

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
THE
WORKS
OF
RALPH CUDWORTH, D.D.

CONTAINING
THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL
SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE,
SERMONS, &c.

A NEW EDITION, WITH REFERENCES TO THE SEVERAL QUOTATIONS IN THE
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM, AND A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,

BY THOMAS BIRCH, M. A. F. R. S.

IN FOUR VOLUMES:
VOL. III.



OXFORD, D. A. TALBOYS.

MDCCCXXIX.



THE TRUE
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM
OF
THE UNIVERSE.

CHAP. IV. CONTINUED.

XXXIV. HITHERTO have we declared the sense of the Pagans in general, those also being included, who supposed God to be a being elevated above the world, that they agreed in these two things: First, the breaking and crumbling, as it were, of the simple Deity, and parcelling out of the same into many particular notions and partial considerations, according to the various manifestations of its power and providence in the world; by the personating and deifying of which severally they made, as it were, so many gods of one. The chief ground whereof was this: because they considered not the Deity according to its simple nature, and abstractly only, but concretely also with the world, as he displayeth himself therein, pervadeth all, and diffuseth his virtues through all. For as the sun, reflected by grosser vapours, is sometimes multiplied, and the same object beheld through a polyedrous glass, by reason of those many super-

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ficies, being represented in several places at once, is thereby rendered manifold to the spectator; so one and the same supreme God, considered concretely with the world, as manifesting his several powers and virtues in it, was multiplied into several names, not without the appearance of so many several gods. Whereas *πολυώνυμον* with those ancient Pagans, was the same thing with *πολυδύναμον*, that which hath many names, all one with that which hath many powers: according to this of Callimachus ^a concerning Diana,

*Δός μοι παρθενὴν αἰώνιον, ἄππα, φυλάσσειν,
καὶ Πολυωνυμίην**

And this of Virgil concerning Alecto, ^b

————— *Tibi nomina mille,
Mille nocendi artes.*

And accordingly the many Pagan gods are, in Plato's *Cratylus*, interpreted as the many powers of one God diffused through the world. And the Pagan theologers seemed to conceive this to be more suitable to the pomp, state and grandeur of the supreme God, for him to be considered diffusively, and called by many names, signifying his many several virtues and powers (polyonymy being by them accounted an honour) rather than to be contracted and shrunk all up into one general notion of a perfect mind, the maker or creator of the whole world. The second thing, in which the Pagans agreed, is their personating and deifying also the parts of the world, and things of nature themselves, and so making them so many gods and goddesses too. Their meaning therein being declared to be really no other than this;

^a Hymn. in Dianam, ver. 5, 6.

^b *Æneid.* lib. vii. ver. 324.

that God, who doth not only pervade all things, but also was the cause of all things, and therefore himself is in a manner all things, ought to be worshipped in all the things of nature and parts of the world: as also, that the force of every thing was Divine, and that in all things, that were beneficial to mankind, the Divine goodness ought to be acknowledged.

We shall now observe, how both those fore-mentioned principles, of God's pervading all things, and his being all things, which were the chief grounds of the seeming Polytheism of the Pagans, were improved and carried on further by those amongst them, who had no higher notion of the supreme Deity, than as the soul of the world. Which opinion, that it found entertainment amongst so many of them, probably might be from hence, because it was so obvious for those of them, that were religious, to conceive, that as themselves consisted of body and soul, so the body of the whole world was not without its soul neither; and that their human souls were as well derived from the life and soul of the world, as the earth and water in their bodies was from the earth and water of the world. Now whereas the more refined Pagans, as was before observed, suppose God to pervade and pass through all things ἀμικτός, unmixedly—these concluded God to be (according to that definition of him in Quinctilian, taken in a rigid sense) “*Spiritum omnibus partibus immistum;*” a spirit mingled with all the parts of the world—or else in Manilius's language,

Infusumque Deum coelo, terrisque fretoque,

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Infused into the heaven, earth, and seas:—"Sacroque meatu conspirare Deum," and intimately to conspire with his own work the world—as being almost one with it. Upon which account he was commonly called Nature also, that being thus defined by some of the Stoics, "Deus mundo permistus;" God mingled throughout with the world;—and "Divina Ratio toti mundo insita," The Divine Reason inserted into the whole world.—Which Nature, notwithstanding, in way of distinction from the particular natures of things, was called κοινὴ φύσις, and *communis natura*, the common nature. And it was plainly declared by them not to be a senseless nature; according to that of Balbus in Cicero, "Natura est, quæ continet mundum omnem, eumque tuetur; atque ea quidem non sine sensu, atque ratione:" It is nature, by which the whole world is contained and upheld, but this such a nature, as is not without sense and reason.—As it is elsewhere said to be perfect and eternal Reason, the Divine Mind and Wisdom, containing also under it all the λόγοι σπερματικοί, the spermatic principles—by which the things of nature (commonly so called) are effected. Wherefore we see, that such naturalists as these may well be allowed to be Theists (Moses himself in Strabo being accounted one of them); whereas those, that acknowledge no higher principle of the world, than a senseless nature (whether fortuitous, or orderly and methodical), cannot be accounted any other than absolute Atheists. Moreover, this soul of the world was by such of these Pagans as admitted no incorporeal substance, itself concluded to be a body too, but λεπτότατον καὶ τάχιστον, a most subtile and most

swift body—as was before observed out of Plato (though endued with perfect mind and understanding, as well as with spermatic reasons), which insinuating itself into all other bodies, did permeate and pervade the whole universe, and frame all things, inwardly mingling itself with all; Heraclitus and Hippasus thinking this to be fire, and Diogenes Apolloniates air; whom Simplicius, who had read some of his then extant works, vindicates from that imputation of Atheism, which Hippo and Anaximander lie under.

Again, whereas the more sublimated Pagans affirmed the supreme God to be all, so as that he was nevertheless something above all too, he being above the soul of the world; (and probably Æschylus, in that forecited passage of his, is to be understood after this manner, *Ζεύς τοι τὰ πάντα καὶ τι τῶνδ' ὑπέροπερον*, Jupiter is the ether, Jupiter is the earth, Jupiter is the heaven; Jupiter is all things, and yet something higher than all, or above all:—) those Pagans, who acknowledged no higher Numen than the soul of the world, made God to be all things in a grosser sense, they supposing the whole corporeal world animated to be also the supreme Deity. For though God, to them, were principally and originally that eternal unmade soul and mind, which diffuseth itself through all things; yet did they conceive; that as the human soul and body, both together, make up one whole rational animal, or man; so this mundane soul, and its body the world, did in like manner, both together, make up one entire Divine animal, or God.

It is true, indeed, that as the human soul doth

As Simplicius describeth God to be *πάντα πρὸ πάντων*, Omnia ante omnia. In Epicet. p. 234.

principally act in some one part of the body, which therefore hath been called the *hegemonicon* and *principale*, some taking this to be the brain, others the heart, but Strato in Tertullian^a ridiculously, the place betwixt the eyebrows; so the Stoics did suppose the great Soul or Mind of the world, to act principally in some one part thereof (which what it was notwithstanding they did not all agree upon), as the hegemonicon or principale; and this was sometimes called by them emphatically God. But nevertheless they all acknowledged this mundane soul, as the souls of other animals, to pervade, animate, or enliven and actuate, more or less, its whole body, the world. This is plainly declared by Laertius in the life of Zeno:^b Τὸν δὴ κόσμον διοικεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν, εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος διήκοντος τοῦ νοῦ, καθάπερ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀλλ' ἤδη δι' ὧν μὲν μᾶλλον, δι' ὧν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἕξις κεχώρηκεν, ὡς διὰ τῶν ὀστέων καὶ τῶν νεύρων· δι' ὧν δὲ ὡς νοῦς, ὡς διὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ζῶων ὄντα καὶ ἐμφυχον καὶ λογικόν, ἔχειν ἡγεμονικόν μὲν τὸν αἶθέρα, ἢ τὸν οὐρανόν, ἢ τὸν ἥλιον· ὃ καὶ πρῶτον θεὸν λέγουσιν αἰσθητικῶς ὥσπερ κεχωρηκέναι, διὰ τῶν ἐν αἵρι, καὶ διὰ τῶν ζώων ἀπάντων καὶ φυτῶν, διὰ δὲ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς καθ' ἕξιν· The Stoics affirm, that the world is governed by mind and providence, this mind passing through all the parts of it, as the soul doth in us: which yet doth not act in all parts alike, but in some more, in some less; it passing through some parts only as a habit (as through the bones and nerves), but through others as mind or understanding (as through that which is called the hegemonicon or principale). So

^a De Anima, cap. xv. p. 169.

^b Lib. vii. segm. 138, 139. p. 452.

the whole world being a living and rational animal, hath its hegemonicon or principal part too, which according to Antipater is the ether, to Posidonius the air, to Cleanthes the sun, &c. And they say also, that this first God is, as it were, sensibly diffused through all animals and plants, but through the earth itself only as a habit.—Wherefore the whole world, being thus acted and animated by one Divine Soul, is itself, according to these Stoics, also the supreme God. Thus Didymus in Eusebius, ὅλον δὲ τὸν κόσμον P. Ev. l. xv. c. xxv. [p. 817.] l. v. p. 235. προσαγορεύουσι θεόν, the Stoics call the whole world God;—and Origen against Celsus, σαφῶς δὴ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον λέγουσιν εἶναι Θεόν, Στωϊκοὶ μὲν τὸν πρῶτον. The Greeks universally affirm the world to be a god, but the Stoics, the first and chief God.—And accordingly Manilius,*

Qua pateat mundum divino numine verti
Atque ipsum esse Deum:

Whereby it may appear the world to be governed by a Divine Mind, and also itself to be God.—As likewise Seneca,^b the philosopher, “Totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum est, et Deus est;” this whole world, within which we are contained, is both one thing and God.—Which is not to be understood of the mere matter of the world, as it is nothing but a heap of atoms, or as endued with a plastic and senseless nature only; but of it as animated by such a soul, as besides sense was originally endued with perfect understanding; and as deriving all its godship from thence. For

* Lib. i. ver. 484, 485.

^b Epistol. xcii. p. 323. tom. ii. opera. Vide etiam Epist. xcv. p. 355.

C. D. I. vii. thus Varro in St. Austin declares both
 9. vi. his own and the Stoical sense concern-
 ing this point, “Dicit idem Varro, adhuc de
 naturali theologia præloquens, Deum se arbi-
 trari esse animam mundi (quem Græci vocant
 κόσμον) et hunc ipsum mundum esse Deum. Sed
 sicut hominem sapientem, cum sit ex corpore et
 animo, tamen ab animo dici sapientem; ita mun-
 dum Deum dici ab animo, cum sit ex animo et
 corpore.” The same Varro discoursing concern-
 ing natural theology, declareth, that, according
 to his own sense, God is the soul of the world
 (which the Greeks call Cosmos), and that this
 world itself is also God. But that this is so to
 be understood, that as a wise man, though con-
 sisting of soul and body, yet is denominated wise
 only from his mind or soul; so the world is de-
 nominated God, from its mind or soul only, it
 consisting both of mind and body.

Now if the whole animated world be the su-
 preme God, it plainly follows from thence, that
 the several parts and members thereof must be
 the parts and members of God; and this was
 readily acknowledged by Seneca;^a “Membra
 sumus corporis magni;” We are all members of
 one great body:—and^b “Totum hoc Deus est,
 socii ejus et membra sumus;” this whole world
 is God, and we are not only his members, but
 also his fellows or companions—as if our human
 souls had a certain kind of fellowship also with
 that great Soul of the universe. And accordingly,
 the Soul of the world, and the whole mundane
 animal, was frequently worshipped by the Pagans,
 in these its several members; the chief parts of

^a Epist. xcv. p. 355.

^b Epist. xcii. p. 323.

the world, and the most important things of nature, as it were by piece-meal. Nevertheless it doth not at all follow from thence, that these were therefore to them really so many several gods; for then not only every man, and every contemptible animal, every plant and herb, and pile of grass, every river and hill, and all things else whatsoever, must be so many several gods. And that the Pagans themselves did not take them for such, Origen observes against that assertion of Celsus, "That if the whole were God, then the several parts thereof must

L p. 234.

needs be gods," or divine too: *ὡς εἶναι θεῖα οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα, μέρη ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ φυτά· εἰ δὲ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου καὶ οἱ ποταμοὶ, καὶ τὰ ὄρη, καὶ αἱ θάλασσαι· ἄρ' ἐπεὶ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος θεός ἐστιν, ἤδη καὶ οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ αἱ θάλασσαι θεοὶ εἰσιν· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο φήσουσιν Ἕλληνας· τοὺς δ' ἐπίστα- τοῦντας (εἰ ἄρα δαίμονας, ἢ θεοὺς, ὡς ἐκείνοι ὀνομάζουσι) ποταμοῖς καὶ θαλάσσαις, τούτους ἂν λέγοιεν θεοὺς. Καὶ τὸ καθολικὸν Κέλσου γίνεται καὶ καθ' Ἕλληνας ψεῦδος, ὅτι ἐάντι ὅλον ἢ Θεός, πάντως τὰ μέρη τούτου ἐστι θεῖα· κατὰ τοῦτο γὰρ θεῖα ἔσται ζῶα, καὶ μυῖαι, καὶ σκνίφες, καὶ σκώλη- κες, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τῶν ὄφρων εἶδος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τῶν ὀρνέων, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἰχθύων· ἅπερ οὐδ' οἱ λέγοντες Θεὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, φήσουσιν.* From hence it would follow, that not only men must be divine and gods, but also all brute animals too (they being parts of the world) and plants to boot. Nay, rivers, and mountains, and seas, being parts of the world likewise (if the whole world be God), must, according to Celsus, needs be gods also. Whereas the Greeks themselves will not affirm this; but they would only call those spirits or demons, which preside over these rivers and seas, gods.

Wherefore this universal assertion of Celsus is false, even according to the Greeks themselves; that if the whole be God, then all the parts thereof must needs be divine, or gods. It following from thence, that flies, and gnats, and worms, and all kinds of serpents, and birds, and fishes, are all divine animals, or gods: which they themselves, who assert the world to be God, will not affirm.—

Wherefore, though it be true, that the Pagans did many times personate and deify the chief parts of the world, and things of nature, as well as they did the several powers and virtues of the mundane soul, diffused through the whole world; yet did not the intelligent amongst them therefore look upon these, as so many true and proper gods, but only worship them as parts and members of one great mundane animal; or rather, worship the Soul of the whole world, their supreme Deity, in them all, as its various manifestations. This St. Austin intimates, when writing against Faustus, the Manichean, he prefers even the Pagan gods before the Manichean: ^a “Jam vero cœlum, et terra, et mare, et aër, et sol, et luna, et cætera sydera omnia, hæc manifesta oculis apparent, atque ipsis sensibus præsto sunt. Quæ cum Pagani tanquam deos colunt, vel tanquam PARTES UNIUS MAGNI DEI (nam universum mundum quidam eorum putant MAXIMUM DEUM) ea colunt, quæ sunt. Vos autem, cum ea colatis, quæ omnino non sunt, propinquiores essetis veræ pietati, si saltem Pagani essetis, qui corpora colunt, etsi non colenda, tamen vera.” Now the heaven, earth, sea, and air, sun, moon, and stars,

^a Lib. xx. contra Faustum, cap. v. p. 238. tom. viii. oper.

are things all manifest and really present to our senses ; which, when the Pagans worship as gods, or as PARTS OF ONE GREAT GOD (for some of them think the whole world to be the GREATEST GOD), they worship things that are; so that you, worshipping things that are not, would be nearer to true piety than you are, were you Pagans, and worshipped bodies too ; which though they ought not to be worshipped, yet are they true and real things.—But this is further insisted upon L. iv. c. xi. by the same St. Austin, in his book [p. 76.]

De C. D. where after that large enumeration of the Pagan gods before set down, he thus convinces their folly in worshipping the several divided members, parts and powers, of the one great God, after that manner personated : “ Hæc omnia quæ dixi, et quæcunque non dixi (non enim omnia dicenda arbitratus sum) hi omnes dii deæque sit unus Jupiter ; sive sint, ut quidam volunt, omnia ista partes ejus, sive virtutes ejus, sicut eis videtur, quibus eum placet esse mundi animum ; quæ sententia velut magnorum, multorumque doctorum est. Hæc, inquam, si ita sunt, quod quale sit, nondum interim quæro, quid perderent, si unum Deum colerent prudentiori compendio ? Quid enim ejus contemneretur, cum ipse coleretur ? Si autem metuendum sit, ne prætermissæ sive neglectæ partes ejus irascerentur ; non ergo, ut volunt, velut unius animantis hæc tota vita est, quæ omnes simul continet deos, quasi suas VIRTUTES, vel MEMBRA, vel PARTES : sed suam quæque pars habet vitam a cæteris separatam, si præter alteram irasci altera potest, et alia placari, alia concitari. Si autem dicitur omnia simul, id est, totum ipsum Jovem potuisse offendi, si

PARTES ejus non etiam singillatim minutatimque colerentur, stulte dicitur. Nulla quippe earum prætermitteretur, cum ipse unus, qui haberet omnia, coleretur." All these things, which we have now said, and many more, which we have not said (for we did not think fit to mention all), all these gods and goddesses, let them be one and the same Jupiter: whether they will have them to be his *PARTS*, or his *POWERS*, and *VIRTUES*, according to the sense of those, who think God to be the soul or mind of the whole world; which is the opinion of many and great doctors. This, I say, if it be so, which, what it is, we will not now examine; what would these Pagans lose, if in a more prudent compendium, they should worship one only God? For what of him could be despised, when his whole self was worshipped? But if they fear, lest his parts pretermitted, or neglected, should be angry, or take offence; then it is not, as they pretend, the life of one great animal, which at once contains all the gods, as his virtues, or members, or parts, but every part hath its own life by itself, separate from the rest, since one of them may be angry, when another is pleased, and the contrary. But if it should be said, that altogether, that is, the whole Jupiter might be offended, if his parts were not worshipped all of them severally and singly; this would be foolishly said, because none of the parts can be pretermitted, when he, that hath all, is worshipped.

Thus do the Pagans in Athanasius* also declare, that they did not worship the several parts of the world, as really so many true and proper

* Orat. contra Græcos, p. 31. tom. i. oper.

gods, but only as the parts, or members, of their one supreme God, that great mundane animal (or whole animated world) taken all together as one thing; ἀλλ' ἴσως διαιρούμενα μὲν, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ λαμβανόμενα, ἐπιδεῖ αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ συνομολογοῦσιν, ὁμοῦ δὲ πάντα συνάπτοντες, καὶ ὡς ἐν ἀποτελοῦντες μέγα σῶμα, τὸ ὅλον Θεὸν εἶναι φήσουσι. But the Pagans themselves will acknowledge, that the divided parts of the world, taken severally, are but indigent and imperfect things; nevertheless do they contend, that as they are by them joined all together into one great body (enlivened by one soul), so is the whole of them truly and properly God.—And now we think it is sufficiently evident, that though these Pagans verbally personated and deified, not only the several powers and virtues of the one supreme God, or mundane soul, diffused throughout the whole world, but also the several parts of the world itself and the natures of things; yet their meaning herein was not to make these in themselves really so many several true and proper gods (much less independent ones), but to worship one supreme God (which to them was the whole animated world) in those his several parts and members, as it were by piece-meal, or under so many inadequate conceptions.

The Pagans therefore were plainly divided in their natural theology, as to their opinions concerning the supreme God; some of them conceiving him to be nothing higher than a mundane soul: whereas others of them, to use Origen's language, did *ὑπερβαίνειν πᾶσαν τὴν αἰσθητὴν φύσιν, καὶ μηδαμοῦ αὐτῆς νομίζειν ἰδρυσθαι τὸν Θεόν, ἄνω καὶ δὲ ὑπὲρ τὰ σώματα ζητεῖν αὐτὸν*, transcend all the sensible nature, and thinking God not at all to be

Cont. Cels.
p. 260.

14 THE WORLD ACCOUNTED THE BODY OF GOD;

seated there, looked for him above all corporeal things.—Now the former of these Pagans worshipped the whole corporeal world, as the body of God; but the latter of them, though they had higher thoughts of God, than as a mundane soul, yet supposing him to have been the cause of all things, and so at first to have contained all things within himself, as likewise that the world, after it was made, was not cut off from him, nor subsisted alone by itself, as a dead thing, but was closely united to him, and livingly dependent on him: these, I say, though they did not take the world to be God, or the body of God, yet did they also look upon it as *θεῖον*, as that which was Divine and sacred; and supposed, that God was to be worshipped in all, or that the whole world was to be worshipped as his image or temple. Thus Plutarch, ^a though much disliking the deifying of inanimate things, doth himself nevertheless approve of worshipping God in the whole corporeal world, he affirming it to be *ἱερόν ἀγιώτατον καὶ θεοπρεπέστατον*, a most holy, and most god-becoming temple.—And the ancient Persians, or magi, who by no means would allow of worshipping God in any artificial temples made with men's hands, did notwithstanding thus worship God, *sub dio*, and upon the tops of mountains, in the whole corporeal world, as his natural temple, as Cicero testifieth: “Nec sequor magos Persarum, quibus auctoribus Xerxes inflammasse templa Græciæ dicitur, quod parietibus includerent deos, quibus omnia deberent esse patentia ac libera, quorumque hic mundus omnis templum esset et domicilium:” Neither do I adhere to the

De Leg. l. ii. p. 335.

^a De Iside et Osir. p. 382.

Persian magi, by whose suggestion and persuasion Xerxes is said to have burnt all the temples of the Greeks, because they inclosed and shut up their gods within walls, to whom all things ought to be open and free, and whose temple and habitation this whole world is.—And, therefore, when Diogenes Laertius^a writeth thus of these magi, that they did θεοὺς ἀποφαίνεσθαι πῦρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ, τῶν δὲ ξοάνων καταγινώσκειν, make fire and earth and water to be gods, but condemn all statues and images—we conceive the meaning hereof to be no other than this, that as they worshipped God in no temple, save only that of the whole world, so neither did they allow any other statues or images of him, than the things of nature, and parts of the world, such as fire, and earth, and water, called therefore by them, in this sense and no other, gods. For thus are they clearly represented by Clemens Alexandrinus; and that according to the express testimony of Dino; Θύειν ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ τοὺς Protrept. p. 43. [cap. v. p. 56. edit. Potteri.] Μάγους ὁ Δίνων λέγει, θεῶν ἀγάλματα μόνα τὸ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ νομίζοντας. Οὐκ ἀπεκρυσάμην οὐδὲ τῶν τούτων ἄγνοιαν. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἀποφεύγειν οἴονται τῆς πλάνης, ἀλλ' εἰς ἕτεραν κατολισθαίνουσιν ἀπάτην. Ἀγάλματα μὲν θεῶν οὐ ξύλα καὶ λίθους ὑπειλήφασιν, ὥσπερ Ἕλληνες· οὐδὲ μὲν Ἰβιδας καὶ Ἰχνεύμονας, καθάπερ Αἰγύπτιοι· ἀλλὰ πῦρ τε καὶ ὕδωρ ὡς φιλόσοφοι· Dinon affirmeth, that the Persian magi sacrificed under the open heavens, they accounting fire and water to be the only statues and images of the gods. For I would not here conceal their ignorance neither, who, thinking to avoid one error, fall into another; whilst they allow not wood and stones to be the images of the gods, as the Greeks do,

^a Proöm. oper. segm. 6. p. 5.

nor Ichneumones and Ibides, as the Egyptians, but only fire and water, as philosophers.—Which difference betwixt the Pagan theologers, that some of them looked upon the whole world as God, or as the body of God, others only as the image, or the temple of God, is thus taken notice of by Macrobius upon Scipio's dream, where the world was called a temple. “ Bene autem universus mundus Dei templum vocatur, propter illos, qui æstimant, nihil esse aliud Deum, nisi cœlum ipsum, et cœlestia ista quæ cernimus. Ideo ut summi omnipotentiam Dei ostenderet posse vix intelligi, nunquam posse videri, quicquid humano subjicitur aspectui templum ejus vocavit; ut qui hæc veneratur ut templa, cultum tamen maximum debeat conditori; sciatque quisquis in usum templi hujus inducitur, ritu sibi vivendum sacerdotis.” The whole world is well called here the temple of God, in way of opposition to those who think God to be nothing else but the heaven itself, and those heavenly things which we see (or the whole sensible world animated): wherefore Cicero, that he might shew the omnipotence of the first supreme God to be such as could scarcely be understood, but not at all perceived by sense, he calleth whatsoever falleth under human sight, his temple; that so he, that worshippeth these things as the temple of God, might in the mean time remember, that the chief worship is due to the maker and creator of them; as also that himself ought to live in the world like a priest or mysta, holily and religiously.—And thus we see, that the Pagans were universally Cosmolatræ, or world-worshippers, in one sense or other; not that they worshipped the world as

lib. i. c. xiv.

a dead and inanimate thing; but either as the body of God, or at least as the temple or image of him. Neither of which terminated their worship in that, which was sensible and visible only, but in that great Mind or Soul, which framed and governeth the whole world understandingly; though this was called also by them (not the nature of things, but) *φύσις κοινὴ*, the common nature, and *φύσις τοῦ παντός*, or *τῶν ὅλων*, the nature of the universe, because it contained under it the spermatie reasons, or plastic principles, of the whole world.

Furthermore, these Pagan Theists universally acknowledging the whole world to be an animal, and that mundane animal also to be a god; those of them, who supposed it not to be the first and highest God, did consequently all conceive it, as hath been already observed, to be either a second, or at least a third god. And thus Origen,^a *σαφῶς δὴ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον λέγουσιν εἶναι Θεόν, Στωϊκοὶ μὲν τὸν Πρῶτον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος τὸν Δεύτερον, τινὲς δὲ αὐτῶν τὸν Τρίτον*. The Greeks do plainly affirm the whole world to be a god; some of them, as the Stoics, the first God; others, as the Platonists, (to whom may be added the Egyptians also) the second god; though some of these Platonists call it the third god. Those of the Platonists, who called the mundane animal, or animated world, the second god, looked upon that whole Platonic trinity of Divine hypostases (*Τάγαθόν, Νοῦς* and *Ψυχή*) all but as one first God: but those others of them, who called it a third god, supposed a great distinction betwixt those three hypostases, and made so many several gods

^a Contra Celsum, lib. i. p. 235.

of them; the first, a monad, or simple goodness; the second, mind or intellect; the third, Psyche, or the universal soul, which also without any more ado they concluded to be the immediate soul of this corporeal world, existing likewise from eternity with it. Now this second god, which was the whole animated world, as well to the Egyptians as the Platonists, was by them both said to be, not only the temple and image, but also the Son of the first God. That the

p. 329, 330,
331.

Egyptians called the animated world the Son of God, hath been already proved; and that the other Pagans did the like also, is evident from this of Celsus, where he pretends, that the Christians called their Jesus the Son of God, in imitation of those ancient

Orig. contra
Cels. p. 308.

Pagans, who had styled the world so: *Ἐποθέν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐπῆλθεν αὐτοῖς, Θεοῦ υἱὸν καλεῖν, σημαίνω· Ἄνδρες παλαιοὶ, τόνδε δὲ τὸν κόσμον, ὡς ἐκ Θεοῦ γενόμενον, παῖδά τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἤθεον προσεῖπον. Πάνυ γὰρ ὁμοίως οὗτός τε κἀκεῖνος πᾶς Θεοῦ·* Whence these Christians came to call their Jesus the Son of God, I shall now declare; namely, because our ancestors had called the world, as made by God, the Son of God, and God. Now is there not a goodly similitude (think you) betwixt these two sons of God, theirs and ours?—Upon which

Orig. contra
Cels. p. 208.

words of his, Origen writeth thus: *ὥθη δὲ υἱὸν Θεοῦ ἡμᾶς λέγειν, παραποιήσαντας τὰ περὶ τοῦ κόσμου, ὡς ἐκ Θεοῦ γενομένου, καὶ υἱὸς ὄντος αὐτοῦ καὶ Θεοῦ·* Celsus supposed us Christians to have borrowed this appellation of the Son of God from the Pagans, they calling the world, as made by God, the Son of God, and God.—Wherefore these Pagans, who looked upon the whole ani-

mated world only as the second God, and Son of God, did unquestionably also worship the first God, in the world, and that probably by personating and deifying his several parts and members too. Thus do we understand, what that was, which gave occasion to this mistake of late writers, that the Pagans worshipped the inanimate parts of the world, as such, for true and proper gods; viz. their not perceiving, that they worshipped these only, as the parts or living members of one great mundane animal, which was to them, if not the first God, yet at least the second God; the temple, image, and Son, of the first God.

And now have we, as we conceive, given a full account of the seeming Polytheism of the Pagans, not only in their poetical and fabulous, but also their political or civil, theology; the former of which was nothing but fancy and fiction, and the conforming of Divine to human things; the latter nothing but vulgar opinion and error, together with the laws and institutes of statesmen and politicians, designed principally to amuse the vulgar, and keep them the better in obedience and subjection to civil laws. Besides which, the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged another theology, which was neither fiction, nor mere opinion and law, but nature and philosophy, or absolute truth and reality; according to which natural and philosophic theology of theirs, there was only one unmade self-originated Deity, and many other created gods, as his inferior ministers. So that those many poetical and political gods could not possibly be looked upon otherwise, than either as the created ministers of one

supreme God, whether taken singly or collectively; or else as the polyonymy and various denomination of him, according to several notions and partial conceptions of him; and his several powers and manifestations of the world personated and deified. Which latter we have already proved to have been the most generally-received opinion of the Pagan theologers; according to that of Euclides^a the philosopher, ἐν Τάγαθὸν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον, there is one supreme Good (or highest Deity) called by many names:—and, according to that of Antisthenes before cited, That the many popular gods were but one and the same natural God, viz. as Lactantius adds, L. i. c. v. “Summæ totius artifex,” The maker of the whole world.

We shall conclude with repeating what hath been already suggested, that though the intelligent Pagans did generally disclaim their fabulous theology; St. Austin telling us, that when the absurdities thereof were urged against them, they would commonly make such replies as these: c. D. l. iv. c. “Absit, inquit, fabularum est ista x. [p. 75.] garrulitas;” and again, “Rursus, inquit, ad fabulas redis;” Far be it from us (say they) to think so or so, this is nothing but the garrulity of idle fables; and, You would bring us again to fables.—And though they owned another theology besides their civil, which was the natural and philosophical, as the only true; yet did they notwithstanding acknowledge a kind of necessity, that, in those times at least, there should be, besides the natural and philosophical theology, which the vulgar were not so capable

^a Apud Diogen. Laert. lib. ii. segm. 106. p. 142.

of, another theology framed and held forth, that might be more accommodate to their apprehensions. Thus that Roman pontifex, Scævola, in St. Austin, declareth,^a “*Expedire existimat falli in religione civitates,*” That it was expedient (as he thought) that cities and commonwealths should be deceived in their religion, or have something false or fabulous intermingled with it; —he giving this reason for the same, because the natural and philosophic theology contained many things in it, which, though true, yet would be hurtful for the vulgar to know; as, for example, “*Quod verus Deus nec sexum habeat, nec ætatem, nec definita corporis membra;*” That the true God hath neither sex, nor age, nor bodily members; and that Hercules and Æsculapius, &c. were not gods, but men, obnoxious to the same infirmities with others—and the like. And the learned Varro, in his book of religions,^b publicly maintained the same doctrine: “*Varro de religionibus loquens, evidenter dicit, multa esse vera, quæ vulgo scire non sit utile; multaque, quæ tametsi falsa sint, aliter existimare populum expediat: et ideo Græcos teletas et mysteria taciturnitate parietibusque clausisse,*” &c. That there were many things true in religion, which it was not convenient for the vulgar to know; as likewise many things false, of which it was expedient they should think otherwise: and that for this cause, the Greeks inclosed their teletæ or mysteries within walls, and kept them under a seal of secrecy.—Upon which of Varro St. Austin thus noteth: “*Hic certe totum consilium prodidit sapientium, per*

^a De Civit. Dei, lib. iv. cap. xxvii. p. 84. tom. vii. oper.

^b Apud Augustin. ubi supra, p. 88.

quos civitates et populi regerentur :” Varro here plainly discovers and betrays the whole counsel and secrecy of statesmen and politicians, by whom cities and nations were governed, and their very arcanum of government, namely this, That people were to be deceived in their religion, for their own good, and the good of their governors.—The same father there adding, That evil demons were much gratified with this doctrine, and liked this fraud and imposture very well, which gave them an advantage to rule and tyrannize, as well over the deceivers as the deceived.—Lastly, Strabo also,* though otherwise a grave and sober writer, speaks freely and broadly to the same purpose; οὐ γὰρ ὄχλόν τε γυναικῶν καὶ παντὸς χυδαίου πλήθους ἐπαγάγειν λόγῳ δυνατὸν φιλοσόφῳ, καὶ προσκαλέσασθαι πρὸς εὐσέβειαν καὶ ὀσιότητα καὶ πίστιν· ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ διὰ δεισδαιμονίας, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ μυθοποιίας καὶ τερατείας· It is not possible, that women, and others of the vulgar sort, should be conducted and carried on towards piety, holiness, and faith, merely by philosophic reason and truth; but this must be done by superstition, and that not without the help of fables and prodigious or wonderful narrations.—From whence it is plain, that Strabo did not only allow a necessity of a civil theology, besides the natural and philosophical, but also of a fabulous and poetical one too. And this is a thing the less to be wondered at in these Pagans, because some Christians also seem to acknowledge a kind of truth herein; Synesius himself writing after this manner :^b τὸ δὲ ῥᾶστον καταγελάσεται ὁ δῆμος· δεῖται γὰρ τερατείας· That, which is

* Lib. i. p. 18.

^b In Encomio Calvitici, p. 73. oper. edit. Pctavii.

easy and ordinary, will be contemned by the vulgar, or common people; and therefore there is need of something strange and prodigious in religion for them. Flavius Josephus making this free acknowledgment, concerning the wise men among the Greeks, *ταῦτα περὶ θεοῦ φρονεῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι δοκοῦσι παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι*, That they held the same things concerning God which the Jews did—adds notwithstanding afterwards, *εἰς πλῆθος δόξαις προκατελημμένον, τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ δόγματος ἐξενεγκεῖν οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν*, that they were afraid to declare the truth of this their doctrine to the vulgar, prepossessed with other opinions.—And indeed they did not think it safe to declare the natural and true theology promiscuously to all; Plato^a himself intimating as much in these words: *τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντός, εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν*. That as it was hard to find out the maker of this universe, so neither, being found out, could he be declared to the vulgar.—Wherefore since God was so hard to be understood, they conceived it necessary, that the vulgar should be permitted to worship him in his works, by parts and piece-meal, according to the various manifestations of himself; that is, should have a civil theology at least, distinct from the natural and philosophical, if not another fabulous one too.

xxxv. We have now dispatched the first of those three heads proposed to be insisted on, viz. that the Pagans worshipped one and the same supreme God, under many personal names, so that much of their Polytheism was but seeming and fantastical, and indeed nothing but the

^a In *Timæo*, cap. xiii. p. 236. edit. Fabricii.

C. Ap. l. ii.
[§. xvi. p.
482. tom. ii.
edit. Haver-
camp.]

polyonymy of one supreme God, they making many poetical and political gods of that one natural God; and thus worshipping God by parts and piece-meal, according to that clear acknowledgment of Maximus Madaurensis^a before cited: “Unius summi Dei virtutes, per mundanum opus diffusas, nos multis vocabulis invocamus; et dum ejus quasi quædam membra carptim variis supplicationibus prosequimur, totum colere videmur.” The virtues of the one supreme God diffused throughout the whole world, we (Pagans) invoke under many several names; and so prosecuting, with our supplications, his as it were divided members, must needs be thought to worship him whole, we leaving out nothing of him.—We shall proceed to the second head proposed, that besides this polyonymy of one supreme God in the poetical and civil theology of the Pagans, which was their seeming and fantastic Polytheism, they had another real Polytheism also; they acknowledging in their natural and philosophic theology likewise a multiplicity of gods, that is, of substantial understanding beings, superior to men, really existing in the world. Which though they were called by them gods, yet were they not therefore supposed to be ἀγέννητοι and αὐτογενεῖς, unmade and self-existent, or independent beings—but all of them (one only excepted) γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, generated gods—according to the larger notion of that word before declared; that is, though not κατὰ χρόνον, yet at least, ἀπ’ αἰτίας γεννητοὶ, though not as made in time, yet as produced from a superior cause.—Plutarch propounding

Vol. i. p. 500.

^a Apud. Augustin. Epist. xvi. p. 15. tom. ii. oper.

this for one amongst his Platonic questions, why *ὁ ἀνωτάτω Θεός*, the highest and supreme God—was called by Plato, both the father and maker of all things, gives this reply to it in the words before cited; *ἢ τῶν μὲν θεῶν τῶν γεννητῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πατήρ ἐστιν (ὡς Ὁμηρος ἐπονομάζει), ποιητῆς δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ ἀψύχων*, that perhaps he was said to be the father of all the generated gods, and of men (as he is also styled in Homer), but the maker of all other irrational and inanimate beings.—From which passage of Plutarch's it plainly appears, that the *ὁ ἀνωτάτω Θεός*, the one highest God—being every way *ἀγέννητος*, unmade and unproduced—was thought to be the maker or father of all the other gods, therefore called *γεννητοί*. Which is further plainly declared elsewhere by the same Plutarch in these words: *Πλάτωνος πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦτε κόσμον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γεννητῶν, τὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ αἰδίου Θεὸν ἐπονομάζοντος*. Plato calleth the one unmade and eternal God the father and maker of the world, and of all other things generated.—And though some of those many gods of Plato's were by him also called *αἰδίοι*, or eternal—yet were they likewise *γεννητοί* too, in another sense, that is, produced and derived, by way of emanation, from that one, who is every way *ἀγέννητος*, underrived and independent upon any other cause.—And thus Proclus universally pronounces: *Τὸ εἶναι θεοὶ, πάντες οἱ θεοὶ διὰ τὸν πρῶτον ἔχουσι θεόν*. All the gods owe their being gods to the first God—he adding, that he is therefore called *πηγὴ τῆς θεότητος*, the fountain of the Godhead.—

Sympos. l.
viii. c. i. [p.
718.]

Theol. p. l.
iii. c. vii. [p.
132.]

Wherefore the many gods of the intelligent

Pagans were derived from one God, and but *ὑπουργοὶ δυνάμεις* (as Plutarch somewhere calls them), the subservient powers, or ministers of the one supreme, unmade Deity.—Which (as hath been before observed) was frequently called by these Pagans Θεός, God—*κατ' ἕξοχὴν*, or in way of eminency; as likewise were those other inferior, or generated gods, in way of distinction from him, called θεοὶ, the gods.—And accordingly

L. iv. p. 200. the sense of Celsus is thus represented

in Origen: Θεοὺς δημιουργοὺς εἶναι πάντων σωμάτων, μόνης ψυχῆς ἔργον οὐσης Θεοῦ. That the gods were the makers of the bodies of all animals, the souls of them only being the work of God.—Moreover, these inferior gods are styled

L. xxii. by Ammianus Marcellinus, *substantiales potestates*, substantial powers—probably in way of distinction from those other Pagan gods, that were not substantial, but only so many names and notions of the one supreme God, or his powers severally personated and deified, which substantial powers of Am. Marcellinus^a (as divination and prophecy was, by their means, imparted to men), were all said to be subject to that one sovereign Deity called Themis; “whom (saith he) the ancient theologers seated *in cubili et solio Jovis*,” in the bed-chamber and throne of Jupiter—as indeed some of the poets have made her to be the wife of Jupiter, and others his sister. And Anaxarchus

Vit. Alex. in Plutarch styles her *πάρεδρος τοῦ Διὸς*,
[p. 596. tom. i. oper.] Jupiter's assessor—though that philosopher abused the fable, and grossly depraved the meaning of it, as if it signified *πᾶν*

^a Histor. lib. xxi. cap. i. p. 263.

τὸ πραχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατοῦντος θεμιτὸν εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον, that whatsoever is done by the sovereign Power, is therefore just and right—whereas the true moral thereof was this, that justice or righteousness sits in council with God, and in his mind and will prescribes laws to nature and the whole world. Themis therefore was another name of God, amongst the Pagans, according to his universal consideration, besides those beforementioned: and when Plato, in his book of Laws,^a would have men to swear by the names of those three gods, Jupiter, Apollo, and Themis; these were but so many several partial notions of the one supreme Deity; the meaning thereof being no other than this, as Pighius observeth, “*Timore divino, veritate ipsa, ac æquitate sanciri debere juramenta. In Jove enim summi numinis potestatem, falsi ac perjurii vindicem; in Apolline veritatis lumen; in Themide, jus, fas, atque licitum esse intelligitur. Est enim Themis ipsa lex æterna atque universalis, mundo ac naturæ præscripta;*” or, according to Cicero, “*Ratio recta summi Jovis.*” And Ficinus, in his commentary as to the main agreeth herewith. So that, when the Pagan theologers affirmed the Numen of Themis to preside over the spirits of the elements, and all those other substantial powers, from whom divination was participated to men; their meaning therein was clearly no other than this; that there was one supreme Deity ruling over all the other gods, and that the Divine Mind, which prescribeth laws to nature and the whole world, and contains all the fatal decrees in it, according to the evolution of

^a Lib. xii. p. 685. oper.

which things come to pass in the world, was the fountain, from whence all divination proceeded; as these secrets were more or less imparted from thence to those inferior created spirits. The philosophy of the Pagan theology amongst the Greeks was plainly no other than this; that there is one unmade self-existent Deity, the original of all, and that there are many other substantial powers or spirits, created by it, as the ministers of its providence in the world: but there was much of poetry, or poetic fancy, intermingled with this philosophy, as the flourish to it, to make up their Pagan theology.

Thus, as hath been before declared, the Pagans held both one God, and many gods, in different senses; one unmade self-existent Deity, and many generated or created gods; Onatus^a the Pythagorean declaring, that they, who asserted one only God, and not many, “understood not what the dignity and majesty of the Divine transcendency consisted in, namely, in ruling over gods;” and Plotinus conceiving, that the supreme God was most of all glorified, not by being “contracted into one,” but “by having multitudes of gods, derived from him, and dependent on him;” and that the honour done to them redounded unto him. Where there are two things to be distinguished; first, that, according to the Pagan Theists, God was no solitary being; but that there were multitudes of gods, or substantial powers, and living understanding natures, superior to men, which were neither self-existent, nor yet generated out of matter, but all generated or

^a Libro περὶ θεῶν καὶ εἰδῶν, apud Stobœum in Eclog. physic. lib. i. cap. i. p. 4.

created from one supreme. Secondly, that forasmuch as these were all supposed to have some influence, more or less, upon the government of the world, and the affairs of mankind, they were therefore all of them conceived to be the due objects of men's religious worship, adoration and invocation; and accordingly was the Pagan devotion scattered amongst them all. Nor were the gods of the oriental Pagans neither mere dead statues and images, as some would conclude from the Scripture, but living understanding beings, superior to men (though worshipped in images) according to that reply of the Chaldeans in Daniel to Nebuchadnezzar, when he required them to tell his dream: "There is none other, that can shew this thing before the king, except those gods, whose dwelling is not with flesh;" that is, the immortal gods, or who are exalted above the condition of human frailty. Though some conceive, that these words are to be understood of a peculiar sort of gods; namely, that this was such a thing, as could not be done by those demons and lower aërial gods, which frequently converse with men, but was reserved to a higher rank of gods, who are above human converse. Now, as to the former of these two things, that God is no solitary being, but that there are multitudes of understanding beings superior to men, the creatures and ministers of one supreme God; the Scriptures both of the Old and New Testament fully agree with the Pagans herein. "Thousand thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him;" and "Ye are come to an innumerable company of angels." But the latter of them, that

Dan. vii. 10.
Heb. xii. 22.

religious worship and invocation doth of right belong to these created spirits, is constantly denied and condemned in these writings, that being a thing peculiarly reserved to that one God, who was the creator of heaven and earth. And thus is that prophecy of Jeremy to be understood, expressed in the Chaldee tongue, that so the Jews might have it in readiness for those Chaldean idolaters, when they came into Babylon: "Thus

Jer. x. 11. shall ye say unto them, The gods, that have not made the heavens and the earth, shall perish from the earth, and from under these heavens." That is, there shall come a time, when none shall be religiously worshipped any where upon the face of the whole earth, save only that God, who made the heavens and the earth, and he without images too. Which prophecy, but in part yet fulfilled, shall then have its complete accomplishment, when "the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ." And thus is the controversy rightly stated betwixt the

Rev. xi. 15. Pagans and the Christians by Lactantius: "Sed fortasse quærat aliquis a nobis, quod apud Ciceronem quærit Hortensius; Si Deus unus est, quæ esse beata solitudo queat? Tanquam nos, qui unum esse dicimus, desertum ac solitarium esse dicamus. Habet enim ministros, quos vocamus nuntios. Et est istud verum, quod dixisse Senecam supra retuli; genuisse regni sui ministros Deum. Verum hi neque dii sunt, neque deos se vocari aut coli volunt; quippe, qui nihil præter jussum ac voluntatem Dei faciant." As if we who say, there is but one God, therefore made a solitary

L. i. [cap. vii. p. 50, 51.]

and deserted Deity. Whereas we acknowledge, that God hath his ministers, whom we call angels: and we grant that to be true, which was before cited out of Seneca, that God hath generated or created ministers of his kingdom. But these are neither gods, nor would they be called gods, nor worshipped; forasmuch as they only execute the will and command of God.—And again afterward to the same purpose: “*Si eos multitudo delectat, non duodecim dicimus, nec trecentos sexaginta quinque (ut Orpheus) sed innumerabiles, et arguimus eorum errores in diversum, qui tam paucos putant. Sciant tamen quo nomine appellari debeant; ne Deum verum violent, cujus nomen exponunt, dum pluribus tribuunt,*” &c. If multitude delight them, we say not, that there are twelve, nor yet three hundred sixty-five, as Orpheus, but innumerable. And we tax their error, on the contrary, who think them to be so few. Nevertheless, let them know, by what name they ought to be called, lest they violate the true God, whose name is profaned, when it is given to many.—From which passages of Lactantius it plainly appeareth, that the main controversy between the Christians and the Pagans was then only this: Whether or no, the created ministers of the supreme God might be called gods, and religiously worshipped. But this Pagan objection against the solitary Deity of the Christians is by some ancient Christian writers also otherwise answered; namely, from those three hypostases or persons of the Trinity; they affirming, upon that account, that though Christians did not acknowledge such a multitude of gods as the Pagans, yet did they not therefore

make God a solitary and sterile being, before the creation neither, as the Jews did; but went in a middle way betwixt Jews and Pagans, they interpreting Moses's *faciamus hominem*, to this sense.

XXXVI. We shall now shew particularly what these many gods of the Pagans were. It hath been often observed, that the Pagans were divided in their philosophic or natural theology, as to their opinions concerning the supreme God; some of them thinking, τὸ Θεῖον ἐξηρημένον εἶναι τῆς ὅλης φύσεως, that the supreme Deity was an abstract being, elevated above nature and the whole world—but others, that he was nothing higher than an *anima mundi*, or soul of the world.—Now the former of these two were chiefly amongst the Greeks, the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, who had accordingly several distinctions amongst them concerning their gods, as between the ὑπερκόσμοι θεοὶ and the ἐγκόσμοι, the supermundane and the mundane gods—the θεοὶ αἰδίοι and the γεννητοὶ, the eternal and the generated gods; that word *latter* being now taken in a narrower and more confined sense, for such as were made in time, or had a beginning of their existence: and, lastly, the νοητοὶ θεοὶ and the αἰσθητοὶ, the intelligible and the sensible gods. And the ὑπερκόσμοι, αἰδίοι and νοητοὶ θεοὶ, supermundane, eternal, and intelligible gods, of these Pythagoreans and Platonists, were first of all, and principally, those τρεῖς ἀρχαὶ καὶ ὑποστάσεις, (as Plotinus calls them) those three divine hypostases, that have the nature of principles in the universe, viz. Tagathon or Hen, Nous and Psyche, or Monad, Mind and Soul. That this trinity was not first of all a mere invention of Plato's, but

much ancients than he, is plainly affirmed by Plotinus in these words: *Καὶ εἶναι τοὺς λό- γους τούσδε μὴ καινοὺς, μὴ δὲ νῦν, ἀλλὰ πάλαι μὲν εἰρησθαι μὴ ἀναπεπταμένως, τοὺς δὲ νῦν λόγους ἐξηγητὰς ἐκείνων γεγονέναι· μαρτυροῖς πιστωσαμένους τὰς δόξας ταύτας παλαιὰς εἶναι, τοῖς αὐτοῦ τοῦ Πλάτωνος γράμμασιν· ἤπτετο μὲν οὖν καὶ Παρμενίδης πρότερον τῆς τοιαύτης δόξης.* That these doctrines are not new, nor of yesterday, but have been very anciently delivered, though obscurely (the discourses now extant being but explanations of them), appears from Plato's own writings; Parmenides before him having insisted on them.

Now it is well known, that Parmenides was addicted to the Pythagoric sect, and therefore probable, that this doctrine of a Divine triad was one of the arcanums of that school also. Which is further confirmed from hence, because Numenius a famous Pythagorean entertained it as such. And Moderatus (as Simplicius informeth us) plainly affirmeth this trinity of principles to have been a Pythagoric cabala: *οὗτος γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορείους τὸ μὲν Πρῶτον ἐν ὑπὲρ τὸ ὄν καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀποφαίνεται· τὸ δὲ Δεύτερον ἐν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄντως ὄν καὶ νοητὸν, τὰ εἶδη φησὶν εἶναι· τὸ δὲ Τρίτον ὅπερ ἐστὶ ψυχικόν, μετέχειν τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν.* This (Moderatus) declareth, that, according to the Pythagoreans, the first one or unity is above all essence; that the second one, which is that, which truly is, and intelligible, according to them, is the ideas; and that the third, which is psychical or soul, partaketh both of the first unity and of the ideas.—Lastly, we have Jamblichus's testimony also in Proclus to the same purpose; *τρῆς εἶναι θεοὺς τούτους καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ἕνονομένους.* That there were three gods also praised by the Pytha-

goreans.—Now we have before shewed, that Pythagoras's philosophy was derived from the Orphic cabala, which Proclus^a in another place thus fully testifieth; *ἅπαντα γὰρ ἢ παρ' Ἐλ-
Theol. Plat. λησι Θεολογία τῆς Ὀρφικῆς ἐστὶ μυσταγωγίας
l. i. c. v. ἔκγονος· πρώτου μὲν Πυθαγόρου παρὰ Ἀγλαοφή-
[p. 13.] μου τὰ περὶ θεῶν ὄργια διδαχθέντος· Δευτέρου δὲ Πλάτωνος
ὑποδεξαμένου τὴν παντελῆ περὶ τούτων ἐπιστήμην, ἔκ τε τῶν
Πυθαγορείων καὶ Ὀρφικῶν γραμμάτων·* All the theology of the Greeks was derived from the Orphic Mystagogia; Pythagoras being first instructed by Aglaophemus in the Orphic Orgia, or mysteries concerning the gods; and Plato being the next, who received a perfect knowledge of all these Divine things, both out of the Pythagoric and the Orphic writings.—And that a trinity was part of that Orphic cabala, we have already proved out of Amelius, he affirming (in Proclus) that Plato's three kings were the same with Orpheus's trinity, of Phanes, Uranus, and Cronus. Moreover, since all these three, Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato, travelling into Egypt, were there initiated in that arcane theology of the Egyptians (called Hermaical) it seemeth probable (as was before observed) that this doctrine of a Divinetriad was also part of the arcane theology of the Egyptians. It hath been also noted, that there were some footsteps of such a trinity in the Mithraic mysteries amongst the Persians, derived from Zoroaster; as likewise that it was expressly contained in the magic or Chalday oracles, of whatsoever authority they may be. Moreover, it hath been signified, that the Samothracians had very anciently a certain trinity of gods, that were the

^a Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. ii. p. 94.

highest of all their gods, and that called by a Hebrew name too, Cabbirim, or the mighty gods: and that from thence the Roman capitoline trinity of gods was derived; the second whereof was Minerva, which among the Latins, as Athena amongst the Greeks, was understood to signify the Divine wisdom. Lastly, the ternary, or triad, was not only accounted a sacred number amongst the Pythagoreans, but also, as containing some mystery in nature, was therefore made use of by other Greeks and Pagans, in their religious rites; as Aristotle informeth us: διὸ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως εἰληφότερες ὡσπερ νόμους ἐκείνης, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀγιστείας τῶν θεῶν χρώμεθα τῷ ἀριθμῷ τούτῳ.

De Cælo, l. i.
c. v. [cap. i.
p. 610. tom.
l. oper.]

Wherefore from nature, and as it were observing her laws, have we taken this number of three, making use of the same in the sacrifices of the gods, and other purifications.—

Now since it cannot well be conceived, how such a trinity of Divine hypostases should be first discovered merely by human wit and reason, though there be nothing in it (if rightly understood) that is repugnant to reason; and since there are in the ancient writings of the Old Testament certain significations of a plurality in the Deity, or of more than one hypostasis, we may reasonably conclude that, which Proclus asserteth of this trinity, as it was contained in the Chaldaic Oracles, to be true, that it was at first θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, a theology of Divine tradition or revelation—or a Divine cabala, viz. amongst the Hebrews first, and from them afterward communicated to the Egyptians and other nations. Neither ought it to be thought any considerable objection to the contrary, because the Platonists, Pythagoreans, and

other Pagan theologians, did not express this their trinity, in the very words of the Athanasian Creed, nor according to the form of the Nicene council. Forasmuch as this mystery was gradually imparted to the world, and that first but sparingly to the Hebrews themselves, either in their written or oral cabala; but afterwards more fully under Christianity, the whole frame whereof was built thereupon. Nevertheless was it not so distinctly and precisely determined, nor so punctually and scrupulously stated among the Christians neither, till after the rising up of heresies concerning it. Nor when all was done, did the orthodox themselves at first universally agree, in the signification of the word *Ὁμοούσιος*, coessential or consubstantial.—Nor, lastly, is it a thing at all to be wondered at, that in such a difficult and mysterious point as this, there should be some diversity of apprehensions amongst the reputed orthodox Christians themselves; and much less therefore amongst Pagans and philosophers. However, we freely acknowledge, that as this Divine cabala was but little understood by many of those who entertained it among the Pagans, so was it by divers of them much depraved and adulterated also.

