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THE  
WORKS  
OF  
RALPH CUDWORTH, D.D.

CONTAINING  
THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL  
SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE,  
SERMONS, &c.

A NEW EDITION, WITH REFERENCES TO THE SEVERAL QUOTATIONS IN THE  
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM, AND A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,

BY THOMAS BIRCH, M. A. F. R. S.

IN FOUR VOLUMES:  
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THE TRUE  
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM  
OF  
THE UNIVERSE.

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CHAP. V. CONTINUED.

**B**UT it would be no impertinent digression here, (as to the main scope of our present undertaking) should we briefly compare the forementioned doctrine and cabala of the ancient Incorporrealists (the Pythagoreans and Platonists) with that of Christianity : and consider the agreement, or disagreement, that is betwixt them. First, therefore, here is a plain agreement of these best and most religious philosophers with Christianity in this : That the most consummate happiness, and highest perfection, that human nature is capable of, consisteth not in a separate state of souls, stripped naked from all body, and having no manner of converse with matter, as some high-flown persons in all ages have been apt to conceit. For such amongst the philosophers (and Platonists too) was Plotinus ; the unevenness and unsafeness of whose temper may sufficiently appear from hence, that as he conceived human souls might possibly ascend to so high a pitch, as quite to shake off

## 2 THE SOUL'S HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST

commerce with all body ; so did he on the other hand again imagine, that they might also descend and sink down so low, as to animate not only the bodies of brutes, but even of trees and plants too: two inconsistent paradoxes; the latter whereof is a most prodigious extravagancy, which yet Empedocles, though otherwise a great wit, seems to have been guilty of also, from those verses of his in Athenæus ; \*

*Ἦδη γὰρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γεύομαι κούρη τε κόρος τε,  
θάμνος τ', οἰανός τε καὶ εἰν ἀλι ἔλλοπος ἰχθύς.*

And amongst the Jews, the famous Maimonides was also of this persuasion, it being a known aphorism of his, in his great work, *דכא אין ניה* *או ריזה שכעילם*: That in the world to come, or state of consummate happiness, there shall be nothing at all of body, but pure incorporeity.— Upon which account, being accused as a denier of the resurrection, (an article as well of the Jewish as of the Christian faith) he wrote that book entitled *Iggereth Teman*, purposely to purge himself, and to reconcile those two assertions together, which he doth after such a manner, as that there should be indeed a resurrection, at the first coming of the Jewish Messias, of some certain persons, to live here awhile upon the earth, eat and drink, marry and be given in marriage, and then die again ; after which, in the world to come, they should for ever continue pure souls, ununited to any body. In which it may be well suspected, that the design Maimonides drove at, was against Christianity ; which, notwithstanding, as to this particular, hath the

\* Deipnosophist, lib. viii. p. 510.

concurrent suffrages of the best philosophers, that the most genuine and perfect state of the human soul, which in its own nature is immortal, is to continue for ever, not without, but with a body; and yet our high-flown enthusiasts generally (however calling themselves Christians), are such great spiritualists, and so much for the inward resurrection, (which we deny not to be a Scripture notion also; as in that of St. Paul, <sup>a</sup> "If ye be risen with Christ," &c. And again, <sup>b</sup> "If by any means I might attain to the resurrection of the dead,") as that they quite allegorize away, together with the other parts of Christianity, the outward resurrection of the body; and, indeed, will scarcely acknowledge any future immortality, or life to come, after death, their spirituality thus ending in Sadducism and infidelity, if not at length in downright Atheism and sensuality.

But, besides this, there is yet a further correspondence of Christianity with the forementioned philosophic cabala, in that the former also supposes the highest perfection of our human souls, not to consist in being eternally conjoined with such gross bodies as these we now have, unchanged and unaltered: for as the Pythagoreans and Platonists have always complained of these terrestrial bodies, as prisons, or living sepulchres of the soul; so does Christianity seem to run much upon the same strain, in these Scripture expressions: "In this we groan earnestly, desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven:" and again, <sup>d</sup> "We that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened, not for that we would be un-

<sup>a</sup> Col. iii. 1.

<sup>c</sup> 2 Cor. v. 2.

<sup>b</sup> Phil. iii. 2.

<sup>d</sup> 2 Cor. v. 4.

clothed (that is, stripped quite naked of all body), but so clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life:" and, lastly, <sup>a</sup> "Ourselves also, which have the first-fruits of the Spirit, groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption (sonship or inheritance), namely, the redemption of our bodies;" that is, the freedom of them from all those evils and maladies of theirs, which we here lie oppressed under. Wherefore we cannot think, that the same heavy load and luggage, which the souls of good men, being here burdened with, do so much groan to be delivered from, shall, at the general resurrection, be laid upon them again, and bound fast to them, to all eternity: for, of such a resurrection as this, Plotinus (though perhaps mistaking it for the true Christian resurrection), might have some cause to affirm, that it would be but *ἀνάστασις εἰς ἄλλον ὕπνον*, a resurrection to another sleep;—the soul seeming not to be thoroughly awake here, but, as it were, soporated with the dull steams and opiotic vapours of this gross body. For thus the author of the Book of Wisdom, <sup>b</sup> "The corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind, that museth upon many things." But the same will further appear, from that account, which the Scripture itself giveth us of the resurrection: and first, in general, when St. Paul, answering that query of the philosophic infidel, "How are the dead raised, or with what body do they come?" replieth in this manner, "Thou fool (that is, thou who thinkest to puzzle or baffle the Christian article of the resurrection, which thou understandest not), that which thou sowest is not quickened (to the production of any

<sup>a</sup> Rom. viii. 23.

<sup>b</sup> Chap. ix. 15.

thing), except it first die to what it was." And "thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain," as of wheat, or of barley, or the like; but God (in the ordinary course of nature), giveth it a body, as it hath pleased him (that is, a stalk, and an ear, having many grains with husks in it, and therefore neither in quantity nor quality the same with that, which was sowed under ground), nor does he give to all seeds one and the same kind of body neither, but to every seed its own correspondent body; as to wheat one kind of ear, and to barley another. As if he should have said: Know that this present body of ours is to be looked upon but as a kind of seed of the resurrection-body, which therefore is accordingly in some sense the same, and in some sense not the same with it. Besides which general account, the particular oppositions, which the Scripture makes betwixt the present and future body, seem very agreeable to those of the philosophic cabala: for, first, the present body is said <sup>a</sup> to be sowed "in corruption," but the future "raised in incorruption." For the children of the resurrection cannot die any more.<sup>b</sup> And then "mortality shall be swallowed up of life."<sup>c</sup> Wherefore the Christian resurrection-body, as well as that of the philosophic cabala, is *σῶμα ἀθάνατον*, and *αἰδιον τοο*, (2 Cor. v. 1.) an immortal and eternal body. Again, the body sowed is said <sup>d</sup> to be a dishonourable, ignominious, and inglorious body; and therefore called also by St. Paul, <sup>e</sup> *τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν*, the body of our humility, or humiliation;—a body agreeable to this lapsed state of the soul, but the body, which

<sup>a</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 42.<sup>b</sup> Luke xx. 36.<sup>c</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 54.<sup>d</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 43,<sup>e</sup> Phil. iii. 21.

shall be raised, shall be a glorious body; and *σύμμορφον τῷ σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ*, “conformable to that glorious body of Christ;” who, when but externally transfigured, his face “did shine as the sun,” and his “raiment was white as the light.” The glory of a body consisteth only in the comeliness of its proportion, and the splendour thereof: thus is there “one glory of the sun, another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars;” that is, a different splendour of them. Wherefore the future body of the righteous, according to the Scripture also, as well as the philosophic cabala, will be *σῶμα φωτεινόν*, and *σῶμα ἀγγοειδές*, and *σῶμα ἀστροειδές*, a glorious, splendid, luciform, and star-like body:—(Wisdom iii. 7.) *ἐν καιρῷ ἐπισκοπῆς αὐτῶν ἐκλάμψουσι*, “The righteous, in the time of their visitation, shall shine forth.”—(Dan. xii. 2, 3.) “They, that be wise, shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they, that turn many to righteousness, as the stars for ever and ever.” And (Matt. xiii. 43.) “Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father.” And therefore probably this future glorious resurrection-body is that “inheritance of the saints in light,” which the Scripture speaks of, Col. i. 12. Moreover, there is another difference betwixt this present and that future body of the righteous, wherein St. Paul<sup>b</sup> and Hierocles<sup>c</sup> do well agree; the first being called by both of them *σῶμα ψυχικόν*, “an animal body”—the second *σῶμα πνευματικόν*, “a spiritual body.”—Which latter expression, in Scripture, not only denotes the subtilty and tenuity thereof; but also as this present body is called an “animal body,” because it is suit-

<sup>a</sup> I Cor. xv. 41.

<sup>b</sup> I Cor. xv. 44.

<sup>c</sup> Comment. in aurea Pythag. carmina, p. 214. edit. Needhami.

able and agreeable to that animal life, which men have common with brutes, so is that future called spiritual, as bearing a fit proportion and correspondency to souls renewed in the spirit of their mind, or in whom the Divine Spirit dwelleth and acteth, exercising its dominion. “There is an animal body, and there is a spiritual body.” And, “the first Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam a quickening spirit.” And thus are ψυχικοί, in the Scripture, taken for οἱ πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες, “they who have not the Spirit.” And <sup>b</sup> ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος οὐ δέχεται τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ θεοῦ, “the animal man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God.” Which Spirit is also said, in Scripture, to be the earnest of that our future inheritance, (Eph. i. 14.) and the earnest of this spiritual and heavenly body, (2 Cor. v. 5.) It is also said to be that, by which (efficiently) these mortal bodies shall be quickened. (Rom. viii. 11.) “If the Spirit of him, that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in you; he, that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit, that dwelleth in you.” Neither doth Hierocles fall much short of this Scripture notion of a spiritual body, when he describes it to be that ὁ τῆ νοερά τελειότητι τῆς ψυχῆς συνάπ- P. 297.  
 τεται, which is agreeable to the intellectu- [p. 217. edit.  
 al perfection of the soul.—This spiritual Needhami.]  
 body is that, which the ancient Hebrews called כנפי תנשך eagle’s wings—we reading thus in the Gemara of the Sanhedrin, (c. 11. fol. 92. col. 2.)  
 אם תאמר אותו שנים שעמיר תקבת. לחרש בהן את תעולם  
 צריקים מה הן עשן תקכה עישה להן כנפים כנשמן על פני המים  
 If you ask, What shall become of the righteous, when God shall renew the world? the answer is,

<sup>a</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 45.

<sup>b</sup> 1 Cor. ii. 14.



God shall make them wings like eagles, whereby they shall fly upon the face of the waters.—Again, as this present body is called, in Scripture, an *earthly* body, so is the future body of the righteous styled by St. Paul, as well as the Pythagoreans, a *heavenly* body, and they, who shall then be possessors thereof, *ἐπουράνιοι ἄνθρωποι*, heavenly men—(1 Cor. xv.) “As is the heavenly, such are they that are heavenly.” Besides which, as philosophers supposed both demons (or angels), and men, to have one and the same *σῶμα ἀγχοειδές, οὐράνιον* and *αἰθέριον*, or a like lucid, heavenly and ethereal body; so from that of our Saviour, when he affirmeth, that they, who “shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, will neither marry, nor be given in marriage; nor can die any more; for they are *ἰσάγγελοι*, equal to the angels.”—From hence, I say, we may venture to call this resurrection-body of the just also an angelical or isangelical body; and the rather because the ancient Hebrews (as we learn from Nachmonides, in Shaar Haggemul), styled it *לבושת תנפש המלאכותי* the angelical clothing of the soul;—and Tertullian himself, “angelificatam carnem,” angelified flesh.—But, lastly, St. Paul is not only positive in his doctrine here, but also negative; <sup>a</sup> “Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption.” Which place being undoubtedly not to be allegorized, it may be from thence inferred, that the happy resurrection-body shall not be this foul and gross body of ours only varnished and gilded over on the outside of it, it re-

Thus St. Austin, *Corpora angelica; and Qualia sunt angelorum.*

positive in his doctrine here, but also negative; <sup>b</sup> “Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption in-

<sup>a</sup> Luke xx. 36.

<sup>b</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 50.

maining still nasty, sluttish, and ruinous within, and having all the same seeds of corruption and mortality in its nature, which it had before, though by perpetual miracle kept off, it being as it were by violence defended from being seized upon and devoured by the jaws of death; but that it shall be so inwardly changed in its nature, as that the possessors thereof cannot die any more. But all this, which hath been said of the resurrection-body, is not so to be understood, as if it belonged universally to all, that shall be raised up at the last day, or made to appear upon the earth in their own persons, at that great and general assizes: that they shall have all alike (wicked as well as good) such glorious, spiritual and celestial bodies: but it is only a description of the *ἀνάστασις τῆς ζωῆς*, the resurrection of life;—which is emphatically called also by our Saviour Christ, *ἀνάστασις ἡ ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν*, the resurrection from the dead,—or to a happy immortality; as they, who shall be thought worthy thereof, are likewise styled by him *υἱοὶ ἀναστάσεως*, the children of the resurrection.—Of which resurrection only it is that St. Paul treateth in that fifteenth chapter of his to the Corinthians. And we say, that this Christian resurrection of life is the vesting and settling of the souls of good men in their glorious, spiritual, heavenly and immortal bodies. The complete happiness of a man, and all the good that can be desired by him, was by the heathen poet thus summed up: “*Ut sit mens sana in corpore sano,*” That there be a sound mind in a sound body:—and the Christian happiness seems to be all comprised in these two things; first, in being inwardly regenerated and renewed

<sup>a</sup> Luke xx. 25.

in the spirit of their mind, cleansed from all pollution of flesh and spirit, and made partakers of the Divine life and nature; and then, secondly, in being outwardly clothed with glorious, spiritual, celestial and incorruptible bodies. The Scripture plainly declareth, that our souls are not at home here, in this terrestrial body, and these earthly mansions, but that they are strangers and pilgrims therein; which the patriarchs also confessing, plainly declared, that they sought a country, not that which they came out from, but a heavenly one. From which passages of Scripture some indeed would infer, that souls being at first created by God pure, pre-existed, before this their terrene nativity, in celestial bodies; but afterwards straggled and wandered down hither, as Philo for one,<sup>a</sup> ἀπολιπούσα μὲν γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸν οὐράνιον τόπον, καθάπερ εἰς ξένην χώραν ἦλθετο σῶμα. Our soul (saith he), having left its heavenly mansion, came down into this earthly body, as a strange place.—But thus much is certain, that our human souls were at first intended and designed by God Almighty, the maker of them, for other bodies and other regions, as their proper home and country, and their eternal resting-place: however, to us, that “be not first, which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterward that which is spiritual.” Now, though some, from that of St. Paul,<sup>b</sup> where he calls this happy resurrection-body, οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, that house of ours, that is from heaven—or which cometh out of heaven—would infer, that therefore it will not be taken out of graves and charnel-

<sup>a</sup> De Agricult. p. 197, et in libro, quis divinarum rerum hæres, p. 519, et alias.

<sup>b</sup> 2 Cor. v. 1.

houses ; they conceiving, also, that the individuation and sameness of men's persons does not necessarily depend upon the numerical identity of all the parts of matter, because we never continue thus the same, our bodies always flowing like a river, and passing away by insensible transpiration ; and, it is certain, that we have not all the same numerical matter, and neither more nor less, both in infancy and in old age, though we be for all that the self-same persons : yet, nevertheless, according to the best philosophy, which acknowledges no essential or specifical difference of matter, the foulest and grossest body that is, merely by motion may not only be crystallized, but also brought into the purity and tenuity of the finest ether. And, undoubtedly, that same numerical body of our Saviour Christ, which lay in the sepulchre, was after his resurrection thus transformed into a spiritual and heavenly body ; the subtilty and tenuity whereof appeared from his entering in when the doors were shut, and his vanishing out of sight ; however its glory were for the time suspended, partly for the better convincing his disciples of the truth of his resurrection, and partly because they were not then able to bear the splendour of it. We conclude, therefore, that the Christian mystery, of the resurrection of life, consisteth not in the soul's being reunited to these vile rags of mortality, these gross bodies of ours, (such as now they are ;) but in having them changed into the likeness of Christ's glorious body, and in this mortal's putting on immortality.

Hitherto have we seen the agreement, that is betwixt Christianity and the old philosophic cabala, concerning the soul, in these two things :

First, that the highest happiness and perfection of the human soul consisteth not in a state of pure separation from all body; and, secondly, that it does not consist neither in an eternal union with such gross terrestrial bodies, as these unchanged; the soul being not at home, but a stranger and pilgrim in them, and oppressed with the load of them: but that at last, the souls of good men shall arrive at glorious, spiritual, heavenly and immortal bodies. But now, as to that point, whether human souls be always united to some body or other, and consequently when by death they put off this gross terrestrial body, they are not thereby quite divested, and stripped naked of all body, but have a certain subtle and spirituous body, still adhering to them, and accompanying them? or else, whether all souls, that have departed out of this life, from the very beginning of the world, have ever since continued in a state of separation from all body, and shall so continue forwards till the day of judgment or general resurrection? we must confess, that this is a thing not so explicitly determined, or expressly decided in Christianity, either way. Nevertheless, it is first of all certain from Scripture, that souls departed out of these terrestrial bodies are therefore neither dead nor asleep, till the last trump and general resurrection, but still alive and awake; our Saviour Christ affirming, that they all live unto God; the meaning whereof seems to be this, that they, who are said to be dead, are dead only unto men here upon earth; but neither dead unto themselves, nor yet unto God, their life being not extinct, but only disappearing to us, and withdrawn from our sight; for-

Death, called  
sleep in Scrip-  
ture, only  
κατ' εὐφη-  
μισμὸν.

asmuch as they are gone off this stage, which we still continue to act upon. And thus it is said also of our Saviour Christ himself, and that after his resurrection too, that “he liveth unto God.” (Rom. vi. 10.) From whence it is evident, that they, who are said to live to God, are not therefore supposed to be less alive, than they were, when they lived unto men. Now it seemeth to be a privilege or prerogative proper to the Deity only, to live and act alone, without vital union or con-  
 junction with any body. “Quærendum <sup>περὶ ἀρχῶν,</sup>  
l. ii.  
 (saith Origen), si possibile est, penitus <sup>[cap. ii. p. 69.</sup>  
oper.]  
 incorporeas remanere rationabiles creaturas, cum ad summum sanctitatis ac beatitudinis venerent? An necesse est eas semper conjunctas esse corporibus?” It is worth our inquiry, whether it be possible for rational creatures to remain perfectly incorporeal, and separate from all body, when they are arrived to the highest degree of holiness and happiness? or whether they be always of necessity conjoined with some bodies;—and afterward he plainly affirmeth it to be impossible: “Vivere præter corpus ullam aliam naturam, præter Patrem, et Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum:” For any other nature, besides the Father, and the Son, and Holy Ghost, to live quite without a body.—Indeed, if this were most natural to the human soul, and most perfective of it, to continue separate from all body, then doubtless (as Origen implied) should the souls of good men, rather after the day of judgment, continue in such a state of separation to all eternity. But, on the contrary, if it be natural to souls to enliven and inform some body or other, (though not always a terrestrial one) as our inward sense inclines us to think, then can it

not seem so probable, that they should, by a kind of violence, be kept so long in an unnatural or preternatural state of nakedness and separation from all body, some of them even from Adam till the day of judgment.

Again, the Scripture also intimates, that souls departed out of this life have a knowledge of one another, and are also capable of the punishment of sense or pain: "Fear him (saith our Saviour) who, after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell," (Luke xii.) And the soul of the rich man is said to be immediately after death in torments, before the day of judgment; as likewise to have known Abraham and Lazarus. And it seems neither agreeable to our common notions, nor yet to piety, to conclude, that the souls of wicked men, departing out of this life, from the beginning of the world in their several ages, till the day of judgment, have all of them no manner of punishment inflicted on them, save only that of remorse of conscience and future expectation. Now it is not conceivable, how souls after death should know and be knowable, and converse with one another, and have any punishment of sense or pain inflicted on them, were they not vitally united

to some bodies. And thus did Tertullian reason long ago: "Dølet apud inferos anima cujusdam, et punitur in flamma, et cruciatur in lingua, et de digito animæ fœlicioris implorat solatium roris. Imaginem existimas, exitum illum pauperis lætantis, et divitis mœrentis. Et quid illic Lazari nomen, si non in veritate res est? Sed etsi imago credenda est, testimonium erit veritatis. Si enim non habet anima corpus, non caperet imaginem corporis. Nec mentiretur

De An. p. 309.  
Rigal.  
[cap. vii.  
p. 165.]

de corporalibus membris scriptura, si non erant. Quid est autem illud, quod ad inferna transfertur, post divortium corporis? quod detinetur, et in diem judicii reservatur? Ad quod et Christus moriendo descendit? puto ad animas patriarcharum? Incorporalitas animæ ab omni genere custodiæ libera est; immunis a pœna et a fœvela. Per quod enim punitur aut fœvetur, hoc erit corpus. Igitur si quid tormenti sive solatii anima præcepit in carcere, vel diversorio inferum, in igni vel in sinu Abrahæ, probata erit corporalitas animæ. Corporalitas enim nihil patitur, non habens per quod pati possit: aut si habet, hoc erit corpus. In quantum enim omne corporale passibile est; in tantum quod passibile est, corporale est." We read in Scripture of a soul tormented in hell, punished with flames, and desirous of a drop of water to cool his tongue. You will say, perhaps, that this is parabolical and fictitious. What then does the name of Lazarus signify there, if it were no real thing? But if it be a parable never so much, yet must it, notwithstanding, as to the main, speak agreeably to truth. For if the soul (after death) have no body at all, then can it not have any corporeal image, shape, or figure. Nor can it be thought, that the Scripture would lie concerning corporeal members, if there were none. But what is that, which, after its separation from this body, is carried down into hell, and there detained prisoner, and reserved till the day of judgment? And what is that, which Christ dying descended down unto? I suppose to the souls of the patriarchs. But incorporeality is free from all custody or imprisonment, as also devoid of pain and pleasure. Wherefore, if souls be sensible of pain after death, and tormented



with fire, then must they needs have some corporeity; for incorporeality suffers nothing. And as every corporeal thing is passive or patible, so again whatsoever is passive is corporeal. <sup>a</sup>Tertullian would also confirm this from a vision or revelation of a certain sister-prophet, (miracles and prophecy being said by him not to be then altogether extinct,) “*Inter cætera ostensa est mihi anima corporaliter, et spiritus videbatur, tenera et lucida, et aërii coloris, et formæ per omnia humanæ.*” There was (said she) amongst other things, a soul corporeally exhibited to my view, and it was tender and lucid, and of aëreal colour, and every way of human form.—Agreeably to which, Tertullian himself addeth; “*Effigiem non aliam animæ humanæ deputandam præter humanam, et quidem ejus corporis, quod unaquæque circumtulit.*” There is no other shape to be assigned to a human soul but human; and, indeed, that of the body, which is before carried about.—It is true, indeed, that Tertullian here drives the business so far, as to make the soul itself to be corporeal, figurate, and colorate, and after death to have the very same shape, which its respective body had before in this life; he being one of those, who were not able to conceive of any thing incorporeal, and therefore, being a religionist, concluded God himself to be a certain body also. But the reasons, which he here insisteth on, will indeed extend no further than to prove, that the soul hath after death some body vitally united to it, by means whereof it is both capable of converse, and sensible of pain, forasmuch as body alone can have no sense of any thing.

<sup>a</sup> Ubi supra, cap. ix. p. 166.

And this is that, which Irenæus from the same Scripture gathereth; not that the soul is a body, but that it hath a body, after death, conjoined with it, and that of the same form and figure with that body, which it had before here in this life: “Ple-  
 nissime autem Dominus docuit, non l. ii. c. lxiii.  
 solum perseverare, non de corpore in [cap. xxxiv.  
 corpus transgredientes animas, sed et p. 168. edit.  
 Massueti.]  
 characterem corporis, in quo etiam adaptantur  
 custodire eundem; et meminisse eas operum,  
 quæ egerunt hic, et a quibus cessaverunt; in en-  
 arratione, quæ scribitur de Divite et de Lazaro,  
 qui refrigerabatur in sinu Abrahæ; in qua ait  
 Divitem cognoscere Lazarum post mortem; et  
 manere in suo ordine unumquemque ipsorum.”  
 Our Lord hath most plainly taught us, that souls  
 do not only continue after death, without passing  
 out of one body into another; but also, that they  
 keep the character of body, wherein they are then  
 also adapted, the same, which they had before;  
 as likewise, that they remember the actions and  
 omissions of their life past; in that enarration,  
 which is written concerning the rich man and La-  
 zarus, who was refreshed in Abraham’s bosom;  
 wherein he affirmeth the rich man to have known  
 both Lazarus and Abraham after death, as also  
 each of them to remain in their own order.—And  
 thus again in the following chapter: C. lxiii.  
 “Per hæc manifestissime declaratum est, [cap. xxxiv.  
 et perseverare animas; et non de corpore p. 168.]  
 in corpus exire; et habere hominis figuram; (ut  
 etiam cognoscantur) et meminisse eorum, quæ hic  
 sint; et dignam habitationem unamquamque gen-  
 tem percipere, etiam ante judicium.” By these  
 things it is most manifestly declared, that souls

do both persevere after death, and that they do not transmigrate out of one body into another, and that they have a human figure or shape (whereby they may be known); as also they remember the things here upon the earth, and their own actions; and, lastly, that each kind of good and bad have their distinct and suitable habitations assigned them, even before the judgment.—Now, that Irenæus did not here mean, that souls are themselves bodily substances, and consequently have a certain character, form, and figure of their own, but only that they have certain bodies conjoined with them, which are figurate, is first of all evident from the words themselves: “characterem corporis, in quo etiam adaptantur, custodire eundem;” the natural sense whereof is this, that they keep the character of body (wherein they are then also adapted after death) the same with that, which these bodies before had here in this life.—And it is further manifest from hence, because he elsewhere plainly declareth souls themselves to be incorporeal; as in his fifth book and seventh chapter, <sup>a</sup> “Flatus autem vitæ incorporalis est,” but the breath of life is incorporeal.—

Furthermore, Origen was not only of the same persuasion, that souls after death had certain subtle bodies united to them, and that those bodies of theirs had the same εἶδος χαρακτηρίζον, characterising form—which these their terrestrial bodies before had; but also thinks, that this, together with the soul’s immortality, may be sufficiently proved from the frequent apparitions or ghosts of departed souls; in way of opposition to Celsus, endeavouring to invalidate the Scripture testimonies

<sup>a</sup> P. 300.

concerning the apparitions of our Saviour Christ, and imputing them either to magical imposture, or fanatic frenzy, or the disciples mistaking their own dreams and fancies for visions and sensations, after the Epicurean way, <sup>a</sup> τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἦττον κατασκευαστικόν ἐστὶν ἀναγκαίου δόγματος, ὡς ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ὑφέστηκε τῶν ἀποθανόντων· καὶ οὐ μάτην πεπίστευκε περὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς, ὁ τοῦτο τὸ δόγμα ἀνειληφώς· ὡς καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς λέγει, σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα περὶ μνημεία τισὶ γεγονέναι τῶν ἤδη τεθνηκότων· Though this might seem to have been smartly opposed by Celsus, yet are those very apparitions of ghosts, notwithstanding, a sufficient argument or proof of a certain necessary opinion, that souls do subsist after death. Neither did Plato vainly conclude the immortality and permanency of the soul, besides other things, from those shadow-like phantasms of the dead, that have appeared to many about graves and monuments.—Whereupon he giveth this further account of these apparitions; τὰ μὲν οὖν γινόμενα περὶ ψυχῆς τεθνηκότων φαντάσματα ἀπὸ τινος ὑποκειμένου γίνεται, τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑφέστηκυῖαν ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ Ἀυγοειδεῖ Σώματι ψυχῆν. For these apparitions of the dead are not mere groundless imaginations, but they proceed from souls themselves, really remaining and surviving after death, and subsisting in that, which is called a luciform body.—Where, notwithstanding Origen takes this Ἀυγοειδὲς Σῶμα, or luciform body, in a larger sense than the Greek philosophers were wont to do; namely, so as to comprehend under it that airy or vaporous body also, which belongeth to unpurged souls, who do therein most frequently appear after death; whereas it is thought proper to the purged souls to be clothed

<sup>a</sup> Adv. Celsum, lib. ii. p. 97.

with the luciform body only. Besides which, the same Origen tells us, that the thing, which St. Thomas the apostle disbelieved, was not our Saviour's appearing after death, as if he had thought it impossible for ghosts or souls departed visibly to appear, but only his rising and appearing in that same solid body, which had been before crucified, and was laid in the sepulchre; συγκατετίθετο μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖνος τῇ φασκούσῃ αὐτὸν ἑωρακέναι, ὡς οὐκ ἀδύνατον ὄντος, τοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ τεθνηκότος ὀφθῆναι· οὐκέτι δ' ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὸ ἐν σώματι αὐτὸν ἀντιτύπῳ ἐγγεῖρθαι. Thomas also, as well as the other apostles, assented to the woman affirming, that she had seen Jesus; as not thinking it at all impossible for the soul of a dead man to be seen: but he did not believe him to have risen and appeared in that self-same solid body, which before he lived in; for which cause he said, not only, unless I see him; but added also, "And unless I shall put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe."—Where again Origen subjoins, Ταῦτα δ' ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ τοῦ Θωμᾶ, κρίνοντος ὅτι δύναται Ὀφθαλμοῖς αἰσθητοῖς φανῆναι ψυχῆς Σῶμα πάντα τῷ προτέρῳ εἶδει, ———μέγεθός τε, καὶ ὄμματα καλ' εἰκυίας, καὶ φωνήν,

Πολλάκι δὲ καὶ τοῖα περὶ χροῦ εἶματ' ἐχοῖσιν.

These things were said by Thomas, not as doubting at all, but that the body of a soul departed (to wit, condensed) might be seen with the eyes of sense, every way resembling that form which it had before in this life, both in respect of bigness, figure, colour, and voice; and oftentimes also in the same customary garments.—Wherefore, according to Origen, the Jews were at that time

generally possessed with this opinion, that souls after death had certain bodies united to them, wherein they might visibly appear; neither is that of any great moment to the contrary, which a learned critic objecteth, that Josephus, writing of their opinions, maketh no mention hereof; he omitting, besides this, other considerable dogmata of theirs also, as that of the resurrection. However this at least is certain from hence, that Origen himself took it for granted, that human souls departed were not altogether naked or unclothed, but clothed with a certain subtile body, wherein they could also visibly appear, and that in their pristine form.

Moreover, it might be here observed also, that when upon our Saviour's first apparition to his disciples, it is said, that they were affrighted, as supposing that they had seen a spirit; our Saviour does not tell them, that a spirit or ghost had no body at all, wherein it could visibly appear; but (as rather taking that for granted),<sup>a</sup> that a spirit had no flesh and bones (no σῶμα ἀντίτυπον), no such solid body as they might find him to have; bidding them therefore handle him, to remove that scruple of theirs. As if he should have said, Though spirits or ghosts, and souls departed, have bodies (or vehicles), which may by them be so far condensed, as sometimes to make a visible appearance to the eyes of men; yet have they not any such solid bodies as those of flesh and bone; and therefore by feeling and handling may you satisfy yourselves, that I am not a mere spirit, ghost, or soul, appearing, as others have frequently done, without a miracle; but that I appear in that very

<sup>a</sup> Luke xxiv. 37.

same solid body, wherein I was crucified by the Jews, by miraculous Divine power, raised out of the sepulchre, and now to be found no more there. Agreeable to which of our Saviour Christ is that of Apollonius in Philostratus; <sup>a</sup> λαβοῦ μοι, ἔφη, καὶ μὲν διαφύγω σε, εἰδωλὸν εἰμι· εἰ δὲ ὑπομείναιμι ἀπτόμενος, πείθε καὶ ζῆν τέ με, καὶ μὴ ἀποβεβληκέναι τὸ σῶμα· Touch me and handle me, and if you find me to avoid the touch, then may you conclude me to be a spirit or ghost (that is, a soul departed); but if I firmly resist the same, then believe me really to live, and not yet to have cast off the body.—And, indeed, though spirits or ghosts had certain subtile bodies, which they could so far condense, as to make them sometimes visible to men; yet is it reasonable enough to think, that they could not constipate or fix them into such a firmness, grossness, and solidity, as that of flesh and bone is, to continue therein; or at least, not without such difficulty and pain, as would hinder them from attempting the same. Notwithstanding which, it is not denied, but that they may possibly sometimes make use of other solid bodies, moving and acting them, as in that famous story of Phlegon's, <sup>b</sup> where the body vanished not, as other ghosts use to do, but was left a dead carcass behind. Now, as for our Saviour Christ's body, after his resurrection, and before his ascension; which notwithstanding its solidity in handling, yet sometimes vanished also out of his disciples' sight: this probably, as Origen conceived, was purposely conserved for a time, in a certain middle state, betwixt the crassities of a

<sup>a</sup> In Vita Apollonii Tyanci, lib. ix. cap. xii. p. 355.

<sup>b</sup> In Libello de Rebus Mirabilibus, cap. i. in Jac. Gronovii Thesaurο Antiq. Græcar. tom. viii. p. 2694.

mortal body, and the spirituality of a perfectly glorified, heavenly, and ethereal body.

But there is a place of Scripture, which, as it hath been interpreted by the generality of the ancient fathers, would naturally imply, even the soul of our Saviour Christ himself, after his death, and before his resurrection, not to have been quite naked from all body, but to have had a certain subtile or spirituuous clothing, and it is this of St. Peter ; *θανατωθεις μὲν σαρκί, ζωοποιηθεις δὲ τῷ πνεύματι, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι πο-* 1 Pet. iii. 18, 19.  
*ρευθεις ἐκήρυξε.* Which being understood by those ancients of our Saviour Christ's descending into Hades or hell, is accordingly thus rendered in the vulgar Latin, " Put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the spirit: in which (spirit) also, he went and preached to those spirits that were in prison," &c. — So that the word *πνεύματι*, or spirit here, according to this interpretation, is to be taken for a spirituuous body ; the sense being this, That when our Saviour Christ was put to death in the flesh, or the fleshly body, he was quickened in the spirit, or a spirituuous body : in which (spirituuous body) also, he went and preached to those spirits that were in prison, &c.—And doubtless it would be said, by the assertors of this interpretation, that the word spirit could not here be taken for the soul of our Saviour Christ, because this being naturally immortal, could not properly be said to be quickened and made alive. Nor could he, that is, our Saviour Christ's soul, be so well said to go, in this spirit neither, that is, in itself, the soul in the soul, to preach to the spirits in prison. They

Of this St. Austin, in his 12th book, De Gen. ad Lit. c. 33. Et Christi quidem animam venisse usque ad ea loca, in quibus peccatores cruciantur, ut eos solvere, quos esse solvendo occultata nobis sua justitia judicabat, non immerito creditur.



would add also, that spirit here could not be taken for the Divine Spirit neither, which was the efficient cause of the vivification of our Saviour's body at his resurrection; because then there would be no direct opposition betwixt being put to death in the flesh, and quickened in the spirit; unless they be taken both alike materially. As also the following verse is thus to be understood; that our Saviour Christ went in that spirit, wherein he was quickened, when he was put to death in the flesh, and therein preached to the spirits in prison. By which spirits in prison also would be meant, not pure incorporeal substances, or naked souls, but souls clothed with subtile spirituous bodies; as that word may be often understood elsewhere in Scripture. But thus much we are unquestionably certain of from the Scripture, that not only Elias, whose terrestrial body seems to have been, in part at least, spiritualized, in his ascent in that fiery chariot, but also Moses appeared visibly to our Saviour Christ and his disciples upon the mount, and therefore (since piety will not permit us to think this a mere prestigious thing) in real bodies; which bodies also seem to have been Ἀυροειδῆ, luciform or lucid, like to our Saviour's then transfigured body.

Again, there are sundry places of Scripture, which affirm, that the regenerate and renewed have here in this life a certain earnest of their future inheritance; which is their spiritual or heavenly body; as also the quickening of their mortal bodies is therein attributed to the efficiency of the spirit dwelling in them. Which is a thing that hath been taken notice of by some of the ancients, as Irenæus: "Nunc autem partem aliquam spiritus

ejus sumimus, ad perfectionem et præparationem incorruptelæ, paulatim assuescentes capere et portare Deum. Quod

l. v. c. viii. [p. 301. edit. Mas-sueti.]

et pignus dixit apostolus; hoc est, partem ejus honoris, qui a Deo nobis promissus est.—Si ergo pignus hoc habitans in nobis jam spirituales effecit, et absorbetur mortale ab immortalitate.”—

Now have we a part of that spirit for the preparation and perfection of incorruption; we being accustomed by little and little to receive and bear God. Which also the apostle hath called an earnest; that is, a part of that honour which is promised to us from God. If therefore this earnest (or pledge), dwelling in us hath made us already spiritual, the mortal is also swallowed up by immortality.—And Novatian,<sup>a</sup> “ Spiritus Sanctus id agit in nobis, ut ad æternitatem et ad resurrectionem immortalitatis corpora nostra perducatur, dum illa in se assuefacit cum cœlesti virtute misceri.” This is that which the Holy Spirit doth in us, namely, to bring and lead on our bodies to eternity, and the resurrection of immortality; whilst in itself it accustometh us to be mingled with the heavenly virtue. Moreover, there are some places, also, which seem to imply, that good men shall, after death, have a further inchoation of their heavenly body, the full completion whereof is not to be expected before the resurrection or day of judgment. We know, that <sup>b</sup> “ if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we groan earnestly.” And, verse 5. “ He that hath wrought

<sup>a</sup> De Trinitate, cap. xxix. p. 450, ad calcem Operum Tertulliani.

<sup>b</sup> 2 Cor. v. 1.

us for the self-same thing is God, who also hath given us the earnest of the Spirit." Now how these preludiums and prelibations of an immortal body can consist with the soul's continuance after death, in a perfect separation from all manner of body, till the day of judgment, is not so easily conceivable.

Lastly, It is not at all to be doubted, but that Irenæus, Origen, and those other ancients, who entertained that opinion of souls being clothed after death with a certain thin and subtile body, suspected it not in the least to be inconsistent with that of the future resurrection; as it is no way inconsistent for one, who hath only a shirt or waistcoat on, to put on a suit of clothes, or exterior upper-garment. Which will also seem the less strange, if it be considered, that even here in this life, our body is, as it were, two-fold, exterior and interior; we having, besides the grossly tangible bulk of our outward body, another interior spirituous body, the soul's immediate instrument, both of sense and motion; which latter is not put into the grave with the other, nor imprisoned under the cold sods. Notwithstanding all which that hath been here suggested by us, we shall not ourselves venture to determine any thing in so great a point, but sceptically leave it undecided.

The third and last thing in the forementioned philosophic or Pythagoric cabala is concerning those beings superior to men, commonly called by the Greeks demons, which Philo<sup>a</sup> tells us are the same with angels amongst the Jews, and accordingly are those words, demons and angels,

<sup>a</sup> De Insomniis, p. 586.

by Hierocles<sup>a</sup> and Simplicius, and other of the latter Pagan writers, sometimes used indifferently as synonymous); viz. That these demons or angels are not pure, abstract, incorporeal substances, devoid of vital union with any matter; but that they consist of something incorporeal, and something corporeal, joined together: so that, as Hierocles writeth of them, τὸ μὲν ἄνω αὐτῶν ἀσώματος οὐσία, τὸ δὲ κάτω σωματικὴ, They have a superior and an inferior part in them; and their superior part is an incorporeal substance; their inferior corporeal.—In a word, that they all, as well as men, consist of soul and body, united together, there being only this difference betwixt them, that the souls of these demons or angels never descend down to such gross and terrestrial bodies, as human souls do; but are always clothed either with ærial or ethereal ones. And, indeed, this Pythagoric cabala was universal, concerning all understanding beings, besides the supreme Deity, or trinity of Divine hypostases; that is, concerning all the Pagan inferior gods; that they are no other than souls vitally united to some bodies, and so made up of incorporeal and corporeal substance, joined together. For thus Hierocles plainly expresseth himself in the forecited place;<sup>b</sup> ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ εἰς τὸ εἶναι οὕτω παρήλθεν, ὡς μήτε τὸ σῶμα εἶναι αὐτὴν μήτε ἄνευ σώματος, &c. The rational nature (in general) was so produced by God, as that it neither is body, nor yet without body; but an incorporeal substance, having a cognate or congenite body.—Which same thing was elsewhere also thus declared by him, ἔστι γὰρ

<sup>a</sup> Comment. in Aurea Pythagor. Carmina, sect. 67, p. 210.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. 210.

p. 17. [p. 19.] πᾶς μὲν ὁ λογικὸς διάκοσμος, μετὰ τοῦ συμπεφυκότες αὐτῷ ἀφθάρτου σώματος, εἰκὼν ὅλου τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, the whole rational order, or rank of being, with its congenite immortal body, is the image of the whole Deity, the maker thereof.—Where, by Hierocles's rational nature or essence, and by the whole rational order, is plainly meant all understanding beings created, of which he acknowledgeth only these three kinds and degrees; first, the immortal gods, which are to him the animated stars; secondly, demons, angels, or heroes; and thirdly, men, called also by him καταχθόνιοι δαίμονες, terrestrial demons;—he pronouncing of them all, that they are alike incorporeal substances, together with a congenite immortal body; and that there is no other understanding nature than such, besides the Supreme Deity, which is complete in itself, without the conjunction of any body. So that, according to Hierocles, the ancient Pythagoric cabala acknowledged no such entities at all, as those intelligences of Aristotle, and the noes of some high-flown Platonists (that is, perfectly unbodied minds); and much less any rank of henades, or unities, superior to these noes. And, indeed, such particular created beings as these, could neither have sense or cognizance of any corporeal thing existing without them (sense, as Aristotle hath observed, resulting from a complication of soul and body, as weaving results from a complication of the weaver and weaving instruments): nor yet could they act upon any part of the corporeal universe. So that these immovable beings would be but like adamantine statues, and things unconnected with the rest of the world, having no commerce with any thing at all but the

Deity; a kind of insignificant metaphysical gazers or contemplators. Whereas the Deity, though it be not properly *ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος*, a mundane soul,—such as, together with the corporeal world, as its body, makes up one complete and entire animal; yet because the whole world proceeded from it, and perpetually dependeth on it, therefore must it needs take cognizance of all, and act upon all in it; upon which account it hath been styled by these Pythagoreans, *ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος*, (not a mundane, but) a supra-mundane soul. Wherefore this ancient Pythagoric cabala seems to be agreeable to reason also, that God should be the only incorporeal being in this sense, such whose essence is complete, and life entire within itself, without the conjunction or appendage of any body; but that all other incorporeal substances created should be completed and made up by a vital union with matter, so that the whole of them is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, but a complication of both; and all the highest and divinest things in the universe, next to the Supreme Deity, are animals consisting of soul and body united together. And after this manner did the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, decline that absurdity objected against them, of the illocality of all finite created spirits, that these being incorporeal substances, vitally clothed with some body, may, by reason of the locality and mobility of their respective bodies, truly be said to be here and there, and to move from place to place.

Wherefore we are here also to shew what agreement or disagreement there is betwixt this part of the Pythagoric cabala and the Christian philoso-

phy. And, first, it hath been already intimated, that the very same doctrine with this of the ancient Pythagoreans was plainly asserted by Origen. Thus, in his first book, *Peri Archon*, c. vi. “*Solius Dei (saith he) id est Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, naturæ id proprium est, ut sine materiali substantia, et absque ulla corporeæ adjectionis societate, intelligatur subsistere.*” It is proper to the nature of God only, that is, of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to subsist without material substance, or the society of any corporeal adjection.—Again, l. ii. c. ii. “*Materialem substantiam opinione quidem et intellectu solum separari, a naturis rationalibus, et pro ipsis, vel post ipsas effectam videri; sed nunquam sine ipsa eas vel vixisse, vel vivere: solius namque trinitatis incorporea vita existere recte putabitur.*” Material substance in rational natures is indeed separable from them in conception and understanding, it seeming to be made for them, and in order of nature after them; but it is not really and actually separable from the same; nor did they ever, nor can they, live without it: for a life perfectly incorporeal is rightly deemed to belong to the trinity only.—So also, in his fourth book, and his *Anacephalæosis*, “*Semper erunt rationabiles naturæ, quæ indigent indumento corporeo. Semper ergo erit natura corporea, cujus indumentis uti necesse est rationabiles creaturas. Nisi quis putet se posse ostendere, quod natura rationalis absque ullo corpore vitam degere possit. Sed quam difficile id sit, et quam prope impossibile intellectui nostro, in superioribus ostendimus.*” There always will be rational natures, which stand in need of a corporeal indument.

Wherefore there will be always corporeal nature, as a necessary indument or clothing for these rational creatures. Unless any one could shew, that it is possible for the rational nature to live without a body. Which how difficult and almost impossible it is to our understanding, hath been already declared.—Aquinas affirmeth<sup>a</sup> Origen, in this doctrine of his, to have followed the opinion of certain ancient philosophers; and undoubtedly it was the old Pythagoric cabala, which the learned Origen here adhered to; that ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία, as it is in Hierocles, and πᾶς ὁ λογικὸς διάκοσμος, the rational nature made by God;—that is, all created understanding beings are neither body, nor yet without body, but have always a cognate or congenite body, as their vehicle or indument. So that angels or demons, as well according to Origen as Hierocles, are all of them incorporeal substances, not naked and abstract, but clothed with certain subtile bodies, or animals compounded and made up of soul and body together.

Wherefore Huëtius,<sup>b</sup> and other learned men, seem not well to have understood Origen here, but to have confounded two different opinions together, when they suppose him to have asserted angels, and all understanding creatures, not to *have* bodies, but to *be* bodies, and nothing else; and, consequently, that there is no incorporeal substance at all besides the Deity: whereas Origen only affirmeth, that nothing besides the Trinity could subsist and live alone, “*absque ulla corporeæ adjectionis societate,*” without the society of any corporeal adjection;—and that the

<sup>a</sup> In Summa Theolog. part i. Quæst. li. p. 1.

<sup>b</sup> In Origenianis, lib. ii. Quæst. v. p. 68.



material nature is only a necessary indument or clothing of all rational or understanding creatures. And in this sense is it, that an incorporeal life is said by him to be proper only to the Trinity; because all other understanding beings are animals compounded of soul and body together. But that Origen acknowledged even our human soul itself to be incorporeal, as also that there is something in angels incorporeal, might be made evident from sundry passages in his writings: as this particularly in his sixth book against Celsus; *ἡμεῖς ἀσώματον οὐσίαν οὐκ ἔσμεν ἐκπυρουμένην, οὐδ' εἰς πῦρ ἀναλυομένην τὴν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν, ἢ τὴν ἀγγέλων ἢ θρόνων, &c. ὑπόστασις*. We do not think an incorporeal substance to be combustible, nor that the soul of man can be resolved into fire, or the substance of angels, thrones, dominions, principalities, or powers.—Where, by the substance of angels, he doubtless meant the souls of them; Origen's sense being thus declared by St. Jerome:<sup>a</sup> “in libris *περὶ ἀρχῶν, angelos, et thronos, et dominationes, et potestates, et rectores mundi et tenebrarum, et omne nomen quod nominatur, dicit, animas esse eorum corporum, quæ vel desiderio vel ministerio susceperint:*” that in his book of principles he affirmeth, angels, and thrones, and dominions, and powers, and the governors of the darkness of this world, and every name that is named (in St. Paul), to be all of them the souls of certain bodies, such as either by their own desire and inclination, or the Divine allotment, they have received.—Now there can be no question made, but that he, who supposed

<sup>a</sup> Epist. lxi. ad Pammachium de Erroribus Johan. Hierosolymitani, tom. ii. oper. p. 118.

the souls of men to be incorporeal, in a strict philosophic sense, and such as could not suffer any thing from fire, did also acknowledge something incorporeal in angels. And thus doth he somewhere declare himself, in that book, *Peri Archon*,<sup>a</sup> “*Per Christum creata dixit (Paulus) omnia visibilia et invisibilia; per quod declaratur, esse etiam in creaturis quasdam invisibiles, secundum proprietatem suam, substantias; sed hæ, quamvis ipsæ non sunt corporeæ, utuntur tamen corporibus, licet ipsæ sunt corporea substantia meliores. Illa vero substantia trinitatis neque corpus, neque in corpore, esse credenda est; sed in toto incorporea.*” When Paul affirmeth all things, visible and invisible, to have been created by Christ, or the *Λόγος*, he intimated, that even amongst the creatures, there are some properly invisible substances. Which invisible substances created, though they be not bodies, yet do they use bodies, themselves being better than corporeal substance. But the substance of the Trinity is neither body, nor yet in body, but altogether incorporeal.—Wherefore angelical and human souls are not, as Huetius supposeth, called incorporeal by Origen, only as subtile bodies sometimes are by the more simple and unskilful, but in a strict philosophic sense; only he supposed them to differ from the Deity in this, that though they be not bodies, yet they are always in bodies, or clothed with bodies; whereas the Deity is in both senses incorporeal, it having not so much as any corporeal indument. So that there is here no contradiction at all to be found in Origen, he constantly asserting angels to have

<sup>a</sup> Lib. iv. cap. ii.

something incorporeal in them as their superior part, and not in that vulgar sense of a subtile body, but in the philosophic; nevertheless, to have also a corporeal indument or clothing, as their outside or lower part, and in that regard only he calling them corporeal.

It is true, indeed, that there were, amongst the ancient fathers, some, who were so far from supposing angels to be altogether incorporeal, that they ran into the other extreme, and concluded them to have nothing at all incorporeal in them, but to be mere bodies. But these either asserted that there was no such thing at all as any incorporeal substance; and that not only angels, and human souls, but also God himself was a body: or at least they concluded, that nothing created was incorporeal; and that God, though himself incorporeal, yet could create nothing but bodies. These are here the two extremes; one, that angels have nothing corporeal at all belonging to them; the other, that they are altogether corporeal, or have nothing incorporeal in them: a middle betwixt both which is the Origenic hypothesis, the same with the Pythagoric; that in angels there is a complication of incorporeal and corporeal substance both together, or that they are animals consisting of soul and body. We shall now make it appear, that the greater part of the ancient fathers were for neither of the two forementioned extremes, either that angels were wholly incorporeal, or that they were wholly corporeal; but rather for the middle hypothesis, that they had bodies, and yet were not bodies, but, as other terrestrial animals, spirits or souls, clothed with etherial or aërial bodies. And that

the generality of the ancient and most learned fathers did not conceive angels to be mere unbodied spirits, is unquestionably evident from hence, because they agreed with the Greek philosophers in that conceit, that evil demons, or devils, were therefore delighted with the blood and nidours of sacrifices, as having their more gross, airy, and vaporous bodies nourished and refreshed with those vapours, which they did, as it were, luxuriate and gluttonize in. For thus does Porphyrius write concerning them, in his book *De Abſtinentia*,<sup>a</sup> οὗτοι οἱ χαίροντες λοιβῇ τε, κνίσσῃ τε, δι' ὧν αὐτῶν τὸ σωματικὸν καὶ πνευματικὸν πιαίνεται· ζῆ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀτμοῖς καὶ ἀναθυμιάσιν· These are they, who take pleasure in the incense, fumes, and nidours of sacrifices, wherewith their corporeal and spiri-  
 tuous part is as it were pinguified; for this lives, and is nourished, by vapours and fumigations. And that, before Porphyrius, many other Pagau philosophers had been of the same opinion, appeareth from this of Celsus: Χρῆ γὰρ Orig. l. viii. ἴσως οὐκ ἀπίστεῖν ἀνδράσι σοφοῖς, οἳ δὴ φασι, [p. 417.] διότι τῶν μὲν περιγεῖων δαιμόνων τὸ πλεῖστον γενέσει συν-  
 τετηκός, καὶ προσηλωμένον αἵματι καὶ κνίσσῃ, &c. We ought to give credit to wise men, who affirm, that most of these lower and circumterreneous demons are delighted with geniture, blood, and nidour, and such-like things, and much gratified therewith; though they be not able to do any thing more in way of recompence, than sometimes perhaps to cure the body, or to foretel good and evil fortunes to men and cities.—Upon Contra Cels. l. vii. p. 334. which account himself, though a zea-  
 lous Pagan, persuadeth men to moderation in

<sup>a</sup> Lib. ii. §. xlii. p. 86.

the use of these sacrifices, as principally gratifying the inferior and worsers demons only. In like manner Origen frequently insisteth upon the same thing, he affirming, that devils were not only delighted with the idolatry of the Pagans in their sacrifices, but also ἀπὸ τῶν θυσιῶν ἀναθυμιάμασι καὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν αἱμάτων καὶ ὀλοκαντωμάτων ἀποφοραῖς τρέφεσθαι τὰ σώματα φιληδονούντων τοῖς τοιούτοις. That their very bodies were nourished by the vapours and fumes arising from them, and that these evil demons therefore did as it were delicate and epicurize in them. And before Origen, most of the ancient fathers, as Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Tatianus, Tertullian, &c. and also many others after him, endeavour to disparage those material and bloody sacrifices upon the same account, as things, whereby evil demons were principally gratified. We shall only cite

C. i. [§. 25.  
p. 398. tom. i.  
oper. Basilii  
in Append.]

one passage to this purpose out of St. Basil, or whoever were the author of that Commentary upon Isaiah, because there is something philosophic in it:

δαίμοσι διὰ τὸ φιληδονον καὶ ἔμπαθές, αἱ θυσίαι φέρουσί τινα ἡδονὴν καὶ χροίαν ἐκθυμῶμεναι, διὰ τῆς καύσεως ἔξατμιζόμενου τοῦ αἵματος, καὶ οὕτω διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης λεπτοποιήσεως εἰς τὴν σύστασιν αὐτῶν ἀναλαμβάνομενον· ὅλοι γὰρ δι' ὄλων τρέφονται τοῖς ἀτμοῖς, οὐ διὰ μασσῆσεως καὶ κοιλίας, ἀλλ' ὡς αἱ τρίχες πάντων ζώων καὶ ὄνυχες, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα εἰς ὅλην ἑαυτῶν τὴν οὐσίαν, τὴν τροφήν καταδέχεται. Sacrifices are things of no small pleasure and advantage to demons; because the blood, being evaporated by fire, and so attenuated, is taken into the compages and substances of their bodies: the whole of which is throughout nourished with vapours, not by eating, and stomachs, or such-

like organs, but as the hairs and nails of all animals, and whatsoever other things receive nourishment into their whole substance.—And thus do we see it undeniably manifest, that many of the ancient fathers supposed devils to have bodies; neither can it at all be doubted, but that they concluded the same of angels too, these being both of the same kind, and differing but as good and evil men. And though they do not affirm this of good angels, but of devils only, that they were thus delighted and nourished with the fumes and vapours of sacrifices, and that they epicurized in them; yet was not the reason hereof, because they conceived them to be altogether incorporeal, but to have pure ethereal or heavenly bodies; it being proper to those gross and vaporous bodies of demons only to be nourished and refreshed after that manner. And now, that all these ancient fathers did not suppose either angels or devils to be altogether corporeal, or to have nothing but body in them, may be concluded from hence, because many of them plainly declared the souls of men to be incorporeal; and therefore it cannot be imagined, that they should so far degrade angels below men, as not to acknowledge them to have any thing at all incorporeal.

But we shall now instance in some few, amongst many of these ancients, who plainly asserted both devils and angels to be spirits incorporate, and not to be mere bodies, but only to have bodies; that is, to consist of soul and body, or corporeal and incorporeal substance joined together. That angels themselves have bodies, is every where declared by St. Austin in his writings; he affirming, that the bodies of good men,

*Psal. lxxxv.*

after the resurrection, shall be “*qualia sunt angelorum corpora*,” such as are the bodies of angels ;

—and that they shall be “*corpora angelica, in societate angelorum*,” angelical

bodies, fit for society and converse with angels— and declaring the difference betwixt the bodies of angels and of devils in this manner: “*Dæmones,*

*De Gen. ad. antequam transgredirentur, cœlestia corpora*  
*Lit. l. iii. c. x. poragerebant, quæ conversa sint expœna*  
*[§ 15. p. 114. tom. iii.] in aëream qualitatem, ut jam possint ab*

*igne pati;*” That though devils, before the transgression, had celestial bodies, as angels now have, yet might these afterwards, in way of punishment, be changed into aërial ones, and such as now may suffer by fire.—Moreover, the same St. Austin somewhere<sup>a</sup> calleth good angels by the name of “*animæ beatæ atque sanctæ*,” happy and holy souls.

—And though it be true, that in his *Retractions* he recallesh and correcteth this, yet was this only a scrupulosity in that pious father concerning the mere word, because he no where found in Scripture angels called by the name of souls ; it being far from his meaning, even there, to deny them to be incorporeal spirits joined with bodies. And certainly he, who every where concludes human souls to be incorporeal, cannot be thought to have supposed angels to have nothing at all but body in them. Again, *Claudianus Mamertus*,<sup>b</sup> writing against *Faustus*, who made angels to be mere bodies without souls, or any thing incorporeal, maintaineth, in way of opposition, not that they are mere incorporeal spirits, without bodies (which is the other extreme), but

<sup>a</sup> *De Musica*, lib. vi. cap. xvii. §. 59. p. 401. tom. i. oper.

<sup>b</sup> *De Statu Animæ*, lib. iii. cap. vii. p. 178. edit. Barthii.

that they consist of corporeal and incorporeal, soul and body joined together; he writing thus of devils: "Diabolus ex duplici diversa que substantia constat; et corporeus est et incorporeus." The devil consisteth of a double and different substance; he is corporeal, and he is also incorporeal.—And again of angels: "Patet

L. iii.

beatos angelos, utriusque substantiæ, et incorporeos esse in ea sui parte, qua ipsis visibilis Deus; et in ea itidem parte corporeos, qua hominibus sunt ipsi visibiles." It is manifest, that the blessed angels are of a two-fold substance; that they are incorporeal in that part of theirs, wherein God is visible to them, and again corporeal, in that other part, wherein themselves are visible to men.

Moreover, Fulgentius writeth concerning angels in this manner: "Plane ex duplici eos esse substantia asserunt mag-

L. iii. De Trin. [p. 119 oper. edit. Sirmond.]

ni et docti viri. Id est, ex spiritu incorporeo, quo a Dei contemplatione nunquam recedunt; et ex corpore, per quod ex tempore hominibus apparent. Corpora vero ætherea, id est, ignea, eos dicunt habere; dæmones vero corpus aëreum." Great and learned men affirm angels to consist of a double substance; that is, of a spirit incorporeal, whereby they contemplate God; and of a body, whereby they are sometimes visible to men: as also, that they have ethereal or fiery bodies, but devils aërial.—And perhaps this might be the meaning of Joannes Thessalonicensis, in that dialogue of his, read and approved of in the seventh council, and therefore the meaning of that council itself too, when it is thus declared, νοερούς μὲν αὐτοῦς ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία γινώσκει, οὐ μὴν ἄσωμάτων πάντα καὶ ἀοράτους, λεπτοσωμάτων δὲ καὶ ἀερώδεις, ἢ



πυρώδεις, &c. That the catholic church acknowledges angels to be intellectual, but not altogether incorporeal and invisible; but to have certain subtle bodies, either airy or fiery.—For it being there only denied, that they were altogether incorporeal, one would think the meaning should not be, that they were altogether corporeal; nor indeed could such an opinion be fastened upon the catholic church; but that they were partly incorporeal, and partly corporeal; this being also sufficient in order to that design, which was driven at in that council. However Psellus,<sup>a</sup> who was a curious inquirer into the nature of spirits, declares it not only as his own opinion, but also as agreeable to the sense of the ancient fathers, *ὡς οὐκ ἀσώματόν τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐστὶ φύλον, μετὰ σώματος δὲ γε*. That the demoniac or angelic kind of beings is not altogether incorporeal, or bodiless, but that they are conjoined with bodies, or have cognate bodies belonging to them.—Who there also further declares the difference betwixt the bodies of good angels and of evil demons, after this manner: *τὸ μὲν*

P. 33. [p. 48.] *γὰρ ἀγγελικόν, αὐγὰς τινὰς ἐξανίσχον ξένας, τοῖς ἐκτός ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐστὶν ἀφόρητόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόστατον· τὸ δαιμόνιον δὲ, εἰ μὲν τοιοῦτον δήποτε ἦν, οὐκ οἶδα εἰπεῖν, ἔοικεν δ' οὖν, ἐωσφόρον Ἡσαίου τὸν ἐκπεσόντα κατονομάζοντος· νῦν δὲ ἀλλὰ ζοφῶδες οἶον καὶ ἀμαυρόν ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῖς ὄμμασι λυπηρόν, γυμνωθὲν τοῦ συζύγου φωτός· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀγγελικόν παντάπασιν ἐστὶν ἄϋλον· διὸ καὶ διὰ πάντα ἐστὶ στερεοῦ διαδύνον καὶ διῶν, καὶ τῆς ἠλιακῆς ἀκτίνος ὃν ἀπαθέστερον· τὴν μὲν γὰρ διὰ σωμάτων διαφανῶν ἰοῦσαν, ἀποστέγει τὰ γεώδη καὶ ἀλαμπῆ ὡς καὶ κλάσιν ὑπομένειν, ἅτε δὴ ἔνυλον ἔχουσαν. τῷ δὲ οὐδέν ἐστι πρόσαντες, οἷα μηδεμίαν ἔχοντι πρὸς μηδὲν ἀντίθεσιν. τὰ δὲ δαιμόνια σώματα, κἄν ὑπὸ λεπτότητος*

<sup>a</sup> Dialog. de Operationibus Dæmonum, p. 44.

ἀφανῆ καθέστηκεν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐνυλά πη, καὶ ἐμπαθῆ, καὶ μάλισθ' ὅσα τοὺς ὑπὸ γῆν ὑποδέδουκε τόπους· ταῦτα γὰρ τοσαύτην ἔχει τὴν σύστασιν, ὡς καὶ ἀφαῖς ὑποπίπτειν, καὶ πληττόμενα ὀδυνᾶσθαι, καὶ πυρὶ προσομιλήσαντα καίεσθαι. The angelical body sending forth rays and splendours, such as would dazzle mortal eyes, and cannot be borne by them; but the demoniac body, though it seemeth to have been once such also, (from Isaiah's calling him, that fell from heaven, Lucifer,) yet is it now dark and obscure, foul and squallid, and grievous to behold, it being deprived of its cognate light and beauty. Again, the angelical body is so devoid of gross matter, that it can pass through any solid thing, it being indeed more impassible than the sun-beams; for though these can permeate pellucid bodies, yet are they hindered by earthy and opaque, and refracted by them: whereas the angelical body is such, as that there is nothing so imporous or solid, that can resist or exclude it. But the demoniac bodies, though, by reason of their tenuity, they commonly escape our sight, yet have they, notwithstanding, gross matter in them, and are patible, especially those of them which inhabit the subterraneous places; for these are of so gross a consistency and solidity, as that they sometimes fall also under touch; and, being stricken, have a sense of pain, and are capable of being burnt with fire.—To which purpose, the Thracian there addeth more afterward from the information of Marcus the monk, a person formerly initiated in the diabolic mysteries, and of great curiosity; τὸ δαιμόνιον ἄρα πνεῦμα διόλου ὄν P. 94. κατὰ φύσιν αἰσθητικὸν κατὰ πᾶν ἑαυτοῦ μέρος, [P. 142.] ἀμέσως ὀρᾷ τε καὶ ἀκούει, καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀφῆς ὑπομένει πάθη, διαιρούμενον ὀδυνᾶται κατὰ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ στερεά· ταύτη

τούτων διενεγκόν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῶν διαιρεθέντων, μόλις ἢ οὐδαμῶς οὐλοῦνται, τὸ δὲ διαιρούμενον εὐθὺς συμφύεται, καθάπερ αἴρος ἢ καὶ ὕδατος μόρια μεπαζύ τινος ἐμπύπτοντα στερεοῦ· ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ θάπτον ἢ λόγος τουτὶ τὸ πνεῦμα συμφύεται, πλὴν ἀνιᾶται κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ γίνεσθαι τὴν διαίρεσιν. The demoniac spirit or subtile body, being every part of it capable of sense, does immediately see and hear, and is also obnoxious to the affections of touch; insomuch that being suddenly divided or cut in two, it hath a sense of pain, as the solid bodies of other animals have; it differing from them only in this, that those other bodies, being once discontinued, are not easily consolidated together again; whereas the demoniac body, being divided, is quickly reintegrated by coalescence, as air or water: nevertheless it is not without a sense of pain at that time, when it is thus divided, &c.—Moreover, the same Marcus affirmeth the bodies of the demons to be nourished also, though in a different manner from ours; τρέφονται οἱ μὲν δι' εἰσπνοῆς, ὡς τὸ ἐν ἀρτηρίαις καὶ ἐν νεύροις πνεῦμα· οἱ δὲ δι' ὑγρότητος, ἀλλ' οὐ στόματι καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὡς περ σπόγγου καὶ ὀστρακόδερμα, σπῶντες μὲν τῆς παρακειμένης ὑγρότητος ἔξωθεν.\* They are some of them nourished by inspiration, as the spirit contained in the nerves and arteries; others by sucking in the adjacent moisture, not as we do by mouths, but as sponges and testaceous fishes.—And now we may venture to conclude, that this opinion of angels being not mere abstract incorporeal substances, and un-bodied minds, but consisting of something incorporeal, and something corporeal, that is, of soul or spirit, and body joined together, is not only more agreeable to reason, but hath also had more suf-

\* P. 56.

frages amongst the ancient fathers, and those of greater weight too, than either of those two other extremes, viz. That angels are mere bodies, and have nothing at all incorporeal in them; or else, that they are altogether incorporeal, without any bodily indument or clothing.

Notwithstanding which, this latter opinion hath indeed prevailed most in these latter ages; time being rightly compared to a river, which quickly sinks the more weighty and solid things, and bears up only the lighter and more superficial. Though there may be other reasons given for this also; as partly because the Aristotelic philosophy, when generally introduced into Christianity, brought in its abstract intelligences along with it; and partly because some spurious Platonists talking so much of their henades and noes, their simple monads and immoveable unbodied minds, as the chief of their generated and created gods; probably some Christians might have a mind to vie their angels with them: and, lastly, because angels are not only called in Scripture spirits, but also by several of the ancients said to be incorporeal; whilst this, in the mean time, was meant only either in respect of that incorporeal part, soul or mind, which they supposed to be in them, or else of the tenuity and subtilty of their bodies or vehicles. For this account does Psellus give hereof: *καὶ τοῖς* P. 30. 33.

*ἡμετέροις καὶ τοῖς θύραθεν, εἰώθος ἐστὶ, τὰ παχύ- [P. 47.]*  
*τερα τῶν σωμάτων σωματώδη λέγειν, ὃ δὲ λεπτομερές ἐστὶ καὶ*  
*τὴν ὄψιν διαφυγάνον καὶ τὴν ἀφήν ἀσώματος, οὐ μόνον οἱ*  
*καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀξιούσι λέγειν. It*  
 is usual both with Christian writers, and Pagans too, to call the grosser bodies corporeal, and those, which, by reason of their subtilty,

avoid both our sight and touch, incorporeal. And before Psellus, Joannes Thessalonicensis, in his dialogue, approved in the seventh council ;\* *ἐὶ δὲ που εὐροις ἀσωμάτους καλουμένους τοὺς ἀγγέλους ἢ δαίμονας, ἢ ψυχὰς, ὡς μὴ ὄντας ἐκ συμμίξεως τῶν ὑλικῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων, καὶ τοιαῦτα σώματα παχέα καὶ ἀντίτυπα, οἷα ἡμεῖς περικείμεθα, οὕτως αὐτοὺς προσηγόρευσαν*. If you find angels, or demons, or separate souls, called sometimes incorporeal, you must understand this in respect of the tenuity of their bodies only; as not consisting of the grosser elements, nor being so solid and antitypous as those, which we are now imprisoned in. And, before them both, Origen, in the proeme of his *Peri Archon*, where, citing a passage out of an ancient book, intituled, *The Doctrine of Peter*, wherein our Saviour Christ is said to have told his disciples, that he was not *δαμόνιον ἀσώματον*, an incorporeal demon—though, rejecting the authority of that book, he thus interprets those words: “*Non idem sensus ex isto sermone ἀσωμάτου indicatur, qui Græcis vel Gentilibus auctoribus ostenditur, quum de incorporea natura a philosophis disputatur. In hoc enim libello, incorporeum dæmonium dixit, pro eo, quod ipse ille quicumque est habitus vel circumscriptio dæmonici corporis, non est similis huic nostro crassiori, vel visibili corpori; sed secundum sensum, ejus qui composuit illam Scripturam, intelligendum est, quod dixit; non esse tale corpus, quale habent dæmones, quod est naturaliter subtile, et velut aura tenue; et propter hoc vel imputatura multis, vel dicitur incorporeum; sed habere se corpus solidum et palpabile.*”—The word *ἀσωμά-*

\* In Actis Concilii vii. Oecum. seu Nicæni ii. Action. v. p. 293. tom. iv. Concilior. edit. Harduini.

τὸν, or incorporeal, is not to be taken here in that sense, wherein it is used by the Greek and Gentile writers, when they philosophized concerning the incorporeal nature. But a demon is here said to be incorporeal, because of the disposition of the demoniac body, not like to this gross and visible body of ours. So that the sense is, as if Christ should have said, I have not such a body as the demons have, which is naturally subtile, thin and soft, as the air, and therefore is either supposed to be by many, or at least called incorporeal; but the body, which I now have, is solid and palpable.— Where we see plainly, that angels, though supposed to have bodies; may, notwithstanding, be called incorporeal, by reason of the tenuity and subtilty of those bodies, comparatively with the grossness and solidity of these our terrestrial bodies. But that indeed which now most of all inclineth some to this persuasion, that angels have nothing at all corporeal hanging about them, is a religious regard to the authority of the third Lateran council, having passed its approbation upon this doctrine; as if the Oecumenical (so called) or second Nicene, wherein the contrary was before owned and allowed, were not of equal force, at least to counterbalance the other.

But though this doctrine of angels, or all created understanding beings superior to men, having a corporeal indument or clothing, does so exactly agree with the old Pythagoric cabala; yet have we reason to think, that it was not therefore merely borrowed or derived from thence by the ancient fathers; but that they were led into it by the Scripture itself. For, first, the historic phenomena of angels in the Scripture are such, as

cannot well be otherwise solved, than by supposing them to have bodies; and then not to lay any stress upon those words of the Psalmist,<sup>a</sup> “who maketh his angels spirits, and ministers a flame of fire,” (though, with good reason, by the ancient fathers interpreted to this sense) because they may possibly be understood otherwise, as sometime they are by rabbinical commentators; nor to insist upon those passages of St. Paul,<sup>b</sup> where he speaks of the tongues of angels, and of the voice of an archangel, and such-like; there are several other places in Scripture, which seem plainly to confirm this opinion. As, first, that of our Saviour before-mentioned to this purpose, Luke xx. 35. “They who shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage, neither can they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels.” For were angels utterly devoid of all bodies, then would the souls of good men, in a state of separation, and without any resurrection, be rather equal to angels, than after a resurrection of their bodies. Wherefore the natural meaning of these words

seems to be this, (as St. Austin hath interpreted them) that the souls of good men, after the resurrection, shall have “*corpora angelica*,” angelical bodies—and “*qualia sunt angelorum corpora*,” such bodies as those of angels are.—Wherein it is supposed, that angels also have bodies, but of a very different kind from those of ours here. Again, that of St. Jude, where he writeth thus of the devils; “the angels, which kept not their first estate (or rather according to the vulgar Latin, “*sum principatum*,” their own

<sup>a</sup> Psalm civ. 4.

<sup>b</sup> 1 Cor. xiii. 1. 1 Thess. iv. 16.

principality) but left their proper habitation (or dwelling-house) hath he reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day." In which words it is first implied, that the devils were created by God pure, as well as the other angels, but that they kept not τὴν αὐτῶν ἀρχὴν; their own principality—that is, their lordly power and dominion over their worse and inferior part, they having also a certain duplicity in their nature, of a better and worsed principle, of a superior part, which ought to rule and govern, and of an inferior, which ought to be governed: nor is it indeed otherwise easily conceivable, how they should be capable of sinning. And this inferior part in angels seems to have a respect to something that is corporeal or bodily in them also, as well as it hath in men. But then, in the next place, St. Jude addeth, as the immediate result and natural consequence of these angels sinning, that they thereby left or lost τὸ ἴδιον οἰκητήριον, *sum proprium domicilium*—that is, not only their dwelling-place at large, those ethereal countries and heavenly regions above, but also their proper dwelling-house, or immediate mansion; to wit, their heavenly body. Forasmuch as that heavenly body, which good men expect after the resurrection, is thus called by St. Paul,<sup>a</sup> τὸ οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, *our habitation or dwelling-house, that is from heaven*.—The heavenly body is the proper house or dwelling, clothing or indument, both of angelical and human souls; and this is that, which makes them fit inhabitants for the heavenly regions. This, I say, was the natural consequence of these angels sinning, their leaving

<sup>a</sup> 2 Cor. v. 1.



or losing their pure and heavenly body, which became thereupon forthwith obscured and incrasated; the bodies of spirits incorporate always bearing a correspondent purity or impurity to the different disposition of their mind or soul. But then again, in the last place, that, which was thus in part the natural result of their sin, was also, by the just judgment of God, converted into their punishment; for their etherial bodies being thus changed into gross, aërial, feculent and vaporous ones, themselves were immediately hereupon, as St. Peter in the parallel place expresseth it,<sup>a</sup> *ταρταρωθέντες*, cast down into Tartarus—and there imprisoned or reserved in chains under darkness, until the judgment of the great day. Where it is observable, that the word *ταρταρωῶν*, used by St. Peter, is the very same that Apollodorus and other Greek writers frequently make use of in a like case, when they speak of the Titans being cast down from heaven; which seems to have been really nothing else but this fall of angels poetically mythologized. And by Tartarus here, in all probability, is meant this lower caliginous air or atmosphere of the earth, according to that of St.

Austin, concerning these angels: “Post peccatum in hanc sunt detrusi caliginem, ubi tamen et aër;” that, after their sin, they were thrust down into the misty darkness of this lower air.—And here are they, as it were, chained and fettered also by that same weight of their gross and heavy bodies, which first sunk them down hither; this not suffering them to reascend up, or return back, to those bright etherial regions above. And being thus for the pre-

<sup>a</sup> 2 Pet. ii. 4.

sent imprisoned in this lower Tartarus, or caliginous air or atmosphere, they are indeed here kept and reserved in custody, unto the judgment of the great day, and general assizes; however they may, notwithstanding, in the mean time, seem to domineer and lord it for a while here. And, lastly, our Saviour's<sup>a</sup> "Go ye cursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels," seems to be a clear confirmation of devils being bodied; because, first, to allegorize this fire into nothing but remorse of conscience, would endanger the rendering of other points of our religion uncertain also; but to say, that incorporeal substances, united to bodies, can be tormented with fire, is, as much as in us lieth, to expose Christianity, and the Scripture, to the scorn and contempt of all philosophers and philosophic wits. Wherefore Psellus lays no small stress upon this

place; *εἰμὶ μὲν παρὰ τῶν τοῦ Σωτῆρος λόγων* P. 57.  
[P. 52.]  
*πεπεισμένος ταῦτα, πυρὶ κολασθῆσθαι φασκόντων τοὺς δαίμονας· ὃ πῶς οἶον παθεῖν ἀσωμάτων ὄντας; τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματος ἀμήχανον παθεῖν ὑπὸ σώματος· ἀνάγκη γοῦν σώμασιν αὐτοῦς τὴν κόλασιν ὑποδέχσθαι πεφυκόσι πάσχειν.* I am also convinced of this, that demons have bodies, from the words of our Saviour, affirming, that they shall be punished with fire: which how could it be, were they altogether incorporeal? it being impossible for that, which is both itself incorporeal, and vitally ununited to any body, to suffer from a body. Wherefore of necessity it must be granted, by us Christians, that devils shall receive punishment of sense and pain hereafter, in bodies capable of suffering.

Now if angels in general, that is, all created

<sup>a</sup> Matth. xxv. 41.

beings superior to men, be substances incorporeal, or souls vitally united to bodies, though not always the same, but sometimes of one kind, and sometimes of another, and never quite separate from all body; it may seem probable from hence, that though there be other incorporeal substances besides the Deity, yet “vita incorporea,” a life perfectly incorporeal in the fore-mentioned Origenic sense, or “sine corporeæ adjectionis societate vivere,” to live altogether without the society of any corporeal adjection,—is a privilege properly belonging to the holy Trinity only: and consequently, therefore, that human souls, when by death they are divested of these gross earthly bodies, they do not then live and act completely, without the conjunction of any body, and so continue till the resurrection or day of judgment; this being a privilege, which not so much as the angels themselves, and therefore no created finite being, is capable of; the imperfection of whose nature necessarily requires the conjunction of some body with them, to make them up complete: without which, it is unconceivable, how they should either have sense or imagination. And thus doth Origen, consensu- taneously to his own principles, conclude; ἡ τῆ

Cont. Cels. ἐαυτῆς φύσει ἀσώματος καὶ ἀόρατος ψυχῆ, ἐν  
l. vii. p. 353. παντὶ σωματικῷ τόπῳ τυγχάνουσα, δέεται σώμα-  
τος οἰκείου τῆ φύσει τοῦ τόπου ἐκείνου· ὅπερ ὅπου μὲν φορεῖ,  
ἀπεκδυσαμένη πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον μὲν, περισσον δὲ ὡς πρὸς  
τὰ δεύτερα· ὅπου δὲ ἐπενδυσαμένη ᾧ πρότερον εἶχε, δεομένῳ  
κρείττονος ἐνδύματος εἰς τοὺς καθαρωτέρους καὶ αἰθερίους  
καὶ οὐρανίους τόπους· Our soul, which in its own  
nature is incorporeal and invisible, in what-  
soever corporeal place it existeth, doth always

stand in need of a body, suitable to the nature of that place respectively; which body it sometimes beareth, having put off that, which before was necessary, but is now superfluous for the following state; and sometimes again putting on something to what before it had, now standing in need of some better clothing, to fit it for those more pure, ethereal and heavenly places. But, in what there follows, we conceive, that Origen's sense having not been rightly understood, his words have been altered and perverted; and that the whole place ought to be read thus: Καὶ ἐνεδύσατο μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆδε γένεσιν ἐρχομένην, τὸ χρήσιμον πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ ὑστέρα τῆς κούσης, ἕως ἢν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνεδύσατο δὲ ὑπ' ἐκείνο, ὃ ἦν ἀναγκαῖον τῷ ἐπὶ γῆς μέλουτι διαζῆν· εἶτα πάλιν ὄντος τινὸς σκήνους, καὶ ἐπιγείου οἰκίας ἀναγκαίας πού τῷ σκῆνει, καταλύεσθαι μὲν φασιν οἱ λόγοι τὴν ἐπίγειον οἰκίαν τοῦ σκήνους, τὸ δὲ σκῆνος ἐπενδύσασθαι οἰκίαν ἀχειροποίητον, αἰώνιον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς· λέγουσι δὲ οἱ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄνθρωποι, τὸ μὲν φθαρτὸν ἐνδύσασθαι αὐτὸ ἀφθαρσίαν· The sense whereof is this: The soul descending hither into generation, put on first that body, which was useful for it whilst to continue in the womb; and then again afterward such a body, as was necessary for it to live here upon the earth in. Again, it having here a two-fold kind of body, the one of which is called σκῆνος, by St. Paul, (being a more subtile body, which it had before), the other the superinduced earthly house, necessarily subservient to this *skenos* here; the Scripture oracles affirm, that the earthly house of this *skenos* shall be corrupted or dissolved, but the *skenos* itself, superindue or put on a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens;” the same declaring, that “the corruptible shall put

on incorruption, and the mortal immortality.' Where it is plain, that Origen takes that σκῆνος, in St. Paul (1 Cor. v. 1.) for a subtile body, which the soul had before its terrene nativity, and which continues with it after death; but in good men will, at last, superindue, or put on (without death) the clothing of immortality. Neither can there be a better commentary upon this place of Origen, than those Excerpta out of Methodius the martyr, in Photius,<sup>a</sup> though seeming to be vi-  
 tiated also; where, as we conceive, the sense of Origen and his followers is first contained in

Thus Origen plainly, in his fifth book, (p. 244.)

That there is διαφορά ἐπιγείου οἰκίας, ἐν ᾗ ἔσται τὸ Σκῆνος καταλυόμενης, καὶ Σκῆνος, ἐν ᾧ οἱ ὄντες δίκαιοι στενάζουσι βαρυνόμενοι, μὴ ἀπεκδύσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ Σκῆνει ἐπενδύσασθαι. A difference betwixt the earthly house, in which the Σκῆνος is, that will be dissolved; and the Σκῆνος itself, wherein good men groan, being burdened, not that they would put it off, but put on immortality upon it.

those words: ἕτερον τὸ σκῆνος, καὶ τοῦ σκῆ-  
 νους ἡ οἰκία, καὶ ἕτερον ἡμεῖς ὧν ἔστι τὸ σκῆνος,

That in St. Paul the τὸ σκῆνος is one thing, and the earthly house of this σκῆνος another thing; and we, that is, our souls, a third thing, distinct from both. And then it is further declared in this that follows: τῆς ζωῆς καταλυθείσης τῆς ὠκυμόρου τὴν πρὸ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἔξουσιν οἰκήσιν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, ἕως ἂν ἀνακαινοποιηθεῖσαν ἡμῖν ἄπτωτον ἀναλάβωμεν τὴν οἰκίαν· ὅθεν καὶ στενάζομεν μὴ θέλοντες τὸ σῶμα ἀπεκδύσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὴν λοιπὴν ἐπενδύσασθαι ζώην· τὸ γὰρ οἰκητήριον τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, ὃ ἐπενδύσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦμεν, ἡ ἀθανασία. That this short life of our earthly body being destroyed, our soul shall then have, before the resurrection, a dwelling from God, until we shall at last receive it renewed, restored, and so made an incorruptible house. Wherefore in this we groan, desirous not to put off all body, but to put on life or immortality

<sup>a</sup> Biblioth. Cod. ccxxiv. p. 919.

upon the body which we shall then have. For that house, which is from heaven, that we desire to put on, is immortality.—Moreover, that the soul is not altogether naked after death, the same Origen endeavours to confirm further from that of our Saviour, concerning the rich man and Lazarus; ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ κολαζόμενος πλούσιος, καὶ ὁ ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραὰμ πένης ἀναπαύομενος, πρὸ τῆς παρουσίας τοῦ σωτήρος, καὶ πρὸ τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸ τῆς ἀναστάσεως, διδάσκουσιν ὅτι καὶ νῦν ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ σώματι χροῖται ἡ ψυχὴ. The rich man punished, and the poor man refreshed in Abraham's bosom, before the coming of our Saviour, and before the end of the world, and therefore before the resurrection, plainly teaches, that even now also after death, the soul useth a body.—He thinketh the same also to be further proved from the visible apparition of Samuel's ghost, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Σαμουὴλ φαινόμενος, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστιν ὁρατὸς ὄν, παρίστησιν ὅτι σῶμα περιέκειτο. Samuel also visibly appearing after death, maketh it manifest, that his soul was then clothed with a body.—To which he adds in Photius,<sup>a</sup> τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅμα τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ σχῆμα, ὁμοειδὲς τῷ παχέϊ καὶ γήινῳ σώματι, &c. That the exterior form and figure of the soul's body after death doth resemble that of the gross terrestrial body here in this life; all the histories of apparitions making ghosts, or the souls of the dead, to appear in the same form which their bodies had before.—This, therefore, as was observed, is that, which Origen understands by τὸ σκῆνος in St. Paul; not this gross terrestrial body, but a certain middle body betwixt it and the heavenly, which the soul after death carries away with it. Now, this opinion of the learned Ori-

<sup>a</sup> Apud Phot. ubi supra, p. 930.

gen's was never reckoned up by the ancient fathers, or his greatest adversaries, in the catalogue of his errors; nor does Methodius the martyr, who was so great an anti-Origenist, where he mentions this Origenic opinion in Photius, seem to tax it otherwise, than as Platonical, implying the soul to be incorporeal. Methodius himself, on the contrary, contending, not that the soul hath a body conjoined with it after death, as a distinct thing from it, but that itself is a body; ὁ θεὸς μόνος ἄδεται ἀσώματος ὦν, αἱ δὲ ψυχαὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πατρὸς τῶν ὄλων, σώματα νοερά ὑπάρχουσαι, εἰς λόγῳ θεωρητὰ μέλη διακεκόσμηνται, ταύτην λαβοῦσαι τὴν διατύπωσιν· ὅθεν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄδῃ, καὶ γλωῶσαν, καὶ δάκτυλον, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μέλη ἱστοροῦνται ἔχειν· οὐχ ὡς σώματος ἑτέρου συνυπάρχοντος αὐταῖς ψυγαῖς ἀειδοῦς· ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐταὶ φύσει αἱ ψυχαὶ παντὸς ἀπογυμνωθεῖσαι περιβλήματος τοιαῦται κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπάρχουσι. God alone is praised as incorporeal and invisible; but souls are made by him (who is the father of all things), intellectual bodies, ornamentally branched out (as it were) into members distinguishable by reason, and having the same form and signature with the outward body. Whence it is, that in Hades (or hell) we read of a tongue, and a finger, and other members; not as if there then were another invisible body coexisting with these souls, but because the souls themselves are in their own nature (when stripped naked of all clothing), according to their very essence such. We say, therefore, if one of these two opinions must needs be entertained, that either the soul itself is a body, or else that it hath a body after death; the latter of them, which was Origen's, ought certainly much to be preferred before the former,

whether held in Tertullian's sense, that all substance, and consequently God himself, is body; or else in that of Methodius, that all created substance is such, God alone being incorporeal.

But we have already shewed, that Origen was not singular in this opinion, Irenæus before him having asserted the same thing, that souls after death are adapted to certain bodies (where the word in the Greek probably was *προσάπτονται*), which have the same character with these terrestrial ones; and Philoponus after him, who was no Pagan, but a Christian philosopher, dogmatizing in like manner. We might here add, that Joannes Thessalonicensis, in that dialogue of his, read in the seventh synod,<sup>a</sup> seemeth to have been of the same persuasion also, when he affirmeth of souls, as well as angels and demons, that they were *ὄραθέντες παρὰ πλειόνων αἰσθητῶς πλεονάκις, τῷ εἶδει τῶν οἰκείων αὐτῶν σωματίων*, often seen by many sensibly, in the form of their own bodies. However, it is a thing, which Psellus took for granted, where, speaking of devils, insinuating their temptations into men's souls, by affecting immediately the fantastic spirit, he writeth after this manner: *ὁ λέγων, πόρρωθεν μὲν ὦν, ἰσχυρο-* P. 94.  
*τέρας δέεται κραυγῆς, ἀγχοῦ δὲ γενόμενος, εἰς τὸ* [P. 72.]  
*τοῦ ἀκούοντος οὗς ψιθυρίζων ὑποφωνεῖ· καὶ εἰ ἐνῆν αὐτῷ  
συνεγγίσει πνεύματι τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐδενὸς ἂν εἰδέθη φόφου,  
ἀλλ' ἦν ὁ κατὰ βούλησιν λόγος ἀφόφω κελεύθῳ πρὸς τὸ δε-  
χόμενον ἐγγινόμενος, ὃ φασὶ καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐξιούσαις τῶν  
σωμάτων εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ταύτας ἀπλήκτως ὀμιλεῖν ἀλλή-  
λαις·* When one man speaks to another from afar off, he must (if he would be heard), make a loud cry or noise; whereas, if he stood near to

<sup>a</sup> Vide Concil. edit. Harduini, tom. iv. p. 293, 294.



him, he might softly whisper into his ear. But could he immediately approach to the spirit (or subtile body of the soul), he should not then need so much as to make a whisper, but might silently, and without noise, communicate whatsoever thoughts of his own to him, by motions made thereupon. And this is said to be the way that souls, going out of these bodies, converse together; they communicating their thoughts to one another without any noise. For Psellus

De Genesi ad  
Literam, c.  
xxxii. [p. 239.  
tom. iii. oper.]

here plainly supposeth souls after death to have πνεῦμα, that is, a certain subtile body, adhering to them, by motions upon which they may silently converse with each other. It is true, indeed, that St. Austin, in his twelfth book *De Genesi ad Literam*, does not himself close with this opinion, of the soul's having a body after death, but much less of its being a body: nevertheless does he seem to leave every man to his own liberty therein, in these words: "Si autem quæritur, dum anima de corpore exierit, utrum ad aliqua loca corporalia feratur, an ad incorporalia corporalibus similia; an vero nec ad ipsa, sed ad illud, quod et corporibus et similitudinibus corporum est excellentius; cito quidem responderim; ad corporalia loca eam vel non ferri nisi cum aliquo corpore, vel non localiter ferri. Jam utrum habeat aliquod corpus, ostendat, qui potest; ego autem non puto. Spiritalem enim arbitror esse, non corporalem; ad spiritalia vero pro meritis fertur, aut ad loca pœnalia similia corporibus." But if it be demanded, when the soul goes out of this body, whether it be carried into any corporeal places, or to incorporeals like to corporeals, or else to neither, but

to that, which is more excellent than both bodies, and the likenesses of bodies? the answer is ready; that it cannot be carried to corporeal places, or not locally carried any whither, without a body. Now whether the soul have some body, when it goes out of this body, let them that can shew; but, for my part, I think otherwise. For I suppose the soul to be spiritual, and not corporeal; and that, after death, it is either carried to spiritual things, or else to penal places, like to bodies, such as have been represented to some in ecstacies, &c.—Where St. Austin himself seems to think the punishment of souls, after death, and before the resurrection, to be fantastical, or only in imagination: whereas there could not be then so much as fantastic punishments neither, nor any imagination at all in souls, without a body, if that doctrine of Aristotle's<sup>a</sup> be true, that fancy or imagination is nothing else but a weaker sense; that is, a thing, which results from a complication of soul and body both together. But it is observable, that in the forecited place that, which St. Austin chiefly opposed, was the soul's being a body, as Tertullian, Methodius, and others had asserted; but as for its having a body, he saith only this: “Ostendat qui potest,” let him that can shew it; he granting, in the mean time, that the soul cannot be locally carried any whither at all after death, nor indeed be in any place without a body. However, the same St. Austin, as he elsewhere condemneth the opinion of those, who would take the fire of hell metaphorically, acknowledg-

<sup>a</sup> De Anima, lib. iii. cap. ix. p. 53. tom. ii. oper.

De Civ. D.  
lib. xxi. c.  
xxvi. [§. iv. p.  
490. tom. vii.  
oper.]

ing it to be real and corporeal; so does he somewhere think it not improbable, but after death, and before the resurrection, the souls of men may suffer from a certain fire, for the consuming and burning up of their dross: "Post istius sane corporis mortem, donec ad illum veniatur, qui post resurrectionem corporum futurus est damnationis et remunerationis ultimus dies; si hoc temporis intervallo, ejusmodi ignem dicuntur perpeti, quem non sentiant illi, qui non habuerint tales mores et amores in hujus corporis vita, ut eorum ligna, et fœnum, et stipula consummantur; alii verò sentiunt, qui ejusmodi secum ædificia portaverunt, &c. non redarguo, quia forsitan verum est." If in this interval of time, betwixt the death of the body, and the resurrection, or day of judgment, the souls of the dead be said to suffer such a fire as can do no execution upon those, who have no wood, hay, nor stubble, to burn up, but shall be felt by such, as have made such buildings or superstructures, &c. I reprehend it not, because perhaps it is true.—The opinion here mentioned, is thus expressed by Origen, in his fifth book against Celsus, which very place St. Austin seems to have had respect to: οὐ συνιδὼν ὅτι ὡσπερ Ἑλλήνων τισὶν ἔδοξε, τὸ πῦρ καθάρσιον ἐπάγεται τῷ κόσμῳ· εἰκὸς δ' ὅτι καὶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν δεομένων τῆς διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς δίκης καίοντος μὲν καὶ οὐ κατακαίοντος τοὺς μὴ ἔχοντας ὕλην δεομένην ἀναλῆσθαι ὑπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ πυρὸς· καίοντος δὲ καὶ κατακαίοντος τοὺς ἐν τῇ διὰ τῶν πράξεων καὶ λόγων καὶ νοημάτων προοπικῶς λεγομένη οἰκοδομῇ ξύλα, χόρτον, ἢ καλάμην οἰκοδομήσαντας. Celsus did not understand, that this fire, as well according to the Hebrews and Christians, as to some of the Greeks,

will be purgatory to the world; as also to every one of those persons, who stand in need of such punishment and remedy by fire: which fire can do no execution upon those, who have no combustible matter in them, but will be felt by such, as in the moral structure of their thoughts, words, and actions, have built up wood, hay and stubble.—Now since souls cannot suffer from fire, nor any thing else in way of sense or pain, without being vitally united to some body, we may conclude, that St. Austin, when he wrote this, was not altogether abhorrent from souls having bodies after death.

Hitherto have we declared, how the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, did repel the assaults of Atheists and Corporealists made against it; but especially how they quitted themselves of that absurdity, of the illocality and immobility of finite created spirits, by supposing them always to be vitally united to some bodies, and consequently, by the locality of those their respective bodies, determined to here and there; according to that of Origen: *ἡ ψυχὴ ἡμῶν δεῖται σώματος, διὰ τὰς τοπικὰς μεταβάσεις*, our soul stands in need C. Cels. l. v. p. 244. of a body in order to local motions.—

We shall in the next place declare, what grounds of reason there were, which induced those ancients to assert and maintain a thing so repugnant to sense and imagination, and consequently to all vulgar apprehension, as a substance in itself unextended, indistant, and indivisible, or devoid of magnitude and parts. Wherein we shall only represent the sense of these ancient Incorporealists, so far as we can, to the best advantage, in order to their vindication, against Atheists and

**Materialists:** ourselves in the mean time not asserting any thing, but leaving every one, that can, to make his own judgment; and so either to close with this, or that other following hypothesis, of extended incorporeals.

Now it is here observable, that it was a thing formerly taken for granted on both sides, as well by the assertors as the deniers of incorporeal substance, that there is but one kind of extension only: and, consequently, that whatsoever hath magnitude and parts, or one thing without another, is not only intellectually and logically, but also really and physically divisible or discernible, as likewise antitypous and impenetrable; so that it cannot coexist with a body in the same place; from whence it follows, that whatsoever arguments do evince, that there is some other substance besides body, the same do therefore demonstrate, according to the sense of these ancients (as well Corporealists as Incorporealists), that there is something unextended, it being supposed by them, both alike, that whatsoever is extended is body. Nevertheless we shall here principally propound such considerations of theirs, as tend directly to prove, that there is something unextendedly incorporeal; and that an unextended deity is no impossible idea; to wit, from hence, because there is something unextended even in our very selves. Where, not to repeat the forementioned ratiocination of Simplicius, that whatsoever can act and reflect upon its whole self, cannot possibly be extended, nor have parts distant from one another; Plotinus first

P. 460. argues after this manner: *τί τοίνυν φήσου-*  
 [Enead. 4. *σιν, οί την ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι λέγοντες, πρῶτον*  
 lib.vii. cap. v.] *μὲν περὶ ἐκάστου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἐν τῷ*

αὐτῇ σώματι, πότερον ἕκαστον ψυχὴν, οἷα ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ὅλη; καὶ  
 πάλιν τοῦ μέρους τὸ μέρος; οὐδὲν ἄρα τὸ μέγεθος συνεβάλλετο  
 τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῆς· καίτοι ἔδει γε ποσοῦ τινος· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλον πολ-  
 λαχῆ, ὅπερ σώμασι παρεῖναι ἀδύνατον, ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ  
 ὅλον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅπερ τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχειν· εἰ δὲ ἕκασ-  
 τον τῶν μερῶν, οὐ ψυχὴν φήσουσιν, ἐξ ἀψύχων ψυχῆ αὐτοῖς  
 ὑπάρξει· What then will they say, who contend,  
 that the soul is a body (or extended) whether or  
 no will they grant concerning every part of the  
 soul in the same body (as that of it which is in  
 the foot, and that in the hand, and that in the  
 brain, &c.) and again every part of those parts,  
 that each of them is soul, such as the whole?  
 If this be consented to, then it is plain, that mag-  
 nitude, or such a quantity, would confer nothing  
 at all to the essence of the soul, as it would do  
 were it an extended thing; but the whole would  
 be in many parts or places, which is a thing, that  
 cannot possibly belong to body; that the same  
 whole should be in more, and that a part should  
 be what the whole is. But if they will not grant  
 every part of their extended soul to be soul, then,  
 according to them, must the soul be made up,  
 and compounded of soul-less things.—Which ar-  
 gument is elsewhere thus propounded by him;  
 εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον ζῶν ἔχει, καὶ ἐν ἀρκεί· εἰ δὲ μη-  
 δενὸς αὐτῶν ζῶν ἔχοντος ἢ σύνοδος πεποίηκε En. 4. l. vii.  
c. ii. [p. 457.]  
 ζῶν, ἄτοπον μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύνατον συμφόρησιν  
 σωματίων ζῶν ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ νοῦν γενῆν τὰ ἀνόητα· If  
 every one of the parts of this extended soul or  
 mind has life in it, then would any one of them  
 alone be sufficient. But to say, that though  
 none of the parts alone have life in them, yet the  
 conjunction of them altogether maketh life, is  
 absurd; it being impossible, that life and soul

should result from a congeries of life-less and soul-less things, or that mind-less things put together should beget mind.—The sum of this argumentation is this; that either every part of extended soul is soul, and of an extended mind, mind; or not. Now, if no part of a soul, as supposed to be extended alone, be soul, or have life and mind in it, then is it certain, that the whole, resulting from all the parts, could have no life nor mind, because nothing can (casually), come from nothing. It is true, indeed, that corporeal qualities and forms, according to the Atomic physiology, result from a composition and contexture of atoms or parts, each of which, taken alone by themselves, have nothing of that quality or form in them,

<sup>a</sup> ——— Ne ex albis alba rearis ;  
Aut ea, quæ nigrant, nigro de semine nata.

