῆς φύσεως. The whole world or heaven, being as well a natural, as an animalish body, is moved properly by soul; but yet by means of nature also, as an instrument, so that the motion of it is not violent.—But whereas Aristotle there insinuates, as if Plato had held the heavens to be moved by a soul violently, contrary to their nature; Simplicius, though sufficiently addicted to Aristotle, ingenuously acknowledges his error herein, and vindicating Plato from that imputation, shews how he likewise held a plastic nature as well as a mundane soul; and that amongst his ten

* De Leg.
l. 10. instances of motion,* the ninth is that of nature; τὴν ἕτερον αἰεὶ κινουῦσαν, καὶ μεταβαλλομένην ὑφ' ἑτέρου that which always moves another, being itself changed by something else;—as the tenth, that of the mundane soul, τὴν ἑαυτὴν κινουῦσαν καὶ ἕτερα, that which originally both moves itself and other things:—as if his meaning in that place were, that though nature be a life and internal energy, yet it acts subserviently to a higher soul as the first original mover.

But the grand objection against Aristotle's holding the world's animation is still behind; namely, from that in his *Metaphysics*,^a where he determines the highest starry heaven to be moved by an immoveable mover, commonly supposed to be the Deity itself, and no soul of the world; and all the other spheres likewise to be moved by so many separate intelligences, and not by souls. To which we reply, that indeed Aristotle's first immoveable mover is no mundane soul, but an abstract intellect separate from matter, and the very Deity itself; whose manner of moving the heavens

^a Lib. xiv. cap. vii. viii. ix. p. 476. s. tom. iv. oper.

is thus described by him,^a κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον, it moveth only as being loved.—Wherefore, besides this supreme unmoved mover, that philosopher supposed another inferior moved mover also, that is, a mundane soul, as the proper and immediate efficient cause of the heavenly motions; of which he speaks after this manner: κινούμενον δὲ τᾶλλα κινεῖ, that which itself being moved (objectively, or by appetite and desire of the first good) moveth other things.—And thus that safe and surefooted interpreter, Alex. Aphrodisius, expounds his master's meaning, that the heaven being animated, and therefore indeed moved by an internal principle of its own, is notwithstanding originally moved by a certain immoveable and separate nature, which is above soul, τῷ νοεῖν τε Quæst. Nat. l. 1. c. 1. αὐτὸ, καὶ ἔφειν καὶ ὄρεξιν ἔχειν τῆς ὁμοιώσεως αὐτοῦ, both by its contemplating of it, and having an appetite and desire of assimilating itself thereunto.—Aristotle seeming to have borrowed this notion from Plato,^b who makes the constant regular circumgyration of the heavens to be an imitation of the motion or energy of intellect. So that Aristotle's first mover is not properly the efficient, but only the final and objective cause, of the heavenly motions, the immediate efficient cause thereof being ψυχὴ καὶ φύσις, soul and nature.—

Neither may this be confuted from those other Aristotelic intelligences of the lesser orbs; that philosopher conceiving in like manner concerning them, that they were also the abstract minds or intellects of certain other inferior souls, which moved their several respective bodies or orbs, cir-

^a Metaph. lib. xiv. cap. viii. p. 479.

^b De Legibus, lib. x. p. 669. et alias.

cularly and uniformly, in a kind of imitation of them. For this plainly appears from hence, in that he affirms of these his inferior intelligences likewise, as well as of the supreme mover, that they do *κινεῖν ὡς τέλος*, move only as the end.

Where it is evident, that though Aristotle did plainly suppose a mundane intellectual soul, such as also contained, either in it, or under it, a plastic nature, yet he did not make either of these to be the supreme Deity; but resolved the first principle of things to be one absolutely perfect mind or intellect, separate from matter, which was *ἀκίνητος οὐσία*,* an immoveable nature,—whose essence was his operation, and which moved only as being loved, or as the final cause: of which he pronounces in this manner, *ὅτι ἐκ τούτης ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις*, that upon such a principle as this, heaven and nature depends;—that is, the animated heaven, or mundane soul, together with the plastic nature of the universe, must of necessity depend upon such an absolutely perfect and immoveable mind or intellect.

Having now declared the Aristotelic doctrine concerning the plastic nature of the universe, with which the Platonic also agrees, that it is, *ἢ μέρος ψυχῆς, ἢ μὴ ἀνεψυχῆς*, either part of a mundane intellectual soul (that is, a lower power and faculty of it), or else not without it, but some inferior thing depending on it;—we think fit to add in this place, that though there were no such mundane soul, as both Plato and Aristotle supposed, distinct from the supreme Deity, yet there might notwithstanding be a plastic nature of the

* Aristot. *Metaphysicor.* lib. xiv. cap. vi. p. 477.

universe depending immediately upon the Deity itself. For the plastic nature essentially depends upon mind or intellect, and could not possibly be without it; according to those words before cited, *ἐκ τολαύτης ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ἡ φύσις*, nature depends upon such an intellectual principle;—and for this cause that philosopher does elsewhere join *νοῦς* and *φύσις*, mind and nature—both together.

25. Besides this general plastic nature of the universe, and those particular plastic powers in the souls of animals, it is not impossible but that there may be other plastic natures also (as certain lower lives, or vegetative souls) in some greater parts of the universe; all of them depending, if not upon some higher conscious soul, yet at least upon a perfect intellect presiding over the whole. As for example; though it be not reasonable to think, that every plant, herb, and pile of grass, hath a particular plastic life, or vegetative soul of its own, distinct from the mechanism of the body, nor that the whole earth is an animal endued with a conscious soul; yet there may possibly be, for aught we know, one plastic nature or life belonging to the whole terrestrial (or terraqueous) globe, by which all plants and vegetables, continuous with it, may be differently formed, according to their different seeds, as also minerals and other bodies framed, and whatsoever else is above the power of fortuitous mechanism effected, as by the immediate cause, though always subordinate to other causes; the chief whereof is the Deity. And this perhaps may ease the minds of those, who cannot but think it too much, to impose all upon one plastic nature of the universe.

26. And now we have finished our first task,

which was to give an account of the plastic nature, the sum whereof briefly amounts to this; that it is a certain lower life than the animal, which acts regularly and artificially, according to the direction of mind and understanding, reason, and wisdom, for ends, or in order to good, though itself do not know the reason of what it does, nor is master of that wisdom according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and drudging executioner of the same; it operating fatally and sympathetically, according to laws and commands prescribed to it by a perfect intellect, and impressed upon it; and which is either a lower faculty of some conscious soul, or else an inferior kind of life or soul by itself; but essentially depending upon a higher intellect.

We proceed to our second undertaking; which was to shew, how grossly those two sorts of Atheists before-mentioned, the Stoical or Cosmo-plastic, and the Stratonical or Hylozoic, both of them acknowledging this plastic life of nature, do mistake the notion of it, or pervert it, and abuse it, to make a certain spurious and counterfeit God-almighty of it (or a first principle of all things), thereby excluding the true omnipotent Deity, which is a perfect mind, or consciously understanding nature, presiding over the universe; they substituting this stupid plastic nature in the room of it.

Now the chief errors or mistakes of these Atheists concerning the plastic nature, are these four following. First, that they make that to be the first principle of all, and the highest thing in the universe, which is the last and lowest of all lives; a thing essentially secondary, derivative, and de-

pendent. For the plastic life of nature is but the mere unbrage of intellectuality, a faint and shadowy imitation of mind and understanding; upon which it doth as essentially depend, as the shadow doth upon the body, the image in the glass upon the face, or the echo upon the original voice. So that if there had been no perfect mind or intellect in the world, there could no more have been any plastic nature in it, than there could be an image in the glass without a face, or an echo without an original voice. If there be $\Phiύσις$, then there must be $Νοῦς$: if there be a plastic nature, that acts regularly and artificially in order to ends, and according to the best wisdom, though itself not comprehending the reason of it, nor being clearly conscious of what it doth; then there must of necessity be a perfect mind or intellect, that is, a Deity, upon which it depends. Wherefore Aristotle does like a philosopher in joining $\Phiύσις$ and $Νοῦς$, nature and mind both together; but these Atheists do very absurdly and unphilosophically, that would make a senseless and unconscious plastic nature, and therefore without any mind or intellect, to be the first original of all things.

Secondly, these Atheists augment the former error, in supposing those higher lives of sense or animality, and of reason or understanding, to rise both of them from that lower senseless life of nature, as the only original fundamental life. Which is a thing altogether as irrational and absurd, as if one should suppose the light, that is in the air or ether, to be the only original and fundamental light, and the light of the sun and stars but a secondary and derivative thing from it, and nothing

but the light of the air modiflicated and improved by condensation; or, as if one should maintain, that the sun and moon, and all the stars, were really nothing else but the mere reflections of those images, that we see in rivers and ponds of water. But this hath always been the sottish humour and guise of Atheists, to invert the order of the universe, and hang the picture of the world, as of a man, with its heels upwards. Conscious reason and understanding, being a far higher degree of life and perfection, than that dull plastic nature, which does only do, but not know, can never possibly emerge out of it; neither can the duplication of corporeal organs be ever able to advance that simple and stupid life of nature into redoubled consciousness or self-perception; nor any triplication, or indeed milleclupation of them, improve the same into reason and understanding.

Thirdly, for the better colouring of the former errors, the Hylozoists adulterate the notion of the plastic life of nature, confounding it with wisdom and understanding. And though themselves acknowledge, that no animal sense, self-perception, and consciousness belongs to it, yet they will have it to be a thing perfectly wise, and consequently every atom of senseless matter that is in the whole world, to be infallibly omniscient, as to all its own capacities and congruities, or whatsoever itself can do or suffer; which is plainly contradictory. For, though there may be such a thing as the plastic nature, that, according to the former description of it, can do without knowing, and is devoid of express consciousness or self-perception, yet perfect knowledge and understanding, without consciousness, is nonsense and impossi-

bility. Wherefore, this must needs be condemned for a great piece of sottishness in the Hylozoic Atheists, that they attribute perfect wisdom and understanding to a stupid unconscious nature, which is nothing but χειροτέχνης, the mere drudging instrument, or manuary opificer of a perfect mind.

Lastly, these Atheists err in this, that they make this plastic life of nature to be a mere material or corporeal thing; whereas matter or body cannot move itself, much less, therefore, can it artificially order and dispose its own motion. And though the plastic nature be indeed the lowest of all lives, yet, notwithstanding, since it is a life, or internal energy, and self-activity, distinct from local motion, it must needs be incorporeal, all life being essentially such. But the Hylozoists conceive grossly both of life and understanding, spreading them all over upon matter, just as butter is spread upon bread, or plaster upon a wall, and accordingly slicing them out in different quantities and bulks, together with it; they contending, that they are but inadequate conceptions of body, as the only substance; and consequently concluding, that the vulgarly received notion of God is nothing else but such an inadequate conception of the matter of the whole corporeal universe, mistaken for a complete and entire substance by itself, that is supposed to be the cause of all things; which fond dream or dotage of their's will be further confuted in due place. But it is now time to put a period to this long, though necessary, digression, concerning the plastic life of nature, or an artificial, orderly, and methodical nature.

XXXVIII. Plato gives an account, why he judged it necessary in those times, publicly to propose that Atheistic hypothesis, in order to a confutation, as also to produce rational arguments for the proof of a Deity, after this manner:

De Leg. lib.
10. p. 666.
oper.

Εἰ μὴ κατεσπαρμένοι ἦσαν οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἀνθρώποις, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τῶν ἐπαμνόντων λόγων, ὡς εἰσὶ θεοὶ, νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη·

Had not these Atheistic doctrines been publicly divulged, and made known in a manner to all, it would not have been needful to have confuted them, nor by reasons to prove a Deity; but now it is necessary.—And we conceive, that the same necessity at this time will justify our present undertaking likewise; since these Atheistic doctrines have been as boldly vented, and publicly asserted in this latter age of our's, as ever they could be in Plato's time; when the severity of the Athenian government must needs be a great check to such designs, Socrates having been put to death upon a mere false and groundless accusation of Atheism, and Protagoras (who doubtless was a real Atheist) having escaped the same punishment no otherwise than by flight, his books being, notwithstanding, publicly burnt in the market-place at Athens, and himself condemned to perpetual exile, though there was nothing at that time proved against him, save only

Diog. La. in
vita Prot. lib.
ix. seg. 51.
p. 576.

this one sceptical passage, in the beginning of a book of his: *περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν, εἰθ' ὡς εἰσιν, εἰθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ, πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ χωλύοντα εἰδέναι, ἥτε ἀδηλότης, καὶ βραχὺς ὦν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.* Concerning the gods, I have nothing at all to say, either that they be or be not; there being many things, that hinder the

knowledge of this matter, both the obscurity of the thing itself, and the shortness of human life. —Whereas Atheism, in this latter age of our's, hath been impudently asserted, and most industriously promoted; that very Atomic form, that was first introduced (a little before Plato's time) by Leucippus, Protagoras, and Democritus, having been also revived amongst us, and that with no small pomp and ostentation of wisdom and philosophy.

It was before observed, that there were two several forms of Atomical philosophy: first, the most ancient and genuine, that was religious, called Moschical (or, if you will, Mosaical) and Pythagorical; secondly, the adulterated Atheistic Atomology, called Leucippean or Democritical. Now, accordingly, there have been in this latter age of our's two several successive resurrections or restitutions of those two Atomologies. For Renatus Cartesius first revived and restored the Atomic philosophy, agreeably, for the most part, to that ancient Moschical and Pythagoric form; acknowledging, besides extended substance and corporeal atoms, another cogitative incorporeal substance, and joining metaphysics or theology, together with physiology, to make up one entire system of philosophy. Nor can it well be doubted, but that this physiology of his, as to the mechanic part of it, hath been elaborated by the ingenious author into an exactness at least equal with the best Atomologies of the ancients. Nevertheless, this Cartesian philosophy is highly obnoxious to censure upon some accounts; the chief whereof is this, that, deviating from that primitive Moschical Atomology, in rejecting all

plastic nature, it derives the whole system of the corporeal universe from the necessary motion of matter, only divided into particles insensibly small, and turned round in a vortex, without the guidance or direction of any understanding nature. By means whereof, though it boast of solving all the corporeal phenomena by mere fortuitous mechanism, and without any final or mental causality, yet it gives no account at all of that, which is the grandest of all phenomena, the *τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς*, the orderly regularity and harmony of the mundane system.—The occasion of which miscarriage hath been already intimated; namely, from the acknowledging only two heads of being, extended and cogitative, and making the essence of cogitation to consist in express consciousness; from whence it follows, that there could be no plastic nature, and therefore either all things must be done by fortuitous mechanism, or else God himself be brought immediately upon the stage for the solving of all phenomena. Which latter absurdity our philosopher being over careful to avoid, cast himself upon the former, the banishing of all final and mental causality quite out of the world, and acknowledging no other philosophic causes, beside material and mechanical. It cannot be denied, but that even some of the ancient religious Atomists were also too much infected with this mechanizing humour; but Renatus Cartesius hath not only outdone them all herein, but even the very Atheists themselves also, as shall be shewed afterward; and, therefore, as much as in him lies, has quite disarmed the world of that grand argument for a Deity, taken from the regular frame and harmony of the universe.

To which gross miscarriage of his there might be also another added, that he seems to make matter necessarily existent, and essentially infinite and eternal. Notwithstanding all which, we cannot entertain that uncharitable opinion of him, that he really designed Atheism; the fundamental principles of his philosophy being such, as that no Atheistic structure can possibly be built upon them. But shortly after this Cartesian restitution of the primitive Atomology, that acknowledgeth incorporeal substance, we have had our Leucippus and Democritus too, who also revived and brought again upon the stage that other Atheistic Atomology, that makes ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους, senseless and lifeless atoms, to be the only principles of all things in the universe; thereby necessarily excluding, besides incorporeal substance and immortality of souls, a Deity and natural morality; as also making all actions and events materially and mechanically necessary.

Now there could be no satisfactory confutation of this Atheistic hypothesis, without a fair proposal first made of the several grounds of it to their best advantage, which we have therefore endeavoured in the former chapter. The answers to which Atheistic arguments ought, according to the laws of method, to be reserved for the last part of the whole treatise, where we are positively to determine the right intellectual system of the universe; it being properly our work here, only to give an account of the three false hypotheses of the mundane system, together with their several grounds. Nevertheless, because it might not only seem indecorous, for the answers to those Atheistic arguments to be so long deferred, and placed

so far behind the arguments themselves, but also prove otherwise really inconvenient, we shall therefore choose rather to break those laws of method (neglecting the scrupulosity thereof), and subjoin them immediately in this place, craving the reader's pardon for this preposterousness.

It is certain, that the source of all Atheism is generally a dull and earthy disbelief of the existence of things beyond the reach of sense; and it cannot be denied, but that there is something of immorality in the temper of all Atheists, as all atheistic doctrine tends also to immorality. Notwithstanding which, it must not be therefore concluded, that all dogmatic Atheists came to be such merely by means of gross intemperance, sensuality, and debauchery. Plato, indeed, describes

one sort of Atheists in this manner: οἷς
De Leg. l. 10.
p. 908. ἀνὰ πρὸς τῇ δόξει, τῇ θεῶν ἔρημα εἶναι πάντα,
 ἀκράτειαί τε ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν προσπέσωσι, μνη-

μαί τε ἴσχυραι καὶ μαθήσεις ὀξεῖαι παρῶσι. Such who, together with this opinion, that all things are void of gods, are acted also by intemperance of pleasures and pains, and hurried away with violent lusts, being persons otherwise endued with strong memories and quick wits.—And these are the debauched, ranting, and hectoring Atheists. But,

Ibid. besides these, that philosopher tells us, that there is another sort of Atheists also: οἷς μὴ νομίζουσι θεοὺς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν, ἦθος φύσει προσγίνεται δίκαιον, μισοῦντές τε γίγνονται τοὺς κακοὺς, καὶ τῷ δυσχεραίνειν τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὔτε τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις προσίενται πράττειν, τοὺς τε μὴ δικαίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων φεύγουσι, καὶ τοὺς δικαίους στέργουσιν. Such who, though they think there be no gods at all, yet, notwithstanding, being naturally disposed to justice and mode-

ration, as they will not do outrageous and exorbitant things themselves, so they will shun the conversation of wicked debauched persons, and delight rather in the society of those that are fair and just.—And these are a sort of externally honest or civilized Atheists. Now what that thing is, which, besides gross sensuality and debauchery, might tempt men to entertain atheistic opinions, the same philosopher also declares; namely, that it is an affectation of singularity, or of seeming wiser than the generality of mankind. For thus when Clinias had disputed honestly against Atheists, from those vulgar topics of the regularity and harmony of the universe (observable in the courses of sun, moon, and stars, and the seasons of the year), and of the common notions of mankind, in that both Greeks and barbarians generally agreed in this, that there were gods, thinking he had thereby made a sufficient confutation of Atheism, the Athenian Hesper hereupon discovers a great fear and jealousy, which he had, lest he should thereby but render himself an object of contempt to Atheists, as being a conceited and scornful generation of men.

ΑΘ. φοβοῦμαι γε ὧ μακάριε τοὺς μοχθηροὺς, μήπως ὑμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν, ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἴστε αὐτῶν περί, τὴν τῆς διαφορᾶς αἰτίαν, ἀλλ' ἠγείσθε ἀκρατεία μόνον ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ βίον ὀρμασθαι τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν, &c. I am afraid of those wicked men the Atheists, lest they should despise you: for you are ignorant concerning them, when you think the only cause of Atheism to be intemperance of pleasures and lusts, violently hurrying men's souls on to a wicked life.—CLIN. What other cause of Atheism can there be besides this?—ATH. That

which you are not aware of, who live remotely, namely, Ἀμαθία μάλα χαλεπή δοκοῦσα εἶναι μεγίστη φρόνησις. A certain grievous ignorance, which yet, notwithstanding, hath the appearance of the greatest wisdom.—And, therefore, afterwards, when that philosopher goes about to propose the Atheistic hypothesis, he calls it,^a τὸν παρὰ πολλοῖς δοξαζόμενον εἶναι σοφώτατον ἀπάντων λόγων, that which to many seemeth to be the wisest and profoundest of all doctrines.—

And we find the same thing at this very day, that Atheists make a great pretence to wisdom and philosophy; and that many are tempted to maintain atheistic opinions, that they may gain a reputation of wit by it. Which, indeed, was one reason, that the rather induced us nakedly to reveal all the mysteries of Atheism, because we observed, that so long as these things are concealed and kept up in huggermugger, many will be the rather apt to suspect, that there is some great depth and profundity of wisdom lodged in them; and that it is some noble and generous truth, which the bigotic religious endeavour to smother and suppress.

Now the case being thus, it was pertinently suggested also by the forementioned philosopher,^b οὐ συγκρόν γε τὸ διαφέρον, εἰ φανεῖεν οἱ λόγων ἀπτόμενοι ἀσεβῶν, ἄλλοις τε ἐξάρχοντες, μηδὲ εὖ τοῖς λόγοις, ἀλλ' ἐξημαρτημένως χρώμενοι, That it must needs be a matter of no small moment, for any one to make it appear, that they, who maintain wicked atheistical opinions, do none of them reason rightly, but grossly fumble in all their ratiocinations.—

^a De Legib. l. x. p. 664. oper.

^b Ibid. p. 667. s.

And we hope to effect this in our present undertaking, to make it evident, that Atheists are no such conjurers, as (though they hold no spirits) they would be thought to be; no such gigantic men of reason, nor profound philosophers, but that, notwithstanding all their pretensions to wit, their Atheism is really nothing else, but ἀμαθία μάλα χαλεπή, a most grievous ignorance, sottishness, and stupidity of mind in them.

Wherefore we shall, in the next place, conjure down all those devils raised and displayed in their most formidable colours, in the precedent chapter; or rather we shall discover, that they are really nothing else, but what these Atheists pretend God and incorporeal spirits to be, mere fantastic spectres and impostures, vain imaginations of deluded minds, utterly devoid of all truth and reality. Neither shall we only confute those Atheistic arguments, and so stand upon our defensive posture, but we shall also assault Atheism even with its own weapons, and plainly demonstrate, that all forms of Atheism are unintelligible nonsense and absolute impossibility to human reason; as we shall likewise, over and above, occasionally insert some (as we think) undeniable arguments for a Deity.



The Digression concerning the Plastic Life of Nature, or an artificial, orderly, and methodical Nature, No. 37. Chap. iii.

“ 1. THAT neither the Hylozoic nor Cosmo-plastic Atheists are condemned for asserting an orderly and artificial plastic nature, as a life dis-

tinct from the animal, however this be a thing exploded, not only by the Atomic Atheists, but also by some professed Theists, who, notwithstanding, might have an undiscerned tang of the mechanical-atheistic humour hanging about them.

2. If there be no plastic artificial nature admitted, then it must be concluded, that either all things come to pass by fortuitous mechanism, and material necessity (the motion of matter unguided) or else that God doth *αὐτοῦργεῖν ἅπαντα*, do all things himself immediately and miraculously, framing the body of every gnat and fly, as it were with his own hands; since Divine laws and commands cannot execute themselves, nor be the proper efficient causes of things in nature. 3. To suppose all things to come to pass fortuitously, or by the unguided motion of matter, a thing altogether as irrational as it is atheistical and impious; there being many phenomena, not only above the powers of mechanism, but also contrary to the laws of it. The mechanic Theists make God but an idle spectator of the fortuitous motions of matter, and render his wisdom altogether useless and insignificant. Aristotle's judicious censure of the fortuitous Mechanists, with the ridiculousness of that pretence, that material and mechanical reasons are the only philosophical. 4. That it seems neither decorous in respect of God, nor congruous to reason, that he should *αὐτοῦργεῖν ἅπαντα*, do all things himself immediately and miraculously, nature being quite superseded and made to signify nothing. The same further confuted by the slow and gradual process of things in nature, as also by those errors and bumbles, that are committed, when the matter proves

inept and contumacious, arguing the agent not to be irresistible. 5. Reasonably inferred, that there is a plastic nature in the universe, as a subordinate instrument of Divine Providence, in the orderly disposal of matter; but yet so as not without a higher providence presiding over it, forasmuch as this plastic nature cannot act electively or with discretion. Those laws of nature concerning motion, which the mechanic Theists themselves suppose, really nothing else but a plastic nature. 6. The agreeableness of this doctrine with the sentiments of the best philosophers in all ages, Aristotle, Plato, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Hippocrates, Zeno, and the Paracelsians. Anaxagoras, though a professed Theist, severely censured, both by Aristotle and Plato, as an encourager of Atheism, merely because he used material and mechanical causes, more than mental and final. Physiologers and astronomers, why vulgarly suspected of Atheism in Plato's time. 7. The plastic nature no occult quality, but the only intelligible cause of that, which is the grandest of all phenomena, the orderly regularity and harmony of things, which the mechanic Theists, however pretending to solve all phenomena, can give no account at all of. A God, or infinite mind, asserted by them, in vain and to no purpose. 8. Two things here to be performed by us; first, to give an account of the plastic nature, and then to shew how the notion of it hath been mistaken, and abused by Atheists. The first general account of this plastic nature, according to Aristotle, that it is to be conceived as art itself acting, inwardly and immediately, upon the matter; as if harmony living in the musical instruments should move the

strings of them without any external impulse.

9. Two pre-eminences of the plastic nature above human art:—First, that whereas human art acts upon the matter from without cumbersomely and moliminously, with tumult and hurly-burly, nature acting on it from within more commandingly doth its work easily, cleverly, and silently. Human art acts on the matter mechanically, but nature vitally and magically. 10. The second pre-eminence of nature above human art, that whereas human artists are often to seek and at a loss, anxiously consult and deliberate, and upon second thoughts mend their former work, nature is never to seek, nor unresolved what to do, nor doth she ever repent afterwards of what she hath done, changing her former course. Human artists themselves consult not, as artists, but only for want of art; and therefore nature, though never consulting, may act artificially. Concluded, that what is called nature is really the Divine art. 11. Nevertheless, that nature is not the Divine art, pure and abstract, but concreted and embodied in matter, *ratio mersa et confusa*; not the Divine art archetypal, but ectypal. Nature differs from the Divine art, as the manuary opificer from the architect. 12. Two imperfections of the plastic nature, in respect whereof it falls short even of human art; first, that though it act for ends artificially, yet itself neither intends those ends, nor understands the reason of what it doth, and therefore cannot act electively. The difference between the spermatic reasons and knowledge. Nature doth but ape or mimic the Divine art or wisdom, being not master of that reason, according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and

drudging executioner of it. 13. Proved that there may be such a thing as acts artificially, though itself do not comprehend that art, by which its motions are governed; first from musical habits; the dancer resembles the artificial life of nature. 14. The same further evinced from the instincts of brute animals, directing them to act rationally and artificially, in order to their own good and the good of the universe, without any reason of their own. The instincts in brutes but passive impresses of the Divine wisdom, and a kind of fate upon them. 15. The second imperfection of the plastic nature, that it acts without animal fancy, *συναίσθησις*, express con-sense, and consciousness, and is devoid of self-perception and self-enjoyment. 16. Whether this energy of the plastic nature be to be called cogitation or no, but a logomachy or contention about words. Granted, that what moves matter vitally, must needs do it by some energy of its own, distinct from local motion; but that there may be a simple vital energy, without that duplicity, which is in synæsthesis, or clear and express consciousness. Nevertheless, that the energy of nature might be called a certain drowsy, unawakened, or astonished cogitation. 17. Instances, which render it probable, that there may be a vital energy, without synæsthesis, clear and express con-sense, or consciousness. 18. The plastic nature, acting neither knowingly nor fantastically, acts fatally, magically, and sympathetically. The Divine laws and fate, as to matter, not mere cogitation in the mind of God, but an energetic and effectual principle; and the plastic nature, the true and proper fate of matter, or the corporeal world. What ma-

gic is, and that nature, which acts fatally, acts also magically and sympathetically. 19. That the plastic nature, though it be the Divine art and fate, yet for all that, it is neither god nor goddess, but a low and imperfect creature; it acting artificially and rationally no otherwise, than compounded forms of letters, when printing coherent philosophic sense; nor for ends, than a saw or hatchet in the hands of a skilful mechanic. The plastic and vegetative life of nature the lowest of all lives, and inferior to the sensitive. A higher providence than that of the plastic nature governing the corporeal world itself. 20. Notwithstanding which, forasmuch as the plastic nature is a life, it must needs be incorporeal. One and the same thing, having in it an entire model and platform, and acting upon several distant parts of matter at once coherently, cannot be corporeal; and though Aristotle no where declares whether his nature be corporeal or incorporeal (which he neither doth clearly concerning the rational soul) and his followers conclude it to be corporeal, yet, according to the very principles of that philosophy, it must needs be otherwise. 21. The plastic nature being incorporeal, must either be a lower power lodged in souls, that are also conscious, sensitive, or rational; or else a distinct substantial life by itself, and inferior kind of soul. How the Platonists complicate both these together; with Aristotle's agreeable determination, that nature is either part of a soul, or not without soul. 22. The plastic nature as to animals, according to Aristotle, a part or lower power of their respective souls. That the phenomena prove a plastic nature or archeus in animals, to make which a dis-

tinct thing from the soul, is to multiply entities without necessity. The soul endued with a plastic power, the chief formatrix of its own body, the contribution of certain other causes not excluded.

23. That besides that plastic principle in particular animals, forming them as so many little worlds, there is a general plastic nature in the whole corporeal universe, which likewise, according to Aristotle, is either a part and lower power of a conscious mundane soul, or else something depending on it.

24. That no less according to Aristotle than Plato and Socrates, ourselves partake of life from the life of the universe, as well as we do of heat and cold, from the heat and cold of the universe; from whence it appears, that Aristotle also held the world's animation, with further undeniable proof thereof. An answer to two the most considerable places of that philosopher, that seem to imply the contrary. That Aristotle's first immoveable mover was no soul, but a perfect intellect abstract from matter; but that he supposed this to move only as a final cause, or as being loved, and besides it, a mundane soul and plastic nature, to move the heavens efficiently. Neither Aristotle's nature, nor his mundane soul, the supreme Deity. However, though there be no such mundane soul, as both Plato and Aristotle conceived, yet notwithstanding there may be a plastic nature depending upon a higher intellectual principle.

25. No impossibility of some other particular plastic principles; and though it be not reasonable to think, that every plant, herb, and pile of grass, hath a plastic or vegetative soul of its own, nor that the earth is an animal; yet, that there may possibly be one plas-

tic unconscious nature in the whole terraqueous globe, by which vegetables may be severally organized and framed, and all things performed, which transcend the power of fortuitous mechanism. 26. Our second undertaking, which was to shew how grossly those Atheists (who acknowledge this plastic nature) misunderstand it and abuse the notion, to make a counterfeit God-Almighty or Numen of it, to the exclusion of the true Deity. First, in their supposing, that to be the first and highest principle of the universe, which is the last and lowest of all lives, a thing as essentially derivative from, and dependent upon a higher intellectual principle, as the echo on the original voice. 27. Secondly, in their making sense and reason in animals to emerge out of a senseless life of nature, by the mere modification and organization of matter. That no duplication of corporeal organs can ever make one single unconscious life to advance into redoubled consciousness and self-enjoyment. 28. Thirdly, in attributing perfect knowledge and understanding to this life of nature, which yet themselves suppose to be devoid of all animal sense and consciousness. 29. Lastly, in making the plastic life of nature to be merely corporeal; the Hylozoists contending, that it is but an inadequate conception of body, as the only substance; and fondly dreaming, that the vulgar notion of God is nothing but such an inadequate conception of the matter of the whole universe, mistaken for a complete and entire substance by itself, the cause of all things."

CHAPTER IV.