For first, the Pagans universally called this their trinity of gods, *τὸν Πρῶτον, τὸν Δεύτερον, and τὸν Τρίτον θεόν*, the first, the second, and the third god;—as the more philosophical amongst them called it also a trinity of causes, and a trinity of principles, and sometimes a trinity of opificers. In *Timæ. Plat.* Thus is this cabala of the trinity styled P. 95. in Proclus, *ἡ τῶν Τριῶν θεῶν παράδοσις*, the tradition of the three gods.—And accordingly is

it said of Numenius by him, that *τρεις ἀν- In Timæ. Plat.*
υμνήσας θεούς, he did τραγωδῶν καλεῖν, πάππον, P. 93.
ἔκγονον, ἀπόγονον, having praised the three gods,
 tragically or affectedly called them, the grand-
 father, the son, and the nephew;—Numenius
 thereby intimating, that as the second of these
 gods was the offspring of the first god, so the third,
 called the nephew of the first, was derived both
 from him and from the second; from the first as
 the grandfather, and from the second as the fa-
 ther of him. Harpocraton, likewise, Atticus, and
 Amelius, are said by Proclus to have entertained
 this same cabala or tradition of the three gods,
 the latter of these styling them *βασιλέας τρεις,* and
 τρίτον δημιουργόν, three kings, and three opificers,
 or makers of the whole world. In like manner
 Plotinus, speaking of the second of these *Enn. 5. 1. v.*
 three hypostases, (that is, *νοῦς,* the first *c. iii. [p. 522.]*
 mind or intellect) calls him *δεύτερον Θεόν,* the second
 god; *Καὶ Θεὸς αὐτῆ ἡ φύσις, καὶ Θεὸς Δεύτερος, προφαί-
 νων ἑαυτὸν, πρὶν ὄρᾶν ἐκείνον· ὁ δὲ ὑπερκάθηται καὶ ὑπερί-
 δρυσταὶ ἐπὶ καλῆς οὐτως οἷον κρηπίδος, ἢ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐξήρηται·
 ἔδει γὰρ ἐκείνον βαίνοντα μὴ ἐπ' ἀψύχου τινός, μὴ δ' αὖ ἐπὶ
 ψυχῆς εὐθὺς βεβηκέναι, ἀλλ' εἶναι αὐτῷ κάλλος ἀμήχανον
 πρὸ αὐτοῦ προῖόν·* And this nature is God, I say
 a second God, offering himself to view, before
 that other God can be seen, who is seated above,
 this being as it were the glorious throne of him.
 For it is not fit, that he should be immediately
 seated in any that is inanimate; nor in mere soul
 neither; but that there should be such an immense
 pulchritude and splendour shining before him, like
 the pomp and procession before the great king.—
 He also elsewhere mentions all these three gods
 together, making this world to be an image of

En. 2. 1. iii. c. **them all:** Εικότως οὖν λέγεται οὗτος ὁ κόσμος
 xviii. [p. 148.] εἰκῶν, αἰεὶ εἰκονιζόμενος· ἐστηκότων μὲν τοῦ πρώ-
 του, καὶ δευτέρου, τοῦ δὲ τρίτου, ἐστηκότος μὲν καὶ αὐτοῦ,
 ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κινουμένου· Where-
 fore this world may well be called an image, it
 depending upon that above (as an image in a
 glass), which is threefold. Whereof the first and
 second God always stand immoveably; the third
 likewise is in itself stable too, but accidentally
 moved, by reason of the mobility of matter and
 things below it.—And that we may here give a
 taste of the mystical theology and enthusiasm of
 these Platonists too, Porphyrius in the life of Plo-
 tinus^a affirmeth, that both Plotinus and himself
 had sometimes experience of a kind of ecstatic
 union with the first of these three gods, that which
 is above mind and understanding: *πολλάκις ἐνάγοντι*
ἐαυτὸν εἰς τὸν πρῶτον καὶ ἐπέκεινα θεὸν ταῖς ἐννοίαις, ἐφάνη
ἐκεῖνος ὁ μήτε μορφήν, μή τέ τινα ἰδέαν ἔχων, ὑπὲρ δὲ νοῦν
καὶ πᾶν τὸ νοητὸν ἰδρυσμένος· ᾧ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ Πορφύριος ἀπαῶ
λέγω πλησιάσαι καὶ ἐνωθῆναι· Plotinus often endea-
 vouring to raise up his mind to the first and
 highest God, that God sometimes appeared to
 him, who hath neither form nor idea, but is placed
 above intellect, and all that is intelligible; to
 whom I Porphyrius affirm myself to have been
 once united in the sixty-eighth year of my age.—
 And again afterward, *τέλος αὐτῷ καὶ σκοπὸς ἦν, τὸ*
ἐνωθῆναι καὶ πελάσαι τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεῷ, ἔτυχεν δὲ τετράκις πον
ὅτε συνήμην αὐτῷ τοῦ σκοποῦ τούτου· Plotinus's chief
 aim and scope was, to be united to and conjoined
 with the supreme God, who is above all; which
 scope he attained unto four several times, whilst
 myself was with him, by a certain ineffable energy.

^a Cap. xxiii. p. 137. in Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. lib. iv. cap. xxvi.

—That is Plotinus aimed at such a kind of rapturous and ecstatic union with the *Τὸ ἐν*, and *Ἐὐαθὸν*, the first of the three highest gods, (called the one and the good) as by himself is described towards the latter end of this last book,^a where he calls it *ἐπαφήν*, and *παρουσίαν ἐπιστήμης κρείττονα*, and *τὸ ἐαυτῶν κέντρον τῷ οἷον πάντων κέντρῳ συνάπτειν*, a kind of tactual union, and a certain presence better than knowledge, and the joining of our own centre, as it were, with the centre of the universe.—Thus we see, that the Platonic trinity is a trinity of gods, of which three gods therefore, the second and the third must of necessity be inferior gods, because otherwise they would be three independent gods; whereas the Pagan theology expressly disclaims a plurality of independent and self-originated deities.

But since, according to the principles of Christianity, which was partly designed to oppose and bear down the Pagan Polytheism, there is one only God to be acknowledged; the meaning whereof notwithstanding seems to be chiefly directed against the deifying of created beings, or giving religious worship to any, besides the uncreated, and the creator of all: moreover, since in the Scripture, which is the only true rule and measure of this Divine cabala of the trinity, though the *λόγος* or Word be said to have been with God, (that is, God the Father) and also itself to be God, (that is, not a creature) yet is it no where called another, or second God. Therefore cannot we Christians entertain this Pagan language of a trinity of Gods, but must call it either a trinity of Divine hypostases, or subsist-

^a De Bono vel Uno, Ennead. vi. lib. ix. cap. x. p. 772.

ences, or persons, or the like. Nevertheless it is observable, that Philo,^a though, according to his Jewish principles, he was a zealous opposer of the Pagan Polytheism and idolatry, yet did he not, for all that, scruple to call the Θεῖον λόγον, the divine Word, after the Platonic way, Δεύτερον Θεόν, a second God; as not suspecting this to clash with the principles of his religion, or that second commandment of the decalogue, “Thou shalt have no other gods before my face;” possibly because he conceived, that this was to be understood of creature-gods only: whereas his second God, the divine λόγος or Word, is declared by him to be αἰδιος, eternal, and therefore, according to the Jewish theology, uncreated. However, this language of a second and third God is not so excusable in a Jew, as it might be in a Pagan; because the Pagans, according to the principles of their religion, were so far from having any scrupulosity against a plurality of gods, (so long as there was only one fountain of the Godhead acknowledged) that they rather accounted it an honour to the supreme God, as hath been already shewed, that he should have many other, not only titular gods under him, but also such as were religiously worshipped: wherefore, besides this second and third God, they also did luxuriate in their other many creature-gods. And indeed St. Austin doth upon this account seem somewhat to excuse the Pagans for this their trinity of gods, and principles, in these words: C. D. I. x. c. 23. “Liberis enim verbis loquuntur philosophi, nec in rebus ad intelligendum difficillimis offensionem religiosarum aurium perti-

^a Vide Eusebium, Præpar. Evangel. lib. vii. cap. xiii. p. 323.

mescunt. Nobis autem ad certam regulam loqui fas est, ne verborum licentia, etiam in rebus, quæ in his significantur, impiam gignat opinionem. Nos autem non dicimus duo vel tria principia, cum de Deo loquimur; sicut nec duos deos vel tres, nobis licitum est dicere, quamvis de unoquoque loquentes, vel de Filio, vel de Spiritu Sancto, etiam singulum quemque Deum esse fateamur." The philosophers use free language; nor in these things, which are extremely difficult to be understood, did they at all fear the offending of any religious and scrupulous ears. But the case is otherwise with us Christians; for we are tied up to phrases, and ought to speak according to a certain rule, lest the licentious use of words should beget a wicked opinion in any concerning those things, that are signified by them.—That is, though this might be in a manner excusable in the Pagans, because each of those three hypostases is God, therefore to call them severally gods, and all of them a trinity of gods and principles; they having no such rule then given them to govern their language by as this; "That though the Father be God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, yet are they not three Gods, but one God:" yet is not this allowable for us Christians, to speak of a second or third God or principle, or to call the holy Trinity a trinity of Gods, notwithstanding that when we speak of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost severally, we confess each of them to be God.

And indeed when the Pagans thus spake of a first, second, and third god, and no more, though having innumerable other gods besides, they did,

by this language, plainly imply, that these three gods of theirs, were of a very different kind from all the rest of their gods ; that is, not θεοὶ γεννητοὶ, but αἰδίοι, not created, but eternal and uncreated ones. And that many of them did really take this whole trinity of gods for the τὸ Θεῖον in general, the Divine Numen, and sometimes call it the first God too, in way of distinction from their generated gods, will be shewed afterward. So that the Πρῶτος Θεός, the first God, was used in different senses by these Pagans, sometimes in a larger sense, and in way of opposition to all the γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, the generated or created gods, or the gods, that were made in time, together with the world ; and sometimes again, more particularly, in way of distinction from those two other Divine hypostases eternal, called by them the second and third god. Which first of the three gods is also frequently by them called Θεός, God, emphatically and by way of excellency, they supposing a gradual subordination in these principles.

Neither was this trinity of Divine subsistences only thus ill-languaged by the Pagans generally, when they called it a trinity of gods ; but also the cabala thereof was otherwise much depraved and adulterated by several of the Platonists and Pythagoreans. For first, the third of these three hypostases, commonly called Psyche, is by some of them made to be ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος, the immediate soul of the corporeal world, informing, acting and enlivening it, after the same manner as the souls of other animals do their respective bodies ; insomuch that this corporeal world itself, as together with its soul it makes up one complete animal, was frequently called the third god.

This Proclus^a affirmeth of Numenius the Pythagorean, ὁ γὰρ κόσμος κατ' αὐτὸν ὁ τρίτος ἐστὶ θεός, That the world, according to him, was the third god.— And Plotinus, being a great reader of this Numenius, seems to have been somewhat infected by him with this conceit also, though contrary to his own principles, from those words before cited out of him,^b ὁ κόσμος θεός, ὡς περ συνηθὲς λέγειν, τρίτος, the world, as is commonly said, is the third god.

Now, if the world be not a creature, then is there no created being at all, but all is God. But not only Timæus Locrus, but also Plato himself, calls it θεῖον γεννητόν, that is, a created god, the word γεννητόν being here put for that, which, after it once was not, is brought into being; which is the proper notion of a creature. So that the animated world is, by Plato, made to be only the chief of all the γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, that is, the creature-gods. Wherefore it is plain, that in this trinity of some Platonists and Pythagoreans, wherein the world is made to be the third god, there is a confused jumble of created and uncreated beings together. For the first of those gods is the father and fountain of all, or the original of the god-head. And the second, forasmuch as he is called by them, both ποιητής, and δημιουργός, the maker and the opificer of the whole world, he therefore can be no creature neither: whereas the third, which is said to be the world, was by Numenius himself also expressly called both ποίημα and τὸ δημιουργούμενον, the work, or thing made, that is

^a Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. ii. p. 93.

^b This is a mistake, for Dr. Cudworth had not cited these words before, but they are to be found in Plotinus, Ennead. iii. lib. v. cap. vi. p. 296.

plainly, the creature of both the former. Proclus thus fully represents his sense; Πατέρα μὲν καλεῖ τὸν πρῶτον, ποιητὴν δὲ τὸν δεύτερον, ποίημα δὲ τὸν τρίτον ὥστε ὁ κατ' αὐτὸν δημιουργὸς διττός, ὅτε πρῶτος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος θεός, τὸ δὲ δημιουργούμενον ὁ τρίτος. Numenius called the first of the three gods the father, the second of them the maker, and the third the work, or thing made; so that, according to Numenius, there were two opificers, or creators of the world, the first and the second god; and the world itself, (that is, the thing made and created by them both) is said to be the third god.

And that this notion of the Trinity is an adulterated one, may be also further concluded from hence, because, according to this hypothesis, they might have said, that there were three hundred and more gods, as well as that there are three; since all the other γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, generated gods—might have come into the number too, as well as the world, they being parts thereof, and gods that differ not in kind from it, but only in degree. Wherefore these philosophers ought not to have made a trinity of gods, distinguished from all the rest, but rather first to have distributed their gods into θεοὶ αἰδίοι and γεννητοὶ, that is, eternal or uncreated, and created gods, and then to have subdivided those created gods into the whole world, and the parts thereof animated.

But because it may be here alleged in favour of this spurious hypothesis of the Trinity, that the world was accounted the third god, only by accident, in respect of its soul, which is properly that third god; though Numenius, with others, plainly affirm the world itself, as ποίημα and δη-

* Comment. in Timæum Platon, lib. ii. p. 93.

μουργούμενον, as the work and thing made, to be the third; we shall therefore reply to this, that even the soul of the mundane animal itself, according to Timæus, and Plato, and others, is affirmed to be *γεννητός θεός*, a generated god—that is, such as was produced from non-existence into being, and therefore truly and properly a creature. Which Aristotle^a observing, therefore took occasion to tax Plato as contradicting himself, in making the soul of the world a principle, that is, the third god, and yet supposing it to be *ὑστερον και ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ*, not eternal, but made or created together with the heaven—of which something before. Wherefore we conclude, that this ancient cabala of the Trinity was depraved and adulterated by those Platonists and Pythagoreans, who made either the world itself, or else *ψυχὴν ἐγκόσμιον*, an informing soul of the world—to be the third hypostasis thereof, they mingling created and uncreated beings together, in that which themselves, notwithstanding, call a trinity of causes and of principles.

And we think it highly probable, that this was the true reason, why Philo, though he admitted the second hypostasis of the Platonic and Pythagoric (if not Egyptian) Trinity, called by him *θεῖος λόγος*, the divine Word—and styled *δεύτερος θεός*, the second god—and, as Eusebius^b adds, *δεύτερον αἴτιον*, the second cause—yet he would not Platonize or Pythagorize any further, so as to take in that third god, or cause, supposed by many of them to be the soul of the whole world,

^a Vide *Metaphys. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 278. tom. iv. oper. et Physic. Auscultat. lib. viii. cap. i. p. 578. tom. i. oper.*

^b *Præparat. Evang. lib. vii. cap. xiii.*

as an animal; because he must then have offered violence to the principles of his own religion, in making the whole created world a god; which practice is, by him, condemned in the Pagans. It is true, that he somewhere sticks not to call God also the soul of the world, as well as the mind thereof, whether he meant thereby τὸν πρὸ τοῦ λόγου θεόν, that God, who is before the Word—or else rather the Word itself, the second God (according to him the immediate creator and governor of the same); nevertheless, he does not seem to understand thereby such a deeply immersed soul, as would make the world an animal, and a god, but a more elevated one; that is, ψυχὴν ὑπερκόσμιον, a super-mundane soul.

To this first depravation of that θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, that theology of Divine tradition—and ancient cabala of the Trinity, by many of the Platonists and Pythagoreans, may be added another, that some of them declaring the second hypostasis of their Trinity to be the archetypal world, or τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν παγέντα κόσμον, as Philo calls it,^a the world that is compounded and made up of ideas—and containeth in it all those kinds of things intelligibly, that are in this lower world sensibly; and further concluding, that all these several ideas of this archetypal and intelligible world, are really so many distinct substances, animals and gods, have thereby made that second hypostasis not to be one God, but a congeries and heap of gods. These are those gods commonly called by them νοητοὶ θεοί, intelligible gods—not as before in way of distinction from the P. 557. αἰσθητοί, the sensible gods—(which is a

^a De Opificio Mundi, p. 4.

more general notion of the word), but from those other gods of theirs (afterwards to be insisted on also) called νοεροὶ θεοὶ, intellectual gods.—Proclus upon Plato's *Politia* ^a concludes, that there is no idea of evil, for this reason, because if there were, καὶ ἡ τῶν κακῶν ἰδέα θεός ἔσται, ἐπεὶ περὶ πᾶσα ἰδέα θεός ὡς Παρμενίδης εἶρηκεν' that very idea of evil also would itself be a god, because every idea is a god, as Parmenides hath affirmed.—Neither was Plotinus himself, though otherwise more sober, altogether uninfected with this fantastic conceit of the ideas being all of them gods, he writing thus concerning the second God, the first Mind or Intellect: γενόμενον δὲ ἤδη En. v. l. i. c. τὰ ὄντα σὺν αὐτῷ γεννῆσαι, πᾶν μὲν τὸ τῶν vii. [p. 489.] ἰδεῶν κάλλος, πάντα δὲ θεοὺς νοητοῦς, that he being begotten by the first God (that is, by way of emanation, and from eternity), generated all entities together with himself, the pulchritude of the ideas, which are all intelligible gods.—Apuleius ^a also (as hath been already noted) grossly and fulsomely imputes the same to Plato, in those words; “ Quos deos Plato existimat, veros, incorporales, animales, sine ullo neque fine neque exordio, sed prorsus ac retro æviter-nos, ingenio ad summam beatitudinem porrecto,” &c.—And he with Julian and others reduce the greater part of the Pagan gods to these ideas of the intelligible, or archetypal world, as making Apollo, for example, to be the intelligible sun, the idea of the sensible; and Diana the intelligible moon, and the like for the rest. Lastly, it hath been observed also, that the Egyptian theologers pretended, in like manner, to worship these

^a De Deo Socratis, p. 43.

intelligible gods, or eternal ideas, in their religious animals, as symbols of them.

Philo indeed Platonized so far, as to suppose God to have made an archetypal and intelligible world, before he made this corporeal and sensible:

De Mun. Opif. Βουλευθείς (ὁ Θεός) τὸν ὄρατὸν τουτουὶ κόσμον
P. 6. [p. 3, 4.] δημιουργῆσαι, προεξετύπου τὸν νοητὸν, ἵνα χρώ-

μενος ἀσωμάτῳ καὶ θεοειδεστάτῳ παραδείγματι, τὸν σωμα-
τικὸν ἀπεργάσῃται, πρεσβυτέρου νεώτερον ἀπεικόνισμα, τσα-
αὔτα περιέξοντα αἰσθητὰ γένη, ὅσαπερ ἐν ἐκείνῳ νοητά.
τὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν συνεστῶτα κόσμον ἐν τόπῳ τινὶ ὑπονοεῖν
ἀδύνατον. God intending to make a visible world,
first formed an intelligible one; that so having
an incorporeal and most godlike pattern before
him, he might make the corporeal world agree-
ably to the same, this younger an image of that
older, that should contain as many sensible kinds
in it, as the other did intelligible. But it is not
possible (saith he) to conceive this world of ideas
to exist in any place.—Nay, according to him,
Moses himself philosophized also after the same
manner in his *Cosmopæia*, describing, in the first
five verses of *Genesis*, the making of an intelli-
ble heaven and earth before the sensible:

P. 6.

πρῶτον οὖν παρὰ τοῦ νοητοῦ κόσμου ὁ ποιῶν
ἐποίει οὐρανὸν ἀσώματον καὶ γῆν ἀόρατον, καὶ ἀέρος ἰδέαν
καὶ κενοῦ, εἴθ' ὕδατος ἀσωμάτου οὐσίαν καὶ πνεύματος,
καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐβδόμου φωτός, ὃ πάλιν ἀσώματον ἦν
καὶ νοητὸν ἡλίου παράδειγμα, &c. The Creator

first of all made an incorporeal heaven and
an invisible earth; the ideas of air and vacuum;
incorporeal water and air; and last of all light,
which was also the incorporeal and intelli-
gible paradigm of the sun and stars, and that
from whence their sensible light is derived.—

But Philo does not plainly make these ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world to be so many distinct substances and animals, much less gods; though he somewhere^a takes notice of those, who, admiring the pulchritude of both these worlds, did not only deify the whole of them, but also their several parts; that is, the several ideas of the intelligible world also, as well as the greater parts of the sensible, an intelligible heaven and earth, sun and moon; they pretending to worship those Divine ideas in all these sensible things. Which high-flown Platonic notion, as it gave sanctuary and protection to the grossest and foulest of all the Pagan superstitions and idolatries, when the Egyptians would worship brute animals, and other Pagans all the things of nature (inanimate substances, and mere accidents), under a pretence of worshipping the Divine ideas in them; so did it directly tend to absolute impiety, irreligion, and Atheism; there being few that could entertain any thoughts at all of those eternal ideas, and scarcely any who could thoroughly persuade themselves that these had so much reality in them, as the sensible things of nature; as the idea of a house in the mind of an architect hath not so much reality in it as a material house made up of stones, mortar, and timber; so that their devotion must needs sink down wholly into those sensible things, and themselves naturally at length fall into this atheistic persuasion, That the good things of nature are the only deities.

Here therefore have we a multitude of Pagan gods supermundane and eternal (though all de-

^a De Confusione Linguar. p. 345.

pending upon one supreme), the gods by them properly called *νοητοί*, intelligible—or the Divine ideas. And we cannot but account this for another depravation of the ancient Mosaic cabala of the Trinity, that the second hypostasis thereof is made to be the archetypal world, and all the Divine ideas, as so many distinct substances, animals, and gods; that is, not one god, but a whole world of gods.

But over and besides all this, some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans did further deprave and adulterate the ancient Hebrew or Mosaic cabala of the Trinity (the certain rule whereof is now only the Scriptures of the New Testament), when they concluded, that as from the third hypostasis of their Trinity, called *ἡ πρώτη ψυχή*, the first soul—there were innumerable other particular souls derived, namely, the souls of all inferior animals, that are parts of the world; so in like manner, that from their second hypostasis, called *ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς*, the first mind or intellect—there were innumerable other *μερικοὶ Νόες*, particular minds—or intellects substantial derived, superior to the first soul; and not only so, but also, that from that first and highest hypostasis of all, called *Τὸ ἓν*, and *Τάγαθόν*, the one, and the good—there were derived likewise many particular *Ἐνάδες*, and *Ἀγαθότητες*, unities and goodnesses substantial—superior to the first intellect. Thus Proclus in N. xxi. [cap. his Theologic Institutions, Μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν xxi. p. 426.] *ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον, ἐνάδες· καὶ μετὰ νοῦν τὸν πρῶτον, νόες· καὶ μετὰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν πρώτην, ψυχαί· καὶ μετὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, φύσεις.* After the first One (and from it), there are many particular henades or unities; after the first Intellect and from it, many particu-

lar noes, minds, or intellects; after the first Soul, many particular and derivative souls; and lastly, after the universal Nature, many particular natures, and spermatic reasons.—Where it may be *obiter* observed, that these Platonists supposed, below the universal Psyche, or mundane soul, a universal φύσις, or substantial nature also; but so as that besides it there were other particular λόγοι σπερματικοί, seminal reasons—or plastic principles also.

As for these noes, and that besides the first universal Mind or Intellect, there are other particular minds or intellects substantial, a rank of beings not only immutably good and wise, but also every way immoveable, and therefore above the rank of all souls, that are self-moveable beings; Proclus was not singular in this, but had the concurrence of many other Platonists with him; amongst whom Plotinus may seem to be one, from this passage of his besides others, *ὅτι ἀθάνατοι δὲ αἱ ψυχαὶ, καὶ νοῦς πᾶς, ἐν ἄλλοις διὰ πλειόνων εἴρηται* that souls are immortal, and every mind or intellect, we have elsewhere largely proved.— Upon which words Ficinus thus: “*Hic, et supra et infra sæpe, per verba Plotini notabis, plures esse mentium animarum-que substantias inter se distinctas, quamvis inter eas unio sit mirabilis.*” Here, and from many other places, before and after, you may observe, that, according to Plotinus, there are many substantial minds distinct from souls, though there be a wonderful union betwixt them.—Moreover, that there was also above these noes, or immoveable but multiform minds, not only one perfect Monad, and first Good, but also a rank

P. 653. [En-
nead. vi. lib.
iv. cap. x.]

of many particular henades or monades, and agathotetes ; was, besides Proclus and others,

In Epict. asserted by Simplicius also: ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ
Ench. p. 9.

τὸ ἀγαθὸν πάντα παράγει, τάτε πρῶτα, καὶ τὰ μέσα, καὶ τὰ ἔσχατα· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα καὶ ἑαυτῷ παράγει, μία ἀγαθότης πολλαὶ ἀγαθότητες, καὶ μία ἐνὰς ἢ ὑπὲρ πάσας, πολλαὶ ἐνάδας· The highest good (saith he) produceth all things from himself, in several ranks and degrees ; the first, the middle, and the last or lowest of all. But the first and the next to himself doth he produce like himself, one goodness many goodnesses, and one unity or henade many henades.—And that by these henades and autoagathotetes he means substantial beings, that are conscions of themselves, appears also from

P. 11. these following words: τὰ μὲν οὖν πρῶτα

τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀγαθοῦ παραγομένων, διὰ το πρὸς αὐτὸ ὁμόφυες, οὐκ ἐξέστη τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ, ἀκίνητα ὄντα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ αἰὲ μακαριότητι ἰδρυμένα, οὐκ ἐνδεῆ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὅτι αὐτοαγαθότητές εἰσι· Those beings, which are first produced from the first good, by reason of their sameness of nature with him, are immoveably and unchangeably good, always fixed in the same happiness, and never indigent of good or falling from it, because they are all essential goodnesses.—Where afterward he adds something concerning the νόες also, that though these were a rank of lower beings, and not αὐτοάγαθα, not essentially goodnesses, but only by participation ; yet, being by their own nature also immoveable, they can never degenerate, nor fall from that participation of good. Notwithstanding which, we must confess, that some of these Platonists seem to take the word henades sometimes in another sense, and to understand

nothing else thereby but the intelligible idea beforementioned; though the ancient Platonists and Pythagoreans were not wont to call these unities, but numbers.

And now have we discovered more of the Pagans' inferior gods, supermundane and eternal, viz. besides those *νοητοὶ θεοὶ*, those intelligible gods —troops of henades and autoagathotetes, unities and goodnesses; and also of noes, immoveable minds or intellects; or, as they frequently call them, *θεοὶ ἐνιαῖοι*, and *θεοὶ νοεροὶ*, henadical (or monadical) gods, and intellectual gods.

But since these noes, or *νοεροὶ θεοὶ*, are said to be all of them in their own nature a rank of beings above souls, and therefore superior to that first Soul, which is the third hypostasis of this Trinity: as all those henades or *ἐνιαῖοι θεοὶ*, those simple monadical gods, are likewise yet a higher rank of beings above the noes, and therefore superior to the second hypostasis also, the first Mind; and yet all these henades and nous, however supposed by these philosophers to be eternal, forasmuch as they are particular beings only, and not universal, cannot be placed higher than in the rank of creatures; it follows from hence unavoidably, that both the second and third hypostases of this Trinity, as well the first Mind as the first Soul, must be accounted creatures also; because no created being can be superior to any thing uncreated. Wherefore Proclus, and some others of those Platonists, plainly understood this Trinity no otherwise, than as a certain scale or ladder of beings in the universe; or a gradual descent of things from the first or highest, by steps downward, lower and lower, so

far as to the souls of all animals. For which cause, Proclus, to make up this scale complete, adds to these three ranks and degrees, below that third of souls, a fourth of natures also; under which there lies nothing but the passive part of the universe, body and matter. So that their whole scale of all that is above body was indeed not a Trinity, but a quaternity, or four ranks and degrees of beings, one below another; the first of henades or unities, the second of noes, minds or intellects, the third of souls, and the last of natures; these being, as it were, so many orbs and spheres, one within and below another. In all which several ranks of being, they supposed one first universal, and unparticipated, as the head of each respective rank, and many particular or participated ones: as one first universal Henade, and many secondary particular henades; one first universal Nous, Mind, or Intellect, and many secondary and particular noes or minds; one first universal Soul, and many particular souls; and lastly, one universal Nature, and many particular natures. In which scale of beings, they deified, besides the first *Τὸ ἐν*, and *Τὰγαθόν*, One, and good—not only the first Mind, and the first Soul, but also those other particular henades and noes universally; and all particular souls above human: leaving out, besides them and inferior souls, that fourth rank of natures, because they conceived, that nothing was to be accounted a god, but what was intellectual and superior to men. Wherein, though they made several degrees of gods, one below another, and called some *αἰδιούς* and some *γεννητούς*, some eternal, and some generated—or made in time; yet

did they no where clearly distinguish betwixt the Deity properly so called, and the creature, nor shew how far in this scale the true Deity went, and where the creature began. But as it were melting the Deity by degrees, and bringing it down lower and lower, they made the juncture and commissure betwixt God and the creature so smooth and close, that where they indeed parted was altogether undiscernible; they rather implying them to differ only in degrees, or that they were not absolute but comparative terms, and consisted but in more and less. All which was doubtless a gross mistake of the ancient cabala of the Trinity.

This is therefore that Platonic Trinity which we oppose to the Christian, not as if Plato's own Trinity, in the very essential constitution thereof, were quite a different thing from the Christian; itself in all probability having been at first derived from a Divine or Mosaic cabala; but because this cabala (as might well come to pass in a thing so mysterious and difficult to be conceived) hath been by divers of these Platonists and Pythagoreans misunderstood, depraved, and adulterated, into such a Trinity, as confounds the differences between God and the creature, and removes all the bounds and land-marks betwixt them; sinks the Deity lower and lower by degrees (still multiplying of it, as it goes), till it have at length brought it down to the whole corporeal world; and when it hath done this, is not able to stop there neither, but extends it further still to the animated parts thereof, stars and demons; the design or direct tendency thereof being nothing else, but to lay a foundation for infinite

Polytheism, cosmolatry (or world-idolatry), and creature-worship. Where it is by the way observable, that these Platonic Pagans were the only public and professed champions against Christianity; for though Celsus were suspected by Origen to have been indeed an Epicurean, yet did he at least personate a Platonist too. The reason whereof might be, not only because the Platonic and Pythagoric sect was the divinest of all the Pagans, and that which approached nearest to Christianity and the truth (however it might by accident therefore prove the worst, as the corruption of the best thing), and by that means could with greatest confidence hold up the bucklers against Christianity and encounter it; but also because the Platonic principles, as they might be understood, would, of all other, serve most plausibly to defend the Pagan Polytheism and idolatry.

Concerning the Christian Trinity, we shall here observe only three things; first, that it is not a Trinity of mere names or words, nor a Trinity of partial notions and inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing. For such a kind of Trinity as this might be conceived in that first Platonic hypostasis itself, called τὸ ἐν and τὰγαθὸν, the one and the good—and perhaps also in that first person of the Christian Trinity; namely, of goodness, and understanding or wisdom, and will or active power, three inadequate conceptions thereof. It is true, that Plotinus was so high-flown, as to maintain, that the first and highest principle of all, by reason of its perfect unity and simplicity, is above the multiplicity of knowledge and understanding, and therefore does not so much as νοεῖν ἑαυτὸ, in a proper sense, understand itself: not-

withstanding which, this philosopher himself adds, that it cannot therefore be said to be ignorant nor unwise neither; these expressions belonging only to such a being, as was by nature intellectual, *νοῦς μὲν γὰρ μὴ νοῶν, ἀνόητος;* En. vi. l. vii. c. 37. [p. 729.] Intellectus, nisi intelligat, demens merito judicatur.—And he seems to grant, that it hath a certain simple clarity and brightness in it, superior to that of knowledge; as the body of the sun has a certain brightness superior to that secondary light, which streameth from it; and that it may be said to be *νόησις αὐτῆ*, knowledge itself—that does not understand, as motion itself does not move. But this can hardly be conceived by ordinary mortals, that the highest and most perfect of all beings should not fully comprehend itself, the extent of its own fecundity and power, and be conscious of all that proceedeth from it, though after the most simple manner. And therefore this high-flown conceit of Plotinus (and perhaps of Plato himself too) has been rejected by latter Platonists, as fantastical and unsafe: for thus Simplicius, *ἀλλὰ καὶ γνῶσιν ἔχειν ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀκροτάτην, οὐ γὰρ ἂν τι τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ παραγομένων ἀγνοήσειεν* In Epict. p. 235. But it must needs have also the most perfect knowledge, since it cannot be ignorant of any thing, that is produced from itself.—And St. Austin,* in like manner, confutes that assertion of some Christians, that the λόγος, or eternal Word, was that very wisdom and understanding, by which the Father himself was wise; as making it nothing but an inadequate conception of God. But this opinion, that the Christian Trinity is but a Trinity of words, or mere logical notions and inadequate

* De Trinit. lib. vi. cap. ii. iii. p. 598, 599. tom. viii. oper.

conceptions of God, hath been plainly condemned by the Christian church in Sabellius and others. Wherefore we conclude it to be a Trinity of hypostases, or subsistences, or persons.

The second thing, that we observe concerning the Christian Trinity, is this: that though the second hypostasis, or person thereof, were begotten from the first, and the third proceedeth both from the first and second; yet are neither this second, nor third, creatures; and that for these following reasons. First, because they were not made $\xi\xi$ $\omicron\nu\kappa$ $\acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\omega\nu$, as Arius maintained, that is, from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being, nor can it be said of either of them, “*Erat quando non erant,*” that once they were not, but their going forth was from eternity—and they were both coeue and coeternal with the Father. Secondly, because they were not only eternal emanations (if we may so call them) but also necessary, and therefore are they both also absolutely undestroyable and unannihilable. Now, according to true philosophy and theology, no creature could have existed from eternity, nor be absolutely undestroyable; and therefore that, which is both eternal and undestroyable, is *ipso facto* uncreated. Nevertheless, because some philosophers have asserted (though erroneously) both the whole world’s eternity, and its being a necessary emanation also from the Deity, and consequently, that it is undestroyable; we shall therefore further add, that these second and third hypostases or persons of the holy Trinity are not only therefore uncreated, because they were both eternal and necessary emanations, and likewise are unannihilable; but also because they are universal, each of them comprehending

the whole world, and all created things under it: which universality of theirs is the same thing with infinity; whereas all other beings, besides this holy Trinity, are particular and finite. Now we say, that no intellectual being, which is not only eternal, and necessarily existent, or undestroyable, but also universal, or infinite, can be a creature.

Again, in the last place, we add, that these three hypostases, or persons, are truly and really one God. Not only because they have all essentially one and the same will, according to that of Origen, *θησκεύομεν οὖν τὸν πατέρα τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ τὸν υἱὸν τῆν ἀλήθειαν, ὅντα δύο τῇ ὑποστάσει πράγματα, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ τῇ συμφωνίᾳ καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τῆς βουλήσεως*. We worship the Father of truth, and the Son the truth itself, being two things as to hypostasis; but one in agreement, consent, and sameness of will:—but also because they are physically (if we may so speak) one also; and have a mutual *περιχώρησις*, and *ἐνύπαρξις*, inexistence and permeation of one another—according to that of our Saviour Christ, “I am in the Father, and the Father in me; and the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works.” We grant, indeed, that there can be no instance of the like unity or oneness found in any created beings; nevertheless, we certainly know from our very selves, that it is not impossible for two distinct substances, that are of a very different kind from one another, the one incorporeal, the other corporeal, to be so closely united together, as to become one animal and person; much less therefore should it be thought impossible for these three Divine hypostases to be one God.

We shall conclude here with confidence, that

the Christian Trinity, though there be very much of mystery in it, yet is there nothing at all of plain contradiction to the undoubted principles of human reason, that is, of impossibility, to be found therein, as the Atheists would pretend, who cry down all for nonsense and absolute impossibility, which their dull stupidity cannot reach to, or their infatuated minds easily comprehend, and therefore even the Deity itself. And it were to be wished, that some religionists and Trinitarians did not here symbolize too much with them, in affecting to represent the mystery of the Christian Trinity as a thing directly contradictory to all human reason and understanding; and that perhaps out of design to make men surrender up themselves and consciences, in a blind and implicit faith, wholly to their guidance; as also to debauch their understandings by this means, to the swallowing down of other opinions of theirs, plainly repugnant to human faculties. As who should say, he that believes the Trinity (as we all must do, if we will be Christians), should boggle at nothing in religion never after, nor scrupulously chew or examine any thing; as if there could be nothing more contradictory, or impossible to human understanding propounded, than this article of the Christian faith.

But, for the present, we shall endeavour only to shew, that the Christian Trinity (though a mystery, yet) is much more agreeable to reason, than that Platonic, or Pseudo-Platonic Trinity before described; and that in those three particulars then mentioned. For, first, when those Platonists and Pythagoreans interpret their third God, or last hypostasis of their Trinity, to be either the world,

or else a ψυχή ἐγκόσμιος, such an immediate soul thereof, as, together with the world its body, make up one animal god; as there is plainly too great a leap here betwixt their second and third hypostasis, so do they debase the Deity therein too much, confound God and the creature together, laying a foundation, not only for cosmolatry, or world-idolatry in general, but also for the grossest and most sottish of all idolatries, the worshipping of the inanimate parts of the world themselves, in pretence as parts and members of this great mundane animal, and sensible god.

It is true, indeed, that Origen and some others of the ancient Christian writers have supposed, that God may be said, in some sense, to be the soul of the world. Thus in that book Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, “Sicut corpus nostrum unum ex multis membris aptatum est, et ab una anima L. ii. c. 1. continetur, ita et universum mundum, velut animal quoddam immane, opinandum puto; quod quasi ab una anima, virtute Dei ac ratione teneatur. Quod etiam a sancta Scriptura indicari arbitror per illud, quod dictum est per prophetam; Nonne cælum et terram ego repleo, dicit Dominus? et cælum mihi sedes, terra autem scabellum pedum meorum; et quod Salvator, cum ait, non esse iurandum neque per cælum, quia sedes Dei est, neque per terram, quia scabellum pedum ejus. Sed et illud quod ait Paulus, Quoniam in ipso vivimus et movemur et sumus. Quomodo enim in Deo vivimus, et movemur, et sumus, nisi quod in virtute sua universum constringit et continet mundum?” As our own body is made up of many members, and contained by one soul, so do I conceive, that the whole world is to be looked

upon as one huge, great animal, which is contained, as it were, by one soul, the virtue and reason of God. And so much seems to be intimated by the Scripture in sundry places; as in that of the prophet, "Do not I fill heaven and earth?" And again, "Heaven is my throne, and the earth my footstool." And in that of our Saviour, "Swear not at all, neither by heaven, because it is the throne of God, nor by the earth, because it is his footstool." And, lastly, in that of Paul to the Athenians, "For in him we live, and move, and have our being." For how can we be said to live, and move, and have our being in God, unless because he, by his virtue and power, does constringe and contain the whole world? and how can heaven be the throne of God, and the earth his footstool, unless his virtue and power fill all things both in heaven and earth?—Nevertheless, God is here said by Origen to be but *quasi anima*, as it were the soul of the world:—as if he should have said, that all the perfection of a soul is to be attributed to God, in respect of the world; he quickening and enlivening all things, as much as if he were the very soul of it, and all the parts thereof were his living members. And perhaps the whole Deity ought not to be looked upon, according to Aristotle's notion thereof, merely as *ἀκίνητος οὐσία*, an immoveable essence;—for then it is not conceivable, how it could either act upon the world, or be sensible of any thing therein; or to what purpose any devotional addresses should be made by us to such an unaffected, inflexible, rocky, and adamantine Being. Wherefore all the perfection of a mundane soul may perhaps be attributed to God, in some sense, and he called, *quasi anima mundi*, as it were the soul thereof:—

though St. Cyprian would have this properly to belong to the third hypostasis or person of the Christian Trinity, viz. the Holy Ghost. But there is something of imperfection also plainly cleaving and adhering to this notion of a mundane soul, besides something of Paganity likewise, necessarily consequent thereupon, which cannot be admitted by us. Wherefore God, or the third Divine hypostasis, cannot be called the soul of the world in this sense, as if it were so immersed therein, and so passive from it, as our soul is immersed into, and passive from its body; nor as if the world, and this soul together, made up one entire animal, each part whereof were incomplete alone by itself. And that God, or the third hypostasis of the Christian Trinity, is not to be accounted, in this sense, properly the soul of the world, according to Origen himself, we may learn from these words of his; “Solius Dei, id est, Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, natura, id est, I. i. c. 6. proprium est; ut sine materiali substantia, et absque ulla corporeæ adjectionis societate, intelligatur subsistere.” It is proper to the nature of God alone, that is, of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, to subsist without any material substance, or body, vitally united to it.—Where Origen affirming, that all created souls and spirits whatsoever, have always some body or other vitally united to them; and that it is the property only of the three persons of the holy Trinity, not to be vitally united to any body, as the soul thereof; whether this assertion of his be true or no (which is a thing not here to be discussed), he does plainly hereby declare, that God, or the third hypostasis of the Trinity, is not to be

accounted, in a true and proper sense, the soul of the world.

And it is certain, that the more refined Platonists were themselves also of this persuasion; and that their third God, or Divine hypostasis, was neither the whole world (as supposed to be animated) nor yet *ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος*, the immediate soul of this mundane animal—but only *ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος*, a supermundane soul;—that is, such a thing as though it preside over the whole world, and take cognizance of all things in it, yet it is not properly an essential part of that mundane animal, but a being elevated above the same. For thus Pro-

In Timæ. p.
93, 94.

clus plainly affirmeth, not only of Amelius, but also of Porphyrius himself, who likewise pretended to follow Plotinus therein; *μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀμέλιον ὁ Πορφύριος οἰόμενος τῷ Πλωτίνῳ συναδέειν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν τὴν ὑπερκόσμιον ἀποκαλεῖ δημιουργόν, τὸν δὲ νοῦν αὐτῆς, πρὸς ὃν ἀπέστραπται, τὸ αὐτοζῶον, ὡς εἶναι τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦ δημιουργοῦ κατὰ τοῦτον.* After Amelius, Porphyrius, thinking to agree with Plotinus, calls the supermundane soul the immediate opificer or maker of the world, and that mind or intellect, to which it is converted, not the opificer himself, but the paradigm thereof.—And though Proclus there makes a question, whether or no this was Plotinus's true meaning, yet Porphyrius is most to be credited herein, he having had such intimate acquaintance with him. Wherefore, according to these three Platonists, Plotinus, Amelius, and Porphyrius, the third hypostasis of the Platonic Trinity is neither the world, nor the immediate soul of the mundane animal; but a certain supermundane soul, which also was *δημιουργός*, the opificer and creator of the world,—

and therefore no creature. Now the corporeal world being supposed, by these Platonists also, to be an animal, they must therefore needs acknowledge a double soul, one *ψυχὴν ἐγκόσμιον*, the immediate soul of this mundane animal, and another *ψυχὴν ὑπερκόσμιον*, a supermundane soul, which was the third in their trinity of gods, or Divine hypostases, the proper and immediate opificer of the world. And the same, in all probability, was Plato's opinion also; and therefore that soul, which is the only Deity, that in his book of Laws he undertakes to prove, was *ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος*, a supermundane soul, and not the same with that *ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος*, that mundane soul, whose genesis, or generation, is described in his *Timæus*; the former of them being a principle and eternal; and the latter made in time, together with the world, though said to be older than it, because in order of nature before it. And thus we see plainly, that though some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans either misunderstood, or depraved the cabala of the trinity, so as to make the third hypostasis thereof to be the animated world, which themselves acknowledged to be *ποίημα* and *δημιουργούμενον*, a creature and thing made; yet others, of the refined of them, supposed this third hypostasis of their trinity to be not a mundane, but a supermundane soul, and *δημιουργόν*, not a creature, but the Creator or opificer of the whole world.

And as for the second particular proposed, it was a gross absurdity in those Platonists also, to make the second, in their trinity of gods, and hypostasis, not to be one God, or hypostasis, but a multitude of gods and hypostasis; as also was that a monstrous extravagancy of theirs, to suppose

the ideas, all of them, to be so many distinct substances and animals. Which, besides others, Tertullian in his book *De Anima* thus imputes to Plato: “Vult Plato esse quasdam substantias invisibiles, incorporeales, supermundiales, divinas, et æternas, quas appellat ideas, id est, formas et exempla, et causas naturalium istorum manifestorum, et subjacentium corporalibus; et illas quidem esse veritates, hæc autem imagines earum.” Plato conceiveth, that there are certain substances, invisible, incorporeal, supermundial, divine, and eternal; which he calls ideas, that is, forms, exemplars, and causes of all these natural and sensible things; they being the truths, but the other the images.—Neither can it be denied, but that there are some odd expressions in Plato, sounding that way, who therefore may not be justified in this, nor I think in some other conceits of his, concerning these ideas: as when he contends, that they are not only the objects of science, but also the proper and physical causes of all things here below; as, for example, that the ideas of similitude and dissimilitude are the causes of the likeness and unlikeness of all things to one another by their participation of them. Nevertheless, it cannot be at all doubted, but that Plato himself, and most of his followers, very well understood, that these ideas were, all of them, really nothing else but the *noëmata*, or conceptions, of that one perfect Intellect, which was their second hypostasis; and, therefore, they could not look upon them in good earnest, as so many distinct substances existing severally and apart by themselves out of any mind, however they were guilty of some extravagant expressions concerning them.

Wherefore, when they called them *ουσιαι*, essences or substances, (as they are called in Philo *αναγκαιόταται ουσίαι*, the most necessary essences,) their true meaning herein was only this, to signify, that they were not such accidental and evanid things, as our conceptions are; they being the standing objects of all science, at least, if not the causes also of existent things. Again, when they were by them sometimes called animals also, they intended only to signify thereby, that they were not mere dead forms, like pictures drawn upon paper, or carved images and statues. And thus Amelius,* the philosopher, plainly understood that passage of St. John the Evangelist, concerning the eternal *λογος*, he pointing the words otherwise than our copies now do, *ὁ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν*, that, which was made, in him was life: this philosopher glossing after this manner upon it, *ἐν ᾧ τὸ γινόμενον ζῶν, καὶ ζῶν, καὶ ὄν πεφυκέναι*, in whom whatsoever was made, was living, and life, and true being.—Lastly, no wonder, if from animals these ideas forthwith became gods too, to such men as took all occasions possible to multiply gods; in which there was also something of that scholastic notion, “*Quicquid est in Deo, est Deus;*” Whatsoever is in God, is God.—But the main thing therein was a piece of Paganic poetry; these Pagan theologers being generally possessed with that poetic humour of personating things and deifying them. Wherefore, though the ideas were so many titular gods to many of the Platonic Pagans, yet did Julian himself, for example, who made the most of them, suppose them all *συνυπαδόντες*

So Clem. Al.
S. Cyril, S.
Aug. and
other Latins:

* Apud Euseb. Præpar. Evangel. lib. ix. cap. xix. p. 540.

χειν καὶ ἐνυπάρχειν, to co-exist with God and in-exist in him—that is, in the first mind, or second hypostasis of their trinity.

Lastly, Whereas Proclus, and others of the Platonists, intermingle many particular gods with those three universal principles or hypostases, of their Trinity, as *noes*, minds, or intellects, superior to the first soul; and henades and agathotetes, unities and goodnesses superior to the first intellect too; thereby making those particular beings, which must needs be creatures, superior to those hypostases, that are universal and infinite, and by consequence creaturizing of them: this hypothesis of theirs, I say, is altogether absurd and irrational also; there being no created beings essentially good and wise, but all by participation, nor any immoveable natures amongst them, whose οὐσία is their ἐνέργεια, their essence, their operation; but all mutable and changeable, and probably, as Origen and others of the fathers add, lapsible and peccable. “Nulla

Περὶ Ἀρχῶν,
l. i. c. viii. p.
685.

natura est, quæ non recipiat bonum et malum, excepta Dei natura, quæ bonorum omnium fons est; et Christi sapientia, sapientiæ enim fons est, et sapientia utique stultitiam recipere non potest; et justitia est, quæ nunquam profecto injustitiam capiet; et verbum est vel ratio, quæ utique irrationalis effici non potest; sed et lux est, et lucem certum est, quod tenebræ non comprehendent. Similiter et natura Spiritus Sancti, quæ sancta est, non recipit pollutionem; naturaliter enim vel substantialiter sancta est. Siqua autem alia natura sancta est, ex assumptione hoc vel inspiratione Spiritus Sancti habet, ut sanctificetur, non ex sua natura hoc possidens,

sed ut accidens ; propter quod et decidere potest, quod accidit." There is no nature, which is not capable both of good and evil, excepting only the nature of God, who is the fountain of all good, and the wisdom of Christ ; for he is the fountain of wisdom, and wisdom itself never can receive folly ; he is also justice itself, which can never admit of injustice ; and the reason and word itself, which can never become irrational ; he is also the light itself, and it is certain, that darkness cannot comprehend this light, nor insinuate itself with it. In like manner the nature of the Holy Ghost is such, as can never receive pollution, it being substantially and essentially holy. But whatsoever other nature is holy, it is only such in way of participation and by the inspiration of this Holy Spirit ; so that holiness is not its very nature and essence, but only an accident to it ; and whatsoever is but accidental may fail. All created beings therefore having but accidental goodness and wisdom, may degenerate and fall into evil and folly.—Which of Origen's is all one, as if he should have said, there is no such rank of beings as autoagathotetes, essential goodnesses, there being only one Being essentially good, or goodness itself. Nor no such particular created beings existing in nature as the Platonists call noes neither, that is, minds or intellects immoveable, perfectly and essentially wise, or wisdom itself, whose οὐσία is their ἐνέργεια, whose essence is their operation, and who consequently have no flux at all in them, nor successive action ; (only the eternal word and wisdom of God being such) who also are absolutely ununitable to any bodies. It is true, that Origen did sometimes

make mention of *νοές*, minds or intellects, but it was in another sense, he calling all souls, as first created by God, and before their lapse, by that name; which was as much as if he should have said, though some of the Platonists talk much of their noes, yet is there nothing answerable to that name, according to their notion of them; but the only noes really existing in nature, are un-fallen, but peccable souls; he often concluding; that the highest rank of created beings are indeed no better than those, which the Platonists commonly call *ψυχαι*, or souls. By which souls he understood first of all, beings in their own nature self-moveable and active; whereas the noes of the Platonists are altogether immoveable and above action. And then again, such beings or spirits incorporeal, as exist not abstractly and separately from all matter, as the noes of the Platonists were supposed to do, but are vitally unitable to bodies, so as, together with those bodies, to compound and make up one animal. Thus, I say, Origen conceived even of the highest angelical, and arch-angelical orders, that they were all of them *ψυχαι*, souls, united to bodies, but such as were pure, subtle, and ethereal: however, he supposed it not impossible for them to sink down into bodies, more gross and feculent. And it is certain, that many of the ancient Christian writers concurred with Origen herein, that the highest created spirits were no naked and abstract minds, but souls clothed with some corporeal indument. Lastly, Origen's souls were also supposed to be, all of them, endowed with *liberum arbitrium*, or free will, and consequently to be self-improvable and self-impairable; and

no particular created spirits to be absolutely in their own nature impeccable, but lapsible into vicious habits: whereas the Platonic noes are supposed to be such beings, as could never fall nor degenerate. And the generality of the Christian writers seemed to have consented, or conspired with Origen in this also, they supposing him, who is now the prince of devils, to have been once an angel of the highest order. Thus does St. Jerome^a determine; “Solus Deus est, in quem peccatum non cadit; cætera, cum sint liberi arbitri, possunt in utramque partem suam flectere voluntatem.” God is the only being, that is absolutely incapable of sin; but all other beings, having free-will in them, may possibly turn their will to either way;—that is, to evil as well as to good. It is certain, that God, in a sense of perfection, is the most free agent of all, neither is contingent liberty universally denied to him; but here it is made the only privilege of God, that is, of the holy Trinity, to be devoid of *liberum arbitrium*, namely, as it implieth imperfection, that is, peccability and lapsibility in it.

It is true, that some of the Platonic philosophers suppose, that even in that rank of beings, called by them souls, though they be not essentially immutable, but all self-moveable and active, yet there are some of them of so high a pitch and elevation, as, that they can never degenerate, nor sink down into vicious habits. Thus Simplicius for one; ἀλλὰ αἱ μὲν πρῶται τῶν ψυχῶν, αἶτε In Epist. p. 12, 13. προσεχῶς ὑπὸ αὐτοαγάθων παραχθῆσαι, καὶ ἔσχόν τι πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὑφεμένον, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθότητες, ἀλλὰ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, πλὴν ὡς συγγενεῖς πρὸς αὐτὸ,

^a Epistol. cxli.