You are not to think that white things are made out of white principles, nor black things out of black ; but the reason of the difference here is plain, because these qualities and forms are not entities really distinct from the magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts, but only such a composition of them, as cause different fancies in us ; but life and understanding, soul and mind, are entities really distant from magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts : they are neither mere fancies nor syllables of things, but simple and uncompounded realities. But if every supposed part of a soul, be soul, and of a mind, mind, then would all the rest of it besides any one part be superfluous ; or indeed every supposed part

<sup>a</sup> Lucret. ii. ver. 730. 732.

thereof would be the same with the whole: from whence it follows, that it could not be extended, or have any real parts at all, since no part of an extended thing can possibly be the same with the whole.

Again, the same philosopher endeavours further to prove, that the human soul itself is unextended and indivisible, from its energies and operations, and that as well those of sensation as of intellection. First, therefore, from external sensations, he reasons in this manner: *εἴτι μέλλει αἰσθάνεσθαι τινος ἐν αὐτῷ δεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ παντός* P. 461.

*ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· καὶ εἰ διὰ πολλῶν αἰσθητηρίων* [cap. vi.]  
*πλείω τὰ εἰσιόντα, ἢ πολλαὶ περὶ ἐν ποίότητες, καὶ δι' ἐνός ποικίλον, οἷον πρόσωπον· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν ῥινός ἄλλο δὲ ὀφθαλμῶν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτόν ὁμοῦ πάντων· καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν δι' ὀμμάτων τὸ δὲ δι' ἀκοῆς, ἐν τῷ δεῖ εἶναι εἰς ὃ ἄμφω· ἢ πῶς ἂν εἴποι ὅτι ἕτερα ταῦτα, μὴ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοῦ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐλθόντων·* That, which perceiveth in us, must of necessity be one thing, and by one and the same indivisible perceive all; and that, whether they be more things, entering through several organs of sense, as the many qualities of one substance, or one various and multiform thing, entering through the same organ, as the countenance or picture of a man. For it is not one thing in us, that perceives the nose, another thing the eyes, and another thing the mouth; but it is one and the self-same thing, that perceiveth all. And when one thing enters through the eye, another through the ear, these also must of necessity come all at last to one indivisible, or else they could not be compared together, nor one of them affirmed to be different from another; the several sentiments of them meeting no where together



in one. He concludes, therefore, that this one thing in us, that sensibly perceives all things, may be resembled to the centre of a circle, and the several senses to lines drawn from the circumference, which all meet in that one centre. Wherefore, that which perceives and apprehends all things in us, must needs be really one and the very same; that is, unextended and indivisible. Which argument is yet further pursued by him, more particularly thus: If that, which sensibly perceiveth in us be extended, so as to have distant parts one without another; then one of these three things must needs be affirmed, that either every part of this extended substance of the soul perceives a part of the object only, or every part of it the whole object, or else all comes to some one point, which alone perceives both the several parts of the object, and the whole, all the other being but as circumferential lines leading to this centre. Now of the former of these three, Plotinus thus: *μεγέθει ὄντι τούτῳ, συμμερίζοιτο ἄν' ὥστε ἄλλο ἄλλου μέρος, καὶ μηδένα ἡμῶν ὅλου τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἀντίληψιν ἔχειν' ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐγὼ μὲν ἄλλον' σὺ δὲ ἄλλον αἰσθοιοι'.* If the soul be a magnitude, then must it be divided together with the sensible object, so that one part of the soul must perceive one part of the object, and another, another; and nothing in it, the whole sensible; just as if I should have the sense of one thing, and you of another. Whereas it is plain by our internal sense, that it is one and the self-same thing, which perceives both the parts and the whole. And of the second, he writeth in this manner: *εἰ δὲ ὅτιοῦν παντὸς αἰσθήσεται· εἰς ἄπειρα διαιρεῖσθαι τοῦ μεγέθους πεφυκότες, ἀπίρους καὶ αἰσθήσεις καθ'*

ἕκαστον αἰσθητὸν συμβήσεται γίγνεσθαι ἐκάστῳ οἷον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀπέρουσ ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι ἡμῶν εἰκόνας. But if every part of the extended soul perceive the whole sensible object, since magnitude is infinitely divisible, there must be in every man infinite sensations and images of one and the same object.—Whereas we are intimately conscious to ourselves, that we have but only one sensation of one object at the same time. And as for the third and last part of this disjunction, that what sensibly perceives in every one, is but one single point, either mathematical or physical; it is certain, first, that a mathematical point, having neither longitude, latitude, nor profundity, is no body nor substance, but only a notion of our own mind, or a mode of conceiving in us. And then, as for a physical point or minimum, a body so little, that there cannot possibly be any less, Plotinus asserting the infinite divisibility of body, here explodes the thing itself. However, he further intimates, that if there were any such physical minimum, or absolutely least body or extensum, this could not possibly receive upon it a distinct representation and delineation of all the several parts of a whole visible object at once, as of the eyes, nose, mouth, &c. in a man's face or picture, or of the particularities of an edifice; nor could such a parvitude or atom as this be the cause of all animal motions. And this was one of Aristotle's<sup>a</sup> arguments, whereby he would prove unextended incorporeals, πῶς τῷ ἀμερεῖ τὸ μεριστόν. If the soul were indivisible as a point, how could it perceive that which is divisible?—that is, take notice of all the distinct parts of an

<sup>a</sup> De Anima, lib. i. cap. iii. p. 10. tom. ii. oper.

extended object, and have a description of the whole of them at once upon itself? The sum of the whole argumentation is this, that if the soul be an extended substance, then must it of necessity be either a physical point or minimum, the least extensum that can possibly be, (if there be any such least, and body or extension be not infinitely divisible), or else it must consist of more such physical points, joined together. As for the former of these, it hath been already declared to be impossible, that one single atom or smallest point of extension, should be able distinctly to perceive all the variety of things: to which might be added, that to suppose every soul to be but one physical minimum, or smallest extensum, is to imply such an essential difference in matter or extension, as that some of the points thereof should be naturally devoid of all life, sense, and understanding, and others again naturally sensitive and rational. Which absurdity, though it should be admitted, yet would it be utterly unconceivable, how there should come to be one such sensitive and rational atom in every man and no more, and how this should constantly remain the same, from infancy to old age, whilst other parts of matter transpire perpetually. But as for the latter, if souls be extended substances, consisting of more points, one without another, all concurring in every sensation; then must every one of those points, either perceive a point and part of the object only, or else the whole. Now, if every point of the extended soul perceive only a point of the object, then is there no one thing in us, that perceives the whole, or which can compare one part

with another. But if every point of the extended soul perceive the whole object at once, consisting of many parts, then would there be innumerable perceptions of the same object in every sensation; as many as there are points in the extended soul. And from both those suppositions, it would alike follow, that no man is one single percipient or person, but that there are innumerable distinct percipients and persons in every man. Neither can there be any other supposition made, besides those three forementioned; as, that the whole extended soul should perceive both the whole sensible object, and all its several parts, no part of this soul in the mean time having any perception at all by itself; because the whole of an extended being is nothing but all the parts taken together; and if none of those parts have any life, sense, or perception in them, it is impossible that there should be any in the whole. But in very truth, to say, that the whole soul perceiveth all, and no part of it any thing, is to acknowledge it not to be extended, but to be indivisible, which is the thing that Plotinus contends for.

And that philosopher here further insists upon internal sensations also, and that *Συμπάθεια*, or *Ὁμοπάθεια*, that sympathy, or homopathy, which is in all animals to the same purpose: it being one and the same thing in them, which perceives pain, in the most distant extremities of the body, as in the sole of the foot, and in the crown of the head; and which moves one part to succour, and relieve another labouring under it, which could not possibly be by traduction of all to one physical point, as the centre, for divers reasons.

Ἐι τοίνυν κατὰ διάδοσιν οὐχ οἶόντε τὴν αἰσθησιν  
 P. 462. τοῦ τοιοῦτου γίγνεσθαι, μὴ δὲ σώματος ὄγκου  
 ὄντος, ἄλλου παθόντος, ἄλλο γινώσιν ἔχειν (παντὸς γὰρ  
 μεγέθους τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἐστὶ) δεῖ τοιοῦτον τίθεσθαι  
 τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, οἷον πανταχοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῶ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι  
 τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλῃ τινὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ σώματι ποιεῖν προσήκει

Since therefore these sympathetic senses cannot possibly be made by traduction, at last to one thing; and body being bulky or out-swelling extension, one part thereof suffering, another cannot perceive it (for in all magnitude, this is one thing and that another), it followeth, that what perceives in us, must be every where, and in all the parts of the body, one and the same thing with itself. Which therefore cannot be itself body, but must of necessity be some other entity or substance incorporeal.—The conclusion is, that in men and animals there is one thing indivisibly the same, that comprehendeth the whole outside of them, perceiveth both the parts and the whole of sensible objects, and all transmitted through several senses, sympathizeth with all the distant parts of the body, and acteth entirely upon all. And this is properly called, I myself, not the extended bulk of the body, which is not one, but many substances, but an unextended and indivisible unity, wherein all lines meet and centre, not as a mathematical point or least *extensum*, but as one self-active, living power, substantial or inside-being, that containeth, holdeth, and connecteth all together.

Lastly, The forementioned philosopher endeavours yet further to prove the human soul to be unextended and devoid of magnitude, and indivisible, from its rational energies or operations,

its νοητῶν νοήσεις, and ἀμεγέθων ἀντιλήψεις, intellections of intelligibles, and apprehensions of things devoid of magnitude, πῶς γὰρ μέγεθος ὄν τὸ μὴ μέγεθος νοήσει; καὶ τῷ μεριστῷ τὸ μὴ μεριστόν. For how could the soul (saith he), if it were a magnitude, understand that, which hath no magnitude? and with that, which is divisible, conceive that which is indivisible?—Now, it is certain, that we have notions of many things, which are ἀφάνταστα, altogether unimaginal, and therefore have nothing of length, breadth, and thickness in them, as virtue, vice, &c. ἀμέγεθες δὲ οἶμαι καὶ τὸ

καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ ἡ τούτων ἄρα νόησις. Plot. p. 463.

ὥστε καὶ προσίοντα καὶ τῷ ἀμερεῖ αὐτῆς ὑποδέξεται, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐν ἀμερεῖ κείσεται. Justice and honesty, and the like, are things devoid of magnitude, and therefore must the intellections of them needs be such too. So that the soul must receive these by what is indivisible, and lodge them in that which is divisible.—We have also a notion, not only of mere latitude or breadth, indivisible as to thickness; and of longitude or a line, indivisible both as to breadth and thickness; but also of a mathematical point, that is every way indivisible, as to length, breadth and thickness. We have a conception of the intention of powers and virtues, wherein there is nothing of extension or magnitude. And indeed all the abstract essences of things, (or the αὐτοέκαστα) which are the first objects of intellection, are indivisible: εἰ δὲ τῶν ἐν ὕλῃ εἰδῶν τὰς νοήσεις φήσουσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ χωριζομένων γε γίνονται τοῦ νοῦ χωρίζοντος, οὐ γὰρ μετὰ σαρκῶν, &c. And though we apprehend forms, that are in matter too, yet do we apprehend them as separated and abstracted from the same; there being

nothing of flesh in our conception of a man, &c.—Nay, the soul conceives extended things themselves, unextendedly and indivisibly; for as the distance of a whole hemisphere is contracted into a narrow compass in the pupil of the eye, so are all distances yet more contracted in the soul itself, and there understood indistantly; for the thought of a mile distance, or of ten thousand miles, or semidiameters of the earth, takes up no more room in the soul, nor stretches it any more, than does the thought of a foot or inch, or indeed of a mathematical point. Were that, which perceiveth in us, a magnitude, then could it not be ἴσον παντὶ αἰσθητῶ, equal to every sensible—and alike perceive both lesser and greater magnitudes than itself: but least of all could it perceive such things as have no magnitude at all. And this was the other part of Aristotle's argumentation, to prove the soul and mind to be unextended and indivisible,<sup>a</sup> πῶς γὰρ νοήσει τὸ ἀμερῆς μεριστῶ; for how could it perceive, that which is indivisible by what is divisible?—he having before demanded, how it could apprehend things divisible, and of a great extension, by a mere point, or absolute parvitude. Where the soul, or that which perceives and understands, is, according to Aristotle, neither divisible, as a continued quantity, nor yet indivisible, either as a mathematical, or as a physical point, and absolute parvitude; but as that, which hath in itself no out-swelling distance, nor relation to any place, otherwise than as it is vitally united to a body, which (wherever it be), it always sympathizes with and acts upon.

<sup>a</sup> De Anima, lib. i. cap. iii. p. 10. tom. ii. oper.

Besides which, these ancient assertors of unextended incorporeals would, in all probability, confirm that opinion from hence, because we cannot only conceive extension without cogitation, and again, cogitation without extension; from whence it may be inferred, that they are entities really distinct and separable from one another, (we having no other rule to judge of the real distinction and separability of things, than from our conceptions), but also are not able to conceive cogitation with extension. We cannot conceive a thought to be of such a certain length, breadth, and thickness, measurable by inches and feet, and by solid measures. We cannot conceive half, or a third part, or a twentieth part of a thought, much less of the thought of an indivisible thing; neither can we conceive every thought to be of some certain determinate figure, either round or angular; spherical, cubical, or cylindrical, or the like. Whereas, if whatsoever is unextended be nothing, thoughts must either be mere non-entities, or else extended too into length, breadth, and thickness; divisible into parts, and measurable; and also (where finite) of a certain figure. And, consequently, all verities in us (they being but complex axiomatical thoughts), must of necessity be long, broad, and thick, and either spherically, or angularly figurate. And the same must be affirmed of volitions likewise, and appetites or passions, as fear and hope, love and hatred, grief and joy; and of all other things belonging to cogitative beings (souls and minds), as knowledge and ignorance, wisdom and folly, virtue and vice, justice and injustice, &c. that these are either all of them ab-



solute non-entities, or else extended into three divisions of length, breadth, and profundity, and measurable not only by inches and feet, but also by solid measures, as pints and quarts; and last of all (where they are finite as in men), figurate. But if this be absurd, and these things belonging to soul and mind (though doubtless as great realities at least, as the things which belong to bodies), be unextended, then must the substances of souls and minds themselves be unextended also. Thus Plotinus of mind; *Νοῦς οὐ διαστάς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ*, mind is not distant from itself:—and indeed were it so, it could not be one thing (as it is), but many; every conceivable part of distant and unextended substance being a substance by itself. And the same is to be said of the human soul, though it act upon distant parts of that body, which it is united to, that itself, notwithstanding, is not scattered out into distance, nor dispersed into multiplicity, nor infinitely divisible; because then it would not be one single substance, or monad, but a heap of substances. Soul is no more divisible than life; of which the forementioned philosopher thus: *ἄραγε τὴν ζωὴν μεριεῖς; ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ πᾶν ἦν ζωὴ, τὸ μέρος ζωὴ οὐκ ἔσται*. Will you divide a life into two? then the whole of it being but a life, the half thereof cannot be a life.—Lastly, if soul and mind, and the things belonging to them, as life and cogitation, understanding and wisdom, &c. be outspread into distance, having one part without another; then can there be no good reason given, why they should not be as well really and physically, as intellectually divisible; and one part of them separable from another: since, as Plotinus, *παντ*

τὸς μεγέθους τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο: In all magnitude or extension, this is one thing, and that another.—At least, no Theist ought to deny, but that the Divine power could cleave or divide a thought, together with the soul, wherein it is, into many pieces; and remove them to the greatest distances from one another (forasmuch as this implies no manner of contradiction, and whatsoever is conceivable by us, may be done by infinite power), in which case neither of them alone would be soul or mind, life or thought, but all put together make up one entire mind, soul, life, and thought.

Wherefore, the sense of the ancient Incorporalists seems to have been as follows: That there are in nature two kinds of substances specifically differing from one another; the first, Ὀγκοί, bulks, or tumours, a mere passive thing; the second, Δυνάμεις, self-active powers or virtues, or φύσις δραστήριος, the energetic nature. The former of these is nothing else but magnitude or extension, not as an abstract notion of the mind, but as a thing really existing without it. For when it is called *res extensa*, the meaning is not, as if the *res* were one thing, and the extension thereof another, but that it is extension or distance, really existing, or the thing thereof (without the mind) and not the notion. Now, this in the nature of it is nothing but *aliud extra aliud*, one thing without another,—and therefore perfect alterity, disunity, and divisibility. So that no extensum whatsoever, of any sensible bigness, is truly and really one substance, but a multitude or heap of substances, as many as there are parts, into which it is divisible. Moreover,

one part of this magnitude always standing without another, it is an essential property thereof to be antitypous or impenetrable; that is, to jostle or shoulder out all other extended substance from penetrating into it, and coexisting with it, so as to possess and take up the same room and space. One yard of distance, or of length, breadth, and thickness, cannot possibly be added to another, without making the whole extension double to what it was before, since one of them must of necessity stand without the other. One magnitude cannot imbibe or swallow up another, nor can there be any penetration of dimensions. Moreover, magnitude or extension, as such, is mere outside or outwardness; it hath nothing within, no self-active power or virtue; all its activity being either keeping out, or hindering, any other extended thing from penetrating into it: (which yet it doth merely by its being extended, and therefore not so much by any physical efficiency as a logical necessity), or else local motion, to which it is also but passive; no body or extension, as such, being able to move itself, or act upon itself.

Wherefore, were there no other substance in the world besides this magnitude or extension, there could be no motion or action at all in it; no life, cogitation, consciousness; no intellection, appetite, or volition, (which things do yet make up the greatest part of the universe), but all would be a dead heap or lump: nor could any one substance penetrate another, and coexist in the same place with it. From whence it follows, of necessity, that besides this outside bulky extension, and tumourous magnitude, there must

be another kind of entity, whose essential attribute or character is life, self-activity, or cogitation. Which first, that it is not a mere mode or accident of magnitude and extension, is plain from hence, because cogitation may be as well conceived without extension, as extension without cogitation; whereas no mode of any thing can be conceived without that, whereof it is a mode. And since there is unquestionably much more of entity in life and cogitation, than there is in mere extension or magnitude, which is the lowest of all being, and next to nothing; it must needs be imputed to the mere delusion and imposture of imagination, that men are so prone to think this extension or magnitude to be only substance, and all other things besides the mere accidents thereof, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it. For though that secondary and participated life (as it is called) in the bodies of animals be indeed a mere accident, and such as may be present or absent without the destruction of its subject; yet can there be no reason given, why the primary and original life itself should not be as well a substantial thing, as mere extension and magnitude. Again, that extension and life, or cogitation, are not two inadequate conceptions neither, of one and the self-same substance, considered brokenly and by piecemeal; as if either all extension had life and cogitation essentially belonging to it, (as the Hylozoists conclude) or at least all life and cogitation had extension; and, consequently, all souls and minds, and even the Deity itself, were either extended life and cogitation, or living and thinking extension; (there being nothing in nature unextended, but extension the only

entity; so that whatsoever is devoid thereof, *is, ipso facto*, absolutely nothing :) this, I say, will also appear from hence, because, as hath been already declared, we cannot conceive a life, or mind, or thought, nor any thing at all belonging to a cogitative being, as such, (as wisdom, folly, virtue, vice, &c.) to be extended into length, breadth, and thickness, and to be mensurable by inches, feet, and yards. From whence it may be concluded, that extension, and life or cogitation, are no inadequate conceptions of one and the self-same thing, since they cannot be complicated together into one, but that they are distinct substances from each other. Lives and minds are such tight and compact things in themselves, and have such a self-unity in their nature, as that they cannot be lodged in that, which is wholly scattered out from itself into distance, and dispersed into infinite multiplicity; nor be spread all over the same, as coextended with it. Nor is it conceivable, how all the several parts of an extended magnitude should jointly concur and contribute to the production of one and the same single and indivisible cogitation; or how that whole heap or bundle of things should be one thinker. A thinker is a monad, or one single substance, and not a heap of substances; whereas no body or extended thing is one, but many substances; every conceivable or smallest part thereof being a real substance by itself.

But this will yet further appear, if we consider what kind of action cogitation is. The action of an extended thing, as such, is nothing but local motion, change of distance, or translation from place to place, a mere outside and superficial

thing; but it is certain, that cogitation (fancy, intellection, and volition) are no local motions; nor the mere fridging up and down of the parts of an extended substance, changing their place and distance; but it is unquestionably an internal energy; that is, such an energy, as is within the very substance or essence of that, which thinketh, or in the inside of it. From which two kinds of energies we may now conclude, that there are also two kinds of entity or substance in nature; the one mere outside, and which hath nothing within it; the other such a kind of entity, as hath an eternal energy; acteth from itself, and within itself, and upon itself; an inside thing, whose action is within the very essence or substance thereof; it being plain, that the cogitative or thinking nature is such a thing, as hath an essential inside or profundity. Now, this inside of cogitative beings, wherein they thus act or think internally within themselves, cannot have any length, breadth, or thickness in it; because if it had, it would be again a mere outside thing. Wherefore had all cogitative beings (souls and minds) extension and magnitude never so much belonging to them, as some suppose them to have, yet could this, for all that, be nothing but the mere outside of their being; besides which, they must of necessity have also an unextended inside, that hath no outswelling tumour, and is not scattered into distance, nor dispersed into multiplicity, which therefore could not possibly exist a part in a part of the supposed extension, as if one half of a mind or thought were in one half of that extension, and another in another; but must of necessity be all undividedly, both in the whole

of it, and in every part. For had every twentieth or hundredth part of this extensum not the whole of a life or mind in it, but only the twentieth or hundredth part thereof, then could none of them have any true life or mind at all, nor consequently the whole have any. Nor indeed is it otherwise conceivable, how a whole quantity of extended substance should be one thing, and have one personality, one I myself in it all, were there not one indivisible thing presiding over it, which held it all together, and diffused itself through all. And thus do we see, how this whole in the whole and in every part (do men what they can) will, like a ghost, still haunt them and follow them every where. But now it is impossible, that one and the self-same substance should be both extended and unextended. Wherefore in this hypothesis of extended understanding spirits, having one part without another, there is an undiscerned complication of two distinct substances, extended and unextended, or corporeal and incorporeal, both together; and a confusion of them into one. Where, notwithstanding, we must acknowledge, that there is so much of truth aimed at, as that all finite incorporeal substances are always naturally united to some bodies; so that the whole of these created animals is completed and made up of both these together, an extended inside, and an unextended outside, both of them substances indeed really distinct, but yet vitally united each to other.

The sum of all is, that there are two kinds of substances in nature, the first extension of magnitude, really existing without the mind, which is a thing, that hath no self unity at all in it, but is

infinite alterity and divisibility, as it is also mere outside and outwardness, it having nothing within, nor any other action belonging to it, but only locally to move, when it is moved. The second, life and mind, or the self-active cogitative nature, an inside being, whose action is not local motion, but an internal energy, within the substance or essence of the thinker himself, or in the inside of him; which, therefore, though unextended, yet hath a certain inward recess, βάθος, or essential profundity. And this is a thing, which can act all of it entirely upon either a greater or lesser quantity of extended substance or body, and its several parts, penetrating into it, and coexisting in the same place with it. Wherefore it is not to be looked upon either as a mathematical, or as a physical point, as an absolute parvitude, or the least extensum possible, it having not only such an essential inside, bathos, or profundity in it, wherein it acteth and thinketh within itself, but also a certain amplitude of active power *ad extra*, or a sphere of activity upon body. Upon which account, it was before affirmed by Plotinus, that an unextended incorporeal is a thing bigger than body, because body cannot exist otherwise than a point of it in a point of space; whereas this one and the same indivisible can at once both comprehend a whole extensum within it, and be all of it in every part thereof. And, lastly, all finite incorporeals are always naturally united to some body or other; from both which together is completed and made up in every created understanding being one entire animal, consisting of soul and body, and having something incorporeal, and something corporeal in it, an unextended inside, and an ex-



tended outside, by means whereof it is determined to here and there, and capable of moving locally, or changing place.

Thus have we represented the sense of the ancient unextended Incorporealists to the best advantage that we could, in way of answer to the premised atheistic argument against incorporeal substance, and in order to the vindication of them from the contempt of Atheists; and we do affirm, that the forementioned arguments of theirs do evince, that there is some other substance besides body, which therefore, according to the principles of these Atheists themselves, must be acknowledged to be unextended, it being concluded by them that whatsoever is extended is body. But whether they do also absolutely prove, that there is *οὐσία ἀμεγέθης, ἀδιάστατος, ἀμερής, and ἀδιαίρετος*, a substance devoid of magnitude, indistant, without parts, and indivisible; this we shall leave others to make a judgment of. However, it is certain, that Atheists, who maintain the contrary, must needs assert, that every thought, and whatsoever belongeth to soul, mind, (as knowledge, virtue, &c.) is not only mentally and mathematically divisible, so that there may be half, a third part, or a quarter of a thought, and the rest, supposed; but also physically separable, or discernible, together with the soul, wherein it is. They must also deny, that there is any internal energy at all, or any other action besides that outside superficial action of local motion, and consequently make all cogitation nothing but local motion or translation. And, lastly, they must maintain, that no substance can coexist with any other substance (as soul with body) otherwise than by

juxta-position only, and by possessing the pores, or filling up the intervals thereof, as a net with the water.

And this is the first answer to the forementioned atheistic argument against incorporeal substance; That though whatsoever is extended be body, yet every thing is not extended; but that life, or mind and cogitation, are an unextended, indistant, and indivisible nature. But, as we have already intimated, there are other learned assertors of incorporeal substance, who, lest God and spirits, being thus made unextended, should quite vanish into nothing, answer that atheistic argumentation after a different manner, by granting to these ~~Atheists~~ that proposition, that whatsoever is, is extended; and what is unextended, is nothing; but then denying that other of theirs, that whatsoever is extended, is body; they asserting another extension, specifically differing from that of bodies: for, whereas corporeal extension is not only impenetrable, so as that no one part thereof can enter into another, but also both mentally and really divisible, one part being in its nature separable from another; they affirm, that there is another incorporeal extension, which is both penetrable, and also indiscerpible, so that no one part thereof can possibly be separated from another, or the whole; and that to such an incorporeal extension as this belongeth life, cogitation, and understanding, the Deity having such an infinite extension, but all created spirits a finite and limited one, which also is in them supposed to be contractable and dilatable. Now it is not our part here to oppose Theists, but Atheists: wherefore we shall leave these two sorts of Incorporealists to dispute

it out friendly amongst themselves; and indeed therefore with the more moderation, equanimity, and toleration of dissent mutually, because it seemeth, that some are in a manner fatally inclined to think one way in this controversy, and some another. And whatever the truth of the case be, it must be acknowledged, that this latter hypothesis may be very useful and serviceable to retain some in Theism, who can by no means admit of a Deity, or any thing else, unextended; though, perhaps, there will not be wanting others also, who would go in a middle way betwixt these two, or compound them together, by supposing the Deity to be indeed altogether unextended, and all of it every where; but finite incorporeals, or created spirits, to have an unextended inside, a life or mind, diffusing itself into a certain amplitude of outward extension, whereby they are determined to a place, yet so as to be all in every part thereof; which outward extension is therefore not to be accounted body, because penetrable, contractable, and dilatible, and because no one part thereof is separable from the rest, by the rushing or incursion of any corporeal thing upon them. And thus is the Atheist's argument against incorporeal substance answered two manner of ways; first, that there is something unextended; and, secondly, that if there were none, yet must there of necessity be a substance otherwise extended than body is, so as to be neither antitypous nor discernible. And ourselves would not be understood here dogmatically to assert any thing in this point, save only what all Incorporealists do agree in, to wit, that besides body, which is impenetrably and divisibly extended, there is in nature another substance, that

is both penetrable of body and indiscerpible, or which doth not consist of parts separable from one another. And that there is at least such a substance as this, is unquestionably manifest from what hath been already declared.

But the Atheist will, in the next place, give an account of the original of this error (as he calls it) of incorporeal substance, and undertake to shew from what mistake it proceeded, which is yet another pretended confutation thereof; namely, that it sprung partly from the abuse of abstract names and notions, men making substances of them; and partly from the scholastic essences, distinct from the things themselves, and said to be eternal. From both which delusions and dotages together the Atheists conceive, that men have been first of all much confirmed in the belief of ghosts and spirits, demons and devils, invisible beings called by several names. Which belief had also another original, men's mistaking their own fancies for realities. The chief of all which affrightful ghosts and spectres, according to these Atheists, is the Deity, the Oberon, or prince of fairies and fancies. But then, whereas men, by their natural reason, could not conceive otherwise of these ghosts and spirits, than that they were a kind of thin, aerial bodies, their understandings have been so enchanted by these abstract names (which are indeed the names of nothing) and those separate essences and quiddities of scholastics, as that they have made incorporeal substances of them; the atheistic conclusion is, that they, who assert an incorporeal Deity, do really but make a scholastic separate essence, or the mere abstract notiou of an accident, a substantial thing, and

a ghost or spirit presiding over the whole world.

To which our reply in general first of all is, That all this is nothing but idle romantic fiction; the belief of a Deity, and substance incorporeal, standing upon none of those imaginary foundations. And then, as for that impudent atheistic pretence, that the Deity is nothing but a figment or creature of men's fear and imagination, and therefore the prince of fairies and fancies; this hath been already sufficiently confuted in our answer to the first atheistic argumentation, where we have also over and above shewed, that there is not only a natural prolepsis or anticipation of a God in the minds of men, but also, that the belief thereof is supported by the strongest and most substantial reason, his existence being indeed demonstrable, with mathematical evidence, to such as are capable, and not blinded with prejudice, nor enchanted by the witchcraft of vice and wickedness, to the debauching of their understandings. It hath been also shewed, that the opinion of other ghosts and spirits, besides the Deity, sprung not merely from fear and fancy neither, as children's bugbears, but from real phenomena; true sensible apparitions, with the histories of them in all ages, without which the belief of such things could never have held up so generally and constantly in the world. As, likewise, that there is no repugnancy at all to reason, but that there may be as well aërial and ethereal, as there are terrestrial animals; and that the dull and earthy stupidity of men's minds is the only thing, which makes them so prone to think, that there is no understanding nature supe-

rior to mankind, but that in the world all is dead about us; and to disbelieve the existence of any thing, which themselves cannot either see or feel. Assuredly, the Deity is no fancy, but the greatest reality in the world, and that, without which there could be nothing at all real, it being the only necessary existent; and, consequently, Atheism is either mere sottishness, or else a strange kind of irreligious fanaticism.

We now further add, that the belief of ghosts and spirits incorporeal; and, consequently, of an incorporeal Deity, sprung neither from any ridiculous mistake of the abstract names and notions of mere accidents for substances, nor from the scholastic essences, said to be eternal. For, as for the latter, none of those scholastics ever dreamed, that there was any universal man, or universal horse, existing alone by itself, and separate from all singulars; nor that the abstract metaphysical essences of men, after they were dead, subsisting by themselves, did walk up and down amongst graves, in airy bodies: it being absolutely impossible, that the real essence of any thing should be separable from the thing itself, or eternal, when that is not so. And were the essences of all things looked upon by these scholastics as substances incorporeal, then must they have made all things (even body itself) to be ghosts, and spirits, and incorporeal; and accidents also (they having their essences too) to be substantial. But in very truth, these scholastic essences, said to be eternal, are nothing but the intelligible essences of things, or their natures as conceivable, and objects of the mind. And, in this sense, it is an acknowledged truth, that the

essences of things (as, for example, of a sphere or triangle) are eternal, and such as were never made; because there could not otherwise be eternal verities concerning them. So that the true meaning of these eternal essences is indeed no other than this, that knowledge is eternal; or that there is an eternal Mind, that comprehendeth the intelligible natures and ideas of all things, whether actually existing, or possible only, their necessary relations to one another, and all the immutable verities belonging to them. Wherefore, though these eternal essences themselves be no ghosts nor spirits, nor substances incorporeal, they being nothing but objective entities of the mind, or noemata, and ideas; yet does it plainly follow from the necessary supposition of them (as was before declared) that there is one eternal unmade Mind, and perfect incorporeal Deity, a real and substantial Ghost or Spirit, which comprehending itself, and all the extent of its own power, the possibility of things, and their intelligible natures, together with an exemplar or platform of the whole world, produced the same accordingly.

But our atheistic argumentator yet further urges; that those scholastics and metaphysicians, who, because life or cogitation can be considered alone abstractly, without the consideration of body, therefore conclude it not to be the accident or action of a body, but a substance by itself (and which also, after men are dead, can walk amongst the graves); that these, I say, do so far abuse those abstract names and notions of mere accidents, as plainly to make substances incorporeal of them. To which therefore we reply also, that were the abstract notions of accidents in general made

incorporeal substances, by those philosophers aimed at, then must they have supposed all the qualities or affections of bodies, such as whiteness and blackness, heat and cold, and the like, to have been substances incorporeal also ; a thing yet never heard or thought of. But the case is far otherwise as to conscious life or cogitation, though it be an abstract also ; because this is no accident of body, as the Atheist (serving his own hypothesis) securely takes it for granted, nor indeed of any thing else, but an essential attribute of another substance, distinct from body (or incorporeal) ; after the same manner, as extension or magnitude is the essential attribute of body, and not a mere accident.

And now, having so copiously confuted all the most considerable atheistic grounds, we are necessitated to dispatch those that follow, being of lesser moment, with all possible brevity and compendiousness. The four next, which are the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth atheistic argumentations, pretend to no more than only this, to disprove a corporeal Deity ; or from the supposition, that there is no other substance in the world besides body, to infer the impossibility of a God ; that is, of an eternal unmade Mind, the maker and governor of the whole world : all which therefore signify nothing at all to the assertors of a Deity incorporeal, who are the only genuine Theists. Nevertheless, though none but Stoics, and such other Corporealists, as are notwithstanding Theists, be directly concerned in an answer to them, yet shall we, first, so far consider the principles of the atheistic Corporealism, contained in those two heads, the fifth and sixth, as



from the absolute impossibility of these hypotheses to demonstrate a necessity of incorporeal substance, from whence a Deity will also follow.

Here, therefore, are there two atheistic hypotheses, founded upon the supposition, that all is body: the first, in the way of qualities, generable and corruptible, which we call the *Hylopathian*; the second, in the way of unqualified atoms, which is the *Atomic, Corporealism, and Atheism*. The former of these was the most ancient, and the first sciography, or rude delineation of *Atheism*. For Aristotle<sup>a</sup> tells us, that the most ancient *Atheists* were those, who supposed matter or body, that is, bulky extension, to be the only substance, and unmade thing, that, out of which all things were made, and into which all things are again resolved; whatsoever is else in the world being nothing but the passions, qualities, and accidents thereof, generable and corruptible, or producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again. From whence the necessary consequence is, That there is no eternal unmade life or understanding, or that mind is no god, or principle in the universe, but essentially a creature.

And this *Hylopathian Atheism*, which supposeth whatsoever is in the universe to be either the substance of matter and bulk, or else the qualities and accidents thereof, generable and corruptible, hath been called also by us *Anaximandrian*. Though we deny not, but that there might be formerly some difference amongst the *Atheists* of this kind; nor are we ignorant, that *Simplicius* and others conceive *Anaximander* to have as-

<sup>a</sup> *Metaphys. lib. i. cap. iii. p. 264. tom. iv. oper.*

served, besides matter, qualities also eternal and unmade, or an homæomery, and similar atomology, just in the same manner as Anaxagoras afterward did, save only that he would not acknowledge any unmade mind or life; Anaximander supposing all life and understanding whatsoever, all soul and mind, to have risen up, and been generated from a fortuitous commixture of those similar atoms, or the qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, and the like, contempered together. And we confess, that there is some probability for this opinion. Notwithstanding which, because there is no absolute certainty thereof, and because all these ancient Atheists agreed in this, that life and understanding are either first and primary, or else secondary qualities of body, generable and corruptible; therefore did we not think fit to multiply forms of Atheism, but rather to make but one kind of Atheism of all this, calling it indifferently, Hylopathian, or Anaximandrian.

The second atheistic hypothesis is that form of Atheism described under the sixth head, which likewise supposing body to be the only substance, and the principles thereof devoid of life and understanding, does reject all real qualities, according to the vulgar notion of them, and generate all things whatsoever, besides matter, merely from the combinations of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, or the contextures of unqualified atoms, life and understanding not excepted; which, therefore, according to them, being no simple primitive and primordial thing, but secondary, compounded, and derivative, the mere creature of matter and motion, could not possibly be a God,

or first principle in the universe. This is that atomic Atheism called Democritical; Leucippus and Democritus being the first founders thereof. For though there was, before them, another atomology, which made unqualified atoms the principles of all bodies, it supposing, besides body, substance incorporeal; yet were these, as Laertius <sup>a</sup> declareth, the first that ever made ἀρχὰς τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους, senseless atoms, the principles of all things whatsoever, even of life and understanding, soul and mind.

Indeed it cannot be denied, but that from these two things granted, that all is body, and that the principles of body are devoid of all life and understanding, it will follow unavoidably, that there can be no corporeal Deity. Wherefore the Stoics, who professed to acknowledge no other substance besides body, and yet nevertheless had a strong persuasion of the existence of a God, or an eternal unmade Mind, the maker of the whole world, denied that other proposition of the atheistic Corporealists, that the principles of all bodies were devoid of life and understanding, they asserting an intellectual fire, eternal and unmade, the maker of the whole mundane system; which postulatam, of a living intellectual body eternal, were it granted to these Stoics, yet could not this their corporeal god, notwithstanding, be absolutely incorruptible, as Origen often inculcath: Ὁ Θεὸς τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἐστὶ σῶμα, οὐκ αἰδουμένοις λέγειν αὐτὸν τρεπτόν, καὶ δι' ὅλων ἀλλοιωτόν καὶ μεταβλητόν, καὶ ἀπαζαπλῶς δυνάμενον φθαρῆναι, παρὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ φθειρόν αὐτόν. God

L. i. c. Cels.  
P. 17.

<sup>a</sup> Lib. ix. segm. 44. p. 573.

to the Stoics is a body, and therefore mutable, alterable, and changeable; and he would indeed be perfectly corruptible, were there any other body to act upon him. Wherefore he is only happy in this, that he wants a corrupter or destroyer.—And thus much was therefore rightly urged by the atheistic argumentator, that no corporeal Deity could be absolutely in its own nature incorruptible, nor otherwise than by accident only immortal, because of its divisibility. For were there any other matter without this world, to make inroads and incursions upon it, or to disunite the parts thereof, the life and unity of the Stoical corporeal god must needs be scattered and destroyed. And therefore of this Stoical god does the same Origen thus further write;

Ὁ τῶν Στωϊκῶν Θεός, ἅτε σῶμα τυγχάνων, ὅτε μὲν ἡγεμονικὸν ἔχει τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν, ὅταν ἡ ἐκπύρωσις ἢ ὅτε δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους γίνεται αὐτῆς, ὅταν ἢ διακόσμησις· οὐδὲ γὰρ δεδύνηται οὗτοι τρανῶσαι τὴν φυσικὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἔννοιαν, ὡς πάντη ἀφθάρτου καὶ ἀπλοῦ, καὶ ἀσυνθέτου, καὶ ἀδιαιρέτου·

The god of the Stoics being a body, hath sometimes the whole for its hegemonic in the conflagration; and sometimes only a part of the mundane matter. For these men were not able to reach to a clear notion of the Deity, as a being every way incorruptible, simple, uncompounded, and indivisible.—Notwithstanding which, these Stoics were not therefore to be ranked amongst the Atheists, but far to be preferred before them, and accounted only a kind of imperfect Theists.

But we shall now make it evident, that in both these atheistic corporealisms (agreeing in those two things, that body is the only substance, and that the principles of body are not vital), there is

an absolute impossibility; not only because, as Aristotle<sup>a</sup> objecteth, they supposed no active principle; but also because their bringing of life and understanding (being real entities) out of dead and senseless matter is also the bringing of something out of nothing. And, indeed, the atomic Atheist is here of the two rather the more absurd and unreasonable, forasmuch as he, discarding all real qualities, and that for this very reason, because nothing can come out of nothing, doth himself, notwithstanding, produce life, sense, and understanding (unquestionable realities) out of mere magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions; that is, indeed, out of nothing. Wherefore there being an absolute impossibility of both these atheistic hypotheses (neither of which is able to solve the phenomenon of life and understanding), from that confessed principle of theirs, that matter, as such, hath no life nor understanding belonging to it, it follows unavoidably, that there must be some other substance besides body or matter, which is essentially vital and intellectual: *Ὅν γὰρ πάντα χρεῖται ἐπακτῶ ζωῆς*, because all things cannot possibly have a peregrine, adventitious, and borrowed life—but something in the universe must needs have life naturally and originally. All life cannot be merely accidental, generable, and corruptible, producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again, but there must of necessity be some substantial life, which point (that all life is not a mere accident, but that there is life substantial) hath been of late, with much reason and judgment, insisted upon, and urged by the writer of the *Life of Na-*

<sup>a</sup> Metaphysic. lib. i. cap. iii. p. 265. tom. iv. oper.

ture. Neither must there be only such a substantial life, as is naturally immortal for the future, but also such as is eternal, and was never made; all other lives and minds whatsoever (none of which could possibly be generated out of matter) being derived from this eternal unmade fountain of life and understanding.

Which thing the hylozoic Atheists being well aware of, namely, that there must of necessity be both substantial and eternal unmade life, but supposing also matter to be the only substance, thought themselves necessitated to attribute to all matter, as such, life and understanding, though not animalish and conscious, but natural only; they conceiving, that, from the modification thereof alone by organization, all other animalish life, not only the sensitive in brutes, but also the rational in men, was derived. But this hylozoic Atheism, thus bringing all conscious and reflexive life or animality, out of a supposed senseless, stupid, and unconscious life of nature in matter, and that merely from a different accidental modification thereof, or contexture of parts, does again plainly bring something out of nothing, which is an absolute impossibility. Moreover, this hylozoic Atheism was long since, and in the first emergence thereof, solidly confuted by the atomic Atheists, after this manner: If matter, as such, had life, perception, and understanding belonging to it, then of necessity must every atom, or smallest particle thereof, be a distinct percipient by itself; from whence it will follow, that there could not possibly be any such men and animals as now are compounded out of them, but every man and animal would be a heap of innumerable per-

cipients, and have innumerable perceptions and intellections; whereas it is plain, that there is but one life and understanding, one soul or mind, one perceiver or thinker, in every one. And to say, that these innumerable particles of matter do all confederate together; that is, to make every man and animal to be a multitude or commonwealth of percipients, and persons, as it were, clubbing together, is a thing so absurd and ridiculous, that one would wonder the hylozoists should not rather choose to recant that their fundamental error of the life of matter, than endeavour to seek shelter and sanctuary for the same under such a pretence. For though voluntary agents and persons may many of them resign up their wills to one, and by that means have all but as it were one artificial will, yet can they not possibly resign up their sense and understanding too, so as to have all but one artificial life, sense, and understanding; much less could this be done by senseless atoms, or particles of matter supposed to be devoid of all consciousness or animality. Besides which, there have been other arguments already suggested, which do sufficiently evince, that sense and understanding cannot possibly belong to matter any way, either originally or secondarily, to which more may be added elsewhere.

And now, from these two things, that life and understanding do not essentially belong to matter as such, and that they cannot be generated out of dead and senseless matter, it is demonstratively certain, that there must be some other substance besides body or matter. However, the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheists taking it for granted, that the first principles of

body are devoid of all life and understanding, must either acknowledge a necessity of some other substance besides body, or else deny the truth of that axiom, so much made use of by themselves, That nothing can come out of nothing. And this was our second undertaking, to shew, that from the very principles of the atheistic Corporealism, represented in the fifth and sixth heads, incorporeal substance is against those Atheists themselves demonstrable.

Our third and last was this; That there being undeniably substance incorporeal, the two next following atheistic argumentations, built upon the contrary supposition, are therefore altogether insignificant also, and do no execution at all. The first of which (being the seventh) impugning only such a soul of the world, as is generated out of matter, is not properly directed against Theism neither, but only such a form of Atheism (sometime beforementioned) as indeed cometh nearest to Theism. Which, though concluding all things to have sprung originally from senseless matter, Night and Chaos; yet supposes things from thence to have ascended gradually to higher and higher perfection; first, inanimate bodies, as the elements, then birds and other brute animals (according to the forementioned Aristophanic tradition, with which agreeth this of Lucretius,<sup>a</sup>

*Principio genus alituum, variaeque volucres;*)

afterward men, and in the last place gods; and that not only the animated stars, but Jupiter, or a soul of the world, generated also out of Night

<sup>a</sup> Lib. v. ver. 797.



and Chaos, as well as all other things. We grant, indeed, that the true and real Theists amongst the ancient Pagans also held the world's animation, and whosoever denied the same were therefore accounted absolute Atheists. But the world's animation, in a larger sense, signifies no more than this, that all things are not dead about us, but that there is a living sentient and understanding nature eternal, that first framed the world, and still presideth over it: and, it is certain, that in this sense all Theists whatsoever must hold the world's animation. But the generality of Pagan Theists held the world's animation also in a stricter sense; as if the world were truly and properly an animal, and therefore a god, completed and made up of soul and body together, as other animals are. Which soul of this great world-animal was to some of them the highest or supreme Deity, but to others only a secondary god, they supposing an abstract mind superior to it. But God's being the soul of the world in this latter Paganic sense, and the world's being an animal or a god, are things absolutely disclaimed and renounced by us. However, this seventh atheistic argument is not directed against the soul of the world in the sense of the Paganic Theists neither (this being, as they think, already confuted), but in the sense of the atheistic Theogonists; not an eternal unmade soul or mind, but a native or generated one only, such as resulted from the disposition of matter, and contexture of atoms, the offspring of Night and Chaos: the Atheists here pretending, after their confutation of the true and genuine Theism, to take away all shadows thereof also, and so to

free men from all manner of fear of being obnoxious to any understanding being, superior to themselves. Wherefore we might here omit the confutation of this argument, without any detriment at all to the cause of Theism: nevertheless, because this in general is an atheistic assertion, that there is no life and understanding presiding over the whole world, we shall briefly examine the supposed grounds thereof, which alone will be a sufficient confutation of it. The first of them therefore is this, that there is no other substance in the world besides body; the second, that the principles of bodies are devoid of all life and understanding; and the last, that life and understanding are but accidents of bodies resulting from such a composition or contexture of atoms, as produceth soft flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized, and of human form. From all which the conclusion is, that there can be no life and understanding in the whole, because it is not of human form, and organized, and hath no blood and brains. But neither is body the only substance, nor are life and understanding accidents resulting from any modification of dead and lifeless matter; nor is blood or brains that, which understandeth in us, but an incorporeal soul or mind, vitally united to a terrestrial organized body; which will then understand with far greater advantage, when it comes to be clothed with a pure, spiritual, and heavenly one. But there is in the universe also a higher kind of intellectual animals, which, though consisting of soul and body likewise, yet have neither flesh, nor blood, nor brains, nor parts so organized as ours are. And the most perfect mind and intel-

lect of all is not the soul of any body, but complete in itself, without such vital union and sympathy with matter. We conclude, therefore, that this passage of a modern writer,<sup>a</sup> "We worms cannot conceive, how God can understand without brains," is *vox pecudis*, the language and philosophy rather of worms or brute animals, than of men.

The next, which is the eighth atheistic argument, is briefly this: That whereas the Deity by Theists is generally supposed to be a living being perfectly happy, and immortal or incorruptible; there can be no such living being immortal, and consequently none perfectly happy. Because all living beings whatsoever are concretions of atoms, which as they were at first generated, so are they again liable to death and corruption; life being no simple primitive nature, nor substantial thing, but a mere accidental modification of compounded bodies only, which upon the disunion of their parts, or the disordering of their contexture, vanisheth again into nothing. And there being no life immortal, happiness must needs be a mere significant word, and but a romantic fiction. Where first, this is well, that the Atheists will confess, that according to their principles, there can be no such thing at all as happiness, because no security of future permanency; all life perpetually coming out of nothing, and whirling back into nothing again. But this atheistic argument is likewise founded upon the former error, that body is the only substance, the first principles whereof are devoid of all life and understanding;

<sup>a</sup> Hobbes.

whereas it is certain, that life cannot possibly result from any composition of dead and lifeless things ; and therefore must needs be a simple and primitive nature. It is true, indeed, that the participated life in the bodies of animals (which yet is but improperly called life, it being nothing but their being actuated by a living soul) is a mere accidental thing, generable and corruptible ; since that body, which is now vitally united to a living soul, may be disunited again from it, and thereby become a dead and lifeless carcass ; but the primary or original life itself is substantial, nor can there be any dead carcass of a human soul. That which hath life essentially belonging to the substance of it, must needs be naturally immortal, because no substance can of itself perish, or vanish into nothing. Besides which, there must be also some, not only substantial, but also eternal unmade life, whose existence is necessary, and which is absolutely unannihilable by any thing else ; which therefore must needs have perfect security of its own future happiness ; and this is an incorporeal Deity. And this is a brief confutation of the eighth atheistic argument.

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BUT the Democritic Atheist proceeds, endeavouring further to disprove a God from the phenomena of motion and cogitation, in the three following argumentations. First, therefore, whereas Theists commonly bring an argument from motion, to prove a God, or first unmoved Mover, the Atheists contend, on the contrary, that from the very nature of motion, the impossibility of

any such first unmoved Mover is clearly demonstrable. For, it being an axiom of undoubted truth concerning motion, that whatsoever is moved is moved by some other thing; or that nothing can move itself; it follows from thence unavoidably, that there is no *eternum Immobile*, no eternal unmoved Mover; but, on the contrary, that there was *eternum Motum*, an eternal Moved; or, that one thing was moved by another, from eternity infinitely, without any first mover or cause, because, as nothing could move itself, so could nothing ever move another, but what was itself before moved by something else.

To which we reply, That this axiom, whatsoever is moved, is moved by another, and not by itself, was by Aristotle, and those other philosophers, who made so much use thereof, restrained to the local motion of bodies only; that no body, locally moved, was ever moved originally from itself, but from something else. Now it will not at all follow from hence, that therefore *nihil movetur nisi a moto*, that no body was ever moved, but by some other body—that was also before moved by something else; or, that of necessity one body was moved by another body, and that by another, and so backwards, infinitely, without any first unmoved or self-moving and self-active mover, as the Democritic Atheist fondly conceits; for the motion of bodies might proceed (as unquestionably it did) from something else, which is not body, and was not before moved. Moreover, the Democritic Atheist here also, without any ground, imagines, that were there but one push once given to the world, and no more, this motion would from thenceforward always

continue in it, one body still moving another to all eternity. For though this be indeed a part of the Cartesian hypothesis, that, according to the laws of nature, a body moving will as well continue in motion, as a body resting in rest, until that motion be communicated and transferred to some other body; yet is the case different here, where it is supposed, not only one push to have been given to the world at first, but also the same quantity of motion or agitation to be constantly conserved and maintained. But to let this pass, because it is something a subtile point, and not so rightly understood by many of the Cartesians themselves, we say, that it is a thing utterly impossible, that one body should be moved by another infinitely, without any first cause or mover, which was self-active, and that not from the authority of Aristotle<sup>a</sup> only, pronouncing οὔτε δυνατόν ὄθεν ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως ἵνα εἰς ἄπειρον, &c. That in the causes of motion, there could not possibly be an infinite progress—but from the reason there subjoined by Aristotle, because εἴπερ μηδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλως αἴτιον οὐδὲν ἐστὶ, if there were no first unmoved mover, there could be no cause of motion at all.—For were all the motion, that is in the world, a passion from something else, and no first unmoved active mover, then must it be a passion from no agent, or without an action, and consequently proceed from nothing, and either cause itself, or be made without a cause. Now the ground of the Atheist's error here is only from hence, because he taketh it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body, nor any other action but local

<sup>a</sup> Physic. Auscult. lib. viii. cap. v. p. 537. tom. i. oper.

motion; from whence it comes to pass, that, to him, this proposition, No body can move itself, is one and the same with this, Nothing can act from itself, or be self-active.

And thus is the atheistic pretended demonstration against a God, or first cause, from motion, abundantly confuted; we having made it manifest, that there is no consequence at all in this argument, that because no body can move itself, therefore there can be no first unmoved mover; as also having discovered the ground of the Atheist's error here, their taking 'it for granted, that there is nothing but body; and, lastly, having plainly shewed, that it implies a contradiction there should be action and motion in the world, and yet nothing self-moving or self-active: so that it is demonstratively certain from motion, that there is a first cause, or unmoved mover. We shall now further add, that from the principle acknowledged by the Democritic Atheists themselves, That no body can move itself, it follows also undeniably, that there is some other substance besides body, something incorporeal, which is self-moving and self-active, and was the first unmoved mover of the heavens or world. For if no body from eternity was ever able to move itself, and yet there must of necessity be some active cause of that motion, which is in the world (since it could not cause itself), then is there unquestionably some other substance besides body, which having a power of moving matter, was the first cause of motion, itself being unmoved.

Moreover, it is certain from hence also, that there is another species of action, distinct from local motion, and such as is not *heterokinesy*,

but *autokinesy*, or self-activity. For since the local motion of body is essentially *heterokinesy*, not caused by the substance itself moving, but by something else acting upon it, that action, by which local motion is first caused, cannot be itself local motion, but must be autokinesy, or self-activity, that which is not a passion from any other agent, but springs from the immediate agent itself, which species of action is called cogitation. All the local motion, that is in the world, was first caused by some cogitative or thinking being, which not acted upon by any thing without it, nor at all locally moved, but only mentally, is the immoveable mover of the heavens, or vortices. So that cogitation is, in order of nature, before local motion, and incorporeal before corporeal substance, the former having a natural *imperium* upon the latter. And now have we not only confuted the ninth atheistic argument from motion, but also demonstrated against the Democritic Atheists from their own principle, that there is an incorporeal and cogitative substance, the first immoveable mover of the heavens, and vortices; that is, an incorporeal Deity.

But the Democritic Atheist will yet make a further attempt to prove, that there can be nothing self-moving or self-active, and that no thinking being could be a first cause; he laying his foundation in this principle, that nothing taketh its beginning from itself, but from the action of some other agent without it. From whence he would infer, that cogitation itself is heterokinesy, the passion of the thinker, and the action of something without it, no cogitation ever rising up of itself without a cause; and that cogitation



is indeed nothing but local motion or mechanism, and all living understanding beings machines, moved from without; and then make this conclusion, that therefore no understanding being could possibly be a first cause: he further adding also, that no understanding being, as such, can be perfectly happy neither, as the Deity is supposed to be, because dependent upon something without it: and this is the tenth atheistic argumentation.

Where we shall first consider that, which the Democritic Atheist makes his fundamental principle, or common notion to disprove all auto-kinesy, or self-activity by, that nothing taketh beginning from itself, but from the action of some other thing without it. Which axiom, if it be understood of substantial things, then is it indeed acknowledged by us to be unquestionably true, it being the same with this, That no substance, which once was not, could ever possibly cause itself, or bring itself into being; but must take its beginning from the action of something else: but then it will make nothing at all against Theism. As it is likewise true, that no action whatsoever, (and therefore no cogitation) taketh beginning from itself, or causeth itself to be, but is always produced by some substantial agent; but this will no way advantage the Atheist neither. Wherefore, if he would direct his force against Theism, he ought to understand this proposition thus, that no action whatsoever taketh beginning from the immediate agent (which is the subject of it), but from the action of some other thing without it; or, that nothing can move or act otherwise, than as it is moved and acted

upon by something else. But this is only to beg the question, or to prove the thing in dispute, identically, that nothing is self-active, because nothing can act from itself. Whereas it is in the mean time undeniably certain, that there could not possibly be any motion or action at all in the universe, were there not something self-moving or self-active, forasmuch as otherwise all that motion or action would be a passion from nothing, and be made without a cause.

And whereas the Atheists would further prove, that no cogitation taketh its beginning from the thinker, but always from the action of some other thing without it, after this manner; because it is not conceivable, why this cogitation, rather than that, should start up at any time, were there not some cause for it, without the thinker: here, in the first place, we freely grant, that our human cogitations are indeed commonly occasioned by the incursions of sensible objects upon us; as also, that the concatenations of those thoughts and phantasms in us, which are distinguished from sensations (whether we be asleep or awake) do many times depend upon corporeal and mechanical causes in the brain. Notwithstanding which, that all our cogitations are obtruded and imposed upon us from without; and that there is no transition in our thoughts at any time, but such as had been before in sense (which the Democritic Atheist avers), this is a thing which we absolutely deny. For, had we no mastery at all over our thoughts, but they were all like tennis-balls, banded and struck upon us, as it were, by rackets from without; then could we not steadily and constantly carry on any designs and purposes of

life. But on the contrary, that of Aristotle<sup>a</sup> is most true (as will be elsewhere further proved), that man, and all rational beings, are in some sense ἀρχὴ πράξεων, a principle of actions, subordinate to the Deity; which they could not possibly be, were they not also a principle of cogitations, and had some command over them; but these were all as much determined by causes without, as the motions of the weathercock are. The rational soul is itself an active and bubbling fountain of thoughts; that perpetual and restless desire, which is as natural and essential to us, as our very life, continually raising up and protruding new and new ones in us; which are as it were offered to us. Besides which, we have also a further self-recollective power, and a power of determining and fixing our mind and intention upon some certain objects, and of ranging our thoughts accordingly. But the Atheist is here also to be taught yet a further lesson, that an absolutely perfect mind (such as the Deity is supposed to be), doth not (as Aristotle writeth of it) ὅτ' ἐ μὲν νοεῖν ὅτ' ἐ δὲ οὐ νοεῖν, sometimes understand, and sometimes not understand—it being ignorant of nothing, nor syllogizing about any thing, but comprehending all intelligibles with their relations and verities at once within itself; and its essence and energy being the same. Which notion, if it be above the dull capacity of Atheists, who measure all perfection by their own scantling, this is a thing that we cannot help.

But as for that prodigious paradox of Atheists, that cogitation itself is nothing but local motion

<sup>a</sup> Vide lib. iii. ad Nicomach. cap. iii. p. 37. tom. iii. et Magnor. Moral. lib. i. cap. ix. et cap. xii. p. 202. 204.

or mechanism, we could not have thought it possible, that ever any man should have given entertainment to such a conceit, but that this was rather a mere slander raised upon Atheists; were it not certain from the records of antiquity, that whereas the old religious Atomists did, upon good reason, reduce all corporeal action (as generation, augmentation, and alteration) to local motion, or translation from place to place (there being no other motion besides this conceivable in bodies); the ancient atheizers of that philosophy (Leucippus and Democritus) not contented herewith, did really carry the business still on further, so as to make cogitation itself also nothing but local motion. As it is also certain, that a modern atheistic pretender to wit hath publicly owned this same conclusion, that mind is nothing else but local motion in the organic parts of man's body. These men have been sometimes indeed a little troubled with the fancy, apparition, or seeming of cogitation that is, the consciousness of it, as knowing not well what to make thereof; but then they put it off again, and satisfy themselves worshipfully with this, that fancy is but fancy, but the reality of cogitation nothing but local motion; as if there were not as much reality in fancy and consciousness, as there is in local motion. That, which inclined these men so much to this opinion, was only because they were sensible and aware of this, that if there were any other action besides local motion admitted, there must needs be some other substance acknowledged besides body. Cartesius indeed undertook to defend brute animals to be nothing else but machines; but then he supposed that there

was nothing at all of cogitation in them, and consequently nothing of true animality or life, no more than is in an artificial automaton, as a wooden eagle, or the like: nevertheless, this was justly thought to be paradox enough. But that cogitation itself should be local motion, and men nothing but machines; this is such a paradox, as none but either a stupid and besotted, or else an enthusiastic, bigotical, or fanatic Atheist, could possibly give entertainment to. Nor are such men as these fit to be disputed with any more than a machine is.

But whereas the atheistic objector adds also, over and above, in the last place, that no understanding being can be perfectly happy neither, and therefore not a god, because essentially dependent upon something else without it; this is all one, as if he should say, that there is no such thing as happiness at all in nature; because it is certain, that without consciousness or understanding nothing can be happy (since it could not have any fruition of itself); and if no understanding being can be happy neither, then must the conclusion needs be that of the Cyrenaics, that *ἑδαιμονία ἀνύπαρκτον*, happiness is a mere chimera—a fantastic notion or fiction of men's minds: a thing, which hath no existence in nature. These are the men, who afterward argue from interest also against a God and religion; notwithstanding that they confess their own principles to be so far from promising happiness to any, as that they absolutely cut off all hopes thereof. It may be further observed also, in the last place, that there is another of the Atheist's dark mysteries here likewise couched, that there is no scale or ladder of

entity and perfection in nature, one above another; the whole universe, from top to bottom, being nothing but one and the same senseless matter, diversely modified. As also that understanding, as such, rather speaks imperfection; it being but a mere whiffling, evanid, and fantastic thing; so that the most absolutely perfect of all things in the universe is grave, solid, and substantial senseless matter: of which more afterward. And thus in the tenth atheistic argumentation also confuted.

But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists will make yet a further assault from the nature of knowledge, understanding, after this manner: If the world were made by a God, or an antecedent mind and understanding, having in itself an exemplar or platform thereof, before it was made, then must there be actual knowledge, both in order of nature and time, before things; whereas things, which are the objects of knowledge and understanding, are unquestionably in order of nature before knowledge; this being but the signature of them, and a passion from them. Now, the only things are singular sensibles or bodies. From whence it follows, that mind is the youngest and most creaturely thing in the world; or that the world was before knowledge, and the conception of any mind; and no knowledge or mind before the world as its cause. Which is the eleventh atheistic argumentation.

But we have prevented ourselves here in the answer to this argument (which would make all knowledge, mind, and understanding junior to the world, and the very creature of sensibles), having already fully confuted it; and clearly

proved, that singular bodies are not the only things, and objects of the mind, but that it containeth its immediate intelligibles within itself; which intelligibles also are eternal, and that mind is no fantastic image of sensibles, nor the stamp and signature of them, but archetypal to them; the first mind being that of a perfect being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own omnipotence, or the possibilities of all things. So that knowledge is older than all sensible things; mind senior to the world, and the architect thereof. Wherefore we shall refer the reader, for an answer to this argument, to the preceding volume, where the existence of a God (that is, a mind before the world) is demonstrated also from this very topic, viz. the nature of knowledge and understanding.

We shall in this place only add; that as the Atheists can no way solve the phenomenon of motion, so can they much less that of cogitation, or life and understanding. To make which yet the more evident, we shall briefly represent a syllabus or catalogue of the many atheistic hallucinations or delirations concerning it. As, first, that senseless matter being the only substance, and all things else but accidental modifications thereof; life and mind is all a mere accidental thing, generable and corruptible, producible out of nothing and reducible to nothing again; and that there is no substantial life or mind any where. In opposition to which, we have before proved, that there must of necessity be some substantial life, and that human souls being lives substantial, and not mere accidental modifications of matter, they are consequently in their own nature immor-

tal, since no substance of itself ever vanisheth into nothing.

Again, the Democritics, and other Atheists conclude, that life and mind are no simple and primitive natures, but secondary and compounded things; they resulting from certain concretions and contextures of matter, and either the mixtures and contemporations of qualities, or else the combinations of those simple elements of magnitude, figure, site, and motion; and so being made up of that, which hath nothing of life or mind in it. For as flesh is not made out of fleshy particles, nor bone out of bony (as Anaxagoras of old dreamed), so may life, as they conceive, be as well made out of lifeless principles, and mind out of that which hath no mind or understanding at all in it: just as syllables pronounceable do result from combinations of letters, some of which are mutes, and cannot by themselves be pronounced at all, others but semi-vocal. And from hence do these Atheists infer, that there could be no eternal unmade life or mind, nor any that is immortal or incorruptible; since upon the dissolution of that compages or contexture of matter, from whence they result, they must needs vanish into nothing. Wherefore according to them, there hath probably sometime heretofore been no life nor understanding at all in the universe, and there may possibly be none again. From whence the conclusion is, that mind and understanding is no god, or principle in the universe; it being essentially factitious, native, and corruptible; or, as they express it in Plato,<sup>a</sup> *θνητὸς ἐκ θνητῶν*, mortal from mortal things—as also, that the souls of

<sup>a</sup> De Legibus, lib. x. p. 666.



men cannot subsist separately after death, and walk up and down in airy bodies ; no more than the form of a house or tree, after the dissolution thereof, can subsist by itself separately, or appear in some other body. But all this foolery of Atheists hath been already confuted, we having before shewed, that life and understanding are active powers, vigours, and perfections, that could never possibly result from mere passive bulk, or dead and senseless matter, however modified and compounded ; because nothing can come effectively from nothing. Neither is there any consequence at all in this, that because flesh is not made out of fleshy principles, nor bone out of bony, red out of red things, nor green out of green ; therefore life and understanding may as well be compounded out of things dead and senseless : because these are no syllables or complexions, as the others are, nor can either the qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry ; or else magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, however combined together, as letters spell them out, and make them up ; but they are simple and primitive things. And accordingly it hath been proved, that there must of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind. For though there be no necessity, that there should be any eternal unmade red, or green, because red and green may be made out of things not red nor green, they, and all other corporeal qualities (so called) being but several contextures of matter, or combinations of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, causing those several fancies in us : and though there be no necessity, that there should be eternal motion, because, if there were once no mo-

tion at all in matter, but all bodies rested, yet might motion have been produced by a self-moving or self-active principle: and, lastly, though there be no necessity, that there should be eternal unmade matter or body neither, because had there been once no body at all, yet might it be made or produced by a perfect omnipotent incorporeal being: nevertheless, is there an absolute necessity, that there should be eternal unmade life, and mind, because were there once no life nor mind at all, these could never have been produced out of matter altogether lifeless and mindless. And though the form of a house cannot possibly exist separately from the matter and substance thereof, it being a mere accidental thing, resulting from such a compages of stone, timber, and mortar, yet are human souls and minds no such accidental forms of compounded matter, but active substantial things, that may therefore subsist separately from these bodies, and enliven other bodies of a different texture. And however some, that are no Atheists, be over prone to conceive life, sense, cogitation, and consciousness, in brutes, to be generated out of dead, senseless, and unthinking matter, (they being disposed thereunto by certain mistaken principles, and ill methods of philosophy) nevertheless is this unquestionably in itself a seed of Atheism; because if any life, cogitation, and consciousness, may be produced out of dead and senseless matter, then can no philosophy hinder, but that all might have been so.

But the Democritic Atheists will yet venture further to deny, that there is any thing in nature self-moving or self-active, but that whatsoever

moveth and acteth, was before moved by something else, and made to act thereby; and again, that from some other thing, and so backward infinitely; from whence it would follow, that there is no first in the order of causes, but an endless retroinfinity. But as this is all one, as to affirm, that there is no such thing at all as life in the world, but that the universe is a compages of dead and stupid matter, so has this infinity in the order of causes been already exploded for an absolute impossibility.

Nevertheless, the Atheists will here advance yet an higher paradox; that all action whatsoever, and therefore cogitation, fancy, and consciousness itself, is really nothing else but local motion, and consequently not only brute-animals, but also men themselves mere machines, which is an equal, either sottishness or impudence, as to assert a triangle to be a square, or a sphere a cube, number to be figure, or any thing else to be any thing: and it is really all one as to affirm, that there is indeed no such thing in ourselves as cogitation; there being no other action in nature, but local motion and mechanism.

Furthermore, the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists universally agree in this, that not only sensations, but also all the cogitations of the mind, are the mere passions of the thinker, and the actions of bodies existing without upon him; though they do not all declare themselves after the same manner herein. For first, the Democritics conclude, that sense is caused by certain grosser corporeal effluvia, streaming from the surfaces of bodies continually, and entering through the nerves; but that all other cogitations of mind

and men's either sleeping or waking imaginations proceed from another sort of simulachra, idols; and images of a more fine and subtile contexture, coming into the brain, not through those open tubes, or channels of the nerves, but immediately through all the smaller pores of the body: so that, as we never have sense of any thing, but by means of those grosser corporeal images, obtruding themselves upon the nerves, so have we not the least cogitation at any time in our mind neither, which was not caused by those finer corporeal images, and exuvius membranes, or effluvia, rushing upon the brain or contexture of the soul. <sup>a</sup> Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος τὴν Αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν Νόησιν Εἰδώλων ἔξωθεν προϊόντων· μηδενὶ γὰρ ἐπιβάλλειν μηδετέραν χωρὶς τοῦ προσπίπτοντος. Leucippus and Democritus determined, that as well Noesis as Aisthesis, mental cogitation as external sensation, was caused by certain corporeal idols, coming from bodies without; since neither sensation nor cogitation could otherwise possibly be produced.—And thus does Laertius <sup>b</sup> also represent the sense of these atheistic philosophers, that the effluvia from bodies called idols were the only causes, τῶν κατὰ ψυχὴν κινήματων καὶ βουλημάτων ἐκάστων καὶ ἠθῶν καὶ παθῶν, of all the motions, passions, and affections, and even the very volitions of the soul.—So that as we could not have the least sensation, imagination, nor conception of any thing otherwise than from those corporeal effluvia, rushing upon us from bodies without, and begetting the same in us, at such a time; so neither

<sup>a</sup> Plutarch de Placit. Philos. lib. iv. cap. viii. p. 899. tom. ii. oper.

<sup>b</sup> Laertius does not ascribe this opinion to Leucippus, but only to Democritus, lib. ix. segm. 44. p. 573.

could we have any passion, appetite, or volition, which we were not in like manner corporeally passive to. And this was the ground of the Democritic fate, or necessity of all human actions, maintained by them, in opposition to the *τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν*, or liberty of will, which cannot be conceived without self-activity, and something of contingency; they supposing human volitions also, as well as all the other cogitations, to be mechanically caused and necessitated from those effluvious images of bodies coming in upon the willers. And, however Epicurus sometime pretended to assert liberty of will against Democritus, yet, forgetting himself, did he also here securely philosophize after the very same manner;

Lucret. l. iv.  
p. 358. 360.  
[ver. 726.]

Nunc age, quæ moveant animum res, accipe paucis;  
Quæ veniunt veniant in mentem, percipe paucis,  
Principio hoc dico rerum simulachra vagari, &c.

But others there were amongst the ancient Atomists, who could not conceive sensations themselves to be thus caused by corporeal effluvia, or exuvious membranes streaming from bodies continually, and that for divers reasons alleged by them; but only by a pressure from them upon the optic nerve, by reason of a tension of the intermedium air, or ether, (being that which is called light;) whereby the distant object is touched and felt, *οἶον διὰ βακτηρίας*,<sup>a</sup> as it were by a staff. Which hypothesis concerning the corporeal part of sense is indeed much more inge-

<sup>a</sup> Vide Plutarch. de Placit. Philos. lib. iv. cap. xv. p. 911. tom. ii. oper. et Laert. lib. vii. segm. 157. p. 466.

nious, and agreeable to reason, than the former. But the atheizers of this atomology, as they supposed sense to be nothing else, but such a pressure from bodies without; so did they conclude imagination and mental cogitation to be but the relics and remainders of those motions of sense formerly made, and conserved afterwards in the brain (like the tremulous vibrations of a clock or bell, after the striking of the hammer, or the rolling of the waves after that the wind is ceased;) melting, fading, and decaying insensibly by degrees. So that, according to these, knowledge and understanding is nothing but failing and decaying sense, and all our volitions but mechanic motions, caused from the actions, or trusions of bodies upon us. Now, though it be true, that in sensation there is always a passion antecedent made upon the body of the sentient from without; yet is not sensation itself this very passion, but a perception of that passion: much less can mental conception be said to be the action of bodies without, and the mere passion of the thinker; and least of all volitions such, there being plainly here something *ἐφ' ἡμῖν*, in our own power,—(by means whereof we become a principle of actions, accordingly deserving commendation, or blame), that is, something of self-activity.

Again, according to the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, all knowledge and understanding is really the same thing with sense; the difference between these two, to some of them, being only this, that what is commonly called sense, is primary and original knowledge, and knowledge but secondary, or fading and decaying sense; but to others, that sense is caused by

those more vigorous idols, or effluvia from bodies intromitted through the nerves; but understanding and knowledge by those more weak and thin, umbratile and evanid ones, that penetrate the other smaller pores of the body: so that both ways understanding and knowledge will be but a weaker sense. Now, from this doctrine of the atheistic Atomists, that all conception and cogitation of the mind whatsoever, is nothing else but sense and passion from bodies without, this absurdity first of all follows unavoidably; that there cannot possibly be any error, or false judgment, because it is certain, that all passion is true passion, and all sense or seeming, and appearance, true seeming and appearance. Wherefore, though some sense and passion may be more obscure than other, yet can there be none false, itself being the very essence of truth. And thus Protagoras, one of these atheistic Atomists, having first asserted, that knowledge is nothing else but sense, did thereupon admit this as a necessary consequence, that *πάσα δόξα ἀληθής*,<sup>a</sup> every opinion is true; because it is nothing but seeming and appearance, and every seeming and appearance is truly such; and because it is not possible for any one to opine that which is not, or to think otherwise than he suffers.—Wherefore Epicurus, being sensible of this inconvenience, endeavoured to dissolve this phenomenon of error and false opinion, or judgment, consistently with his own principles, after this manner; that though all knowledge be sense, and all sense true, yet may error arise notwithstanding, *ex*

<sup>a</sup> Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 118. and Laert. lib. ix. scgm. 51, p. 576.

*animi opinatu*,<sup>a</sup> from the opinion of the mind, adding something of its own, over and above, to the passion and fancy of sense. But herein he shamefully contradicts himself; for if the mind, in judging and opining, can superadd any thing of its own, over and above to what it suffers, then is it not a mere passive thing, but must needs have a self-active power of its own, and consequently will prove also incorporeal; because no body can act otherwise than it suffers, or is made to act by something else without it. We conclude, therefore, that since there is such a thing as error, or false judgment, all cogitations of the mind cannot be mere passions; but there must be something of self-activity in the soul itself, by means whereof it can give its assent to things not clearly perceived, and so err.

Again, from this atheistic opinion, That all knowledge is nothing else but sense, either primary or secondary, it follows also, that there is no absolute truth nor falsehood, and that knowledge is of a private nature, relative and fantastical only, or mere seeming, that is, nothing but opinion; because sense is plainly seeming, phantasy, and appearance; a private thing, and relative to the sentient only. And here also did Protagoras,<sup>b</sup> according to his wonted freedom, admit this consequence, that knowledge being sense, there was no absoluteness at all therein; and that nothing was true otherwise, than *τούτῳ καὶ τινὶ*, to this and to that man so thinking;—that every man did but *τὰ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον δοξάζειν*, opine only his own things;—that *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον*

<sup>a</sup> Vide Lucret. l. iv. ver. 464.

<sup>b</sup> Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 116. 119. 122. 126. 129.



ἄνθρωπος, every man was the measure of things and truth to himself;—and, lastly, τὸ φαινόμενον ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ εἶναι ὃ φαίνεται, that whatsoever seemed to every one, was true to him, to whom it seemed.—Neither could Democritus himself, though a man of more discretion than Protagoras, dissemble this consequence from the same principle asserted by him, that understanding is fantastical, and knowledge but opinion; he owning it sometimes before he was aware, as in these words of his:<sup>a</sup> γινώσκειν χρὴ ἄνθρωπον τῷδε τῷ κανόνι, ὅτι αἰτίας ἀπήλλακται. We ought to know man, according to this rule, that he is such a thing, as hath nothing to do with absolute truth.—And again, αἰτία (or ἐτεῆ) οὐδὲν ἴσμεν περὶ οὐδενός, ἀλλ' ἐπιρροσμη ἐκάστοισιν ἢ δόξαις. We know nothing absolutely concerning any thing; and all our knowledge is opinion.—Agreeably to which, he determined, that men's knowledge was diversified by the temper of their bodies, and the things without them.<sup>b</sup> And Aristotle judiciously observing both these doctrines, That there is no error or false judgment, but every opinion true; and again, That nothing is absolutely true, but relatively only; to be really and fundamentally one and the same, imputeth them both together to Democritus, in these words of his:<sup>c</sup> οὐδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές· ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθές εἶναι. Democritus held, that there was nothing absolutely true; but because he thought know-

<sup>a</sup> Vide Sextum Empiric. lib. vii. advers. Mathematic. seu i. advers. Logicos. §. 137. p. 399, 400.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. p. 399.

<sup>c</sup> Aristot. Metaphysic. lib. iv. cap. v. p. 312. tom. iv. oper.

ledge or understanding to be sense, therefore did he conclude, that whatsoever seemed according to sense, must of necessity be true (not absolutely but relatively), to whom it so seemed.—These gross absurdities did the atheistic Atomists plunge themselves into, whilst they endeavoured to solve the phenomenon of cogitation, mind, or understanding, agreeably to their own hypothesis. And, it is certain, that all of them, Democritus himself not excepted, were but mere blunderers in that atomic physiology, which they so much pretended to, and never rightly understood the same; forasmuch as that, with equal clearness, teaches these two things at once, that sense indeed is fantastical and relative to the sentient; but that there is a higher faculty of understanding and reason in us, which thus discovers the phantasm of sense, and reaches to the absoluteness of truth, or is the criterion thereof.

But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists will further conclude, that the only things or objects of the mind are singular sensibles, or bodies existing without it; which therefore must needs be, in order of nature, before all knowledge, mind, and understanding whatsoever, this being but a fantastic image or representation of them. From whence they infer, that the corporeal world, and these sensible things, could not possibly be made by any mind or understanding, because essentially junior to them, and the very image and creature of them. Thus does Aristotle observe,<sup>a</sup> concerning both Democritus and Protagoras, that they did *ὑπολαμβάνειν τὰ ὄντα*

<sup>a</sup> *Metaphysicor. lib. iv. cap. v. p. 313. tom. iv. oper.*

*μόνον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ*, suppose the only things or objects of the mind to be sensibles; and that this was the reason why they made knowledge to be sense, and therefore relative and fantastical. But we have already proved, that mind and understanding is not the fantastic image of sensibles or bodies, and that it is in its own nature not ectypal, but archetypal and architectonical of all; that it is senior to the world, and all sensible things, it not looking abroad for its objects any where without, but containing them within itself; the first original Mind being an absolutely perfect Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own omnipotence, or all possibilities of things, together with the best platform of the whole, and producing the same accordingly.

But it being plain that there are, besides singulars, other objects of the mind universal, from whence it seems to follow, that sensibles are not the only things; some modern atheistic wits have therefore invented this further device to maintain the cause, and carry the business on, that universals are nothing else but names or words, by which singular bodies are called; and, consequently, that in all axioms and propositions, sententious affirmations and negations (in which the predicate at least is universal), we do but add or subtract, affirm or deny, names of singular bodies; and that reason or syllogism is nothing but the reckoning or computing the consequences of these names or words. Neither do they want the impudence to affirm, that besides those passions or fancies, which we have from things by sense, we know nothing at all of any

thing but only the names, by which it is called; than which there cannot be a greater sottishness or madness: for if geometry were nothing but the knowledge of names, by which singular bodies are called, as itself could not deserve that name of a science, so neither could its truths be the same in Greek and in Latin; and geometricians, in all the several distant ages and places of the world, must be supposed to have had the same singular bodies before them, of which they affirmed and denied those universal names.

In the last place, the Epicurean and Anaximandrian Atheists, agreeably to the premised principles, and the tenor of their hypothesis, do both of them endeavour to depreciate and undervalue knowledge or understanding, as a thing, which hath not any higher degree of perfection or entity in it than is in dead and senseless matter; it being, according to them, but a passion from singular bodies existing without, and therefore both junior and inferior to them; a tumult raised in the brain, by motions made upon it from the objects of sense; that which essentially includeth in it dependance upon something else; at best but a thin and evanid image of sensibles, or rather an image of those images of sense, a mere whiffling and fantastic thing; upon which account they conclude it not fit to be attributed to that, which is the first root and source of all things, which therefore is to them no other than grave and solid senseless matter, the only substantial, self-existent, independent thing, and consequently the most perfect and Divine. Life and understanding, soul and mind, are to them no simple and primitive natures, but secondary

and derivative, or syllables and complexions of things, which sprung up afterwards, from certain combinations of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, or contemperations of qualities, textures either of similar or dissimilar atoms. And as themselves are juniors to senseless matter and motion, and to those inanimate elements, fire, water, air and earth, the first and most real productions of nature and chance, so are their effects, and the things that belong to them, comparatively with those other real things of nature, but slight, ludicrous, and umbratile, as landscape in picture, compared with the real prospect of high mountains, and low valleys, winding or meandrous rivers, towering steeples, and the shady tops of trees and groves; as they are, accordingly, commonly disparaged under those names of notional and artificial. And thus was the sense of the ancient Atheists represented by

Plato; *φασί, τὰ μὲν Μέγιστα καὶ Κάλλιστα*  
De Leg. l. x.  
 p. 889.  
 [p. 665, 666.] *ἀπεργάζεσθαι Φύσιν καὶ Τύχην, τὰ δὲ Σμικρό-  
 τερα Τέχνην· ἦν δὴ παρὰ φύσεως λαμβάνουσαν  
 τὴν τῶν μεγάλων καὶ πρώτων γένεσιν ἔργων, πλάττειν καὶ  
 τεκταίνεσθαι πάντα τὰ σμικρότερα, ἃ δὴ τεχνικὰ προσα-  
 γορεύομεν·* They say, that the greatest and most  
 excellent things of all were made by senseless  
 nature and chance; but all the smaller and more  
 inconsiderable, by art, mind, and understanding;  
 which taking from nature those first and greater  
 things as its ground-work to act upon, doth  
 frame and fabricate all the other lesser things,  
 which are therefore commonly called artificial.—  
 And the mind of these Atheists is there also  
 further declared by that philosopher after this  
 manner: The first, most real, solid and substan-

tial things in the whole world, are those elements, fire, water, air, and earth, made by senseless nature and chance, without any art, mind, or understanding: and next to these the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, and this terrestrial globe, produced out of the aforesaid inanimate elements, by unknowing nature, or chance likewise, without any art, mind, or God.—The fortuitous concourse of similar or dissimilar atoms, begetting this whole system and compages of heaven and earth: *τέχνην δὲ ὑστερον ἐκ τούτων ὑστέραν γενομένην, αὐτὴν θνητὴν ἐκ θνητῶν ὑστερα γεγενῆσθαι παιδείας τινὰς, ἀληθείας οὐ σφόδρα μετεχούσας, ἀλλ' εἰδῶλ' ἅτα ξυγγενῆ ἑαυτῶν, οἷον ἢ γραφικὴ καὶ τὰ ἕξῃς.* But that afterwards art or mind, and understanding, being generated also in the last place out of those same senseless and inanimate bodies or elements (it rising up in certain smaller pieces of the universe, and particular concretions of matter called animals), mortal from mortal things, did produce certain other ludicrous things, which partake little of truth and reality, but are mere images, umbrages, and imitations, as picture and landscape, &c. but, above all, those moral differences of just and unjust, honest and dishonest, the mere figments of political art, and slight umbratile things, compared with good and evil natural, that consist in nothing, but agreement and disagreement with sense and appetite: *τὰ γὰρ καλὰ, φύσει μὲν ἄλλα, νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ δίκαια οὐδὲ τοπαράπαν φύσει.* For, as for things good and honest, those, that are such by nature, differ from those, which are such by law; but as for just and unjust, there is by nature no such thing at all.—The upshot and conclusion of all is, that there is no

such scale or ladder in nature as Theists and metaphysicians suppose, no degrees of real perfection and entity one above another, as of life and sense above inanimate matter, of reason and understanding above sense; from whence it would be inferred, that the order of things in nature was in way of descent from higher and greater perfection, downward to lesser and lower, which is indeed to introduce a God. And that there is no such scale or ladder of perfection and entity, they endeavour further to prove from hence, because, according to that hypothesis, it would follow, that every the smallest and most contemptible animal that could see the sun, had a higher degree of entity and perfection in it, than the sun itself; a thing ridiculously absurd; or else, according to Cotta's<sup>a</sup> instance; "*Idcirco formicam antepenendam esse huic pulcherrimæ urbi, quod in urbe sensus sit nullus, in formica non modo sensus, sed etiam mens, ratio, memoria.*" That therefore every ant or pismire were far to be preferred before this most beautiful city of Rome; because in the city there is no sense; whereas an ant hath not only sense, but also mind, reason, and memory;—that is, a certain sagacity superior to sense. Wherefore they conclude, that there is no such scale or ladder in nature, no such climbing stairs of entity and perfection, one above another, but that the whole universe is one flat and level, it being indeed all nothing but the same uniform matter, under several forms, dresses, and disguises; or variegated by diversity of accidental modifica-

<sup>a</sup> Apud Ciceron. de Natur. Deor. lib. iii. cap. ix. p. 3061. tom. ix. oper.

tions; one of which is that of such beings as have fancy in them, commonly called animals; which are but some of sportful or wanton natures, more trimly artificial and finer *gamaieus*, or pretty toys; but by reason of this fancy they have no higher degree of entity and perfection in them, than is in senseless matter: as they will also be all of them quickly transformed again into other seemingly dull, unthinking and inanimate shapes. Hitherto the sense of Atheists.

But the pretended grounds of this atheistic doctrine (or rather madness), have been already also confuted over and over again. Knowledge and understanding is not a mere passion from the thing known, existing without the knower, because to know and understand, as Anaxagoras<sup>a</sup> of old determined, is *κρατεῖν*, to master and conquer the thing known, and consequently not merely to suffer from it, or passively to lie under it, this being *κρατεῖσθαι*, to be mastered and conquered by it. The knowledge of universal theorems in sciences is not from the force of the thing known existing without the knower, but from the active power, and exerted vigour or strength of that, which knows. Thus Severinus, Boethius; “Videsne, ut in cognoscendo, cuncta sua potius facultate, quam eo-  
Cons. l. v. pro.  
4. [lib. v. p.  
132.]  
 rum, quæ cognoscuntur, utantur? Neque id injuria, nam cum omne judicium judicantis actus existat, necesse est, ut suam quisque operam, non ex aliena, sed ex propria potestate perficiat.” See you not how all things, in knowing, use their own power and faculty rather than that of the thing known? For since judgment

<sup>a</sup> Apud Aristot. de Anima, lib. iii. cap. v. p. 48. tom. ii. oper.



is the action of that which judgeth, every thing must of necessity perform its own action, by its own power, strength, and faculty, and not by that of another.—Sense itself is not a mere passion, or reception of the motion from bodies without the sentient, for if it were so, then would a looking-glass, and other dead things see; but it is a perception of a passion made upon the body of the sentient, and therefore hath something of the soul's own self-activity in it. But understanding, and the knowledge of abstract sciences is neither primary sense, nor yet the fading and decaying remainders of the motions thereof, but a perception of another kind, and more inward than that of sense; not sympathetic, but unpassionate, the noemata of the mind being things distinct from the phantasmata of sense and imagination; which are but a kind of confused cogitations. And though the objects of sense be only singular bodies, existing without the sentient, yet are not these sensibles therefore the only things and cogitables; but there are other objects of science, or intelligibles, which the mind containeth within itself. That dark philosophy of some, tending so directly to Atheism, that there is nothing in the mind or understanding, which was not at first in corporeal sense, and derived in way of passion from matter, was both elegantly and solidly confuted by

Boethius's philosophic muse after this manner :

Quondam porticus attulit,  
 Obscuros nimium senes,  
 Qui sensus et imagines  
 E corporibus extimis,  
 Credant mentibus imprimi ;

Ut quondam celeri stylo  
 Mos est æquore paginae  
 Quæ nullas habeat notas,  
 Pressas figere literas.  
 Sed mens si propriis vigens  
 Nihil motibus explicat,  
 Sed tantum patiens jacet  
 Notis subdita corporum,  
 Cassasque in speculi vicem  
 Rerum reddit imagines,  
 Unde hæc sic animis viget,  
 Cernens omnia notio?  
 Quæ vis singula prospicit?  
 Aut quæ cognita dividit?  
 Quæ divisa recolligit?  
 Alternumque legens iter,  
 Nunc summis caput inserit,  
 Nunc decidit in infima;  
 Tum sese referens sibi  
 Veris falsa redarguit?  
 Hæc est efficiens magis,  
 Longe causa potentior  
 Quam quæ materiæ modo  
 Impressas patitur notas.  
 Præcedit tamen excitans  
 Et vires animi movens,  
 Vivo in corpore passio.  
 Cum vel lux oculos ferit,  
 Vel vox auribus instrepit:  
 Tum mentis vigor excitus,  
 Quas intus species tenet,  
 Ad motus similes vocans,  
 Notis applicat exteris.

It is true indeed, that the *Noηρόν*, or thing understood, is, in order of nature, before the intellection and conception of it; and from hence was it, that the Pythagoreans and Platonists concluded, that *Νοῦς*, mind or intellect, was not the very first and highest thing in the scale of the universe, but that there was another Divine hypostasis, in order of nature before it, called by them *Ἐν* and *Τ' ἀγαθόν*, one and the good—as the *Noηρόν* or intelligible thereof.

But as those three archical hypostases of the Platonists and Pythagoreans are all of them really but one Θεῖον or Divinity, and the first of those three (superior to that which is properly called by them mind or intellect), is not supposed therefore to be ignorant of itself; so is the first Mind or Understanding no other, than that of a perfect Being, infinitely good, fecund, and powerful, and virtually containing all things; comprehending itself and the extent of its own goodness, fecundity, virtue, and power; that is, all possibilities of things, their relations to one another, and verities; a mind before sense and sensible things. An omnipotent understanding Being, which is itself its own intelligible, is the first Original of all things. Again, that there must of necessity be some other substance besides body or matter, and which, in the scale of nature, is superior to it, is evident from hence, because otherwise there could be no motion at all therein, no body being ever able to move itself. There must be something self-active and hylarchical, something that can act both from itself, and upon matter, as having a natural imperium, or command over it. Cogitation is, in order of nature, before local motion. Life and understanding, soul and mind, are no syllables or complexions of things, secondary and derivative, which might therefore be made out of things devoid of life and understanding; but simple, primitive, and uncompounded natures: they are no qualities or accidental modifications of matter, but substantial things. For which cause souls or minds can no more be generated out of matter, than matter itself can be generated out

of something else ; and therefore are they both alike (in some sense), principles, naturally ingenerable and incorruptible, though both matter, and all imperfect souls and minds, were at first created by one perfect, omnipotent, understanding Being. Moreover, nothing can be more evident than this, that mind and understanding hath a higher degree of entity or perfection in it, and is a greater reality in nature, than mere senseless matter or bulky extension. And, consequently, the things which belong to souls and minds, to rational and intellectual beings as such, must not have less, but more reality in them, than the things which belong to inanimate bodies. Wherefore, the differences of just and unjust, honest and dishonest, are greater realities in nature, than the differences of hard and soft, hot and cold, moist and dry. He, that does not perceive any higher degree of perfection in a man than in an oyster, nay, than in a clod of earth or lump of ice, in a piece of paste or pie-crust, hath not the reason or understanding of a man in him. There is unquestionably a scale or ladder of nature, and degrees of perfection and entity, one above another, as of life, sense, and cogitation, above dead, senseless, and unthinking matter; of reason and understanding above sense, &c. And if the sun be nothing but a mass of fire, or inanimate subtile matter agitated, then hath the most contemptible animal that can see the sun, and hath consciousness and self-enjoyment, a higher degree of entity and perfection in it, than that whole fiery globe; as also than the materials (stone, timber, brick and mortar), of the most stately structure, or city. Not-

withstanding which, the sun in other regards; and as its vastly extended light and heat hath so great an influence upon the good of the whole world, plants and animals, may be said to be a far more noble and useful thing in the universe; than any one particular animal whatsoever. Wherefore there being plainly a scale or ladder of entity, the order of things was unquestionably, in way of descent, from higher perfection downward to lower; it being as impossible for a greater perfection to be produced from a lesser, as for something to be caused by nothing. Neither are the steps or degrees of this ladder (either upward or downward) infinite; but as the foot, bottom, or lowest round thereof, is stupid and senseless matter, devoid of all life and understanding; so is the head, top, and summit of it a perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things. A perfect understanding Being is the beginning and head of the scale of entity; from whence things gradually descend downward; lower and lower, till they end in senseless matter. *Νοῦς πάντων προγενέστατος*, Mind is the oldest of all things,—senior to the elements, and the whole corporeal world; and likewise, according to the same ancient Theists, it is *Κύριος κατὰ φύσιν*, by nature lord over all—or hath a natural imperium and dominion over all, it being the most hegemonical thing. And thus was it also affirmed by Anaxagoras, *Νοῦς βασιλεὺς οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς*, that Mind is the sovereign King of heaven and earth.

We have now made it evident, that the Epicurean and Anaximandrian Atheists, who derive the original of all things from senseless matter,

devoid of all manner of life, can no way solve the phenomenon of cogitation (life and understanding, soul and mind), no more than they can that of local motion. And the reason why we have insisted so much upon this point, is, because these Atheists do not only pretend to solve this phenomenon of cogitation without a God, and so to take away the argument for a Deity from thence, but also to demonstrate the impossibility of its existence, from the very nature of knowledge, mind, and understanding. For if knowledge be, in its own nature, nothing but a passion from singular bodies existing without the knower; and if life and understanding, soul and mind, be junior to body, and generated out of senseless matter, then could no mind or understanding Being possibly be a god, that is, a first principle, and the maker of all things. And though modern writers take little or no notice of this, yet did Plato anciently make the very state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists principally to consist in this very thing, viz. Whether life and understanding, soul and mind, were juniors to body, and sprung out of senseless matter, as accidental modifications thereof, or else were substantial things, and in order of nature before it. For after the passages before cited, he thus concludeth: *κινδυνεύει ὁ λέγων ταῦτα, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα, πρῶτα ἠγεῖσθαι τῶν πάντων εἶναι, καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα αὐτὰ, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὕστερον· εἶκοι δὲ οὐ κινδυνεύειν, ἀλλὰ ὄντως σημαίνειν ταῦτα ἡμῖν τῷ λόγῳ.* Ἄρ. οὖν πρὸς Διὸς οἷον πηγὴν τινα ἀνοήτου δόξης ἀνευρήκαμεν ἀνθρώπων, ὅποσοι τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἐφήσαντο ζητημάτων. These men seem to suppose fire, wa-

ter, air, and earth, to be the very first things in the universe, and the principles of all, calling them only nature; but soul and mind to have sprung up afterwards out of them. Nay, they do not only seem to suppose this, but also in express words declare the same. And thus (by Jupiter) have we discovered the very fountain of that atheistic madness of the ancient physiologists, to wit, their making inanimate bodies senior to soul and mind.—And accordingly that philosopher addresses himself, to the confutation of Atheism, no otherwise than thus, by proving soul not to be junior to senseless body, or inanimate matter, and generated out of it; \* ὁ πρῶτον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς αἴτιον ἀπάντων, τοῦτο οὐ πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον ἀπεφήναντο εἶναι γεγονός, οἱ τῶν ἀσεβῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λόγοι· ὁ δὲ ὕστερον πρότερον ὅθεν ἡμαρτήκασι περὶ θεῶν τῆς ὄντως οὐσίας· ψυχὴν ἡγνοηκέναι κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ὀλίγου ζύμπαντες, οἷόν τε ὃν τυγχάνει καὶ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει· τῶν τε ἄλλων αὐτῆς περὶ καὶ δὴ καὶ γενέσεως, ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστὶ, σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη, καὶ μεταβολῆς πάσης ἄρχει· That which is the first cause of the generation and corruption of all things, the atheistic doctrine supposes not to have been first made; but what is indeed the last thing, to be the first. And hence is it, that they err concerning the essence of the gods. For they are ignorant what kind of thing soul is, and what power it hath, as also especially concerning its generation and production, that it was first of all made before body, it being that, which governs the motions, changes, and transformations thereof. But if soul be first in order of nature before body, then must those things, which

\* Ibid. p. 667.

are cognate to soul, be also before the things which appertain to body; and so mind and understanding, art and law, be before hard and soft, heavy and light; and that, which these Atheists call nature (the motion of inanimate bodies), junior to art and mind, it being governed by the same.—Now that soul is in order of nature before body, this philosopher demonstrates only from the topic or head of motion, because it is impossible that one body should move another infinitely, without any first cause or mover; but there must of necessity be something self-moving and self-active, or which had a power of changing itself, that was the first cause of all local motion in bodies. And this being the very notion of soul, that it is such a thing, as can move or change itself (in which also the essence of life consisteth), he thus inferreth,<sup>a</sup> *ικανώτατα δέδεικται ψυχή τῶν πάντων πρεσβυτάτη, γενομένη τε ἀρχὴ κινήσεως*. It is therefore sufficiently demonstrated from hence, that soul is the oldest of all things in the corporeal world, it being the principle of all the motion and generation in it.—And his conclusion is,<sup>b</sup> *ὁρθῶς ἄρα εἰρηκότες ἀν ἡμῶν ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος ἡμῶν, σῶμα δὲ δευτέρον τε καὶ ὕστερον, ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης, ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν*. It hath been therefore rightly affirmed by us, that soul is older than body, and was made before it, and body younger and junior to soul; soul being that, which ruleth, and body that which is ruled. From whence it follows, that the things of soul also are older than the things of body; and therefore cogitation, intellection, volition, and appetite, in order of nature before length, breadth,

<sup>a</sup> Ibid. p. 668.<sup>b</sup> P. 669.



and profundity.—Now it is evident, that Plato in all this understood, not only the mundane soul, or his third Divine hypostasis, the original of that motion, that is in the heavens and the whole corporeal universe, but also all other particular lives and souls whatsoever, or that whole rank of beings called soul; he supposing it all to have been at first made before the corporeal system, or at least to have been in order of nature senior to it, as superior and more excellent (that which ruleth being superior to that which is ruled), and no soul or life whatsoever, to be generated out of senseless matter.