The idea of God declared, in way of answer to the first Atheistic argument. The grand prejudice against the naturalness of this idea, as essentially including unity or oneliness in it, from the Pagan Polytheism, removed. Proved that the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one supreme Deity. What their Polytheism and idolatry was; with some account of Christianity.—1. The either stupid insensibility, or gross impudence of Atheists, in denying the word GOD to have any signification, or that there is any other idea answering to it besides the mere phantasm of the sound. The disease called by the philosopher ἀπολίθωσις τοῦ νοητικοῦ, the petrification (or dead insensibility) of the mind.—2. That the Atheists themselves must needs have an idea of God in their minds, or otherwise, when they deny his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing. And that they have also the same idea of him with Theists, they denying the very same thing which the others affirm.—3. A lemma, or preparatory proposition to the idea of God, that though some things be made or generated, yet it is not possible, that all things should be made, but something must of necessity exist of itself from eternity unmade, and be the cause of those other things that are made.—4. The two most opposite opinions, concerning that which was self-existent from eternity, or unmade, and the cause of all other things made: one, that it was nothing but senseless matter, the most imperfect of all things; the other, that it was something most perfect, and therefore consciously intellectual. The assertors of this latter opinion, Theists in a strict and proper sense; of the former, Atheists. So that the idea of God in general is a perfect consciously understanding being (or mind) self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things.—5. Observed, that the Atheists, who deny a God, according to the true idea of him, do often abuse the word, calling senseless matter by that name, and meaning nothing else thereby but a first principle, or self-existent unmade thing. That, according to this notion of the word God, there can be no such thing as an Atheist, no man being able to persuade himself, that all things sprung from nothing.—6. In order to the more punctual declaration of the Divine idea, the opinion of those taken notice of, who suppose two self-existent unmade principles, God and matter; and so God not to be the sole, but only the chief principle.—7. That these are but imperfect and mistaken Theists. Their idea of God declared, with its defectiveness. A latitude in Theism. None to be condemned for absolute Atheists,

but such as deny an eternal unmade mind, ruling over matter.—8. The most compendious idea of God, an absolutely perfect being. That this includes not only conscious intellectuality and necessary existence, but also omni-causality, omnipotence, and infinite power: and therefore God the sole principle of all, and cause of matter. The true notion of infinite power. Pagans acknowledged the Divine omnipotence. And that the Atheists supposed infinite power to be included in the idea of God, proved from Lucretius.—9. That absolute perfection implies something more than power and knowledge. A vaticination in men's minds of a higher good than either. That God is better than knowledge, according to Aristotle; and that there is morality in the nature of God, wherein his chief happiness consisteth. This borrowed from Plato, who makes the highest perfection, and supreme Deity, to be goodness itself, above knowledge and intellect. God, and the supreme good, according to the Scripture, love. God no soft or fond love, but an impartial law, and the measure of all things. That the Atheists supposed goodness also to be included in the idea of God. The idea of God more explicate and unfolded, a being absolutely perfect, infinitely good, wise, and powerful, necessarily existent; and not only the framer of the world, but also the cause of all things.—10. That this idea of God essentially includes unity or oneliness in it; since there can be but one supreme, one cause of all things, one omnipotent, and one infinitely perfect. This unity or oneliness of the Deity supposed also by Epicurus and Lucretius, who professedly denied a God, according to this idea.—11. The grand prejudice against the naturalness of this idea of God, as it essentially includes unity and solitariness, from the Polytheism of all nations formerly, besides the Jews, and of all the wisest men and philosophers: from whence it is inferred, that this idea of God is but artificial, and owes its original to laws and institution. An inquiry to be made concerning the true sense of the Pagan Polytheism. That the objectors take it for granted, that the Pagan Polytheists universally asserted many self-existent intellectual beings, and independent deities, as so many partial causes of the world.—12. First, the irrationality of this opinion, and its manifest repugnancy to the phenomena; which render it less probable to have been the belief of all the Pagan Polytheists.—13. Secondly, that no such thing at all appears, as that ever any intelligent Pagans asserted a multitude of eternal, unmade, independent deities. The Hesiodian gods. The Valentinian Æons. The nearest approach made thereunto by the Manichean good and evil gods. This doctrine not generally asserted by the Greek philosophers, as Plutarch affirmeth. Questioned whether the Persian evil demon, or Arimanius, were a self-existent principle, essentially evil. Aristotle's confutation and explosion of many principles, or independent deities. Faustus the Manichean's conceit, that the Jews and Christians paganized, in the opinion of monarchy, with St. Austin's judgment, concerning

the Pagans, thereupon.—14. Concluded that the Pagan Polytheism must be understood according to another equivocation in the word gods, as used for created intellectual beings, superior to men, that ought to be religiously worshipped. That the Pagans held both many gods and one God (as Onatus the Pythagorean declares himself), in different senses; many inferior deities subordinate to one Supreme.—15. Further evidence of this, that the intelligent Pagan Polytheists held only a plurality of inferior deities, subordinate to one Supreme: first, because after the emersion of Christianity, and its contest with Paganism, when occasion was offered, not only no Pagan asserted a multiplicity of independent deities, but also all universally disclaimed it, and professed to acknowledge one supreme God.—16. That this was no refinement or interpolation of Paganism, as might possibly be suspected, but that the doctrine of the most ancient Pagan theologers, and greatest promoters of Polytheism, was agreeable hereunto; which will be proved, not from suspected writings (as of Trismegist and the Sybils), but such as are indubitate. First, that Zoroaster, the chief promoter of Polytheism in the eastern parts, acknowledged one supreme Deity, the maker of the world, proved from Eubulus in Porphyry, besides his own words cited by Eusebius.—17. That Orpheus, commonly called by the Greeks the Theologer, and the father of the Grecanic Polytheism, clearly asserted one supreme Deity, proved by his own words, out of Pagan records.—18. That the Egyptians themselves, the most polytheistical of all nations, had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme Deity.—19. That the poets, who were the greatest depravers of the Pagan theology, and, by their fables of the gods, made it look more aristocratically, did themselves notwithstanding acknowledge a monarchy, one Prince and Father of gods. That famous passage of Sophocles not to be suspected, though not found in any of his tragedies now extant.—20. That all the Pagan philosophers, who were Theists, universally asserted a mundane monarchy. Pythagoras, as much a Polytheist as any, and yet his first principle of things, as well as numbers, a monad or unity. Anaxagoras's one mind ordering all things for good. Xenophanes' one and all, and his one God the greatest among the gods.—21. Parmenides' supreme God, one immoveable. Empedocles' both many gods junior to friendship and contention, and his one God, called τὸ ἕν, senior to them. Zeno Eleates' demonstration of one God, in Aristotle.—22. Philolaus's prince and governor of all, God always one. Euclides Megarensis's God, called ἕν τὸ ἀγαθόν, one the very good. Timæus Locrus's mind and good, above the soul of the world. Antisthenes' one natural God. Onatus's Corypheus.—23. Generally believed and true, that Socrates acknowledged one supreme God; but that he disclaimed all the inferior gods of the Pagans, a vulgar error. Plato also a Polytheist, and that passage, which some lay so great stress upon (that he was serious when he

began his epistles with God, but when with gods jocular), spurious and counterfeit; and yet he was, notwithstanding, an undoubted Monotheist also in another sense; an assertor of one God over all, of a maker of the world, of a first God, of a greatest of the gods. The first hypostasis of the Platonic trinity properly the King of all things, for whose sake are all things; the father of the cause and prince of the world, that is, of the eternal intellect, or λόγος.—24. Aristotle an acknowledger of many gods (he accounting the stars such), and yet an express assertor of εἰς νοῦς, one prince, one immoveable mover.—25. Cleanthes and Chrysippus Stoics, though they filled the whole heaven, earth, air, and sea with gods, yet, notwithstanding, they acknowledged only one God immortal, Jupiter; all the rest being consumed into him, in the successive conflagrations, and afterwards made anew by him. Cleanthes' excellent and devout hymn to the supreme God.—26. Endless to cite all the passages of the later Pagan writers and Polytheists, in which one supreme God is asserted. Excellent discourses in some of them concerning the Deity, particularly Plotinus; who, though he derived all things, even matter itself, from one supreme Deity, yet was a contender for many gods.—27. This not only the opinion of philosophers and learned men, but also the general belief of the Pagan vulgar: that there was one supreme God, proved from Maximus Tyrius. The Romans' *Deus optimus maximus*. The Pagans, when most serious, spake of God singularly. *Kyrie Eleeson* part of the Pagans' litany to the supreme God. The more civilized Pagans, at this very day, acknowledge one Supreme Deity, the maker of the world.—28. Plutarch's testimony, that, notwithstanding the variety of Paganic religions, and the different names of gods used in them, yet one reason, mind, or providence ordering all things, and its inferior ministers, were alike every where worshipped.—29. Plain that the Pagan Theists must needs acknowledge one supreme Deity, because they generally believed the whole world to be one animal, governed by one soul. Some Pagans made this soul of the world their supreme God; others an abstract mind superior to it.—30. The Hebrew doctors generally of this persuasion, that the Pagans worshipped one supreme God, and that all their other gods were but mediators betwixt him and men.—31. Lastly, this confirmed from Scripture. The Pagans knew God. Aratus's Jupiter, and the Athenians' unknown God, the true God.—32. In order to a fuller explication of the Pagan theology, and shewing the occasion of its being misunderstood, three heads requisite to be insisted on. First, that the Pagans worshipped one supreme God under many names; secondly, that besides this one God, they worshipped also many gods, which were indeed inferior deities subordinate to him; thirdly, that they worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods in images, statues, and symbols, sometimes abusively called also gods. First, that the supreme God amongst the

Pagans was polyonymous, and worshipped under several personal names, according to his several attributes and the manifestations of them, his gifts and effects in the world.—33. That, upon the same account, things not substantial were personated and deified by the Pagans, and worshipped as so many several names and notions of one God.—34. That as the whole corporeal world animated was supposed by some of the Pagans to be the supreme God, so he was worshipped in the several parts and members of it (having personal names bestowed upon them) as it were by parcels and piece-meal, or by so many inadequate conceptions. That some of the Pagans made the corporeal world the temple of God only, but others the body of God.—35. The second head proposed, that besides the one supreme God, under several names, the Pagans acknowledged and worshipped also many gods; θεοὺς γεννητοῦς, made gods, created intellectual beings superior to men.—36. The Pythagoric or Platonic trinity of Divine hypostases. And the higher of the inferior deities, according to this hypothesis, Nous, Psyche, and the whole corporeal world; with particular Noes and Henades.—37. The other inferior deities, acknowledged as well by the vulgar as philosophers, of three sorts. First, the sun, moon, and stars, and other greater parts of the universe animated, called sensible gods.—38. Secondly, their inferior deities invisible, ethereal, and aerial animals, called demons. These appointed by the supreme Deity to preside over kingdoms, cities, places, persons, and things.—39. The last sort of the Pagan inferior deities, heroes and θεῶνθεωποι, or men-gods. Euemerus taxed by Plutarch, for making all the Pagan gods nothing but dead men.—40. The third general head proposed, that the Pagans worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods in images, statues, and symbols. That first of all, before images and temples, rude stones and pillars without sculpture were erected for religious monuments, and called βαιτίλια, or Bethels.—41. That afterwards images, statues, and symbols were used, and housed in temples. These placed in the west-end of the temples to face the east; so that the Pagans entering worshipped towards the west; one probable occasion of the ancient Christians praying towards the east. The golden calf made for a symbolic presence of the God of Israel.—42. All the parts of the entire Pagan religion represented together at once in Plato.—43. That some late writers, not well understanding the sense of Pagans, have confounded all their theology, by supposing them to worship the inanimate parts of the world as such, for gods; therefore distinguishing betwixt their animal and their natural gods. That no corporeal thing was worshipped by the Pagans otherwise, than either as being itself animated with a particular soul of its own, or as being part of the whole animated world, or as having demons presiding over it, to whom the worship was properly directed; or, lastly, as being images or symbols of Divine things.—44. That though the Egyptians be said to have worshipped

brute animals, and were generally therefore condemned by the other Pagans; yet the wiser of them used them only as hieroglyphics and symbols.—45. That the Pagans worshipped not only the supreme God, but also the inferior deities, by material sacrifices. Sacrifices or fire-offerings, in their first and general notion, nothing else but gifts and signs of gratitude, and appendices of prayer. But that animal sacrifices had afterwards a particular notion also of expiation fastened on them; whether by Divine direction, or human agreement, left undetermined.—46. The Pagans' apology for the three forementioned things. First, for worshipping one supreme God under many personal names, and that not only according to his several attributes, but also his several manifestations, gifts, and effects, in the visible world. With an excuse for those corporeal Theists, who worshipped the whole animated world as the supreme God, and the several parts of it under personal names, as living members of him.—47. Their apology for worshipping, besides the one supreme God, many inferior deities. That they worshipping them only as inferior could not, therefore, be guilty of giving them that honour which was proper to the Supreme. That they honoured the supreme God incomparably above all. That they put a difference in their sacrifices; and that material sacrifices were not the proper worship of the supreme God, but rather below him.—48. Several reasons of the Pagans, for giving religious worship to inferior created beings. First, that this honour, which is bestowed upon them, does ultimately redound to the supreme God, and aggrandize his state and majesty, they being all his ministers and attendants.—49. That as demons are mediators betwixt the celestial gods and men, so those celestial gods, and all the other inferior deities, are themselves also mediators betwixt man and the supreme God, and as it were convenient steps, by which we ought with reverence to approach him.—50. That there is an honour in justice due to all those excellent beings that are above us; and that the Pagans do but honour every thing as they ought, in that due rank and place, in which the supreme God hath set it.—51. That demons or angels being appointed to preside over kingdoms, cities, and persons, and the several parts of the corporeal universe, and being many ways benefactors to us, thanks ought to be returned to them by sacrifice.—52. That the inferior gods, demons, and heroes, being all of them able to do us either good or hurt, and being also irascible, and therefore provokable by our neglect of them, it is as well our interest as our duty to pacify and appease them by worship.—53. Lastly, that it cannot be thought, that the supreme God will envy those inferior gods that worship or honour which is bestowed upon them; nor suspected, that any of those inferior deities will factiously go about to set up themselves against the supreme God.—54. That many of the Pagans worshipped none but good demons, and that those of them, who worshipped evil ones, did it only in order to

their appeasement and mitigation, that so they might do them no hurt. None but magicians to be accounted properly devil worshippers, who honour evil demons, in order to the gratification of their revenge, lust, and ambition.—55. The Pagans plead, that those demons, who delivered oracles, and did miracles amongst them, must needs be good, since there cannot be a greater reproach to the supreme God, than to suppose him to appoint evil demons as presidents and governors over the world, or to suffer them to have so great a sway and share of power in it. The faith of Plato in Divine Providence, that the good every where prevails over the bad, and that the Delphic Apollo was therefore a good demon.—56. The Pagans' apology for worshipping the supreme God in images, statues, and symbols. That these are only schetically worshipped by them, the honour passing from them to the prototype. And that since we living in bodies cannot easily have a conception of any thing without some corporeal image or phantasm, thus much must be indulged to the infirmity of human nature (at least in the vulgar) to the worship of God, corporeally in images, to prevent their running to Atheism.—57. That though it should appear, by this apology of the Pagans, that their case were not altogether so bad as is commonly supposed, yet they cannot be justified thereby in the three particulars above-mentioned, but the Scripture condemnation of them is irrefragable, that knowing God, they did not glorify him as God, or sanctify his name; that is, worship him according to his uncommon and incommunicable, his peerless and insociable, transcendent and singular, incomparable and unresemblable nature; but mingled, some way or other, creature-worship with the worship of the Creator. First, that the worshipping of one God in his various gifts and effects, under several personal names, a thing in itself absurd, may also prove a great occasion of Atheism, when the things themselves come to be called by those names, as wine Bacchus, corn Ceres. The conclusion easily following, from thence, that the good things of nature are the only deities. But to worship the corporeal world itself animated, as the supreme God, and the parts of it as the members of God, is plainly to confound God with the creature, and not to glorify him as Creator, nor according to his separate and spiritual nature.—58. To give religious worship to demons or angels, heroes or saints, or any other intellectual creatures, though not honouring them equally with the supreme God, is to deny God the honour of his holiness, his singular, insociable, and incommunicable nature, as he is the only self-originated being, and the Creator of all; of whom, through whom, and to whom are all things. As God is such a being, that there is nothing like him, so ought the worship which is given him to be such as hath nothing like to it, a singular, separate, and incommunicate worship. They not to be religiously worshipped, that worship.—59. That the religious worship of created spirits proceeded chiefly from a fear, that if they were not worshipped, they would be pro-

voked and do hurt, which is both highly injurious to good spirits, and a distrust of the sufficiency of God's power to protect his worshippers. That all good spirits uninvoked are of themselves officiously ready to assist those, who sincerely worship and propitiate the supreme Deity, and therefore no need of the religious worship of them, which would be also offensive to them.—60. That men's praying to images and statues is much more ridiculous than children's talking to babies made of clouts, but not so innocent; they thereby debasing both themselves and God, not glorifying him according to his spiritual and unresemblable nature, but changing the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of corruptible man or beast.—61. The mistake of those who think none can be guilty of idolatry, that believe one God the maker of the world.—62. That from the same ground of reason, that nothing ought to be religiously worshipped besides the supreme God, or whom he appoints to represent himself (because he ought to be sanctified, and dealt withal, according to his singular nature, as unlike to every thing), it follows, contrary to the opinion of some opposers of idolatry, that there ought also to be a discrimination made between things sacred and profane, and reverence used in Divine worship. Idolatry and sacrilege allied.—63. Another Scripture charge upon the Pagans, that they were devil-worshippers; not as though they intended all their worship to evil demons or devils as such, but because their Polytheism and idolatry (unacceptable to God and good spirits) was promoted by evil spirits delivering oracles and doing miracles for the confirmation of it, they also insinuating themselves into the temples and statues, therefore the worship was looked upon as done to them. The same thing said of others besides Pagans, that they worshipped devils.—64. Proved that they were evil demons, who delivered oracles, and did miracles amongst the Pagans, for the carrying on of that religion, from the many obscene rites and mysteries, not only not prohibited, but also enjoined by them.—65. The same thing further proved from other cruel and bloody rites, but especially that of man-sacrifices. Plutarch's clear acknowledgment, that both the obscene rites and man-sacrifices, amongst the Pagans, owed their original to wicked demons.—66. That the God of Israel neither required nor accepted of man-sacrifices, against a modern Diatribist.—67. That what faith soever Plato might have in the Delphic Apollo, he was no other than an evil demon, or devil. An answer to the Pagans' argument from Divine Providence.—68. That the Pagans' religion, unsound in its foundation, was infinitely more corrupted and depraved by means of these four things:—First, the superstition of the ignorant vulgar.—69. Secondly, the licentious figments of poets and fable-mongers, frequently condemned by Plato and other wiser Pagans.—70. Thirdly, the craft of priests and politicians.—71. Lastly, the imposture of evil demons, or devils. That by means of these four things, the Pagan religion became a

most foul and unclean thing. And as some were captivated by it under a most grievous yoke of superstition, so others strongly inclined to Atheism.—72. Plato not insensible, that the Pagan religion stood in need of reformation; nevertheless, supposing many of those religious rites to have been introduced by visions, dreams, and oracles, he concluded, that no wise legislator would, of his own head, venture to make an alteration; implying, that this was a thing not to be effected otherwise than by Divine revelation and miracles. The generally-received opinion of the Pagans, that no man ought to trouble himself about religion, but content himself to worship God, νόμος πόλεως, according to the law of that country which he lived in.—73. Wherefore God Almighty, in great compassion to mankind, designed himself to reform the religion of the Pagan world, by introducing another religion of his own framing instead of it; after he had first made a præludium thereunto in one nation of the Israelites, where he expressly prohibited, by a voice out of the fire, in his first commandment, the Pagan Polytheism, or the worshipping of other inferior deities besides himself; and in the second, their idolatry, or the worshipping of the supreme God in images, statues, or symbols. Besides which, he restrained the use of sacrifices: as also successively gave predictions, of a Messiah to come, such as together with miracles might reasonably conciliate faith to him when he came.—74. That afterwards, in due time, God sent the promised Messiah, who was the eternal Word hypostatically united with a pure human soul and body, and so a true θεάνθρωπος, or God-man; designing him for a living temple and visible statue or image, in which the Deity should be represented and worshipped; as also after his death and resurrection, when he was to be invested with all power and authority, for a prince and king, a mediator and intercessor betwixt God and men.—75. That this θεάνθρωπος, or God-man, was so far from intending to require men-sacrifices of his worshippers, as the Pagan demons did, that he devoted himself to be a catharma and expiatory sacrifice for the sins of the whole world; and thereby also abolished all sacrifices or oblations by fire whatsoever, according to the Divine prediction.—76. That the Christian Trinity, though a mystery, is more agreeable to reason than the Platonic; and that there is no absurdity at all in supposing the pure soul and body of the Messiah to be made a living temple or Shechinah, image or statue of the Deity. That this religion of one God and one Mediator, or θεάνθρωπος, God-man, preached to the Pagan world, and confirmed by miracles, did effectually destroy all the Pagan inferior deities, middle gods and mediators, demons and heroes, together with their statues and images.—77. That it is no way incongruous to suppose, that the Divine Majesty, in prescribing a form of religion to the world, should graciously condescend to comply with human infirmity, in order to the removing of two such grand evils as Polytheism and idolatry, and the bringing of men to

worship God in spirit and in truth.—78. That demons and angels, heroes and saints, are but different names for the same things, which are made gods by being worshipped. And that the introducing of angel and saint-worship, together with image-worship, into Christianity, seems to be a defeating of one grand design of God Almighty in it, and the paganizing of that, which was intended for the unpaganizing of the world.—79. Another key for Christianity in the Scripture, not disagreeing with the former, that since the way of wisdom and knowledge proved ineffectual as to the generality of mankind, men might, by the contrivance of the gospel, be brought to God and a holy life (without profound knowledge) in the way of believing.—80. That, according to the Scripture, there is a higher, more precious, and diviner light, than that of theory and speculation.—81. That in Christianity all the great, goodly, and most glorious things of this world are slurred and disgraced, comparatively with the life of Christ.—82. And that there are all possible engines in it to bring men up to God, and engage them in a holy life.—83. Two errors here to be taken notice of; the first, of those who make Christianity nothing but an Antinomian plot against real righteousness, and as it were a secret confederacy with the devil. The second, of those who turn that into matter of mere notion and opinion, dispute and controversy, which was designed by God only as a contrivance, machine, or engine, to bring men effectually to a holy and godly life.—84. That Christianity may be yet further illustrated, from the consideration of the adversary or Satanical power, which is in the world. This no Manichean substantial evil principle, but a polity of lapsed angels, with which the souls of wicked men are also incorporated, and may therefore be called the kingdom of darkness.—85. The history of the fallen angels in Scripture briefly explained.—86. The concurrent agreement of the Pagans concerning evil demons or devils, and their activity in the world.—87. That there is a perpetual war betwixt two polities or kingdoms in the world, the one of light, the other of darkness; and that our Saviour Christ, or the Messiah, is appointed the head or chieftain over the heavenly militia, or the forces of the kingdom of light.—88. That there will be at length a palpable and signal overthrow of the Satanical power and whole kingdom of darkness, by *θεός ἀπὸ μηχανῆς*, God appearing in an extraordinary and miraculous manner; and that this great affair is to be managed by our Saviour Christ, as God's vicegerent, and a visible judge both of quick and dead.—89. That our Saviour Christ designed not to set up himself factiously against God Almighty, nor to be accounted *κύριος θεοῦ*, superior to God, but that when he hath done his work, and put down all adversary power, himself will then be subject to God, even the Father, that so God may be all in all.—90. Lastly, having spoken of three forms of religions, the Jewish, Christian, and the Pagan, and there remaining only a fourth, the Mahometan, in which the Divine monarchy is zealously asserted,

we may now conclude, that the idea of God (as essentially including unity in it) hath been entertained in all forms of religion. An account of that seemingly-strange phenomenon of Providence: the rise, growth, and continuance of the Mahometan religion not to be attempted by us, at least in this place.

1. **HAVING** in the former chapter prepared the way, we shall now proceed (with the Divine assistance) to answer and confute all those Atheistic arguments before proposed. The first whereof was this, That there is no idea of God, and therefore either no such thing existing in nature, or at least no possible evidence of it.

To affirm, that there is no idea of God, is all one as to affirm, that there is no conception of the mind answering to that word or name; and this the modern Atheists stick not to maintain, that the word God hath no signification, and that there is no other idea or conception in men's minds, answering thereunto, besides the mere phantasm of the sound. Now, for any one to go about soberly to confute this, and to prove, that God is not the only word without a signification, and that men do not every where pay all their religious devotions to the mere phantasm of a transient sound, expecting all good from it, might very well seem to all intelligent persons a most absurd and ridiculous undertaking; both because the thing is so evident in itself, and because the plainest things of all can be least proved; for *ὁ πάντα*

ἀπόδεικτα νενομικῶς, αὐτὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀναιρεῖ.

He that thinks all things to be demonstrable, takes away demonstration itself.

Procl. in Timæ. p. 176.
edit. Græc.
Basil. 1534.
fol.

—Wherefore we shall here only suggest thus much, that since there are different words for God in several languages, and men have the same notion or conception in their minds answer-

ing to them all, it must needs be granted, that they have some other idea or conception belonging to those words, besides the phantasms of their several sounds. And indeed it can be nothing else, but either monstrous sottishness and stupidity of mind, or else prodigious impudence, in these Atheists to deny, that there is any idea of God at all in the minds of men, or that the word hath any signification.

It was heretofore observed by Epic-
 Arria. l. 1. c. 5. p. 95.
 Edit. Cantabr.
 tetus, ἄν τις ἐνίστηται πρὸς τὰ ἄγαν ἐκφανῆ,
 πρὸς τοῦτον οὐ ράδιόν ἐστιν εὐρεῖν λόγον, δι' οὗ
 μεταπέσει τις αὐτὸν· τοῦτο δ' οὔτε παρὰ τὴν ἐκέ-
 νου γίνεται δύναμιν, οὔτε παρὰ τὴν τοῦ διδάσκοντος ἀσθέ-
 νειαν· That if any man will oppose or contradict
 the most evident truths, it will not be easy to find
 arguments wherewith to convince him. And yet
 this, notwithstanding, ought neither to be im-
 puted to any inability in the teacher, nor to any
 strength of wit in the denier, but only to a certain
 dead insensibility in him.—Whereupon he further
 adds, that there is a double ἀπονέκρωσις, ἢ ἀπολίθωσις,
 mortification or petrification of the soul; the one,
 when it is stupified and besotted in its intellec-
 tuals; the other, when it is bedeaded in its mor-
 als as to that pudor, that naturally should belong
 to a man. And he concludes, that either of these
 states (though it be not commonly so apprehend-
 ed) is a condition little less deplorable, than that
 of bodily death; as also that such a person is not
 at all to be disputed with. For ποῖον αὐτῷ πῦρ ἢ
 ποῖον σίδηρον προσάγω, ἵν' αἰσθηταὶ ὅτι νεκρῶνται; αἰσθα-
 νόμενος οὐ προσποιεῖται; ἔτι χείρων ἐστὶ τοῦ νεκροῦ, ἐκτέ-
 τμηται γὰρ τὸ αἰδῆμον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἐντρέπτικον· What
 sword can one bring, or what fire, by burning or

slashing, to make such a one perceive that he is dead? But if he be sensible, and will not acknowledge it, then he is worse than dead, being castrated as to that pudor, that belongs to a man.— Moreover, that philosopher took notice, that in those times, when this denial of most evident truths proceeded rather from impudence than stupidity or sottishness, the vulgar would be apt to admire it for strength of wit and great learning; *ἀν δέ τινος τὸ αἰδῆμον ἀπονεκρωθῆ, τοῦτο ἔτι καὶ δύναμιν καλοῦμεν*. But if any man's pudor be deaded or mortified in him, we call this power and strength.—

Now, as this was sometimes the case of the Academics, so is it also commonly of the Atheists, that their minds are partly petrified and benumbed into a kind of sottish and stupid insensibility, so that they are not able to discern things that are most evident; and partly depudorated, or become so void of shame, as that though they do perceive, yet they will obstinately and impudently deny the plainest things that are; as this, that there is any idea answering to the word God, besides the phantasm of the sound. And we do the rather insist upon this prodigious monstrosity of Atheists in this place, because we shall have occasion afterwards more than once to take notice of it again in other instances, as when they affirm, that local motion and cogitation are really one and the self-same thing, and the like. And we conceive it to be unquestionably true, that it is many times nothing else, but either this shameless impudence, or sottish insensibility in Atheists, that is admired by the ignorant for profoundness of wit and learning; *ἄλλὰ ταύτην δύναμιν εἶπω; μὴ γένοιτο. εἰ*

^a Epictet. apud Arrian. ubi supra, p. 96.

μη̄ καὶ τὴν τῶν Κιναιδῶν, καθ' ἣν πᾶν τὸ ἐπελθὸν ἐν μέσῳ καὶ ποιῶσι καὶ λέγουσι. But shall I call this power or wit, and commend it upon that account? no more than I will commend the impudence of the Cinædi, who stick not publicly to do and say any thing.—

II. But whatever these Atheists deny in words, it is notwithstanding evident, that even themselves have an idea or conception in their minds answering to the word God, when they deny his existence, because otherwise they should deny the existence of nothing. Nor can it be at all doubted, but that they have also the same idea of God with Theists, they denying the existence of no other thing than what these assert. And as in all other controversies, when men dispute together, the one affirming, the other denying, both parties must needs have the same idea in their minds of what they dispute about, or otherwise their whole disputation would be but a kind of Babel language and confusion; so must it be likewise in this present controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists. Neither indeed would there be any controversy at all between them, did they not both by God mean one and the same thing; nor would the Atheists be any longer Atheists, did they not deny the existence of that very same thing which the Theists affirm, but of something else.

III. Wherefore, we shall in the next place declare, what this idea of God is, or what is that thing, whose existence they that affirm, are called Theists, and they who deny, Atheists. In order whereunto, we must first lay down this lemma, or preparatory proposition—that as it is generally acknowledged, that all things did not exist from

eternity, such as they are, unmade, but that some things were made and generated or produced ; so it is not possible that all things should be made neither, but there must of necessity be something self-existent from eternity, and unmade ; because if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. The reason of which is so evident and irresistible, that even the Atheists confess themselves conquered by it, and readily acknowledge it for an indubitable truth, that there must be something ἀγέννητον, something which was never made or produced—and which therefore is the cause of those other things that are made, something αὐτόφωες and αὐθυπόστατον, that was self-originated and self-existing, and which is as well ἀνώλεθρον and ἀφθαρτον, as ἀγέννητον, incorruptible and undestroyable, as ingenerable ; whose existence therefore must needs be necessary, because if it were supposed to have happened by chance to exist from eternity, then it might as well happen again to cease to be. Wherefore all the question now is, what is this ἀγέννητον and ἀνώλεθρον, αὐτόφωες and αὐθυπόστατον, this ingenerable and incorruptible, self-originated and self-existent thing, which is the cause of all other things that are made.

iv. Now there are two grand opinions opposite to one another concerning it ; for, first, some contend, that the only self-existent, unmade, and incorruptible thing, and first principle of all things, is senseless matter ; that is, matter either perfectly dead and stupid, or at least devoid of all animalish and conscious life. But because this is really the lowest and most imperfect of all beings, others on the contrary judge it reasonable,

that the first principle and original of all things should be that, which is most perfect (as Aristotle^a observes of Pherecydes, and his followers, τὸ γεννησάν πρῶτον ἄριστον τίθειαι, that they made the first cause and principle of generation to be the best), and then apprehending, that to be endued with conscious life and understanding is a much greater perfection than to be devoid of both,

De Nat.
Deor. l. 2.
cap. xvii. p.
2978. tom.
ix. oper.

(as Balbus in Cicero declares upon this very occasion, “Nec dubium quin quod animans sit, habeatque mentem, et rationem, et sensum, id sit melius quam id quod his careat”) they therefore conclude, that the only unmade thing, which was the principle, cause, and original of all other things, was not senseless matter, but a perfect conscious understanding nature, or mind. And these are they, who are strictly and properly called Theists, who affirm, that a perfectly conscious understanding being, or mind, existing of itself from eternity, was the cause of all other things; and they, on the contrary, who derive all things from senseless matter, as the first original, and deny that there is any conscious understanding being self-existent or unmade, are those that are properly called Atheists. Wherefore, the true and genuine idea of God in general, is this, A perfect conscious understanding being (or mind) existing of itself from eternity, and the cause of all other things.

v. But it is here observable, that those Atheists, who deny a God, according to this true and genuine notion of him, which we have declared, do often abuse the word, calling senseless matter

^a Metaphysicor. lib. xii. cap. iv. p. 446. tom. iv. oper.

by that name; partly perhaps as endeavouring thereby, to decline that odious and ignominious name of Atheists, and partly as conceiving, that whatsoever is the first principle of things, ingenerable and incorruptible, and the cause of all other things besides itself, must therefore needs be the divinest thing of all. Wherefore, by the word God, these mean nothing else, but that which is ἀγέννητον, unmade or self-existent, and the ἀρχή, or first principle of things. Thus it was before observed,^a that Anaximander called infinite matter, devoid of all manner of life, τὸ θεῖον, or God; and Pliny, the corporeal world, endued with nothing but a plastic unknowing nature, Numen; as also others in Aristotle,^b upon the same account, called the inanimate elements gods, as supposed first principles of things; θεοὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα, for these are also gods.—And indeed Aristotle himself seems to be guilty of this miscarriage of abusing the word God after this manner, when, speaking of love and chaos, as the two first principles of things, he must, according to the laws of grammar, be understood to call them both gods: τούτους μὲν οὖν πῶς χρὴ διανεῖμαι, περὶ τοῦ τίς πρῶτος, ἐξέστω κρίνειν ὕστερον. Concerning these two (gods) how they ought to be ranked, and which of them is to be placed first, whether love or chaos, is afterwards to be resolved.—Which passage of Aristotle's seems to agree with that of Epicharmus,^c Ἄλλὰ λέγεται μὲν

Metaph. lib.
1. cap. 4. p.
267. tom. iv.
oper.

^a Chap. iii. sec. xx.

^b This is a mistake of Dr. Cudworth, for Aristotle does not speak of those philosophers, who considered the elements as gods, but of Empedocles, and his well known principles of Νεῖκος and Φιλία. De Generatione et Corruptione, cap. vi. p. 734. tom. i. oper.

^c Apud Diogen. Laert. lib. iii. segm. 10. p. 171.