συμφυῶς τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀναποσπάστως ὀρέγονται, καὶ τὴν αἴρεσιν μονοειδῶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τεταμένην ἔχουσι, οὐδέποτε ἀποκλίνουσαι πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον· καὶ εἶπερ ἢ προαἴρεσις ἀντ' ἄλλου τινός ἐστιν αἴρεσις, τάχα οὐκ ἂν εἴη προαἴρεσις ἐκείνοις; εἰ μήτις αὐτὴν προαἴρεσιν ὡς τὰ πρῶτα ἀγαθὰ αἰρουμένην καλοῖ. But the first and highest of souls, which were immediately produced from what are essentially good, although they have some abatement in them, they being not goodnesses essentially, but desirous of good, nevertheless are they so near a-kin to that highest good of all, as that they do naturally and indivulsively cleave to the same, and have their volitions always uniformly directed towards it, they never declining to the worsen. Insomuch that if proæresis be taken for the chusing of one thing before another, perhaps there is no such thing as proæresis to be imputed to them, unless one should call the chusing of the first goods proæresis.—By these higher souls Simplicius must needs understand, either the souls of the sun, moon, and stars, or else those of the superior orders of demoniac or angelic beings. Where though he make a question, whether proæresis or deliberation belong to them, yet does he plainly imply, that they have none at all of that lubricous *liberum arbitrium* or free-will belonging to them, which would make them capable of vice and immorality as well as virtue.

But whatever is to be said of this, there seems to be no necessity at all for admitting that assertion of Origen's, that all rational souls whatsoever, even those of men and those of the highest angelical orders, are universally of one of the same nature, and have no fundamental or essential difference in their constitution; and conse-

quently that all the difference, that is now betwixt them, did arise only from the difference of their demeanor, or use of that power and liberty, which they all alike once had. So that thrones, and dominions, and principalities, and powers, were all made such by their merits; and human souls, though now sunk so low, yet are not absolutely incapable of commencing angels, or ascending to those highest altitudes: as it is not impossible, according to him, neither, but that the highest angels also, the seraphim and cherubim might, in length of time, not only degenerate into devils, but also sink down into human bodies; his reason for which monstrous paradox is only this, that the Divine justice cannot otherwise well be salved, but God must needs be a *προσωπολήπτης*, an acceptor of persons, should he have arbitrarily made such vast differences amongst intellectual beings. Which ground he also extendeth so far, as to the human soul of our Saviour Christ himself, as being not partially appointed to that transcendent dignity of its hypostatic union, but by reason of its most faithful adherence to the Divine word and wisdom, in a pre-existent state, beyond all other souls; which he endeavours thus to prove from the Scripture: “Quod dilectionis perfectio, et affectus περὶ Ἀρχῶν,
l. i. c. vi. sinceritas, ei inseparabilem cum Deo fecerit unitatem, ita ut non fortuita fuerit, aut cum personæ acceptione, animæ ejus assumptio, sed virtutum suarum sibi merito delata; audi ad eum prophetam dicentem, Dillexisti justitiam et odisti iniquitatem; propterea unxit te Deus, Deus tuus, oleo lætitiæ præ participibus tuis: dilectionis ergo merito ungitur oleo lætitiæ anima Christi, id est,

cum verbo Dei unum efficitur. Ungi namque oleo lætitiæ, non aliud intelligitur quam Spiritu Sancto repleti. Præ participibus autem dixit; quia non gratia spiritus sicut prophetis ei data est, sed ipsius verbi Dei in ea substantialis inerat plenitudo." That the perfection of love, and sincerity of Divine affection, procured to this soul its inseparable union with the Godhead, so that the assumption of it was neither fortuitous nor partial, or with prosopolepsy (the acception of persons) but bestowed upon it justly for the merit of its virtues; hear (saith he) the prophet thus declaring to him, "Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity: therefore hath God, even thy God, anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows." The soul of Christ therefore was anointed with the oil of gladness, or made one with the word of God, for the merits of love and faithful adherence to God, and no otherwise. For to be anointed with the oil of gladness here properly signifies nothing else, but to be replenished with the Holy Ghost. But when it is said, that he was thus anointed above his fellows, this intimateth, that he had not the Holy Ghost bestowed upon him, only as the prophets and other holy men had, but that the substantial fulness of the word of God dwelt in him.—But this reason of Origen's seems to be very weak; because if there be a rank of souls below human, specifically differing from the same, as Origen himself must needs confess, (he not allowing the souls of brutes to have been human souls lapsed, as some Pythagoreans and Platonists conceited, but renouncing and disclaiming that opinion, as monstrously absurd and irrational) there can be

no reason given, why there might not be as well other ranks and orders of souls superior to those of men, without the injustice of prosopolepsy; as, besides Simplicius, Plotinus and the generality of other Platonists conceived.

But least of all can we assent to Origen, when from this principle, that souls, as such, are essentially endowed with *liberum arbitrium*, or free-will, and therefore never in their own nature impeccable, he infers those endless circuits of souls upwards and downwards, and so makes them to be never at rest, denying them any fixed state of holiness and happiness by Divine grace; such as wherein they might be free from the fear and danger of ever losing the same. Of whom St. Austin* therefore thus: “*Illum et propter alia nonnulla, et maxime propter alternantes sine cessatione beatitudines et miserias, et statutis seculorum intervallis ab istis ad illas, atque ab illis ad istas itus ac reditus interminabiles, non immerito reprobavit ecclesia; quia et hoc quod misericors videbatur, amisit, faciendo sanctis veras miserias, quibus poenas luerent, et falsas beatitudines, in quibus verum ac securum, hoc est, sine timore certum sempiterni boni gaudium non haberent.*” The church hath deservedly rejected Origen, both for certain other opinions of his, and especially for those his alternate beatitudes and miseries, without end, and for his infinite circuits, ascents and descents of souls, from one to the other, in restless vicissitudes and after periods of time. Forasmuch as hereby he hath quite lost that very title of pitiful, or merciful, which otherwise he seemed to have deserved, by making so many true miseries for

* De Civitate Dei, lib. xxi. cap. xvii. p. 481. tom viii. oper.

the best of saints, in which they should successively undergo punishment and smart ; and none but false happiness for them, such as wherein they could never have any true or secure joy, free from the fear of losing that good which they possess. —For this Origenical hypothesis seems directly contrary to the whole tenor of the gospel, promising eternal and everlasting life to those, who believe in Christ, and perseveringly obey him ; (1 John ii.) “ This is the promise, that he hath promised us, even eternal life :” and Tit. i. 2. “ In hope of eternal life, which God, that cannot lie, hath promised.” And, “ God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life :” and lest all this should be taken for a periodical eternity only, (John iii. 26.) “ He that believeth in me, shall never die.” And possibly this might be the meaning of St. Paul, (2 Tim. i. 10.) when he affirmeth of our Saviour Christ, that “ he hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light, through the gospel ;” not because he was the first, who had discovered, and published to the world, the soul's immortality, which was believed before, not only by all the Pharisaic Jews, but also by the generality of Pagans too ; but because these, for the most part, held their endless circuits and transmigrations of souls : therefore was he the first, who brought everlasting life to light, and gave the world assurance, in the faith of the gospel, of a fixed and permanent state of happiness, and a never-fading crown of glory to be obtained ; “ Him that overcometh will I make a pillar in the temple of my God ; and he shall go no more out.” Apoc. iii. 12.

Now the reason, why we mentioned Origen here, was because he was a person, not only thoroughly skilled in all the Platonic learning, but also one, who was sufficiently addicted to those dogmata, he being commonly conceived to have had too great a kindness for them; and, therefore, had there been any solidity of reason for either those particular henades or noes of theirs, created beings above the rank of souls, and consequently, according to the Platonic hypothesis, superior to the universal Psyche also (which was the third hypostasis in their trinity, and seems to answer to the Holy Ghost in the Christian); Origen was as likely to have been favourable thereunto as any other. But it is indeed manifestly repugnant to reason, that there should be any such particular, that is, created henades, and *αἰτιαθότητες*, essential goodnesses—superior to the Platonic first Mind; or any such noes, and *αἰτισοφίαι*, essential wisdoms—superior to their universal Psyche; it being all one, as if, in the Christian Trinity, besides the first person, or the Father, one should suppose a multitude of particular paternities superior to the second; and also, besides the second person, the Son, or Word, a multitude of particular sons, or words, all superior to the third person, the Holy Ghost. For this is plainly to make a breach upon the Deity, to confound the Creator and creature together; and to suppose a company of such creaturely gods, as imply a manifest contradiction in the very notion of them.

Wherefore, we shall here observe, that this was not the Catholic doctrine of the Platonic school, that there were such henades and noes, but only a private opinion of some doctors amongst them,

and that of the latter sort too. For, first, as for those henades, as there are not the least footsteps of them to be found any where in Plato's writings, so may it be plainly gathered from them, that he supposed no such thing. Forasmuch as, in his second epistle, where he describes his trinity, ^a he doth not say of the first, *περὶ τὸ πρῶτον τὰ πρῶτα*, about the first are the first—as he doth of the second, *δευτερον περὶ τὰ δευτερα*, and of the third, *τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα*, about the second are the second, and about the third the third—but of the first he saith; *περὶ τὸν πάντων Βασιλέα πάντ' ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα*, about the king of all things are all things, and for his sake are all things; and he is the cause of all things, that are good.—Wherefore here are no particular henades and autoagathotetes, unities and goodnesses; about the first *Τὸ Ἐν* and *Τάγαθόν*, One and Good; but all good things are about him, he being both the efficient and final cause of all. Moreover Plotinus, throughout all his works, discovers not the least suspicion neither of these henades and agathotetes, this language being scarcely to be found any where in the writings of any Platonists senior to Proclus; who also, as if he were conscious, that this *assumentum* to the Platonic theology were not so defensible a thing, doth himself sometime, as it were, tergiversate and decline it; by equivocating in the word henades, taking them for the ideas, or the intelligible gods before mentioned. As perhaps Synesius also uses the word, in his first hymn, when God is called by him

*Ἐνοτήτων ἕνας ἀγνή,
Μονάδων μονάς τε πρώτη,*

^a P. 707. oper.

the first Henad of Henades, and the first Monad of Monades; that is, the first idea of good, and cause of all the ideas.—And as for the particular noes, minds or intellects, these indeed seem to have crept up somewhat before Plotinus's time; he, besides the passage before cited, elsewhere giving some intimations of them, as Enn.

6. l. iv. c. iv. Ἄλλα πῶς ψυχὰὶ πολλὰὶ καὶ νοῖ πολλοὶ; but how can there be many souls, and many minds, and not only one, but many entia?

—From which, and other places of his, Ficinus concluded Plotinus, himself really to have asserted, above the rank of souls, a multitude of other substantial beings, called νόες or νοῖ, minds or intellects. Nevertheless, Plotinus speaking of them so uncertainly, and making such an union betwixt all these noes and their particular respective souls, it may well be questioned, whether he really took them for any thing else but the heads and summities of those souls; he supposing, that all souls have a mind in them, the participation of the first Mind; as also unity too, the participation of the first Unity; whereby they are capable of being conjoined with both:

δεῖ νοῦν ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι, καὶ νοῦ ἀρχὴν, καὶ αἰτίαν, καὶ θεόν ὡς περ τὸ κέντρον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐστίν· ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν

Enn. l. v. c. xi. [lib. i. p. 492.]

ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ σημεῖον ἐν αὐτῷ· καὶ αἱ γραμμαὶ τὸ ἴδιον προσφέρουσι πρὸς τοῦτο· τῷ γὰρ τοιούτῳ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἡμεῖς ἐφαπτόμεθα, καὶ σύνεσμεν, καὶ ἀνηρητήμεθα ἐνιδρόμεθα δὲ, οἷ ἂν συννεύωμεν ἐκεῖ· There must needs be mind in us, as also the principle and cause of mind, God. Not as if he were divided, but because, though remaining in himself, yet he is also considered in many as capable to receive him. As the centre, though it remain in itself, yet is it also in every line drawn

from the circumference, each of them, by a certain point of its own, touching it. And by some such thing in us it is, that we are capable of touching God, and of being united to him, when we direct our intention towards him.—And in the next chapter he adds, ἔχοντες τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνομεθα, ἀλλ' ἀργοῦμεν ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνεργείαις τὰ πολλά· οἱ δ' οὐδ' ὄλως ἐνεργοῦσιν· ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἐνεργείαις αἰεὶ, νοῦς δὲ καὶ τὸ πρὸ νοῦ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, &c. That though we have these things in us, yet do we not perceive them, being for the most part idle and asleep, as to these higher energies; as some never at all exercise them. However, those do always act; mind, and that which is before mind, unity; but every thing, which is in our souls, is not perceived by us, unless come to the whole, when we dispose ourselves towards it, &c.—Where Plotinus seems to make the noes, or minds, to be nothing else but something in souls, whereby they partake of the first Mind. And it is said of Porphyrius, who was well acquainted with Plotinus's philosophy, that he quite discarded and rejected these noes or intellects, as substances really distinct from the first Mind, and separate from souls. And it is certain, that such minds as these are no where plainly mentioned by Plato, he speaking only of minds in souls, but not of any abstract and separate minds, save only one. And though some might think him to have given an intimation of them in his δεύτερον περὶ τὰ δεύτερα, (beforementioned) his second about the second things, or second things about the second—yet by these may very well be understood the ideas; as by the third things about the third, all created beings. Wherefore we may conclude, that this Platonic, or rather

Pseudo-Platonic trinity, which confounds the differences betwixt God and the creature, and that probably in favour of the Pagan Polytheism and idolatry, is nothing so agreeable to reason itself, as that Christian Trinity before described, which distinctly declares, how far the Deity goes, and where the creature begins; namely, that the Deity extends so far as to this whole Trinity of hypostases; and that all other things whatsoever, this Trinity of persons only excepted, are truly and properly their creatures, produced by the joint concurrence and influence of them all, they being really but one God.

But, it is already manifest, that all the forementioned depravations and adulterations of that Divine cabala of the Trinity, and that spurious trinity, described, (which, because asserted by some Platonists, was called Platonical, in way of distinction from the Christian) cannot be justly charged, neither upon Plato himself, nor yet upon all his followers universally. But, on the contrary, we shall now make it appear, that Plato and some of the Platonists retained much of the ancient genuine cabala, and made a very near approach to the true Christian Trinity; forasmuch as their three hypostases, distinguished from all their other gods, seem to have been none of them accounted creatures, but all other things whatsoever the creatures of them.

First, therefore, we affirm, that Plato himself does, in the beginning of his *Timæus*, very carefully distinguish betwixt God and the creature, he determining the bounds between them after this manner: ^a Ἔστιν οὖν δὴ κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν πρῶτον δια-

^a Cap. xii. p. 235. edit. Fabricii.

ρετέον τάδε· τί τὸ ὄν μὲν αἰεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον· καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν, ὄν δὲ οὐδέποτε· τὸ μὲν δὴ, νοήσει μετὰ λόγον περιληπτὸν, αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά ὄν· τὸ δ' αὖ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου, δοξαστὸν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν· πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον, ὑπ' αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι. We being here to treat concerning the universe, judge it necessary to begin with a distinction betwixt that, which always is, and hath no ortus, or generation; and that, which is made, but never truly is. The former of which, being always like itself and the same, is comprehensible by intellection with reason, or is the object of knowledge; the latter of them, that which is made and perisheth, but never truly is, is not properly knowable, but opinable only, or the object of opinion, together with irrational sense. Now every thing, that is made, must of necessity be made by some cause.—The reason, why Plato, being to treat of the universe, begins here with this distinction, was, as Proclus^a well observes, because ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ἡμῶν ἐννοίαις ἀπόκειται, τὸ εἶναι τι αἰεὶ ὄν· it is either one of our common notions, or a thing mathematically demonstrable, that there must be something eternal, or which was never made, but always was, and had no beginning.—And it is evident by sense and experience, that all things are not such, but that some things are made and perish again, or generated and corrupted. Now the latter Platonists, being strongly possessed with a prejudice of the world's eternity, or that it had no beginning, have offered strange violence to Plato's text in this place, and wrested his words to quite a different sense from what he intended; as if by his τὸ γιγνόμενον, that which is

^a Comment. in Timæum Pláton. lib. i. p. 10.

made—he did not at all mean that, which had a beginning, but only that, whose duration is flowing and successive, or temporary, which might notwithstanding be without beginning; and as if he supposed the whole corporeal world to be such, which though it hath a successive and temporary duration, yet was without any beginning. And the current ran so strong this way, that even Boethius, that learned Christian philosopher, was himself also carried away with the force thereof, he taking it for granted, likewise, that Plato held the eternity of the world in this sense, that is, its being without beginning: “Non recte quidam Consol. Phil. I. v. Pro. 6. (saith he) qui cum audiunt visum Platoni

mundum hunc nec habuisse initium temporis, nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri coæternum putant. Aliud est enim, per interminabilem duci vitam, quod mundo Plato tribuit; aliud interminabilis vitæ totam pariter complexum esse præsentiam; quod divinæ mentis proprium esse manifestum est. Neque Deus conditis rebus antiquior videri debet, temporis quantitate, sed simplicis potius proprietate naturæ.” Some, when they hear Plato to have held, that the world had no beginning, nor shall never have an end, do not rightly from thence infer, that Plato therefore made the world coeternal with God, because it is one thing always to be, and another thing to possess an endless life all at once, which is proper to the Divine mind. Neither ought God to be thought older than the world, in respect of time, but only in respect of the simplicity of his nature.—To which purpose he adds afterwards, “Itaque si digna rebus nomina velimus imponere, Platonem sequentes, Deum

quidem æternum, mundum verò dicemus esse perpetuum." Therefore, if we would give proper names to things agreeable to their natures, following Plato, we should say, that God was eternal; but the world only perpetual.—But as this doctrine of the latter Platonists quite frustrates Plato's design in this place, which was to prove or assert a God; because, if the world had no beginning, though its duration be never so much successive, yet would it not follow from thence, that therefore it must needs have been made by some other cause; so is it directly contrary to that philosopher's own words, himself there declaring, that by his τὸ γιγνόμενον, ortum, or that which is made—he did not understand only that, whose duration is successive, but also τὸ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχον, that which had a beginning of its generation—and τὸ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενον, that which begun from a certain epocha of time—or that which once was not, and therefore must needs be brought into being by some other cause. So that Plato there plainly supposed all temporary beings once to have had a beginning of their duration, as he declareth in that very Timæus of his, that Time itself was not eternal, or without beginning, but made together with the heaven or world;—and from thence does he infer, that there must of necessity be another eternal Being, viz. such as hath both a permanent duration, and was without beginning, and was the cause both of time and the world: forasmuch as nothing can possibly be made without a cause; that is, nothing, which once was not, could of itself come into being, but must be produced by some other thing; and so at last we must needs come to something, which

had no beginning. Wherefore Plato, thus taking it for granted, that whatsoever hath a temporary and flowing duration, was not without beginning; as also that whatsoever was without beginning, hath a permanent duration or standing eternity; does thus state the difference betwixt uncreated and created beings, or betwixt God and creature; namely, that creature is that, whose duration being temporary or successive, once had a beginning; and this is his τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν, ὃν δὲ οὐδέποτε, that which is made, but never truly is,—and that which ὑπ' αἰτίου τινός ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεται, must of necessity be produced by some cause—but that whatsoever is without beginning, and hath a permanent duration, is uncreated or Divine; which is his τὸ ὄν μὲν αἰεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, that which always is, and hath no generation, nor was ever made.—Accordingly as God is styled in the Septuagint translation of the Mosaic writings, ὁ Ὄν, he that truly is.

Now as for this αἰδῖος οὐσία or φύσις, this eternal nature—which always is, and was never made, Plato speaks of it, not singularly only, as we Christians now do, but often in the Paganic way plurally also; as when, in this very Timæus, he calls the world τῶν αἰδῖων θεῶν γεγονός ἄγαλμα, a made or created image of the eternal gods.—By which eternal gods he there meant doubtless that τὸ πρῶτον, and τὸ δεύτερον, and τὸ τρίτον, that first, and second, and third, which, in his second epistle to Dionysius, he makes to be the principles of all things; that is, his trinity of Divine hypostases, by whose concurrent efficiency, and according to whose image and likeness, the whole world was made; as Plotinus also plainly declareth in these words of his before cited: οὗτος μὲν ὁ κόσμος εἰκὼν αἰεὶ

εἰκονιζόμενος, ἐστηκότων μὲν τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ δευτέρου, καὶ τοῦ τρίτου. This world is an image always iconized, or perpetually renewed (as the image in a glass is) of that first, second, and third principle, which are always standing—that is, fixed in eternity, and were never made. For thus Eusebius records, that the ancient interpreters of Plato expounded this first, second, and third of his in the forementioned epistle, of a trinity of gods; ταῦτα Pr. Ev. l. xi. οἱ τὸν Πλάτωνα διασαφεῖν πειρώμενοι, ἐπὶ τὸν c.xx.[p.541.] πρῶτον θεὸν ἀνάγουσιν, ἐπίτε τὸ Δεύτερον αἴτιον, καὶ Τρίτον τὴν τοῦ κόσμου Ψυχὴν, Θεὸν Τρίτον καὶ αὐτὴν ὀριζόμενοι εἶναι. These things do the interpreters of Plato refer to the first God, and to the second cause; and to the third the soul of the world, they calling this also the third god.—Wherefore we think there is good reason to conclude, that those eternal or uncreated gods of Plato in his *Timæus*, whose image or statue this whole generated or created world is said by him to be, were no other than his trinity of Divine hypostases, the makers or creators thereof. And it was before (as we conceive) rightly guessed, that Cicero also was to be understood of the same eternal gods, as Platonizing, when he affirmed, “*A diis omnia a principio facta,*” that all things were at first made by the gods—and “*a providentia deorum mundum et omnes mundi partes constitutas esse;*” that the world and all its parts were constituted by the providence of the gods.^a

But that the second hypostasis in Plato's trinity, viz. mind or intellect, though said to have been generated, or to have proceeded by way of emanation from the first called Tagathon, the

^a Plat. *Timæ.* p. 529, oper.

Good, was notwithstanding unquestionably acknowledged to have been eternal, or without beginning, might be proved by many express testimonies of the most genuine Platonists: but we shall here content ourselves only with two, one of Plotinus writing thus concerning it, Enn. 5. l. i. c. vi. ἐκποδῶν δὲ ἡμῖν ἔστω γένεσις ἢ ἐν χρόνῳ, τὸν λόγον περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ ὄντων ποιουμένοις, &c. Let all temporal generation here be quite banished from our thoughts, whilst we treat of things eternal, or such as always are, we attributing generation to them only in respect of causality and order, but not of time.—And though Plotinus there speak particularly of the second hypostasis or nous, yet does he afterwards extend the same also to the third hypostasis of that trinity, called Psyche, or the mundane soul; which is there said by him likewise to be the word of the second, as that second was the word of the first; Καὶ τὸ γεννώμενον ἀπὸ κρείττονος Νοῦ, Νοῦν εἶναι, καὶ κρείττων ἀπάντων Νοῦς, ὅτι τ' ἄλλα μετ' αὐτὸν, οἷον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ λόγος νοῦ, καὶ ἐνέργειά τις, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκείνου. That which is generated from what is better than mind, can be no other than mind, because mind is the best of all things, and every thing else is after it, and junior to it, as Psyche or soul, which is in like manner the word of mind, and a certain energy thereof, as mind is the word and energy of the first Good.—The other testimony is of Porphyrius, cited by St. Cyril out of the fourth book of his philosophic history, where he sets down the doctrine of Plato after this manner:

εἰπόντος Πλάτωνος περὶ τοῦ Ἀγαθοῦ οὕτως ἀπὸ
 δὲ τούτου τρόπον τινα ἀνθρώποις ἀνεπινόητον νοῦν

S. Cyril. C.
 Jul. l. i, p.
 32.

γενέσθαι τε ὅλον καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὑφεστῶτα, ἐν ᾧ ἔξ τὰ ὄντως

ὄντα, καὶ ἡ πᾶσα οὐσία τῶν ὄντων· ὁ δὲ καὶ πρῶτος καλὸν καὶ αὐτόκαλον, παρ' ἑαυτοῦ τῆς καλλονῆς ἔχον τὸ εἶδος· προήλθε δὲ προαιώνιος ἀπ' αἰτίου τοῦ θεοῦ ὠρμημένος, αὐτογένητος ὢν καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου κινουμένου πρὸς γένεσιν τὴν τούτου ἢ πρόοδος γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ τούτου παρελθόντος αὐτογόνως ἐκ θεοῦ, παρελθόντος δὲ οὐκ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος χρονικῆς, οὐπω γὰρ χρόνος ἦν· ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ χρόνου γενομένου πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐστὶ τι ὁ χρόνος, ἄχρονος γὰρ αἰὶ καὶ μόνος αἰώνιος ὁ νοῦς· Plato thus declareth concerning the first Good, that from it was generated a certain mind incomprehensible to mortals; in which subsisting by itself, are contained the things that truly are, and the essences of all beings. This is the first fair, and pulchritude itself, which proceeded or sprung out of God from all eternity as its cause, but notwithstanding after a peculiar manner, as self-begotten, and as its own parent. For it was not begotten from that, as any way moved towards its generation; but it proceeded from God as it were self-begottenly. And that not from any temporal beginning, there being as yet no such thing as time: nor when time was afterward made, did it any way affect him; for mind is always timeless, and alone eternal.—Here, besides the eternity of mind or intellect, the second Divine hypostasis in the Platonic trinity, there are other strange and unusual expressions concerning it; for though it be acknowledged to have been generated from the first original Deity, yet it is called αὐτοπάτωρ and αὐτογένητος, its own parent, and its own offspring, and said to have sprung out αὐτογόνως, self-begottenly.

Now because this is so great a riddle or mystery, it is worth the while to consider its true meaning and the ground thereof; which is thus

declared by Porphyrius. Mind, though it sprung from the first Good or supreme Deity from eternity, yet it is said to be self-begotten, because it did not spring from that, as any ways moved towards its generation, but as always standing still or quiescent. Which doctrine was before delivered by Plotinus after this manner :

οὐ En. 5. 1. i. c. κινήεντος φατέον γίγνεσθαι, εἰ γὰρ κινήέντος vi. [p. 487.] αὐτοῦ τι γίγνοιτο, τρίτον ἀπ' ἐκείνου τὸ γινόμενον μετὰ τὴν κίνησιν ἂν γίγνοιτο, καὶ οὐ δεύτερον· δεῖ οὖν ἀκινήτου ὄντος, εἴτι δεύτερον μετ' αὐτό, οὐ προσενέυσαντος, οὐδὲ βουληθέντος, οὐδὲ ὄλως κινήέντος, ὑποστῆναι αὐτό. That, which was immediately generated from the first, did not proceed from it as any ways moved towards its generation, because then it would not have been the second, but the third after that motion. Wherefore, if there be any second after that first Good, it must needs proceed from that first, as remaining immoveable, and not so much as actively consenting thereto, nor willing it, which would be motion.—Now this in Porphyrius's language is paraphrased to be, a being produced from the first Good or original Deity, αὐτογόνως, self-begottenly—or in a way of self-generation. But the plain meaning thereof seems to be no other than this: that though this second Divine hypostasis did indeed proceed from the first God, yet was it not produced thence after a creaturely, or in a creating way, by the arbitrary will and command thereof, or by a particular fiat of the supreme Deity, but by way of natural and necessary emanation. Neither was Porphyrius singular in this language, we finding the very same expression, of αὐτοπάτωρ and αὐτόγονος, self-parent and self-begotten, in Jamblichus's Mysteries ;

where it is likewise by him applied not to the first Principle of all, but to a second Divine hypostasis,^a ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς τούτου, ὁ αὐτάρκης θεὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξέλαμψε, διὸ καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ καὶ αὐτόγονος. From this one, the self-sufficient God made himself to shine forth into light; and therefore is he called Sui-Pater, and Seipso-genitus, his own father, and self-begotten.—But of this God or Divine hypostasis in Jamblichus more afterward. We cannot justify such kind of language as this in the Christian Trinity, because we have no warrant for it from the Scripture; though we are not ignorant that some late divines have ventured to call the Christian Logos after the same manner αὐτόθεον, and *ex seipso Deum*, God from himself.

Dionysius Petavius having rightly declared the doctrine of Arius, after this manner, that the Father was the only eternal God, and that the Son, or Word, was a creature made by him in time, and out of nothing; that is, after he had not been produced into being; subjoins these

words: “In ea vero professione, quod supra memoravi, planissime constat, germanum Platonium Arium exstitisse.” From the profession of this doctrine, it is most undeniably manifest (what was

before affirmed) that Arius was a german or genuine disciple of Plato's.—But from what we have now cited out of Plato himself, and others of his most genuine followers, it is certain, that Petavius (though otherwise learned and industrious) was herein grossly mistaken, and that Arius was no Platonist at all. And, indeed, for either Plato or Plotinus to have denied the eternity of

^a Jamblich. de Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. viii. cap. ii. p. 158.

that second hypostasis of his, called Nous, or Logos, and the son of the first, would have been all one as if they should have denied the eternity of wisdom and understanding itself; because, according to them, this second hypostasis is essentially nothing but *αὐτοσοφία*, original wisdom itself—and, consequently, that very wisdom, by which God himself is wise. Which how far, or in what sense it is true, we do not here dispute. Nevertheless, Athanasius seems to have been fully of the same opinion with them herein, from this passage of his: *Καὶ σοφία καὶ ἀλήθειά ἐστιν* DeSent.Dion. tom. i. p. 567. *ὁ Κύριος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλης σοφίας δεύτερος, ἀλλὰ μόνος οὗτος δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα πεποιήκεν ὁ πατήρ, &c.* Our Lord is both wisdom and truth, neither is he second from any other wisdom; but it is he alone, by whom the Father made all things. And again, *οὔτε γὰρ λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ λόγου πατήρ,* for the Father of the Word is not properly himself the Word. And *οὐκ ἦν Λόγος ὁ τὸν Λόγον προέμενος, ἦν γὰρ ὁ Λόγος πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. Σοφία γεγέννηται ὁ Κύριος· οὐκ ἦν οὖν σοφία ὁ τὴν σοφίαν ἀνείς· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἤμην, φησὶν, ἣ προσέχαιρεν.* That was not Word, which produced the Word, for the Word was with God. The Lord is Wisdom; therefore that was not Wisdom, which produced Wisdom, that speaks thus of herself, “His delight was with me.”—But those latter words he citeth with approbation out of Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria. And the same Athanasius affirmeth Arius, on the contrary, to have maintained, that there was another Word and Wisdom senior to that Word and Wisdom in our Saviour Christ. To conclude, no Platonist in the world ever denied the eternity of that nous, or universal mind, which is the second hypo-

tasis of their trinity; but, on the contrary, as hath been already observed, some of them seemed rather to attribute too much to it, in calling it *αὐτοπάτωρ* and *αὐτόγονος*, its own parent and its own offspring, as that which was self-begotten, though this but in a certain mystical sense; they otherwise not denying it to have proceeded also from the first Good, and to be the offspring

P. 119.
[tom. i.
oper. in
Disput. cum
Ario.]

thereof. Wherefore Plato, who supposed the world not to have been eternal, asserting the eternity of that second hypostasis of his trinity, thereby plainly made it to be no creature, according to Athanasius's own doctrine: *εἰ αἰδίος ἐστὶν ὁ υἱὸς, οὐκ ἦν κτίσμα, εἰ δὲ κτίσμα τυγχάνει, οὐκ ἦν αἰδίος*. If the Son be eternal, he was no creature; and, on the contrary, if he be a creature, he was not eternal.—

Neither is there any force at all in that testimony of Macrobius,^a which Petavius urgeth to the contrary; wherein the first Cause is said *de se mentem creasse*, to have created Mind from itself;—and again this Mind, *animam se creasse*, to have created from itself soul;—because it is certain, that these ancient Pagans did not then so strictly confine that word *creare*, (as we Christians now do) to that narrow sense and notion, of the production of things in time; but used it generally for all manner of production or efficacy. But the chief ground of Petavius's mistake herein, besides his prejudice against Platonism in general, was his not distinguishing betwixt that spurious trinity of some Platonists, wherein the third hypostasis was the whole animated world, (which gave him occasion to write thus: “Tertius

^a In Somn. Scipion. lib. i. cap. xiv. p. 73.

vero Deus manifeste creatus ab iisdem Platonicis putatur, quem et *ποίημα* nominant;”) and that other doctrine of those, who made it not to be the world itself, that is a creature, but the Opificer or creator thereof.

But we grant, that there may be some more reason to make a question, whether Plato himself held the eternity of the mundane soul (commonly said to be the third hypostasis of his trinity) or no; because in his *Timæus*, though he acknowledged it to be senior to the world, yet does he seem to attribute a temporary generation, or nativity to it. Nevertheless, it is no way probable, that Plato's third principle of all things, in his epistle to *Dionysius*, and that *Psyche*, or soul of his, which is the only God, and in his tenth *De Legibus* he goes about to prove against the *Atheists*, should ever not have been; and therefore it is most reasonable to compound this business, thus, by supposing, with *Plotinus* and others, that Plato held a double *Psyche*, or soul, one *ἐγκόσμιον*, or mundane—which is, as it were, the concrete form of this corporeal world; whereby this world is properly made an animal, and a second, or created god; another *ὑπερκόσμιον*, supramundane, or separate; and which is not so much the form, as the artificer of the world. The first of which two *Plotinus*, calling it the heavenly *Venus*, thus describeth: τὴν δὲ En. 3. 1. v. c. ii. [p. 293.] οὐρανίαν λεγομένην, ἐκ Κρόνου νοῦ ὄντος ἐκείνου, ἀνάγκη ψυχὴν θειοτάτην εἶναι, εὐθὺς ἔξ αὐτοῦ ἀκήρατον ἀκηράτου, μέινασαν ἄνω ὡς μὴ δὲ εἰς τὰ τῆδε ἐλθεῖν, μήτε ἐδελήσασαν, μήτε δυναμένην, ὅτι ἦν φύσεως μὴ κατὰ τὰ κάτω φύσαν βαίνειν. Χωριστὴν οὖσαν τινὰ ὑπόστασιν, καὶ ἀμέτοχον ὕλης οὐσίαν· ὅθεν αὐτὴν τοῦτω ἠνίττοντο, τῷ ἀμήτορα εἶναι, ἦν δὲ

καὶ θεὸν ἂν τις δικαίως, οὐ δαίμονα εἴποι, ἄμικτον οὔσαν, καὶ καθαρὰν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, &c. ὅθεν οὐδ' ἂν ἐκπέσοι, νοῦ ἐξηρητημένη πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἢ ἥλιος ἂν ἔχοι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὅσον αὐτὸν περιλάμπει φῶς, εἰς αὐτὸν συνηρητημένον· ἐφεπομένη δὲ τῷ Κρόνῳ, ἢ εἰ βούλει τῷ πατρὶ τοῦ Κρόνου Οὐρανῷ, ἐνήργησέ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ὑκείωθη, καὶ ἐρασθεῖσα ἔρωτα ἐγέννησε. This heavenly Venus, which they affirm to have been begotten from Saturn, that is, from a perfect mind or intellect, must needs be that most divine soul (the third archical hypostasis) which being immediately begotten, pure from that which is pure, always remains above, so that it neither can, nor will, ever descend down to these lower things, so as to be immersed in them; it being of such a nature, as is not inclinable to sink, or lapse downward. A certain separate substance, which doth not at all partake of matter, as the fable intimated, when it called it motherless; and therefore may it well be styled by us, not a demon, but a god. Whence it comes to pass, that this soul can never fall, it being much more closely united and connected with that immoveable Mind or Intellect, than that light, which is circumfused about the sun, is connected with the sun. This Venus therefore following Chronus, or rather the father of Chronus, Uranus, acting towards it, and being enamoured with it, begat love, *Χωριστὴν δὲ ἐκείνην τὴν ψυχὴν λέγοντες, τὴν πρῶτως ἐλλάμπουσαν τῷ οὐρανῷ, χωριστὸν καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦτον θεσόμεθα.* Moreover, as we call this soul itself separate, so is this love of it, or begotten by it, a separate love.—After which, he speaks of another soul of the world, which is not separate from it, but closely conjoined therewith, he calling it a lower Venus and Love; namely, that

other Venus, which in the fable is said to have been begotten from Jupiter himself (the superior soul of the world) and Dione, a watery nymph. We conclude, therefore, that though this lower mundane soul, might, according to Plato, have a temporary production together with the world, or before it; yet that other superior and most divine soul, which Plotinus calls the heavenly Venus and Love, the son of Chronus without a mother, and which was truly the third hypostasis of Plato's trinity, was eternal, and without beginning. And thus, according to the forementioned principle of Athanasius, none of these three hypostases of Plato's trinity were creatures, but all of them divine and uncreated.

Which, to make yet more evident, we shall further observe, first, that Plato himself, in that second epistle of his to Dionysius, after he had mentioned his first, second, and third; that is his trinity of Divine hypostases, immediately subjoins these words: *Ἡ οὖν ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ὀρέγεται μαθεῖν ποῦ ἅττα ἐστὶ, βλέπουσα εἰς τὰ αὐτῆς συγγενῆ, ὧν οὐδὲν ἰκανῶς ἔχει· τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως περὶ καὶ ὧν εἶπον, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτο.* The mind of man (as parturient) has always a great desire to know what these things are, and to that end does it look upon things cognate to it, which are all insufficient, imperfect and heterogeneous. But in that King of all things, and in the other, second and third, which I spake of, there is nothing of this kind; that is, nothing like to these created things.

Secondly, The three hypostases of Plato's trinity are not only all eternal, but also necessarily existent, and absolutely undestroyable. For the first of them can no more exist without the second, nor

the first and second without the third, than original light can exist without its splendour, coruscation, or effulgency. And Plotinus, writing against some Gnostics in his time, who would make more of these Divine hypostases, or principles, than three, concludes, that there can be neither more of them, nor fewer, in this manner; οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ ἐφ' En. 2. l. ix. c. ἐτέρας ἀρχὰς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο προσθησαμένους, εἶτα i. [p. 199.] νοῦν μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ νοοῦν πρῶτως, εἶτα ψυχὴν μετὰ νοῦν· αὕτη γὰρ τάξις κατὰ φύσιν, μήτε πλείω τίθεσθαι ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, μήτε ἐλάττω· εἶτε γὰρ ἐλάττω, ἢ ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν ταυτὸ φήσουσιν, ἢ νοῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐδείχθη πολλαχῆ. λοιπὸν δὲ ἐπισκέψασθαι ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εἰ πλείω τούτων, &c. Wherefore we ought not to entertain any other principles; but having placed first the simple good, to set Mind, or the supreme Intellect next after it, and then the universal Soul in the third place. For this is the right order, according to nature, neither to make more intelligibles, (or universal principles) nor yet fewer than these three. For he, that will contract the number, and make fewer of them, must of necessity either suppose Soul and Mind to be the same, or else Mind and the first Good. But that all these three are diverse from one another, hath been often demonstrated by us. It remains now to consider, that if there be more than these three principles, what natures they should be, &c.—

Thirdly, As all these three Platonic hypostases are eternal and necessarily existent, so are they plainly supposed by them, not to be particular, but universal beings; that is, such as do περιέχειν τὸ ὅλον, contain and comprehend the whole world under them—and preside over all things; which is all one as to say, that they are each of them in-

finite and omnipotent. For which reason are they also called, by Platonic writers, ἀρχαὶ and αἴτια, and δημιουργοὶ, principles, and causes, and officers of the whole world. First, as for Νοῦς, Mind, or understanding; whereas the old philosophers before Plato, as Anaxagoras, Archelaus, &c. and Aristotle after him, supposed Mind and Understanding to be the very first and highest principle of all; which also the magic or Chaldee oracles take notice of, as the most common opinion of mankind.

**Ὁν πρῶτον κληίζεται ἔθνη ἀνθρώπων,*

That Mind is generally by all men looked upon, as the first and highest God—Plato considering, that unity was, in order of nature, before number and multiplicity; and that there must be Νοητὸν before Νοῦς, an Intelligible before Intellect—so that knowledge could not be the first; and, lastly, that there is a good transcending that of knowledge; made one most simple Good, the fountain and original of all things, and the first Divine hypostasis; and mind or intellect only the second next to it, but inseparable from it, and most nearly cognate with it. For which cause, in his Philebus,^a though he agrees thus far with those other ancient philosophers, ὡς ἀεὶ τοῦ παντός Νοῦς ἄρχει, that Mind always rules over the whole universe—yet does he add afterward, ὅτι Νοῦς ἐστὶ γενοῦστος τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου, that Mind is (not absolutely the first principle, but) cognate with the cause of all things; and that therefore it rules over all things, with, and in a kind of subordination to that first principle, which is Tagathon,

P. 30.

^a Oper. p. 80. edit. Ficini.

or the highest Good: where, when Plato affirms, that Mind, or his second Divine hypostasis, is *γενοῦστος* with the first, it is all one as if he should have said, that it is *συγγενής*, and *ὁμοειδής*, and *ὁμογενής*, with it; all which words are used by Athanasius, as synonymous with *ὁμοούσιος*, coessential, or consubstantial. So that Plato here plainly and expressly agrees, or symbolizes, not with the doctrine of Arius, but with that of the Nicene council, and Athanasius; that the second hypostasis of the Trinity, whether called Mind, or Word, or Son, is not *ἑτερούσιος*, but *γενοῦστος* or *ὁμοούσιος*, coessential or consubstantial with the first; and therefore not a creature.

And then, as for the third hypostasis, called Psyche, or the superior mundane soul, Plato in his Cratylus, bestowing the name of Zeus, that is, of the supreme God upon it, and etymologizing the same from *ζῆν*, adds these words concerning it; *οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αἴτιος μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν, ἢ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων*. There is nothing, which is more the cause of life to us and other animals, than this prince and king of all things; and that therefore God was called by the Greeks Zeus, because it is by him that all animals live.—And yet that all this was properly meant by him of the third hypostasis of his trinity, called Psyche, is manifest from those words of his that follow; where he expounds the poetic mythology beforementioned, making Zeus to be the son of Chronos; *εὐλογον δὲ, μεγάλης τινὸς διανοίας ἕκγονον εἶναι τὸν Δία*, it is agreeable to reason, that Zeus should be the progeny or offspring of a certain great mind.—Now *ἕκγονος* and *γενοῦστος* are equivalent terms also; and therefore Plato here

makes the third hypostasis of his trinity likewise to be *ὁμοούσιος*, coessential with the second; as he elsewhere made the second coessential with the first.

It is true, that by the *δημιουργός*, or opificer in Plato, is commonly meant nous or intellect, his second hypostasis; (Plotinus affirming as much, *δημιουργός ὁ νοῦς Πλάτωνι*, The demiurgus to Plato is intellect.) Nevertheless, both Amelius, and Plotinus, and other Platonists, called his third hypostasis also *δημιουργόν*, the artificer or opificer of the whole world; some of them making him to be the second from Mind or Intellect; others the third from the first Good, the supreme cause of all things; who was by Atticus and Amelius styled *Demiurgus* also. Wherefore, as was before suggested, according to the genuine and ancient Platonic doctrine, all these three hypostases were the joint-creators of the whole world, and of all things besides themselves; as Ficinus more than once declares the tenor thereof, "Hi Tres uno quodam consensu omnia producunt," These three with one common consent produce all things—and before him Proclus,^a *πάντα ἀνήρτηται τοῦ ἐνός διὰ νοῦ μέν καὶ ψυχῆς*, all things depend upon the first One, by Mind and Soul—and accordingly we shall conclude in the words of Porphyrius, that the true and real Deity, according to Plato, extends to three Divine hypostases, the last whereof is Psyche or Soul.

From all which it appears, that Arius did not so much Platonize, as the Nicene fathers and Athanasius; who, notwithstanding, made not

^a Comment, in *Timæum* Platon. lib. i. p. 66.

Plato, but the Scripture, together with reason deducing natural consequences therefrom, their foundation. And that the Platonic trinity was a certain middle thing also betwixt the doctrine of Sabellius and that of Arius, it being neither a trinity of words only, or logical notions, or mere modes, but a trinity of hypostases; nor yet a jumbled confusion of God and creature (things heterousious) together; neither the second nor third of them being creatures, or made in time, but all eternal, infinite, and creators.

But that it may yet more fully appear, how far the most refined Platonic and Parmenidian, or Pythagoric trinity, doth either agree or disagree with the Scripture doctrine, and that of the Christian church in several ages; we shall here further observe two things concerning it. The first whereof is this, that though the genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans supposed none of their three archical hypostases to be indeed creatures, but all of them eternal, necessarily existent and universal or infinite, and consequently creators of the whole world; yet did they nevertheless assert an essential dependence of the second hypostasis upon the first, as also of the third both upon the first and second; together with a gradual subordination in them. Thus Plotinus, writing of the generation of the eternal Intellect, which is the second in the Platonic trinity, and answers to the

Enn. v. l. i. Son or Word in the Christian: Τὸ δὲ αἰ
c. vi. [p. 487.] τέλειον, αἰεὶ καὶ ἀίδιον γεννᾷ, καὶ ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ δὲ
ἑαυτοῦ γεννᾷ. Τί οὖν χρῆ περι τοῦ τελειοτάτου λέγειν; μηδὲν
ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γεννᾶν, ἢ τὰ μέγιστα μετ' αὐτόν. Μέγιστον δὲ μετ'
αὐτόν Νοῦς καὶ Δεύτερον. Καὶ γὰρ ὁρᾷ ὁ Νοῦς ἐκείνον, καὶ
δεῖται αὐτοῦ μόνου· ἐκείνος δὲ τούτου οὐδέν. Καὶ τὸ γεννώμε-

νον ἀπὸ κρείττονος νοῦ, νοῦν εἶναι· Καὶ κρείττων ἀπάντων ὁ Νοῦς, ὅτι τ' ἄλλα μετ' αὐτόν. Οἶον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ λόγος νοῦ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργειά τις. That which is always perfect, generates what is eternal, and that which it generates, is always less than itself. What shall we therefore say of the most absolutely perfect Being of all? Does that produce nothing from itself? or rather does it not produce the greatest of all things after it? Now the greatest of all things after the most absolutely perfect Being, is mind or intellect; and this is second to it. For mind beholdeth this as its father, and standeth in need of nothing else besides it: whereas that first Principle standeth in need of no mind or intellect. What is generated from that, which is better than mind, must needs be mind or intellect; because mind is better than all other things, they being all in order of nature after it and junior to it; as Psyche itself, or the first Soul; for this is also the word or energy of mind, as that is the word and energy of the first Good.—Again, the same is more particularly declared by him, concerning the third hypostasis called Psyche, that as it essentially dependeth upon the second, so is it gradually subordinate, or some way inferior to it. *Ψυχὴν γὰρ γεννᾷ Νοῦς, νοῦς ὦν τέλειος. Καὶ γὰρ τέλειον ὄντα, γεννᾷν ἔδει, καὶ μὴ δύναμιν οὔσαν τοσαύτην ἄγονον εἶναι. Κρείττων δὲ οὐχ οἶόντε ἦν εἶναι, οἷδ' ἐνταῦθα τὸ γεννώμενον, ἀλλ' ἘΛΑΤΤΟΝ ὄν, εἶδολον εἶναι αὐτοῦ.* Perfect Intellect generates soul; and it being perfect, must needs generate, for so great a power could not remain sterile. But that, which is here begotten also, cannot be greater than its begetter; but must needs be inferior to it, as being the image thereof.—Elsewhere the same philosopher, calling

P. 489.

P. 554.
[Ennead. v.
lib. viii.
cap. xiii.]

the first hypostasis of this trinity Uranus, the second Chronos, and the third Zeus (as Plato had done before) and handsomely allegorizing that fable, concludes in this manner concerning Chronos, or the second of these; *μεταξὺ ὧν πατρός τε ἀμείνωνος, καὶ ἡττονος υἱέως*, That he is in a middle state or degree betwixt his father, who is greater, and his son, who is less and inferior.—Again, the same thing is by that philo-

P. 513.
[Ennead. v.
lib. iii. cap.
xvi.]

sopher thus asserted in general, *ἐν τοῖς γεννωμένοις, οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ κάτω χωρεῖν*. In the things generated from eternity, or produced by way of natural emanation, there is no progress upwards, but all downwards, and still a gradual descent into greater multiplicity.—We shall cite but only one passage more out of this philosopher, which containeth something of argumentation in it also: *οὐ ταῦτὸν τὸ*

En. v. l. iii. c.
xv. [p. 512.]

ἐξ ἐκείνου ἐκείνω, εἰ οὖν μὴ ταῦτὸν, οὐδέγε βέλτιον. That which is generated, or emanateth, immediately from the first and highest Being, is not the very same thing with it, as if it were nothing but that repeated again and ingeminated; and as it is not the same, so neither can it be better than it.—From whence it follows, that it must needs be gradually subordinate and inferior to it.

Which gradual subordination and essential dependence of the second and third hypostasis upon the first is by these Platonics illustrated several ways. Ficinus resembles it to the circulations of water, when some heavy body falling into it, its superficies is depressed, and from thence every way circularly wrinkled. “*Alius (saith he) sic ferme profluit ex alio, sicut in aqua circulus dependet a circulo;*” one of these Divine hypostases

doth in a manner so depend upon another, as one circulation of water depends upon another.—Where it is observable also, that the wider the circulating wave grows, still hath it the more subsidence and detumescence, together with an abatement of celerity, till at last all becomes plain and smooth again. But, by the Pagan Platonists themselves, each following hypostasis is many times said to be ἵχνος καὶ τόπος, a print, stamp or impression, made by the former, like the signature of a seal upon wax. Again, it is often called by them εἰκὼν, and εἶδωλον, and μίμημα, an image, and representation, and imitation; which if considered in *audibles*, then will the second hypostasis be looked upon as the echo of an original voice; and the third as the repeated echo, or echo of that echo: as if both the second and third hypostases were but certain replications of the first original Deity with abatement; which though not accidental or evanid ones, but substantial, yet have a like dependence one upon another, and a gradual subordination. Or if it be considered in *visibles*, then will the second hypostasis be resembled to the image of a face in a glass, and the third to the image of that image reflected in another glass, which depend upon the original face, and have a gradual abatement of the vigour thereof. Or else the second and third may be conceived as two parhelii, or as a second and third sun. For thus does^a Plotinus call the universal Psyche, or third hypostasis, εἰκόνα νοῦ σώζουσάν τι φῶς ἐκείνου, the image of mind (which is the second) retaining much of the splendour thereof.—Which similitude of theirs, notwithstanding, they would

^a Ennead. v. lib. i. cap. vi. p. 487.

not have to be squeezed or pressed hard ; because they acknowledge, that there is something of dissimilitude in them also, which then would be forced out of them. Their meaning amounts to no more than this, that as an image in a glass is said *ἑτέρου εἶναι*, essentially to belong to something else, and to depend upon it ; so each following hypostasis doth essentially depend upon the former or first, and hath a subordination to it. But we meet with no expression in any of these Pagan Platonists so unhandsome and offensive, as that of Philo's, in his second book of allegories,^a *σκία δὲ θεοῦ ὁ Λόγος αὐτοῦ ἐστίν, ᾧ καθάπερ ὄργάνῳ προσχρησάμενος ἑκοσμοποιεῖ*, The word is the shadow of God, which he made use of, as an instrument, in the making of the world.—Notwithstanding which, the same writer doth call him elsewhere, more honourably, a second god, and the son of the first God. As in the same place he doth also declare, that this shadow and image of God is itself the archetype of other things, *αὕτη δὲ ἡ σκία, καὶ ὡσανεὶ ἀπεικόνισμα, ἑτέρων ἐστὶν ἀρχέτυπον, ὡσπερ ὁ θεὸς παράδειγμα τῆς εἰκόνας, ἢ σκίαν νυνὶ κέκληκα, οὕτως ἡ εἰκὼν ἄλλο γίνεταί παράδειγμα*. This shadow, and as it were image (of the first God) is itself the archetype and pattern of other things below it. As God is the pattern of this image, (which we call his shadow ;) so is this image itself another pattern or paradigm also.—But this dependance and subordination of the Divine hypostasis is most frequently illustrated in Platonic writings, by the *ἑκλαμψις* or *ἀπαύγασμα*, the effulgency or out-shining of light and splendour from the sun, and other luminous bodies ; the nous, or second hypostasis

^a P. 79. Oper.

being resembled to that rarious effulgency, which immediately encompassing them, is beheld together with them, and, as the astronomers tell us, augments their apparent diameter, and makes it bigger than the true, when they are beheld through telescopes, cutting off those luxuriant and circumambient rays. And the third hypostasis is resembled to the remoter and more distant splendour, which circling still gradually decreaseth. Thus Plotinus, πῶς οὖν καὶ τί

δεῖ νοῆσαι περὶ ἐκεῖνο μένον, περιλαμψιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ
 μὲν, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ μένοντος, οἷον ἡλίου τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ
 λαμπρὸν, ὡσπερ περιθρόνον, ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ γεννώμενον μένοντος.

P. 487. [En-
nead. v. lib.
i. cap. vi.]

How should we consider this second hypostasis, otherwise than as the circumfused splendour, which encompasseth the body of the sun; and from that always remaining is perpetually generated anew.