Wherefore we must needs here condemn that doctrine of some professed Theists and Christians of latter times, who generate all souls, not only the sensitive in brutes, but also the rational in men, out of matter; forasmuch as hereby, not only that argument for the existence of a God, from souls, is quite taken away, and nothing could hinder, but that senseless matter might be the Original of all things, if life and understanding soul and mind, sprung out of it; but also the Atheist will have an advantage to prove the impossibility of a God from hence; because if life and understanding, in their own nature, be factitious, and generable out of matter, then are they no substantial things, but accidental only; from whence it will plainly follow, that no mind could possibly be a God, or first cause of all things, it being not so much as able to subsist by itself. Moreover, if mind, as such, be generable, and educible out of nothing, then must it needs be in its own nature corruptible also, and reducible to nothing again; whereas the Deity is both an un-

made and incorruptible being. So that there could not possibly be, according to this hypothesis, any other God, than such a Jupiter, or soul of the world, as the atheistic Theogonists acknowledged, that sprung out of Night, Chaos, and Nonentity, and may be again swallowed up into that dark abyss. Senseless matter, therefore, being the only unmade and incorruptible thing, and the fountain of all things, even of life and understanding, it must needs be acknowledged to be the only real Numen.

Neither will the case be much different, as to some others, who, though indeed they do not professedly generate the rational, but only the sensitive soul, both in men and brutes; yet do nevertheless maintain the human soul itself to be but a mere blank, or white sheet of paper, that hath nothing at all in it, but what was scribbled upon it by the objects of sense; and knowledge, or understanding, to be nothing but the result of sense, and so a passion from sensible bodies existing without the knower. For hereby, as they plainly make knowledge and understanding to be, in its own nature, junior to sense, and the very creature of sensibles; so do they also imply the rational soul, and mind itself, to be as well generated as the sensitive, wherein it is virtually contained; or to be nothing but a higher modification of matter, agreeably to that Leviathan-doctrine, that men differ no otherwise from brute animals, than only in their organization, and the use of speech or words.

In very truth, whoever maintaineth, that any life or soul, any cogitation or consciousness, self-perception and self-activity, can spring out of

dead, senseless and unactive matter, the same can never possibly have any rational assurance, but that his own soul had also a like original, and consequently is mortal and corruptible. For if any life and cogitation can be thus generated, then is there no reason, but that all lives may be so, they being but higher degrees in the same kind; and neither life, nor any thing else, can be in its own nature indifferent, to be either substance or accident, and sometimes one and sometimes the other; but either all life, cogitation and consciousness, is accidental, generable and corruptible, or else none at all.

That, which hath inclined so many to think the sensitive life, at least, to be nothing but a quality, or accident of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible into it, is that strange Protean transformation of matter into so many seemingly unaccountable forms and shapes, together with the scholastic opinion thereupon of real qualities; that is, entities distinct from the substance of body, and its modifications, but yet generable out of it, and corruptible into it; they concluding, that as light and colours, heat and cold, &c. according to those fancies, which we have of them, are real qualities of matter, distinct from its substance and modifications; so may life, sense, and cogitation, be in like manner qualities of matter also, generable and corruptible. But these real qualities of body, in the sense declared, are things, that were long since justly exploded by the ancient Atomists, and expunged out of the catalogue of entities, of whom Laertius<sup>a</sup> hath recorded, that they did ἐκβάλλειν τὰς ποιότητας, quite

<sup>a</sup> Lib x. segm. xlv. p. 261.

cashier and banish qualities out of their philosophy—they resolving all corporeal phenomena, and therefore those of heat and cold, light and colours, fire and flame, &c. intelligibly, into nothing but the different modifications of extended substance, viz. more or less magnitude of parts, figure, site, motion or rest, (or the combinations of them,) and those different fancies caused in us by them. Indeed there is no other entity, but substance and its modifications. Wherefore the Democritics and Epicureans did most shamefully contradict themselves, when, pretending to reject and explode all those entities of real qualities, themselves nevertheless made life and understanding such real qualities of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it.

There is nothing in body or matter, but magnitude, figure, site, and motion or rest: now it is mathematically certain, that these, however combined together, can never possibly compound, or make up life or cogitation; which therefore cannot be an accident of matter, but must of necessity be a substantial thing. We speak not here of that life (improperly so called) which is, in vulgar speech, attributed to the bodies of men and animals; for it is plainly accidental to a body to be vitally united to a soul, or not. Therefore is this life of the compound corruptible and destroyable, without the destruction of any real entity: there being nothing destroyed, nor lost to the universe, in the deaths of men and animals, as such, but only a disunion, or separation made of those two substances, soul and body, one from another. But we speak here of

the original life of the soul itself, that this is substantial, neither generable nor corruptible, but only creatable and annihilable by the Deity. And it is strange, that any men should persuade themselves, that that, which rules and commands in the bodies of animals, moving them up and down, and hath sense or perception in it, should not be as substantial, as that stupid and senseless matter, that is ruled by it. Neither can matter (which is also but a mere passive thing) efficiently produce soul, any more than soul matter; no finite, imperfect substance being able to produce another substance out of nothing. Much less can such a substance, as hath a lower degree of entity and perfection in it, create that, which hath a higher. There is a scale, or ladder of entities and perfections in the universe, one above another, and the production of things cannot possibly be in way of ascent from lower to higher, but must of necessity be in way of descent from higher to lower. Now to produce any one higher rank of being from the lower, as cogitation from magnitude and body, is plainly to invert this order in the scale of the universe from downwards to upwards, and therefore is it atheistical; and by the same reason, that one higher rank or degree in this scale is thus unnaturally produced from a lower, may all the rest be so produced also. Wherefore we have great reason to stand upon our guard here, and to defend this post against the Atheists; that no life, or cogitation, can either materially or efficiently result from dead and senseless body; or that souls, being all substantial and immaterial things, can neither be

generated out of matter; nor corrupted into the same, but only created or annihilated by the Deity.

The grand objection against this substantiality of souls sensitive, as well as rational, is from that consequence, which will be from thence inferred; of their permanent subsistence after death, their perpetuity, or immortality. This seeming very absurd, that the souls of brutes also should be immortal, or subsist after the deaths of the respective animals: but especially to two sorts of men; first, such as scarcely in good earnest believe their own soul's immortality; and secondly, such religionists, as conclude, that if irrational, or sensitive souls subsist after death, then must they needs go presently either into heaven or hell. And R. Cartesius was so sensible of the offensiveness of this opinion, that though he were fully convinced of the necessity of this disjunction, that either brutes have nothing of sense or cogitation at all; or else they must have some other substance in them, besides matter, he chose rather to make them mere senseless machines, than to allow them substantial souls. Wherein, avoiding a lesser absurdity or paradox, he plainly plunged himself into a greater; scarcely any thing being more generally received, than the sense of brutes. Though in truth all those, who deny the substantiality of sensitive souls, and will have brutes to have nothing but matter in them, ought consequently, according to reason, to do as Cartesius did, deprive them of all sense. But, on the contrary, if it be evident from the phenomena, that brutes are not mere senseless machines or automata, and only like clocks or watches, then

ought not popular opinion and vulgar prejudice so far to prevail with us, as to hinder our assent to that, which sound reason and philosophy clearly dictates, that therefore they must have something more than matter in them. Neither ought we, when we clearly conceive any thing to be true, as this, That life and cogitation cannot possibly rise out of dead and senseless matter, to abandon it, or deny our assent thereunto, because we find it attended with some difficulty not easily extricable by us, or cannot free all the consequences thereof from some inconvenience or absurdity, such as seems to be in the permanent subsistence of brutish souls.

For the giving an account of which, notwithstanding, Plato and the ancient Pythagoreans proposed this following hypothesis ; That souls, as well sensitive as rational, being all substantial, but not self-existent (because there is but one fountain and principle of all things), were therefore produced or caused by the Deity. But this, not in the generations of the respective animals ; it being indecorous, that this Divine, miraculous, creative power should constantly lackey by, and attend upon natural generations ; as also incongruous, that souls should be so much juniors to every atom of dust, that is in the whole world ; but either all of them from eternity, according to those, who denied the novelty of the world ; or rather, according to others, who asserted the cosmogonia, in the first beginning of the world's creation. Wherefore, it being also natural to souls, as such, to actuate and enliven some body, or to be, as it were, clothed therewith ; these, as soon as created, were immediately invested with cer-

tain thin and subtile bodies, or put into light ethereal or aërial chariots and vehicles ; wherein they subsist, both before their entrance into other gross terrestrial bodies, and after their egress out of them. So that the souls, not only of men, but also of other animals, have sometimes a thicker, and sometimes a thinner indument or clothing. And thus do we understand Boëthius, not only of the rational, but also of the other inferior sensitive souls, in these verses of his ;\*

Tu cauis animas paribus vitasque minores  
Provehis, et levibus sublimes curribus aptans,  
In coelum terramque seris.

Where his light chariots, which all lives or souls, at their very first creation by God, are placed in, and in which being wafted, they are both together, as it were, sowed into the gross terrestrial matter, are thin, aërial and ethereal bodies. But this is plainly declared by Proclus upon the *Timæus*, after he had spoken of the souls of demons and men, in this manner ; *καὶ γὰρ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῶν θνητῶν σωμάτων, αἰδίους* L. v. p. 290. *καὶ ἐκκινήτοις τισὶ χρῆσθαι σώμασιν, ὡς κατ' οὐσίαν ἔχουσαν τὸ κινεῖν*. And every soul must of necessity have, before these mortal bodies, certain eternal and easily moveable bodies, it being essential to them to move.—There is indeed mention made by the same Proclus, and others, of an opinion of *ἄλογοι δαίμονες*, irrational or brutish demons, or demoniac aërial brutes ; of which he sometimes speaks doubtfully, as *εἴπερ γὰρ εἰσιν ἄλογοι δαίμονες,* L. iv. p. 288. *ὡς οἱ θεουργοί*, If there be any irrational demons, as the Theurgists affirm.—But the dispute, doubt, or controversy here only was,

\* *De Consolat. Philosoph. lib. iii. p. 69.*



Whether there were any such irrational demons immortal, or no. For thus we learn from these words of Ammonius upon the Porphyrian *Isagogæ*; οἱ μὲν γὰρ φασιν εἶναι τι δαιμονίων ἀλόγων γένος ἀθάνατον, οἱ δὲ φασι καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος θνητὸν εἶναι. Some affirm, that there is a certain kind of irrational demons immortal; but others, that all these irrational or brutish demons are mortal.—Where, by irrational demons immortal, seem to be understood such, as never descend into terrestrial bodies (and these are there disclaimed by Ammonius); but the mortal ones, such as act also upon gross terrestrial bodies, obnoxious to death and corruption. As if Ammonius should have said, There are no other brutish, or irrational demons; than only the souls of such brute animals as are here amongst us, sometimes acting only aërial bodies. Thus, according to the ancient Pythagoric hypothesis, there is neither any new substantial thing now made, which was not before; nor yet any real entity destroyed into nothing; not only no matter, but also no soul nor life; God, after the first creation, neither making any new substance, nor yet annihilating any thing made. He then creating nothing, that was not fit to be conserved in being, and which could not be well used and placed in the universe; and afterward never repenting him of what he had before done. And natural generations and corruptions being nothing but accidental mutations, concretions and secretions, or anagrammatical transpositions of pre- and post-existing things, the same souls and lives being sometimes united to one body, and sometimes to another; sometimes in thicker, and sometimes in thinner clothing; and

sometimes in the visible, sometimes in the invisible (they having aërial, as well as terrestrial vehicles); and never any soul quite naked of all body. And thus does Proclus complain of some, as spurious Platonists, οὐ φθείροντες τὸ ὄχημα ἀναγκάζονται ποτε παντὸς σώματος ἔξω ποιεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν, Who, destroying the thinner vehicles of souls, were therefore necessitated sometimes to leave them in a state of separation from all body, or without any corporeal indument.— Which Cabala, probably derived from the Egyptians by Pythagoras, was before fully represented by us out of Ovid; though that transmigration of human souls there, into ferine bodies, hath not been by all acknowledged, as a genuine part thereof. And the same was likewise insisted upon by Virgil, Georg. l. iv. as also owned and confirmed by Macrobius for a great truth; Somn. Scip. l. ii. c. xii. [p. 161.] “Constat secundum veræ rationis assertionem, quam nec Cicero nescit, nec Virgilius ignorat, dicendo,

<sup>a</sup> Nec morti esse locum; —

Constat, inquam, nihil intra vivum mundum perire, sed eorum, quæ interire videntur, solam mutari speciem.” It is manifest, according to reason and true philosophy, which neither Cicero nor Virgil were unacquainted with (the latter of these affirming, that there is no place at all left for death); I say, it is manifest, that none of those things, that to us seem to die, do absolutely perish within the living world, but only their forms changed.—

<sup>a</sup> Georg. lib. iv. vers. 221.

Now, how extravagant soever this hypothesis seem to be, yet is there no question, but that a Pythagorean would endeavour to find some countenance and shelter for it in the Scripture; especially that place, which hath so puzzled and nonplussed interpreters, Rom. viii. 19, &c. "For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject unto vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him, who hath subjected the same in hope; because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know, that the whole creation groaneth, and travaileth in pain together until now. And not only they, but ourselves also, which have the first-fruits of the Spirit, groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, even the redemption of our bodies." Where it is first of all evident, that the *κτίσις*, creature, or creation spoken of, is not the very same with the *τέκνα* or *υἱοὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, the children or sons of God—but something distinct from them. Wherefore, in the next place, the Pythagorean will add, that it must of necessity be understood, either of the inanimate creature only, or of the lower animal creation, or else of both these together. Now, though it be readily acknowledged, that there is a *prosopopœia* here, yet cannot all those expressions, for all that, without difficulty and violence, be understood of the inanimate creation only, or senseless matter; viz. that this hath *ἀποκαρδοκίαν*, an earnest expectation—of some future good to itself; that it is now made subject *ματαιότητι*, to vanity—frustration and disappointment of desire; and *φθορᾷ*, to cor-

ruption and death—and that οὐχ ἑκούσα, not willingly—but reluctantly; and yet ἐπ’ ἐλπίδι too, in hope—notwithstanding, of some further good to follow afterward; and that it doth in the mean time συστενάζειν and συνωδίνειν, groan and travail in pain together, till it be at length delivered from “the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God.” Moreover, in the generations and corruptions of senseless bodies, as of minerals and vegetables, or when, for example, oil is turned into flame, flame into smoke, water into vapour, vapour into snow or hail, grass into milk, milk into blood and bones, and the like; there is, I say, in all this, no hurt done to any thing, nor any real entity destroyed, all the substance of matter still remaining entirely the same, without the least diminution, and only accidental transformations thereof made. All this is really nothing, but local motion; and there is no more toil nor labour to an inanimate body in motion, than in rest; it being altogether as natural for a body to be moved by something else, as of itself to rest. It is all nothing, but change of figure, distance, site, and magnitude of parts, causing several sensations, fancies, and apparitions in us. And they, who would have the meaning of this place to be, That all such-like mutations, and alternate vicissitudes in inanimate bodies, shall at length quite cease; these groaning in the mean time, and travailing in pain to be delivered from the toilsome labour of such restless motion, and to be at ease and quiet; by taking away all motion thus, out of a fond regard to the ease and quiet of senseless matter, they would thereby, *ipso facto*, petrify the whole corporeal

universe, and consequently the bodies of good men also after the resurrection, and congeal all into rocky marble or adamant. And as vain is that other conceit of some, that the whole terrestrial globe shall at last be vitrified, or turned into transparent crystal, as if it also groaned in the mean time for this. For whatsoever change shall be made of the world in the new heaven and the new earth to come, it is reasonable to think, that it will not be made for the sake of the senseless matter, or the inanimate bodies themselves, to which all is alike; but only for the sake of men and animals, the living spectators and inhabitants thereof, that it may be fitter, both for their use and delight. Neither indeed can those words, for the creature "itself shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God," be understood of any other, than animals; forasmuch as this liberty of the children of God, here meant, is their being clothed, instead of mortal, with immortal bodies; of which no other creatures are capable, but only such as consist of soul and body. And that *πᾶσα κτίσις*, that whole creation—which is said afterward to groan and travail in pain together, may be well understood of all that of the creation, which can groan, or be sensible of evil or misery. Wherefore, the Pythagorean would interpret this place of the lower animal creation only, which is sensible of good and evil; that as this was unwillingly, or against its own inclination (after the fall of man, or lapse of souls) made subject to vanity, and the bondage of corruption, pain, misery, and death, in those gross terrestrial bodies; in the manifestation of the sons of God,

when they, instead of these mortal bodies, shall be clothed with celestial and immortal ones, then shall this creature also have its certain share in the felicity of that glorious time, and partake in some measure of such a liberty, by being freed in like manner from these their gross terrestrial bodies, and now living only in thin aërial and immortal ones; and so a period put to all their miseries and calamities by him, who made not death, neither hath pleasure in the destruction of the living, but created whatsoever liveth to this end, that it might have its being, and enjoy itself. But however thus much is certain, that brute animals, in this place, cannot be quite excluded; because the *πᾶσα κτίσις*, the whole creation—will not suffer that: and therefore a Pythagorist would conclude it a warrantable inference from this text of Scripture, that that whole rank in the creation of irrational and brutish animals below men shall not be utterly annihilated in the consummation of things, or future renovation of the world, quite stripped of all this furniture, men being then left alone in it; but that there shall be a continuation of this species or rank of being. And not only so neither; as if there should still be a constant succession of such alternate generations and corruptions, productions or births, and deaths of brute animals, to all eternity; but also, that the individuals themselves shall continue the same, forasmuch as otherwise there would be none at all delivered from the bondage of corruption. And lastly, that these very souls of brutes, which at this time groan and travail in pain, shall themselves be made partakers of that liberty of the children of God; since otherwise they should be

with child, or parturient of nothing; groaning not for themselves, but others. But enough of this Pythagoric hypothesis, which, supposing all manner of souls, sensitive as well as rational, to be substantial things, and therefore to have a permanency after death, in their distinct natures, allows them certain thin aërial ochemata, or vehicles, to subsist in, when these gross terrestrial ones shall fail them.

But let these aërial vehicles of the souls of brutes go for a whimsey, or mere figment; nor let them be allowed to act or enliven any other, than terrestrial bodies only, by means whereof they must needs be, immediately after death, quite destitute of all body; they subsisting nevertheless, and not vanishing into nothing, because they are not mere accidents, but substantial things; we say, that in this case, though the substances of them remain, yet must they needs continue in a state of insensibility and inactivity, unless perhaps they be again afterward united to some other terrestrial bodies. Because, though intellection be the energy of the rational soul alone, without the concurrence of body, yet is the energy of the sensitive, always conjoined with it; sense being, as Aristotle<sup>a</sup> hath rightly determined, a complication of soul and body together, as weaving is of the weaver and weaving instruments. Wherefore we say, that if the irrational and sensitive souls in brutes, being substantial things also, be after death quite destitute of all body, then can they neither have sense of any thing, nor act upon any thing, but must continue

<sup>a</sup> De Anima, lib. ii. cap. vi. p. 27. tom. ii. oper.

for so long a time, in a state of insensibility and inactivity. Which is a thing therefore to be thought the less impossible, because no man can be certain, that his own soul in sleep, lethargies, and apoplexies, &c. hath always an uninterrupted consciousness of itself; and that it was never without thoughts, even in the mother's womb. However, there is little reason to doubt, but that the sensitive souls of such animals, as lie dead or asleep all the winter, and revive or awake again, at the approaching warmth of summer, do for that time continue in a state of inactivity and insensibility. Upon which account, though these souls of brutes may be said in one sense to be immortal, because the substance of them, and the root of life in them, still remains; yet may they, in another sense, be said also to be mortal, as having the exercise of that life, for a time at least, quite suspended. From whence it appears, that there is no reason at all for that fear and suspicion of some, that if the souls of brutes be substantial, and continue in being after death, they must therefore needs go either to heaven or hell. But as for that supposed possibility of their awakening again afterward, in some other terrestrial bodies, this seemeth to be no more, than what is found by daily experience in the course of nature, when the silk-worm, and other worms, dying, are transformed into butterflies. For there is little reason to doubt, but that the same soul, which before acted the body of the silk-worm, doth afterward act that of the butterfly: upon which account it is, that this hath been made by Christian theologers an emblem of the resurrection.



Hitherto have we declared two several opinions, concerning the substantial souls of brutes supposed therefore to have a permanent subsistence after death; one of Plato's and the Pythagoreans', that when they are divested of these gross terrestrial bodies, they live, and have a sense of themselves, in thin aërial ones; the other of such, as exploding these aërial vehicles of brutes, and allowing them none but terrestrial bodies, affirm the substances of them, surviving death, to continue in a state of inactivity and insensibility; sleep, silence, or stupor. But now, to say the truth, there is no absolute necessity, that these souls of brutes, because substantial, should therefore have a permanent subsistence after death to all eternity; because, though it be true, that no substance once created by God will of itself ever vanish into nothing, yet it is true also, that whatsoever was created by God out of nothing, may possibly by him be annihilated and reduced to nothing again. Wherefore, when it is said, that the immortality of the human soul is demonstrable by natural reason, the meaning hereof is no more than this, that its substantiality is so demonstrable; from whence it follows, that it will naturally no more perish or vanish into nothing, than the substance of matter itself: and not that it is impossible either for it, or matter, by the Divine power to be annihilated. Wherefore the assurance that we have of our own souls' immortality, must depend upon something else besides their substantiality, namely, a faith also in the Divine Goodness, that he will conserve in being, or not annihilate, all such substances created by him, whose permanent subsistence is neither inconsistent with

his own attributes, nor the good of the universe, as this of rational souls unquestionably is not; they having both morality and liberty of will, and thereby being capable of rewards and punishments, and consequently fit objects for the Divine justice to display itself upon. But, for aught we can be certain, the case may be otherwise as to the souls of brute animals, devoid both of morality and liberty of will, and therefore incapable of reward and punishment; that though they will not naturally of themselves vanish into nothing, yet, having been created by God in the generations of the respective animals, and had some enjoyment of themselves for a time, they may by him again be as well annihilated in their deaths and corruptions; and if this be absolutely the best, then doubtless is it so. And to this seemeth agreeable the opinion of Porphyrius,<sup>a</sup> amongst the philosophers, when he affirmed every irrational power or soul to be resolved into the life of the whole; that is, retracted and resumed into the Deity, and so annihilated as to its creaturely nature: though possibly there may be another interpretation of that philosopher's meaning here, viz. that all the sensitive souls of brutes are really but one and the same mundane soul, as it were, outflowing and variously displaying itself, and acting upon all the several parts of matter, that are capable to receive it, but at their deaths retiring again back into itself. But we have sufficiently retunded the force of that objection against the ingenerability of all souls, and the substantiality of those of brutes also, from their conse-

<sup>a</sup> Vide Sententias ad Intelligibilia ducentes, par. i. § xxii. p. 227. § xxiv. p. 228. et alias.

quent permanence after death ; we having shewed, that, notwithstanding this their substantiality, there is no absolute necessity of their perpetuity after death, and permanency to all eternity, or else, that if they do continue to subsist (God annihilating no substance), unless they have aërial vehicles to act, they must remain in a state of inactivity and insensibility, silence or sleep.

Now therefore, if no souls, no life, nor cogitation, could possibly be ever generated out of dead and senseless matter, they being not mere accidents, but substantial things, which must in this case have come from nothing; then, either all souls existed of themselves from eternity, or else there must of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind, from whence all the other lives and minds were derived. And that this was the doctrine of the ancient Theists, That no soul or mind, no life or understanding, was ever generated out of matter, but all produced by the Deity, the sole fountain of life and understanding, might be here proved, were it needful, at large, by sundry testimonies; but it may sufficiently appear from those verses of Virgil, first in his sixth *Æneid*, where, after he had spoken of God, as a spirit and mind diffused throughout the whole world, he addeth,

\* *Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitæque volantum,  
Et quæ marmoreo fert monstra sub æquore pontus,*

That from thence are the lives of all men and beasts, birds flying in the air, and monsters swimming in the sea.—And again in his *Georgics*, where, after these words,

\* *Vers 728.*

\* ——— Deum namque ire per omnes  
Terrasque, tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum,

That God passeth through all tracts of earths,  
seas, and heavens,—he subjoineth,

Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,  
Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas.  
Scilicet huc reddi deinde, et resoluta referri,  
Omnia, nec 'morti esse locum.

And from hence, not only men, but also all manner of brute animals and beasts, when produced into this world, do every one derive their lives or souls, as also at their deaths they render the same back again to him, in whose hand or custody they remain undestroyed; so that there is no place any where in the world left for death.—This was therefore undoubtedly the genuine doctrine of the ancient Theists, however some of late have deviated and swerved from it; that no life was generated out of matter, but all created by the Deity, or derived from it, the sole fountain of lives and souls.

And it is a truth so evident, that life being substantial, and not a mere accidental thing generated and corrupted, there must therefore of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind, from whence all other lives and minds are derived, that the Hylozoic Atheists themselves (in this far wiser than the Atomics) were fully convinced thereof; nevertheless being strongly possessed with that atheistic prejudice, that there is no other substance besides body, they attribute this first original unmade life and understanding to all

\* Lib. iv. versc 221.

matter as such (but without animal consciousness) as an essential part thereof, or inadequate conception of it. From which fundamental life of nature in matter, modified by organization, they fancy the lives of all animals and men to have proceeded. So that though the modified lives of animals and men, as such, according to them, be accidental things, generated and corrupted, produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again; yet this fundamental life of matter, which is the basis, upon which they stand, being substantial, is also eternal and incorruptible. These Hylozoists therefore, to avoid a Deity, suppose every atom of senseless matter to have been, from all eternity, infallibly omniscient, that is, to know all things without either error or ignorance, and to have a knowledge before sense, and undervived from sensibles (quite contrary to the doctrine of the atomic Atheists, who make all knowledge, sense, or the product thereof), though without any animal consciousness and self-perception.

But, as nothing can be more prodigiously absurd, than thus to attribute infallible omniscience to every atom of matter; so is it also directly contradictory to suppose perfect knowledge, wisdom, or understanding, without any consciousness or self-perception, consciousness being essential to cogitation: as also, that the substantial and fundamental life in men and other animals should never perish, and yet notwithstanding their souls and personalities in death utterly vanish into nothing. Moreover, this hypothesis can never possibly solve the phenomenon of men and animals neither; not only because no organization or modification of matter whatsoever could ever

produce consciousness and self-perception in what was before unconscious; but also because every smallest atom thereof being supposed to be a percipient by itself, and to have a perfect life and understanding of its own, there must be in every one man and animal, not one, but a heap or commonwealth of innumerable percipients. Lastly, whereas these hylozoic Atheists make every atom of matter omniscient, but nothing at all omnipotent, or assert perfect knowledge, without any perfect power, a knowledge without sense, and undervived from sensibles; we demand of them, where the intelligibles or objects of this knowledge are? and whence the ideas thereof are derived? For since they proceed not in a way of passion from sensibles existing without, nor could result from those atoms neither, as comprehending themselves, they must needs come from nothing, and many of them, at least, be the conceptions of nothing. There cannot possibly be any other original, by the wit of man devised, of knowledge and understanding, than from an absolutely perfect and omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own infinite power, or all possibilities of things, that is, all intelligibles. But there can be but one such omnipotent Being, and therefore no more than one original, and eternal unmade mind, from whence all the other minds are derived. Wherefore this hylozoic Atheism is nothing but the breaking and crumbling of the simple Deity, one perfect understanding Being, into matter, and all the several atoms of it.

And now have we made it manifest, that these Atheists are so far from being able to disprove a God from this topic of cogitation, knowledge, or

understanding, that they cannot possibly solve the phenomenon thereof, without a God; it indeed affording invincible arguments of his existence. For, first, if no life or cogitation, soul or mind, can possibly spring out of matter or body, devoid of life and understanding, and which is nothing but a thing extended into length, breadth, and thickness; then is it so far from being true, that all life and understanding is junior to senseless matter, and the offspring thereof, that of necessity either all lives and souls were self-existent from eternity, or else there must be one perfect unmade life and mind, from whence all other imperfect ones were derived: there must be an eternal knowledge before sense and sensibles; which is that that hath printed the stamps and signatures of itself, upon the matter of the whole world. Indeed nothing can be more certain than this, that all knowledge and understanding in ourselves is not a mere passion from singular sensibles or bodies existing without us, as the forementioned Atheists also conclude; (from whence they would again infer, that knowledge, as such, is in its own nature junior to sensibles, and the mere creature of them, and consequently no creator;) there being nothing, which comes to us from the objects of sense without, but only local motion and pressure, and there being other objects of the mind, besides singular sensibles; not only all universals, but also such intelligibles, as never were, nor can be in sense. Now, if our human knowledge and understanding be not a passion from things existing without us; then can it have no other original than in way of participation, from a perfect mind, the mind of an infinitely fecund and powerful

Being, comprehending itself, and in itself all things; all the possibilities of things before they were made, their respects, and the verities belonging to them. So that a perfect omnipotent Being, together with the possibilities of things contained in it, is the first Νοητόν, intelligible, or object of mind and understanding, by which all other singulars are understood. And were there no such perfect, infinitely fecund, and powerful Being, there could have been no mind or understanding at all. As also, were there no perfect mind, viz. that of an omnipotent Being comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things virtually contained in it; all the knowledge, and intelligible ideas of our imperfect minds, must needs have sprung from nothing. And thus is the existence of a God again demonstrated from that phenomenon of knowledge or understanding.

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HAVING quite routed and vanquished the Atheists' main body, we shall now blow away the remainder of their weaker and scattered forces, viz. their objections against Providence, their queries, and their arguments from interest, with a breath or two. Their first objection is against Providence, as to the fabric of the world, from the faultiness of the mundane system, intellectually considered, and in order to ends; "Quia tanta stat prædita culpa;"<sup>a</sup> That because it is so ill-made,—therefore it could not be made by a God. Where the Atheist takes it for granted, that whosoever asserts a God, or a perfect mind,

<sup>a</sup> Lucret. lib. i. vers. 183.



to be the original of all things, does therefore *ipso facto* suppose all things to be well made, and as they should be. And this doubtless was the sense of all the ancient Theologers, however some modern Theists deviate therefrom; these concluding the perfection of the Deity not at all to consist in goodness, but in power and arbitrary will only. As if to have a will determined by a rule or reason of good, were the virtue of weak, impotent, and obnoxious beings only, or of such as have a superior over them to give law to them, that is, of creatures; but the prerogative of a being irresistibly powerful, to have a will absolutely indifferent to all things, and undetermined by any thing but itself, or to will nothing because it is good, but to make its own arbitrary or contingent and fortuitous determination the sole reason of all its actions, nay, the very rule or measure of goodness, justice, and wisdom itself. And this is supposed by them to be the liberty, sovereignty, and dominion of the Deity. Wherefore such Theists as these would think themselves altogether unconcerned in these atheistic objections against Providence, or in defending the fabric of the world, as faultless, they being as ready as the Atheists themselves, to acknowledge, that the world might really have been much better made than it now is; only that it must be said to be well, because so made, but pretending nevertheless, that this is no impeachment at all of the existence of a God, “*Quia Deus non tenetur ad optimum,*” because God is no way bound or obliged to the best;—he being indeed, according to them, nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent. But what do these Theists here else, than whilst

they deny the fortuitous motion of senseless matter to be the first original of all things, themselves in the mean time enthrone fortuitousness and contingency in the will of an omnipotent Being, and there give it an absolute sovereignty and dominion over all? So that the controversy betwixt the Atheists and these Theists seems to be no other than this, whether senseless matter fortuitously moved, or a fortuitous will omnipotent, such as is altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, be the sovereign Numen, and original of all things. Certainly we mortals could have little better ground for our faith and hope, in such an omnipotent arbitrary will as this, than we could have in the motions of senseless atoms furiously agitated, or of a rapid whirlwind. Nay, one would think, that of the two it should be more desirable to be under the empire of senseless atoms, fortuitously moved, than of a will altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, armed with omnipotence; because the former could harbour no hurtful or mischievous designs against any, as the latter might. But this irrational will, altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, is so far from being the highest liberty, sovereignty, and dominion, the greatest perfection, and the divinest thing of all, that it is indeed nothing else but weakness and impotency itself, or brutish folly and madness. And therefore those ancients, who affirmed, that Mind was Lord over all, and the supreme King of heaven and earth, held at the same time, that Good was the sovereign monarch of the universe, Good reigning in Mind, and together with it, because Mind is that, which

orders all things for the sake of Good; and whatsoever doth otherwise, was, according to them, not *Νοῦς*, but *Ἄνοια*, not *Mens*, but *Dementia*, and consequently no god. And thus does Celsus in Origen declare the nature of God, οὐ γὰρ

P. 240. τῆς πλημμελοῦς ὀρέξεως, οὐδὲ τῆς πεπλανημένης ἀκοσμίας, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὀρθῆς καὶ δικαίας φύσεως Θεός ἐστιν ἀρχηγέτης. God is not the president or head of irregular and irrational lust or appetite,

and of loose erratic disorderliness, but of the just and righteous nature.—And though this were there misapplied by him against the Christian doctrine of the resurrection (not understood), yet is the passage highly approved by Origen; he adding further, in confirmation thereof, and that as the general sense of Christians too,<sup>a</sup> φημὲν ὅτι οὐ δύναται αἰσχρὰ ὁ Θεός, ἐπεὶ ἔσται ὁ Θεός δυνάμενος μὴ εἶναι Θεός, εἰ γὰρ αἰσχρόν τι δρᾷ ὁ Θεός, οὐκ ἐστὶ Θεός. We Christians (who hold the resurrection) say as well as you, that God can do nothing, which is in itself evil, inept, or absurd; no more than he is able not to be God. For if God do any

So likewise, p. 247. ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν οἷός τε παράλογον οὔτε παρ' ἑαυτὸν ἐργάσασθαι ἐστὶν ὁ Θεός. According to us also, God can do nothing, that is absurd, or besides reason.

\* P. 265. [Libro de Provid. Enead. iii. Lib. ii. cap. xiii.] P. 743. [Enead. vi.

evil, he is no God.—And again,<sup>b</sup> οὐδὲν μὴ πρότερον ἑαυτῷ ὁ Θεός βούλεται, ἀναιρετικὸν τυγχάνον τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὸν Θεὸν, God willeth nothing unbecoming himself, or what is truly indecorous; forasmuch as this is inconsistent with his Godship.—And to the same purpose Plotinus,<sup>\*</sup> ποιεῖ τὸ Θεῖον ὡς πέφυκε, πέφυκε δὲ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ οὐσίαν, ἢ τὸ καλὸν ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον συνεκφέρει, εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐκεῖ ταῦτα, ποῦ ἂν εἶη. The Deity acteth according to its own nature and essence; and its nature and

<sup>a</sup> P. 246.

<sup>b</sup> P. 247.

essence displayeth goodness and justice: lib. viii. cap ix.]  
 for if these things be not there, where  
 should they else be found?—And again, elsewhere, Θεός ὅπερ ἔχρην εἶναι, οὐ τοίνυν οὕτω συνέβη, ἀλλ' ἔδει οὕτω· τὸ δ' ἔδει τοῦτο, ἀρχὴ τῶν ὅσα ἔδει. God is essentially that, which ought to be; and therefore he did not happen to be such as he is: and this first *ought to be* is the principle of all things whatsoever, that ought to be.—Wherefore the Deity is not to be conceived, as mere arbitrariness, humour, or irrational will and appetite omnipotent (which would indeed be but omnipotent chance), but as an overflowing fountain of love and goodness, justly and wisely dispensing itself, and omnipotently reaching all things. The will of God is goodness, justice, and wisdom; or decorousness, fitness, and ought itself, willing; so that the Τὸ Βέλτιστον, that, which is absolutely the best, is νόμος ἀπαράβατος, an indispensable law to it, because its very essence.—God is μέτρον πάντων, an impartial balance,—lying even, equal and indifferent to all things, and weighing out heaven and earth, and all the things therein, in the most just and exact proportions, and not a grain too much or too little of any thing. Nor is the Deity therefore bound or obliged to do the best, in any way of servility (as men fondly imagine this to be contrary to his liberty), much less by the law and command of any superior (which is a contradiction), but only by the perfection of its own nature, which it cannot possibly deviate from, no more than ungod itself. In conclusion, therefore, we acknowledge the Atheist's argument to be thus far good; that if there be a God, then of necessity must all things be well made, and as

they should be; *et vice-versa*. But no Atheist will ever be able to prove, that either the whole system of the world could have been better made, or that so much as any one thing therein is made ineptly.

There are indeed many things in the frame of nature, which we cannot reach to the reasons of, they being made by a knowledge far superior and transcendent to that of ours, and our experience and ratiocination but slowly discovering the intrigues and contrivances of Providence therein; witness the circulation of the blood, the milky and lymphatic vessels, and other things (without which the mechanic structure of the bodies of animals cannot be understood), all but so lately brought to light; wherefore we must not conclude, that whatsoever we cannot find out the reason of, or the use, that it serveth to, is therefore ineptly made. We shall give one instance of this; the *intestinum cæcum*, in the bodies of men and other animals, seems, at first sight, to be but a mere botch or bungle of nature, and an odd impertinent appendix; neither do we know, that any anatomist or physiologer hath given a rational account thereof, or discovered its use: and yet there being a valve at the entrance of it, these two both together are a most artificial contrivance of nature, and of great advantage for animals, to hinder the regurgitation of the fæces upward towards the ventricle.

The first atheistic instance of the faultiness of things, in the frame of nature, is from the constitution of the heavens, and the disposition of the equator and ecliptic, intersecting each other in an angle of three-and-twenty degrees and upwards; whereby, as they pretend, the terrestrial globe is

rendered much more uninhabitable than otherwise it might be. <sup>a</sup> But this is built upon a false supposition of the ancients, that the torrid zone, or all between the tropics, was utterly uninhabitable by reason of the extremity of heat. And it is certain, that there is nothing, which doth more demonstrate a Providence than this very thing, it being the most convenient site or disposition, that could be devised, as will appear, if the inconveniences of other dispositions be considered, especially these three; first, If the axes of those circles should be pallel, and their plains coincident; secondly, If they should intersect each other in right angles; and thirdly (which is a middle betwixt both), If they should cut one another in an angle of forty-five degrees. For it is evident, that each of these dispositions would be attended with far greater inconveniences to the terrestrial inhabitants, in respect of the length of days and nights, heat and cold. And that these two circles should continue thus, to keep the same angular intersection, when physical and mechanic causes would bring them nearer together; this is a farther eviction of a Providence also.

In the next place, the Atheist supposes, that, according to the general persuasion of Theists, the world and all things therein were created only for the sake of man, <sup>b</sup> he thinking to make some advantage for his cause from hence. But this seemeth, at first, to have been an opinion only of some straight-laced Stoics, though afterward indeed recommended to others also, by

<sup>a</sup> Vide Lucret. lib. v. vers. 201.

<sup>b</sup> Id. lib. ii. vers. 174, 175.

their own self-love, their over-weaning and puffy conceit of themselves. And so fleas and lice, had they understanding, might conclude the bodies of other greater animals, and men also, to have been made only for them. But the whole was not properly made for any part, but the parts for the whole, and the whole for the Maker thereof. And yet may the things of this lower world be well said to have been made principally (though not only) for man. For

Thus Plato, *μαῖρος μὲν ἑνεκα*  
*ἄλλου, καὶ οὐχ*  
*ἄλλου μέρους*  
*ἕνεκα.*  
De Legib.  
p. 903.

we ought not to monopolize the Divine goodness to ourselves, there being other animals superior to us, that are not altogether unconcerned neither in this visible creation; and it being reasonable

to think, that even the lower animals likewise, and whatsoever hath conscious life, was made partly also, to enjoy itself. But Atheists can be no fit judges of worlds being made well or ill, either in general, or respectively to mankind, they having no standing measure for well and ill, without a God and morality, nor any true knowledge of themselves, and what their own good or evil consisteth in. That was at first but a froward speech of some sullen discontented persons, when things falling not out agreeably to their own private, selfish, and partial appetites, they would revenge themselves, by railing upon nature (that is, Providence), and calling her a stepmother only to mankind, whilst she was a fond, partial, and indulgent mother to other animals;<sup>a</sup> and though this be elegantly set off by Lucretius,<sup>b</sup> yet is there nothing but poetic flourish

<sup>a</sup> Vide Plin. Hist. Natur. Procm. lib. vii.

<sup>b</sup> Lib. v. vcrs. 223.

in it all, without any philosophic truth; the advantages of mankind being so notoriously conspicuous above those of brutes.

But as for evils in general, from whence the Atheist would conclude the God of the Theist to be either impotent or envious; it hath been already declared, that the true original of them is from the necessity of imperfect beings, and the impossibility of things; but that the Divine art and skill most of all appeareth in bonifying these evils, and making them, like discords in music, to contribute to the harmony of the whole, and the good of particular persons.

Moreover, a great part of those evils, which men are afflicted with, is not from the reality of things, but only from their own fancy and opinions, according to that of the moralist, <sup>a</sup> *Ταράσσει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων δόγματα.* It is not things themselves, that disturb men, but only their own opinions concerning things.—And therefore it being much in our own power to be freed from these, Providence is not to be blamed upon the account of them. Pain is many times nearly linked with pleasure, according to that Socratic fable, <sup>b</sup> That when God could not reconcile their contrary natures (as he would) he tied them head and tail together. And good men know, that pain is not the evil of the man, but only of the part so affected (as Socrates also), *Τὸ ἀλγούν ἐν τῷ σκέλει μένει,* It goes no further than the leg where it is.—But this is many times very serviceable to free us from

<sup>a</sup> Epictet. in Enchiridio, cap. v. Vide etiam M. Antoninum, lib. iv. §. 3. p. 97. et lib. v. §. xix. p. 159.

<sup>b</sup> Apud Platon. in Phædonc, p. 376.



the greater evils of the mind; upon which all our happiness dependeth. To the Atheists, who acknowledge no *malum culpæ*, no evil of fault (turpitude, or dishonesty), death is the greatest and most tragical of all evils. But though this, according to their forlorn hypothesis, be nothing less than an absolute extinction of life; yet, according to the doctrine of the genuine Theists, which makes all souls substantial, no life of itself (without Divine annihilation) will ever quite vanish into nothing, any more than the substance of matter doth. And the ancient Pythagoreans and Platonists have been here so kind, even to the souls of brutes also, as that they might not be left in a state of inactivity and insensibility after death, as to bestow upon them certain subtile bodies, which they may then continue to act in. Nor can we think otherwise, but that Aristotle, from this fountain, derived that doctrine of his in his second book, *De Gen. An. c. 3.* <sup>a</sup> where, after he had declared the sensitive soul to be inseparable from body, he addeth *πάσης οὖν ψυχῆς δύναμις ἕτερον σώματος ἔοικε κεκοινωνηκέναι καὶ θειοτέρου τῶν καλουμένων στοιχείων· ὡς δὲ διαφέρουσι τιμιότητι αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίᾳ ἀλλήλων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη διαφέρει φύσις.* All souls therefore seem to have another body, and diviner than that of the elements; and as themselves differ in dignity and nobility, so do these bodies of theirs differ from one another.—And afterward calling this subtile body *πνεῦμα*, or a spirit, he affirmeth it to be, *ἀνάλογον τῶ τῶν ἄστρον στοιχείῳ*, analogous to the element of the stars.—Only as Galen, and St. Austin, and others, have conceived, Aristotle deviated here from the

<sup>a</sup> P. 618. tom. ii. oper.

Pythagoreans in this, that he supposed the sensitive soul itself to be really nothing else, but this very subtile and star-like body, and not a distinct substance from it, using it only as a vehicle. Nevertheless, he there plainly affirmeth the mind or rational soul to be really distinct from the body, and to come into it from without pre-existing; and consequently should acknowledge also its after-immortality. But whatsoever Aristotle's judgment were (which is not very material) it is certain, that dying to the rational or human soul is nothing but a withdrawing into the tiring-house, and putting off the clothing of this terrestrial body. So that it will still continue after death, to live to God, whether in a body, or without it. Though according to Plato's express doctrine, the soul is never quite naked of all body, he writing thus; *ἀεὶ ψυχὴ ἐπιτεταγμένη σώματι, τότε μὲν ἄλλω τότε δὲ ἄλλω* the soul is always conjoined with a body, but sometimes of one kind, and sometimes of another— which many Christian doctors also, as is before declared, have thought highly probable. However, our Christian faith assures us, that the souls of good men shall at length be clothed with spiritual and heavenly bodies, such as are, in Aristotle's language, *ἀνάλογα τῶ τῶν ἀστρῶν στοιχείῳ*, analogous to the element of the stars.—Which Christian resurrection, therefore, to life and immortality, is far from being, as Celsus<sup>a</sup> reproached it, *σκωλήκων ἐλπίς*, the mere hope of worms.—And thus much shall suffice, in way of confutation, of the first atheistic objection against Providence, which is the twelfth argumentation propounded in the second chapter.

<sup>a</sup> Apud Origin, contra Celsum, lib. v. p. 240.

The thirteenth atheistic argument, or second objection against Providence, is from the seeming confusion of human affairs; that all things fall alike to all; the innocent and the nocent, the pious and the impious, the religious and the profane: nay, that many times the worsser causes and men prevail against the better, as is intimated in that passage of the poet,<sup>a</sup> though in the person of a Theist,

*Victrix causa Deo placuit, sed victa Catoni;*

And that the unjust and ungodly often flow in all kind of prosperity, whilst the innocent and devout worshippers of the Deity, all their lives long, conflict with adversity. Whereas, were there a God and providence, as they conceive, profane and irreligious persons would be presently thunder-struck from heaven, or otherwise made remarkable objects of Divine vengeance, as also the pious miraculously protected and rescued from evil and harms.

Now we grant indeed, that this consideration hath too much puzzled and staggered weak minds in all ages. Because<sup>b</sup> “sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore is the heart of the sons of men fully set in them to do evil.” And the Psalmist himself<sup>c</sup> was sometime much perplexed with this phenomenon, the prosperity of the ungodly, who “set their mouths against heaven, and whose tongue walketh through the earth;” so that he was tempted to think, “he had cleansed his heart in vain, and washed his

<sup>a</sup> Lucan. lib. i. vers. 131.

<sup>b</sup> Eccles. viii. 11.

<sup>c</sup> Psal. lxxiii.

hands in innocency;" (till at length, entering into the sanctuary of God, his mind became illuminated, and his soul fixed in a firm trust and confidence upon Divine Providence; "Whom have I in heaven but thee," &c. "My flesh and my heart faileth, but God is the strength of my heart, and my portion for ever.") For, as some will from hence be apt to infer, That there is no God at all, but that blind chance and fortune steer all, ("the fool hath said in his heart, There is no God;"<sup>a</sup>) so will others conclude, That though there be a God, yet he either does not know things done here below, ("how does God know? and is there knowledge in the Most High?"<sup>b</sup>) or else will not so far humble himself, or disturb his own ease and quiet, as to concern himself in our low human affairs.

Thus did some in Plato from hence conclude, εἶναι μὲν Θεοῦ, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνων ἀμελεῖν πραγμάτων De Leg. x. [p. 664].

First of all therefore, we here say, that it is altogether unreasonable to require, that Divine Providence should miraculously interpose upon every turn in punishing the ungodly, and preserving the pious, and thus perpetually interrupt the course of nature (which would look but like a botch or bungle, and a violent business), but rather carry things on *ἀψόφῳ κεύθῳ*, in a still and silent path, and shew his art and skill in making things of themselves fairly unwind, and clear up at last into a satisfactory close. Passion and self-interest is blind, or short-sighted; but that, which steers the whole world, is no fond, pettish, impatient, and passionate thing, but an impartial, disinterested, and uncaptivated nature. Nevertheless, it is certain, that sometimes we have not wanted in-

<sup>a</sup> Psal. xiv. 1.

<sup>b</sup> Psal. lxxii. 2.

stances, in cases extraordinary, of a Θεός ἀπό μηχανῆς, God appearing, as it were, miraculously upon the stage,—and manifesting himself in taking immediate vengeance upon notorious malefactors, or delivering his faithful servants from imminent dangers or evils threatened; as the same is often done also by a secret and undiscerned over ruling of the things of nature. But it must be granted, that it is not always thus, but the periods of Divine Providence here in this world are commonly longer, and the evolutions thereof slower; according to that of Euripides,<sup>a</sup> which yet has a tang of profaneness in the expression,

Μίλλαι τὸ θεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοιαῦτον φύσει,

The Deity is slow or dilatory, and this is the nature of it. For it is not from slackness and remissness in the Deity, but either from his patience and long-suffering, he willing, that men should repent, or else to teach us patience by his example (as Plutarch<sup>b</sup> suggesteth), or that all things may be carried on with more pomp and solemnity; or lastly, for other particular reasons, as Plutarch<sup>c</sup> ventures to assign one, why it might not be expedient for Dionysius the tyrant, though so profane and irreligious a person, to have been cut off suddenly. But wicked and ungodly persons oftentimes fail not to be met withal at last, and at the long-run, here in this life, and either in themselves or posterity, to be notoriously branded with the marks of Divine displeasure: according to that of the poet,<sup>d</sup> “Raro antecedentem sceles-

<sup>a</sup> In Oreste, vers. 420.

<sup>b</sup> De sera Numinis Vindicta, tom. ii. oper. p. 550.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid. p. 557.

<sup>d</sup> Horat. Odar. lib. iii. od. ii.

tum," &c. It is seldom, that wickedness altogether escapes punishment, though it come slowly after, limping with a lame foot;—and those proverbial speeches amongst the Pagans, <sup>a</sup>

Ὅψι θεῶν ἀλεῦσι μύλοι, ἀλεῦσι δὲ λεπτά.

Mills of the gods do slowly wind,  
But they at length to powder grind.

and, "Divine justice steals on softly with woollen feet, but strikes at last with iron hands."

Nevertheless we cannot say, that it is always thus neither, but that wicked persons may possibly sometimes have an uninterrupted prosperity here in this life, and no visible marks of Divine displeasure upon them: but, as the generously virtuous will not envy them upon this account, nor repine at their own condition, they knowing that <sup>b</sup> οὐδὲν κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ οὐδ' αὖ τῷ φαύλῳ ἀγαθόν, There is neither any thing truly evil to the good, nor good to the evil;—so are they so far from being staggered herewith in their belief of a God and providence, that they are rather the more confirmed in their persuasions of a future immortality and judgment after death, when all things shall be set straight and right, and rewards and punishments impartially dispensed. That of Plutarch <sup>c</sup> therefore is most true here, εἰς οὖν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἅμα καὶ τὴν διαμονὴν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς βεβαιῶν, καὶ θάτερον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπολιπεῖν ἀναιροῦντα θάτερον, That there is a necessary connexion betwixt those two things, Divine Providence, and the permanence or immortality of human souls, one and the same

<sup>a</sup> Vide Plutarch, ubi supra, p. 548.

<sup>b</sup> Vide Platon. in Apolog. Socratis, p. 369. et de Republic. lib. x. p. 518.

<sup>c</sup> Ubi supra, p. 560.

reason confirming them both; neither can one of these be taken alone without the other.—But they, who, because judgment is not presently executed upon the ungodly, blame the management of things as faulty, and Providence as defective, are like such spectators of a dramatic poem, as when wicked and injurious persons are brought upon the stage, for awhile swaggering and triumphing, impatiently cry out against the dramatist, and presently condemn the plot; whereas, if they would but expect the winding up of things, and stay till the last close, they should then see them come off with shame and sufficient punishment.<sup>a</sup> The evolution of the world, as Plotinus calls it,<sup>b</sup> is ἀληθέστερον ποίημα, a truer poem;—and we men histrionical actors upon the stage, who, notwithstanding, insert something of our own into the poem too; but God Almighty is that skilful dramatist, who always connecteth that of ours, which went before, with what of his follows after, into good coherent sense, and will at last make it appear, that a thread of exact justice did run through all, and that rewards and punishments are measured out in geometrical proportion.

Lastly, It is in itself fit, that there should be somewhere a doubtful and cloudy state of things, for the better exercise of virtue and faith. For, as there could have been no Hercules, had there not been monsters to subdue; so, were there no such difficulties to encounter with, no puzzles and entanglements of things, no temptations and trials to assault us, virtue would grow languid,

<sup>a</sup> Vide Plutarch, ubi supra, p. 554.

<sup>b</sup> Ennead. iii. lib. ii. cap. xvi. p. 267. oper.

and that excellent grace of faith want due occasions and objects to exercise itself upon. Here have we therefore such a state of things, and this world is, as it were, a stage erected for the more difficult part of virtue to act upon, and where we are to live by faith, and not by sight; that faith, which is "the substance of things to be hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen;" a belief in the goodness, power, and wisdom of God, when all things are dark and cloudy round about us. "The just shall live by his faith."

We have now sufficiently confuted the second atheistic objection also, against Providence, as to the conduct and economy of human affairs. Nevertheless this is a large field, and much more might be said in defence of Providence, both as to these and other instances, had we room here to expatiate in. Wherefore, for a supplement of what remains, we shall refer the reader to the writings of others, who have professedly undertaken apologies for Providence, both as to the fabric and economy of the world; but especially the learned and ingenious author<sup>a</sup> of the *Divine Dialogues*. Only we shall here add some few considerations, not so much for the confutation of Atheists, as for the better satisfaction of such religionists, who, too easily concluding, that all things might have been much better than they are, are thereupon apt to call in question the Divine attribute of goodness in its full extent, which yet is the only foundation of our Christian faith.

First therefore we say, that in judging of the works of God, we ought not to consider the parts of the world alone by themselves; and then,

<sup>a</sup> Dr. Henry More.



because we could fancy much finer things, thereupon blame the Maker of the whole. As if one should attend only to this earth, which is but the lowest and most dreggy part of the universe; or blame plants, because they have not sense; brutes, because they have not reason; men, because they are not demons or angels; and angels, because they are not gods, or want Divine perfection. Upon which account, God should either have made nothing at all, since there can be nothing besides himself absolutely perfect, or else nothing but the higher rank of angelical beings, free from mortality, and all those other evils, that attend mankind, or such fine things as Epicurus's gods were feigned to be, living in certain delicious regions, <sup>a</sup> where there was neither blustering winds, nor any lowering clouds, nor nipping frosts, nor scorching heat, nor night, nor shadow, but the calm and unclouded ether, always smiling with gentle serenity, whereas were there but one kind of thing (the best) thus made, there could have been no music nor harmony at all in the world, for want of variety. But we ought, in the first place, to consider the whole, whether that be not the best, that could be made, having all that belongeth to it; and then the parts in reference to the whole, whether they be not, in their several degrees and ranks, congruous and agreeable thereunto. But this is a thing, which hath been

P. 256.

[Lib. ii. de  
Providentia,  
Enead. iii.  
lib. ii. cap. iii.]

so well insisted upon by Plotinus, that we cannot speak better to it, than in his words: "Ὅλον γὰρ τι ἐποίησε πάγκαλον, καὶ αὐταρκες, καὶ φίλον αὐτῷ, καὶ τοῖς μέρεσι τοῖς αὐτοῦ, τοῖς τε κυριωτέροις καὶ τοῖς ἐλάττωσιν ὡσάντως προσ-

<sup>a</sup> Vide Lucret. lib. iii. ver. 19.

φάροις· ὁ τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν μερῶν τὸ ὅλον αἰτιώμενος, ἀτοπος  
 ἂν εἴη τῆς αἰτίας· τὰ τε γὰρ μέρη πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον δεῖ σκοπεῖν  
 εἰ σύμφωνα καὶ ἁρμόττοντα ἐκείνῳ, καὶ τὸ ὅλον σκοπούμενον,  
 μὴ πρὸς μέρη ἄττα μικρὰ βλέπειν· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τὸν κόσμον  
 αἰτωμένου ἀλλὰ τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ χωρὶς λαβόντα, οἷον εἰ,  
 καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς· God made the whole most beautiful,  
 entire, complete, and sufficient; all agreeing  
 friendly with itself and its parts; both the nobler  
 and the meaner of them being alike congruous  
 thereunto. Whosoever, therefore, from the parts  
 thereof, will blame the whole, is an absurd and  
 unjust censurer. For we ought to consider the  
 parts, not alone by themselves, but in reference to  
 the whole, whether they be harmonious and agree-  
 able to the same. Otherwise we shall not blame the  
 universe, but some of its parts only, taken by  
 themselves; as if one should blame the hair or  
 toes of a man, taking no notice at all of his Divine  
 visage and countenance; or omitting all other  
 animals, one should attend only to the most con-  
 temptible of them; or, lastly, overlooking all  
 other men, consider only the most deformed  
 Thersites. But that, which God made, was the  
 whole as one thing; which he that attends to  
 may hear it speaking to him after this manner:  
 ‘God Almighty hath made me, and from thence  
 came I, perfect and complete, and standing in  
 need of nothing, because in me are contained all  
 things; plants, and animals, and good souls, and  
 men happy with virtue, and innumerable demons,  
 and many gods. Nor is the earth alone in me  
 adorned with all manner of plants, and a variety  
 of animals; or does the power of soul extend  
 at most no further than to the seas; as if the  
 whole air, and ether, and heaven, in the mean

time, were quite devoid of soul, and altogether unadorned with living inhabitants. Moreover, all things in me desire good, and every thing reaches to it, according to its power and nature. For the whole depends upon that first and highest Good, the gods themselves, who reign in my several parts, and all animals, and plants, and whatsoever seems to be inanimate in me. For some things in me partake only of being, some of life also, some of sense, some of reason, and some of intellect above reason. But no man ought to require equal things from unequal; nor that the finger should see, but the eye; it being enough for the finger to be a finger, and to perform its own office."—And again, afterwards, *ὡσπερ τεχνίτης οὐ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ζῳῷ ὀφθαλμοὺς ποιεῖ, οὕτως οὐδ' ὁ λόγος πάντα θεοὺς ἐργάζεται· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν θεοὺς, τὰ δὲ δαίμονας δευτέραν φύσιν, εἶτα ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ζῶα ἐφεξῆς, οὐ φθόνῳ· ἀλλὰ λόγῳ ποικιλίαν νοερὰν ἔχοντι· ἡμεῖς δὲ ὡσπερ οἱ ἄπειροι γραφικῆς τέχνης αἰτιῶνται, ὡς οὐ καλὰ τὰ χρώματα πανταχοῦ, ὃ δ' ἄρα τὰ προσήκοντα ἀπέδωκεν ἑκάστῳ τόπῳ· ἢ εἴ τις δρᾶμα μέμφοιτο, ὅτι μὴ πάντες ἦρωες ἐν ἀντῷ, καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς.* As an artificer would not make all things in an animal to be eyes; so neither has the Divine Λόγος, or spermatic reason of the world, made all things gods; but some gods, and some demons, and some men, and some lower animals; not out of envy, but to display its own variety and fecundity. But we are like unskilful spectators of a picture, who condemn the limner, because he hath not put bright colours every where; whereas he had suited his colours to every part respectively, giving to each such as belonged to it. Or else are we like those, who would blame a comedy or tragedy, because they were not all kings or heroes, that

acted in it, but some servants and rustic clowns introduced also, talking after their rude fashion. Whereas the dramatic poem would neither be complete, nor elegant and delightful, were all those worse parts taken out of it.

Again, We cannot certainly conclude, that the works of God and his creation do not transcend those narrow limits, which vulgar opinion and imagination sets them, that commonly terminates the universe, but a little above the clouds, or at most supposes the fixed stars, being all fastened in one solid sphere, to be the utmost wall, or arched roof, and rolling circumference thereof. Much less ought we, upon such groundless suppositions, to infer, that the world might therefore have been made much better than it is, because it might have been much more roomy and capacious. We explode the atheistic infinity of distant worlds; nor can we admit that Cartesian, seemingly more modest, indefinite extension of one corporeal universe, which yet really, according to that philosopher's meaning, hath *nullos fines*, no bounds nor limits at all. For we persuade ourselves, that the corporeal world is as incapable of a positive infinity of magnitude, as it is of time; there being no magnitude so great, but that more still might be added to it. Nevertheless, as we cannot possibly imagine the sun to be a quarter, or an hundredth part so big as we know it to be; so much more may the whole corporeal universe far transcend those narrow bounds, which our imagination would circumscribe it in. The new celestial phenomena, and the late improvements of astronomy and philosophy made thereupon, render it so probable, that even this dull earth of

ours is a planet, and the sun a fixed star in the centre of that vortex, wherein it moves, that many have shrewdly suspected, that there are other habitable globes, besides this earth of ours, (which may be sailed round about in a year or two) as also more suns, with their respective planets, than one. However, the distance of all the fixed stars from us being so vast, that the diameter of the great orb makes no discernible parallax in the site of them; from whence it is also probable, that the other fixed stars are likewise vastly distant from one another: this, I say, widens the corporeal universe to us, and makes those “*flam-mantia mœnia mundi*,” as Lucretius calls<sup>b</sup> them those flaming walls of the world, to fly away before us. Now, it is not reasonable to think, that all this immense vastness should lie waste, desert, and uninhabited, and have nothing in it that could praise the Creator thereof, save only this one small spot of earth. “In my father’s house (saith our Saviour) are many mansions.” And Baruch, (chapter iii. appointed by our church to be read publicly) “Oh Israel, how great is the house of God, and how large is the place of his possession? Great and hath no end, high and unmeasurable.” Which yet we understand not of an absolute infinity, but only such an immense vastness, as far transcends vulgar opinion and imagination.

We shall add but one thing more, that, to make a right judgment of the ways of Providence, and the justice thereof, as to the economy of mankind, we must look both forwards and backwards, or besides the present, not only upon the future, but also the past time. Which rule is likewise thus

<sup>a</sup> Lib. i. ver. 73, 74.

set down by Plotinus; οὐδ' ἐκείνον ἀποβλη-  
 τέον τὸν λόγον, ὅς οὐ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἐκάστοτε  
 φησὶ βλέπειν· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς πρόσθεν περιόδους,  
 καὶ αὖ τὸ μέλλον· Neither is that doctrine  
 of the ancients to be neglected, that, to give an  
 account of Providence, we ought to look back,  
 upon former periods, as well as forward to what  
 is future.—Indeed he, and those other philoso-  
 phers, who were religious, understood this so, as  
 to conclude a pre-existent state of all particular  
 souls, wherein they were at first created by God  
 pure, but by the abuse of their own liberty dege-  
 nerated, to be a necessary hypothesis, for the  
 solving that phenomenon of the depraved state  
 of mankind in general here in this life. And not  
 only so, but they endeavoured in like manner to  
 give an account also of those different conditions  
 of particular persons as to morality, from their  
 infancy, and their other different fates here, deriv-  
 ing them all ἐκ τῶν προβεβιωμένων, from their sever-  
 al demeanors heretofore in a pre-existent state.—  
 And there have not wanted Christian doctors,  
 who have complied with these philosophers in  
 both. But our common Christianity only agrees  
 thus far, as to suppose a kind of imputative pre-  
 existence in Adam, in whom all were created  
 pure, and so consequently involved in his after  
 miscarriage, to solve the pravity of human nature;  
 upon which account we are all said to be φύσει  
 τέκνα ὀργῆς, \* by nature children of wrath.—But as  
 for the different conditions of persons, and their  
 several fates, more disadvantageous to  
 some than others, this indeed the gene-  
 rality of Christian doctors have been

P. 246.  
 [Ennead. iii.  
 lib. ii. cap.  
 xiii.]

Thus Hierocles,  
 οὐκ ἀμελείται  
 ὁ ἀγαθὸς πῦν  
 γινόμενος, κἄν

\* Eph. ii. 3.

παλαιῶν με-  
νιμάτων ἐφίλ-  
κται στίγματα,  
157.

content to resolve only into an occult,  
but just Providence. And thus does  
Origen himself sometimes modestly pass  
it over, as in his third book against

\* P. 134.

Celsus,\* πολλοῖς καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀνατροφῆς τοιούτως  
γεγένηται, ὡς μηδὲ φαντασίαν ἐπιτραπῆναι τῶν κρειττόνων λα-  
βεῖν· ἀλλ' αἰεὶ καὶ ἐκ πρώτης ἡλικίας ἦτοι ἐν παιδικοῖς εἶναι  
ἀκολάστων ἀνδρῶν, ἢ δεσποτῶν ἢ ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ κωλυούσῃ  
τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναβλέπειν κακοδαμονίᾳ· τὰς δὲ περὶ τούτων  
αἰτίας πάντως μὲν εἰκὸς εἶναι, ἐν τοῖς τῆς προνοίας λόγοις·  
πίπτειν δὲ αὐτὰς εἰς ἀνθρώπους οὐκ εὐχερές· It hap-  
peneth to many, so to have been brought up from  
their very childhood, as that, by one means or  
other, they could have no opportunity at all of  
thinking of the better things, &c. And it is very  
probable, that there are causes of these things in  
the reasons of Providence, though they do not  
easily fall under human notice.

But there is yet a third atheistic objection  
against Providence behind, That it is impossible  
any one Being should animadvert and order all  
things in the distant places of the world at once;  
and, were this possible, yet would such infinite  
negotiosity be very uneasy and distractious to it,  
and altogether inconsistent with happiness. Nor  
would a Being; irresistibly powerful, concern it-  
self in the good or welfare of any thing else, it  
standing in need of nothing, and all benevolence  
and good-will arising from indigency and imbe-  
cility. Wherefore such a Being would wholly be  
taken up in the enjoyment of itself, and its own  
happiness, utterly regardless of all other things.

To which the reply is, first, That though our-  
selves, and all created beings, have but a finite  
animadversion, and narrow sphere of activity;

yet does it not therefore follow, that the case must be the same with the Deity, supposed to be a Being infinitely perfect, ἀπειροδύναμος, that hath no manner of defect—either of knowledge or power in it. But this is a mere *idolum specus*, an idol of the cave or den—men measuring the Deity by their own scantling and narrowness. And, indeed, were there nothing at all but what we ourselves could fully comprehend, there could be no God. Were the sun an animal, and had life coextended with its rays and light, it would see and perceive every atom of matter, that its outstretched beams reached to, and touched. Now all created beings are themselves, in some sense, but the rays of the Deity, which therefore cannot but feel and sensibly perceive all these its own effluxes and emanations. Men themselves can order and manage affairs in several distant places at once, without any disturbance; and we have innumerable notions of things in our mind, that lie there easily together, without crowding one another, or causing any distraction to us.\*

Nevertheless, the minds of weak mortals may here be somewhat eased and helped, by considering what hath been before suggested; that there is no necessity God Almighty should ἀνρουργεῖν ἅπαντα, do all things himself immediately and drudgingly—but he may have his inferior ministers and executioners under him, to discharge him of that supposed encumberment. As, first of all, an artificial plastic nature, which, without knowledge and animal consciousness, disposes the matter of the universe according to the plat-

\* Vide Xenophontem de Memorabilib. Socratis, lib. i. p. 575.



form or idea of a perfect mind, and forms the bodies of all animals. And this was one reason, why we did before insist so much upon this artificial, regular, and methodical nature, namely, that Divine Providence might neither be excluded from having an influence upon all things in this lower world, as resulting only from the fortuitous motions of senseless matter, unguided by any mind; nor yet the Deity be supposed to do every thing itself immediately and miraculously, without the subservient ministry of any natural causes, which would seem to us mortals, to be not only a violent, but also an operose, cumbersome, and moliminous business. And thus did Plato<sup>a</sup> acknowledge, that there were *ἐμφρονος φύσεως αἰτιαὶ αἰς ὑπερορούσαις χροῖται ὁ Θεός* certain causes of a prudent, that is, artificial and orderly nature, which God makes use of, as subservient to himself in the mundane economy.—Besides which, those instincts also impressed upon animals, and which they are passive to, directing them to act for ends either not understood, or not attended to by them, in order to their own good and the good of the universe, are another part of that Divine Fate, which, inserted into things themselves, is the servant and executioner of Providence. Above all which, there are yet other knowing and understanding ministers of the Deity, as its eyes and hands; demoniac or angelic beings, appointed to preside over mankind, all mundane affairs, and the things of nature; they having their several distinct offices and provinces assigned them. Of which also Plato thus; *τούτους εἶσιν*

<sup>a</sup> In *Timæo*, §. xxxvi. p. 256.

ἄρχοντες προστεταγμένοι ἐκάστοις, ἐπὶ τὸ σμικρὸ- P. 903. [De  
 τατον αἰεὶ πάθης καὶ πράξεως. There are Legibus, lib.  
 x. p. 671.]

certain rulers or presidents appointed by the supreme God, who governs the whole world, over all the several things and parts therein, even to the smallest distribution of them.—All which inferior causes are constantly overlooked and supervised by the watchful eye of God Almighty himself, who may also sometimes extraordinarily interpose.

We need not, therefore, restrain and confine Divine Providence to a few greater things only, as some do, that we may thereby consult the ease of the Deity, and its freedom from distraction; but may and ought to extend it to all things whatsoever, small as well as great. And, indeed, the great things of the world cannot well be ordered neither, without some regard to the small and little: \* οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ σμικρῶν τοὺς μεγάλους φασὶν οἱ λιθολόγοι λίθους εὖ κείσθαι as architects affirm, that great stones cannot be well placed together in a building without little.—Neither can generals of armies, nor governors of families, nor masters of ships, nor mechanic artificers, discharge their several functions, and do their works respectively as they ought, did they not mind small things also, as well as the great. Μὴ τοίνυν (saith the forementioned philosopher)<sup>b</sup> τόνγε Θεὸν ἀξιώσομέν ποτε θνητῶν δημιουργῶν φαυλότερον, οἱ τὰ προσήκοντα αὐτοῖς ἔργα, ὅσῳπερ ἂν ἀμείνους ὦσι, τόσῳ ἀκριβέστερα καὶ τελεώτερα μία τέχνη σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀπεργάζονται. Let us not therefore make God Almighty inferior to mortal officers, who, by one and the same art, can order small things as well as great; and so

\* Plato de Legib. lib. x. p. 671.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid.

suppose him to be supine and negligent.—Nevertheless, the chief concernment and employment of Divine Providence in the world is the economy of souls, or government of rational beings, which is by Plato contracted into this compendium ;

P. 903. οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔργον τῷ πεπτευτῇ λείπεται πλὴν με-  
[P. 672.] τατιθῆναι τὸ μὲν ἄμεινον γινόμενον ἦθος εἰς βελτίω  
τόπον χεῖρον δὲ εἰς τὸν χείρονα, &c. There is no other  
work left for the supreme Governor of all, than  
only to translate better souls into better places  
and conditions, and worsen into worsen—or, as  
he after addeth, to dispose of every one in the  
world in such a manner, as might best render  
νικῶσαν ἀρετὴν, ἠττωμένην δὲ κακίαν, virtue victorious,  
and triumphant over vice.—And thus may the  
slow and imperfect wits of mortals be satisfied;  
that Providence to the Deity is no moliminous,  
laborious, and distractious thing.

But that there is no higher spring of life in rational animals, than contracted self-love, and that all good-will and benevolence arises only from indigency and imbecility, and that no being whatsoever is concerned in the welfare of any other thing, but only what itself stands in need of; and, lastly, therefore, that what is irresistibly powerful, and needs nothing, would have no manner of benevolence, nor concern itself in the good and welfare of any thing whatsoever; this is but another idol of the Atheists' den, and only argues their bad nature, low-sunk minds, and gross immorality. And the same is to be said also of that other maxim of theirs,<sup>a</sup> That what is perfectly happy would have nothing at all to do, but only enjoy its own ease and quiet: whereas there is nothing

<sup>a</sup> Vide Diogen. Laert. lib. x. Segm. 139. p. 661.

more troublesome to ourselves than this ἀπραξία, this having nothing to do—and the activity of the Deity, or a perfect being, is altogether as easy to it as its essence.

The atheistic queries come next to be answered; which, being but three, are naturally to be disposed in this order: First, If there were a God, or perfect Being, who therefore was sufficiently happy in the enjoyment of himself, why would he go about to make a world? Secondly, If he must needs make a world, why did he not make it sooner? this late production thereof looking, as if he had but newly awaked out of a long sleep throughout infinite past ages, or else had in length of time contracted a satiety of his solitude. Thirdly and lastly, What tools or instruments? what machines or engines had he? Or how could he move the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal? because then he would run through all things, and could not lay hold nor fasten upon any thing.

To the first therefore we say, That the reason, why God made the world, was from his own overflowing and communicative goodness, that there might be other beings also happy, besides him, and enjoy themselves. Nor does this at all clash with God's making of the world for his own glory and honour; though Plotinus<sup>a</sup> were so shy of that, γελοῖον ἵνα τιμῶται, καὶ μεταφερόντων ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαματοποιῶν τῶν ἐνταῦθα, it is ridiculous to say, that God made the world, that he might be honoured; this being to transfer the affections of human artificers and statuaries upon him.—But the

<sup>a</sup> Libro contra Gnosticos, Ennead. ii. lib. ix. cap. iv. p. 202.

chief reason of his saying so was, because that philosopher conceived the world to have proceeded, not so much from the will of the Deity, as the necessity of its nature. Though this be true also, that God did not make the world merely to ostentate his skill and power, but to communicate his goodness, which is chiefly and properly his glory, as the light and splendour of the sun is the glory of it. But the Atheist demands, What hurt had it been for us never to have been made? and the answer is easy, We should then never have enjoyed any good, or been capable of happiness; and had there been no rational creatures at all made, it must have been either from impotent sterility in the Deity, or else from an invidious, narrow, and contracted selfishness, or want of benignity, and communicative goodness; both which are inconsistent with a perfect Being. But the argument may be thus retorted upon these Atheists; What hurt would it be for us to cease to be, or become nothing? And why then are these Atheists, as well as others, so unwilling to die?

But then in the next place they urge: Why was not the world made sooner, since this goodness of God was without date, and from everlasting? But this question may be taken in two different senses; either, Why was not the world from eternity, as God and his goodness are eternal? or else, secondly, If the world could not be from eternity, yet, notwithstanding, why was it not sooner, but so lately made? In both which queries the atomic Atheists take it for granted, that the system of the world was not from eternity, but had a beginning. Now we say, that the reason, why the world was not made from eter-

nity, was not from any defect of goodness in the Divine will, but because there is an absolute impossibility in the thing itself; or because the necessity and incapacity of such an imperfect being hindered. For we must confess, that, for our parts, we are prone to believe, that could the world have been from eternity, it should certainly have been so. And just thus does Philoponus, in his confutation of Proclus's arguments for the world's eternity, declare himself, and no otherwise: *Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄρα μὴ εἶναι τὸν κόσμον αἰδίου ὑποτιθέμενοι, οὔτε τὸ εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν αἰεὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀφαιρούμεθα, οὔτε ἀσθένειαν τῆς δημιουργικῆς αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῦμεν δυνάμεως· ἀλλὰ μὴ δύνασθαι αἰεὶ εἶναι τὸν κόσμον δι' αὐτὴν τὴν τοῦ γενομένου φύσιν ὑποτιθέμεθα*. Ourselves also supposing the world not to have been eternal, do neither ascribe this to any defect either of goodness or of power in the Deity, but only to the impossibility of the thing itself.—Where, in the following words, he gives a two-fold account of this impossibility of the world's eternity; *ὅτι τε τὸ ἀπειρον κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὑποστῆναι, ἢ διεξίτητον εἶναι ἢ ἀδύνατον καὶ ὅτι συναἰδίου εἶναι τῷ ποιῶντι τὸ γινόμενον φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει*. First, because there can be nothing actually infinite, and yet run through, as all the past duration of the world hath been; and, secondly, because that, which is made, or brought into being by another, as a distinct thing from it, cannot be co-eternal with its maker.—Where it is probable that Philoponus, being a Christian, designed not to oppose the eternal generation of the Son of God, but only to assert that nothing, which was properly made or created by God, and nothing, which was not itself God, could be from eternity, or without beginning. And now we see, how

those atheistic exceptions against the novelty of the Divine creation, as if God must therefore either have slept from eternity, or else have at length contracted a satiety of his former solitude, and the like, do of themselves quite vanish into nothing. But then, as to the second sense of the question, Why the world, though it could not possibly be from eternity, yet was no sooner, but so lately made? we say, that this is an absurd question; both because time was made together with the world, and there was no sooner or later before time; and also because whatsoever had a beginning, must of necessity be once but a day old. Wherefore the world could not possibly have been so made by God in time, as not to be once but five or six thousand years old, and no more; as now it is.

And as for the third and last query; How God could move and command the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal? we reply, first, that all other things being derived from God, as their only fountain and original, and essentially depending on him, who, by his absolute power also, could annihilate whatsoever he created; he must needs have a despotic power over all; and every thing whatsoever be naturally subject and obsequious to him. And since no body can possibly move itself, that, which first moved matter, must of necessity be incorporeal; nor could it by local motion, as one body moves another, or as engines and machines move by trusion or pulsion, they being before moved, but must do it by another kind of action, such as is not local motion, nor heterokinesy, but autokinesy; that is, by cogitation. Wherefore, that conceit of the Atheists,

that an incorporeal Deity could not possibly move the matter of the world, because it would run through it, and could not fasten or lay hold thereupon, is absurd, because this moves matter not mechanically but vitally, and by cogitation only. And that a cogitative being, as such, hath a natural imperium over matter, and power of moving it, without any engines or machines, is unquestionably certain, even from our own souls; which move our bodies, and command them every way, merely by will and thought. And a perfect mind, presiding over the matter of the whole world, could much more irresistibly, and with infinitely more ease, move the whole corporeal universe, merely by will and cogitation, than we can our bodies.

The last head of atheistic argumentation is from interest. And, first, the Atheists would persuade, that it is the interest of mankind in general, and of every particular person, that there should be no God, that is, no Being infinitely powerful, that hath no law, but its own will; and therefore may punish whom he pleases eternally after death:

To which our first reply is, that if there be a God, and souls be immortal, then is it not any man's thinking otherwise that will alter the case, nor afford the Atheists any relief against those two imagined evils of theirs. For things are sullen, and will be as they are, whatever we think them, or wish them to be; and men will at last discover their error, when perhaps it may be too late. Wishing is no proving; and therefore this atheistic argument from interest is no argu-



ment at all against the existence of a God, it being nothing but the ignorant wish and vain desire of besotted Atheists.

In the next place, this wish of Atheists is altogether founded upon a mistaken notion of God Almighty too, that he is nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent; which indeed is not the most desirable thing. But as it hath been often declared, the will of God is the will of goodness, justice, and wisdom itself omnipotent. His will is not mere will, such as hath no other reason besides itself; but it is law, equity, and chancery; it is the *τὸ δεῖον*, or Ought itself—decreeing, willing, and acting. Neither does God punish any out of a delight in punishment, or in the evil and suffering of the persons punished; but to those, who are not *ἀνίατοι*, altogether incurable, *δίκη ἰατρεία*, his punishment is physic—in order to their recovery and amendment; so that the source and fountain thereof is goodness to the persons themselves punished. But to such as are incurable, the punishment inflicted on them is intended for the good of the whole. So that this attribute of justice in God doth not at all clash with the attribute of goodness, it being but a branch thereof, or particular modification of the same. Goodness and justice in God are always complicated together; neither his goodness being fondness, nor his justice cruelty; but he being both good in punishing, and just in rewarding and dispensing benefits. Wherefore, it can be the interest of none, that there should be no God nor immortality, unless perhaps of such desperately and incurably wicked persons, who abandoning their

true interest of being good, having thereupon no other interest now left them, than not to be, or become nothing.

To be without a God, is to be without hope in the world; for Atheists can have neither faith, nor hope, in senseless matter, and the fortuitous motions thereof. And though an understanding being have never so much enjoyment of itself for the present, yet could it not possibly be happy, without immortality, and security of the future continuance thereof. But the Atheists conclude, that there is nothing immortal, and that all life perisheth and vanisheth into nothing; and consequently also, that *εὐδαιμονία ἀνύπαρκτον*, happiness is a thing that hath no existence in nature, a mere figment and chimera, or idle wish and vain dream of mortals. Wherefore it cannot be the interest of mankind, that this hypothesis should be true, which thus plainly cuts off all hope from men, and leaves them in an utter impossibility of being ever happy.

God is such a being, as if he could be supposed not to be, there is nothing, which any, who are not desperately engaged in wickedness, no, not Atheists themselves, could possibly more wish for or desire. To believe a God, is to believe the existence of all possible good and perfection in the universe; it is to believe, that things are as they should be, and that the world is so well framed and governed, as that the whole system thereof could not possibly have been better. For peccability arises from the necessity of imperfect free-willed beings, left to themselves, and therefore could not by omnipotence itself have been excluded; and though sin actual might perhaps have been kept out by

force and violence, yet, all things computed, it was doubtless most for the good of the whole, that it should not be thus forcibly hindered. There is nothing, which cannot be hoped for, by a good man, from the Deity; whatsoever happiness his being is capable of, and such things, as "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor can now enter into the heart of man to conceive." Infinite hopes lie before us, from the existence of a Being infinitely good and powerful, and our own souls' immortality; and nothing can hinder or obstruct these hopes, but our own wickedness of life. To believe a God, and do well, are two the most hopeful, cheerful, and comfortable things, that possibly can be. And to this purpose is that of Linus,<sup>a</sup>

*"Ελπεσθαι χρὴ πάντ', ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστ' οὐδέν ἄελλπτον"*

*"Ῥαδία πάντα Θεῷ τελέσαι, καὶ ἀνήνυτον οὐδέν."*

Wherefore, as for Democritus and Epicurus, whose encomiums the Atheists here so loudly sing forth, we say, that however they have made so great a noise in the world, and have been so much cried up of late, yet were they really no better than a couple of infatuated sophists, or witty fools, and debauchers of mankind.

And now come we to the last atheistic argumentation, wherein they endeavour to recommend their doctrine to civil sovereigns, and to persuade them, that Theism or religion is absolutely inconsistent with their interest; their reasons for which are these three following. First, because the civil sovereign reigns only in fear; and therefore, if there be any power and fear greater than the

<sup>a</sup> Apud Jamblichum de Vita Pythagor. cap. xxvii. p. 117, 118.

power and fear of the Leviathan, civil authority can signify little. Secondly, because sovereignty is in its own nature absolutely indivisible, and must be either infinite, or none at all; so that Divine laws (natural and revealed) superior to it, circumscribing it, would consequently destroy it. Wherefore religion and Theism must of necessity be displaced, and removed out of the way, to make room for the Leviathan to roll and tumble in. Thirdly and lastly, private judgment of good and evil, just and unjust, is also contradictory to the very being of a body politic; which is one artificial man, made up of many natural men united under one head, having one common reason, judgment, and will, ruling over the whole. But conscience, which religion introduceth, is private judgment of good and evil, just and unjust, and therefore altogether inconsistent with true politics; that can admit of no private consciences, but only one public conscience of the law.

In way of answer to the first of which, we must here briefly unravel the atheistic ethics and politics. The foundation whereof is first laid in the villanizing of human nature; as that, which has not so much as any the least seeds, either of politicalness or ethicalness at all in it; nothing of equity and philanthropy (there being no other charity or benevolence any where, according to them, save what resulteth from fear, imbecility, and indigency); nothing of public and common concern, but all private and selfish; appetite and utility, or the desires of sensual pleasure, and honour, dominion, and precellency before others,

being the only measures of good in nature. So that there can be nothing naturally just or unjust, nothing in itself sinful or unlawful, but every man by nature hath *jus ad omnia*, a right to every thing—whatsoever his appetite inclineth him unto, or himself judgeth profitable; even to other men's bodies and lives. “*Si occidere cupis, jus habes;*” if thou desirest to kill, thou hast then naturally a right thereunto;—that is, a liberty to kill without any sin or injustice. For *jus* and *lex*, or *justitia*, right and law, or justice, in the language of these atheistic politicians, are directly contrary to one another; their right being a belluine liberty, not made, or left by justice, but such as is founded in a supposition of its absolute nonexistence. Should therefore a son not only murder his own parents, who had tenderly brought him up, but also exquisitely torture them, taking pleasure in beholding their rueful looks, and hearing their lamentable shrieks and outcries, there would be nothing of sin or injustice at all in this, nor in any thing else; because justice is no nature, but a mere factitious and artificial thing, made only by men and civil laws. And, according to these men's apprehensions, nature has been very kind and indulgent to mankind herein, that it hath thus brought us into the world, without any fetters or shackles upon us, free from all duty and obligation, justice and morality, these being to them nothing but restraints and hinderances of true liberty. From all which it follows, that nature absolutely dissociates and segregates men from one another, by reason of the inconsistency of those appetites of theirs, that are all carried

out only to private good, and consequently, that every man is, by nature, in a state of war and hostility against every man.

In the next place, therefore, these atheistic politicians further add, that though this their state of nature, which is a liberty from all justice and obligation, and a lawless, loose, or belluine right to every thing, be in itself absolutely the best; yet nevertheless by reason of men's imbecility; and the equality of their strengths, and inconsistency of their appetites, it proves by accident the worst; this war with every one making men's right or liberty to every thing indeed a right or liberty to nothing; they having no security of their lives, much less of the comfortable enjoyment of them. For as it is not possible, that all men should have dominion (which were indeed the most desirable thing, according to these principles), so the generality must needs be sensible of more evil in such a state of liberty with an universal war against all, than of good. Wherefore, when men had been a good while hewing, and slashing, and justling against one another, they became at length all weary hereof, and conceived it necessary by art to help the defect of their own power here, and to choose a lesser evil for the avoiding of a greater; that is, to make a voluntary abatement of this their infinite right, and to submit to terms of equality with one another, in order to a sociable and peaceable cohabitation: and not only so, but also for the security of all, that others should observe such rules as well as themselves, to put their necks under the yoke of a common coercive power, whose will, being the will of them all, should be the

very rule, and law, and measure of justice to them.

Here therefore these atheistic politicians, as they first of all slander human nature, and make a villain of it; so do they, in the next place, reproach justice and civil sovereignty also, making it to be nothing but an ignoble and bastardly brat of fear; or else a lesser evil, submitted to merely out of necessity, for the avoiding of a greater evil, that of war with every one, by reason of men's natural imbecility. So that, according to this hypothesis, justice and civil government are plainly things not good in themselves, nor desirable (they being a hinderance of liberty, and nothing but shackles and fetters), but by accident only, as necessary evils: and thus do these politicians themselves sometimes distinguish betwixt good and just, that "bonum amatur per se, justum per accidens;" good is that, which is loved for itself, but just by accident.—From whence it follows unavoidably, that all men must of necessity be ἀκοντες δίκαιοι, unwillingly just,—or not with a full and perfect, but mixed will only; just being a thing that is not sincerely good, but such as hath a great dash or dose of evil blended with it. And this was the old atheistic generation of justice, and of a body politic, civil society, and sovereignty. For though a modern writer affirm this hypothesis (which he looks upon as the only true scheme of politics) to be a new invention, as the circulation of the blood, and no older than the book *De Cive*, yet is it certain, that it was the commonly-received doctrine of the atheistic politicians and philosophers before Plato's time; who

represents their sense concerning the original of justice and civil society in this manner: ὁ πρῶτον

ἔφην ἔρεῖν, περὶ τούτου ἄκουε, τί τε ὃν τυγχάνει  
καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη· πεφυκέναι γὰρ δὴ De Rep. l. ii.  
p. 358, 359.  
φασι, τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι [P. 442. edit.  
Ficini.]  
κακόν· πλέονι δὲ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι,

ἢ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀδικεῖν· ὥστε ἐπειδὴν ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσί τε καὶ ἀδικῶνται, καὶ ἀμφοτέρων γεύονται, τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν, τὸ δὲ αἰρεῖν, δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν ξυνηθῆσθαι ἀλλήλοις, μήτ' ἀδικεῖν, μήτ' ἀδικεῖσθαι· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δὴ ἄρξασθαι νόμους τίθεσθαι, καὶ ὀνομάσαι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον· I am to declare first what justice is, according to the sense of these philosophers, and from whence it was generated. They say, therefore, that by nature, lawless liberty, and to do that which is now called injustice and injury to other men, is good; but to suffer it from others, is evil. But of the two there is more of evil in suffering it, than of good in doing it: whereupon when men had clashed a good while, doing and suffering injury, the greater part, who by reason of their imbecility were not able to take the former without the latter, at length compounded the business amongst themselves, and agreed together by pacts and covenants, neither to do nor suffer injury, but to submit to rules of equality, and make laws by compact, in order to their peaceable cohabitation, they calling that, which was required in those laws, by the name of just.—And then is it added: καὶ εἶναι ταύτην γένεσιν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης, μεταξὺ οὖσαν τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου ὄντος, ἐὰν ἀδικῶν μὴ διδῶ δίκην, τοῦ δὲ κακίστου, ἐὰν ἀδικούμενρος τιμωρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατος ἦ· τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσῳ ὃν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, ἀγαπᾶσθαι, οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀρρώστια τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τιμώμενον·



And this is, according to these philosophers, the generation and essence of justice, as a certain middle thing betwixt the best and the worst. The best, to exercise a lawless liberty of doing whatsoever one please to other men without suffering any inconvenience from it; and the worst to suffer evil from others, without being able to revenge it. Justice, therefore, being a middle thing betwixt both these, is loved, not as that which is good in itself, but only by reason of men's imbecility, and their inability to do injustice. Forasmuch as he, that had sufficient power, would never enter into such compacts, and submit to equality and subjection. As for example, if a man had Gyges's magical ring, that he could do whatsoever he listed, and not be seen or taken notice of by any, such an one would certainly never enter into covenants, nor submit to laws of equality and subjection.— Agreeably whereunto, it hath been concluded also by some of these old atheistic philosophers, that justice was ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, not properly and directly one's own good, the good of him that is just, but another man's good, partly of the fellow-citizens, but chiefly of the ruler, whose vassal he is.—And it is well known, that after Plato's time, this hypothesis concerning justice, that it was a mere factitious thing, and sprung only from men's fear and imbecility, as a lesser evil, was much insisted on by Epicurus also.

But let us in the next place see, how our modern atheistic philosophers and politicians will manage and carry, on this hypothesis, so as to consociate men by art into a body politic, that are naturally dissociated from one another, as

also make justice and obligation artificial, when there is none in nature. First of all, therefore, these artificial justice-makers, city-makers, and authority-makers, tell us, that though men have an infinite right by nature, yet may they alienate this right, or part thereof, from themselves, and either simply renounce it, or transfer the same upon some other person; by means whereof it will become unlawful for themselves, afterwards, to make use thereof. Thus a late writer,<sup>a</sup> men “may by signs declare, *Velle se non licitum sibi amplius fore, certum aliquid facere, quod jure antea fecisse poterant*; That it is their will, it shall no longer be lawful for them, to do something, which before they had a right to do;” and this is called by him, a simple renunciation of right. And, further, saith he, they “may declare again, *Velle se non licitum sibi amplius fore alicui resistere, &c.* That it is their will, it shall be no longer lawful for them, to resist this or that particular person, whom before they might lawfully have resisted;” and this is called a translation of right. But if there be nothing in its own nature unlawful, then cannot this be unlawful for a man afterwards, to make use of such liberty, as he had before in words renounced or abandoned. Nor can any man, by his mere will, make any thing unlawful to him, which was not so in itself; but only suspend the exercise of so much of his liberty as he thought good. But, however, could a man by his will oblige himself, or make any thing unlawful to him, there would be nothing got by this, because then might he, by his will, disoblige himself again, and make the same law-

<sup>a</sup> Hobbes, *Elem. de Cive*, cap. ii. §. 4.

ful as before. For what is made merely by will, may be destroyed by will. Wherefore, these politicians will yet urge the business further, and tell us, that no man can be obliged but by his own act, and that the essence of injustice is nothing else but *dati repetitio*,<sup>a</sup> the taking away of that, which one had before given. To which we again reply, that were a man naturally unobliged to any thing, then could he no way be obliged to stand to his own act, so that it should be really unjust and unlawful for him, at any time, upon second thoughts, voluntarily to undo, what he had before voluntarily done. But the Atheists here plainly render injustice a mere ludicrous thing, when they tell us,<sup>b</sup> that it is nothing but such an absurdity in life, as it is in disputation, when a man denies a proposition, that he had before granted; which is no real evil in him as a man, but only a thing called an absurdity, as a disputant. That is, injustice is no absolute evil of the man; but only a relative incongruity in him, as a citizen. As when a man speaking Latin, observes not the laws of grammar, this is a kind of injustice in him, as a Latinist or grammarian; so when one, who lives in civil society, observes not the laws and conditions thereof, this is, as it were, the false Latin of a citizen, and nothing else. According to which notion of injustice, there is no such real evil or hurt in it, as can any way withstand the force of appetite and private utility, and oblige men to civil obedience, when it is contrary to the same. But these political jugglers and enchanters will here cast yet a further mist before men's eyes with their pacts and covenants.

<sup>a</sup> Id. *ibid.* cap. iii. §. 3.

<sup>b</sup> Id. *ibid.*

For men by their covenants, say they, may unquestionably oblige themselves, and make things unjust and unlawful to them, that were not so before. Wherefore, injustice is again defined by them, and that with more speciousness, to be the breach of covenants. But though it be true, that if there be natural justice, covenants will oblige; yet, upon the contrary supposition, that there is nothing naturally unjust, this cannot be unjust neither, to break covenants. Covenants, without natural justice, are nothing but mere words and breath (as indeed these atheistic politicians themselves, agreeably to their own hypothesis, call them); and therefore can they have no force to oblige. Wherefore, these justice-makers are themselves at last necessitated to fly to laws of nature, and to pretend this to be a law of nature, that men should stand to their pacts and covenants. Which is plainly to contradict their main fundamental principle, that by nature nothing is unjust or unlawful; for, if it be so, then can there be no laws of nature; and if there be laws of nature, then must there be something naturally unjust and unlawful. So that this is not to make justice, but clearly to unmake their own hypothesis, and to suppose justice to have been already made by nature, or to be in nature; which is a gross absurdity in disputation, to affirm what one had before denied. But these their laws of nature are indeed nothing but juggling equivocation, and a mere mockery; themselves again acknowledging them to be no laws, because law is nothing but the word of him who hath command over others; but only conclusions or theorems concerning what conduces to the conservation

and defence of themselves, upon the principle of fear; that is, indeed the laws of their own timorous and cowardly complexion: for they who have courage and generosity in them, according to this hypothesis, would never submit to such sneaking terms of equality and subjection, but venture for dominion; and resolve either to win the saddle, or lose the horse. Here therefore do our atheistic politicians plainly dance round in a circle; they first deriving the obligation of civil laws, from that of covenants, and then that of covenants from the laws of nature; and, lastly, the obligation both of these laws of nature, and of covenants themselves, again, from the law, command, and sanction, of the civil sovereign; without which neither of them would at all oblige. And thus is it manifest, how vain the attempts of these politicians are, to make justice artificially, when there is no such thing naturally (which is indeed no less than to make something out of nothing); and by art to consociate into bodies politic those whom nature had dissociated from one another; a thing as impossible, as to tie knots in the wind or water; or to build up a stately palace or castle out of sand. Indeed the ligaments, by which these politicians would tie the members of their huge Leviathan, or artificial man, together, are not so good as cobwebs; they being really nothing but mere will and words: for if authority and sovereignty be made only by will and words, then is it plain, that by will and words they may be unmade again at pleasure.