χάος πρῶτον γενέσθαι θεῶν, but chaos is said to have made the first of gods;—unless we should rather understand him thus, that chaos was said to have been made before the gods. And this abuse of the word God is a thing, which the learned Origen took notice of in his book against Celsus, where he speaks of that religious care, which ought to

L. 1. p. 19.
Cant.

μεγαλοφύεστερον, καὶ ὀλίγην τούτων περίνοιαν εἰληφώς, εὐλαβηθήσεται, ἄλλα ἄλλοις ἐφαρμόζειν ὀνόματα πράγμασι, μήποτε ὅμοιον πάθῃ τοῖς τὸ Θεὸς ὄνομα ἐσφαλμένως φέρουσιν, ἐπὶ ὕλην ἄψυχον. He, therefore, that hath but the least consideration of these things, will take a religious care, that he give not improper names to things, lest he should fall into a like miscarriage with those, who attribute the name of God to inanimate and senseless matter.—Now, according to this false and spurious notion of the word of God, when it is taken for any supposed first principle, or self-existent unmade thing, whatsoever that be, there neither is nor can be any such thing as an Atheist; since whosoever hath but the least drachm of reason, must needs acknowledge, that something or other existed from eternity unmade, and was the cause of those other things that are made. But that notion or idea of God, according to which some are Atheists and some Theists, is, in the strictest sense of it, what we have already declared, A perfect mind, or consciously understanding nature, self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things.—The genuine Theists being those, who make the first original of all things universally to be a consciously understanding nature (or perfect mind); but the Atheists, properly such, as derive all things

from matter, either perfectly dead and stupid, or else devoid of all conscious and animalish life.

VI. But that we may more fully and punctually declare the true idea of God, we must here take notice of a certain opinion of some philosophers, who went as it were in a middle betwixt both the former, and neither made matter alone, nor God, the sole principle of all things; but joined them both together, and held two first principles or self-existent unmade beings, independent upon one another—God, and the matter. Amongst whom the Stoics are to be reckoned, who, notwithstanding, because they held, that there was no other substance besides body, strangely confounded themselves, being by that means necessitated to make their two first principles, the active and the passive, to be both of them really but one and the self-same substance: their doctrine to this purpose being thus declared by Cicero:^a “*Naturam dividebant in res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se præbens, ex qua efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant; in eo, quod efficeretur, materiam quandam; in utroque tamen utrumque. Neque enim materiam ipsam cohærere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia; nihil est enim, quod non alicubi esse cogatur.*” The Stoics divided nature into two things as the first principles, one whereof is the efficient or artificer, the other that which offers itself to him for things to be made out of it. In the efficient principle they took notice of active force in the patient of matter,

^a Academ. Quæst. lib. i. cap. vi. p. 2231. tom. viii. oper. But Cicero in this passage does not treat of the opinion of the Stoics, but of that of Plato and his ancient followers, or the first Academics.

but so as that in each of these were both together; forasmuch as neither the matter could cohere together, unless it were contained by some active force, nor the active force subsist of itself without matter, because that is nothing, which is not somewhere.—But besides these Stoïcs, there were other philosophers, who, admitting of incorporeal substance, did suppose two first principles, as substances really distinct from one another, that were co-existent from eternity—an incorporeal Deity and matter; as for example, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Atticus, and many more; insomuch that Pythagoras himself was reckoned amongst those by Numenius, and Plato by Plutarch and Laertius.

See Euseb.
Præp. Ev.
lib. 7. c. 7.

And we find it commonly taken for granted, that Aristotle also was of this persuasion, though it cannot be certainly concluded from thence (as some seem to suppose), because he asserted the eternity of the world; Plotinus, Porphyrius, Jamblichus, Proclus, and Simplicius doing the like, and yet, notwithstanding, maintaining, that God was the sole principle of all things, and that matter also was derived from him. Neither will that

L. 1. c. 1. p.
263. tom. iv.
oper.

passage of Aristotle's, in his *Metaphysics*, necessarily evince the contrary: Θεός δοκεῖ τὸ αἴτιον πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις, God seems to be a cause to all things, and a certain principle;—because this might be understood only of the forms of things.

But it is plain, that Plutarch was a maintainer of this doctrine, from his discourse upon the Platonic *psychogonia*^a (besides other places): βέλτιον

^a Tom. ii. oper. p. 1014.

οὐν Πλάτωνι πειθόμενους τὸν μὲν κόσμον ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγονέ-
 ναι λέγειν καὶ ἄδειν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγυότων,
 ὁ δὲ ἄριστος τῶν αἰτιῶν· τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην, ἐξ ἧς γέγο-
 νεν, οὐ γενομένην, ἀλλὰ ὑποκειμένην αἰεὶ τῷ δημιουργῷ, εἰς
 διάθεσιν καὶ τάξιν αὐτῆς, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐξομοίωσιν, ὡς δυ-
 νατὸν ἦν παρασχεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ γένεσις,
 ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς, μηδ' ἰκανῶς ἔχοντος; ὡς οἰκίας, καὶ
 ἱματίου, καὶ ἀνδριάντος· It is, therefore, better for us
 to follow Plato (than Heraclitus), and loudly to
 declare, that the world was made by God. For
 as the world is the best of all works, so is God
 the best of all causes. Nevertheless, the sub-
 stance or matter, out of which the world was
 made, was not itself made; but always ready at
 hand, and subject to the artificer, to be ordered
 and disposed by him. For the making of the
 world was not the production of it out of nothing,
 but out of an antecedent bad and disorderly state,
 like the making of a house, garment, or statue.

It is also well known, that Hermogenes, and
 other ancient pretenders to Christianity, did in
 like manner assert the self-existence and impro-
 duction of the matter, for which cause they were
 commonly called Materiarii, or the Materiarian
 heretics; they pretending by this means to give an
 account (as the Stoics had done before them) of
 the original of evils, and to free God from the im-
 putation of them. Their ratiocination to which
 purpose, is thus set down by Tertullian:

“God made all things, either out of him-
 self, or out of nothing, or out of matter.

Adver. Her-
 mog. p. 282.
 Reg.

He could not make all things out of himself, be-
 cause himself being always unmade, he should
 then really have been the maker of nothing: and
 he did not make all out of nothing, because being

essentially good, he would have made *nihil non optimum*, every thing in the best manner, and so there could have been no evil in the world; but since there are evils, and these could not proceed from the will of God, they must needs arise from the fault of something, and therefore of the matter, out of which things were made." Lastly, it is sufficiently known, likewise, that some modern sects of the Christian profession, at this day, do also assert the uncreatedness of the matter. But these suppose, in like manner as the Stoics did, body to be the only substance.

VII. Now of all these, whosoever they were, who thus maintained two self-existent principles, God and the matter, we may pronounce universally, that they were neither better nor worse, than a kind of imperfect Theists.

They had a certain notion or idea of God, such as it was, which seems to be the very same with that expressed in Aristotle,^a Ζῶν ἄριστον αἰδίου, an animal the best, eternal; and represented also by Epicurus in this manner,^b Ζῶν πᾶσαν ἔχον μακαριότητα μετ' ἀφθαρσίας, an animal, that hath all happiness with incorruptibility.—

Wherein it was acknowledged by them, that besides senseless matter, there was also an animalish and conscious or perceptive nature, self-existent from eternity; in opposition to Atheists, who made matter either devoid of all manner of life, or at least of such as is animalish and conscious, to be the sole principle of all things. For it hath been often observed, that some Atheists attributed a kind of plastic life or nature to that

^a Metaphys. lib. xiv. cap. viii. p. 479. tom. iv. oper.

^b Vide Diogen. Laert. lib. x. segm. 123. p. 655.

matter, which they made to be the only principle of the universe. And these two sorts of Atheisms were long since taken notice of by Seneca, in these words: “Universum, in quo nos quoque sumus, expers esse consilii, et aut ferri temeritate quadam, aut natura nesciente quid faciat.” The Atheists make the universe, whereof ourselves are part, to be devoid of counsel; and, therefore, either to be carried on temerarily and fortuitously, or else by such a nature, as which (though it be orderly, regular, and methodical) yet is, notwithstanding, nescient of what it doth.—But no Atheist ever acknowledged conscious animality to be a first principle in the universe; nor that the whole was governed by any animalish, sentient, and understanding nature, presiding over it as the head of it; but as it was before declared, they concluded all animals and animality, all conscious, sentient, and self-perceptive life, to be generated and corrupted, or educed out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Wherefore they, who, on the contrary, asserted animality and conscious life to be a first principle or unmade thing in the universe, are to be accounted Theists. Thus Balbus in Cicero declares,* that to be a Theist is to assert, “Ab animantibus principiis mundum esse generatum,” that the world was generated or produced at first from animant principles;—and that it is also still governed by such a nature; “Res omnes subjectas esse naturæ sentienti,” that all things are subject to a sentient and conscious nature, steering and guiding of them.—

Nat. Qu.
Præf. l. 1.

* De Natura Deor. l. ii. sect. xxx. p. 299. tom. ix. oper.

But to distinguish this Divine animal from all others, these definers added, that it was ἀρίστον, and μακαρώτατον, the best and most happy animal;—and, accordingly, this difference is added to that generical nature of animality by Balbus the Stoic, to make up the idea or definition of God complete: “Talem esse deum certa
Cicero de Nat. D. l. 2. cap. xvii. p. 2977. tom. ix. oper. notione animi præsentimus; primum, ut sit animans; deinde, ut in omni natura nihil illo sit præstantius.” We presage concerning God, by a certain notion of our mind; first, that he is an animans, or consciously living being; and then, secondly, that he is such an animans, as that there is nothing in the whole universe, or nature of things, more excellent than him.—

Wherefore these Materiarian Theists acknowledged God to be a perfectly-understanding being, and such as had also power over the whole matter of the universe; which was utterly unable to move itself, or to produce any thing without him. And all of them, except the Anaxagoreans,* concluded, that he was the creator of all the forms of inanimate bodies, and of the souls of animals. However, it was universally agreed upon amongst them, that he was at least the orderer and disposer of all; and that, therefore, he might upon that account well be called the δημιουργός, the maker or framer of the world.

Notwithstanding which, so long as they maintained matter to exist independently upon God, and sometimes also to be refractory and contumacious to him, and by that means to be the cause of evil, contrary to the Divine will; it is

* Vide Diogen. Laert. lib. ii. segm. 9. p. 85.

plain, that they could not acknowledge the Divine omnipotence, according to the full and proper sense of it; which may also further appear from these queries of Seneca,* concerning God: “Quantum Deus possit? materiam ipse sibi formet, an data utatur? Deus quicquid vult efficiat? an in multis rebus illum tractanda destituant, et a magno artifice prave formentur multa, non quia cessat ars, sed quia id, in quo exercetur, sæpe inobsequens arti est?” How far God’s power does extend? whether he makes his own matter, or only use that which is offered him; whether he can do whatsoever he will; or the materials in many things frustrate and disappoint him, and by that means things come to be ill framed by this great artificer, not because his art fails him, but because that which it is exercised upon, proves stubborn and contumacious?—Wherefore, I think, we may well conclude, that those Materiarian Theists had not a right and genuine idea of God.

Nevertheless, it does not, therefore, follow, that they must needs be concluded absolute Atheists; for there may be a latitude allowed in Theism. And though, in a strict and proper sense, they be only Theists who acknowledge one God perfectly omnipotent, the sole original of all things, and as well the cause of matter as of any thing else; yet it seems reasonable, that such consideration should be had of the infirmity of human understandings, as to extend the word further, that it may comprehend within it those also, who assert one intellectual principle self-existent from eternity, the framer and governor of the whole world, though not the creator of the matter; and

* Præfat. lib. i. Quæst. Natur. tom. ii. oper. p. 485.

that none should be condemned for absolute Atheists, merely because they hold eternal uncreated matter, unless they also deny an eternal unmade mind, ruling over the matter, and so make senseless matter the sole original of all things. And this is certainly most agreeable to common apprehensions; for Democritus and Epicurus would never have been condemned for Atheists, merely for asserting eternal self-existent atoms, no more than Anaxagoras and Archelaus were (who maintained the same thing), had they not also denied that other principle of their's, a perfect mind, and concluded, that the world was made, μηδενὸς διατάττοντος ἢ διαταξαμένον τὴν πᾶσαν ἔχοντος μακαριότητα μετ' ἀφθαρσίας, without the ordering and disposal of any understanding being, that had all happiness with incorruptibility.—

VIII. The true and proper idea of God, in its most contracted form, is this, a being absolutely perfect; for this is that alone, to which necessary existence is essential, and of which it is demonstrable. Now, as absolute perfection includes in it all that belongs to the Deity, so does it not only comprehend (besides necessary existence) perfect knowledge or understanding, but also omni-causality and omnipotence (in the full extent of it), otherwise called infinite power. God is not only ζῶον ἄριστον, and “animans quo nihil in omni natura præstantius,” as the Materiarian Theists described him, the best living being; nor, as Zeno Eleates^a called him, κράτιστον πάντων, the most powerful of all things;—but he is also παγκρατής, and παντοκράτωρ, and παντεξούσιος, absolutely omni-

^a Vide Aristot. Libro de Xenocrate, Zenone, et Gorgia, cap. iii. p. 840. tom. ii. oper.

potent, and infinitely powerful; and, therefore, neither matter, nor any thing else, can exist of itself independently upon God; but he is the sole principle and source, from which all things are derived.

But because this infinite power is a thing, which the Atheists quarrel much withal, as if it were altogether unintelligible, and therefore impossible; we shall here briefly declare the sense of it, and render it (as we think) easily intelligible or conceivable, in these two following steps: first, that by infinite power is meant nothing else but perfect power, or else, as Simplicius calls it, ὅλη δύναμις, a whole and entire power,—such as hath no allay and mixture of impotency, nor any defect of power mingled with it. And then, again, that this perfect power (which is also the same with infinite) is really nothing else but a power of producing and doing all whatsoever is conceivable, and which does not imply a contradiction; for conception is the only measure of power and its extent, as shall be shewed more fully in due place.

Now, here we think fit to observe, that the Pagan Theists did themselves also vulgarly acknowledge omnipotence as an attribute of the Deity; which might be proved from sundry passages of their writings:—

Homer. Od. 8.^a

————— Θεὸς ἄλλοτ' ἐπ' ἄλλω
Ζεὺς ἀγαθόντε κακόντε διδοί, δύναται γὰρ ἅπαντα.

————— Deus aliud post aliud
Jupiter, bonumque malumque dat, potest enim omnia.

^a Vers. 226, 227.

And again, Od. ζ'.^a

— Θεὸς τὸ μὲν δώσει, τὸ δ' ἔλασει,
 Ὅτι κεν ᾗ θυμῷ ἐθέλει, δύναται γὰρ ἅπαντα.

— Deus autem hoc dabit, illud omittet,
 Quodcunque ei libitum fuerit, potest enim omnia.

To this purpose also, before Homer, Linus :^b

Ῥᾶδια πάντα θεῶ τέλεισαι, καὶ ἀνύπτου οὐδέν·

And after him, Callimachus :^c

Δαίμονι ρέξαι πᾶν δυνατόν·

All things are possible for God to do, and nothing transcends his power.—

Thus also amongst the Latin poets, Virgil.
 Æn. I.

Sed pater omnipotens speluncis abdidit atris.

Again, Æn. II.

At pater Anchises oculos ad sydera lætus
 Extulit, et coelo palmas cum voce tetendit ;
 Jupiter omnipotens, precibus si flecteris ullis.

And, Æn. IV.

Talibus orantem dictis, arasque tenentem
 Audiit Omnipotens.

Ovid, in like manner, Metamorph. I.

Tum pater omnipotens misso perfregit Olympum
 Fulmine, et excussit subjectum Pelion Ossæ.

And to cite no more, Agatho, an ancient Greek poet, is commended by Aristotle, for affirming

^a Vers. 432, 433.

^b Apud Jamblichum in Vita Pythag. cap. xxviii. p. 117, 118.

^c Apud Plutarch. de Placitis Philosophor. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 880. tom. ii. oper.

nothing to be exempted from the power of God but only this, that he cannot make that not to have been, which hath been; that is, do what implies a contradiction.

*Μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ, καὶ Θεὸς στέρησεται,
Ἄγέμεντα ποιεῖν, ἄσσο' ἂν ἢ πεπραγμένα·*

Eth. Nic. l. 4.
c. 2. p. 98.
tom. iii. oper.

Hoc namque duntaxat negatum etiam Deo est,
Quæ facta sunt, infecta posse reddere.

Lastly, that the Atheists themselves under Paganism looked upon omnipotence and infinite power as an essential attribute of the Deity, appears plainly from Lucretius; when he tells us, that Epicurus, in order to the taking away of religion, set himself to confute infinite power:

—Omne immensum peragravit mente animoque,
Unde refert nobis victor, quid possit oriri,
Quid nequeat: finita potestas denique quoique
Quanam sit ratione, atque alte terminus hærens.
Quare religio pedibus subjecta vicissim
Obteritur, nos exæquat victoria cœlo.

L. i. vers.
75, &c.

As if he should have said, Epicurus, by shewing that all power was finite, effectually destroyed religion: he thereby taking away the object of it, which is an omnipotent and infinitely powerful Deity. And this is a thing, which the same poet often harps upon again, that there is no infinite power, and consequently no Deity, according to the true idea of it. But, last of all, in his sixth book, he condemns religionists, as guilty of great folly, in asserting omnipotence or infinite power (that is, a Deity), after this manner:

Rursus in antiquas referuntur religiones,
Et dominos aeres asciscunt, omnia posse,
Quos miseri credunt, ignari quid queat esse,

Quid nequeat, finita potestas denique quoique,
 Quanam sit ratione, atque alte terminus hærens :
 Quo magis errantes tota regione feruntur.

Where though the poet, speaking carelessly, after the manner of those times, seems to attribute omnipotence and infinite power to gods plurally ; yet, as it is evident in the thing itself, that this can only be the attribute of one supreme Deity ; so it may be observed, that in those passages of the poets before cited, it is accordingly always ascribed to God singularly. Nevertheless, all the inferior Pagan deities were supposed by them to have their certain shares of this Divine omnipotence, severally dispensed and imparted to them.

ix. But we have not yet dispatched all that belongs to the entire idea of God ; for knowledge and power alone will not make a God. For God is generally conceived by all to be a most venerable and most desirable being ; whereas, an omniscient and omnipotent arbitrary Deity, that hath nothing either of benignity or morality in its nature, to measure and regulate its will, as it could not be truly august and venerable, according to that maxim, *sine bonitate nulla majestas* ; so neither could it be desirable, it being that which could only be feared and dreaded, but not have any firm faith or confidence placed in it. Plutarch, in the life of Aristides :^a τὸ Θεῖον τρισὶ δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀφθαρσία, καὶ δυνάμει, καὶ ἀρετῇ· ὧν σεμνότατον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ θεϊότατόν ἐστι· ἀφθάρτῳ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τῷ κενῷ, καὶ τοῖς στοιχείοις συμβέβηκε· δύνναμιν δὲ σεισμοὶ καὶ κέραννοι, καὶ πνευμάτων ὄρμαι καὶ ρευμάτων ἐπιφοραὶ μεγάλην ἔχουσι, &c. God seems to excel in these three things, incorruptibility, power, and virtue ; of all which the

^a P. 322. tom. i. oper.

most Divine and venerable is virtue: for vacuum and the senseless elements have incorruptibility; earthquakes, and thunders, blustering winds and overflowing torrents, much of power and force. Wherefore, the vulgar being affected three manner of ways towards the Deity, so as to admire its happiness, to fear it, and to honour it; they esteem the Deity happy for its incorruptibility, they fear it and stand in awe of it for its power, but they worship it, that is, love and honour it, for its justice.—And indeed an omnipotent arbitrary Deity may seem to be in some sense a worse and more undesireable thing, than the Manichean evil god; forasmuch as the latter could be but finitely evil, whereas the former might be so infinitely. However, I think, it can be little doubted, but that the whole Manichean hypothesis, taken all together, is to be preferred before this of one omnipotent arbitrary Deity (devoid of goodness and morality) ruling all things; because there the evil principle is yoked with another principle essentially good, checking and controlling it; and it also seems less dishonourable to God, to impute defect of power than of goodness and justice to him.

Neither can power and knowledge alone make a being in itself completely happy; for we have all of us by nature *μαντευμά τι* (as both Plato and Aristotle call it) a certain divination, presage, and parturient vaticination in our minds, of some higher good and perfection than either power or knowledge. Knowledge is plainly to be preferred before power, as being that which guides and directs its blind force and impetus; but Aristotle himself declares, that there is *λόγου τι κρείττον*, which is *λόγου ἀρχή*, something better than

Eth. Eudem.
l. 7. c. 14.
p. 384. tom.
iii. oper.

reason and knowledge, which is the principle and original of all.—For (saith he) λόγου ἀρχὴ οὐ λόγος, ἀλλὰ τι κρεῖττον·

The principle of reason is not reason, but something better.—Where he also intimates this to be the proper and essential character of the Deity; τὶ οὖν ἂν κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης, πλὴν ὁ Θεός: For what is there, that can be better than knowledge, but God?—Likewise the same philosopher elsewhere plainly determines, that there is morality in the nature of God; and that his happiness consisteth principally therein, and not in external things,

De Rep. l. 7.
c. 1. p. 569.
tom. iii. oper.

and the exercise of his power: ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐκάστῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον, ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας, ἔστω συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῶ θεῶ χρωμένοις, ὃς εὐδαίμων μὲν ἔστι καὶ μακάριος, δι' οὐθὲν δὲ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτὸς, καὶ τῶ ποιός τις εἶναι τὴν φύσιν. That every man hath so much of happiness, as he hath of virtue and wisdom, and of acting according to these, ought to be confessed and acknowledged by us, it being a thing, that may be proved from the nature of God, who is happy, but not from any external goods, but because he is himself (or that which he is) and in such a manner affected according to his nature;—that is, because he is essentially moral and virtuous.

Which doctrine of Aristotle's seems to have been borrowed from Plato, who in his dialogues *De Republica*,^a discoursing about moral virtue, occasionally falls upon this dispute concerning the *summum bonum*, or chiefest good; wherein he concludes, that it neither consisted in pleasure, as

^a De Republica, lib. vi. p. 477. oper.

such, according to the opinion of the vulgar, nor yet in mere knowledge and understanding, according to the conceit of others, who were more polite and ingenious. οἶθα ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολ-

Lib. 6.

λοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶαι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψότε-
ροις φρόνησις· καὶ ὅτιγε οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι
δειξαι ἥτις φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ φάναι, μάλα γελοίως, ὀνειδίζοντες γὰρ, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν
τὸ ἀγαθόν, λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδῶσι· You know that,
to the vulgar, pleasure seems to be the highest
good; but to those, who are more elegant and in-
genious, knowledge: but they, who entertain this
latter opinion, can none of them declare what
kind of knowledge it is, which is that highest and
chiefest good, but are necessitated at last to say,
that it is the knowledge of good, very ridicu-
lously: forasmuch as herein they do but run
round in a circle, and upbraiding us for being ig-
norant of this highest good, they talk to us at the
same time, as knowing what it is. And thereupon
he adds, Καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἀλη-
θείας, ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τοῦτο ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ, ὀρθῶς
ἠγήσεται. Ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν, ὡςπερ φῶς τε καὶ
ὄψιν ἠλιοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ὀρθόν, ἥλιον δὲ ἠγεῖσθαι οὐκ ὀρ-
θῶς, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταυθα ἀγαθοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ἀμφοτέρα ὀρθόν,
ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἠγεῖσθαι ὀπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὀρθόν, ἀλλ' ἔτι μει-
ζόνως τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔξιν τιμητέον. That though know-
ledge and truth be both of them excellent things,
yet he that shall conclude the chief good to be
something which transcends them both, will not
be mistaken. For as light, and sight, or the see-
ing faculty, may both of them rightly be said to
be soliform things, or of kin to the sun, but nei-
ther of them to be the sun itself; so knowledge
and truth may likewise both of them be said to be

boniform things, and of kin to the chief good, but neither of them to be that chief good itself; but this is still to be looked upon as a thing more august and honourable.—In all which of Plato's there seems to be little more, than what may be experimentally found within ourselves; namely, that there is a certain life, or vital and moral disposition of soul, which is much more inwardly and thoroughly satisfactory, not only than sensual pleasure, but also than all knowledge and speculation whatsoever.

Now whatever this chiefest good be, which is a perfection superior to knowledge and understanding; that philosopher^a resolves, that it must needs be first and principally in God, who is therefore called by him, 'Ιδέα τ' ἀγαθοῦ, the very idea or essence of good.—Wherein he trod in the footsteps of the Pythagoreans, and particularly of Timæus Locrus,^b who, making two principles of the universe, mind and necessity, adds, concerning the former, *τουτέων τὸν μὲν τὰς τ' ἀγαθοῦ φύσιος εἶμεν, θεόν τε ὀνυμαίνεσθαι ἀρχάντε τῶν ἀρίστων*. The first of these two is of the nature of good, and it is called God, the principle of the best things.—Agreeably with which doctrine of their's, the Hebrew Cabalists also make a Sephirah in the Deity, superior both to Binah and Chochmah (understanding and wisdom), which they call Chether, or the crown. And some would suspect this Cabalistic learning to have been very ancient among the Jews, and that Parmenides was imbued with it, he calling God in like manner *στεφάνην*, or the crown.—For which,

^a Vide Platon. de Republica, lib. ii. p. 431. et Philebum, p. 77, &c.

^b Libro de Anima Mundi, cap. i. p. 543. inter Scriptores Mytholog.
^a Tho. Gale editos.

Velleius in Cicero* (representing the several opinions of philosophers concerning God), perstrings him amongst the rest; “*Parmenides commentitium quiddam coronæ similitudine efficit, Stephanem appellat, continentem ardore lucis orbem, qui cingit cælum, quem appellat deum.*”

But all this while we seem to be to seek, what the chief and highest good superior to knowledge is, in which the essence of the Deity principally consists; and it cannot be denied, but that Plato sometimes talks too metaphysically and cloudily about it; for which cause, as he lay open to the lash of Aristotle, so was he also vulgarly perstringed for it, as appears by that of Amphys the poet in Laertius:^b

Τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὃ, τι ποτ' ἴστιν, οὐδ' οὐ τυγχάνειν
 Μέλλεις διὰ ταύτην, ἥττον οἶδα τοῦτ' ἐγὼ,
 Ἡ τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Ἀγαθόν

What good that is, which you expect from hence, I confess, I less understand, than I do Plato's good.—Nevertheless, he plainly intimates these two things concerning it: first, that this nature of good, which is also the nature of God, includes benignity in it, when he gives this account^c of God's both making the world, and after such a manner—“*Because he was good, and that which is good, hath no envy in it; and therefore he both made the world, and also made it as well, and as like to himself as was possible.*”—And, secondly, that it comprehends eminently all virtue and justice, the Divine Nature being the first pattern hereof; for which cause virtue is defined

* De Natura Deorum, lib. i. cap. x. p. 2895. oper. tom. ix.

^b Lib. iii. segm. 27. p. 181.

^c Vide Platon. in Timæo, p. 527.

to be, an assimilation to the Deity. Justice and honesty are no factious things, made by the will and command of the more powerful to the weaker, but they are nature and perfection, and descend downward to us from the Deity.

But the Holy Scripture, without any metaphysical pomp and obscurity, tells us plainly, both what is that highest perfection of intellectual beings, which is *κρείττον λόγου καὶ ἐπιστήμης*, better than reason and knowledge,—and which is also the source, life, and soul of all morality; namely, that it is love or charity. Though I speak with the tongue of men and angels, and have not love, I am but *χαλκὸς ἢ χῶν, ἢ κύμβαλον ἀλαλάζον*, as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal,—which only makes a noise without any inward life. And though I have prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge, and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not love, I am nothing; that is, I have no inward satisfaction, peace, or true happiness. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and give my body to be burned, and have not love, it profiteth me nothing; I am for all that utterly destitute of all true morality, virtue, and grace. And accordingly it tells us also, in the next place, what the nature of God is—that he is properly neither power nor knowledge (though having the perfection of both in him), but love. And certainly whatever dark thoughts, concerning the Deity, some men in their cells may sit brooding on, it can never reasonably be conceived, that that which is *ικανώτατον ἀπάντων καὶ αὐταρκέστατον*, the most self-sufficient and self-happy being,—should have any narrow and selfish designs abroad, with-

out itself, much less harbour any malignant and despightful ones towards its creatures. Nevertheless, because so many are apt to abuse the notion of the Divine love and goodness, and to frame such conceptions of it, as destroy that awful and reverential fear that ought to be had of the Deity, and make men presumptuous and regardless of their lives; therefore we think fit here to superadd, also, that God is no soft nor fond and partial love, but that justice is an essential branch of this Divine goodness; God being, as the writer *De Mundo*^a well expresses it, νόμος ἰσοκλιῆς, an impartial law;—and as Plato,^b μέτρον πάντων, the measure of all things.—In imitation whereof, Aristotle concludes also, that a good man (in a lower and more imperfect sense) is μέτρον too, an impartial measure of things and actions.

It is evident, that the Atheists themselves, in those former times of Paganism, took it for granted, that goodness was an essential attribute of the Deity, whose existence they opposed (so that it was then generally acknowledged for such, by the Pagan Theists), from those argumentations of their's, before-mentioned, the 12th and 13th, taken from the topic of evils, the pretended ill frame of things, and want of providence over human affairs. Which, if they were true, would not at all disprove such an arbitrary Deity (as is now fancied by some) made up of nothing but will and power, without any essential goodness and justice. But those arguments of the Atheists are directly levelled against the Deity, according to the true notion or idea of it; and could they be made good,

^a Cap. vi. p. 865. tom. i. oper. Aristotelis.

^b De Legibus, lib. iv. p. 601.

would do execution upon the same. For it cannot be denied, but that the natural consequence of this doctrine, that there is a God essentially good, is this, that therefore the world is well made and governed. But we shall afterwards declare; that though there be evil in the parts of the world, yet there is none in the whole; and that moral evils are not imputable to the Deity.

And now we have proposed the three principal attributes of the Deity. The first whereof is infinite goodness with fecundity; the second, infinite knowledge and wisdom; and the last, infinite active and perceptive power. From which Divine attributes, the Pythagoreans and Platonists seem to have framed their trinity of archical hypostases, such as have the nature of principles in the universe, and which, though they apprehended as several distinct substances, gradually subordinate to one another, yet they many times extend the τὸ Θεῖον so far, as to comprehend them all within it. Which Pythagoric trinity seems to be intimated

by Aristotle in these words: *καθάπερ γὰρ φασὶ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοῖς τρισὶ διώρισται*. As the Pythagoreans also say, the universe, and all things, are determined and contained by three principles.—Of which Pythagoric trinity more afterwards. But now we may enlarge and fill up that compendious idea of God premised, of a being absolutely perfect, by adding thereunto (to make it more particular) such as infinitely good, wise, and powerful, necessarily existing, and not only the framer of the world, but also the cause of all things. Which idea of the Deity is sufficient, in order to our present undertaking.

De Cael. l. 1.
c. 1. p. 610.
tom. i. oper.

Nevertheless, if we would not only attend to what is barely necessary for a dispute with Atheists, but also consider the satisfaction of other free and devout minds, that are hearty and sincere lovers of this most admirable and most glorious being, we might venture for their gratification to propose yet a more full, free, and copious description of the Deity, after this manner.—God is a being absolutely perfect, unmade, or self-originated, and necessarily existing; that hath an infinite fecundity in him, and virtually contains all things; as also an infinite benignity or overflowing love, uninviciously displaying and communicating itself; together with an impartial rectitude, or nature of justice; who fully comprehends himself, and the extent of his own fecundity, and therefore all the possibilities of things, their several natures and respects, and the best frame or system of the whole; who hath also infinite active and perceptive power; the fountain of all things, who made all that could be made, and was fit to be made, producing them according to his own nature (his essential goodness and wisdom), and therefore according to the best pattern, and in the best manner possible, for the good of the whole; and reconciling all the variety and contrariety of things in the universe into one most admirable and lovely harmony. Lastly, who contains and upholds all things, and governs them after the best manner also, and that without any force or violence, they being all naturally subject to his authority, and readily obeying his law. And now we see, that God is such a being, as that, if he could be supposed not to be, there is

nothing whose existence a good man could possibly more wish or desire.

x. From the idea of God thus declared, it evidently appears, that there can be but one such being, and that *Μόνως*, unity, oneliness, or singularity is essential to it; forasmuch as there cannot possibly be more than one Supreme, more than one Omnipotent, or infinitely powerful Being, and more than one cause of all things besides itself. And however Epicurus, endeavouring to pervert and adulterate the notion of God, pretended to satisfy that natural prolepsis or anticipation in the minds of men, by a feigned and counterfeit asserting of a multiplicity of co-ordinate deities, independent upon one Supreme, and such as were also altogether unconcerned either in the frame or government of the world, yet himself, notwithstanding, plainly took notice of this idea of God, which we have proposed, including unity or oneliness in it (he professedly opposing the existence of such a Deity); as may sufficiently appear from that argumentation of his, in the words before cited:

Lib. 2. p.
198. Lamb.

Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi
Inde manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?
Quis pariter cœlos omnes convertere, et omnes
Ignibus ætheriis terras suffire feraces?
Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore præsto?