But this essential dependence, and gradual subordination of hypostasis, in the Platonic trinity, will yet more fully appear from those particular distinctive characters, which are given to each of them. For the first of these is often said to be

Ἐν πρὸ πάντων, one before all things—a simple unity, which virtually containeth all things. And

as Plotinus writes, οὕτως εἶχε πάντα ὡς μὴ
 διακεκριμένα, τὰ δὲ ἐν δευτέρῳ διεκέκριτο τῷ λόγῳ

P. 513. [En-
nead. v. lib.
iii. cap. xv.]

This so containeth all things, as not being yet secrete and distinct; whereas in the second they are discerned and distinguished by reason—that is, they are actually distinguished in their ideas; whereas the first is the simple and fecund power of all things. Wherefore the second was called by Parmenides Ἐν πάντα, one actually all things—that is, in their distinct ideas. And the

third, according to the same philosopher, as Plotinus^a tells us, was Ἐν καὶ πάντα, one and all things;—as having still more multiplicity and alterity in it. One effectively all things. That which doth actively display, and produce into being, what was virtually or potentially contained in the first; and ideally or exemplarily in the second. Accordingly, the first of these is sometimes said to be Πάντα ἐνικῶς, all things unitively;—the second Πάντα νοερώς, all things intellectually;—and the third, Πάντα ψυχικῶς, all things animally;—that is, self-moveably, actively and productively. Again, the first of these is commonly styled Τ'ἀγαθόν, the Good, or Goodness itself, above mind and understanding—and also ὑπερούσιον, above essence—in-
effable and incomprehensible. And sometimes also φῶς ἀπλουν, a simple light—the second Νοῦς, Λόγος, Σοφία, Unity and Goodness—only by participation, or Ἀγαθοειδής, Boniform—but essentially and formally; mind, or understanding, reason and wisdom, all-comprehending, or infinite knowledge. The third, Ψυχὴ, self-moveable soul—goodness and wisdom by participation, but essentially and formally, infinite self-activity, or effectiveness; infinite, active, perceptive, and animadversive power. Sometimes it is styled also Ἀφροδίτη and Ἔρως, Venus and Love; but differently from that of the First Good, which is Love too; but a love of redundancy, or overflowing fulness and fecundity:

Plot. 494. [Ennead. v. lib. ii. cap. i.] ὄν γὰρ τέλειον, τῷ μηδὲν ζητεῖν, μὴ δὲ ἔχειν, μὴ δὲ δεῖσθαι, οἷον ὑπερερῶν, καὶ τὸ ὑπερπλήρες

αὐτοῦ πεποίηκε πάντα, That which being absolutely perfect, and seeking, or wanting nothing, as it were, overflowed; and by its exuberant re-

^a Ennead. v. lib. i. cap. viii. p. 490. oper.

dundancy produced all things.—Whereas this latter is a love of infinite activity. Of the first, it is said, by Plotinus, that it is *ἀνεύργητος*, above all manner of action—for which cause, the making of the world is not properly ascribed to him, though he be the original fountain of all: according to that of Numenius, *Καὶ γὰρ οὔτε δημιουργεῖν ἐστὶ χρεὼν τὸν πρῶτον, καὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦντος Θεοῦ (τοῦ υἱοῦ) χρὴ εἶναι, καὶ νομίζεσθαι πατέρα τὸν πρῶτον θεόν*. Neither is it fit to attribute the architecture of the world to the first God, but rather to account him the father of that god, who is the artificer.—Who again speaks further to the same purpose thus: *τὸν μὲν πρῶτον Θεὸν ἀργὸν εἶναι ἔργων ζυμπάντων καὶ βασιλέα*. It is to be acknowledged, that the first God is void of all manner of work or action, he being the King of all things.—Of the second, to whom the energy of intellection is attributed, it is said, notwithstanding, that his *οὐσία* in his *ἐνέργεια*, his essence, his operation; and that he is *ἀκίνητος οὐσία*, though a multiform, yet an immoveable nature. He therefore is properly called the demiurgus, as the contriving architect, or artificer, in whom the archetypal world is contained, and the first paradigm, or pattern of the whole universe. But the third is a kind of moveable deity, *τὸ περὶ νοῦν κινούμενον* (as Plotinus speaks) *καὶ νοῦ φῶς, καὶ ἴχνος ἐξηρητημένον ἐκείνου*. That, which moveth about mind, or intellect, the light or effulgency thereof, and its print or signature, which always dependeth upon it, and acteth according to it.—This is that, which reduces both the fecundity of the first simple good, and also the immoveable wisdom and architectonic contrivance of the second into act or energy. This is the

Eus. Pr. Ev.
l. xi. c. xviii.
[p. 537.]

immediate, and, as it were, manuary opificer of the whole world, and τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν τοῦ παντός, that which actually governs, rules, and presideth over all.—Amelius, in that passage of his before cited out of Proclus, calling these three Divine hypostases three minds, and three kings, styles the first of them Τὸν ὄντα, Him that is—the second Τὸν ἔχοντα, Him that hath—and the third Τὸν ὁρῶντα, Him that beholds.—In which expressions, though peculiar to himself, he denotes an essential dependance, and gradual subordination in them.

Now that which is most liable to exception, in this Platonic scale or gradation of the Deity, seems to be the difference betwixt the first and the second. For whereas the essential character of the second is made to be understanding, reason, and wisdom, it seems to follow from hence, that either the first and the second are really nothing else but two different names, or inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing; or else, if they be distinct hypostases, or persons, that the first of them must needs be ἄνους and ἄλογος, devoid of mind, reason, and wisdom—which would be very absurd. To which all the reply we can make, is as follows: First, that this is indeed one peculiar arcanum of the Platonic and Pythagoric theology, (which yet seems to have been first derived from Orpheus and the Egyptians, or rather from the Hebrews themselves) that whereas the Pagan theologers generally concluded, νοῦν πάντων προγενέστατον, that Mind and Understanding, properly so called, was the oldest of all things—the highest principle and first original of the world; those others placed something above it, and consequently made it to be not the first, but

the second; which they did chiefly upon these three following grounds. First, because understanding, reason, knowledge, and wisdom, cannot be conceived, by us mortals, otherwise than so as to contain something of multiplicity in them; whereas it seems most reasonable to make the first principle of all, not to be number or multitude, but a perfect monad, or unity. Thus Plo-

tinus, ἀόριστον μὲν νόησις ὡςπερ ὄψις, ὀρίζομένη
 δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ· διὸ καὶ εἴρηται ἐκ τῆς ἀορίστου·
 δνάδος καὶ τοῦ ἐνός τὰ εἶδη καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί· τοῦτο

P. 518.

[Ennead. v.
lib. iv. c. ii.]

γὰρ ὁ νοῦς. διὸ οὐχ ἀπλοῦς, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ, &c. Intellection, as well as vision, is in its own nature an indefinite thing, and is determined by the intelligible: therefore it is said, that ideas, as numbers, are begotten from infinite duality and unity; and such is intellect, which consequently is not simple, but many, it contemplating many ideas; and being compounded of two, that which is understood, and that which understands.—And again else-

where, τὸ πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου νοητοῦ, οὔτε νοῦς οὔτε
 κόσμος νοητός, ἀπλοῦστερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ πολλοῦ
 πολὺ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολὺ τοῦτο ἐξ οὐ πολλοῦ, &c.

P. 514.

[Ennead. v.
lib. iii. c. xvi.]

The principle of every thing is more simple than the thing itself. Wherefore the sensible world was made from Intellect, or the Intelligible; and before this, must there needs be something more simple still. For many did not proceed from many; but this multiform thing, Intellect, proceeded from that, which is not multiform, but simple, as number from unity.—To this purpose does

he also argue in these words: εἰ τὸ νοοῦν τι
 πλήθος, δεῖ ἐν τῷ μὴ πλήθει τὸ νοεῖν μὴ εἶναι· ἦν
 δὲ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον· ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις ἄρα αὐτοῦ τὸ

P. 535.

[Ennead. v.
lib. vi. c. iii.]

νοεῖν, καὶ νοῦς ἔσται· If that which understands be

many, or contain multitude in it, then that which contains no multitude, does not properly understand; and this is the first thing: but intellection and knowledge properly so called are to be placed among things, which follow after it, and are second.—And he often concludes, ἐν τῇ δευτέρῃ φύσει εἶναι τὸ γινώσκειν. That knowledge (properly so called, by reason of its multiplicity) belongs to the second rank of being, and not the first.—Another ground or reason is, because, in order of nature, there must be Νοητὸν before Νοῦς, something Intelligible before Intellect; and from hence does

P. 536. Plotinus conclude, τὸ νοεῖν οὐ πρῶτον, οὔτε τῷ εἶναι, οὔτε τῷ τίμιον εἶναι· ἀλλὰ δεύτερον, καὶ γινόμενον, ἐπειδὴ ὑπέστη τὸ ἀγαθόν. καὶ γινόμενον ἐκίνησε πρὸς αὐτὸ, &c. That to understand is not the first, neither in essence, nor in dignity, but the second; a thing in order of nature, after the first Good, and springing up from thence, as that which is moved with desire towards it.—Their third and last ground or reason is, because intellection and knowledge are not the highest Good, that therefore there is some substantial thing, in order of nature superior to intellect. Which consideration Plato much insisteth upon, in his sixth book De Republica. Now upon these several accounts do

Plot. p. 512. the Platonists confidently conclude, ὅτι [Ennead. v. lib. iii. c. xiv. Θεὸς κρείττων Λόγου καὶ νοῦ καὶ αἰσθήσεως, παρασχὼν ταῦτα οὐκ αὐτὸς ὦν ταῦτα· that the supreme Deity is more excellent and better than the Λόγος (Reason, or the Word) Intellect and Sense, he affording these things, but not being these him-

P. 514. [cap. xvi.] self.—And τὸ γινόμενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ λόγος πολὺς καὶ πᾶς· τὸ δὲ ἦν δηλονότι οὐ Λόγος· πῶς οὖν ἐξ οὐκ λόγου Λόγος· καὶ πῶς τὸ ἀγαθοειδὲς ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ· that,

which was generated from the first principle, was Logos (Word or Reason) manifold; but the first principle itself was not Word: if you demand, therefore, how Word, or Reason, should proceed from that which is not Word or Reason? we answer, as that, which is boniform, from goodness itself.—With which Platonic and Pythagoric doctrine exactly agreeth Philo the Jew also,^a ὁ πρὸ τοῦ Λόγου, Θεὸς κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ πᾶσα λογικὴ φύσις, τῷ δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν πάντων ἐν τῇ βελτίστῃ καὶ τινὶ ἐξαιρέτῳ καθεστῶτι ἰδέα, οὐδὲν θέμις ἦν γένητον ἕξομιωθῆναι: that God, which is before the Word or Reason, is better and more excellent than all the rational nature; neither is it fit, that any thing, which is generated, should be perfectly like to that, which is originally from itself and above all.—And, indeed, we should not have so much insisted upon this, had it not been by reason of a devout veneration, that we have for all the Scripture-mysteries; which Scripture seems to give no small countenance to this doctrine, when it makes in like manner an eternal Word and Wisdom to be the second hypostasis of the Divine Triad, and the first-begotten Son, or offspring of God the Father. And Athanasius, as was before observed, very much complieth here also with the Platonic notion, when he denies, that there was any λόγος or σοφία, any Reason or Wisdom—before that Word and Son of God, which is the second hypostasis of the holy Trinity. What then? shall we say, that the first hypostasis or person in the Platonic trinity (if not the Christian also) is ἄνοος and ἄλογος, senseless and irrational—and altogether devoid of mind and understanding? Or would not this be to

^a Apud Euseb. Præpar. Evang. lib. vii. cap. xiii. p. 323.

introduce a certain kind of mysterious Atheism ; and, under pretence of magnifying and advancing the supreme Deity, monstrously to degrade the same? For why might not senseless matter as well be supposed to be the first original of all things, as a senseless, incorporeal being? Plotinus, therefore, who rigidly and superstitiously adheres to Plato's text here, which makes the first and highest principle of all to be such a being, as, by reason of its absolute and transcendent perfection, is not only above understanding, knowledge, and reason, but also above essence itself (which therefore he can find no other names for, but only Unity and Goodness substantial); and, consequently, knowledge and wisdom to be but a second, or postnate thing, though eternal; but, notwithstanding, does seem to labour under this metaphysical profundity; he sometimes endeavours to solve the difficulty thereof after this manner, by distinguishing of a double light; the one simple and uniform, the other multiform, or manifold; and attributing the former of these to the supreme Deity only, (whose simple original light he resembles to the luminous body of the sun itself;) the latter of them to the second hypostasis, as being the *ἐκλαμψις* or *ἀπαύγασμα*, the circumambient fulgor, or outshining splendour of that sun. Thus Enn. v. l. vi. c. 4. ^a τὸ παρέχον τοῦτο τὸ φῶς, φῶς ἐστὶν ἀπλοῦν, that from which this multiform light of *Νοῦς*, or Intellect (the second hypostasis,) is derived, is *φῶς ἀπλοῦν*, another most simple light.—As he elsewhere accordingly writeth of the first Principle, or supreme Deity, that it is *ἐν νοήσει ἐτέρωσ ἢ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν*, in knowledge or under-

^a P. 536.

standing, but of a different kind from that understanding of the second hypostasis, called Intellect. — Sometimes again, this philosopher subtilly distinguisheth betwixt νόσις αὐτή, intelligence itself, and τὸ νοοῦν, or τὸ ἔχον τὴν νόησιν, that which doth understand, or which hath intelligence in it; making the first principle to be the former of these two, and the second hypostasis of their trinity to be the latter: οὐδ' ἡ νόσις νοεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον τὴν νόησιν, δύο οὖν πάλιν αὖ ἐν τῷ νοοῦντι γίνεται· τοῦτο δὲ οὐδαμῆ δύο. Intelligence itself doth not understand, but that which hath intelligence: for in that, which doth understand, there is a kind of duplicity. But the first principle of all hath no duplicity in it.—Now that duplicity, which he fancies to be in that, which hath intelligence, is either the duplicity of him, that hath this intelligence, and of the intelligence itself, as being not the same; or else of him, and the τὸ νοητὸν, the intelligible, or object of his intellection—intellect supposing an intelligible in order of nature before it. And from this subtilly would he infer, that there is a certain kind of imperfection and indigence in that which doth understand, or hath intelligence, ἐνδεές τὸ νοοῦν, ὡσπερ τὸ ὁρῶν, That which understandeth is indigent as that which seeth.—But perhaps this difficulty might be more easily solved, and that according to the tenor of the Platonic hypothesis too, by supposing the abatement of their second hypostasis to consist only in this, that it is not essentially τ' ἀγαθόν, goodness itself, but only ἀγαθοειδής, boniform, or good by participation—it being essentially no higher than Νοῦς, Λόγος and Σοφία, Mind, Reason, and Wisdom—for which cause it is called by those names. as

the proper characteristic thereof. Not as if the first were devoid of wisdom, under pretence of being above it; but because this second is not essentially any thing higher. As, in like manner, the third hypostasis is not essentially wisdom itself, standing or quiescent, and without motion or action; but wisdom as in motion, or wisdom moving and acting.

The chief ground of this Platonic doctrine of an essential dependance, and therefore gradual subordination, in their trinity of Divine hypostases, is from that fundamental principle of their theology, that there is but one Original of all things, and *μία πηγή τῆς θεότητος*, only one Fountain of the Godhead; from whence all other things whatsoever, whether temporal or eternal, created or uncreated, were altogether derived. And therefore this second hypostasis of their trinity, since it must accordingly derive its whole being from the first, as the *ἀπαύγασμα* from the *φῶς*, the splendour from the original light—must of necessity have also an essential dependance upon the same; and, consequently, a gradual subordination to it.

For though they commonly affirm their second hypostasis to have been begotten from their first, and their third from their second; yet do they by no means understand thereby any such generation as that of men; where the father, son, and grandson, when *adulti* at least, have no essential dependance one upon another, nor gradual subordination in their nature, but are all perfectly coequal, and alike absolute. Because this is but an imperfect generation, where that, which is begotten, doth not receive its whole being originally from

that which did beget, but from God and nature ; the begetter being but either a channel or an instrument, and having been himself before begotten or produced by some other. Whereas the first Divine hypostasis is altogether unbegotten from any other, he being the sole principle and original of all things, and therefore must the second needs derive its whole essence from him, and be generated after another manner, namely, in a way of natural emanation, as light is from the sun ; and, consequently, though coeternal, have an essential dependance on him, and gradual subordination to him.

Moreover, the Platonists would recommend this their gradation in the Deity, or trinity of hypostases subordinate, from hence ; because by this means there will not be so vast a chasm and hiatus betwixt God and the highest creatures, or so great a leap and jump in the creation, as otherwise there must needs be : nor will the whole Deity be screwed up to such a disproportionate height and elevation, as would render it altogether incapable of having any intercourse or commerce with the lower world ; it being, according to this hypothesis of theirs, brought down by certain steps and degrees nearer and nearer to us. For if the whole Deity were nothing but one simple monad, devoid of all manner of multiplicity, as God is frequently represented to be, then could it not well be conceived by us mortals, how it should contain the distinct ideas of all things within itself, and that multiform platform and paradigm of the created universe, commonly called the archetypal world. Again, were the Deity only an immoveable mind ; as Aristotle's god is

ἀκίνητος οὐσία, an absolutely immoveable substance—whose essence and operation are one and the same; and, as other theologers affirm, that whatsoever is in God, is God; it would be likewise utterly inconceivable, not only, how there should be any liberty of will at all in God (whereas the same theologers, contradicting themselves, zealously contend notwithstanding, that all the actions of the Deity are not necessary, and but few of them such), but also, how the Deity should have any commerce or intercourse with the lower world; how it should quicken and actuate the whole, be sensible of all the motions in it, and act *pro re nata* accordingly; all which the instincts and common notions of mankind urge upon them. Neither can they be denied, without raising the very foundations of all religion, since it would be to no more purpose, for men to make their devotional addresses to such an immoveable, inflexible, and unaffectible Deity, than to a senseless adamantine rock. But these difficulties (as the Platonists pretend) are all removed by that third hypostasis in their trinity; which is a kind of moveable deity. And thus are all the phenomena of the Deity, or the different common notions in the minds of men concerning it, though seemingly repugnant and clashing with one another, yet, in their opinion, fairly reconciled and solved by this trinity of Divine hypostases subordinate.

Lastly, They pretend also, that according to this hypothesis of theirs, there may be some reasonable satisfaction given to the mind of man, both why there are so many Divine hypostases, and why there could be no more: whereas, according to other ways, it would seem to have

been a mere arbitrary business; and that there might have been either but one solitary Divine hypostasis, or but a duality of them; or else they might have been beyond a trinity, numberless.

The second thing, which we shall observe concerning the most genuine Platonical and Parmenidian trinity, is this; that though these philosophers sometimes called their three Divine hypostases, not only τρεῖς φύσεις, three natures, and three principles, and three causes, and three opificers, but also three gods, and a first, and second, and third god; yet did they often, for all that, suppose all these three to be really one θεῖον, one Divinity, or Numen. It hath been already proved from Origen and others, that the Platonists most commonly called the animated world the second god, though some of them, as for example Numenius, styled it the third god. Now those of them, who called the world the second god, attributed indeed (not more, but) less divinity to it, than those, who would have it to be the third god. Because these latter supposed, that soul of the world to be the third hypostasis of their trinity; but the other taking all these three Divine hypostases together, for one supreme and first God, called the world the second god; they supposing the soul thereof to be another soul inferior to that first Psyche, which was properly their third hypostases. Wherefore this was really all one, as if they should have called the animated world the fourth god; only by that other way of reckoning, when they called it a second god, they intimated, that though those three Divine hypostases were frequently called three gods, yet were they, notwithstanding, really all but one θεῖον, Divinity or Numen; or, as Plo-

tinus speaks, τὸ ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεῖον, the Divinity which is in the whole world.—Thus when God is so often spoken of in Plato singularly, the word is not always to be understood of the first hypostasis only, or the Tagathon, but many times plainly of the πρῶτον, and δεύτερον, and τρίτον, the first, and second, and third all together; or that whole Divinity, which consisteth or is made up of these three hypostases. And this will further appear from hence, because when the whole world is said in Plato to be the image of the eternal gods, as also by Plotinus, of the first, second, and third, by whom it is always produced anew, as the image in a glass is; this is not to be understood, as if the world being tripartite, each third part thereof was severally produced or created by one of those three; nor yet can it be conceived, how there could be three really distinct creations of one and the same thing. Wherefore the world having but one creation, and being created by those three Divine hypostases; it follows, that they are all three really but one Creator and one God. Thus when, both in Plato and Plotinus, the lives and souls of all animals, (as stars, demons and men) are attributed to the third hypostasis, the first and great Psyche, as their fountain and cause after a special manner; accordingly as in our Creed, the Holy Ghost is styled “the Lord and giver of life;” this is not so to be understood, as if therefore the first and second hypostases were to be excluded from having any causality therein. For the first is styled by Plato also, αἴτιον πάντων τῶν καλῶν the cause of all good things—and therefore doubtless chiefly of souls; and the second is called by him and others too, αἴτιον and

δημιουργός, the cause and artificer of the whole world.—We conclude, therefore, that souls being created by the joint concurrence and influence of these three hypostases subordinate, they are all really but one and the same God. And thus it is expressly affirmed by Porphyrius in St. Cyril,^a ἄχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν θείου προελθεῖν οὐσίαν· εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν τὸ ἀγαθόν, μετ' αὐτὸν δὲ καὶ δεύτερον, τὸν δημιουργόν· τρίτην δὲ καὶ τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν· ἄχρι γὰρ ψυχῆς τὴν θεότητα προελθεῖν· that the essence of the Divinity proceeds or propagates itself (by way of descent downwards) unto three hypostases or subsistences. The highest God is the Tagathon, or supreme Good; the second next after him is the Demiurgus so called, the architect or artificer of the world; and the soul of the world, that is the third: for the Divinity extendeth so far as to this soul.—Here we plainly see, that though Porphyrius calls the three Divine hypostases three gods; yet does he at the very same time declare, that ἡ θείου οὐσία and θεότης, the essence of the Godhead and the Divinity extends itself to all these three hypostases, including the third and last also (which they call the mundane soul) within the compass of it. And, therefore, that even according to the Porphyrian theology itself, (which could not be suspected to affect any compliance with Christianity) the three hypostases in the Platonic trinity are ὁμοούσιοι, coessential, both as being each of them God, and as being all one God. St. Cyril himself also acknowledging as much; where he writeth thus of the Platonists:^b τρεῖς ἀρχικὰς ὑποστάσεις ὑποτιθέμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ προσήκειν ἰσχυρισάμενοι· That sup-

^a Contra Julian. lib. viii. p. 271.

^b Ibid. p. 270.

posing three hypostases, which have the nature of principles (in the universe), they extend the essence of God to all these three hypostases.

Indeed, many conceive, that the Platonists making the three hypostases of their trinity to be thus gradually subordinate one to another, could not, for that very reason, acknowledge them to be one Divinity : but the Platonists themselves do, upon this very account, and no other, declare all these three to be one Divinity, because they have an essential dependance and gradual subordination in them ; the second being but the image of the first, and the third the image both of the first and second. Whereas, were these three supposed to be perfectly coequal, and to have no essential dependance one upon another, they could not by these Platonists be concluded to be any other than three co-ordinate gods, having only a general or specific identity ; and so no more one, than three men are one man : a thing, which the Platonic theology is utterly abhorrent from, as that which is inconsistent with the perfect monarchy of the universe, and highly derogatory from the honour of the supreme God and first Cause. For example, should three suns appear in the heaven all at once, with coequal splendour, and not only so, but also be concluded, that though at first derived (or lighted and kindled) from one, yet they were now all alike absolute and independent ; these three could not so well be thought to be one sun, as three that should appear gradually differing in their splendour, two of them being but the *parheli* of the other, and essentially depending on it ; forasmuch as the second would be but the reflected image of the first, and

the third but the second refracted. At least those three coequal suns could not so well be thought to be one thing, as the sun, and its first and secondary splendour, (which can neither be beheld without the sun, nor the sun without them) might be accounted one and the same thing.

The Platonists, therefore, first of all suppose such a close and near conjunction betwixt the three hypostases of their trinity, as is no where else to be found in the whole world. To this purpose Plotinus: ὁρᾷ δὲ αὐτὸν, οὐ χωρισθεὶς, ἀλλ' Eu. v. l. i. c. ὅτι μετ' αὐτὸν καὶ μεταξὺ οὐδέν· ὡς οὐδὲ ψυχῆς vi. [p. 488.] καὶ νοῦ· ποθεῖ δὲ πᾶν τὸ γεννησαν καὶ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾷ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ὦσι μόνοι, τὸ γεννησαν καὶ τὸ γεγεννημένον· ὅταν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀριστον ἢ τὸ γεννησαν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης σύνεστιν αὐτῷ, ὡς τῇ ἐτερότητι μόνον κεχωρίσθαι. Intellect is said to behold the first Good; not as if it were separated from it, but only because it is after it, but so as that there is nothing between them; as neither is there betwixt intellect and soul. Every thing; which is begotten, desires and loves that which begat it; especially when these two (that which begat, and that which is begotten) are alone, and nothing besides them. Moreover, when that which begot, is absolutely the best thing, that, which is immediately begotten from it, must needs cohere intimately with it and so as to be separated from it only by alterity.—Which is all one as if he should have said, that these three Divine hypostases are so intimately conjoined together, and united with one another, as that they are *tantum non*, only not—the very self-same. Again, the Platonists further declare, that these three hypostases of their trinity are ἀδιαίρετοι, absolutely indivisible and inseparable, as the ἀπάνγαμα is ἀδιαί-

ρετον from the φῶς, the splendour indivisibly conjoined with the light or sun.—Which similitude also Athanasius often makes use of to the same purpose. Thirdly, these Platonists seem likewise to attribute to their three Divine hypostases just such an Ἐμπεριχώρησις, circuminsession, or mutual in-being, as Christians do. For as their second and third hypostases must needs be in the first, they being therein virtually contained; so must the first likewise be in the second and third; they being as it were but two other editions thereof; or itself gradually displayed and expanded. But to speak particularly, the first must needs be in the second, the Tagathon in the Nous, and so both of them really one and the same God; because the common notions of all mankind attribute understanding and wisdom to the Deity; but according to the principles of Plato, Plotinus, and others, the Deity does not properly understand any where but in the second hypostasis, which is the mind and wisdom of it. And the emperichoresis of the second or third hypostases was thus intimated by Plato also; *Σοφία μὴν καὶ* Phileb. p. 30. *Νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἂν ποτε γενοίσθην. Οὐκοῦν* [p. 80.] *ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεΐς φύσει, βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχὴν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι.* Where having spoken of that Divine wisdom and mind, which orders all things in the world, he adds: “But wisdom and mind can never be without soul (that is, cannot act without it): wherefore, in the nature of Jupiter, is at once contained both a kingly mind and a kingly soul.” Here he makes Jupiter to be both the second and third hypostases of his trinity, Nous and Psyche; and, consequently, those two to be but one God. Which Nous is

also said to be both the *γενούσσης*, *i. e.* of the same kind, and coessential with the first Cause of all things. To conclude: as that first Platonic hypostasis, which is itself said to be above mind and wisdom, is properly wise and understanding in the second; so do both the first and the second move and act in the third. Lastly, all these three hypostases, Tagathon, Nous, and Psyche, are said by the Platonists to be one *Θεῖον*, or Divinity; just in the same manner as the centre, immoveable distance, and moveable circumference of a sphere, or globe, are all essentially one sphere. Thus Plotinus expressly, writing of the third hypostasis, or Psyche: *σεμνὸν γὰρ τι καὶ ἡ* P. 409. [Enn. *ψυχὴ ἢ τοιαύτη, οἷον κύκλος προσάρμωττων κέν-* iv. lib. iv. *τρῶ, εὐθὺς μετὰ κέντρον ἀνξήθεις, διάστημα ἀδιά-* cap. xvi.] *στατον· οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ἕκαστα, εἰ τ' ἀγαθὸν τις καὶ τὸ κέντρον* *τάξειε, τὸν νοῦν κατὰ κύκλον ἀκίνητον, ψυχὴν δὲ κατὰ κύ-* *κλον κινούμενον ἂν τάξειε.* For this Psyche, or third hypostasis, is a venerable and adorable thing also; it being the circle fitted to the centre, an indistant distance (forasmuch as it is no corporeal thing). For these things are just so, as if one should make the Tagathon, or first Good, to be the centre of the universe; in the next place, Mind or Intellect to be the immoveable circle, or distance; and, lastly, Soul to be that, which turns round, or the whole moveable circumference, acted by love, or desire.—These three Platonic hypostases, therefore, seem to be really nothing else but infinite goodness, infinite wisdom, and infinite active love and power, not as mere qualities or accidents, but as substantial things, that have some kind of subordination one to another; all concurring together to make up one *θεῖον*, or Divinity, just as

the centre, immoveable distance, and moveable circumference, concurrently make up one sphere.

We have now given a full account of the true and genuine Platonic and Parmenidian or Pythagoric trinity; from which it may clearly appear, how far it either agreeth or disagreeeth with the Christian. First, therefore, though some of the latter Platonists have partly misunderstood, and partly adulterated that ancient cabala of the Trinity, as was before declared, confounding therein the differences between God and the creature, and thereby laying a foundation for infinite Polytheism; yet did Plato himself, and some of his genuine followers (though living before Christianity) approach so near to the doctrine thereof, as in some manner to correspond therewith, in those three fundamentals beforementioned. First, in not making a mere trinity of names and words, or of logical notions and inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing; but a trinity of hypostases, or subsistences, or persons. Secondly, in making none of their three hypostases to be creatures, but all eternal, necessarily existent and universal; infinite, omnipotent, and creators of the whole world, which is all one, in the sense of the ancients, as if they should have affirmed them to be *homoousian*. Lastly, in supposing these three Divine hypostases, however sometimes paganically called three gods, to be essentially one Divinity. From whence it may be concluded, that as Arianism is commonly supposed to approach nearer to the truth of Christianity than Photinianism, so is Platonism undoubtedly more agreeable thereunto than Arianism; it being a certain middle thing betwixt that and Sabel-

lianism, which in general was that mark, that the Nicene council also aimed at.

Notwithstanding which, there is a manifest disagreement also betwixt the Platonic trinity, as declared, and the now received doctrine in the Christian church; consisting in a different explication of the two latter points mentioned. First, because the Platonists dreamed of no such thing at all, as one and the same numerical essence, or substance of the three Divine hypostases. And, secondly, because, though they acknowledged none of those hypostases to be creatures, but all God; yet did they assert an essential dependance of the second and third upon the first, together with a certain gradual subordination; and therefore no absolute coequality. And this is the true reason, why so many late writers have affirmed Platonism to symbolize with Arianism, and the latter to have been indeed nothing else but the spawn of the former; merely because the Platonists did not acknowledge one and the same numerical essence, or substance of all their three hypostases, and asserted a gradual subordination of them; but chiefly for this latter ground. Upon which account some of the ancients also have done the like, as particularly St. Cyril (contra Jul. lib. i.); he writing thus concerning Plato: *Τεθεώρηκε μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὑγιῶς εἰσάπαν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τὰ Ἀρείου πεφρονηκόσιν, ἐν ἴσῳ διαιρεῖ, καὶ ὑφίστησιν, ὑποκαθεμένας τε ἀλλήλαις τὰς ὑποστάσεις εἰσφέρει.* P. 34.
 Plato did not thoroughly perceive the whole truth of the Trinity, but, in like manner with those who follow Arius, divided the Deity, or made a gradation in it, and introduced subordinate hypostases:—as elsewhere the same pious father

also taxes the Platonists, for not declaring the three hypostases of their trinity to be, in his sense, homoousian, that is, absolutely coequal. But though we have already proved, that Platonism can by no means be confounded with Arianism, because it directly confronted the same in its main essentials; which were, *Erat quando non erat*, or the second hypostasis being made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, together with its being mutable and lapsable; since, according to Platonism, the Nous is essentially both eternal and immutable: yet that the most refined Platonism differed from the now-received doctrine of the Christian church, in respect of its gradual subordination, is a thing so unquestionably evident, as that it can by no means be dissembled, palliated, or excused.

Over and besides which, it cannot be denied, but the best of Plato's followers were sometimes also further extravagant in their doctrine of the Trinity, and spake at random concerning it, and inconsistently with their own principles; especially where they make such a vast and disproportionate distance betwixt the second and third hypostases thereof; they not descending gradually and orderly, but as it were tumbling down from the former of them to the latter. Thus Plotinus himself, when having spoken magnificently of that soul of the world, which is his third hypostasis, Enn. v. l. i. c. ii. [p. 483.] he subjoins immediately, ὁμοειδῆς δὲ καὶ ἡμετέρα, καὶ ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν προσελθόντων σκοπῆς, λαβὼν κεκαθαρωμένην, εὐρήσεις τὸ αὐτὸ τίμιον ὃ ἦν ψυχῆ. That this soul of ours is also uniform (or of the same species) with that mundane soul; for if any one (saith he) will consider it as in itself pure and naked, or stripped from all things adventitious to

it, he shall find it to be in like manner venerable.—Agreeably whereunto doth this same philosopher elsewhere call that mundane soul *πρεσβυτέραν καὶ ἀδελφὴν*, that is, but the elder sister of our human souls.—Which, as it rankly savours of philosophic pride and arrogancy, thus to think so magnificently of themselves, and to equalize in a manner their own souls with that mundane soul; so was it a monstrous degradation of that third hypostasis of their trinity, and little other than an absolute creaturizing of the same. For if our human soul be *ὁμοειδής*, of the same kind or species with the third hypostasis of the trinity; then is it not only *ὁμότιμος*, of like honour and dignity, but also, in the language of the Christian church, *ὁμοούσιος*, coessential with our human souls (as our Saviour Christ, according to the Arians in Athanasius, is said to be *ὁμοούσιος ἡμῶν* Tom. i. p. 557. *τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, coessential with us men). [libro. de Sententia Dionys.]

From whence it will follow, that either that must be a creature, or else our human souls Divine. Wherefore, unless these Platonists would confine the Deity wholly to their first hypostasis, which would be monstrously absurd for them, to suppose that first eternal Mind and Wisdom, by which the world was made, to be a creature; they must of necessity make a vast leap or jump betwixt the second and third of their hypostases; the former of them being that perfect Wisdom, which was the Architect or Demiurgus of the world, whilst the latter is only the elder sister of all human souls. Moreover these Platonists, by their thus bringing down the third hypostasis of their trinity so low, and immersing it so deeply into the corporeal world, as if it were the inform-

ing Soul thereof, and making it to be but the elder sister of our created souls, did doubtless therein designedly lay a foundation for their Polytheism and creature-worship (now vulgarly called idolatry) that is, for their cosmolatry, astrolatry, and demonolatry. For thus much is plainly intimated

in this following passage of Plotinus: *δια*
 P. 483. *ταύτην ὁ κόσμος ὄδε θεός· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἥλιος θεός*
 [Ennead. v. lib. i. cap. ii.] *ὅτι ἐμψυχος, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα·* This whole corporeal world is made a god by the soul thereof.

And the sun is also a god, because animated; as likewise are all the stars therefore gods.—Where he afterwards adds, *τὴν δὲ θεοῖς αἰτίαν τοῦ θεοῖς εἶναι, ἀνάγκη πρῆσβυτέραν θεὸν αὐτῶν εἶναι·* That which is to these gods, or goddesses, the cause of their being gods, must needs itself be the elder god or goddess.—So that this third hypostasis of the Platonic trinity, called the mundane soul, is but a kind of sister goddess with the souls of the sun, moon, and stars, though elder indeed than they; they being all made goddesses by her. Where there is a confused jumble of things contradictory together; that Soul of the world being at once supposed to be a sister to other souls, and yet, notwithstanding, to deify them; whereas this sisterly relation and consanguinity betwixt them would, of the two, rather degrade and creaturize that mundane soul, which is their third god, or Divine hypostasis, than advance and deify those particular created souls. Here therefore we see the inconvenience of these Platonic *βαθμοὶ*, stories, stairs and gradations in the Deity, that it is a thing liable to be much abused to creature-worship and idolatry, when the distances are made so wide, and the lowest of the Deity is supposed to differ but gradually only

from the highest of created beings. And because Porphyrius trod in Plotinus's footsteps here, as elsewhere, this was, in all probability, the true reason, why the Arians (as Socrates recordeth^a) were by Constantine called Porphyrianists; not because their trinities were exactly the same, but because Arius and Porphyrius did both of them alike (though upon different grounds) make their trinity a foundation for creature-worship and idolatry. But, nevertheless, all this (as many other things) was but heedlessly and inadvertently written by Plotinus; he, as it were, drowsily nodding all the while, as it was also but supinely taken up by Porphyrius after him: it being plainly inconsistent with the genuine tenor of both their hypotheses, thus to level the third hypostasis of the trinity with particular created souls, and thereby to make so disproportionate a distance, and so vast a chasm, betwixt it and the second. For Plotinus himself, when in a more sober mood, declares, that third hypostasis not to be the immediate, informing soul of the corporeal world, but a higher separate soul, or superior Venus, which also was the Demiurgus, the maker, both of other souls and of the whole world. As Plato had before expressly affirmed him to be the Inspirer of all life, and Creator of souls, or the Lord and Giver of life: and likewise declared, that amongst all those things, which are ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς συγγενῆ, congenerous and cognate with our human souls—there is οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο, nothing any where to be found at all like unto it.—So that Plato, though he were also a star-worshipper and idolater, upon other grounds, yet in all probabi-

^a Vide lib. i. cap. ix. p. 32.

lity would he not at all have approved of Plotinus's *ὁμοειδῆς δὲ καὶ ἡμετέρα*, our souls being of the same species with that third hypostasis of the Divine triad; but rather have said, in the language of the Psalmist, "It is he that hath made us, and not we ourselves; we are his people, and the sheep of his pasture."

Notwithstanding all which, a Christian Platonist, or Platonic Christian, would, in all probability, apologize for Plato himself, and the ancient and most genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans, after this manner. First, that since they had no Scriptures, councils, nor creeds, to direct their steps in the darkness of this mystery, and to confine their language to a regular uniformity; but theologized all freely and boldly, and without any scrupulosity, every one according to his own private apprehensions; it is no wonder at all, if they did not only speak, many times unadvisedly, and inconsistently with their own principles, but also plainly wander out of the right path. And that it ought much rather to be wondered at, that living so long before Christianity, as some of them did, they should in so abstruse a point, and dark a mystery, make so near an approach to the Christian truth afterward revealed, than that they should any where fumble or fall short of the accuracy thereof: they not only extending the true and real Deity to three hypostases, but also calling the second of them, *λόγον*, reason or word too, (as well as *νοῦν*, mind or intellect) and likewise the Son of the first hypostasis, the Father; and affirming him to be the *δημιουργός* and *αἴτιον*, the artificer and cause of the whole world; and, lastly, describing him, as the Scripture doth, to be the

image, the figure and character, and the splendour or brightness of the first. This, I say, our Christian Platonist supposes to be much more wonderful, that this so great and abstruse a mystery, of three eternal hypostases in the Deity, should thus by Pagan philosophers, so long before Christianity, have been asserted, as the principal and original of the whole world; it being more indeed than was acknowledged by the Nicene fathers themselves; they then not so much as determining, that the Holy Ghost was an hypostasis, much less that he was God.

But particularly as to their gradual subordination of the second hypostasis to the first, and of the third to the first and second; our Platonic Christian, doubtless, would therefore plead them the more excusable, because the generality of Christian doctors, for the first three hundred years after the apostles' times, plainly asserted the same; as Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Tatianus, Iræneus, the author of the *Recognitions*, Tertullian, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, Gregorius Thaumaturgus, Dionysius of Alexandria, Lactantius, and many others. All whose testimonies, because it would be too tedious to set down here, we shall content ourselves only with one of the last mentioned: "*Et Pater et Filius Deus est; Instit. l. iv. c. sed ille quasi exuberans fons, hic tan-*^{xxix.}[p. 514.]
quam defluens ex eo rivus: Ille tanquam sol, hic tanquam radius a sole porrectus." Both the Father and the Son is God; but he as it were an exuberant fountain, this as a stream derived from him: he like to the sun, this like to a ray extended from the sun.—And though it be true that Atha-

nasius,^a writing against the Arians, does appeal to the tradition of the ancient church, and amongst others cites Origen's testimony too; yet was this only for the eternity and divinity of the Son of God, but not at all for such an absolute coequality of him with the Father, as would exclude all dependance, subordination, and inferiority; those ancients so unanimously agreeing therein, that they are by Petavius^b therefore taxed for Platonism, and having by that means corrupted the purity of the Christian faith, in this article of the Trinity. Which how it can be reconciled with those other opinions of ecclesiastic tradition being a rule of faith, and the impossibility of the visible church's erring in any fundamental point, cannot easily be understood. However, this general tradition or consent of the Christian church, for three hundred years together after the apostles' times, though it cannot justify the Platonists, in any thing discrepant from the Scripture, yet may it in some measure doubtless plead their excuse, who had no Scripture-revelation at all, to guide them herein; and so at least make their error more tolerable or pardonable.

Moreover, the Platonic Christian would further apologize for these Pagan Platonists after this manner: That their intention in thus subordinating the hypostases of their trinity was plainly no other, than to exclude thereby a plurality of co-ordinate and independent gods, which they sup-

^a Vide Epistol. de Synodi Nicænae contra Hæresin Arian. Decretis, tom. i, oper. p. 277.

^b Vide lib. i. de Trinitate, cap. iii. p. 20. et cap. iv. p. 24. tom. ii. Dogmat. Theolog.

posed an absolute coequality of them would infer. And that they made only so much subordination of them, as was both necessary to this purpose, and unavoidable; the juncture of them being in their opinion so close, that there was *μηδὲν μεταξὺ*, nothing intermedious—or that could possibly be thrust in between them. But now again, on the other hand, whereas the only ground of the coequality of the persons in the holy Trinity is, because it cannot well be conceived, how they should otherwise all be God; since the essence of the Godhead, being absolute perfection, can admit of no degrees; these Platonists do on the contrary contend, that notwithstanding that dependance and subordination, which they commonly suppose in these hypostases, there is none of them, for all that, to be accounted creatures, but that the general essence of the Godhead, or the uncreated nature, truly and properly belongeth to them all: according to that of Porphyrius before cited, *ἄχρη τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν θείου προελθεῖν οὐσίαν*, the essence of the Godhead proceedeth to three hypostases.—Now these Platonists conceive, that the essence of the Godhead, as common to all the three hypostases of their trinity, consisteth (besides perfect intellectuality) in these following things: First, in being eternal, which, as we have already shewed, was Plato's distinctive character betwixt God and the creature. That whatsoever was eternal, is therefore uncreated; and whatsoever was not eternal, is a creature: he by eternity meaning, the having not only no beginning, but also a permanent duration. Again, in having not a contingent but necessary existence, and therefore being absolutely

undestroyable; which perhaps is included also in the former. Lastly, in being not particular, but universal ἐν καὶ πάντα, one and all things, or that which comprehends the whole; which is all one as to say, in being infinite and omnipotent, and the creator of the whole world. Now, say these Platonists, if any thing more were to be added to the general essence of the Godhead besides this, then must it be self-existence, or to be underived from any other, and the first original, principle, and cause of all: but if this be made so essential to the Godhead, or uncreated nature, as that whatsoever is not thus originally of itself, is therefore *ipso facto* to be detruded and thrust down into the rank of creatures; then must both the second and third hypostases, as well in the Christian as the Platonic Trinity, upon this supposition, needs be creatures, and not God; the second deriving its whole being and godship from the first; and the third, both from the first and second; and so neither first nor second being the cause of all things. But it is unquestionable to these Platonists, that whatsoever is eternal, necessarily existent, infinite, and omnipotent, and the creator of all things, ought therefore to be religiously worshipped and adored as God, by all created beings. Wherefore this essence of the Godhead, that belongeth alike to all the three hypostases, being, as all other essences, perfectly indivisible, it might be well affirmed, according to Platonic grounds, that all the three Divine hypostases (though having some subordination in them) yet in this sense are coequal, they being all truly and alike God or uncreated. And the Platonists thus distinguishing betwixt οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, the essence

of the Godhead, and the distinct hypostases or personalities thereof, and making the first of them to be common, general, and universal, are not without the consent and approbation of the orthodox fathers herein; they determining, likewise, that in the Deity, essence or substance differs from hypostasis, as τὸ κοινὸν from τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, that which is common and general, differs from that which is singular and individual.—Thus, besides many others, St. Cyril,^a ἦν ἔχει διαφορὰν τὸ γένος, ἢ εἶδος, ὑπὲρ τὸ ἄτομον, ταύτην ἢ οὐσία πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει. The essence or substance of the Deity differs from the hypostasis, after the same manner as a genus or species differs from an individuum.—So that, as well according to these fathers as the Platonists, that essence or substance of the Godhead, which all the three persons agree in, is not singular, but generical or universal; they both supposing each of the persons also to have their own numerical essence. Wherefore, according to this distinction, betwixt the essence or substance of the Godhead, and the particular hypostases, (approved by the orthodox fathers) neither Plato, nor any intelligent Platonist, would scruple to subscribe that form of the Nicene council, that the Son or Word, is ὁμοούσιος, coessential, consubstantial, and coequal with the Father. And we think it will be proved afterwards, that this was the very meaning of the Nicene council itself, that the Son was therefore coessential or consubstantial with the Father, merely because he was God, and not a creature.

^a This seems to be a mistake for *Theodoret*, in whom we find these very words: Dialog. i. advers. Hæres. tom. ii. oper. p. 297. Though the same thing is said in other words in St. Cyril: Dialog. i. de Trinitate, p. 408. tom. v. oper. ed. Auberti.

Besides which, the genuine Platonists would doubtless acknowledge also all the three hypostases of their trinity to be homoousian, coessential or consubstantial, yet in a further sense than this; namely, as being all of them one Θεῖον or Divinity. For thus, besides that passage of Porphyrius before cited, may these words of St. Cyril be understood concerning them; * μέχρῃ τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ θεοῦ προσήκειν ἰσχυρίζονται. That, according to them, the essence of God extendeth to three hypostases, or comprehendeth three hypostases in it:—that is, not only so as that each of these three is God; but also, that they are not so many separate and divided gods, but all of them together one God or Divinity. For though the Platonists, as Pagans, being not so scrupulous in their language, as we Christians are, do often call them three gods, and a first, second, and third god; yet, notwithstanding, as philosophers, did they declare them to be one Θεῖον or Divinity; and that, as it seems, upon these several accounts following: First, because they are indivisibly conjoined together, as the splendour is indivisible from the sun. And then, because they are mutually inexistent in each other, the first being in the second, and both first and second in the third. And, lastly, because the entireness of the whole Divinity is made up of all these three together, which have all μίαν ἐνέργειαν, one and the same energy or action *ad extra*. And therefore as the centre, radius distance, and moveable circumference, may be all said to be coessential to a sphere; and the root, stock, and boughs, or branches, coessential to an entire tree: so, but in

* Contra Julian. lib. viii. p. 270.

much a more perfect sense, are the Platonic Tagathon, Nous, and Psyche, coessential to that ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεῖον, that Divinity in the whole universe. Neither was Athanasius a stranger to this notion of the word ὁμοούσιος also, he affirming τὰ De Sent. κλήματα ὁμοούσια καὶ ἀδιαίρετα εἶναι τῆς ἀμπέ- Dionys. p. 556. [tom. i. oper.] λου, that the branches are coessential

with, and indivisible from, the vine;—and illustrating the Trinity by that similitude. Neither must it be thought, that the whole Trinity is one, after the very same manner that each single person thereof is in itself one, for then should there be a Trinity also in each person. Nor that it is so called undivided, as if three were not three in it; (which were to make the mystery contemptible:) but because all the three hypostases, or persons, are indivisibly and inseparably united to each other, as the sun and the splendour, and really but one God. Wherefore, though there be some subordination of hypostases, or persons, in Plato's trinity, (as it is commonly represented) yet this is only *ad intra* within the Deity itself, in their relation to one another, and as compared amongst themselves; but, *ad extra*, outwardly, and to us, are they all one and, the same God, concurring in all the same actions; and, in that respect, without any inequality, because in identity there can be no inequality.

Furthermore, the Platonic Christian would, in favour of these Platonists, urge also, that, according to the principles of Christianity itself, there must of necessity be some dependance and subordination of the persons of the Trinity, in their relation to one another; a priority and posteriority, not only τὰξως, but also ἀξιώματος, of dignity as

well as order, amongst them. First, because that which is originally of itself, and underived from any other, must needs have some superiority and pre-eminence over that, which derives its whole being and godship from it, as the second doth from the first alone, and the third from the first with the second. Again, though all those three hypostases, or persons, be alike omnipotent, *ad extra*, or outwards, *ad intra*, inwards, or within the Deity itself, are they not so; the Son being not able to beget the Father, nor the Holy Ghost to produce either Father or Son; and therefore neither of these two latter is absolutely the cause of all things, but only the first. And upon this account was that first of these three hypostases (who is the original fountain of all) by Macrobius * styled, *omnipotentissimus Deus*, the most omnipotent God; he therein implying the second and third hypostases, *Nous* and *Psyche*, to be omnipotent too, but not in a perfect equality with him, as within the Deity they are compared together; however, *ad extra*, or outwardly, and to us, they being all one, are equally omnipotent. And Plotinus writeth also to the same purpose: *εἰ*

P. 517. [Enn. v. lib. iv. cap. i.]

τέλειόν ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ δύναμις ἡ πρώτη, δεῖ πάντων τῶν ὄντων δυνατώτατον εἶναι, &c. If the first be absolutely perfect, and the first Power, then must it needs be the most powerful of all beings; other powers only imitating and partaking thereof.—And accordingly hereunto would the Platonic Christian further pretend, that there are sundry places in the Scripture, which do not a little favour some subordination and priority, both of order and dignity, in the persons of the holy

* In *Somnium Scipion*. lib. i. cap. xvii. p. 87.

Trinity; of which none is more obvious than that of our Saviour Christ, "My Father is greater than I:" which, to understand of his humanity only, seemeth to be less reasonable, because this was no news at all, that the eternal God, the creator of the whole world, should be greater than a mortal man, born of a woman. And thus do divers of the orthodox fathers, as Athanasius himself, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen and St. Chrysostom, with several others of the Latins, interpret the same to have been spoken, not of the humanity, but the Divinity of our Saviour Christ. Insomuch that Petavius himself, expounding the Athanasian Creed, writeth in this manner: "Pater major Filio, rite et ca-
De Trin.
P. 863.
 tholice pronuntiatus est a plerisque veterum; et origine prior sine reprehensione dici solet." The Father is, in a right catholic manner, affirmed, by most of the ancients, to be greater than the Son; and he is commonly said also, without reprehension, to be before him in respect of original.—Whereupon he concludeth the true meaning of that Creed to be this, that no person in the Trinity is greater or less than other, in respect of the essence of the Godhead common to them all: "Quia vera Deitas in nullo esse aut minor aut major potest;" because the true Godhead can be no where greater or less:—but that, notwithstanding, there may be some inequality in them, as they are *hic Deus*, and *hæc persona*; this God, and that person.—It is true, indeed, that many of those ancient fathers do restrain and limit this inequality only to the relation of the persons one to another, as the Father's begetting, and the Son's being begotten by the Father, and the Holy

Ghost proceeding from both; they seeming to affirm, that there is otherwise a perfect equality amongst them. Nevertheless several of them do extend this difference further also; as, for example, St. Hilary, a zealous opposer of the Arians, he in his book of Synods writing thus: "Siquis unum dicens Deum, Christum autem Deum, ante secula Filium Dei, obsecutum Patri in creatione omnium, non confitetur, anathema sit." And again, "Non exæquamus vel conformamus Filium Patri, sed subjectum intelligimus." And Athanasius himself, who is commonly accounted the very rule of orthodoxy in this point, when he doth so often resemble the Father to the ἥλιος, or to the φῶς, the sun, or the original light, and the Son to the ἀπαύγασμα, the splendour or brightness of it, (as likewise doth the Nicene council and the Scripture itself;) he seems hereby to imply some dependance of the second upon the first, and subordination to it; especially when he declareth, that the three persons of the Trinity are not to be looked upon as three principles, nor to be resembled to three suns, but to the sun, and its

Cont. Ar. Or. splendour, and its derivative light: οὐδὲ
iv. p. 467. γὰρ τρεῖς ἀρχὰς εἰσάγομεν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τριῶν ἡλίων

[tom. i. oper.] ὑπεθέμεθα τὴν εἰκόνα, ἀλλὰ ἥλιον καὶ ἀπαύγασμα,

καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐξ ἡλίου ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγάσματι φῶς· οὕτω μίαν ἀρχὴν οἶδαμεν. For it appears from the similitude used by us, that we do not introduce three principles (as the Marcionists and Manicheans did) we not comparing the Trinity to three suns, but only to the sun and its splendour; so that we acknowledge only one principle.—As also where he approves of this of Dionysius of Alexandria, ὁ δὲ γε Θεός

² P. 1178 and 1182. oper. ed. Benedict.

αἰώνιον ἔστι φῶς, οὔτε ἀρχάμενον, οὔτε ἄλῃζόν ποτε· οὐκοῦν αἰώνιον πρόκειται καὶ σύνεστιν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, ἀναρχον καὶ ἀειγενές προφαινόμενον αὐτοῦ· God is an eternal light, which never began, and shall never cease to be; wherefore there is an eternal splendour also coexistent with him, which had no beginning neither, but was always generated by him, shining out before him.—For if the Son of God be as the splendour of the sun ἀειγενής, always generated—then must he needs have an essential dependance upon the Father, and subordination to him. And this same thing further appears from those other resemblances, which the same Dionysius maketh of the Father and the Son, approved in like manner also by Athanasius; viz. to the fountain and the river; to the root and the branch; to the water and the vapour; for so it ought to be read, ὕδατος, and not πνεύματος, as appeareth from his book of the Nicene synod, where he affirmeth the Son to have been begotten of the essence or substance of the Father: ὡς τοῦ φωτός ἀπαύγασμα, ὡς ὕδατος ἀτμὶς, as the splendour of the light, and as the vapour of the water;—adding: οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, οὔτε ἡ ἀτμὶς, αὐτὸ τὸ ὕδωρ ἔστιν, ἢ αὐτὸς ὁ ἥλιος· οὔτε ἀλλότριον, ἀλλὰ ἀπόρροια τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας· For neither the splendour nor the vapour is the very sun and the very water; nor yet is it alien from it, or a stranger to its nature; but they are both effluxes from the essence or substance of them; as the Son is an efflux from the substance of the Father, yet so as he is no way diminished or lessened thereby. Now all these similitudes, of the fountain and the river,

P. 565. [lib. de Sententia Dionys. contra Arian. tom. i.]

P. 275. [tom. i. oper.]

the root and the branch, the water and the vapour, (as well as that of the sun and the splendour) seem plainly to imply some dependance and subordination. And Dionysius doubtless intended them to that purpose, he asserting, as Photius informeth us, an inferiority of power and glory in the second, as likewise did Origen before him; both whose testimonies, notwithstanding, Athanasius maketh use of, without any censure or reprehension of them. Wherefore, when Athanasius, and the other orthodox fathers, writing against Arius, do so frequently assert the equality of all the three persons, this is to be understood in way of opposition to Arius only, who made the Son to be unequal to the Father, as *ἑτεροούσιον*, of a different essence from him—one being God and the other a creature; they affirming, on the contrary, that he was equal to the Father, as *ὁμοούσιος*, of the same essence with him;—that is, as God, and not a creature. Notwithstanding which equality, there might be some subordination in them, as *hic Deus* and *hæc persona* (to use Petavius's language), this God and that person.