Neither indeed are these atheistic politicians themselves altogether unaware hereof, that this their artificial justice and obligation can be no

firm vinculum of a body politic, to consociate those together, and unite them into one, who are naturally dissociated and divided from one another; they acknowledging, that “covenants without the sword, being but words and breath, are of no strength to hold the members of their Leviathan, or body politic, together.” Wherefore, they plainly betake themselves at length from art to force and power, and make their civil sovereign really to reign only in fear.<sup>a</sup> And this must needs be their meaning, when they so constantly declare all obligation, just and unjust, to be derived only from law; they by law there understanding a command directed to such as by reason of their imbecility are not able to resist: so that the will and command of the more powerful obliges by the fear of punishment threatened.<sup>b</sup> Now, if the only real obligation to obey civil laws be from the fear of punishment, then could no man be obliged to hazard his life for the safety of his prince and country; and they, who could reasonably promise themselves impunity, would be altogether disobliged, and consequently might justly break any laws for their own advantage. An assertion so extravagant, that these confounded politicians themselves are ashamed plainly to own it, and therefore disguise it what they can by equivocation; themselves sometimes also confessing so much of truth, that “*pœna non obligat, sed obligatum tenet,*”<sup>c</sup> punishment does not oblige, but only hold those to their duty, who were before obliged.—Furthermore, what is made by power

<sup>a</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, cap. xvi.

<sup>b</sup> *Id.* *Element. de Cive*, cap. xv. §. 5.

<sup>c</sup> *Id.* *ibid.*, cap. xiv. §. 2.

and force only, may be unmade by power and force again. If civil sovereigns reign only in the fear of their own sword, then is that right of theirs, so much talked of, indeed nothing else but might, and their authority, force; and consequently successful and prosperous rebellion, and whatsoever can be done by power, will be *ipso facto* thereby justified. Lastly, were civil sovereigns, and bodies politic, mere violent and contra-natural things, then would they all quickly vanish into nothing, because nature will prevail against force and violence; whereas men constantly every where fall into political order, and the corruption of one form of government is but the generation of another.

Wherefore, since it is plain, that sovereignty and bodies politic can neither be merely artificial nor yet violent things, there must of necessity be some natural bond or vinculum to hold them together, such as may both really oblige subjects to obey the lawful commands of sovereigns, and sovereigns in commanding to seek the good and welfare of their subjects; whom these atheistic politicians (by their infinite and belluine right) quite discharge from any such thing. Which bond or vinculum can be no other than natural justice; and something of a common and public, of a cementing and conglutinating nature, in all rational beings; the original of both which is from the Deity. The right and authority of God himself is founded in justice; and of this is the civil sovereignty also a certain participation. It is not the mere creature of the people, and of men's wills, and therefore annihilable again by their wills at pleasure; but hath a stamp of Divi-

nity upon it, as may partly appear from hence, because that *jus vitæ et necis*, that power of life and death—which civil sovereigns have, was never lodged in singulars, before civil society; and therefore could not be conferred by them. Had not God and nature made a city; were there not a natural conciliation of all rational creatures, and subjection of them to the Deity, as their head (which is Cicero's,<sup>a</sup> “*una civitas deorum atque hominum*,” one city of gods and men)—had not God made ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι, ruling and being ruled—superiority and subjection, with their respective duty and obligation; men could neither by art, or political enchantment, nor yet by force, have made any firm cities or polities. The civil sovereign is no Leviathan, no beast, but a God (“I have said, Ye are gods”<sup>b</sup>): he reigns not in mere brutish force and fear, but in natural justice and conscience, and in the right and authority of God himself. Nevertheless, we deny not, but that there is need of force and fear too, to constrain those to obedience, to whom the conscience of duty proveth ineffectual. Nor is the fear of the civil sovereign's own sword alone sufficient for this neither, unassisted by religion, and the fear of an invisible Being omnipotent, who seeth all things, and can punish secret as well as open transgressors, both in this life and after death. Which is a thing so confessedly true, that Atheists have therefore pretended religion to have been at first a mere political figment. We conclude, therefore, that the civil sovereign reigneth not, merely in the fear of his own power and sword; but first

<sup>a</sup> De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. lxii. p. 3043. tom. ix. oper.

<sup>b</sup> Psalm lxxxii. 6.



in the justice and authority, and then in the power and fear also of God Almighty. And thus much for the first atheistic pretence, from the interest of civil sovereigns.

To their second, that sovereignty is essentially infinite, and therefore altogether inconsistent with religion, that would limit and confine it, we reply; that the right and authority of civil sovereigns is not, as these our atheistic politicians ignorantly suppose, a mere belluine liberty, but it is a right essentially founded in the being of natural justice, as hath been declared. For authority of commanding is such a right, as supposes obligation in others to obey, without which it could be nothing but mere will and force. But none can be obliged in duty to obey, but by natural justice; commands, as such, not creating obligation, but presupposing it. For, if persons were not before obliged to obey, no commands would signify any thing to them. Wherefore, the first original obligation is not from will, but nature. Did obligation to the things of natural justice, as many suppose, arise from the will and positive command of God, only by reason of punishments threatened, and rewards promised; the consequence of this would be, that no man was good and just, but only by accident, and for the sake of something else; whereas the goodness of justice or righteousness is intrinsical to the thing itself, and this is that which obligeth (and not any thing foreign to it), it being a different species of good from that of appetite, and private utility, which every man may dispense withal. Now there can be no more infinite justice, than there can be an infinite rule, or an infinite measure. Justice is

essentially a determinate thing ; and therefore can there not be an infinite *jus*, right or authority. If there be any thing in its own nature just and obliging, or such as ought to be done ; then must there of necessity be something unjust, or unlawful, which therefore cannot be obligingly commanded by any authority whatsoever. Neither ought this to be thought any impeachment of civil authority, it extending universally to all, even to that of the Deity itself. The right and authority of God himself; who is the supreme sovereign of the universe, is also in like manner bounded and circumscribed by justice. God's will is ruled by his justice, and not his justice ruled by his will ; and therefore God himself cannot command, what is in its own nature unjust. And thus have we made it evident, that infinite right and authority of doing and commanding any thing without exception, so that the arbitrary will of the commander should be the very rule of justice itself to others, and consequently might oblige to any thing, is an absolute contradiction; and a non-entity ; it supposing nothing to be in its own nature just or unjust ; which if there were not, there could be no obligation nor authority at all. Wherefore the Atheists, who would flatter civil sovereigns with this infinite right, as if their will ought to be the very rule of justice and conscience, and upon that pretence prejudice them against religion, do as ill deserve of them, as of religion hereby ; they indeed absolutely divesting them of all right and authority, and leaving them nothing, but mere brutish force and belluine liberty. And could civil sovereigns utterly demolish and destroy conscience and religion in the

minds of men (which yet is an absolute impossibility), they thinking thereby to make elbow-room for themselves, they would certainly bury themselves also in the ruins of them. Nevertheless, thus much is true; that they, in whom the sovereign legislative power of every polity is lodged (whether single persons, or assemblies); they, who make civil laws, and can reverse them at pleasure, though they may unquestionably sin against God, in making unjust laws, yet can they not sin politically or civilly, as violators or transgressors of those laws cancelled and reversed by them; they being superior to them. Nor is this all; but these sovereign legislative powers may be said to be absolute also in another sense, as being *ἀνυπεύθυνοι*, unjudicable,—or uncensurable by any human court; because, if they were so obnoxious, then would that court or power, which had a right to judge and censure them, be superior to them; which is contrary to the hypothesis. And then, if this power were again judicable by some other, there must either be an infinite progress, or endless circulation (a thing not only absurd, but also utterly inconsistent with government and property; because, there being no ultimate judgment unappealable from, there could never be any final determination of controversies); or else at last, all must be devolved to the multitude of singulars, which would be a dissolution of the body politic, and a state of anarchy. And thus have we fully confuted the second atheistic pretence also, for the “inconsistency of religion with civil sovereignty.”

Their third and last follows; “That private judgment of good and evil is contradictory to civil

sovereignty, and a body politic, this being one artificial man, that must be all governed by one reason and will." But conscience is private judgment of good and evil, lawful and unlawful, &c. To which we reply, that it is not religion, but, on the contrary, the principles of these atheistic politicians, that unavoidably introduce private judgment of good and evil, such as is absolutely inconsistent with civil sovereignty; there being, according to them, nothing in nature of a public or common good, nothing of duty or obligation, but all private appetite and utility, of which also every man is judge for himself. For if this were so, then, whenever any man judged it most for his private utility to disobey laws, rebel against sovereigns, nay, to poison or stab them, he would be unquestionably bound by nature, and the reason of his own good, as the highest law, to do the same. Neither can these atheistic politicians be ever able to bring men out of this state of private good, judgment and will, which is natural to them, by any artificial tricks and devices, or mere enchantments of words, as artificial justice, and an artificial man, and a common person and will, and a public conscience, and the like. Nay, it is observable, that themselves are necessitated, by the tenor of these their principles, casuistically to allow such private judgment and will, as is altogether inconsistent with civil sovereignty; as, that any man may lawfully resist in defence of his own life; and that they, who have once rebelled, may afterwards justly defend themselves by force. Nor indeed can this private judgment of men, accord-

ing to their appetite and utility, be possibly otherwise taken away, than by natural justice, which is a thing not of a private but of a public and common nature; and by conscience, that obligeth to obey all the lawful commands of civil sovereigns, though contrary to men's appetites and private interest. Wherefore conscience also is, in itself, not of a private and partial, but of a public and common nature; it respecting Divine laws, impartial justice and equity, and the good of the whole, when clashing with our own selfish good, and private utility. This is the only thing that can naturally consociate mankind together, lay a foundation for bodies politic, and take away that private will and judgment, according to men's appetite and utility, which is inconsistent with the same; agreeably to that of Plato's,<sup>a</sup> *Τὸ κοινὸν συνδέει, τὸ ἴδιον διασπᾶ*, that, which is of a common and public nature, unites; but that, which is of a private, segregates and dissociates.—It is true indeed, that particular persons must make a judgment in conscience for themselves (a public conscience being nonsense and ridiculous), and that they may also err therein: yet is not the rule neither, by which conscience judgeth, private; nor itself unaccountable, unless in such mistaken fanatics, as professedly follow private impulses; but either the natural and eternal laws of God, or else his revealed will, things more public than the civil laws of any country, and of which others also may judge. Nevertheless, we deny not, but that evil persons may, and do sometimes make a pretence of con-

<sup>a</sup> De Legib. lib. ix. p. 660.

science and religion, in order to sedition and rebellion, as the best things may be abused ; but this is not the fault of religion, but only of the men ; conscience obliging, though first to obey God, yet, in subordination to him, the laws of civil sovereigns also. To conclude, conscience and religion oblige subjects actively to obey all the lawful commands of civil sovereigns, or legislative powers, though contrary to their own private appetite, interest, and utility ; but when these same sovereign legislative powers command unlawful things, conscience, though it here obliges to obey God, rather than man, yet does it, notwithstanding, oblige not to resist. Rom. xiii. " Whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation." And Matt. xxvi. " All they, that take the sword, shall perish with the sword." Here is " the patience and the faith of the saints." And thus does religion " give unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's," as well as " unto God the things that are God's."

And now, having fully confuted all the atheistic grounds, we confidently conclude, that the first original of all things was neither stupid and senseless matter fortuitously moved, nor a blind and nescient, but orderly and methodical plastic nature ; nor a living matter, having perception or understanding natural, without animal sense or consciousness ; nor yet did every thing exist of itself necessarily from eternity, without a cause. But there is one only necessary existent, the Cause of all other things ; and this an absolutely perfect Being, infinitely good, wise, and powerful ;

**214 ONE PERFECT BEING, THE ROOT OF ALL.**

who hath made all, that was fit to be made, and according to the best wisdom, and exerciseth an exact providence over all : whose name ought to be hallowed, and separated from all other things ; To whom be all honour, and glory, and worship, for ever and ever. Amen.

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**DISCOURSE**  
**CONCERNING THE**  
**TRUE NOTION**  
**OF THE**  
**LORD'S SUPPER.**





THE  
TRUE NOTION

OF THE

LORD'S SUPPER.

THE INTRODUCTION.

ALL great errors have ever been intermingled with some truth. And indeed, if Falsehood should appear alone unto the world, in her own true shape and native deformity, she would be so black and horrid that no man would look upon her; and therefore she hath always had an art to wrap up herself in a garment of light, by which means she passed freely disguised and undiscerned. This was elegantly signified in the fable thus: Truth at first presented herself to the world, and went about to seek entertainment; but when she found none, being of a generous nature, that loves not to obtrude herself upon unworthy spirits, she resolved to leave earth, and take her flight for heaven: but as she was going up, she chanced, Elijah-like, to let her mantle fall; and Falsehood, waiting by for such an opportunity, snatched it up presently, and ever since goes about disguised in Truth's attire.

Pure falsehood is pure nonentity, and could not subsist alone by itself; wherefore it always twines up together about some truth, παραφνάδος εἰκός, as Athenagoras the Christian philosopher speaks,

like an ivy, that grows upon some wall, twining herself into it with wanton and flattering embraces, till at length destroyed and pulled down that which held it up. There is always some truth

In. Orat. de  
Resurrect.  
Mort.

which gives being to every error: “*Est quædam veritatis anima, quæ corpus omnium errorum agitat et informat.*” There

is ever some soul of truth, which doth secretly spirit and enliven the dead and unwieldy lump of all errors,—without which it could not move or stir. Though sometimes it would require a very curious artist, in the midst of all error’s deformities, to descry the defaced lineaments of that truth which first it did resemble: as Plutarch spake sometime of those Egyptian fables of Isis and

Lib. de Iside  
et Osiride.

Osiris, that they had *ἀμυδράς τινὰς ἐμφάσεις τῆς ἀληθείας*, certain weak appearances and glimmerings of truth—but so as that they needed *δεινοῦ ἰχνηλάτου*, some notable diviner—to discover them.

And this I think is the case of that grand error of the Papists, concerning the Lord’s supper being a sacrifice; which perhaps at first did rise by degeneration from a primitive truth, whereof the very obliquity of this error yet may bear some dark and obscure intimation. Which will best

See chap. v.

appear, when we have first discovered the true notion of the Lord’s supper; whence we shall be able at once to convince the error of this popish tenet, and withal to give a just account of the first rise of it. “*Rectum index sui et obliqui.*”

## CHAP. I.

That it was a custom among the Jews and Heathens, to feast upon things sacrificed ; and that the custom of the Christians, in partaking of the body and blood of Christ once sacrificed upon the cross, in the Lord's supper, is analogical hereunto.

**T**HE right notion of that Christian feast, called the Lord's supper, in which we eat and drink the body and blood of Christ, that was once offered up to God for us, is to be derived (if I mistake not) from analogy to that ancient rite among the Jews, of feasting upon things sacrificed, and eating of those things, which they had offered up to God.

For the better conceiving whereof, we must first consider a little, how many kinds of Jewish sacrifices there were, and the nature of them. Which, although they are very well divided, according to the received opinion, into four, **עולם**, **חטאה**, **אשם**, **שלמים**, the burnt-offering, the sin-offering, the trespass-offering, and the peace-offering—yet perhaps I may make a more notional division of them, for our use, into these three species.

First, Such, as were wholly offered up to God, and burnt upon the altar: which were the holocausts, or burnt-offerings.

Secondly, Such, wherein, besides something offered up to God upon the altar, the priests had also a part to eat of. And these are also subdivided into the sin-offerings and the trespass-offerings.

Concerning the difference between these two, see Petit in his Variæ Lectiones.

Thirdly, Such, as in which, besides something offered up to God, and a portion be-

stowed on the priests, the owners themselves had a share likewise. And these were called שלמים, or peace-offerings,—which contained in them, as the Jewish doctors speak, תלק לשם חלק רבהו חלק, לבעל, a portion for God,—and the priests and the owners also; and thence they use to give the etymon of the Hebrew word *shelamim*. בִּיזַת הַזֹּבַח שְׂרוּס בִּינְיָהָם because these sacrifices brought peace to the altar, the priests, and the owners, in that every one of these had a share in them.

Now, for the first of these, although (perhaps to signify some special mystery concerning Christ) they were themselves wholly offered up to God, and burnt upon the altar; yet they had ever peace-offerings regularly annexed to them, when they were not קַרְבָּנֵי צִיבּוּר, offerings for the whole congregation,—but for any particular person; that so the owners might at the same time, when they offered up to God, feast also upon the sacrifices.

And for the second, although the owners themselves did not eat of them, the reason was, because they were not perfectly reconciled to God, being for the present in a state of guilt, which they made atonement for in these sacrifices; yet they did it by the priests, who were their mediators unto God, and, as their proxies, did eat of the sacrifices for them.

But in the peace-offerings, because such as brought them had no uncleanness upon them, (Lev. vii. 20.) and so were perfectly reconciled to God, and in covenant with him, therefore they were in their own persons to eat of those sacrifices, which they had offered unto God as a federal rite between God and them; which we shall explain at large hereafter.

So then the eating of the sacrifices was a due and proper appendix unto all sacrifices, one way or other, and either by the priests, or themselves, when the person that offered was capable thereof. Wherefore we shall find in the Scripture, that eating of the sacrifices is brought in continually as a rite belonging to sacrifice in general. Which we will now shew in divers instances.

Exod. xxxiv. 15. God commands the Jews, that when they came into the land of Canaan, they should destroy the altars and images, and all the monuments of idolatry among those Heathens thus; "lest thou make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land, and they go a whoring after their gods, and one call thee, and thou **EAT** of his sacrifice:" which indeed afterward came to pass, Num. xxv. 2, "They called the people to the sacrifice of their gods, and the people did **EAT**, and bow down to their gods;" or, as it is cited in Psal. cvi. 28, "They joined themselves unto Baal-peor, and **ATE** the sacrifice of the dead."

When Jethro, Moses's father-in-law, came to him, (Exod. xviii. 12.) "he took a burnt-offering and sacrifices for God; and Aaron came, and all the elders of Israel, **TO EAT BREAD** before the Lord:" by sacrifices there are meant peace-offerings, as Aben-Ezra and the Targum well expound it, which, we said before, were regularly joined with burnt-offerings.

So Exod. xxxii. When the Israelites worshipped the golden calf, the text saith, that "Aaron built an altar before it, and made a proclamation, saying, To-morrow is a **FEAST** unto the Lord:" (see how the altar and the feast were a-kin to one another :) "And they rose up early in the morning,

and offered burnt-offerings, and brought peace-offerings, and the people SAT DOWN TO EAT AND DRINK." Which passage St. Paul makes use of, being about to dehort the Corinthians from eating things sacrificed to idols, 1 Cor. x. "Neither be ye idolaters, as some of them were, as it is written, The people SAT DOWN TO EAT AND DRINK:" for this was no common eating, but the eating of those sacrifices which had been offered up to the golden calf.

The 1st of Samuel i. 3. it is said of Elkannah, that "he went up out of his city yearly to worship and to sacrifice to the Lord of hosts in Shiloh: and when the time was come, that he offered, he gave to Peninnah his wife, and to all her sons and daughters, PORTIONS; and unto Hannah he gave a double PORTION;" that is, portions to eat of those sacrifices that had been offered up to God, as R. David Kimchi notes. And in the ninth chapter of the same book, when Saul was seeking Samuel, going towards the city he met some maidens, that told him Samuel was come to the city, for there was a sacrifice for the people that day in the high place: "As soon (say they) as you come into the city, you shall find him before he go up to the high place TO EAT; for the people will not EAT until he come, because he doth bless the sacrifice." Where, though the word *bamah* properly signifies a high place, or place of sacrifice, whence the Greek word Βώμος is thought to be derived; yet it is here rendered by the Targum, as often elsewhere, בֵּית אֲסַחְרוּתָא, *domus accubitus*, a house of feasting;—because feasting and sacrificing were such general concomitants of one another.

So again, in the 16th chapter, Samuel went to Bethlehem to anoint David: "I am come (saith he) to sacrifice to the Lord: sanctify yourselves, and come with me to the sacrifice." But when he understood, that Jesse's youngest son was absent, he saith to Jesse, "Send and fetch him, for we will not sit down until he come."

Ver. xi.

So I understand that of the Sichemites, according to the judgment of the Jewish doctors, Judg. ix. 27. "They went into the house of their god, and did eat and drink, and cursed Abimelech;" that is, they went into the house of their god to sacrifice, and did eat and drink of the sacrifice: which perhaps was the reason of the name, by which they called their god, whom they thus worshipped, BERITH, which signifies a covenant, because they worshipped him by this federal rite of eating of his sacrifices; of which more hereafter.

Thus likewise the Hebrew scholiasts expound that in the 16th chapter of the same book, verse 23, concerning the Philistines, when they had put out Samson's eyes; "They met together to offer a great sacrifice unto Dagon their god, and to REJOICE;" that is, in feasting upon the sacrifices.

Hence it is, that the idolatry of the Jews, in worshipping other gods, is so often described synecdochically under the notion of feasting: Isa. lvii. 7. "Upon a lofty and high mountain hast thou set thy bed, and thither wentest thou up to offer sacrifice." \* For in those ancient times they were not wont to sit at feasts, but lie down on beds or couches. (Ezek. xxiii.)

\* Of Saba, see Salmasius in Plinianis Exercitat. p. 497. et 500.

"You sent for men from far, Sabeans



from the wilderness (i. e. idolatrous priests from Arabia), and lo they came, for whom thou didst wash thyself, and satest upon a stately bed, with a table prepared before thee." (Amos ii. 8.) "They laid themselves down upon clothes laid to pledge by every altar;" i. e. laid themselves down to eat of the sacrifice, that was offered on the altar. And, in Ezek. xviii. 11, eating upon the mountains seems to be put for sacrificing upon the mountains, because it was a constant appendix to it. "He that hath not done any of these things, but hath even eaten upon the mountains," כַּמִּזְבֵּיחַ פָּלַח לְמַעֲוָתָא, i. e. hath worshipped idols upon the mountains;—so the Targum renders it. Lastly, St. Paul makes eating of the sacrifice a general appendix of the altar, (Heb. xii. 10.) "We have an altar whereof they have no right to eat that serve the tabernacle."

I will observe this one thing more, because it is not commonly understood, that all the while the Jews were in the wilderness, they were to eat no meat at all at their private tables but that whereof they had first sacrificed to God at the tabernacle. For this is clearly the meaning of that place, Lev. xvii. 4, 5. "Whatsoever man there be of the house of Israel, that killeth a lamb, or a goat, or an ox, within the camp, or without the camp, and bringeth it not to the door of the tabernacle, to offer an offering to the Lord, blood shall be imputed to him. And so Nachmonides there glosses, according to the mind of the ancient Rabbins, הִנֵּה הַמִּזְבֵּיחַ צִדָּה שֶׁבֶל מֵה שֶׁהֵם אוֹבְלִים שְׁלָמִים i. e. Behold, God commanded at first, that all, which the Israelites did eat, should be peace-offerings.—Which command was afterward dispensed with, when they

came into the land, and their dwellings were become remote from the tabernacle, so that they could not come up every day to sacrifice. Deut. xii. 12. "If the place, which the Lord thy God hath chosen be too far from thee; then thou shalt kill of the herd and of the flock, and thou shalt eat within thy gates whatsoever thy soul lusteth after." Only now there were, instead thereof, three constant and set times appointed in the year, in which every male was to come up and see God at his tabernacle, and eat and drink before him; and the sacrifice, that was then offered, was wont to be called by them, עלת דאייה, a sacrifice of seeing.

Thus I have sufficiently declared the Jewish rite of joining feasting with sacrificing; and it will not be now amiss, if we add, as a *mantissa* to that discourse, something of the custom of the Heathens also in the like kind, the rather because we may make some use of it afterward. And it was so general amongst them in their idolatrous sacrifices, that Isaac Abarbanel, a learned Jew, observed it in Pirush Hattorah: בומים קדמינים בל מי : שהוא עשה עבודת אלילים מד היה עושה עליה מכרה. In those ancient times, whosoever sacrificed to idols, made a feast upon the sacrifice.—And the original of it amongst them was so ancient, that it is ascribed by their own authors to Prometheus, as Salmasius, in his Solino-Plinian Exercitations, notes,

"Hunc sacrificii morem a Prometheo P. 129. a.  
originem duxisse volunt, quo partem hostiæ in ignem conjicere soliti sunt, partem ad suum victum abuti. Which Prometheus, although, according to Eusebius's Chronicon, and our ordinary chronologers, his time would fall near

about the 3028th year of the Julian period, which was long after Noah; yet it is certain, that he lived much sooner, near about Noah's time, in that he is made to be the son of Japhet, which was Noah's son, from whom the Europeans de-

scended, (Gen. x. 5.) called therefore by the poet *Tāpeti genus*. For there is no great heed to be given to the chronology of human writers concerning this age of the world, which Censorinus from Varro calls *Μυθικόν*, the fabulous time or age.—

Although I rather subscribe to the judgment of the learned Vossius, that this Prometheus was no other than Noah himself, the father of Japhet, and not his son, because the other things do so well agree to him; and we may easily allow the Heathens such a mistake as that is, in a matter of so remote antiquity: and then, if this be true, the whole world received this rite of feasting upon sacrifice, at first, together with that of sacrifice, at the same time. Instances of this custom are so frequent and obvious in Heathen authors, that Homer alone were able to furnish us sufficiently.

In the *α* of the Iliads, he brings in a description of a hecatomb-sacrifice, which Agamemnon prepared for Apollo by his priest Chryses, and a feast that followed immediately after it. In *β* the same Agamemnon offers up an ox to Jupiter, and inviteth divers of the Grecian captains to partake of it. In *γ* of the Odyssees, Nestor makes a magnificent sacrifice to Neptune of eighty-two bullocks, with a feast upon it, on the shore. In *θ* Alcinous offers up a bullock unto Jupiter, and then immediately follows,

Note that the islands of the nations—is commonly used in Scripture as a proper name to express Europe by.  
Lib. i. de Idol.

———— Δάινυντ' ἐρικυδέα δαΐτα  
 Τετρώμανοι —————

Plato, in his second *De Legibus*, acknowledges these feasts under the name of ἑορταὶ μετὰ θεῖον, feasts after Divine worship—offered up to the gods. Among the Latins, that of Lycus in Plautus's *Pœnulus* belongs to this purpose ;

Convivas volo  
 Reperire vobis commodos, qui una sient,  
 Interibi attulerint exta.

And that of Gelasimus in *Stichus* ;

Jamne exta cocta sunt? quot agnis fecerat?

After this manner he, in *Virgil's Eclogues*, invites his friend,

Cum faciam vitula pro frugibus, ipse venito.

And thus *Evander* entertains *Æneas*, in the eighth *Æneid*,

Tum lecti juvenes certatim, aræque sacerdos,  
 Viscera tosta ferunt taurorum.——

Plutarch somewhere observes, it as a strange and uncouth rite, in the worship of the goddess *Hecate*, that they which offered sacrifice unto her, did not partake of it. And the same author reports of *Catiline* and his conspirators, ὅτι καταθύσαντες ἄνθρωπον ἐγείσαντο τῶν σαρκῶν, that sacrificing a man, they did all eat somewhat of the flesh—using this religious rite as a bond to confirm them together in their treachery. But *Strabo* tells us of a strange kind of worship used by the *Persians* in their sacrifices, where no part of the flesh was offered up to the gods, but all

eaten up by those that brought it, and their guests: they supposing, in the mean while, that whilst they did eat of the flesh, their god, which they worshipped, had the soul of the sacrifice that was killed in honour to him. The author's own words are these in his fifteenth book: *Μερίσαντος δὲ τοῦ Μάγου τὰ κρέα τοῦ ὑφηγομένου τὴν ἱερουργίαν, ἀπιασι διελόμενοι, τοῖς θεοῖς οὐδὲν ἀπονείμαντες μέρος. Τῆς γὰρ ΨΥΧῆΣ φασι τοῦ ἱερείου δεῖσθαι τὸν θεόν, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός. Ὅμως δὲ τοῦ ἐπίπλου τι μικρὸν τιθέασιν, ὡς λέγουσί τινες, ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ*—*Sua quisque accepta abeant, nulla parte diis relata; dicunt enim Deum nihil velle præter hostiæ animam: quidam tamen (ut fertur) omenti partem igni imponunt.*

From this custom of the Heathens of feasting upon sacrifices arose that famous controversy among the Christians in the primitive times, sometimes disputed in the New Testament, whether it were lawful *ΕΣΘΙΕΙΝ ΕΙΔΩΛΟΪΘΥΤΑ*, to eat things sacrificed to idols.

These Gentile feasts upon the sacrifices were usually kept in the temple, where the sacrifice was offered; as may be gathered from that passage of Herodotus in *Clio*, where, speaking of *Cleobus* and *Bithene*, and what happened to them after that prayer, which their mother put up to the gods for them, *ὡς ἔθυσαν* (saith he) *καὶ εὐωχῆθησαν, κατακοιμηθέντες ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἱερῷ, &c.* As soon as they had sacrificed and feasted, lying down to sleep in the same temple, they died there, and never rose more—But it is very apparent from that of *St. Paul*, *1 Cor. viii. 10.* “If any man see thee, which hast knowledge, sit at meat,” *ἐν εἰδωλείῳ*, that is, not, as *Erasmus* translates it, “in epulo simulachrorum,” but as *Beza*, and from him our

interpreters, in the idol's temple ; for so both the Syriac metaphrast expounds it,  $\text{בֵּית אִסְמָא}$ , and the Arabic *في بيت اصنام* in the house of idols.

If any thing were left, when these feasts were ended, they were wont to carry portions of them home to their friends : so that learned scholiast upon Aristophanes in *Plutus* tells us, *οἱ γὰρ ἐκ θυσίας ἰόντες, ἔφερον ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς θυσίας τοῖς οἰκείοις κατὰ νόμον τινά.* Whence Petit, in that excellent collection of Attic laws, inserted this for one, *viz.* “ that they that go home from a sacrifice should carry part of it to their friends.” And that Greek comedian himself alludeth there to it in these words :

————— *Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κρεάδιον*  
*τῶν ἔνδοθεν τις εἰσενεγκάτω λαβών.*

Theocritus in his *Bucoliastes* doth express it fully ;

————— *καὶ τὸ δὲ θύσας*  
*ταῖς νύμφαις, Μόρσωνι καλὸν κρέας αὐτίνα πέμφον.*

And Plautus in *Miles* ;

————— *Sacrificant ?*  
*Dant inde partem majorem mihi quam tibi.*

These portions, which they carried home, were called commonly by the Greeks *μερίδες*, and in the Umbrian language, as Festus tells us, *strobula*. Theophrastus in his *Characters* uses the word *τόμοι* in this sense, *καὶ θύοντας καὶ περὶ ἀκαιρίας, ἀναλίσκοντας ἤκων Τόμον ἀπαιτήσων, i. e. ad sacrificantes et epula concelebantes accedit, ut inde portionem auferat.*

And because they thought they did receive

some blessings from the gods with it, therefore it was sometimes called *ὑγίεια*, as we find in Hesychius upon that word *ὑγίεια· ἄλφιστα οἴνω καὶ ἐλαίῳ πεφυραμένα, καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐκ θεοῦ φερόμενον, εἴτε μύρον, εἴτε θάλλος, ἢ ὑγίεια.*

But otherwise, if there were any thing yet remaining, it belonged to the priests, as we learn from that scholiast, which we have already commended, upon *Vespæ*, *νόμος ἦν, τὰ ὑπολειπόμενα τῆς θυσίας τοὺς ἱερέας λαμβάνειν· i. e.* It was an ancient law among the Athenians, that the priests should have the remainder.—Which is not only to be understood of the skin and such-like parts, but of the flesh of the sacrifice itself; as we learn from St. Austin in his exposition upon Rom. ii. who tells us also, that these relics were sometimes sold for them in the market; whence that speech of St. Paul, 1 Cor. x. 25. “Whatsoever is sold in the shambles eat, asking no question for conscience’ sake.”

I will shut up all with this one observation more, That as we said of the Jews, that in the wilderness they did eat no meat, but of that which they had first sacrificed; in like manner the Heathens were wont to sacrifice before all their feasts: whence it is, that Athenæus observes, feasts among the ancient Heathens were ever accounted sacred and religious things. And thus we must understand that speech of St. Paul in the twenty-seventh verse of the forenamed chapter, “If any one, that believes not, invite you, and you be disposed to go; whatsoever is set before you eat, asking no question for conscience’ sake.” Nay, it was accounted a profane thing amongst them, to eat any meat at their private tables,

whereof they had not first sacrificed to their gods; as appeareth by the Greek proverb, *ἀθῦρα ἐσθίειν*, used by Anacreon and others as a brand of a notorious wicked man, viz. One that would eat meat whereof he had not sacrificed.

Now having thus shewn, that both amongst the Jews under the law, and the Gentiles in their Pagan worship (for Paganism is nothing but Judaism degenerate), it was ever a solemn rite to join feasting with sacrifice, and to EAT of those things which had been offered up; the very concinnity and harmony of the thing itself leads me to conceive, that that Christian feast under the gospel, called THE LORD'S SUPPER, is the very same thing, and bears the same notion, in respect of the true Christian sacrifice of Christ upon the cross, that those did to the Jewish and Heathenish sacrifices; and so is "EPULUM SACRIFICIALE," a sacrificial feast—I mean, a feast upon sacrifice; or, "EPULUM EX OBLATIS," a feast upon things offered up to God.—Only this difference arising in the parallel, that because those legal sacrifices were but types and shadows of the true Christian sacrifice, they were often repeated and renewed, as well as the feasts, which were made upon them: but now the true Christian sacrifice being come, and offered up once for all, never to be repeated, we have therefore no more typical sacrifices left amongst us, but only the feasts upon the true sacrifice still symbolically continued, and often repeated, in reference to that ONE GREAT SACRIFICE, which is always as present in God's sight, and efficacious, as if it were but now offered up for us.



## CHAP. II.

An objection taken from the Passover answered. Proved that the Passover was a true sacrifice, and the paschal feast a feast upon a sacrifice, from Scripture, and Jewish authors.

**B**UT methinks I hear it objected to me, that  
Object. the true notion of the Lord's supper is to be derived rather from the Passover among the Jews; it being the common opinion of divines, that the Jews had but two sacraments, viz. circumcision and the Passover, that answer to those two amongst us, baptism and the Lord's supper: but the Jewish Passover had no relation to a sacrifice, being nothing else but a mere FEAST; and therefore from analogy to the Jewish we cannot make the Lord's supper to be "EPULUM SACRIFICIALE," a feast upon sacrifice.

To which I answer, first, That I know not  
Answ. what warrant there is for that divinity so confidently imposed upon us by some, that the Jews had but two sacraments, circumcision and the Passover; and that it should thence follow by inevitable consequence, that the Lord's supper must ἀντιστοιχῆν, answer only to the Jewish Passover. Sure I am, the Jews had many more.

For not to instance in that of St. Paul,  
1 Cor. x. "Our fathers were all BAPTIZED unto Moses in the cloud, and in the sea," like our Christian baptism; "and did all EAT the same spiritual meat (viz. the manna), and did all DRINK the same spiritual drink" (viz. the water of the rock

that followed them), like the bread and wine in the Christian Lord's supper: nor to examine all the other sacramental ceremonies, which they had, that were almost as many sacraments as ceremonies. These feasts upon the sacrifices, which we have all this while insisted on, were nothing else but true and proper \* sacraments joined with sacrifices.

\* See Cloppenburg in Schola Sacrif. and of the right Notion of the Sacrament see Vossius in Thes. Theolog.

But, secondly, I will grant, that the Jewish Passover hath a special resemblance to the Christian LORD'S SUPPER, although upon other grounds; for I say, undoubtedly the Passover was a true and proper sacrifice, and therefore the paschal feast a feast upon a sacrifice: so that this shall still advance and improve our former notion.

For the better conceiving whereof, we must understand, that besides those four general kinds of sacrifices among the Jews beforementioned, the burnt-offering, the sin-offering, the trespass-offering, and the peace-offering; there were some other peculiar kinds of sacrifices, as the masters tell us, viz. these three, בכורים, ומעשר, ופסח, the firstlings of cattle, and the tenth, and the Passover. And the reason why these, in the distribution of sacrifices, are thus distinguished by them from all the other general kinds of sacrifices, is thus given by the famous Maimonides upon the Misna of the Talmud, in Massecheth Zebachim, the 6th chapter, לפי שאיתן האדכע פעמים רבות יתחייב היחיד בכל אחד מהם לפי שני העניינים והציכור דייכים בהם בומנים ואלו אינם בן Because those four forenamed were such kind of sacrifices, as that a private person was often bound to each of them in several cases, and the whole congregation in seve-

ral seasons; but these three were not of that nature, being peculiarly restrained to one case or season.—Now these three kinds of peculiar sacrifices were in their nature all nearest of kin to the peace-offerings, and are therefore called by the Jewish doctors *דמים לשלמים*, like to peace-offerings,—because they were not only killed in the same place, being all *קדשים קלים*, light holy things,—and had the *אימרום*, or inward parts—thereof, to be burnt likewise upon the altar; but also, in that part of them was to be eaten by the owners. Insomuch that the Talmudists put many cases in which a lamb, that was set apart for a Passover, and could not be offered in that notion, was to be turned into a peace-offering, as that which was near of kin to it.

But yet these masters tell us, there were three precise differences between the *pascha* and the ordinary peace-offering, *בסמיכה ונסכים ותנופת חזה* ושוק. First, in that there was no laying on of hands upon the passover in the killing of it; for this was nowhere commanded, as in all the peace-offerings. Secondly, that there was no *mincah* or meat-offering, nor *libamen* or drink-offering, to be joined with it (for so they use to include both in the word *Nesachim*). Thirdly, that there was no waving of the breast and shoulder for the priests' portion; the reason whereof was, because the priests were bound always to have Passover-offerings of their own, as it is expressed *Ezra vi.* and so needed not any wave-offering.

But that the passovers were, in other respects, of the same nature with the peace-offerings, and therefore true and proper sacrifices, because it is a thing generally not so well understood, and

therefore opposed by divers, I shall labour the more fully to convince it. I say, that the passovers were always brought to the tabernacle or the temple, and there presented and offered up to God by the priest, as all sacrifices were; that the blood of them was there sprinkled upon the altar, of which the Hebrew doctors well observe, \* עקר הוזהב בהויית הדם, The very essence of a sacrifice is in sprinkling of the blood;—  
\*Maimon. in Korban Pesach. c. ii.  
 and also that the Imurim (as they call them), that is, the fat and kidneys, were burnt upon the altar: all this I shall endeavour to demonstrate.

Only first I must premise this, that when I say the passover was brought to the tabernacle, and offered by the priests, I do not mean, that the priests were always bound to kill the passovers: for I grant, that the people were wont to kill their own passovers; and so I find it expressly in the Misna of the Talmud, Massech. Zebach, cap. v. sect. 6. שחט ישראל וקבל הכהן, All Israel killed the passover, and the priests received the blood.—Which Talmudical expression alludes to that place, Exod. xii. vi. “The whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall kill it in the evening;” where this seems to be commanded by God. And the practice consonant hereunto, I find intimated at least in Scripture, in Hezekiah’s passover, 2 Chron. xxx. 17. “There were many in the congregation, that were not sanctified; therefore the Levites had the charge of killing the passover for every one that was not clean, to sanctify it unto the Lord.” Where R. Solomon writeth thus: אלא תתמה למה לא שחטו בעלים עצמם, Wonder not, why the owners themselves did

not kill them, for it followeth, that many in the congregation had not sanctified themselves; therefore the Levites were appointed in their place to sanctify the work unto the Lord.—And R. D. Kimchi to the same purpose: “Though many of them did eat the passover in uncleanness, it being a case of necessity, in that they had no time to purify themselves; yet for them to come into the court, and kill the passovers, this was not needful, when it might be done as well by the Levites.” And therefore the same is to be thought likewise of the priests and Levites killing the passover, (Ezra vi.) because the people returning newly from captivity were not yet purified, as it is there also partly intimated.

But this doth not at all hinder our proceeding, or evince the Passover not to be a sacrifice: for it is a great mistake in most of our learned writers, to think, that the killing of every sacrifice was proper to the priest; whereas indeed there was no such matter; but as we have already granted, that the people commonly killed their own passovers, so we will affirm, that they did the same concerning any of the other sacrifices. Lev. i. 4, 5. it is said concerning the burnt-offering, “If any man bring a burnt-offering to the Lord, he shall lay his hand upon the head of the burnt-offering, AND HE SHALL KILL the bullock before the Lord, and the priests, Aaron’s sons, shall take the blood.” So concerning the peace-offerings, chap. iii. 2. “He shall lay his hand on the head of his offering, and KILL it at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation:” and concerning the sin-offering, chap. iv. 24. “HE shall lay his hand on the head of the goat, and KILL it at the place

where they kill the burnt-offering before the Lord.” We see then what incompetent judges our own authors are in Jewish customs and antiquities. The Jewish doctors and antiquaries (which are so much contemned by some of our magisterial dictators in all learning) would have taught us here another lesson. For thus Maimonides, in *Biath Hammik.* speaks to this point, שחומת קורשים כשרה, בחדים אפילו קורשי קורשים בין קורשי יחיד ובין קורשי ציבור שנאושחט את בן הבקו, that is, the killing of the holy things may lawfully be done by strangers, yea, of the most holy things, whether they be the holy things of a private person, or of the whole congregation: as it is said, Lev. i. “And he shall kill the bullock; and the priests, Aaron’s sons, shall take the blood.”—The same is avouched again afterward, by the same author, in *Maaseh Korban,* chap. v.

But if any one would therefore fain know, what were properly the priests’ actions about the sacrifice, which might not be done lawfully by any stranger, the same Jewish authors have a trite rule amongst them concerning it: מקבלה ואילך, מצות כהונה, the receiving of the blood, and all the other parts, that were to be offered up, and all that followeth after that, belongeth to the priests’ office.—And Isaac Abarbanel will teach us more particularly, in his comment on Leviticus, that there were five things to be done by the owners of the sacrifice that brought it, and five things by the priest that offered it. The first five were, laying on of hands, killing, slaying, cutting up, and washing of the inwards; the other five were, the receiving of the blood in a vessel, the sprinkling of it upon the altar, the

\* Of this vide  
Magistororum  
Placita.

putting\* of fire upon the altar, the ordering of the wood upon the fire, and the ordering of the pieces upon the wood. Hence it is, that upon the forequoted place of the Misna (which I brought to shew, that the people did kill the passovers), Rabbi Obadiah of Bartonora thus glosseth, שחט ישראל אם ירצה שהשחיטה, בישרה בורום בכל הקרבנות, *i. e.* The people of Israel might all kill the passovers themselves, if they pleased, because the KILLING OF ANY SACRIFICE might be done lawfully by strangers; but the priests received the blood.

Now, I come to prove what I have undertaken. And, first, that the passover was always brought to the tabernacle or the temple, and there offered unto God as the other sacrifices were, is clear enough from Deut. xvi. 5. "Thou shalt not sacrifice the passover within any of the gates which the Lord thy God giveth thee; but at the place which the Lord thy God chooseth to place his name in, there thou shalt sacrifice." And that this is to be understood not of Jerusalem in general, but of the tabernacle or temple, appears, both because the same expressions are used of the other sacrifices, Deut. xii. ver. 5, 6. 11. 14. where it is clearly meant, that they were to be brought to the temple; and because it is certain, that every thing that was killed amongst the Jews, was either to be killed at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, or else might be killed indifferently in any part of the whole land.

Let us now see, how the Jewish doctors comment upon this place, men better skilled in these rites than our own authors are, R. Moses BEN MAIMON, in Halachah Pesach, cap. i. אין שחטין

אֶת הַפֶּסַח, &c. They kill not the passover but in the court, as the rest of the holy things; yea, in the time when high places were permitted, they sacrificed not the passover in a private high place; for it is said, Deut. xvi. "Thou mayest not sacrifice the passover in any of thy gates." We have learnt, that this is a prohibition to kill the passover in any private high place, although it be in a time when high places are permitted.—From which excellent gloss of theirs, it appeareth, that there was more preciseness in bringing of the passover to the place where God's name was put, and offering it at the tabernacle or the temple, than of any of the other sacrifices. And this was the reason, as was before intimated out of KIMCHI, why in Hezekiah's passover the Levites had the charge of killing, because the passovers were to be killed in the court of the temple, whither the people being unclean could not enter; for otherwise, if it had been done without the court, they might as well have killed their own passovers as have eaten them. And this may be further confirmed, in that the passover is called a *korban*: (Numb. ix. vii.) "When certain men were defiled by a dead body, that they could not keep the Passover, they came to Moses, and said, Wherefore are we kept back, that we may not OFFER an OFFERING to the Lord in his appointed season?" And again, ver. xiii. "If any one be clean, and forbearth to keep the Passover, even that soul shall be cut off, because he brought not an OFFERING (or a KORBAN) to the Lord in his appointed season." Nothing was called an OFFERING, or a KORBAN, but that which was brought and offered up to



God at the tabernacle or temple where his name was put.

That the blood of the passovers was to be sprinkled by the priest, and fat only to be burnt upon the altar, although this must needs follow from the former, yet I prove it more particularly thus: (Exod. xxiii. 18.) "Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leavened bread; neither shall the fat of my feast remain until the morning." For by the general consent of the Jewish scholiasts, and all those Christian interpreters that I have seen, this place is to be understood only of the passover; and therefore ONKELOS, that famous Chaldee paraphrast, for דם זבחי the blood of my sacrifice—made no question but to read it דם פסחאי the blood of my Passover.—But it appears undoubtedly from a parallel place in the 34th chapter of the same book, ver. 23, 25, 26, where those 17, 18, and 19th verses of the 23d chapter are again repeated: "Thrice in the year shall all your men-children appear before the Lord.—Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leaven, neither shall the sacrifice of the feast of the Passover be left unto the morning. The first of the first-fruits of thy land thou shalt bring into the house of the Lord thy God. Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother's milk." Here what was wanting in the former is supplied; "Neither shall the sacrifice of the feast of the PASSOVER be left unto the morning." And I have set down the whole context with it, because it will be needful, for the better clearing of it, to consider its coherence with other verses, which is the very same in both chapters; and Isaac Abar-

Abarbanel hath set it down excellently in this manner.

First therefore, saith he, when God had spoken of the Jews appearing thrice before him every year, viz. at the feast of the Passover or of unleavened bread, the feast of weeks or Pentecost, the feast of tabernacles or in-gathering, ביום שהגיד שלשת, i. e. When he had spoken of these three feasts, he subjoins immediately, some rule concerning every one of them in particular:—First, for the Passover, in those words, “Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leaven, neither shall the sacrifice of the feast of the Passover be left until the morning:” Secondly, for the feast of Pentecost, in those, “The first of the first-fruits of the land thou shalt bring into the house of the Lord thy God:” Thirdly, for the feast of tabernacles or in-gathering; “Thou shalt not seethe a kid in his mother’s milk;” which words, for want of this light of the context, were never yet sufficiently explained by any of our interpreters. And the thread of this coherence alone led Abarbanel very near the true meaning of them, ere he was aware: היותר נראה בזה שהיה ממעשה עובדי עבודת אלילים בזמן קבוציהם לעשות כן רל לבשל הגדלים בחלב בזמן אסיפת לחם, i. e. It seems most probable, that this command was occasioned from a custom among the idolatrous Heathens, that at the time of their gathering in of fruits, they were wont to boil a kid in the dam’s milk, thinking, that by this means, they were made acceptable to their gods, and did procure a blessing by it.—To confirm which gloss, he tells us of a cus-

tom somewhat like to this, used in his time in some parts of Spain.

But because Abarbanel doth not tell his tale so handsomely as he should, I will help him out a little from an ancient Karraite, whose comment I have seen upon the Pentateuch, MS. (for the monuments of these Karraite Jews were never yet printed, and are very rarely seen in these European parts). And it is thus: "It was a custom of the ancient Heathens, when they had gathered in all their fruits, to take a kid, and boil it in the dam's milk, and then *דרך בשפה*, in a magical way, to go about and besprinkle with it all their trees and fields, and gardens and orchards; thinking, by this means, they should make them fructify, and bring forth fruit again more abundantly the following year." Wherefore, God forbid his people, the Jews, at the time of their in-gathering, to use any such superstitious or idolatrous rite. And I produce this the rather, because Abarbanel, towards the end of his comment on this place, mentions a gloss of some KARRAITISH author upon it, although it be altogether unlike to this, which we have here related. *חבמי הקראים כתבו בטעם לא* Scribunt sapientes Karræorum, Ne coquas hædum in lacte matris suæ, hoc est, Ne commisceatur germen cum radicibus.

But to return. As from the coherence of the whole context thus cleared, it is manifest, that this verse in both places is to be understood only of the Passover; so it may be further confirmed from the Talmudists, who ever expound it in this sense, as appears by the Misna in Zebachin, chapter

the sixth : השחט את הפסח על החמץ עובר בלא תעשה  
 He that killeth the passover with leaven, sinneth  
 against a negative command—(which is more  
 amongst the Jews than to sin against a positive),  
 viz. that in these places already quoted, “Thou  
 shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leaven;”  
 from whence they collected, as Maimonides  
 tells us, that they were to put away leaven the  
 fourteenth day, a day before the killing of the  
 passover. Nay, this place cannot possibly be  
 understood in any other sense, as of sacrifices in  
 general, because leaven was sometimes commanded  
 with sacrifices, as Lev. vii. 13.

But that the blood of the passovers was sprinkled,  
 may be demonstrated further, not only from  
 that of Hezekiah’s passover, 2 Chron. xxx. 16.  
 “The priests sprinkled the blood, which they re-  
 ceived from the hand of the Levites; for there  
 were many in the congregation that were not sanc-  
 tified; therefore the Levites had the charge of  
 killing the passovers;” but also from Josiah’s,  
 chap. xxxv. ver. 11. which can no ways be evaded;  
 “They (that is), the Levites, killed the passover,  
 and the priests sprinkled the blood from their  
 hands, and the Levites flayed them.” Now the  
 sprinkling of the blood is the essence of a sacri-  
 fice, as before we noted from the Jewish doctors.  
 And therefore the Passover must needs be a sacri-  
 fice : ὅπερ ἔδει δείξαι.

For a confirmation of all this, I will describe  
 punctually the whole manner of the PASCHAL SA-  
 CRIFICE from the Misna of the Jewish Talmud, a  
 monument of such antiquity, as cannot be dis-  
 trusted in these rites. Nothing (say they) was  
 killed before the morning sacrifice; and after the

evening sacrifice, nothing but the passover. The evening sacrifice was usually killed between the eighth and ninth hour (that is, half an hour after two in the afternoon), and offered between the ninth and tenth (that is, half an hour after three). But in the evening of the Passover, the daily sacrifice was killed an hour sooner; and after that began the killing of the passover, which was to be done between the two evenings; whereof the first began at noon, from the sun's declination towards the west, the second at sun-set. Yet the *pascha* might be killed before the daily sacrifice, if there were but one to stir the blood, and keep it from coagulating, till the blood of the daily sacrifice were sprinkled; for that was always to be sprinkled first. The passovers were always killed by three several companies. When the court was once full, they shut the doors, and the priests stood all in their ranks, with round vessels in their hands, to receive the blood; those that were of gold, in a rank by themselves, and those that were of silver; all without bottoms, lest they should be set somewhere on the ground, and the blood congeal in them. And they killed the passovers, as the peace-offerings, in any part of the court, because they were קדשים קלים, the less holy things;—as קדשי קדשים, the holy of holies,—were always to be killed at the north side of the altar. The priests then took the blood, and gave it from one to another, till it came to him that stood next the altar; and he sprinkled it all at once towards the bottom of the altar, which was a square of thirty-two cubits, save that the south-east horn had no bottom. After the blood was sprinkled, the lamb was flayed, and cut up, the *imurim*; or

inwards, taken out and laid upon the altar ; then the owner took up the lamb, with the skin of it, and carried it to his own home. The first company having ended, then the second came in, and afterward the third ; and for every company they began a new HALLEL, and sang all the while the passovers were killing ; and when they had finished the *hallel*, they sang it over a second time ; and when they had gone over it a second time, they began it a third time ; although it was never known, that the third time they sang out the *hallel* quite, or came any further than אהבתי\* אהבתי\* before the priests had done.

But because, besides these Talmudistic Jews, there is another sect of KARRAITES, mentioned before (that reject all Talmudical traditions, which are not grounded upon Scripture), though little known amongst us, yet famous in the orient ; I will produce one testimony of theirs also from an ancient manuscript, that so it may appear we have the full consent of all Jewish antiquity for this opinion. The author's name to me is uncertain, because the papers have lost both their beginning and end. But they contain in them divers large and complete discourses upon several arguments in the Karraite way, as about the Jewish year, the sabbath, the Passover, &c. Concerning the Passover, he divides his discourse into several chapters, whereof the title of one is this, במקום הקרבת הפסח ואכילתו, concerning the place where the passover was to be offered and eaten ;— where he thus begins : דע שהקרבת הפסח הוא במקום : המובחר בכתוב לא תיכל לזבוח את הפסח באחד שערך ומקום שחישתו בעזרה ושפיכת דמו אל יסוד המזבח ואימודיו היו

\*אהבתי\* אהבתי\*  
I love the Lord,  
&c. is the be-  
ginning of  
Psalm cxvi.  
being part of  
the *hallel* or  
hymn sung at  
that time,  
which began  
at Ps. cxiii.  
and reached  
to the end of  
Ps. cxviii.

נקטרום במובח, i. e. Know, that the offering of the passover was always in the place which God had chosen (to put his name there), as it is written,— “Thou shalt not sacrifice the passover within any of thy gates; and the place of the killing of the passover was in the court called HESRA, and the blood of it was poured out towards the bottom of the altar, and the *imurim* or inward parts of it were burnt upon the altar, &c.

Hence it was, that when Cestius once demanded what the number of the Jews was that resorted to Jerusalem, at the time of their solemn feasts, the priests made answer, and told him exactly how many lambs and kids were sacrificed at the Passover, *είκοσίπεντε μυριάδες, πρόσδε πεντακισχίλια εξακόσια*, twenty-five myriads five thousand and six hundred;—which they could not have done, had not they sacrificed them at the temple.

But what need have we of any more dispute? When the Passover was first kept in Egypt, were not the paschal lambs there killed in a sacrificial and expiatory way, when the blood thereof was to be sprinkled upon the houses, for God to look upon, and so pass over them? It is true, they were killed in every private house; but the reason of that was, because there were then priests in every family, viz. the \* first-born, which were afterward redeemed, when the children of Israel gave up the whole tribe of Levi to God for his service. Such priests as these were those whom Moses sent to sacrifice, Exod. xxiv. 5. called there *young men*; “Moses sent young men of the children of Israel, which offered burnt-offerings, and sacrificed peace-offerings to the Lord;” where

\* Vide claris. Seldenum de Succes. in Pontificat. Hebræor. l. i. c. i. et de Succes. ad Leges Heb. l. i. c. v.

Onkelos the Chaldee paraphrast reads it *הלש ית בכדי*, he sent the first-born:—to which agreeth the Arabic translation of R. Saadiab, and the Persian of Tawasius, as Mr. Selden notes, whom I cannot without honour mention, as the glory of our nation for oriental learning.

And was not the killing of the passover a special type of the death of Christ, the true sacrifice of the world? Give me leave to note one thing to this purpose, upon the credit of Justin Martyr, in his dialogue with Trypho, that in the ancient Hebrew copies of the Bible, there was in the book of Ezra a speech of his, which he made before the passover, expounding the mystery thereof concerning Christ; which, because it favoured the Christians, was timely expunged by the Jews. The speech was this: *Καὶ εἶπεν Ἐσδράς τῷ λαῷ, τοῦτο τὸ πάσχα ὁ Σωτὴρ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ καταφυγὴ ἡμῶν. Καὶ ἐὰν διανοηθῆτε, καὶ ἀναβῆ ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν, ὅτι μέλλομεν αὐτὸν ταπεινοῦν ἐν σημείῳ, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐλπίσωμεν ἐπ' αὐτὸν, οὐ μὴ ἐρημωθῆ ὁ τόπος οὗτος εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, λέγει ὁ θεὸς τῶν δυνάμεων. Ἐὰν δὲ μὴ πιστεύσητε αὐτῷ, μηδὲ εἰσακούσητε τοῦ κηρύγματος αὐτοῦ, ἔσεσθε ἐπίχαρμα τοῖς ἔθνεσι.* i. e. *Et dixit Esdras populo, Hoc pascha Salvator noster et perfugium nostrum. Et si in animum induxeritis, et in cor vestrum ascenderit, quod humiliaturi eum simus in signo, et postea speraturi in eum, non desolabitur locus iste in omne tempus, dicit Deus exercituum. Sin in eum, non credideritis, neque audieritis annunciationem ejus, deridiculum eritis gentibus.*—Remarkable it is, if it be true; and the author deserves the better credit in it, because he was a Samaritan; and therefore might be the better skilled in Jewish writings. But however, I am



sure the apostle tells us, not only that the Passover was a type of Christ, in respect of his death, but also that the proper notion of the paschal feast was to be a feast upon sacrifice, in those words, 1 Cor. v. 7, 8. "Christ our passover is sacrificed for us; therefore let us keep the feast (that is, the paschal feast upon this sacrificed Christ) with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth." Where, alluding to that common Jewish custom of feasting upon sacrifices, of which we have before spoken, he implies, that the paschal supper was a feast of the same nature, a sacrificial feast.

### CHAP. III.

An answer to some objections against the Passover's being a sacrifice : and the controversy about the day upon which the Jews kept the Passover about the time of our Saviour's death discussed. Proved against Scaliger, and others of that opinion, that no translation of feasts from one FERIA to another were then in use.

**B**UT yet we will not dissemble, what there is of any moment, either in antiquity or reason, against our own opinion, ere we let this discourse pass, but subject all to an impartial view.

And first, the authority of Philo, who, in his third book *De Vita Mosis*, speaks thus concerning the Passover : 'Εν ἣ οὐχ οἱ μὲν ἰδιῶται προσάγουσι τῷ βωμῷ τὰ ἱερέια, θύουσι δ' οἱ ἱερεῖς· ἀλλὰ νόμου προστάξει σύμπαν τὸ ἔθνος ἱεράται, τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐκάστου τὰς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν θυσίας ἀνάγοντες τότε καὶ χειροουργοῦντες. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄλλος ἅπας λεῶς ἐγεγήθει καὶ παιδρὸς ἦν, ἐκάστου νομιζόντος ἱερωσύνην τετιμῆσθαι· i. e. In qua non ut alias plebeii homines victimas adducunt ad altare macandas a sacerdotibus, sed jubente lege tota gens sacrificat, dum pro se quisque mactat hostiam suis manibus. Tunc universus populus exulta-

bat, unoquoque existimante se sacerdotii dignitate honoratum.—And again, in his book *De Decalogo*: Ἐν ἧ θύουσι πανδημεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστος, τοὺς ἱερεῖς αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀναμένοντες, ἱερωσύνην τοῦ νόμου χαρισαμένου τῷ ἔθνει παντὶ, μίαν ἡμέραν ἐξαίρετον ἀνὰ πᾶν ἔτος, εἰς αὐτοργίαν θυσιῶν. Quando populariter singuli sacrificant, non exspectatis sacerdotibus, ipsi permissu legis fungentes sacerdotio, quotannis per unum diem destinatum huic negotio.

But to this we answer, that Philo doth not here deny the Passover to be a sacrifice, but confirm it rather, in that he calls it often, here and elsewhere, *θυσία*, and saith, that they did ἀνάγειν, bring it to the altar,—and that the people did ἱεραῶσθαι, sacrifice;—and doth only distinguish this paschal sacrifice from all the other sacrifices in this, that here, according to his opinion, every one of the people was ἱερωσύνῃ τετιμημένος, honoured with the priestly office,—and that the law did ἱερωσύνην παντὶ τῷ ἔθνει χαρίζεσθαι, make every one a priest for that time, to offer up their own passover.—

But moreover, it is well known, that Philo,\* though he were a Jew by nation, yet was very ignorant of Jewish customs, having been born and bred up at Alexandria: and we have a specimen of his mistakes here, in that he seems to make this difference between the Passover and the other sacrifices, that they were only killed by the priest, but the people themselves killed their own passovers, νόμου προσταζει, and νόμου χαρισαμένου, according to the law;—where he means doubtless that, in Exod. xii. 16. “the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall kill it.” For this is that *solenne delirium* of our late authors also,

\* Scalig E. lench. Trihæ. cap. xxv. circa finem. Item in Emend. Temp. de Cyclo Judæorum Karrain. et Hug. Grotius in Matt. xxvi.

which we have chastised before. But, if he mean moreover, that the people did not only kill their passovers, but do all other priestly offices concerning them, when he says they were *ἱερωσύνη τε-τιμημένοι* this, as it hath no ground from Scripture (and, I think, will hardly find a patron now to defend it), so it doth not prejudice our opinion of the Passover's being a sacrifice, but still much confirm it.

Secondly, it may seem to some a kind of impossibility to conceive, how so many sacrifices, as there must be at every Passover, could all be offered upon one altar, since there were no more by the law permitted.

To which, nevertheless, I need not answer any thing but this ; that there was nothing but the fat and some of the inwards burnt upon the altar ; and that the bigness of the altar was greater than perhaps is ordinarily conceived : for under the second temple, the area thereof, upon the top, was a square of twenty-eight cubits, as the Talmudists constantly relate ; to which Josephus also agreeth very near, if the difference of those cubits, which he useth, be allowed. Only they may please to learn from the instance of Josiah's Passover,

2 Chron. xxxv. which was said to be so great, that "there was no Passover like to that kept in Israel, from the days of Samuel the prophet, unto that time," that this was possible to be done ; for it either is or must be confessed, that then they were all offered upon the altar.

But, lastly, we must confess ingenuously, that there is one great difficulty yet behind, concerning our Saviour's last Passover, which, according to the general consent of our best divines, critics,

and chronologers, was kept a day before the Jews kept their Passover: whether therefore his paschal lamb, which he with his apostles did then eat, were first sacrificed at the temple; and how could that be?

Where, not to engage ourselves any more than needs we must, in that nice and perplexed but famous controversy, concerning the time of the Jewish Passover about our Saviour's death; it will not be amiss, first to take notice, that the Latin church ever maintained the contrary opinion against the Greeks, viz. that the Jews kept the Passover on the same night which our Saviour did: and though it be true, that of later times most of our best learned authors have quitted that opinion of the Latins, and closed altogether with the Greeks, as Paulus Burgensis, Munster, Scaliger, and Casaubon; yet, notwithstanding, our countryman, Mr. Broughton (understanding, perhaps, better than they did, that the Jewish Passover was a true and proper sacrifice, and first, according to God's command, was to be offered up to God, before feasted on), espied a difficulty here concerning our Saviour's Passover (which they took no notice of), that could not easily be solved; and therefore, he thought good *scindere nodum*, as Alexander did, to cut the knot which he could not loose,—and absolutely to deny, that the Jewish Passover, and our Saviour's, were then celebrated on two several nights. And he is of late seconded by Johannes Cloppenburg, a Belgic divine (in an epistle written upon this argument to Ludovicus De Dieu), insisting upon the very same ground, because the paschal lamb, which Christ with his disciples did eat,

could not have been sacrificed at the temple, unless it had been at the same time when the Jewish Passover was solemnly celebrated. His words to this purpose, expressing fully Mr. Broughton's sense, are these " Non potuit mactari agnus paschalis extra templum Hierosolymitanum : In templo mactari non potuit citra generalem populi consensum : Quare neque dies mactationis potuit anticipari." It follows, " Vel ergo dicendum Christum comedisse agnum non mactatum in templo, atque hoc facto (quod absit) legem violasse ; (juxta legem enim agnus privatim comedendus e templo deferendus domi erat in ædes privatas, post igne absumentam in templo adipem, et sanguinem delatum ad altare); vel Judæos eodem tempore cum Christo pascha celebrasse."

But I must confess, although I am as much addicted to that hypothesis of the Passover's being a sacrifice, and as tender of it as Mr. Broughton could be, or any body else ; yet I cannot but yield myself captive to truth, on which side soever it presents itself, and though it be *εἰς καθαίρειν τῶν ἰδίων* (as Aristotle saith a philosopher should do), to the destruction of our own phenomena.

And indeed those two places especially, brought out of St. John's gospel, to prove that the Jews kept their Passover the day after our Saviour did his, seem to me to be unanswerable, nor any way cured by those *σοφὰ φάρμακα*, which are applied to them.

The first is chap. xix. ver. 14. where, the next day after Christ had kept his Passover with his disciples, when Pilate delivered him up to the Jews to be crucified, it is said, that it was then *παρασκευὴ τοῦ Πάσχα*, the preparation of the Pass:

over;—where they tell us, that by the preparation of the Passover is meant the preparation of the sabbath, on which the second day of the Passover fell. But, *En jecur criticum!* as Scaliger sometimes cries out; and what a far-fetched conceit is this!

The second is that in chap. xviii. ver. 28. When Jesus was led into Pilate's judgment-hall, early in the morning, it is said, that the Jews themselves went not into the judgment-hall, lest they should be defiled, but that they might eat the passover. Here we are told, that by eating the passover is meant the eating of the *chagigah*, that was killed the day before with the passover, whereof something, perhaps, remained till the day following. And this gloss is little better than the former; for, although they appeal to that place in Deut. xvi. 2. to prove, that the *chagigah* was sometimes called by the name of *passover*, which indeed, if our English translation were authentic, would make something for them; "Thou shalt therefore sacrifice the passover unto the Lord thy God of the flock and the herd," as if there had been a passover of oxen, as well as of sheep; yet in the Hebrew the words run thus, וזבחת פסח ליהוה אלהיך צאן ובקר, which, according to a several punctuation, and a several supplying of something that must be understood, may be expounded several ways; any of which is far better than that which our English translators have unhappily pitched upon.

Onkelos, in his paraphrase (which seldom merits that name, being indeed commonly nothing but a rigid version, reads it thus, ותבום פסחא קדם, יהוה אלהיך מן בני ענא ונכסת קדשיא מן תורי, i. e. And

thou shalt sacrifice the passover before the Lord thy God of the sons of the flock, and the peace-offerings (thereof) of oxen;—which interpretation is followed by R. Solomon and Aben-Ezra, צאן לחיוב הפסח ובקר לשלמים i. e. sheep for the Passover, and oxen for the peace-offerings, or the *chagigah*.—And it may be confirmed from that of Josiah's Passover, 2 Chron. xxxv. 7. "Josiah gave to the people, of the flock, lambs and kids, all for the Passover-offerings, to the number of thirty thousand, and three thousand bullocks:" where the bullocks, or the herd, are divided from the Passover-offerings, because they served for the peace-offerings, or the *chagigah*, as appeareth from ver. 13. "They roasted the passovers with fire, according to the ordinance; but the OTHER HOLY OFFERINGS (that is, the peace-offerings, or *chagigah*) sod they in pots, and cauldrons, and pans." Nachmanides hath another interpretation of it to this purpose, יצוה בפסח והוא השה שהזביר כבר, וצאן ובקר אלים ועוים ובני בקר לחוג חגיגה i. e. He commandeth here the passover, which was a lamb, as he had said before—(making the pause there); and צאן ובקר, the flock and the herd, or the sheep and the kids, and the young bullocks, for the *chagigah*;—giving other instances, in which the conjunctive particle *vau*, which he doth here supply, is in like manner to be understood.

And this exposition is rather approved than the former, not only by Abarbanel, but also by the Karraite, which I have before commended; who, quoting one R. Aaron for the author of it, doth express it thus: ויהיה מאמר וזבחת מושך עצמו ואחר עמו וזבחת פסח ליהוה אלוהך וזבחת צאן ובקר במו ולא למדתי חכמה ודעת קשים ארע i. e. The word זבחת (Thou

shalt sacrifice) is to be repeated ἀπὸ κιονοῦ before THE FLOCK AND THE HERD, thus,—And thou shalt sacrifice the passover to the Lord thy God, and thou shalt sacrifice sheep and oxen, or the flock and the herd; as in like manner, Prov. xxx. 3. the particle (ὃς *not*) is to be repeated ἀπὸ κοινοῦ from the former part of the verse.—So that it cannot hence be proved, that the peace-offerings, offered with the passover, were ever called by the name of Passover.

There is another place in the same evangelist, that hath not been observed by any one, to this purpose, which, if it were rightly understood, would be as clear a testimony as any of the rest. And it is in the 19th chapter, ver. 31. ἦν γὰρ μεγάλη ἡ ἡμέρα ἐκείνη τοῦ Σαββάτου, for that sabbath-day was a great day.—Μεγάλη ἡμέρα, in the Greek of the Hellenists, is used for the first, or the last day of every solemn feast, in which there was a holy convocation to the Lord. This appeareth from Isa. i. 13. “Your new-moons and sabbaths, the calling of assemblies (which was the first and last day of the feast), I cannot away with:” which the Septuagint render thus, Τὰς Νουμηνίας ὑμῶν καὶ τὰ Σάββατα, καὶ τὰς μεγάλας ἡμέρας, Your new-moons and sabbaths, and your GREAT DAYS.—For the last day of the feast we have it used by our evangelist, chap. vii. ver. 37. “In the last day, the GREAT DAY of the feast, ἡμέρα τῆς μεγάλης τῆς ἑορτῆς; and doubtless by the same evangelist for the first day of the feast, in this place: and therefore the Jews did not eat their passover till the night before, which was the same night our Saviour was crucified.

Which may be strengthened further by this ar-



gument; that if the Jews had celebrated their Passover the same night which our Saviour did his, it is certain, they would never have gone about immediately with swords and staves to have apprehended him, and then have brought him to the high-priest's hall, and afterward have arraigned him at Pilate's judgment-seat, and lastly have crucified him; all the same day. For the first day of unleavened bread was, by the law, a holy convocation to the Lord, on which it was not lawful to do any work; and we know the Jews were rigid enough in observing these legal ceremonies.

If then it must be granted, that our Saviour, with his disciples, kept the Passover the night before the vulgar Jews did celebrate it, our next work is to shew, how it might be probable, that our Saviour's passover was first sacrificed at the temple.

And here, perhaps, I might run for shelter to that story in Suidas, upon the word Ἰησοῦς, that Christ was enrolled into the number of the two-and-twenty legal priests, that served at the altar, from the pretended confession of an ancient Jew in Justinian's time; and then he might possibly sacrifice his own passover at the temple, though the Jews had not solemnized theirs till the day after; but that I hold this to be a mere fable; and that not only ridiculous, but impious.

Or I might take up the opinion of the Greeks; that Christ did not keep a true legal Passover, but a feast of unleavened bread in imitation of it; or, as the learned Hugh\* Grotius (who hath lately asserted this opinion) expresseth it, not Πάσχα θύσιμον, but μνημονευτικόν, such as the

\*In Annot. ad Matt. c. xxvi.

Jews at this day keep, because the temple being down, their sacrifices are all ceased. But this opinion hath been exploded by most of our late authors; and indeed I can no way satisfy myself in it, and therefore will not acquiesce in this answer.

But before we are able to give a true account of this query, we must search a little deeper into the true ground of this difference between our Saviour's Passover and the Jews'.

The common opinion is, that the Jews in our Saviour's time were wont to translate their festivals from one *Feria* to another upon several occasions; as, whenever two festivals were immediately to follow one another, to join them into one; and therefore, when any fell upon the sixth *Feria*, to put it over to the next *Feria* or the sabbath, to avoid the concurrence of two sabbaths together; in the same manner as the Jews use to do in their calendar at this day, where they have several rules to this purpose, expressed by abbreviatures, thus, *Adu, Badu, Gahaz, Zabad, Agu*; whereof each letter is a numeral for some *Feria*. The rule for the Passover is בַּדּוּ, *Badu*; that is, that it should not be kept on the second, fourth, or sixth *Feria*. (There is an extract of a Rabbinical decree to this purpose, under the name of R. Eliezer, in Munster upon Matt. chap. xxvi.) And therefore, at this time, when our Saviour was crucified, the Passover falling upon the sixth *Feria*, or Friday, was, say they, by the Jews translated, according to this rule, to the next *Feria*, and kept on Saturday, or the sabbath; but our Saviour, not regarding these traditions, observed that day precisely which was commanded in the law, ἐν ἡ ἕδαι

θύεσθαι τὸ πάσχα, (Luke xxii. 7.) that is, as they expound it, “upon which the Passover ought to have been killed;” which was Friday, the day before.

But, under favour, I conceive, that all these decrees, together with that *ratiocinium*, or calendar, to which they do belong, were not then in use in our Saviour’s time (although it be so confidently averred by the incomparable Joseph Scaliger), but long since invented by the Jews. Which I shall make appear;

First, In that the ancient Jews, about and since our Saviour’s time, often solemnized as well the Passovers, as the other feasts, upon the *Ferias* next before and after the sabbaths, and those other *Ferias*, which have been made rejectitious since by that calendar. In the Talmudical title Succoth, chapter the last, we read of יום טוב הסמוך לשבת בן לפניה בן לאחריה that is, a feast going immediately before, or following immediately after, the sabbath.—And in Betzah, chap. i. יום טוב חל להיות אחר, and שחל להיות ערב שבת שבת, a feast, that falls to be on the evening of the sabbath, or the day after the sabbath.—In Chagigah, the second chapter, עצרת שחל להיות בערב שבת, which is to the same purpose with the former. More particularly concerning the Passover Pesachim, chap. vii. sect. 10. “Ossa, nervi, et omne residuum agni paschalis, cremantor sexto decimo: si is dies SABBATUM, decimo septimo.” From this, and divers like places of the Talmud, Aben Ezra on Lev. xxiii. 4. observes, בסשנה גם בתלמוד ראיות שהיה פסח בברו, There be divers instances in the Misna and the Gemara of the Passovers being kept in BADU,—that is, on those days, which were made

rejectitious in the late calendar, the second, fourth, and sixth *Feria*. Therefore, these translations were not in use when the doctors of the Misna and Gemara lived.

Secondly, In that the Jews ever, while the temple stood, observed their new moons and feasts, according to the *φάσις* or appearance—of the moon, and therefore had no calendar for their rule to sanctify their feasts by, but they were then sanctified by the heavens, as the Misna speaks. This is so clearly delivered by R. Moses Ben Maimon, in that excellent Halachah, entitled, KIDDUSH HACCCHODESH, that I wonder so many learned men, that are well skilled in those authors, should miss of it. For having spoken of the rules of observing the *φάσις*, he then adds, that these were never made use of since the Sanhedrin ceased in the land of Israel, after the destruction of the temple; since which time they have used a calendar, calculated according to the middle motion of the moon. דבר זה הלכה למשה מסיני הוא שבזמן שיש סנהדרין קובעין עלפי הראייה ובזמן שאין שם סנהדרין קיבעין עלפי החשבון הוזה שאנו משחבים בו היום ואין נזקקין לראיה אלא פעמום שהיה יום שקיבעין בחשבון זה הואיום הראייה או קדם לו ביום או אחריו ביום: Et hæc erat traditio Mosis in monte Sinai, quod omni tempore, quo duraret Sanhedrin, constituerent Neomenias juxta *φάσις* hoc vero tempore, quo jam cessavit Sanhedrin, constituerent secundum calculum hunc astronomicum, quo nos hodie utimur: nec ullo modo jam ad *φάσις* nos astringimus, cum sæpe contingat, ut dies, legitimus secundum nostrum calculum vel concurrat cum lunari *φάσει*, vel antevortat eam unica die, vel etiam subsequatur.—And again, a little after, most punctually; מאימתי התחילו כל ישראל לחשוב בחשבון זה מסוף חכמי תלמוד בעת שחדבה ארץ ישראל ולא נשאר בית דין

קבות אבל בימי חכמי משנה וכו' בימי חכמי תלמוד עד ימי אביי  
 ודבא על קבועת ארץ ישראל היו סנמכין: Quando primum  
 cœperunt omnes Israelitæ computare, secundum  
 hunc calculum? A fine doctorum Talmudicorum,  
 quando jam desolata erat terra Israel, neque erat  
 consistorium aut synedrium, quod determinaret:  
 nam per omnes dies doctorum Misnæ et doctorum  
 Gemaræ, usque ad Abæum et Rabbæum, acqui-  
 escebant omnes Judæi in sanctione terræ Israelis.

—And those rules forementioned of not keeping  
 the several feasts upon such and such *Ferias*  
 were made together with this calendar, as the  
 same author there also avoucheth: אין קיבעין בהשבון :  
 זה בימי אדו לפי שהחשבון זה הוא לקבוע הירח והשמש בחלובה  
 זה בימי אדו לפי שהחשבון זה הוא לקבוע הירח והשמש בחלובה  
 ז. e. אמטעען לא במקום אמתי לפיכך עשו יום קביעה ויום דחייה

In this account they never constituted the new-  
 moon of Tisri upon Adu, because this account  
 was made according to the conjunction of the sun  
 and moon in the middle motion; therefore, now  
 they constituted some legitimate and other rejec-  
 titious days, which they could not do before,  
 when the new-moon (and therefore all the other  
 feasts) was determined according to the *φάσις*.

But the Talmud was not completely finished  
 till about the five hundredth year of the Christian  
 era; therefore this Jewish calendar, and these  
 rules concerning the translation of feasts, were  
 not in being till about that time, and so could be  
 no reason of this difference between the time, in  
 which our Saviour solemnized the Passover, and  
 the other Jews.

For further confirmation hereof, we may ob-  
 serve, that the Karraites, which have rejected the  
 fond traditions of the Pharisees, retain still the  
 ancient custom of reckoning their new-moons *ἀπὸ*



sis, and in most of their appointed times they agree with us. But we may not receive the testimony of any one that is of the sect of the Rabbins, because they are divided from us in this; and although they be our brethren and our flesh, yet herein they have rebelled and grieved his Holy Spirit.

Having thus disproved the common and received opinion, and removed the false ground of this difference of time between our Saviour's Passover and the Jews, we come, in the next place, to lay down the true, which must be derived from that way of reckoning the months, and of determining the ראש חודש, the head or beginning of the month, — which was in use in our Saviour's time, which (as we have shewed already in general) was by the φάσις\* so it will be expedient to describe the whole manner of it more particularly from authentic authors.\*

\* Talmud Babyl. in Rosh Hashanah, et Maimon. in Kiddish Hashchod.

In the great or outer court of the temple, there was a house called Beth-Jazek, where the senate sat all the thirtieth day of every month, to receive the witnesses of the moon's appearance, and to examine them. And here they always had a feast provided for the entertainment of those that came, to encourage men to come the more willingly. In ancient times they did admit of strangers, and receive their testimony, if it were approved upon examination. But when the heretics (that is, the Christians) afterward grew up, by whom (they say) they were sometimes deluded, they began to grow shy, and to admit of none but such as were approved of to be of the Jews' religion. If there came approved witnesses upon the thirtieth

day of the *φάσις* seen, then the chief man of the senate stood up and pronounced MEKUDDASH, it is sanctified;—and the people standing by caught the word from him, and cried out MEKUDDASH, MEKUDDASH. Whereupon there was notice presently given to all the country; which was done at first by torches from mountain to mountain, till at length the Christians (they say) abused them in that kind also with false fires; wherefore they were fain to send messengers from place to place over the whole land, to give intelligence of the new-moon. But if, when the consistory had sat all the thirtieth day, there came no approved witnesses of the *φάσις*, then they made an intercalation of one day in the former month, and decreed the following one-and-thirtieth day to be the calends. And yet, notwithstanding, if after the fourth or fifth day there should come some witnesses from afar, that testified they had seen the *φάσις* in its due time, nay, though they came towards the end of the month (*אפילו באר בסוף החודש*) the senate, when they had used all means by affrighting them from that testimony, that so, if it were possible, they might decline a new consecration (after they had already made an *embolism* in the former month) if the witnesses remained constant, were then bound to alter the beginning of the month, and reckon it a day sooner, to wit, from the thirtieth day.

Here we see the true ground of the difference of a day, that might arise continually about the calends of the month, and so consequently about any of the other feasts, which did all depend on them; *viz.* between the true time of the moon's *φάσις*, upon the thirtieth day, and that of the se-



nate's decree, a day after. For since it appears out of their own monuments, how unwilling they were, having once made a consecration of the *neomenia*, to alter it again; it may be probably conceived, that, in those degenerated times, the senate might many times refuse to accept the testimony of undoubted witnesses: and then, it seems, they had such a canon as this, בית רצן שקדשו את החדש בין שגנים בין מוטעים הגה זה מקודש וחיובין חבל לתקן המועים על היום אעפי שוח יורעשמעו, that whatsoever time the senate should conclude of for the calends of the month, though it were certain they were in the wrong, yet all were bound to order their feasts according to it:—Which I cannot think was approved of by our Saviour, and the most pious Jews. And, therefore, I conceive it most probable, that this was the very case between our Saviour's Passover and the Jews', in that he followed the true *φάσις*, confirmed by sufficient and assured witnesses; but the other Jews superstitiously observed the pertinacious decree of the senate of Sanhedrin, which was for the day after.

And now, at last, we are come again to the acme of the question that was first propounded, How our Saviour's passover, notwithstanding all this, might be sacrificed the day before those of the other Jews were.

To which I answer, that upon this ground, not only our Saviour and his apostles, but also divers others of the most religious Jews, kept the Passover upon the fifteenth day from the true *φάσις* of the moon, and not from the senate's decree, which I may confirm from the testimony of Epiphanius, that reports there was, at this time, *θόρυβος*, a tumult and contention,

In Panario  
Hær. ii.

amongst the Jews about the Passover; and so we may easily persuade those other evangelists, that intimate Christ's Passover to have been solemnized, when many others kept it, to agree with St. John, who assures us, that it was also by divers Jews kept the day after. Now, it was a custom among the Jews, in such doubtful cases as these, which oftentimes fell out, to permit the feasts to be solemnized, or passovers killed, on two several days together. Maimonides affirmeth, that, in the remoter parts of the land of Israel, they always solemnized the feast of the new-moons two days together; nay, in Jerusalem itself, where the senate sat, they kept the new-moon of Tisri, which was the beginning of the year, twice, lest they should be mistaken in it. In the Talmud we have an instance of the Passover's being kept two days together, because the new-moon was doubtful, in Gemarah Rosh Hashanah, cap. i. Hence the Karraites, who still keep the ancient custom of observing the moon's *φάσις*, retain it as a rule to this day, לעשות שני ימים מספק, *observare duos dies propter dubium*.—Nay, the Rabbinical Jews themselves, since they have changed the phasis for the synod or conjunction of the moon in the middle motion, in imitation hereof, still observe to keep the Passover two days together, *iisdem ceremoniis*, as the learned author of the Jewish Synagogue reports; and Scaliger himself, not only of that, but also of the other feasts, “Judæi post institutionem hodierni computi eandem solennitatem celebrant biduo, propterea quod mensem incipiant a medio motu lunæ: itaque מספק מתברית המארים propter dubium conjunctionis luminarium, Pascha celebrant 15.

et 16. Nisan, Pentecosten 6. et 7. Sivan, Scenopugia 15. et 16. Tisri; idque vocant יום טוב שני של גליית. Festum secundum exsiliorum.

Now then we see, that nothing hinders, but that the Passover might be a sacrifice. And thus we have hitherto cleared the way.

## CHAP. IV.

Demonstrated, that the Lord's supper in the Christian church, in reference to the true sacrifice of Christ, is a parallel to the feasts upon sacrifices both in the Jewish religion and heathenish superstition.

BUT lest we should seem all this while to set up fancies of our own, and then sport with them, we come now to demonstrate and evince, that the Lord's supper, in the proper notion of it, is EPULUM EX OBLATIS, or a FEAST UPON SACRIFICE; in the same manner with the feasts upon the Jewish sacrifices under the law, and the feasts upon ΕΙΔΩΛΟΘΥΤΑ, (things offered to idols) among the heathens: and that from a place of Scripture, where all these three shall be compared together, and made exact parallels to one another.

### 1 CORINTH. chap. x.

14. Wherefore, my dearly beloved, flee from idolatry.

15. I speak as to wise men, judge ye what I say.

16. The cup of blessing, which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread, which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?

18. Behold Israel after the flesh; are not they which eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?

20. Now I say, that the things, which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God; and I would not, that ye should have fellowship with devils.

21. Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of devils; ye cannot be partakers of the Lord's table, and the table of devils.

Where the apostle's scope being to convince the Corinthians of the unlawfulness of eating things sacrificed to idols, he doth it in this manner: shewing, that though an idol were truly nothing, and things sacrificed to idols were physically nothing, as different from other meats, (as, it seems, they argued, and St. Paul confesses, ver. 19.) yet morally and circumstantially, to eat of things sacrificed to idols in the idol's temple, was to consent with the sacrifices, and to be guilty of them.

Which he doth illustrate, first, from a parallel rite in Christian religion; where the eating and drinking of the body and blood of Christ, offered up to God upon the cross for us in the Lord's supper, is a real communication in his death and sacrifice: ver. 16. "The cup of blessing, which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread, which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?"

Secondly, From another parallel of the same rite among the Jews; where always they, that ate of the sacrifices, were accounted partakers of the altar, that is, of the sacrifice offered up upon the altar, ver. 18. "Behold Israel after the flesh; are not they which eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?" "In veteri lege quicumque admitte-

bantur ad edendum de hostiis oblati, censebantur ipsius sacrificii, tanquam pro ipsis oblatis, fieri participes, et per illud sanctificari;" as a late commentator fully expresses it.

Therefore, as to eat the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's supper, is to be made partaker of his sacrifice offered up to God for us; as to eat of the Jewish sacrifices under the law, was to partake in the legal sacrifices themselves: so to eat of things offered up in sacrifice to idols, was to be made partakers of the idol-sacrifices, and therefore was unlawful.

For the things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils; but Christ's body and blood were offered up in sacrifice unto God, and therefore they could not partake of both together, the sacrifice of the true God, and the sacrifice of devils. "Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord, and the cup of devils; ye cannot be partakers of the Lord's table, and the table of devils." St. Paul's argument here must needs suppose a perfect analogy between these three, and that they are all parallels to one another; or else it hath no strength. Wherefore I conclude from hence, that the LORD'S SUPPER is the same among Christians, in respect of the Christian sacrifice, that among the Jews the feasts upon the legal sacrifices were, and among the Gentiles the feasts upon the idol sacrifices; and therefore EPULUM SACRIFICIALE, OR EPULUM EX OBLATIS. "ΟΠΕΡ'ΕΔΕΙ ΔΕΙΓΞΑΙ.

## CHAP. V.

The result of the former discourse; that the Lord's supper is not a sacrifice, but a feast upon a sacrifice.

THUS having declared and demonstrated the true notion of the Lord's supper, we see then how that theological controversy, which hath cost so many disputes, whether the Lord's supper be a sacrifice, is already decided: for it is not SACRIFICIUM, but EPULUM 'EK THΣ ΘΥΣΙΑΣ, not a SACRIFICE, but a feast upon sacrifice;—or else, in other words, not OBLATIO SACRIFICII, but, as Tertullian excellently speaks, PARTICIPATIO SACRIFICII, not the offering of something up to God upon an altar, but the eating of something which comes from God's altar,—and is set upon our tables. Neither was it ever known amongst the Jews or heathens, that those tables, upon which they did eat their sacrifices, should be called by the name of altars. St. Paul, speaking of the feasts upon the idol-sacrifices, calls the places, upon which they were eaten, “the table of devils,” because the devils' meat was eaten on them; not the altars of devils: and yet doubtless he spake according to the true propriety of speech, and in those technical words, that were then in use amongst them. And, therefore, keeping the same analogy, he must needs call the communion-table by the name of the Lord's table, *i. e.* the table, upon which God's meat is eaten; not his altar, upon which it is offered. It is true, an altar is nothing but a table; but it is a table upon which God himself eats,

consuming the sacrifices by his holy fire: but when the same meat is given from God unto us to eat of, the relation being changed, the place on which we eat is nothing but a table.

And because it is not enough in any discourse, as Aristotle well observeth in his Ethics, to confute an error, unless we can also shew τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ψεύδους, the cause of that error;—having thus discovered the true notion of the Lord's supper, we may easily discern from hence also, how that mistake grew up, and that by the degeneration of this truth. There is a sacrifice in the Lord's supper symbolically, but not there as offered up to God, but feasted on by us; and so not a sacrifice, but a sacrificial feast; which began too soon to be misunderstood.

## CHAP. VI.

The further improvement of that general notion, how the Lord's supper is a federal rite between God and us, at large: concluded with a memorable story out of Maimonides and Nachmanides.

I SHOULD now come to make some further improvement of this general notion of the Lord's supper, by shewing what these feasts upon the sacrifice did signify under the law; and then applying the same in a more perfect manner to the Lord's supper under the gospel, being warranted thereunto by that analogy, which is between them. But because there may be divers glosses and interpretations of these feasts upon the sacrifices, which are obvious to every common understanding, we will decline them all, and pitch only upon one, which is not so vulgarly under-

stood; and it is this, that the eating of God's sacrifice was a FEDERAL RITE between God and those that offered them; according to the custom of the ancients, and especially in those oriental parts, to confirm and ratify their covenants by eating and drinking together.

Thus when Isaac made a covenant with Abimelech the king of Gerar, the text saith, Gen. xxvi. "He made him and those that were with him a feast, and they did eat and drink, and rose up betimes in the morning, and swore to one another."

When Laban made a covenant with Jacob, Gen. xxxi. 44. "Now, therefore, come (saith Laban) let us make a covenant, I and thou, and let it be for a witness between me and thee:" then it follows in the text, "They took stones, and made a heap, and did eat there upon the heap; and Laban called it JEGAR-SAHADUTHA," in his Chaldee tongue, but Jacob (in the Hebrew language) GALEED, *i. e.* a heap of witness;—implying, that those stones, upon which they had eaten and drank together, should be a witness against either of them that should first violate that covenant. R. Moses Bar Nachman, in his comment, thus glosseth upon this place, אכלו שם מעט לזכרון שהוא דרך באים בברית לאכול שניהם מלחם אחד לחברה ולאהבה ואחרי ביאם בשבעה ובברית זבח ועשה להם כרה; *i. e.* They did eat there a little upon the heap for a memorial; because it was the manner of those that enter into covenant, to eat both together of the same bread, as a symbol of love and friendship.—And Isaac Abrabanel much to the purpose, היה מנתג בניהם שהאובלים להם על שלחן, אחד יחשבו ראחים נאמנים *i. e.* It was an ancient cus-



tom amongst them, that they, which did eat bread together upon the same table, should be accounted ever afterwards as entire brethren.—And in this sense he conceiveth that place, Lamentations v. 6. may be expounded; “We have given the hand to the Egyptians and to the Assyrians by fulness of bread,” *i. e.* We have made a covenant with them.

Joshua ix. 14. When the Gibeonites came to the Israelites, and desired them to make a league with them, it is said, “The men of Israel took of their victuals, and asked not counsel of the mouth of the Lord;” that is, they made a covenant with them, as Kimchi learnedly expounds it, לקשו מצירים ואבלו ממנו בברית ברו שיבטחי בהם. *Acceperunt de viatico ipsorum, et comederunt cum illis per modum fœderis.*—For so it follows afterward in the text, “And Joshua made peace with them.”

Hence also was that emphatical expression, Psalm xli. 9. spoken literally by David of Achitophel, “Mine own familiar friend, that did eat of my bread, hath lift up the heel against me;” but seeming prophetically to glance at Judas, that dipping with Christ in the same dish betrayed him. The singular emphasis of which speech, we, that are unacquainted with this custom of the oriental nations, cannot easily perceive; neither can we any where better learn it, than from that passage of Celsus in Origen, who carping at that history of Judas’s betraying Christ in the gospel, as an incredible thing, made, in the meanwhile, an excellent comment upon this prophecy, when he little thought of it. “Ὅτι ἀνθρώπων μὲν ὁ κοινωνήσας τραπέζης οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλεύσειεν, πολλῶν πλείον ὁ θεῷ συνευωχῆθεις οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ ἐπίβουλος ἐγίνετο, *i. e.* Si ho-

mini nemo insidiaretur ejusdem mensæ particeps, multo minus Deo;—And Origen's reply to him, which shews, that though this were an unusual thing, yet it sometimes came to pass, is very pregnant also for our purpose: Τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι πολλοὶ κοινωνήσαντες ἀλῶν καὶ τραπέζης ἐπεβούλευσαν τοῖς συνεστίοις; καὶ πλήρης ἐστὶν ἡ Ἑλλήνων καὶ Βαρβάρων ἱστορία τοιούτων παραδειγμάτων. Καὶ ὄνειδίζων γε ὁ Πάριος Ἰαμβοτοιοῦς τὸν Λυκάμβαντα μετὰ ἄλλας καὶ τράπεζαν συνθήκας ἀθετήσαντα, φησὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν, Ὅρκον δὲ ἐνοσφίσθης μέγαν, ἄλλας τε καὶ τράπεζαν· i. e. Quis ignorat multos ad communionem salis et mensæ adhibitos insidiatos tamen suis contubernalibus? Plena est historia tam Græcorum quam Barbarorum exemplis ejusmodi. Et Parius ille Iamborum scriptor, exprobrans Lycambæ violatum fœdus quod sal et mensa conciliaverat, sic eum alloquitur, sacramentum irritasti magnum, salem atque mensam.—All which makes manifest, what a heinous offence it was accounted anciently to be guilty of the breach of a covenant, which had been confirmed by eating and drinking together.

In the seventh verse of Obadiah, that prophet speaks to Edom in this manner: “All the men of thy confederacy have brought thee to the border; the men, that were at peace with thee, have deceived thee; they, that eat thy bread, have laid a wound under thee.”

In the New Testament, that place, John iv. 9. is well observed by Heinsius, in his Aristarchus, to carry this notion, “How is it that thou, being a Jew, askest drink of me, being a woman of Samaria?” “Suavissime dictum (saith that forenamed critic) ex eorum more, qui, cum peregrini essent,

aut alieno fuissent animo, animis conciliandis cibum mutuo ac potum alter alterius gustabant.”

Wherefore, I think from all these instances I may conclude, that this is the true etymon of that Hebrew word ברית, which signifies a covenant,—or any federal communion betwixt parties, from ברה, comedere,—because it was the constant custom of the Hebrews and oriental nations to establish covenants by eating and drinking together; as hath been shewed.

And as the Jews, so likewise did the heathens in the same manner, use to ratify their covenants between parties, by eating together. Lucian in Toxaris reports it of the Scythians, that when any one was injured, and could not revenge himself, the manner was, that he should kill an ox, and cut it into small pieces; which being boiled, he was to sit down by them with his hands behind him (which was a gesture of earnest supplication amongst them), and then whosoever was minded to help him, came, and did eat a piece of his flesh, and so with this ceremony promised to assist him. And this was accounted a covenant of mutual defence between them; whence that Greek proverb, *Ἐπὶ βύρσης ἐκαθέζετο*, In tergore bovis desedit,—of which Erasmus in his Adages.

Herodotus reporteth of the Persians, that they made their leagues and covenants at feasts; and of the Nasamones, a people of Lybia, that they composed peace by stretching out a cup full of wine to each other, and pledging one another in it. Alexander ab Alexandro relates this of the Thracians and Egyptians, that “e cornibus boum (quæ veteribus poculorum loco erant) vina sibi in-

vicem propinantes, id firmissimum contracti fœderis vinculum esse putabant." Curtius reporteth of the Macedonians, "quod patrio ritu fœdus, quod sanctissimum vellent haberi, sic inibant, ut panem gladio divisum uterque libaret."

And therefore Alexander, when he fell in love with Roxana, commanded bread forthwith to be brought before him; which when he had divided with his sword, and they had both tasted together of, he took her presently to himself as his wife. And there remaineth a custom to this day, something like this, at weddings, in many countries, that when the bridegroom and bride are come from church, they have a piece of cake brought them, which when the bridegroom hath tasted, he gives it to the bride to taste of likewise, in token of a covenant between them. The Germans still use to conclude of bargains, and ratify friendship between parties, by drinking together, as appeareth by that phrase which they have, *den Frieden trînchen*, Pacem bibere.

In like manner, I say, the eating of sacrifices, which were God's meat, was a federal rite between God and those that did partake of them, and signified there was a covenant of friendship between him and them.