Where he would conclude it to be a thing utterly impossible, for the Deity to animadvert, order, and dispose all things, and be present every where in all the distant places of the world at once; which could not be pretended of a multitude of co-ordinate gods, sharing the govern-

ment of the world amongst them ; and, therefore, it must needs be levelled against a Divine monarchy, or one single, solitary, supreme Deity, ruling over all. As, in like manner, when he pursues the same argument further in Cicero, to this purpose, that though such a thing were supposed to be possible, yet it would be, notwithstanding, absolutely inconsistent with the happiness of any being, he still proceeds upon the same hypothesis of one sole and single

Deity: “ Sive ipse mundus Deus est, quid potest esse minus quietum, quam nullo puncto temporis intermisso, versari circum axem cœli admirabili celeritate? sive in ipso mundo Deus inest aliquis, qui regat, qui gubernet, qui cursus astrorum, mutationes temporum, hominum commoda vitasque tueatur; nœ ille est implicatus molestis negotiis et operosis.”

De Nat. D.
l. 1. cap. xx.
p. 2909. tom.
ix. oper.

Whether you will suppose the world itself to be a God, what can be more unquiet, than without intermission perpetually to whirl round upon the axis of the heaven with such admirable celerity? or whether you will imagine a God in the world distinct from it, who does govern and dispose all things, keep up the courses of the stars, the successive changes of the seasons, and orderly vicissitudes of things, and contemplating lands and seas, conserve the utilities and lives of men; certainly he must needs be involved in much solicitous trouble and employment.—For, as Epicurus here speaks singularly, so the trouble of this theocracy could not be thought so very great to a multitude of co-ordinate deities, when parcelled out among them, but would rather seem to be but a sportful and delightful divertisement

to each of them. Wherefore it is manifest, that such an idea of God, as we have declared, including unity, oneliness and singularity in it, is a thing, which the ancient Atheists, under the times of Paganism, were not unacquainted with, but principally directed their force against. But this may seem to be anticipated in this place, because it will fall in afterwards more opportunely to be discoursed of again.

XI. For this is that, which lies as the grand prejudice and objection against that idea of God, which we have proposed, essentially including *μόνωσιν*, singularity or oneliness in it, or the real existence of such a Deity, as is the sole monarch of the universe; because all the nations of the world heretofore (except a small and inconsiderable handful of the Jews), together with their wisest men, and greatest philosophers, were generally looked upon as Polytheists, that is, such as acknowledged and worshipped a multiplicity of gods. Now one God, and many gods, being directly contradictory to one another, it is therefore concluded from hence, that this opinion of monarchy, or of one supreme God, the maker and governor of all, hath no foundation in nature, nor in the genuine ideas and prolepses of men's minds, but is a mere artificial thing, owing its original wholly to private fancies and conceits, or to positive laws and institutions, amongst Jews, Christians, and Mahometans.

For the assoiling of which difficulty (seeming so formidable at first sight), it is necessary that we should make a diligent inquiry into the true and genuine sense of this Pagan Polytheism. For since it is impossible, that any man in his wits

should believe a multiplicity of gods, according to that idea of God before declared, that is, a multiplicity of supreme, omnipotent, or infinitely powerful beings; it is certain, that the Pagan Polytheism, and multiplicity of gods, must be understood according to some other notion of the word gods, or some equivocation in the use of it. It hath been already observed, that there were some time amongst the Pagans such, who, meaning nothing else by gods but understanding beings superior to men, did suppose a multitude of such deities, which yet they conceived to be all (as well as men) native and mortal, generated successively out of matter, and corrupted again into it, as Democritus's idols were. But these Theogonists, who thus generated all things whatsoever, and therefore the gods themselves universally, out of night and chaos, the ocean or fluid matter (notwithstanding their using the name gods) are plainly condemned both by Aristotle and Plato for downright Atheists, they making senseless matter the only self-existent thing, and the original of all things.

Wherefore there may be another notion of the word gods, as taken for understanding beings superior to men, that are not only immortal, but also self-existent and unmade. And, indeed, the assertors of a multiplicity of such gods as these, though they cannot be accounted Theists in a strict and proper sense (according to that idea of God before declared), yet they are not vulgarly reputed Atheists neither, but looked upon as a kind of middle thing betwixt both, and commonly called Polytheists. The reason whereof seems to be this, because it is generally apprehended to be

essential to Atheism, to make senseless matter the sole original of all things, and consequently to suppose all conscious intellectual beings to be made or generated. Wherefore they, who, on the contrary, assert (not one but) many understanding beings unmade and self-existent, must needs be looked upon as those who, of the two, approach nearer to Theism than to Atheism, and so deserve rather to be called Polytheists than Atheists.

And there is no question to be made, but that the urgers of the forementioned objection against that idea of God, which includes oneliness and singularity in it, from the Pagan Polytheism, or multiplicity of gods, take it for granted, that this is to be understood of many unmade self-existent deities, independent upon one Supreme, that are so many first principles in the universe, and partial causes of the world. And certainly, if it could be made to appear, that the Pagan Polytheists did universally acknowledge such a multiplicity of unmade, self-existent deities, then the argument fetched from thence, against the naturalness of that idea of God proposed (essentially including singularity in it), might seem to have no small force or validity in it.

XII. But, first, this opinion of many self-existent deities, independent upon one Supreme, is both very irrational in itself, and also plainly repugnant to the phenomena. We say, first, it is irrational in itself, because self-existence and necessary existence being essential to a perfect being, and to nothing else, it must needs be very irrational and absurd to suppose a multitude of imperfect understanding beings self-existent, and no perfect one. Moreover, if imperfect under-

standing beings were imagined to exist of themselves from eternity, there could not possibly be any reason given, why just so many of them should exist, and neither more nor less, there being indeed no reason why any at all should. But if it be supposed, that these many self-existent deities happened only to exist thus from eternity, and their existence, notwithstanding, was not necessary, but contingent; the consequence hereof will be, that they might as well happen again to cease to be, and so could not be incorruptible. Again, if any one imperfect being whatsoever could exist of itself from eternity, then all might as well do so, not only matter, but also the souls of men, and other animals; and, consequently, there could be no creation by any Deity, nor those supposed deities therefore deserve that name. Lastly, we might also add, that there could not be a multitude of intellectual beings self-existent, because it is a thing, which may be proved by reason, that all imperfect understanding beings or minds do partake of one perfect mind, and suppose also omnipotence or infinite power; were it not, that this is a consideration too remote from vulgar apprehension, and therefore not so fit to be urged in this place.

Again, as this opinion of many self-existent deities is irrational in itself, so is it likewise plainly repugnant to the phenomena of the world. In which, as Macrobius writes,^a *omnia sunt connexa*, all things conspire together into one harmony, and are carried on peaceably and quietly, constantly and evenly, without any tumult or hurly-burly, confusion or disorder, or the least appear-

^a In Somn. Scip. lib. i. cap. xiv. p. 75.

ance of schism and faction; which could not possibly be supposed, were the world made and governed by a rabble of self-existent deities, co-ordinate, and independent upon one Supreme.

Wherefore this kind of Polytheism was *obiter* thus confuted by Origen: *πόσῳ οὖν βέλτιον τὸ ἐκ τῶν ὀρωμένων πειθόμενον τοῖς κατὰ τὴν εὐταξίαν τοῦ κόσμου σέβειν τὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος ἕνα, καὶ συμπέοντος αὐτοῦ ὅλῳ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ δυναμένου ὑπὸ πολλῶν δημιουργῶν γεγονέναι, ὡς οὐδ' ὑπὸ πολλῶν ψυχῶν συνέχεσθαι ὅλον τὸν οὐρανὸν κινουσῶν*; How much better is it, agreeably to what we see in the harmonious system of the world, to worship one only maker of the world, which is one, and conspiring throughout with its whole self, and therefore could not be made by many artificers, as neither be contained by many souls, moving the whole heaven?—Now since this opinion is both irrational in itself, and repugnant to the phenomena, there is the less probability, that it should have been received and entertained by all the more intelligent Pagans.

XIII. Who, that they did not thus universally look upon all their gods as so many unmade self-existent beings, is unquestionably manifest from hence, because ever since Hesiod's and Homer's time at least, the Greekish Pagans generally acknowledged a theogonia, a generation, and temporary production of the gods; which yet is not to be understood universally neither, forasmuch as he is no Theist, who does not acknowledge some self-existent deity. Concerning this theogonia, Herodotus writeth after this man-

Euter. p. 53.
lib. 2. cap.
53. p. 109.
edit. Gronov.

ner: *ὅθεν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν, εἴτε αἰεὶ ἦσαν πάντες, ὁκοῖοί τε τινες τὰ εἶδεα, οὐκ*

ἠπιστέατο μέχρι οὗ πρώην τε καὶ χθῆς, ὡς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ· Ἡσίοδον γάρ καὶ Ὅμηρον ἠλικίην τετρακοσίοισι ἔτεσι δοκέω μὲν πρεσβυτέρους γενέσθαι, καὶ οὐ πλέοσι. οὗτοι δὲ εἰσὶ οἱ ποιήσαντες Θεογονίαν Ἑλλῆσι, καὶ τοῖσι θεοῖσι τὰς ἐπωνυμίας δόντες. Whence every one of the gods was generated, or whether they all of them ever were, and what are their forms, is a thing that was not known till very lately; for Hesiod and Homer were (as I suppose) not above four hundred years my seniors. And these were they, who introduced the theogonia among the Greeks, and gave the gods their several names:—that is, settled the Pagan theology. Now, if before Hesiod's and Homer's time, it were a thing not known or determined amongst the Greeks, whether their gods were generated, or all of them existed from eternity; then it was not universally concluded by them, that they were all unmade and self-existent. And though, perhaps, some might in those ancient times believe one way, and some another, concerning the generation and eternity of their gods; yet it does not follow, that they, who thought them to be all eternal, must therefore needs suppose them to be also unmade or self-existent. For Aristotle, who asserted the eternity of the world, and consequently also of those gods of his, the heavenly bodies, did not, for all that, suppose them to be self-existent or first principles, but all to depend upon one principle or original Deity. And, indeed, the true meaning of that question in Herodotus, whether the gods were generated or existed all of them from eternity, is (as we suppose) really no other than that of Plato's, *εἰ γέγονεν ὁ κόσμος ἢ ἀγενῆς ἐστὶ*. Whether the world were made or unmade?

—and whether it had a temporary beginning, or existed such as it is from eternity; which will be more fully declared afterwards. But ever since Hesiod's and Homer's time, that the theogonia or generation of the gods was settled, and generally believed amongst the Greeks, it is certain, that they could not possibly think all their gods eternal, and therefore much less unmade and self-existent.

But though we have thus clearly proved, that all the Pagan gods were not universally accounted by them so many unmade self-existent deities, they acknowledging a theogonia, or a generation of gods; yet it may be suspected, notwithstanding, that they might suppose a multitude of them also (and not only one) to have been unmade from eternity and self-existent. Wherefore we add, in the next place, that no such a thing does at all appear neither, as that the Pagans or any others did ever publicly or professedly assert a multitude of unmade self-existent deities. For, first, it is plain concerning the Hesiodian gods, which were all the gods of the Greekish Pagans, that either there was but one of them only self-existent, or else none at all. Because Hesiod's gods were either all of them derived from chaos (or the floating water), love itself being generated likewise out of it (according to that Aristophanic tradition before-mentioned); or else love was supposed to be a distinct principle from chaos, namely, the active principle of the universe, from whence, together with chaos, all the theogonia and cosmogonia was derived. Now, if the former of these were true, that Hesiod supposed all his gods universally to have been generated and

sprung originally from chaos, or the ocean ; then it is plain, that notwithstanding all that rabble of gods mustered up by him, he could be no other than one of those Atheistic Theogonists before-mentioned, and really acknowledged no God at all, according to the true idea of him ; he being not a Theist, who admits of no self-existent Deity. But if the latter be true, that Hesiod supposed love to be a principle distinct from chaos, namely. the active principle of the universe, and derived all his other gods from thence, he was then a right pagan Theist, such as acknowledged indeed many gods, but only one of them unmade and self-existent, all the rest being generated or created by that one. Indeed, it appears from those passages of Aristotle, before cited ^{P. 116. 112.} by us, that that philosopher had been sometimes divided in his judgment concerning Hesiod, where he should rank him, whether among the Atheists or the Theists. For in his book *De Cælo* he ranks him amongst those, who made all things to be generated and corrupted, besides the bare substance of the matter, that is, amongst the absolute Atheists, and looked upon him as a ringleader of them ; but in his *Metaphysics*, upon further thoughts, suspects, that many of those, who made love the chiefest of the gods, were Theists, they supposing it to be a first principle in the universe, or the active cause of things, and that not only Parmenides, but also Hesiod, was such. Which latter opinion of his is by far the more probable, and therefore embraced by Plutarch,* who somewhere determines Hesiod to have asserted one θεὸν ἀγέννητον, or unmade Deity ; as also by the ancient scho-

* De Placitis Philosophor. lib. i. cap. vi. p. 880.

liast upon him, writing thus, that Hesiod's love was ὁ οὐράνιος ἔρωσ, ὃς καὶ Θεός· ὁ γὰρ ἐξ Ἀφροδίτης νεώτερός ἐστιν. The heavenly love, which is also God; that other love, that was born of Venus, being junior.—But Joannes Diaconus; ἔρωτα δὲ ἐνταῦθα νοητέον, οὐ τὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης παῖδα, πῶς γὰρ τῆς μητρὸς μήπω γεγονῆσ οὗτος παράγεται; ἀλλ' ἄλλον τινα πρεσβυγενῆ ἔρωτα. οἶμαι δὲ τὴν ἐγκατεσπαρμένην φυσικῶς κινήτικὴν αἰτίαν ἐκάστω τῶν ὄντων. By love here (saith he), we must not understand Venus's son, whose mother was as yet unborn, but another more ancient love, which I take to be the active cause or principle of motion, naturally inserted into things.—Where, though he do not seem to suppose this love to be God himself, yet he conceives it to be an active principle in the universe derived from God, and not from matter. But this opinion will be further confirmed afterward.

The next considerable appearance of a multitude of self-existent deities, seems to be in the Valentinian thirty gods and æons, which have been taken by some for such; but it is certain, that these were all of them, save one, generated; they being derived by that fantastic deviser of them, from one self-originated deity, called Bythus. For thus

HER. 31. cap. ii. p. 164. tom. i. oper. Epiphanius informs us, *τριακοντα γὰρ καὶ οὗτος Θεοὺς καὶ Αἰῶνας καὶ Οὐρανοὺς βούλεται*

παρεισάγειν, ὧν ὁ πρῶτός ἐστι Βυθός. This (Valentinus) would also introduce thirty gods and æons, and heavens, the first of which is Bythus;—he meaning thereby an unfathomable depth and profundity; and therefore, this Bythus was also called by him, ὁ ἀνοτάτω καὶ ἀκατονόμαστος πατήρ, the highest and ineffable Father.

We do indeed acknowledge, that there have

been some, who have really asserted a duplicity of gods, in the sense declared, that is, of animalish or perceptive beings self-existent; one as the principle of good, and the other of evil. And this Ditheism of theirs seems to be the nearest approach, that was ever really made to Polytheism; unless we should here give heed to Plutarch,^a who seems to make the ancient Persians, besides their two gods, the good and the evil, or Oromasdes and Arimanius, to have asserted also a third middle deity, called by them, Mithras; or to some ecclesiastic writers, who impute a trinity of gods to Marcion^b (though Tertullian^c be yet more liberal, and increase the number to an ennead). For those, that were commonly called Tritheists, being but mistaken Christians and Trinitarians, fall not under this consideration. Now, as for that forementioned Ditheism, or opinion of two gods, a good and an evil one, it is evident, that its original sprung from nothing else, but first a firm persuasion of the essential goodness of the Deity, together with a conceit, that the evil that is in the world, was altogether inconsistent and unreconcilable with the same; and that, therefore, for the solving of this phenomenon, it was absolutely necessary to suppose another animalish principle self-existent, or an evil god. Wherefore, as these Ditheists, as to all that which is good in the world, held a monarchy, or one sole principle and original; so it is plain, that had it not been for this business of evil (which they conceived could not

^a De Iside et Osiride, tom. ii. p. 369.

^b Vide Euseb. Hist. Eccles. lib. v. cap. xiii. p. 177. et auctores illos quos Jo. Bapt. Cotelerius laudat ad Constit. Apost. p. 339. tom. i. Patrum Apostol.

^c Libro i. adversus Marcionem, cap. xvi. p. 237, 238.

be solved any other way) they would never have asserted any more principles or gods than one.

The chiefest and most eminent assertors of which ditheistic doctrine of two self-existent animalish principles in the universe, a good god and an evil demon, were the Marcionites and the Manicheans; both of which, though they made some slight pretences to Christianity, yet were not by Christians owned for such. But it is certain, that besides these, and before them too, some of the professed Pagans also entertained the same opinion, that famous moralist, Plutarchus Chæronensis being an undoubted patron of it; which in his book *De Iside et Osiride* he represents, with some little difference, after this manner; *μεμιγμένη*

P. 371. Par. γὰρ ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις καὶ σύστασις ἐξ ἐναντίων, οὐ μὲν ἰσοσθενῶν δυνάμεων, ἀλλὰ τῆς βελτίονος τὸ κράτος ἐστίν· ἀπολέσθαι δὲ τὴν φαύλην παντάπασιν ἀδύνατον, πολλὴν μὲν ἐμπεφυκυῖαν τῷ σώματι, πολλὴν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ παντός, αἰὲ πρὸς τὴν βελτίονα δυσμαχοῦσαν. The generation and constitution of this world is mixed of contrary powers or principles (the one good, the other evil), yet so as that they are not both of equal force, but the better of them more prevalent: notwithstanding which, it is also absolutely impossible for the worsor power or principle to be ever utterly destroyed, much of it being always intermingled in the soul, and much in the body of the universe, there perpetually tugging against the better principle.

Indeed, learned men of later times have, for the most part, looked upon Plutarch here, but either as a bare relater of the opinion of other philosophers, or else as a follower only, and not a leader in it. Notwithstanding which, it is evident,

that Plutarch was himself heartily engaged in this opinion, he discovering no small fondness for it, in sundry of his other writings; as, for example, in his Platonic questions, where he thus declares himself concerning it, ἢ τὸ πολλάκις ὑφ' P. 1003. Par. ἡμῶν λεγόμενον ἀληθές ἐστίν, ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἄνους tom. ii. oper. ψυχῆ, καὶ τὸ ἄμορφον σῶμα, συννηῆρχον ἀλλήλοις αἰεὶ, καὶ τὸ οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν γένεσιν ἔχεν οὐδὲ ἀρχὴν· or else that which is often affirmed by us is true, that a mad irrational soul, and an unformed disorderly body, did co-exist with one another from eternity, neither of them having any generation or beginning.—And in his *Timæan Psychogonia* he does at large industriously maintain the same, there and elsewhere^a endeavouring to establish this doctrine, as much as possibly he could, upon rational foundations. As, first, that nothing can be made or produced without a cause; and therefore there must of necessity, be some cause of evil also, and that a positive one too; he representing the opinion of those as very ridiculous, who would make the nature of evil to be but ἐπεισόδιον, an accidental appendix to the world, and all that evil which is in it, to have come in only by the bye, and by consequence, without any positive cause. Secondly, that God being essentially good could not possibly be the cause of evil, where he highly applauds Plato for removing God to the greatest distance imaginable from being the cause of evil. Thirdly, that as God could not, so neither could ὕλη ἄποιος, matter in itself devoid of all form and quality, be the cause of evil, noting this to have been the subterfuge of the Stoics. Upon which account

^a Libro de Iside et Osiride, p.369, et Psychogon. p. 1014, 1015. tom. ii. oper.

he often condemns them, but uncertainly, sometimes as such, who assigned no cause at all of evils, and sometimes again as those, who made God the cause of them. For in his *Psychogonia*^a he concludes, that unless we acknowledge a substantial evil principle, αἱ Στοικαὶ καταλαμβάνουσι ἡμᾶς ἀπορίαι, τὸ κακὸν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀναιτίως καὶ ἀγεννήτως ἐπεισάγοντες, ἐπεὶ τῶν γε ὄντων οὔτε τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὔτε τὸ ἄπειον, εἰκός ἐστιν οὐσίαν κακοῦ καὶ γένεσιν παρασχέιν. The Stoical difficulties will of necessity overtake and involve us, who introduce evil into the world from nothing, or without a cause, since neither that which is essentially good (as God), nor yet that which is devoid of all quality (as matter), could possibly give being or generation to it.—But in his book against the Stoics,^b he accuses them as those, who made God, essentially good, the cause of evil. Αὐτοὶ τὴν κακῶν ἀρχὴν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα τὸν θεὸν ποιοῦσι, οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη τὸ κακὸν ἐξ αὐτῆς παρέσχηκεν, ἄπειος γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ πάσας ὅσας δέχεται διαφορὰς, ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιοῦντος αὐτὴν καὶ σχηματίζοντος ἔσχηκεν ὥστε ἀνάγκη τὸ κακὸν, εἰ μὲν δι' οὐδέν, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὴν κινουσαν ἀρχὴν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ γεγονός ὑπάρχειν. Themselves make God being good the principle and cause of evil, since matter, which is devoid of quality, and receives all its differences from the active principle that moves and forms it, could not possibly be the cause thereof. Wherefore, evil must of necessity, either come from nothing, or else it must come from the active and moving principle, which is God.—Now from all these premises joined together, Plutarch concludes, that the phenomenon of evil could no otherwise possibly be solved, than by supposing a substantial principle for it, and a certain irra-

^a P. 1015. tom. ii. oper.^b P. 1076. tom. ii. oper.

tional and maleficent soul or demon, unmade, and co-existing with God and matter from eternity, to have been the cause thereof. And accordingly he resolves, that as whatsoever is good in the soul and body of the universe, and likewise in the souls of men and demons, is to be ascribed to God as its only original; so whatsoever is evil, irregular and disorderly in them, ought to be imputed to this other substantial principle, a ψυχὴ ἄνοος καὶ κακοποιός, an irrational and maleficent soul or demon,—which insinuating itself every where throughout the world, is all along intermingled with the better principle: ^a καὶ μὴ πᾶν εἶναι ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν, so that neither the soul of the universe, nor that of men and demons, was wholly the workmanship of God, but the lower, brutish, and disorderly part of them the effect of the evil principle.

But, besides all this, it is evident, that Plutarch was also strongly possessed with a conceit, that nothing substantial could be created (no not by Divine power) out of nothing pre-existing; and, therefore, that all the substance of whatsoever is in the world, did exist from eternity unmade; so that God was only the orderer or the methodizer and harmonizer thereof. Wherefore, as he concluded, that the corporeal world was not created by God out of nothing, as to the substance of it, but only the pre-existing matter, which before moved disorderly, was brought into this regular order and harmony by him; in like manner he resolved, that the soul of the world (for such a thing is always supposed by him) was not made by God out of nothing neither, nor out of any thing inani-

^a Plutarch, de Animæ. Procreat. ex Timæo, p. 1027.

mate and soul-less pre-existing, but out of a pre-existing disorderly soul, was brought into an orderly and regular frame; ἀκοσμία γὰρ ἦν τὰ De Psychog. p. 1014. Par. πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως, ἀκοσμία δὲ οὐκ ἀσώματος οὐδὲ ἀκίνητος, οὐδὲ ἄψυχος, ἀλλὰ ἄμορφον μὲν καὶ ἀσύστατον τὸ σωματικόν, ἐμπληκτον δὲ καὶ ἄλογον τὸ κινητικόν ἔχουσα· τοῦτο δὲ ἦν ἀναρμοστία ψυχῆς οὐκ ἐχούσης λόγον· ὁ γὰρ θεὸς οὔτε σῶμα τὸ ἀσώματον, οὔτε ψυχὴν τὸ ἄψυχον ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἀρμόνικον ἄνδρα, &c. There was unformed matter before this orderly world was made, which matter was not incorporeal, nor unmoved or inanimate, but body discomposed and acted by a furious and irrational mover, the deformity whereof was the disharmony of a soul in it, devoid of reason. For God neither made body out of that which was no body, nor soul out of no soul. But as the musician, who neither makes voice nor motion, does by ordering of them, notwithstanding, produce harmony; so God, though he neither made the tangible and resisting substance of body, nor the fantastic and self-moving power of soul, yet taking both those principles pre-existing (the one of which was dark and obscure, the other turbulent and irrational), and orderly disposing and harmonizing of them, he did by that means produce this most beautiful and perfect animal of the world.—And further, to the same purpose: οὐχὶ σώματος ἀπλῶς, οὐδὲ ὄγκου καὶ ὕλης, ἀλλὰ συμμετρίας περὶ σῶμα καὶ κάλλους καὶ ὁμοιότητος, ἦν ὁ θεὸς πατὴρ καὶ δημιουργός· ταῦτα δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς, ὡς τὴν μὲν οὔτε ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ γενομένην οὔτε κόσμου ψυχὴν οὔσαν, ἀλλὰ τινα φανταστικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς, ἀλόγου δὲ καὶ ἀτάκτου φορᾶς καὶ ὀρμῆς δύνάμιν αὐτοκίνητου καὶ ἀεικίνητου· τὴν δὲ αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς διαρμολογῶν, προσήκουσιν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ λόγοις, ἐγκατέστησεν ἡγεμόνα τοῦ κόσμου

γεγονότος γεννητήν οὔσαν. God was not the cause or maker of body simply, that is, neither of bulk nor matter, but only of that symmetry and pulchritude which is in body, and that likeness which it hath to himself; which same ought to be concluded also concerning the soul of the world, that the substance of it was not made by God neither; nor yet that it was always the soul of this world, but at first a certain self-moving substance, endowed with a fantastic power, irrational and disorderly, existing such of itself from eternity, which God, by harmonizing, and introducing into it fitting numbers and proportions, made to be the soul and prince of this generated world.—According to which doctrine of Plutarch's, in the supposed soul of the world, though it had a temporary beginning, yet was it never created out of nothing, but only that, which pre-existed disorderly, being acted by the Deity, was brought into a regular frame. And therefore he concludes, ἡ ψυχὴ νοῦ μετασχούσα καὶ λογισμοῦ καὶ ἀρμονίας, οὐκ ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρος, οὐδ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γέγονεν. Soul partaking of mind, reason, and harmony, is not only the work of God, but also a part of him; nor is it a thing so much made by him, as from him, and existing out of him.—And the same must he likewise affirm concerning all other souls, as those of men and demons, that they are either all of them the substance of God himself, together with that of the evil demon; or else certain delibations from both, (if any one could understand it) blended and confounded together; he not allowing any new substance at all to be created by God out of nothing pre-existent. It was observed in the beginning of this chapter,

that Plutarch was an assertor of two *αὐθυπόστατα* or self-existent principles in the universe, God and matter; but now we understand, that he was an earnest propugnator of another third principle (as himself calls it) besides them both, viz. a *ψυχῆ ἄνοος καὶ κακοποιός*, a mad, irrational, and maleficent soul or demon:—so that Plutarch was both a Triarchist and a Ditheist, an assertor of three principles, but of two gods; according to that forementioned notion of a God, as it is taken for an animalish or perceptive being self-existent.

We are not ignorant, that Plutarch endeavours with all his might to persuade this to have been the constant belief of all the Pagan nations, and of all the wisest men and philosophers that ever were amongst them. “For this (saith he, in his book *De Iside et Osiride*)^a is a most ancient opinion, that hath been delivered down from theologers and law-makers, all along to poets and philosophers; and though the first author thereof be unknown, yet hath it been so firmly believed every where, that the footsteps of it have been imprinted upon the sacrifices and mysteries or religious rites, both of Barbarians and Greeks; namely, that the world is neither wholly unguided by any mind or reason, as if all things floated in the streams of chance and fortune, nor yet that there is any one principle steering and guiding all, without resistance or control; because there is a confused mixture of good and evil in every thing, and nothing is produced by nature sincere. Wherefore it is not one only dispenser of things, who, as it were, out of several vessels distributeth those several liquors of good and evil, mingling them together, and

^a Tom. ii. oper. p. 369.

dashing them as he pleaseth ; but there are two distinct and contrary powers or principles in the world, one of them always leading as it were to the right hand, but the other tugging a contrary way. Insomuch that our whole life, and the whole world, is a certain mixture and confusion of these two ; at least this terrestrial world below the moon is such, all being every where full of irregularity and disorder. For if nothing can be made without a cause, and that which is good cannot be the cause of evil, there must needs be a distinct principle in nature, for the production of evil as well as good. And this hath been the opinion of the most and wisest men, some of them affirming θεοὺς εἶναι δύο καθάπερ ἀντιτέχνους, that there are two gods as it were of contrary crafts and trades, one whereof is the maker of all good, and the other of all evil ; but others calling the good principle only a God, and the evil principle a demon, as Zoroaster the magician." Besides which Zoroaster and the Persian magi, Plutarch pretends, that the footsteps of this opinion were to be found also in the astrology of the Chaldeans, and in the mysteries and religious rites, not only of the Egyptians, but also of the Grecians themselves ; and, lastly, he particularly imputes the same to all the most famous of the Greek philosophers, as Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Plato, and Aristotle ; though his chiefest endeavour of all be to prove, that Plato was an undoubted champion for it: Ἄλλὰ De Psychog. ταυτὸ Πλάτων οὐκ ἔπαθε τοῖς ὕστερον, οὐδὲ πα- P. 1015. Πα- ριδῶν, ὡς ἐκείνοι, τὴν μεταξὺ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τριτην ἀρχὴν καὶ δύναμιν, ὑπόμεινε τῶν λόγων τὸν ἀτοπώτατον, ἐπεισόδιον οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ποιοῦντα τῶν κακῶν φύσιν ἀπ' αὐ-

τομάτου κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Ἐπικούρω μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἀκαρῆς ἐγκλίνας τὴν ἄτομον συγχωροῦσιν, ὡς ἀνάτιον ἐπίεισ-ἀγοντι κίνησιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, αὐτοὶ δὲ κακίαν καὶ κακοδαμονίαν τσαυτήν, ἑτέρας τε περὶ σῶμα μυρίας ἀτοπίας καὶ δυσχερείας, αἰτίαν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς οὐκ ἔχούσας, κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν γεγονέναι λέγουσιν· ὁ δὲ Πλάτων οὐχ' οὕτως· ἀλλὰ τὴν ὕλην διαφορᾶς ἀπάσης ἀπαλλάττων, καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν ἀπωτάτω τιθέμενος. But Plato was not guilty of that miscarriage of later philosophers, in overlooking the third power, which is between the matter and God, and thereby falling into the grossest of all absurdities, that the nature of evils was but an accidental appendix to the world, and came into it merely by chance, nobody knows how. So that those very philosophers, who will by no means allow to Epicurus the smallest declension of his atoms from the perpendicular, alleging, that this would be to introduce a motion without a cause, and to bring something out of nothing, themselves do, notwithstanding, suppose all that vice and misery, which is in the world, besides innumerable other absurdities and inconveniences about body, to have come into it, merely by accidental consequence, and without having any cause in the first principles. But Plato did not so; but divesting matter of all qualities and differences, by means whereof it could not possibly be made the cause of evils, and then placing God at the greatest distance from being the cause thereof, he consequently resolved it into a third unmade principle between God and the matter, an irrational soul, or demon, moving the matter disorderly.—

Now, because Plutarch's authority passeth so uncontrolled, and his testimony in this particular

seems to be of late generally received as an oracle, and consequently the thing taken for an unquestionable truth, that the Ditheistic doctrine of a good and evil principle was the Catholic or universal doctrine of the Pagan Theists, and particularly that Plato, above all the rest, was a professed champion for the same; we shall therefore make bold to examine Plutarch's grounds for this so confident assertion of his; and principally concerning Plato. And his grounds for imputing this opinion to Plato, are only these three, which follow. First, because that philosopher, in his *Politicus*,^a speaks of a necessary and innate appetite, that may sometimes turn the heavens a contrary way, and by that means cause disorder and confusion: Secondly, because, in his tenth *De Legibus*, he speaks of two kinds of souls, whereof one is beneficent, but the other contrary: and, lastly, because in his *Timæus* he supposeth the matter to have been moved disorderly before the world was made; which implies, that there was a disorderly and irrational soul consisting with it as the mover of it, matter being unable to move itself. But as to the first of these allegations, out of Plato's *Politicus*, we shall only observe, that that philosopher, as if it had been purposely to prevent such an interpretation of his meaning there as this of Plutarch's, inserts these very words:^b μήτ' αὖ δύο τινε θεῶν, φρονούντε ἑαυτοῖς ἐναντία στρέφειν αὐτόν. Neither must any such thing be supposed, as if there were two gods, contrarily minded to one another, turning the heavens sometimes one way, and sometimes another.—Which

^a P. 176. oper.^b Ibid. p. 175.

plain declaration of Plato's sense, being directly contrary to Plutarch's interpretation, and this Dithestic opinion, might serve also for a sufficient confutation of his second ground from the tenth *De Legibus*,^a as if Plato had there affirmed, that there were two souls moving the heavens, the one beneficent, but the other contrary; because this would be all one as to assert two gods, contrarily minded to one another. Notwithstanding which, for a fuller answer thereunto, we shall further add, that this philosopher did there, first, only distribute souls in general into good and evil, those moral differences properly belonging to that rank of beings, called by him souls, and first emerging in them, according to this premised doctrine, τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτία ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῶν καλῶν, καὶ κακῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν, δικάϊων τε καὶ ἀδίκων. Soul is the cause of good and evil, honest and dishonest, just and unjust.—But then, afterwards, making inquiry concerning the soul of the world or heaven, what kind of soul that was, he positively

P. 898.
Steph.

concludes, that it was no other than a soul endued with all virtue. ΑΘ. ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μὲν ἐστὶν ἡ περιάγουσα ἡμῖν πάντα, τὴν δὲ οὐρανῶ περιφορὰν ἐξ ἀνάγκης περιάγειν φατέον, ἐπιμελουμένην καὶ κοσμοῦσαν, ἥτοι τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν ἥτοι τὴν ἐναντίαν. ΚΛ. Ω ξένη, ἀλλὰ ἐκ γε τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδ' ὅσιον ἄλλως λέγειν, ἢ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν μίαν ἢ πλείους περιάγειν αὐτά.—ΑΤΗ. HOSP. Since it is soul that moves all things, we must of necessity affirm, that the heaven or world is moved by some soul or other, adorning and disposing of it, whether it be the best soul, or the contrary. CLIN. O Hospes, it

^a P. 669. oper.

is certainly not holy nor pious to conclude otherwise, than that a soul endued with all virtue, one or more, moves the world.—And as for the last thing urged by Plutarch, that before the world was made, the matter is said by Plato^a to have been moved disorderly, we conceive, that that philosopher did therein only adhere to that vulgarly-received tradition, which was originally Mosaical, that the first beginning of the Cosmo-*pœia* was from a chaos, or matter confusedly moved, afterward brought into order. And now we think it plainly appears, that there is no strength at all in any of Plutarch's fore-mentioned allegations, nor any such monster to be found any where in Plato, as this substantial evil principle or god, a wicked soul or demon, unmade and self-existent from eternity, opposite and inimicous to the good God, sharing the empire and dominion of the world with him. Which opinion is really nothing else but the deifying of the devil, or prince of evil spirits, making him a cor rival with God, and entitling him to a right of receiving Divine honour and worship.