And thus does there seem not to be so great a difference betwixt the more genuine Platonists and the ancient orthodox fathers, in their doctrine concerning the Trinity, as is by many conceived. However, our Platonic Christian would further add, that there is no necessity at all from the principles of Platonism itself, why the Platonists should make any other or more subordination in their Trinity, than the most severely-orthodox fathers themselves. For, according to the common hypothesis of the Platonists, when the cha-

racter of the first hypostasis is supposed by them to be infinite goodness; of the second, infinite wisdom; and of the third, infinite active love and power, (these not as accidents and qualities, but as all substantial) it is more easy to conceive, that all these are really but one and the same God, than how there should be any considerable inferiority in them. But, besides this, there is another Platonic hypothesis (which St. Austin hinteth from Porphyrius, though he professeth he did not well understand it) where the third hypostasis is made to be a certain middle betwixt the first and second.

De Civ. D.
l. x. c. xxiii.
Cum dicit
medium, non
postponit, sed
interponit.

And this does Proclus also sometimes follow, calling the third in like manner μέσην δύναμιν, a middle power, and σχέσιν ἀμφοῖν, the relation of both the first and second to one another.— Which agreeth exactly with that apprehension of some Christians, that the third hypostasis is as it were the nexus betwixt the first and second, and that love, whereby the Father and Son love each other. Now, according to this latter Platonic hypothesis, there would seem to be not so much a gradation or descent, as a kind of circulation in the Trinity. Upon all which considerations, the Platonic Christian will conclude, that though some junior Platonists have adulterated the notion of the Trinity, yet either there is no such great difference betwixt the genuine Platonic Trinity, rightly understood, and the Christian; or else, that as the same might be modelled and rectified, there need not to be.

But though the genuine Platonists do thus suppose the three hypostases of their Trinity to be all of them, not only God, but also one God, or μία

θεότης, one entire Divinity;—upon which latter account, the whole may be said also by them, to have one singular or numerical essence: yet notwithstanding must it be acknowledged, that they no where suppose each of these three hypostases to be numerically the very same, or to have no distinct singular essences of their own; this being, in their apprehensions, directly contradictory to their very hypothesis itself, and all one as if they should affirm them, indeed not to be three hypostases, but only one. Nevertheless, the Christian Platonist would here also apologize for them after this manner; that the ancient orthodox fathers of the Christian church were generally of no other persuasion than this, that that essence or substance of the Godhead, which all the three persons or hypostases agree in, as each of them is God, was not one singular and individual, but only one common and universal essence or substance; that word substance being used by them as synonymous with essence, and applied to universals likewise, as it is by the Peripatetics, when they call a man, or animal in general, *substantiam secundam*, a second substance.—Now this is evident from hence, because these orthodox fathers did commonly distinguish in this controversy of the Trinity, betwixt Οὐσία and Ὑπόστασις, the essence or substance of the Godhead—and the hypostases or persons themselves, after this manner; namely, that the hypostasis or person was singular and individual, but the essence or substance common and universal. Thus does Theodoret

Dial. i. adv.

Hær. [tom. ii. oper. p. 297.] κατάγε τὴν τῶν πατέρων διδασκαλίαν, ἣν ἔχει διαφορὰν τὸ κοινὸν ὑπὲρ τὸ ἴδιον, ἢ τὸ γένος ὑπὲρ

τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἄτομον, ταύτην ἔχει Ἡ Ο΄ΥΣΙ΄Α πρὸς ΤΗ΄Ν ὙΠΟ΄ΣΤΑΣΙΝ. According to the doctrine of the fathers, as that which is common differs from that which is proper, and the genus from the species or individuum, so doth essence or substance, differ from hypostases; that is to say, that essence or substance of the Godhead, which is common to all the three hypostases, or whereby each of them is God, was concluded by the fathers, not to be one singular or individual, but one general or universal essence and substance; Theodoret, notwithstanding, there acknowledging, that no such distinction was observed by other Greek writers betwixt those two words οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, essence or substance and hypostasis, as that the former of them should be restrained to universals only, generical or specific essences or substances; but that this was peculiar to the Christian fathers, in their doctrine concerning the Trinity. They in the mean time not denying, but that each hypostasis, prosopon, or person, in the Trinity, might be said in another sense, and in way of opposition to Sabellius, to have its own singular, individual, or existent essence also; and that there are thus, τρεῖς οὐσίαι, three singular existent essences in the Deity, as well as τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, three hypostases; an hypostasis being nothing else to them but an existent essence: however, for distinction's sake, they here thought fit thus to limit and appropriate the signification of these two words, that a singular and existent essence should not be called essence, but hypostasis; and by οὐσία, essence or substance, should be meant that general or universal nature of the Godhead only, which is com-

Greg. Nyssen.
adv. Eunem.
l. xii. [p. 301.
tom. ii. oper.]

mon to all those three singular hypostases or persons, or in which they all agree. We might here heap up many more testimonies for a further con-

firmation of this; as that of St. Basil: ὄν
Ep. 369. [Ep. ἔχει λόγον τὸ κοινὸν πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον, τοῦτον ἔχει
cccxlx. tom. ii. oper. p. 1046. edit. Paris 1638.] ἡ οὐσία πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν. What common
is to proper, the same is essence or sub-

stance (in the Trinity) to the hypostases.—But we shall content ourselves only with this full

acknowledgment of D. Petavius: “In
De Trin. l. iv. c. vii. [§. ii. hoc uno Græcorum præsertim omnium
p. 215. tom. ii. Dogmat. Theolog.] judicia concordant, οὐσίαν, id est, essen-
tiam sive substantiam; aut naturam

(quam φύσιν vocant) generale esse aliquid et commune, ac minime definitum; ὑπόστασιν vero proprium, singulare, et circumscriptum, quod ex illo communi et peculiaribus quibusdam notis ac proprietatibus veluti componitur.” In this one thing do the judgments and opinions of all the Greeks especially agree, that Usia, essence or substance, and nature, which they call Physis (in the Trinity), is something general, common and undetermined; but hypostasis is that, which is proper, singular, and circumscribed, and which is, as it were, compounded and made up of that common essence or substance, and certain peculiar notes and properties, or individuating circumstances.

But, besides this, it is further certain, that not a few of those ancient fathers, who were therefore reputed orthodox, because they zealously opposed Arianism, did entertain this opinion also, that the three hypostases or persons of the Trinity, had not only one general and universal essence of the Godhead, belonging to them all, they being

all God; but were also three individuals, under one and the same ultimate species, or specific essence and substance of the Godhead; just as three individual men (Thomas, Peter, and John), under that ultimate species of man; or that specific essence of humanity, which have only a numerical difference from one another. Wherefore an hypostasis, or person (in the Trinity) was accordingly thus defined by some of these fathers (viz. Anastasius and Cyril^a) to be “*Essentia cum suis quibusdam proprietatibus ab iis, quæ sunt ejusdem speciei, numero differens;*” an essence or substance, with its certain properties (or individuating circumstances), differing only numerically from those of the same species with it.—This doctrine was plainly asserted and industriously pursued (besides several others both of the Greeks and Latins), especially by Gregory Nyssen, Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus the Martyr, and Damascen; whose words, because Petavius^b hath set them down at large, we shall not here insert. Now these were they, who principally insisted upon the absolute coequality and independent coordination of the three hypostases or persons in the Trinity, as compared with one another. Because, as three men, though one of them were a father, another a son, and the third a nephew, yet have no essential dependance one upon another, but are naturally coequal and un subordinate, there being only a numerical difference betwixt them; so did they in like manner conclude, that the three hypostases, or persons of the Deity

^a Vide Exposition. Compendiar. Fidei Orthodox. in Bibliothec. Patrum, p. 677. tom. xv. edit. Paris, 1645.

^b Lib. iv. de Trinit. cap. ix. §. iv. tom. ii. Dogmat. Theolog.

(the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost), being likewise but three individuals, under the same ultimate species or specific essence of the Godhead, and differing only numerically from one another, were absolutely coequal, unsubordinate, and independent: and this was that, which was commonly called by them their *ὁμοουσιότης*, their coessentiality or consubstantiality. Wherefore it is observable, that St. Cyril, one of these theologians, finds no other fault at all with the Platonic trinity, but only this, that such an *ὁμοουσιότης*, such a coessentiality or consubstantiality as this, was not acknowledged therein; *ἐλελοίπει* Cont. Jul. l. viii. p. 270. *δ' ἂν πρὸς τοῦτο αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν, εἰ τὸν τῆς ὁμοουσιότητος λόγον ἐφαρμόττειν ἤθελον ὑποστάσει ταῖς τρισίν, ἵνα καὶ μία νοοῖτο τῆς θεότητος φύσις, τὸ τρίχιδες οὐκ ἔχουσα πρὸς ἑτερότητα φυσικὴν, καὶ τό γε δὴ δεῖν ἀλλήλων ἐν μείοσιν ὁρᾶσθαι ὑποστάσεις.* There would have been nothing at all wanting to the Platonic trinity for an absolute agreement of it with the Christian, had they but accommodated the right notion of coessentiality or consubstantiality to their three hypostases; so that there might have been but one specific nature or essence of the Godhead, not further distinguishable by any natural diversity, but numerically only, and so no one hypostasis any way inferior or subordinate to another.—That is, had these Platonists complied with that hypothesis of St. Cyril and others, that the three persons of the Trinity were but three independent and co-ordinate individuals, under the same ultimate species or specific essence of the Godhead, as Peter, Paul, and John, under that species or common nature of humanity, and so taken in this coessentiality or consubstantiality

of theirs, then had they been completely orthodox. Though we have already shewed, that this Platonic trinity was, in another sense, homoousian; and perhaps it will appear afterwards, that it was so also in the very sense of the Nicene fathers and of Athanasius. Again, these theologers supposed the three persons of their trinity to have really no other than a specific unity or indentity; and because it seems plainly to follow from hence, that therefore they must needs be as much three gods as three men are three men; these learned fathers endeavoured with their logic to prove, that three men are but abusively and improperly so called three, they being really and truly but one, because there is but one and the same specific essence or substance of human nature in them all; and seriously persuaded men to lay aside that kind of language. By which same logic of theirs, they might as well prove also, that all the men in the world are but one man, and that all Epicurus's gods were but one god neither. But not to urge here, that, according to this hypothesis, there cannot possibly be any reason given, why there should be so many as three such individuals in the species of God, which differ only numerically from one another, they being but the very same thing thrice repeated; and yet that there should be no more than three such neither, and not three hundred, or three thousand, or as many as there are individuals in the species of man; we say, not to urge this, it seems plain, that this trinity is no other than a kind of tritheism, and that of gods independent and coordinate too. And therefore some would think, that the ancient and genuine Platonic trinity,

taken with all its faults, is to be preferred before this trinity of St. Cyril and St. Gregory Nyssen, and several other reputed orthodox fathers; and more agreeable to the principles both of Christianity and of reason. However, it is evident from hence, that these reputed orthodox fathers, who were not a few, were far from thinking the three hypostases of the Trinity to have the same singular existent essence, they supposing them to have no otherwise one and the same essence of the Godhead in them, nor to be one god, than three individual men have one common specific essence of manhood in them, and are all one man. But as this trinity came afterwards to be decreed for tritheistic; so in the room thereof started there up that other trinity of persons numerically the same, or having all one and the same singular existent essence; a doctrine, which seemeth not to have been owned by any public authority in the Christian church, save that of the Lateran council^a only.

And that no such thing was ever entertained by the Nicene fathers and those first opposers of Arianism, might be rendered probable in the first place from the free confession and acknowledgment of D. Petavius (a person well acquainted with ecclesiastic antiquity); and for this reason especially, because many are much led by such

new names and authorities: "In eo præcipuam vim collocasse patres, ut æqualem patri natura excellentiaque filium esse defenderent, citra expressam SINGULARITATIS mentionem, licet ex eo conjicere.

^a The fourth general Lateran council held in 1215, under Pope Innocent III.

Etenim Nicæni isti præsules, quibus nemo melius Arianæ sectæ arcana cognovit, nemo, qua re opprimenda maxime foret, acrius dijudicare potuit, nihil in professionis suæ formula spectarunt aliud, nisi ut æqualitatem illam essentiæ, dignitatis, æternitatis astruerent. Testatur hoc ὁμοουσίον vox ipsa, quæ arx quædam fuit catholici dogmatis. Hæc enim æqualitatem potius essentiæ, quam SINGULARITATEM significat, ut capite quinto docui. Deinde cætera ejusdemmodi sunt in illo decreto, ut, &c. The chief force, which the ancient fathers opposed against the Arian heretics, was in asserting only the equality of the Son with the Father, as to nature or essence, without any express mention of the SINGULARITY of the same. For those Nicene bishops themselves, who did understand best of any the secrets of the Arian faction, and which way it should especially be oppugned, aimed at nothing else, in their confession of faith, but only to establish that equality of essence, dignity, and eternity, between them. This does the word homoousios itself declare, it signifying rather equality, than SINGULARITY, of essence, as we have before shewed. And the like do those other passages in the same decree; as, That there was no time when the Son was not; and, That he was not made of nothing, nor of a different hypostasis, or essence.—Thus does Petavius clearly confess, that this same singularity of numerical essence was not asserted by the Nicene council, nor the most ancient fathers, but only an equality or sameness of generical essence; or else that the Father and Son agreed only in one common essence or substance of the Godhead, that is, the eternal and uncreated nature.

But the truth of this will more fully appear from these following particulars: First, because these orthodox anti-arian fathers did all of them zealously condemn Sabellianism, the doctrine whereof is no other than this, that there was but one hypostasis, or singular individual essence, of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and, consequently, that they were indeed but three several names, or notions, or modes, of one and the self-same thing. From whence such absurdities as these would follow, that the Father's begetting the Son was nothing but one name, notion, or mode of the Deity's begetting another; or else the same Deity, under one notion, begetting itself under another notion. And when again the Son, or Word, and not the Father, is said to have been incarnated, and to have suffered death for us upon the cross, that it was nothing but a mere logical notion or mode of the Deity, that was incarnate and suffered, or else the whole Deity under one particular notion or mode only. But should it be averred notwithstanding, that this trinity, which we now speak of, was not a trinity of mere names and notions, as that of the Sabellians, but of distinct hypostases or persons; then must it needs follow (since every singular essence is an hypostasis according to the sense of the ancient fathers) that there was not a trinity only, but a quaternity of hypostases, in the Deity. Which is a thing, that none of those fathers ever dreamed of.

Again, the word homoousios, as was before intimated by Petavius, was never used by Greek writers otherwise than to signify the agreement of things, numerically differing from one another in some common nature or universal essence, or

their having a generical unity or identity, of which sundry instances might be given. Nor indeed is it likely, that the Greek tongue should have any name for that, which neither is a thing in nature, nor falls under human conception, viz. several things having one and the same singular essence. And, accordingly, St. Basil interprets the force of this word thus: ἀναιρεῖ τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς

ὑποστάσεως, οὐ γὰρ αὐτῷ τί ἐστὶν ἑαυτῷ ὁμοούσιον, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἕτερω· In Epist. [Epist. ccc. p. 1070. tom. ii. oper.] That it plainly takes

away the sameness of hypostasis, that is, of singular numerical essence (this being that, which the ancient fathers meant by the word hypostasis): for the same thing is not homoousios, coessential or consubstantial with itself, but always one thing with another.—Wherefore as τὸ ὁμοούσιον and συγγένεια are used by Plotinus as synonymous, in these words concerning the soul, θείων

μεστὴ διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ ὁμοούσιον, that it En. iv. l. vii. c. x. [p. 464.]

is full of Divine things, by reason of its being cognate or congenerous, and homoousios with them; so doth Athanasius in like manner use them, when he affirmeth τὰ κλήματα εἶναι

ὁμοούσια καὶ συγγενῆ τῆς ἀμπέλου, that the Epist. de Sent. Dion. p. 556. [tom. i. oper.] branches are homoousios (coessential

or consubstantial) and congenerous with the vine, or with the root thereof.—Besides which, the same father uses ὁμογενῆς, and ὁμοειδῆς, and ὁμοφυῆς, indifferently for ὁμοούσιος, in sundry places; none of which words can be thought to signify an identity of singular essence, but only of generical or specifical. And thus was the word homoousios plainly used by the council of Chalcedon,^a they affirming, that our Saviour Christ was ὁμοούσιος τῷ

^a Vide tom. ii. Concilior. p. 456. edit. Harduini.

πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, καὶ ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρώ-
 πότητα, coessential or consubstantial with the Fa-
 ther, as to his Divinity; but coessential or con-
 substantial with us men, as to his humanity.—

Where it cannot reasonably be suspected, that
 one and the same word should be taken in two
 different senses in the same sentence, so as, in the
 first place, to signify a numerical identity, but, in
 the second, a generical or specific only. But,
 lastly, which is yet more, Athanasius himself
 speaketh in like manner of our Saviour Christ's

being homoousios with us men: εἰ μὲν
 [de sentent. Dionys.] οὖν ὁμοούσιός ἐστιν ἡμῖν υἱός, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡμῖν
 ἔχει γένεσιν, ἔστω κατὰ τοῦτο ὁ υἱὸς ἀλλότριος

κατ' οὐσίαν τοῦ πατρὸς, ὡσπερ καὶ ἡ ἄμπελος τοῦ γεωργοῦ.

If the Son be coessential or consubstantial (or of
 the same essence or substance) with us men, he
 having the very same nature with us, then let him
 be in this respect a stranger to the essence or
 substance of the Father, even as the vine is to
 the essence of the husbandman.—And again,
 a little after, in the same epistle, ἢ λέγων μὴ εἶναι
 τὸν λόγον ἴδιον, τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας, ἐφρόνει τοῦτον
 ὁμοούσιον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Or did Dionysius,

Thus also in
 his first epis-
 tle to Serapion,
 ἀνθρώποι γ' οὖν
 ὅμοιοι καὶ τὴν
 ταυτότητα
 ἔχοντες ὁμοού-
 σιοί ἐσμὲν ἀλ-
 λήλων. We
 men being
 alike, and hav-
 ing the same-
 ness of nature,
 are consub-
 stantial with
 one another.
 And, p. 170.
 ὡσπερ οὖν μαί-
 νοιτ' ἀντις λέ-

think you, when he affirmed the Word
 not to be proper to the essence of the
 Father, suppose him therefore to be co-
 essential or consubstantial with us men?
 —From all which it is unquestionably
 evident, that Athanasius did not, by the
 word homoousios, understand that which
 hath the same singular and numerical
 essence with another, but the same com-
 mon generical or specific only; and,
 consequently, that he conceived the Son

to be coessential or consubstantial with the Father after that manner.

Furthermore, the true meaning of the Nicene fathers may more fully and thoroughly be perceived, by considering what that doctrine of Arius was, which they opposed and condemned. Now Arius maintained the Son or Word to be *κτίσμα*, a creature, made in time, and mutable or defectible; and, for that reason, as Athanasius tells us, *ἑτεροούσιον* and *ἀλλοτριούσιον*, of a different essence or substance from the Father, (that which is created being supposed to differ essentially or substantially from that which is uncreated.)—Wherefore the Nicene fathers, in way of opposition to this doctrine of Arius, determined, that the Son or Word was not thus *ἑτεροούσιος*, nor *ἀλλοτριούσιος*, but *ὁμοούσιος τῷ Πατρὶ*, coessential or consubstantial with the Father;—that is, not a creature, but God; or agreeing with the Father in that common nature or essence of the Godhead. So that this is that *οὐσία*, essence or substance of the ancient fathers, which is said to be the same in all the three hypostases of the Trinity, as they are called God; not a singular existent essence, but the common, general, or universal essence of the Godhead, or of the uncreated nature, called by St. Hilary, “*Natura una, non unitate personæ, sed generis;*” one nature, not by unity of person, but of kind.—Which unity of the common or general essence of the Godhead is the same thing also with that equality, which some of the ancient fathers so

γων, τὴν οἰκίαν ὁμοούσιον τοῦ οἰκοδόμου, καὶ τὸ σκάφος τοῦ ναυπηγοῦ, οὕτως ἀνεπὶ τῶν ἀν τὶς εἶποι, πάντα υἱὸν ὁμοούσιον εἶναι τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ πατρὸς. It were madness to say, that a house is coessential or consubstantial with the builder, or a ship with the shipwright; but it is proper to say, that every son is coessential or consubstantial with his father.

De Synodis, [seu Fide Orientalium, §. lxxvi. p. 1193. oper.]

much insist upon against Arius; namely, an equality of nature, as the Son and Father are both of them alike God, that essence of the Godhead (which is common to all the three persons) being, as all other essences, supposed to be indivisible. From which equality itself also does it appear, that they acknowledged no identity of singular essence, it being absurd to say, that one and the self-same thing is equal to itself. And with this equality of essence did some of these orthodox fathers themselves imply, that a certain inequality of the hypostases or persons also, in their mutual relation to one another, might be consistent. As for example, St. Austin writing

Cont. Serm. thus against the Arians: "Patris, ergo
Arian. c. xviii. et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, etiamsi dis-
[p. 451. tom. viii. oper.]

parem cogitant potestatem, naturam saltem confiteantur æqualem:" Though they conceive the power of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be unequal, yet let them, for all that, confess their nature at least to be equal.—And

3. Cont. Eu- St. Basil likewise: "Though the Son
nom. [p. 79. be in order second to the Father, be-
tom. ii. oper. cause produced by him, and in dignity
edit. Par. also, (forasmuch as the Father is the
1615.]

cause and principle of his being) yet is he not, for all that, second in nature, because there is one Divinity in them both."—And that this was indeed the meaning, both of the Nicene fathers, and of Athanasius, in their Homoousiotes, their coessentiality or consubstantiality, and coequality of the Son with the Father; namely, their having both the same common essence of the Godhead; or that the Son was no creature, as Arius contended, but truly God or uncreated likewise, will

appear undeniably from many passages in Athanasius, of which we shall here mention only some few. In his epistle concerning the Nicene council, he tells us how the Eusebian faction subscribed the form of that council, though afterward they recanted it: πάντων τε ὑπογραφάντων

ὑπέγραψαν καὶ οἱ περὶ Εὐσέβιον τούτοις τοῖς ῥήμασιν οἷς αἰτιῶνται νῦν οὔτοι· λέγω δὲ τῷ ἕκ τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ τῷ ὁμοουσίῳ, καὶ ὅτι μήτε κτίσμα ἢ ποίημα, μήτε τῶν γενητῶν ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ υἱός· ἀλλὰ γέννημα καὶ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας ὁ λόγος. All the rest subscribing, the Eusebianists themselves subscribed also to these very words, which they now find fault with; I mean, of the essence or substance, and coessential, or consubstantial, and that the Son is no creature or facture, or any of the things made, but the genuine offspring of the essence or substance of the Father.—Afterwards he declareth, how the Nicene council at first intended to have made use only of Scripture words and phrases against the

Arians: τῆς συνόδου βουλομένης τὰς μὲν τῶν Ἀρειανῶν τῆς ἀσεβείας λέξεις ἀνελεῖν· τὰς δὲ τῶν γραφῶν ὁμολογουμένας φωνὰς γράψαι, ὅτι τε υἱός ἐστιν οὐκ ἕξ οὐκ ὄντων, ἀλλ' ἕκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ σοφία, ἀλλ' οὐ κτίσμα οὐδὲ ποίημα· ἴδιον δὲ ἕκ τοῦ πατρὸς γέννημα· As that Christ was the Son of God, and not from nothing, but from God, the word and wisdom of God, and consequently, no creature or thing made. But when they perceived, that the Eusebian faction would evade all those expressions by equivocation, ἠναγκάσθησαν λοιπὸν λευκότερον εἰπεῖν τὸ ἕκ τοῦ Θεοῦ. καὶ γράψαι ἕκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶναι τὸν υἱόν, ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ τὸ ἕκ τοῦ Θεοῦ κοινὸν καὶ ἴσον, τοῦ τε υἱοῦ καὶ τῶν γενητῶν νομίζεσθαι· They conceived themselves necessitated, more plainly to declare, what they

meant by being from God, or out of him; and therefore added, that the Son was out of the substance of God, thereby to distinguish him from all created beings.—Again, a little after, in the same epistle, he adds: ἡ σύνοδος τοῦτο νοοῦσα, κάλῳς ὁμοούσιον ἔγραψεν, ἵνα τήντε τῶν αἱρετικῶν κακοθήειαν ἀναστρέψωσι· καὶ δείξωσιν ἄλλον εἶναι τῶν γενητῶν τὸν λόγον· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο γράψαντες εὐθὺς ἐπήγαγον· τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἢ κτιστόν· ἢ τρεπτόν· ἢ ποίημα· ἢ ἐξ ἐτέρας οὐσίας, τούτους ἀναθεματίζει ἡ ἀγία καὶ καθολικὴ Ἐκκλησία· The synod perceiving this, rightly declared, that the Son was homoousiós with the Father; both to cut off the subterfuges of heretics, and to shew him to be different from the creatures. For after they had decreed this, they added immediately, They who say, that the Son of God was from things that are not, or made, or mutable, or a creature, or of another substance or essence, all such does the holy and catholic church anathematize. Whereby they made it evident, that these words, Of the Father, and co-essential or consubstantial with the Father, were opposed to the impiety of those expressions of the Arians, that the Son was a creature, or thing made, and mutable, and that he was not before he was made; which he that affirmeth, contradicteth the synod, but whosoever dissents from Arius, must needs consent to these forms of the synod.—In this same epistle, to cite but one pas-

sage more out of it, χαλκός, στίλβων καὶ χρυσός, &c. ἀλλ' ἑτεροφυῆ καὶ ἑτερούσια ἀλλήλων· εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ υἱὸς οὕτως ἐστίν, ἔστω κτίσμα ὡσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς, καὶ μὴ ὁμοούσιος, εἰ δὲ υἱός ἐστι λόγος, σοφία, εἰκὼν τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀπάνυσμα, εἰκότως ὁμοούσιος ἂν εἴη· Brass and gold, silver and tin, are alike in their shining and

P. 272.

colour; nevertheless in their essence and nature are they very different from one another. If therefore the Son be such, then let him be a creature as we are, and not coessential (or consubstantial); but if he be a Son, the word, wisdom, image of the Father, and his splendour, then of right should he be accounted coessential and consubstantial.—Thus, in his epistle concerning Dionysius, we have *ἕνα τῶν γενητῶν εἶναι τὸν υἱόν*, and *μὴ ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ*: the Son's being one of the creatures, and his not being coessential or consubstantial with the Father—put for synonymous expressions, which signify one and the same thing.

P. 561.

Wherefore it seemeth to be unquestionably evident, that when the ancient orthodox fathers of the Christian church maintained, against Arius, the Son to be homoousion, coessential or consubstantial with the Father, though that word be thus interpreted, Of the same essence or substance, yet they universally understood thereby, not a sameness of singular and numerical, but of common or universal, essence only; that is, the general or specific essence of the Godhead; that the Son was no creature, but truly and properly God. But if it were needful, there might be yet more testimonies cited out of Athanasius to this purpose. As from his epistle De Synodis Arimini et Seleuciæ, where he writeth thus, concerning the difference betwixt those two words; *Ὁμοιούσιον*, of like substance—and *Ὁμοούσιον*, of the same substance*—*Οἴδατε γὰρ καὶ ὑμεῖς ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σχημάτων καὶ ποιότητων λέγεται ὅμοιον ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν οὐσιῶν οὐχ*

P. 929.

* P. 928, tom. i. oper.

Ὁμοιότης, ἀλλὰ ταυτότης ἀν λεχθείη· ἄνθρωπος γοῦν ἄνθρωπῳ ὅμοιος λέγεται οὐ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν—τῇ γὰρ οὐσίᾳ Ὁμοφυεῖς εἰσι· καὶ πάλιν ἄνθρωπος κνὶ οὐκ Ἀνόμοιος λέγεται ἀλλ' Ἐτεροφυής· Ὅν κοῦν τὸ Ὁμοφυές καὶ Ὁμοούσιον, το δὲ Ἐτεροφυές καὶ ἑτερούσιον· For even yourselves know, that similitude is not predicated of essences, or substances, but of figures and qualities only. But of essences or substances, identity or sameness is affirmed, and not similitude. For a man is not said to be like to a man, in respect of the essence or substance of humanity, but only as to figure or form; they being said, as to their essence, to be congenerous, of the same nature or kind with one another. Nor is a man properly said to be unlike to a dog, but of a different nature or kind from him. Wherefore that, which is congenerous, of the same nature, kind, or species, is also homoousion, coessential or consubstantial (of the same essence or substance), and that, which is of a different nature, kind or species, is heterousion, (of a different essence or substance.)—Again, Athanasius, in that fragment of his against the hypocrisy of Meletius, &c. concerning consubstantiality, writeth in this manner: ^a Ὁ τοίνυν ἀναιρῶν τὸ εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ, λέγων δὲ ὅμοιον, ἀναιρεῖ τὸ εἶναι Θεόν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐξηγούμενος τὸ Ὁμοούσιον, ὡς ὅμοιον τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἑτέραν τὴν οὐσίαν λέγει, Θεῷ δὲ ὁμοιόμενῃ· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, εἶναι πρεπόντως λέγει μὴ φρονῶν ὁμοούσιον, ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρώπου οὐσίας· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ οὐσίαν, ἐκ Θεοῦ ὁ υἱός, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ὁμοιώματι καθάπερ ἀνδρίας ἀνθρώπῳ· ἢ ὡς ἄνθρωπος Θεῷ, δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος ὁμοούσιον μὲν λέγων, ὁμοούσιον δὲ οὐ φρονῶν· Οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν βούλεται τὸ Ὁμοούσιον ἀκούεσθαι, ὅπερ ἐστίν, περὶ μίας καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς

^a Tom. i. oper. p. 572.

οὐσίας· ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν συνήθειαν, καὶ ἵνα διαβάλλῃ ταύτην, Ἑλληνικὴν ῥῆσιν εἰρηκένας τὸ ὁμοούσιον ῥῆμα τοῦ ἐν Ἑλληνισμῷ ἔθους ἐπ' οὐδενὶ ἑτέρῳ κείμενον ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν παραστήσαι, &c. He that denies the Son to be homoousion, consubstantial with the Father, affirming him only to be like to him, denies him to be God. In like manner, he, who retaining the word homoousion or consubstantial, interprets it notwithstanding only of similitude or likeness in substance, affirmeth the Son to be of another different substance from the Father, and therefore not God; but like to God only. Neither doth such a one rightly understand those words, "Of the substance of the Father," he not thinking the Son to be so consubstantial, or of the essence and substance of the Father, as one man is consubstantial, or of the essence or substance of another who begat him. For he who affirmeth, that the Son is not so of God, as a man is of a man, according to essence or substance; but that he is like him only as a statue is like a man, or as a man may be like to God, it is manifest, that such a one, though he use the word homoousios, yet he doth not really mean it. For he will not understand it, according to the customary signification thereof, for that, which hath one and the same essence or substance; this word being used by Greeks and Pagans in no other sense, than to signify that, which hath the same nature; as we ought to believe concerning the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. —Where we see plainly, that though the word homoousios be interpreted, That which hath one and the same essence or substance, yet is this understood of the same common nature, and as one man is of the same essence or substance with an-

other. We might here also add to this the concurrent testimonies of the other orthodox fathers; but, to avoid tediousness, we shall omit them, and only insert some passages out of St. Austin to the same purpose. For he, in his first book, *contra Maxim.* (chap. xv.^a) writeth thus: “*Duo veri homines, etsi nullus eorum filius sit alterius, unius tamen et ejusdem sunt substantiæ. Homo autem alterius hominis verus filius nullo modo potest nisi ejusdem cum patre esse substantiæ, etiamsi non sit per omnia similis patri. Quocirca verus Dei filius, et unius cum patre substantiæ est, quia verus filius est; et per omnia est patri similis, quia est Dei filius.*” Two true men, though neither of them be son to the other, yet are they both of one and the same substance. But a man, who is the true son of another man, can by no means be of a different substance from his father, although he be not in all respects like unto him. Wherefore the true Son of God is both of one substance with the Father, because he is a true Son, and he is also in all respects like to him, because he is the Son of God. Where Christ, or the Son of God, is said to be no otherwise of one substance with God the Father, than here amongst men the son is of the same substance with his father, or any one man with another. Again, the same St. Austin, in his *Respons. ad Sermonem Arianorum*,^b expresseth himself thus:

To the same purpose is that in his second book, chap. vi. “*Diversa quidem substantia*

“*Ariani nos vocitant homoousianos, quia contra eorum errorem, Græco vocabulo ὁμοούσιον defendimus, Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum; id est, unius ejusdem-*

^a Cap. xvi. §. ii. p. 503. tom. viii. oper. ed. Benedict.

^b Cap. xxxvi. p. 458. tom. viii. oper.

que substantiæ, vel, ut expressius dicamus, essentiæ (quæ οὐσία Græce appellatur) quod planius dicitur unius ejusdemque naturæ. Et tamen si quis istorum, qui nos homoousianos vocant, filium suum non cujus ipse esset, sed diversæ diceret esse naturæ, exhæredari ab ipso mallet filius, quam hoc putari. Quanta igitur impietate isti cæcantur, qui cum confiteantur unicum Dei filium, nolunt ejusdem naturæ cujus pater est confiteri, sed diversæ atque imparis, et multis modis rebusque dissimilis, tanquam non de Deo natus, sed ab illo de nihilo sit creatus; gratia filius, non natura." The Arians call us homoousians, because, in opposition to their error, we defend the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be in the language of the Greeks homoousios, that is, of one and the same substance; or, to speak more clearly, essence, this being in Greek called *ousia*, which is yet more plainly thus expressed, of one and the same nature. And yet there is none of their own sons, who thus call us homoousians, who would not as willingly be disinherited, as be accounted of a different nature from his father. How great impiety therefore are they blinded with, who, though they acknowledge, that there is one only Son of God, yet will not confess him to be of the same nature with his Father, but different and unequal, and many ways unlike him, as if he were not born of God, but created out of nothing by him, himself being a creature, and so a son, not by nature, but grace only.—Lastly (to name no more places) in his first book *De Trinitate*,^a he hath these words: "Si filius creatura non est, ejusdem cum

est Deus Pater, et Homo Mater: non tamen diversa substantia est Deus Pater et Deus Filius: sicut non est diversa substantia, Homo Mater, et Homo Filius.

^a Cap. vi. p. 534, 535. tom. viii. oper.

patre substantiæ est. Omnis enim substantia, quæ Deus non est, creatura est; et quæ creatura non est, Deus est. Et si non est filius ejusdem substantiæ, cujus est pater, ergo facta substantia est." If the Son be not a creature, then is he of the same substance with the Father; for whatever substance is not God, is creature; and whatever is not creature, is God. And therefore, if the Son be not of the same substance with the Father, he must needs be a made and created substance, and not truly God.

Lastly, That the ancient orthodox fathers, who used the word homoousios against Arius, intended not therein to assert the Son to have one and the same singular or individual essence with the Father, appeareth plainly from their disclaiming and disowning those two words, Ταυτοούσιον and Μονοούσιον. Concerning the former of which, Epiphanius thus: Καὶ οὐ λέγομεν Ταυτοούσιον, ἵνα [Hæres. Anomæor. p. 920. tom. i. op.] μὴ ἡ λέξις παρά τισι λεγομένη, Σαβελλίῳ ἀπεικασθῆ. Ταυτὸν δὲ λέγομεν τῇ θεότητι, καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ, καὶ τῇ δυνάμει. We affirm not the Son to be tautoousion, (one and the same substance with the Father) lest this should be taken in way of compliance with Sabellius; nevertheless do we assert him to be the same in Godhead, and in essence, and in power.—Where it is plain, that when Epiphanius affirmed the Son to be the same with the Father in Godhead and essence, he understood this only of a generical or specific, and not of a singular or individual sameness; namely, that the Son is no creature, but God also, as the Father is: and this he intimates to be the true and genuine sense of the word homoousios; he therefore rejecting that other word tautoousios, because it would be lia-

ble to misinterpretation, and to be taken, in the Sabellian sense, for that, which hath one and the same singular and individual essence, which the word homoousios could not be obnoxious to. And as concerning that other word monoousios, Athanasius himself, in his Exposition of Faith, thus expressly condemns it: οὐτε γὰρ υἱοπατέρα φρονούμεν, ὡς οἱ Σαβέλλιοι Μονοούσιον καὶ οὐχ Ὁμοούσιον. We do not think the Son to be really one and the same with the Father, as the Sabellians do, and to be monoousios, and not homoousios; they thereby destroying the very being of the Son.—Where ousia, essence or substance, in that fictitious word monoousios, is taken for singular or existent essence, the whole Deity being thus said, by Sabellius, to have only one singular essence or hypostasis in it: whereas in the word homoousios is understood a common or universal, generical or specific essence; the Son being thus said to agree with the Father in the common essence of the Godhead, as not being a creature. Wherefore Athanasius here disclaimeth a monoousian trinity, as Epiphanius did before a tautoousian; both of them a trinity of mere names and notions, or inadequate conceptions of one and the same singular essence or hypostasis; they alike distinguishing them from the homoousian trinity, as a trinity of real hypostases or persons, that have severally their own singular essence, but agree in one common and universal essence of the Godhead, they being none of them creatures, but all uncreated, or creators. From whence it is plain that the ancient orthodox fathers asserted no such thing as one and the same singular or numerical essence, of the several per-

sons of the Trinity; this, according to them, being not a real trinity, but a trinity of mere names, notions, and inadequate conceptions only, which is thus disclaimed and declared against by Athanasius; *Τριάς δέ ἐστὶν οὐχ ἕως ὀνόματος μόνου, καὶ φαντασίᾳ λέξεως, ἀλλὰ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ ὑπάρξει Τριάς.* The Trinity is not a trinity of mere names and words only, but of hypostases, truly and really existing.—But the homoousian Trinity of the orthodox went exactly in the middle, betwixt that monoousian trinity of Sabellius, which was a trinity of different notions or conceptions only of one and the self-same thing; and that other heteroousian trinity of Arius, which was a trinity of separate and heterogeneous substances (one of which only was God, and the other creatures); this being a trinity of hypostases or persons numerically differing from one another, but all of them agreeing in one common or general essence of the Godhead or the uncreated nature, which is eternal and infinite. Which was also thus particularly declared by Athanasius; *οὔτε ἑλαττόν τι*

Ad Serap. φρονεῖ ἡ καθολικὴ Ἐκκλησία, ἵνα μὴ εἰς τοὺς νῦν
Ep. p. 202. κατὰ Καιάφαν Ἰουδαίους, καὶ εἰς Σαβέλλιον περι-
πέση· οὔτε πλεῖον ἐπινοεῖ, ἵνα μὴ εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πολυθεό-
τητα κατακυλισθῇ. The catholic church doth neither believe less than this homoousian Trinity, lest it should comply with Judaism, or sink into Sabellianism; nor yet more than this, lest, on the other hand, it should tumble down into Arianism, which is the same with Pagan Polytheism and idolatry;—it introducing in like manner the worshipping of creatures together with the Creator.

And now, upon all these considerations, our Platonic Christian would conclude, that the ortho-

^a Epistol. ad Serapion. tom. i. opér. p. 202.

dox Trinity of the ancient Christian church did herein agree with the genuinely Platonic trinity, that it was not monoousian, one sole singular essence, under three notions, conceptions, or modes only, but three hypostases or persons. As, likewise, the right Platonic trinity does agree with the Trinity of the ancient orthodox Christians in this, that it is not heteroousian, but homoousian, coessential, or consubstantial; none of their three hypostases being creatures, or particular beings, made in time; but all of them uncreated, eternal, and infinite.

Notwithstanding all which, it must be granted, that though this homoousiotes, or coessentiality of the three persons in the Trinity, does imply them to be all God, yet does it not follow from thence of necessity that they are therefore one God. What then? shall we conclude, that Athanasius himself also entertained that opinion before mentioned and exploded, of the three persons in the Trinity being but three individuals under the same species (as Peter, Paul, and Timothy), and having no other natural unity or identity than specific only? Indeed, some have confidently fastened this upon Athanasius, because, in those Dialogues of the Trinity,^a published amongst his works, and there entitled to him, the same is grossly owned, and in defence thereof this absurd paradox maintained, that Peter, Paul, and Timothy, though they be three hypostases, yet are not to be accounted three men, but only then when they dissent from one another, or disagree in will or opinion. But it is certain, from several passages in those dialogues themselves, that they could not be written by Athanasius; and there hath been also another

^a Dialog. I. p. 160. tom. ii. oper.

father found for them, to wit, Maximus the martyr. Notwithstanding which, thus much must not be denied by us, that Athanasius, in those others his reputedly-genuine writings, does sometime approach so near hereunto, that he lays no small stress upon this homouoiotes, this coessentiality and common nature of the Godhead, to all the three persons, in order to their being one God. For thus, in that book entitled, Concerning the common Essence of the Three Persons, and the chapter inscribed, "Ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶ τρεῖς θεοί, That there are not three gods—doth Athanasius lay his foundation here. When to that question proposed, How it can be said, that the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, and yet that there are not three gods? the first reply which he makes is this: ὅπου κοινὰ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, κοινὸν καὶ ὄνομα τῆς ἀξίας· οἷον ὁ θεὸς τὰ εἰς πλήθη διηρημένα ἀπὸ μιᾶς φύσεως, ἐνὶ ὀνόματι καλεῖ· καὶ ὅτε ὀργίζεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὸν πάντα ἄνθρωπον τῇ ὀργῇ ὑποκείμενον, ἕνα ἄνθρωπον καλεῖ· καὶ ὅτι διαλλάσσεται τῷ κόσμῳ, ὡς ἐνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ διαλλάσσεται· Where there is a communion of nature, there is also one common name of dignity bestowed. And thus doth God himself call things, divided into multitudes from one common nature, by one singular name. For both when he is angry with men, doth he call all those, who are the objects of his anger, by the name of one man; and when he is reconciled to the world, is he reconciled thereto as to one man.—The first instances, which he gives hereof, are in Gen. the sixth, 3d and 7th verses; "My Spirit shall not always strive with man, and I will destroy man whom I have created."—Upon which, Athanasius makes this reflection; καίτοι οὐκ ἦν εἷς, ἀλλὰ μυριάδες ἀπειροί· ἀλλὰ τῷ ὀνόματι τῆς φύσεως, τὸν πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἕνα ἐκά-

λεσεν ἄνθρωπον διὰ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς οὐσίας· Though there was not then only one man, but infinite myriads of men, nevertheless by the name of one nature, doth the Scripture call all those men one man, by reason of their community of essence or substance.—Again, he commenteth in like manner upon that other Scripture pas-
P. 213, 214.
 sage, Exodus xv. 1. “The horse and his rider hath he thrown into the sea ;” “Οτε ἐξῆλθε Φαραὼ κατὰ τὴν θάλασσαν, πίπτων μετὰ μυρίων ἀρμάτων ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ, καὶ ἦσαν πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι οἱ βυθισθέντες μετ’ ἐκείνου, καὶ ἵπποι πολλοί· ὁ δὲ Μωσῆς εἰδὼς, ὅτι πάντων τῶν βυθισθέντων μία ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἵππων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν λέγει, ἵππον καὶ ἀναβάτην ἔρριψεν εἰς θάλασσαν· τὰ πλήθη τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκάλεσεν ἓνα ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τὰ πλήθη τῶν ἵππων ἐκάλεσεν ἵππον ἓνα, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς φύσεως·
 When Pharaoh went out to the Red Sea, and fell, with infinite chariots in the same ; and there were many men, that were drowned together with him, and many horses ; yet Moses knowing, that there was but one common nature of all those, that were drowned, speaketh thus both of the men and horses ; The Lord hath thrown both the horse and the rider into the sea : he calling such a multitude of men but one singular man, and such a multitude of horses but one horse.—Whereupon
 Athanasius thus concludeth ; εἰ οὖν ἐν τοῖς
P. 214.
 ἀνθρώποις, ὅπου συγκέχεται τὰ τῆς φύσεως· ὅπου διάφορα τὰ τῆς μορφῆς καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ βουλῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν οὔτε γνώμη ἴση, οὔτε μορφή, οὔτε ἰσχύς· καὶ διάφοροι γλῶτται, διὸ καὶ ἄνθρωποι μέροπες λέγονται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως πᾶσα ἡ οἰκουμένη εἰς ἄνθρωπος ἐκλήθη· ὅπου δὲ ἀμέριστος ἡ ἀξία, μία βασιλεία, μία δύναμις, καὶ βουλὴ, καὶ ἐνέργεια, ἰδιάζουσα τὴν τριάδα ἀπὸ τῆς κτίσεως, Ἐνα λέγω Θεόν. If therefore amongst men, where

the things of nature are confounded, and where there are differences of form, power and will (all men, not having the same disposition of mind, nor form, nor strength), as also different languages (from whence men are called by the poets *Mero-pes*), nevertheless, by reason of the community of nature, the whole world is called one man; might not that Trinity of persons, where there is an undivided dignity, one kingdom, one power, one will, and one energy, be much rather called one God?—But though it be true, that Athanasius in this place (if at least this were a genuine *fœtus of Athanasius*) may justly be thought to attribute too much to this *κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως καὶ οὐσίας*, a common nature, essence, or substance—of all the three persons, as to the making of them to be truly and properly one God; and that those Scripture passages are but weakly urged to this purpose: yet it is plain, that he did not acquiesce in this only, but addeth other things to it also, as their having not only one will, but also one energy or action, of which more afterwards. Moreover,

P. 467.

Athanasius elsewhere plainly implieth, that this common essence or nature of the Godhead is not sufficient alone to make all the three hypostases one God. As in his fourth oration against the Arians, where he tells us, that his Trinity of Divine hypostases cannot therefore be accounted three gods, nor three principles, because they are not resembled by him to three original suns, but only to the sun, and its splendour, and the light from both. Now, three suns, according to the language of Athanasius, have *κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως καὶ οὐσίας*, a common nature, essence, and substance—and therefore are coessen-

tial or consubstantial; and since they cannot be accounted one sun, it is manifest, that, according to Athanasius, this specific identity or unity, is not sufficient to make the three Divine hypostases one God. Again, the same Athanasius, in his Exposition of Faith,^a writeth thus; οὔτε τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις μεμερισμένας καθ' ἑαυτάς, ὡσπερ σωματοφυῶς ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ λογίσασθαι, ἵνα μὴ πολυθεΐαν ὡς τὰ ἔθνη φρονήσωμεν. Neither do we acknowledge three hypostases, divided or separate by themselves (as is to be seen corporeally in men) that we may not comply with the Pagan Polytheism.—From whence it is evident, that neither three separate men, though coessential to Athanasius, were accounted by him to be one man, nor yet the community of the specific nature and essence of the Godhead can alone, by itself, exclude Polytheism from the Trinity. Wherefore, the true reason, why Athanasius laid so great a stress upon this homoussiotes, or coessentiality of the Trinity, in order to the unity of the Godhead in them, was not because this alone was sufficient to make them one God, but because they could not be so without it. This Athanasius often urges against the Arians, as in his fourth oration, where he tells them, πολλοὺς ἂν εἰσάγοιεν [θεοὺς] διὰ τὸ ἑτεροειδὲς αὐτῶν, that they must needs introduce a plurality of gods, because of the heterogeneity of their trinity.—And again afterwards determining, that there is ἐν εἶδος τῆς θεότητος, one species of the Godhead in Father, Son, and Spirit, he adds;^b οὕτω καὶ ἓνα διὰ τῆς τριάδος ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι τὸν θεόν· καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον εὐσεβέστερον λέγομεν τῆς πολυειδοῦς τῶν αἰρετικῶν θεότητος, ὅτι τὴν μίαν ἐν τριάδι θεότητα φρονοῦμεν· εἰ γὰρ

^a Tom. i. oper. p. 241.^b P. 468.

μη οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ποίημα καὶ κτίσμα ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος——ἀνάγκη λέγειν αὐτοὺς δύο θεοὺς, ἓνα μὲν κτιστὴν, τὸν δὲ ἕτερον κτιστόν· And thus do we acknowledge one only God in the Trinity; and maintain it more religiously, than those heretics do, who introduce a multiform deity, consisting of divers species; we supposing only one universal Godhead in the whole. For if it be not thus, but the Son be a creature, made out of nothing, however called god by these Arians, then must he and his Father of necessity be two gods; one of them a creator, the other a creature.—In like manner, in his book of the Nicene council, he affirmeth, concerning the

P. 275. Arians, τρεῖς θεοὺς τρόπον τινὰ κηρύττουσιν εἰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις ξένας, ἀλλήλων παντάπασι κεχωρισμένας, διαιροῦντες τὴν ἁγίαν μονάδα, that they make in a manner three gods, dividing the holy monad into three heterogeneous substances, separate from one another.—Whereas the right orthodox Trinity, on the contrary, is elsewhere thus described by Ep. ad Serap. P. 202. ἡμῖν; Τριάς τοίνυν ἁγία καὶ τελεία ἐστίν, ἐν πατρὶ, καὶ υἱῷ, καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι θεολογουμένη, οὐδὲν ἀλλότριον ἢ ἕξωθεν ἐπιμιγνύμενον ἔχουσα, οὐδὲ ἐκ δημιουργοῦ καὶ γεννητοῦ συνεσταμένη, ἀλλ' ὅλη τοῦ κτίζειν καὶ δημιουργεῖν οὔσα· The holy and perfect Trinity theologised in the Father, Son, and Spirit, hath nothing alien, foreign, or extraneous intermingled with it; nor is it compounded of heterogeneous things, the creator and creature joined together.—And whereas the Arians interpreted that of our Saviour Christ, “I and my Father are one,” only in respect of consent or agreement of will, Athanasius shewing the insufficiency hereof, concludeth thus, ἀνάγκη λοιπὸν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν νοεῖν καὶ τὴν υἱοῦ καὶ

πατρός ἐνότητα, wherefore, besides this consent of will, there must of necessity be another unity of essence or substance also, acknowledged in the Father and the Son.—Where by unity of essence or substance, that Athanasius did not mean a unity of singular and individual, but of general or universal essence only, appears plainly from these following words :

τὰ μὲν γὰρ γενητὰ κἀν
 συμφωνίαν ἔχρη πρὸς τὸν πεποιηκότα, ἀλλ' ἐν Ep. de Syn. Arim, et Sel. p. 923.
 κινήσει καὶ μετουσίᾳ ταύτην ἔχει, ὥσπερ ὁ μὴ φυ-

λάξας ἐκβέβληται τῶν οὐρανῶν, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ὧν γέννημα, οὐσία καὶ ἐν ἔστιν αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ· for those things, which are made or created, though they may have an agreement of will with their Creator, yet have they this by participation only, and in a way of motion; as he, who retaining not the same, was cast out of heaven. But the Son, being begotten from the essence or substance of the Father, is essentially or substantially one with him.—So that the opposition here is betwixt unity of consent with God in created beings, which are mutable, and unity of essence in that, which is uncreated, and immutably of the same will with the Father. There are also many other places in Athanasius, which though some may understand of the unity of singular essence, yet were they not so by him intended, but either of generic or specific essence only, or else in such other sense as shall be afterwards declared. As, for example, in his fourth oration, τὴν μίαν

ἐν τριάδι θεότητα φρονοῦμεν, we acknowledge P. 468.
 only one Godhead in the Trinity;—where the following words plainly imply this to be understood, in part at least, of one common or general essence of the Godhead, εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἔξ

οὐκ ὄντων ποίημα καὶ κτίσμα ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, &c. Because if it be not so, but the Word be a creature, made out of nothing, he is either not truly God, or if he be called by that name, then must they be two gods, one a creator, the other a creature.—Again,

P. 456. *ἐν εἰσὶν ὁ υἱὸς καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τῇ ἰδιότητι καὶ οἰκειότητι τῆς φύσεως, καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τῆς μίας θεότητος.* That the Son and the Father are one thing in the propriety of nature, and in the sameness of one Godhead;—it is evident from the context, that this is not to be understood of a sameness of singular essence, but partly of a common and generical one, and partly of such another sameness or unity, as will be hereafter expressed. Lastly, when the three hypostases are somewhere^a said by him to be *μία οὐσία*, one essence or substance—this is not to be understood neither in that place, as if they had all three the same singular essence, but in some of those other senses beforementioned.