For the better conceiving whereof, we must observe, that sacrifices, beside the nature of expiation, had the notion of feasts, which God himself did, as it were, feed upon. Which I explain thus: When God had brought the children of Israel out of Egypt, resolving to manifest himself in a peculiar manner present among them, he thought good to dwell amongst them in a visible and external manner; and therefore, while they

were in the wilderness, and sojourned in tents, he would have a tent or tabernacle built, to sojourn with them also. This mystery of the tabernacle was fully understood by the learned Nachmanides, who in few words, but pregnant, thus expresseth it, עקר החפץ במשכן הוא מקום מגורת השכינה; and again, סוד המשכן הוא שיהיה הבבד אשר מן על הד, סיני שוכן עליו; that is, the mystery of the tabernacle was this, that it was to be a place for the Shechinah, or habitation of Divinity to be fixed in:—and this, no doubt, as a special type of God's future dwelling in Christ's human nature, which was the TRUE SCHECHINAH. But, when the Jews were come into their land, and had there built them houses, God intended to have a fixed dwelling-house also; and therefore his moveable tabernacle was to be turned into a standing temple. Whence, by imitation, came all those temples among the heathens, which they apprehended as so many places of peculiar residence, or habitation, for their deities, next the heavens, to dwell in; as appears by that of Silius, amongst many others,

—————Tarpeie Pater, qui templa secundam  
Incolis a coelo sedem.—————

Now the tabernacle or temple being thus as a house for God to dwell in visibly, to make up the notion of dwelling or habitation complete, there must be all things suitable to a house belonging to it. Hence, in the holy place, there must be a table and a candlestick, because this was the ordinary furniture of a room; as the forecommended Nachmanides observes, סמך השלחן והמנורה שהם כל ים במדו, יודו על ענין המשכן, *i. e.* He addeth a table and a can-

dlestick, because these suit the notion of a dwelling-house.—The table must have its dishes, and spoons, and bowls, and covers, belonging to it, though they were never used, and always be furnished with bread upon it. The candlestick must have its lamps continually burning.

Hence also there must be a continual fire kept in this house of God's upon the altar, as the *focus* of it: to which notion, I conceive, the prophet Isaiah doth allude, chap. xxxi. ver. 9. אשר אור לו בציון ותמר בירושלים, which I would thus translate, qui habet ignem suum in Sion, et focum suum in Jerusalem.

And besides all this, to carry the notion still further, there must be some constant meat and provision brought into this house, which was done in the sacrifices, that were partly consumed by fire upon God's own altar, and partly eaten by the priests, which were God's family, and therefore to be maintained by him. That, which was consumed upon God's altar, was accounted God's MESS, as appeareth from the first chapter of Malachi, where the altar is called

Ver. 12.

GOD'S TABLE, and the sacrifice upon it, GOD'S MEAT; "Ye say, the table of God is polluted, and the fruit thereof, his meat, is contemptible." And often in the law the sacrifice is called God's לֶחֶם, that is, his bread or food.—Whence, in that learned Hebrew book Cozri, the king Haber objects to the Jew Cozar against his religion, that it seemed to place corporeity in God, in making him to feed upon the flesh of beasts in these sacrifices. To which the Jewish doctor answers cabalistically in this manner; that as, in men, corporeal meat is a

means to unite and continue the soul (which is a spirit) to a body; so, in the land of Israel, the blood of beasts offered up in sacrifice had an attractive power to draw down Divinity, and unite it to the Jews. And methinks this may be a little further convinced from that passage in the 50th Psalm, "If I were hungry, I would not tell thee; for the world is mine, and the fulness thereof. Will I eat the flesh of bulls, or drink the blood of goats?" For though it be here denied, that God did really feed upon the sacrifices, yet it is implied there was some such allusive signification in them.

Wherefore it is further observable, that beside the flesh of the beast offered up in sacrifice, there was a *mincah*, or meat-offering, made of flour and oil, and a *libamen*, or drink-offering, that was always joined with the daily sacrifice, as the bread and drink, which were to go along with God's meat.

It was also strictly commanded, that there should be salt in every sacrifice and oblation, because all meat is unsavoury without salt; as R. Moses Bar Nachman hath here also well observed, מפני שאינו דרך כביר להיות לחם השם טפל מבלי מלח *i. e.* Because it was not honourable, that God's meat should be unsavoury, without salt.

Lastly, all these things were to be consumed on the altar only by the holy fire, that came down from heaven, because they were God's portion, and therefore to be eaten or consumed by himself in an extraordinary manner. And this the devil sometime imitated, in some sacrifices offered up to him. For so I understand that passage of Pindar in his Olympiacs, Ode vii. speaking of the

Rhodians, that when they had prepared, and were come to offer sacrifice to Jupiter, they had by chance forgotten to bring fire with them: but Jupiter, being conscious of their good intentions, rained down upon them A GOLDEN SHOWER (as I understand it), A SHOWER of fire; a pure imitation of the sacred story. Take it in that elegant poet's own words:—

Καί τοι γὰρ αἰδοίσας ἔχοντες  
 Σπείριμα' ἀνέβαν φλογὸς οὐδ,  
 Τεύξαν δ' ἌΠΥ' ΡΟΙΣ ἹΕΡΟΙ' Σ  
 Ἄλσος ἐν ἀκροπόλει κείνοισι μὲν ξαν-  
 θὰν ἀγαγὼν νεφέλαν,  
 Πολὺν ὕπε χρυσόν.

That is, according to Benedictus's metaphrase, " Etenim Rhodii ascenderunt, quamvis non habentes ardentis semen ignis. Verum dum instrunt sacrificiis igni carentibus aram in arce, illis quidem flavam adducens nebulam, multum pluit [Jupiter] aurum."

And Solinus reports it of the Vulcanian hill in Sicily, that they which offered sacrifice upon it never put fire to it, but expected it should be kindled from heaven. His words, according to Salmasius's edition, are these; " Nec longe inde Collis Vulcanius, in quo qui divinæ rei operantur, ligna vitea super aras struunt; nec ignis adponitur in hanc congeriem. Cum prosicias intulerunt, si adest Deus, si sacrum probatur, sarmenta, licet viridia, sponte concipiunt, et nullo inflagrante halitu, ab ipso numine fit accendium. Ibi epulantes adludit flamma, quæ, flexuosis excessibus vagabunda, quem contigerit non adurit; nec aliud est quam imago nuncia perfecti rite Voti." The place is very remarkable; and where he says thus, "epulantes adludit flamma," he alludeth to that



custom of feasting on the sacrifices, which was before explained.

I will add to all this the words of a late learned author, that sometime stumbled unawares upon this very notion which we are now about, and yet expressed it happily in this manner; "Deus ad suam cum populo Judæorum familiaritatem significandam, sibi ab illo carnes, sanguinem atque fruges in ALTARI atque MENSA offerri voluit, ut ostenderet se quasi COMMUNEM in illo populo habere MENSAM, esse illius CONVIVAM perpetuum, atque ita familiariter cum illis habitare."

And as it was thus among the Hebrews, so it seems, that sacrifices had the notion of feasts likewise among the ancient Persians, that worshipped the fire, of whom Maximus Tyrius thus relateth, "Ὅτι ἐπιφοροῦντες πρὸς τροφήν ἐπιλέγουσι, Πῦρ, δέσποτα, ἔσθιε, i. e. bringing in the sacrifices to the fire, which was their god, they were wont to say, "Ignis, Domine, comede."

The sacrifices then being God's feasts, they that did partake of them must needs be his CONVIVÆ, and in a manner EAT and DRINK with him. And that this did bear the notion of a federal rite in the Scripture account, I prove from that place, Lev. ii. 13. "Thou shalt not suffer the SALT OF THE COVENANT of thy God to be lacking; with all thine offerings thou shalt offer salt." Where the salt, that was to be cast upon all the sacrifices, is called THE SALT OF THE COVENANT, to signify, that as men did use to make covenants by eating and drinking together, where salt is a necessary appendix; so God by these sacrifices, and the feasts upon them, did ratify and confirm his covenant with those that did partake of them,

inasmuch as they did in a manner EAT and DRINK with him.

For salt was ever accounted amongst the ancients a most necessary concomitant of feasts, and condiment of all meats. כל סעודה שאין מליח בה אינה פתעס, saith the Jewish proverb in Beracoth, "Omne convivium, in quo non est salitum, non est convivium." And therefore because covenants and reconciliations were made by eating and drinking, where salt was always used, salt itself was accounted among the ancients AMICITIÆ SYMBO-  
 LUM. "Ἀλας καὶ τράπεζα, sal et mensa—was used proverbially among the Greeks to express friendship by; "Ἀλας καὶ τράπεζαν παραβαίνειν, in the words of Origen before quoted out of Archilocus, "sal et mensam transgredi,"—was to violate the most sacred league of friendship. Æschines, in his oration De Perperam Habita Legatione, hath a passage very pertinent to this purpose; Τοὺς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως ἄλας καὶ δημοσίαν τράπεζαν περὶ πλείστου δεῖ ποιῆσθαι, Etenim civitatis sales et communem mensam ait se plurimi facere debere.—Thus I understand that symbol of Pythagoras, τὸν ἄλα παρατίθεσθαι, (by Erasmus's leave) for friendship and hospitality. There is a pregnant instance of this very phrase in the Scripture, (Ezra iv. 14.) where our translators read it thus, "Because we have maintenance from the king's palace:" but the words in the Chaldee run after this manner, כען כלקבל דיימלח היכלא מלחנא. i. e. quod sale palatii salivimus — "Because we have eaten of the king's salt [that is, because we have engaged ourselves in a covenant of friendship to him, by eating of meat], therefore it is not meet for us to see the king's dishonour." That proverb men-

tioned in Tully makes to this purpose, "*Multos modios salis simul edendos esse, ut amicitiae munus completum sit:*" which was, because that federal symbol had been so often abused. Nay, hence there remaineth a superstitious custom amongst us and other nations to this day, to count the overturning of the salt upon the table ominous, as betiding some evil to him towards whom it falls: "*Quia amoris et amicitiae symbolum.*" And by this time I think I have given a sufficient comment upon מלח הברית, the salt of the covenant in the text.

Only I must not forget, that as in God's sacrifices there was ever salt to be used, so the like was generally observed in the Heathen sacrifices; as that one place out of Pliny, amongst many, shall sufficiently testify: "*Maxima salis auctoritas e sacris veterum intellegitur, apud quos nulla sacra sine mola salsa conficiebatur.*" And the reason of it also is thus given by that famous scholiast upon Iliad *ἀ. διότι οἱ ἄλεις φιλίας σύμβολον*, because salt is a symbol of friendship;—which is the same with that reason given by God, why he would always have salt in his sacrifices, because it was מלח הברית, that is "*sal symbolum fœderis,*" as before was shewn. And this phrase, being thus explained, will clearly expound that other phrase, about which critics have laboured so much in vain, where the same words are used, but inverted, and a covenant is called a covenant of salt, as salt is here called the salt of the covenant, (Numb. xviii. 19. and 2 Chron. xiii. 5.) viz. because covenants were established by eating and drinking together, where salt was a necessary appendix.

Now therefore, that we may return: As the legal sacrifices, with the feasts upon those sacrifices, were FEDERAL RITES between God and men; in like manner, I say, the Lord's supper under the gospel, which we have already proved to be EPULUM SACRIFICIALE, a feast upon sacrifice, must needs be EPULUM FÆDERALE, a feast of amity and friendship—between God and men; where, by eating and drinking at God's own table, and of his meat, we are taken into a sacred covenant, and inviolable league of friendship with him.

Which I will confirm from that forecommended place, whence I have already proved, that the Lord's supper is a feast upon sacrifice. For there the apostle thus dehorts the Corinthians from eating of the feasts upon idol-sacrifices, which are a parallel to the feast upon the Christian sacrifice in the Lord's supper, because this was to have fellowship and federal communion with devils: the things that the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God, "and I would not, brethren, that ye should have FELLOWSHIP (OR COMMUNION, *κοινωνίαν*) with devils." Where the comment of St. Chrysostom is excellent to our purpose: *Εἰ γὰρ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων τὸ κοινωνεῖν ἀλῶν καὶ τραπέζης φιλίας ἀφορμὴ καὶ σύμβολον γίνεται, ἐγχωρεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ Δαιμόνων τοῦτο συμβῆναι* that is, If among men to communicate of bread and salt be a token and symbol of friendship, it must carry the same notion between men and devils in the idol-feasts.—If therefore to eat the sacrifice of devils be to have federal communion with those devils to whom it was offered; then to eat the sacrifice of Christ, once offered up to God in the Lord's supper, is to have federal communion with God.

There is an excellent story in Maimonides's *Moreh Nevochim*, concerning an ancient custom of the Zabii of feasting together with their gods in this federal way, which will much illustrate this notion: for, going about to give the reason, why the eating of blood was forbidden in the law, he fetches it from the idolatrous use of it then in Moses's time among the Zabii; according to his principles, who thought the reason of all the ceremonial precepts was to be fetched from some such accidental grounds, because those laws were not *primæ* but *secundæ intentionis* in God. "Mularum legum rationes et causæ (saith he) mihi innotuerunt ex cognitione fidei, rituum, et cultus Zabiorum."

By these Zabii he means the ancient Chaldeans; the word in the original Arabic, according to the copy of Joseph Scaliger, being thus writ-

ten, In Epist. 62. ad Isaacum Casaubonum. ضبين "A Vento Apeliote sic dicti (as he \* observes), quasi dicas Orientales." And that book, which Maimonides so often quoteth concerning that nation, their rites and religion, is still extant among the Mahumetan Arabians, as the same Scaliger avoucheth. The story then is this, according to the Hebrew translation of Rabbi Abben Tibbon, lib. 3. cap. 46. רע כיהדם הוא טמא מאד בעיני הצאבה ועם כל זה היו או בלים אותו מפני שהיו חושבים שהוא מזון השדים וכשאכל אותו מי שאכלו כבר השתתף עם השדים ויבואידו ; i. e. Licet sanguis impurus et immundus admodum fuerit in oculis Zabiorum, tamen ab illis comestus fuerit, eo quod existimarunt CIBUM HUNC ESSE DÆMONUM, et quod is, qui eum comedit, hoc ratione COMMUNICATIONEM aliquam cum dæmoni-

bus haberet, ita ut familiariter cum illo conversentur, et futura ei aperiant.—But because others of them did abhor the eating of blood, as a thing repugnant unto nature, they performed this service in a little different manner.

היו שם אנשים שהיה קאה בעיניהם. אכילת הדם כי הוא דבר שומאם הו טכע האדם והיו שוהטים בהמה ומקכלים דמו בכלי או בחפידה ואוכלים בשר השחוטת היה סביב דמה היו מדמין במעשה זה שהשדום יאכלו הדם אשר הוא מזונם והם יאכלו הבשר ובוה תהיה האהבה האהבה והרעית בהם בעבוד שאכלו כלם על שלחן אחד ובמושב אחד ויבאו להם שדום ההם לפי מחשבתם בחלום יוגידו להם העתודות ויעילו להם ; i. e. Mactantes bestiam aliquam, sanguinem in circulo sedentes comedebant ; imaginantes sibi in hoc opere, ipsis CARNEM COMEDENTIBUS, Dæmones ILLUM SANGUINEM COMEDERE, et hunc esse IPSORUM CIBUM, hocque medio AMICITIAM, FRATERNITATEM et FAMILIARITATEM inter ipsos contrahi, quia omnes in una mensa edunt, uno consessu accumbunt.

As for the former part of this story, I find it also in Rabbi Moses Bar Nachman upon Deut. xii. 23. where he goes about to give the reason why blood was forbidden in the law, as Maimonides did, although, in the first place, he saith, it was because blood served in the sacrifices for expiation, otherwise than Maimonides (for there was a great controversy between these two doctors about the nature of sacrifices): but yet, in the second place also, he brings in this, also, because it was used superstitiously by the Heathens in the worship of their idol-gods. והיתה העבודה היא באכילה מן הדם בי חיו מבעים חדם לשרים והם אובלים עלהו וממנו כאילו הם קרואים לשרים לאכול על שלחן השדום חהם ומת i. e. הברים עמהם— והנח חיו מתנבאים בו ומגידים עתידות They performed their superstitious worship, by eating of blood in this manner ; they gathered to-

gether blood for the devils their idol-gods, and then they came themselves, and did eat of that blood with them, as being the devil's GUESTS, and INVITED to EAT at the TABLE of devils; and so were JOINED in federal society with them. And by this kind of communion with devils, they were able to prophesy, and foretel things to come.

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**TWO SERMONS.**

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11

# SERMON I.

PREACHED BEFORE THE HONOURABLE HOUSE OF COMMONS,  
AT WESTMINSTER, MARCH 31, 1647.

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Εὐσεβεί, ὦ τέκνον' ὁ γὰρ Εὐσεβῶν ἄκρως Χριστιανίζει.

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TO THE HONOURABLE  
HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE scope of this sermon, which not long since exercised your patience, worthy senators, was not to contend for this or that opinion, but only to persuade men to the life of Christ, as the pith and kernel of all religion; without which, I may boldly say, all the several forms of religion, though we please ourselves never so much in them, are but so many several dreams. And those many opinions about religion, that are every where so eagerly contended for on all sides, where this doth not lie at the bottom, are but so many shadows fighting with one another: so that I may well say of the true Christian, that is indeed possessed of the life of Christianity, in opposition to all those that are but lightly tinctured with the opinions of it, in the language of the poet:

Ὀίος πέπνυται, τοὶ δ' ὡς σκῆαι ἀίσσουσι.

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Wherefore I could not think any thing else, either more necessary for Christians in general, or more seasonable at this time, than to stir them up to the real establishment of the righteousness of God in their hearts, and that participation of the Divine nature, which the apostle speaketh of. That so they might not content themselves with mere fancies and conceits of Christ, without the Spirit of Christ really dwelling in them, and Christ himself inwardly formed in their hearts; nor satisfy themselves with the mere holding of right and orthodox opinions, as they conceive, whilst they are utterly devoid within of that Divine life, which Christ came to kindle in men's souls; and therefore are so apt to spend all their zeal upon a violent obtruding of their own opinions and apprehensions upon others, which cannot give entertainment to them: which, besides its repugnancy to the doctrine and example of Christ himself, is like to be the bellows, that will blow a fire of discord and contention in Christian commonwealths; whilst in the mean time, these hungry and starved opinions devour all the life and substance of religion, as the lean kine in Pharaoh's dream did eat up the fat. Nor, lastly, please themselves only in the violent opposing of other men's superstitions, according to the genius of the present times, without substituting in the room of them an inward principle of spirit and life in their own souls. For I fear many of us, that pull down idols in churches, may set them up in our hearts; and whilst we quarrel with painted glass, make no scruple at all of entertaining many foul lusts in our souls, and committing continual idolatry with them.

This, in general, was the design of this following discourse, which you were pleased, noble senators, not only to express your good acceptance of, but also to give a real signification of your great undeserved favour to the author of it. Who therefore cannot but, as the least expression of his thankfulness, humbly devote it to you; presenting it here again to your eye in the same form in which it was delivered to your ear. Desirous of nothing more, than that it might be some way useful to you, to kindle in you the life and heat of that which is endeavoured here to be described upon paper; that you may express it, both in your private conversations, and likewise in all your public employments for the commonwealth. That you may, by your kindly influence, effectually encourage all goodness; and by virtue of your power and authority (to use the phrase of Solomon) "scatter away all evil with your eye," as the sun by his beams scattereth the mists and vapours. That from you "judgment may run down like waters, and righteousness like a mighty stream," to refresh this whole land, that thirsteth after them: which, whilst you distribute them plentifully to others, will bestow both strength and honour to yourselves. For justice and righteousness are the establishment of every throne, of all civil power and authority; and if these should once forsake it, though there be lions to support it, it could not stand long. These, together with a good peace, well settled in a commonwealth, are all the outward felicity we can expect, till that happy time come, which the prophet foretelleth, and is therefore more than a Platonical idea;

when "the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the calf, and the young lion, and the fatling together, and a little child lead them:" when "the sucking child shall play on the hole of the asp, and the weaned child shall put his hand on the cockatrice den:" when "they shall not hurt nor destroy in all God's holy mountain; for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea."

I have but one word more; if you please to give me leave; that after your care for the advancement of religion, and the public good of the commonwealth, you would think it worthy of you to promote ingenious learning, and cast a favourable influence upon it. I mean, not that only which furnisheth the pulpit, which you seem to be very regardful of; but that, which is more remote from such popular use, in the several kinds of it, which yet are all of them both very subservient to religion, and useful to the commonwealth. There is indeed a *ψευδοπαιδεία*, as the philosopher tells us, a bastardly kind of literature, and a *ψευδώνυμος γνώσις*, as the apostle instructeth us, a knowledge falsely so called; which deserve not to be pleaded for. But the noble and generous improvement of our understanding faculty, in the true contemplation of the wisdom, goodness, and other attributes of God, in this great fabric of the universe, cannot easily be disparaged, without a blemish cast upon the Maker of it. Doubtless, we may as well enjoy that which God hath communicated of himself to the creatures, by this larger faculty of our understandings, as by those narrow and low fa-

culties of our senses; and yet nobody counts it to be unlawful to hear a lesson played upon the lute, or to smell at a rose. And these raised improvements of our natural understandings may be as well subservient and subordinate to a Divine light in our minds, as the natural use of these outward creatures here below to the life of God in our hearts. Nay, all true knowledge doth of itself naturally tend to God, who is the fountain of it; and would ever be raising of our souls up upon its wings thither, did not we κατέχειν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ, detain it, and hold it down, in unrighteousness, as the apostle speaketh. All philosophy to a wise man, to a truly sanctified mind, as he in Plutarch speaketh, is but ὕλη τῆς Θεολογίας, matter for Divinity to work upon. Religion is the queen of all those inward endowments of the soul; and all pure natural knowledge, all virgin and undeflowered arts and sciences, are her handmaids, that rise up, and call her blessed. I need not tell you how much the skill of tongues and languages, besides the excellent use of all philology in general, conduceth to the right understanding of the letter of sacred writings, on which the spiritual notions must be built; for none can possibly be ignorant of that, which have but once heard of a translation of the Bible. The apostle exhorteth private Christians to “whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, to think on those things:” and therefore it may well become you, noble gentlemen, in your public sphere to encourage so noble a thing as knowledge is, which will reflect so much lustre and honour back again

upon yourselves. That God would direct you in all your counsels, and still bless you, and prosper you in all your sincere endeavours for the public good, is the hearty prayer of,

Your most humble Servant,

RALPH CUDWORTH.

## SERMON I.

*And hereby we do know, that we know him, if we keep his commandments.—He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him.—1 JOHN ii. 3, 4.*

WE have much inquiry concerning knowledge in these latter times. The sons of Adam are now as busy as ever himself was about the tree of knowledge of good and evil, shaking the boughs of it, and scrambling for the fruit; whilst, I fear, many are too unmindful of the tree of life. And though there be now no cherubims with their flaming swords to fright men off from it; yet the way, that leads to it, seems to be so solitary and untrodden as if there were but few that had any mind to taste of the fruit of it. There be many, that speak of new glimpses and discoveries of truth, of dawns of gospel light; and no question but God hath reserved much of this for the very evening and sun-set of the world; for in the latter days knowledge shall be increased: but yet I wish we could in the mean time see that day to dawn, which the apostle speaks of, and that “day-star to arise in men’s hearts.” I wish, whilst we talk of light, and dispute about truth, we could walk more as “children of the light.” Whereas, if St. John’s rule be good here in the text, that no man truly knows Christ, but he that keepeth his commandments; it is much to be suspected, that many of us, who pretend to light, have a thick



and gloomy darkness within, overspreading our souls.

There be now many large volumes and discourses written concerning Christ, thousands of controversies discussed, infinite problems determined concerning his Divinity, humanity, union of both together, and what not; so that our bookish Christians, that have all their religion in writings and papers, think they are now completely furnished with all kinds of knowledge concerning Christ; and when they see all their leaves lying about them, they think they have a goodly stock of knowledge and truth, and cannot possibly miss of the way to heaven; as if religion were nothing but a little book-craft, a mere paper-skill.

But if St. John's rule here be good, we must not judge of our knowing of Christ by our skill in books and papers, but by our keeping of his commandments. And that, I fear, will discover many of us (notwithstanding all this light which we boast of round about us) to have nothing but Egyptian darkness within our hearts.

The vulgar sort think, that they know Christ enough out of their creeds, and catechisms, and confessions of faith; and if they have but a little acquainted themselves with these, and like parrots conned the words of them, they doubt not, but that they are sufficiently instructed in all the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven. Many of the more learned, if they can but wrangle and dispute about Christ, imagine themselves to be grown great proficient in the school of Christ.

The greatest part of the world, whether learned or unlearned, think, that there is no need of purging and purifying of their hearts for the right

knowledge of Christ and his gospel: but though their lives be never so wicked, their hearts never so foul within, yet they may know Christ sufficiently out of their treatises and discourses, out of their mere systems and bodies of divinity; which I deny not to be useful in a subordinate way; although our Saviour prescribeth his disciples another method to come to the right knowledge of Divine truths, by doing of God's will. "He that will do my Father's will (saith he), shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God." He is a true Christian indeed, not he that is only book-taught, but he, that is God-taught; he, that hath an unction from the Holy One (as our Apostle calleth it) that teacheth him all things; he, that hath the Spirit of Christ within him, that searcheth out the deep things of God: "for as no man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of a man, which is in him; even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God."

Ink and paper can never make us Christians, can never beget a new nature, a living principle in us; can never form Christ, or any true notions of spiritual things, in our hearts. The gospel, that new law, which Christ delivered to the world, it is not merely a dead letter without us, but a quickening spirit within us. Cold theorems and maxims, dry and jejune disputes, lean syllogistical reasonings, could never yet of themselves beget the least glimpse of true heavenly light, the least sap of saving knowledge in any heart. All this is but the groping of the poor dark spirit of man after truth, to find it out with his own endeavours, and feel it with his own cold and benumbed hands. Words and syllables, which are but dead things,

cannot possibly convey the living notions of heavenly truths to us. The secret mysteries of a Divine life, of a new nature, of Christ formed in our hearts, they cannot be written or spoken, language and expressions cannot reach them; neither can they be ever truly understood, except the soul itself be kindled from within, and awakened into the life of them. A painter, that would draw a rose, though he may flourish some likeness of it in figure and colour, yet he can never paint the scent and fragrancy; or if he would draw a flame, he cannot put a constant heat into his colours; he cannot make his pencil drop a sound, as the echo in the epigram mocks at him;

———*Si vis similem pingere, pinge sonum.*

All the skill of cunning artizans and mechanics cannot put a principle of life into a statue of their own making. Neither are we able to enclose in words and letters the life, soul, and essence, of any spiritual truths, and, as it were, to incorporate it in them.

Some philosophers have determined that ἀρετή is not διδακτόν, virtue cannot be taught by any certain rules or precepts. Men and books may propound some direction to us, that may set us in such a way of life and practice, as in which we shall at last find it within ourselves, and be experimentally acquainted with it; but they cannot teach it us like a mechanic art or trade. No, surely, “there is a spirit in man; and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth understanding.” But we shall not meet with this spirit any where but in the way of obedience: the knowledge of Christ, and the keeping of his commandments, must always

go together, and be mutual causes of one another.

“ Hereby we know, that we know him, if we keep his commandments.”

“ He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him.”

I come now unto these words themselves, which are so pregnant, that I shall not need to force out any thing at all from them: I shall therefore only take notice of some few observations which drop from them of their own accord, and then conclude with some application of them to ourselves.

I. First, then, If this be the right way and method of discovering our knowledge of Christ, by our keeping his commandments; then we may safely draw conclusions concerning our state and condition from the conformity of our lives to the will of Christ.

Would we know, whether we know Christ aright, let us consider whether the life of Christ be in us. “ Qui non habet vitam Christi, Christum non habet :” He that hath not the life of Christ in him, he hath nothing but the name, nothing but a fancy of Christ, he hath not the substance of him. He that builds his house upon this foundation, not an airy notion of Christ swimming in his brain, but Christ really dwelling and living in his heart, as our Saviour himself witnesseth, he “ buildeth his house upon a rock ;” and when the floods come, and the winds blow, and the rain descends, and beats upon it, it shall stand impreguably. But he that builds all his comfort upon an ungrounded persuasion, that God from all eternity hath loved him, and absolutely decreed him to life and hap-

piness, and seeketh not for God really dwelling in his soul ; he builds his house upon a quicksand, and it shall suddenly sink and be swallowed up : “ his hope shall be cut off, and his trust shall be a spider’s web ; he shall lean upon his house, but it shall not stand ; he shall hold it fast, but it shall not endure.”

We are no where commanded to pry into these secrets, but the wholesome counsel and advice given us is this, “ to make our calling and election sure.” We have no warrant in Scripture to peep into these hidden rolls and volumes of eternity, and to make it our first thing that we do, when we come to Christ, to spell out our names in the stars, and to persuade ourselves, that we are certainly elected to everlasting happiness, before we see the image of God, in righteousness and true holiness, shaped in our hearts. God’s everlasting decree is too dazzling and bright an object for us at first to set our eye upon. It is far easier and safer for us to look upon the rays of his goodness and holiness, as they are reflected in our hearts, and there to read the mild and gentle characters of God’s love to us, in our love to him, and our hearty compliance with his heavenly will ; as it is safer for us, if we would see the sun, to look upon it here below in a pail of water, than to cast up our daring eyes upon the body of the sun itself, which is too radiant and scorching for us. The best assurance that any one can have of his interest in God, is doubtless the conformity of his soul to him. Those Divine purposes, whatsoever they be, are altogether unsearchable and unknowable by us : they lie wrapped up in everlasting darkness, and covered in a deep abyss : Who is able to fathom the bottom of them ?

Let us not therefore make this our first attempt towards God and religion, to persuade ourselves strongly of these everlasting decrees: for if at our first flight we aim so high, we shall happily but scorch our wings, and be struck back with lightning, as those giants of old were, that would needs attempt to assault heaven. And it is indeed a most gigantic essay to thrust ourselves so boldly into the lap of heaven; it is a prank of Nimrod, of a mighty hunter, thus rudely to deal with God, and to force heaven and happiness before his face, whether he will or no. The way to obtain a good assurance indeed of our title to heaven, is not to clamber up to it by a ladder of our own ungrounded persuasions, but to dig as low as hell by humility and self-denial in our own hearts: and though this may seem to be the farthest way about, yet it is indeed the nearest and safest way to it. We must ἀναβαίνειν κάτω, and καταβαίνειν ἄνω, as the Greek epigram speaks, ascend downward, and descend upward, if we would indeed come to heaven, or get any true persuasion of our title to it.

The most gallant and triumphant confidence of a Christian riseth safely and surely on this low foundation, that lies deeper underground, and there stands firmly and steadfastly. When our heart is once turned into a conformity with the word of God, when we feel our will perfectly to concur with his will, we shall then presently perceive a spirit of adoption within ourselves, teaching us to cry, Abba, Father. We shall not then care for peeping into those hidden records of eternity, to see whether our names be written there in golden characters; no, we shall find a copy of

God's thoughts concerning us written in our own breasts. There we may read the characters of his favour to us; there we may feel an inward sense of his love to us, flowing out of our hearty and unfeigned love to him. And we shall be more undoubtedly persuaded of it, than if any of those winged watchmen above, that are privy to heaven's secrets, should come and tell us, that they saw our names enrolled in those volumes of eternity. Whereas, on the contrary, though we strive to persuade ourselves never so confidently, that God from all eternity hath loved us, and elected us to life and happiness; if we do yet, in the mean time, entertain any iniquity within our hearts, and willingly close with any lust; do what we can, we shall find many a cold qualm every now and then seizing upon us at approaching dangers; and when death itself shall grimly look us in the face, we shall feel our hearts even to die within us, and our spirits quite faint away, though we strive to raise them and recover them never so much with the strong waters and *aquavite* of our ungrounded presumptions. The least inward lust willingly continued will be like a worm, fretting the gourd of our jolly confidence and presumptuous persuasion of God's love, and always gnawing at the root of it; and though we strive to keep it alive, and continually besprinkle it with some dews of our own, yet it will be always dying and withering in our bosoms. But a good conscience within will be always better to a Christian, than "health to his navel, or marrow to his bones;" it will be an everlasting cordial to his heart; it will be softer to him than a bed of down, and he may sleep securely upon it in the

midst of raging and tempestuous seas, when the winds bluster, and the waves beat round about him. A good conscience is the best looking-glass of heaven, in which the soul may see God's thoughts and purposes concerning it, as so many shining stars reflected to it. "Hereby we know Christ, hereby we know, that Christ loves us, if we keep his commandments."

II. Secondly, If hereby only we know, that we know Christ, by our keeping his commandments, then the knowledge of Christ doth not consist merely in a few barren notions, in a form of certain dry and sapless opinions.

Christ came not into the world to fill our heads with mere speculations, to kindle a fire of wrangling and contentious dispute amongst us, and to warm our spirits against one another with nothing but angry and peevish debates; whilst in the mean time our hearts remain all ice within towards God, and have not the least spark of true heavenly fire to melt and thaw them. Christ came not to possess our brains only with some cold opinions, that send down nothing but a freezing and benumbing influence upon our hearts. Christ was *vitæ magister*, not *scholæ*: and he is the best Christian, whose heart beats with the purest pulse towards heaven; not he, whose head spinneth out the finest cobwebs.

He that endeavours really to mortify his lusts, and to comply with that truth in his life, which his conscience is convinced of, is nearer a Christian, though he never heard of Christ, than he, that believes all the vulgar articles of the Christian faith, and plainly denieth Christ in his life.



Surely the way to heaven, that Christ hath taught us, is plain and easy, if we have but honest hearts : we need not many criticisms, many school distinctions, to come to a right understanding of it. Surely Christ came not to ensnare us and entangle us with captious niceties, or to puzzle our heads with deep speculations, and lead us through hard and craggy notions into the kingdom of heaven. I persuade myself, that no man shall ever be kept out of heaven for not comprehending mysteries, that were beyond the reach of his shallow understanding, if he had but an honest and good heart, that was ready to comply with Christ's commandments. " Say not in thy heart, Who shall ascend into heaven ?" that is, with high speculations, to bring down Christ from thence ; or " Who shall descend into the abyss beneath ?" that is, with deep searching thoughts to fetch up Christ from thence : but lo, " the word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart."

But I wish it were not the distemper of our times, to scare and fright men only with opinions, and make men only solicitous about the entertaining of this and that speculation, which will not render them any thing the better in their lives, or the liker unto God ; whilst in the mean time there is no such care taken about keeping of Christ's commandments, and being renewed in our minds according to the image of God in righteousness and true holiness. We say, " Lo, here is Christ," and, " Lo, there is Christ," in these and these opinions ; whereas, in truth, Christ is neither here, nor there, nor any where, but where the Spirit of Christ, where the life of Christ is.

Do we not now-a-days open and lock up heaven with the private key of this and that opinion of our own, according to our several fancies, as we please? And if any one observe Christ's commandments never so sincerely, and serve God with faith and a pure conscience, that yet haply skills not of some contended-for opinions, some darling notions, he hath not the right *shibboleth*, he hath not the true watch-word, he must not pass the guards into heaven. Do we not make this and that opinion, this and that outward form, to be the wedding-garment, and boldly sentence those to outer darkness, that are not invested therewith? Whereas, every true Christian finds the least dram of hearty affection towards God to be more cordial and sovereign to his soul, than all the speculative notions and opinions in the world; and though he study also to inform his understanding aright, and free his mind from all error and misapprehensions, yet it is nothing but the life of Christ deeply rooted in his heart, which is the chemical elixir, that he feeds upon. Had he "all faith, that he could remove mountains" (as St. Paul speaks), had he "all knowledge, all tongues and languages;" yet he prizeth one dram of love beyond them all. He accounteth him, that feedeth upon mere notions in religion, to be but an airy and cameleon-like Christian. He findeth himself now otherwise rooted and centred in God, than when he did before merely contemplate and gaze upon him; he tasteth and relisheth God within himself; he hath *quendam saporem Dei*, a certain savour of him;—whereas before he did but rove and guess at random at him. He feeleth himself safely anchored in God, and will

not be dissuaded from it, though perhaps he skill not many of those subtilties, which others make the *alpha* and *omega* of their religion. Neither is he scared with those childish affrightments, with which some would force their private conceits upon him; he is above the superstitious dreading of mere speculative opinions, as well as the superstitious reverence of outward ceremonies; he cares not so much for subtilty, as for soundness and health of mind. And, indeed, as it was well spoken by a noble philosopher, *ἀνευ ἀρετῆς Θεὸς ὄνομα μόνον*, that without purity and virtue, God is nothing but an empty name;—so it is as true here, that without obedience to Christ's commandments, without the life of Christ dwelling in us, whatsoever opinion we entertain of him, Christ is but only named by us, he is not known.

I speak not here against a free and ingenuous inquiry into all truth, according to our several abilities and opportunities; I plead not for the captivating and enthralling of our judgments to the dictates of men; I do not disparage the natural improvement of our understanding faculties by true knowledge, which is so noble and gallant a perfection of the mind: but the thing, which I aim against, is, the dispiriting of the life and vigour of our religion by dry speculations, and making it nothing but a mere dead skeleton of opinions, a few dry bones, without any flesh and sinews, tied up together, and the misplacing of all our zeal upon an eager prosecution of these, which should be spent to better purpose upon other objects.

Knowledge indeed is a thing far more excellent than riches, outward pleasures, worldly dignities,

or any thing else in the world besides holiness, and the conformity of our wills to the will of God ; but yet our happiness consisteth not in it, but in a certain Divine temper and constitution of soul, which is far above it.

But it is a piece of that corruption, that runneth through human nature, that we naturally prize truth more than goodness, knowledge more than holiness. We think it a gallant thing to be fluttering up to heaven with our wings of knowledge and speculation ; whereas, the highest mystery of a Divine life here, and of perfect happiness hereafter, consisteth in nothing but mere obedience to the Divine will. Happiness is nothing but that inward sweet delight, that will arise from the harmonious agreement between our wills and God's will.

There is nothing contrary to God in the whole world, nothing that fights against him, but self-will. This is the strong castle that we all keep garrisoned against heaven in every one of our hearts, which God continually layeth siege unto ; and it must be conquered and demolished, before we can conquer heaven. It was by reason of this self-will, that Adam fell in paradise ; that those glorious angels, those morning-stars, kept not their first station, but dropped down from heaven like falling stars, and sunk into this condition of bitterness, anxiety, and wretchedness, in which now they are. They all entangled themselves with the length of their own wings, they would needs will more and otherwise than God would will in them ; and, going about to make their wills wider, and to enlarge them into greater amplitude, the more they struggled, they found themselves

the faster pinioned, and crowded up into narrowness and servility; insomuch, that now they are not able to use any wings at all, but, inheriting the serpent's curse, can only creep with their bellies upon the earth. Now, our only way to recover God and happiness again is, not to soar up with our understandings, but to destroy this self-will of ours; and then we shall find our wings to grow again, our plumes fairly spread, and ourselves raised aloft into the free air of perfect liberty, which is perfect happiness.

There is nothing in the whole world able to do us good or hurt, but God and our own will: neither riches nor poverty, nor disgrace nor honour, nor life nor death, nor angels nor devils; but willing or not willing, as we ought. Should hell itself cast all its fiery darts against us, if our will be right, if it be informed by the Divine will, they can do us no hurt; we have then (if I may so speak), an enchanted shield, that is impenetrable, and will bear off all. God will not hurt us, and hell cannot hurt us, if we will nothing but what God wills. Nay, then we are acted by God himself, and the whole Divinity floweth in upon us; and when we have cashiered this self-will of ours, which did but shackle and confine our souls, our wills shall then become truly free, being widened and enlarged to the extent of God's own will. Hereby we know, that we know Christ indeed, not by our speculative opinions concernnig him, but by our keeping of his commandments.

III. Thirdly, If hereby we are to judge, whether we truly know Christ, by our keeping of his commandments; so that he that saith he knoweth him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a

liar: then this was not the plot and design of the gospel, to give the world an indulgence to sin, upon what pretence soever.

Though we are too prone to make such misconstructions of it; as if God had intended nothing else in it, but to dandle our corrupt nature, and contrive a smooth and easy way for us to come to happiness, without the toilsome labour of subduing our lusts and sinful affections: or, as if the gospel were nothing else but a declaration to the world, of God's engaging his affections from all eternity on some particular persons in such a manner, as that he would resolve to love them, and dearly embrace them, though he never made them partakers of his image in righteousness and true holiness; and though they should remain under the power of all their lusts, yet they should still continue his beloved ones, and he would, notwithstanding, at last, bring them undoubtedly into heaven. Which is nothing else but to make the God that we worship, the God of the New Testament, *προσωπολήπτης*, an accepter of persons, and one, that should encourage that in the world which is diametrically opposite to God's own life and being.

And, indeed, nothing is more ordinary than for us to shape out such monstrous and deformed notions of God unto ourselves, by looking upon him through the coloured medium of our own corrupt hearts, and having the eye of our soul tintured by the suffusions of our own lusts. And therefore because we mortals can fondly love and hate, and sometimes hug the very vices of those to whom our affections are engaged, and kiss their very deformities; we are so ready to shape out a Deity

like unto ourselves, and to fashion out such a God as will, in Christ at least, hug the very wickedness of the world, and in those that be once his own, by I know not what fond affection, appropriated to himself, connive at their very sins, so that they shall not make the least breach betwixt himself and them. Some there are, that question, whether of the two be the worse idolatry, and of the deeper stain, for a man to make a god out of a piece of wood, and fall down unto it and worship it, and say, Deliver me, for thou art my God, as it is expressed in the prophet Isaiah; or to set up such an idol-god of our own imagination as this is, fashioned out according to the similitude of our own fondness and wickedness: and when we should paint out God with the liveliest colours that we can possibly borrow from any created being, with the purest perfections that we can abstract from them; to draw him out thus with the black coal of our own corrupt hearts, and to make the very blots and blurs of our own souls to be the letters which we spell out his name by. Thus do we, that are children of the night, make black and ugly representations of God unto ourselves; as the Ethiopians were wont to do, copying him out according to our own likeness, and setting up that unto ourselves for a god, which we love most dearly in ourselves, that is, our lusts. But there is no such god as this any where in the world, but only in some men's false imaginations, who know not, all this while, that they look upon themselves instead of God, and make an idol of themselves, which they worship and adore for him; being so full of themselves, that whatsoever they see round about them, even God himself, they colour with

their own tincture; like him, that Aristotle speaks of, that wheresoever he went, and whatsoever he looked upon, he saw still his own face, as in a glass, represented to him. And therefore it is no wonder, if men seem naturally more devoutly affected toward such an imaginary god, as we have now described, than to the true real God, clothed with his own real attributes; since it is nothing but an image of themselves, which, Narcissus-like, they fall in love with: no wonder if they kiss and dandle such a baby-god as this, which, like little children, they have dressed up out of the clouts of their own fond fancies, according to their own likeness, of purpose that they might play and sport with it.

But God will ever dwell in spotless light, howsoever we paint him and disfigure him here below; he will still be circled about with his own rays of unstained and immaculate glory. And though the gospel be not God as he is in his own brightness, but God veiled and masked to us, God in a state of humiliation, and condescent, as the sun in a rainbow; yet it is nothing else but a clear and unspotted mirror of Divine holiness, goodness, purity; in which attributes lie the very life and essence of God himself. The gospel is nothing else but God descending into the world in our form, and conversing with us in our likeness; that he might allure and draw us up to God, and make us partakers of his Divine form. Θεός γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος (as Athanasius speaks) ἵνα ἡμᾶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ θεοποιήσῃ, God was therefore incarnated and made man, that he might deify us;—that is (as St. Peter expresseth it), make us partakers of the Divine nature. Now, I say, the very



proper character and essential tincture of God himself is nothing else but goodness. Nay, I may be bold to add, that God is therefore God, because he is the highest and most perfect good; and good is not therefore good, because God out of an arbitrary will of his would have it so. Whatsoever God doth in the world, he doth it as suitable to the highest goodness; the idea and fairest copy of which is his own essence.

Virtue and holiness in creatures, as Plato well discourseth in his *Euthyphro*, are not therefore good, because God loveth them, and will have them be accounted such; but rather God therefore loveth them, because they are in themselves simply good. Some of our own authors go a little further yet, and tell us, that God doth not fondly love himself, because he is himself, but therefore he loveth himself, because he is the highest and most absolute goodness; so that if there could be any thing in the world better than God, God would love that better than himself: but because he is essentially the most perfect good, therefore he cannot but love his own goodness infinitely above all other things. And it is another mistake, which sometimes we have of God, by shaping him out according to the model of ourselves, when we make him nothing but a blind, dark, impetuous self-will running through the world; such as we ourselves are furiously acted with, that have not the ballast of absolute goodness to poise and settle us.

That I may therefore come nearer to the thing in hand; God, who is absolute goodness, cannot love any of his creatures, and take pleasure in them, without bestowing a communication of his

goodness and likeness upon them. God cannot make a gospel to promise men life and happiness hereafter, without being regenerated, and made partakers of his holiness. As soon may heaven and hell be reconciled together, and lovingly shake hands with one another, as God can be fondly indulgent to any sin, in whomsoever it be. As soon may light and darkness be espoused together, and midnight be married to noon-day, as God can be joined in a league of friendship to any wicked soul.

The great design of God in the gospel is to clear up this mist of sin and corruption, which we are here surrounded with, and to bring up his creatures out of the shadow of death to the region of light above the land of truth and holiness. The great mystery of the gospel is to establish a god-like frame and disposition of spirit, which consists in righteousness and true holiness, in the hearts of men. And Christ, who is the great and mighty Saviour, came on purpose into the world, not only to save us from fire and brimstone, but also to save us from our sins. Christ hath therefore made an expiation of our sins by his death upon the cross, that we, being thus delivered out of the hands of these our greatest enemies, might serve God without fear, in holiness and righteousness before him all the days of our life. This "grace of God, that bringeth salvation," hath therefore "appeared unto all men, in the gospel, that it might teach us to deny ungodliness and worldly lusts, and that we should live soberly, righteously and godlily in this present world; looking for that blessed hope, and glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ, who gave him-

self for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify to himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works." These things I write unto you (saith our apostle a little before my text) that you sin not;" therein expressing the end of the whole gospel, which is, not only to cover sin by spreading the purple robe of Christ's death and sufferings over it, whilst it still remaineth in us with all its filth and noisomeness unremoved; but also to convey a powerful and mighty spirit of holiness, to cleanse us and free us from it. And this is a greater grace of God to us, than the former, which still go both together in the gospel; besides the free remission and pardon of sin in the blood of Christ, the delivering of us from the power of sin, by the Spirit of Christ dwelling in our hearts.

Christ came not into the world only to cast a mantle over us, and hide all our filthy sores from God's avenging eye, with his merits and righteousness; but he came likewise to be a chirurgeon and physician of souls, to free us from the filth and corruption of them; which is more grievous and burdensome, more noisome to a true Christian, than the guilt of sin itself.

Should a poor wretched and diseased creature, that is full of sores and ulcers, be covered all over with purple, or clothed with scarlet, he would take but little contentment in it, whilst his sores and wounds remain upon him; and he had much rather be arrayed in rags, so he might obtain but soundness and health within. The gospel is a true Bethesda, a pool of grace, where such poor, lame and infirm creatures as we are, upon the moving of God's Spirit in it, may descend down,

not only to wash our skin and outside, but also to be cured of our diseases within. And whatever the world thinks, there is a powerful Spirit, that moves upon these waters, the waters of the gospel, spreading its gentle, healing, quickening wings over our souls. The gospel is not like Abana and Pharpar, those common rivers of Damascus, that could only cleanse the outside ; but is a true Jordan, in which such leprous Naamans as we all are, "may wash and be clean." "Blessed indeed are they, whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered : Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin ;" but yet rather blessed are they, whose sins are like a morning cloud, and quite taken away from them. Blessed, thrice "blessed are they, that hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be satisfied : blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God."

Our Saviour Christ came (as John the Baptist tells us) "with a fan in his hand, that he might thoroughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into his garner : but the chaff he will burn up with unquenchable fire." He came (as the prophet Malachi speaks) "like a refiner's fire, and like fuller's soap ; to sit as a refiner and purifier of silver, and to purify all the sons of Levi, and purge them as gold and silver, that they may offer unto the Lord an offering in righteousness."

Christ came not only to write Holiness to the Lord upon Aaron's forehead, and to put his urim and thummim upon his breast-plate ; but, "This is the covenant, saith the Lord, that I will make with them in those days ; I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts ;

and then I will be their God, and they shall be my people." They shall be all kings and priests unto me. "God sent his own Son (saith St. Paul) in the likeness of sinful flesh, and by a sacrifice for sin condemned sin in the flesh; that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit."

The first Adam, as the Scripture tells us, brought in a real defilement, which, like a noisome leprosy, hath overspread all mankind; and therefore the second Adam must not only fill the world with a conceit of holiness, and mere imaginary righteousness: but he must really convey such an immortal seed of grace into the hearts of believers as may prevail still more and more in them, till it have at last quite wrought out that poison of the serpent.

Christ, that was nothing but Divinity dwelling in a tabernacle of flesh, and God himself immediately acting a human nature, came into the world to kindle here that Divine life amongst men, which is certainly dearer unto God, than any thing else whatsoever in the world; and to propagate this celestial fire from one heart still unto another, until the end of the world. Neither is he, nor was he, ever absent from this spark of his Divinity kindled amongst men, wheresoever it be, though he seem bodily to be withdrawn from us. He is the standing, constant, inexhausted fountain of this Divine light and heat, that still toucheth every soul that is enlivened by it, with an outstretched ray, and freely lends his beams, and disperseth his influence to all, from the beginning of the world to the end of it. "We all receive of his fulness grace for grace;" as all the stars in heaven are said to

light their candles at the sun's flame. For though his body be withdrawn from us, yet, by the lively and virtual contact of his Spirit, he is always kindling, cheering, quickening, warming, and enlivening hearts. Nay, this Divine life, begun and kindled in any heart, wheresoever it be, is something of God in flesh, and, in a sober and qualified sense, Divinity incarnate; and all particular Christians, that are really possessed of it, so many mystical Christs.

And, God forbid, that God's own life and nature, here in the world, should be forlorn, forsaken, and abandoned, of God himself. Certainly, wherever it is, though never so little, like a sweet, young, tender babe, once born in any heart, when it crieth unto God the father of it, with pitiful and bemoaning looks imploring his compassion, it cannot choose but move his fatherly bowels, and make them yearn, and turn towards it, and, by strong sympathy, draw his compassionate arm to help and relieve it. Never was any tender infant so dear to those bowels that begat it, as an infant new-born Christ, formed in the heart of any true believer, to God the father of it. Shall the children of this world, the sons of darkness, be moved with such tender affection and compassion towards the fruit of their bodies, their own natural offspring? and shall God, who is the father of lights, the fountain of all goodness, be moved with no compassion towards his true spiritual offspring, and have no regard to those sweet babes of light, engendered by his own beams in men's hearts, that, in their lovely countenances, bear the resemblance of his own face, and call him their father? Shall he see them lie fainting, and gasping, and dying

here in the world, for want of nothing to preserve and keep them, but an influence from him, who first gave them life and breath? No, hear the language of God's heart, hear the sounding of his bowels towards them: "Is it Ephraim, my dear son? is it that pleasant child? Since I spake of him, I do earnestly remember him; my bowels, my bowels are troubled for him; I will surely have mercy upon him, saith the Lord." If those expressions of goodness and tender affection here, among the creatures, be but drops of that full ocean that is in God; how can we then imagine, that this father of our spirits should have so little regard to his own dear offspring, I do not say our souls, but that, which is the very life and soul of our souls, the life of God in us (which is nothing else but God's own self communicated to-us, his own Son born in our hearts), as that he should suffer it to be cruelly murdered in its infancy by our sins, and, like young Hercules, in its very cradle to be strangled by those filthy vipers? that he should see him crucified by wicked lusts, nailed fast to the cross by invincible corruptions, pierced and gored on every side with the poisonous spears of the devil's temptations, and at last to give up the ghost; and yet his tender heart not at all relent, nor be all this while impassioned with so sad a spectacle? Surely, we cannot think he hath such an adamant breast, such a flinty nature, as this is.

What then? must we say, that though indeed he be willing, yet he is not able to rescue his crucified and tormented Son now bleeding upon the cross; to take him down from thence, and save him; then must sin be more powerful than God;

that weak, crazy and sickly thing, more strong than the Rock of ages; and the devil, the prince of darkness, more mighty than the God of light. No, surely; there is a weakness and impotency in all evil, but a masculine strength and vigour in all goodness; and therefore, doubtless, the highest good the *πρωτον αγαθον*, as the philosopher calls it, is the strongest thing in the world. “Nil potentius summo Bono.” God’s power, displayed in the world, is nothing but his goodness strongly reaching all things from height to depth, from the highest heaven to the lowest hell; and irresistibly imparting itself to every thing, according to those several degrees, in which it is capable of it.

Have the fiends of darkness then, those poor forlorn spirits, that are fettered and chained up in the chains of their own wickedness, any strength to withstand the force of infinite goodness, which is infinite power? or do they not rather sculk in holes of darkness, and fly, like bats and owls, before the approaching beams of this Sun of Righteousness? Is God powerful to kill and to destroy, to damn and to torment? and is he not powerful to save? Nay, it is the sweetest flower in all the garland of his attributes, it is the richest diadem in his crown of glory, that he is *mighty to save*:—and this is far more magnificent for him, than to be styled *mighty to destroy*. For that, except it be in a way of justice, speaks no power at all, but mere impotency; for the root of all power is goodness.

Or must we say, lastly, that God indeed is able to rescue us out of the power of sin and Satan, when we sigh and groan towards him; but yet sometimes, to exercise his absolute authority, his



uncontrollable dominion, he delights rather in plunging wretched souls down into infernal night and everlasting darkness? What shall we then make the God of the whole world? Nothing but a cruel and dreadful *Erinnys*, with curled fiery snakes about his head, and firebrands, in his hands, thus governing the world? Surely this will make us either secretly to think, that there is no God at all in the world, if he must needs be such; or else to wish heartily there were none. But, doubtless, God will at last confute all these our misapprehensions of him; he will unmask our hypocritical pretences, and clearly cast the shame of all our sinful deficiencies upon ourselves, and vindicate his own glory from receiving the least stain or blemish by them. In the mean time, let us know, that the gospel now requireth far more of us than ever the law did; for it requireth a new creature, a Divine nature, Christ formed in us: but yet withal it bestoweth a quickening spirit, an enlivening power, to enable us to express that which is required of us. Whosoever therefore truly knows Christ, the same also keepeth Christ's commandments. But "he that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him."

I have now done with the first part of my discourse, concerning those observations, which arise naturally from the words, and offer themselves to us. I shall, in the next place, proceed to make some general application of them all together.

Now, therefore, I beseech you, let us consider, whether or no we know Christ indeed: not by our acquaintance with systems and models of divinity not by our skill in books and papers, but by our

keeping of Christ's commandments. All the books and writings, which we converse with, they can but represent spiritual objects to our understandings; which yet we can never see in their own true figure, colour and proportion, until we have a Divine light within, to irradiate and shine upon them. Though there be never such excellent truths concerning Christ and his gospel set down in words and letters, yet they will be but unknown characters to us, until we have a willing Spirit within us, that can decipher them; until the same Spirit, by secret whispers in our hearts, do comment upon them, which did at first indite them. There be many, that understand the Greek and Hebrew of the Scripture, the original languages in which the text was written, that never understood the language of the Spirit.

There is a *caro* and a *spiritus*, a flesh and a spirit, a body and a soul in all the writings of the Scriptures. It is but the flesh and body of Divine truths, that is printed upon paper; which many moths of books and libraries do only feed upon; many walking skeletons of knowledge, that bury and entomb truths in the living sepulchres of their souls, do only converse with; such as never did any thing else, but pick at the mere bark and rind of truths, and crack the shells of them. But there is a soul and spirit of Divine truths that could never yet be congealed into ink, that could never be blotted upon paper; which, by a secret traduction and conveyance, passeth from one soul unto another, being able to dwell or lodge no where, but in a spiritual being, in a living thing, because itself is nothing but life and spirit. Neither can it, where indeed it is, express

itself sufficiently in words and sounds, but it will best declare and speak itself in actions; as the old manner of writing among the Egyptians was, not by words, but things. The life of Divine truths is better expressed in actions, than in words, because actions are more living things than words: words are nothing but dead resemblances and pictures of those truths, which live and breath in actions; and “the kingdom of God (as the apostle speaketh) consisteth not in word,” but in life and power. *Τὰ πρόβατα οὐ χόρτον φέρουντα τοῖς ποιμέσιν ἐποδεικνύει πόσον ἔφαγεν* (saith the moral philosopher) *ἀλλὰ τὴν νομὴν ἔσω πέψαντα ἔριον ἔξω φέρε καὶ γάλα*: Sheep do not come and bring their fodder to their shepherd, and shew him how much they eat; but inwardly concocting and digesting it, they make it appear by the fleece which they wear upon their backs, and by the milk which they give.—And let not us Christians affect only to talk and dispute of Christ, and so measure our knowledge of him by our words; but let us shew *ἀπὸ τῶν θεωρημάτων πεφθέντων τὰ ἔργα*, our knowledge concocted into our lives and actions; and then let us really manifest that we are Christ’s sheep indeed, that we are his disciples, by that fleece of holiness which we wear, and by the fruits that we daily yield in our lives and conversations: for “herein (saith Christ) is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit; so shall ye be my disciples.”

Let us not, I beseech you, judge of our knowing Christ by our ungrounded persuasions, that Christ from all eternity hath loved us, and given himself particularly for us, without the conformity of our lives to Christ’s commandments, with-

out the real partaking of the image of Christ in our hearts. The great mystery of the gospel doth not lie only in Christ without us (though we must know also what he hath done for us); but the very pith and kernel of it consists in Christ inwardly formed in our hearts.

Nothing is truly ours but what lives in our spirits. Salvation itself cannot save us as long as it is only without us, no more than health can cure us, and make us sound, when it is not within us, but somewhere at a distance from us; no more than arts and sciences, whilst they lie only in books and papers without us, can make us learned. The gospel, though it be a sovereign and medicinal thing itself, yet the mere knowing and believing of the history of it will do us no good; we can receive no virtue from it, till it be inwardly digested and concocted into our souls; till it be made ours, and become a living thing in our hearts. The gospel, if it be only without us, cannot save us, no more than that physician's bill could cure the ignorant patient of his disease, who, when it was commended to him, took the paper only, and put it up in his pocket, but never drank the potion that was described in it.

All that Christ did for us in the flesh, when he was here upon earth, from his lying in a manger, when he was born in Bethlehem, to his bleeding upon the cross on Golgotha, it will not save us from our sins, unless Christ by his Spirit dwell in us. It will not avail us to believe, that he was born of a virgin, unless the power of the Most High overshadow our hearts, and beget him there likewise. It will not profit us to believe, that he died upon the cross for us, unless we be baptized

into his death by the mortification of all our lusts; unless the old man of sin be crucified in our hearts. Christ indeed hath made an expiation for our sins upon his cross, and the blood of Christ is the only sovereign balsam to free us from the guilt of them : but yet, besides the sprinkling of the blood of Christ upon us, we must be made partakers also of his spirit. Christ came into the world, as well to redeem us from the power and bondage of our sins, as to free us from the guilt of them. “ You know (saith St. John) that he was manifested to take away our sins : whosoever therefore abideth in him, sinneth not ; whosoever sinneth, hath not seen nor known him.” Lo the end of Christ’s coming into the world ! Lo a design worthy of God manifested in the flesh.

Christ did not take all those pains to lay aside his robes of glory, and come down hither into the world, to enter into a virgin’s womb, to be born in our human shape, and to be laid a poor crying infant in a manger, and having no form or comeliness at all upon him, to take upon him the form of a servant, to undergo a reproachful and ignominious life, and at last to be abandoned to a shameful death, a death upon the cross ; I say, he did not do all this merely to bring in a notion into the world, without producing any real substantial effect at all ; without the changing, mending, and reforming of the world ; so that men should still be as wicked as they were before, and as much under the power of the prince of darkness, only they should not be thought so ; they should still remain as full of all the filthy sores of sin and corruption as before, only they should be accounted whole. Shall God come down from heaven, and pitch a

tabernacle amongst men? Shall he undertake such a huge design, and make so great a noise of doing something, which, when it is all summed up, shall not at last amount to a reality? Surely Christ did not undergo all this to so little purpose; he would not take all this pains for us, that he might be able at last to put into our hands nothing but a blank. He "was with child," he "was in pain and travail;" and hath "he brought forth nothing but wind? hath he been delivered of the east wind?" Is that great design, that was so long carried in the womb of eternity, now proved abortive, or else nothing but a mere windy birth? No surely: the end of the gospel is life and perfection; it is a Divine nature; it is a godlike frame and disposition of spirit; it is to make us partakers of the image of God in righteousness and true holiness, without which salvation itself were but a notion.

Christ came into the world to make an expiation and atonement for our sins; but the end of this was, that we might eschew sin; that we might forsake all ungodliness and worldly lusts. The gospel declares pardon of sin to those that are heavy laden with it and willing to be disburdened, to this end, that it might quicken and enliven us to new obedience. Whereas otherwise the guilt of sin might have detained us in horror and despair, and so have kept us still more strongly under the power of it, in sad and dismal apprehensions of God's wrath provoked against us, and inevitably falling on us: but Christ hath now appeared like a day-star, with most cheerful beams; nay, he is the Sun of Righteousness himself, which hath risen upon the world with his

healing wings, with his exhilarating light, that he might chase away all those black despairing thoughts from us. But Christ did not rise that we should play, and sport, and wantonize with his light; but that we should do "the work of the day" in it; that we should walk *εὐσχημόνως* (as the apostle speaketh) not in our night-clothes of sinful deformity, but clad all over with the comely garments of light. The gospel is not big with the child of a fancy, of a mere conceit of righteousness without us, hanging at distance over us, whilst our hearts within are nothing but cages of unclean birds, and like houses continually haunted with devils, nay, the very rendezvous of those fiends of darkness.

Holiness is the best thing that God himself can bestow upon us, either in this world, or the world to come. True evangelical holiness, that is, Christ formed in the hearts of believers, is the very cream and quintessence of the gospel. And were our hearts sound within, were there not many thick and dark fumes, that did arise from thence, and cloud our understandings, we could not easily conceive the substance of heaven itself to be any thing else but holiness, freed from those encumbrances, that did ever clog it and accloy it here; neither should we wish for any other heaven besides this. But many of us are like those children, whose stomachs are so vitiated by some disease, that they think ashes, coal, mud wall, or any such trash, to be more pleasant than the most wholesome food: such sickly and distempered appetites have we about these spiritual things, that hanker after I know not what vain shows of happiness, whilst in the mean time we neglect that, which is the only

true food of our souls, that is able to nourish them up to everlasting life.

Grace is holiness militant, holiness encumbered with many enemies and difficulties, which it still fights against, and manfully quits itself of; and glory is nothing else but holiness triumphant, holiness with a palm of victory in her hand, and a crown upon her head: "Deus ipse cum omni sua bonitate, quatenus extra me est, non facit me beatum, sed quatenus in me est:" God himself cannot make me happy, if he be only without me, and unless he give in a participation of himself, and his own likeness into my soul.—Happiness is nothing but the releasing and unfettering of our souls from all these narrow, scant, and particular good things; and the espousing of them to the highest and most universal good, which is not this or that particular good, but goodness itself; and this is the same thing, that we call holiness. Which, because we ourselves are so little acquainted with (being for the most part ever courting a mere shadow of it), therefore we have such low, abject, and beggarly conceits thereof; whereas it is in itself the most noble, heroical and generous thing in the world. For I mean by holiness nothing else but God stamped and printed upon the soul. And we may please ourselves with what conceits we will; but so long as we are void of this, we do but dream of heaven, and I know not what fond paradise; we do but blow up and down an airy bubble of our own fancies, which riseth out of the froth of our vain hearts; we do but court a painted heaven, and woo happiness in a picture, whilst in the mean time a true and real hell will suck in our souls



into it, and soon make us sensible of a solid woe and substantial misery.

Divine wisdom hath so ordered the frame of the whole universe, as that every thing should have a certain proper place, that should be a receptacle for it. Hell is the sink of all sin and wickedness. The strong magic of nature pulls and draws every thing continually to that place, which is suitable to it, and to which it doth belong; so all these heavy bodies press downwards towards the centre of our earth, being drawn in by it: in like manner hell, wheresoever it is, will by strong sympathy pull in all sin, and magnetically draw it to itself: as true holiness is always breathing upwards, and fluttering towards heaven, striving to embosom itself with God; and it will at last undoubtedly be conjoined with him; no dismal shades of darkness can possibly stop it in its course, or bear it back.

*Ὡς αἰεὶ τὸ ὁμοίον ἀγεί θεὸς εἰς τὸ ὁμοίον.*

Nay, we do but deceive ourselves with name: hell is nothing but the orb of sin and wickedness, or else that hemisphere of darkness, in which all evil moves; and heaven is the opposite hemisphere of light, or else, if you please, the bright orb of truth, holiness and goodness: and we do actually in this life instate ourselves in the possession of one or other of them. Take sin and disobedience out of hell, and it will presently clear up into light, tranquillity, serenity, and shine out into a heaven. Every true saint carrieth his heaven about with him in his own heart; and hell, that is without, can have no power over him. He might safely wade through hell itself, and,

like the three children, pass through the midst of that fiery furnace, and yet not at all be scorched with the flames of it : he might walk through the valley of the shadow of death, and yet fear no evil.

Sin is the only thing in the world that is contrary to God. God is light, and that is darkness : God is beauty, and that is ugliness and deformity. All sin is direct rebellion against God ; and with what notions soever we sugar it, and sweeten it, yet God can never smile upon it, he will never make a truce with it. God declares open war against sin, and bids defiance to it ; for it is a professed enemy to God's own life and being. God, which is infinite goodness, cannot but hate sin, which is purely evil. And though sin be in itself but a poor, impotent and crazy thing, nothing but straitness, poverty, and nonentity, so that of itself it is the most wretched and miserable thing in the world, and needeth no farther punishment besides itself ; yet Divine vengeance beats it off still farther and farther from God, and, wheresoever it is, will be sure to scourge it and lash it continually. God and sin can never agree together.

That I may therefore yet come nearer to ourselves : This is the message, that I have now to declare unto you, that " God is light, and in him is no darkness at all. If we say, that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth." Christ and the gospel are light, and there is no darkness at all in them : if you say, that you know Christ and his gospel, and yet keep not Christ's commandments, but dearly hug your private darling corruptions, you are liars, and the truth is not in you ; you have

no acquaintance with the God of light, nor the gospel of light. If any of you say, that you know Christ, and have an interest in him, and yet (as I fear too many do) still nourish ambition, pride, vain-glory, within your breasts, harbour malice, revengefulness, and cruel hatred to your neighbours in your hearts, eagerly scramble after this worldly pelf, and make the strength of your parts and endeavours serve that blind mammon, the god of this world; if you wallow and tumble in the filthy puddle of fleshly pleasures, or if you aim only at yourselves in your lives, and make yourself the compass by which you sail, and the star by which you steer your course, looking at nothing higher or more noble than yourselves; deceive not yourselves, you have neither seen Christ, nor known him: you are deeply incorporated (if I may so speak) with the spirit of this world, and have no true sympathy with God and Christ, no fellowship at all with them.

And, I beseech you, let us consider; Be there not many of us, that pretend much to Christ, that are plainly in our lives as proud, ambitious, vain-glorious as any others? Be there not many of us, that are as much under the power of unruly passions, as cruel, revengeful, malicious, censorious as others? that have our minds as deeply engaged in the world, and as much enslaved to riches, gain, profit, those great admired deities of the sons of men, and their souls as much overwhelmed and sunk with the cares of this life? Do not many of us as much give ourselves to the pleasures of the flesh, and though not without regrets of conscience, yet ever now and then secretly soak ourselves in them? Be there not

many of us, that have as deep a share likewise in injustice and oppression, in vexing the fatherless and the widows? I wish it may not prove some of our cases at that last day, to use such pleas as these unto Christ in our behalf; Lord, I have prophesied in thy name; I have preached many a zealous sermon for thee; I have kept many a long fast; I have been very active for thy cause in church, in state; nay, I never made any question, but that my name was written in thy book of life: when yet, alas! we shall receive no other return from Christ but this: "I know you not; depart from me, ye workers of iniquity." I am sure there be too many of us, that have long pretended to Christ, which make little or no progress in true Christianity, that is, holiness of life; that ever hang hovering in a twilight of grace, and never seriously put ourselves forward into clear day light, but esteem that glimmering *crepusculum* which we are in, and like that faint twilight better than broad open day: whereas "the path of the just (as the wise man speaks) is as the shining light, that shineth more and more unto the perfect day." I am sure there be many of us, that are perpetual dwarfs in our spiritual stature, like those silly women (that St. Paul speaks of) laden with sins, and led away with divers lusts, that are "ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth;" that are not now one jot taller in Christianity, than we were many years ago, but have still a sickly, crazy, and unsound a temper of soul as we had long before.

Indeed, we seem to do something; we are always moving and lifting at the stone of corruption, that lies upon our hearts, but yet we never stir it

notwithstanding, or at least never roll it off from us. We are sometimes a little troubled with the guilt of our sins, and then we think we must thrust our lusts out of our hearts; but afterwards we sprinkle ourselves over with I know not what holy water, and so are contented to let them still abide quietly within us. We do every day truly confess the same sins, and pray against them; and yet still commit them as much as ever, and lie as deeply under the power of them. We have the same water to pump out in every prayer, and still we let the same leak in again upon us. We make a great deal of noise, and raise a great deal of dust with our feet; but we do not move from off the ground, on which we stood, we do not go forward at all: or if we do sometimes make a little progress, we quickly lose again the ground which we had gained; like those upper planets in the heaven, which (as the astronomers tell us) sometimes move forwards, sometimes quite backwards, and sometimes perfectly stand still; have there stations and retrogradations, as well as their direct motions. As if religion were nothing else but a dancing up and down upon the same piece of ground, and making several motions and friskings on it; and not a sober journeying and travelling onwards toward some certain place. We do and undo; we do "*Penelopes telam texere*;" we weave sometimes a web of holiness, but then we let our lusts come, and undo and unravel all again. Like Sisyphus in the fable, we roll up a mighty stone with much ado, sweating and tugging up the hill; and then we let it go, and tumble down again unto the bottom; and this is our constant work. Like those Danaides,

which the poets speak of, we are always filling water into a sieve, by our prayers, duties, and performances, which still runs out as fast as we pour it in.

What is it, that thus cheats us, and gulls us of our religion? that makes us thus constantly to tread the same ring and circle of duties, where we make no progress at all forwards, and the farther we go, are still never the nearer to our journey's end? What is it, that thus starves our religion, and makes it look like those kine in Pharaoh's dream, ill-favoured and lean-fleshed, that it hath no colour in its face, no blood in its veins, no life nor heat at all in its members? What is it, that doth thus be-dwarf us in our Christianity? What low, sordid, unworthy principles do we act by, that thus hinder our growth, and make us stand at a stay, and keep us always at the very porch and entrance where we first began? Is it a sleepy, sluggish conceit, that it is enough for us if we be but once in a state of grace, if we have but oncesteped over the threshold; we need not take so great pains to travel any farther? or is it another damping, choaking, stifling opinion, that Christ hath done all for us already without us, and nothing need more to be done within us? no matter how wicked we be in ourselves, for we have holiness without us; no matter how sickly and diseased our souls be within, for they have health without them. Why may we not as well be satisfied and contented to have happiness without us too to all eternity, and so ourselves for ever continue miserable? "Little children, let no man deceive you; he that doth righteousness is righteous, even as he is righteous:

but he that committeth sin is of the devil." I shall therefore exhort you in the wholesome words of St. Peter ; "Give all diligence to add to your faith, virtue; and to virtue, knowledge; to knowledge, temperance; and to temperance, patience; to patience, godliness; and to godliness, brotherly-kindness; and to brotherly-kindness, charity; For if these things be in you and abound, they make you, that ye shall neither be barren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ." The apostle still goes on, and I cannot leave him yet: "But he that lacketh these things is blind, and cannot see far off, and hath forgotten, that he was once purged from his old sins. Wherefore the rather, brethren, give diligence to make your calling and election sure; for if ye do these things, ye shall never fall." Let us not only talk and dispute of Christ, but let us indeed put on the Lord Jesus Christ. Having those great and precious promises, which he hath given us, let us strive to be made partakers of the Divine nature, escaping the corruption that is in the world through lust; and being begotten again to a lively hope of enjoying Christ hereafter, let us purify ourselves, as he is pure.

Let us really declare that we know Christ, that we are his disciples, by our keeping of his commandments; and, amongst the rest, that commandment especially, which our Saviour Christ himself commendeth to his disciples in a peculiar manner; "This is my commandment, that ye love one another, as I have loved you:" and again, "These things I command you, that you love one another. Let us follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God.

Let us put on, as the elect of God, holy and beloved, bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, long-suffering, forbearing one another, and forgiving one another, if any man have a quarrel against any, even as Christ forgave us : and above all these things let us put on charity, which is the bond of perfectness. Let us in meekness instruct those that oppose themselves, if God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth ; that they may recover themselves out of the snares of the devil, that are taken captive by him at his will. Beloved, let us love one another ; for love is of God, and whosoever loveth is born of God, and knoweth God."

O Divine love ! the sweet harmony of souls ! the music of angels ! the joy of God's own heart ! the very darling of his bosom ! the source of true happiness ! the pure quintessence of heaven ! that which reconciles the jarring principles of the world, and makes them all chime together ! that which melts men's hearts into one another ! See how St. Paul describes it, and it cannot choose but enamour your affections towards it : " Love envieth not, it is not puffed up, it doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity ; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things." I may add, in a word, it is the best-natured thing, the best-complexioned thing in the world. Let us express this sweet harmonious affection in these jarring times : that so, if it be possible, we may tune the world into better music. Especially in matters of religion, let us strive with all meekness to instruct



and convince one another. Let us endeavour to promote the gospel of peace, the dove-like gospel, with a dove-like spirit. This was the way, by which the gospel at first was propagated in the world: Christ did not cry, nor lift up his voice in the streets; a bruised reed he did not break, and the smoking flax he did not quench; and yet he brought "forth judgment unto victory." He whispered the gospel to us from mount Sion, in a still voice; and yet the sound thereof went out quickly throughout all the earth. The gospel at first came down upon the world gently and softly like the dew upon Gideon's fleece; and yet it quickly soaked quite through it: and, doubtless, this is still the most effectual way to promote it farther. Sweetness and ingenuity will more command men's minds than passion, sourness and severity; as the soft pillow sooner breaks the flint, than the hardest marble. Let us *ἀληθεύειν ἐν ἀγάπῃ*, follow truth in love—and of the two, indeed, be contented rather to miss of the conveying of a speculative truth, than to part with love. When we would convince men of any error by the strength of truth, let us withal pour the sweet balm of love upon their heads. Truth and love are two the most powerful things in the world; and when they both go together, they cannot easily be withstood. The golden beams of truth and the silken cords of love, twisted together, will draw men on with a sweet violence, whether they will or no.

Let us take heed we do not sometimes call that zeal for God and his gospel, which is nothing else but our own tempestuous and stormy passion. True zeal is a sweet, heavenly and gentle flame, which maketh us active for God, but always

within the sphere of love. It never calls for fire from heaven to consume those that differ a little from us in their apprehensions. It is like that kind of lightning (which the philosophers speak of) that melts the sword within, but singeth not the scabbard: it strives to save the soul, but hurteth not the body. True zeal is a loving thing, and makes us always active to edification, and not to destruction. If we keep the fire of zeal within the chimney, in its own proper place, it never doth any hurt; it only warmeth, quickeneth and enliveneth us: but if once we let it break out, and catch hold of the thatch of our flesh, and kindle our corrupt nature, and set the house of our body on fire, it is no longer zeal, it is no heavenly fire, it is a most destructive and devouring thing. True zeal is an *ignis lambens*, a soft and gentle flame, that will not scorch one's hand; it is no predatory or voracious thing: but carnal and fleshly zeal is like the spirit of gunpowder set on fire, that tears and blows up all that stands before it. True zeal is like the vital heat in us, that we live upon, which we never feel to be angry or troublesome; but though it gently feed upon the radical oil within us, that sweet balsam of our natural moisture, yet it lives lovingly with it, and maintains that, by which it is fed: but that other furious and distempered zeal is nothing else but a fever in the soul. To conclude, we may learn what kind of zeal it is that we should make use of in promoting the gospel, by an emblem of God's own, given us in the Scripture, those fiery tongues, that, upon the day of Pentecost, sat upon the apostles, which sure were harmless flames, for we cannot read that they did any

hurt, or that they did so much as singe a hair of their heads.

I will therefore shut up this with that of the apostle; "Let us keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." Let this soft and silken knot of love tie our hearts together; though our heads and apprehensions cannot meet, as indeed they never will, but always stand at some distance off from one another. Our zeal, if it be heavenly, if it be true vestal fire kindled from above, will not delight to tarry here below, burning up straw and stubble and such combustible things, and sending up nothing but gross and earthy fumes to heaven; but it will rise up, and return back pure as it came down, and will be ever striving to carry up men's hearts to God along with it. It will be only occupied about the promoting of those things, which are unquestionably good; and when it moves in the irascible way, it will quarrel with nothing but sin. Here let our zeal busy and exercise itself, every one of us beginning first at our own hearts. Let us be more zealous than ever we have yet been in fighting against our lusts, in pulling down these strong holds of sin and Satan in our hearts. Here let us exercise all our courage and resolution, our manhood and magnanimity.

Let us trust in the almighty arm of our God, and doubt not but he will as well deliver us from the power of sin in our hearts, as preserve us from the wrath to come. Let us go out against these un-circumcised Philistines, I mean our lusts, not with shield or spear, not in any confidence of our own strength, but in the name of the Lord of hosts; and we shall prevail, we shall overcome our lusts: "for greater is he that is in us, than he

that is in them.—The eternal God is our refuge, and underneath are everlasting arms; he shall thrust out these enemies from before us; and he shall say, Destroy them.” We shall enter the true Canaan, the good land of promise, “that floweth with milk and honey,” the land of truth and holiness. “Wherefore take unto you the whole armour of God, that you may be able to withstand. Let your loins be girt about with truth; have on the breast-plate of righteousness; and let your feet be shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace. Above all take the shield of faith, whereby ye shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked; and take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God.” And lastly, be sure of this, that ye “be strong only in the Lord, and in the power of his might.”

There be some, that dishearten us in this spiritual warfare, and would make us let our weapons fall out of our hands, by working in us a despair of victory. There be some evil spies, that weaken the hands and hearts of the children of Israel, and bring an ill report upon that land, that we are to conquer, telling of nothing but strange giants, the sons of Anak, there, that we shall never be able to overcome. “The Amalekites (say they) dwell in the south, the Hittites, Jebusites, Amorites in the mountains, and the Canaanites by the sea-coast;” huge armies of tall invincible lusts: “we shall never be able to go against this people;” we shall never be able to prevail against our corruptions. Hearken not unto them, I beseech you, but hear what Caleb and Joshua say; “Let us go up at once and possess it, for we are able to

overcome them ;” not by our own strength, but by the power of the Lord of hosts. There are indeed sons of Anak there, there are mighty giant-like lusts, that we are to grapple with ; nay, there are principalities and powers too, that we are to oppose : but the great Michael, the Captain of the Lord’s host, is with us ; he commands in chief for us, and we need not be dismayed. “ Understand therefore this day, that the Lord thy God is he which goeth before thee as a consuming fire ; he shall destroy these enemies, and bring them down before thy face.” If thou wilt be faithful to him, and put thy trust in him, as the fire consumeth the stubble, and as the flame burneth up the chaff, so will he destroy thy lusts in thee : their root shall be rottenness, and their blossom shall go up as the dust.

But let us take heed, that we be not discouraged, and before we begin to fight, despair of victory : but to believe and hope well in the power of our God and his strength, will be half a conquest. Let us not think holiness in the hearts of men here in the world is a forlorn, forsaken, and outcast thing from God, that he hath no regard of holiness ; wherever it is, though never so small, if it be but hearty and sincere, it can no more be cut off and discontinued from God, than a sun-beam here upon earth can be broken off from its intercourse with the sun, and be left alone amidst the mire and dirt of this world. The sun may as well discard its own rays, and banish them from itself into some region of darkness far remote from it, where they shall have no dependence at all upon it, as God can forsake and abandon holiness in the world, and leave it a poor orphan thing,

that shall have no influence at all from him to preserve and keep it. Holiness is something of God, wherever it is; it is an efflux from him, that always hangs upon him, and lives in him: as the sun-beams, although they gild this lower world, and spread their golden wings over us, yet they are not so much here, where they shine, as in the sun; from whence they flow. God cannot draw a curtain betwixt himself and holiness, which is nothing but the splendour and shining of himself; he cannot hide his face from it, he cannot desert it in the world. He that is once born of God, shall overcome the world, and the prince of this world too, by the power of God in him. Holiness is no solitary neglected thing; it hath stronger confederacies, greater alliances, than sin and wickedness. It is in league with God and the universe; the whole creation smiles upon it: there is something of God in it, and therefore it must needs be a victorious and triumphant thing.

Wickedness is a weak, cowardly and guilty thing, a fearful and trembling shadow. It is the child of ignorance and darkness; it is afraid of light, and cannot possibly withstand the power of it, nor endure the sight of its glittering armour. It is allied to none but wretched, forlorn and apostate spirits, that do what they can to support their own weak and tottering kingdom of darkness, but are only strong in weakness and impotency. The whole polity and commonwealth of devils is not so powerful as one child of light, one babe in Christ; they are not able to quench the least smoking flax, to extinguish one spark of grace. Darkness is not able to make resistance against light, but ever, as it comes, flies be-

fore it. But if wickedness invite the society of devils to it (as we learn by the sad experience of these present times, in many examples of those, that were possessed with malice, revengefulness and lust), so that those cursed fiends do most readily apply themselves to it, and offer their service to feed it and encourage it, because it is their own life and nature, their own kingdom of darkness, which they strive to enlarge and to spread the dominions of; shall we then think, that holiness, which is so nearly allied unto God, hath no good genius at all in the world to attend upon it, to help it and encourage it? Shall not the kingdom of light be as true to its own interest, and as vigilant for the enlarging of itself, as the kingdom of darkness? Holiness is never alone in the world, but God is always with it, and his loving Spirit doth ever associate and join itself to it. He, that sent it into the world, is with it as Christ speaketh of himself; "The Father hath not left me alone, because I do always those things that please him." Holiness is the life of God, which he cannot but feed and maintain wheresoever it is: and as devils are always active to encourage evil, so we cannot imagine, but that the heavenly host of blessed angels above are busily employed in the promoting of that, which they love best, that which is dearest to God, whom they serve, the life and nature of God. "There is joy in heaven at the conversion of one sinner;" heaven takes notice of it; there is a choir of angels, that sweetly sings the epithalamium of a soul divorced from sin and Satan, and espoused unto Christ. What therefore the wise man speaks concerning wisdom, I shall apply to holiness: "Take fast hold

of holiness, let her not go, keep her, for she is thy life: keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life," and of death too. Let nothing be esteemed of greater consequence and concernment to thee than what thou doest and actest, how thou livest. Nothing without us can make us either happy or miserable; nothing can either defile us, or hurt us, but what goeth out from us, what springeth and bubbleth up out of our own hearts. We have dreadful apprehensions of the flames of hell without us; we tremble, and are afraid, when we hear of fire and brimstone; whilst in the mean time we securely nourish within our own hearts a true and living hell,

—et cæco carpimur igni:

The dark fire of our lusts consumeth our bowels within, and miserably scorceth our souls, and we are not troubled at it. We do not perceive how hell steals upon us whilst we live here. And as for heaven, we only gaze abroad, expecting that it should come in to us from without, but never look for the beginnings of it to arise within, in our own hearts.

But lest there should yet haply remain any prejudice against that, which I have all this while heartily commended to you, true holiness, and the keeping of Christ's commandments, as if it were a legal and a servile thing, that would subject us to a state of bondage, I must here needs add a word or two, either for the prevention or removal of it. I do not therefore mean by holiness, the mere performance of outward duties of religion, coldly acted over as a task; nor our habitual prayings, hearings, fastings, multiplied one



upon another (though these be all good, as subservient to a higher end); but I mean an inward soul and principle of Divine life, that spiriteth all these that enliveneth and quickeneth the dead carcass of all outward performances whatsoever: I do not here urge the "dead law of outward works," which indeed, if it be alone, subjects us to a "state of bondage;" but the inward law of the gospel, the "law of the Spirit of life," than which nothing can be more free and ingenuous: for it doth not act us by principles without us, but is an inward self-moving principle living in our hearts.

The first, though it work us into some outward conformity to God's commandments, and so hath a good effect upon the world; yet we are all this while but like dead instruments of music, that sound sweetly and harmoniously, when they are only struck and played upon from without by the musician's hand, who hath the theory and law of music living within himself.

But the second, the living law of the gospel, the "law of the Spirit of life" within us, is as if the soul of music should incorporate itself with the instrument, and live in the strings, and make them of their own accord, without any touch or impulse from without, dance up and down, and warble out their harmonies.

They, that are acted only by an outward law, are but like *neurospasts*, or those little puppets, that skip nimbly up and down, and seem to be full of quick and sprightly motion; whereas they are all the while moved artificially by certain wires and strings from without, and not by any principle of motion from themselves within: or

else like clocks and watches, that go pretty regularly for a while, but are moved by weights and plummetts, or some other artificial springs, that must be ever now and then wound up, or else they cease.

But they, that are acted by the new law of the gospel, by the "law of the Spirit," they have an inward principle of life in them, that from the centre of itself puts forth itself freely and constantly into all obedience to the will of Christ. This new law of the gospel is a kind of musical soul, informing the dead organs of our hearts, that makes them of their own accord delight to act harmoniously according to the rule of God's word.

The law, that I speak of, is a law of love, which is the most powerful law in the world; and yet it freeth us in a manner from all law without us, because it maketh us become a law unto ourselves. The more it prevaieth in us, the more it eateth up and devoureth all other laws without us; just as Aaron's living rod did swallow up those rods of the magicians, that were made only to counterfeit a little life.

*Quis legem det amantibus?*

*Major lex amor est sibi.*

Love is at once a freedom from all law, a state of purest liberty; and yet a law too of the most constraining and indispensable necessity.

The worst law in the world is the "law of sin, which is in our members;" which keeps us in a condition of most absolute slavery, when we are wholly under the tyrannical commands of our lusts: this is a cruel Pharaoh indeed, that sets

his hard task-masters over us, and maketh us wretchedly drudge in mire and clay.

The law of the letter without us sets us in a condition of little more liberty, by restraining us from many outward acts of sin; but yet it doth not disenthral us from the power of sin in our hearts.

But the "law of the spirit of life," the gospel law of love, it puts us into a condition of most pure and perfect liberty; and whosoever really entertains this law, he hath "thrust out Hagar" quite, he hath "cast out the bond-woman and her children;" from henceforth Sarah, the free-woman, shall live for ever with him, and she shall be to him a mother of many children; her seed shall be "as the sand of the sea-shore for number," and "as the stars of heaven." Here is evangelical liberty, here is gospel freedom, when "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made us free from the law of sin and death;" when we have a liberty from sin, and not a liberty to sin: for our dear Lord and Master hath told us, that "whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of it."

He that lies under the power and vassalage of his base lusts, and yet talks of gospel freedom, he is but like a poor condemned prisoner, that in his sleep dreams of being set at liberty, and of walking up and down wheresoever he pleaseth, whilst his legs are all the while locked fast in fetters and irons. To please ourselves with a notion of gospel liberty, whilst we have not a gospel principle of holiness within us, to free us from the power of sin, is nothing else but to gild over our bonds and fetters, and to fancy ourselves to be in a golden cage. There is a straitness, slavery, and

narrowness in sin: sin crowds and crumples up our souls, which, if they were freely spread abroad, would be as wide and as large as the whole universe.

No man is truly free, but he that hath his will enlarged to the extent of God's own will, by loving whatsoever God loves, and nothing else. Such an one doth not fondly hug this and that particular created good thing, and envassal himself unto it; but he loveth every thing that is lovely, beginning at God, and descending down to all his creatures, according to the several degrees of perfection in them. He enjoys a boundless liberty, and a boundless sweetness, according to his boundless love. He enclaspeth the whole world within his outstretched arms; his soul is as wide as the whole universe, as big as "yesterday, today, and for ever." Whosoever is once acquainted with this disposition of spirit, he never desires any thing else, and he loves the life of God in himself dearer than his own life. To conclude this, therefore; if we love Christ, and keep his commandments, his commandments will not be grievous to us; his yoke will be easy, and his burden light: it will not put us into a state of bondage, but of perfect liberty. For it is most true of evangelical obedience, what the wise man speaketh of wisdom, "her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace: she is a tree of life to those that lay hold upon her, and happy are all they that retain her."

I will now shut up all with one or two considerations, to persuade you farther to the keeping of Christ's commandments.

First, from the desire, which we all have of knowledge. If we would indeed know Divine truths, the only way to come to this is by keeping of Christ's commandments. The grossness of our apprehensions in spiritual things, and our many mistakes, that we have about them, proceed from nothing but those dull and foggy steams, which rise up from our foul hearts, and becloud our understandings. If we did but heartily comply with Christ's commandments, and purge our hearts from all gross and sensual affections, we should not then look about for truth wholly without ourselves, and enslave ourselves to the dictates of this and that teacher, and hang upon the lips of men; but we should find the great eternal God inwardly teaching our souls, and continually instructing us more and more in the mysteries of his will; and "out of our bellies should flow rivers of living waters." Nothing puts a stop and hindrance to the passage of truth in the world, but the carnality of our hearts, the corruption of our lives.

It is not wrangling disputes, and syllogistical reasonings, that are the mighty pillars, that underprop truth in the world: if we would but under-set it with the holiness of our hearts and lives, it should never fail. Truth is a prevailing and conquering thing, and would quickly overcome the world, did not the earthiness of our dispositions, and the darkness of our false hearts hinder it. Our Saviour Christ bids the blind man wash off the clay, that was upon his eyes in the pool of Siloam, and then he should see clearly; intimating this to us, that it is the earthiness of men's af-

fections, that darkens the eye of their understandings in spiritual things. Truth is always ready and near at hand, if our eyes were not closed up with mud, that we could but open them to look upon it. Truth always waits upon our souls, and offers itself freely to us, as the sun offers its beams to every eye, that will but open, and let them shine in upon it. If we could but purge our hearts from that filth and defilement, which hangeth about them, there would be no doubt at all of truth's prevailing in the world. For truth is great, and stronger than all things: all the earth calleth upon truth, and the heaven blesseth it; all works shade and tremble at it. The truth endureth, and is always strong; it liveth and conquereth for evermore. She is the strength, kingdom, power, and majesty of all ages. Blessed be the God of truth.

Secondly, if we desire a true reformation, as some would be thought to do; let us begin here in reforming our hearts and lives, in keeping Christ's commandments. All outward forms and models of reformation, though they be never so good in their kind, yet they are of little worth to us without this inward reformation of the heart. Tin, or lead, or any other baser metal, if it be cast into never so good a mould, and made up into never so elegant a figure, yet it is but tin or lead still; it is the same metal, that it was before. If adulterate silver, that hath much alloy or dross in it, have never so current a stamp put upon it, yet it will not pass notwithstanding, when the touchstone trieth it. We must be reformed within, with a spirit of fire, and a spirit of burning, to

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purge us from the dross and corruption of our hearts, and refine us as gold and silver; and then we shall be reformed truly, and not before. When this once comes to pass, then shall Christ be set upon his throne indeed, then "the glory of the Lord shall overflow the land;" then we shall be a people acceptable unto him, and as mount Sion, which he dearly loved.

## SERMON II.

*But thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.—1 Cor. xv. 5—7.*

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Χριστιανισμός ἐστὶ τῆς Θείας φύσεως μίμησις.

S. GREGORY NYSSEN.

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CHRIST'S resurrection, which the Apostle treateth of in the former part of this chapter, is one of the main and principal articles of our Christian faith: for though Christ by his death upon the cross made a propitiatory sacrifice for the world, yet it was his resurrection only, which did manifest his death to be effectual and available for that end, and did evidence its acceptance with God. For if the grave had detained Christ, and held him prisoner, this would have been an argument, that the debt, for which he was committed to that dark dungeon, was not yet paid, nor satisfaction made; for "if Christ be not raised (saith the apostle) your faith is in vain, ye are yet in your sins." <sup>Verse 17.</sup> But now death and the grave having delivered up Christ out of their custody, his resurrection is an undoubted argument, that they had no more to lay to his charge, as he was a surety and undertaker for mankind; but the debt which was owing to the law and Divine justice,



was in the court of heaven fully acquitted and discharged. For Christ was delivered for our sins, and rose again for our justification.

Rom. iv.

And though Christ's other miracles ought to have conciliated belief to his doctrine from the Jews; yet his resurrection from the dead (foretold by himself, and really accomplished) added to all the rest, was a most undoubted and unquestionable confirmation of his prophetic ministry. For if it were supposed (as the Jews of old, and the Talmudists of later times, maliciously calumniated our Saviour Christ), that a mere wizard or magician should have appeared, and not only have done many miracles by Beelzebub and the powers of darkness, but also have foretold, that after he had been put to death, he should rise again, and have given this as a farther sign to confirm his prophecy, as our Saviour did, Matt. xii. 39. it could never be conceived, that Divine Providence should suffer such an impostor miraculously to rise again, in so remarkable a manner, and so often to appear before the eyes of so many spectators, and at last visibly to ascend up to heaven. Because this would have been *tentatio invincibilis* to mankind; it being not imaginable, what greater assurance heaven itself could give, to confirm and seal a prophet, and persuade the world, that what he did was by the finger of God, and not by magical imposture, than this is. And therefore it is observable, that though a good while after our Saviour's time, when the Jews had now forfeited that peculiar Providence, that watched over them, a certain counterfeit Messias, one David El-Roy, was permitted to do several strange and miraculous things by magic and witch-

craft, if the Jewish relations be true; yet, when he gave this for a sign to the Persian king, to prove himself the Messias, that after he was beheaded by him, he should rise again, he plainly discovered his imposture, to the great disappointment of the deluded Jews, who (as Maimonides writes) in vain expected his resurrection a good while after.

In Iggereth  
Teman.

Moreover, if Christ had not risen again after death, the world would not have had sufficient ground to trust and believe in him as a Saviour. St. Austin reckoned it as great a miracle as any that Christ ever did upon earth, that the world should be brought off to believe in a crucified Saviour. For to worship *הללך*, as the Jews by way of disgrace call our Saviour, or *τὸν ἀνασκολοπιζόμενον* in Lucian's language, one that was hanged, for a God, and to believe in him, could not but seem a monstrous and prodigious thing, both to Jews and Gentiles; and certainly it would never have been brought to pass, had there not been unquestionable assurance given of Christ's resurrection from the dead. For who would be so sottish as to believe in a dead Saviour, and to expect help and assistance from him that had not been able to help himself, and therefore had given no proof that he was able to help others? nay, from him, that, to all human appearance had now no being at all? Upon which account the Psalmist upbraids the sottish heathen, that "they ate the sacrifices of the dead." Psal. cvi. Wherefore it is observable, in the gospel, that when Christ was now dead, and buried in his sepulchre, the hope and expectation of his disciples, who had formerly believed in him, lay, as it were, entombed in the

-same sepulchre with him. And then the two disciples, that went to Emmaus, could only say,

Luke xxiv. “ We trusted, that this had been he, which should have redeemed Israel.”

But afterwards, when they were able upon good grounds to affirm, that *Κύριος ἀληθῶς ἀνέστη*, the Lord was risen indeed,—then their faith revived anew, and mounted up higher than ever, and grew triumphant in them.

Again, there was another excellent design in Christ's resurrection from the dead, which the apostle pursues largely also in this chapter; *viz.* To give the world assurance of a life after death, and a blessed immortality to be enjoyed by all true believers and followers of Christ. Christ, by his resurrection, hath “abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light,” as the apostle speaks, (2 Tim. i. 10.) or, as the church sings in that Divine anthem, “After he had overcome the sharpness of death, he opened the kingdom of heaven to all believers.” The reasons of philosophy, that prove the soul's immortality, though firm and demonstrative in themselves, yet they are so thin and subtile to vulgar apprehensions, that they glide away through them, and leave no such palpable impressions on them, as can be able sufficiently to bear up against that heavy weight of gross infidelity, that continually sinks down the minds of men to a distrust of such high things, as be above the reach of sense. Neither are these considerations any longer of force, than men can actually attend to the strength and coherence of the demonstration; and when that actual attention (which is operose and difficult) is taken off, then the truth itself, like a spectre or apparition,

suddenly vanishes away, and men question with themselves afterwards whether there were any such thing, or no. Such thin and evanid things are philosophical speculations about the high mysteries of faith and religion. But Christ's raising of the self-same body which was laid in the sepulchre, and afterwards appearing in it often to his disciples, gave such evident assurance of the soul's immortality and life after death, as must needs strike more strongly upon vulgar minds, and make more palpable impressions on them, and be always of more present and ready use, than any philosophical reasons and demonstrations.