And it is observable, that Plutarch himself confesseth this interpretation, which he makes of Plato, to be new and paradoxical, or an invention of his own: *καὶ διὰ τὸ πλείστοις τῶν ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ὑπεναντιοῦσθαι δεόμενον παραμυθίας*, Psychog. p. 1012. such as because it was contrary to the generally-received opinion of Platonists, himself thought to stand in need of some apology and defence.—To which purpose, therefore, he adds P. 1014. again: *πρῶτον οὖν ἦν ἔχω περὶ τούτων δianoian, ἐκθήσομαι πιστούμενος τῷ εἰκότι, καὶ παραμυθούμενος, ὡς*

^a In *Timæo*, cap. xiv. p. 527.

ἔνεστι, τὸ ἀληθές τοῦ λόγου, καὶ παράδοξον. I will (saith he) declare mine own opinion first concerning these things, confirming it with probabilities, and, as much as possibly I can, aiding and assisting the truth and paradoxicalness thereof. Moreover, Proclus upon the Timæus takes notice of no other philosophers that ever imputed this doctrine to Plato, or indeed maintained any such opinion of two substantial principles of good and evil, but only Plutarch and Atticus (though, I confess, Chalcidius cites Numenius also to the same purpose). Proclus's words are

P. 116. these: οἱ μὲν περὶ Πλούταρχον τὸν Χερωνέα καὶ Ἄττικον προεῖναι φασὶ τὴν ἀκόσμητον ὕλην πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως, προεῖναι δὲ καὶ τὴν κακεργάτιν ψυχὴν τὴν τοῦτο κινουσαν, πόθεν γὰρ ἢ κίνησις ἦν, ἢ ἀπὸ ψυχῆς; εἰ δὲ ἄτακτος ἢ κίνησις, ἀπὸ ἀτάκτου ψυχῆς. Plutarchus Chæronensis and Atticus maintain, that before the generation and formation of the world, there was unformed and disorderly matter existing (from eternity) together with a maleficent soul: for whence, say they, could that motion of the matter, in Plato's Timæus, proceed, but from a soul? and if it were a disorderly motion, it must then needs come from a disorderly soul.—And as Proclus tells us, that this opinion of theirs had been before confuted by Porphyrius and Jamblichus, as that which was both irrational and impious, so doth he there likewise himself briefly refer it in these two propositions: First, that *πᾶσα ψυχὴ γέννημά ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ*, every soul is the offspring of God,—and there can be no soul, nor any thing else, besides God, self-existing; and, Secondly, *τὸ κακὸν διαιώνιον ποιεῖν, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἄτοπον, οὐ γὰρ ὁμότιμον τῷ θεῷ τὸ ἄθεον, οὔτε ἐπίσης ἀγέννητον,*

οὔτε ὅλως ἀντιδιηρημένον· It is absurd to make evil alike eternal with good, for that which is godless cannot be of like honour with God, and equally unmade, nor indeed can there be any thing at all positively opposite to God.—

But because it may probably be here demanded, what account it was then possible for Plato to give of the original of evils, so as not to impute them to God himself, if he neither derived them from ἕλη ἄποιος, unqualified matter (which Plutarch has plainly proved to be absurd), nor yet from a ψυχῆ ἄνοος, an irrational and maleficent soul of the world, or demon, self-existent from eternity; we shall, therefore, hereunto briefly reply, that though that philosopher derived not the original of evils from unqualified matter, nor from a wicked soul, or demon unmade, yet did he not therefore impute them to God neither, but, as it seemeth, to the necessity of imperfect beings. For as Timæus Locrus had before Plato determined, that the world was made by God and necessity, so does Plato himself accordingly declare in his Timæus,^a ὅτι μεμιγμένη τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως, νοῦ δὲ ἀνάγκης ἄρχοντος· That the generation of this world is mixed, and made up of a certain composition of mind and necessity both together, yet so, as that mind doth also (in some sense) rule over necessity.—Wherefore, though, according to Plato, God be properly and directly the cause of nothing else but good, yet the necessity of these lower imperfect things does unavoidably give being and birth to evils. For, first, as to moral evils (which are the chiefest), there is a necessity, that there should be higher and lower

^a P. 533, oper.

inclinations in all rational beings, vitally united to bodies, and that as autexousious, or free-willed, they should have a power of determining themselves more or less either way ; as there is also a necessity, that the same liberty of will (essential to rational creatures), which makes them capable of praise and reward, should likewise put them in a possibility of deserving blame and punishment. Again, as to the evils of pain and inconvenience ; there seems to be a necessity, that imperfect terrestrial animals, which are capable of the sense of pleasure, should in contrary circumstances (which will also sometimes happen, by reason of the inconsistency and impossibility of things) be obnoxious to displeasure and pain. And, lastly, for the evils of corruptions and dissolutions ; there is a plain necessity, that if there be natural generations in the world, there should be also corruptions ; according to that of Lucretius^a before cited,

Quando aliud ex alio reficit natura, nec ullam
Rem gigni patitur, nisi morte adjutam aliena.

To all which may be added, according to the opinion of many, that there is a kind of necessity of some evils in the world for a condiment (as it were) to give a relish and haut-goust to good ; since the nature of imperfect animals is such, that they are apt to have but a dull and sluggish sense, a flat and insipid taste of good, unless it be quickened and stimulated, heightened and invigorated, by being compared with the contrary evil. As also, that there seems to be a necessary use in the world of the *κακὰ ἀκούσια*, those involuntary evils of pain and suffering, both for the exercise of virtue, and

^a Lib. i. vers. 264.

the quickening and exciting the activity of the world, as also for the repressing, chastising and punishing of those *κακὰ ἐκούσια*, those voluntary evils of vice and action.—Upon which several accounts, probably, Plato concluded, that evils could not be utterly destroyed, at least in this lower world, which, according to him, is the region of lapsed souls: *ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, (ὑπεναντίον γὰρ τῷ ἀγαθῷ αἰεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη) οὐτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἰδρῦσθαι, τήνδε θνητὴν φύσιν, καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης· διὸ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε, φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα· φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γείεσθαι.* But it is neither possible (O Theodorus) that evils should be quite destroyed (for there must be something always contrary to good), nor yet that they should be seated amongst the gods, but they will of necessity infest this lower mortal region and nature. Wherefore, we ought to endeavour to flee from hence with all possible speed; and our flight from hence is this, to assimilate ourselves to God as much as may be; which assimilation to God consisteth in being just and holy with wisdom.—Thus, according to the sense of Plato, though God be the original of all things, yet he is not to be accounted properly the cause of evils, at least moral ones (they being only defects), but they are to be imputed to the necessity of imperfect beings, which is that *ἀνάγκη πολλὰ τῷ θεῷ δυσμαχοῦσα καὶ ἀφηνιάζουσα*, that necessity, which doth often resist God, and as it were shake off his bridle.—Rational creatures being, by means thereof, in a capability of acting contrary to God's will and law, as well as their own true nature and good; and other things hindered of that

perfection, which the Divine goodness would else have imparted to them. Notwithstanding which, mind, that is, God, is said also by Plato to rule over necessity, because those evils, occasioned by the necessity of imperfect beings, are over-ruled by the Divine art, wisdom, and providence, for good; Typhon and Arimanius (if we may use that language) being, as it were, outwitted by Osiris and Oromasdes, and the worst of all evils made, in spite of their own nature, to contribute subserviently to the good and perfection of the whole; *καὶ τοῦτο μεγίστης τέχνης ἀγαθοποιεῖν τὰ κακὰ*, and this must needs be acknowledged to be the greatest art of all, to be able to bonify evils, or tincture them with good.—

And now we have made it to appear (as we conceive) that Plutarch had no sufficient grounds to impute this opinion, of two active perceptive principles in the world (one the cause of good, and the other of evil) to Plato. And as for the other Greek philosophers, his pretences to make them assertors of the same doctrine seem to be yet more slight and frivolous. For he concludes

* οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι οὐδαμῶς τὸ κακὸν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς παρελάμβανον
The Pythagoreans nowhere admitted evil amongst the principles.
Syrianus in Aristot. Metaphys. MS. p. 218.

the * Pythagoreans to have held two such substantial principles of good and evil, merely because they sometimes talked of the *ἐναντιότητες* and *συστοιχίαι*, the contrarieties and conjugations of things, such as finite and infinite, dextrous and sinister, even and odd, and the like. As also, that Heraclitus entertained the same opinion, because he spake of *παλίντροπος ἁρμονία κόσμον*, a versatile harmony of the world,—whereby things reciprocate forwards and backwards, as when a

bow is successively intended and remitted ; as likewise because he affirmed all things to flow, and war to be the father and lord of all. Moreover, he resolves,^a that Empedocles's friendship and contention could be no other than a good and evil god ; though we have rendered it probable, that nothing else was understood thereby but an active spermatic power in this corporeal world, causing vicissitudes of generation and corruption. Again, Anaxagoras is entitled by him to the same philosophy, for no other reason, but only because he made mind and infinite matter two principles of the universe. And, lastly, Aristotle himself cannot escape him from being made an assertor of a good and evil god too, merely because he concluded form and privation to be two principles of natural bodies. Neither does Plutarch acquit himself any thing better, as to the sense of whole nations, when this doctrine is therefore imputed by him to the Chaldeans, because their astrologers supposed two of the planets to be beneficent, two maleficent, and three of a middle nature ; and to the ancient Greeks, because they sacrificed not only to Jupiter Olympius, but also to Hades, or Pluto, who was sometimes called by them the infernal Jupiter. We confess, that his interpretation of the traditions and mysteries of the ancient Egyptians is ingenious, but yet there is no necessity for all that, that by their Typhon should be understood a substantial evil principle, or god self-existent, as he contends. For it being the manner of the ancient Pagans (as shall be more fully declared afterwards) to physiologize in their theology, and to personate all the several things in

^a De Iside et Osiride, p. 370.

nature; it seems more likely, that these Egyptians did, after that manner, only προσωποποιεῖν, personate that evil and confusion, tumult and hurliburly, constant alteration and vicissitude of generations and corruptions, which is in this lower world, (though not without a Divine providence) by Typhon.

Wherefore, the only probability now left is that of the Persian Magi, that they might indeed assert two such active principles of good and evil, as Plutarch and the Manicheans afterwards did; and we must confess, that there is some probability of this, because, besides Plutarch, Laertius^a affirms the same of them, δύο κατ' αὐτούς εἶναι ἀρχάς, ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα καὶ κακὸν, that there are two principles according to the Persian Magi, a good demon and an evil one;—he seeming to vouch it also from the authorities of Hermippus, Eudoxus, and Theopompus. Notwithstanding which, it may very well be questioned, whether the meaning of those Magi were not herein misunderstood, they perhaps intending nothing more by their evil demon than such a Satanical power as we acknowledge; that is, not a substantial evil principle, unmade and independent upon God, but only a polity of evil demons in the world, united together under one head or prince. And this, not only because Theodorus in Photius^b calls the Persian Arimanius by that very name, Satanus; but also because those very traditions of their's, recorded by Plutarch himself, seem very much to favour this opinion,

they running after this manner: ἔπεισι δὲ
De Is. et Osir. 370. Par. χρόνος εἰμαρμένος, ἐν ᾧ τὸν Ἀρειμάνιον λοιμὸν
 ἐπάγοντα καὶ λιμὸν, ὑπὸ τούτων ἀνάγκη φθαρῆναι παντά-

^a In Proœmio, segm. 8. p. 6.

^b Bibliothec. Cod. lxxx. i. p. 199.

πασι καὶ ἀφανισθῆναι, τῆς δὲ γῆς ἐπιπέδου καὶ ὁμαλῆς γενομένης, ἓνα βίον καὶ μίαν πολιτείαν ἀνθρώπων μακαρίων καὶ ὁμογλώσσων ἀπάντων γενέσθαι. That there is a fatal time at hand, in which Arimanius, the introducer of plagues and famines, must of necessity be utterly destroyed; and when, the earth being made plane and equal, there shall be but one life, and one polity of men, all happy and speaking the same language.—Or else, as Theopompus^a himself represented their sense, *τέλος ἀπολείπεσθαι τὸν Ἄδην, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους εὐδαίμονας ἔσεσθαι, μῆτε τροφῆς δεομένους, μῆτε σκίαν ποιούντας· τὸν δὲ ταῦτα μηχανησάμενον θεὸν ἡρεμεῖν καὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι χρόνῳ καλῶς μὲν οὐ πολὺν τῷ θεῷ, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπῳ κοιμωμένῳ μέτριον.* That in conclusion Hades shall be utterly abolished, and then men shall be perfectly happy, their bodies neither needing food, nor casting any shadow; that God, which contrived this whole scene of things, resting only for the present a certain season, which is not long to him, but like the intermission of sleep to men.—For since an unmade and self-existent evil demon, such as that of Plutarch's and the Manicheans', could never be utterly abolished or destroyed; it seems rather probable, that these Persian Magi did, in their Arimanius, either *προσωποποιεῖν*, personate evil only, as we suppose the Egyptians to have done in Typhon; or else understand a Satanical power by it: notwithstanding which, they might possibly sacrifice thereunto (as the Greeks did to evil demons) for its appeasement and mitigation; or else, as worshipping the Deity itself, in the ministers of its wrath and vengeance.

However, from what hath been declared, we

^a Apud Plutarch. de Iside et Osiride, p. 370. tom. ii. oper.

conceive it does sufficiently appear, that this di-theistic doctrine of a good and evil god (or a good god and evil demon both self-existent), asserted by Plutarch and the Manicheans, was never so universally received amongst the Pagans as the same Plutarch pretendeth. Which thing may be yet further evidenced from hence, because the Manicheans professed themselves not to have derived this opinion from the Pagans, nor to be a subdivision under them, or schism from them, but a quite different sect by themselves. Thus, Faustus in

Contra Faust.
lib. 20. c. 3.
p. 237. tom.
viii. oper.
edit. Bened.
dict.

St. Augustin: “Pagani bona et mala, tetra et splendida, perpetua et caduca, mutabilia et certa, corporalia et divina, unum habere principium dogmatizant.

His ego valde contraria censeo, qui bonis omnibus principium fateor Deum, contrariis vero Hylem (sic enim mali principium et naturam theologus noster appellat.)” The Pagans dogmatize, that good and evil things, foul and splendid, perishing and perpetual, corporeal and Divine, do all alike proceed from the same principle. Whereas we think far otherwise, that God is the principle of all good, but Hyle (or the evil demon) of the contrary, which names our theologer (Manes) confounds together.—And afterwards Faustus there again determines, that there were indeed but two sects of religion in the world, really distinct from one another, viz. Paganism and Manicheism.^a From whence it may be concluded, that this doctrine of two active principles of good and evil, was not then looked upon as the generally-received doctrine of the Pagans. Wherefore, it seems reasonable to think, that Plutarch’s imputing it so

^a Apud Augustin. ubi supra.

universally to them, was either out of design, thereby to gain the better countenance and authority to a conceit, which himself was fond of; or else, because he being deeply tinctured, as it were, with the suffusions of it, every thing which he looked upon seemed to him coloured with it. And indeed, for aught we can yet learn, this Plutarchus Chæronensis, Numenius, and Atticus, were the only Greek philosophers, who ever in public writings positively asserted any such opinion.

And probably St. Athanasius is to be understood of these, when, in his oration *contra Gentes*,^a he writes thus concerning this opinion: Ἑλλήνων οὖν τινὲς πλανηθέντες τῆς ὁδοῦ, καὶ τὸν Χριστὸν οὐκ ἐγνωκότες, ἐν ὑπόστασει καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν εἶναι τὴν κακίαν ἀπεφάναντο· ἀμαρτάνοντες κατὰ δύο ταῦτα, ἢ τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀποστεροῦντες τοῦ εἶναι ποιητὴν τῶν ὄντων, οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη τῶν ὄντων κύριος, εἴγε κατ' αὐτούς ἡ κακία καθ' ἑαυτὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει καὶ οὐσίαν, ἢ πάλιν θέλοντες αὐτὸν ποιητὴν εἶναι τῶν ὄλων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ δώσουσιν εἶναι, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς οὔσιν καὶ τὸ κακὸν κατ' αὐτούς ἐστι. Some of the Greeks, wandering out of the right way, and ignorant of Christ, have determined evil to be a real entity by itself, erring upon two accounts: because they must of necessity either suppose God not to be the maker of all things, if evil have a nature and essence by itself, and yet be not made by him; or else that he is the maker and cause of evil; whereas it is impossible, that he, who is essentially good, should produce the contrary.—After which that father speaks also of some degenerate Christians, who fell into the same error; οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν αἱρέσεων ἐκπεσόντες τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς διδασκαλίας, καὶ περὶ τὴν

^a Tom. i. p. 6. oper.

πίστιν ναυαγήσαντες, καὶ οὗτοι μὲν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ κακοῦ παραφρονοῦσιν εἶναι. Some heretics, forsaking the ecclesiastical doctrine, and making shipwreck of the faith, have in like manner falsely attributed a real nature and essence to evil.—Of which heretics, there were several sects before the Manicheans, sometime taken notice of and censured by Pagan philosophers themselves ; as by Celsus,* where he charges Christians with holding this opinion, that there is ἐναντίος τῷ μεγάλῳ θεῷ θεὸς καταραμένος, an execrable god contrary to the great God ;—and by Plotinus, writing a whole book against such Christians (the ninth of his second Ennead), which, by Porphyrius, was inscribed, πρὸς τοὺς Γνωστικούς, Against the Gnostics.—

But if, notwithstanding all that we have hitherto said to the contrary, that which Plutarch so much contends for should be granted to be true, that the Pagan theologers generally asserted two self-existent principles (a good God, and an evil soul or demon), and no more, it would unavoidably follow from thence, that all those other gods, which they worshipped, were not looked upon by them as so many unmade self-existent beings, because then they should have acknowledged so many first principles. However, it is certain, that if Plutarch believed his own writings, he must of necessity take it for granted, that none of the Pagan gods (those two principles of good and evil only excepted) were by their theologers accounted unmade or self-existent beings. And as to Plutarch himself, it is unquestionably manifest, that though he were a Pagan, and a worshipper of all those many gods of their's, but

* Apud Origen. contra Celsum, lib. vi. p. 303.

especially amongst the rest, of the Delian Apollo (whose priest he declares himself to have been), yet he supposed them all (except only one good God, and another evil soul of the world) to be no self-existent deities, but θεοὶ γεννητοὶ,^a generated or created gods only. And the same is to be affirmed of all his Pagan followers, as also of the Manicheans, forasmuch as they, besides their good and evil god (the only unmade, self-existent beings acknowledged by them), worshipped also innumerable other deities.

Hitherto we have not been able to find amongst the Pagans, any who asserted a multitude of unmade, self-existent deities: but, on the contrary, we shall now find one, who took notice of this opinion of πολλαὶ ἀρχαὶ, many principles, so far forth as to confute it; and that is Aristotle, who was not occasioned to do that neither, because it was a doctrine then generally received, but only because he had a mind odiously to impute such a thing to the Pythagoreans and Platonists, they making ideas (sometimes called also numbers) in a certain sense, the principles of things. Nevertheless, the opinion itself is well confuted by that philosopher from the phenome-

na, after this manner: Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικόν, καὶ οὕτως αἰεὶ ἄλλην ἐχομένην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς ἐκάστης ἄλλας, ἐπεισοδιῶδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν· &c. They who say that mathematical number is the first, and suppose one principle of one thing, and another of another, would make the whole world to be like an incoherent and disagreeing poem, where things do not all mutually contribute to one ano-

Arist. Met.
l. 14. c. 10.
pag. 486.
tom. iv. oper.

^a Vide Rualdum in Vita Plutarchi, cap. ix.

ther, nor conspire together to make up one sense and harmony: but the contrary (saith he) is most evident in the world; and, therefore, there cannot be many principles, but only one.—From whence it is manifest, that though Aristotle were a worshipper of many gods, as well as the other Pagans (he somewhere representing it as very absurd to sacrifice to none but Jupiter), yet he was no Polytheist, in the sense before declared, of many unmade, self-existent deities, nor indeed any Ditheist neither, no assertor of two understanding principles, a good and evil god (as Plutarch pretended him to be); he not only here exploding that opinion of *πολλαὶ ἀρχαί*, many principles, but also expressly deriving all from one; and in that very chapter affirming, that good is a principle, but not evil. But as for the Platonists and Pythagoreans there perstringed by him, though it be true, that they made ideas in some sense principles, as the paradigms of things; yet, according to Aristotle's own confession, even in that same chapter, they declared also, that there was *ἄλλη ἀρχὴ κυριωτέρα*, another principle more excellent or superior; which is indeed that, that was called by them the *τὸ ἐν*, or *μονὰς*, unity itself, or a monad, that is, one most simple deity.

Though we did before demonstrate, that the Pagan gods were not all supposed by them to be unmade, self-existent beings, because they acknowledged a theogonia, a generation and temporary production of gods; yet, forasmuch as it might be suspected, that they held notwithstanding a multitude of unmade deities, we have now made the best inquiry that we could concerning this: and the utmost that we have been able yet

to discover, is, that some few of the professed Pagans, as well as of pretended Christians, have indeed asserted a duplicity of such gods (viz. understanding beings unmade), one good, and the other evil, but no more. Whereas, on the contrary, we have found, that Aristotle did professedly oppose this opinion of many principles, or unmade gods, which certainly he durst never have done, had it then been the generally-received opinion of the Pagans. And though it be true, that several of the ancient Christians, in their disputes with Pagans, do confute that opinion of many unmade deities; yet we do not find, for all that, that any of them seriously charge the Pagans with it, they only doing it occasionally and *ex abundanti*. But we should be the better enabled to make a clear judgment concerning this controversy, whether there were not amongst the Pagan deities a multitude of supposed unmade beings, if we did but take a short survey of their religion, and consider all the several kinds of gods worshipped by them; which may, as we conceive, be reduced to these following heads:—In the first place, therefore, it is certain, that many of the Pagan gods were nothing else but dead men (or the souls of men deceased), called by the Greeks Heroes, and the Latins Manes; such as Hercules, Liber, Æsculapius, Castor, Pollux, Quirinus, and the like. Neither was this only true of the Greeks and Romans, but also of the Egyptians, Syrians, and Babylonians. For which cause the Pagan sacrifices are, by way of contempt, in the Scripture,^a called the sacrifices of the dead; that is, not of dead or lifeless statues, as some

^a Psalm cvi. 28.

would put it off, but of dead men: which was the reason why many of the religious rites and solemnities, observed by the Pagan priests, were

Chap. vi.
ver. 31.

mournful and funeral; accordingly as it is expressed in Baruch concerning the Babylonians:—"Their priests sit in their temples, having their clothes rent, and their heads and beards shaven, and nothing upon their heads; they roar and cry before their gods, as men do at the feast, when one is dead." Some of which rites are therefore thought to have been interdicted to the Israelitish priests. And the same thing is noted likewise by the poet^a concerning the Egyptians:

Et quem tu plangens, hominem testaris, Osirin:

and intimated by Xenophanes the Colophonian,^b when he reprehensively admonished the Egyptians after this manner: *εἰ θεοὺς νομίζουσι μὴ θρηνεῖν, εἰ δὲ θρηνοῦσι μὴ θεοὺς νομίζεω*, That if they thought those to be gods, they should not so lament them; but if they would lament them, they should no longer think them gods.—Moreover, it is well known, that this humour of deifying men was afterwards carried on further, and that living men (as emperors) had also temples and altars erected to them; nay, human polities and cities were also sometimes deified by the Pagans, Rome itself being made a goddess. Now, no man can imagine, that those men-gods and city-gods were looked upon by them as so many unmade, self-existent deities, they being not indeed so much

^a Lucan. Pharsal. lib. viii. vers. 133.

^b Vide Plutarch. de Superstit. p. 171. tom. ii. oper. et Aristot. Rhetoric. lib. ii. cap. xxiii. p. 789. tom. iii. oper.

as φύσει γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, gods made or generated by nature, but rather artificially made by human will and pleasure. Again, another sort of the Pagan deities were all the greater parts of the visible mundane system, or corporeal world, as supposed to be animated—the sun, the moon, and the stars, and even the earth itself, under the names of Vesta and Cybele, the mother of the gods, and the like. Now it is certain, also, that none of these could be taken for unmade, self-existent deities neither, by those who supposed the whole world itself to have been generated, or had a beginning, which, as Aristotle^a tells us, was the generally-received opinion before his time. There was also a third sort of Pagan deities, ethereal and ariel animals invisible, called demons, genii, and lares, superior indeed to men, but inferior to the celestial or mundane gods before-mentioned. Wherefore, these must needs be looked upon also by them but as γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, generated or created gods, they being but certain inferior parts of the whole generated world.

Besides all these, the Pagans had yet another sort of gods, that were nothing but mere accidents or affections of substances, which therefore could not be supposed by them to be self-existent deities, because they could not so much as subsist by themselves. Such as were virtue, piety, felicity, truth, faith, hope, justice, clemency, love, desire, health, peace, honour, fame, liberty, memory, sleep, night, and the like; all which had their temples or altars erected to them. Now this kind of Pagan gods cannot well be conceived to have been any thing else, but the several and

^a Lib. i. de Cœlo, cap. x. p. 632. tom. i. oper.

various manifestations of that one Divine force, power, and providence, that runs through the whole world (as respecting the good and evil of men), fictitiously personated, and so represented as so many gods and goddesses.

Lastly, there is still another kind of Pagan gods behind, having substantial and personal names, which yet cannot be conceived neither to be so many understanding beings, unmade and independent upon any supreme, were it for no other reason but only this, because they have all of them their particular places and provinces, offices and functions severally, as it were, assigned to them, and to which they are confined; so as not to interfere and clash with one another, but agreeably to make up one orderly and harmonious system of the whole; one of those gods ruling only in the heavens, another in the air, another in the sea, and another in the earth and hell; one being the god or goddess of learning and wisdom, another of speech and eloquence, another of justice and political order; one the god of war, another the god of pleasure; one the god of corn, and another the god of wine, and the like. For how can it be conceived, that a multitude of understanding beings, self-existent and independent, could thus of themselves have fallen into such an uniform order and harmony; and, without any clashing, peaceably and quietly sharing the government of the whole world amongst them, should carry it on with such a constant regularity? For which cause, we conclude also, that neither those *dii majorum gentium*, whether the twenty *Selecti*, or the twelve *Consentes*, nor yet that triumvirate of gods, amongst whom Homer

shares the government of the whole world, according to that of Maximus Tyrius,

τριχθὰ Ὀμήρω δέδασται τὰ πάντα, Ποσειδῶν ^{Diss. 16.}
 μὲν ἔλαχε, πολὴν ἅλα ναίμεν αἰεὶ, Ἄδης δὲ ἔλαχε ζόφον
 ἠερόεντα, Ζεὺς δὲ οὐρανόν· The sea being assigned to
 Neptune, the dark and subterraneous parts to
 Pluto, but the heaven to Jupiter; which three
 are sometimes called also the celestial, marine,
 and terrestrial Jupiter; nor, lastly, that other
 Roman and Samothracian trinity of gods, wor-
 shipped altogether in the capitol, Jupiter, Mi-
 nerva, and Juno; I say, that none of all these
 could reasonably be thought by the Pagans
 themselves, to be so many really distinct, un-
 made, and self-existent deities.

Wherefore the truth of this whole business seems to be this, that the ancient Pagans did physiologize in their theology; and whether looking upon the whole world animated, as the supreme God, and consequently the several parts of it as his living members; or else, apprehending it at least to be a mirror, or visible image of the invisible Deity, and consequently all its several parts, and things of nature, but so many several manifestations of the Divine power and providence, they pretended, that all their devotion towards the Deity ought not to be huddled up in one general and confused acknowledgment of a supreme invisible Being, the creator and governor of all; but that all the several manifestations of the Deity in the world, considered singly and apart by themselves, should be made so many distinct objects of their devout veneration. And, therefore, in order hereunto, did they *προσωποποιεῖν*, speak of the things in nature, and

the parts of the world, as persons,—and consequently as so many gods and goddesses; yet so, as that the intelligent might easily understand the meaning, that these were all really nothing else but so many several names and notions of that one Numen, divine force and power, which runs through the whole world, multiformly displaying itself therein. To this purpose, Balbus in Cicero;^a “Videtisne ut a physicis rebus tracta ratio sit ad commentitios et fictos deos?” See you not, how from the things of nature fictitious gods have been made?—And Origen seems to insist upon this very thing (where Celsus upbraids the Jews and Christians for worshipping one only God), shewing, that all that seeming multiplicity of Pagan gods could not be understood of so

L. 1. p. 18. many distinct substantial independent
edit. Cantab. deities: *δεικνύτω τοίνυν, πῶς αὐτὸς δύναται*

παραστήσαι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν καθ' Ἑλληνας θεῶν, ἢ τοὺς λοιπούς βαρβάρους· Δεικνύτω ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν Μνημοσύνης γεννώσης ἀπὸ Διὸς τὰς Μούσας, ἢ Θέμιδος τὰς Ὠρας, ἢ τὰς Χάριτας αἰεὶ γυμνὰς παραστησάτω δύνασθαι κατ' οὐσίαν ὑφεστηκέναι, ἀλλ' οὐ δυνήσεται τὰ Ἑλλένων ἀναπλάσματα (σωματοποιεῖσθαι δοκοῦντα ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων) δεικνύναι Θεούς. To this sense: Let Celsus, therefore, himself shew, how he is able to make out a multiplicity of gods (substantial and self-existent) according to the Greeks and other barbarian Pagans; let him declare the essence and substantial personality of that memory, which by Jupiter generated the Muses, or of that Themis, which brought forth the hours; or let him shew how the Graces, always naked, do subsist by themselves. But he will never be able to do this,

^a De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxviii. p. 2995. tom. ix. oper. *

nor to make it appear, that those figments of the Greeks (which seem to be really nothing else but the things of nature turned into persons) are so many distinct (self-existent) deities.—Where the latter words are thus rendered in a late edition; “Sed nunquam poterit (Celsus) Græcorum figmenta, quæ validiora fieri videntur, ex rebus ipsis deos esse arguere;”—which we confess we cannot understand; but we conceive the word *σωματοποιεῖσθαι*, there turned *validiora fieri*, is here used by Origen in the same sense with *προσωπόποιεῖσθαι*: so that his meaning is, as we have declared, that those figments of the Greeks and other barbarian Pagans (which are the same with Balbus’s *commentitii et ficti Dei*), are really nothing else but the things of nature, figuratively and fictitiously personated, and consequently not so many distinct substantial deities, but only several notions and considerations of one God, or supreme Numen, in the world.

Now this fictitious personating, and deifying of things, by the Pagan Theologers, was done two manner of ways; one, when those things in nature were themselves without any more ado, or change of names, spoken of as persons, and so made gods and goddesses, as in the many instances before proposed: another, when there were distinct proper and personal names accommodated severally to those things, as of Minerva to wisdom, of Neptune to the sea, of Ceres to corn, and of Bacchus to wine. In which latter case, those personal names properly signify the invisible Divine powers, supposed to preside over those several things in nature; and these are therefore properly those gods and goddesses, which are *δωτηῆρες*.