But though Athanasius no where declare the three hypostases of the Trinity to have only one and the same singular essence, but, on the contrary, denies them to be monoousian; and though he lay a great stress upon their *εἰδικὴ ἐνότης*, their specific or generic unity, and coessentiality, in order to their being one God, forasmuch as without this they could not be God at all; yet doth he not rely wholly upon this, as alone sufficient to that purpose, but addeth certain other considerations thereunto, to make it out, in manner as followeth. First, that this Trinity is not a trinity of principles, but that there is only one principle or fountain of the Godhead in it, from which the

^a Vide Question. vi. p. 442. tom. ii. oper. Athanas.

other are derived. Thus doth he write in his fifth oration,^a *μία ἀρχή, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο εἷς θεός*, there is but one principle, and accordingly but one God.—Again, in his book against the Sabellianists, *οὐκ εἰσὶ δύο θεοὶ, ὅτι μηδὲ δύο πατέρες, μηδὲ ἑτεροούσιος τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἢ γεγενημένου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὰς εἰσάγων δύο, δύο κηρύττει Θεοὺς, αὕτη Μαρκίωνος ἢ δυσσέβεια*. There are not two gods, both because there are not two fathers, and because that, which is begotten, is not of a different essence from that which beget. For he that introduceth two principles, preacheth two gods; which was the impiety of Marcion.—Accordingly, the same Athanasius declareth, *τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀρχὴν καὶ ρίζαν καὶ πηγὴν εἶναι τοῦ υἱοῦ*, that the essence or substance of the Father is the principle, and root, and fountain of the Son.—And in like manner doth he approve of this doctrine of Dionysius, *ὅτι πηγὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν πάντων ἐστὶν ὁ θεός, ποταμὸς δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ προχέομενος ὁ υἱός*. That God (the Father) is the first fountain of all good things, but the Son a river poured out from him.—To the same purpose is it also, when he compareth the Father and the Son to the water and the vapour arising from it; to the light and the splendour; to the prototype and the image. And he concludeth the unity of the Godhead from hence, in this manner: *τὴν θείαν τριάδα εἷς ἕνα ὡσπερ εἷς κορυφὴν τινα, τὸν θεὸν τῶν ὅλων* De Syn. Nic. P. 275. τὸν παντοκράτορα λέγω, συγκεφαλαιοῦσθαι καὶ συναῆσθαι *πᾶσα ἀνάγκη*. The Divine Trinity must needs be collected and gathered up together, under that omnipotent God of the whole world, as under one head.—But the chief force of this consideration

^a P. 509.

is only to exclude the doctrine of the Marcionists, who made more independent and self-existent principles and gods. Notwithstanding which, it might still be objected, that the Christian Trinity is a trinity of distinct subordinate gods; in opposition whereunto, this argument seems only to prepare the way to what follows; namely, of the close conjunction of these three hypostases into one God: forasmuch, as were they three independent principles, there could not be any coalescence of them into one.

In the next place, therefore, Athanasius further addeth, that these three Divine hypostases are not *μεμερισμένοι* and *κεχωρισμένοι*, separate and disjointed beings, but *ἀδιαίρετοι*, indivisibly united to one another. Thus in his fifth oration; ^a *πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν ἐν ὄντας τῇ θεότητι, καὶ τῷ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἀμέριστον, καὶ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀχώριστον εἶναι τὸν λόγον ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς*. The Father and the Son are both one thing in the Godhead, and in that the Word, being begotten from him, is indivisibly and inseparably conjoined with him.—Where, when he affirmeth the Father and the Son to be one in the Godhead; it is plain, that he doth not mean them to have one and the same singular essence, but only generical and universal; because in the following words he supposes them to be two, but indivisibly and inseparably united together. Again, in his book *De Sent. Dionys.* *ἔστιν ἀδιαίρετος τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱός, ὡς ἔστι τὸ ἀπαύγασμα πρὸς τὸ φῶς*, the Son is indivisible from the Father, as the splendour is from the light.—And afterwards, in the same book, he insisteth further upon this point, according to the sense of Dionysius, after this manner; ^b *ὁ δὲ*

^a P. 529.^b P. 566.

ἴδιον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας τον υἱὸν εἶναι διδάσκει, ὡς ἔστιν ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὸν νοῦν καὶ ποταμὸς πρὸς τὴν πηγὴν· εἰ μὲν οὖν διαιρεῖν καὶ ἀποξενοῦν τὸν λόγον καὶ τὸν νοῦν τις δύναται, ἢ τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ τὴν πηγὴν μερίσαι καὶ τειχίσαι διελεῖν, ἢ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα ἅμα διελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ φωτός, &c. Dionysius teacheth, that the Son is cognate with the Father, and indivisible from him, as reason is from the mind, and the river from the fountain. Who is there, therefore, that would go about to alienate reason from the mind, and to separate the river from the fountain, making up a wall between them? or to cut off the splendour from the light?—Thus also in his epistle to Serapion, that the Holy Ghost is not a creature, ἢ διέ-
 λέτωσαν πρῶτον αὐτοὶ τοῦ ἀπαυγάσματος τὸ φῶς, P. 194.
 ἢ τὴν σοφίαν τοῦ σοφοῦ, ἢ μὴ εἰπάτωσαν, πῶς
 ἐστι ταῦτα· Let these men first divide the splendour from the light, or wisdom from him that is wise; or else let them wonder no more how these things can be.—Elsewhere Athanasius calls the whole Trinity *τριάδα ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἠνωμένην πρὸς ἑαυτὴν*, a Trinity undivided and united to itself.—Which Athanasian indivisibility of the Trinity is not so to be understood, as if three were not three in it; but, first of all, that neither of these could be without the other, as the original light or sun could not be without the splendour, nor the splendour without the original light, and neither one nor the other of them without a diffused derivative light. Wherefore God the Father being an eternal sun, must needs have also an eternal splendour, and an eternal light. And, secondly, that these are so nearly and intimately conjoined together, that there is a kind of *συνέχεια*, continuity, betwixt them; which yet is not to be un-

derstood in the way of corporeal things, but so as is agreeable to the nature of things incorporeal.

Thirdly, Athanasius ascendeth yet higher, affirming the hypostases of the Trinity not only to be indivisibly conjoined with one another, but also to have a mutual inexistence in each other, which later Greek fathers^a have called *ἐμπεριχώρησιν*, their circuminsession. To this purpose does P. 665. [tom. i. oper. Libro de Sentent. Dionys. p. 565.] he cite the words of Dionysius, ἀπόρροια γὰρ νοῦ λόγος, καὶ ἀπὸ καρδίας διὰ στόματος, ἐξοχετεύεται, ἕτερος γεγόμενος τοῦ ἐν καρδίᾳ λόγου, καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἑκάτερος ἐν ἑκατέρῳ, ἕτερος ὢν θατέρου, καὶ ἐν εἰσὶν ὄντες δύο· οὕτω καὶ ὁ πατήρ καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐν, καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐλέχθησαν εἶναι· for reason is the efflux of the mind, which in men is derived from the heart into the tongue, where it is become another reason or word, differing from that in the heart; and yet do these both mutually exist in each other, they belonging to one another; and so though being two, are one thing. Thus are the Father and the Son one thing, they being said to exist in each other.—And Athanasius further illustrates this also by certain similitudes; as that again of the original light and the splendour, he affirming *φῶς εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀπανάσματι, καὶ ἀπάνασμα ἐν τῷ ἡλίῳ*, that the original light is in the splendour, and again the splendour in the sun;—and also that of the prototype and the image, or the king and his picture; which he thus insisteth upon: Orat. iv. p. 457. ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι τοῦ βασιλέως τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ μορφή ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐν τῷ βασιλεῖ τὸ ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι εἶδος ἐστίν· In the picture is contained the form and figure of the king, and in the king the form and figure of

^a See Petav. lib. iv. de Trinitate, cap. xvi. p. 263. tom. ii. Dogmat. theolog.

the picture. And therefore if any one, when he had seen the picture, should afterward desire to see the king, the picture would by a *prosopopœia* bespeak him after this manner: *ἐγὼ καὶ* Orat. iv. p.

ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐν ἐσμέν, ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἰμι, καὶ κεῖ- 457.

νός ἐν ἐμοί· καὶ ὁ ὄρας ἐν ἐμοί, τοῦτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ βλέπεις, καὶ ὁ εὐρακὰς ἐν ἐκείνῳ, τοῦτο βλέπεις ἐν ἐμοί· ὁ γὰρ προσκυνῶν τὴν εἰκόνα, ἐν αὐτῇ προσκυνεῖ τὸν βασιλέα· I and the king am one, for I am in him, and he is in me; and what you take notice of in me, the same may you observe in him also; and what you see in him, you may see likewise in me: he, therefore, that worshippeth the image, therein worshippeth the king, the image being nothing but the form of the king.—Elsewhere, in the fourth oration, he thus insisteth upon this particular: *ἔστι γὰρ ὁ* P. 456.

υἱὸς ἐν τῷ πατρὶ, ὥσγε νοεῖν ἕξεστιν, ἐπειδὴ σύμ-

παν τὸ εἶναι τοῦ υἱοῦ, τοῦτο τῆς πατρὸς οὐσίας ἰδίον ἐστιν, ὡς ἐκ φωτός ἀπαύγασμα, καὶ ἐκ πηγῆς ποταμός, ὥστε τὸν ὄρωντα τὸν υἱὸν ὄραν τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἴδιον. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἴδιον, τοῦτο ὁ υἱὸς τυγχάνει ὦν, ὡς ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγασματι ὁ ἥλιος, καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ ἡ πηγὴ. The Son is in the

Father, as may be conceived from hence; because the whole being of the Son is proper to the essence of the Father, he being derived from it, as the splendour from the light, and the river from the fountain: so that he, who sees the Son, sees that which is the Father's own and proper. Again, the Father is in the Son, because that which is the Father's own and proper, that is the Son; accordingly as the sun is also in the splendour, the mind in reason, and the fountain in the river.—What cavils the Arians had against this doctrine, Athanasius also informs us: *ἤρξαντο δια-*

Orat. iv. [p. 453.] *σύρειν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου λεγόμενον, Ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί· λέγοντες, πῶς δύναται οὗτος ἐν ἐκείνῳ, κακείνος ἐν τούτῳ χωρεῖν; ἢ πῶς ὅλως δύναται ὁ πατὴρ μείζων ὢν, ἐν τῷ νιῷ ἐλάττωι ὄντι χωρεῖν· καίτοι τί θαυμαστὸν εἰ ὁ υἱὸς ἐν τῷ πατρὶ, ὅπουγε καὶ περὶ ἡμῶν γέγραπται, Ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν.* Here the Arians begin to quarrel with that of our Lord, "I am in the Father, and the Father in me;" objecting, How is it possible, that both the former should be in the latter, and the latter in the former? or how can the Father, being greater, be received in the Son, who is lesser? And yet what wonder is it if the Son should be in the Father; since it is written of us men also, that "in him we live, and move, and have our being?"—In way of reply whereunto, Athanasius first observes, that the ground of this Arian cavillation was the grossness of their apprehensions, and that they did *τὰ ἀσώματα σωματικῶς ἐκλαμβάνειν*, conceive of incorporeal things after a corporeal manner.—And then does he add, *οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἐκεῖνοι νομίζουσιν, ἀντεμβιβαζόμενοι εἰς ἀλλήλους εἰσίν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀγγείοις κενόις ἐξ ἀλλήλων πληρουμένοις, ὥστε τὸν μὲν υἱὸν πληροῦν τὸ κοῖλον τοῦ πατρὸς, τὸν δὲ πατέρα πληροῦν τὸ κοῖλον τοῦ υἱοῦ, καὶ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν μὴ εἶναι πλήρη καὶ τέλειον.* For the Father and Son are not, as they suppose, transvasated and poured out one into another, as into an empty vessel; as if the Son filled up the concavity of the Father, and again, the Father that of the Son; and neither of them were full or perfect in themselves. For all this is proper to bodies: wherefore though the Father be, in some sense, greater than the Son; yet notwithstanding may he be in him after an incorporeal manner.—And he replieth to their last cavil thus: "That

the Son is not so in the Father, as we ourselves are said to live and move, and be in God ;” *αὐτὸς γὰρ ὡς ἐκ πηγῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ἐστι ζωὴ, ἐν ᾗ τὰ πάντα ζωογονεῖται καὶ συνέστηκεν, οὐ γὰρ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν ζώῳ ζῆ, &c.* For he himself, from the fountain of the Father, is that life, in whom all things are quickened and consist ; neither does he, who is the life, live in another life, which were to suppose him not to be the life itself.—“Nor (saith he) must it be conceived, that the Father is no otherwise in the Son, than he is in holy men corroborating of them ; for the Son himself is the power and wisdom of God, and all created beings are sanctified by a participation of him in the Spirit.” Wherefore this perichoresis, or mutual in-being of the Father and the Son, is to be understood after a peculiar manner, so as that they are really thereby one ; and what the Son and Holy Ghost doth, the Father doth in them, according to that of Athanasius, ^a *ἡ τοῦ υἱοῦ θεότης τοῦ πατρὸς θεότης ἐστὶ καὶ οὕτως ἐν τῷ υἱῷ τὴν τῶν πάντων πρόνοιαν ποιεῖται.* The Godhead of the Son is the Godhead of the Father ; and so the Father exercises a providence over all things in the Son.

Lastly, The same Athanasius, in sundry places, still further supposes those three Divine hypostases to make up one entire Divinity, after the same manner as the fountain and the stream make up one entire river ; or the root, and the stock, and the branches, one entire tree. And in this sense, also, is the whole Trinity said by him to be *μία θεότης*, and *μία φύσις*, and *μία οὐσία*, and *εἷς θεός*, one Divinity, and one nature, and one essence, and one God.—And accordingly the word homoiousios seems here to be taken by Athanasius in a

^a Pag. 457.

further sense, besides that before mentioned; not only for things agreeing in one common and general essence, as three individual men are coessential with one another; but also for such as concurrently together make up one entire thing, and are therefore jointly essential thereunto. For when he affirmeth, τὸ φυτόν εἶναι ρίζης ὁμοφύες, and τὰ κλήματα ὁμοούσια τῆς ἀμπέλου, that the tree is congenerous or homogeneal with the root, and the branches coessential with the vine;—his meaning is, that the root, stock, and branches, are not only of one kind, but also all together make up the entire essence of one plant or tree. In like manner, those three hypostases, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are not only congenerous and coessential, as having all the essence of the Godhead alike in them, but also as concurrently making up one entire Divinity. Accordingly whereunto, Athanasius further concludes, that these three Divine hypostases have not a consent of will only, but essentially one and the self-same will, and that they do also jointly produce *ad extra*, μίαν ἐνέργειαν, one and the self-same energy, operation, or action; nothing being peculiar to the Son, as such, but only the economy of the incarnation: Ὁμοία ἐαυτῇ.

Ep. ad Serap. καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἡ Τριάς· καὶ μία ταύτης ἡ ἐνέργεια· ὁ γὰρ Πατὴρ διὰ τοῦ Λόγου, ἐν τῷ Πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ τὰ πάντα ποιεῖ· καὶ οὕτως ἡ ἐμότης τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος σώζεται· καὶ οὕτως εἰς Θεὸς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ κηρύττεται ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων, καὶ διὰ πάντων, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν· ἐπὶ πάντων μὲν ὡς πατὴρ, ὡς ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ· διὰ πάντων δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου· ἐν πᾶσι δὲ, ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ· The Trinity is like itself, and by nature indivisible, and there is one energy or action of it; for the Father by the Word, in the Holy Ghost, doth all things.

And thus is the unity of the holy Trinity conserved, and one God preached in the church: namely, such as is above all, and by or through all, and in all. Above all, as the Father, the principle and fountain; though all, by the Word; and in all, by the Holy Spirit.—And elsewhere he writeth often to the same purpose. Thus have we given a true and full account, how, according to Athanasius, the three Divine hypostases, though not monoousios, but homoousios only, are really but one God or Divinity. In all which doctrine of his there is nothing but what a true and genuine Platonist would readily subscribe to. From whence it may be concluded, that the right Platonic trinity differs not so much from the doctrine of the ancient church, as some late writers have supposed.

Hitherto hath the Platonic Christian endeavoured partly to rectify and reform the true and genuine Platonic trinity, and partly to reconcile it with the doctrine of the ancient church. Nevertheless, to prevent all mistakes, we shall here declare, that wheresoever this most genuine Platonic trinity may be found to differ, not only from the Scripture itself, (which yet notwithstanding is the sole rule of faith) but also from the form of the Nicene and Constantinopolitan councils; and further from the doctrine of Athanasius too, in his genuine writing, (whether it be in their inequality, or in any thing else) it is there utterly disclaimed and rejected by us. For as for that Creed, commonly called Athanasian, which was written a long time after by some other hand; since at first it derived all its authority, either from the name of Athanasius, to whom it

was entitled, or else because it was supposed to be an epitome and abridgment of his doctrine; this (as we conceive) is therefore to be interpreted according to the tenor of that doctrine, contained in the genuine writings of Athanasius. Of whom we can think no otherwise, than as a person highly instrumental and serviceable to Divine Providence, for the preserving of the Christian church from lapsing, by Arianism, into a kind of pagan and idolatrous Christianity; in religiously worshipping of those, which themselves concluded to be creatures; and by means of whom especially, the doctrine of the Trinity, (which before fluctuated in some loose uncertainty) came to be more punctually stated and settled.

Now the reason why we introduced the Platonic Christian here thus apologizing was, first, because we conceived it not to be the interest of Christianity, that the ancient Platonic trinity should be made more discrepant from the Christian, than indeed it is. And, secondly, because, as we have already proved, the ancient and genuine Platonic trinity was doubtless anti-Arian, or else the Arian trinity anti-Platonic; the second and third hypostases, in the Platonic trinity, being both eternal, infinite, and immutable. And as for those Platonic *βαθμοὶ*, or gradations, so much spoken of, these (by St. Cyril's^a leave) were of a different kind from the Arian, there being not the inequality of creatures in them to the Creator. Wherefore Socrates, the ecclesiastic historian, not without cause wonders, how those two presbyters, Georgius and Timotheus, should adhere to the Arian faction, since they were ac-

^a Advers. Julian. lib. viii. p. 270. et lib. i. p. 34.

counted such great readers of Plato and L. vii. c. vi.
 Origen ; θανμάσαι οὖν μοι ἔπεισι, πῶς οὗτοι οἱ [p. 343.]
ἄνδρες, τῇ Ἀρειανῶν θρησκείᾳ παρέμειναν, ὧν ὁ μὲν Πλάτωνα
ἀεὶ μετὰ χεῖρας εἶχεν, ὁ δὲ τὸν Ὀριγένην ἀνέπνεεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ
Πλάτων τὸ Δεύτερον καὶ τὸ Τρίτον αἴτιον, ὡς αὐτὸς ὀνομά-
ζειν εἴωθεν, ἀρχὴν ὑπάρξεως, εἰληφέναι φησί· καὶ Ὀριγένης
συναίδιον πανταχοῦ ὁμολογεῖ τὸν υἱὸν τῷ πατρὶ· It seems
 to me wonderful, how those two persons should
 persist in the Arian persuasion ; one of them having
 always Plato in his hands, and the other con-
 tinually breathing Origen. Since Plato no where
 affirmeth his first and second cause (as he was
 wont to call them) to have had any beginning of
 their existence ; and Origen every where confess-
 eth the Son to be coeternal with the Father.

Besides which, another reason for this apology
 of the Christian Platonist was, because as the Pla-
 tonic Pagans after Christianity did approve of the
 Christian doctrine concerning the Logos, as that
 which was exactly agreeable with their own ; so
 did the generality of the Christian fathers, be-
 fore and after the Nicene council, represent the
 genuine Platonic trinity as really the same thing
 with the Christian, or as approaching so near to
 it, that they differed chiefly in circumstances, or
 the manner of expression. The former of these is
 evident from that famous passage of Amelius con-
 temporary with Plotinus, recorded by Eusebius,
 St. Cyril, and Theodoret ; Καὶ οὗτος ἄρα Pr. Ev. l. xi.
*ἦν ὁ Λόγος, καθ' ὃν αἰεὶ ὄντα, τὰ γινόμενα ἐγι- c. ix. [cap.
νετο, ὡς ἂν καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ἀξιώσειε, καὶ νῆ Δί' xix. p. 540.]
ὄν ὁ Βάρβαρος ἀξιοῖ ἐν τῇ τῆς ἀρχῆς τάξει τε καὶ ἀξία καθεσ-
τηκότα, πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι, καὶ Θεὸν εἶναι· δι' οὗ πάνθ' ἀπ-
λῶς γεγενῆσθαι· ἐν ᾧ τὸ γινόμενον ζῶν καὶ ζῶην καὶ ὄν πε-
*φνέκναι· καὶ εἰς τὰ σώματα πίπτειν καὶ σάρκα ἐνδυσάμενον,**

φαντάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, μετὰ καὶ τοῦ τηλικαῦτα δεικνύειν τῆς φύσεως τὸ μεγαλειῶν ἀμέλει· καὶ ἀναλυθέντα πάλιν ἀποθεοῦσθαι, καὶ Θεὸν εἶναι, οἷος ἦν πρὸ τοῦ εἰς τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καταχθῆναι· And this was the Logos or Word, by whom existing from eternity, according to Heraclitus, all things were made, and whom that barbarian also placeth in the rank and dignity of a principle, affirming him to have been with God, and to be God ; and that all things were made by him, and that whatsoever was made, was life and being in him. As also, that he descended into a body, and, being clothed in flesh, appeared as a man, though not without demonstration of the Divinity of his nature. But that afterwards being loosed or separated from the same, he was deified, and became God again, such as he was before he came down into a mortal body.—In which words, Amelius speaks favourably also of the incarnation of that eternal Logos. The same is further manifest from what St. Austin writeth concerning a De Civ. Dei. l. x. c. xxix. [p. 202. tom. vii. oper.] Platonist in his time : “ *Initium sancti evangelii, cui nomen est secundum Johannem, quidam Platonicus, sicut a sancto sene Simpliciano, qui postea Mediolanensi ecclesie præsedidit episcopus, solebamus audire, auribus literis conscribendum, et per omnes ecclesias in locis eminentissimis proponendum esse dicebat.*” We have often heard from that holy man Simplicianus, afterward bishop of Milan, that a certain Platonist affirmed, the beginning of St John’s Gospel deserved to be writ in letters of gold, and to be set up in all the most eminent places throughout the Christian churches.—And the latter will sufficiently appear from these following testimonies : Justin Martyr, in his apology affirmeth of

Plato, δευτέραν χώραν τῷ παρὰ Θεοῦ λόγῳ δι- pag. 93.
 δωσι τὴν δὲ τρίτην τῷ λεχθέντι ἐπιφέρεσθαι τῷ [Apol. ii.]
 ὕδατι πνεύματι, &c. That he gave the second place to
 the Word of God; and the third to that Spirit,
 which is said to have moved upon the waters.—
 Clemens Alexandrinus, speaking of that passage
 in Plato's second epistle to Dionysius, concerning
 the first, second, and third, writeth thus: οὐκ
 ἄλλως ἔγωγε ἐξακούω, ἢ τὴν ἁγίαν τριάδα μηνύ- Strom. l. v.
 εσθαι, τρίτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα· τὸν p. 598. [p.
 υἱὸν δὲ δεύτερον, δι' οὗ πάντα ἐγένετο κατὰ βου- 720. edit. Pot-
 λησιν τοῦ πατρὸς· I understand this no otherwise, teri]
 than that the holy Trinity is signified thereby,
 the third being the Holy Ghost, and the second
 the Son, by whom all things were made, ac-
 cording to the will of the Father.—Origen also
 affirmeth the Son of God to have been plainly
 spoken of by Plato, in his epistle to Hermias and
 Coriscus, ὁ πάντ' ἐπαγγελλόμενος εἰδέναι Κέλ- L. vi. c. Cels,
 σος καὶ πολλὰ τῶν Πλάτωνος παρατιθέμενος, [p. 280.]
 ἐκὼν, οἶμαι, σιωπᾶ τὸν περὶ υἱοῦ θεοῦ λόγον, τὸν παρὰ Πλά-
 τῶνι λεγόμενον ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἑρμείαν καὶ Κορίσκον ἐπιστολῇ·
 Celsus, who pretendeth to know all things, and
 who citeth so many other passages out of Plato,
 doth purposely (as I suppose) dissemble and con-
 ceal that, which he wrote concerning the Son of
 God, in his epistle to Hermias and Coriscus;
 where he calls him the God of the whole uni-
 verse, and the prince of all things, both present
 and future; afterwards speaking of the Father of
 this prince and cause.—And again, elsewhere in
 that book, he writeth to the same pur- Cont. Cels. l.
 pose: ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἐβουλήθη τὸ παρὰ Πλάτωνι ἐν- vi. p. 308.

^a The following are not Origen's words, but Dr. Cudworth's, who thus explains the passage of Plato cited by Origen.

ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς λελεγμένον, οὐ ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω ἐμνήσθημεν, περὶ τοῦ διακοσμήσαντος τόδε τὸ πᾶν, ὡς ὄντος υἱοῦ, θεοῦ, παραθέσθαι ἵνα μὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ὃν πολλὰ κίς ἐσέμνυνεν, ἀναγκασθῆ παραδέξασθαι, ὅτι ὁ μὲν δημιουργὸς τοῦδε τοῦ παντός, υἱὸς ἐστὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὁ δὲ πρῶτος καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸς πατὴρ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ. Neither would Celsus (here speaking of Christians making Christ the Son of God) take any notice of that passage in Plato's epistle beforementioned, concerning the framer and governor of the whole world, as being the Son of God; lest he should be compelled by the authority of Plato, whom he so often magnifieth, to agree with this doctrine of ours, that the Demiurgus of the whole world is the Son of God; but the first and supreme Deity, his Father.—Moreover, St. Cyprian, or whoever were the author of the book inscribed *De Spiritu Sancto*, affirmeth the Platonists first and universal Psyche, to be the same with the Holy Ghost in the Christian theology, in these words: “*Hujus sempiterna virtus et divinitas, cum in propria natura, ab inquisitoribus mundi antiquis philosophis proprie investigari non posset; subtilissimis tamen intuiti conjecturis compositionem mundi, et distinctis elementorum affectibus, præsentem omnibus animam adfuisse dixerunt; quibus, secundum genus et ordinem singulorum, vitam præberet et motum, et intransgressibiles figeret metas, et stabilitatem assignaret; et universam hanc vitam, hunc motum, hanc rerum essentiam, animam mundi vocaverunt.*” In the next place, Eusebius Cæsariensis gives a full and clear testimony of the concordance and agreement of the Platonic, at least as to the main, with the Christian Trinity, which he will have to have been

Pr. Ev. l. xi.
c. xx. [p.
541.]

the cabala of the ancient Hebrews, thus: τῶν παρ' Ἑβραίοις λογίων μετὰ τὸν περὶ πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ λόγον, ἐν τρίτῃ τάξει τὸ "Ἁγιον Πνεῦμα καταλεγόντων" καὶ τὴν γε ἁγίαν καὶ μακαρίαν Τριάδα τοῦτον ὑποτιθεμένων τὸν τρόπον, ὡς ἂν τῆς τρίτης δυνάμεως πᾶσαν ὑπερβιβηκίας γεννητὴν φύσιν οὔσαν πρώτην μὲν τῶν διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ συστασῶν νοερῶν οὐσιῶν, τρίτην δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου Αἰτίου· θεὰ ὅπως καὶ ὁ Πλάτων τοιαῦτά τινα ἠνίξαστο διὰ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον ἐπιστολῆς, &c. The oracles of the Hebrews, placing the Holy Ghost after the Father, and the Son in the third rank, and acknowledging a holy and blessed Trinity after this manner, so as that this third power does also transcend all created nature, and is the first of those intellectual substances, which proceed from the Son, and the third from the first cause: see how Plato enigmatically declareth the same things in his epistle to Dionysius, in these words, &c. These things the interpreters of Plato refer to a first god, and to a second cause, and to a third the soul of the world, which they call also the third god. And the Divine Scriptures in like manner rank the holy Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in the place or degree of a principle.—But it is most observable what Athanasius affirmeth of the Platonists; that though they derived the second hypostasis of their trinity from the first, and the third from the second, yet they supposed both their second and third hypostases to be uncreated; and therefore does he send the Arians to school thither, who, because there is but one Ἀγέννητος, one self-originated Being—would unskilfully conclude, that the Word or Son of God must therefore needs be a creature. Thus in his book concerning the decrees of the Nicene council; ἐχρήσαντο Pag. 278.

παρ' Ἑλλήνων λοιπὸν τὴν λέξιν τοῦ Ἀγεννήτου ἵνα προφάσῃ καὶ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος, ἐν τοῖς γενητοῖς πάλιν καὶ τοῖς κτίσμασι συναριθμῶσι τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγον· δι' οὗ αὐτὰ τὰ γενητὰ γέγονεν· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοοῦντες τὸ ὄνομα οὕτως ἀναισχυντοῦσιν, ἔδει μαθεῖν αὐτοὺς παρὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς δεδωκότων αὐτὸ, ὅτι καὶ οὐ λέγουσιν ἐκ τοῦ Ἀγαθοῦ Νοῦν, καὶ τὸν ἐκ τοῦ Νοῦ ψυχὴν· καίτοι γινώσκοντες τὸ ἐξ ὧν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἐφοβήθησαν ὅμως καὶ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν Ἀγένητα· εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο λέγοντες οὐκ ἐλαττοῦσι τὸ πρῶτον ἐξ οὗ καὶ ταῦτα πέφυκε· καὶ ἢ καὶ αὐτοὺς οὕτω λέγειν, ἢ μηδὲν λέγειν περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἴσασιν· The Arians borrowing the word Agennetos from the Pagans, (who acknowledge only one such) make that a pretence to rank the Word or Son of God, who is the creator of all, amongst creatures or things made. Whereas they ought to have learned the right signification of that word Agennetos from those very Platonists, who gave it them: who, though acknowledging their second hypostasis of Nous or Intellect, to be derived from the first called Tagathon, and their third hypostasis or Psyche from the second; nevertheless doubt not to affirm them both to be ageneta or uncreated, knowing well, that hereby they detract nothing from the majesty of the first, from whom these two are derived. Wherefore, the Arians either ought so to speak as the Platonists do, or else to say nothing at all concerning these things, which they are ignorant of. In which words of Athanasius, there is a plain distinction made betwixt ἀγέννητος and ἀγένητος; that is, unbegotten and uncreated; and the second person of the Trinity, the Son or Word of God, though acknowledged by him not to be Ἀγένητος, unbegotten, (he being begotten of the Father, who is the only Agennetos) yet is he here said to be Ἀγένητος, uncreated; he declaring

the Platonists thus to have affirmed the second and third hypostases of their trinity, not to be creatures, but uncreated. Which signal testimony of Athanasius, concerning the Platonic trinity, is a great vindication of the same. We might here further add St. Austin's confession also, that God the Father, and ^{De Civit. Dei,} God the Son, were by the Platonists ^[lib. x. cap. xxiii.] acknowledged in like manner, as by the Christians; though, concerning the Holy Ghost, he observes some difference betwixt Plotinus and Porphyrius, in that the former did *postponere animæ naturam paterno intellectui*; the latter, *interponere*: Plotinus did postpone his Psyche, or soul, after the paternal Intellect; but Porphyrius interponed it betwixt the Father and the Son, as a middle between both.—It was before observed, that St. Cyril of Alexandria affirmeth nothing to be wanting to the Platonic trinity, but only that *homousiotes* of his and some other fathers in that age, that they should not only all be God, or uncreated; but also three *coequal individuals*, under the same ultimate species, as three individual men; he conceiving that gradual subordination, that is in the Platonic trinity, to be a certain tang of Arianism. Nevertheless, he thus concludeth,^a *πλὴν οὐκ ἠγνόηκεν ὀλοτρόπως τὸ ἀληθές*, that Plato notwithstanding was not altogether ignorant of the truth, but that he had the knowledge of the only-begotten Son of God, as likewise of the Holy Ghost, called by him Psyche; and that he would have every way expressed himself rightly, had he not been afraid of Anitus and Melitus, and that poison, which Socrates

^a Advers. Julian: lib. i. p. 34.

drunk. Now, whether this were a fault or no in the Platonists, that they did not suppose their hypostases to be three individuals under the same ultimate species, we leave to others to judge. We might here add the testimony of Chalcidius, because he is unquestionably concluded to have been a Christian; though his language indeed be too much paganical, when he calls the three Divine hypostases, a chief, a second, and a third god: “Istius rei dispositio talis mente concipienda est; originem quidem rerum esse summum et ineffabilem Deum; post providentiam ejus secundum Deum, latorem legis utriusque vitæ tam æternæ quam temporariæ; tertium esse porro substantiam, quæ secunda mens intellectusque dicitur, quasi quædam custos legis æternæ. His subjectas esse rationabiles animas, legi obsequentes, ministras vero potestates, &c. Ergo summus Deus jubet, secundus ordinat, tertius intimat. Animæ vero legem agunt.” This thing is to be conceived after this manner; that the first Original of things is the supreme and ineffable God; after his providence, a second god, the establisher of the law of life both eternal and temporary; and the third (which is also a substance, and called a second mind or intellect) is a certain keeper of this eternal law. Under these three are rational souls, subject to that law, together with the ministerial powers, &c. So that the sovereign or supreme God commands, the second orders, and the third executes. But souls are subject to the law.—Where Chalcidius, though seeming indeed rather more a Platonist than a Christian, yet acknowledgeth no such beings as henades and noes; but only three

Divine hypostases, and under them rational souls. But we shall conclude with the testimony of Theodoret in his book *De Principio* ;^a τὴν Πλάτωνος διάνοιαν ἀναπτύσσοντες ὁ Πλωτῖνος καὶ ὁ Νουμῆνιος, τρία φασὶν αὐτὸν εἰρηκέναι ὑπέροχρον καὶ αἴδια, τ' ἀγαθὸν, καὶ νοῦν, καὶ τοῦ παντός τὴν ψυχὴν· ὃν μὲν ἡμεῖς Πατέρα καλοῦμεν τ' ἀγαθὸν ὀνομάζοντες, Νοῦν δὲ ὃν ἡμεῖς Λόγον προσαγορεύομεν, τὴν δὲ τὰ πάντα ψύχουσαν καὶ ζωοποιούσαν δύναμιν, Ψυχὴν καλοῦντα, ἣν Πνεῦμα ἅγιον οἱ θεοὶ προσαγορεύουσι λόγοι· καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἑβραίων φιλοσοφίας καὶ θεολογίας σεσύληται. Plotinus and Numenius, explaining Plato's sense, declare him to have asserted three super-temporals or eternals, Good, Mind or Intellect, and the Soul of the universe; he calling that Tagathon which to us is Father; that Mind or Intellect, which to us is the Son or Word; and that Psyche, or a power animating and enlivening all things, which our Scriptures call the Holy Ghost. And these things (saith he) were by Plato purloined from the philosophy and theology of the Hebrews.

Wherefore, we cannot but take notice here of a wonderful providence of Almighty God, that this doctrine of a trinity of Divine hypostases should find such admittance and entertainment in the Pagan world, and be received by the wisest of all their philosophers, before the time of Christianity; thereby to prepare a more easy way for the reception of Christianity among the learned Pagans: which that it proved successful accordingly, is undeniably evident from the monuments of antiquity. And the junior Platonists, who were most opposite and adverse to Christianity, became at length so sensible hereof, that besides

^a Tom. ii. oper. p. 496.

their other adulterations of the Trinity before-mentioned, for the countenancing of their polytheism and idolatry, they did, in all probability for this very reason, quite innovate, change, and pervert, the whole cabala, and no longer acknowledge a trinity, but either a quaternity, or a quinary, or more of Divine hypostases; they first of all contending, that before the Trinity, there was another supreme and highest hypostasis, not to be reckoned with the others, but standing alone by himself. And we conceive the first innovator in this kind to have been Jamblichus, who, in his Egyptian Mysteries,* where he seems to make the Egyptian theology to agree with his own hypotheses, writeth in this manner : *πρὸ τῶν ὄντως ὄντων καὶ τῶν ὄλων ἀρχῶν, ἔστι θεὸς εἰς πρῶτος καὶ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ καὶ βασιλέως· ἀκίνητος ἐν μονότητι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἐνότητος μένων· οὔτε γὰρ νοητὸν αὐτῷ ἐπιπλέκεται, οὔτε ἄλλό τι· παράδειγμα δὲ ἴδρυνται τοῦ ἀνοπάτορος αὐτογόνου καὶ μονοπάτορος θεοῦ τοῦ ὄντως ἀγαθοῦ· μείζον γάρ τε καὶ πρῶτον καὶ πηγὴ τῶν πάντων, καὶ πυθμὴν τῶν νοουμένων πρώτων ἰδεῶν ὄντων· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνός τούτου, ὁ ἀντάρκης θεός, ἑαυτὸν ἐξέλαμψε, διὸ καὶ ἀνοπάτωρ καὶ ἀντάρκης· ἀρχὴ γὰρ οὗτος καὶ θεὸς θεῶν· μονὰς ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός, προούσιος καὶ ἀρχὴ τῆς οὐσίας.* Before those things, which truly are, and the principles of all, there is one God superior to the first God and king, immoveable, and always remaining in the solitude of his own unity; there being nothing intelligible, nor any thing else mingled with him; but he being the paradigm of that God truly good, which is self-begotten and his own parent. For this is greater, and before him, and the fountain of all things, the foundation of all the first intelligible ideas. Wherefore, from this one did that self-sufficient

* Sect. viii. cap. ii. p. 158.

God, who is autopator, or his own parent, cause himself to shine forth; for this is also a principle, and the God of gods, a monad from the first one, before all essence.—Where, so far as we can understand, Jamblichus's meaning is, that there is a simple unity in order of nature, before that Tagathon, or monad, which is the first of the three Divine hypostases. And this doctrine was afterwards taken up by Proclus, he declaring it in this manner; *πανταχοῦ ὁ Πλάτων ἀπὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἐπὶ τὰς ἐνάδας ἀνατρέχειν εἴωθεν· μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος κατὰ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων τάξιν πρὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἐν αἰεὶ ἐστὶ, καὶ πᾶσα θεία τάξις ἀπὸ μονάδος ἄρχεται· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριάδος προῖέναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὸν θεῖον, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῆς τριάδος ἢ μονάδος· ἔστω μὲν οὖν καὶ οἱ δημιουργοὶ τρεῖς ἀλλὰ τίς ὁ πρὸ τῶν τριῶν εἷς, οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν θεῶν τάξεων ἐκ πλήθους ἄρχεται· οὐκ ἄρα ἀπὸ τριάδος ἄρχεσθαι δεῖ τὸν δημιουργικὸν ἀριθμὸν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μονάδος·* Plato every where ascends from multitude to unity, from whence also the order of the many proceeds; but before Plato, and according to the natural order of things, one is before multitude, and every Divine order begins from a monad. Wherefore, though the Divine number proceed in a trinity, yet before this trinity must there be a monad. Let there be three demiurgical hypostases; nevertheless, before these must there be one, because none of the Divine orders begins from multitude. We conclude, that the demiurgical number does not begin from a trinity, but from a monad, standing alone by itself before that trinity.—Here Proclus, though endeavouring to gain some countenance for this doctrine out of Plato, yet, as fearing lest that should fail him, does he fly to the order of nature, and from thence would infer, that before

the trinity of demiurgic hypostases, there must be a single monad or henad, standing alone by itself, as the head thereof. And St. Cyril of Alexandria, who was junior to Jamblichus, but senior to Proclus, seems to take notice of this innovation in the Platonic theology, as a thing then new. *Jul. l. viii. p. 271.*

ly crept up, and after the time of Porphyry : ἀλλ' οἱ γε προειρημένοι καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀντιλέγουσι, φάσκοντες μὴ δεῖν Τ' ΑΓΑΘΟΝ συναριθμῆν τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐξήρησθαι γὰρ ἀπὸ πάσης κοινωνίας διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀπλοῦν πάντα καὶ ἀδεκτον τινὸς συμβάσεως· Ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ΝΟΥ, (ἀρχὴ γὰρ οὗτος) τὴν τριάδα μίαν σωθῆναι. But those beforementioned contradict this doctrine (of Porphyrius and the ancient Platonists), affirming that the Tagathon ought not to be connumerated or reckoned together with those which proceed from it, but to be exempted from all communion, because it is altogether simple, and incapable of any commixture or consociation with any other. Wherefore these begin their trinity with Nous or Intellect, making that the first.—The only difference here is, that Jamblichus seems to make the first hypostasis of the trinity after a monad to be Tagathon, but St. Cyril, Nous. However, they both meant the same thing, as also did Proclus after them. Wherefore, it is evident, that when, from the time of the Nicene council and Athanasius, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity came to be punctually stated and settled, and much to be insisted upon by Christians, Jamblichus, and other Platonists, who were great antagonists of the same, perceiving what advantage the Christians had from the Platonic trinity, then first of all innovated this doctrine, introducing a quaternity of Divine hypostases, instead of a trinity, the

first of them being not co-ordinate with the other three, nor consociated or reckoned with them; but all of them, though subordinate, yet universal, and such as comprehend the whole; that is, infinite and omnipotent; and therefore none of them creatures. For it is certain, that before this time, or the age that Jamblichus lived in, there was no such thing at all dreamed of by any Platonist, as an unity before and above the Trinity, and so a quaternity of Divine hypostases; Plotinus positively determining, that there could neither be more nor fewer than three; and Proclus himself acknowledging the ancient tradition, or cabala, to have run only of three gods; and Numenius, who was senior to them both, writing thus of Socrates, Τρεῖς θεοὺς τιθεμένου Σωκράτους, that he also (before Plato) asserted three gods;—that is, three Divine hypostases, and no more, as principles; therein following the Pythagoreans.

Euseb. P. E.
I. xiv. c. v.
[p. 728.]

Moreover, the same Proclus, besides his henades and noes beforementioned, added certain other fantastic trinities of his own also; as this, for example, of the first essence, the first life, and the first intellect (to omit others); whereby that ancient cabala and θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, theology of Divine tradition—of three archical hypostases, and no more, was disguised, perverted, and adulterated.

But, besides this advantage from the ancient Pagan Platonists and Pythagoreans admitting a trinity into their theology, in like manner as Christianity doth (whereby Christianity was the more recommended to the philosophic Pagans), there is another advantage of the same extending

even to this present time, probably not unintended also by Divine Providence; that whereas bold and conceited wits, precipitately condemning the doctrine of the Trinity for nonsense, absolute repugnancy to human faculties, and impossibility, have thereupon some of them quite shaken off Christianity, and all revealed religion, professing only Theism; others have frustrated the design thereof, by paganizing it into creature-worship or idolatry; this ignorant or conceited confidence of both may be returned, and confuted from hence, because the most ingenious and acute of all the Pagan philosophers, the Platonists and Pythagoreans, who had no bias at all upon them, nor any Scripture revelation, that might seem to impose upon their faculties, but followed the free sentiments and dictates of their own minds, did notwithstanding not only entertain this trinity of Divine hypostases eternal and uncreated, but were also fond of the hypothesis, and made it a main fundamental of their theology.

It now appears from what we have declared, that as to the ancient and genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans, none of their trinity of gods, or Divine hypostases, were independent, so neither were they *γενετοὶ θεοὶ*, creature-gods,—but uncreated; they being all of them not only eternal, and necessarily existent and immutable, but also universal, that is infinite and omnipotent; causes, principles, and creators of the whole world. From whence it follows, that these Platonists could not justly be taxed for idolatry, in giving religious worship to each hypostasis of this their trinity. And we have the rather insisted so long upon this Platonic trinity, because we shall make use of this

doctrine afterwards, in our defence of Christianity, where we are to shew, that one grand design of Christianity being to abolish the Pagan idolatry, or creature-worship, itself cannot justly be charged with the same from that religious worship given to our Saviour Christ, and the Trinity (the Son and Holy Ghost), they being none of them, according to the true and orthodox Christianity, creatures; however the Arian hypothesis made them such. And this was indeed the grand reason, why the ancient fathers so zealously opposed Arianism, because that Christianity, which was intended by God Almighty for a means to extirpate Pagan idolatry, was thereby itself paganized and idolatrized, and made highly guilty of that very thing, which it so much condemned in the Pagans, that is, creature-worship. This might be proved by sundry testimonies of Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nyssen, Gregory Nazianzen, Epiphanius, Chrysostom, Hilary, Ambrose, Austin, Faustinius, and Cyril of Alexandria; all of them charging the Arians as guilty of the very same idolatry with the Gentiles or Pagans, in giving religious worship even to the Word and Son of God himself (and consequently to our Saviour Christ), as he was supposed by them to be but a creature. But we shall content ourselves here only to cite one remarkable passage out of Athanasius, in his fourth oration against the

P. 468, 469.

Arians: δια τί οὖν οἱ Ἀρειομανῖται τοιαῦτα λογιζόμενοι καὶ νοοῦντες, οὐ συναριθμοῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ γὰρ κακῆνοι ὡσπερ οὗτοι τῇ κτίσει λατρεύουσι παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα τὰ πάντα Θεόν— εἰ δὲ οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες ἐνὶ ἀγενήτῳ καὶ πολλοῖς γενητοῖς λατρεύουσιν, οὗτοι δὲ ἐνὶ γενητῷ καὶ ἀγενήτῳ, οὐδ' οὕτω διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων· ὅ τε γὰρ παρ'

αὐτῶν λεγόμενος εἷς γενητός ἐκ πολλῶν ἐστι, καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ πάλιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ ἐνὶ τούτῳ φύσιν ἔχουσι, καὶ οὕτως γὰρ κἀκεῖνοι κτίσματα εἰσιν· ἄθλιοι καὶ πλέον ὅσον ἐβλάβησαν κατὰ Χριστοῦ φρονοῦντες· ἐξέπεσον γὰρ τῆς ἀληθείας· καὶ τὴν μὲν Ἰουδαίων προδοσίαν ὑπερέβησαν ἀρνούμενοι τὸν Χριστόν· τοῖς δὲ Ἕλλησι συγκυλίωνται, κτίσμασι καὶ διαφοροῖς θεοῖς λατρεύοντες οἱ θεοστρυγεῖς· Why therefore do not these Arians, holding this, reckon themselves amongst the Pagans or Gentiles, since they do in like manner worship the creature, besides the Creator? For though the Pagans worship one uncreated and many created gods, but these Arians only one uncreated and one created, to wit, the Son or Word of God; yet will not this make any real difference betwixt them; because the Arians' one created is one of those many Pagan gods; and those many gods of the Pagans or Gentiles have the same nature with this one, they being alike creatures. Wherefore these wretched Arians are apostates from the truth of Christianity, they betraying Christ more than the Jews did, and wallowing or tumbling in the filth of Pagan idolatry; worshipping creatures, and different kinds of gods:—where, by the way, we may take notice that when Athanasius affirmeth of the Arians, what St. Paul doth of the Pagans, that they did τῇ κτίσει λατρεύειν παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, his meaning could not well be, that they worshipped the creature more than the Creator; forasmuch as the Arians constantly declared, that they gave less worship to Christ the Son or Word of God, he being by them accounted but a creature, than they did to the Father the Creator; but either that they worshipped the creature besides the Creator, or the creature instead of the Creator, or in the room of

him, who was alone of right to be religiously worshipped. Again, when the same Athanasius declareth, that the Greeks, Gentiles, or Pagans, did universally worship ἐνὶ ἀγενητῶ, only one uncreated,—he seems to imply, that the Platonic trinity of hypostases, affirmed by him to be all uncreated, were by them looked upon only as one entire Divinity.

But the principal things, which we shall observe from this passage of Athanasius, and those many other places of the fathers, where they parallel the Arians with the Pagans, making the former guilty of the very same idolatry with the latter, even then, when they worshipped our Saviour Christ himself, or the Word and Son of God, as he was by them supposed to be nothing but a creature, are these following; first, that it is here plainly declared by them, that the generality of the Pagans did not worship a multitude of independent gods, but that only one of their gods was uncreated or self-existent, and all their other many gods looked upon by them as his creatures. This, as it is expressly affirmed by Athanasius here, that the Greeks or Pagans did ἐνὶ ἀγενήτῳ καὶ πολλοῖς γενητοῖς λατρεύειν, worship only one uncreated, and many created gods;—so is it plainly implied by all those other forementioned fathers, who charge the Arians with the guilt of Pagan idolatry: because, had the Pagans worshipped many uncreated and independent gods, it would not therefore follow, that the Arians were idolaters, if the Pagans were. But that this was indeed the sense of the fathers, both before and after the Nicene council, concerning the Pagan polytheism and idolatry, that it consisted not in wor-

shipping many uncreated and independent gods, but only one uncreated and many created, hath been already otherwise manifested ; and it might be further confirmed by sundry testimonies of them ; as this of St. Gregory Nazianzen in his 37th oration ;^a *Τί δαὶ οὐχὶ καὶ παρ' Ἑλλησι φαῖεν ἂν Μία Θεότης, ὡς οἱ τὰ τελεώτερα παρ' ἐκείνοις Φιλοσοφοῦντες ;* What then, would some say, is there not one Divinity also amongst the Pagans, as they, who philosophize more fully and perfectly amongst them, do declare ?—And that full and remarkable one of Irenæus, where he plainly affirmeth of the Gen-
L. ii. c. ix. [p. 129. ed. Grabbii, p. 126. ed. Massueti.] tiles ; “*Ita creaturæ potius quam Creatori serviebant, et his quinon sunt dii, ut primum deitatis locum attribuerent uni alicui et summo fabricatori hujus universitatis Deo :*” that they so served the creature, and those who are not gods, rather than the Creator ; that notwithstanding they attributed the first place of the Deity to one certain supreme God, the maker of this universe.—The second thing is, that Athanasius, and all those other orthodox fathers, who charged the Arians with Pagan idolatry, did thereby plainly imply, those not to be incapable of idolatry, who worship one sovereign Numen, or acknowledge one supreme Deity, the maker of the whole world ; since not only the Arians unquestionably did so, but also, according to these fathers the very Pagans themselves. The third thing is, that, in the judgment of Athanasius, and all the orthodox anti-Arian fathers, to give religious worship to any created being whatsoever, though inferior to that worship which is given to the supreme God, and therefore, according to the mo-

^a Pag. 601. tom. i. oper.

dern distinction, not *λατρεία*, but *δουλεία*, is absolutely idolatry. Because it is certain, that the Arians gave much an inferior worship to Christ, the Son, or Word of God, whom they contended to be a mere creature, made in time, mutable and defectible, than they did to that eternal God, who was the Creator of him. As those fathers imply, the Pagans themselves to have given much an inferior worship to their *πολλοὶ γενητοὶ θεοὶ*, their many gods,—whom themselves looked upon as creatures, than they did *ἐνὶ ἀγένητῳ*, to that one uncreated God.

Now if the Arians, who zealously contended for the unity of the Godhead, were nevertheless, by the fathers, condemned as guilty of idolatry, for bestowing but an inferior kind of religious worship upon Christ, the Son or Word of God himself, as he was supposed by them to be a creature; then certainly cannot they be excused from that guilt, who bestow religious worship upon these other creatures, angels and souls of men, though inferior to what they give to the supreme omnipotent God, the creator of all. Because the Son or Word of God, however conceived by these Arians to be a creature, yet was looked upon by them as the first, the most glorious, and most excellent of all creatures, and that by which, as an instrument, all other creatures, as angels and souls, were made; and therefore, if it were idolatry in them, to give an inferior kind of religious worship to this Son and Word of God himself, according to their hypothesis, then can it not possibly be accounted less, to bestow the same upon those other creatures, made by him, as angels and men deceased. Besides which, the Word and

Son of God, however supposed by these Arians to be a creature, yet was not really such ; and is in Scripture unquestionably declared to be a true object of religious worship (“ Worship him, all ye gods”); so that the Arians, though formally idolaters, according to their own false hypothesis, yet were not materially and really so : whereas these religious angel and saint-worshippers must be as well materially as formally such. And here it is observable, that these ancient fathers made no such distinction of religious worship, into Latria, as peculiar to the supreme God, it being that whereby he is adored as self-existent and omnipotent, or the Creator of all ; and Doulia, such an inferior religious worship, as is communicable to creatures : but concluded of religious worship, universally, and without distinction, that the due object of it all was the Creator only, and not any creature. Thus Athanasius plainly in his third oration :^a *εἰ γὰρ ὡς τῇ δόξῃ ὑπερέχων προσκυνεῖτο, ἔδει καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποβεβηκότων, τὸν ὑπερέχοντα προσκυνεῖν· ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως, κτίσματι γὰρ κτίσμα οὐ προσκυνεῖ, ἀλλὰ κτίσμα θεόν·* If the Son or Word of God were to be worshipped (though a creature) because transcending us in glory and dignity, then ought every inferior being to worship what is superior to it : whereas the case is otherwise ; for a creature doth not religiously worship a creature, but only God the Creator.—Now they, who distinguish religious worship into Latria and Doulia, must needs suppose the object of it in general to be that, which is superior to us, and not the Creator only ; which is here contradicted by Athanasius. But because it was objected against

^a Pag. 394. tom. i. oper.

these orthodox fathers by the Arians, that the humanity of our Saviour Christ, which is unquestionably a creature, did share in their religious worship also; it is worth the while to see what account Athanasius gives of this: οὐ

κτίσμα προσκυνούμεν, μὴ γένοιτο· Ἐθνικῶν γὰρ καὶ Ἀρειανῶν ἡ τοιαύτη πλάνη· ἀλλὰ τὸν Κύριον

Ad Adolph. p. 157. [Tom. i. oper.]

τῆς κτίσεως σαρκωθέντα τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγον προσκυνούμεν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ σὰρξ αὐτὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν μέρος ἐστὶ τῶν κτισμάτων, ἀλλὰ θεοῦ γέγονε σῶμα καὶ οὔτε τὸ τοιοῦτον σῶμα, καθ' ἑαυτὸ διαιροῦντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου, προσκυνούμεν, οὔτε τὸν Λόγον προσκυνῆσαι θέλοντες, μακρύνομεν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς σαρκός· ἀλλ' εἰδότες, τὸ, ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, τοῦτον καὶ ἐν σαρκὶ γενόμενον ἐπιγινώσκομεν θεόν· We give no religious worship to any creature, far be it from us; for this is the error of the Pagans and of the Arians; but we worship the Word of God, the Lord of the creation incarnated. For though the flesh of Christ, considered alone by itself, were but a part of the creatures, nevertheless was it made the body of God. And we neither worship this body by itself alone, divided from the Word, nor yet, intending to worship the Word, do we remove it at a great distance from this flesh; but knowing that of the Scripture, "the Word was made flesh," we look upon this Word even in the flesh as God.