And the Scripture is herein very harmonious, and agreeable to itself, both in the Old and New Testament; for, as in the one, it makes the original of death's entrance into the world to be the sin and disobedience of the first Adam, who was *ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς, χοϊκός*, of the earth, earthy;—so in the other it attributes the recovery of life and immortality to the meritorious obedience of the second Adam, that was *ὁ Κύριος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, ἐπουράνιος*, the Lord from heaven, heavenly—who by his death vanquished and destroyed death. For as Samson, who was a type of our Saviour, when he was besieged by the Philistines in the city Gaza (Judges xvi.) rose up at midnight, and pulled up the gates of the city, and the posts, and laying them upon his shoulders, carried them up to the top of the hill; in like manner, Christ our Lord, when he was environed and encompassed by death, after he had been awhile detained under the custody thereof, he ascended victoriously out of the power of the grave, and carried the gates of hell and death

upon his shoulders along with him triumphantly into heaven: he slighted and dismantled that mighty garrison, whose walls were stronger than brass, and gates harder than adamant, that it should be no longer a prison, with doors and bars to shut up those that believe in him, but an open and free passage, and a broad highway to life and immortality. He is "the resurrection and the life," (John xi. 25.) and "he that believeth in him, though he were dead, yet shall he live." For, he that liveth, and was dead, and is alive for evermore, even he hath the keys of hell and of death. Rev. i. 18.

But that which I chiefly aim at at this time, concerning Jesus's resurrection and ascension into heaven, is this; That by and after it he was made Lord and Christ, King and Saviour, and Sovereign of his church. Not but that Christ's humanity was always hypostatically united to the Divinity; but because the economical kingdom of Christ, as mediator, according to the Scripture calculation, seems not to commence till after the state of humiliation was, and so begins its epocha from Christ's resurrection, or his exaltation to sit at God's right hand in heaven. (Acts ii. 36.) "Let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus, whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ." (Acts v. 31.) "Jesus whom ye slew and hanged on a tree, him hath God exalted on his right hand to be a prince and a Saviour," &c. (Philip. ii. 9.) "Who humbled himself and became obedient to the death of the cross; wherefore God hath highly exalted him, and given him a name above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, &c. and

that every tongue shall confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." And that article of our creed, concerning Christ's sitting at God's right hand in heaven, signifies thus much unto us; that Christ, after his resurrection and ascension into heaven, hath all power given him both in heaven and in earth, all things being made subject to him, "excepting him only that hath put all things under him." <sup>1 Cor. xv. 27.</sup>

He being, for the comfort of his church and members here upon earth, according to his humanity, made God's vicegerent, and seated in his Father's throne; and having a mediatorial kingdom bestowed upon him, that shall continue, <sup>Verse 24.</sup> "till he hath put down all authority and power, and hath subdued all enemies under his feet;" and then hath delivered up this economical kingdom to God the Father, "that God <sup>Verse 28.</sup> may be all in all."

And this is an unspeakable consolation, that Christian religion affords to us, and a most gracious condescension of the all-wise God; that forasmuch as we, who dwell in these houses of clay, are so far removed from the pure and abstracted Deity, and so infinitely disproportioned unto it, that there should be such a contrivance as this set on foot, that we should have one of our own flesh and blood, that was in all things tempted like unto us, and had experience of all our difficulties and calamities; who demonstrated his infinite love to us in laying down his life for us, and therefore we cannot doubt, but hath a most tender sympathy and fellow-feeling with us in all our infirmities; I say, that we should have such a one exalted to God's right hand, and invested

with all authority and power both in heaven and earth, that he might administer all things for the good of his church and members, and supply them in all their wants and necessities. Which consideration must needs be far more comfortable, cheering, and reviving, to every true Christian, than it was to the sons of Jacob, when they went down to Egypt to buy corn and provision for their necessities, to think, that Joseph their brother was made lord of all the land.

And yet, notwithstanding, this is wholly eluded and evacuated by those high-flown spiritualists of these latter times, that slight and reject the letter of the New Testament, as a mean and carnal thing, and will acknowledge no other death and resurrection of Christ, no other ascension and sitting at God's right hand; nay, no other day of judgment, nor resurrection of the body, but what is mystical and allegorical; whereby they do not only impudently slur the gospel, according to the history and the letter, in making it no better than a romantic legend, or a mere Æsopic fable, that contains a good *ἐπιμύθιον*, or moral under it; but also plainly defeat the counsel of God against themselves and mankind, by antiquating Christianity, and bringing in instead thereof old Paganism again, disguised under a few canting phrases of Scripture language. For though Moses had a veil over his face, though there were many obscure umbrages and allegories in the law (the children of Israel being then not able to bear the brightness of that evangelical truth that shined under them); yet now, under the gospel, “we do all with open face behold, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord” nakedly re-

<sup>2</sup> Cor. iii.

presented to us, being "changed into the same image from glory to glory."

But to let these pass, and still to improve our former meditation farther; let us in the next place consider, that Christ, who received all this power after his resurrection and ascension, did not receive it in vain and to no purpose, either taking no notice of our human transactions here below, as having removed his pavilion too far into those regions of light and glory from us; or else remaining, notwithstanding, an idle spectator, and no way concerning or interesting himself in the issues of our human affairs. Which will be so much the more improbable, if we consider what the Scripture and experience tell us, that the devil and apostate spirits are perpetually active and busy in promoting the concernments of the kingdom of darkness. And therefore doubtless he, whom God hath made the shepherd and bishop of our souls, can never be so regardless of his office, nor so careless of his flock and tender lambs committed to his charge, as to suffer those cruel wolves to prey upon them at pleasure; and to have no pity at all for them, nor to extend his watchful providence over them, whom once he vouchsafed to redeem with his own precious blood. No certainly; he, that waded through so many difficulties and agonies for us in the days of his flesh; he, that "bore our griefs and carried our sorrows;" he, that was "wounded for our transgressions, and bruised for our iniquities;" that sweat drops of blood in the garden, and was nailed to the cross for us in Golgotha; he cannot so easily forget those whom he hath so dearly bought, nor suffer all that power which God hath



invested him with for the good of his church, to lie by him idle and unemployed.

But to the end that there might not be the least ground of suspicion or distrust left in the minds of men concerning this particular, Christ, after his ascension into heaven, thought good to give us a sensible demonstration both of his kingly power, and of his watchful care and providence over his church, that he would not leave them orphans, and destitute of all assistance, by sending down his Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost, in a visible and miraculous manner, upon his disciples. (Acts ii. 32.) "This Jesus hath God raised up, of which we are all witnesses: therefore, being by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath shed forth this, which you now see and hear." And verily, if there had been no news heard of our Lord and Saviour Christ, after he ascended above the clouds out of his disciples' sight, no real and visible demonstration of his existence, power, and providence over his church; the distrustful hearts of men would have been too prone to suspect, that the pretence of an invisible kingdom at God's right hand above had been no better than a mere dream, an airy and fantastic notion; and they would have been too ready to have called in question the truth of all his other miracles, his resurrection and ascension, witnessed only by his own disciples, and to have surmised those several apparitions of his, that we read of after his death, had been nothing else but spectres, or phantasms, like the vulgarly-believed apparitions of the ghosts of men in airy bodies. But the sensible and miraculous pouring out of the

**Holy Ghost** upon his disciples, after his ascension into heaven, was a palpable confirmation of all Christ's other miracles, of the validity of his meritorious death and passion, of the truth of his resurrection and ascension; and gives most comfortable assurance to all believers to the world's end, that though his bodily presence be withdrawn from them, yet he hath not left his church utterly forlorn, and destitute of all assistance; but that his Spirit, the holy Comforter, continueth to be present amongst them, as his vicegerent, and to assist them for all the holy purposes of the gospel, to the world's end. Now the principal effects of Christ's Holy Spirit, which are to be hoped for and expected by every true believer and private Christian, are comprised by the apostle under three heads here in the text, as consisting in a threefold victory over a threefold enemy. "The sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law: but thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ."

1. A victory over sin, as that which is the cause of death.

2. A victory over the law, as that which aggravates the guilt, and exasperates the power of sin.

3. Lastly, A victory over death, the fruit and consequent of sin.

First, therefore, There is a victory over sin to be obtained in and through Christ.

Some there are, that will acknowledge no other victory over sin but an external one; that whereby it was conquered for us by Christ upon the cross, sixteen hundred years since, where he "spoiled principalities and powers, and made a show of them openly, triumphing over them in it." (Col. ii. 15.)

and where he “redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us.” (Gal. iii. 13.) And doubtless this was one great end of Christ’s coming into the world to make a propitiatory sacrifice for the sins of mankind: not only that he might thereby put a period to those continually repeated and ineffectual sacrifices of brute beasts, and the offering of the blood of bulls and goats, that could not take away sin, nor propitiate his Divine Majesty; but also that he might at once give a sensible demonstration, both of God’s high displeasure against sin, and of his placableness and reconcilableness to sinners returning to obedience; and, therefore, to that end, that the despair of pardon might not hinder any from repentance and amendment of life, promulgate free pardon and remission of sins, through his blood, to all that should repent and believe the gospel.

But it is a very unsound and unwholesome interpretation of this salutary undertaking of Christ’s in the gospel, as if the ultimate end and design of it were to procure remission of sin, and exemption from punishment only, to some particular persons still continuing under the power of sin, and to save them at last in their sins, that is, with a mere outward and carnal salvation; it being a thing utterly impossible, that those undefiled rewards of the heavenly kingdom should be received and enjoyed by men in their unregenerate and unrenewed nature.

For what is this else, but to make Christ the grand patron of the kingdom of darkness, and to suppose God to be such a being as may be bribed and corrupted, by sacrifice and intercession, to

a partial connivance and fond indulgence of men in their sins to all eternity? or else to insinuate, that there is no other evil at all in sin, but only in respect of that outward punishment consequent upon it? Which is to destroy the nature and reality of sin, and to make it nothing but a mere name or fancy; as if good and evil, just and unjust (as some philosophers dreamed), were not *Φύσει*, but *Νόμῳ* and *Δόξῃ* only, had no reality in nature, but depended only upon arbitrary laws, enforced by outward punishments, or mere opinions: and so were only *Ποιητὰ*, (as Democritus expresseth it) mere factitious things, or else *Φανταστὰ*, fictitious and imaginary: either of which opinions, if they were true, then indeed remission of sin, and exemption from punishment, would quite take away all the evil of sin.

But if sin be not a mere name or fancy, but that which hath a real and intrinsical evil in it, greater than that of outward punishment; then certainly it cannot be so transcendent a happiness, as some men carnally conceit, to have an impunity in sinning to all eternity, that the accomplishment thereof should be thought the only fit undertaking for the Son of God to engage in, and that which would deservedly entitle him the Saviour of mankind. For that of Socrates in Plato must then needs be true, *Τὸν ἀδικούντα μὴ δίδοναι δίκην, πάντων μέγιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον κακῶν εἶναι*, that (in those which are not incorrigible and incurable) it is the greatest evil that can possibly befall them, to continue in wickedness unpunished; and the greatest kindness that they can receive, by the lesser evil of punishment and castigation, to be cured of the greater evil of sin:—For (as the same philosopher

speaks) Ἰατρικὴ τῆς πονηρίας δίκη, chastisement and correction is the natural remedy and cure of wickedness;—which our Saviour confirms, Rev. iii. 19. when he said, “As many as I love, I rebuke and chasten :” and sure the remedy is not worse than the disease.

Wherefore it was so far from being the ultimate end of Christ’s undertaking to die for sin, that men might securely live in it, that on the contrary, the death of Christ was particularly intended as an engine to batter down the kingdom of sin and Satan, and to bring men effectually unto God and righteousness, as the Scripture plainly witnesseth, (1 Pet. ii. 24.) “His own self bare our sins in his body on the tree, that we, being dead to sin, might live to righteousness.” The death of Christ conducing to this great end, not only as it was exemplary, and hieroglyphically instructed us, that we ought to take up the cross likewise, 1 Pet. vi. 1. and follow our crucified Lord and Saviour, suffering in the flesh, and ceasing from sin; but also as it doth most lively demonstrate to us God’s high displeasure against sin, and the malignant nature of it, that could not otherwise be expiated than by the blood of that innocent and immaculate Lamb, the only-begotten Son of God; and, lastly, as the hope of pardon and free remission of sin, in the blood of Christ, for the truly penitent, might invite and animate men to cheerful and vigorous endeavours against sin.

Others there are, that tell us, there is indeed something farther aimed at in the gospel besides the bare remission of sins, but that it is nothing else but the imputation of an external righteous-

ness, or another's inherent holiness, which is so completely made ours thereby to all intents and purposes, as if we ourselves had been really and perfectly righteous; and this upon no other condition or qualification at all required in us, but only of mere faith scrupulously prescinded from all holiness and sanctification, or the laying hold or apprehending only (as they use to phrase it) of this external and imputed righteousness; that is, the merely believing and imagining it to be ours: which kind of faith therefore is but the imagination of an imagination, or of that, which really is not, and, as Pindar calls man *Σκιᾶς ὄναρ*, the very dream of a shadow.

For though this be pretended by some to be spoken only of justification as contradistinct from sanctification, the latter of which they conceive must by no means have any conditional influence upon the former; yet it will unavoidably extend to the taking away of the necessity of inherent righteousness and holiness, and all obligation to it: upon which very account it is so highly acceptable, because under a specious show of modesty and humility it doth exceedingly gratify men's hypocrisy and carnality: for he that is thus completely justified by the imputation of a mere external righteousness, must needs have *ipso facto* a right and title thereby to heaven and happiness without holiness; for (Rom. viii. 30.) "Whom he justifieth them he also glorifieth." Neither can any thing be required inherently in them, where all inherency is perfectly supplied by imputation. And though it be pretended, that sanctification will spontaneously follow after by way of gratitude; yet this is like to prove but a very slippery

hold, where it is believed, that gratitude itself, as well as all other graces, is already in them by imputation. Neither can it be reasonably thought, that true holiness should spring by way of gratitude or ingenuity from such a principle of carnality, as makes men so well contented with a mere imaginary righteousness.

But this opinion, as it makes God, in justifying, to pronounce a false sentence, and to conceive of things otherwise than they are, and to do that, which himself hath declared to be abominable, to justify the wicked (in a forensic sense) and as it is irreconcilable to those many scriptures, that assure us God will render to every man according to his works; so it also takes away the necessity of Christ's meritorious and propitiatory sacrifice for the remission of sins: for where a complete righteousness is imputed, there is no sin at all to be pardoned. And, lastly, it vainly supposes righteousness and holiness to be mere fantastical and imaginary things; for otherwise it were no more possible, that a wicked man should be made righteous by another's righteousness imputed, than that a sick man should be made whole by another's imputed health. "If a brother or sister be naked and destitute of daily food, and one of you say unto them, Depart in peace, be you warmed, and be you filled; notwithstanding you give them not those things, which are needful for the body; what doth it profit? (James ii. 15, 16.) Even so, what doth it profit, my brethren, if a man say he hath faith (or imputed righteousness) and have not works? (that is, real and inherent righteousness, or inward regeneration) can such a

faith (that is, imagination or imputation) save him?" Certainly no more than mere words can clothe a naked man's back, or feed a hungry man's belly, or warm and thaw him, whose blood is frozen and congealed in his veins. Nay, it is no more possible for a man to be made holy, than to be made happy, by mere imputation, which latter few men would be contented withal; and, were it not for their hypocrisy, they would be as little contented with the former; and it would as little please them to be *opinionem tantum justi*, as *opinionem tantum beati*, to use Tully's expression against the Epicureans. Nay, since it is most certain, that the greatest part of our happiness consisteth in righteousness and holiness, it will unavoidably follow, that if we have no other than an imputative righteousness, we can have no other than an imputative happiness, and a mere imaginary heaven, which will little please us, when we feel ourselves to be in a true and real hell.

But it is not our intention here to quarrel about words and phrases, as if Christ's meritorious satisfaction might not be said to be imputed to those that repent and believe the gospel for remission of sins; much less to deny what the holy Scripture plainly asserts, true and living faith, that worketh by love, which is the very essence of the new creature, or regenerate nature, λογίζεσθαι εἰς δικαιοσύνην, to be imputed, or accounted for righteousness—under the gospel dispensation, where God will not proceed according to legal rigour and severity with his fallen creatures, but according to that equity and Ἐπιείκεια, which the philosopher tells us is the truest justice. But our only design is, to caution against that Antino-



mian error, which is too often insinuated under the notion of imputed righteousness, as if there were no necessity of inherent righteousness, and a real victory over sin, in order to salvation, but that an imputed or imaginary one might serve the turn. Which error springing up very early amongst the Gnostic Christians, St. John gives a very seasonable antidote against it. (1 John iii. 7.) "Little children, let no man deceive you; he that doth righteousness, is righteous, even as he is righteous:" and in chap. ii. ver. 4. "He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him." To which purpose is that also in his first chapter, (ver. 5.) "This is the message which we have heard of him, and declare to you, that God is light, and in him is no darkness at all. If we say that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth: but if we walk in the light, as he is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin." Wherefore the same apostle, in that Epistle, tells us of overcoming the wicked one, (chap. ii. 14.) and of overcoming the world, by our faith in Christ. (chap. v. 4.) And in the Apocalypse he propoundeth, from Christ himself, divers remarkable promises to him that overcometh: That he shall eat of the tree of life, that is in the midst of the paradise of God, (chap. ii. ver. 7.) That he shall not be hurt of the second death, (ver. 11.) That he shall have the hidden manna, and a white stone with a new name written in it, which no man knoweth, saving he that receiveth it, (ver. 17.) That he will give him the morning-star, (ver. 28.) That he shall be

clothed in white raiment, and his name shall not be blotted out of the book of life, (chap. iii. ver. 5.) That he shall be a pillar in the temple of God, (ver. 12.) And that he shall sit with Christ in his throne, as he overcame and sat down with his Father in his throne. (ver. 21.) The condition of all which promises being overcoming, we may well conclude from thence, that there is a real, and not an imaginary victory only, to be obtained over the power of sin, as well as the guilt of it.

Nay, it is true, and very observable, that those places, which are usually quoted as the foundation of an imputed righteousness in some other sense than what we before mentioned, are indeed no otherwise to be understood than of a real inward righteousness, that is wrought or infused by the Spirit of Christ. As that principal one, Philip. iii. 8. "Yea doubtless, and I count all things lost for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord;—that I may win him, and be found in him, not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is of the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith." Where Christ, whom the apostle desires to win, and to be found in, and the righteousness, which is through the faith of Christ, and the righteousness, which is of God through faith, are no external imputed righteousness, but the real inward righteousness of the new creature, wrought by the Spirit of Christ through faith, which is opposed here to our own righteousness, and the righteousness, which is of the law; that is, the righteousness of outward works done by our own natural power, according to the letter of the law, in our unregenerate state: for so the following

words explain the meaning, “that I may know him, and the power of his resurrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings, being made conformable unto his death; if by any means I might attain to the resurrection of the dead.” And this same inward and real righteousness is often elsewhere called Christ, and the new man, that is said to be in us, and which we are exhorted to put on, not by conceit or imagination only, but by real conformity to his nature, and participation of his spirit.

And whereas the magnifiers of free grace in an Antinomian sense, and the decriers of inherent righteousness, commonly conceive, that the free grace of God consists in nothing but either in the pardon of sin and exemption from punishment, or the imputation of an external holiness, and accounting men just freely, without any condition but only the mere believing of this, that they are so accounted; and that faith is no otherwise considered in the gospel, than in order to the believing of this imputation; and that our own works, when they are comparatively undervalued to grace and faith, are to be taken for all inherent righteousness and holiness, even the new creature itself: that all these are errors, as it might be abundantly proved from sundry other places of Scripture, so it may sufficiently appear from that one, Eph. ii. 4, &c. “God, who is rich in mercy, for his great love, wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ, (by grace ye are saved), and hath raised us up together—That in the ages to come he might shew the exceeding riches of his grace, and his kindness towards us in Christ Jesus. For by grace are ye saved through

faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God : not of works, lest any man should boast. For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works." For when we are here said to be saved by grace, it is plain, that the apostle means by saved, inwardly quickened and sanctified: *σωζεσθαι* (saith Grotius well here) is *purgari a vitiis*: which inward sanctification is here attributed to God's free grace, and denied to ourselves and to works; the meaning whereof is, that it is not effected by our own works (whether of outward morality or legal ceremonies) done by our natural power in the unregenerate state, but by the quickening and enlivening spirit of Christ inwardly creating us anew. And, lastly, faith is plainly made the instrument of this inward sanctification, that is not wrought by our own works, but the grace and spirit of Christ. Whence we may well conclude, that the true object of the Christian faith is not only the blood of Christ shed upon the cross for the remission of sin, but also the renewing spirit of Christ for the inward conquering and mortifying of it, and the quickening or raising of us to an heavenly life.

And I dare be bold to say, that the inward sense of every true and sincere-hearted Christian, in this point speaks the same language with the Scripture. For a true Christian, that hath any thing of the life of God in him, cannot but earnestly desire an inward healing of his sinful maladies and distempers, and not an outward hiding and palliation of them only. He must needs passionately long more and more after a new life and nature, and the Divine image to be more fully formed in him; insomuch, that if he

might be secured from the pains of hell without it he could not be fully quieted and satisfied therewith. It is not the effects and consequents of sin only, the external punishment due unto it, that he desires to be freed from, but the intrinsical evil of sin itself, the plague of his own heart. As he often meditates with comfort upon that outward cross, to which his Saviour's hands and feet were nailed for his sins; so he impatiently desires also to feel the virtue of that inward cross of Christ, by which the world may be crucified to him, and he unto the world; and the power of Christ's resurrection in him still to raise him farther unto newness of life. Neither will he be more easily persuaded to believe, that his sinful lusts, the malignity and violence whereof he feels within himself, can be conquered without him, than that an army here in England can be conquered in France or Spain. He is so deeply sensible of the real evil, that is in sin itself, that he cannot be contented to have it only histrionically triumphed over. And to fancy himself covered all over with a thin veil of mere external imputation, will afford little satisfactory comfort unto him, that hungers and thirsts after righteousness, and is weary and heavy laden with the burden of sins, and doth not desire to have his inward maladies hid and covered only, but healed and cured. Neither can he be willing to be put off till the hour of death for a divorce betwixt his soul and sin; nor easily persuaded, that though sin should rule and reign in him all his life-long, yet the last parting groan, that shall divide his soul and body asunder, might have so great an efficacy, as in a moment also to separate all sin from his soul.

But that we may not seem here either to beat the air in generals and uncertainties, or by an indiscreet zeal to countenance those conceited and high-flown enthusiasts of latter times, that, forgetting that example of modesty given us by the blessed apostle, “Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect” Phil. iii. 12.

———But this one thing I do; forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press towards the mark,” boldly arrogate to themselves such an absolute perfection, as would make them not to stand in need of any Saviour, nor to be cleansed by the blood of the Lamb, which therefore they allegorize into a mystical sense; we must declare, that we speak not here of inherent righteousness, and a victory over sin in a legal or pharisaical sense, but in such an evangelical sense, as yet notwithstanding is true and real.

The first degree whereof is a principle of new life, infused into the soul by the spirit of Christ through faith (which the apostle calls *semen Dei*, the seed of God), inclining it 1 John iii. 9. to love God and righteousness, as a thing correspondent to its nature, and enabling it to act freely and ingenuously in the ways of God, out of a living law written upon the heart, and to eschew sin as contrary to a vital principle. For the true gospel-righteousness, which Christ came to set up in the world, doth not consist merely in outward works, whether ceremonial or moral, done by our own natural power in our unregenerate state, but in an inward life and spirit wrought by God. Which those very philosophers seemed in a manner to acknowledge, that denied ἀρετήν to be διδασκόντι, that

virtue could be taught by outward rules and precepts like an art or trade; and Aristotle himself also, when he inclines to think, that men are *θειὰ μοίρα ἀγαθοί*, and that their being good depends upon some extraordinary Divine influence and assistance. Which I the rather take notice of, because some late pretenders to philosophy have profanely derided this doctrine after this manner, as if it made good thoughts and virtuous dispositions to be **POURED** and **BLOWN** into men by God. But there is a second degree of victory over sin, which every true Christian ought not only to look upon as possible, but also to endeavour after, and restlessly to pursue; which is “such a measure of strength in the inward man,” and such a degree of mortification or crucifixion of our sinful lusts, as that a man will not knowingly and deliberately do any thing, that his conscience plainly tells him is a sin, though there be never so great temptations to it.

Whether or no this be that evangelical perfection, which was the mark that St. Paul pressed towards, and which he seems mystically to call the “resurrection from the dead,” or any thing farther, I leave it to others to make a judgment of. But doubtless, they, that have attained to such a principle of new life, and such a measure of inward strength, as is already mentioned, that is to the perfection of unfeigned sincerity, may, notwithstanding the irregularities of the first motions, violent assaults, and importunities of temptations, sudden incursions, and obreptions, sins of mere ignorance and inadvertency, (which are all washed away in the blood of Christ) in a true evangelical sense be said to have attained to a victory over sin.

Wherefore I demand, in the next place, Why it should be thought impossible, by the grace of the gospel, and the faith of Christ, to attain to such a victory as this is over sin? For sin owes its original to nothing else but ignorance and darkness, Πᾶς ὁ πονηρὸς ἄγνοεῖ, Every wicked man is ignorant.—And therefore in that sense that other maxim of the Stoics may have some truth also, that ἀκούτες ἁμαρτάνουσι, Men sin against their will;—because if they knew that those things were indeed so hurtful to them, they would never do them. Now, we all know, how easily light conquers darkness, and upon its first approach makes it fly before it, and, like a guilty shade, seek to hide itself from it, by running round about the earth. And certainly the light of God arising in the soul can with as much ease scatter away the night of sinful ignorance before it. For truth hath a cognation with the soul; and falsehood, lies, and impostures are no more able to make resistance against the power of truth breaking forth, than darkness is able to dispute with light. Wherefore the entrance in of light upon the soul is half a conquest over our sinful lusts.

Again, though sin have had a long and customary possession in the soul, yet it has no just title, much less a right of inheritance in it. For sin is but a stranger and foreigner in the soul, an usurper and intruder into the Lord's inheritance. Sin it is no nature, as St. Austin and others of the fathers often inculcate, but an adventitious and extraneous thing; and the true and ancient nature of the soul of man suffers violence under it, and is oppressed by it. It is nothing else but the preternatural state of rational beings, and there-



fore we have no reason to think it must needs be perpetual and unalterable. Is it a strange thing that a jarring instrument by the hand of a skilful musician should ever be set in tune again? Doubtless if an instrument of music were a living thing, it would be sensible of harmony as its proper state, and abhor discord and dissonancy as a thing preternatural to it. The soul of man was harmonical as God at first made it, till sin, disordering the strings and faculties, put it out of tune, and marred the music of it: but doubtless that great Harmonist, that tunes the whole world, and makes all things keep their times and measures, is able to set this lesser instrument in tune again. Sin is but a disease and dyscrasy in the soul; righteousness is the health and natural complexion of it; and there is a propension in the nature of every thing to return to its proper state, and to cast off whatever is heterogeneous to it. And some physicians tell us, that medicaments are but subservient to nature, by removing obstructions and impediments; but nature itself, and the inward Archæus released and set at liberty, works the cure. Bodies, when they are bent out of their place, and violently forced out of the natural position of their parts, have a spring of their own, and an inward strong propension to return to their own natural posture, which produceth that motion of restitution, that philosophers endeavour to give a reason of. As for example, air may be forced into much a lesser room, than it would naturally expand itself into: but whilst it is under this violence, it hath a spring or strong *conatus* to return to its proper state, (of which several ingenious observations have been lately published by a learned hand.) Now sin being a vio-

lent and preternatural state, and a sinner's returning to God and righteousness being *motus restitutionis et liberationis*, whereby the soul is restored to its true freedom and ancient nature; why should there not be such an elater or spring in the soul, (quicken'd and enlivened by Divine grace) such a natural *conatus* of returning to its proper state again? Doubtless there is, and the Scripture seems sometimes to acknowledge it, and call it by the name of Spirit, when it speaketh of our free-acting in God's ways from an inward principle. For the spirit is not always to be taken for a breath or impulse from without; but also for an inward propension of the soul, awakened and revived in it, to return to its proper state, as it is intellectual, and then to act freely in it according to its ancient nature. For if the spirit were a mere external force acting upon the soul, without the concurrence of an innate principle, then to be acted by the spirit would be a state of violence to the soul, which it could not delight always to continue under; whereas the state of the spirit is a state of freedom, and not of violence, as the apostle witnesseth, when he calls it the freedom of the spirit: it is the soul's acting from an inward spring and principle of its own intellectual nature, not by a mere outward impulse, like a boat, that is tugged on by oars, or driven by a strong blast of wind. Wherefore the soul's returning from sin to righteousness, which is its primitive nature, must needs have great advantages, it going on *secundo flumine*, according to the genuine current of its true intellectual nature, and having besides the assistance of a gentle gale of the Divine Spirit from without to help it forwards.

Why should it be thought so great an impossi-

bility for men willingly to do that, which is agreeable to the law of goodness, since this is the genuine nature of the soul, when once it is freed from mistakes and incumbrances, from that which is heterogeneous and adventitious to it, that clogs it and oppresses it; and every life and nature acts freely according to its own propensions? Why should it seem strange, that the superior faculties of the soul should become predominant, since they are φύσει δεσποτικάι, of a lordly nature, and made to rule, and the inferior faculties of a servile temper, and made to be subject; why should it seem impossible for equity, light, and reason to be enthroned in the soul of man again, and there to command and govern those exorbitant affections, that do so lawlessly rebel against them? For if some grave commanders and generals have been able by the majesty of their very looks to hush and silence a disorderly and mutinous rout of soldiers; certainly reason re-enthroned in her majestic seat, and re-invested with her ancient power and authority, which is natural and not usurped, would much more easily be able to check and controul the tumultuous rabble of lusts and passions in us.

Doubtless God hath no other design upon us in religion, and the gospel of his Son, than what is for our good, and to restore us to the rectitude and perfection of our own beings: wherefore he seeks to redeem and call off our affections from the perishing vanities of this world, which being so infinitely below us, to debase and pollute our spirits: wherefore he would not have us to addict ourselves wholly to the gratifications of our lower faculties, which are but the brute in us, but he would have the best in us to be uppermost, the man to rule the brute, and the τὸ Θεῖον that

that is of God in us, to rule our manly and rational faculties. He would not have us, Narcissus-like, to be always courting our own shadow in the stream; for, according to the ancient Democritical philosophy, this whole visible world is nothing else but mere extended bulk, and hath nothing real in it but atoms or particles of a different magnitude, diversly placed and agitated in a continual whirlpool. But all the colour, beauty and varnish, all that which charms and bewitches us in these objects without us, is nothing but the vital sensations and relishes of our own souls. This gives all the paint and lustre to those beauties, which we court and fall in love withal without us, which are otherwise as devoid of reality and fantastical as the colours of the rainbow. So that this outward world is not unfitly compared to an enchanted palace, which seems indeed mighty pleasing and ravishing to our deluded sense, whereas all is but imaginary and a mere prestigious show; those things, which we are enamoured with, thinking them to be without us, being nothing but the vital energies of our own spirits. In a word, God would have man to be a living temple for himself to dwell in, and his faculties instruments to be used and employed by him; which need not be thought impossible, if that be true, which philosophy tells us, that there is *cognatio quædam*, a certain near kindred and alliance between the soul and God.

Lastly, we must observe, though this inward victory over sin be no otherwise to be effected than by the spirit of Christ through faith, and by a Divine operation in us, so that in a certain sense we may be said to be passive thereunto; yet not-

withstanding we must not dream any such thing, as if our active co-operation and concurrence were not also necessarily required thereunto. For as there is a spirit of God in nature, which produceth vegetables and minerals, which human art and industry could never be able to effect; namely, that *spiritus intus alens*, which the poet speaks of, which yet notwithstanding doth not work absolutely, unconditionally, and omnipotently, but requireth certain preparations, conditions, and dispositions in the matter, which it works upon; (for unless the husbandman plough the ground and sow the seed, the spirit of God in nature will not give any increase :) in like manner the Scripture tells us, that the Divine Spirit of grace doth not work absolutely, unconditionally, and irresistibly in the souls of men, but requireth certain preparations, conditions, and co-operations in us; forasmuch as it may both be quenched, and stirred up or excited in us. And, indeed, unless we plough up the fallow-ground of our hearts, and sow to ourselves in righteousness, (as the prophet speaks) by our earnest endeavours; we cannot expect, that the Divine Spirit of grace will shower down that heavenly increase upon us. Wherefore, if we would attain to a victory over sin by the spirit of Christ, we must endeavour to fight a good fight, and run a good race and to "enter in at the strait gate," that so overcoming we may receive the crown of life. And thus much shall suffice to have spoken at this time concerning the first particular, The victory over sin.

I shall now proceed to speak something briefly to the two other victories that remain, which are attainable also by Christ over the law and death.

And the law may be considered two manner of ways: first, as an outward covenant of works, that pronounceth death and condemnation to all, that do not yield absolute and entire obedience to whatever is therein commanded; and which imposed also with the same severity a multitude of outward ceremonial observations, which had no intrinsical goodness at all in them, but kept men in a state of bondage and servility. Now the law, in this sense, as it is an outward letter and covenant of works, is already conquered externally for us by Christ's death upon the cross; (Gal. iii. 13.) "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us; for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree; that the blessing of Abraham might come on the gentiles through Jesus Christ, that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith." And he hath thereby freed us also from our obligation to those commandments that were not good, having "broken down the middle wall of partition, that was betwixt Jew and gentile," <sup>Ezek. xx. 25.</sup> abolishing in his flesh the enmity, even the law of commandments, (Eph. ii. 14, 15.) and blotting out the hand-writing of ordinances, that was against us, which was contrary to us, and taking it out of the way, nailing it to his cross." Col. ii. 14.

Secondly, The law is sometimes also considered in Scripture as an inward state of mind, wrought by the law and truth of God, whether written outwardly in the letter of the Scripture, or inwardly in the conscience, prevailing only so far as to beget a conviction of men's duty, and of the wrath of God against sin, but not enabling them with inward strength and power to do what is command-

ed, willingly, out of a love of it. It is such a state when men are only passive to God's law, and unwillingly subject unto it (as an enemy) for fear of wrath and vengeance. And this must needs be a state of miserable bondage and servility, distraction and perplexity of mind; when men are at once strongly convinced of the wrath of God against sin, and yet under the power of their lusts hailing and dragging of them to the commission of it. It is that state (as I conceive) which St. Paul describes, (Rom. vii.) after this manner: "The law is spiritual, but I am carnal, sold under sin: for that which I do, I allow not; for what I would that do I not, but what I hate, that do I." And again, "I see another law in my members warring against my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin. O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from this body of death?" Now from the law in this sense, that is, from the bondage and servility of the legal state, we are not delivered, nor made conquerors, by what Christ did outwardly upon the cross, as some imagine; as if he had there purchased for us an indulgence to sin without controul; but by the inward working of his Holy Spirit, freeing us from the power and bondage of sin, and unbewitching us from the love of it.

Wherefore there is a double freedom from this legal state to be taken notice of; a true and a false freedom; which I cannot better explain, than by using the apostle's own similitude in the beginning of the seventh chapter: "Know ye not, brethren, that the law hath dominion over a man as long as he liveth? (or rather, as long as it, that is the law, liveth?) For the woman, which hath a husband,

is bound by the law to her husband so long as he liveth, but if her husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of the husband. So then, if while her husband liveth she be married to another man, she shall be called an adultress: but if her husband be dead, she is free from that law; so that she is no adultress, though she be married to another man." Where the law is compared to a husband; and one, that is under the law, or in a legal state, to a woman, that hath a husband. And as there are two ways, by which a woman may be freed from her husband; the one, if she break loose from him whilst he yet liveth, contrary to the laws of wedlock, and marry to another man; which is an undue and unlawful freedom, for then she is justly styled an adultress: another, if she stay till her husband be dead, and then, being free from the law of her husband, does lawfully marry to another man: in like manner there are two ways, by which men may be freed from the law, as it is an inward state of bondage and servility. The first is, when men do illegally and unlawfully break loose from the law, which is their husband, whilst he is yet alive, and ought to have dominion over them, and marry themselves to another husband; which husband's name is carnal liberty, or licentiousness, too often miscalled in these latter times by the name of Christian liberty: and such as these may well be styled, in the Scripture-language, adulterers and adultresses. But there is another freedom from the law, which is a due and just freedom, when we do not make ourselves free before the time, violently breaking loose from it; but when we stay till the law, which is our husband, is dead, and the compulsory power of it



taken away by the mortification of our lusts and affections, and so marry another husband, which is Christ, or the Spirit of righteousness, (Rom. viii. 2.) "The law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death."

Wherefore there are three general states of men, in order to God and religion, that may be here taken notice of. The first is of those, that are alive to sin, and dead to the law. This the apostle speaks of, (Rom. vii. 9.) "I was alive without the law once." These are those, whose consciences are not yet considerably awakened to any sense of their duty, nor to the discrimination of good and evil, but sin freely, without any check or control, without any disquieting remorse of conscience.

The second is, when men are at once alive both to the law and sin, to the conviction of the one, and the power and love of the other; both these struggling together within the bowels of the soul, checking and controlling one another. This is a broken, confounded and shattered state; and these, in the apostle's language, are said to be slain by the law. "I was alive without the law once; but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died. And the commandment, which was ordained to life, I found to be unto death. For sin, taking occasion by the commandment, deceived me, and by it slew me." Here is no peace, rest nor comfort to be had in this state, men's souls being distracted and divided by an intestine and civil war between the law of the mind and the law of the members conflicting with one another.

Wherefore the third state is, when men are

dead both to the law and sin, and "alive unto God and righteousness; the law of the Spirit of life freeing them from the law of sin and death." In the first of these three states, which is the most wretched and deplorable of all, we are sin's freemen, that is, free to commit sin without check or control. In the second, we are bondmen to God and righteousness, and serve God out of a principle of fear, and according to an outward rule only; children of Hagar the bondmaid, and of the letter. In the third, we are God's freemen and sons, and serve him in the newness of the spirit, out of a love to God and righteousness; children of the New Testament, and of Sarah the free-woman.

Wherefore here are two mistakes or errors to be taken notice of, that defeat and disappoint the design of Christ in giving us the victory over the law. The first is of those, that we have already mentioned, that seek to themselves a freedom from the bondage of the law otherwise than by Christ and the Spirit of righteousness; namely, in a way of carnal liberty and licentiousness; whereby, instead of being bondmen to God and righteousness, they become perfect freemen to sin and wickedness, which is the most deplorable thralldom in the world. Wherefore these men, instead of going forward from the second state unto higher perfection, wheel back again unto the first; just as if the children of Israel, after they had been brought out of Egypt, and travelled a while in the desert of Arabia, where the law was given, instead of entering into Canaan, should have wheeled back into Egypt, and then, enjoying the garlic and onions, and flesh-pots thereof, should persuade themselves this was, indeed, the true "land of promise,

that floweth with milk and honey." And there is very great danger, lest when men have been tired out by wandering a long time in the dry and barren wilderness of the law, where they cannot enjoy the pleasure of sin as formerly, and yet have not arrived to the relish and love of righteousness, by reason of their impatience, they should at last make more haste than good speed, being seduced by some false shows of freedom, that are very tempting to such weary travellers, and promise much comfort and refreshment to them, inviting them to sit down under their shadow; such as are a self-chosen holiness, ceremonial righteousness, opinionative zeal, the tree of knowledge mistaken for the tree of life, high-flown enthusiasm and seraphicism, epicurizing philosophy, antinomian liberty, under the pretence of free grace and a gospel spirit.

The second mistake, that is here to be heeded, is, of those, that would by all means persuade themselves, that there is no higher state of Christian perfection to be aimed at, or hoped for, in this life, than this legal state; That the good they would do, they do not: the evil they would not do, that they do; that the law of sin in their members still leads them captive from the law of their minds: having no other ground at all for this, but a novel interpretation of one paragraph in the Epistle to the Romans, contrary to other express places of Scripture, and the sense of all ancient interpreters; and yet with so much zeal, as if it were a principal part of the gospel-faith to believe this (which is indeed arrant infidelity), as if it were no less than presumption or impiety to expect a living law written upon our hearts. But

this is nothing else, but, instead of seeking liberty out of the bondage of the law, to fall in love with our bonds and fetters, and plainly to deny the victory over the law by Christ, and to affirm, that the gospel is but the ministration of a dead and killing letter, and not of the Spirit that quickeneth and maketh alive.

I come now, in the third and last place, to the victory over death, expressed by the resurrection of the body to life and immortality; which, as it was meritoriously procured for us by Christ's dying upon the cross (his resurrection afterward being an assured pledge of the same to us), so it will be really effected at last by the same Spirit of Christ that gives us victory over sin here. Rom. viii. 11. "If the Spirit of him, that raised up Jesus dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit, that dwelleth in you:" as if he should have said, If the Spirit of Christ dwell in you, regenerating and renewing your souls, the very same Spirit hereafter shall also immortalize your very bodies. Avicen, the Mahometan philosopher, in his *Almahad*, hath a conceit, that the meaning of the resurrection of the body is nothing else but this, to persuade vulgar people, that though they seem to perish, when they die, and their bodies rot in the grave; yet, notwithstanding, they shall have a real subsistence after death, by which they shall be made capable, either of future happiness or misery. But because the apprehensions of the vulgar are so gross, that the permanency and immortality of the soul is too subtile a notion for them, who commonly count their bodies for themselves, and cannot conceive, how they should

have any being after death, unless their very bodies should be raised up again; therefore, by way of condescension to vulgar understandings, the future permanency and subsistence of the soul, in prophetic writings, is expressed under this scheme of the resurrection of the body, which yet is meant *κατὰ δόξαν* only, and not *κατ' ἀλήθειαν*. Which conceit, how well soever it may befit a Mahometan philosopher, I am sure it no way agrees with the principles of Christianity; the Scripture here and elsewhere assuring us, that the resurrection of the body is to be understood plainly, and without a figure; and that the saints, departed this life in the faith and fear of Christ, shall not be mere souls without bodies to all eternity, as Avicen, Maimonides, and other philosophers dreamed, but consist of soul and body united together. Which bodies, though, as the doctrine of the church instructeth us, they shall be both specifically and numerically the same with what they were here; yet, notwithstanding, the Scripture tells us, they shall be so changed and altered, in respect of their qualities and conditions, that in that sense they shall not be the same. Ver. 36, 37. "Thou fool, that, which thou sowest, is not quickened, except it die: thou sowest not that body, that shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain; but God giveth it a body, as it pleaseth him, and to every seed his own body." The apostle here imitating the manner of the Jews, who (as appeareth from the \* Talmud) were wont familiarly to illustrate the business of the "resurrection of the body" by the similitude of seed sown into the ground, and springing up

\* See Gemera, in Chetuboth, cap. 13. E in Israel, nam. 50.

again. Accordingly he goes on, "It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; sown in weakness, it is raised in power; sown a natural body, raised a spiritual body." Which epithet was used also in this case, both by the philosophers and the Jews; for Hierocles upon the Golden Verses calls them *ὀχήματα πνευματικά*, *vehicula spiritualia*, spiritual bodies;—and R. Menachem, from the ancient cabalists, *רדחנת התלבשות*, the spiritual clothing.—Lastly, the apostle concludes, thus; "Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." For which cause he tells us elsewhere, that they, which do not die, must of necessity be changed. And, indeed, if men should be restored after death to such gross, foul, and cadaverous bodies, as these are here upon earth, which is the very region of death and mortality, without any change at all; what would this be else, but, as Plotinus the philosopher against the Gnostics writes, *ἐγείρεσθαι εἰς ἄλλον ὕπνον*, to be raised up to a second sleep,—or to be entombed again in living sepulchres? "For the corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind, that museth upon many things." Wisdom ix. 15. Wherefore we must needs explode that old Jewish conceit, commonly entertained amongst the rabbinical writers to this day, that the future resurrection is to be understood of such gross and corruptible bodies, as these are here upon earth, to eat, drink, marry, and be given in marriage, and (which must needs follow) afterward to die again. Nachmanides, in his *Shaar Haggemul*, is the only Jewish author

that ventures to depart from the common road here, and to abandon this popular error of the Jews, endeavouring to prove, that the bodies of the just, after the resurrection, shall not eat and drink, but be glorified bodies: but\*

\* In Nachalath Avoth, cap. 4. רעת דתוצרים דרואונו. This is the very same with the opinion of the Christians, that hold, that after the resurrection men shall not eat, drink, marry, or be given in marriage, or die again, but continue eternally in those bodies, resembling the heavenly bodies; and these they vulgarly call glorified bodies.

Abravanel confutes him with no other argument than this; That this was the doctrine and opinion of the Christians.

Let us therefore now consider, how abundantly God hath provided for us by Jesus Christ, both in respect of our souls, and of our bodies; our souls, in freeing us by the Spirit of Christ (if we be not wanting to ourselves) from the slavery of sin, and bondage of the law, as it is a letter only; our bodies, in that this corruptible shall put on incorruption, and this mortal immortality, and that these vile bodies shall be made like to Christ's glorious body. In both which

the complete salvation of man consisteth, the perfection and happiness both of soul and body. For, though our salvation consists chiefly in the former, in the victory over sin, and in the renovation of the mind, yet without the latter, which is the victory over death, and the immortalizing of our bodies, it would be a very lame and imperfect thing. For righteousness alone, if it should *male habitare*, dwell always in such inconvenient houses, as these earthly tabernacles are, however the high-flown Stoic may brag, it could not render our condition otherwise, than troublesome, solicitous, and calamitous. Wherefore the holy men in Scripture, not without cause, longed for this future change. Rom. viii. 23. "We

groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our bodies." 2 Cor. v. 2. "In this we groan earnestly, desiring to be clothed upon with our house, which is from heaven." But there is no obtaining of this future victory over death and mortality, except we first get a victory over sin here. For this is that crown of life, that Christ, the first-begotten from the dead, will set upon the heads of none, but those, that have here fought a good fight, and overcome. For as death proceeds only from sin and disobedience, so the way to conquer death, and to arrive at life and immortality, is by seeking after an inward conquest over sin. For "righteousness is immortal," Wisd. i. 15. and will immortalize the entertainers of it; and, as the Chaldee oracle speaks,

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ἐκτείνεις πυρινὸν νόον,  
"Ἔργον ἐπ' εὐσεβείας βευστόν, καὶ σῶμα σωστικόν.

Having hitherto shewed, what are the great things we hope for by Christ, and are to endeavour after, namely, to procure an inward and real victory over sin by the Spirit of Christ, that so we may hereafter attain a victory over death and mortality; we cannot but take notice briefly of some errors of those, that, either pretending the impossibility of this inward victory over sin, or else hypocritically declining the combat, make up a certain religion to themselves out of other things, which are either impertinent, and nothing to the purpose, or else evil and noxious.

For, first, some (as was intimated before) make to themselves a mere fantastical and imaginary religion, conceiting that there is nothing at all for them to do, but confidently to believe, that all is



already done for them ; that they are dearly beloved of God, without any conditions or qualifications to make them lovely. But such a faith as this is nothing but mere fancy and carnal imagination, proceeding from that natural self-love, whereby men fondly dote upon themselves, and are apt to think that God loves them as fondly and as partially as they love themselves, tying his affection to their particular outward persons, their very flesh and blood ; hereby making God a being like unto themselves, that is, wholly acted by arbitrary self-will, fondness, and partiality ; and perverting the whole nature and design of religion, which is not mere phantastry and an historical show, but a real victory over the real evil of sin, without which God can neither take pleasure in any man's person, nor can there be a possibility of being happy, a real turning of the soul from darkness unto light, from the power of Satan unto God.

Again, some there are, that, instead of walking in the narrow way, that Christ commendeth to us, of subduing and mortifying our sinful lusts, make to themselves certain other narrow ways of affected singularity in things, that belong not to life and godliness, outward strictnesses and severities of their own choosing and devising ; and then persuade themselves, that this is the strait gate and narrow way of Christ, that leadeth unto life. Whereas these are, indeed, nothing else but some particular paths and narrow slices cut out of the broad way. For though they have an outward and seeming narrowness, yet they are so broad within, that camels with their burdens may easily pass through them. These, instead of

taking up Christ's cross upon them, make to themselves certain crosses of their own, and then laying them upon their shoulders and carrying them, please themselves with a conceit, that they bear the cross of Christ; whereas in truth and reality they are many times too much strangers to that cross of his, by which the world should be crucified to them, and they unto the world.

Some place all their religion in endless scrupulosities about indifferent things, neglecting in the mean time the *τὰ βαρύτερα τοῦ νόμου*, the more weighty things—both of law and gospel, and (as our Saviour farther expresseth it) *δωλίζοντες τὸν κώνωπα, τὴν δὲ κάμηλον καταπίνοντες*, straining at a gnat, and swallowing a camel;—that is, being not so scrupulous as they ought to be about the substantials of religion and a good life. For as we ought not to place the chief of our religion in the mere observation of outward rites and ceremonies, whilst in the mean time we hypocritically neglect the morals and substantials; which may deservedly be branded with the name of superstition: so we ought to know, that it is equal superstition to have such an abhorrence of indifferent things, as to make it the main of our religion to abstain from them; both of these arguing equal ignorance of the nature of God, as if he were some morose, humorous, and captious being; and of that righteousness, which the kingdom of God consisteth in; as if these outward and indifferent things could either hallow or defile our souls, or as if salvation and damnation did depend upon the mere using or not using of them. The apostle himself instructeth us, that the kingdom of God consisteth no more in *ἀκρο-*

*βυστία* than in *περιτομή*, no more in uncircumcision than in circumcision;—that is, no more in not using outward ceremonies and indifferent things than in using of them. Wherefore the negative superstition is equal to the positive, and both of them alike call off men's attention from the main things of religion, by engaging them over-much in small and little things. But the sober Christian, that neither places all his religion in external observances, nor yet is superstitiously anti-ceremonial, as he will think himself obliged to have a due regard to the commands of lawful authority in adiaphorous things, and to prefer the peace and unity of the Christian church, and the observation of the royal law of charity, before the satisfaction of any private humour or interest; so he will be aware of that *ἀμετρία τῆς ἀβολκῆς*, which many run into, of banishing away all the solemnity of external worship, the observation of the Lord's day, and of the Christian sacraments, under the notion of ceremonies, quite out of the world. To conclude; unless there be a due and timely regard had to the commands of lawful authority in indifferent things, and to order, peace, and unity in the church, it may easily be foreseen, that the reformed part of Christendom will at length be brought to confusion, by crumbling into infinite sects and division, and then to utter ruin.

Again, many mistake the vices of their natural complexion for supernatural and Divine graces. Some think dull and stupid melancholy to be Christian mortification: others, that turbulent and fiery zeal is the vigour of the Spirit. Whereas zeal is one of those things, that Aristotle calls *τὰ μέσα*, of a middle nature,—neither good nor bad

in itself, but which, as it is circumstantiated, may indifferently become either virtue or vice. For there is a *πικρὸς ζῆλος*, as the apostle calls it, a bitter zeal,—which is contrary to all Christian love and charity, and is nothing else but the vices of acerbity, envy, malice, cruelty, tintured and gilded over with a religious show. And there may be also a turbulent and factious zeal, when men, under a pretence of acting for the glory of God, violate just and lawful authority, in order to the advancement of their own private self-interest. Indeed, there was amongst the Jews a certain right, called *jus zelotarum*, or the right of zealots—whereby private persons, acted by a zeal for God, might do immediate execution upon some malefactors, without expecting the sentence of any court of judicature. And some conceive, that our Saviour, by this right of zealots, did whip the buyers and sellers out of the temple, and overturn the tables of the money-changers; because he was never questioned by the Jews for it. But this was then a legal and regular thing, permitted by the public laws of that nation in some certain cases, yet so as that those zealots were afterward accountable to the Sanhedrin for what they did. However, a little before the destruction of the temple, as Josephus tells us, there were a crew of desperate miscreants, that, abusing this right, and calling themselves by the name of Kennain, *i. e.* zealots, made a pretence from hence to commit most villanous actions. And I wish some had not too much entertained this opinion, that private persons might reform public abuses, whether belonging to the ecclesiastical or the civil polity, without and against the consent of the supreme

magistrate, in a turbulent manner, *jure zelatorum*; by the right of zealots;—nay, and that actions, that are otherwise altogether unwarrantable in themselves, may notwithstanding be justified by zeal for God and good ends. But God needs no man's zeal to promote an imaginary interest of his in the world, by doing unjust things for him. “Will you speak wickedly for God, or talk deceitfully for him? will you accept his person?” was the generous expostulation of Job with his friends; and he tells them in the following words, that this was nothing else, but to mock God as one man mocketh another.

The Divine zeal is no corybantic fury, but a calm and regular heat, guided and managed by light and prudence, and carried out principally neither for nor against indifferent rites and unnecessary opinions, but those things that are immutably good and fundamental to Christianity; always acknowledging a due subordination to that authority, civil and ecclesiastical, that is over us.

Lastly, some there are, whose pretence to religion and the Spirit is founded in nothing else but a faculty of rhetoricating and extemporizing with zeal and fervency, which they take to be nothing less than Divine inspiration, and that which the Scripture calls “praying in the Holy Ghost,” an undoubted character of a person truly regenerated. Which being a great delusion, whereby many are hindered from seeking after the real effects of the Divine Spirit, by idolizing, instead thereof, that which is merely natural (if not artificial); I think it not impertinent here to speak a little of it. And certainly that, which is frequently attained to in the very height by persons grossly hypocritical

and debauched, can never be concluded to be Divine inspiration, or to proceed from any higher principle than mere natural enthusiasm. For there is not only a poetical enthusiasm, of which Plato discourseth in his *Ion*, but, though oratory be a more sober thing, a rhetorical enthusiasm also, that makes men very eloquent, affectionate, and bewitching in their language, beyond what the power of any bare art and precepts could enable them unto; insomuch that both these, poets and orators, have oftentimes conceited themselves to be indeed divinely inspired: as those known verses testify:

*Est Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo;*

And,

*Sedibus æthereis Spiritus ille venit.*

And, concerning orators, the like might be proved, if the time would here permit, by sundry testimonies: but I shall here instance only in *Aristides*, a famous orator, who not only speaks positively of himself, as inspired in his orations, but affirms the same also concerning rhetoric in general, when it is extraordinary, that it comes by immediate inspiration as oracles and prophecies do, and not from art or nature. Wherefore it is not at all to be wondered at, if, when men are employed in religious and devotional exercises, the same natural enthusiasm, especially having the advantage of religious melancholy, which makes men still more enthusiastical, should so wing and inspire the fancies of these religious orators, as to make them wonderfully fluent, eloquent, and rapturous, so that they beget strange passions in their

auditors, and conclude themselves to be divinely inspired. Whereas, notwithstanding, they may have no more of Divine inspiration in all this than those poets and orators beforementioned had; that is to say, be no otherwise inspired, than by a rhetorical or hypochondriacal enthusiasm, that is merely natural. But it is far from my intention here to disparage the sincere and ardent affections of devout souls, naturally and freely breathing out their earnest desires unto God in private; although perhaps this be not without some kind of enthusiasm also. For enthusiasm, as well as zeal, and other natural things, may be well used, and, being rightly circumstantiated and subservient to a better principle, become irreprehensible. Some have observed, that no great work of the brain, that begot much admiration in the world, was ever achieved without some kind of enthusiasm; and the same may be affirmed of the most transcendently virtuous and heroical actions. But then the goodness of these actions is never to be estimated merely by the degree of enthusiastic heat and ardour that is in them, but by such other laws and circumstances, as moralize human actions. Wherefore, my meaning, as I said before, is only this, to caution against that vulgar and popular error of mistaking the natural and enthusiastical fervour of men's spirits, and the ebullieny of their fancy, when it is tinctured with religion, and idolizing of it instead of the supernatural grace of God's Holy Spirit; and of looking for the effect of God's Spirit principally in words and talk, or thinking, that God is chiefly glorified with a loud noise, and long speeches. For the true demonstration of God's Holy Spirit is no where

to be looked for but in life and action, or such earnest and affectionate breathings after a further participation of the Divine image, as are accompanied with real and unfeigned endeavours after the same; which is the true praying in the Holy Ghost, though there be no extemporaneous effusion of words. And, therefore, when some Corinthians were puffed up, by reason of a faculty which they had of rhetoricating religiously, St. Paul, like an apostle, tells them, that he would come amongst them and “know, not the speech of them that were puffed up,<sup>1 Cor. iv. 19.</sup> but the power. For the kingdom of God (saith he) consisteth not in word, but in power and life.” Wherefore, laying aside these and such-like childish mistakes, and things that are little to the purpose, let us seriously apply ourselves to the main work of our religion; that is, to mortify and vanquish our sinful lusts by the assistance of God's Holy Spirit through faith in Christ; that so being dead to sin here, we may live with God eternally hereafter.





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### CHAP. III.

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20. Notwithstanding which, forasmuch as the plastic nature is a life, it must needs be incorporeal. One and the self-same thing having in it an entire model and platform of the whole, and acting upon several distant parts of matter, cannot be a body. And though Aristotle himself do no where declare this nature to be either corporeal or incorporeal (which he neither clearly doth concerning the rational soul) and his followers commonly take it to be corporeal; yet, according to the genuine principles of that philosophy, must it needs be otherwise . . . . 353

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26. Our second undertaking, which was to shew, how grossly those Atheists (who acknowledge this artificial plastic nature, without animality) misunderstand it, and abuse the notion, to make a counterfeit God Almighty, or numen of it; to the exclusion of the true Deity. First, in their supposing that to be the first and highest principle of the universe, which is the last and lowest of all lives, a thing as essentially derivative from, and dependent upon, a higher intellectual principle, as the echo on the original voice. Secondly, in their making sense and reason in animals to emerge out of a senseless life of nature, by the mere modification and organization of matter. That no duplication of corporeal organs can ever make one single unconscious

life to advance into redoubled consciousness and self-enjoyment. Thirdly, in attributing (some of them) perfect knowledge and understanding to this life of nature, which yet themselves suppose to be devoid of all animal sense and consciousness. Lastly, in making this plastic life of nature to be merely corporeal; the Hylozoists contending, that it is but an inadequate conception of body as the only substance, and fondly dreaming, that the vulgar notion of a God is nothing but such an inadequate conception of the matter of the whole universe, mistaken for an entire substance by itself the cause of all things. And thus far the digression . . . . . 369

XXXVIII. That though the confutation of the atheistic grounds, according to the laws of method, ought to have been reserved for the last part of this discourse, yet we, having reason to violate those laws, crave the reader's pardon for this preposterousness. A considerable observation of Plato's, "That it is not only gross sensuality, which inclines men to atheize, but also an affectation of seeming wiser than the generality of mankind. As likewise, that the Atheists making such pretence to wit, it is a seasonable and proper undertaking, to evince, that they fumble in all their ratiocinations." And we hope to make it appear, that the Atheists are no conjurors; and that all forms of Atheism are nonsense and impossibility . . . . . 374

CHAP. IV.

*The idea of God declared, in way of answer to the first atheistic argument; and the grand objection against the naturalness of this idea (as essentially including unity or oneliness in it) from the pagan Polytheism, removed. Proved, that the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one supreme Deity. A fuller explication of whose Polytheism and idolatry intended; in order to the better giving an account of Christianity.*

I. THE either stupid insensibility or gross impudence of Atheists, in denying the word of God to have any signification, or that there is any other idea answering to it besides the mere phantasm of the sound. The disease called by the philosopher ἀπολίθωσις τοῦ νοητικοῦ, the petrification, or dead insensibility of the mind . . . . . 399

II. That the Atheists themselves must needs have an idea of

God in their minds; or otherwise, when they deny his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing. That they have also the same idea of him in general with the Theists; the one denying the very same thing which the others affirm . . . 402

III. A lemma, or preparatory proposition to the idea of God, That though some things be made or generated, yet it is not possible that all things should be made, but something must of necessity exist of itself from eternity unmade, and be the cause of those other things that are made . . . . . ib.

iv. The two most opposite opinions concerning what was self-existent from eternity, or unmade, and the cause of all other things made; one, that it was nothing but senseless matter, the most imperfect of all things. The other, that it was something most perfect, and therefore consciously intellectual. The assertors of this latter opinion, Theists, in a strict and proper sense; of the former, Atheists. So that the idea of God in general is, a perfectly conscious understanding being (or mind), self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things . . . . . 403

v. Observable, that the Atheists, who deny a God, according to the true idea of him, do notwithstanding often abuse the word, calling senseless matter by that name; they meaning nothing else thereby but only a first principle, or self-existent unmade thing: according to which notion of the word God, there can be no such thing at all as an Atheist, no man being able to persuade himself, that all things sprung from nothing . . . 404

VI. In order to a more punctual declaration of this Divine idea, the opinion of those taken notice of, who suppose two self-existent, unmade principles, God and matter, according to which, God not the principle of all things, nor the sole principle, but only the chief . . . . . 407

VII. These Materiarians, imperfect and mistaken Theists. Not Atheists, because they suppose the world made and governed by an animalish, sentient, and understanding nature; whereas no Atheists acknowledge conscious animality to be a first principle, but conclude it to be all generable and corruptible: nor yet genuine Theists, because they acknowledge not omnipotence in the full extent thereof. A latitude therefore in Theism; and none to be condemned for absolute Atheists but such as deny an eternal unmade mind, the framer and governor of the whole world . . . . . 410

VIII. An absolutely perfect being, the most compendious

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Notwithstanding which, Aristotle doth not only often speak of God singularly, and of the Divinity emphatically, but also professedly opposes that imaginary opinion of many independent principles, or unmade deities. He confuting the same from the phenomena or the compages of the world, which is not *επεισοδιώδης*, but all uniform, and agreeably conspiring into one harmony 308

Aristotle's supreme Deity, the first immoveable Mover. The difference here betwixt Plato and Aristotle ; Plato's original of motion ; a self-moving soul, Aristotle's an immoveable mind. But this difference not so great as at first sight it seems ; because Aristotle's immoveable mind doth not move the heavens efficiently, but only finally, or as being loved. Besides which, he must needs suppose another immediate mover, which could be nothing but a soul of them . . . . . 311

Aristotle's immoveable mind not only the cause of motion, but

also of well and fit; all the order, pulchritude, and harmony, that are in the world, called therefore by Aristotle the separate good thereof. This together with nature (its subordinate instrument) the efficient cause of the whole mundane system: which, however co-eternal with it, yet is, in order of nature, junior to it . . . . . 314

Aristotle and other ancients, when they affirm mind to have been the cause of all things, understood it thus, that all things were made by an absolute wisdom, and after the best manner. The Divine will, according to them, not a mere arbitrary, humorsome, and fortuitous thing, but decency and fitness itself 317

From this passage of Aristotle's, that the Divinity is either God, or the work of God, evident, that he supposed all the gods to have been derived from one and therefore his intelligences of the spheres . . . . . 318

That, according to Aristotle, this speculation of the Deity constitutes a particular science by itself, distinct from physiology and geometry: the former whereof (physiology) is conversant about what was inseparable and moveable, the second (geometry, about things immoveable, but not really separable; but the third and last (which is theology) about that which is both immoveable and separable, an incorporeal Deity . . . . 319

Four chief points of Aristotle's theology or metaphysics, concerning God; first, that though all things are not eternal and unmade, yet something must needs be such, as likewise incorruptible, or otherwise all might come to nothing. Secondly, that God is an incorporeal substance, separate from sensibles, indivisible, and devoid of parts and magnitude. Thirdly, that the Divine intellect is the same with its intelligibles, or containeth them all within itself; because the Divine mind, being senior to all things, and architectonical of the world, could not then look abroad for its objects without itself. The contrary to which supposed by Atheists. Lastly, that God being an immoveable substance, his act and energy are his essence; from whence Aristotle would infer the eternity of the world . 320

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The stoical argumentations for a God not inconsiderable, and  
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The stoical god, not a mere plastic and methodical, but an in-  
 tellectual fire. The world, according to them, not a plant, but  
 animal; and Jupiter the soul thereof. From the supposed one-  
 liness of which Jupiter, they would sometimes infer the singu-  
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 though there were fifty, or a hundred worlds, yet would there  
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Nevertheless, the supreme God praised and extolled by them  
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Their professing subjection to his laws as their greatest li-  
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And to submit their wills to his will in every thing, so as to  
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Their pretending to look to God, and to do nothing without  
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Their praising him as the Author of all good . . . . . 352

Their addressing their devotions to him alone, without the

conjunction of any other god; and particularly imploring his assistance against temptations . . . . . 353

Cleanthes's excellent and devout hymn to the supreme God 354

xxvi. Cicero, though affecting to write in the way of the new academy, yet no sceptic as to Theism. Nor was he an assertor of many independent deities. Cicero's gods (the makers of the world) the same with Plato's eternal gods, or trinity of Divine hypostases subordinate. This language the Pagans in St. Cyril would justify, from that of the Scripture, "Let us make man" 356

Varro's threefold theology, the fabulous, the natural, and the civil or popular; agreeably to Scævola the Pontifex's three sorts of gods, poetical, philosophical, and political. The former condemned by him as false; the second, though true, said to be above the capacity of the vulgar: and therefore a necessity of a third or middle betwixt both; because many things true in religion not fit for the vulgar to know. Varro's supreme Numen the great soul or mind of the whole world: his inferior gods. parts of the world animated. Image-worship condemned by him as disagreeable to the natural theology . . . . . 364

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Dio Chrysostomus, a Sophist, his clear testimony, βασιλεύσθαι τὸ ὅλον, that the whole world was under a kingly government or monarchy . . . . . 375

Galen's true hymn to the praise of Him, that made us, in his book De usu Partium . . . . . 376

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A most full and excellent description of the supreme God in Aristides's first oration, or hymn to Jupiter, wherein he affirmeth all the several kinds of gods to be but a defluxion and derivation from Jupiter . . . 379

All the latter philosophers after Christianity (though maintainers of the world's eternity, yet) agreed in one supreme Deity, the cause of this world, and of the other gods. Excellent speculations in them concerning the Deity, especially Plotinus; who, though deriving matter and all from one Divine principle, yet was a contender for many gods: he supposing the grandeur and majesty of the supreme God to be declared by the multitude of gods under him. Themistius; that the same supreme God was worshipped by Pagans, Christians, and all nations, though in different forms: and that God was delighted with this variety of religions . . . 381

The full testimony of St. Cyril, that the Greek philosophers universally acknowledged one God, the Maker of the universe. from whom were produced into being certain other gods, both intelligible and sensible . . . 383

XXVII. This not only the opinion of philosophers and learned men, but also the general belief of the vulgar amongst the Pagans. A judgment of the vulgar and generality to be made from the poets. Dio Chrysostomus's affirmation, that all the poets acknowledged one first and greatest God, the Father of all the rational kind, and the King thereof . . . ib.

The testimony of Aristotle, That all men acknowledged kingship or monarchy amongst the gods: of Maximus Tyrius, that notwithstanding so great a discrepancy of opinion in other things yet throughout all the Gentile world, as well the unlearned as learned, did universally agree in this, that there was one God the King and Father of all, and many gods the sons of that one God; of Dio Chrysostomus also to the same purpose; he intimating likewise, that of the two, the acknowledgment of the one supreme God, was more general than that of the many inferior gods . . . 385

That the sense of the vulgar Pagans herein is farther evident from hence, because all nations had their several proper names for the one supreme God; as the Romans Jupiter, the Greeks

Zeus, the Africans and Arabians Hammon, the Scythians Pappæus, the Babylonians Bel, &c. . . . . 387

True, that Origen, though allowing Christians to use the appellative names for God in the languages of the several nations, yet accounted it unlawful for to call him by those proper names; because not only given to idols, but also contaminated with wicked rites and fables: according to which, they should be indeed rather the names of a demon than of a God. Notwithstanding which, he does not deny those Pagans ever to have meant the supreme God by them, but often acknowledge the same. But Lactantius indeed denies the Capitoline Jupiter to be the supreme God, and that for two reasons. First, because he was not worshipped without the partnership of Minerva and Juno, his daughter and wife. Granted here, that there was a mixture of the fabulous or poetical theology with the natural to make up the civil. But that wise men understood these to be but three several names or notions of one supreme God. This confirmed from Macrobius . . . . . 388

Vossius's conjecture, that in this Capitoline Trinity there was a farther mystery aimed at, of three Divine hypostases. This Roman trinity derived from the Samothracian Cabiri. Which word being Hebraical, gives cause to suspect this tradition of a trinity among the Pagans to have sprung from the Hebrews 390

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That the Capitoline Jupiter was the supreme God, evident from those titles of Optimus Maximus; and of Omnipotens by the pontifices in their public sacrifices. Seneca's testimony, that the ancient Hetrurians by Jupiter meant the mind and spirit, maker and governor, of the whole world. The Roman soldiers' acclamation in Marcus Aurelius's German expedition (to Jove the god of gods, who alone is powerful) according to Tertullian a testimony to the Christian's God . . . . . 392

That as the learned Pagans in their writings, so likewise the vulgar in their common speech, when most serious, often used the word God, singularly and emphatically, for the Supreme, proved from Tertullian, Minutius Felix, and Lactantius: together with the testimony of Proclus, that the one supreme God was more universally believed throughout the world than the many gods . . . . . 395.

That Kyrie Eleeson was anciently a Pagan litany to the supreme God, proved from Arianus. The supreme God often called by the Pagans also *Kύριος*, or the Lord . . . 397

That even the most sottishly superstitious, idolatrous, and polytheistical, amongst the Pagans, did, notwithstanding, generally acknowledge one supreme Deity; fully attested and elegantly declared by Aurelius Prudentius in his Apotheosis 399

However, some of the ancient Pagans were said to have acknowledged none but visible and corporeal gods, yet as they conceived these to be endued with life and understanding, so did they suppose one Supreme amongst them, as either the whole heaven or ether animated, or the subtile fiery substance, that pervadeth all things, the God of the Heraclitics and Stoics; or the sun the Cleanthean god . . . 400

Though Macrobius refer so many of the Pagan gods to the sun, and doubtless himself looked upon it as a great god, yet does he deny it to be *omnipotentissimum Deum*, the most omnipotent God of all; he asserting a Trinity of Divine hypostases superior to it, in the Platonic way . . . 401

That the Persians themselves, the most notorious sun-worshippers, did, notwithstanding, acknowledge a Deity superior to it, and the maker thereof; proved from Eubulus. As also that the Persians' country-Jupiter was not the sun; confirmed from Herodotus, Xenophon, Plutarch, and Curtius. Cyrus's Lord God of heaven, who commanded him to build a house at Jerusalem; the same with the God of the Jews . . . 405

That as (besides the Scythians) the Ethiopians in Strabo, and other barbarian nations, anciently acknowledged one sovereign Deity; so is this the belief of the generality of the Pagan world to this very day . . . 406

XXVIII. Besides Themistius and Symmachus, asserting one and the same thing to be worshipped in all religions, though after different ways, and that God Almighty was not displeased with this variety of his worship; Plutarch's memorable testimony, that as the same sun, moon, and stars, are common to all, so were the same gods. And that not only the Egyptians, but also all other Pagan nations worshipped one reason and providence ordering all; together with its inferior subservient powers and ministers, though with different rites and symbols . . . 407

Titus Livius also of the same persuasion, that the same immortal gods were worshipped every where (namely, one supreme

and his inferior ministers); however the diversity of rites made them seem different . . . . . 409

Two Egyptian philosophers, Heraiscus and Asclepiades, professedly insisting upon the same thing, not only as to the Egyptians, but also the other Pagan nations: the latter of them (Asclepiades) having written a book entitled, *The Symphony, or Harmony of all Theologies or Religions*, to wit, in these two fundamentals, that there is one supreme God, and besides him, other inferior gods, his subservient ministers, to be worshipped. From whence Symmachus and other Pagans concluded, that the differences of religion were not to be scrupulously stood upon, but every man ought to worship God according to the law and religion of his own country. The Pagans' sense thus declared by Stobæus, that the multitude of gods is the work of the Demiurgus, made by him together with the world . . . . . 411

XXIX. That the pagan Theists must needs acknowledge one supreme Deity, further evident from hence; because they generally believed the whole world to be one animal, actuated and governed by one soul. To deny the world's animation, and to be an Atheist, all one, in the sense of the ancient Pagans. Against Gassendus, that Epicurus denied the world's animation, upon no other account, but only because he denied a providential deity. This whole animated world, or the soul thereof, to the Stoics, and others, the *πρῶτος Θεός*, the first and highest God . . . . . 414

Other Pagan theologers, who though asserting likewise the world's animation, and a mundane soul, yet would not allow this to be the supreme Deity, they conceiving the first and highest God to be no soul, but an abstract and immoveable mind superior to it. And to these, the animated world and mundane soul but *δευτερος θεός*, a second god . . . . . 415

But the generality of those, who went higher than the soul of the world, acknowledged also a principle superior to mind or intellect, called *τὸ ἐν* and *τὰγαθόν*, the one, and the good; and so asserted a Trinity of Divine hypostases subordinate, Monad, Mind, and Soul. So that the animated world or soul thereof was to some of these but *τρίτος θεός*, the third god . . . . . 416

The Pagans, whether holding soul, or mind, or monad, to be the highest, acknowledged only one in those several kinds, as the head of all; and so always reduced the multiplicity of things to an unity, or under a monarchy . . . . . 417

Observed, that to the Pagan theologers universally, the world



was no dead thing, or mere machine and automaton, but had life or soul diffused through it all; those being taxed by Aristotle as Atheists, who made the world to consist of nothing but monads or atoms, dead and inanimate. Nor was it quite cut off from the supreme Deity, how much soever elevated above the same: the forementioned Trinity, of Monad, Mind, and Soul, being supposed to be most intimately united together, and indeed all but one entire Divinity; displayed in the world; and supporting the same . . . . . 418

xxx. The sense of the Hebrews in this controversy. That according to Philo, the pagan Polytheism consisted not in worshipping many independent gods, and partial creators of the world, but, besides the one Supreme, other created beings superior to men . . . . . 420

That the same also was the sense of Flavius Josephus, according to whom, this the doctrine of Abraham; that the supreme God was alone to be religiously worshipped, and no created thing with him. Aristæus's assertion in Josephus, that the Jews and Greeks worshipped one and the same supreme God, called by the Greeks Zene, as giving life to all . . . . . 422

The latter rabbinical writers generally of this persuasion, that the Pagans acknowledging one supreme and universal Numen, worshipped all their other gods, as his ministers, or as mediators and intercessors betwixt him and them. And this condemned by them for עבירה ודירה strange worship or idolatry. —The first commandment thus interpreted by Maimonides, and Baal Ikkarim; Thou shalt not set up, besides me, any inferior gods as mediators, nor religiously worship my ministers or attendants. The miscarriage of Solomon and other kings of Israel and Judah this, that believing the existence of the one supreme God, they thought it was for his honour, that his ministers also should be worshipped. Abravanel's ten species of idolatry, all of them but so many several modes of creature-worship; and no mention amongst them made of many independent gods . . . . . 424

Certain places of Scripture also interpreted by rabbinical writers to this purpose; that the Pagan nations generally acknowledged one sovereign Numen . . . . . 429

The Jews, though agreeing with the Greeks and other Pagans in this, that the stars were all animated, nevertheless denied them any religious worship . . . . . 431

xxx. This same thing plainly confirmed from the New

Testament; that the Gentiles or Pagans, however Polytheists and idolaters, were not unacquainted with the true God. First from the Epistle to the Romans; where that, which is knowable of God, is said to have been manifest amongst the Pagans; and they to have known God, though they did not "glorify him as God, but hold the truth in unrighteousness;" by reason of their Polytheism and idolatry (or image-worship), the latter of which accounted by the Jews the greatest enormity of the Pagans, as is proved from Philo: and this the reason, why their Polytheism called also idolatry. Plainly declared by St. Paul, that the Pagan superstition consisted not in worshipping many independent gods and creators, but in joining creature-worship some way or other with the worship of the Creator. *Παρά τὸν κτίσαντα*, how to be understood; and in what sense the Pagans, though acknowledging the Creator, might be said to have worshipped the creature, beyond him . . . . . 432

Again, from St. Paul's oration to the Athenians, where their "unknown God" is said to be that same God, whom St. Paul preached, who made the world and all things in it. And these Athenian Pagans are affirmed *εἰσεβῆιν*, religiously and devoutly to worship this true God . . . . . 437

Lastly, that Aratus's Zeus was the true God, whose offspring our souls are, proved not only from the context of that poet himself, undeniably, and from the scholiast upon him, but also St. Paul's positive affirmation. Nor was Aratus singular in this; that ancient prayer of the Athenians, commended by M. Antoninus for its simplicity, (*Ἦσον, ἦσον, ᾧ φίλε Ζεῦ*; Rain, rain, O gracious Jupiter, &c.) no otherwise to be understood. And how that other passage of St. Paul, that in the wisdom of God, "the world by wisdom knew not God," does not at all clash herewith . . . . . 442

XXXII. In order to a fuller explication of the Pagan theology, and making it the better appear, that the Polytheism thereof was not contradictory to the acknowledgment of one supreme omnipotent Numen; three things to be considered. First, that much of their Polytheism was but seeming and fantastical only, and really nothing but the polyonymy of one God. Secondly, that their real and natural Polytheism consisted only in religiously worshipping, besides this one supreme universal Numen, many other particular and inferior created beings; as animated stars, demons, and heroes. Thirdly, that they worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods, in statues, images, and symbols;

these were also sometimes abusively called gods. To one or other of which three heads, all the pagan Polytheism referrible . . . . . 443

For the better persuading, that much of the pagan Polytheism, was really nothing but the polyonymy of one supreme God, or the worshipping him under several personal names; to be remembered again, what was before suggested; that the Pagan nations generally, besides their vulgar, had another more arcane theology, which was the theology of wise men and of truth. That is, besides both their fabulous and poetical, their political and civil theology, they had another natural and philosophic one. This distinction of the vulgar and civil theology, from the natural and real, owned by the Greeks generally, and amongst the Latins, by Scavola the Pontifex, Varro, Cicero, Seneca, and others . . . . . ib.

That the civil theology of the Pagans differed from the natural and real, by a certain mixture of fabulosity in it. Of the Romans suffering the statue of Jupiter's nurse to be kept in the very capitol, as a religious monument. Jupiter's nativity, or his having a father and a mother, atheistically fabulous; poets themselves acknowledging so much of the natural and true theology, that Jupiter being the father of gods and men, the maker of the whole world, was himself eternal and unmade . . . . . 445

That the civil as well as poetical theology had some appearance of many independent deities also; they making several supreme, in their several territories and functions; one chief for one thing, and another for another. But according to the natural and philosophic theology, the theology of wise men and of truth, all these but poetical, commentitious, fictitious, and fantastic gods; such as had no distinct substantial essences of their own; and therefore really to be accounted nothing else but several names or notions of one supreme God . . . . . 446

Certain, that the Egyptians had several proper and personal names for one supreme universal Numen, that comprehends the whole world, according to several notions of it, or its several powers: as Ammon, Phtha, Osiris, Neith, Cneph; to which may be added Serapis and Isis too. Besides Jamblichus, Damascius's testimony also to this purpose; concerning the Egyptian theology. This the pattern of the other, especially European theologies, the Greek and Roman . . . . . 447

That the Greeks and Romans also often made more gods of one, or affected a polyonymy of the same gods, evident from

those many proper and personal names bestowed, first upon the sun (of which Macrobius), who therefore had this epithet of *πολυώνυμος*, given to him; and then upon the moon, styled also polyonymous, as well as her brother the sun; and lastly upon the earth, famous likewise for her many names, as Vesta, Cybele, Ceres, Proserpina, Ops, &c. Wherefore not at all to be doubted, but that the supreme God, or sovereign Numen of the whole world, was much more polyonymous. This title given to him also, as well as to Apollo in Hesychius. He thus invoked by Cleanthes. Zeno, the writer *De Mundo*, Seneca, Macrobius, clearly confirm the same. Maximus Madaurensis in St. Augustine his full acknowledgment thereof . . . . . 450

The first instances of the polyonymy of the supreme God, amongst the Pagans in such names as these; *Βρονταῖος*, 'Υέτιος, *Πολιεύς*, *Μελίχιος*, *Φίλιος*, *Ξένιος*, *Σωτήρ*, &c. And amongst the Latins, Victor, Invictus, Opitulus, Stator, Tigillus, Centupeda, Almus, Ruminus, &c. Again, 'Ανάγκη, *Είμαρμένη*, *Πεπρωμένη*, *Μοῖρα*, 'Αδράστεια, all several names of the one supreme God, as likewise were Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, in the writer *De Mundo*. And amongst the Latins, not only Fate, but also Nature and Fortune too, as Cicero and Seneca affirm . . . . . 453

But besides these, there were other proper names of the supreme God, which had a greater show and appearance of so many several gods, they having their peculiar temples, and several appropriated rites of worship. And, first, such as signify the Deity, according to its more universal nature. As for example, Pan; which not the corporeal world inanimate, or endued with a senseless nature only, but a rational or intellectual principle displaying itself in matter, framing the world harmoniously, and being, in a manner, all things. This also the universal pastor and shepherd of all mankind . . . . . 455

Again, Janus; first invoked by the Romans in their sacrifices, and never omitted. The most ancient God, and first beginning of all things. Described by Ovid, Martial, and others, as an universal Numen. Concluded by St. Austin to be the same with Jupiter, the soul or mind of the whole world. The word Janus probably derived from *Ζανός* the Ætolian Jupiter 457

Genius also, one of the twenty select Roman gods, according to Festus, an universal Numen; that God, who is the begetter of all things. And, according to Varro in St. Austin, the same with Jupiter . . . . . 459

That Chronos, or Saturn, no particular deity, but an universal

Numen also, which comprehends the whole nature of the world, affirmed by Dionysius Halicarnassensis. The word Saturn Hebrurian (and originally from the Hebrew סֵתֶר) signifies *hidden*; called by the Latins, *Deus Latius*, the hidden God; whence Italy *Latium*, and the Italians Latins; as worshippers of this hidden God, or the occult principle of all things. This, according to Varro, he that produceth out of himself the hidden seeds and forms of all things, and swalloweth them up into himself again; which, the devouring of his male children. This *sinus quidam naturæ*, &c. a certain inward and deep recess of nature containing all things within itself; as God was sometimes defined by the Pagans. This to St. Austin the same with Jupiter; as likewise was Cœlus, or Uranus, in the old inscription, another name of God too. The poetic theology of Jupiter's being the son of Saturn, and Saturn the son of Cœlus; an intimation (according to Plato) of a Trinity of Divine hypostases universal . . . . . 460

Though Minerva or Athena were sometimes confined to a narrower sense, yet was it often taken for a name of God also, according to his universal notion; it being to Athenagoras the Divine wisdom displaying itself through all things. This excellently described by Aristides, as the first-begotten offspring of the original Deity or the second Divine hypostasis, by which all things were made; agreeably with the Christian theology 463

Aphrodite Urania, or the heavenly Venus, another name of God also, according to his universal notion; it being the same with that Love, which Orpheus, and other philosophers in Aristotle, made the first original of all things. Plato's distinction of an elder and a younger Venus: the former, the daughter of Uranus, without a mother, or the heavenly Venus: said to be senior to Japhet and Saturn. The latter, afterwards begotten from Jupiter and the nymph Dione, the vulgar Venus. Urania, or the heavenly Venus, called by the oriental nations, Mylitta; that is, the mother of all things. Temples in Pausanias dedicated to this heavenly Venus. This described by Æschylus, Euripides, and Ovid, as the supreme Deity, and the Creator of all the gods. God Almighty also thus described, as a heavenly Venus, or Love, by Sev. Boethius. To this Urania, or the heavenly Venus, another Venus in Pausanias near a-kin; called Ἀποστροφία or Verticordia; as conversive of men's minds upwards, from unchaste love, or unclean lust . . . . . 466

Though Vulcan, according to the common notion of him, a

special god, yet had he sometimes a more universal consideration. Zeno in Laertius, that the supreme God is called Vulcan as acting in the artificial fire of nature. Thus the soul of the world styled by the Egyptians Phtha; which, as Jamblichus tells us, was the same with the Greeks' Hephæstus, or Vulcan 468

Besides all which names of the supreme God, Seneca informs us, that he was sometimes called also *Liber Pater*, because the Parent of all things; sometimes Hercules, because his force is unconquerable; and sometimes Mercury, as being reason number, order, and knowledge . . . . . 469

But besides this polyonymy of God, according to his universal notion, there were other *dii speciales*, or special gods also, amongst the Pagans; which likewise were really but several names of one and the same supreme Deity, *varie utentis sua potestate* (as Seneca writeth), diversely using his power, in particular cases, and in the several parts of the world. Thus Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto (mistaken by some Christians for a trinity of independent gods), though three civil gods, yet were they really but one and the same natural and philosophic God; as acting in those three parts of the world; the heaven, the sea, the earth, and hell. Pluto in Plato's Cratylus, a name for that part of Divine Providence which is exercised in the government of separate souls after death . . . . . 470

This styled by Virgil the Stygian Jupiter. But by others, Pluto together with Ceres, the manifestation of the Deity, in this whole terrestrial globe. The celestial and terrestrial Jupiter but one God. Zeus and Hades one and the same to Orpheus. Euripides doubtful whether God should be invoked by the name of Zeus, or Hades. Hermesianax the Colophonian poet, makes Pluto the first of those many names of God synonymous with Zeus . . . . . 472

Neptune also, another special god, a name of the supreme Deity, as acting in the seas only. This affirmed by Xenocrates in Stobæus, Zeno in Laertius, Balbus and Cotta in Cicero, and also by Maximus Tyrius . . . . . 473

The statue of Jupiter with three eyes, in Pausanias; signifying, that according to the natural theology, it was one and the same God, ruling in those three several parts of the world, the heaven, the sea, and the earth; that was called by three names, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto. Wherefore, since Proserpina and Ceres are the same with Pluto, and Salacia with Neptune, concluded, that all these, though several poetical and political

gods, yet were but one and the same natural and philosophic God . . . . . 474

Juno also, another special god, a name of the supreme Deity, as acting in the air. Thus Xenocrates and Zeno. The Pagans in St. Austin, that God, in the ether. From whence St. Austin disputeth against the Pagans. Maximus Tyrius, of these and many other gods of the Pagans, that they were but *θεῖα ὀνόματα*, Divine names . . . . . 475

Yet many other special gods amongst the Pagans, which also were really nothing but Divine names, or names of God, as variously exercising his power, or bestowing several gifts; as in corn and fruit, Ceres; in wine, Bacchus; in medicine, Æsculapius; in traffic, Mercury; in war, Mars; in governing the winds, Æolus; &c. . . . . 478

That not only philosophers did thus interpret the many poetical and political gods, into one and the same natural God; but the poets themselves also sometimes openly broached this more arcane, free, and true theology; as Hermesianax amongst the Greeks, and Valerius Soranus amongst the Latins . . . . . ib.

That St. Austin, making a large enumeration of the other special gods amongst the Pagans, affirmeth of them universally, that, according to the sense of the Pagan doctors, they were but one natural god, and all really the same with Jupiter 479

Apuleius, in his book *De Deo Socratis*, either not rightly understood by that learned and industrious philologer, G. I. Vossius, or else not sufficiently attended to. His design there plainly to reduce the Pagans' civil theology into a conformity with the natural and philosophic; which he does as a Platonist, by making the *dii consentes* of the Romans, and other invisible gods, to be all of them nothing but the Divine ideas; and so the offspring of one highest God. An occasion for this fancy, given by Plato, where he calls his ideas animals . . . . . 482

Nor was Apuleius singular herein; Julian in his book against the Christians going the very same way; and no otherwise understood by St. Cyril, than as to make the invisible gods worshipped by the Pagans to be the Divine ideas. A fancy of the same Julian, who opposed the incarnation of the eternal Word, that Æsculapius was first of all the idea of the medicinal art, generated by the supreme God, in the intelligible world; which afterwards, by the vivific influence of the sun, was incarnated, and appeared in human form about Epidaurus. And that this Pagan doctrine, older than Christianity, proved out of Philo,

writing of a sun, and moon intelligible, as well as sensible, religiously worshipped by the Pagans; that is, the ideas of the archetypal world. And thus were these ideas of the Divine intellect, *νοητοὶ θεοί*, intelligible gods,—to Plotinus also . 482

Wherefore Julian, Apuleius, and those others, who thus made all the Pagan invisible gods to be nothing else but the Divine ideas, the patterns of things in the archetypal world, supposed them not to be so many independent deities, nor really distinct substances, separate from one another, but only so many partial considerations of one God. Julian before affirming them, *ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγενῆσθαι αὐτοὺς, συνυπάρχειν τε καὶ ἐνυπάρχειν αὐτῷ*, as to have been generated out of him; so also to coexist with him, and inexist in him . . . . . 492

That the Pagans appointed some particular god or goddess by name, to preside over every thing (there being *μηδὲν ἄθεον*, nothing at all without a god to them),—appeareth from that catalogue of their ignoble or petty gods, collected by St. Austin out of Varro. Now it is incredible, that they should think all these to be so many single substantial spirits of each sex, really existing apart in the world: they must therefore needs take them to be so many partial considerations of the Deity, either in the way of the more high-flown Platonists, as his ideas exemplarily and virtually containing all things; or else in that more common and easy way of the generality; as so many several denominations of him, according to the several manifestations of his power and providence; or, as the Pagans in Eusebius declare themselves, those several virtues and powers of the supreme God, themselves personated and deified. Which yet, because they were not executed without the subservient ministry of created spirits, angels, or demons, appointed to preside over such things; therefore might these also, collectively taken, be included under them . . . . . 493

But for the fuller clearing of this point, that the pagan Polytheism was in great part nothing but the polyonymy of one God, two things here to be taken notice of. First, that the Pagan theology universally supposed God to be diffused through all, to permeate and pervade all, and intimately to act all. Thus Horus Apollo of the Egyptians. Thus, among the Greeks, Diogenes the Cynic, Aristotle the Italic, and Stoical philosophers. Thus the Indian Brachmans before Strabo. Thus also the Latin poets; and Seneca, Quintilian, Apuleius, and Servius, besides others 496

That Anaxagoras and Plato also, though neither of them con-



founded God with the world, but affirmed him to be unmingled with any thing, yet concluded him in like manner to permeate and pervade all things. Plato's etymology of *δικαιον*, as taken for a name of God, to this purpose in his *Cratylus*. Where a fragment of Heraclitus, and his description of God agreeably hereunto; a most subtile and swift substance, that permeates and passes through every thing, by which all things are made. But Plato, disclaiming this corporeity of the Deity, will neither have it fire nor heat; but a perfect mind, that passes through all things unmixedly . . . . . 500

Wherefore no wonder, if the Pagans, supposing God to be diffused through all things, called him, in the several parts of the world, and things of nature, by several names, as in the earth Ceres, in the sea Neptune, &c. This account of the pagan Polytheism given by Paulus Orosius, that whilst they believed God to be in many things, they indiscreetly made many gods of him . . . . . 501

Farther to be observed, that many of the Pagan theologers seemed to go yet a strain higher, they supposing God not only to pervade all things, but also to be himself all things. That the ancient Egyptian theology ran so high, evident from the Saitic inscription. A strong tang hereof in *Æschylus*; as also in *Lucan*. Neither was this proper to those who held God to be the soul of the world, but the language also of those other more refined philosophers, *Xenophanes*, *Parmenides*, &c. they affirming God to be one and all, with which agreeth the author of the *Asclepian Dialogue*, that God is *unus omnia*, one all things;—and that before things were made, he did then *κρύπτειν*, hide them,—or occultly contain them all within himself. In like manner *Orpheus* . . . . . 502

This not only a farther ground of the polyonymy of one God, according to the various manifestations of himself in the world, but also of another strange phenomenon in the Pagan theology, their personating the inanimate parts of the world, and natures of things, and bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. Thus *Moschopulus* before cited, and *Arnobius*. This *Plutarch* thinks to have been done at first metonymically only, the effects of the gods being called gods; as the books of *Plato*, *Plato*. And thus far not disliked by him. But himself complaineth, that afterwards it was carried on farther by superstitious religionists, and not without great impiety. Nevertheless, that inanimate substances, and the natures

of things, were formerly deified by the ancient Pagans, otherwise than metonymically, proved from Cicero, Philo, and Plato. For they supposing God to pervade all things, and to be all things, did therefore look upon every thing as sacred or Divine; and theologize the parts of the world and natures of things; titularly making them gods and goddesses. But especially such things, as wherein human utility was most concerned, and which had most of wonder in them . . . . . 504

This properly the physiological theology of the Pagans, their personating and deifying the natures of things and inanimate substances. That the ancient poetic fables of the gods were many of them, in their first and true meaning, thus physiologically allegorical, and not mere herology, affirmed against Eusebius. Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, famous for thus allegorizing the fables of the gods. Chrysippus's allegorizing an obscene picture of Jupiter and Juno in Samos. Plato, though no friend to these poetic fables, yet confesses some of them to have contained allegories in them: the same doth also Dionysius Halicarnassus; and Cicero likewise, who affirmeth this personating and deifying the natures of things, to have filled the world with superstition . . . . . 511

Against Eusebius again, that the whole theology of the Pagans consisted not in thus deifying the natures of things, and inanimate bodies; because he that acknowledgeth no animant God, acknowledgeth no God at all, but is a downright Atheist 514

Neither ought this physiological theology of the Pagans, that consisted in personating and deifying the natures of things and inanimate bodies, to be confounded with that natural and philosophical theology of Varro, Scævola, and others, which admitted of no other but animant gods, and such as really existed in nature: for which cause it was called natural, in opposition to the fictitious and fantastic poetic gods . . . . . 515

St. Austin's just censure and condemnation of the Pagans, for their thus theologizing of physiology, or fictitiously personating and deifying the natures of things . . . . . 516

But though the Pagans did thus verbally personate and deify the things of nature, yet did not the intelligent amongst them therefore count these true and proper gods. Cotta in Cicero, "though we call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus, yet was there never any one so mad, as to take that for a god which himself feeds upon and devours." The Pagans really accounted that only for a god, by the invoking whereof they might expect be-

nefit to themselves ; and therefore nothing inanimate. This proved from Plato, Aristotle, Lucretius, Cicero, and Plutarch. Wherefore these natures of things deified, but fictitious and fantastic gods. Nor can any other sense be made of them than this, that they were really but so many several names of one supreme God, as severally manifested in his works : according to that Egyptian theology, that God may be called by the name of every thing, or every thing by the name of God. With which agreeth Seneca, that there may be as many names of God, as there are gifts and effects of his ; and the writer De Mundo, that God may be denominated from every nature, he being the cause of all things . . . . . 517

Wherefore these deified natures of things were not directly worshipped by the intelligent Pagans, but only relatively to the supreme God, or in way of complication with him only ; and so not so much themselves as God worshipped in them. The Pagans' pretence, that they did not look upon the world with such eyes as oxen and horses do, but with religious eyes, so as to see God in every thing. They therefore worshipped the invisible Deity in the visible manifestations of himself ; God and the world together. This sometimes called Pan and Jupiter. Thus was the whole world said to be the greatest God, and the circle of the heavens worshipped by the Persians ; not as inanimate matter, but as the visible manifestation of the Deity, displayed from it, and pervaded by it. When the Roman sea-captains sacrificed to the waves, their worship intended to that God who stilleth the waves and quieteth the billows . . . . . 521

These Pagans also apprehended a necessity of permitting men to worship the invisible God in his visible works. This account given by them in Eusebius. Plato himself approved of worshipping the invisible God in the sun, moon, and stars, as his visible images. And though Maximus Tyrius would have men endeavour to rise above the starry heavens, and all visible things, yet does he allow the weaker to worship God in his progeny. And Socrates persuades Euthydemus to be contented herewith. Besides which, some Pagans worshipping the elements, directed their intention to the spirits of those elements, as Julian in Ammianus (these being supposed also to be animated), or else to those demons whom they conceived to inhabit them, or preside over them . . . . . 524

xxxiii. Farther to be observed, that amongst those natures of things, some were merely accidental, as hope, love, desire,

memory, truth, virtue, piety, faith, justice, concord, clemency, victory, echo, night. According to which, the vulgar Athenians supposed St. Paul to have deified Anastasis, or made a goddess of the resurrection, as well as a god of Jesus. Vices also sometimes thus deified by them, as Contumely and Impudence (to whom were temples dedicated at Athens), though to the end that these things might be deprecated. These accidents sometimes deified under counterfeit proper names, as Pleasure under the name of Volupia, and Lubentina Venus; Time, under the name of Chronos or Saturn; Prudence, or Wisdom, under the names of Athena or Minerva; against which, Origen in his answer to Celsus. Cicero himself allowed of dedicating temples to mind, virtue, piety, faith, &c. . . . . 527

But such accidents and affections of things deified could not possibly be accounted true and proper gods, they having not *ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν*, any real subsistence, or substantial essence of their own.—And thus does Origen again dispute against Minerva's godship, as tropologized into Prudence. As he doth also elsewhere, upon the same ground, against that of Memory, the mother of the Muses, and that of the Graces; he conceiving, these and such-like, therefore, to be nothing but figments of the Greeks, they being things personated, and feigned with human members. Thus the Pagans condemned by Prudentius also, for feigning things incorporeal, with counterfeit members. These gods plainly exploded by Cotta, or Cicero in disguise; as having only *vim rerum*, but not *deorum*, the force of things, but not of gods in them; or being but *naturæ rerum*, and not *figuræ deorum* . . . . . 531

Wherefore the true meaning of these deified natures of things could be no other than this, that God was to be acknowledged and worshipped in all things; or, as the Pagans themselves declare it, that the force of every thing was both governed by God, and itself Divine. Pliny of this breaking and crumbling of the Deity into parts, every one worshipping that in God, and for a god, which himself most stood in need of. This dividing of the simple Deity, and worshipping it brokenly by parcels and piece-meal, as manifested in all the several things of nature, and parts of the world, justly censured, and elegantly perstringed, by Prudentius against Symmachus. Where Prudentius grants, that Symmachus, who declared, that it was one thing which all worshipped; when he sacrificed to Victory, did sacrifice to God Almighty, under that partial notion, as the giver of vic-

tory. This, in the Egyptian allegory, Osiris mangled and cut in pieces by Typhon. Victory and Virtue, as well as Neptune, Mars, and Bellona, but several names or notions of Jupiter, in the prologue of Plautus's *Amphitryo* . . . . . 534

Vossius's opinion, that these deified accidents, and natures of things, as well as the other Pagan invisible gods, were commonly looked upon by the vulgar, as so many single substantial minds, or spirits created by the supreme God, and appointed to preside over those several things respectively. Where it is acknowledged, that neither the political nor the poetical gods of the Pagans were taken, so much as by the vulgar, for so many independent deities . . . . . 536

Probable, that by these gods the wiser Pagans sometimes understood demons in general, or collectively; that is, whosoever they were, that were appointed to preside over those several things, or dispense them. As *Æolus* in Arrianus seems to be taken for the demons appointed by God Almighty to preside over the winds . . . . . 539

Lactantius's reason, why the *consentes* and select gods, vulgarly worshipped by the Romans, could not be single demons or angels . . . . . 542

And from Aristotle's observation, against Zeno, that, according to law, or civil theology, one god was chief for one thing, and another for another, concluded, that these political gods were not properly the subservient ministers of the Supreme; and therefore could be nothing but several names and notions of one natural God, according to his various powers and effects . . . . . ib.