είων,* the givers and dispensers of the good things, and the removers of the contrary; but they are used improperly also for the things of nature themselves, which, therefore, as manifestations of the Divine power, goodness, and providence personated, are sometimes also abusively called gods and goddesses. This mystery of the Pagan Poly-

In Hesiod.
P. 1.

theism, is thus fully declared by Moschopolus: Ἰστέον ὅτι πάντα οἱ Ἕλληνες ἅ δὴ δύναντι ἔχοντα ἰώρουσι, οὐκ ἄνευ ἐπιστασίας θεῶν τὴν δύναντι αὐτῶν ἐνεργεῖν ἐνόμιζον, ἐνὶ δὲ ὀνόματι τὸ τε τὴν δύναντι ἔχον, καὶ τὸν ἐπιστατοῦντα τοῦτω θεὸν ὠνόμαζον· ὅθεν Ἡφαιστον ἔκαλον τότε διακονικὸν τοῦτο πῦρ, καὶ τὸν ἐπιστατοῦντα ταῖς διὰ τούτου ἐνεργομέναις τέχναις, καὶ Δήμητραν τὸν σῖτον καὶ τοὺς καρπούς, καὶ τὴν δωρουμένην τούτους θεὸν, καὶ ἐπιστατοῦσαν αὐτοῖς, καὶ Ἀθηνᾶν τὴν φρόνησιν, καὶ τὴν ἔφορον τῆς φρονήσεως θεόν· καὶ τὸν Διόνυσον τὸν οἶνον καὶ τὸν διδόντα τοῦτον θεόν· ὃν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ διδόναι τὸν οἶνον ὁ Πλάτων παράγει, καὶ Διδούνησον τοῦτον ποιεῖ εἶτα καὶ Διόνυσον· καὶ Εἰλειθυίας τοὺς τόκους, καὶ τὰς ἐφορώσας τοὺς τόκους θεάς· καὶ Ἀφροδίτην τὴν συνουσίαν καὶ ἐπιστατοῦσαν ταύτῃ θεόν· κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ Μούσας ἔλεγον τάσπε λογικὰς τέχνας, οἷον ῥητορικὴν, ἀστρονομίαν, κωμωδίαν, τραγωδίαν, καὶ τὰς ἐφόρους καὶ παρόχους τούτων θεάς. We must know, that whatsoever the Greeks (or Pagans) saw to have any power, virtue, or ability in it, they looked upon it as not acting according to such power, without the providence, presidency, or influence of the gods; and they called both the thing itself, which hath the power, and the deity presiding over it, by one and the same name: whence the ministerial fire used in mechanic arts, and the god presiding over those arts that work by fire, were both alike called Hephæstus, or Vul-

* Hesiod. in Theogon. vers. 111.

can ; so the name Demetra, or Ceres, was given as well to corn and fruits, as to that goddess which bestows them ; Athena, or Minerva, did alike signify wisdom, and the goddess which is the dispenser of it ; Dionysius, or Bacchus, wine, and the god that giveth wine ; (whence Plato etymologizes the name from giving of wine.) In like manner, they called both the child-bearing of women, and the goddesses that superintend over the same, Eilithyia, or Lucina ; Coitus, or copulation, and the deity presiding over it, Aphrodite or Venus. And, lastly, in the same manner, by the Muses they signified both those rational arts, rhetoric, astronomy, poetry, and the goddesses, which assist therein or promote the same.—Now, as the several things in nature and parts of the corporeal world are thus metonymically and catachrestically called gods and goddesses, it is evident, that such deities as these could not be supposed to be unmade or self-existent, by those, who acknowledged the whole world to have been generated and had a beginning. But as these names were used more properly, to signify invisible and understanding powers, presiding over the things in nature, and dispensing of them, however they have an appearance of so many several distinct deities ; yet they seem to have been all really nothing else, but as Balbus in Cicero^a expresses it, “ Deus pertinens per naturam cujusque rei,” God passing through, and acting in the nature of every thing ; —and consequently, but several names, or so many different notions and considerations of that one supreme Numen, that Divine force, power,

^a De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxviii. p. 2996. tom. ix. oper.

and providence, which runs through the whole world, as variously manifesting itself therein.

Wherefore, since there were no other kinds of Gods amongst the Pagans, besides these already enumerated, unless their images, statues, and symbols, should be accounted such (because they were also sometimes abusively called gods) which could not be supposed by them to have been unmade or without a beginning, they being the workmanship of men's own hands; we conclude universally, that all that multiplicity of Pagan gods, which makes so great a show and noise, was really either nothing but several names and notions of one supreme Deity, according to its different manifestations, gifts, and effects in the world, personated; or else many inferior understanding beings, generated or created by one Supreme: so that one unmade self-existent Deity, and no more, was acknowledged by the more intelligent of the ancient Pagans (for of the sottish vulgar, no man can pretend to give an account, in any religion), and, consequently, the Pagan Polytheism (or idolatry) consisted not in worshipping a multiplicity of unmade minds, deities, and creators, self-existent from eternity, and independent upon one Supreme; but in mingling and blending, some way or other, unduly, creature-worship with the worship of the Creator.

And that the ancient Pagan Theists thus acknowledged one supreme God, who was the only Θεός ἀγέννητος, unmade or unproduced Deity, (I say, Theists, because those amongst the Pagans, who admitted of many gods, but none at all unmade, were absolute Atheists) this may be unde-

niably concluded from what was before proved, that they acknowledged omnipotence or infinite power to be a Divine attribute. Because upon the hypothesis of many unmade self-existent deities, it is plain, that there could be none omnipotent, and consequently no such thing as omnipotence *in rerum natura*: and therefore omnipotence was rightly and properly styled by Macrobius,^a *summi Dei omnipotentia*, it being an attribute essentially peculiar to one supreme and sole self-existent Deity. And Simplicius, likewise a Pagan, confuted the Manichean hypothesis of two self-existent deities from hence also, because it destroyed omnipotence: ἀναγκάζονται δύο λέγοντες τῶν ὄλων ἀρχὰς (τὸ τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν) καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν παρ' αὐτοῖς λεγόμενον Θεὸν, μηκέτι πάντων αἴτιον λέγειν, μηδὲ ὡς παντοκράτορα δικαίως ἀνυμνεῖν, μηδὲ δύναμιν αὐτῷ τὴν ἀκροτάτην καὶ ὅλην ἀνατιθέναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἡμισὺ τῆς ὅλης δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο. For they, who assert two principles of the universe (one good, the other evil) are necessitated to grant, that the good principle, called by them God, is not the cause of all things, neither can they praise it as omnipotent, nor ascribe a perfect and whole entire power to it, but only the half of a whole power at most, if so much.—Over and besides all which, it hath been also proved already, that the ancient Atheists under Paganism directed themselves principally against the opinion of monarchy, or of one supreme Deity ruling over all; from whence it plainly appears, that it was then asserted by the Pagan Theists.

And we think it here observable, that this was a thing so generally confessed and acknowledged,

^a In Somn. Scipion. lib. i. cap. xvii. p. 87.

In Epict. c. 4. Potius in cap. xxxiv. p. 164. edit. Salmas.

that Faustus the Manichean took up this conceit, that both the Christians and Jews paganized in the opinion of monarchy, that is, derived this doctrine of one Deity, the sole principle of all things, only by tradition from the Pagans, and, by consequence, were no other than schisms or subdivided sects of Paganism. “ Vos desciscentes a gentibus (saith he) monarchiæ opinionem primo vobiscum divulsistis, id est, ut omnia credatis ex deo. Estis sane schisma, nec non et priores vestri Judæi. De opinione monarchiæ, in nullo etiam ipsi dissentiunt a paganis. Quare constat vos atque Judæos schisma esse gentilitatis. Sectas autem si quæras, non plures erunt quam duæ, Gentium et nostra.” You revolting from the Gentiles, broke off their opinion of monarchy, and carried it along with you, so as to believe all things to come from God. Wherefore, you are really nothing but a schism of Paganism, or a subdivided branch of it, and so are your predecessors the Jews; who differ nothing from Pagans neither in this opinion of monarchy. Whence it is manifest, that both Christians and Jews are but schisms of Gentilism. But as for sects of religion, really differing from another, there are but these two, that of the Pagans, and that of our's, who altogether dissent from them.—Now though this be false and foolish, as to the Christians and Jews deriving that opinion of monarchy, only by way of tradition, from the Pagans, which is a thing founded in the principles of nature; yet it sufficiently shews this to have been the general sense of the Pagans, that all their gods were derived from one sole, self-existent Deity; so that they neither acknowledged

S. Aug. contra Faust. l. 20. cap. iv. p. 237. tom. viii. oper.

a multitude of unmade deities, nor yet that duplicity of them, which Plutarch contended for (one good, and the other evil), who accordingly denied God to be the cause of all things, writing thus in his *Defect of Oracles*,^a οἱ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἀπλῶς τὸν Θεόν, οἱ δὲ ὁμοῦ τι πάντων αἴτιον ποιοῦντες, ἀστοχοῦσι τοῦ μετρίου καὶ πρέποντος, They are guilty of one extreme, who make God the cause of nothing, and they of another, who make him the cause of all things.

—But this paradox was both late started amongst the Greeks, and quickly cried down by the succession of their philosophers, and therefore prejudiceth not the truth of Faustus's general assertion concerning the Pagans. Which is again fully confirmed by St. Austin in his reply :

“ Siquis ita dividat, ut dicat eorum, quæ aliqua religione detinentur, aliis placere unum Deum colendum, aliis multos ; per hanc differentiam et pagani a nobis remoti sunt, et Manichæi cum paganis deputantur, nos autem cum Judæis. Hic forte dicatis, quod multos deos vestros ex una substantia perhibetis ; quasi pagani multos suos, non ex una asserant, quamvis diversa illis officia, et opera, et potestates illis attribuant ; sicut etiam apud vos alius deus expugnat gentem tenebrarum, alius ex ea capta fabricat mundum,” &c. If one should make another distribution of religionists, into such as worship either one God, or many gods ; according to this division, the Pagans will be removed from us Christians, and joined with you Manicheans. But, perhaps, you will here say, that all your many gods are derived from one substance ; as if the Pagans did not also derive

L. 20. cap.
10. p. 241.
tom. viii.
oper.

^a Tom. ii. oper. p. 414.

all their gods from one, though attributing several offices, works, and powers to them; in like manner as amongst you, one god expugns the nation of darkness, another god makes a world out of it, &c.—And again, afterwards, he writes further

to the same purpose: “ *Discat ergo S. Aug. contra Faust. l. 20. c. 19. p. 246.* Faustus monarchiæ opinionem non ex gentibus nos habere, sed gentes non usque adeo ad falsos deos esse dilapsas, ut opinionem amitterent unius veri dei, ex quo est omnis qualiscunque natura.” Let Faustus therefore know, that we Christians have not derived the opinion of monarchy from the Pagans, but that the Pagans have not so far degenerated, sinking down into the worship of false gods, as to have lost the opinion of one true God, from whom is all whatsoever nature.—

XIV. It follows, from what we have declared, that the Pagan Polytheism, or multiplicity of gods, is not to be understood in the sense before expressed, of many *θεοὶ ἀγέννητοι καὶ αὐθυπόστατοι*, many unproduced and self-existent deities, but according to some other notion or equivocation of the word gods. For God is *τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων*, one of those words, that hath been used in many different senses,—the Atheists themselves acknowledging a God and gods, according to some private senses of their own (which yet they do not all agree in neither), and Theists not always having the same notion of that word; forasmuch as angels in Scripture are called gods in one sense, that is, as understanding beings superior to men, immortal, holy, and happy; and the word is again sometimes carried down lower to princes and magistrates; and not only so, but also to

good men as such, when they are said to be made partakers of the Divine nature.^a And thus that learned philosopher and Christian, Boethius,^b “Omnis beatus deus; sed natura quidem unus, participatione vero nihil prohibet esse quamplurimos.” Every good and happy man is a god, and though there be only one god by nature, yet nothing hinders but that there may be many by participation.—But then again, all men and angels are alike denied to be gods in other respects, and particularly as to religious worship: “Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve.” Now this is that, which seems to be essentially included in the Pagan notion of the word God or gods, when taken in general—namely, a respect to religious worship. Wherefore, a God in general, according to the sense of the Pagan Theists, may be thus defined, An understanding Being superior to men, not originally derived from senseless matter, and looked upon as an object for men’s religious worship. But this general notion of the word God is again restrained and limited by differences, in the division of it. For such a God as this may be either ἀγέννητος, ingenerate or unproduced, and consequently self-existent; or else γεννητός, generated or produced, and dependent on some higher Being as its cause. In the former sense, the intelligent Pagans, as we have declared, acknowledged only one God, who was therefore called by them ὁ θεὸς κατ’ ἐξοχὴν, according to that of Thales in Laertius,^c πρῆσβύτατον τῶν ὄντων ὁ θεός, ἀγέννητον γάρ· God is the oldest of all things, be-

^a 2 Peter i. 4.

^b De Consolat. Philos. lib. iii. p. 72. s.

^c Lib. i. segm. 35. p. 21. s.

cause he is unmade or unproduced, and the only thing that is so ;—but in the latter, they admitted of many gods, many understanding beings, which, though generated or produced, yet were superior to men, and looked upon as objects for their religious worship. And thus the Pagan Theists were both Polytheists and Monotheists in different senses, they acknowledged both many gods, and one God ; that is, many inferior deities, subordinate to one Supreme. Thus Onatus the Pythagorean, in Stobæus, declares himself:

Ecl. Phys.

l. 1. p. 4. edit. Plantin. δοκεί δὲ μοι, καὶ μὴ εἰς εἷ μὲν ὁ θεός, ἀλλ' εἰς μὲν

ὁ μέγιστος, καὶ καθ' ὑπέριτερος, καὶ ὁ κρατέων τῷ παντός· οἱ δ' ἄλλοι πολλοὶ διαφέροντες κατὰ δύναμιν, βασιλεύει δὲ πάντων αὐτῶν ὁ καὶ κράτει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ ἀρετῇ μείζων· οὗτος δὲ καὶ εἶη ὁ περιέχων τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον· τοὶ δ' ἄλλοι οἱ θεόντες εἰςὶ κατ' οὐρανὸν σὺν τε τῷ παντός περιαγήσει, κατὰ λόγον ὑποθέοντες τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ νοητῷ.

It seemeth to me, that there is not only one God, but that there is one the greatest and highest God, that governeth the whole world, and that there are many other gods besides him differing as to power, that one God reigning over them all, who surmounts them all in power, greatness, and virtue. That is that God, who contains and comprehends the whole world ; but the other gods are those, who, together with the revolution of the universe, orderly follow that first and intelligible God.—Where it is evident, that Onatus's πολλοὶ θεοί, or many gods, were only the heavenly bodies, or animated stars. And partly from those words cited, but chiefly others, which follow after in the same place (that will be produced elsewhere), it plainly appears, that in Onatus's time, there were some who acknowledged one only God, denying

all those other gods, then commonly worshipped. And indeed Anaxagoras seems to have been such an one; forasmuch as asserting one perfect mind ruling over all (which is the true Deity), he effectually degraded all those other Pagan gods, the sun, moon, and stars from their godships, by making the sun nothing but a globe of fire, and the moon earth and stones, and the like of the other stars and planets. And some such there were also amongst the ancient Egyptians, as shall be declared in due place. Moreover, Proclus, upon Plato's *Timæus*, tells us, P. 206. that there hath been always less doubt and controversy in the world concerning the one God, than concerning the many gods. Wherefore Onatus here declares his own sense, as to this particular, viz. that besides the one supreme God, there were also many other inferior deities, that is, understanding beings, that ought to be religiously worshipped.

But because it is not impossible, but that there might be imagined one supreme Deity, though there were many other *θεοὶ ἀγέννητοι*, unmade and self-existent gods besides, as Plutarch supposed before, one supreme God, together with a *ψυχὴ ἄνοος*, an irrational soul or demon unmade, inferior in power to it; therefore, we add, in the next place, that the more intelligent Pagans did not only assert one God, that was supreme and *κράτιστος πάντων*, the most powerful of all the gods, but also, who, being omnipotent, was the principle and cause of all the rest, and therefore the only *θεὸς ἀγέννητος καὶ ἀθυπόστατος*, the only unproduced and self-existent Deity.—Diss. 1. p. 5.
edit. Lugd.
1631. in 8vo. Maximus Tyrius affirms this to have been the general sense of all the Pagans, that there

was θεός εἰς πάντων βασιλεύς καὶ πατήρ, καὶ θεοὶ πολλοί, θεοῦ παῖδες, συνάρχοντες θεῶ, one God the king and father of all, and many gods, the sons of God, reigning together with God.—Neither did the poets imply any thing less, when Ζεὺς was so often called by the Greeks, and Jupiter by the Latins, πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, and *hominum pater atque deorum*, or *hominum factorque deorum*, and the like. And, indeed, the theogonia of the ancient Pagans before-mentioned, was commonly thus declared by them universally, γεννητοὺς τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι, that the gods were generated, or, as Herodotus^a expresseth it, ὅτι ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν ἐγένετο, that every one of the gods was generated or produced;—which yet is not so to be understood, as if they had therefore supposed no God at all unmade or self-existent (which is absolute Atheism), but that the οἱ θεοὶ, the gods, as distinguished from the ὁ θεός, or τὸ θεῖον, from God, or the supreme Deity, were all of them universally made or generated.

But to the end, that we may now render this business yet something more easy to be believed, that the intelligent Pagans did thus suppose all their gods save one to have been made or generated, and consequently acknowledged only one θεὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀθυπόστατον, one unproduced and self-existent Deity,—we shall in this place further observe, that the theogonia of those ancient Pagans, their genesis and generation of gods, was really one and the same thing with the cosmogonia, the genesis and generation of the world, and indeed both of them understood of a temporary production both of these gods and the world. And this we shall first prove from Plato, in

^a Histor. lib. ii. cap. liii. p. 109.

his *Timæus*; where he, being to treat of the cosmogonia, premiseth this distinction concerning two heads of being—that some were eternal and never made, and some again made or generated; the former whereof he calls *οὐσία*, or essence, the latter *γένεσις*, or generation; adding also this difference betwixt them, that the eternal and immutable things were the proper objects of science and demonstration, but the other generated things of faith and opinion only; Page 29.

ὅ, τι γὰρ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία, τοῦτο πρὸς πίστιν ἀλήθεια, for what essence is to generation, the same is certainty of truth or knowledge to faith.—And thereupon he declares, that his reader was not to expect the same evidence and certainty of truth from him, where he was now to treat of things generated (namely, the gods, and the visible world), as if he had been to discourse about things immutable and eternal, in these words: Page 29.

εἰν οὖν, ὃ Σώκρατες, πολλά πολλῶν εἰπόντων περὶ θεῶν καὶ τῆς τοῦ παντός γενέσεως, &c. If, therefore, O Socrates, many things having been spoken by many men, concerning the gods and the generation of the universe, we be not able to discourse demonstratively concerning the same, you ought not at all to wonder at it, or be displeased with us; but, on the contrary, to rest well satisfied with our performance, if upon this argument we do but deliver probabilities.—Where the gods are by Plato plainly referred to *γένεσις*, and not to *οὐσία*; to generation, and not to eternal or immutable essence, as they are also joined with the generation of the world, as being but a part thereof. Neither is this at all to be wondered at in Plato, since first the whole visible world was

no less to him than it was to the other Pagans, a God; he calling it θεὸν εὐδαίμονα, a happy God, and before it was yet made, θεὸν ἐσόμενον, a God about to be made.—Not as if Plato accounted the senseless matter of this corporeal world, whether as perfectly dead and stupid, or as endowed with a plastic nature only, to be a God (for no inanimate thing was a God to Plato), but because he supposed the world to be an animal, endowed with an intellectual soul, and indeed the best of all animals compounded of soul and

body: οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ
 Page 30. λέγειν, τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῶον ἔμφυχον ἔννοον
 τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν. Where-
 fore we are thus, according to probability, to
 conclude, that this world was really made by the
 providence of God an intellectual animal;—
 whence from an animal forthwith it became a God.
 So that here we are to take notice of two gods in
 Plato, very different from one another: one a ge-
 nerated god, this whole world animated; and
 another that God, by whose providence this world
 was generated, and thus made an animal and a
 god; which latter must needs be an unmade,
 self-existent Deity, and not belong to γένεσις, but
 to οὐσία, not to generation, but to immutable es-
 sence. Again, those greater parts of the world,
 the sun, the moon, and the stars (as supposed also
 to be animated with particular souls of their
 own) were as well accounted by Plato, as by the
 other Pagans, gods, he plainly calling them there
 ὄρατοι καὶ γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, visible and generated gods.—
 Besides which celestial gods, the earth itself also
 is supposed by him to be either a god or goddess,
 according to those ancient copies of the Timæus

used both by Cicero and Proclus: Γῆν δὲ, τροφὸν μὲν ἡμετέραν, εἰλουμένην δὲ περὶ τὸν διὰ παντός πόλον τεταμένον, φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας, ἐμηχανήσατο, πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν, ὅσοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ γεγόνασι. God fabricated the earth also, which is our nurse, turning round upon the axis of the world, and thereby causing and maintaining the succession of day and night, the first and oldest of all the gods generated within the heavens.—Where, since that philosopher seems the rather to make the earth an animal and a God, because of its diurnal circumgyration upon its own axis, we may conclude, that afterwards, when in his old age (as Plutarch^a records from Theophrastus), he gave entertainment also to that other part of the Pythagoric hypothesis, and attributed to the earth a planetary annual motion likewise about the sun (from whence it would follow, that, as Plotinus^b expresseth it, the earth was ἐν τῶν ἀστρῶν, one of the stars), he was therefore still so much the more inclined to think the earth to be a god as well as the other planets, or at least as the moon; that having been formerly represented in the Orphic tradition but as another habitable earth. For these verses of Orpheus are recorded by Proclus,^c to that purpose:

Μήσατο δ' ἄλλην γαῖαν ἀπείρατον, ἐν τε Σελήην
 Ἄθνατοι κλήζουσιν, ἐπιχθόνιοι δὲ τε Μῆνην,
 Ἡ πόλλ' οὔρε' ἔχει, πόλλ' ἄστεα, πολλὰ μέλαθρα.

The sense whereof is this: That God in the cos-

^a In Question. Platonic. p. 1006. oper. vide etiam eundem in Vita Numæ, tom. i. oper. p. 312.

^b Lib. ii. de Dub. Animæ, Ennead iv. lib. iv. cap. xxii. p. 414.

^c Comment. in Timæum Platonis, lib. iv. p. 283. vide etiam lib. v. p. 292.

mogonia, or cosmopœia, besides this earth of our's, fabricated also another vast earth, which the immortal gods call Selene, but mortal men Mene, or the moon; that hath many hills and valleys, many cities and houses in it.—From whence Proclus, though as it seems a stranger to the Pythagoric system, yet being much addicted to these Orphic traditions, concluded the moon to be, *γῆν αἰθερίαν*, an ethereal earth.—

See Macrob.
Som. Scip. l.
1. c. 11. p. 58.

After all this, Plato, that he might be thought to omit nothing in his Timæan cosmogonia, speaks also of the *genesis ortus*, or generation of the poetic gods, under the name of demons, such as Tethys and Phorcys, Saturn and Rhea, Jupiter and Juno, and the like; which seem to be really nothing else but the other inanimate parts of the world and things of nature, *θεοποιηθέντα*, that is, fictitiously personated and deified (as is elsewhere declared). Which whole business was a thing set off by those poets with much fiction and physiological allegory. And though Plato, out of a seeming compliance with the laws of his city, pretends here to give credit to this poetic theogonia, as tradition delivered down from the sons of the gods, who must not be supposed to have been ignorant of their parents; yet, as Eusebius^a well observeth, he doth but all the while silyly jeer it, plainly insinuating the fabulosity thereof, when he affirmeth it to have been introduced not only *ἀνευ ἀναγκαιῶν ἀποδείξεων*,^b without necessary demonstrations, but also *ἀνευ εἰκότων*, without so much as probabilities. Nevertheless,

^a Preparat. Evangelic. lib. ii. cap. vii. p. 75, 76.

^b Plat. in Timæo, cap. xxvi. p. 249.

Proclus,^a suspecting no such matter, but taking Plato in all this to have been in very good earnest, interprets these poetic gods or demons mentioned by him, to be the gods below the moon (notwithstanding that the earth was mentioned before by Plato), calling them γενεσιούργους θεούς, the gods that cause generation, and seeming to understand thereby the animated elements; Jupiter being here not taken, as he is often elsewhere, for the supreme God, but only for the animated ether, as Juno for the animated air. And upon this occasion he runs out into a long dispute, to prove, that not only the stars were animated, but also all the other sublunary bodies or elements: *εἰ γὰρ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος θεὸς εὐδαίμων, ἐστὶ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τῶν συμπληρούντων αὐτὸν μορίων ἄθειον, καὶ ἀπρονόητον, εἰ δὲ καὶ θεοῦ πάντα μετέχει καὶ προνοίας, θείαν ἔλαχε φύσιν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ οἰκεῖαι τάξεις θεῶν ἐφειστήκασιν αὐτοῖς, εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς διὰ μέσων ψυχῶν καὶ νόων μετέχει τῆς μιᾶς ψυχῆς, καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς νοῦ, τί χρὴ περὶ τούτων οἴεσθαι τῶν στοιχείων· πῶς οὐ πολλῶ μᾶλλον ταῦτα διὰ δὴ τινων μέσων θείων τάξεων μετέληχε τῆς μιᾶς τοῦ κόσμου θεότητος.* For if the whole world be a happy God, then none of the parts of it are godless, or devoid of providence; but if all things partake of God and Providence, then are they not unfurnished of the Divine nature; and if so, there must be some peculiar orders of gods presiding over them. For if the heavens by reason of particular souls and minds partake of that one soul and one mind; why should we not conclude the same concerning the elements, that they also, by certain intermedium orders of gods, partake of that one Divinity of the whole world?—Wherefore, a little be-

^a In *Timæum* Platon. lib. iv. p. 287.

fore, the same Proclus highly condemns certain ancient physiologers whom he supposeth Aristotle to have followed: πολλοῖς τῶν φυσιο-

P. 285.

λόγων ἄψυχα εἰκῆ φερόμενα, καὶ ἀπρονόητα ταῦτα εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα νενόμισται· τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐρανία διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τάξιν, νοῦν καὶ θεῶν μετέχειν ὡμολόγουν, τὴν δὲ γένεσιν, ὡς πολυμετάβολον, καὶ ἀόριστον, καὶ ἀπρονόητον ἀπέλιπον, οἷα δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ὕστερον ἐδόξασε, ταῖς οὐρανίαις περιφοραῖς μόνως ἐπιστήσας, τὰς ἀκινήτους αἰτίας· εἴτε ὀκτῶ εἶεν, εἴτε πλείους· ἄψυχα δὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα ταῦτα καταλείπων· The elements were thought by most of the ancient physiologers to be inanimate, and to be moved fortuitously without providence. For though they acknowledged the heavenly bodies, by reason of that order that appears in them, to partake of mind and gods; yet they left this sublunary world (or genesis) to float up and down without providence. And these Aristotle afterwards followed, appointing immoveable intelligences to preside over the celestial spheres only (whether eight or more) but leaving all the lower elements dead and inanimate.

Lastly, besides all those other mundane gods before-mentioned, as generated together with the world, though Proclus seems to be of another opinion, yet it is manifest, that Plato doth not there in his Timæus altogether forget those properly called demons (elsewhere so much insisted upon by him), but in the very next following words he plainly insinuates them, after this manner: ὅσοι φαίνονται καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλωσι θεοὶ, the gods, which appear visibly to us as often as they please, or which can appear and disappear at pleasure—speaking also of their genesis or generation as

* In Timæo, cap. xxvi. p. 248.

part of the cosmogonia; and then again afterwards calling them νέοι θεοί, junior gods, he describes them as those whose particular office it was to superintend and preside over human affairs, *καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα τὸ θνητὸν διακυβερνᾶν ζῶον, ὅτι μὴ κακῶν αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ γίγνοιτο αἴτιον*, and to govern this mortal animal, man, after the best manner possible, so that he should no otherwise fail of doing well or being happy, than as he became a cause of evil and misery to himself, by the abuse of his own liberty.—

And thus much out of Plato's *Timæus*; but the same thing might be proved also out of his other writings, as particularly from that passage in his tenth book of *Laws*,^b where he takes notice again of the theogonia of the ancients, and that as it had been depraved and corrupted by a great mixture of impious and immoral fables. *Εἰσὶν ἡμῖν ἐν γράμμασι λόγοι κείμενοι. Οἱ μὲν ἐν τισι μέτροις, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων λέγοντες περὶ θεῶν, οἱ μὲν παλαιότατοι, ὡς γέγονεν ἡ πρώτη φύσις οὐρανοῦ τῶν τε ἄλλων· προϋόντες δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐ πολὺ θεογονίαν διεξέρχονται, γενόμενοί τε ὡς πρὸς ἀλλήλοις ὠμίλησαν.* There are (saith he) extant among us Athenians, certain stories and traditions, very ancient, concerning the gods, written partly in metre, and partly in prose, declaring how the heaven, and the other gods were at first made, or generated, and then, carrying on their fabulous theogonia farther, how these generated gods afterward conversed with one another, and ingendering after the manner of men, begat other gods.—Where that philosopher, taking off his vizard, plainly discovers his great dislike of that whole fabulous theogonia (how-

^a In *Timæo*, cap. xxix. p. 252.

^b P. 664.

ever he acknowledges elsewhere; that it did contain *υποβολας*,^a that is, physiological allegories under it), as a thing that was destructive of all piety and virtue, by reason of its attributing all human passions and vices to the gods. However, it plainly appears from hence, that the theogonia and the cosmogonia were one and the same thing, the generation of the gods being here the generation of the heaven, and of the sun, moon, and stars, and the like.

Moreover, this same thing is sufficiently manifest also even from Hesiod's own theogonia, which doubtless was that which Plato principally aimed at; and if it were not absolutely the first, yet it is the most ancient writing now extant, in that kind. For there, in the beginning of that poem, Hesiod^b invokes his muses after this manner:—

Χαίρετε, τίκνα Δίος, δότα δὲ ἡμερέσσων ἀοιδῶν
 Κλείετε δ' ἀθανάτων ἱερὸν γένος αἰὲν ἰόντων,
 Οἱ Γῆς ἐξεγένοντο καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστειρόεντος,
 Νυκτὸς δὲ δουφερέης, οὗς θ' ἄλμυρός ἐτρεφε Πόντος.
 Εἰπατε δ', ὡς τὰ πρῶτα Θεοὶ καὶ Γαῖα γενοντο,
 Καὶ Ποταμοί, καὶ Πόντος ἀπείρετος οἰδηματι θύων,
 Ἄστρά τε λαμπυρόωντα, καὶ Οὐρανὸς εὐρύς ὑπερθεῖν,
 Οἱ γ' ἐκ τῶν ἐγένοντο θεοὶ δωτήρες ἰάων.

Salvete natæ Jovis, date vero amabilem cantilenam:
 Celebrate quoque immortalium divinum genus semper existentium,
 Qui tellure prognati sunt, cœlo stellato,
 Nocteque caliginosa, quos item salsus nutritiv pontus.
 Dicite insuper, ut primum dii et terra facti fuerint,
 Et flumina, et pontus immensus æstu feryens,
 Astraque fulgentia, et cœlum latum superne,
 Et qui ex his nati sunt, dii, datores bonorum.

Where we see plainly, that the generation of the gods is the generation of the earth, heaven,

^a Vide Platon. de Republ. lib. ii. p. 430.

^b Theogon. vers. 104.

stars, seas, rivers, and other things begotten from them (as probably amongst the rest demons and nymphs, which the same Hesiod speaks of elsewhere). But immediately after this invocation of the muses, the poet begins with Chaos, and Tartara, and Love, as the first principles, and then proceeds to the production of the earth and of night out of chaos; of the ether and of day from night; of the starry heavens, mountains, and seas, &c. All which genesis or generation of gods is really nothing but a poetical description of the cosmogonia; as throughout the sequel of that whole poem all seems to be physiology, veiled under fiction and allegories. And thus the ancient scholia upon that book begin, *ιστέον ὅτι ὁ περὶ τῆς Θεογονίας λόγος φυσικὴν διήγησιν τῶν ὄντων ὑπαγορεύει*, We must know, that the whole doctrine of the theogonia contains under it, in way of allegory, a physiological declaration of things;—Hesiod's gods being not only the animated parts of the world, but also all the other things of nature, fictitiously personated and deified, or abusively called gods and goddesses.