—And again to the same purpose, Καὶ γι-

P. 160.

νωσκέτωσαν ὅτι τὸν Κύριον ἐν σαρκὶ προσκυνοῦντες, οὐ κτίσματι προσκυνούμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν κτίστην, ἐνδυσάμενον τὸ κτιστὸν σῶμα. Let these Arians know at length, that we, who worship the Lord in flesh, worship no creature, but only the Creator clothed with a creaturely body.—And for the same cause was it, that Nestorius afterwards, dividing the Word from the flesh, the Divinity of Christ from

the humanity, and not acknowledging such an hypostatic union betwixt them as he ought, but, nevertheless, religiously worshipping our Saviour Christ, was therefore branded by the Christian church with the name of *Ἀνθρωπολάτρης*, a man-worshipper, or idolater.— To conclude, they who excuse themselves from being idolaters no otherwise than because they do not give that very same religious worship to saints and angels, which is peculiar to God Almighty, and consists in honouring him as self-existent, and the Creator of all things, but acknowledge those others to be creatures; suppose that to be necessary to idolatry, which is absolutely impossible, viz. to acknowledge more omnipotents, as creators of all, than one, or to account creatures as such creators; as they imply all those to be incapable of idolatry, who acknowledge one supreme God the creator of the whole world; which is directly contradictory to the ancient church.

Hitherto, in way of answer to an atheistic objection against the naturality of the idea of a God, as including oneliness in it, from the Pagan Polytheism, have we largely proved, that at least the civilized and intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one sovereign Numen; and that their polytheism was partly but fantastical, nothing but the polyonymy of one supreme God, or the worshipping him under different names and notions, according to his several virtues and manifestations; and that though, besides this, they had another natural and real polytheism also; yet this was only of many inferior or created gods, subordinate to one supreme *Ἀγένητος*, or uncreated.

Which, notwithstanding, is not so to be understood, as if we did confidently affirm, that the opinion of many independent deities never to have so much as entered into the mind of any mortal. For since human nature is so mutable and de-pravable, as that, notwithstanding the connate idea and prolepsis of God in the minds of men, some unquestionably do degenerate and lapse into Atheism; there can be no reason, why it should be thought absolutely impossible, for any ever to entertain that false conceit of more independent deities. But as for independent gods invisible, we cannot trace the footsteps of such a polytheism as this any where, nor find any more than a Ditheism, of a good and evil principle: only Philo and others seem to have conceived, that amongst the ancient Pagans, some were so grossly sottish, as to suppose a plurality of independent gods visible, and to take the sun, and moon, and all the stars, for such. However, if there were any such, and these writers were not mistaken, as it frequently happened, it is certain, that they were but very few; because, amongst the most barbarian Pagans at this day, there is hardly any nation to be found, without an acknowledgment of a sovereign Deity, as appears from all those discoveries which have been made of them, since the improvement of navigation.

Wherefore, what hath been hitherto declared by us, might well be thought a sufficient answer to the forementioned atheistic objection against the idea of God. Notwithstanding which, when we wrote the contents of this chapter, we intended a farther account of the natural and real Polytheism of the Pagans, and their multifarious idolatry,

chiefly in order to the vindication of the truth of Christianity against Atheists; forasmuch as one grand design hereof was unquestionably to destroy the Pagan Polytheism and idolatry, which consisted in worshipping the creature besides the Creator.

But we are very sensible, that we have been surprised in the length of this chapter, which is already swelled into a disproportionate bigness; by means whereof we cannot comprehend, within the compass of this volume, all that belongs to the remaining contents, together with such a full and copious confutation of the atheistic grounds, as was intended. Wherefore we shall here divide the chapter, and reserve those remaining contents, together with a further confutation of Atheism, if need be, for another volume, which, God affording life, health, and leisure, we intend shall follow. Only subjoining, in the mean time, a short and compendious confutation of all the atheistic arguments proposed.

The reader will observe that the foregoing paragraph refers to the 4to. edit. of 1743, as published by Dr. Cudworth.

A.
CONFUTATION
OF
ATHEISM.

CHAP. V.

HAVING in the second chapter revealed all the dark mysteries of Atheism, and produced the utmost strength of that cause; and in the third made an introduction to the confutation of those Atheistic grounds, by representing all the several forms and schemes of Atheism, and shewing both their disagreements amongst themselves, and wherein they all agree together against Theists; we have been hitherto prevented of that full and copious confutation of them, intended by us, by reason of that large account given of the Pagan Polytheism: which yet was no impertinent digression neither, it removing the grand objection against the naturalty of the idea of God, as including onlieness in it; as also preparing a way for that defence of Christianity, designed by us against Atheists. Wherefore, that we may not here be quite excluded of what was principally intended, we shall subjoin a contracted and compendious confutation of all the premised Atheistic principles. The first whereof was this, that either men have no idea of God at all, or else none but such as is compounded and made up of impossible and contradictory notions: from whence these Athe-

ists would infer him to be an inconceivable nothing. In answer whereunto, there hath been something done already, it being declared in the beginning of the fourth chapter, what the idea of God is, viz. a perfect understanding nature, necessarily self-existent, and the cause of all other things. And as there is nothing either unconceivable or contradictory in this idea, so have we shewed, that these confounded Atheists do not only, at the same time when they verbally deny an idea of God, implicitly acknowledge and confess it, forasmuch as otherwise, denying his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing; but also that they agree with Theists in this very idea; it being the only thing that Atheists contend for, that the first original and head of all things is no perfect understanding nature, but that all sprung from Tohu and Bohu, or dark and senseless matter fortuitously moved. Moreover, we have not only thus declared the idea of God, but also largely proved, and made it clearly evident, that the generality of mankind in all ages have had a prolepsis or anticipation in their minds, concerning the real and actual existence of such a being; the Pagans themselves, besides their other many gods (which were understanding beings superior to men), acknowledging one chief and sovereign Numen, the maker of them all, and of the whole world. From whence it plainly appears, that those few Atheists, that formerly have been, and still are, here and there up and down in the world, are no other than the monsters and anomalies of human kind. And this alone might be sufficient to repel the first Atheistic assault, made against the idea of God.

Nevertheless, that we may not seem to dissemble any of the Atheists' strength, we shall here particularly declare all their most colourable pretences against the idea of God, and then shew the folly and invalidity of them. Which pretences are as follow : first, That we have no idea nor thought of any thing not subject to corporeal sense ; nor the least evidence of the existence of any thing, but from the same. Secondly, That Theists themselves acknowledging God to be incomprehensible, he may be from thence inferred to be a nonentity. Thirdly, That the Theists' idea of God, including infinity in it, is therefore absolutely inconceivable and impossible. Fourthly, That theology is an arbitrary complement of inconsistent and contradictious notions. And, lastly, That the idea and existence of God owes all its being, either to the confounded nonsense of astonished minds, or else to the fiction and imposture of politicians.

We begin with the first: That we can have no idea, conception, or thought, of any thing, not subject to sense ; nor the least evidence of the existence of any thing, but from the same. Thus a modern Atheistic writer ;^a " Whatsoever we can conceive, hath been perceived first by sense, either at once or in parts ; and a man can have no thought representing any thing not subject to sense." From whence it follows, that whatsoever is not sensible and imaginable, is utterly unconceivable, and to us nothing. Moreover, the same writer adds, that " the only evidence, which we have of the existence of any thing, is from sense ;" the consequence whereof is this, that there being

^a Hobbes's Leviathan, part i. cap. i.

no corporeal sense of a Deity, there can be no evidence at all of his existence. Wherefore, according to the tenor of the Atheistic philosophy, all is resolved into sense, as the only criterion of truth, accordingly as Protagoras in Plato's *Theætetus*^a concludes knowledge to be sense; and a late writer of our own, determines sense to be original knowledge. Here have we a wide ocean before us, but we must contract our sails. Were sense knowledge and understanding, then he, who sees lights and colours, and feels heat and cold, would understand light and colours, heat and cold, and the like of all other sensible things: neither would there be any philosophy at all concerning them. Whereas the mind of man remaineth altogether unsatisfied concerning the nature of these corporeal things, even after the strongest sensations of them, and is but thereby awakened to a further philosophic inquiry and search about them, what this light and colours, this heat and cold, &c. really should be; and whether they be indeed qualities in the objects without us, or only phantasms and sensations in ourselves. Now it is certain, that there could be no suspicion of any such thing as this, were sense the highest faculty in us; neither can sense itself ever decide this controversy; since one sense cannot judge of another, or correct the error in it; all sense as such (that is, as fancy and apparition) being alike true. And had not these Atheists been notorious dunces in that atomic philosophy which they so much pretend to, they would clearly have learned from thence, that sense is not knowledge and understanding, nor the criterion of truth as to sensible

^a P. 118.

things themselves; it reaching not to the essence or absolute nature of them, but only taking notice of their outside, and perceiving its own passions from them, rather than the things themselves; and that there is a higher faculty in the soul, of reason and understanding, which judges of sense; detects the fantasy and imposture of it; discovers to us that there is nothing in the objects themselves, like to those forementioned sensible ideas; and resolves all sensible things into intelligible principles; the ideas whereof are not foreign and adventitious, and mere passive impressions upon the soul from without, but native and domestic to it, or actively exerted from the soul itself; no passion being able to make a judgment either of itself, or other things. This is a thing so evident, that Democritus himself could not but take notice of it, and acknowledge it, though he made not a right use thereof; he in all probability continuing notwithstanding a confounded and besotted Atheist; Sextus Empiricus having recorded this of him: ^a *Ἐν τοῖς κανόσι δύο φησὶν εἶναι γνώσεις, τὴν μὲν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς διανοίας ὧν τὴν μὲν διὰ τῆς διανοίας γνῶσιν κατάγει, προσμαρτυρῶν αὐτῇ τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀληθείας κρίσιν, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων σκοτίνην ὀνομάζει, ἀφαιρούμενος αὐτῆς τὸ πρὸς διάγνωσιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀπλανές· λέγει δὲ κατὰ λέξιν, Γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι· ἡ μὲν γνησίη· ἡ δὲ σκοτίνη· καὶ σκοτίης μὲν, τὰδε συμπαντα, ὄψις, ἀκοή, ὄδμη, γεῦσις, ψεῦσις· ἡ δὲ γνησίη ἀποκεκρυμμένη δὲ ταύτης·* Democritus in his Canons affirmeth, that there are two kinds of knowledges; one of the senses, and another by the mind. Of which that by the mind is only accounted knowledge, he bearing witness to the faithfulness and firmness thereof

^a Lib. vii. advers. Mathemat. §. 138, 139. p. 400.

for the judgment of truth. The other by the senses he calleth dark, denying it to be a rule and measure of truth. His own words are these : There are two species of knowledge, the one genuine, the other dark and obscure. The dark and obscure knowledge is seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. But the genuine knowledge is another more hidden and recondit.—To which purpose there is another fragment also of this Democritus preserved by the same Sextus ;^a *Νόμῳ γλυκὺ, καὶ νόμῳ πικρὸν, νόμῳ θερμὸν, νόμῳ ψυχρὸν· νόμῳ χροιοῦ· αἰτία δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν· ὅπερ νομίζεται μὲν εἶναι καὶ δοξάζεται τὰ αἰσθητὰ, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα.* Bitter and sweet, hot and cold, are only in opinion or fancy. Colour is only in opinion ; atoms and vacuum alone in truth and reality. That which is thought to be are sensibles ; but these are not according to truth, but atoms and vacuum only. Now the chief ground of this rational discovery of the ancient Atomists, that sensible things, as heat and cold, bitter and sweet, red and green, are no real qualities in the objects without, but only our own fancies, was because in body there are no such things intelligible, but only magnitude, figure, site, motion, and rest. Of which we have not only sensible ideas, passively impressed upon us from without, but also intelligible notions, actively exerted from the mind itself. Which latter, notwithstanding, because they are not unaccompanied with sensible phantasms, and by many unskilfully confounded with them. But, besides these, we have other intelligible notions, or ideas, also which have no genuine phantasms at all belonging to them. Of which who-

^a Id *ibid.* §. 135. p. 399.

soever doubts, may easily be satisfied and convinced, by reading but a sentence or two that he understands in any book almost that shall come next to his hand; and reflexively examining himself, whether he have a phantasm, or sensible idea, belonging to every word or no. For whoever is modest and ingenuous will quickly be forced to confess, that he meets with many words, which though they have a sense or intelligible notion, yet have no genuine phantasm belonging to them. And we have known some, who were confidently engaged in the other opinion, being put to read the beginning of Tully's Offices, presently nonplussed and confounded in that first word *quamquam*; they being neither able to deny, but that there was a sense belonging to it, nor yet to affirm, that they had any phantasm thereof, save only of the sound or letters. But to prove that there are cogitations not subject to corporeal sense, we need go no further than this very idea or description of God; a substance absolutely perfect, infinitely good, wise, and powerful, necessarily self-existent, and the cause of all other things. Where there is not one word unintelligible to him, that hath any understanding in him, and yet no considerative and ingenuous person can pretend, that he hath a genuine phantasm, or sensible idea, answering to any one of those words, either to substance, or to absolutely perfect, or to infinitely, or to good, or to wise, or to powerful, or to necessity, or to self-existence, or to cause; or indeed to all, or other, or things. Wherefore it is nothing but want of meditation, together with a fond and sottish dotage upon corporeal sense, which hath so far imposed upon some, as to make them be-

lieve, that they have not the least cogitation of any thing not subject to corporeal sense; or that there is nothing in human understanding, or conception, which was not first in bodily sense; a doctrine highly favourable to Atheism. But since it is certain, on the contrary, that we have many thoughts not subject to sense, it is manifest, that whatsoever falls not under external sense, is not therefore unconceivable, and nothing. Which whosoever asserts, must needs affirm life and cogitation itself, knowledge or understanding, reason and memory, volition and appetite, things of the greatest moment and reality, to be nothing but mere words without any signification. Nay, fancy and sense itself, upon this hypothesis, could hardly escape from becoming nonentities too, forasmuch as neither fancy nor sense falls under sense, but only the objects of them; we neither seeing vision, nor feeling taction, nor hearing audition, much less hearing sight, or seeing taste, or the like. Wherefore, though God should be never so much corporeal, as some Theists have conceived him to be; yet since the chief of his essence, and as it were his inside, must by these be acknowledged to consist in mind, wisdom and understanding, he could not possibly, as to this, fall under corporeal sense (sight or touch) any more than thought can. But that there is substance incorporeal also, and therefore in itself altogether insensible, and that the Deity is such, is demonstrated elsewhere.

We grant, indeed, that the evidence of particular bodies, existing *hic et nunc*, without us, doth necessarily depend upon the information of sense; but yet, nevertheless, the certainty of this very evi-

dence is not from sense alone, but from a complication of reason and understanding together with it. Were sense the only evidence of things, there could be no absolute truth and falsehood, nor certainty at all of any thing; sense, as such, being only relative to particular persons, seeming and fantastical, and obnoxious to much delusion. For if our nerves and brain be inwardly so moved, and affected, as they would be by such an object present, when indeed it is absent, and no other motion or sensation in the mean time prevail against it and obliterate it; then must that object of necessity seem to us present. Moreover, those imaginations, that spring and bubble from the soul itself, are commonly taken for sensations by us when asleep, and sometimes in melancholic and fanciful persons also when awake. That Atheistic principle, that there is no evidence at all of any thing as existing, but only from corporeal sense, is plainly contradicted by the atomic Atheists themselves, when they assert atoms and vacuum to be the principles of all things, and the exuvius images of bodies to be the causes both of sight and cogitation: for single atoms, and those exuvius images, were never seen nor felt; and vacuum, or empty space, is so far from being sensible, that these Atheists themselves allow it to be the one only incorporeal. Wherefore they must here go beyond the ken of sense, and appeal to reason only for the existence of these principles: as Protagoras, one of them in Plato, professedly doth; ἄθρει περισκοπῶν μή τις τῶν Theæt. p. 155. ἀμνήτων ἐπακούη· εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι, οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο Sleph. οἴομενοι εἶναι, ἢ οὐ ἂν δύνωνται ἀπριξ ταῖν χερσῶν λαβέσθαι, πᾶν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι, ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει. Have

a care that none of the profane and uninitiated in mysteries overhear you. By the profane I mean (saith he) those, who think nothing to exist but what they can feel with their fingers, and exclude all that is invisible out of the rank of being.— Were existence to be allowed to nothing, that doth not fall under corporeal sense, then must we deny the existence of soul and mind in ourselves and others, because we can neither feel nor see any such thing. Whereas we are certain of the existence of our own souls, partly from an inward consciousness of our own cogitations, and partly from that principle of reason, that nothing cannot act. And the existence of other individual souls is manifest to us, from their effects upon their respective bodies, their motions, actions, and discourse. Wherefore, since the Atheists cannot deny the existence of soul or mind in men, though no such thing fall under external sense, they have as little reason to deny the existence of a perfect mind, presiding over the universe, without which it cannot be conceived, whence our imperfect ones should be derived. The existence of that God, whom no eye hath seen nor can see, is plainly proved by reason from his effects, in the visible phenomena of the universe, and from what we are conscious of within ourselves.

The second pretence of Atheists against the idea of God, and consequently his existence, is, because Theists themselves acknowledging God to be incomprehensible, it may be from thence inferred, that he is a nonentity. Which argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things: first, that what is incomprehensible is altogether unconceivable; and then, that what is unconceivable is

nothing. The latter of which two, perhaps, may be granted to them, that what is so utterly inconceivable is nothing, as that no man can frame any manner of idea or conception of it, is therefore either in itself, or at least to us, nothing. Because though that of Protagoras be not true, in his sense, πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον Plato Theæt. εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, [p. 118.] ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. That man is the measure of all things, either as existing or not existing—he meaning indeed nothing else thereby, but that there was no absolute truth or falsehood of any thing, but all was relative to particular persons, and fantastical or seeming only. And though it must not be granted, that whatsoever any man's shallow understanding cannot easily and fully comprehend, is therefore presently to be expunged out of the catalogue of beings; which is the reason, or rather infidelity of the anti-trinitarians; yet is there notwithstanding some truth in that of Aristotle, that ψυχὴ πῶς πάντα, the rational soul or mind is in a manner all things;—it being able to frame some idea and conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of things, and hath either an actual or possible existence, from the very highest to the lowest. Mind and understanding is, as it were, a diaphanous and crystalline globe, or a kind of notional world, which hath some reflex image, and correspondent ray, or representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true and real world of being. And upon this account may it be said, that whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely inconceivable, is indeed a nonentity.

But the former is absolutely denied by us, that whatsoever is incomprehensible is inconceivable;

and therefore when we affirm, that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect minds cannot have such a conception of his nature, as doth perfectly master, conquer, and subdue, that vast object under it ; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the same, as that it doth every way match and equalize it. Now it doth not at all follow from hence, because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow understandings, that he is utterly inconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a nonentity. For, it is certain, that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate and comprehensive knowledge of the essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a truth, though abused by the Sceptics, that there is *ἀκατάληπτόν τι*, something incomprehensible—in the essence of the lowest substances. For even body itself, which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their fingers, and which is the only substance, that they acknowledge either in themselves or the universe, hath such puzzling difficulties and entanglements in the speculation of it, that they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might instance also in some accidental things, as time and motion. Truth is bigger than our minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower participation only of the intellectual nature, and are rather apprehenders than comprehenders thereof. This is indeed one badge of our creaturely state, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive knowledge, or such as is

adequate and commensurate to the essences of things ; from whence we ought to be led to this acknowledgment, that there is another perfect Mind or understanding Being above us in the universe, from which our imperfect minds were derived, and upon which they do depend. Wherefore if we can have no idea or conception of any thing, whereof we have not a full and perfect comprehension, then can we not have an idea or conception of the nature of any substance. But though we do not comprehend all truth, as if our mind were above it, or master of it, and cannot penetrate into, and look quite through the nature of every thing, yet may rational souls frame certain ideas and conceptions, of whatsoever is in the orb of being proportionate to their own nature, and sufficient for their purpose. And though we cannot fully comprehend the Deity, nor exhaust the infiniteness of its perfection, yet may we have an idea or conception of a being absolutely perfect ; such a one as is *nostro modulo conformis*, agreeable and proportionate to our measure and scantling—as we may approach near to a mountain, and touch it with our hands, though we cannot encompass it all round, and enclasp it within our arms. Whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely inconceivable, is nothing ; but not whatsoever is not fully comprehensible by our imperfect understandings.

It is true, indeed, that the Deity is more incomprehensible to us than any thing else whatsoever, which proceeds from the fulness of its being and perfection, and from the transcendency of its brightness ; but for the very same reason may it be said also, in some sense, that it is more know-

able and conceivable than any thing. As the sun, though by reason of its excessive splendour, it dazzle our weak sight, yet it is notwithstanding far more visible also, than any of the *nebulosæ stellæ*, the small misty stars. Where there is more of light, there is more of visibility ; so where there is more of entity, reality, and perfection, there is there more of conceptibility and cognoscibility ; such an object filling up the mind more, and acting more strongly upon it. Nevertheless, because our weak and imperfect minds are lost in the vast immensity and redundancy of the Deity, and overcome with its transcendant light and dazzling brightness, therefore hath it to us an appearance of darkness and incomprehensibility ; as the unbounded expansion of light, in the clear transparent ether, hath to us the apparition of an azure obscurity ; which yet is not an absolute thing in itself, but only relative to our sense, and a mere fancy in us.

The incomprehensibility of the Deity is so far from being an argument against the reality of its existence, as that it is most certain, on the contrary, that were there nothing incomprehensible to us, who are but contemptible pieces, and small atoms of the universe ; were there no other being in the world, but what our finite and imperfect understandings could span or fathom, and encompass round about, look through and through, have a commanding view of, and perfectly conquer and subdue under them ; then could there be nothing absolutely and infinitely perfect, that is, no God. For though that of Empedocles be not true in a literal sense, as it seems to have been

taken by Aristotle,^a γαῖα μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν, &c. that by earth we see earth, by water water, and by fire fire ; and understand every thing by something of the same within ourselves : yet is it certain, that every thing is apprehended by some internal congruity in that which apprehends, which perhaps was the sense intended by that noble philosophic poet. Wherefore it cannot possibly otherwise be, but that the finiteness, scantness, and imperfection, of our narrow understandings must make them asymmetrical, or incommensurate, to that which is absolutely and infinitely perfect.

And nature itself plainly intimates to us, that there is some such absolutely perfect Being, which though not inconceivable, yet is incomprehensible to our finite understandings, by certain passions, which it hath implanted in us, that otherwise would want an object to display themselves upon ; namely those of devout veneration, adoration, and admiration, together with a kind of ecstasy and pleasing horror ; which, in the silent language of nature, seems to speak thus much to us, that there is some object in the world, so much bigger and vaster than our mind and thoughts, that it is the very same to them, that the ocean is to narrow vessels ; so that when they have taken into themselves as much as they can thereof by contemplation, and filled up all their capacity, there is still an immensity of it left without, which cannot enter in for want of room to receive it, and therefore must be apprehended after some other strange and mysterious manner, viz. by their being as it were plunged into it, and swallowed up or lost in it. To conclude, the Deity is indeed incompre-

^a De Anima, lib. i. cap. ii. p. 3. tom. ii. oper.

hensible to our finite and imperfect understandings, but not inconceivable; and therefore there is no ground at all for this atheistic pretence, to make it a nonentity.

We come to the third atheistic argumentation; That because infinity (which according to theology is included in the idea of God, and pervadeth all his attributes) is utterly inconceivable, the Deity itself is therefore an impossibility and nonentity. To this sense sound sundry passages of a modern writer; as, "Whatsoever we know, we learn from our phantasms; but there is no phantasm of infinite, and therefore no knowledge or conception of it." Again, "Whatsoever we imagine is finite, and therefore there is no conception or idea of that which we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite time, or of infinite power. Wherefore the name of God is used not to make us conceive him, but only that we may honour him." The true meaning whereof (as may be plainly gathered from other passages of the same writer) is thus to be interpreted; That there is nothing of philosophic truth and reality in the idea or attributes of God; nor any other sense in those words, but only to signify the veneration and astonishment of men's own confounded minds. And, accordingly, the word infinite is declared to signify nothing at all in that which is so called (there being no such thing really existing), but only the inability of men's own minds, together with their rustic astonishment and admiration. Wherefore when the same writer determines, that God must not be said to be finite, this being no good courtship nor compliment; and yet the word infinite signifieth nothing in the thing itself, nor

hath any conception at all answering to it ; he either does plainly abuse his reader, or else he leaves him to make up this conclusion, That since God is neither finite nor infinite, he is an inconceivable nothing. In like manner, another learned well-willer to Atheism declareth, That he, who calleth any thing infinite, doth but “ *rei quam non capit, attribuere nomen, quod non intelligit,*” attribute an unintelligible name to a thing inconceivable ; because all conception is finite, and it is impossible to conceive any thing that hath no bounds or limits. But that, which is mistaken for infinite, is nothing but a confused chaos of the mind, or an unshaken embryo of thought ; when men going on farther and farther, and making a continual progress, without seeing any end before them ; being at length quite weary and tired out with this their endless journey, they sit down, and call the thing by this hard and unintelligible name, infinite.—And from hence does he also infer, that because we can have no idea of infinite, as to signify any thing in that which is so called, we therefore cannot possibly have “ *germanam ideam Dei,*” any true and genuine idea or notion of God.—Of which they, who understand the language of Atheists, know very well the meaning to be this ; that there is indeed no such thing, or that he is a non-entity.

Now since this exception against the idea of God, and consequently his existence, is made by our modern and neoteric Atheists ; we shall, in the first place, shew how contradictory they are herein to their predecessors, the old philosophic Atheists ; and consequently, how inconsistent and disagreeing Atheists in several ages have been

with one another. For whereas these modern Atheists would have this thought a sufficient confutation of a Deity, that there can be nothing infinite ; it is certain, that the ancient philosophic Atheists were so far from being of this persuasion, that some of them, as Anaximander expressly made *Ἄπειρον*, or Infinite, the principle of all things ; that is, infinitely extended and eternal matter, devoid of all life and understanding. For though Melissus's *Ἄπειρον*, or Infinite, which he made the first principle, was a most perfect Being eminently containing all things (as hath been already shewed) and therefore the true Deity ; Anaximander's *Ἄπειρον*, or Infinite, yet however called *Θεῖον*, or Divine by him, (it being the only divinity which he acknowledged) was nothing but senseless matter, an atheistic infinite. Wherefore both Theists and Atheists in those former times did very well agree together in this one point, that there was something or other infinite, as the first principle of all things ; either infinite mind, or infinite matter ; though this latter atheistic infinity of extended matter be indeed repugnant to conception (as shall be proved afterwards) there being no true infinite, but a perfect Being, or the holy Trinity. Furthermore, not only Anaximander, but also after him Democritus and Epicurus, and many others of that atheistic gang, heretofore asserted likewise a numerical infinity of worlds, and therefore much more than an infinity of atoms, or particles of matter. And though this numerical infinity of theirs were also inconceivable and impossible ; yet does it sufficiently appear from hence, that these ancient philosophic Atheists were so far from being abhorrent from infinity, as

a thing impossible, and a non-entity, that they were on the contrary very fond thereof; and therefore never went about to disprove a Deity after this manner, because there can be nothing infinite.

But, in the next place, we shall make it manifest, that these modern Atheists do no less contradict plain reason and their very selves also, than they do their predecessors in that impiety, when they thus go about to disprove the existence of a God, because there can be nothing infinite, neither in duration, nor in power, nor in any other regard. For, first, though it should be doubted whether there be a God or no; yet must it needs be acknowledged to be as indubitable as any thing in all geometry, that there was something or other infinite in duration, or eternal, without beginning: because, if there had been once nothing at all, there could never have been any thing; that common notion, or principle of reason, having here an irresistible force, that nothing could ever come from nothing. Now, if there were never nothing, but always something, then must there of necessity be something infinite in duration, and eternal without beginning. Wherefore it cannot be accounted less than extreme sottishness and stupidity of mind in these modern Atheists, thus to impugn a Deity from the impossibility of infinite duration without beginning. But, in the next place, we must confess it seems to us hardly conceivable, that any Atheist whatsoever could possibly be so prodigiously sottish, or so monstrously infatuated, as really to think, that once there was nothing at all, but that afterwards senseless matter happened (nobody knows how) to come into

being, from whence all other things were derived. According to which hypothesis it would follow also, that matter might as well some time or other happen again to cease to be, and so all things vanish into nothing. To conclude, therefore, these Atheists must of necessity be guilty of one or other of these two things; either of extreme sottishness and stupidity in acknowledging neither God, nor matter, nor any thing, to have existed infinitely from eternity without beginning; or else, if they do acknowledge the pre-eternity of matter, or its infinite past duration without beginning, then, of the most notorious impudence, in making that an argument against the existence of a God, which themselves acknowledge to matter.

Nevertheless we shall here readily comply with these modern Atheists thus far, as to grant them these two following things: First, That we can have no proper and genuine phantasm of any infinite whatsoever, because we never had corporeal sense of any, neither of infinite number nor of infinite magnitude, and therefore much less of infinite time or duration, and of infinite power; these two latter things, time and power, themselves not falling under corporeal sense. Secondly, That as we have no phantasm of any infinite, so neither is infinity fully comprehensible by our human understandings, that are but finite. But since it is certain, even to mathematical evidence, that there was something infinite in duration, or without beginning, insomuch that no intelligent Atheist, upon mature consideration, will ever venture to contradict it; we shall from hence extort from these Atheists an acknowledgment of the falseness of these two theorems of theirs, that whatso-

ever we have no phantasm or sensible idea of, as also whatsoever is not fully comprehensible by us, is therefore a pure non-entity or nothing; and enforce them to confess, that there is something really existing in nature, which we have neither any phantasm of, not yet can fully comprehend with our imperfect understandings.

Nay, we will yet go further in compliance with them, and acknowledge likewise, that as for those infinities, of number, of corporeal magnitude; and of time or successive duration, we have not only no phantasm, nor full intellectual comprehension of them, but also no manner of intelligible idea, notion, or conception. For though it be true, that number be somewhere said by Aristotle^a to be infinite, yet was his meaning there only in such a negative sense as this, that we can never possibly come to an end thereof by addition, but may in our minds still add number to number infinitely; which is all one as if he should indeed have affirmed, that there can be no number actually and positively infinite, according to Aristotle's own definition of infinite, elsewhere given,^b namely, that to which nothing can be added; no number being ever so great, but that one or more may still be added to it. And as there can be no infinite number, so neither can there be any infinity of corporeal magnitude; not only because if there were, the parts thereof must needs be infinite in number, but also because, as no number can be so great, but that more may be added to it; so neither can any body or magnitude be ever so vast, but that

^a Metaphys. lib. xi. cap. xi. p. 434. tom. iv. oper. et Phys. Auscultat. lib. iii. cap. v. p. 486. tom. i. oper. et cap. viii. p. 491.

^b Phys. Auscultat. lib. iii. cap. ix. p. 492. tom. i. oper.

more body or magnitude may be supposed still further and further; this addition of finites never making up infinite. Indeed, infinite space, beyond the finite world, is a thing which hath been much talked of; and it is by some supposed to be infinite body, but by others to be an incorporeal infinite; through whose actual distance notwithstanding (mensurable by poles and miles) this finite world might roll and tumble infinitely. But as we conceive, all that can be demonstrated here is no more than this, but how vast soever the finite world should be, yet there is a possibility of more and more magnitude and body, still to be added to it, further and further, by Divine power infinitely; or that the world could never be made so great, no not by God himself, as that his own omnipotence could not make it yet greater. Which potential infinity, or indefinite increasableness of corporeal magnitude, seems to have been mistaken for an actual infinity of space. Whereas, for this very reason, because more could be added to the magnitude of the corporeal world infinitely, or without end, therefore is it impossible, that it should ever be positively and actually infinite; that is, such as to which nothing more can possibly be added. Wherefore we conclude concerning corporeal magnitude, as we did before of number, that there can be no absolute and actual infinity thereof; and that how much vaster soever the world may be, than according to the supposition of vulgar astronomers, who make the starry sphere the utmost wall thereof; yet is it not absolutely infinite, such as really hath no bounds or limits at all, nor to which nothing more could, by Divine power, be added. Lastly, We affirm like-

wise concerning time, or successive duration, that there can be no infinity of that neither, no temporal eternity without beginning: and that not only because there would then be an-actual infinity and more than an infinity of number; but also because, upon this supposition, there would always have been an infinity of time past, and consequently an infinity of time past, which was never present. Whereas all the moments of past time must needs have been once present; and, if so, then all of them, at least save one, future too; from whence it will follow, that there was a first moment, or beginning of time. And thus does reason conclude, neither the world, nor time itself, to have been infinite in their past duration, nor eternal without beginning.

Here will the Atheist think presently, he hath got a great advantage to disprove the existence of a God; “*Nonne, qui æternitatem mundi sic tollunt, eadem opera etiam mundi conditori æternitatem tollunt?*” Do not they, who thus destroy the eternity of the world, at the same time destroy also the eternity of the Creator? For if time itself were not eternal, then how could the Deity, or any thing, be so?—the Atheist securely taking it for granted, that God himself could not be otherwise eternal, than by a successive flux of infinite time; but we say, that this will on the contrary afford us a plain demonstration of the existence of a Deity. For since the world and time itself were not infinite in their past duration, but had a beginning, therefore were they both certainly made together by some other Being, who is, in order of nature, senior to time, and so without time, before time; he being above that successive flux,

and comprehending in the stability and immutable perfection of his own being, his yesterday, and to-day, and for ever. Or thus; Something was of necessity infinite in duration, and without beginning; but neither the world, nor motion, nor time, that is, no successive being was such; therefore is there something else, whose being and duration is not successive and flowing, but permanent to whom this infinity belongeth. The Atheists here can only smile, or make faces, and shew their little wit in quibbling upon *nunc-stans*; or a standing *now* of eternity; as if that standing eternity of the Deity (which with so much reason hath been contended for by the ancient genuine Theists) were nothing but a pitiful small moment of time standing still, and as if the duration of all beings whatsoever must needs be like our own; whereas the duration of every thing must of necessity be agreeable to its nature: and, therefore, as that, whose imperfect nature is ever flowing like a river, and consists in continual motion and changes one after another, must needs have accordingly a successive and flowing duration; sliding perpetually from present into past, and always posting on towards the future, expecting something of itself, which is not yet in being, but to come; so must that, whose perfect nature is essentially immutable, and always the same, and necessarily existent, have a permanent duration; never losing any thing of itself once present, as sliding away from it, nor yet running forwards to meet something of itself before, which is not yet in being; and it is as contradictory for it ever to have begun, as ever to cease to be.

Now whereas the modern Atheists pretend to

have proved, that there is nothing infinite, neither in duration nor otherwise, and consequently no Deity, merely because we have no sense nor phantasm of infinite, nor can fully comprehend the same; and therefore will needs conclude, that the words infinite and eternal signify nothing in the thing itself, but either men's own ignorance and inability to conceive, when, or whether, that which is called eternal, began; together with the confounded nonsense of their astonished minds, and their stupid veneration of that, which their own fear and fancy has raised up as a bug-bear to themselves; or else the progress of their thoughts further and further backward indefinitely, (though they plainly confute themselves in all this, by sometimes acknowledging matter and motion infinite and eternal, which argues either their extreme sottishness or impudence :) we have shewed, with mathematical evidence and certainty, that there is really something infinite in duration, or eternal; by which therefore cannot be meant men's own ignorance, or the confounded nonsense of their devotion, nor yet the idle progress of their minds further and further indefinitely, which never reaches infinite, but a reality in the thing itself, namely this,—that it never was not, nor had any beginning. Moreover, having demonstrated concerning this infinity and eternity, without beginning, that it cannot possibly belong to any successive being, we confidently conclude against these Atheists also, that it was not matter and motion, or this mundane system, but a perfect immutable nature, of a permanent duration (that is, a God); to whom it belonged. To sum up all, therefore, we say, that

infinite and eternal are not words, that signify nothing in the thing itself, nor mere attributes of honour, compliment, and flattery, that is, of devout and religious nonsense, error, and falsehood; but attributes belonging to the Deity, and to that alone, of the most philosophic truth and reality. And though we, being finite, have no full comprehension and adequate understanding of this infinity and eternity (as not of the Deity), yet can we not be without some notion, conception, and apprehension thereof, so long as we can thus demonstrate concerning it, that it belongs to something, and yet to nothing neither, but a perfect immutable nature. But the notion of this infinite eternity will be yet further cleared in the following explanation and vindication of infinite power.

For the Atheists principally quarrel with infinite power, or omnipotence, and pretend, in like manner, this to be utterly inconceivable and impossible, and subjected in nothing. Thus a modern atheistic writer concludes, that since no man can conceive infinite power, this is also but an attribute of honour, which the confounded nonsense of astonished minds bestows upon the object of their devotion, without any philosophic truth and reality. And here have our modern Atheists indeed the suffrage and agreement of the ancient philosophic Atheists also with them, who, as appears from the verses before cited out of Lucretius, concerned themselves in nothing more, than asserting all power to be finite, and omnipotence, or infinite power, to belong to nothing.

First, therefore, it is here observable, that this omnipotence, or infinite power, asserted by Theists, has been commonly either ignorantly mistaken,

or wilfully misrepresented by these Atheists, out of design to make it seem impossible and ridiculous, as if by it were meant a power of producing and doing any thing whatsoever, without exception, though never so contradictory; as a late atheistic person, seeming to assert this Divine omnipotence and infinite power really and designedly, notwithstanding abused the same with this sceptic irony, That God by his omnipotence, or infinite power, could turn this tree into a syllogism. Children, indeed, have sometimes such childish apprehensions of the Divine omnipotence; and Ren. Cartesius^a (though otherwise an acute philosopher) was here no less childish, in affirming, that all things whatsoever, even the natures of good and evil, and all truth and falsehood, do so depend upon the arbitrary will and power of God, as that, if he had pleased, twice two should not have been four; nor the three angles of a plain triangle equal to two right ones, and the like; he only adding, that all these things, notwithstanding, when they were once settled by the Divine decree, became immutable; that is, I suppose, not in themselves, or to God, but unto us: than which no paradox of any old philosopher was ever more absurd and irrational. And certainly, if any one did desire to persuade the world that Cartesius, notwithstanding all his pretences to demonstrate a Deity, was indeed but an hypocritical Theist, or personated and disguised Atheist, he could not have a fairer pretence for it out of all his writings than from hence; this being plainly to destroy the Deity, by making one attribute thereof

^a Vide Respons. ad Objectiones sextas, §. vi. p. 160. edit. Amstel. 1685. in 4to.

to devour and swallow up another; infinite will and power, infinite understanding and wisdom: For to suppose God to understand, and to be wise only by his will, is all one as to suppose him to have really no understanding at all. Wherefore we do not affirm God to be so omnipotent, or infinitely powerful, as that he is able to destroy or change the intelligible natures of things at pleasure; this being all one as to say, that God is so omnipotent and infinitely powerful, that he is able to destroy, or to baffle and befool his own wisdom and understanding, which is the very rule and measure of his power. We say not, therefore, that God by his omnipotence, or infinite power, could make twice two not to be four, or turn a tree into a syllogism; but we say, that omnipotence, or infinite power, is that which can produce and do all whatsoever is possible, that is, whatsoever is conceivable, and implies no manner of contradiction; the very essence of possibility being no other than conceptibility. And thus has the point been stated all along, not only by Christian Theists, but even the ancient Pagan theologians themselves, that omnipotence, or infinite power, is that which can do all things, that do not imply a contradiction, or which are not inconceivable. This appearing from that of Agatho, cited before out of Aristotle,^a That nothing is exempted from the Divine power, but only to make *πεπραγμένα ἀγένητα*, what hath been done to be undone, or the like hereunto. Now infinite power being nothing else but a power of doing whatsoever is conceivable, it is plainly absurd to say, that a power of doing nothing but what is conceivable is inconceivable.

^a Lib. vi. ad Nicomach. cap. ii. p. 98. tom. iii. oper.

But, because the Atheists look upon infinity as such a desperate and affrightful thing, we shall here render it something more easy, and take off that frightful vizard from it, which makes it seem such a *mormo*, or bug-bear to them, by declaring, in the next place, that infinity is really nothing else but perfection. For infinite understanding and knowledge is nothing else but perfect knowledge, that which hath no defect or mixture of ignorance with it, or the knowledge of whatsoever is knowable. So, in like manner, infinite power is nothing else but perfect power, that which hath no defect or mixture of impotency in it; a power of producing and doing all whatsoever is possible, that is, whatsoever is conceivable. Infinite power can do whatsoever infinite understanding can conceive, and nothing else; conception being the measure of power, and its extent, and whatsoever is in itself inconceivable being therefore impossible. Lastly, infinity of duration or eternity, is really nothing else but perfection, as including necessary existence and immutability in it: so that it is not only contradictory to such a Being to cease to be or exist, but also to have had a newness or beginning of being, or to have any flux or change therein, by dying to the present, and acquiring something new to itself, which was not before. Notwithstanding which, this being comprehends the differences of past, present, and future, or the successive priority and posteriority of all temporary things: and because infinity is perfection, therefore can nothing, which includeth any thing of imperfection, in the very idea and essence of it, be ever truly and properly infinite, as number, corporeal mag-

nitude, and successive duration. All which can only, *mentiri infinitatem*, counterfeit and imitate infinity—in their having more and more added to them infinitely, whereby notwithstanding they never reach it, or overtake it. There is nothing truly infinite, neither in knowledge, nor in power, nor in duration, but only one absolutely perfect Being, or the holy Trinity,

Now, that we have an idea or conception of perfection, or a perfect Being, is evident from the notion that we have of imperfection, so familiar to us ; perfection being the rule and measure of imperfection, and not imperfection of perfection ; as a straight line is the rule and measure of a crooked, and not a crooked line of a straight : so that perfection is first conceivable, in order of nature, before imperfection, as light before darkness, a positive before the privative or defect. For perfection is not properly the want of imperfection, but imperfection of perfection. Moreover, we perceive divers degrees of perfection in the essences of things, and consequently a scale or ladder of perfections in nature, one above another, as of living and animate things above senseless and inanimate, of rational things above sensitive ; and this by reason of that notion or idea, which we first have of that which is absolutely perfect, as the standard ; by comparing of things with which, and measuring of them, we take notice of their approaching more or less near thereunto. Nor indeed could these gradual ascents be infinite, or without end, but they must come at last to that which is absolutely perfect, as the top of them all. Lastly, We could not perceive imperfection in the most perfect of all those things, which we

ever had sense or experience of in our lives, had we not a notion or idea of that which is absolutely perfect, which secretly comparing the same with, we perceive it to come short thereof. And we might add here, that it is not conceivable neither, how there should be any lesser perfection existent in any kind, were there not first something perfect in that kind, from whence it was derived: this of Boetius^a being the very sense and language of nature in rational beings; “Omne, quod imperfectum esse dicitur, id diminutione perfecti imperfectum esse perhibetur. Quo fit, ut si in quolibet genere imperfectum quid esse videatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid esse, necesse sit. Etenim sublata perfectione, unde illud, quod imperfectum perhibetur, existerit, ne fingi quidem potest. Neque enim a diminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum cepit exordium; sed ab integris absolutisque procedens, in hæc extrema, atque effæta dilabitur.” Whatsoever is said to be imperfect, is accounted such by the diminution of that which is perfect; from whence it comes to pass, that if in any kind any thing appear imperfect, there must of necessity be something also in that kind perfect. For perfection being once taken away, it could not be imagined, from whence that which is accounted imperfect should have proceeded. Nor did the nature of things take beginning from inconsummate and imperfect things, but proceeding from things absolute and complete, thence descend down to these lower, effete, and languid things.—But of this more elsewhere.

Wherefore since infinite is the same with abso-

^a De Consolat. Philos. lib. iii. p. 69, 70. edit. Vallini.

lutely perfect, we having a notion or idea of the latter, must needs have of the former. From whence we learn also, that though the word infinite be in the form thereof negative, yet is the sense of it, in those things which are really capable of the same, positive, it being all one with absolutely perfect; as likewise the sense of the word finite is negative, it being the same with imperfect. So that finite is properly the negation of infinite, as that which in order of nature is before it; and not infinite the negation of finite. However, in those things which are capable of no true infinity, because they are essentially finite, as number, corporeal magnitude, and time, infinity being there a mere imaginary thing, and a non-entity, it can only be conceived by the negation of finite; as we also conceive nothing by the negation of something; that is, we can have no positive conception thereof.

We conclude, to assert an infinite Being, is nothing else but to assert a Being absolutely perfect, such as never was not, or had no beginning, which could produce all things possible and conceivable, and upon which all other things must depend. And this is to assert a God; one absolutely perfect Being, the Original of all things: God, and Infinite, and absolutely Perfect, being but different names for one and the same thing.

We come now to the fourth atheistic objection, That theology is nothing but an arbitrary complement of inconsistent and contradictory notions., Where, first, we deny not, but that as some theologians (or bigotical religionists) of later times extend the Divine omnipotence to things contradictory and impossible, as to the making of one

and the same body, to be all of it in several distant places at once ; so may others sometimes unskilfully attribute to the Deity things inconsistent or contradictory to one another, because seeming to them to be all perfections. As, for example, though it be concluded generally by theologers, that there is a natural justice and sanctity in the Deity, yet do some notwithstanding contend, that the will of God is not determined by any antecedent rule or nature of justice and sanctity in the Deity, yet do some notwithstanding contend, that the will of God is not determined by any antecedent rule or nature of justice, but that whatsoever he could be supposed to will arbitrarily, would therefore be *ipso facto* just ; which is called by them the Divine sovereignty, and looked upon as a great perfection ; though it be certain, that these two things are directly contradictory to one another, *viz.* That there is something *φύσει*, in its own nature just and unjust, or a natural sanctity in God ; and that the arbitrary will and command of the Deity is the only rule of justice and injustice. Again, some theologers determining, That whatsoever is in God, is God, or essential to the Deity ; they conceiving such an immutability to be a necessary perfection thereof, seem thereby not only to contradict all liberty of will in the Deity, which themselves notwithstanding contend for in a high degree, that all things are arbitrarily determined by Divine decree ; but also to take away from it all power of acting *ad extra*, and of perceiving or animadverting things done successively here in the world. But it will not follow from these and the like contradictions of mistaken theologers, that therefore theology itself is contra-

dicious, and hath nothing of philosophic truth at all in it; no more than because philosophers also hold contradictory opinions, that therefore philosophy itself is contradictory, and that there is nothing absolutely true or false, but (according to the Protagorean doctrine) all seeming and fantastical.

But in the next place we add, that though it be true, that the nature of things admits of nothing contradictory, and that whatsoever plainly implies a contradiction, must therefore of necessity be a non-entity; yet is this rule, notwithstanding, obnoxious to be much abused, when whatsoever men's shallow and gross understandings cannot reach to, they will therefore presently conclude to be contradictory and impossible. As, for example, the Atheists and Materialists cannot conceive of any other substance besides body, and therefore do they determine presently, that incorporeal substance is a contradiction in the very terms, it being as much as to say, incorporeal body:^a wherefore when God is said by theologians to be an incorporeal substance, this is to them an absolute impossibility. Thus a modern writer: "The universe, that is, the whole mass of all things, is corporeal; that is to say, body. Now every part of body is body, and consequently every part of the universe is body; and that which is not body, is no part thereof. And because the universe is all, that which is no part of it, nothing. Therefore when spirits are called incorporeal, this is only a name of honour, and it may with more piety be attributed to God

^a Hobbes's *Leviath.* cap. xxxiv.

himself, in whom we consider, not what attribute best expresseth his nature, which is incomprehensible, but what best expresseth our desire to honour him." Where incorporeal is said to be an attribute of honour; that is, such an attribute, as expresseth only the veneration of men's minds, but signifieth nothing in nature, nor hath any philosophic truth and reality under it; a substance incorporeal being as contradictory as something and nothing. Notwithstanding which, this contradiction is only in the weakness and childishness of these men's understandings, and not the thing itself; it being demonstrable, that there is some other substance besides body, according to the true and genuine notion of it. But because this mistake is not proper to Atheists only, there being some Theists also, who labour under this same infirmity of mind, not to be able to conceive any other substance besides body, and who therefore assert a corporeal Deity; we shall in the next place shew, from a passage of a modern writer, what kind of contradictions they are, which these Atheists impute to all theology, namely, such as these; that it supposes God to perceive things sensible, without any organs of sense; and to understand and be wise without any brains. "Pious men (saith he) attribute to God Almighty, for honour's sake, whatsoever they see honourable in the world, as seeing, hearing, willing, knowing, justice, wisdom, &c. But they deny him such poor things, as eyes, ears and brains, and other organs, without which we worms neither have, nor can conceive, such faculties to be: and so far they do well. But when they dispute of God's actions philosophically, then do they consider

them again, as if he had indeed such faculties: This is not well, and thence is it, that they fall into so many difficulties. We ought not to dispute of God's nature. He is no fit subject of our philosophy. True religion consisteth in obedience to Christ's lieutenants, and in giving God such honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their several lieutenancies shall ordain." Where the plain and undisguised meaning of the author seems to be this: That God is no subject of philosophy, as all real things are; (accordingly as he declareth elsewhere, that ^a "Religio non est philosophia, sed lex;" Religion is not a matter of philosophy, but only of law and arbitrary constitution)—he having no real nature of his own, nor being any true inhabitant of the world or heaven, but (as all other ghosts and spirits) an inhabitant of men's brains only, that is, a figment of their fear and fancy, or a mere political scare-crow. And therefore such attributes are to be given to him, without any scrupulosity, as the civil law of every country shall appoint, and no other; the wise and nasute very well understanding, that all this business of religion is nothing but mere pageantry, and that the attributes of the Deity indeed signify neither true nor false, nor any thing in nature, but only men's reverence and devotion towards the object of their fear: the manner of expressing which is determined by civil law. Wherefore to say, that God sees all things, and yet hath no eyes; and that he hears all things, and yet hath no ears; and that he understands, and is wise, and yet hath no

^a De Homine, cap. xiv.

brains; and whatsoever else you will please to say of him, as attributes of honour, and only as signifying devotion, is thus far well enough. But when men, not understanding the true cabala, will needs go further, they mistaking attributes of honour for attributes of nature, and of philosophic truth, and making them premises to infer absolute truth, and convince falsehood from, or matters to dispute and reason; that is, when they will needs suppose such a thing as a God really to exist in the world, then do they involve themselves in all manner of contradiction, nonsense, and absurdity; as, for example, to affirm seriously, that this God really sees all things in the world, and yet hath no eyes; and that he indeed hears all things, and yet hath no ears; and, lastly, that he understands and is wise, and yet hath no brains, which things are all absolutely contradictory, unconceivable and impossible. The sum of all is this, that when religion and theology, which is indeed nothing but law and fantasy, is made philosophy, then is it all mere jargon and insignificant nonsense. And now we see what those contradictions are, which the Atheists charge upon theology; such as owe all their being only to the grossness, sottishness, and brutishness of these men's own apprehensions. From whence proceedeth likewise, this following definition of knowledge and understanding,^a That it is nothing but a tumult of the mind, raised by external things, pressing the organical parts of man's body. "O ye brutish among the people, when will ye understand? and ye fools, when will ye be wise? He that planted the ear, (and gave man's soul a power of hearing thereby) shall

^a Leviathan, cap. xxxi. et Elementa de Cive, cap. xv.

not he (though himself have no ears) hear? He that formed the eye (and gave the human soul a power of seeing, by it as an instrument) shall not he (though himself have no eyes) see? Lastly, he that teacheth man knowledge, (or gave him an understanding mind, besides brains) shall not he (though himself be without brains) know and understand?"

It is certain, that no simple idea, as that of a triangle or a square, of a cube or sphere, can possibly be contradictory to itself; and therefore much less can the idea of a perfect Being (which is the compendious idea of God), it being more simple than any of the other. Indeed this simple idea of a perfect Being is pregnant of many attributes; and therefore, the idea of God, more fully declared by them all, may seem to be in this respect a compounded idea, or one idea and conception, consisting or made up of many; which, if they were really contradictory, would render the whole a non-entity. As, for example, this; a plain triangle, whose three angles are greater than two right ones, it being contradictory and unconceivable, is therefore no true idea, but a non-entity. But all the genuine attributes of the Deity, of which its entire idea is made up, are things as demonstrable of a perfect Being, as the properties of a triangle or a square are of those ideas respectively, and therefore cannot they possibly be contradictory, neither to it, nor to one another, because those things, which agree in one third, must needs agree together amongst themselves.

Nay, the genuine attributes of the Deity, namely such as are demonstrable of an absolute perfect

Being, are not only not contradictory, but also necessarily connected together, and inseparable from one another. For there could not possibly be one thing infinite in wisdom only, another thing infinite only in power, and another thing only infinite in duration or eternal. But the very same thing, which is infinite in wisdom, must needs be also infinite in power, and infinite in duration, and so *vice versa*. That, which is infinite in any one perfection, must of necessity have all perfections in it. Thus are all the genuine attributes of the Deity not only not contradictory, but also inseparably concatenate; and the idea of God no congeries either of disagreeing things; or else of such, as are unnecessarily connected with one another.

In very truth, all the several attributes of the Deity are nothing else but so many partial and inadequate conceptions of one and the same simple perfect Being, taken in as it were by piecemeal, by reason of the imperfection of our human understandings, which could not fully conceive it all together at once; and therefore are they really all but one thing, though they have the appearance of multiplicity to us. As the one simple light of the sun, diversely refracted and reflected from a roid cloud, hath to us the appearance of the variegated colours of the rainbow.