And thus does Vossius himself afterwards confess, that, according to the natural theology, all the Pagan gods were but several denominations of one God. Where, notwithstanding, this learned and industrious philologer seems to take the natural and philosophic theology for the physiological, he making the god thereof the nature of things. Whereas the natural theology was the true, and real, and philosophical, opposed both to the fictions of the poets, and the institutes of law-makers and politicians. As Varro affirmeth, that in cities those things were worshipped and believed, according to false opinions, which had no nature, nor real subsistence, neither in the world, nor without it. The God of the Pagans not the nature of things, which could be the Numen of none but of Atheists; but an understanding Being, the great Mind, or Soul of the whole world,

pervading all things. Thus unquestionably true, that the many poetical and political gods were but several names or notions of one natural, real, and true God. Besides which, there were other inferior ministers of this supreme God, acknowledged to be the instruments of his providence, and religiously worshipped also. A brief but full account of the Pagans' natural theology, set down by Prudentius . . . . . 544

And when the more high-flown Pagans referred these poetical and political gods to the Divine ideas, or patterns of things in the archetypal world; which, besides the Platonists, the Egyptians in Celsus are said to have done, making the brute animals worshipped by them, but symbols of the eternal ideas; they hereby made these gods to be but so many partial considerations of one God neither, as being all things, or containing in himself the causes of all things; as Julian himself declareth in his sixth oration . . . . . 547

An anacephalæosis, that much of the pagan Polytheism was but the polyonymy of one God; he being worshipped under several names. First, according to several general notions of him; as of Janus, Genius, Saturn, Minerva, Urania, or the heavenly Venus, or Love, and others before declared. So also of Summanus, according to St. Austin, and Themis, afterwards to be mentioned . . . . . 549

And, secondly, according to other more particular notions of them (in their special gods), as acting in some parts of the world only, or exercising some particular powers . . . . . 551

And, lastly, as pervading all things, and being all things, or the cause of all things, he was thereupon called by the name of every thing, or every thing by his name. The Pagans in St. Austin; that their ancestors were not so sottish, as not to understand, that those things of nature were but Divine gifts, and not themselves gods. And the Pagans in Eusebius; that the invisible God, the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in his visible effects, wherein he hath displayed himself . 552

Though the two former kinds of these gods only called by Athanasius poetical and fictitious, he opposing them to those of the third sort, that were natural and real things; yet may these also be well called poetical, fictitious, and fantastical gods too; because though themselves were real things, existing in nature, yet was their personation and deification, mere fiction, fancy, and poetry. And accordingly were they before called by Origen *Ἑλλήνων ἀναπλάσματα*, mere fragments of the Greeks 553

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**XXXIV.** OF those Pagans, who supposed the supreme God to be the whole animated world. Hitherto shewed, that even the most refined of the Pagans agreed in these two things. First, in breaking and crumbling the one simple Deity, and multiplying it into many gods; or parcelling it out into several particular notions, according to its several powers and virtues (*Πολύωνυμον* being, to these Pagans, the same thing with *Πολυδύναμον*). And then, in theologizing the whole world, personating and deifying the natures of things, accidents, and inanimate bodies. They supposing God to pervade all things, and himself to be in a manner all things: therefore every thing to the religious, sacred, and Divine; and God to be worshipped in all . . . . . 1

We shall now add, that both those forementioned principles, of God's pervading all things, and his being all things, were carried on farther by those Pagan theologers, who had no higher notion of the supreme Deity, than as the soul of the world. For, first, whereas the more refined Pagans supposed God to pervade all things unmixedly; these mingled and confounded him with the whole world; some of them supposing him also to be a subtile body . . . . . 3

Again, whereas the other more sublimated Pagans affirmed God so to be all, as nevertheless to be something also above all; these concluded him to be nothing higher than the animated world . . . . . 5

And though they supposed, that as well in this mundane animal as in other animals, there was something principal and hegemonical (whether the sun, or ether, or fire), which therefore was emphatically called God; yet did they conceive the whole matter thereof to be animated, and so to be all God. Not barely as matter, but by reason of the soul thereof . . . ib.

Now if the whole world animated be the supreme God, then must all the parts and members of the world be the parts and members of one God; but not themselves therefore properly so

many gods. This affirmed by Origen, as the true sense of these Pagans, against that unwary assertion of Celsus, that if the whole were God, then must the several parts thereof needs be gods . . . . . 8

Wherefore, though these Pagans deified the parts of the world and natures of things, as well as the powers of the mundane soul; yet did not the intelligent amongst them worship them severally, as so many true and proper gods, but only as the parts and members of one great animal or god; or rather worship the great mundane Soul (the Life of the whole world) in them all. This proved from St. Austin . . . . . 10

The same plainly declared also by the Pagans in Athanasius, that not the divided parts of the world were by them accounted so many several gods, but the whole, made up of them all, one God; which yet might be worshipped in its several parts 12

The Pagans being thus divided, as to their opinions concerning the natural and true theology, some of them worshipped the world as the body of God, but others only as his image or temple. Thus Plutarch, though disliking the deifying of inanimate things, did notwithstanding approve of worshipping God in the whole world, as his most sacred temple. And the Persian Magi, allowing of no artificial temples made with men's hands, worshipped God *sub dio*, and upon the tops of mountains, as conceiving the whole world to be his natural temple. For the same reason did they condemn also artificial statues and images, concluding fire, earth, and water, and the like parts of the world, to be the natural images of the Deity. Thus Dino in Clemens Alexandrinus. This difference amongst the Pagan theologers noted by Macrobius. Thus were all the Pagans world-worshippers, in different senses; but not as a dead and inanimate thing, but either as the body of God, or else as his temple or image . . . . . 13

Furthermore, the Pagans universally acknowledging the world to be an animal, those of them, who supposed it not to be the first and highest God, conceived it to be either a second or else a third god; and so worshipped it, not only as a temple or image, but also as the son of the first God. Celsus pretended the Christians to have called their Jesus the Son of God, in imitation of these Pagans who styled the world so . . . 17

Thus have we made it fully to appear, that, according to the saying of Antisthenes, the many popular gods of the Pagans



were but one and the same natural God; or, according to that of Euclides, their many gods were but many names. So that neither their poetical nor yet their political theology, was looked upon by them as true and natural . . . . . 19

Nevertheless, the wiser Pagans generally concluded, that there ought to be another theology, besides the natural, fitly calculated for the vulgar, and having a mixture of falsehood and fabulosity in it. Varro and Scævola agreed, that the vulgar being incapable of the true and natural theology, it was expedient for them to be deceived in their religion. Strabo also, that the vulgar cannot, by philosophic reason and truth, be carried on to piety; but this must be done by superstition, and by the help of fables, and prodigious relations. The same partly acknowledged by Synesius for true. Plato also, that it is hard to find out God, but impossible to declare him to the vulgar; and therefore a necessity of a civil theology, distinct from the natural and philosophical . . . . . 20

xxxv. We come now to the next thing proposed, that, besides this seeming and fantastic Polytheism of the Pagans, which was nothing but the polyonymy of one God, they had another real Polytheism, even in their natural and philosophic theology itself. But this not of self-existent gods, but generated or created ones only. Thus, according to Plutarch, one highest unmade God is the Maker and Father of all the other gods, generated or derived from him. And Proclus concludes all the gods to derive their godship from the first God, who therefore is the fountain of the Godhead . . . . . 23

These inferior Pagan gods styled by Ammianus Marcellinus substantial powers, in way of opposition to those other poetical and political gods, that were not substantial or real, but only several names or notions of one supreme God. Those substantial powers (as divination and prophecy was by them imparted to men) said to be all subject to that one sovereign deity, called Themis, placed by Pagan theologers in the throne of Jupiter. This Themis also another name or notion of the supreme God, besides those beforementioned. Poetry and phantasty intermingled by the Pagans with their natural or philosophic theology . . . . . 25

Thus the Pagans held both one God and many gods, in different senses. Onatus and Plotinus, that the majesty of the supreme God consisteth in having multitudes of gods dependent

on him, and ruled by him, and that the honour done to them redounds to him. The gods of the original Pagans not mere dead statues and images, but living understanding beings, represented by them. That Christians asserted no solitary Deity, as Pagans pretended, but agreed with this of Seneca, that God hath generated or created innumerable understanding beings superior to men, ministers of his kingdom; the only difference being this, that they gave them no religious worship: out of Lactantius . . . . . 28

xxxvi. That besides the inferior gods, generally received by all the Pagans (namely, animated stars, demons, and heroes), the more refined of them, who accounted not the animated world the supreme Deity, acknowledged a trinity of Divine hypostases superior to them all. Which doctrine affirmed by Plotinus to have been very ancient, and no invention of Plato's . . . . . 32

Parmenides an assertor of a trinity long before Plato. This imputed to the Pythagoreans, by Moderatus in Simplicius, and Jamblichus in Proclus. Before Pythagoras, Orpheus had his trinity, Phanes, Uranus, and Chronus; the same with Plato's three kings or principles. Probable, that Pythagoras and Orpheus derived the same from the theology of the Egyptian Hermes. Some footsteps of such a trinity, in the Mithraic mysteries, amongst the Persians, and the Zoroastrian cabala. The same expressly declared in the Magic or Chaldaic oracles. A trinity of Gods worshipped anciently by the Samothracians, and called by a Hebrew name *cabiri*, the mighty gods. From thence the Roman Capitoline trinity derived; the second whereof, Minerva, or the Divine wisdom. The Ternary, a number used by the Pagans, in their religious rites, as mysterious . . . . . 33

It being no way probable, that such a trinity of Divine hypostases should have sprung from human wit, we may reasonably assent to what Proclus affirmeth, that it was at first *θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία*, a theology of Divine tradition or revelation;—as having been first imparted to the Hebrews, and from them communicated to other nations. Nevertheless, as this Divine cabala was but little understood by these Pagans, so was it by many of them depraved and adulterated . . . . . 35

This called universally by them a trinity of gods; or a first, second, and third god: by some a trinity of causes, and of principles, and of officers. The tradition of the three gods, in Proclus, ancient and famous. Numenius's three gods, called

by him the father, the son, and the nephew (or grandson). Nous, or intellect, to Plotinus, a second god: as also the world an image of all the three gods. Plotinus and Porphyrius, their ecstatic union with the first of these three gods . . . 36

That Philo, a religious Jew, and zealous opposer of the pagan Polytheism, called, notwithstanding, thê Divine Word, also a second god. This not agreeable to the principles of Christianity. Nevertheless St. Austin partly excuses this language in the Pagans . . . 39

And they perhaps the more excusable, because they sometimes called also those three hypostases, taken all together, the first god . . . 41

Nor was this trinity of Divine hypostases ill-languaged only by the Pagans, but also the cabala thereof much depraved and adulterated by some Platonists and Pythagoreans. As first, such as made the world to be the third god. Such a trinity, a confounding of God and creature together . . . 42

And that this an adulterated notion of the Trinity, evident from hence; because no reason, why these philosophers should stop here, since the sun, moon, and stars, and their other generated gods, differ not in kind, but only in degree, from the world . . . 44

Neither will this excuse them, that they understood this chiefly of the soul of the world; since if there were such a mundane soul, as together with the world made up one animal, this itself must needs be a creature also . . . ib.

This probably the reason, why Philo, though acknowledging the Divine Word as a second god, and second cause, yet no where speaketh of a third god; lest he should thereby seem to deify the whole created world. Though he call God also, in some sense, the soul of the world too (whether meaning thereby his first or his second god). So that Philo seems to have acknowledged only a duality, and not a trinity, of Divine hypostases . . . 45

Another depravation of this *θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία*, theology of Divine tradition—or cabala of the Trinity, that some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans, concluding all those several ideas of the Divine intellect, or archetypal world, to be so many distinct substances, animals, and gods; have thereby made their second hypostasis, not one, but a heap of innumerable gods and hypostases, and consequently destroyed their trinity . . . 46

Though Philo again here Platonized so far, as to suppose an incorporeal heaven and earth, and an intelligible sun, moon, and stars, to have been made before the corporeal and sensible; yet does he no where declare them to be so many distinct substances and animals, much less gods; but on the contrary censures that for Pagan idolatry. This pretence of worshipping the Divine ideas, in all sensible things, that which gave sanctuary and protection to the foulest and sottishest of all the Pagan idolatries; the Egyptians worshipping brute animals thus, and the Greeks the parts of the world inanimate, and natures of things . . . . . 48

A third deprivation or adulteration of the Divine cabala of the Trinity, by Proclus and other latter Platonists, asserting an innumerable company of henades, particular unities, superior to the first Nous, or Intellect, their second hypostasis; as also innumerable noes, substantial minds or intellects, superior to the first Psyche, their third hypostasis . . . . . 50

These noes seem to be asserted by Plotinus also: as likewise the henades and agathotetes were by Simplicius . . . . . 51

A swarm of innumerable Pagan gods from hence; besides their intelligible gods, or ideas, particular henades and noes, unities and intellects . . . . . 53

Now since these particular henades and noes of theirs must needs be creatures, the trinity of Proclus and such others nothing but a scale or ladder of nature, wherein God and the creature are confounded together, the juncture or commissure betwixt them being no where discernible; as if they differed only in degrees; a gross mistake and adulteration of the ancient cabala of the Trinity . . . . . ib.

This that Platonic, or rather pseudo-Platonic trinity, by us opposed to the Christian, viz. such a trinity, as confounds the differences betwixt God and the creature; bringing the Deity by degrees down lower and lower, and at length scattering it into all the animated parts of the world; a foundation for infinite Polytheism, cosmolatry or world-idolatry, and creature-worship. Hence the Platonists and Pythagoreans the fittest men to be champions for Paganism against Christianity . 55

Concerning the Christian Trinity, three things to be observed. First, that it is not a Trinity of mere names and words, nor logical notions, or inadequate conceptions of God; this doctrine having been condemned by the Christian church, in Sabellius

and others ; but a Trinity of hypostases, subsistences, or persons . . . . . 56

The second thing observable in the Christian Trinity, that though the second hypostasis thereof were begotten from the first, and the third proceedeth both from the first and second ; yet neither of them creatures. First, because not made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, or from an antecedent nonexistence brought forth into being, but both of them coeternal with the Father. Secondly, because all necessarily existent, and unannihilable. Thirdly, because all of them universal, or infinite, and creatures of all other particular beings . . . . . 58

The third observable as to the Christian Trinity, that the three hypostases thereof are all truly and really one God ; not only by reason of agreement of will, but also of a mutual περιχώρησις and ἐνύπαρξις, permeation of each other, and inexistence.— Though no instance of the like unity to be found elsewhere in nature ; yet since two distinct substances, corporeal and incorporeal, make one man and person in ourselves, much more may three Divine hypostases be one God . . . . . 59

Though much of mystery in the Christian Trinity, yet nothing of plain contradiction to reason therein ; that is, no nonsense, and impossibility. The ill design of those, who represent the Christian Trinity as absolutely contradictory to reason, that they may thereby debauch men's understandings, and make them swallow down other things, which unquestionably are such ib.

The Christian Trinity much more agreeable to reason than the pseudo-Platonic, in the three particulars beforementioned. First, its making their third hypostasis the animated world, or mundane soul. Which, not only too great a leap betwixt the second and third, but also a gross debasement of the Deity, and confounding it with the creature ; a foundation for world-idolatry, and worshipping inanimate things, as parts and members of God . . . . . 60

God to Origen, but *quasi anima mundi*, as it were the soul of the world, and not truly and properly such. All the perfection of this notion to be attributed to God, but not the imperfection thereof . . . . . 61

Certain, that, according to the more refined Platonists, their third Divine hypostasis, not a mundane, but supra-mundane soul, and the δημιουργός, or opificer—of the whole world. So to Amelius, Porphyrius, and Plotinus. A double soul of the world

to Plato likewise. The third hypostasis, to these, no creature, but a creator . . . . . 64

So in their second particular (whereby the forementioned pseudo-Platonic trinity, no trinity), its making all the ideas and archetypal paradigms of things, so many hypostases, animals, and gods. This a monstrous extravagancy. Not to be doubted, but that Plato well understood these ideas to be nothing but noēmata, or conceptions of the Divine mind, existing no where apart by themselves; however called *οὐσίαι*, essences or substances,—because not such accidental and evanid things as our human thoughts are, they being the standing and eternal objects of all science: as also ζῶα, or animals;—to signify, that they were not mere dead forms, as pictures upon paper, or carved statues. And thus did not only Amelius understand St. John concerning the Logos, whatsoever was made was life in him, but also divers of the ancient fathers, Greek and Latin. This deifying of ideas but a piece of Pagan poetry . . . . . 65

Lastly, whereas Proclus and others intermingle many particular gods with those three universal hypostases, and henades, and agathotetes, unities and goodnesses, substantial above the first intellect; and noes, particular minds or intellects, above the first soul; this hypothesis of theirs altogether irrational and absurd; there being nothing essentially goodness, wisdom, and sanctity, but the three Divine hypostases, all other beings having only a participation thereof. Thus Origen expressly; who therefore acknowledgeth no higher rank of created beings than such as the Platonists call souls, that are self-moveable, vitally unitable to bodies, and peccable. With whom agreeth St. Jerome, and others of the fathers, that God is the only impeccable being; but all understanding creatures free-willed, and lapsable . . . . . 68

An opinion of Simplicius, that even in that rank of beings called souls (though not essentially immutable, but self-moveable) some are of so high a pitch, as that they can never degenerate, nor sink or fall into vicious habits. Insomuch that he makes a question, whether proæresis belong to them or no 71

But whatever is to be thought of this, Origen too far in the other extreme, in denying any other ranks of souls above human; and supposing all the difference, that is now betwixt the highest angels and men, to have proceeded only from their merits; and different uses of their free will; his reason being this,

because God would be otherwise a *prosopoleptes*, or accepter of persons. This also extended by him to the soul of our Saviour Christ ; as not partially chosen to that dignity, but for its faithful adherence to the Divine Word in a pre-existent state ; which he would prove from Scripture. But if a rank of souls below human, and specifically differing from them, as Origen himself confesses those of brutes to be ; no reason, why there might not also be other ranks or species superior to them 72

But least of all can we assent to Origen, when from this principle, that all souls are essentially endued with free will, and therefore in their nature peccable, he infers those endless circuits of souls, upwards and downwards, and consequently denies them any fixed state of holiness and happiness by Divine grace ; an assertion contrary to the tenor and promises of the gospel. Thus perhaps that to be understood, that " Christ brought life and immortality to light through the gospel ;" not as if he were the first who taught the soul's immortality, a thing believed before by the pharisaic Jews, and generality of Pagans ; but because these held their endless transmigrations and circuits, therefore was he the first who brought everlasting life and happiness to light . . . . . 75

That Origen, a man well skilled in the Platonic learning, and so much addicted to the dogmata thereof, would never have gone so far into that other extreme, had there been any solidity of reason for either those *henades*, or *noes*, of the latter Platonists. This opinion all one, as if the Christian should suppose besides the first person, or Father, a multitude of particular paternities, superior to the second person ; and also besides the one Son, or Word, a multitude of particular sons or words, superior to the third, the Holy Ghost. This plainly to make a breach upon the Deity, and to introduce a company of such creaturely gods, as imply a contradiction in their very notion 77

Lastly, this not the catholic doctrine of the Platonic school neither, but a private opinion only of some late doctors. No footsteps of these *henades* and *agathotetes* to be found any where in Plato ; nor yet in Plotinus. This language little older than Proclus. Nor does Plato speak of any abstract or separate mind, save only one ; his second things about the second, being ideas ; as his thirds about the third created beings. Plotinus also doubtful and staggering about these *noes*, he seeming sometimes to make them but the heads or summities of souls.

Wherefore this pseudo-Platonic trinity to be exploded, as confounding the differences betwixt God and the creature. Whereas the Christian Trinity homogeneal, all Deity or Creator ; all other things being supposed to be the creatures of those three hypostases, and produced by their joint concurrence and influence ; they being all really but one God . . . . . 77

Nevertheless, these forementioned depravations and adulterations of that Divine cabala of the Trinity, not to be charged upon Plato himself, nor all the other ancient Platonists and Pythagoreans ; some of which approached so near to the Christian Trinity as to make three hypostases all truly Divine, and creators, other things being the creatures of them . . . . . 81

First, therefore, Plato himself, in his *Timæus*, carefully distinguisheth betwixt God and the creature, and determineth the bounds of each, after this manner. That the first is that, which always is, and never was made ; the second, that which is made and had a beginning, but truly is not. His meaning here perverted by junior Platonists, whom Boetius also followed. Where Plato also takes it for granted, that whatsoever hath a temporary and successive duration, had a beginning ; and whatsoever had no beginning, hath no successive but permanent duration : and so concludes, that whatsoever is eternal, is God ; but whatsoever exists in time, and hath a beginning, creature . . . . . *ib.*

Now to Plato, more eternal gods than one. Which not ideas or noemata, but true substantial things ; his first, second, and third, in his epistle to Dionysius, or trinity of Divine hypostases, the makers or creators of the whole world. Cicero's gods, by whose providence the world and all its parts were framed . . . . . 85

The second hypostasis in Plato's trinity, to wit, mind or intellect, unquestionably eternal, and without beginning. The same affirmed by Plotinus also of the third hypostasis, or Psyche, called the word of the second, as the second the word of first. Porphyrius's testimony to this purpose in St. Cyril ; where also mind, or the second Divine hypostasis (though said to have been begotten from the first, yet), called *ἀνοπάτωρ*, and *ἰδιογένητος*, its own parent, and its own offspring,—and said to have sprung out *ἰδιογένως*, self-begottenly . . . . . 86

This mysterious riddle expounded out of Plotinus. The plain meaning thereof no more than this, that though this second hypostasis proceeded from the first, yet was it not produced by it after a creaturely manner, nor arbitrarily by will and choice,



but in way of natural and necessary emanation. Thus have some Christians ventured to call the Logos, *αυτόθεον*, and *ex seipso Deum*, God from himself . . . . . 88

Dionysius Petavius, having declared the doctrine of Arius, that the Father was the only eternal God, and the Son, or Word, a creature, made in time, and out of nothing; concludes it undeniably manifest from hence, that Arius was a germane, true, and genuine Platonist. Whereas it is most certain from hence, that Arius was no Platonist at all; and that Petavius himself did not well understand the Platonic doctrine. Had Plato denied the eternity of his second hypostasis, called *Nous*, he must have denied the eternity of wisdom and understanding itself; this being to him that wisdom by which God himself is wise, and whereby he made the world. With which agreeth also Athanasius; "Our Lord is wisdom, and not second to any other wisdom; and, the Father of the Word is not himself Word; and, that was not word and wisdom, which produced word and wisdom." This in opposition to Arius, who maintained another word and wisdom, senior to that word and wisdom in Christ. These Platonists, so far from denying the eternity of the Word, that they rather attributed too much to it, in making itself begotten. Wherefore Plato, asserting the eternity of his second hypostasis, *Nous* or Logos, and not of the world, did thereby, according to Athanasius's own doctrine, make it to be no creature . . . . . 90

Nor is there any force at all in that testimony of Macrobius, cited by Petavius, to the contrary, wherein the first hypostasis is said to have created Mind from itself, and the second to have created Soul; because these ancient Pagans did not confine the word *create* to such a narrow sense, as Christians commonly do; but used it generally for all manner of production. Petavius's mistake, chiefly from that spurious trinity of the latter Platonists, whose third god is by themselves called *ποίημα*, a creature. But this not the doctrine of the ancients . . . . . 92

Nevertheless some more reason to doubt, whether Plato's third hypostasis were eternal, because in his *Timæus*, he generates the mundane soul, this controversy decided, by supposing a double Psyche, *ἐγκόσμιον*, and *ὑπερκόσμιον*, a mundane, and supra-mundane soul; the first of these called by Plotinus a heavenly Venus, and a separate soul. Wherefore, though the lower Venus, or mundane soul, according to Plato made in time together with the world; yet the higher Divine soul, or heavenly

Venus, the son of Chronus without a mother, his third hypostasis, eternal, and without beginning . . . . . 93

This farther evident from hence, because Plato, in his epistle to Dionysius, affirmeth as well of the second and third, as of the first, that in all those things that are cognate to our human soul (or creaturely) there is *οὐδέν τοιοῦτο*, nothing like thereunto . . . . . 95

Secondly, the three hypostases of Plato's trinity not only all eternal, but also necessarily existent, and absolutely unannihilable. Nor could the first any more exist without the second and third, than the sun without its primary light and secondary splendour. These also, according to Plotinus, the three principles of the universe; so that there could be neither more, nor fewer. They who called the second autopator, signified thereby the necessity of its existence . . . . . ib.

Thirdly, these three Platonic hypostases, as eternal and necessary, so likewise universal, or comprehensive of the whole world, that is, infinite and omnipotent. Therefore called principles, and causes, and officers. Though nous, or mind, vulgarly looked upon as the highest principle of all things, yet Plato set before it one most simple good. When Nous, said by Plato to be *γενοῦστος*, of the same kind with the first cause of all things, this all one as if he had affirmed it to be *ὁμοούσιος*, coessential or consubstantial with it . . . . . 96

Plato's third hypostasis, Pysche, or the superior mundane soul, called by him Zeus, from *ζῆν*, as also the cause and fountain of life, and the prince and king of all things. And when said to be *ἐκγονος*, the offspring of the highest mind,—thereby made consubstantial with it also. So that Plato's whole trinity homoousian . . . . . 98

Though by the demiurgus or officer Plato commonly meant the second hypostasis, mind or intellect, yet Atticus, Amelius, Plotinus, and others, called the third, or the higher Psyche also, by that name. Wherefore, according to the genuine Platonic and Parmenidian trinity, all the three hypostases joint creatures of the whole world. Thus Ficinus often, and Proclus. Porphyrius's affirmation, that the Deity, according to Plato, extends to three hypostases . . . . . 99

Certain therefore, that Arius did not Platonize, but rather Athanasius and the Nicene fathers; who, notwithstanding, made not Plato but the Scriptures their foundation. The genuine trinity of Plato and Parmenides, a middle betwixt that of Sabellius

and that of Arius; it being neither a trinity of words and names as the former; nor an heteroousious trinity, a confused jumble of God and the creature together; but homoousious and homogeneal: all eternal, necessarily existent, infinite or omnipotent, and creator . . . . . 99

But that it may yet more fully appear, how far the most refined Platonic and Parmenidian trinity does either agree or disagree with the Scripture and Christian doctrine, two things farther to be observed concerning it. First, that the Platonists universally asserted an essential dependence of their second and third hypostases upon the first, as also a gradual subordination in them. Thus Plotinus; Chronos, or the second hypostasis, is in a middle state betwixt his father who is greater, and his son who is inferior. And that in this eternal generation or emanation no progress upward, but all downward, and a gradual descent 100

More of the dependence and gradual subordination of the second and third hypostases of the Platonic trinity to the first. Each following hypostasis called *ἵχνος* and *τόπος* and *εἰκὼν*, and *εἶδωλον*, and *μίμημα*, of that before it. Philo's offensive expression, that the Logos, or Word, is the shadow of God. This gradation commonly illustrated by the *ἐκλαμψις*, or *ἀπαύγασμα*, the effulgency or out-shining splendour of the sun . . . . 102

The same farther manifested from the several distinctive characters given to each hypostasis in the true Platonic or Parmenidian trinity. The first, *ἐν πρὸ πάντων*, one before all things;—the second, *ἐν πάντα*, one all things,—as to their distinct ideas; the third, *ἐν καὶ πάντα*, one really producing all things. The first, Unity and Goodness essential; the second, Understanding and Wisdom; the third, self-active Love and Power. The first, or Father *ἀνεέργητος*, above action;—the second or Son, the Demiurgus, the Maker or contriving Architect of the world, but an immoveable nature; the third a moveable Deity, and the immediate Governor of the whole world. Amelius's distinction of them into *τὸν ὄντα*, *τὸν ἔχοντα*, *τὸν ὀρῶντα* . . . . . 105

The greatest difficulty in the distinctive characters of these three Platonic hypostases; that understanding, reason, and wisdom, should be made peculiar to the second, as if the first were therefore devoid of mind, reason, and wisdom. This an arcanum of the Platonic and Pythagoric theology; that whereas Anaxagoras, Aristotle, and the vulgar, make mind and understanding the oldest of all things, and the highest principle in the universe; this supposes mind, knowledge, and wisdom, to be not

the first, but second. Partly because there is a multiplicity in knowledge, but there must be unity before multiplicity. And partly because there must be *Νοητόν* before *Νοῦς*, an object or intelligible before intellect.—As also, because intellection or knowledge is not the highest good, or happiness; and therefore to be some substantial thing, in order of nature superior to mind. Hence concluded, that the supreme Deity is better than *Logos*, reason, word, or intellect. That not *Logos*, from whence *Logos* is derived. Thus *Philo*; The God before Reason, or Word, better than all the rational nature. But this difficulty common to Platonism with Christianity; which likewise makes Word, or reason and wisdom, not the first, but second hypostasis. Thus does *Athanasius* deny, that there is any word, reason, or wisdom, before the Son of God. What then? Is the first hypostasis therefore *ἄνοους* and *ἄλογος*, devoid of reason and mind?—*Plotinus's* attempt to answer this; that the first hath *φῶς ἀπλοῦν*, a simple light,—different from that multiform light of knowledge. Again, that the first is *νόησις αὐτῆ*, intelligence itself,—and therefore superior to intellect, or that which hath intellection. (For *ἡ νόησις οὐ νοεῖ*, intelligence itself doth not understand.) Besides which, another attempt also to solve this difficulty . 108

The ground of this Platonic dependence and subordination in the Divine hypostases; because there is but one fountain of the Godhead; so that the second must needs differ from the first, as the *ἀπαύγασμα* from the *φῶς*, the splendour from the sun 114

Though the second hypostasis said to have been begotten from the first; yet this not to be taken for such a generation as that of men, where three men (father, son, and grandson), all adult, have no essential dependence upon one another, nor gradual subordination. This but an imperfect generation . ib.

Furthermore, the Platonists would recommend this their gradation in the Deity, or subordination of hypostases, from hence, because by this means, not so great a leap or jump in the creation, as otherwise there must be; nor the whole Deity screwed up to such a disproportionate height, as would render it incapable of having any intercourse with the lower world. Were the whole Deity, either one simple monad, or else an immoveable mind, it could have no such liberty of will as is commonly attributed to it, nor be affectible with any thing here below; nor indeed any fitter object for men's devotion than an adamantine rock. Whereas all the phenomena of the Deity solvable by this Platonic gradation . . . . . 115

As also, according to this hypothesis, some reasonable satisfaction to be given, why just so many Divine hypostases, and neither fewer nor more . . . . . 116

The second thing to be observed, concerning the genuine Platonic or Parmenidian trinity; that though the hypostases thereof be called three natures, and three principles, and three opificers, and three gods; yet they all really make up but one Divinity. For the world, being created by all three, and yet having but one creation, they must needs be all one Creator. Porphyrius in St. Cyril explicitly, that according to Plato, the essence of the Deity extendeth to three hypostases . . . 117

Platonists farther add, that were it not for this essential dependence and subordination, the three Divine hypostases must needs be three co-ordinate gods; and no more one God than three men are one man, or three suns one sun. Whereas the sun, its splendour, and derivative light, may all well be accounted one and the same thing . . . . . 120

These Platonists therefore suppose so close a union, and so near a conjunction, betwixt their three hypostases, as no where else to be found in nature. Plotinus, that there is nothing between them, and that they are only not the very same. They acknowledge also their perichoresis or mutual inexistence. The three hypostases one Divinity to the Platonists, in the same manner as the centre, radius distance immoveable, and moveable circumference of a sphere, all one sphere. The first infinite Goodness, the second infinite Wisdom, the third infinite active Love, and power substantial . . . . . 121

From this full account of the true and genuine Platonic trinity, its both agreement and disagreement with the Christian, plainly appeareth. First, its agreement in the three fundamental things beforementioned; and consequently its discrepance from Arianism . . . . . 124

Secondly, its disagreement notwithstanding, from the now-recited doctrine, in that it supposes the three hypostases not to have one and the same singular essence, nor yet an absolute coequality, but a gradual subordination, and essential dependence. Upon which account, said by some to symbolize with Arianism, however different from it in the main point . . . . . 125

Besides which, the best of the Platonists sometimes guilty of extravagant expressions. Plotinus's *ὁμοειδής δὲ καὶ ἡμετέρα*, that our human soul is of the same species with the mundane soul, or third hypostasis;—that being but the elder sister. Which

indeed is to make it coessential or consubstantial with us men, as St. Austin understood it. This a foundation for creature-worship or idolatry. Why the Arians by Constantine called Porphyrianists. But this doctrine, as repugnant to Plato, so elsewhere contradicted by Plotinus himself . . . . . 126

That notwithstanding a Platonic Christian would apologize for Plato and the genuine Pythagoreans after this manner. First, that having no Scriptures, councils, nor creeds, to direct them in the darkness of this mystery, and to guide their language, they the more excusable, if not always uniform, and sometimes extravagant. More to be wondered at, that they should approach so near the Christian truth . . . . . 130

And for their gradual subordination of hypostases, and dependence of the second and third upon the first; that these Platonists herein the more excusable, because the majority of Christian doctors, for the first three centuries, seem to have asserted the same . . . . . 131

The Platonic Christians' farther apology; that the Platonists' intention in subordinating their three hypostases, only to exclude a plurality of co-ordinate independent gods. That none of Plato's three hypostases, creatures, but that the essence of the Godhead belongeth to them all; they being all eternal, necessarily existent, infinite or omnipotent, and creators. Therefore in the sense of the Nicene council, consubstantial and coequal. The essence of the Godhead, wherein all the three hypostases agree, as well to the fathers as Platonists, general and universal . . . . . 132

Besides which the genuine Platonists would acknowledge also all their three hypostases to be homoousian, coessential, or consubstantial, yet in a farther sense, as making up one entire Divinity: as the root, stock, and branches, coessential to a vine. The trinity not so undivided as if three were not three in it. The inequality and subordination in the Platonic trinity within the Deity itself only, and in the relation of the hypostases to one another; they being *ad extra*, all one and the same God, jointly concurring in the same actions, and in that respect devoid of inequality . . . . . 136

Furthermore, the Platonic Christian would urge, that according to the principles of Christianity itself, there must needs be some dependence and subordination in these hypostases, in their relation to one another; a priority and posteriority of order and dignity: that which is originally of itself, having some kind of

priority and superiority over that which is wholly derived from it. The second and third hypostases not so omnipotent as the first, because not able to beget or produce that. Hence first styled by Macrobius, the most omnipotent of all. Sundry passages in Scripture favouring this hypothesis, as also orthodox fathers. Athanasius's resemblances to the original light and the secondary splendour; to the fountain and the stream, the root and the branch, the water and the vapour. The equally asserted by the orthodox, in way of opposition to the Arian inequality of God and creature; that they equally God, or uncreated. Notwithstanding which, some inequality amongst them allowed by Petavius and others, as this God and that person 137

However, no necessity of any more inequality and subordination in the Platonic, than in the Christian trinity; they being but infinite goodness, and infinite wisdom, and infinite active love, and power substantial. Another hypothesis of some Platonists hinted by St. Austin out of Porphyry, which makes the third hypostasis a middle betwixt the first and second; and implies not so much a gradation, as a circulation in the trinity . 142

As for the Platonists supposing their three hypostases (though one entire Divinity) to have their distinct singular essences, without which they conceive they could be nothing but three names; the Platonic Christian would make this apology, that the orthodox fathers themselves were generally of this persuasion, that the essence of the Godhead, wherein all the three persons agree, not one singular, but only one common or universal essence. Their distinction to this purpose, betwixt *ὄνσια* and *ὑπόστασις*; that the former was common or generical, the latter singular or individual. Theodoret, Basil, and many others. Petavius's acknowledgment, that the Greeks universally agreed therein . . . . . 143

The opinion of Gregory Nyssen, Cyril, Damascen, and others, that the persons of the Trinity no otherways one, than as three individuals under the same species, or as three men agree in the same common humanity. These the chief assertors of an absolute, independent, and unsubordinate coequality. This the only fault that St. Cyril finds in the Platonists, that they did not after such a consubstantiality. Whereas this trinity, Tritheism; the three persons thereof being no more one God than three men are one man; however this certain, that these fathers did not suppose the three hypostases of the Trinity to have all the same singular essence. Another extreme, that sprung up after-

wards in the room of the former Tritheism, and owned by no other authority than of a Lateran council . . . . . 146

And that this sameness of singular essence was not asserted by the Nicene fathers, and first opposers of Arius : first, clearly acknowledged by Petavius . . . . . 150

But this farther evident from hence ; because the same orthodox fathers, who opposed Arianism, did also condemn Sabellianism ; which asserted, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be but one hypostasis, that is, to have but one and the same singular essence ; and consequently acknowledged no other trinity than of names or words . . . . . 152

It appeareth also from hence, because the word homoousious had never any other sense, than to signify the agreement of things numerically differing, in some common and general nature or essence. St. Basil, that the same thing is not homoousious, coessential, or consubstantial with itself ; but always one thing with another. *Τὸ ὁμοούσιον* the same with *συγγένεια* in Plotinus. So also in Athanasius, he affirming the branches to be homoousious and congenerous with the root. Besides which, *ὁμογενής*, *ὁμοειδής*, and *ὁμοφυής*, used by Athanasius and others as synonymous with *ὁμοούσιος*. None of which words signify an identity of singular essence, but general or universal only. The council of Chalcedon, that our Saviour Christ, as to his humanity, was homoousious or consubstantial with us men. Thus does Athanasius deny the Son or Word, as such, to be homoousious or consubstantial with creatures ; as also he affirmeth men to be consubstantial and coessential with his Father . . . . . 152

Moreover, the sense of the Nicene fathers, in their consubstantiality, may more fully appear from the doctrine of Arius opposed by them ; which made the Son a creature, and therefore (as Athanasius writeth) *ἑτερούσιον* or *ἀλλοτριούσιος*, of a different essence or substance from the Father. Proved clearly from Athanasius, that by the consubstantiality of the Word was meant no more, than its being not a creature or uncreated . . . . . 155

Farther proof, out of Athanasius, that by consubstantiality is not meant a sameness of singular, but only of general essence. As also out of St. Austin . . . . . 159

Lastly, that the homoousian fathers did not assert against Arius, a sameness of singular essence, evident from their disclaiming those two other words, *ταυτούσιον*, and *μονοούσιον* (as having a Sabellian sense in them), the former by Epiphanius, the latter by Athanasius. So that they, who asserted the Son to



be homoousious, consubstantial with the Father, denied him to be monoousious, or tautoousious, that is, to have the same singular essence . . . . . 164

From all these considerations, concluded by the Platonic Christian, that as the genuine trinity of Plato agreed with that of the orthodox Christians, in being not heteroousian, but homoousian, coessential or consubstantial; not made up of God and creature, but all homogeneous of uncreated, or creator: so did the Trinity of the first orthodox Anti-Arians herein agree with the Platonic trinity, that it was not monoousian, or tautoousian, one and the same singular essence, under three names or notions only; but really three hypostases or persons . . . 166

Nevertheless, here remaineth a question to be answered; whether Athanasius, the Nicene fathers, and all the first Anti-Arians, did therefore assert the same thing with Greg. Nyssen, Cyril, and others, that the three persons in the Trinity were but three co-ordinate individuals, under the same species, having only a specific unity or identity (besides consent of will); or that they all agree in the uncreated Nature only. This grossly asserted in the Dialogues of the Trinity, vulgarly imputed to Athanasius, and to that purpose also, that three men are not three men, but only then when they dissent from one another in will and opinion. But these Dialogues pseudepigraphous. Nevertheless to be granted, that Athanasius himself, in that book of the Common Essence of the Persons, seems to lay something too much stress upon this common nature, essence, or substance, of the three persons, as to the making of them all but one God. However, it is certain, he does not there rely upon that alone; and elsewhere acknowledgeth it to be insufficient. The true reason why Athanasius laid so great a stress upon the Homoousiotes, not because this alone would make them one God, but because they could not possibly be one God without it: For if the Father be uncreated, and the Son a creature, then can they not both be one God. Several passages of Athanasius cited to this purpose. Those expressions in him of one Godhead, and the sameness of the Godhead, and one essence or substance in the Trinity, not so to be understood, as if the three persons were but several names, notions, or modes of one thing . . . 167

Wherefore though Athanasius lay his foundation in this *εἰδικὴ ἐνότης*, common specific unity of the persons (which is their consubstantiality), in order to their being one God; yet does he superadd other considerations also thereunto. As first of all

this, that they are not three principles, but only one; the essence of the Father being the root and fountain of the Son and Spirit; and the three hypostases, gathered together under one head. Where Athanasius implies, that, were they perfectly co-ordinate and independent, they would not be one but three gods 174

In the next place, he farther addeth, that these three hypostases are not three separated disjoined things, but indivisibly united; as the splendour is indivisible from the sun, and wisdom from him that is wise. That neither of these persons could be without the other; nor any thing come between them: they so immediately conjoined together, as that there is a kind of *συνέχεια*, or continuity betwixt them . . . . . 176

Thirdly, Athanasius goes yet higher; affirming these three hypostases not only to be indivisibly conjoined, but also to have a mutual inexistence in each other. This afterwards called an Emperichoresis. That of our Saviour, "I am of the Father, and the Father in me," therefore quarrelled at by the Arians, because they conceived of things incorporeal after a corporeal manner. That the Godhead of the Son is the Godhead of the Father; and the Father exercises a providence over all, in the Son . . . . . 178

Lastly, Athanasius also, in sundry places, supposes the three Divine hypostases to make up one entire Divinity; as the fountain and the stream make up one entire river; the root, stock, and branches, one entire tree. Accordingly the word homoousios used by Athanasius, in a farther sense, not only to signify things agreeing in one common and general essence, but also such as essentially concur to the making up of one entire thing. That the three hypostases do outwardly, or *ad extra*, produce all, *μίαν ἐνέργειαν*, one and the self-same action;—the Father by the Word, in the Holy Spirit, doing all things. That all this doctrine of Athanasius would have been readily assented to by Plato and his genuine followers. The Platonic Christian therefore concludeth, that there is no such real difference betwixt the genuine Platonic trinity, and that of the first orthodox Anti-Arian fathers, as some conceive. From which notwithstanding that tritheistic trinity, of St. Greg. Nyssen, Cyril, and others, of three co-ordinate individuals under the same species (as three men), seems to have been a deviation . 181

Hitherto the Platonic Christians' apology, for the genuine Platonic Trinity; or endeavour to reconcile it with the doctrine of the ancient church: where nothing is asserted by ourselves, but

all submitted to the judgment of the learned in these matters. And whatsoever in Plato's trinity shall be found discrepant from the sense of the first orthodox Anti-Arian fathers, utterly disclaimed by us. Athanasius a great instrument of Divine Providence, for preserving the Christian church from lapsing into a kind of pagan and idolatrous Christianity . . . . 183

The reason of this apology, for the genuine Platonic trinity; because it is against the interest of Christianity that this should be made more discrepant from the Christians than indeed it is. Moreover certain, that this genuine Platonic trinity was Anti-Arian; or rather the Arian Anti-Platonic. Wherefore Socrates wondered, that Georgius and Timotheus presbyters should adhere to the Arian faction; when one of them was accounted much a Platonist, the other an Origenist . . . . 184

Furthermore, Platonic Pagans, after Christianity, highly approved of the beginning of St. John's Gospel concerning the Logos, as exactly agreeing with their Platonic doctrine. Thus Amelius in Eusebius, and others. A Platonist in St. Austin, that it deserved to be writ in golden letters, and set up in some eminent places in every Christian church. But that, which is most of all considerable, to justify this apology, the generality of Christian fathers, before and after the Nicene council, looked upon this Platonic trinity, if not as really the same thing with the Christian, yet as approaching so near thereunto, that it differed chiefly in circumstances, or manner of expression. Thus Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, St. Cyprian, or the author of the book *De Spiritu Sancto*, Eusebius Cæsariensis, and, which is most of all to the purpose, Athanasius himself, he giving a signal testimony thereunto. To which may be added St. Austin and Theodoret. St. Cyril, though blaming the Platonic subordination (himself supposing the Trinity to be three co-ordinate individuals under the same specific nature of the Godhead), yet acknowledges, that Plato was not altogether ignorant of the truth, &c. But that Plato's subordination of his second hypostasis to the first, was not (as the Arian) of a creature to the Creator; already made unquestionably evident . . . 185

Wherefore a wonderful providence of Almighty God here to be taken notice of; that this doctrine, of a trinity of Divine hypostases, should be entertained in the Pagan world before Christianity, as it were to prepare a way for the reception of it amongst the learned. Which the junior Platonists were so sensible of, that besides their other adulterations of the Platonic

trinity before mentioned (for the countenancing of their Polytheism and idolatry), they at length innovated and altered the whole cabala, now no longer acknowledging a trinity, but at least a quaternity of Divine hypostases; namely, before and besides the Trinity, another hypostasis superior thereunto, and standing alone by itself. This first started by Jamblichus, carried on by Proclus, taken notice of by St. Cyril: besides which, Proclus also added other fantastic trinities of his own . . . 193

Another advantage of this Platonic trinity, extending to the present time; perhaps not unintended also by Divine Providence to abate the confidence of those conceited wits, who so boldly decried the Trinity for nonsense, absolute contradiction to reason, and impossibility, when they shall find, that the best and freest wits amongst the Pagans, though having no Scripture revelation to impose upon them, were yet fond of this hypothesis . . . 197

And now it sufficiently appears, that the ancient Platonists and Pythagoreans were not to be taxed for Polytheists and idolaters, in giving religious worship to their three Divine hypostases. One grand design of Christianity, to free the world from idolatry and creature-worship: and this the reason why the ancient fathers so zealously opposed Arianism, because it thwarted that design, it paganizing and idolatrizing that which was intended for the unpaganizing of the world. One remarkable passage of Athanasius to this purpose . . . . . 198

Where first observable, that Athanasius expressly affirmeth the Pagans to have worshipped only one uncreated and many created gods. Thus Greg. Naz. that there was but one Divinity amongst the Pagans also. And Irenæus, that they attributed the first place of the Deity to one supreme God, the Maker of this universe. And, secondly, that to Athanasius, and all those other fathers who charged the Arians with idolatry, this was supposed not to consist in worshipping many independent and self-existent gods, but in giving religious worship to creatures: as the Arians gave a religious worship to the Son or Word, supposed by themselves to be but a creature . . . . . 201

But if Arians guilty of Polytheism or idolatry, for bestowing religious worship upon the Son or Word, as a creature (though the chief of creatures, and that by which all others were made), much more they guilty hereof, who religiously worshipped other inferior beings. Athanasius; that no creature the object of religious worship, and that the orthodox worshipped the Divinity in the humanity of our Saviour Christ. Nestorius branded

with the name of a man-worshipper. Some suppose that necessary to idolatry, which is impossible, to worship more than one, as omnipotent, or with mental *latria* . . . . . 203

And now have we sufficiently answered the objection against the naturalness of the idea of a God, as including oneliness in it, from the pagan Polytheism. What farther here intended concerning the same (as a foundation for our defence of Christianity) deferred, to make room for a confutation of all the atheistic arguments.

## CHAP. V.

### *A particular confutation of all the atheistic grounds.*

THE first atheistic argument; that there is no idea of God. That in answer to this, the idea of God hath been already declared; *viz.* a perfect understanding being, unmade, or self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things, in which nothing inconceivable nor contradictory. That these confounded Atheists themselves, who deny that there is any idea of God at all, must notwithstanding, of necessity, suppose the contrary; because otherwise, denying his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing. And that they agree also with Theists in the same idea; the one denying the existence of that which the other asserteth, that an understanding nature is the original of all things. This idea of God, as containing oneliness and singularity in it, not only largely defended and made good against that objection from the pagan Polytheism; but also proved, that the generality of mankind have a natural prolepsis or anticipation in their minds concerning the real and actual existence of such a being. Atheists but monsters, and anomalies of mankind. This a sufficient confutation of the first atheistic argument . . . . . 209

Nevertheless, that Atheists may not pretend any of their strength to be concealed, all their particular exceptions against the idea of God here declared, being five. Their first exception, that we can have no idea nor thought of any thing not subject to sense; much less any evidence of the existence thereof. The answer, First, that whereas the Atheists suppose sense to be the only knowledge, or at least original knowledge; sense, as such, is not knowledge, or understanding; because if it were, then every one that sees light and colours, or feels heat and cold, would understand light and colours, heat and cold.

Plainly proved also from that atomic philosophy (which the Epicurean Atheists so much pretend to), that there is a higher faculty of the soul, which judges of sense, detects the phantasy thereof, resolves sensible things into intelligible principles, &c. No passion able to make a judgment, either of itself, or of other things. The confounded Democritus himself sometimes acknowledged sense to be but seeming and phantasy, and not to reach to the absolute truth and reality of things. He therefore exploded qualities out of the rank of entities, because unintelligible; concluding them to be but our own phantasms. Undeniably evident, that we have ideas, notions, and thoughts, of many things, that never were in sense, and whereof we have no genuine phantasms. Atheists attend not to their own cogitations. That opinion, that there is nothing in the understanding which was not before in sense, false and atheistical. Men having a notion of a perfect understanding being, the cause of all things, as the object of their devotion; the Atheists, notwithstanding, would here persuade them, that they have none, and that the thing is a nonentity, merely because they have no sensible idea or phantasm thereof. And so may they as well prove, not only reason and understanding, appetite and volition, to be nonentities, but also fancy and sense itself; neither of these falling under sense, but only the objects of them. Were God indeed corporeal, as some mistaken Theists suppose, yet his essence chiefly consisting in mind and understanding, this of him could not possibly be subject to sense. But that there is also substance incorporeal, which therefore in its own nature is insensible, and that the Deity is such will be elsewhere demonstrated 211

Though the evidence of singular bodies existing, depend upon the information of sense, yet the certainty of this very evidence, not from sense alone, but a complication of reason and understanding with it. Sense fantastical, not reaching to the absolute truth of things; and obnoxious to delusion. Our own imaginations taken for sensations and realities in sleep, and by melancholized persons when awake. Atomic Atheists themselves assert the existence of such things as they have no sense of; atoms, membranes, or exuvius images of bodies, nay, incorporeal space. If the existence of nothing to be acknowledged which falls not under sense, then not the existence of soul and mind. God the great mind that rules the whole universe; whence our imperfect minds derived. The existence of that God, whom no eye can see, demonstrated by reason from his effects . . . . . 216

The second atheistic pretence against the idea of God and his existence, from Theists' own acknowledging him to be incomprehensible; from whence they infer him to be a nonentity. Here perhaps it may be granted, in a right sense, that whatsoever is altogether inconceivable, is either in itself, or at least to us, nothing. How that of Protagoras, that every man is the measure of all things to himself, in his sense false. Whatsoever any man's shallow understanding cannot clearly comprehend, not therefore to be presently expunged out of the catalogue of beings. Nevertheless, according to Aristotle, the soul and mind in a manner all things. This a crystalline globe, or notional world, that hath some image in it of whatsoever is contained in the real globe of being . . . . . 218

But this absolutely false; that whatsoever cannot be fully comprehended by us, is therefore utterly inconceivable and consequently nothing. For we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, nor have such an adequate conception of any substance, as perfectly to master and conquer the same. That of the Sceptics so far true, that there is some something incomprehensible in the essence of every thing, even of body itself. Truth bigger than our minds. Proper to God Almighty (who alone is wise) perfectly to comprehend the essences of all things. But it follows not from hence, that therefore we have no idea nor conception at all of any thing. We may have a notion or idea of a perfect being, though we cannot fully comprehend the same by our imperfect minds; as we may see and touch a mountain, though we cannot enclasp it all round within our arms. This therefore a false theorem of the Atheists, that whatsoever cannot be fully comprehended by men's imperfect understandings, is an absolute nonentity . . . . . 219

Though God more incomprehensible than other things, because of his transcendent perfection, yet hath he also more of conceptibility: as the sun, dazzling our sight, yet hath more of visibility also than any other object. The dark incomprehensibility of the Deity, like the azure obscurity of the transparent ether, not any thing absolutely in itself, but only relative to us 221

This incomprehensibility of the Deity, so far from being an argument against its existence, that certain, on the contrary, were there nothing incomprehensible to our imperfect minds, there could be no God. Every thing apprehended by some internal congruity. The scantness and imperfection of our narrow understandings must needs make them asymmetrical or incommensurate to what absolutely perfect . . . . . 222

Nature itself intimates, that there is something vastly bigger than our mind and thoughts, by those passions implanted in us, of devout veneration, adoration, and admiration, with ecstasy and pleasing horror. That of the Deity, which cannot enter into the narrow vessels of our minds, must be otherwise apprehended, by their being plunged into it, or swallowed up, and lost in it. We have a notion or conception of a perfect being, though we cannot fully comprehend the same; because ourselves being imperfect, must needs be incommensurate thereunto. Thus no reason at all, in the second atheistic pretence, against the idea of God and his existence; from his confessed incomprehensibility . . . . . 223

The third follows, That infinity, supposed to be essential to the Deity, is a thing perfectly inconceivable, and therefore an impossibility and nonentity. Some passages of a modern writer to this purpose. The meaning of them, that there is nothing of philosophic truth in the idea or attributes of God, nor any other sense in the words, than only to signify the veneration and astonishment of men's own minds. That the word infinite signifies nothing in the thing itself so called, but only the inability of our understandings, and admiration. And since God, by Theists, is denied to be finite, but cannot be infinite, therefore an inconceivable nothing. Thus another learned well-willer to Atheism. That we have no idea of infinite, and therefore not of God. Which, in the language of Atheists, all one as to say, that he is a nonentity . . . . . 224

*Answer.* This argument, that there can be nothing infinite, and therefore no God, proper to the modern and neoteric Atheists only; but repugnant to the sense of the ancients. Anaximander's *ἄπειρον*, infinite matter,—though Melissus's *ἄπειρον*, the true Deity.—Formerly both Theists and Atheists agreed in this; that there must be something or other infinite, either an infinite mind, or infinite matter. The ancient Atheists also asserted a numerical infinity of worlds. Thus do Atheists confute or contradict Atheists . . . . . 225

That the modern Atheists do no less contradict plain reason also, and their very selves, than they do their predecessors, when they would disprove a God from hence, because there can be nothing infinite. For, first, certain, that there was something or other infinite in duration, or eternal without beginning; because, if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. But hardly any Atheists can be so sottish, as



in good earnest to think there was once nothing at all, but afterwards senseless matter happened to be. Notorious impudence in them, who assert the eternity of matter, to make this an argument against the existence of a God; because infinite duration without beginning an impossibility . . . . . 227

A concession to the Atheists of these two things; that we neither have a phantasm of any infinite, because there was never any in sense; and that infinity is not fully comprehensible by finite understandings neither. But since, mathematically certain, that there was something infinite in duration, demonstrated from hence, against Atheists, that there is something really existing, which we have neither any phantasm of, nor yet can fully comprehend in our minds . . . . . 228

Farther granted, that as for infinity of number, magnitude, and time, without beginning; as we have no phantasm nor full comprehension of them, so have we neither any intelligible idea, notion, or conception: from whence it may be concluded, that they are nonentities. Number infinite in Aristotle, only in a negative sense, because we can never come to an end thereof by addition. For which very reason also there cannot possibly be any number positively infinite, since one or more may always be added. No magnitude so great neither, but that a greater may be supposed. By infinite space, to be understood nothing but a possibility of more and more body, farther and farther infinitely, by Divine power; or that the world could never be made so great, as that God was not able to make it still greater. This potential infinity, or indefinity of body, seems to be mistaken for an actual infinity of space. Lastly, no infinity of time past, because then there must needs be time past which never was present. An argument of a modern writer. Reason therefore concludes, neither world nor time to have been infinite in past duration 229.

Here will the Atheist think he has got a great advantage for disproving the existence of a God; they, who thus take away the eternity of the world, taking away also the eternity of a God. As if God could not be eternal otherwise than by a successive flux of infinite time. But we say, that this affordeth a demonstration of a God; because, since both the world and time had a beginning, there must of necessity be something whose duration is not successive; but permanent, which was the creator of them both. Wherefore the Atheists can here only make grimaces, and quibble upon *nunc-stans*; as if this standing eternity of the Deity was nothing but a pitiful moment of time

standing still; and as if all duration must needs be the same with ours, &c. . . . . 231

Concluded, that infinite and eternal are not words which signify nothing in the thing itself, but only the idle progress of our minds, or our own ignorance, stupid astonishment, and veneration: not mere attributes of honour and compliment, but attributes belonging to the Deity (and that alone), of the most philosophic truth. And though we have no adequate comprehension thereof, yet must we have some notion of that which we can demonstrate to belong to something . . . . . 232

But the thing, which the Atheists principally quarrel with, is infinite power, or omnipotence; which they pretend also to be utterly inconceivable, and impossible, and a name of nothing. Where indeed our modern Atheists have the joint suffrage of the ancients also, who concerned themselves in nothing more than disproving omnipotence, or infinite power . . . . . 234

This omnipotence either wilfully or ignorantly misrepresented by Atheists, as if it were a power of doing things contradictory. An irony of a modern Atheist, that God could turn a tree into a syllogism. The absurd doctrine of Cartesius, that God could have made twice two not to have been four, or the three angles of a triangle not to have been equal to two right. This to make one attribute of the Deity devour and destroy another; infinite will and power, infinite understanding and wisdom. To suppose God to understand and be wise only by will, really to give him no understanding at all. God not so omnipotent as that he can destroy the intelligible natures of things; which were to baffle and befool his own wisdom. Infinite power that which can do all that is possible; that is, conceivable, or implies no contradiction. The very essence of possibility, conceptibility. And thus all the ancient Theists. Absurd for Atheists to say, that a power of doing nothing but what is conceivable is inconceivable . . . . . ib.

But because Atheists look upon infinity as such a mormo, we shall take off the vizard from it; by declaring, that it is really nothing else but perfection. Infinite understanding and knowledge, perfect understanding without any defect, and the knowledge of all things knowable. Infinite power, perfect power, or a power of doing all things possible. Infinite duration, perfection of essence. Because infinity, perfection; therefore nothing, which includeth any thing of imperfection in the essence of it, can be truly and properly infinite; as number, magnitude,

and time: all which can but counterfeit infinity. Nothing one way infinite which is not so every way, or a perfect being 237

Now, that we have an idea of perfection, plain from that of imperfection. Perfection first in order of nature, as the rule and measure. This not the want of imperfection, but imperfection the want of perfection. A scale or ladder of perfections in nature, perceived by means of that idea which we have of a being absolutely perfect, the measure of them. Without which we could not take notice of imperfection in the most perfect of all those things which we ever had sense of. Boethius; that whatsoever is imperfect in any kind, implies something in that kind perfect from whence it was derived. And that the nature of things took not beginning from any thing incomplete and imperfect; but descended downward, from what was absolutely perfect, by steps and degrees, lower and lower . . . 238

Wherefore, since infinite the same with perfect, we having a notion of the latter must needs have of the former. And though the word infinite be negative, yet is the sense positive. Finite the negation of infinite, as which, in order of nature, is before it; and not infinite of finite. However, in things incapable of true infinity; infinity, being here a mere imaginary thing and nonentity, can be only conceived by the negation of finite, as nothing is by the negation of something. An infinite being nothing but a perfect being, such as never was not, and could produce all things possible, or conceivable . . . 239

The fourth atheistic pretence against the idea of God; that it is an arbitrary complement of contradictory notions. Where first we deny not, but that as some religionists extend the Divine power to things contradictory, so may others compound contradictions together in the nature of the Deity. But it does not follow from thence that theology itself is therefore contradictory, no more than that philosophy is so because some philosophers also hold contradictory things; or that nothing is absolutely true, neither in divinity nor philosophy, but all seeming and fantastical; according to the Protagorean doctrine . . . 240

But though it be true, that whatsoever really implies a contradiction is a nonentity; yet is this rule obnoxious to much abuse, when whatsoever men's shallow understandings cannot reach to, is therefore presently cried down by them, as an impossibility, or nothing. As when the Atheists and Materialists explode incorporeal substance upon this pretence; or make it

only an attribute of honour, expressing the veneration of men's minds, but signifying nothing in nature, nor having any philosophic truth. But the Atheists' true meaning in this objection, and what kind of contradictions they are which they impute to all theology, may appear from a passage of a modern writer, namely, such as these: when God is said to perceive sensible things, and yet to have no organs of sense; as also to understand, and yet to have no brains. The undisguised meaning of the writer, that religion is not philosophy, but law, and all mere arbitrary constitution; nor God a subject of philosophy, as all real things are; he being no true inhabitant of the world or heaven, but only of men's brains and fancies; and his attributes signifying neither true nor false, nor any thing in nature, but only men's reverence and devotion towards what they fear. And so may any thing be said of God, no matter what, so it be agreeable to civil law. But when men mistake attributes of honour for attributes of philosophic truth; that is, when they will suppose such a thing as a God really to exist; then is all absurd nonsense and contradiction. God's understanding without brains no contradiction . . . . . 242

Certain, that no simple idea, as of a triangle, or a square, can be contradictory to itself; much less can the idea of a perfect being, the most simple of all. This indeed pregnant of many attributes, which, if contradictory, would render the whole a nonentity; but all the genuine attributes of the Deity as demonstrable of a perfect being as the properties of a triangle or a square; and therefore can neither be contradictory to it, nor one another . . . . . 246

Nay, the genuine attributes of the Deity not only not contradictory, but also all necessarily connected together . . . . . ib.

In truth all the attributes of the Deity, but so many partial and inadequate conceptions of one and the same perfect being, taken into our minds as it were by piece-meal . . . . . 247

The idea of God neither fictitious nor factitious. Nothing arbitrary in it; but a most natural and simple idea, to which not the least can be added, nor any thing detracted from it. Nevertheless may there be different apprehensions concerning God; every one that hath a notion of a perfect being, not understanding all that belongeth to it; no more than of a triangle, or of a sphere . . . . . ib.

Concluded therefore, that the attributes of God no confounded nonsense of religiously-astonished minds, huddling up

together all imaginable attributes of honour, courtship, and compliment; but the attributes of necessary philosophic truth; and such as do not only speak the devotion of men's hearts, but also declare the real nature of the thing. Here the wit of a modern atheistic writer ill placed. (Though no doubt but some, either out of superstition or ignorance, may attribute such things to the Deity as are incongruous to its nature.) Thus the fourth atheistic pretence against the idea of God confuted 248

In the next place, the Atheists think themselves concerned to give an account of this unquestionable phenomenon; the general persuasion of the existence of a God in the minds of men, and their propensity to religion; whence this should come if there were no real object for it in nature. And this they would do by imputing it, partly to the confounded nonsense of astonished minds, and partly to the imposture of politicians. Or else to these three things; to men's fear; and to their ignorance of causes; and to the fiction of law-makers and civil sovereigns . . . . . 250

In the first of these atheistic origins of religion; That mankind, by reason of their natural imbecility, are in continual solicitude and fear concerning future events, and their good and evil fortune. And this passion of fear raises up in them, for an object to itself, a most affrightful phantasm; of an invisible understanding being, omnipotent, &c. They afterwards standing in awe of this their own imagination, and tremblingly worshipping the creature of their own fear and fancy . . . . . ib.

The second atheistic origin of Theism and religion; That men having a natural curiosity to inquire into the causes of things, wheresoever they can discover no visible and natural causes, are prone to feign causes invisible and supernatural. As Anaxagoras said, never to have betaken himself to a God, but only when he was at a loss for necessary material causes. Wherefore no wonder, if the generality of mankind, being ignorant of the causes of all or most things, have betaken themselves to a God, as to a refuge and sanctuary for their ignorance . . . . . 251

These two accounts of the phenomenon of religion; from men's fear and solicitude, and from their ignorance of causes and curiosity, joined together by a modern writer. As if the Deity were but a mormo or bugbear, raised up by men's fear, in the darkness of their ignorance of causes. The opinion of other ghosts and spirits also deduced from the same original. Men's taking things casual for prognostics, and being so addicted

to omens, portents, prophecies, &c. from a fantastic and timorous supposition, that the things of this world are not disposed of by nature, but by some understanding person . . . 252

But lest these two accounts of the phenomenon of religion should prove insufficient, the Atheists superadd a third, imputing it also to the fiction and imposture of civil sovereigns; who, perceiving an advantage to be made from hence, for the better keeping men in subjection, have thereupon dexterously laid hold of men's fear and ignorance; and cherished those seeds of religion in them, from the infirmities of their nature: confirming their belief of ghosts and spirits, miracles, prodigies, and oracles, by tales, publicly allowed and recommended. And that religion might be every way obnoxious to their designs, have persuaded the people, that themselves were but the interpreters of the gods, from whom they received their laws. Religion an engine of state; to keep men busily employed; entertain their minds; render them tame and gentle, apt for subjection and society . . . 253

All this not the invention of modern Atheists. But an old atheistic cabal; that the gods made by fear. Lucretius; that the causes of religion, terror of mind and darkness; and that the empire of the gods owes all its being to men's ignorance of causes; as also, that the opinions of ghosts proceeded from men's not knowing how to distinguish their dreams and other frightful fancies from sensations . . . 254

An old atheistic surmise also; that religion a political invention. Thus Cicero; the Atheists in Plato, that the gods are not by nature, but by art and laws only. Critias, one of the thirty tyrants of Athens, his poem to this purpose . . . 256

That the folly and falseness of these three atheistic pretences, for the origin of religion, will be fully manifested. First, as to that of fear and fancy. Such an excess of fear, as makes any one constantly believe the existence of that for which no manner of ground, neither in sense nor reason, highly tending also to his own disquiet; nothing less than distraction. Wherefore the generality of mankind here affirmed by Atheists, to be frightened out of their wits, and distempered in their brains; only a few of themselves, who have escaped this panic terror, remaining sober, or in their right senses. The sobriety of Atheists nothing but dull stupidity and dead incredulity; they believing only what they can see or feel . . . 258

True, that there is a religious fear consequent upon the be-

lief of a God ; as also, that the sense of a Deity is often awakened in men's minds by their fears and dangers. But religion no creature of fear. None less solicitous about their good and evil fortune than the pious and virtuous; who place not their chief happiness in things alien, but only in the right use of their own will. Whereas the good of Atheists wholly in things obnoxious to fortune. The timorous complexion of Atheists, from building all their politics and justice upon the foundation of fear . . . . . 259

The Atheists' grand error here ; that the Deity, according to the general sense of mankind, nothing but a *terrificum*, a formidable, hurtful, and undesirable thing. Whereas men every where agree in that Divine attribute of goodness and benignity *ib.*

Φθονερὸν τὸ δαιμόνιον, in the worst sense, taken by none but a few ill-natured men, painting out the Deity according to their own likeness. This condemned by Aristotle in the poets (he calling them therefore liars), by Plutarch in Herodotus, as spoken universally; Plutarch himself restraining the sense thereof to his evil principle. Plato's ascribing the world to the Divine goodness, who therefore made all things most like himself. The true meaning of this proverb; That the Deity affecteth to humble and abase the pride of men. Lucretius's hidden force, that hath, as it were, a spite to all overswelling greatnesses, could be no other than the Deity. Those amongst Christians, who make the worst representation of God, yet fancy him kind and gracious to themselves . . . . . 260

True, that religion often expressed by the fear of God. Fear *prima mensura Deitatis*, the first impression that religion makes upon men in this lapsed state.—But this not a fear of God, as mischievous and hurtful, nor yet as a mere arbitrary being, but as just, and an impartial punisher of wickedness. Lucretius's acknowledging men's fear of God to be conjoined with a conscience of duty. A natural discrimination of good and evil, with a sense of an impartial justice presiding over the world, and both rewarding and punishing. The fear of God, as either a hurtful, or arbitrary and tyrannical being (which must needs be joined with something of hatred), not religion, but superstition. Fear, faith, and love ; three steps and degrees of religion, to the son of Sirach. Faith better defined in Scripture than by any scholastics. God such a being, as if he were not, nothing more to be wished for . . . . . 262

The reason why Atheists thus mistake the notion of God, as

a thing only to be feared, and consequently hated; from their own ill-nature and vice. The latter disposing them so much to think, that there is no difference of good and evil by nature, but only by law; which law, contrary to nature as restraint to liberty. Hence their denying all natural charity, and acknowledging no benevolence or good-will but what arises from imbecility, indigency, and fear. Their friendship at best no other than *mercatura utilitatum*. Wherefore, if there were an omnipotent Deity, this (according to the atheistic hypothesis) could not have so much as that spurious love or benevolence to any thing, because standing in need of nothing, and devoid of fear. Thus Cotta in Cicero. All this asserted also by a late pretender to politics; he adding thereunto, that God hath no other right of commanding than his irresistible power; nor men any obligation to obey him but only from their imbecility and fear, or because they cannot resist him. Thus do Atheists transform the Deity into a monstrous shape; an omnipotent being that hath neither benevolence nor justice in him. This indeed a mormo or bugbear . . . . . 265

But as this a false representation of Theism, so the atheistic scene of things most uncomfortable, hopeless, and dismal, upon several accounts. True, that no spiteful designs in senseless atoms; in which regard, Plutarch preferred even this atheistic hypothesis before that of an omnipotent mischievous being. However, no faith, nor hope neither, in senseless atoms. Epicurus's confession, that it was better to believe the fable of the gods, than that material necessity of all things, asserted by the other atheistic physiologers before himself. But he not at all mending the matter by his supposed free will. The panic fear of the Epicureans, of the frame of heaven's cracking, and this compilement of atoms being dissolved into a chaos. Atheists running from fear plunge themselves into fear. Atheism, rather than Theism, from the imposture of fear, distrust, and disbelief of good. But vice afterwards prevailing in them makes them desire there should be no God . . . . . 268

Thus the Atheists, who derive the origin of religion from fear, first put an affrightful vizard upon the Deity, and then conclude it to be but a mormo or bugbear, the creature of fear and fancy. More likely of the two, that the opinion of a God sprung from hope of good than fear of evil; but neither of these true, it owing its being to the imposture of no passion, but supported by the strongest and clearest reason. Nevertheless, a



natural prolepsis, or anticipation of a God also, in men's minds, preventing reason. This called by Plato and Aristotle, a vaticination . . . . . 270

The second atheistic pretence to solve the phenomenon of religion, from the ignorance of causes, and men's innate curiosity (upon which account the Deity said by them to be nothing but an asylum of ignorance, or the sanctuary of fools), next to be confuted . . . . . 271

That the Atheists, both modern and ancient, here commonly complicate these two together, fear, and ignorance of causes; making Theism the spawn of both; as the fear of children in the dark raises bugbears and spectres. Epicurus's reason why he took such great pains in the study of physiology; that, by finding out the natural causes of things, he might free men from the terror of a God, that would otherwise assault their minds . . . . . 272

The Atheists thus dabbling in physiology, and finding out material causes for some of those phenomena, which the unskilful vulgar solve only from a Deity; therefore confident, that religion had no other original than this ignorance of causes: as also, that nature, or matter, does all things alone without a God. But we shall make it manifest, that philosophy and the true knowledge of causes lead to a Deity; and that Atheism, from ignorance of causes, and want of philosophy . . . . . 273

For, first, no Atheist, who derives all from senseless matter, can possibly assign any cause of himself, his own soul, or mind; it being impossible, that life and sense should be naturally produced from what dead and senseless; or from magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions. An atheistic objection, nothing to the purpose; that laughing and crying things are made out of not laughing and crying principles: because these result from the mechanism of the body. The Hylozoists never able neither to produce animal sense and consciousness. The Atheists, supposing their own life and understanding, and all the wisdom that is in the world, to have sprung merely from senseless matter, and fortuitous motions; grossly ignorant of causes. The philosophy of ourselves, and true knowledge of the cause of our own soul and mind, brings to God . . . . . ib.

Again, Atheists ignorant of the cause of motion, by which they suppose all things done; this phenomenon being no ways solvable, according to their principles. First, undeniably cer-

tain, that motion not essential to all body or matter as such, because then there could have been no mundane system, no sun, moon, earth, &c. all things being continually torn in pieces, and nothing cohering. Certain also, that dead and senseless matter, such as that of Anaximander, Democritus, and Epicurus, cannot move itself spontaneously, by will or appetite. The Hylozoists farther considered elsewhere. Democritus could assign no other cause of motion than this, that one body moved another from eternity infinitely; without any first cause or mover. Thus also a modern writer. To assert an infinite progress in the causes of motion, according to Aristotle, to assign no cause thereof at all. Epicurus, though an exploder of qualities, forced here to fly to an occult quality of gravity. Which, as absurd in infinite space, and without any centre of rest; so indeed nothing but to make his own ignorance, and he knows not why, to be a cause. The motion of body, from the activity of something incorporeal. Though motion taken for translation be a mode of matter; yet as it is taken for the *vis movens*, a mode or energy, of something that is incorporeal and self-active. The motion of the whole corporeal universe originally from the Deity. Thus the ignorance of the cause of motion another ground of Atheism . 275

Thirdly, the Atheists also ignorant of the cause of that grand phenomenon, the *τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς*, the regular and artificial frame of the mundane system,—and of the bodies of animals; together with the harmony of all. They who boast they can give causes of all things without a God, able to give no cause of this, but only, that it happened by chance so to be. This, either to make the absence of a cause (chance being but the absence of an intending cause); or their own very ignorance of the cause, and they know not why, to be a cause; or to make one contrary the cause of another (confusion of order and harmony, chance of art and skill): or, lastly, to deny it to have any cause at all, since they deny an intending cause . . . . . 279

But here the Atheists make several pretences for this their ignorance. First, that the world is not so well made, but that it might have been much better; and many flaws to be found therein: whereas a God, or perfect being, would have bungled in nothing, but have made all things after the best manner. But this a twelfth atheistic argumentation, and the confutation thereof to be expected afterward. Reason why some modern Theists give Atheists so much advantage here, as to acknowledge things be ill made; whilst the ancient pagan Theists stood

their ground, and generously maintained, that mind being the maker of all things, and not blind fortune or chance, nor arbitrary will, and irrational human omnipotent; the *τὸ βέλτιστον*, that which is absolutely the best, in order to the good of the whole (so far as the necessity of things would admit), the measure and rule of nature and Providence . . . . . 280

Again, the atomic and Epicurean Atheists pretend, that though many things serve for uses, yet it does not therefore follow, that they were made intentionally for those uses; because things that happen by chance may have uses consequent. Thus Lucretius, and the old atheistic philosophers before Aristotle, of the parts of the bodies of animals, and all other things. The answer, that when things consist of many parts, all artificially proportioned together, with much curiosity, as for example, the eye; no man who considers the anatomy thereof, and its whole structure, can reasonably conclude, that it happened so to be made; and the use of seeing followed: but that it was made intentionally for the use of seeing. But to maintain, that not only eyes happened to be so made, and the use of seeing followed, but also ears, and a mouth, and feet, and hands, and all the other parts organical and similar (without any of which the whole would be inept or useless), all their several uses, unintended, following; gross insensibility, and stupidity. Galen of the Use of Parts . . . . . 282

Democritus's dotages; countenanced also by Cartesius's book of *Meteors* (first written with design to solve all those phenomena without a God), but unsuccessfully. Nevertheless we acknowledge, that God and nature do all things in the most frugal and compendious way; and that the mechanic powers are taken in, so far as they will serviceably comply with the intellectual platform. But nature not mechanical and fortuitous only, but also vital and artificial; the Archeus of the whole world . . . . . 285

Again, Atheists farther pretend, that though it may well seem strange, that matter fortuitously moved, should, at the very first, fall into such a regularity and harmony as is now in the world; yet not at all strange, that atoms, moving from all eternity, and making all manner of combinations and contextures, and trying all experiments, should, after innumerable other inept and incongruous forms, at length fall into such a system as this. They say therefore, that the earth, at first, brought forth divers monstrous and irregular shapes of animals; some wanting feet, some

hands, some without a mouth, &c. to which the ancients added centaurs, scyllas, and chimeras; mixedly bovine and hominiform animals. Though Epicurus, ashamed to own these, would seem to exclude them, but without reason. But because we have now no such irregular shapes produced out of the earth, they say, that the reason is, because none could continue and propagate their kind by generation, but only such as happened to be fitly made. Thus Epicurus, and the Atheists before Aristotle. They also add hereunto their infinite worlds; amongst which they pretend, not one out of a thousand, or of ten thousand, hath so much regularity in it as this of ours. Lastly, they presage likewise, that this world of ours shall not always continue such, but after awhile fall into confusion and disorder again; and then we may have centaurs, scyllas and chimeras, as before . . . . . 286

Nevertheless, because this universal and constant regularity of things, for so many ages together, is so puzzling; they would persuade us that the senseless atoms, playing and toying up and down from eternity, without any care or thought, were at length taught by the necessity of things, and driven to a kind of trade, or habit of artificialness and methodicalness . . . 290

To all which atheistic pretences replied, first, That this is an idle dream, or impudent forgery, that there was once an inept mundane system; and in this world of ours, all manner of irregular shapes of animals: not only because no tradition of any such thing; but also because no reason possibly to be given, why such should not be produced out of the earth still, though they could not continue long. That also another atheistic dream, that in this world of ours, all will quickly fall into confusion and nonsense again. And as their infinite worlds an impossibility, so their assertion of the irregularity of the supposed other worlds well enough answered, by a contrary assertion; that were every planet a habitable earth, and every fixed star a sun, having all more or fewer such habitable planets moving round about them, and none of them desert or uninhabited, there would not be found so much as one ridiculous or inept system amongst them all; the Divine act being infinite . . . 291

Again, that the fortuitous motions of senseless atoms should in length of time, grow artificial, and contract a habit, or trade of acting regularly, as if directed by perfect art and wisdom; this atheistic fanaticism . . . . . 292

No more possible, that dead and senseless matter, fortuitous-

ly moved, should at length be taught and necessitated by itself to produce this artificial system of the world; than that a dozen or more persons, unskilled in music, and striking the strings as it happened, should at length be taught and necessitated to fall into exquisite harmony; or that the letters in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, though having so much philosophic sense, should have been all scribbled at random. More philosophy in the great volume of the world, than in all Aristotle's and Plato's works; and more of harmony than in any artificial composition of vocal music. That the Divine art and wisdom hath printed such a signature of itself upon the matter of the whole world, as fortune and chance could never counterfeit . . . . 292

But, in the next place, the Atheists will for all this undertake to demonstrate, that things could not possibly be made by any intending cause, for ends and uses; as eyes for seeing, ears for hearing; from hence, because things were all in order of time, as well as nature, before their uses. This argument seriously propounded by Lucretius in this manner; if eyes were made for the use of seeing, then of necessity must seeing have been before eyes: but there was no seeing before eyes; therefore could not eyes be made for the sake of seeing . . . . 294

Evident, that the logic of these Atheists differs from that of all other mortals; according to which the end for which any thing is designedly made, is only in intention first, but in execution last. True, that men are commonly excited from experience of things, and sense of their wants, to excogitate means and remedies; but it doth not therefore follow, that the Maker of the world could not have a preventive knowledge of whatsoever would be useful for animals, and so make them bodies intentionally for those uses. That argument ought to be thus framed: whatsoever is made intentionally for any end, as the eye for that of seeing, that end must needs be in the knowledge and intention of the maker, before the actual existence of that which is made for it: but there could be no knowledge of seeing before there were eyes; therefore eyes could not be made intentionally for the sake of seeing . . . . 296

This the true scope of the premised atheistic argument, however disguised by them in the first propounding. The ground thereof, because they take it for granted, that all knowledge is derived from sense, or from the things known pre-existing without the knower. And here does Lucretius triumph. The controversy therefore at last resolved into this; whether all know-

ledge be in its own nature junior to things : for if so, it must be granted, that the world could not be made by any antecedent knowledge. But this afterwards fully confuted ; and proved, that knowledge is not, in its own nature, ectypal, but archetypal ; and that knowledge was older than the world, and the Maker thereof . . . . . 297

But Atheists will except against the proving of a God, from the regular and artificial frame of things ; That it is unreasonable to think, there should be no cause in nature for the common phenomena thereof ; but a God thus introduced to solve them. Which also, to suppose the world bungled and botched up. That nature is the cause of natural things, which nature does not intend, nor act for ends. Wherefore the opinion of final causality for things in nature but an *idolum specus*. Therefore rightly banished by Democritus out of physiology . . . 298

The answer : Two extremes here to be avoided ; one of the atomic Atheists, who derive all things from the fortuitous motion of senseless matter ; another of bigotical religionists, who will have God to do all things himself immediately without any nature. The middle betwixt both, that there is not only a mechanical and fortuitous but also an artificial nature, subservient to the Deity, as the manuary officer and drudging executioner thereof. True, that some philosophers have absurdly attributed their own properties, or animal idiopathies, to inanimate bodies. Nevertheless, this no idol of the cave, or den, to suppose the system of the world to have been framed by an understanding being, according to whose direction, nature, though not itself intending, acteth. Balbus's description of this artificial nature in Cicero. That there could be no mind in us, were there none in the universe. That of Aristotle true, that there is more of art in some things of nature than in any thing made by men. Now the causes of artificial things, as a house or clock, cannot be declared without intention for ends. This excellently pursued by Aristotle. No more can the things of nature be rightly understood, or the causes of them fully assigned, merely from matter and motion, without intention or mind. They, who banish final or mental causality from philosophy, look upon the things of nature with no other eyes than oxen and horses. Some pitiful attempts of the ancient Atheist to solve the phenomena of animals without mental causality. Democritus and Epicurus so cautious, as never to pretend to give an account of

the formation of the fœtus. Aristotle's judgment here to be preferred before that of Democritus . . . . . 300

But nothing more strange than that these Atheists should be justified in this their ignorance by professed Theists and Christians; who atomizing likewise in their physiology, contend, that this whole mundane system resulted only from the necessary and unguided motion of matter, either turned round in a vortex, or jumbled in a chaos, without the direction of any mind. These mechanic Theists more immodest than the atomic Atheists themselves; they supposing these their atoms, though fortuitously moved, yet never to have produced any inept system, or incongruous forms; but from the very first, all along, to have ranged themselves so orderly, as that they could not have done it better had they been directed by a perfect mind. They quite take away the argument for a God, from the phenomena, and that artificial frame of things, leaving only some metaphysical arguments; which, though never so good, yet by reason of their subtilty cannot do so much execution. The Atheists gratified to see the cause of Theism thus betrayed by its professed friends; and the grand argument for the same totally slurred by them . . . . . 306

As this great insensibility of mind, to look upon the things of nature with no other eyes than brute animals do; so are there sundry phenomena, partly above the mechanic powers, and partly contrary to the same, which therefore can never be solved, without mental and final causality. As in animals, the motion of the diaphragma in respiration, the systole and diastole of the heart (being a muscular constriction and relaxation): to which might be added others in the macrocosm; as the intersection of the planes of the equator and ecliptic; or the earth's diurnal motion upon an axis not parallel with that of its annual. Cartesius's confession, that, according to mechanic principles, these should continually come nearer and nearer together; which since they have not done, final or mental causality here to be acknowledged, and because it was best it should be so. But the greatest phenomenon of this kind, the formation and organization of animals; which these mechanists never able to give any account of. Of that posthumous piece of Cartesius, *De la Formation du Fœtus* . . . . . 308

Pretended, that to assign final causes, is to presume ourselves to be as wise as God Almighty, or to be privy to his counsels.

But the question, not whether we can always reach to the ends of God Almighty, or know what is absolutely best in every case, and accordingly conclude things therefore to be so; but whether any thing in the world be made for ends otherwise than would have resulted from the fortuitous motion of matter. No presumption, nor intrusion into the secrets of God Almighty, to say, that eyes were made by him intentionally for the sake of seeing. Anaxagoras's absurd aphorism, that man was therefore the most solert of all animals, because he chanced to have hands. Far more reasonable to think (as Aristotle concludeth), that because man was the wisest of all animals, therefore he had hands given him. More proper to give pipes to one that hath musical skill, than upon him, that hath pipes, to bestow musical skill . . . . . 310

In the last place, mechanic Theists pretend, and that with some more plausibility, that it is below the dignity of God Almighty to perform all those mean and trivial offices of nature, himself immediately. This answered again; that though the Divine wisdom itself contrived the system of the whole for ends, yet is there an artificial nature under him, as his inferior minister and executioner. Proclus's description hereof. This nature, to Proclus, a god or goddess; but only as the bodies of the animated stars were called gods, because the statues of the gods 311

That we cannot otherwise conclude, concerning these mechanic Theists, who derive all things in the mundane system, from the necessary motions of senseless matter, without the direction of any mind, or God; but that they are imperfect Theists, or have a certain tang of the atheistic enthusiasm (the spirit of infidelity) hanging about them . . . . . 314

But these mechanic Theists counterbalanced by another sort of Atheists, not fortuitous, nor mechanical; namely, the Hylozoists, who acknowledge the works of nature to be the works of understanding, and deride Democritus's rough and hooky atoms, devoid of life; they attributing life to all matter as such, and concluding the vulgar notion of a God to be but an inadequate conception of matter, its energetic nature being taken alone by itself as a complete substance. These Hylozoists never able to satisfy that phenomenon, of the one agreeing and conspiring harmony throughout the whole universe; every atom of matter, according to them, being a distinct percipient; and these unable to confer notions one with another . . . . . ib.

Nor can the other Cosmo-plastic Atheists (to whom the whole



world but one huge plant or vegetable, endowed with a spermatic artificial nature, orderly disposing the whole, without sense or understanding) do any thing towards the solving of this or any other phenomena; it being impossible that there should be any such regular nature otherwise than as derived from and depending on a perfect mind . . . . . 315

Besides these three phenomena, of cogitation, motion, and the artificial frame of things, with the conspiring harmony of the whole (no way solvable by Atheists), here farther added, that those who asserted the novelty of the world, could not possibly give an account neither of the first beginning of men, and other animals, not now generated out of putrefaction. Aristotle sometimes doubtful and staggering concerning the world's eternity. Men and all other animals not produced at first by chance, either as worms out of putrefaction, or out of eggs, or wombs, growing out of the earth; because no reason to be given why chance should not as well produce the same out of the earth still. Epicurus's vain pretence, that the earth, as a child-bearing woman, was now grown effete and barren. Moreover, men and animals, whether first generated out of putrefaction, or excluded out of wombs or egg-shells, supposed by these Atheists themselves to have been produced in a tender infant-like state, so that they could neither supply themselves with nourishment, nor defend themselves from harms. A dream of Epicurus, that the earth sent forth streams of milk after those her new-born infants and nurslings, confuted by Critolaus in Philo. Another precarious supposition, or figment, of Epicurus; that then no immoderate heats, nor colds, nor any blustering winds. Anaximander's way of solving this difficulty; that men were first generated and nourished in the bellies of fishes, till able to shift for themselves; and then disgorged upon dry land. Atheists swallow any thing rather than a God . . . . . ib.

Wherefore here being *dignus vindice nodus*, a Θεὸν ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, reasonably introduced, in the Mosiac cabala, to solve the same. It appearing, from all circumstances put together, that this whole phenomenon surpasses, not only the mechanic but also the plastic powers; there being much of discretion therein. However, not denied but that the ministry of spirits (created before man, and other terrestrial animals) might be here made use of. As in Plato, after the creation of immortal souls by the supreme God, the framing of mortal bodies is committed to junior gods . . . . . 319

Furthermore, Atheists no more able to solve that ordinary phenomenon, of the conservation of species, by the difference of sexes, and a due proportion of number kept up between males and females. Here a providence, also, superior as well to the plastic as mechanic nature . . . . . 320

Lastly, other phenomena, as real, though not physical; which Atheists cannot possibly solve, and therefore do commonly deny; as of natural justice or honesty, and obligation; the foundation of politics, and the mathematics of religion. And of liberty of will, not only that of fortuitous self-determination, when an equal eligibility of objects; but also that which makes men deserve commendation and blame. These not commonly distinguished as they ought. Epicurus's endeavour to solve liberty of will, from atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular, mere madness and frenzy . . . 321

And now have we already preventively confuted the third atheistic pretence, to solve the phenomenon of Theism, from the fiction and imposture of politicians; we having proved, that philosophy and the true knowledge of causes infer the existence of a God. Nevertheless, this is to be here farther answered . . . . . ib.

That statesmen and politicians could not have made such use of religion, as sometimes they have done, had it been a mere cheat and figment of their own. Civil sovereigns in all the distant places of the world could not have so universally conspired, in this one piece of statecraft or cozenage; nor yet have been able to possess the minds of men every where with such a constant awe and dread of an invisible nothing. The world would long since have discovered this cheat, and suspected a plot upon their liberty, in the fiction of a God; at least governors themselves would have understood it; many of which, notwithstanding, as much awed with the fear of this invisible nothing, as any others. Other cheats and juggles, when once detected, no longer practised. But religion now as much in credit as ever, though so long since decried by Atheists for a political cheat. That Christianity, a religion founded in no human policy, prevailed over the craft and power of all civil sovereigns, and conquered the persecuting world, by suffering deaths and martyrdoms. This presignified by the prophetic spirit . . . 322

Had the idea of God been an arbitrary figment, not conceivable, how men should have universally agreed in the same, and the attributes belonging thereunto (this argument used by

Sextus): nor that civil sovereigns themselves should so universally have jumped in it . . . . . 325

Furthermore; not conceivable, how this thought, or idea of a God, should have been formed by any, had it been the idea of nothing. The superficialness of Atheists, in pretending, that politicians, by telling men of such a thing, put the idea into their minds. No notions or ideas put into men's minds by words but only the phantasms of the sounds. Though all learning be not remembrance, yet is all human teaching but maieutical or obstetricious; not the filling of the soul as a vessel, by pouring into it from without; but the kindling of it from within. Words signify nothing to him that cannot raise up within himself the notions or ideas correspondent to them. However, the difficulty still remains; how statesmen themselves, or the first inventor of this cheat, could have framed any notion at all of a nonentity . . . . . 326

Here the Atheists pretend, that there is a feigning power in the soul, whereby it can make ideas and conceptions of nonentities; as of a golden mountain, or a centaur: and that by this an idea of God might be framed, though there be no such thing. Answer: that all the feigning power of the soul consisteth only in compounding ideas of things, that really exist apart, but not in that conjunction. The mind cannot make any new conceptive cogitation which was not before; as the painter or limner cannot feign foreign colours. Moreover, the whole of these fictitious ideas, though it have no actual yet hath it a possible entity. The Deity itself, though it could create a world out of nothing, yet can it not create more cogitation or conception than is or was always entertained in its own mind from eternity; nor frame a positive idea of that which hath no possible entity . . . . . 328

The idea of God no compilement or aggregation of things, that exist severally apart in the world; because then it would be a mere arbitrary thing, and what every one pleased; the contrary whereunto hath been before manifested . . . . 329

Again: some attributes of the Deity no where else to be found in the whole world; and therefore must be absolute nonentities, were there no God. Here the painter must feign colours, and create new cogitation out of nothing . . . . 330

Lastly, upon supposition that there is no God, it is impossible, not only that there should be any for the future, but also that there should ever have been any; whereas all fictitious

ideas must have a possible entity, since otherwise they would be inconceivable, and no ideas. . . . . 330

Wherefore some Atheists will farther pretend, that besides this power of compounding things together, the soul hath another ampliating or amplifying power; by both which together, though there be no God existing, nor yet possible, the idea of him might be fictitiously made; those attributes, which are no where else to be found, arising by way of amplification or augmentation of something found in men . . . . . ib.

Answer: first, that according to the principles of these Atheists, that all our conceptions are nothing but passions from objects without, there cannot possibly be any such amplifying power in the soul, whereby it could make more than is. Thus Protagoras in Plato; no man can conceive any thing but what he suffers. Here also, as Sextus intimateth, the Atheists guilty of that fallacy called a circle or diallelus. For having first undiscernedly made the idea of imperfection from perfection, they then go about again to make the idea of perfection out of imperfection. That men have a notion of perfection, by which, as a rule, they judge things to be imperfect, evident from that direction given by all theologers, to conceive of God, in way of remotion or abstraction of all imperfection. Lastly, finite things added together can never make up infinite; as more and more time backward can never reach to eternity without beginning. God differs from imperfect things, not in degree, but kind. As for infinite space, said to consist of parts finite; we certain of no more than this, that the finite world might have been made bigger and bigger infinitely; for which very cause it could never be actually infinite. Gassendus's objection, that the idea of an infinite God might as well be feigned as that of infinite worlds. But infinite worlds are but words or notions ill put together, or combined; infinity being a real thing in nature, but misapplied, it being proper only to the Deity . . . . . 332

The conclusion; that since the soul can neither make the idea of infinite, by amplification of finite; nor feign or create any new cogitation, which was not before; nor make a positive idea of a nonentity; certain, that the idea of God no fictitious thing. . . . . 334

Farther made evident, that religion not the figment of civil sovereigns. Obligation in conscience the foundation of all civil right and authority. Covenants, without this, nothing but words and breath. Obligations, not from laws neither, but be-

fore them; or otherwise they could not oblige. Lastly, this derived not from utility neither. Were obligation to civil obedience made by men's private utility, then could it be dissolved by the same. Wherefore if religion a fiction or imposture, civil sovereignty must needs be so too . . . . . 334

Had religion been a fiction of politicians, they would then have made it every way pliable, and flexible; since otherwise it would not serve their turn, nor consist with their infinite right . 336

But religion in its own nature a stiff inflexible thing, as also justice, it being not factitious, or made by will. There may therefore be a contradiction betwixt the laws of God and of men; and in this case does religion conclude, that God ought to be obeyed rather than men. For this cause, atheistic politicians of latter times declare against religion as inconsistent with civil sovereignty; it destroying infinite right, introducing private judgment, or conscience, and a fear greater than that of the Leviathan; to wit, of him who can inflict eternal punishment. Senseless matter the Atheists' natural god; the leviathan or civil sovereign his artificial one. Religion thus disowned and disclaimed by politicians, as inconsistent with civil power, could not be the creature of political art. Thus all the three atheistic pretences to solve the phenomenon of religion, from fear, ignorance of causes, and fiction of politicians, fully confuted . 337

But because, besides those ordinary phenomena beforementioned, there are certain other extraordinary ones that cannot be solved by Atheists, which therefore they will impute, partly to men's fear and ignorance, and partly to the fiction and imposture of civil governors (*viz.* apparitions, miracles, and prophecies); the reality of these here also to be briefly viudicated 340

First, as for apparitions; though much of fabulosity in these relations, yet unquestionably something of truth. Atheists imputing these things to men's mistaking their dreams and fancies for sensations, contradict their own fundamental principle, that sense is the only criterion of truth; as also derogate more from human testimony than they ought . . . . . ib.