Neither was this only the doctrine of the Greeks, that the world was thus made or generated, and that the generation of the world was a theogonia, or a generation of gods (the world itself and its several parts being accounted such by them), but also in like manner of the other Barbarian Pagans. For Diogenes Laertius hath recorded In Proem. P. 2. concerning the Persian Magi, *ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τε οὐσίας θεῶν καὶ γενέσεως, οὐς καὶ πῦρ εἶναι καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ.*^a That they did both assert the being and generation of gods, and also that these gods

^a Vide etiam Herodot. Hist. lib. i. cap. cxxxi. p. 55.

were fire, and earth, and water;—that is, that the animated elements were gods (as Proclus also before declared), and that these, together with the world, were generated, or had a beginning. And

In the Persian sacrifices, μάγος ἀνὴρ παρσοτικός ἱερασιδεὶ θεογονίῳν, one of the Magi standing by sung the Theogonia, (i. e. the Cosmogonia.) Herod. in Clio. n. 132. lib. i. p. 55,

both Laertius and Diodorus represent it as the opinion of the ancient Egyptians, that the world was generated, or had a temporary production; as also, that the sun and moon, and other parts of the world, were gods. But whereas the same Diodorus writes of certain Egyptian gods, οἱ γένεσιν αἰδίων ἐσχηκότες, which had an eternal generation;—he seems to mean thereby only the celestial gods, the sun, moon, and stars, as distinct from those other heroes and men-gods, which are again thus described by him: οἱ θνητοὶ ὑπάρξαντες, διὰ δὲ σύνεσιν καὶ κοινὴν ἀνθρώπων εὐεργεσίαν, τετυχηκότες τῆς ἀθανασίας: Who, though naturally mortal, yet, by reason of their wisdom, virtue, and beneficence toward mankind, had been advanced to immortality.—

And by this time we think it doth sufficiently appear, that the theogonia of the ancients is not to be understood merely of their heroes and men-gods, or of all their gods, as supposed to have been nothing else but mortal men, (*Dii mortali-bus nati matribus*, as Cotta in Cicero^a speaks) who, according to the more vulgar signification of the word, had been generated (*humano more*), as some, otherwise learned men, have seemed to suppose; but that it extends to all the inferior Pagan gods, some whereof were parts of the visible world animated, as the sun, moon, stars, and earth: so that their theogonia was the very same thing with the

^a De Natur. Deor. lib. iii. cap. xviii. p. 3075. tom. ix. oper.

cosmogonia, or at least a part thereof. Notwithstanding which, we deny not, but that there was also, in the pagan fables of the gods, a certain mixture of history and herology interserted, and complicated all along together with physiology.

We are, in the next place, to observe, that both this theogonia and cosmogonia of the ancient Pagans, their generation of the world and gods, is to be understood of a temporary production of them, whereby they were made *ἐκ μὴ ὄντων*, or from an antecedent non-existence brought into being. For this was the general tradition amongst the Pagans, that the world was made out of an antecedent chaos, as shall be afterwards further declared. And Aristotle^a affirmeth, that before his time, this genesis and temporary production of the world had been universally entertained by all, and particularly, that Plato was an assertor of the same. Nevertheless, the generality of the latter Platonists^b endeavour, with all their might, to force a contrary sense upon his *Timæus*: which is a thing, that Plutarch long since observed after this manner; *οἱ πλείστοι τῶν χρωμένων Πλά-*

τωνι, φοβούμενοι, καὶ παραλυπούμενοι, πάντα De Psychog. Plat. p. 1013.
μηχανῶνται, καὶ παραβιάζονται καὶ στρέφουσιν,

ὡς τι δεινὸν καὶ ἄρρητον οἴομενοι δεῖν περικαλύπτειν καὶ ἀρνεῖσθαι, τὴν τε τοῦ κόσμου τὴν τε τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ γένεσιν καὶ σύστασιν, οὐκ ἐξ αἰδίου συνεστώτων, οὔδε τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον οὕτως ἐχόντων. The most of Plato's followers, being infinitely troubled and perplexed in their minds, turn themselves every way, using all manner of arts, and offering all kind of violence to his text, as conceiving, that they ought, by all

^a De Cælo, lib. i. cap. x. p. 632. tom. i. oper.

^b Vide Proclum in *Timæum* Platon.

means possible, to hide and conceal that opinion (as infand and detestable) of the generation of the world, and of the soul of it, so as not to have continued from eternity, or through a succession of infinite time.—Notwithstanding which, we conceive it to be undeniably evident, that Plato, in his *Timæus*, doth assert the genesis of the world in this sense; to wit, of a temporary production of it, and as not having existed from eternity, or without beginning. First, because, in the entrance of that discourse,^a he opposeth these two things to one another, τὸ αἰεὶ ὄν, that which always is,—and τὸ γένεσθαι ἔχον, that which is generated or made;—and therefore, in affirming the world to have been generated, he must needs deny the eternity thereof. Again, the question is so punctually stated by him afterwards, as that there is no possibility of any subterfuge left, πότερον ἦν αἰεὶ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχων οὐδεμίαν, ἢ γέγονεν, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενος; Whether the world always were, having no beginning or generation, or whether it was made or generated, having commenced from a certain epocha?—To which the answer is, γέγονεν, that it was made, or had a beginning.—Moreover, this philosopher there plainly affirms also,^b that time itself was made, or had a beginning, χρόνος δ' οὖν μετ' οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, ἵνα ἅμα γεννηθέντες, ἅμα καὶ λυθῶσιν, ἂν ποτε λύσις τις αὐτῶν γένηται. Time was made together with the heaven, that, being both generated together, they might be both dissolved together likewise, if at least there should ever be any dissolution of them.—Besides which, he plainly declares, that before this orderly world was produced, the matter of it did move disorderly;^c πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὄρατόν, παραλαβῶν,

^a Cap. xii. p. 235.

^b Cap. xx. p. 245.

^c *Timæi*, cap. xiv. p. 237.

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οὐκ ἠσυχίαν ἄγον, ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας. God taking all that matter, which was, (not then resting, but moving confusedly and disorderly) he brought it into order out of confusion.—Which is no more than if he should have said, God made this world out of an antecedent chaos; which, as we said before, was the constant tradition of the ancient Pagans. Now, as to authority, we may well conclude, that Aristotle was better able to understand both Plato's philosophy and Greek, than any of those junior Platonists, who lived hundreds of years after. And yet we are not quite destitute of other suffrages besides Aristotle's neither; not only Philo, the Jew,^a but also Plutarch^b and Atticus,^c who were both of them Platonic Pagans, voting on this side, besides Alexander Aphrodisius,^d a judicious Peripatetic. The only objection considerable is from what Plato himself writes in his third and sixth book of Laws; in the former whereof, Clinias and the Athenian Hospes discourse together after this manner, concerning the original or first beginning of commonwealths: Πολιτείας δ' ἀρχὴν τίνα ποτὲ φῶμεν γεγονέναι; ΚΛ. Λέγεις δὲ πόθεν; ΑΘ. Οἶμαι μὲν ἀπὸ χρόνου μήκους τε καὶ ἀπειρίας, καὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ. ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; ΑΘ. Φέρε, ἀφ' οὗ πόλεις τ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι πολιτευόμενοι, δοκεῖς ἂν ποτε κατανοῆσαι χρόνου πλήθος ὅσον γέγονεν; ΚΛ. Οὐκ οὐν ῥᾶόν γε οὐδαμῶς. ΑΘ. Τὸ δέ γε ὡς ἀπειρόν τι καὶ ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη. ΚΛ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε. ΑΘ. Μῶν γε οὖν οὐ μυρίαί μὲν ἐπὶ μυριάσις ἡμῖν

^a In Libro, quod mundus sit incorruptibilis, p. 941. oper.
^b In Libro de Animæ Procreat. p. 1013, 1014. tom. ii. oper.
^c Apud Euseb. Præpar. Evangel. lib. xv. cap. vi. p. 801.
^d Comment. in Libros Metaphys. Aristot. p. 181. ed. Latin. Paris. 1506. fol.

γεγόνασι πόλεις ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦ πλήθους λόγον, οὐκ ἐλάττους ἐφαρμέναι; πεπολιτευμένοι δ' αὖ πάσας πολιτείας πολλακίς ἑκασταχοῦ; καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ἐξ ἐλαττόνων, μείζους, τοτὲ δὲ ἐκ μείζονων, ἐλάττους· καὶ χείρους ἐκ βελτιόνων γέγονασι, καὶ βελτίους ἐκ χειρόνων.

ΑΤΗ. What beginning shall we say there was of commonwealths? **CL.** Whence would yourself derive them?

ΑΤΗ. I suppose from a great length and infinity of time, through successive changes.

CL. I understand not well what you mean.

ΑΤΗ. Thus therefore, do you think, that you are able to determine what length or quantity of time there hath been since cities and polities of men first began? **CL.** This is by no means easy to be done.

ΑΤΗ. Wherefore, there is a kind of infinity and inestimability of this time. **CL.** It is very true.

ΑΤΗ. Have there not then been innumerable cities constituted within this time, and as many again destroyed, of all several forms; they being changed from greater to lesser, and from lesser to greater, from better to worser, and from worser to better?—Now, we say, that if Plato intended here to assert an absolute infinity of time past, then it must needs be granted, that in his old age, when he wrote his book of *Laws*, he changed his opinion from what it was before when he wrote his *Timæus*; and if so, he ought in all reason to have retracted the same, which he does not here do; but in very truth, the meaning of this philosopher in those words cited, seems to be this; not that there was an absolute infinity of time past, (as Proclus contends, taking advantage of that word ἀπειρία) but only that the world had lasted such a length of time, as was in a manner inestimable to us, or uncomputable by us; there having hap-

pened, as he addeth, in the mean time, several successive destructions and consumptions of mankind, by means of various accidents, as particularly one most remarkable deluge and inundation of waters. The latter place, in his sixth book of Laws, runs thus : ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων

P. 781.

γένεσις ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν ἔληχεν, οὐδ' ἔξει ποτέ γε τελευτήν· ἀλλ' ἦν τε αἰὲ καὶ ἔσται πάντως· ἢ μῆκός τι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀφ' οὗ γέγονεν, ἀμήχανον ἂν χρόνον ὅσον γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη. Either the generation of men had no beginning at all, and will have no end, but always was and always will be ; or else there has been an inestimable length of time from the beginning of it.—Which place affordeth still more light to the former ; for we may well conclude, that by ἀπείρον τι καὶ ἀμήχανον, there was not meant an absolute infinity of time, but only such as had a very remote or distant beginning, because ἀμήχανον here is plainly taken in that sense. We conceive, therefore, that this was Plato's opinion in his old age, when he wrote his book of Laws, that though the world had a beginning, yet it had continued a very long time not computable by us ; or at least he thought fit to declare himself after that manner, perhaps by reason of the clamours of Aristotle, or some others against his Timæus, that so he might thereby somewhat mollify that opinion of the novelty of the world, by removing the epocha and date thereof to so great a distance.

Now, it is very true, what we have several times before suggested, that there have been amongst the Pagans, both Theogonists and Cosmogonists too, that were Atheists ; they abusing the word gods several ways ; some of them, as Anaximander, understanding thereby inanimate worlds suc-

cessively generated out of senseless matter, and corrupted again into it; others, as Anaximenes and Democritus, allowing, that there were certain animals and understanding beings superior to men, but such only as were native and mortal, in like manner as men, and calling these by the name of gods. Of the former of which two philosophers, St. Austin* gives us this account: "Anaximenes omnes rerum causas infinito aëri dedit, nec deos negavit aut tacuit, non tamen ab ipsis aërem factum, sed ipsos ex aëre ortos credidit:" Anaximenes made infinite air to be the first original and cause of all things; and yet was he not therefore silent concerning the gods, much less did he deny them; nevertheless, he did not believe the air to have been made by the gods, but the gods to have been all generated out of the air.—These were therefore such Theogonists, as supposed all the gods without exception to be generable and corruptible, and acknowledged no θεὸν ἀγέννητον at all, no understanding being unmade and self-existent; but concluded senseless matter to be the only ἀγέννητον and original of all things, which is absolute Atheism. Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that all the Pagan Theogonists were not Atheists, (no more than all their Cosmogonists Theists) but that there was another sort of Theogonists amongst them, who supposed indeed all the inferior mundane gods to have been made or generated in one sense or other; but asserted one θεὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀθνηπόστατον, one supreme unmade self-existent Deity, who was the cause of them all: which Theogonists, for distinction sake from those other Atheistic ones, may be called Divine.

* De Civitate Dei, lib. viii. cap. ii. p. 147. tom. vii. oper.

And that Plato was such a Divine Theogonist, is a thing, as we conceive, out of question; but if there had been any doubt concerning it, it would have been sufficiently removed from those passages before cited out of his *Timæus*. To which, nevertheless, for fuller satisfaction sake, may be added these two following: the first, page 34: οὗτος δὴ πᾶς ὄντος αἰὶ λογισμὸς θεοῦ, περὶ τὸν ποτὲ ἐσόμενον θεὸν λογισθείς. For thus it ought to be read ὄντος, as it is also in Aldus's edition; and not ὄντως, as in Stephens, following an error in that of Ficinus. And accordingly the words are thus rendered by Cicero: "Hæc Deus is, qui semper erat, de aliquando futuro deo cogitans, lævem eum effecit, et undique æquabilem," &c. This was the ratiocination or resolution of that God, which always is, concerning that god, which was sometime about to be made, that he should be smooth and spherical, &c.—Where again, it presently follows in Cicero's version, "Sic Deus ille æternus hunc perfecte beatum deum procreavit;" thus that eternal God procreated this perfectly happy god, the world.—Where there is plainly mention made of two gods, one a generated god, the animated world, called elsewhere in Plato θεῖον γεννητὸν; and another eternal and unmade God, *innatus et infectus Deus*, who was the cause of the world's generation or production; or, to keep close to Plato's own language, one God who belonged to genesis, or that head of being, which he calls generation, and therefore must needs have an antecedent cause of his existence, since nothing can be made without a cause; and another God, that was truly and properly οὐσία, immutable essence, who was the cause of that generated god the universe, and

therefore of all things. The other passage of Plato's is, (page 41, of his *Timæus*), ἐπεὶ οὖν πάντες ὅσοι τε περιπολοῦσι φανερώς, καὶ ὅσοι φαίνονται καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἰθέλωσι θεοὶ, γένεσιν ἔσχον, λέγει πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁ τὸδε τὸ πᾶν γεννήσας, τάδε, Θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργός, πατήρ τε ἔργων, ἃ δι' ἐμοῦ γενόμενα. When therefore all the gods, both those which move visibly about the heavens, and those which appear to us as often as they please (that is, both the stars and demons), were generated or created, that God, which made this whole universe, bespake these generated gods after this manner: Ye gods of gods (whom I myself am the maker and father of) attend.—Where the words θεοὶ θεῶν, notwithstanding Proclus's other differing conjectures, seem to have been very well rendered by Cicero: *Dii, qui deorum satū orti estis*, Ye gods, which are the progeny or offspring of the gods.—And the gods, whose offspring these generated gods (the animated stars and demons) are said to be, must needs be those αἰδίοι θεοὶ, those eternal gods, elsewhere mentioned in the same *Timæus*, as where the philosopher calls the world,^a τῶν αἰδίων θεῶν γεγονός ἀγαλμα, a generated or created image of the eternal gods;—as Cicero also is to be understood of these, when he speaks of the world's being made by the gods, and by the counsel of the gods. Now, these eternal gods of Plato, called by his followers θεοὶ ὑπερκόσμοι, the supramundane gods,—though, according to that stricter notion of the word γένεσις, as it is used both in Plato and Aristotle, for a temporary production of things, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, they were indeed all ἀγέννητοι, because they never were not, and had no beginning of their existence; yet, not-

^a *Timæi*, cap. xxi. p. 245. s.

withstanding were they not therefore supposed by that philosopher to be all *αὐτόγονοι* and *αὐθυπόστατοι*, so many self-originated and self-subsistent beings, or first principles, but only one of them such, and the rest derived from that one: it being very true, as we conceive, what Proclus affirms, *ὅτι ὁ Πλάτων ἐπὶ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἀνάγει πάντα*, that Plato re-
In Timæ.
p. 116.
duces all things to one principle,—even matter itself; but unquestionable, that he deriveth all his gods from one. Wherefore, all those eternal gods of Plato (one only excepted), though they were not *γέννητοι*, or generated in one sense, that is, *κατὰ χρόνον*, as to a temporary beginning, yet were they, notwithstanding, as Proclus distinguisheth, *γέννητοι ἀπ' αἰτίας*, generated in another sense, as produced from a superior cause, there being only one such *ἀγέννητος*, one ingenerate or unproduced Deity. Thus, according to Plato, there were two sorts of secondary or inferior and derivative gods; first, the *θεοὶ ἐγκόσμοι*, or mundane gods, such as had all of them a temporary generation with the world, and of whom Plato's theogonia and *γενέσεις θεῶν* is properly to be understood; and secondly, the *ὑπερκόσμοι* and *αἰδίοι θεοὶ*, the supramundane and eternal gods, which were all of them also, save only one, produced from that one, and dependent on it as their cause. But of these inferior eternal gods of the Platonists and Pythagoreans we are to speak again afterwards. In the mean time it is evident, that in that passage of Plato's before cited, there is plain mention made both of *θεοὶ γένεσιν ἔχοντες*, of *dii orti*, gods who were made or generated with the world, and of *ὁ τὸδε τὸ πᾶν γεννήσας*, of one God, who was the maker of them, and of the whole universe, who

therefore is himself every way ἀγέννητος, unmade or unproduced.—And accordingly, he afterwards subjoins, καὶ ὁ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα πάντα διατάξας, ἔμενεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ἦθει· μένοντος δὲ νοήσαντες οἱ παῖδες τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς τάξιν, ἐπέθοντο αὐτῇ. which Cicero thus renders: “Atque is quidem (Deus) qui cuncta composuit, constanter in suo manebat statu; qui autem erant ab eo creati (dii) cum parentis ordinem cognovissent, hunc sequebantur,” &c. Then that god, who framed all things, remained constantly in his former state; and his sons, or the gods that were created by him, observed his order and appointment.—

Neither was Plato singular in this; but the generality of the other Pagan Theists, who were more intelligent, all along agreed with him herein, as to the generation of the mundane gods; and so were both Theists and Theogonists, they indeed understanding nothing else by their theogonia, or generation of gods, than a Divine cosmogonia, or creation of the world by God; forasmuch as they supposed the world itself as animated, and its several parts to be gods. So that they asserted these three things: first, a cosmogonia, the generation of the world, that it was not from eternity, but had a novity or beginning; secondly, that this cosmogonia, or generation of the world, was also a theogonia, or generation of gods, the world itself and several of its parts animated being esteemed such; and lastly, that both these gods and the world were made and produced by one θεὸς ἀγέννητος καὶ αὐτογενής, one unproduced and self-originated Deity.—All which particulars we may here briefly exemplify in *P. Ovidius Naso*, whose paganism sufficiently appears from his *Fastorum* and all his

other writings, and who also went off the stage before Christianity appeared on it, and may well be presumed to represent the then generally received doctrine of the Pagans. First, therefore, as for the generation and novity of the world, and its first production out of a chaos, we have it fully acknowledged by him in these following verses :

Ante mare et terras, et, quod tegit omnia, cœlum,	Metam. l. 1.
Unus erat toto naturæ vultus in orbe,	[vers. 5.]
Quem dixere chaos, rudis indigestaque moles,	
Nec quicquam nisi pondus iners, congestaque eodem	
Non bene junctarum discordia semina rerum.	
Nullus adhuc mundo præbebat lumina Titan,	
Nec nova crescendo reparabat cornua Phœbe,	
Nec circumfuso pendebat in aëre tellus,	
Ponderibus librata suis ; nec brachia longo	
Margine terrarum porrexerat Amphitrite.	
Quaque erat et tellus, &c.	

Which, in Mr. Sandys's English, with some little alteration, speaks thus :—

Before that sea, and earth, and heaven was fram'd,
 One face had nature, which they chaos nam'd.
 No Titan yet the world with light adorns,
 Nor waxing Phebe fills her wain'd horns ;
 Nor hung the self-poiz'd earth in thin air plac'd,
 Nor Amphitrite the vast shore embrac'd ;
 Earth, air, and sea confounded, &c.

In the next place, when there was a world made out of this chaos, that this cosmogonia, or generation of the world, was also a theogonia, or generation of gods, is plainly intimated in these verses :

Neu regio foret ulla suis animalibus orba,
 Astra tenent cœleste solum, formæque deorum.

To this sense,

That nought of animals might unfurnish'd lie,
 The gods, in form of stars, possess the sky.

And that all this was effected, and this orderly mundane system produced out of a disorderly confused chaos, not by a fortuitous motion of matter, or the jumbling of atoms, but by the providence and command of one unmade Deity, which was also that, that furnished all the several parts of the world with respective animals, the sea with fishes, the earth with men, and the heaven with gods; is thus declared also by the poet:—

Hanc Deus et melior litem natura diremit,
 Nam cœlo terras, et terris abscidit undas:
 Et liquidum spisso secrevit ab aëre cœlum, &c.
 Sic ubi dispositam, quisquis fuit ille deorum,
 Congeriem secuit, sectamq̄e in membra redegit;
 Principio terram, ne non æqualis ab omni
 Parte foret, magni speciem glomeravit in orbis:
 Tum freta diffudit, rapidisque tumescere ventis
 Jussit, &c.
 Sic onus inclusum numero distinxit eodem
 Cura Dei, &c.

This strife (with better nature) God decides,
 He earth from heaven, the sea from earth divides:
 He ether pure extracts from grosser air,
 All which unfolded by his prudent care,
 From that blind mass; the happily disjoin'd
 With strifeless peace, he to their seats confin'd, &c.
 What God soever this division wrought,
 And every part to due proportion brought,
 First, lest the earth unequal should appear,
 He turn'd it round in figure of a sphere.
 Then seas diffus'd, commanding them to roar
 With ruffling winds, and give the land a shore.
 To those he added springs, ponds, lakes immense,
 And rivers whom their winding borders fence.

Where, though that learned paraphrast supposed (and not without some probability neither) that *Deus et melior natura*, God and the better nature, —were one and the self-same thing, yet we rather conceived them to be distinct, but one of them subordinate to the other as its instrument, God

and the plastic nature; accordingly as Aristotle writes in his *Physics*, Νοῦς καὶ Φύσις αἴτιον τοῦδε τοῦ παντός, That mind and nature were both together the cause of this universe.—

Nevertheless, we cannot but observe in this place, that though that poet speaks more than once of God singularly, as also calls him *mundi fabricator*, and *ille opifex rerum*, and *mundi melioris origo*; yet notwithstanding, where he writes of the making of man, Pagan-like, he affirms him, though to have been made by God, yet according to the image or likeness of the gods, which govern all things.

Sanctius his animal, mentisque capacius altæ,
Deerat adhuc, et quod dominari in cætera posset;
Natus homo est: sive hunc divino semine fecit,
Ille opifex rerum, mundi melioris origo:
Sive recens tellus, seductaque nuper ab alto
Æthere, cognati retinebat semina cœli.
Quam satus Iapeto, mistam fluvialibus undis,
Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta deorum.

The nobler being, with a mind possess,
Was wanting yet, that should command the rest.
That Maker, the best world's original,
Either him fram'd of seed celestial;
Or earth, which late he did from heaven divide,
Some sacred seeds retain'd to heaven allied:
Which with the living stream Prometheus mixt,
And in that artificial structure fixt
The form of all the all-ruling deities.

And because some may probably be puzzled with this seeming contradiction, that one God should be said to be the maker of the whole world and of man, and yet the government of all should be attributed to gods plurally, and man said to be made in the image and likeness of the gods; we shall therefore add here, that according to the tenor of the Pagan theology, the inferior and minor gods

were supposed also to have all of them their several share in the government of things below them: for which cause they are called not only by Maximus Tyrius,^a *συνάρχοντες θεῶν*, co-rulers with God, but also by Plato himself, *τῷ μεγίστῳ δαίμονι συνάρχοντες*, the co-governors and co-reigners with the supreme God. So that the government of this inferior world was by the Pagans often attributed to them jointly, the supreme and inferior gods both together, under that one general name of gods. But the chief of those inferior deities, in whose image man is also said to have been made, as well as in the likeness of the supreme, were either those celestial gods and animated stars before mentioned by the poet, or else the eternal gods of Plato, which were looked upon likewise as co-makers of the world subordinate.

Besides Ovid, we might instance here in many more of the Pagan Theogonists clearly acknowledging in like manner one unmade Deity, which generated both the world and all the other gods in it; as, for example, Strabo, who, affirming that the world was *τῆς φύσεως ἅμα καὶ τῆς προνοίας ἔργον*, the joint work both of nature and providence,—

as it was before ascribed by Ovid to L. 17. p. 809. *Deus et melior natura*, adds concerning Providence or the Deity in this manner: *Τὸ δὲ τῆς προνοίας, ὅτι βεβούληται καὶ αὐτὴ ποικιλοτέρα τις οὔσα, καὶ μυρίων ἔργων δημιουργὸς, ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ζῶα γεννᾶν, ὡς πολὺ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τούτων τὰ κράτιστα Θεοῦς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ὧν ἕνεκεν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα συνέστηκε. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν Θεοῖς ἀπέδειξε τὸν οὐρανὸν, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις τὴν γῆν.* That having a multiform fe-

^a Dissertat. i. p. 5. edit. Lugd. 1631. 8vo.

cundity in it, and delighting in variety of works, it designed principally to make animals as the most excellent things, and amongst them chiefly those two noblest kinds of animals, gods and men; for whose sakes the other things were made; and then assigned heaven to the gods, and earth to men, the two extreme parts of the world for their respective habitations.—Thus also Seneca in Lactantius,^a speaking concerning God: “*Hic cum prima fundamenta molis pulcherrimæ jaceret, et hoc ordiretur, quo neque majus quicquam novit natura nec melius; ut omnia sub ducebibus irent, quamvis ipse per totum se corpus intenderat, tamen ministros regni sui deos genuit.*” God, when he laid the foundations of this most beautiful fabric, and began to erect that structure, than which nature knows nothing greater or more excellent; to the end that all things might be carried on under their respective governors orderly, though he intended himself through the whole, as to preside in chief over all, yet did he generate gods also, as subordinate ministers of his kingdom under him.—We shall forbear to mention the testimonies of others here, because they may be more opportunely inserted elsewhere; only we shall add, as to Hesiod and Homer, that though they seem to have been sometimes suspected, both by Plato and Aristotle, for Atheistic Theogonists, yet, as Aristotle did, upon maturer thoughts, afterwards change his opinion concerning both of them, so it is most probable, that they were no Atheists, but Divine Theogonists; such as supposed indeed many generated gods, but one supreme unmade Deity, the maker both

^a Divin. Institut. lib. i. cap. v. p. 40.

of the world and them. And this not only for the grounds before alleged concerning Hesiod, and because both of them do every where affirm even their generated gods to be immortal (which no Atheists did), but also for sundry other reasons, some of which may be more conveniently inserted elsewhere. Moreover, it hath been already intimated, that the generated gods of Hesiod and Homer extend farther than those of Plato's; they being not only the animated parts of the world, but also all the other things of nature fictitiously personated, and improperly or abusively called gods and goddesses; whereof a farther account will be afterwards given.

Neither ought it at all to be wondered at, if these Divine Theogonists amongst the Pagans did many times, as well as those other atheistic ones, make Chaos and the Ocean senior to the gods, and Night the mother of them. The former of these being not only done by Hesiod and Homer, but also by the generality of the ancient Pagan Theists in Epicharmus;^a and the latter by Orpheus,^b an undoubted Theist, in his hymn of the Night:

Νύκτα θεῶν γενέτειραν αἰσίομας, ἠδὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν

Noctem concebro genetricem hominum deumque.

They not understanding this absolutely and universally of all the gods without exception, as the other Atheistic Theogonists did, as if there had been no unmade Deity at all, but Chaos and Night (that is, senseless matter blindly and fortu-

^a Apud Diog. Laert. lib. iii. segm. 10. p. 170.

^b P. 99. oper. Vide etiam eundem in Argonautic. vers. 339. p. 24. et Proclum in Timæum Platonis, lib. ii. p. 63.

itously moved,) had been the sole original of all things, but only of the οἱ Θεοί, the gods, so called by way of distinction from God, or the supreme Deity; that is, the inferior mundane gods generated together with the world. The reason whereof was, because it was a most ancient, and in a manner universally received tradition amongst the Pagans, as hath been often intimated, that the cosmogonia, or generation of the world, took its first beginning from a chaos (the Divine Cosmogonists agreeing herein with the Atheistic ones); this tradition having been delivered down from Orpheus and Linus (amongst the Greeks), by Hesiod and Homer, and others; acknowledged by Epicharmus; and embraced by Thales, Anaxagoras, Plato, and other philosophers, who were Theists; the antiquity whereof was thus declared by Euripides:^a

Οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλ' ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάρα,
 Ὡς οὐρανὸς τε γαῖα τ' ἦν μορφῇ μία,
 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐχωρίσθησαν ἀλλήλων δίχα,
 Τίττουσι πάντα, κἀνέδωκαν εἰς φάος,
 Τὰ δένδρα, πτηνὰ, θῆρας, οὓς θ' ἄλμη τρέφει,
 Γένος τε θνητῶν.

Non hic meus, sed matris est sermo meæ,
 Figura ut una fuerit et coeli et soli,
 Secreta quæ mox ut receperunt statum,
 Cuncta ediderunt hæc in oras luminis;
 Feras, volucres, arbores, ponti gregem,
 Homines quoque ipsos.

Neither can it reasonably be doubted, but that it was originally Mosaical, and indeed at first a Divine revelation, since no man could otherwise pretend to know what was done before mankind

^aIn Menalippe apud Diodor. Sicul. lib. i. cap. iv. et Eusebium Præparat. Evangel. lib. i. cap. v. p. 20.

had any being. Wherefore those Pagan Cosmogonists, who were Theists, being Polytheists and Theogonists also, and asserting, besides the one supreme unmade Deity, other inferior mundane gods, generated together with the world (the chief whereof were the animated stars), they must needs, according to the tenor of that tradition, suppose them, as to their corporeal parts at least, to have been juniors to Night and Chaos, and the offspring of them, because they were all made out

Sympos. l. 4.

Qu. 5. [p. 670.

tom. ii. oper.]

of an antecedent dark chaos. *Τὴν μυγατὴν ἐκτεθειάσθαι λέγουσιν* (saith Plutarch), ὑπὸ Αἰγυπτίων τυφλὴν οὔσαν, ὅτι τὸ σκότος τοῦ φῶτος ἡγουῦντο πρεσβύτερον. The *mus araneus* being blind, is said to have been deified by the Egyptians, because they thought, that darkness was older than light.—And the case was the same concerning their demons likewise, they being conceived to have their corporeal vehicula also; for which cause, as Porphyrius^a from Numenius writeth, the ancient Egyptians pictured them in ships or boats floating upon the water: *τοὺς δὲ Αἰγυπτίους διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς δαίμονας ἅπαντας οὐκ ἐστάναι ἐπὶ στερεοῦ, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἐπὶ πλοίου.* The Egyptians therefore represented all their demons, as not standing upon firm land, but in ships upon the water.—But as for the incorporeal part or souls of those inferior gods, though these Divine Theogonists could not derive their original from Chaos or matter, but rather from that other principle called Love, as being divinely created, and so having God for their father, yet might they, notwithstanding, in another sense, fancy Night to have been their mother too, inasmuch as they were

^a De Antro Nymphar. p. 56. edit. Cantab.

all made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, from an antecedent non-existence or nothing, brought forth into being. For which cause there seems to have been in Orpheus a dialogue betwixt the Maker of the world and Night.^a For that this ancient cabala, which derived the cosmogonia from Chaos and Love, was at first religious and not atheistical, and Love understood in it not to be the offspring of Chaos, may be concluded from hence, because this Love as well as Chaos was of a Mosaical extraction also, and plainly derived from that Spirit of God, which is said in Scripture to have moved upon the waters, that is, upon the chaos; whether by this Spirit be to be meant God himself, as acting immediately upon the matter, or some other active principle derived from God and not from matter (as a mundane soul or plastic nature). From whence also it came, that, as Porphyrius testifieth, the ancient Pagans thought the water to be divinely inspired: ἡγοῦντο γὰρ προσιζάνειν τῷ ὕδατι τὰς ψυχὰς θεοπρόϊω ὄντι ὡς φησιν ὁ Νουμήνιος διὰ τοῦτο λέγων καὶ τὸν προφήτην εἰρηκέναι, ἐμφέρεσθαι ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος θεοῦ πνεῦμα. They thought, that souls attended upon the water, or resorted thereunto, as being divinely inspired, as Numenius writeth, adding the prophet also therefore to have said, that the Spirit of God moved upon the water.—

De Ant.
Nymph. p.
256.

And that this cabala was thus understood by some of the ancient Pagan Cosmogonists themselves, appears plainly, not only from Simmias Rhodius and Parmenides, but also from these following verses of Orpheus, or whoever was the writer of those Argonautics, undoubtedly ancient,

^a Apud Proclum et alios.

where Chaos and Love are thus brought in together :—

P. 17. ed. Πρῶτα μὲν ἀρχαίου Χάος μελήφατον ὕμνον,
Steph. Ὡς ἐπάμειψε φύσει, ὡς τ' οὐρανὸς εἰς πέρας ἦλθε,
 Γῆς τ' εὐρυστέρου γένεσιν, πυθμένα τε θαλάσσης,
 Πρεσβύτατόν τε καὶ αὐτοτελῆ πολύμητιν Ἔρωτα,
 "Ὅσα τ' ἐφικεν ἅπαντα, δέικρινε δ' ἄλλον ἀπ' ἄλλου·

To this sense : We will first sing a pleasant and delightful song concerning the ancient Chaos, how heaven, earth, and seas were framed out of it ; as also concerning that much-wise and sagacious Love, the oldest of all, and self-perfect, which actively produced all these things, separating one thing from another.—Where this Love is not only called πολύμητις, of much counsel or sagaciousness, which implies it to have been a substantial and intellectual thing, but also πρεσβύτατος, the oldest of all, and therefore senior to Chaos, as, likewise, αὐτοτελής, self-perfect or self-originated.—From whence it is manifest, that, according to the Orphic tradition, this Love, which the cosmogonia was derived from, was no other than the eternal unmade Deity (or an active principle depending on it) which produced this whole orderly world, and all the generated gods in it, as to their material part, out of Chaos and Night. Accordingly, as Aristotle determines in his Me-

L. 1. c. 6. taphysics, not only in the place before
p. 849. cited, but also afterward : ἕτεροι δὲ τινες,
ὄθεν ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, ὅσοι ἢ Νοῦν ἢ Ἔρωτα ποιούσιν
ἀρχήν. Others, besides the material cause of the
world, assign an efficient, or cause of motion ;
namely, whosoever make either Mind (and intel-
lect) or Love a principle.—Wherefore we con-
clude, that that other Atheistic cabala, or Aristot-

phanic tradition before-mentioned, which accordingly, as Aristotle also elsewhere declareth concerning it, did ἐκ νυκτὸς πάντα γεννᾶν, generate all things whatsoever, even the gods themselves universally, out of Night and Chaos, making Love itself likewise to have been produced from an egg of the Night; I say, that this was nothing else but a mere depravation of the ancient Mosaic cabala, as also an absolutely impossible hypothesis, it deriving all things whatsoever in the universe, besides the bare substance of senseless matter, in another sense than that before-mentioned, out of nonentity or nothing; as shall be also farther manifested afterwards.

We have now represented the sense and generally received doctrine of the ancient Pagan theologers, that there was indeed a multiplicity of gods, but yet so that one of them only was ἀγέννητος, ingenerate or unmade, by whom all the other gods, together with the world, were made, so as to have had a novelty of being, or a temporary beginning of their existence; Plato and the Pythagoreans here only differing from the rest in this, that though they acknowledged the world and all the mundane gods to have been generated together in time, yet they supposed certain other intelligible and supramundane gods also, which however, produced from one original Deity, were nevertheless eternal or without beginning. But now we must acknowledge, that there were amongst the Pagan Theists some of a different persuasion from the rest, who therefore did not admit of any theogonia in the sense before declared, that is, any temporary generation of gods, because they acknowledged no cosmogonia, no

temporary production of the world, but concluded it to have been from eternity.

That Aristotle was one of these is sufficiently known; whose inferior gods, therefore, the sun, moon, and stars, must needs be ἀγέννητοι, or ingenerate, in this sense, so as to have had no temporary production, because the whole world to him was such. And if that philosopher^a be to be believed, himself was the very first, at least of all the Greeks, who asserted this ingenerateness or eternity of the world; he affirming, that all before him did γεννᾶν τὸν κόσμον, and κοσμοποιεῖν, generate or make the world; that is, attribute a temporary production to it, and consequently to all those gods also, which were a part thereof. Notwithstanding which, the writer *De Placitis Philosophorum*,^b and Stobæus,^c impute this dogma of the world's eternity to certain others of the Greek philosophers before Aristotle (besides Ocellus Lucanus,^d who is also acknowledged by Philo to have been an assertor thereof). And indeed Epicharmus, though a Theist, seems plainly to have been of this persuasion, that the world was unmade, as also that there was no theogonia, nor temporary production of the inferior gods, from these verses of his,^e according to Grotius's correction:—

Excerpt. Ἄλλ' αἰεὶ τοὶ θεοὶ παρῆσαν, ὑπέλιπον δ' οὐ πάποκα·
p. 478. Τάδε δ' αἰεὶ πάροσθ' ἴμοια, διὰ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν αἰεί.

^a De Coelo, lib. i. cap. x. p. 623. tom. i. oper.

^b Lib. ii. cap. iv. p. 886.

^c Eclog. Physic. lib. i. cap. xxiv. p. 44.

^d De Mundi Æternitate, inter Scriptor. Mytholog. a Tho. Gale editos.

^e Apud Diogen. Laert. lib. iii. scgm. x. p. 170.

Ἄλλὰ λέγεται μὲν χάος πρῶτον γένεσθαι τῶν θεῶν
 Πῶς δὲ; ἀμάχανον γ' ἀπὸ μηδὲ τινος ὅ, τι πρῶτον μῶλοι·
 Οὐκ ἄρ' ἔμολε πρῶτον οὐδὲν, οὐδὲ μὰ Δία δεύτερον,
 Τῶν δὲ γ' ἂν ἄμαες νῦν λέγομεν ᾧδ' εἶναι μέλλει τάδε.

Nempe Di semper fuerunt, atque nunquam intercident :
 Hæc quæ dico semper nobis rebus in iisdem se exhibent.
 Extitisse sed deorum primum perhibetur chaos :
 Quinam vero ? nam de nihilo nil pote primum existere.
 Ergo nec primum profecto quicquam, nec fuit alterum :
 Sed quæ nunc sic appellantur, alia fient postmodum.

Where, though he acknowledges this to have been the general tradition of the ancient Theists, that Chaos was before the gods, and that the inferior mundane gods had a temporary generation, or production with the world ; yet, notwithstanding, does he conclude against it, from this ground of reason—because nothing could proceed from nothing ; and, therefore, both the gods, and indeed whatsoever else is substantial in the world, was from eternity unmade, only the fashion of things having been altered.

Moreover, Diodorus Siculus affirms the Chaldeans likewise to have asserted this dogma of the world's eternity, L. 2. p. 82.
 Χαλδαῖοι τὴν μὲν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν αἰδιόν φασιν εἶναι, καὶ μήτε
 ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν ἐσχηκέναι, μήθ' ὕστερον φθορὰν ἐπιδέξασθαι.
 The Chaldeans affirm the nature of the world to be eternal, and that it was neither generated from any beginning, nor will ever admit corruption.—Who, that they were not Atheists for all that (no more than Aristotle), appears from those following words of that historiographer: τὴν τε τῶν ὄλων τάξιν τε καὶ διακόσμησιν, θεία τινη προνοία γεγονέναι, καὶ νῦν ἕκαστα τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ γινομένων, οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχεν, οὐδ' αὐτομάτως, ἀλλ' ὠρισμένη τινη καὶ βεβαίως κεκυρωμένη θεῶν κρίσει, συντελεῖσθαι. They believe also, that the order

and disposition of the world is by a certain Divine Providence, and that every one of those things, which come to pass in the heavens, happens not by chance, but by a certain determinate and firmly ratified judgment of the gods.—However, it is a thing known to all, that the generality of the later Platonists stiffly adhered to Aristotle in this; neither did they only assert the corporeal world, with all the inferior mundane gods in it, to be ἀγεννήτους, or ingenerate, and to have existed from eternity, but also maintained the same concerning the souls of men, and all other animals (they concluding that no souls were younger than body or the world); and because they would not seem to depart from their master, Plato, therefore did they endeavour violently to force this same sense upon Plato's words also.

Notwithstanding which, concerning these later Platonists, it is here observable, that though they thus asserted the world, and all inferior gods and souls, to have been ἀγεννήτους, according to that stricter sense of the word declared, that is, to have had no temporary generation or beginning, but to have existed from eternity; yet by no means did they therefore conceive them to be αὐτογενεῖς καὶ αὐθυποστάτους, self-originated, and self-existing, but concluded them to have been all derived from one sole self-existent Deity.

En. 3. l. 2. c. 1.

as their cause; which, therefore, though not in order of time, yet of nature was before them. To this purpose, Plotinus: νοῦν πρὸ αὐτοῦ εἶναι οὐχ ὡς χρόνῳ πρότερον αὐτοῦ ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὅτι παρὰ νοῦ ἔστι καὶ φύσει πρότερος ἐκεῖνος, καὶ αἴτιον τούτου, ἀρχέτυπον οἶον καὶ παράδειγμα εἰκόνοσ'· καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον ὄντος καὶ ὑποστάντος αἰεὶ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον. Mind or God was

before the world, not as if it existed before it in time, but because the world proceeded from it, and that was in order of nature first as the cause thereof, and its archetype or paradigm; the world also always subsisting by it and from En. 2. 1. 9. it.—And again elsewhere to the same c. 3.

purpose, οὐ τοίνυν ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ἐγένετο καὶ γενήσεται, ὅσα γενητὰ λέγεται, οὐ δὲ φθαρήσεται, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅσα ἔχει εἰς ἅ. The things, which are said to have been made or generated, were not so made, as that they ever had a beginning of their existence, but yet they were made, and will be always made (in another sense); nor will they ever be destroyed otherwise than as being dissolved into those simple principles, out of which some of them were compounded.—Where, though the world be said never to have been made as to a temporary beginning, yet, in another sense, is it said to be always made, as depending upon God En. 5. 1. 8. perpetually as the emanative cause c. 12.

thereof. Agreeably whereunto, the manner of the world's production from God is thus declared by that philosopher; οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἱ φθείρουσι καὶ γενῶσιν αὐτὸν, ὅστις γὰρ τρόπος τῆς ποιήσεως ταύτης, οὐκ ἐθέλουσι συνιέναι, οὐδ' ἴσασιν, ὅτι ὅσον ἐκεῖνα ἐλλάμπει, οὐ μήποτε τὰ ἄλλα ἐλλείπει. They do not rightly, who corrupt and generate the world, for they will not understand what manner of making or production the world had, to wit, by way of effulgency or eradiation from the Deity. From whence it follows, that the world must needs have been so long as there was a God, as the light was coeve with the sun.—So likewise Proclus^a concludes,

^a There are still extant eighteen arguments of his, wherein he attacks the Christian doctrine of the world's being created by God in

that the world was *αἰὶ γιγνόμενος, καὶ ἐλλαμπόμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος*, always generated or radiated from God—and therefore must needs be eternal, God being so. Wherefore these latter Platonists supposed the same thing concerning the corporeal world, and the lower mundane gods, which their master Plato did concerning his higher eternal gods; that though they had no temporary production, yet they all depended no less upon one supreme Deity, than if they had been made out of nothing by him. From whence it is manifest, that none of these philosophers apprehended any repugnancy at all betwixt these two things; existence from eternity, and being caused or produced by another. Nor can we make any great doubt, but that if the latter Platonists had been fully convinced of any contradictory inconsistency here, they would readily have disclaimed that their so beloved hypothesis of the world's eternity; it being so far from truth what some have supposed, that the assertors of the world's eternity were all Atheists, that these latter Platonists were led into this opinion no otherwise than from the sole consideration of the Deity; to wit, its *ἀγαθοειδῆς βούλησις, καὶ γόνιμος δύναμις*, its essential goodness, and generative power, or emanative fecundity—as Proclus plainly declares upon the *Timæus*.

P. 116.

Now, though Aristotle were not acted with any such divine enthusiasm as these Platonists seem to have been, yet did he notwithstanding,

time; in answer to which, John Philoponus wrote the same number of books against the eternity of the world. Vide Jo. Alberti Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. lib. v. c. xxvi. §. xiii. p. 522.

after his sober manner, really maintain the same thing; that though the world, and inferior mundane gods, had no temporary generation, yet were they nevertheless all produced from one supreme Deity as their cause. Thus Simplicius represents that philosopher's sense: *Ἀριστοτέλης οὐ γίνεσθαι ἀξιοῖ τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπὸ Θεοῦ παράγεσθαι*. Aristotle would not have the world to have been made (so as to have had a beginning), but yet

In Arist.
Phys. l. 8.
p. 320. b.
edit. Aldi.

nevertheless to have been produced from God after some other manner.—And again afterward; *Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς αἰδίου κινήσεως αὐτοῦ θεὸν λέγων, ὅμως ἀγένητον αὐτὸν ἀποδείκνυσι*. Aristotle, though making God the cause of the heaven and its eternal motion, yet concludes it notwithstanding to have been ingenerate or unmade;—that is, without beginning. However, we think fit here to observe, that though Aristotle do for the most part express a great deal of zeal and confidence for that opinion of the world's eternity, yet doth he sometimes for all that seem to flag a little, and speak more languidly and sceptically about it; as, for example, in his book *de Partibus Animalium*, where he treats concerning an artificial nature: *μᾶλλον εἰκὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν γεγενῆσθαι, ὑπὸ τοιαύτης αἰτίας, εἰ γέγονε, καὶ εἶναι διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, μᾶλλον ἢ ζῶα τὰ θνητά*. It is more

L. 1. c. 1.
[p. 474.
tom. 2.
oper.]

likely, that the heaven was made by such a cause as this (if it were made), and that it is maintained by such a cause, than that mortal animals should be so; which yet is a thing more generally acknowledged.—Now it was before declared, that Aristotle's artificial nature was nothing but the mere executioner or officer of a perfect Mind,

that is, of the Deity; which two therefore he sometimes joins together in the *Cosmopœia*, affirming that Mind and nature, that is, God and nature, were the cause of this universe.

And now we see plainly, that though there was a real controversy amongst the Pagan theologers (especially from Aristotle's time downward), concerning the *Cosmogonia* and *Theogonia*, according to the stricter notion of those words, the temporary generation or production of the world and inferior gods, or whether they had any beginning or no; yet was there no controversy at all concerning the self-existency of them, but it was universally agreed upon amongst them, that the world, and the inferior gods, however supposed by some to have existed from eternity, yet were nevertheless all derived from one sole self-existent Deity as their cause; *ὑπὸ θεοῦ παραγόμενοι ἢ ἐλλαμπόμενοι*, being either radiated or produced from God.—Wherefore it is observable, that these Pagan Theists, who asserted the world's eternity, did themselves distinguish concerning the word *γενητόν* *ortum, natum, et factum*, as that which was equivocal: and though in one sense of it, they denied, that the world and inferior gods were *γενητοί*, yet notwithstanding did they in another sense clearly affirm the same. For the word

γενητόν (say they) strictly and properly taken, is *τὸ ἐν μέρει χρόνου τὴν εἰς τὸ εἶναι*

πάροδον λαχόν, that which in respect of time passed out of non-existence into being—or *ὁ τὸ πρότερον μὴ ὄν, ὕστερον δὲ ὄν*, that which being not before, afterwards was.—Nevertheless they acknowledge, that in a larger sense this word *γενητόν* may be taken also for *τὸ ὁπωσοῦν ἀπ' αἰτίας*

ὕφιστάμενον, that which doth any way depend upon a superior being as its cause.—And there must needs be the same equivocation in the word ἀγένητον, so that this in like manner may be taken also, either χρονικῶς, for that which is ingenerate in respect of time, as having no temporary beginning; or else for that which is ἀπ' αἰτίας ἀγένητον, ingenerate or unproduced from any cause:—in which latter sense, that word ἀγένητον, or unmade, is of equal force and extent with αὐθυπόστατον or αὐτογενές, that which is self-subsistent or self-originated;—and accordingly it was used by those Pagan Theists, who concluded ὅτι ὕλη ἀγένητος, i. e. that matter was unmade—that is, not only existed from eternity without beginning, but also was self-existent, and independent upon any superior cause. Now, as to the former of these two senses of those words, γενητὸν and ἀγένητον, the generality of the ancient Pagans, and together with them Plato, affirmed the world, and all the inferior gods, to be γενητούς, to have been made in time—or to have had a beginning; (for whatever the latter Platonists pretend, this was undoubtedly Plato's notion of that word, and no other, when he concluded the world to be γενητὸν, forasmuch as himself expressly opposes it to αἰδίου, that which is eternal.) But, on the contrary, Aristotle, and the latter Platonists, determined the world, and all the inferior gods, to be in this sense ἀγενήτους, such as had no temporary beginning—but were from eternity. However, according to the latter sense of those words, all the Pagan theologers agreed together, that the world, and all the inferior gods, whether having a beginning, or existing from eternity,

were notwithstanding *γενητοί ἀπ' αἰτίας*, produced or derived from a superior cause;—and that thus there was only one *θεός ἀγένητος*, one unproduced and self-existent Deity—who is said by them to be *αἰτίας κρείττων καὶ πρεσβύτερος*, superior to a cause, and older than any cause, he being the cause of all things besides himself. Thus Crantor, and his followers in Proclus, zealous assertors of the world's eternity, determined, *γενητὸν*

In *Timæ*,
p. 25.

[Vide etiam
eundem in
Introductione
in *Theologi-
am Platoni-
cam*; lib. 1.
c. xxviii.
p. 66, and p.
68. et lib. vi.
c. 2. p. 341.]

λέγεσθαι τὸν κόσμον ὡς ἀπ' αἰτίας ἄλλης παραγόμενον, καὶ οὐκ ὄντα αὐτόγονον οὐδὲ ἀθυπόστατον: that the world (with all the inferior mundane gods in it), notwithstanding their being from eternity, might be said to be *γενητοί*, that is *οἰτι*, or made, as being produced from another

cause, and not self-originated or self-existing. In like manner Proclus himself, that grand champion for the world's eternity, plainly acknowledged, notwithstanding, the generation of the gods and world in this sense, as being produced from a superior cause: *λέγομεν θεῶν γενήσεις, τὴν ἀρρήτον αὐτῶν πρόσδοτον ἐνδεικνύμενοι, καὶ τὴν τῶν δευτέρων ἐτερότητα, πρὸς τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν*. We call it the generations of the gods, meaning thereby, not any temporary production of them, but their ineffable procession from a superior first cause.—Thus also Salustius, in his book *de Diis et Mundo*,^a where he contends the world to have been from eternity, or without beginning, yet concludes both it, and the other inferior gods, to have been made by one supreme Deity, who is called by him, *ὁ πρῶτος Θεός*, the first God.—For, saith he,

^a Cap. xiii. p. 269. inter Scriptor. *Mythologic.* à Tho. Gale editos.

μεγίστης τῆς δυνάμεως ούσης, οὐκ ἀνθρώπους ἔδει καὶ ζῶα μόνα ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ θεούς τε καὶ δαίμονας. God, or the first cause, having the greatest power, or being omnipotent, ought therefore to make not only men, and other animals, but also gods and demons. And accordingly this is the title of his 18th chapter: πῶς τὰ αἰδία λέγεται γίνεσθαι, how eternal things may be said to be made or generated.—It is true, indeed (as we have often declared), that some of the Pagan Theists asserted God not to be the only ἀγένητον καὶ ἀθυπόστατον, the only unmade and self-existent being—but that matter also was such; nevertheless, this opinion was not so generally received amongst them, as is commonly supposed: and though some of the ancient fathers confidently impute it to Plato, yet there seems to be no sufficient ground for their so doing; and Porphyrius, Jamblichus, Proclus, and other Platonists, do not only professedly oppose the same as false, but also as that which was dissonant from Plato's principles. Wherefore, according to that larger notion of the word ἀγένητον, as taken synonymously with αὐτογενές and ἀθυπόστατον, there were many of the Pagan theologers, who agreed with Christians in this, ὅτι αὐτὸ ἀγένητον ὁ Θεός, καὶ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀν' εἶποι τις ἡ ἀγεννησία, that God is the only ingenerate or unmade being, and that his very essence is ingenerability or inascibility;—all other things, even matter itself, being made by him. But all the rest of them (only a few Ditheists excepted), though they supposed matter to be self-existent, yet did they conclude, that there was only εἷς Θεὸς ἀγένητος, only one unmade or unproduced God—and that all their other

gods were *γενητοὶ*, in one sense or other, if not as made in time, yet at least as produced from a superior cause.

Nothing now remaineth, but only that we shew, how the Pagans did distinguish, and put a difference, betwixt the one supreme unmade Deity, and all their other inferior generated gods. Which we are the rather concerned to do, because it is notorious, that they did many times also confound them together, attributing the government of the whole world to the gods promiscuously, and without putting any due discrimination betwixt the supreme and inferior (the true reason whereof seems to have been this, because they supposed the supreme God, not to do all immediately, in the government of the world, but to permit much to his inferior ministers); one instance of which we had before in Ovid, and innumerable such others might be cited out of their most sober writers. As, for example, Cicero, in his first book of Laws,^a “*Deorum immortalium vi, ratione, potestate, mente, numine, natura omnis regitur;*” the whole nature, or universe, is governed by the force, reason, power, mind, and divinity of the immortal gods.—And again in his second book,^b “*Deos esse dominos ac moderatores omnium rerum, eaque quæ geruntur, eorum geri iudicio atque numine; eosdemque optime de genere hominum mereri, et qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, qua mente, qua pietate religiones colat, intueri; priorumque et impiorum habere rationem; a principio civibus suasum esse*

^a Lib. i. cap. vii. p. 3303. oper. tom. ix.

^b Lib. ii. cap. vii. p. 3343.

debet:" the minds of citizens ought to be first of all imbued with a firm persuasion, that the gods are the lords and moderators of all things, and that the conduct and management of the whole world is directed and overruled by their judgment and Divine power; that they deserve the best of mankind, that they behold and consider what every man is, what he doth and takes upon himself, with what mind, piety, and sincerity, he observes the duties of religion; and, lastly, that these gods have a very different regard to the pious and the impious.—Now such passages as these abounding every where in Pagan writings, it is no wonder, if many, considering their theology but slightly and superficially, have been led into an error, and occasioned thereby to conclude the Pagans not to have asserted a Divine monarchy, but to have imputed both the making and governing of the world to an aristocracy or democracy of co-ordinate gods, not only all eternal, but also self-existent and unmade. The contrary whereunto, though it be already sufficiently proved, yet it will not be amiss for us here in the close, to shew how the Pagans, who sometimes jumble and confound the supreme and inferior gods all together, do notwithstanding at other times many ways distinguish between the one supreme God, and their other many inferior gods.

First, therefore, as the Pagans had many proper names for one and the same supreme God, according to several particular considerations of him, in respect of his several different manifestations and effects in the world; which are oftentimes mistaken for so many distinct deities (some supposing them independent, others subordinate);

so had they also, besides these, other proper names of God, according to that more full and comprehensive notion of him, as the Maker of the whole world, and its supreme Governor, or the sole Monarch of the universe. For thus the Greeks called him *Ζεύς* and *Ζῆν*, &c. the Latins Jupiter and Jovis, the Babylonians Belus and Bel, the Persians Mithras and Oromasdes, the Egyptians and Scythians (according to Herodotus) Ammoun and Pappæus. And Celsus in Origen concludes it to be a matter of pure indifferency, to call the supreme God by any of all these names, either

Lib. 5. c. *Ζεύς*, or Ammoun, or Pappæus, or the
Celsum. like; *Κέλσος οἶεται μηδὲν διαφέρειν, Δία*
p. 261. *Ἐψιστον, καλεῖν ἢ Ζῆνα, ἢ Ἀδωναῖον, ἢ Σαβα-*

ῶθ, ἢ (ὡς Αἰγύπτιοι) Ἀμμουν, ἢ (ὡς Σκύθαι) Παππαῖον. Celsus thinks it to be a matter of no moment, whether we call the highest and supreme God, Adonai and Sabaoth, as the Jews do; or Dia and Zena, as the Greeks; or, as the Egyptians, Ammoun; or, as the Scythians, Pappæus.—Notwithstanding which, that pious and jealous father expresseth a great deal of zeal against Christians then using any of those Pagan names. “But we will rather endure any torment (saith he) than confess Zeus (or Jupiter) to be God; being well assured, that the Greeks often really worship, under that name, an evil demon, who is an enemy both to God and men. And we will rather suffer death, than call the supreme God Ammoun, whom the Egyptian enchanters thus invoke: *λεγέτωσαν δὲ καὶ Σκύθαι τὸν Παππαῖον Θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν· ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς οὐ πεισόμεθα, τιθέντες μὲν τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸν, ὡς δὲ φίλον τῷ λαχόντι τὴν Σκυθῶν ἐρημίαν, καὶ τὸ ἔθνος αὐτῶν καὶ διάλεκτον, οὐκ ὀνομάζοντες τὸν Θεὸν, ὡς κυρίῳ*

ὀνόματι τῷ Παππαῖον. Σκυθιστὶ γὰρ τὸ προσηγορικὸν τὸν Θεὸν, καὶ Αἰγυπτιστὶ, καὶ πάσῃ διαλέκτῳ ἢ ἕκαστος ἐντέθραπται, ὀνομάζων, οὐχ ἀμαρτήσεται. And though the Scythians call the supreme God Pappæus, yet we, acknowledging a supreme God, will never be persuaded to call him by that name, which it pleased that demon (who ruled over the Scythian desert, people, and language) to impose. Nevertheless, he that shall use the appellative name for God, either in the Scythian, Egyptian, or any other language which he hath been brought up in, will not offend." Where Origen plainly affirms the Scythians to have acknowledged one supreme God, called by them Pappæus, and intimates, that the Egyptians did the like, calling him Ammoun. Neither could it possibly be his intent to deny the same of the Greeks and their Zeus, however his great jealousy made him to call him here a demon; it being true in a certain sense, which shall be declared afterward, that the Pagans did oftentimes really worship an evil demon, under those very names of Zeus and Jupiter, as they did likewise under those of Hammon and Pappæus.

In the mean time we deny not, but that both the Greeks used that word Zeus, and the Latins Jupiter, sometimes φυσικῶς, for the ether, fire or air, some accordingly etymologizing Ζεὺς from Ζέω, others Δεὺς from Δεύω: whence came those forms of speech, *sub Jove*, and *sub Dio*. And thus Cicero, "Jovem Ennius nuncupat ita dicens.

Aspice hoc sublime candens, quem invocant omnes Jovem.

Hunc etiam augures nostri cum dicunt

De Nat. D.
l. 2. 223.
Lamb. [c. 25.
p. 2992.
tom. 9.
oper.]

Jove fulgente, Jove tonante; dicunt enim in cælo fulgente, tonante," &c. The reason of which speeches seems to have been this, because in ancient times some had supposed the animated heaven, ether and air, to be the supreme Deity. We grant, moreover, that the same words have been sometimes used *ιστορικῶς* also, for a hero or deified man, said by some to have been born in Crete, by others in Arcadia. And Callimachus,^a though he were very angry with the Cretians for affirming Jupiter's sepulchral monument to have been with them in Crete, as thereby making him mortal:

Κρήτες ἀεὶ ψεύσται, καὶ γὰρ τάφον, εἴ ἄνα, σείο
Κρήτες ἐτεκμήναντο σὺ δ' οὐ θάνεις, ἔσσι γὰρ αἰεὶ.

Cretes semper mendaces, tuum enim, rex sepulchrum
Extruxerunt: tu vero non es mortuus, semper enim es.

Himself nevertheless (as Athenagoras^b and Origen^c observe) attributed the beginning of death to him, when he affirmed him to have been born in Arcadia; ἀρχὴ γὰρ θανάτου ἢ ἐπὶ γῆς γένεσις, because a terrene nativity is the beginning of death.—Wherefore this may pass for a general observation here: that the Pagan theology was all along confounded with a certain mixture of physiology and herology or history blended together. Nevertheless it is unquestionable, that the more intelligent of the Greekish Pagans did frequently understand by Zeus that supreme unmade Deity, who was the maker of the world, and of all the

^a Hymno in Jovem, vers. 8, 9.

^b In Legation. pro Christianis, cap. 26. p. 121.

^c Contra Celsum, lib. iii, p. 137.

inferior gods. Porphyrius in Eusebius thus declares their sense, τὸν Δία, τὸν Νοῦν Præp. Ev. l. 3. c. 9. p. 100. κόσμον ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὃς τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐδημιούργησεν, ἔχων τὸν κόσμον. By Zeus the Greeks understand that Mind of the world, which framed all things in it, and containeth the whole world.—Agreeable whereunto is that of Maximus Tyrius,^a Κάλει τὸν μὲν Δία, νοῦν πρεσβύτατον, καὶ ἀρχικώτατον, ᾧ πάντα ἔπεται καὶ πειθαρχεῖ. By Jupiter you are to understand that most ancient and princely Mind, which all things follow and obey.—And Eusebius himself, though not forward to grant any more than needs he must to Pagans, concludes with this acknowledgment hereof: ἔστω ὁ Ζεὺς μηκέθ' ἢ πυρώδης καὶ αἰθέριος οὐσία, ὥσπερ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἐνομιζέτο, κατὰ τὸν Πλούταρχον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὁ ἀνωτάτω Νοῦς, ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργός. Let Jupiter therefore be no longer that fiery and ethereal substance, which the ancient Pagans, according to Plutarch, supposed him to be; but that highest Mind, which was the maker of all things.—But Phor-nutus^b by Jupiter understands the Soul of the world, he writing thus concerning him; ὥσπερ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ ψυχῆς διοικούμεθα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ κόσμος ψυχὴν ἔχει τὴν συνέχουσαν αὐτὸν, καὶ αὐτὴ καλεῖται Ζεὺς, αἰτία οὐσα τοῖς ζῶσι τοῦ ζῆν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο βασιλεύειν ὁ Ζεὺς λέγεται τῶν ὅλων. As we ourselves are governed by a soul, so hath the world in like manner a Soul, that containeth it; and this is called Zeus, being the cause of life to all things that live; and therefore Zeus or Jupiter is said to reign over all

^a Dissert. 29. p. 290.

^b Libro de Natura Deor. cap. 2. inter Scriptores Mythologicos a Tho. Gale editos.

things.—However, though these were two different conceptions amongst the Pagans concerning God, some apprehending him to be an abstract mind separate from the world and matter, but others to be a soul of the world only; yet nevertheless they all agreed in this, that Ζεὺς or Jupiter was the supreme moderator or governor of all.

P. 396. edit. And accordingly Plato, in his Cratylus, Steph. taking these two words, Ζῆνα and Δία, both together, etymologizeth them as one; after this manner: *συντιθέμενα εἰς ἓν δηλοῖ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅστις ἐστὶν αἴτιος μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν, ἢ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων· συμβαίνει οὖν ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζεσθαι οὕτως, τῷ Θεὸς εἶναι δι' ὃν ζῆν αἰεὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσιν ὑπάρχει, διείληπται δὲ δίχα (ὡσπερ λέγω) ἐν ὃν τὸ ὄνομα, τῷ Δία καὶ Ζηνί.* These two words compounded together declare the nature of God; for there is nothing, which is more the cause of life, both to ourselves and all other animals, than he, who is the Prince and King of all things; so that God is rightly thus called, he being that by whom all things live. And these are really but one name of God, though divided into two words.—But because it was very obvious then to object against this position of Plato's, that Zeus or Jupiter could not be the Prince of all things, and first Original of life, from the Theogonia of Hesiod and other ancient Pagans, in which himself was made to have been the son of Κρόνος, or Saturn; therefore this objection is thus preoccupied by Plato, *τοῦτον δὲ, Κρόνον υἱὸν, ὑβριστικὸν μὲν ἂν τιμὴ δόξειεν εἶναι ἀκούσαντι ξαίφνης.* Whosoever shall hear this (saith he), will presently conclude it to be contumelious to this Zeus or Jupiter (as he hath been described by us),

to be accounted the son of Chronos or Saturn.— And in answer hereunto, that philosopher stretcheth his wits to salve that poetic Theogonia, and reconcile it with his own theological hypothesis; and thereupon he interprets that Hesiodian Ζεύς or Jupiter into a compliance with the third hypostasis of his Divine triad, so as properly to signify the superior Soul of the world; *εὐλογον δὲ, μεγάλης τινός διανοίας ἐκγονον εἶναι τὸν Δία. Κρόνος γὰρ τὸ καθαρόν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκήρατον τοῦ Νοῦ ἔστι δὲ οὗτος Οὐρανοῦ υἱός, ὡς λόγος.* Nevertheless it is reasonable to suppose Zeus or Jupiter to be the offspring of some great mind; and Chronos or Saturn signifieth a pure and perfect mind eternal; who again is said to be the son of Uranus or Cælius.— Where it is manifest, that Plato endeavours to accommodate this poetic trinity of gods, Uranus, Chronos, and Zeus, or Cælius, Saturn, and Jupiter, to his own trinity of Divine hypostases, *τ' αγαθόν, νοῦς, and ψυχή*, the first good, a perfect intellect, and the highest soul.—Which accommodation is accordingly further pursued by Plotinus in several places, as *Enn. 5. l. 1. c. 4. and Enn. 5. l. 8. c. 13.* Nevertheless, these three archical hypostases of the Platonic trinity, though looked upon as substances distinct from each other, and subordinate, yet are they frequently taken all together by them for the whole supreme Deity. However, the word Ζεύς is by Plato severally attributed to each of them; which Proclus thus observed upon the *Timæus*: *λέγωμεν ὅτι πολλαὶ μὲν εἰσι τάξεις καὶ παρὰ Πλάτωνι τοῦ Διός. Ἄλλος γὰρ ὁ δημιουργός Ζεύς, ὡς ἐν Κρατύλῳ γέγραπται, καὶ ἄλλος ὁ Πρῶτος τῆς Κρονίας τριάδος, ὡς ἐν* P. 298.
Γοργία λέγεται, καὶ ἄλλος ὁ ἀπόλυτος, ὡς ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ

παραδίδοται, καὶ ἄλλος ὁ οὐράνεος, εἴτε ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀπλανοῦς εἴτε ὁ ἐν τῇ θατέρου περιόδῳ. We say, therefore, that there are several orders, ranks, or degrees of Zeus or Jupiter in Plato: for sometimes he is taken for the Demiurgus or opificer of the world, as in Cratylus; sometimes for the first of the Saturnian triad, as in Georgias; sometimes for the superior Soul of the world, as in Phædrus; and, lastly, sometimes for the lower soul of the heaven.—Though, by Proclus's leave, that Zeus or Jupiter which is mentioned in Plato's Cratylus (being plainly the superior Psyche or Soul of the world) is not properly the Demiurgus or opificer, according to him; that title rather belonging to νοῦς or intellect, which is the second hypostasis in his trinity.

9 NO 58

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