That some Atheists sensible hereof have acknowledged the reality of apparitions, concluding them nevertheless to be the mere creatures of imagination; as if a strong fancy could produce real substances or objects of sense. The fanaticism of Atheists, who will rather believe the greatest impossibilities, than endanger the being of a God. Invisible ghosts permanent easily introduce one supreme ghost of the whole world. . 341

Democritus yet farther convinced; that there were invisible beings superior to men, independent upon imagination, and permanent (called by him idols), but having nothing immortal in them; and therefore that God could be no more proved from the existence of them than of men. Granted by him, that there were, not only terrestrial, but also aëreal and ethereal animals; and that all those vast regions of the universe above were not desert and uninhabited. Here something of the fathers, asserting angels to have bodies; but more afterwards . . . 341

To this phenomenon of apparitions may be added those two others, of witches and demoniacs; both of these proving, that spirits are not fancies, nor inhabitants of men's brains only, but of the world: as also, that there are some impure spirits, a confirmation of the truth of Christianity. The confident ex- ploders of witchcraft suspicious for Atheism. As for demoniacs or energumeni, certain from Josephus, that the Jews did not take these demons or devils for bodily diseases, but real substances, possessing the bodies of men. Nor probable, that they supposed, as the Gnostics afterward, all diseases to be the infestation of evil spirits; nor yet (as some think) all demoniacs to be madmen. But when there were any unusual and extra- ordinary symptoms in any bodily distemper, but especially that of madness, they supposing this to be supernatural, imputed it to the infestation of some devil. Thus also the Greeks 344

That demoniacs and energumeni are a real phenomenon; and that there are such also in these times of ours, asserted by Fernelius and Sennertus. Such maniacal persons, as not only discover secrets, but also speak languages which they had never learned, unquestionably demoniacs or energumeni. That there have been such in the times since our Saviour, proved out of Psellus; as also from Fernelius. This for the vindication of Christianity against those who suspect the Scripture-demoniacs for figments . . . 348

The second extraordinary phenomenon proposed; that of miracles, and effects supernatural. That there have been such things amongst the Pagans, and since the times of Christianity too, evident from their records. But more instances of these in Scripture . . . 352

Two sorts of miracles. First, such as, though they cannot be done by ordinary causes, yet may be effected by the natural power of invisible spirits, angels, or demons. As illiterate demoniacs speaking Greek. Such amongst the Pagans that mi-

racle of the whetstone cut in two with a razor. Secondly, such as transcend the natural power of all second causes and created beings . . . . . 353

That late Politico-Theological Treatise, denying both these sorts of miracles, inconsiderable, and not deserving here a confutation . . . . . 354

Supposed in Deut. that miracles of the former sort might be done by false prophets, in confirmation of idolatry. Wherefore miracles alone not sufficient to confirm every doctrine 355

Accordingly in the New Testament do we read of *τέραρα ψεύδους*, lying miracles;—that is, miracles done in confirmation of a lie, and by the power of Satan, &c. God permitting it, in way of probation of some, and punishment of others. Miracles done for the promoting of creature-worship or idolatry, instead of justifying the same, themselves condemned by it 356

Had the miracles of our Saviour been all of the former kind only, yet ought the Jews, according to Moses's law, to have acknowledged him for a true prophet, he coming in the name of the Lord, and not exhorting to idolatry. Supposed in Deut. that God would not permit false prophets to do miracles, save only in the case of idolatry; or when the doctrine is discoverable to be false by the light of nature; because that would be an invincible temptation. Our Saviour, that eximious prophet, foretold, by whom God would again reveal his will to the world; and no more out of flaming fire. Nevertheless some miracles of our Saviour Christ's such also as could be done only by the power of God Almighty . . . . . 357

All miracles evince spirits; to disbelieve which is to disbelieve sense, or unreasonably to derogate from human testimony. Had the Gentiles entertained the faith of Christ, without miracles, this itself would have been a great miracle . . . . . 359

The last extraordinary phenomenon, divination or prophecy. This also evinces spirits (called gods by the Pagans): and thus that of theirs true; if divination, then gods . . . . . 360

Two sorts of predictions likewise as of miracles. First, such as might proceed from the natural presaging power of created spirits. Such predictions acknowledged by Democritus, upon account of his idols. Not so much contingency in human actions, by reason of men's liberty of will, as some suppose ib. Another sort of predictions of future events imputable only to the supernatural prescience of God Almighty. Epicurus's pretence, that divination took away liberty of will; either as

supposing or making a necessity. Some Theists also denying the prescience of God Almighty, upon the same account. Certain, that no created being can foreknow future events otherwise than in their causes. Wherefore predictions of such events as had no necessary antecedent causes, evince a God . . . 362

That there is foreknowledge of future events, unforeknowable to men, formerly the general persuasion of mankind. Oracles and predictions amongst the Pagans, which evince spirits, as that of Attius Navius. Most of the Pagan oracles, from the natural presaging power of demons. Nevertheless some instances of predictions of a higher kind amongst them; as that of Vectius Valens, and the sibyls. Thus Balaam divinely assisted to predict our Saviour . . . . . 364

Scriptures triumphing over Pagan oracles. Predictions concerning our Saviour Christ, and the conversion of the Gentiles. Amongst which that remarkable one of the seventy weeks 368

Other predictions concerning the fates of kingdoms, and of the church. Daniel's fourth ten-horned beast, the Roman empire. This prophecy of Daniel's carried on farther in the Apocalypse. Both of them prophetic calendars of times, to the end of the world . . . . . 369

That this phenomenon of Scripture-prophecies cannot possibly be imputed by Atheists, as some others, to fear, or ignorance of causes, or to the fiction of politicians. They not only evince a Deity, but also the truth of Christianity. To this purpose, of more use to us, who now live, than the miracles themselves recorded in Scripture . . . . . 370

These five extraordinary phenomena all of them evince spirits to be no fancies, but substantial inhabitants of the world; from whence a God may be inferred. Some of them immediately prove a Deity . . . . . ib.

Here have we not only fully confuted all the atheistic pretences from the idea of God, but also, by the way, already proposed several substantial arguments for a Deity. The existence whereof will now be farther proved from its very idea . 371

True, that some of the ancient Theists themselves declare God not to be demonstrable. Thus Alexander Aprodus. Clemens Alexand. But their meaning therein no more than this, that God cannot be demonstrated *a priori* from any antecedent necessary cause. Not follow from hence, that therefore no certainty or knowledge of the existence of a God; but only conjectural probability, faith, and opinion. We may have a cer-



tain knowledge of things, the *διότι* whereof cannot be demonstrated *a priori*; as, that there was something or other eternal, without beginning. Whenssoever a thing is necessarily inferred from what is altogether undeniable, this may be called a demonstration. Many geometrical demonstrations such; or of the *ὄτι* only . . . . . 371

A special position of Cartesius; that there can be no certainty of any thing, no, not of geometrical theorems, nor common notions; before we be certain of the existence of a God, essentially good, who therefore cannot deceive. From whence it would follow, that neither Atheists, nor such Theists as assert an arbitrary Deity, can ever be certain of any thing; as that two and two are four . . . . . 374

However, some appearance of piety in this assertion; yet is it a foundation of eternal scepticism, both as to all other things, and the existence of a God. That Cartesius here went round in a circle, proving the existence of a God from our faculties, and then the truth of our faculties from the existence of a God; and consequently proved nothing. If it be possible that our faculties might be false, then must we confess it possible, that there may be no God; and consequently remain for ever sceptical about it . . . . . 375

Wherefore a necessity of exploding and confuting this new sceptical hypothesis, of the possibility of our faculties being so made as to deceive us in all our clearest perceptions. Omnipotence itself cannot make any thing to be indifferently true or false. Truth not factitious. As to the universal theorems of abstract science, the measure of truth no foreign or extraneous thing, but only our own clear and distinct perception. Here whatsoever is clearly perceived, is; the very essence of truth, perceptibility. Granted by all, that there can be no false knowledge or understanding. The perception of the understanding never false, but only obscure. Not nature that erreth in us, but we ourselves, in assenting to things not clearly perceived. Conclusion; that Omnipotence cannot create any understanding faculties, so as to have as clear and distinct conceptions of all falsehoods and nonentities as of truths; because whatsoever is clearly and distinctly perceived, hath therefore an entity; and Omnipotence itself (to speak with reverence) cannot make nothing to be something, or something nothing. This no more than that it cannot do things contradictory. Conception the measure of power . . . . . 376

True, that sense as such is but fantastical and relative; and were there no other perception, all truth would be private, relative, and seeming, none absolute. This probably the reason why some have suspected the same of knowledge also. But mind and understanding reach beyond fancy and appearance, to the absoluteness of things. It hath the criterion of truth within itself . . . . . 379

Objected; that this an arrogance, for creatures to pretend to an absolute certainty of any thing. Answer: that God alone is ignorant of nothing, and infallible in all things; but no derogation from the Deity, to suppose, that he should make created minds such as to have a certainty of something; as the whole to be greater than the part, and the like: since otherwise they would be but a mere mockery. Congruous to think, that God hath made men so as that they may possibly attain to some certainty of his own existence. Origen, that knowledge is the only thing that hath certainty in it . . . . 381

Having now some firm ground or footing to stand upon, a certainty of common notions, without which nothing could be proved by reason; we shall endeavour, by means hereof, to demonstrate the existence of a God from his idea . . . 383

Cartesius's undertaking to do this with mathematical evidence; as this idea includeth in it necessary existence. This argument hitherto not so successful, it being by many concluded to be a sophism. That we shall impartially set down all that we can, both for it and against it; leaving others to make a judgment . . . . . ib.

First, against the Cartesian demonstration of a God. That because we can frame an idea of a necessarily-existent being, it does not at all follow that it is; since we can frame ideas of things that never were, nor will be. Nothing to be gathered from hence, but only that it is not impossible. Again, from this idea, including necessary existence, nothing else inferrible, but that what hath no necessary existence is not perfect; and, that if there be a perfect being, its existence always was and will be necessary; but not absolutely, that it doth exist. A fallacy, when from the necessity of existence affirmed only hypothetically, the conclusion is made absolutely. Though a perfect being must exist necessarily, yet not therefore follow, that it must and doth exist. The latter a thing indemonstrable 384

For the Cartesian demonstration of a God. As from the notion of a thing impossible, we conclude, that it never was nor

will be ; and of that which hath a contingent schesis to existence, that it might be, or might not be ; so from that which hath necessary existence in its nature, that it actually is. The force of the argumentation not merely hypothetical ; if there be a perfect being, then is its existence necessary ; because this supposes that a necessary existent being is contingent to be or not to be : which a contradiction. The absurdity of this will better appear, if, instead of necessary existence, we put in actual. No Theists can otherwise prove that a God, though supposed to exist, might not happen by chance to be. Nevertheless God, or a perfect being, not here demonstrated *a priori*, when from its own idea. The reader left to make a judgment . . . . . 386

A progymnasma, or prelusory attempt towards the proving of a God from his idea, as including necessary existence. First, from our having an idea of a perfect being, implying no manner of contradiction in it, it follows that such a thing is possible. And from that necessary existence included in this idea, added to the possibility thereof, it farther follows that it actually is. A necessary existent being, if possible, is ; because, upon the supposition of its nonexistence, it would be impossible for it ever to have been. Not so in contingent things. A perfect being is either impossible to have been, or else it is. Were God possible, and yet not, he would not be a necessary but contingent being. However, no stress laid upon this . . . . . 389

Another plainer argument for the existence of a God, from his idea. Whatsoever we can frame an idea of in our minds, implying no contradiction, this either actually is, or else, if it be not, is possible to be. But if God be not, he is not possible to be. Therefore he is. The major before proved, that we cannot have an idea of any thing which hath neither actual nor possible existence . . . . . 391

A farther ratiocination from the idea of God, as including necessary existence, by certain steps. First, certain, that something or other did exist of itself from eternity, without beginning. Again, whatsoever did exist of itself from eternity, did so exist naturally and necessarily, and therefore there is a necessary existent being. Thirdly, nothing could exist of itself from eternity naturally and necessarily, but what contained necessary self-existence in its nature. Lastly, a perfect being, and nothing else, containeth necessary existence in its nature. Therefore it is. An appendix to this argument ; that no tem-

porary successive being could be from eternity without beginning. This proved before . . . . . 392

Again, the controversy betwixt Atheists and Theists first clearly stated from the idea of God, and then satisfactorily decided. Premised, that as every thing was not made, so neither was every thing unmade. Atheists agree in both. The state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists; whether that, which being itself unmade, was the cause of all other things made, were the most perfect or the most imperfect being. A certain kind of atheistic Theism, or Theogonism, which acknowledging a God, or soul of the world, presiding over the whole, supposed him, notwithstanding, to have emerged out of Night and Chaos; that is, to have been generated out of senseless matter . . . . . 394

The controversy thus stated easily decided. Certain, that lesser perfection may be derived from greater, or from that which is absolutely perfect; but impossible, that greater perfection, and higher degrees of entity, should rise out of lesser and lower. Things did not ascend, but descend. That life and sense may naturally rise from the mere modification of dead and senseless matter, as also reason and understanding from sense; the philosophy of the kingdom of darkness. The Hylozoists so sensible of this, that there must be some substantial unmade life and understanding; that atheizing, they thought it necessary to attribute life and understanding to all matter as such. This argument a demonstration of the impossibility of Atheism . . . . . 396

The controversy again more particularly stated, from the idea of God, as including mind and understanding in it; viz. whether all mind were made or generated out of senseless matter, or whether there were an eternal unmade mind, the maker of all. This the doctrine of Theists, that mind the oldest of all things; of Atheists, that it is a post-nate thing, younger than the world, and an umbratile image of real beings . . . . 398

The controversy thus stated again decided. Though it does not follow, that if once there had been no corporeal world or matter, there could never have been any; yet it is certain, that if once there had been no life nor mind, there could have never been any life or mind. Our imperfect minds, not of themselves from eternity, and therefore derived from a perfect unmade mind . . . . . 399

That Atheists think their chief strength to lie here, in their

disproving a God, from the nature of understanding and knowledge. According to them, things made knowledge, and not knowledge things. All mind and understanding the creature of sensibles, and a fantastic image of them ; and therefore no mind their creator. Thus does a modern writer conclude, that knowledge and understanding are not to be attributed to God, because they imply dependence upon things without ; which is all one as if he should have said, that senseless matter is the more perfect of all things, and the highest numen . . . . 400

A compendious confutation of the premised atheistic principles. Knowledge not the activity of sensibles upon the knower and his passion. Sensible things themselves not known by the passion, or fancy of sense. Knowledge not from the force of the thing known, but of the knower. Besides phantasms of singular bodies, intelligible ideas universal. A late atheistic paradox, that universals nothing but names. Axiomatic truths in abstract sciences no passion from bodies by sense, nor yet gathered by induction from many singulars ; we at once perceiving it impossible that they should be otherwise. An ingenious observation of Aristotle's, that could it be perceived by sense, the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ; yet would not this be science, or knowledge, properly so called : which is of universals first, and from thence descends to singulars . . . . . 402

Again, we have conceptions of things incorporeal, as also of such corporeals as never did exist, and whose accuracy sense could not reach to ; as a perfect straight line and plain superficies, an exact triangle, circle, or sphere. That we have a power of framing ideas of things that never were nor will be, but only possible . . . . . 405

Inferred from hence, that human science itself not the mere image and creature of singular sensibles, but proleptical to them, and in order of nature before them. But since there must be *νοητόν* before *νοῦς*, intelligibles before intellection ;—the only true account of knowledge and its original is from a perfect omnipotent being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or the possibilities of all things, their relations and immutable truths. And of this one perfect mind all imperfect minds partake . . . . . 406

Knowledge, therefore, in the nature of it, supposeth the existence of a perfect omnipotent being, as its *νοητόν*, or intelligible.—This comprehending itself, the first original knowledge,

a mind before the world, and all sensibles not ectypal, but archetypal, and the framer of all. Wherefore not Atheism, but Theism, demonstrable from knowledge and understanding 407

This farther confirmed from hence; because there are eternal verities, such as were never made, nor had any beginning. That the diagonal of a square incommensurable to the sides, an eternal truth to Aristotle. Justin Martyr's *αἰώνια δίκαια*, or eternal morals,—geometrical truths, not made by any man's thinking, but before all men; as also before the world and matter itself . . . . . 408

Now if there be eternal verities, the simple reasons and intelligible essences of things must needs be eternal likewise. These called by Plato things that always are, but were never made, ingenerable and incorruptible. However Aristotle quarrels with Plato's ideas, yet does he also agree with him in this, that the forms or species of things were eternal, and never made; and that there is no generation of them; and that there are other things besides sensibles the immutable objects of science. Certain, that there could be no immutable science, were there no other objects of the mind but sensibles. The objects of geometrical science no material triangles, squares, &c.: these, by Aristotle, said to be no where. The intelligible natures of things to Philo the most necessary essences . . . . . 410

Now if there be eternal truths and intelligibles, whose existence also is necessary; since these can be no where but in a mind, there must be an eternal necessarily-existing mind, comprehending all these ideas and truths at once, or being them. Which no other than the mind of a perfect omnipotent being, comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things, the extent of its own power . . . . . 414

Wherefore there can be but one only original mind; which all other minds partake of. Hence ideas, or notions exactly alike in several men; and truths indivisibly the same: because their minds all stamped with the same original seal. Themistius; that one man could not teach another, were there not the same notion both in the learner and teacher. Nor could men confer together as they do, were there not one mind that all partaked of. That anti-monarchical opinion, of many understanding beings eternal and independent, confuted. And now have we not only asserted the idea of a God, and confuted all the atheistic pretences against it; but also from this idea demonstrated his existence . . . . . 415

## SECT. II.

A CONFUTATION of the second atheistic argument, against omnipotence and Divine creation; that nothing can, by any power whatsoever, be made out of nothing. In answer to which, three things to be insisted on. First, that *de nihilo nihil*, nothing out of nothing,—is in some sense an axiom of unquestionable truth, but then makes nothing against Theism, or Divine creation. Secondly, that nothing out of nothing, in the sense of the atheistic objectors, viz. that nothing, which once was not, could by any power whatsoever be brought into being, is absolutely false; and that, if it were true, it would make no more against Theism than it does against Atheism. Lastly, that from this very axiom, nothing from nothing, in the true sense thereof, the absolute impossibility of Atheism is demonstrable . 417

*De nihilo nihil*, nothing from nothing, in some sense is a common notion of unquestionable truth. For, first, certain that nothing, which once was not, could ever of itself come into being: or, that nothing can take beginning of existence from itself; or, that nothing can be made or produced without an efficient cause. From whence demonstrated, that there was never nothing, or, that every thing was not made, but something did exist of itself from eternity unmade or underived from any thing else . . . . . 418

Again, certain also that nothing could be efficiently produced by what hath not at least equal perfection, and a sufficient active or productive power. That of an effect, which transcends the perfection of its supposed cause, must come from nothing, or be made without a cause. Nor can any thing be produced by another, though having equal perfection, unless it have also a sufficient active or productive power. Hence certain, that were there once no motion at all in the world, and no other substance besides body which had no self-moving power, there could never possibly be any motion or mutation to all eternity, for want of a sufficient cause or productive power. No imperfect being hath a productive power of any new substance which was not before, but only of new accidents and modifications; that is, no creature can create. Which two forementioned senses respect the efficient cause . . . . . ib.

Thirdly, nothing can be materially produced out of nothing

pre-existing or inexisting. And, therefore, in all natural generations (where the supernatural power of the Deity interposes not) no new real entity or substance produced which was not before, but only new modifications of what substantially pre-existed . . . . . 420

Nothing out of nothing, so much insisted on by the old physiologists before Aristotle, in this sense, commonly misunderstood by modern writers, as if they designed thereby to take away all Divine creation out of nothing pre-existing. Granted, this to have been the sense of the Stoics and of Plutarch; he affirming the world to have been no otherwise made by God, than a house is by a carpenter, or a garment by a tailor. Plutarch and the Stoics therefore imperfect Theists, but nevertheless zealous religionists. But the ancient Italic philosophers here acted only as physiologists, and not as theologers, or metaphysicians; they not directing themselves against a Divine creation out of nothing pre-existing; but only contending, that neither in natural generations any new real entity was created, nor in corruptions annihilated; but only the modifications of what before existed, changed: or, that no new real entity could be made out of matter . . . . . 421

That this was the true meaning of those ancient physiologists, evident from the use which they made of this principle, nothing out of nothing; which twofold. First, upon this foundation they endeavoured to establish a peculiar kind of physiology, and some atomology or other, either similar or dissimilar; homœomery, or anomœomery. Anaxagoras from hence concluded, because nothing could be made out of nothing pre-existing and inexisting, that therefore there were in every body similar atoms, of all kinds, out of which, by concretions and secretions, all natural generations made; so that bone was made out of bony atoms pre-existing and inexisting; flesh out of fleshy, and the like. This the Anaxagorean homœomery, or similar atomology, built upon this principle, nothing out of nothing . . . 424

But the ancient Italics, both before and after Anaxagoras (whom Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, here followed), with greater sagacity concluded, from the same principle, nothing out of nothing, that those qualities and forms of bodies, naturally generated and corrupted, were therefore no real entities, distinct from the substance of matter, but only different modifications thereof, causing different fancies in us; and this an anomœomery, or dissimilar atomology, the atoms thereof



being devoid of qualities. Those simple elements or letters (in nature's alphabet), out of which, variously combined, these philosophers spelled out or compounded all the syllables and words (or complexions) of corporeal things, nothing but figure, site, motion, rest, and magnitude of parts. Were qualities and forms real entities distinct from these, and not pre-existing (as Anaxagoras dreamed), they must then have come from nothing, in natural generations; which impossible . . . . . 425

Another improvement of this principle, nothing out of nothing, made by the Italic philosophers; that the souls of animals, especially human, since they could not possibly result from the mere modifications of matter, figure, site, motion, &c. were not produced in generations, nor annihilated in deaths and corruptions; but being substantial things, did pre and post-exist. This set down as the controversy betwixt Atheists and Theists, in Lucretius. Whether souls were generated, or insinuated into bodies. Generations and corruptions of animals, to these Pythagoreans, but anagrammatical transpositions. That those philosophers, who asserted the pre-existence and ingenerability of souls, did not therefore suppose them to have been self-existent and uncreated, but derived them all from the Deity. Thus Proclus, though maintaining the eternity of souls with the world. The ingenerability of souls in Plato's *Timæus* no more than this, that they were not generated out of matter; and for this cause also were they called principles, in the same sense as matter was so accounted. Souls, therefore, to Plato, created by God, though not in the generation of animals, but before . . . . . 427

St. Austin himself sometime staggering and sceptical in the point of pre-existence. That we have a philosophic certainty of no more than this, that souls were created by God out of nothing pre-existing, some time or other; either in generations, or before them. That unless brutes be mere machines, the reason the same also concerning brutish souls; that the senot generated out of matter, but created some time or other by the Deity; as well as the matter of their bodies was . . . . 430

That all these three forementioned particulars, wherein it is true, that nothing can possibly come from nothing, are reducible to this one general proposition, that nothing can be caused by nothing; which will no way clash with the Divine omnipotence or creative power, as shall be shewed afterwards; but confirm the same. But those same words, nothing out of

nothing, may carry another sense ; when that  $\xi\xi \ \acute{\omicron}\nu\kappa \ \acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\omega\nu$ , out of nothing,—is not taken causally, but only to signify the *terminus a quo*, the term from which, or an antecedent nonexistence : and the meaning thereof will be, that nothing which before was not, could afterwards, by any power whatsoever, be brought into being. And this the sense of the Democritic and Epicurean objectors ; viz. that no real entity can be made, or brought out of nonexistence into being ; and therefore the creative power of Theists an impossibility . . . . . 432

Our second undertakings in way of answer hereunto ; to shew, that nothing out of nothing, in this sense is false ; as also, that, were it true yet it would make no more against Theism than it doth against Atheism ; and therefore ought not to be used by Atheists as an argument against a God. If this universally true, that nothing at all, which once was not, could ever be brought into being, then could there be no making nor causing at all no motion nor action, mutation or generation. But ourselves have a power of producing new cogitation in our minds, and new motion in our bodies. Wherefore Atheists forced to restrain this proposition to substantials only. And here some deceived with the equivocation, in this  $\xi\xi \ \acute{\omicron}\nu\kappa \ \acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\omega\nu$ , out of nothing ; which may be taken either causally, or else to signify the term from which that is, from an antecedent nonexistence ; they confounding both these together ; whereof the first only true, the latter false. Again, others staggered with the plausibility of this proposition ; partly because no artificial thing (as a house or garment) can be made by men, but out of pre-existing matter ; and partly because ancient physiologers maintained the same also concerning natural generations, that no new real entity or substance could be therein produced ; and lastly, because it is certain that no imperfect created being can create any new substance ; they being therefore apt to measure all power whatsoever by these scantlings. But as easy for a perfect being to create a world, matter and all, out of nothing (in this sense, that is, out of an antecedent nonexistence), as for us to create a thought, or to move a finger, or for the sun to send out rays. For an imperfect substance, which once was not, to be brought into being by God, this not impossible, in any of the forementioned senses ; he having not only infinitely greater perfection, but also sufficient productive or emanative power. True, that infinite power cannot do things in their own nature impossible ; but nothing thus impossible but what contradictory : and

though a contradiction for any thing, at the same time, to be and not be; yet none at all, for an imperfect being (which is in its nature contingent to existence), after it had not been, to be. Wherefore, since the making of a substance to be, which was not before, is no way contradictory, nor consequently in its own nature impossible; it must needs be an object of perfect power . . . . . 433

Furthermore, if no real entity or substance could possibly be brought out of nonexistence into being; then must the reason hereof be, because no substance can derive its whole being from another substance. But from hence it would follow, that whatsoever is substantial, did not only exist from eternity, but also of itself, independently upon any thing else. Whereas first, the pre-eternity of temporary beings not agreeable to reason; and then, to suppose imperfect substances to have existed of themselves and necessarily, is to suppose something to come from nothing, in the impossible sense; they having no necessary self-existence in their nature. As they, who affirm all substance to be body, and no body to be able to move itself, though supposing motion to have been from eternity; yet make this motion to come from nothing, or be caused by nothing. What in its nature contingently possible to be, or not be, could not exist of itself; but must derive its being from something else, which necessarily existeth. Plato's distinction therefore betwixt two kinds of substances must needs be admitted, that, which always is, and was never made: and that which is made, or had a beginning . . . . . 437

Lastly, if this true, that no substance makeable or producible, it would not only follow from thence (as the Epicurean Atheist supposes) that matter, but also that all souls (at least human), did exist of themselves, from eternity, independently upon any thing else; it being impossible, that mind or soul should be a modification of senseless matter, or result from figures, sites, motions, and magnitudes. Human souls substantial, and therefore according to this doctrine, must have been never made; whereas Atheists stiffly deny both their pre and post-existence. Those pagan Theists, who held the eternity of human minds, supposed them, notwithstanding, to have depended upon the Deity, as their cause. Before proved, that there can be but one understanding being, self-existent. If human souls depend upon the Deity as their cause, then doubtless matter also . . . . 438

A common but great mistake that no pagan Theist ever ac-

knowledged any creative power out of nothing; or else, that God was the cause of any substance. Plato's definition of effective power in general, and his affirmation, that the Divine efficiency is that whereby things are made after they had not been. Certain, that he did not understand this of the production of souls out of matter, he supposing them to be before matter, and therefore made by God out of nothing pre-existing. All philosophers, who held the immortality and incorporeity of the soul, asserted it to have been caused by God, either in time or from eternity. Plutarch's singularity here. Unquestionable, that the Platonists supposed one substance to receive its whole being from another; in that they derive their second hypostasis or substance, though eternal, from the first; and their third from both; and all inferior ranks of beings from all three. Plotinus, Porphyrius, Jamblichus, Hierocles, Proclus, and others, derived matter from the Deity. Thus the Chaldee oracles; and the old Egyptian or Hermaic theology also, according to Jamblichus. Those Platonists, who supposed the world and souls eternal, conceived them to have received their being as much from the Deity as if made in time . . . . . 441

Having now disproved this proposition, "nothing out of nothing," in the atheistic sense, viz. That no substance was caused or derived its being from another, but whatsoever is substantial, did exist of itself from eternity, independently; we are, in the next place, to make it appear also, that were it true, it would no more oppose Theism than it doth Atheism. Falsehoods (though not truths) may disagree. Plutarch, the Stoics, and others, who made God the creator of no substance, though not genuine yet zealous Theists. But the ancient Atheists, both in Plato and Aristotle, generated and corrupted all things; that is, produced all things out of nothing, or nonexistence, and reduced them into nothing again; the bare substance of matter only excepted. The same done by the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves, the makers of this objection: though according to the principles of their own atomic physiology, it is impossible, that life and understanding, soul and mind, should be mere modifications of matter. As Theists give a creative power of all, out of nothing, to the Deity; so do Atheists to passive and dead matter. Wherefore this can be no argument against Theism; it equally opposing Atheism. . . . . 445

An anacephalæosis; wherein observable, that Cicero makes *de nihilo fieri*, and *sine causa*, to be made out of nothing, and

to be made without a cause, one and the self-same thing; as also, that he doth not confine this to the material cause only. Our third and last undertaking; to prove that Atheists produce real entities out of nothing, in the first impossible sense; that is, without a cause . . . . . 452

A brief synopsis of Atheism; that matter being the only substance, is therefore the only unmade thing; and that whatsoever else is in the world, besides the bare substance thereof, was made out of matter, or produced from that alone . . . 455

The first argument: when Atheists affirm matter to be the only substance, and all things to be made out of that, they suppose all to be made without an efficient cause; which is to bring them from nothing, in an impossible sense. Though something may be made without a material cause pre-existing; yet cannot any thing possibly be made without an efficient cause. Wherefore if there be any thing made, which was not before, there must of necessity be, besides matter, some other substance as the active efficient cause thereof. The atheistic hypothesis supposes things to be made without any active or effective principle. Whereas the Epicurean Atheists attribute the efficiency of all to local motion; and yet deny matter or body (their only substance) a self-moving power. They hereby make all the motion that is in the world to have been without a cause, or to come from nothing; all action without an agent; all efficiency without an efficient . . . . . 456

Again, should we grant these Atheists motion without a cause, yet could not dead and senseless matter, together with motion, ever beget life, sense, and understanding; because this would be something out of nothing, in way of causality, local motion only changing the modifications of matter, as figure, place, site, and disposition of parts. Hence also those spurious Theists confuted, who conclude God to have done no more in the making of the world, than a carpenter doth in the building of a house (upon this pretence, that nothing can be made out of nothing); and yet suppose him to make souls out of dead and senseless matter, which is to bring them from nothing in way of causality . . . . . 457

Declared before, That the ancient Italics and Pythagorics proved in this manner, that souls could not possibly be generated out of matter; because nothing can come from nothing, in way of causality. The subterfuge of the atheistic Ionics out of Aristotle; that matter being the only substance, and life,

sense and understanding, nothing but the passions, affections, and dispositions thereof; the production of them out of matter, no production of any new real entity . . . . . 458

Answer: Atheists taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body or matter, therefore falsely conclude life sense, and understanding to be accidents or modes of matter; they being indeed the modes or attributes of substance incorporeal and self-active. A mode that which cannot be conceived without the thing whereof it is a mode; but life and cogitation may be conceived without corporeal extension; and indeed cannot be conceived with it . . . . . 460

The chief occasion of this error from qualities and forms; as because the quality of heat, and form of fire, may be generated out of matter; therefore life, cogitation, and understanding also. But the atomic Atheists themselves explode qualities, as things really distinct from the figure, site, and motion of parts, for this very reason, because nothing can be made out of nothing causally. The vulgar opinion of such real qualities in bodies, only from men's mistaking their own fancies, apparitions, passions, affections, and seemings, for things really existing without them. That in these qualities, which is distinct from the figure, site, and motion of parts, not the accidents and modifications of matter, but of our own souls. The atomic Atheists infinitely absurd when exploding qualities, because nothing can come out of nothing, themselves bring life, sense and understanding, out of nothing, in way of causality. That opinion, that cogitation is nothing but local motion, and men themselves but mere machines, prodigious sottishness or intolerable impudence . . . . 462

Very observable here, that Epicurus himself, having a mind to assert contingent liberty, confesseth, that he could not do this, unless there were some such thing in the principles; because nothing can be made out of nothing, or caused by nothing; and therefore does he ridiculously feign a third motion of atoms, to solve that phenomena of free will. Wherefore he must needs be guilty of an impossible production, of something out of nothing, when he brings soul and mind out of dead senseless atoms. Were there no substantial and eternal life and understanding in the universe, there could none have been ever produced; because it must have come from nothing, or been made without a cause. That dark philosophy which educes not only real qualities and substantial forms, but also souls themselves, at least sensitive, out of the power of the matter, educes them out

of nothing, or makes them without a cause ; and so prepares a direct way to Atheism . . . . . 464

They who suppose matter otherwise than by motion, and by a kind of miraculous efficiency, to produce souls, and minds, attribute that creative power to this senseless and inactive matter, which themselves deny to a perfect being as an absolute impossibility. Thus have we demonstrated the impossibility and nonsense of all Atheism from this very principle, That nothing can be made from nothing, or without sufficient cause . . . 467

Wherefore, if no middle betwixt these two, but all things must either spring from a God, or matter ; then is this also a demonstration of the truth of Theism, by deduction to impossible : either there is a God, or else all things are derived from dead and senseless matter : but this latter is impossible ; therefore a God. Nevertheless, that the existence of a God may be farther directly proved also from the same principle, rightly understood, nothing out of nothing causally, or nothing caused by nothing, neither efficiently nor materially . . . . . 468

By these steps ; first, that there was never nothing, but something or other did exist of itself from eternity, unmade, and independently upon any thing else, mathematically certain ; from this principle, “nothing from nothing.” Had there been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. Again, Whatsoever did exist of itself from eternity, must have so existed necessarily, and not by any free will and choice. Certain, therefore, that there is something actually in being, whose existence is and always was necessary. Now that which exists necessarily of itself, must have necessity of existence in its nature ; which nothing but a perfect being hath. Therefore there is a perfect being ; and nothing else besides this did exist of itself from eternity, but all other things whatsoever (whether souls or matter) were made by it. To suppose any thing to exist of itself necessarily, that hath no necessary existence in its nature, is to suppose that necessary existence to have come from nothing 469

Three reasons why some Theists have been so staggering and sceptical about the necessary self-existence of matter. First, from an idiotical conceit, that because artificial things cannot be made by men but out of pre-existent matter, therefore nothing by God, or a perfect being, can be otherwise made. Secondly, because some of them have supposed *ἀλην ἄσώματον*, an incorporeal hyle, or first matter unmade ; an opinion older than Aristotle. Whereas this really nothing but a metaphysical

notion of the potentiality or possibility of things, respectively to the Deity. Lastly, because some of them have conceived body and space to be really the same thing; and space to be positively infinite, eternal, and necessarily existent. But if space be not the extension of the Deity itself, as some suppose; but of body, only considered abstractedly from this or that, and therefore immoveably; then no sufficient ground for the positive infinity or the indefinity thereof, as Cartesius imagined: we being certain of no more than this, that be the world and its space, or extension, never so great, yet it might be still greater and greater infinitely; for which very cause it could never be positively infinite. This possibility of more body and space, farther and farther indefinitely, or without end, as also its eternity, mistaken, for actual space and distance positively infinite and eternal. Nor is there perhaps any such great absurdity in the finiteness of actual space and distance (according to this hypothesis), as some conceive . . . . . 470

Moreover, the existence of a God may be farther proved from this common notion, "nothing from nothing causally;" not only because were there no God, that idea which we have of a perfect being must have come from nothing, and be the conception of nothing; but also all the other intelligible ideas of our minds must have come from nothing likewise, they being not derived from sense. All minds, and their intelligible ideas by way of participation, from one perfect omnipotent being comprehending itself . . . . . 473

However, certain from this principle, "nothing from nothing," or "nothing caused by nothing;" that souls and minds could never have emerged out of dead and senseless matter, or from figures, sites, and motions; and therefore must either have all existed of themselves, necessarily from eternity; or else be created by the Deity out of nothing pre-existing. Concluded, that the existence of a God is altogether as certain, as that our human souls did not all exist from eternity, of themselves necessarily. Thus is the second atheistic argumentation against omnipotence or Divine creation, from that false principle, "nothing out of nothing," in the atheistic sense (which is, that nothing could be brought out of nonexistence into being, or no substance derive its whole being from another substance, but all was self-existent from eternity), abundantly confuted; it having been demonstrated, that unless there be a God, or a perfect omnipotent being, and creator, something must have come from



nothing in the impossible sense; that is, have been caused by nothing, or made without a cause. . . . . 474

### SECT. III.

THE six following atheistic argumentations, driving at these two things (the disproving, first of an incorporeal and then of a corporeal Deity), next taken all together. In way of answer to which, three things. First, to confute the atheistic argumentations against an incorporeal Deity, being the third and fourth. Secondly, to shew, that from the very principles of the atheistic Corporealism, in their fifth and sixth arguments, incorporeal substance is demonstrable. And, lastly, that therefore the two following atheistic arguments (built upon the contrary supposition) are also insignificant . . . . . 475

Before we come to the Atheistic arguments against an incorporeal Deity, premised; that though all Corporealists be not Atheists, yet Atheists universally mere Corporealists. Thus Plato in his Sophist, writing of those who maintained that nature generated all things without the direction of any mind, affirmeth, that they held body and substance to be one and the self-same thing. From whence it follows, that incorporeal substance is incorporeal body, or contradictory nonsense; and that whatsoever is not body is nothing. He likewise addeth, that they who asserted the soul to be a body, but had not the confidence to make prudence and other virtues bodies (or bodily), quite overthrew the cause of Atheism. Aristotle also representeth the atheistic hypothesis thus, that there is but one nature, matter; and this corporeal (or endued with magnitude) the only substance; and all other things, the passions and affections thereof . . . . . ib.

In disproving incorporeal substance, some difference amongst the Atheists themselves. First, those who held a vacuum (as Epicurus and Democritus, &c.) though taking it for granted, that what is unextended or devoid of magnitude is nothing; yet acknowledged a double extended nature; the first impenetrable and tangible, body; the second penetrable and intangible, space or vacuum; to them the only incorporeal. Their argument thus; since nothing incorporeal besides space (which can neither do nor suffer any thing), therefore no incorporeal Deity. The answer: if space be a real nature, and yet not bodily; then must it needs be either an affection of incorporeal sub-

stance, or else an accident without a substance. Gassendus's officiousness here to help the Atheists, that space is neither accident nor substance, but a middle nature, or essence betwixt both. But, whatsoever is, must either subsist by itself, or else be an attribute, affection, or mode of something, that subsisteth by itself. Space, either the extension of body, or of incorporeal substance, or of nothing; but nothing cannot be extended; wherefore space, supposed not to be the extension of body, must be the extension of an incorporeal substance infinite, or the Deity; as some Theists assert . . . . . 478

Epicurus's pretended gods, such as could neither touch nor be touched, and had not *corpus*, but *quasi corpus* only; and therefore incorporeals distinct from space. But granted that he colluded or juggled in this . . . . . 480

Other Atheists, who denied a vacuum, and allowed not space to be a nature, but a mere imaginary thing, the phantasm of a body, or else extension considered abstractedly, argued thus: whatsoever is extended, is body, or bodily; but whatsoever is, is extended; therefore whatsoever is, is body . . . . . *ib.*

This argument against incorporeal substance answered two manner of ways; some assertors of incorporeal substance denying the minor, whatsoever is, is extended; others the major of it, whatsoever is extended is body. First, the generality of ancient Incorporealists really maintained, that there was something unextended, indistant, devoid of quantity, and of magnitude, without parts, and indivisible. Plato, that the soul is before longitude, latitude, and profundity. He also denies, that whatsoever is in no place, is nothing. Aristotle's first immoveable mover also devoid of magnitude. So likewise is mind, or that which understands, to him. He also denies place and local motion to the soul otherwise than by accident with the body 481

Philo's double substance, distant and indistant. God also to him, both every where (because his powers extend to all things) and yet no where, as in a place; place being created by him, together with bodies. Plotinus much concerned in this doctrine. Two books of his upon this subject, that one and the same numerical thing (*viz.* the Deity) may be all, or the whole every where. God to him, before all things that are in a place: therefore wholly present to whatsoever present. This would he prove also from natural instincts. He affirmeth likewise, that the human soul is numerically the same, both in the hand and in the foot. Simplicius's argument for unextended

substance; that whatsoever is self-moving, must be indivisible and indistant. His affirmation, that souls, locally immoveable, move the body by cogitation . . . . . 486

None more full and express in this than Porphyrius. His assertion, that were there such an incorporeal space (as Democritus and Epicurus supposed), mind, or God, could not be coextended with it; but only body. The whole Deity indivisibly and indistantly present to every part of divisible and distant things . . . . . 490

Thus Origen in his against Celsus. St. Austin, that the human soul hath no dimensions, of length, breadth, and thickness, and is in itself *illocabilis*. Boethius reckons this amongst the common notions, known only to wise men, that incorporeals are in no place . . . . . 492

This therefore no novel or recent opinion, that the Deity is not part of it here, and part of it there, nor mensurable by yards and poles; but the whole undivided, present to every part of the world. But because many objections against this, we shall farther shew, how these ancient Incorporealists endeavoured to quit themselves of them. The first objection, that to suppose the Deity, and other incorporeal substances, unextended, is to make them absolute parvitudes, and so contemptible things. Plotinus's answer; that what is incorporeal, not so indivisible as a little thing; either a physical minimum, or mathematical point: for thus God could not *congruere* with the whole world, nor the soul with the whole body. Again, God not so indivisible, as the least, he being the greatest of all, not in magnitude, but power. He so indivisible, as also infinite. This an error proceeding from sense and imagination; that what unextended, therefore little. Incorporeal substance, the whole of which is present to every part of body, therefore greater than body. Porphyrius to the same purpose, that God is neither to be looked upon as the least, nor as the greatest, in way of magnitude 494

The second objection; that what neither great nor little, and possesses no place, a nonentity. This, according to Plato, Plotinus, and Porphyrius, a mistake proceeding from men's adhering to sense and imagination. They grant, that an unextended being is *ἀφάνταστον*, unimaginable.—Porphyrius, that mind and fancy are not the same, as some maintain. That, which can neither do, or suffer, not nothing, though it swell not out into distance. Two kinds of substances to Plotinus; bulky tumours, and unbulky active powers. Which latter, said by Sim-

plicius to have nevertheless a certain depth or profundity in them. Something *ἀφάνταστον*, unimaginable,—even in body itself. We cannot possibly imagine the sun of such a bigness, as reason evinces it to be urged also by Plotinus, that an unstretched-out duration, or timeless eternity, as difficult to be conceived as an unextended substance: and yet must this needs be attributed to the Deity . . . . . 498

That God and human souls no otherwise incorporeal than as *σῶμα λεπτομερὲς*, a thin or subtile body, false. Because the difference of grossness and subtlety in bodies, according to true philosophy, only from motion. That the most subtile body may possibly be made as gross as lead or iron; and the grossest as subtile as ether. No specific difference of matter . . . . . 504

The third argument against unextended substance; that to be all in the whole, and all in every part, a contradiction and impossibility. This granted by Plotinus to be true of bodies, or that which is extended; that it cannot be *ἰσοῦ πᾶν* but impossible, that what hath no parts, should be a part here, and a part there. Wherefore the word *ἅλον* (in that, whole in the whole, and whole in every part) to be taken only in a negative sense, for *μὴ μεμερισμένον*, undivided.—The whole undivided Deity every where; and not a part of it here only, and a part there . . . . . 505

The last objection is against the illocality and immobility of finite created spirits, and human souls only. That this not only absurd, but also contrary to that generally-received tradition amongst Theists, of souls moving locally after death, into another place, called Hades. Two answers of Plotinus to this. First, that by Hades may be meant only the invisible, or the soul's acting without the body. Secondly, that if by Hades be meant a worsor place, the soul may be said to be there where its idol is. But when this same philosopher supposeth the soul (in good men) to be separable also from this idol, he departeth from the genuine cabala of his own school. That souls always united to some body or other. This asserted here by Porphyrius; that the soul is never quite naked of all body; and therefore may be said to be there, wheresoever its body is . . . . . 507

Some excerptions out of Philoponus; wherein the doctrine of the ancients, concerning the soul's spirituous or airy body (after death), is largely declared . . . . . 511

Intimated here by Philoponus, that, according to some of

these ancients, the soul hath such a spirituous body here in this life, as its interior indument, which then adheres to it, when its outer garment is stripped off by death. An opinion of some, that the soul may, in this spirituous body, leave its grosser body for some time, without death. True, that our soul doth not immediately act upon bones and flesh; but certain thin and subtle spirits, the instruments of sense and motion. Of which Porphyrius thus: "The blood is the food of the spirit, and the spirit the vehicle of the soul" . . . . . 516

The same Philoponus farther addeth, that, according to the ancients, besides both the terrestrial and this spirituous or airy body, there is yet a third kind of body, peculiar to such as are souls, as are more thoroughly purged after death; called by them a luciform, and heavenly and ethereal, and star-like body. Of this Proclus also upon the Timæus (who affirmeth it to be unorganized), as likewise Hierocles. This called the thin vehicle of the soul, in the Chaldee oracles, according to Psellus and Pletho. By Hierocles, a spiritual body, in a sense agreeable to that of the Scripture: by Synesius, the Divine body. This distinction of two interior vehicles, or tunicles of the soul, besides the terrestrial body (called by Plato the ostreaceous), no invention of latter Platonists since Christianity; it being plainly insisted upon by Virgil, though commonly not understood 517

That many of these Platonists and Pythagoreans supposed the soul, in its first creation, when made pure by God, to be clothed with this luciform and heavenly body; which also did always inseparably adhere to it, in its after-descents into the æreal and terrestrial; though fouled and obscured. Thus Pletho. And the same intimated by Galen; when he calls this the first vehicle of the soul. Hence was it, that besides the moral and intellectual purgation of the soul, they recommended also a mystical or teletic way of purifying the ethereal vehicle, by diet and catharms. This much insisted on by Hierocles. What Pliny's dying by wisdom, or the philosophic death 522

But this not the opinion of all, that the same numerical ethereal body always adhereth to the soul; but only, that it every where either finds or makes a body suitable to itself. Thus Porphyrius. Plato also seems to have been of that persuasion . . . . . 526

This affirmed by Hierocles to have been the genuine cabala of the ancient Pythagoreans, which Plato afterward followed. Hierocles's definition of a man, a rational soul together with a

cognate immortal body; he declaring this enlivened terrestrial body to be but the idol or image of the true man, or an accession to him. This therefore the answer of the ancient Incorporealists to that objection against the illocality and immobility of created incorporeals; that these being all naturally united to some body or other, may be thus said to be in a place, and locally moved. And, that it does not follow, that because created incorporeals are unextended, they might therefore inform the whole corporeal universe . . . . . 527

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THAT it would be no impertinent digression here to compare the forementioned Pythagoric cabala with the doctrine of Christianity; and to consider their agreement or disagreement. First, therefore, a clear agreement of these most religious philosophers with Christianity in this, that the highest happiness and perfection of human nature consisteth not in a separate state of souls un-united to any body, as some high-flown persons have conceited. Thus Plotinus, who sometimes runs as much into the other extreme, in supposing human souls to animate not only the bodies of brutes but also of plants. Thus also Maimonides amongst the Jews; and therefore suspected for denying the resurrection. His Iggereth Teman written purposely to purge himself of this suspicion. The allegorizers of the resurrection, and of the life to come . . . . . 1

Again, Christianity correspondeth with the philosophic cabala concerning human souls in this, that their happiness consisteth not in conjunction with such gross terrestrial bodies as these we now have; Scripture, as well as philosophy, complaining of them as a heavy load and burden to the soul; which therefore not to be taken up again at the resurrection. Such a resurrection as this called by Plotinus a resurrection to another sleep. The difference betwixt the resurrection-body and this present body in Scripture. The resurrection-body of the just (as that of the philosophic cabala) immortal and eternal, glorious and lucid; star-like and spiritual; heavenly and angelical. Not this gross fleshy body, gilded and varnished over in the outside

only, but changed throughout. This the resurrection of life, in Scripture emphatically called the resurrection. Our souls strangers and pilgrims in these terrestrial bodies: their proper home and country the heavenly body. That the grossest body that this, according to philosophy, may merely by motion be brought into the purity and tenuity of the finest ether . . . . 3

But whether human souls after death, always united to some body, or else quite naked from all body till the resurrection; not so explicitly determined in Christianity. Souls after death live unto God. According to Origen, this a privilege proper to the Deity, to live and act alone, without vital union with any body. If natural to the soul to enliven a body, then not probable that it should be kept so long in an unnatural state of separation . . . . . 11

Again; probable from Scripture that wicked souls after death have punishment of sense or pain, besides remorse of conscience: which not easily conceivable how they should have without bodies. Thus Tertullian. He adding, that men have the same shape or effigies after this life which they had here. Though indeed he drive the business too far, so as to make the soul itself to be a body, figurate and colourate . 14

But Irenæus plainly supposed the soul after death (being incorporeal) to be adapted to a body, such as has the same character and figure with its body here in this life . . . . 17

Origen also of this persuasion, that souls after death have certain subtile bodies, retaining the same characterizing form which their terrestrial bodies had. His opinion, that apparitions of the dead are from the souls themselves, surviving in that which is called a luciform body. As, also, that St. Thomas did not doubt but that the body of a soul departed might appear every way like the former: only he disbelieved our Saviour's appearing in the same solid body which he had before death . . . . 18

Our Saviour telling his disciples, that a spirit had no flesh and bones, that is, no solid body as himself then had, seems to imply them to have thinner bodies, which they may visibly appear in. Thus, in Apollonius, is touch made the sign to distinguish a ghost appearing from a living man. Our Saviour's body after his resurrection, according to Origen, in a middle state betwixt this gross or solid body of ours, and that of a ghost . . . . 21

A place of Scripture, which, as interpreted by the fathers, would naturally imply the soul of our Saviour after death not to have been quite naked of all body, but to have had a corporeal

spirit. Moses and Elias visibly appearing to our Saviour, had therefore true bodies . . . . . 23

That the regenerate here in this life have a certain earnest of their future inheritance (which is their spiritual or heavenly body), gathered from Scripture by Irenæus and Novatian. Which prelibations of the spiritual body cannot so well consist with a perfect separation from all body after death till the day of judgment . . . . . 24

This opinion of Irenæus, Origen, and others, supposed by them not at all to clash with the Christian article of the resurrection. Nothing in this point determined by us . . . . . 26

The last thing in the Pythagoric cabala, that demons or angels, and indeed all created understanding beings, consist, as well as men, of soul and body, incorporeal and corporeal, united all together. Thus Hierocles, universally of all the rational nature; and that no incorporeal substance, besides the supreme Deity, is complete, without the conjunction of a body. God the only incorporeal in this sense; and not a mundane but a supra-mundane soul . . . . . 26

Origen's full agreement with this old Pythagoric cabala, that rational creatures are neither body, nor yet without body; but incorporeal substances having a corporeal indument . . . . . 29

Origen misrepresented by Huetius, as asserting angels not to have bodies, but to be bodies; whereas he plainly acknowledged the human soul to be incorporeal, and angels also to have souls. He proveth incorporeal creatures from the Scriptures; which, though themselves not bodies, yet always use bodies. Whereas the Deity is neither body, nor yet clothed with a body, as the proper soul thereof . . . . . 31

Some of the fathers so far from supposing angels altogether incorporeal, that they ran into the other extreme, and concluded them altogether corporeal; that is, to be all body, and nothing else. The middle betwixt both these, the Origenic and Pythagoric hypothesis, that they consist of incorporeal and corporeal substance, soul and body joined together. The generality of the ancient fathers for neither of those extremes. That they did not suppose angels to be perfectly unbodied spirits, evident from their affirming devils, as the Greek philosophers did demons, to be delighted with the nidours of sacrifices; as having their vaporous bodies, or airy vehicles, refreshed thereby. Thus Porphyrius, and before him Celsus. Amongst the Christians (besides Origen), Justin, Athenagoras, Tatianus, &c. St. Basil,



concerning the bodies of demons or devils being nourished with vapours; not by organs, but throughout their whole substance . . . . . 34

Several of the fathers plainly asserting both devils and angels to consist of soul and body, incorporeal and corporeal substance joined together. St. Austin, Claudianus, Mamertus, Fulgentius, Joannes Thessalonicensis; and Psellus, who philosophizeth much concerning this . . . . . 37

That some of the ancients, when they called angels incorporeal, understood nothing else thereby but only that they had not gross but subtile bodies . . . . . 43

The fathers, though herein happening to agree with the philosophic cabala, yet seemed to have been led thereunto by Scripture. As from that of our Saviour, they who shall obtain the resurrection of the dead, shall be *ισάγγελοι*, equal to the angels;—that is, according to St. Austin, shall have angelical bodies. From that of St. Jude, that angels sinning lost their own proper dwelling-house; that is, their heavenly body (called *οικητήριον* by St. Paul), which made them fit inhabitants of the heavenly regions; and thereupon cast down into the lower Tartarus; interpreted by St. Austin to be this caliginous air or atmosphere of the earth. Again, from that fire said to have been prepared for the devils: which being not to be taken metaphorically, therefore (as Psellus concludeth) implies them to be bodied; because an incorporeal substance alone, and not vitally united to any body, cannot be tormented with fire . . . 45

Now if all created incorporeals, superior to men, be souls vitally united to bodies, and never quite separate from all body; then probable, that human souls, after death, not quite naked from all body, as if they could live and act completely without it; a privilege superior to that of angels, and proper to the Deity. Nor is it at all conceivable how imperfect beings could have sense and imagination without bodies. *Origen contra Celsum*, “Our soul, in its own nature incorporeal, always standeth in need of a body suitable to the place wherein it is. And, accordingly, sometimes putteth off what it had before; and sometimes again putteth on something new.” Where the following words being vitiated, Origen’s genuine sense restored. Evident, that Origen distinguisheth the *τὸ σκῆνος* in St. Paul (translated *tabernacle*) from the earthly house; he understanding by the former a thin spirituous body, which is a middle betwixt the earthly and the heavenly, and which the soul remain-

eth still clothed with after death. This opinion of Origen's, that the soul after death not quite separate from all body, never reckoned up in the catalogue of his errors. Origen not taxed by Methodius for asserting souls to have bodies, but for not asserting them to be bodies; there being no truly incorporeal substance, according to Methodius, but the Deity. This one of the extremes mentioned. And the Origenic hypothesis to be preferred before that of Methodius . . . . . 49

Already observed, that Origen not singular in this opinion concerning human souls; Irenæus, Philoponus, Joannes Thesalonicensis, Psellus, and others, asserting the same. St. Austin in his *De Gen. ad Lit.* granted, that souls after death cannot be carried to any corporal places, nor locally moved without a body. Himself seems to think the punishment of souls, before the resurrection, to be fantastical. But gives liberty of thinking otherwise. In his book *De Civ. D.* he conceives that Origenic opinion not improbable, that some souls after death, and before the resurrection, may suffer from a certain fire for the consuming and burning up of their dross: which could not be without bodies . . . . . 55

Hitherto shewed how the ancient assertors of unextended incorporeals answered all the objections made against them; but especially that of the illocality and immobility of created incorporeals; namely, that by those bodies which they are always vitally united to, they are localized and made capable of motion; according to that of Origen, the soul stands in need of a body for local motions. Next to be considered, their reasons for this assertion of unextended and indistant substance, so repugnant to imagination . . . . . 59

That whatsoever arguments do evince other substance besides body, the same against the Atheists demonstrate, that there is something unextended; themselves taking it for granted, that whatsoever is extended, is body. Nevertheless, other arguments propounded by these ancients, to prove directly unextended substance. Plotinus's first, to prove the human soul and mind such. Either every part of an unextended soul, is soul; and of mind, mind; or not. If the latter, that no part of a soul, or mind, is by itself soul, or mind; then cannot the whole, made up of all those parts, be such. But if every supposed part of a soul be soul, and of a mind, mind; then would all but one be superfluous: or every one be the whole: which cannot be in extended things . . . . . 60

Again, Plotinus endeavours to prove, from the energies of the soul, that it is unextended; because it is one and the same indivisible thing, that perceiveth the whole sensible object. This farther pursued; if the soul be extended, then must it either be one physical point, or more. Impossible, that it should be but one physical point. If therefore more, then must every one of those points either perceive a point of the object, and no more, or else the whole. If the former, then can nothing perceive the whole, nor compare one part of it with another: if the latter, then would every man have innumerable perceptions of the whole object at once. A fourth supposition, that the whole extended soul perceives both the whole object, and all the parts thereof (no part of the soul having any perception by itself); not to be made; because the whole of an extended substance nothing but all the parts: and so if no part have any perception the whole can have none. Moreover, to say the whole soul perceiveth all, and no part of it any thing, is indeed to acknowledge it unextended, and to have no distant parts . . . . 63

Again, this philosopher would prove the same thing from the sympathy or homopathy which is in animals; it being one and the same thing that perceives pain in the head and in the foot, and comprehends the whole bulk of the body . . . . 67

Lastly, he disputes farther from the rational energies. A magnitude could not understand what hath no magnitude and what is indivisible: whereas we have a notion, not only of latitude as indivisible to thickness, and of longitude as to breadth, but also of a mathematical point, every way indivisible. We have notions of things also that have neither magnitude nor site, &c. Again, all the abstract essences of things indivisible. We conceive extended things themselves unextendedly; the thought of a mile, or a thousand miles distance, taking up no more room in the soul, than the thought of an inch, or of a mathematical point. Moreover, were that, which perceiveth in us, a magnitude, it could not be equal to every sensible, and alike perceive things greater and lesser than itself . . . . 68

Besides which, they might argue thus; that we as we can conceive extension without cogitation, and again cogitation without extension (from whence their distinction and separability is inferrible): so can we not conceive cogitation with extension; nor the length, breadth, and thickness of a thought; nor the half, or a third, or the twentieth part thereof; nor that it is figurative, round, or angular. Thoughts therefore must be nonentities, if

whatsoever is unextended be nothing; as also metaphysical truths, they having neither dimensions nor figure. So volitions and passions, knowledge and wisdom itself, justice and temperance. If the things belonging to soul and mind be unextended, then must themselves be so. Again, if mind and soul have distant parts, then could none of them be one, but many substances. If life divided, then a half of it would not be life. Lastly, no reason could be given, why they might not be as well really as intellectually divisible. Nor could a Theist deny, but that Divine power might cleave a thought, together with the soul wherein it is, into many pieces . . . . . 71

The sense of the ancient Incorporealists therefore this; that in nature two kinds of substances. The first of them passive bulk, or distant and extended substance; which is all one thing without another; and therefore as many substances as parts, into which it can be divided essentially antitypous; one magnitude joined to another always standing without it, and making the whole so much bigger. Body all outside, having nothing within, no internal energy, nor any action besides local motion; which it is also passive to . . . . . 73

Were there no other substance besides this, there could be motion, action, life, cogitation, intellection, volition; but all would be a dead lump; nor could any one thing penetrate another. Wherefore another substance, whose character *φύσις δραστήριος*, the active nature,—life, self-activity, cogitation: which no mode or accident of extension, it having more of entity in it. Nor are these two, extension and life, inadequate conceptions of one and the same substance. A thinker a monad; or one single substance. Not conceivable, how the several parts of an extended substance should jointly concur to produce one and the same thing . . . . . 74

The energies of these two substances very different. The one nothing but local motion, or translation from place to place; a mere outside thing: the other cogitation, an internal energy; or in the inside of that which thinks. Which inside of the thinking nature hath no length, breadth, or profundity, no out-swell-ing tumour; because then it would be outside again. Were a cogitative being extended, yet must it have, besides this extended outside, an unextended inside. But one and the same substance cannot be extended and unextended. Wherefore in this opinion of extended incorporeals, a complication of two substances, and

a confusion of them together into one. True nevertheless, that all finite incorporeal substance is always naturally united with some extended body, as its outside . . . . . 76

All summed up together . . . . . 78

Hitherto the sense of the ancient assertors of unextended incorporeals represented to the best advantage. Nothing asserted by us; but that these, and other arguments, do demonstrate, against the Atheists, some other substance besides body: but whether or no they prove this to be indistant and unextended, left to others to make a judgment. The Atheists, who deny this, must acknowledge every thought to be not only mentally but also physically divisible and separable, together with the soul; as also deny internal energy; and consequently make cogitation nothing but local motion; and, lastly, hold that no substance can coexist with another substance, more inwardly than by juxta-position . . . . . 80

This the first answer to the forementioned atheistic argument against incorporeal substance, made by the ancients by denying the minor, that though whatsoever is extended be body yet every thing is not extended. But the argument otherwise answered by some learned assertors of incorporeal substance, by denying the major; that though every thing be extended, or what unextended nothing; yet whatever is extended is not body; they asserting another extension incorporeal, which is both penetrable and not made up of parts physically separable from one another; to which belongeth life, self-activity, and cogitation. Probable, that some would compound both the forementioned hypotheses together; by supposing the Deity to be altogether unextended, and indivisibly all every where; but souls, or created incorporeals, to have an unextended inside, diffused, as it were, into an extended outside. Ourselves here only to oppose Atheists; and dogmatize no farther than to assert, what all Incorporealists agree in, that besides body there is another substance, which consisteth not of parts really separable from one another; which is penetrable of body, and self-active, and hath an internal energy, distinct from local motion. All which is demonstratively certain. This the full answer to the first atheistic argument against incorporeal substance; that either there is something unextended, or at least extended otherwise than body, so as to be penetrable thereof, and indiscerpibly one with itself, and self-active . . . . . 81

The second atheistic assault against incorporeal substance ; by pretending the original of this mistake to have sprung from the scholastic essences, distinct from the things themselves ; and the abuse of abstract names and notions, they being made to be substances existing by themselves. For, though the opinion of ghosts and spirits (whereof God is the chief) sprung first from fear ; yet that these should be incorporeal could never have entered into the minds of men, had they not been enchanted with these abstract names and separate essences . . . . 83

The first general reply to this, that it is all but romantic fiction. That the opinion of the Deity sprung not from fear, and that all invisible ghosts are not fancies, already sufficiently proved ; as also the existence of a God demonstrated by reason. That apparitions are real phenomena ; and reasonable to think, that there may as well be invisible aërial and ethereal, as there are visible terrestrial animals. Sottishness to conclude, that there is no understanding nature superior to man . . . . 84

The second particular reply, that the opinion of spirits incorporeal sprung not from the scholastic essences, whether considered concretely as universals only, or abstractly. No man supposing these to be things really and substantially existing without the mind ; either a universal man and universal horse, or else humanity and equinity : and that these walk up and down in airy bodies ; they being only *noemata*, or the intelligible essences of things, as objects of the mind. These essences of things said to be eternal, as their verities. The meaning of these eternal essences, not that they are so many eternal substances incorporeal ; but that knowledge is eternal, and that there is an eternal unmade mind that comprehends them ; which all other minds partake of . . . . . 85

Again, that another atheistic dream, that the abstract names and notions of the mere accidents of bodies were made substances incorporeal ; souls, minds, and ghosts. Conscious life no accident of bodies, as Atheists suppose ; but the essential attribute of another substance, which incorporeal ; as magnitude or extension is the essential attribute of body . . . . 89

The following atheistic arguments to be dispatched with more brevity. That the four next, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth, proceed only upon this supposition, that there is no other substance in the world besides body or matter ; and therefore signify nothing to the assertors of an incorporeal Deity. Stoics and the like, only concerned to answer them. Nevertheless, from

the impossibility of these atheistic Corporealisms, contained in the fifth and sixth, a necessity of incorporeal substance will be evinced . . . . . 87

Here two atheistic Corporealisms founded upon these suppositions, that all is body or matter; and, that matter, as such, is devoid of life and understanding. The first in the way of qualities and forms generable and corruptible, called the hylopathian. This the most ancient atheistic form, as we learn from Aristotle; *viz.* that bulky extension the only substantial and unmade thing, and all other things but the passious, qualities, and accidents thereof; makeable out of it, and destroyable into it. The consequence from whence, that there is no substantial unmade life and understanding: and that no mind could be a God or Creator; it being all accidental, factitious, and creature 88

This hylopathian Atheism called also by us Anaximandrian. Though we are not ignorant that Simplicius conceives Anaximander to have held an homœomery, or similar atomology, of eternal unmade qualities, as Anaxagoras afterwards; only, that he acknowledged no unmade life or mind, but generated it all from the fortuitous commixture of those qualified atoms. (Which no improbable opinion, though not certain.) Because, however Anaximander supposed life and understanding to be at least secondary qualities, and accidents of body, generable and corruptible. And not fit to multiply forms of Atheism . . . . . ib.

The second atheistic Corporealism, in the way of unqualified atoms, producing all things, even life and understanding, from figures, sites, motions, and magnitudes of parts. From whence it will also follow, that mind is no primordial thing, but secondary, compounded, and derivative; creature, and no creator. This called Democritic; not because Democritus was the first in- or of the dissimilar atomology; but because he was the first atheizer of it, or the first who made dissimilar atoms the principles of all things whatsoever, even of life and understanding 89

Not to be denied, but that from these two things granted, that all is body, and that the first principles of body are devoid of life and understanding, it would follow unavoidably, that there is no God. Therefore the Stoics who were corporeal Theists, denied the latter; they supposing an understanding fire, eternal and unmade, the maker of the whole mundane system. Truly observed by Origen, that this corporeal god of the Stoics was but by accident incorruptible and happy; and only because wanting a destroyer. This no genuine Theism . . . . . 90

But an absolute impossibility in both these atheistic Corporealisms; not only because they suppose no active principle; but also, because they bring life and understanding, that is, something out of nothing; or make them without a cause. Where the atomic Atheists of the two most to be condemned, because so grossly contradicting themselves. From that true principle, that matter, as such, is devoid of life and understanding, an absolute necessity of another substance incorporeal, which is essentially vital and intellectual. That all life cannot possibly be factitious and accidental, generable and corruptible; but there must be substantial life: and also some eternal . 91

The truth of this understood and acknowledged by the Hylozoists; that there must of necessity be both substantial and unmade life and understanding; who therefore attribute the same to all matter, as such, but without animality; which, according to them, is all factitious and accidental. Wherefore this hylozoic Atheism also brings conscious life and animality out of nothing; or makes them without a cause. The argument of the Epicurean Atheists, against Stratonism or Hylozoism, unanswerable; that upon this supposition there must be in every man and animal a heap of innumerable percipients, as many as there are atoms of matter; and so no one thinker. The pretence of the Hylozoists, that all the particles of matter in every animal do confederate, ridiculous and impossible . . . . . 93

Thus the fifth and sixth atheistic argumentations fully confuted; and from that true supposition in them, that matter, as such, is devoid of life and understanding, incorporeal substance plainly demonstrated: which was our second undertaking . 94

The third and last, that there being undeniably substance incorporeal, the two following atheistic argumentations (built upon the supposition of the contrary) altogether insignificant. The seventh not properly directed against Theism, but against a religious kind of Atheism or Theogonism; which supposed a God or soul of the world generated out of senseless matter, and the offspring of Night and Chaos. A sober and true sense of the world's animation; that there is a living, sentient, and understanding nature, presiding over the whole world. But the sense of pagan Theists, that the whole corporeal world animated is a God, exploded by us. This argument therefore being not against Theism, but Theogonism; the confutation thereof might be here well omitted, without any detriment to our cause. But because the denying of a living understanding nature presid-



ing over the world is atheistical, the ground of this assertion briefly declared, that life and understanding are accidents of bodies, resulting only from such a composure of atoms as produce flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized; and, that there is no reason to be found any where but only in human form: which also confuted. A brutish passage of a modern writer, "that it is inconceivable by men how God can understand without brains" . . . . . 95

The next (which is the eighth atheistic argumentation), that there can be no living being immortal, nor perfectly happy; built upon that false supposition also, that all life and understanding result from a contexture of dead and senseless atoms, and therefore are dissolvable and annihilable. But that there is life essential, and substantial, which naturally immortal: as also a necessity of an eternal life, and mind unmade, and unannihilable; which perfectly happy . . . . . 98

#### SECT. IV.

THE Epicurean Atheists farther endeavour to disprove a God, from the phenomena of motion and cogitation; in the three following argumentations, the ninth, tenth, and eleventh. From motion, thus; that from this principle, "nothing can move itself, but whatsoever is moved, is moved by another," it will follow, that there can be no first cause and unmoved mover, but one thing moved another from eternity infinitely; because nothing could move another which was not itself first moved by something else . . . . . 99

Answer: the meaning of this axiom; not that nothing can act from itself, as the Atheist supposes; he taking it for granted that every thing is body, and that all action is local motion; but, that no body resting could ever locally move itself. A false supposition of the Atheists and some Cartesians; that were there but once motion in the matter, this would of itself continue to all eternity. True, that of Aristotle; that to make an infinite progress in the causes of motion, and no first mover, is all one as to say, that there is no cause at all thereof; or, that all the motion in the world is a passion without an agent, or comes from nothing. Clearly impossible, that there should be any motion at all, were there nothing self-moving or self-active 100

Wherefore from this principle, that no body can move itself, it follows undeniably, that there is some other substance in

the world besides body that hath an active power of moving body . . . . . 102

Another corollary from the same principle; that there is another species of action, distinct from local motion, and which is not heterokinesy, but autokinesy. That the action, by which local motion is first caused, could not be itself local motion. All local motion caused originally by cogitation. Thus the ninth atheistic argument from motion confuted: and from hence, that no body can move itself demonstrated, that there is something incorporeal the first cause of local motion, by cogitation . . . . . ib.

But the Atheists farther pretend to prove, that cogitation itself is heterokinesy, the passion of the thinker, and the action of some other external agent upon him; because nothing taketh beginning from itself; and no cogitation can rise of itself, without a cause. That therefore thinking beings themselves are machines, and no cogitation local motion. And, no understanding being a first cause, nor perfectly happy; because dependent upon something else . . . . . 103

Answer. True, that no substance beginning from itself; as also, that no action causeth itself. But false, that no action taketh beginning from the immediate agent; or, that nothing can act otherwise than as acted upon by something else. Atheists here affirm only what they should prove, and so beg the question. If nothing self-active, then all the motion and action in the universe must come from nothing, or be made without a cause . . . . 104

True, also, that our human cogitations are frequently occasioned from external objects, and that the concatenations of thoughts and phantasms often depend upon mechanic causes. But false, that all cogitations are obtruded upon us from without; and that no transition in our thoughts which was not before in sense. The human soul a principle of actions, and therefore also of cogitations. This a bubbling fountain of thoughts. But that there is such a perfect mind as at once comprehends all truth, and was before sensibles . . . . 105

This a prodigious paradox, and falsity of Atheists; that cogitation, local motion; and thinking beings, machines. Here a correction of what we wrote before, vol. iii. p. 462. and a change of our opinion, upon farther consideration; that not only a modern writer, but also the ancient atheistic Atomists, did conclude cogitation to be really nothing else but local motion. Nevertheless, these men troubled with the fancy of cogitation; which

because they cannot make local motion, they would persuade us to be no reality, or nothing. Atheists aware, that if there be any action besides local motion, there must then be some other substance acknowledged besides body. They, who make cogitation local motion, and men machines, no more to be disputed with than senseless machines . . . . . 106

To affirm, that no understanding being can be happy, nor a God, because dependent upon something without it, all one as to affirm, that senseless matter is the most perfect of all things; and that knowledge, as such, speaking imperfection, is but a whiffing and fantastic thing. But of this more afterwards. Thus the tenth atheistic argument confuted . . . . . 108

Another atheistic argument, from the nature of knowledge and understanding. That the world could not be made by an understanding being, because there was no knowledge before things, which are the objects of it; and the only things are sensibles, which knowledge a passion from. Therefore all mind, as such a creature, and none a creator . . . . . 109

This already fully answered, vol. iii. p. 398, and so forwards. Where proved, that singular bodies are not the only things and objects of the mind, but that it containeth its intelligibles within itself. And that knowledge is archetypal to the world, and the maker of all. So the existence of a God demonstrable from the nature of knowledge and understanding . . . . . *ib.*

That the Atheists can no more solve the phenomenon of cogitation than that of local motion, evident from their many hallucinations concerning it; whereof a catalogue subjoined. First, that all life and understanding, a mere accidental thing, generable and corruptible, and no life nor mind substantial or essential. This before confuted . . . . . 110

Again, that life and mind no simple and primitive natures, but compounded syllables of things; and therefore none immortal nor incorruptible. Answer: that life and understanding are active powers, and could never result from mere passive bulk; nor can any composition of dead and senseless matter, possibly forget life and understanding. Though no necessity, that there should be any external unmade red or green, because these might be made out of things not red nor green; nor that there should be eternal motion, because motion might be produced from a self-active principle; nor that there should be any eternal unmade matter, because were there none, it might notwithstanding be created by a perfect incorporeal being: yet an absolute neces-

sity of eternal unmade life and mind ; because had there been once none, there could never have been any . . . . 111

Another atheistic hallucination, that there is nothing of self-activity in cogitation ; nor any thing could act otherwise than as it is made to act by something else. This to bring all action from nothing, or to suppose it without a cause . . . . 113

Another madness of theirs already mentioned, that cogitation, local motion, and thinking beings, machines. This equal sottishness or impudence, as to affirm number to be figure, &c. . . . . 114

Another paradox of the Epicurean and Democritic Atheists, that mental cogitation, as well as sensation, the mere passions of the thinker, and the actions of bodies existing without him ; some of them supposing thoughts to be caused by certain finer images than sensations ; others that they are the remainders of the motions of sense, formerly made. Answer : that sensation itself is not a mere corporeal passion, but the perception of a passion, in a way of fancy ; much less mental cogitations such ; and least of all volitions . . . . . ib.

But consentaneously hereunto these Atheists determine all knowledge and understanding to be really the same thing with sense. From whence follow two absurdities ; first, that there can be no such thing as error, because all passion is true passion, and all sense, true sense ; that is, true seeming and appearance. This absurdity owned by Protagoras. Epicurus endeavoured to avoid this, but in vain, and contradictiously to his own principles . . . . . 117

A second absurdity consequent thereupon ; that there is no absolute truth nor falsehood, but all knowledge private and relative, and nothing but opinion. This freely owned likewise by Protagoras. Sometimes also by Democritus. Who therefore but a blunderer neither, in the atomic philosophy ; which plainly supposes a higher faculty of reason and understanding, that judges of sense, and discovers the phantastry thereof ; it reaching to absolute truth . . . . . 119

Another atheistic error ; that singular bodies are the only objects of mental conception, as well as of sensation. This imputed by Aristotle, to Democritus and Protagoras. But sufficiently before confuted . . . . . 121

The better to maintain this paradox, added by a modern atheistic writer, as his own invention ; that universals are nothing else but names, by which many singular bodies are called ;

axioms or propositions, the addition and subtraction of names; and syllogistic reasoning the reckoning the consequences of them: and that therefore besides the passions of sense we know nothing at all of any thing but only the names by which it is called. Whence it would follow that geometrical truths not the same in Greek and in Latin, &c. . . . . 122

That the Atheists, according to these premised principles, endeavour to depreciate knowledge and understanding, as that which speaks no higher perfection than is in senseless matter. Thus the Atheists in Plato make it but a ludicrous, umbratile, and evanid thing; the mere image of bodies the only realities. Their design in this to take away the scale or ladder of entities . . . . . 123

All the grounds of this again briefly confuted, and particularly, that opinion so much favouring Atheism, that there is nothing in the understanding which was not before in sense, out of Boethius. Just and unjust greater realities in nature than hard and soft, &c. Unquestionably a scale or ladder of entities, and therefore certain, that the order of things must be in way of descent, from higher perfection to lower, and not of ascent, from lower to higher. The steps of this ladder not infinite; the foot thereof inanimate matter; the head, a perfect omnipotent being, comprehending in itself all possibilities of things. Mind by nature lord over all; and sovereign king of heaven and earth . . . . . 127

The reason, why we so much insist upon this; because Atheists pretend, not only to solve the phenomenon of cogitation without a God; but also from thence to demonstrate the impossibility of his existence. Though modern writers not so much aware hereof, yet is the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists thus stated by Plato; whether soul and mind juniors to senseless matter, and the offspring thereof; or else substantial things, and in order of nature before it. Accordingly Plato confuteth Atheism no otherwise than by proving soul not to be junior to inanimate matter, and generated out of the same. Evident, that Plato by soul here understood, not only the mundane soul, but also that whole rank of beings called soul; and that no life was generated out of matter . . . . . 132

Those professed Christians who generate rational souls out of senseless matter, plain betrayers of the cause of Theism 136

Nor is the case much different as to others; who, though they professedly generate only sensitive souls, yet making the ratio-

nal but mere blanks, which have nothing in them but what was scribbled upon them by sense; and so knowledge, in its own nature, junior to sense and sensibles; highly gratify the Atheists hereby . . . . . 137

If any life and cogitation may be generated out of dead and senseless matter, then can no good reason be given why all should not be. Life not partly accidental, partly substantial; but either all conscious life, accidental, generable, and corruptible; or else none at all . . . . . ib.

The doctrine of real qualities generable and corruptible, favourable to Atheism also. And though the atheistic Atomists explode all the other qualities, because nothing can come from nothing; yet contradicting themselves again, do they make life and understanding real qualities, generated out of matter, or caused by nothing . . . . . 138

There being a scale or ladder of entities in nature, to produce a higher rank of beings out of a lower; as life and cogitation out of matter and magnitude, is to invert the order of this scale from downwards to upwards; and so to lay a foundation for Atheism. Wherefore great reason to maintain this post against the Atheists; that no souls can be generated out of matter 139

The grand objection against the substantiality of sensitive souls, from that consequence of their permanent subsistence after death. Cartesius so sensible thereof, that he would rather make brutes to be senseless machines, than allow them substantial souls; which he granted they must have if thinking beings. What clearly demonstrable by reason not to be abandoned, because attended with some difficulties, or seemingly offensive consequences . . . . . 141

The Pythagoric hypothesis; that souls all created by God, not in the generation of animals, but in the cosmogonia. These therefore first clothed with thin and subtile bodies ærial or ethereal ochemata, wherein they subsist, both before their ingress into terrestrial bodies, and after their egress out of them. Thus Boethius and Proclus. Ammonius's irrational demons mortal; brutish souls in ærial bodies. Since the first creation no new substantial thing made or destroyed, and therefore no life. This looked upon by Macrobius as a great truth . . . 142

That the Pythagoreans would endeavour to gain some countenance for this hypothesis from the Scripture . . . 146

But if these ærial vehicles of brutish souls be exploded for a whimsey, and none but terrestrial bodies allowed to them; though

after death they will not vanish into nothing, yet must they needs remain in a state of insensibility and inactivity till reunited to other terrestrial bodies. Wherefore these in one sense mortal, though in another immortal. Silk-worms dying, and reviving in the form of butterflies, made an emblem of the resurrection by Christian theologers . . . . . 150

But no absolute necessity, that the souls of brutes, though substantial should have a permanent subsistence after death, either in a state of activity or inactivity; because whatsoever created by God may possibly by him be annihilated. The substantiality only of the rational soul demonstrable by reason; or that it will not of itself vanish into nothing; but not that it is absolutely impossible for it to be annihilated; the assurance of this depending upon a faith in the Divine goodness. Porphyrius's assertion, that brutish souls are resolved into the life of the universe. The whole answer to this objection against the substantiality of brutish souls; that they may, notwithstanding, possibly be annihilated in the deaths of animals as well as they were created in their generations: but if they do subsist (without aërial vehicles), they must remain in a state of inactivity and insensibility . . . . . 152

That this the doctrine of the ancient pagan theologers, that no life or soul generated out of dead and senseless matter; but all produced by the Deity, as well as matter; proved out of Virgil; though sundry other testimonies also might be added thereunto . . . . . 154

The hylozoic Atheists themselves so sensible thereof, that there must be some substantial and unmade life (from whence the lives and minds of all animals are derived), that they attribute the same to matter; and conclude, that though the modified lives of animals and men be accidental, generated, and corrupted, yet the fundamental life of them is substantial, and incorruptible. These also asserted a knowledge before sense, and undervived from sensibles . . . . . 155

This hylozoic Atheism again confuted. Absurd to suppose knowledge and understanding without consciousness; as also, that the substantial and fundamental life of men and other animals should never perish, and yet their souls and personalities, vanish into nothing. That no organization can produce consciousness. These Atheists not able possibly to give an account, whence the intelligible objects and ideas of this their knowledge of matter should spring. This hylozoic Atheism nothing but the crumbling of the Deity into matter . . . . . 156

Concluded, that the phenomenon of mind and understanding can no way possibly be solved by Atheists without a God; but affordeth a solid demonstration of his existence . . . 157

## SECT. V.

THERE now remaining only the atheistic objections against Providence, their queries and arguments from interests; their first objection, from the frame of the world, as faulty: or, because things are ill made, that therefore not made by a God. This directed against the sense of the ancient theologers; that God, being a perfect mind, therefore made the world after the best manner. Some modern theologers deviating from this, as if the perfection of the Deity consisted not at all in goodness, but in power and arbitrary will only. The controversy betwixt these and Atheists; but whether matter fortuitously moved, or a fortuitous will omnipotent, be the original of all things. No ground of faith in a mere arbitrary deity. To have a will undetermined to good, no liberty nor sovereignty, but impotency. God to Celsus the head or president of the righteous nature. This not only the sense of Origen, but of the ancient Christians in general. Plotinus; the will of God essentially that which ought to be. God an impartial balance weighing out heaven and earth. The Deity not servilely bound to do the best; but this the perfection of its nature. No Atheists able to prove the world to be ill made . . . . . 159

Not to be concluded, that whatsoever we cannot find out the reason or use of, is therefore ineptly made. For example; the *intestinum cæcum*, though seemingly an odd appendix, and which the generality of anatomists give little account of; yet that, with the valve at its entrance, both together, an artificial contrivance of nature, to hinder the regurgitation of the fæces 164

The first atheistic instance of the faultiness of things; in the disposition of the equator and ecliptic intersecting each other in such an angle, whereby the terrestrial globe rendered not so habitable as it might have been. This objection founded upon a false supposition, that the torrid zone uninhabitable. But this the best disposition; which being contrary to mechanic causes, therefore its continuance, together with the constant parallelism of the earth's axis, a manifest eviction of Providence; and that the *τὸ βέλτιστον*, the best, is a cause in nature . 164

In the next place; the Atheists would prove against some



Theists that all things not made for the sake of man. This at first but the doctrine of strait-laced Stoics only ; recommended afterwards by men's self-love. Whereas Plato's doctrine, that the whole not made for any part, but the parts for the whole. Nevertheless, things in the lower world made principally (though not only) for man. Atheists no judges of the well or ill making of worlds, they having no standing measure of good. That nature a stepmother to man, but a froward speech of some discontented persons, seeking to revenge themselves by railing upon nature, that is, Providence . . . . . 165

Evils in general from the necessity of imperfect beings, and impossibility of things . . . . . 167

Men afflicted more from their own fancies than reality of things. Pain (which a real evil of sense) often linked with pleasure, according to the Socratic fable. This not the evil of the whole man, but of the outside only. Serviceable to free men from the greater evils of the mind. Death, according to the atheistic hypothesis, an absolute extinction of all life ; but, according to genuine Theism, only a withdrawing into the tiring-house, and putting off the terrestrial clothing. The dead live to God. Christian faith gives assurance of a heavenly body hereafter. The Christian resurrection not the hope of worms. This the confutation of the twelfth atheistic argument . . . . . 167

The thirteenth ; but second objection against Providence as to human affairs, because all things fall alike to all ; and sometimes vicious and irreligious persons most prosperous . 170

Granted, that this consideration hath too much staggered weak minds in all ages. Some concluding from thence that there is no God, but that blind chance steereth all. Others, that though there be a God, yet he knows nothing done here below. Others, that though he do know, yet he neglecteth human affairs . . . . . ib.

Unreasonable to require that God should miraculously interpose at every turn ; or to think, that every wicked person should presently be thunderstruck. That which steers the whole world no fond and passionate but an impartial nature. Yet, that there want not instances of an extraordinary Providence. Good reasons for the slowness of Divine vengeance. The notoriously wicked commonly met with at the long run 171

The sometimes impunity of wicked persons so far from staggering good men as to Providence, that it confirms them in

their belief of future immortality and judgment after death. The evolution of human affairs a kind of dramatic poem, and God Almighty the skilful dramatist, who always connecteth that of ours which went before, with what of his follows after, into coherent sense. A geometrical distribution of rewards and punishments . . . . . 173

That there ought to be a doubtful and cloudy state of things for the exercise of faith and the more difficult part of virtue. Had there been no monsters to subdue, there could have been no Hercules. Here we are to live by faith, and not by sight 174

But that to make a full defence of Providence would require a large volume. The reader therefore referred to others for a supplement. Only some few considerations to be here propounded, not so much for the confutation of Atheists, as satisfaction of Theists, sometimes apt to call in question the Divine goodness, though the very foundation of our Christian faith 175

First, that in judging of the works of God we ought not to consider the parts of the world alone by themselves, but in order to the whole. Were nothing made but the best, there could have been no harmony for want of variety. Plotinus, that a limner does not make all eye, nor place bright colours every where; nor a dramatist introduce only kings and heroes upon the stage . . . . . ib.

Secondly, that we ought not to confine God's creation to the narrowness of vulgar opinion, which extends the universe but little beyond the clouds, and walls it in with a sphere of fixed stars. The world incapable of infinity of magnitude as well as of time. Nevertheless, as the sun is much bigger than we can imagine it, so much more may the world be. The new celestial phenomena widen the corporeal universe, and make those fancied flaming walls thereof to fly away before us. Not reasonable to think that all this immense vastness should be desert and uninhabited . . . . . 179

Thirdly, that we cannot make a right judgment of the ways of Providence without looking both forwards upon what is future, and backwards upon what is past, as well as upon the present. That the Platonists and Pythagoreans solved many phenomena from the *τὰ προβεβιωμένα*, things done in a pre-existent state.—Our common Christianity supposeth but a kind of impu-  
tative pre-existence to solve the pravity of mankind and the evils of this state. The different fates and conditions of men

here in this life to be resolved into a just though occult Providence . . . . . 180

The third objection against Providence, or fourteenth atheistic argument ; that it is impossible for any one being to animadvert and order all things ; and, if it were possible, that it would be distractious, and inconsistent with happiness. Moreover, that an irresistibly-powerful and happy being would not concern itself in the welfare of others ; benevolence arising only from imbecility . . . . . 182

The reply ; that because ourselves have but a finite animadversion, and narrow sphere of activity ; to measure the Deity accordingly, is but an idol of the cave or den. Certain, that were there nothing but what we could fully comprehend, there could be no God. Had the sun life, equally coextended with its rays, it would perceive every thing touched by them. Creatures but the rays of the Deity. Men able to manage affairs, in many distant places, without distraction. And innumerable notions lie together in our minds, without crowding one another, or any disturbance to us . . . . . ib.

But for the easing the minds of weak mortals, already suggested, that there is no necessity God should himself immediately do all things : he having ministers under him, executioners of his providence ; as, an artificial plastic nature (for this reason, partly before insisted on) ; instincts also in animals a part of that Divine fate which is the servant of Providence. Above which, other knowing and understanding ministers of the Deity appointed to preside over human affairs. But all overlooked by the watchful eye of God Almighty, who may himself extraordinarily interpose . . . . . 183

Wherefore no need to confine Providence to a few greater things only, to free the Deity from distraction. Small things (upon which greater often depend) not neglected by it. Nevertheless, the chief employment of Divine Providence, in the economy of souls, by Plato reduced to this compendium ; the translating of them into better or worse states, according to their demeanors. Thus may the slow wits of mortals more easily conceive Providence not to be laborious and distractious to the Deity . . . . . 185

But that all benevolence arises from imbecility, and that what is perfectly happy would be troubled with no business, but enjoy its own ease ; idols of the Atheists' den. These other

the narrow contractedness of their minds by vice and immorality . . . . . 186

The atheistic queries next to be answered. The first query: If there were a God, who was perfectly happy in himself, why would he go about to make a world? *Answer.* The reason of God's making the world was from his overflowing and communicative goodness, that there might be other beings happy besides himself. This consistent with God's making the world for his own glory. The reason why Plotinus would explode that. True, that God did not make the world merely to ostentate his skill and power; but to display his goodness, which is chiefly his glory. The Atheists farther demand, What hurt would it have been for us never to have been made? *Answer.* No other than this, that we could never have enjoyed good, nor been capable of happiness. If no hurt not to have been made, then none to be annihilated; the distance being as great from nothing to something, as from something to nothing . . . 187

The second atheistic query: If God's goodness were the cause of his making the world, why then was it not made sooner? This question capable of a double sense: First, Why was not the world from eternity? The reply: This not from any defect in the Divine goodness, but because there is an impossibility of the thing itself; the necessity and incapacity of such an imperfect being hindering it. Ourselves prone to think, that could the world have been from eternity, it should have been so. Thus Philoponus, in his confutation of Proclus's arguments for the world's eternity. And now no place left for those atheistic cavils against the novelty of the creation; as if God must therefore have slept from eternity; or had contracted a satiety of his former solitude. Another sense of the question: Why, though the world could not be from eternity, yet was it not made sooner? *Answer.* The world could not possibly have so been made in time, as that it should not have been once but a day old; and also once no more than five or six thousand years old . . . . . 188

The third atheistic query: How could God move the matter of the whole world; especially if incorporeal? *Answer.* That all things being derived from the Deity, and essentially depending on him, they must needs be commandable by him, and obsequious to him. And since no body can move itself; that which first moved the matter must be incorporeal, and not

move it by machines and engines, but by cogitation or will only. That conceit, that an incorporeal Deity could not move matter, because it would run through it, absurd; this moving not mechanically, but vitally. That cogitative beings have a natural power of moving matter, evident from our own souls moving our bodies, not by machines or engines, but merely by thought. More easy for the Deity to move the whole world by will and cogitation, than for us our bodies . . . . . 190

The last head of the atheistic argumentation, from interest. First, that it is the interest of particular persons there should be no being infinitely powerful, who hath no law but his own will. The first reply; wishing is no proving. Nor will any man's thinking make things otherwise than they are . . . 191

But, secondly, this wish of Atheists founded upon a mistaken notion of God Almighty, that he is nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent. God's will not mere will, but law and equity; ought itself willing. Nor does justice in God clash with goodness; but is a branch or particular modification thereof. The interest of none there should be no God, unless perhaps of such as are irreclaimably wicked, and wilfully abandon their own true good . . . . . 192

To be without God, to be without hope. No faith nor hope in senseless matter. According to the atheistic hypothesis, no possibility of happiness nor security of good . . . . 193

God such a being, as, if he were not, nothing more to be wished for. To believe a God, to believe the existence of all good and perfection; and that things are all made and governed as they should be. Peccability from the necessity of imperfect free-willed beings. Infinite hopes from a being infinitely good and powerful. Democritus and Epicurus, however cried up so much of late, but infatuated Sophists, or witty fools, and debauchers of mankind . . . . . ib.

The last atheistic argumentation, That Theism or religion is inconsistent with the interest of civil sovereigns. Their first pretence for this, that the civil sovereign reigns only in fear; and therefore must be no power nor fear greater than that of the leviathan . . . . . 194

In answer to this, the atheistic ethics and politics to be unravelled. Their foundation laid in the villanizing of human nature. That there is no natural justice, equity, nor charity. No public nor common nature in men, but all private and self-

ish. That every man by nature hath a right to every thing, even to other men's bodies and lives. That an appetite to kill and torment, by nature gives a right. That nature hath brought men into the world without any fetters or shackles of duty and obligation, the hinderances of liberty. Lastly, that nature absolutely dissociates and segregates men from one another, by reason of the inconsistency of appetites and private good. Every man by nature in a state of war against every man 195

But, in the next place, they add, that though this state of nature, which is belluine liberty, and lawless freedom to every thing, be in itself the best; yet by accident, and by reason of men's imbecility, does it prove the worst. Wherefore, when men had been weary of hewing and slashing, they then be-thought themselves at length of helping nature by art; by submitting to a lesser evil for the avoiding of a greater; abating their infinite right, and yielding to terms of equality with others, and subjection to a common power . . . . . 197

Where these Atheists first slander human nature; and then debase justice and civil authority, making it the ignoble and bastardly brat of fear; or a lesser evil submitted to out of necessity for the avoiding of a greater. According to which atheistic hypothesis no man is willingly just. This no new invention of the writer De Cive, but the old atheistic generation of justice, and of a body politic, civil society, and sovereignty (before Plato's time); it being fully described in his second book of a Commonwealth. Where the philosopher concludes justice, according to these, to be but a middle thing betwixt the best and the worst; loved, not as good in itself, but only by reason of men's imbecility: or, that justice is indeed another man's good, and the evil of him that is just. The same hypothesis also, concerning justice, as a factitious thing, that sprung only from fear and imbecility, and was chosen but as a lesser evil, insisted on by Epicurus . . . . . 198

The vain attempts of our modern atheistic politicians, to make justice by art when there is none by nature. First, by renouncing and transferring men's right by will and words. For if nothing naturally unlawful, then can no man, by will and words, make any thing unlawful to himself. What made by will may be destroyed by will. The ridiculous conceit of these atheistic politicians, that injustice is nothing but *dati repetitio*, and such an absurdity in life, as is in disputation when a man

denies a proposition he had before granted ; no real evil in the man, but only a relative incongruity in him as a citizen. Again, these justice-makers and authority-makers pretend to derive their factitious justice from pacts and covenants. But pacts and covenants, without natural justice (as themselves confess), nothing but words and breath ; and therefore can have no force to oblige. Wherefore they make another pretence also from certain counterfeit laws of nature of their own devising, that are nothing but mere juggling equivocation ; they being but the laws of fear, or their own timorous and cowardly complexion. They ridiculously dance round in a circle, when they derive the obligation of civil laws from covenants ; of covenants from laws of nature ; and of laws of nature again from civil laws. Their vain attempt by art to consociate what nature hath dissociated, like tying knots in the wind or water. Their artificial obligation, or ligaments, by which the members of their leviathan are held together, more slender than cobwebs . . . 200

These artificial justice-makers and obligation-makers sensible of the weakness of these attempts artificially to consociate what nature hath dissociated ; therefore fly at last from art to force and power ; making their sovereign to reign only in fear. This the true meaning of that opinion, that all obligation is derived from law ; that is, the command of him who hath power to compel. If obligation to obey civil laws only from fear of punishment, then is no man obliged to hazard his life for the safety of his prince ; and whoever can promise themselves impunity, may justly disobey. If civil sovereigns reign only in fear, then is their authority nothing but force ; and power would justify rebellion. Lastly, if civil right or authority nothing but force and violence, then could it not last long ; what natural prevailing against what is violent . . . . . 204

Wherefore since civil authority and bodies politic can neither be merely artificial, nor yet violent things, there must be some natural vinculum to hold them together, such as will both oblige subjects to obey the commands of sovereigns, and sovereigns, in commanding, to seek the good of their subjects ; something of a common, public, and conglutinating nature ; which no other than natural justice. The authority of God himself founded in justice ; of which civil authority a participation. Sovereignty no creature of the people and of men's wills ; but hath a stamp of Divinity upon it. Had not God made a city, men,

neither by art or political enchantment, nor by mere force, could have made any. The whole world one city of God and rational beings. The civil sovereign no leviathan; that is, no beast, but a god. He reigns not in mere brutish force and fear, but in natural justice and conscience, and the authority of God himself. Nevertheless, need of force and fear too, to compel some to their duty; nor is the sovereign's sword here alone sufficient, but he must reign also in the fear of God Almighty 206

The second atheistic pretence, to make religion inconsistent with civil sovereignty; because it limits and confines that which in its own nature is and ought to be infinite. The reply: that the Atheists' infinite right and authority of civil sovereigns is nothing but belluine liberty; but true right and authority are essentially founded in natural justice; there being no authority to command, where there is not an obligation to obey; and commands not creating obligation, but presupposing it, without which they would signify nothing. The first original obligation not from will but nature. The error of those Theists who derive all obligation to moral things from the will and positive command of God, as threatening punishments and promising rewards. From whence it would follow, that no man is good and just but by accident only, and for the sake of something else. Justice a different species of good from that of private utility. Infinite justice as absurd as an infinite rule or measure. If no infinite justice, then no infinite right and authority. God's own authority bounded by justice: his will ruled by justice, and not justice by his will. Atheists, under a pretence of giving civil sovereigns infinite right, really divest them of all right and authority, leaving them nothing but brutish force. Proved here that the *summæ potestates* must of necessity be ἀνυπεύθυνοι . . . . . 208

The last atheistic pretence for the inconsistency of religion with civil power, because conscience is private judgment of good and evil. *Answer.* That not religion, but Atheism, introduceth such private judgment as is absolutely inconsistent with civil sovereignty, it acknowledging nothing in nature that tends to public and common good, but making private appetite the only rule or measure of good, and utility of justice. The desperate consequence from hence, that private utility may justify rebellion and parricide. The Atheists' professed assertion, that they who have once rebelled may justly defend themselves after-



ward by force. Though private persons must make a judgment in conscience for themselves (the Atheists' public conscience being nonsense and contradiction), yet is the rule of conscience not private, but public, except only to mistaken fanatics; who therefore sometimes make a pretence of conscience and religion, in order to sedition and rebellion. Religion and conscience oblige subjects, in all lawful things, actively to obey the sovereign powers: in unlawful, not to resist . . . 210

The conclusion of the whole book: that all the atheistic grounds being fully confuted, and the impossibility of Atheism demonstrated; it is certain, that the original and head of all things is no blind and unconscious nature, but a perfect understanding being, self-existent; who hath made all that was fit to be made, and after the best manner, and exerciseth a just providence over all. To whom be all honour and glory, &c. 213

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THE END.