Wherefore the attributes of God are no bundle of unconceivables and impossibles, huddled up together; nor attributes of honour and compliment only, and nothing but the religious nonsense of astonished minds, expressing their devotion towards what they fear; but all of them attributes of nature, and of most severe philosophic

truth. Neither is the idea of God an arbitrary complement of things unnecessarily connected, and separable from one another; it is no factitious, nor fictitious thing, made up by any feigning power of the soul, but it is a natural and most simple uncompounded idea; such as to which nothing can be arbitrarily added, nor nothing detracted from. Notwithstanding which, by reason of the imperfection of human minds, there may be, are, different apprehensions concerning it. For as every one, that hath a conception of a plain triangle in general doth not therefore know, that it includes this property in it, to have three angles equal to two right ones; nor doth every one, who hath an idea of a rectangular triangle, presently understand, that the square of the subtense is equal to the squares of both the sides; so neither doth every one, who hath a conception of a perfect Being, therefore presently know all that is included in that idea. Moreover, men may easily mistake things for absolute perfections, which are not such, as hath been partly already shewed.

And now, whereas the Atheists pretend, in the next place, to give an account of that supposed contradictiousness in the idea and attributes of God, namely, that it proceeded principally from fear, or the confounded nonsense of men's astonished minds, huddling up together all imaginable attributes of honour, courtship, and compliment, without any philosophic truth, sense, or signification; as also, in part, from the fiction and imposture of politicians: all this hath been already prevented, and the foundation thereof quite taken away, by our shewing, that there is nothing in the genuine idea of God and his attributes, but what is demon-

strable of a perfect Being, and that there cannot be the least either added to that idea, or detracted from it, any more than there can be any thing added to or detracted from the idea of a triangle, or of a square. From whence it follows unavoidably, that there cannot possibly be any thing either contradictory or arbitrary in the Divine idea, and that the genuine attributes thereof are attributes of necessary philosophic truth: namely, such as do not only speak the piety, devotion, and reverence of men's own minds, but declare the real nature of the thing itself. Wherefore, when a modern atheistic writer affirmeth of all those, who reason and conclude concerning God's nature from his attributes, "That, losing their understanding in the very first attempt, they fall from one inconvenience (or absurdity) to another without end; after the same manner, as when one, ignorant of court ceremonies, coming into the presence of a greater person than he was wont to speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himself from falling, lets slip his cloak; to recover his cloak, lets fall his hat; and so, with one disorder after another, discovers his rusticity and astonishment:" we say, that, though there be something of wit and fancy in this, yet, as it is applied to theology, and the genuine attributes of the Deity, there is not the least of philosophic truth. However, we deny not but that some, either out of superstition, or else out of flattery, (for thus are they styled by St. Jerome,^a "stulti adulescentes Dei," foolish flatterers of God Almighty)—have sometimes attributed such things to him as are incongruous to his nature, and, under a pretence

^a Comment. in Habacuc, lib. i. p. 148. tom. vi. oper.

of honouring him, by magnifying his power and sovereignty, do indeed most highly dishonour him ; they representing him to be such a Being as is no way amiable or desirable.

But the Atheists are most of all concerned to give an account of that unquestionable phenomenon—the general persuasion of the existence of a God in the minds of men, and their propensity to religion in all ages and places of the world ; whence this should come, if there be really no such thing in nature : and this they think to do in the last place, also, partly from men's own fear, together with their ignorance of causes, and partly from the fiction of law-makers and politicians, they endeavouring thereby to keep men in civil subjection under them ; where we shall first plainly and nakedly declare the Atheist's meaning, and then manifest the invalidity and foolery of these pretences to solve the forementioned phenomenon.

First, therefore, these Atheists affirm, That mankind, by reason of their natural imbecility, are in perpetual solicitude, anxiety and fear, concerning future events, or their good and evil fortune to come ; and this passion of fear inclining men to imagine things formidable and fearful, and to suspect or believe the existence of what really is not ; I say, that this distrustful fear and jealousy in the minds of men, concerning their future condition, raises up to them the phantasm of a most affrightful spectre, an invisible understanding Being, arbitrarily governing and swaying the affairs of the whole world, and at pleasure tyrannizing over mankind. And when men's exorbitant fear and fancy has thus raised up to

itself such a mormo, or bug-bear, such an affrightful spectre, as this, a thing that is really no inhabitant of the world, or of heaven, but only of men's brains, they afterward stand in awe of this their own imagination, and tremblingly worship this creature and figment of their own fear and fancy, as a thing really existing without them, or a God; devising all manner of expressions of honour and reverence towards it, and anxiously endeavouring, by all ways conceivable, to propitiate and atone the same. And thus have they brought upon themselves a most heavy yoke of bondage, and filled their lives with all manner of bitterness and misery.

Again, to this fear of future events the Atheists add also ignorance of causes, as a further account of this phenomenon of religion, so generally entertained in the world. For mankind (say they) are naturally inquisitive into the causes of things; and that not only of the events of their own good and evil fortune, but also of the phenomenon of the world, and the effects of nature: and such is their curiosity, that wheresoever they can discover no visible and natural causes, there are they prone to feign and imagine other causes, invisible and supernatural. As it was observed of the tragic dramatists that, whenever they could not well extricate themselves, they were wont to bring in a god upon the stage: and as Aristotle^a recordeth of Anaxagoras, that he never betook himself to Mind, or Understanding, that is, to God for a cause, but only when he was at a loss for other natural and necessary causes. From whence these Atheists would infer, that nothing but ignorance of causes

^a Metaphys. lib. i. cap. iv. p. 267. tom. iv. oper.

made Anaxagoras to assert a Deity. Wherefore it is no wonder (say they) if the generality of mankind, being ignorant of the causes almost of all events and effects of nature, have, by reason of their natural curiosity and fear, feigned or introduced one invisible power or agent omnipotent, as the supreme cause of all things; they betaking themselves thereto, as to a kind of refuge, asylum, or sanctuary for their ignorance.

These two accounts of the phenomenon of religion, from men's fear and solicitude about future events, and from their ignorance of causes, together with their curiosity, are thus joined together by a modern writer:^a "Perpetual fear of future evils always accompanying mankind, in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse for their evil fortune, but some power or agent invisible." Moreover, it is concluded, that from the same originals sprang, not only that vulgar opinion of inferior ghosts and spirits also, subservient to the supreme Deity (as the great ghost of the whole world, apparitions being nothing but men's own dreams and fancies taken by them for sensations), but also men's taking things casual for prognostics, and their being so superstitiously addicted to omens and portents, oracles, and divinations and prophecies; this proceeding likewise from the same fantastic supposition, that the things of the world are disposed of, not by nature, but by some understanding and intending agent or person.^b

^a Hobbes, *Leviath*, cap. xii.

^b This is levelled against Hobbes *De Homine*, cap. xiii. and *Leviathan*, cap. xii.

But lest these two forementioned accounts of that phenomenon of religion, and the belief of a Deity, so epidemical to mankind, should yet seem insufficient; the Atheists will superadd a third to them, from the fiction and imposture of civil sovereigns, crafty law-makers, and designing politicians; who perceiving a great advantage to be made, from the belief of a God and religion, for the better keeping of men in obedience and subjection to themselves, and in peace and civil society with one another (when they are persuaded, that besides the punishments appointed by laws, which can only take place upon open and convicted transgressors, and are often eluded and avoided, there are other punishments, that will be inflicted even upon the secret violators of them, both in this life and after death, by a Divine, invisible, and irresistible hand) have thereupon dexterously laid hold of men's fear and ignorance, and cherished those seeds of religion in them (being the infirmities of their nature) and further confirmed their belief of ghosts and spirits, miracles and prodigies, oracles and divinations, by tales or fables, publicly allowed and recommended; according to that definition of religion given by a modern writer,^a "Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, religion; not allowed, superstition." And that religion, thus nursed up by politicians, might be every way compliant with, and obsequious to, their designs, and no way refractory to the same; it hath been their great care to persuade the people, that their laws were not merely their own inventions, but that themselves were only the inter-

^a Leviathan. cap. vi.

preters of the gods therein, and that the same things were really displeasing to the gods, which were forbidden by them; God ruling over the world no otherwise, than in them, as his vicegerents; according to that assertion of a late writer, *Tract. Theol. Polit. [Ben. Spinozæ, cap. ix. p. 214.]* “*Deum nullum regnum in homines habere, nisi per eos, qui imperium tenent,*” that God reigneth over men, only in the civil sovereigns.—This is therefore another atheistic account of religion’s so generally prevailing in the world, from its being a fit engine of state, and politicians generally looking upon it as an *arcanum imperii*, a mystery of government—to possess the minds of the people with the belief of a God, and to keep them busily employed in the exercises of religion, thereby to render them the more tame and gentle, apt to obedience, subjection, peace, and civil society.

Neither is all this the mere invention of modern Atheists, but indeed the old atheistic cabal, as may appear partly from that known passage of the poet,^a That the gods were first made by fear—and from Lucretius’s so frequently insisting upon the same, according to the mind of Epicurus. For in his first book he makes “*terrorem animi, et tenebras,*” terror of mind, and darkness—the chief causes of Theism; and in his sixth, he further pursues the same grounds, especially the latter of them, after this manner:

Lamb. 528. *Cætera quæ fieri in terris coeloque tuentur*
 [ver. 49.] *Mortales, pavidis quom pendent mentibu’ sæpe,*
Efficiunt animos humiles formidine divum;
Depressosque premunt ad terram, propterea quod
IGNORANTIA CAUSARUM conferre deorum
Cogit ad imperium res; et concedere regnum, et,

^a Petron. in Fragment. p. 676. edit. Burman.

Quorum operum causas nulla ratione videre
Possunt, hæc fieri divino numine rentur.

To this sense; Mortals, when with trembling minds they behold the objects both of heaven and earth, they become depressed and sink down under the fear of the gods; ignorance of causes setting up the reign and empire of the gods. For when men can find no natural causes of these things, they suppose them, presently, to have been done by a Divine power.

And this ignorance of causes is also elsewhere insisted upon by the same poet, as the chief source of religion, or the belief of a God.

Præterea coeli rationes ordine certo,
Et varia annorum cernebant tempora verti;
Nec poterant quibus id fieret cognoscere causis.
Ergo PERFUGIUM sibi habebant, omnia divis
Tradere, et ipsorum nutu facere omnia flecti.

Lib. v. Lamb.
p. 500. [ver.
1182.]

Moreover, when a modern writer declares the opinion of ghosts to be one of those things, in which consisteth the natural seeds of religion: as also that this opinion proceedeth from the ignorance how to distinguish dreams, and other strong fancies from vision and sense; he seemeth herein to have trod likewise in the footsteps of Lucretius, giving, not obscurely, the same account of religion in his fifth book.*

Nunc quæ causa deum per magnas numina gentes
Pervolarit, et ararum compleverit urbes, &c.
Non ita difficile est rationem reddere verbis.
Quippe etenim jam tum divum mortalia secla
Egregias animo facies vigilante videbant,
Et magis in somnis, mirando corporis auctu.
His igitur sensum tribuebant, &c.

That is, How the noise of the gods came thus to

* Ver. 1160.

ring over the whole world, and to fill all places with temples and altars, is not a thing very difficult to give an account of; it proceeding first from men's fearful dreams, and their phantasms when awake, taken by them for visions and sensations. Whereupon they attributed not only sense to these things as really existing, but also immortality and great power. For though this were properly an account only of those inferior and plebeian gods, called demons and genii, yet was it supposed, that the belief of these things did easily dispose the minds of men also to the persuasion of one supreme omnipotent Deity over all.

Lastly, that the ancient Atheists, as well as the modern, pretended, the opinion of a God and religion to have been a political invention, is frequently declared in the writings of the Pagans; as in this of Cicero,^a “*Hi, qui dixerunt totam de diis immortalibus opinionem fictam esse ab hominibus sapientibus, reipublicæ causa, ut quos ratio non posset, eos ad officium religio duceret; nonne omnem religionem funditus sustulerunt?*” They, who affirmed the whole opinion of the gods to have been feigned by wise men for the sake of the commonwealth, that so religion might engage those to their duty, whom reason could not, did they not utterly destroy all religion?—And the sense of the ancient Atheists is thus represented by Plato; Θεούς, ὧ μακάριε, εἶναι πρῶτον φασίν οὗτοι τέχνη, οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ τισὶ νόμοις· καὶ τούτους ἄλλους ἄλλοις, ὅπη ἕκαστοι συνωμολόγησαν νομοθετούμενοι. They first of all affirm, that the gods are not by nature, but by art and laws only; and that from thence it comes to pass, that they are

De Leg. l. x.
[p. 666.]

^a De Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. xlii. p. 2945. tom. ix. oper.

different to different nations and countries, accordingly as the several humours of their law-makers did chance to determine.—And before Plato, Critias, one of the thirty tyrants of Athens, plainly declared religion at first to have been a political intrigue, in those verses of his recorded by Sextus^a the philosopher, beginning to this purpose ; “ that there was a time at first, when men’s life was disorderly and brutish, and the will of the stronger was the only law : after which they consented and agreed together to make civil laws ;” that so the disorderly might be punished. Notwithstanding which, it was still found, that men were only hindered from open but not from secret injustices : whereupon some sagacious and witty person was the author of a further invention, to deter men as well from secret as from open injuries :

Ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τὸ θεῖον εἰσηγήσατο
Ὡς ἔστι δαίμων ἀφθίτω θάλλων βίῳ,
Νόῳ τ’ ἀκούων καὶ βλέπων, φρονῶντε·
Ἵφ’ οὗ πᾶν μὲν τὸ λεχθὲν ἐν βροτοῖς ἀκούεται,
Δρώμενον δὲ πᾶν ἰδεῖν δύσησεται.

Namely, by introducing or feigning a God immortal and incorruptible, who hears, and sees, and takes notice of all things.—Critias then concluding his poem in these words ;

Οὕτω δὲ πρῶτον οἶομαι πείσασθαι τινα
Θητοὺς νομίζειν δαιμόνων εἶναι γένος.

And in this manner do I conceive, some one at first to have persuaded mortals to believe, that there is a kind of gods.^b

^a Lib. viii. advers. Mathematic. §. 54. p. 562.

^b To these passages of the ancients, wherein the origin of all religion is ascribed to state-policy, add Seneca, Quæst. Natur. lib. ii. cap. xlii. p. 536. tom. ii. oper and Sextus Empiric. lib. viii. advers. Mathematic. p. 551.

Thus have we fully declared the sense of the Atheists, in their account of the phenomenon of religion and the belief of a God ; namely, that they derive it principally from these three springs or originals ; first, from men's own fear and solicitude concerning future events, or their good and evil fortune. Secondly, from their ignorance of the causes both of those events, and the phenomena of nature ; together with their curiosity. And, lastly, from the fiction of civil sovereigns, law-makers and politicians. The weakness and foolery of all which we shall now briefly manifest. First, therefore, it is certain, that such an excess of fear, as makes any one constantly and obstinately to believe the existence of that, which there is no manner of ground neither from sense nor reason for, tending also to the great disquiet of men's own lives, and the terror of their minds, cannot be accounted other than a kind of crazedness or distraction. Wherefore, the Atheists themselves acknowledging the generality of mankind to be possessed with such a belief of a Deity, when they resolve this into such an excess of fear ; it is all one, as if they should affirm, the generality of mankind to be frightened out of their wits, or crazed and distempered in their brains : none but a few Atheists, who being undaunted and undismayed have escaped this panic terror, remaining sober and in their right senses. But, whereas the Atheists thus impute to the generality of mankind, not only light-minded credulity and phantasmagoria, but also such an excess of fear, as differs nothing at all from crazedness and distraction or madness ; we affirm, on the contrary, that their supposed courage, stayedness and sobriety, is

really nothing else but the dull and sottish stupidity of their minds; dead and heavy incredulity, and earthly diffidence or distrust; by reason whereof they will believe nothing but what they can feel or see.

Theists indeed have a religious fear of God, which is consequent from him, or their belief of him (of which more afterwards); but the Deity itself, or the belief thereof, was not created by any antecedent fear, that is, by fear concerning men's good and evil fortune; it being certain, that none are less solicitous concerning such events, than they who are most truly religious. The reason whereof is, because these place their chief good in nothing that is ἀλλότριον, *aliene*, or in another's power—and exposed to the strokes of fortune; but in that which is most truly their own, namely, the right use of their own will. As the Atheists, on the contrary, must needs, for this very reason, be liable to great fears and solitudes concerning outward events, because they place their good and evil in the πάθος ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης, the passion of pleasure and pain;—or at least, denying natural honesty, they acknowledge no other good but what belongs to the animal life only, and so is under the empire of fortune. And that the Atheists are indeed generally timorous and fearful, suspicious and distrustful things, seems to appear plainly from their building all their politics, civil societies, and justice (improperly so called), upon that only foundation of fear and distrust.

But the grand error of the Atheists here is this, that they suppose the Deity, according to the sense of the generality of mankind, to be nothing but a mormo, bug-bear, or terriculum, an af-

frightful, hurtful, and most undesirable thing: whereas men every where invoke the Deity in their straits and difficulties for aid and assistance, looking upon it as exorable and placable; and by their trust and confidence in it, acknowledge its goodness and benignity. Synesius affirms, that though men were otherwise much divided in their opinions, yet ἀγαθὸν τὸν Θεὸν ὑμνοῦσιν ἅπαντες ἀπανταχοῦ καὶ σοφοὶ καὶ ἄσοφοι, they all every where, both wise and unwise, agree in this, that God is to be praised, as one who is good and benign.

If among the Pagans there were any who understood that proverbial speech, φθονερόν τὸ δαμόνιον, in the worst sense, as if God Almighty were of an envious and spiteful nature;—these were certainly but a few ill-natured men, who therefore drew a picture of the Deity according to their own likeness. For the proverb, in that sense, was disclaimed and cried down by all the wiser Pagans; as Aristotle, who affirmed the poets to have lied in this, as well as they did in many other things; and Plutarch, who taxeth

Metaph. l. i. c. 2. [p. 263. tom. iv. oper.]
 οὔτε τὸ θεῖον φθονερόν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἄνθρωποι.
 c. de Herod. Malign. [p. 857. tom. ii. oper.]

Herodotus for insinuating τὸ θεῖον πᾶν φθονερόν τε καὶ ταραχώδες, the Deity universally (that is, all the gods) to be of an envious and vexatious or spiteful disposition;—whereas himself appropriated this only to that evil demon or principle asserted by him, as appeareth from the life of P. Æmilius,^a written by him, where he affirmeth, not that τὸ θεῖον πᾶν φθονερόν, the Deity universally was of an envious nature:—but, that there is a certain deity or demon, whose proper

^a Tom. ii. oper. p. 273.

task it is, to bring down all great and over-swelling human prosperity, and so to temper every man's life, that none may be happy in this world, sincerely and unmixedly, without a check of adversity;—which is, as if a Christian should ascribe it to the devil. And Plato ^a plainly declares the reason of God's making the world at first, to have been no other than this, ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος; because he was good, and there is no manner of envy in that which is good.—From whence he also concluded, πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια αὐτῷ, that God therefore willed all things should be made the most like himself;—that is, after the best manner. But the true meaning of that ill-languaged proverb seems, at first, to have been no other, than what, besides Hesiod, the Scripture itself also attributes to God Almighty, that he affecteth to humble and abase the pride of men, and to pull down all high, towering, and lofty things, whether as noxious and hurtful to the men themselves, or as in some sense invidious to him, and derogatory from his honour, who alone ought to be exalted, and no flesh to glory before him. And there hath been so much experience of such a thing as this in the world, that the Epicurean poet himself could not but confess, that there was some hidden force or power, which seemed to have a spite to all over-swelling greatnesses, and affect to cast contempt and scorn upon the pride of men;

Usque adeo res humanas vis abdita quædam
Obterit, et pulchros fascas, sævasque secures,
Proculcare, ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur.

Lamb. 503.
[lib. v. ver.
1232.]

^a In Timæo, cap. xiv. p. 237. edit. Fabricii.

Where he plainly reeled and staggered in his Atheism, or else was indeed a Theist, but knew it not; it being certain, that there can be no such force as this, "in regno atomorum," in the reign or empire of senseless atoms.—And as for those among Christians, who make such a horrid representation of God Almighty, as one who created far the greatest part of mankind, for no other end or design, but only this, that he might recreate and delight himself in their eternal torments; these also do but transcribe or copy out their own ill-nature, and then read it in the Deity; the Scripture declaring on the contrary, that God is love. Nevertheless these very persons, in the mean time, dearly hug and embrace God Almighty in their own conceit, as one that is fondly good, kind, and gracious to themselves; he having fastened his affections upon their very persons, without any consideration of their dispositions or qualifications.

It is true, indeed, that religion is often expressed in the Scripture by the fear of God, and fear hath been said to be "*prima mensura Deitatis*," the first measure of the Divinity in us,—or the first impression, that religion makes upon men in this obnoxious and guilty state, before they have arrived to the true love of God and righteousness. But this religious fear is not a fear of God, as a mere arbitrary omnipotent Being, much less as hurtful and mischievous (which could not be disjoined from hatred); but an awful regard of him, as of one who is essentially just, and as well a punisher of vice and wickedness, as a rewarder of virtue; Lucretius himself, when he describes this religious fear of men, confessing it to be conjoined

with a conscience of their duty, or to include the same within itself ;

Tunc populi gentesque tremunt, &c. P. 503. [lib. v.
Ne quod ob admissum foede dictumve superbe, vers. 1223.]
Poenarum grave sit solvendi tempus adactum.

And this is the sense of the generality of mankind, that there being a natural difference of good and evil moral, there is an impartial justice in the Deity, which presideth over the same, and inclines it as well to punish the wicked, as to reward the virtuous : Epicurus himself acknowledging thus much, *ἐνθεν καὶ μεγίστας βλάβας οἴονται, τοῖς* Ep. ad Menec. p. 46. Gass. [tom. v. oper. *κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγεσθαι, καὶ ὠφελείας τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς,* Theists suppose, that there are vide etiam Diog. Laert. lib. x. §. 124. p. 665.] both great evils inflicted upon the wicked from the gods ; and also great rewards

by them bestowed upon the good.—And this fear of God is not only beneficial to mankind in general, by repressing the growth of wickedness, but also wholesome and salutary to those very persons themselves, that are thus religiously affected, it being preservative of them both from moral evils, and likewise from the evils of punishment consequent thereupon. This is the true and genuine fear of religion, which when it degenerates into a dark kind, of jealous and suspicious fear of God Almighty, either as a hurtful, or as a mere arbitrary and tyrannical Being, then is it looked upon as the vice or extreme of religion, and distinguished from it by that name of *δεισιδαιμονία*, superstition.—Thus is the character of a superstitious man given by Plutarch, *οἶεται θεοὺς εἶναι,* *περὶ δεισιδαιμ.* [p. 165, tom. ii. oper.] *λνπηροὺς δὲ καὶ βλαβεροὺς,* that he thinks there are gods, but that they are noxious and hurtful ; and *ἀνάγκη καὶ μισεῖν τὸν δεισιδαίμονα, καὶ φοβεῖσθαι*

τοὺς θεοὺς, a superstitious man must needs hate God, as well as fear him.—“The true fear of God (as the son of Sirach speaks) is the beginning of his love, and faith is the beginning of cleaving to him.” As if he should have said, The first entrance into religion is an awful regard to God as the punisher of vice; the second step forwards therein is faith or confidence in God, whereby men rely upon him for good, and cleave to him; and the top and perfection of all religion is the love of God above all, as the most amiable Being. Christianity, the best of religions, recommendeth faith to us, as the inlet or introduction into all true and ingenuous piety; for “he that cometh to God, must not only believe that he is, but also that he is a rewarder of those that seek him.” Which faith is better defined in the Scripture than by any scholastic, to be the substance of things (that are to be) hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen; that is, a confident persuasion of things that fall not under sight (because they are either invisible or future), and which also are to be hoped for. So that religious fear consisteth well with faith, and faith is near of kin to hope, and the result of both faith and hope is love; which faith, hope and love, do all suppose an essential goodness in the Deity. God is such a being, who, if he were not, were of all things whatsoever most to be wished for; it being indeed no way desirable (as that noble Emperor concluded) for a man to live in a world void of a God and providence. He that believes a God, believes all that good and perfection in the universe which his heart can possibly wish or desire. It is the interest of none, that there should

be no God, but only of such wretched persons as have abandoned their first and only true interest of being good, and friends to God, and are desperately resolved upon ways of wickedness.

The reason why the Atheists do thus grossly mistake the notion of God, and conceive of him differently from the generality of mankind, as a thing which is only to be feared, and must consequently be hated, is from nothing but their own vice and ill-nature. For, first, their vice so far blinding them, as to make them think, that the moral differences of good and evil have no foundation in nature, but only in law or arbitrary constitution (which law is contrary to nature, nature being liberty, but law restraint); as they cannot but really hate that which hinders them of their true liberty and chief good, so must they needs interpret the severity of the Deity so much spoken of against wickedness, to be nothing else but cruelty and arbitrary tyranny. Again, it is a wretched ill-natured maxim, which these Atheists have, that there is “*nulla naturalis charitas,*” no natural charity,—but that “*omnis benevolentia* Cic. de N. D. l. i. 213. Lamb. [cap. xliii. p. 2948. oper.] *oritur ex imbecillitate et metu,*” all benevolence ariseth only from imbecility and fear;—that is, from being either obnoxious to another’s power, or standing in need of his help. So that all that is now called love and friendship amongst men, is, according to these, really nothing, but either a crouching under another’s power, whom they cannot resist, or else “*mercatura quædam utilitatum,*” a certain kind of merchandizing for utilities.—And thus does Cotta in Cicero declare their sense; “*Ne* Cic. ibid. *homines quidem censetis, nisi imbecilli essent, fu-*

tuos beneficos aut benignos ;” You conceive that no man would be any way beneficent or benevolent to another, were it not for his imbecility or indigence.—But as for God Almighty, these Atheists conclude, that upon the supposition of his existence, there could not be so much as this spurious love or benevolence in him neither towards any thing : because by reason of his absolute and irresistible power, he would neither stand in need of any thing, and be devoid of all fear. Thus the forementioned Cotta : “ Quid est præstantius bonitate et beneficentia? Quæ cum carere Deum vultis, neminem Deo nec Deum nec hominem carum, neminem ab eo amari vultis. Ita fit, ut non modo homines a diis, sed ipsi dii inter se ab aliis alii negligantur.” What is there more excellent than goodness and beneficence? which when you will needs have God to be utterly devoid of, you suppose, that neither any god nor man is dear to the supreme God, or beloved of him. From whence it will follow, that not only men are neglected by the gods, but also the gods amongst themselves are neglected by one another.—Accordingly a late pretender to politics, who in this manner discards all natural justice and charity, determines concerning God,^a “ Regnandi et puniendi eos, qui leges suas violant, jus Deo esse a sola potentia irresistibili ;” that he has no other right of reigning over men, and of punishing those who transgress his laws, but only from his irresistible power.—Which indeed is all one as to say, that God has no right at all of ruling over mankind, and imposing commands upon them, but

Cic. *ibid.*

^a Hobbes, *Elem. de Cive*, cap. xv. §. 4. p. 112. et alias.

what he doth in this kind, he doth it only by force and power, right and might (or power) being very different things from one another, and there being no *jus* or *right* without natural justice; so that the word *right* is here only abused. And consentaneously hereunto the same writer further adds,^a “*si jus regnandi habeat Deus ab omnipotentia sua, manifestum est obligationem ad præstandam ipsi obedientiam incumbere hominibus propter imbecillitatem;*” that if God’s right of commanding be derived only from his omnipotence, then it is manifest, that men’s obligations to obey him lie upon them only from their imbecility.—Or, as it is further explained by him, “*homines ideo Deo subjectos esse, quia omnipotentes non sunt, aut quia ad resistendum satis virium non habent;*” that men are therefore only subject to God, because they are not omnipotent, or have not sufficient power to resist him.—Thus do we see plainly, how the Atheists, by reason of their vice and ill-nature (which make them deny all natural justice and honesty, all natural charity and benevolence), transform the Deity into a monstrous shape; such an omnipotent Being, as, if he were, could have nothing neither of justice in him, nor of benevolence towards his creatures; and whose only right and authority of commanding them would be his irresistible power; whom his creatures could not place any hope, trust, and confidence in, nor have any other obligation to obey, than that of fear and necessity, proceeding from their imbecility, or inability to resist him. And such a Deity as this is indeed

^a Ibid. §. 7. p. 114.

a mormo or bug-bear, a most formidable and affrightful thing.

But all this is nothing but the Atheists' false imagination, true religion representing a most comfortable prospect of things from the Deity ; whereas on the contrary, the atheistic scene of things is dismal, hopeless, and forlorn, that there should be no other good, than what depends upon things wholly out of our own power, the momentary gratification of our insatiate appetites, and the perpetual pouring into a " dolium pertusum," a perforated and leaking vessel :—that ourselves should be but a congeries of atoms, upon the dissolution of whose compages our life should vanish into nothing, and all our hope perish: that there should be no providence over us, nor any kind and good-natured being above to take care of us, there being nothing without us but dead and senseless matter. True, indeed, there could be no spiteful design in senseless atoms, or a dark unconscious nature. Upon which ac-

count, Plutarch would grant, that even this atheistic hypothesis itself, as bad as it is, were, notwithstanding, to be preferred before that of an omnipotent, spiteful, and malicious being (if there can be any such hypothesis as this), a monarchy of the Manichean evil principle, reigning all alone over the world, without any cor-rival, and having an undisturbed empire. Nevertheless it is certain also, that there could be no faith nor hope neither in these senseless atoms, both necessarily and fortuitously moved, no more than there could be faith and hope in a whirlwind, or in a tempestuous sea, whose merciless waves are inexorable, and deaf to all cries and suppli-

De Superst.
[p. 164. tom.
ii. oper.]

cations. For which reason Epicurus^a himself confessed, that it was better to give credit to the fable of gods (as he calls it), than to serve the atheistic fate, or that material necessity of all things, introduced by those atheistic philosophers, Leucippus and Democritus : *κρείττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ κατακολουθεῖν, ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἰμαρμένῃ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίδα παραιτήσεως ὑπογράφει θεῶν διὰ τιμῆς· ἡ δὲ ἀπαραίτητον ἔχει τὴν ἀνάγκην*. Because there is hopes, that the gods may be prevailed with by worship and prayer ; but the other (necessity) is altogether deaf and inexorable.—And though Epicurus thought to mend the matter, and make the atheistic hypothesis more tolerable, by introducing into it (contrary to the tenor of those principles) liberty of will in men ; yet this, being not a power over things without us, but ourselves only, could alter the case very little. Epicurus himself was in a panic fear, lest the frame of heaven should sometime upon a sudden crack, and tumble about his ears, and this fortuitous compilement of atoms be dissolved into a chaos ;

^b ————— *Tria talia texta*

*Una dies dabit exitio ; multosque per annos
Sustentata ruet moles et machina mundi.*

And what comfort could his liberty of will then afford him, who placed all his happiness in security from external evils ? *Τέλος τοῦ μὴ νομίζειν θεοὺς, μὴ φοβεῖσθαι* (saith Plutarch) : The atheistic design in shaking off the belief of a God, was to be without fear ;—but by means hereof, they framed such a system of things to themselves, as under which they could not have

^a Vide Diog. Laert. lib. x. segm. 134. p. 659.

^b Lucret. lib. v. ver. 95.

*Epist. ad Men.
p. 49. Gass.*

*De Superst.
[p. 165. tom.
ii. oper.]*

the least hope, faith, or confidence. Thus running from fear did they plunge themselves into fear; for they, who are without hope, can never be free from fear. Endless of necessity must the fears and anxieties of those men be, who shake off that one fear of God that would only preserve them from evil, and have no faith nor hope in them. Wherefore we might conclude upon better grounds than the Atheists do of Theism, that Atheism (which hath no foundation at all in nature nor in reason) springs first from the imposture of fear. For the faith of religion being the substance or confidence of such things not seen as are to be hoped for; atheistic infidelity must needs, on the contrary, be a certain heavy diffidence, despondence, and misgiving of mind, or a timorous distrust and disbelief of good to be hoped for, beyond the reach of sense; namely, of an invisible Being omnipotent, that exerciseth a just, kind, and gracious providence, over all those who commit their ways to him, with an endeavour to please him, both here in this life and after death. But vice, or the love of lawless liberty, prevailing over such disbelieving persons, makes them by degrees more and more desirous, that there should be no God; that is, no such hinderer of their liberty; and to count it a happiness to be freed from the fear of him, whose justice (if it were) they must needs be obnoxious to.

And now have we made it evident, that these Atheists, who make religion and the belief of a God to proceed from the imposture of fear, do first of all disguise the Deity, and put a monstrous, horrid, and affrightful vizard upon it, transforming it into such a thing, as can only be feared

and hated ; and then do they conclude concerning it (as well indeed they may), that there is no such thing as this really existing in nature, but that it is only a mormo or bug-bear, raised up by men's fear and fancy. Of the two, it might better be said, that the opinion of a God sprung from men's hope of good, than from their fear of evil ; but really it springs neither from hope nor fear (however in different circumstances it raises both those passions in our minds) ; nor is it the imposture of any passion, but that whose belief is supported and sustained by the strongest and clearest reason, as shall be declared in due place. But the sense of a Deity often preventing ratiocination in us, and urging itself more immediately upon us, it is certain, that there is also, besides a rational belief thereof, a natural prolepsis or anticipation in the minds of men concerning it, which, by Aristotle, is called *Mavrēia*, a vaticination.

Thus have we sufficiently confuted the first atheistic pretence to solve the phenomenon of religion, and the belief of a God, so generally entertained, from the imposture of fear. We come now to the second, That it proceeded from the ignorance of causes also, or men's want of philosophy ; they being prone, by reason of their innate curiosity, where they find no causes to make or feign them ; and from their fear, in the absence of natural and necessary causes, to imagine supernatural and Divine ; this also affording them a handsome cover and pretext for their ignorance : for which cause these Atheists stick not to affirm of God Almighty, what some philosophers do of occult qualities, that he is but " *perfugium et asylum*

ignorantiæ," a refuge and shelter for men's ignorance;—that is, in plain and downright language, the mere sanctuary of fools.

And these two things are here commonly joined together by these Atheists, both fear, and ignorance of causes, as which jointly concur in the production of Theism; because, as the fear of children raises up bug-bears, especially in the dark, so do they suppose in like manner the fear of men, in the darkness of their ignorance of causes especially, to raise up the mormo, spectre, or phantasm of a God; which is thus intimated by the Epicurean poet,^a

—————Omnia cæcis
In tenebris metuunt.

Steph. Poe.
Phil. 158. ex
Sexto. [vide
Sextum Em-
pir. lib. viii.
advers. Ma-
themat. §. 24.
p. 554.]

And accordingly Democritus gave this account of the original Theism or religion, ὀρῶντες τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετέωροις παθήματα οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καθάπερ βροντὰς καὶ ἀστραπὰς καὶ κεραυνούς, ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης ἐκλείψεις, ἐδειματοῦντο θεοὺς οἴομενοι τούτων αἰτίους; that when, in old times, men observed strange and affrightful things in the meteors and the heaven, as thunder, lightning, thunderbolts, and eclipses, they not knowing the causes thereof, and being terrified thereby, presently imputed them to the gods.—And Epicurus declares this to have been the reason, why he took such great pains in the study of physiology, that, by finding out the natural and necessary causes of things, he might be able to free both himself and others from the terror of a God, which would otherwise invade and assault them; the importunity of men's minds, whenever they are at a loss for natural

^a Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 54, 55.

causes, urging them so much with the fear, suspicion, and jealousy, of a Deity.

Wherefore the Atheists thus dabbling in physiology, and finding out, as they conceive, material and mechanical causes for some of the phenomena of nature, and especially for such of them as the unskilful vulgar sometimes impute to God himself, when they can prove eclipses (for example) to be no miracles, and render it probable, that thunder is not the voice of God Almighty himself, as it were roaring above in the heavens, merely to affright and amaze poor mortals, and make them quake and tremble; and that thunderbolts are not there flung by his own hands, as the direful messengers of his wrath and displeasure; they presently conclude triumphantly thereupon, concerning nature or matter, that it doth

* *Ipsa sua per se, sponte, omnia Diis agere expers,*

do all things alone of itself without a God.—But we shall here make it appear in a few instances, as briefly as we may, that philosophy, and the true knowledge of causes, leads to God; and that Atheism is nothing but ignorance of causes and of philosophy.

For, first, no Atheist, who derives all from senseless atoms, or matter, is able to assign any cause at all of himself, or give any true account of the original of his own soul or mind, it being utterly inconceivable and impossible, that soul and mind, sense, reason, and understanding, should ever arise from irrational and senseless matter, however modified; or result from atoms, devoid of all manner of qualities, that is, from mere mag-

* *Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 1091.*

nitude, figure, site, and motion of parts: for though it be indeed absurd to say (as these Atheists allege) that laughing and crying things are made out of laughing and crying principles,

^a Et ridere potest non ex ridentibu' factus,

yet does it not therefore follow, that sensitive and rational beings might result from a composition of irrational and senseless atoms; which, according to the Democritic hypothesis, have nothing in them but magnitude, figure, site, and motion, or rest, because laughing and crying are motions, which result from the mechanism of human bodies, in such a manner organized; but sense and understanding are neither local motion, nor mechanism. And the case will be the very same, both in the Anaximandrian or Hylopathian, and in the Stratonic or Hylozoic Atheism; because sense and conscious understanding could no more result, either from those qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, contempered together; or from the mere organization of inanimate and senseless matter, than it could from the

^b Concursus, motus, ordo, positura, figuræ,

of atoms devoid of all manner of qualities. Had there been once nothing but senseless matter, fortuitously moved, there could never have emerged into being any soul or mind, sense or understanding; because no effect can possibly transcend the perfection of its cause. Wherefore Atheists, supposing themselves, and all souls and minds, to have sprung from stupid and senseless matter, and all that wisdom, which is any where in the

^a Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 985.

^b Id. lib. i. ver. 686.

world, both political and philosophical, to be the result of mere fortune and chance, must needs be concluded to be grossly ignorant of causes ; which had they not been, they could never have been Atheists. So that ignorance of causes is the seed, not of Theism, but of Atheism ; true philosophy, and the knowledge of the cause of ourselves, leading necessarily to a Deity.

Again, Atheists are ignorant of the cause of motion in bodies also ; by which, notwithstanding, they suppose all things to be done ; that is, they are never able to solve this phenomenon so long as they are Atheists, and acknowledge no other substance besides matter or body. For, first, it is undeniably certain, that motion is not essential to all body, as such, because then no particles of matter could ever rest ; and consequently there could have been no generation, nor no such mundane system produced as this is, which requires a certain proportionate commixture of motion and rest ; no sun, nor moon, nor earth, nor bodies of animals ; since there could be no coherent consistency of any thing, when all things fluttered and were in continual separation and divulsion from one another. Again, it is certain likewise, that matter or body, as such, hath no power of moving itself freely or spontaneously neither, by will or appetite ; both because the same inconvenience would from hence ensue likewise, and because the phenomena or appearances do plainly evince the contrary. And as for that prodigiously-absurd paradox of some few hylozoic Atheists, that all matter, as such, and therefore every smallest particle thereof, hath not only life essentially belonging to it, but also perfect wisdom and knowledge,

together with appetite, and self-moving power, though without animal sense or consciousness: this, I say, will be elsewhere in due place further confuted. But the generality of the ancient Atheists, that is, the Anaximandrians and Democritics, attributed no manner of life to matter, as such; and therefore could ascribe no voluntary or spontaneous motion to the same, but fortuitous only; according to that of the Epicurean poet^a already cited,

Nam certe neque consilio, primordia rerum
Ordine se quæque, atque sagaci mente locarunt;
Nec quos quæque darent motus pepigere profecto.

Wherefore these Democritics, as Aristotle somewhere^b intimates, were able to assign no other cause of motion, than only this, That one body moved another from eternity infinitely, so that there was no *πρῶτον κινουόν*, no first unmoved mover,—ever to be found; because there is no beginning nor first in eternity. From whence probably, that doctrine of some atheistic Stoics in Alex.

Aphrodisius was derived, That there is no first in the rank and order of causes.

Alex. Aph.
lib. de Fato,
P. [§. 25. p.
118. edit.
Lond:]

—In the footsteps of which philosophers a modern writer seemeth to have trodden, when declaring himself after this manner; ^c “ Si quis ab effectu quocunque, ad causam ejus immediatam, atque inde ad remotiorem, ac sic perpetuo ratiocinatione ascenderit, non tamen in æternum procedere poterit, sed defatigatus aliquando deficiet.” If any one will from whatsoever effect ascend upward to its immediate cause, and from

^a Lib. i. ver. 1020.

^b Vide Physic. lib. viii. cap. i. §. 3. p. 796. tom. i. oper. et §. 27. p. 579.

^c Hobbes, Elem. Philosoph. part iv. cap. xxvi. p. 204.

thence to a remoter, and so onwards perpetually, in his ratiocination ; yet shall he never be able to hold on through all eternity ; but at length being quite tired out with his journey, be forced to desist, or give over.—Which seems to be all one as if he should have said, one thing moved or caused another infinitely from eternity, in which there being no beginning, there is consequently no first mover or cause to be reached unto. But this infinite progress of these Democritics, in the order of causes, and their shifting off the cause of motion, from one thing to another, without end or beginning, was rightly understood by Aristotle,^a to be indeed the assigning of no cause of motion at all, *εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν, εἰ μῆτι ἔσται κατὰ φύσιν κινούν πρῶτον*, they acknowledging (saith he) no first mover according to nature, must needs make an idle progress infinitely ;—that is, in the language of this philosopher, assign no cause at all of motion. Epicurus therefore, to mend the matter, though according to the principles of the atomic physiology, he discarded all other qualities, yet did he notwithstanding admit this one quality of gravity or ponderosity in atoms, pressing them continually downwards in infinite space. In which, as nothing could be more absurd nor unphilosophical than to make upwards and downwards in infinite space, or a gravity tending to no centre, nor place of rest ; so did he not assign any cause of motion neither, but only in effect affirm, the atoms therefore to tend downwards, because they did so ; a quality of gravity, signifying only an endeavour to tend downwards, but why or wherefore, nobody knows. And it is all one as if Epicurus should

^a Physic. Auscultat. lib. vii. cap. ii. p. 365. tom. i. oper.

have said, that atoms moved downwards by an occult quality, he either betaking himself to this as an asylum, a sanctuary, or refuge, for his ignorance; or else indeed, more absurdly, making his very ignorance itself (disguised under that name of a quality) to be the cause of motion. Thus the Atheists universally either assigned no cause at all for motion, as the Anaximandrians and Democritics; or else no true one, as the Hylozoists; when, to avoid incorporeal substance, they would venture to attribute perfect understandings, appetite or will, and self-moving power, to all senseless matter whatsoever. But since it appears plainly, that matter or body cannot move itself, either the motion of all bodies must have no manner of cause; or else must there of necessity be some other substance besides body, such as is self-active and hylarchical, or hath a natural power of ruling over matter. Upon which latter account Plato rightly determined, that cogitation, which is self-activity or autokinesy, was, in order of nature, before the local motion of body, which is heterokinesy. Though motion considered passively in bodies, or taken for their translation, or change of distance and place, be indeed a corporeal thing, or a mode of those bodies themselves moving; yet, as it is considered actively for the *vis movens*, that active force, which causes this translation, or change of place, so is it an incorporeal thing; the energy of a self-active substance upon that sluggish matter or body, which cannot at all move itself. Wherefore, in the bodies of animals, the true and proper cause of motion, or the determination thereof at least, is not the matter itself organized, but the soul either as cogitative, or plasticly

self-active, vitally united thereunto, and naturally ruling over it. But in the whole world it is either God himself, originally impressing a certain quantity of motion upon the matter of the universe, and constantly conserving the same, according to that of the Scripture, "In him we live and move" (which seems to have been the Acts. xvii. 28. sense also of that noble Agrigentine poet and philosopher,^a when he described God to be only "a pure or holy mind, that with swift thoughts agitates the whole world"); or else it is instrumentally an inferior created spirit, soul, or life of nature; that is, a subordinate hylarchical principle, which hath a power of moving matter regularly, according to the direction of a superior perfect Mind. And thus do we see again, that ignorance of causes is the seed of Atheism, and not of Theism; no Atheists being able to assign a true cause of motion, the knowledge whereof plainly leadeth to a God.

Furthermore, those Atheists, who acknowledge no other principle of things but senseless matter fortuitously moved, must needs be ignorant also of the cause of that grand phenomenon, called by Aristotle, the *τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς*, the well and fit in nature;—that is, of the most artificial frame of the whole mundane system in general, and of the bodies of animals in particular, together with the conspiring harmony of all. For they, who boasted themselves able to give natural causes of all things whatsoever, without a God, can give no other cause at all of this phenomenon, but only that the world happened by chance to be thus made as it is. Now, they, who make fortune

^a Empedocles, cujus versus duos vido apud Ammonium Comm. in librum Aristot. *περὶ Ἐρμηνείας*, p. 107. edit. Aldinæ.

and chance to be the only cause of this so-admirable phenomenon, the most regular and artificial frame and harmony of the universe, they either make the mere absence and want of a cause, to be a cause, fortune and chance being nothing else but the absence or want of an intending cause ; or else do they make their own ignorance of a cause, and they know not how, to be a cause ; as the author of the *Leviathan*^a interprets the meaning hereof : “ Many times (saith he) men put for cause of natural events their own ignorance, but disguised in other words ; as when they say, that fortune is the cause of things contingent ; that is, of things whereof they know no cause.” Or they affirm, against all reason, one contrary to be the cause of another, as confusion to be the cause of order, pulchritude, and harmony ; chance and fortune, to be the cause of art and skill ; folly and nonsense, the cause of the most wise and regular contrivance : or lastly, they deny it to have any cause at all, since they deny an intending cause, and there cannot possibly be any other cause of artificialness and conspiring harmony, than mind and wisdom, counsel and contrivance.

But because the Atheists here make some pretences for this their ignorance, we shall not conceal any of them, but bring them all to light ; to the end that we may discover their weakness and foolery. First, therefore, they pretend, that the world is not so artificially and well made, but that it might have been made much better, and that there are many faults and flaws to be found therein ; from whence they would infer, that it was not made by a perfect God, he being supposed by

^a Cap. xi. et alias.

Theists to be no bungler, but a perfect Mind, or a Being infinitely good and wise, who therefore should have made all things for the best.

But this being already set down by itself, as a twelfth atheistic objection against a Deity, we must reserve the confutation thereof for its proper place. Only we shall observe thus much here by the way ; that those Theists of later times, who, either because they fancy a mere arbitrary Deity ; or because their faith in the Divine Goodness is but weak ; or because they judge of things according to their own private appetites and selfish passions, and not with a free uncaptivated universality of mind, and an impartial regard to the good of the whole ; or because they look only upon the present scene of things, and take not the future into consideration, nor have a comprehensive view of the whole plot of Divine Providence together ; or lastly, because we mortals do all stand upon too low a ground, to take a commanding view and prospect upon the whole frame of things ; and our shallow understandings are not able to fathom the depths of the Divine wisdom, nor trace all the methods and designs of Providence ; grant, that the world might have been made much better than now it is ; which indeed is all one as to say, that it is not well made : these neoteric Christians (I say) seem hereby to give a much greater advantage to the Atheists, than the Pagan Theists themselves heretofore did, who stood their ground, and generously maintained against them, that Mind being the maker of all things, and not fortune or chance, nor arbitrary self-will, and irrational humour omnipotent, the *τὸ βέλτιστον*, that which is absolutely the best in every case, so far as the necessity of

things would admit, and in compliance with the good of the whole, was the measure and rule both of nature and Providence.

Again, the atomic Atheists further allege, that though there be many things in the world, which serve well for uses, yet it does not at all follow, that therefore they were made intentionally and designedly for those uses; because, though things happen by chance to be so or so made, yet may they serve for something or other afterward, and have their several uses consequent. Wherefore all the things of nature happened (say they) by chance to be so made as they are, and their several uses notwithstanding were consequent, or following thereupon. Thus the Epicurean poet:

Lucret. l. iv. ——— Nil ideo natum est in corpore, ut uti
p. 567. Lamb. Possemus, sed quod natum est id procreat usum.
[vers. 832,
833.]

Nothing in man's body was made out of design for any use; but all the several parts thereof, happening to be so made as they are, their uses were consequent thereupon.—In like manner the

old atheistic philosophers in Aristotle
concluded, τούς ὀδόντας ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀνατεῖλαι,
τούς μὲν ἐμπροσθίους ὄξεις, ἐπιτηδείους πρὸς τὸ
διαρῆναι, τούς δὲ γομφίους πλατεῖς, καὶ χρησίμους πρὸς τὸ
λεαίνειν τὴν τροφήν· ἐπεὶ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ
συμπεσεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν, ἐν ὅσοις
δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἕνεκα τοῦ· That the former teeth
were made by material or mechanical necessity,
thin and sharp, by means whereof they became
fit for cutting; but the jaw-teeth thick and broad,
whereby they became useful for the grinding of
food. But neither of them were intended to be

such, for the sake of these uses, but happened by chance only. And the like concerning all the other parts of the body, which seem to be made for ends.—Accordingly the same Aristotle represents the sense of those ancient Atheists, concerning the other parts of the universe, or things of nature, that they were all likewise made such, by the necessity of material (or mechanical) motions undirected, and yet had nevertheless their several uses consequent upon this their accidental structure. *Τί κωλύει τὴν φύσιν μὴ ἕνεκα τοῦ ποιεῖν, μηδ' ὅτι βέλτιον, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἔει οὐ Ζεὺς, οὐχ ὅπως τὸν σίτον ἀξέησεν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, &c.* What hinders but that nature might act without any respect to ends or good and better, as Jupiter, or the heaven, raineth not intentionally to make the corn grow, but from necessity? because the vapours, being raised up into the middle region, and there refrigerated and condensed, must needs descend down again in the form of water. But this happens by mere chance, and without any intention, that the grain is made to grow thereby; as the contrary sometimes happens by the excess of it.

But to this we reply, that though a thing, that happens accidentally to be so or so made, may afterward, notwithstanding, prove often serviceable for some use or other; yet, when any thing consisteth of many parts, that are all artificially proportioned together, and with much curiosity accommodated one to another, any one of which parts having been wanting, or otherwise in the least placed and disposed of, would have rendered the whole altogether inept for such a use; then may we well conclude it not to have been made by chance, but by counsel and design, intentionally,

for such uses. As, for example, the eye, whose structure and fabric consisting of many parts (humours and membranes), is so artificially composed, no reasonable person, who considers the whole anatomy thereof, and the curiosity of its structure, can think otherwise of it, but that it was made out of design for the use of seeing; and did not happen accidentally to be so made, and then the use of seeing follow; as the Epicurean poet would fain persuade us,

P. 367. Lamb. Lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata,
 [lib. iv. ver. Prospicere ut possimus.
 823.]

You are by all means to take heed of entertaining that so-dangerous opinion (to Atheism), that eyes were made for the sake of seeing, and ears for the sake of hearing.—But for a man to think, that not only eyes happened to be so made, and the use of seeing unintended followed; but also, that in all the same animals, ears happened to be so made too, and the use of hearing followed them; and a mouth and tongue happened to be so made likewise, and the use of eating, and (in men) of speaking, was also accidentally consequent thereupon; and feet were in the same animals made by chance too, and the use of walking followed; and hands made in them by chance also, upon which so many necessary uses depend; besides innumerable other parts of the body, both similar and organical, none of which could have been wanting, without rendering the whole inept or useless: I say, to think, that all these things should happen by chance to be thus made in every one and the same animal, and not designed by mind or

counsel, that they might jointly concur and contribute to the good of the whole ; this argues the greatest insensibility of mind imaginable. But this absurd and ridiculous conceit hath been long since so industriously confuted, and the folly thereof manifested by that learned Pagan philosopher and physician, Galen, in his book of the Use of Parts, that it would be altogether superfluous to insist any more upon it.^a

Wherefore, that the former teeth are made thin and sharp, and the jaw-teeth thick and broad, by chance only, and not for use, was one of the Democritic dotages ; as also, that nothing in the clouds and meteors was intended for the good of this habitable earth, within whose atmosphere they are contained, but all proceeded from material and mechanical necessity. Which conceit, though Cartesius seem to have written his whole book of Meteors in favour of, he beginning it with the derision of those, who “seat God in the clouds, and imagine his hands to be employed in opening and shutting the cloisters of the winds, in sprinkling the flowers with dews, and thunder-striking the tops of mountains ;” and closing his discourse with this boast, that he had now made it manifest, there was no need to fly to miracles (that is, to bring in a God upon the stage) to solve those phenomena ; yet were it easy enough to demonstrate the defectiveness of those his mechanical undertakings in sundry particulars, and to evince that all those things could not be carried on with such constant regularity, by mere fortuitous mechanism, without any superior principle to guide and steer them. Nevertheless, we acknowledge,

^a Vide Lactant. de Opificio Dei, cap. vi. p. 1003.

that God and nature do things every where, in the most frugal and compendious way, and with the least operoseness; and therefore that the mechanic powers are not rejected, but, taken in, so far as they could comply serviceably with the intellectual model and platform; but still so, as that all is supervised by one understanding and intending Cause, and nothing passes without his approbation, who, when either those mechanic powers fall short, or the stubborn necessity of matter proves uncompliant, does overrule the same, and supply the defects thereof, by that which is vital; and that without setting his own hands immediately to every work too, there being a subservient minister under him, an artificial nature, which, as an Archeus of the whole world, governs the fluctuating mechanism thereof, and does all things faithfully, for ends and purposes, intended by its director.

But our atomic Atheists still further allege, that though it might well seem strange, that matter fortuitously moved should, at the very first jump, fall into such a regular frame as this is, having so many aptitudes for uses, so many correspondences between several things, and such an agreeing harmony in the whole; yet ought it not to seem a jot strange, if atoms, by motion, making all possible combinations and contextures, and trying all manner of conclusions and experiments, should, after innumerable other freaks, and discongruous forms produced, in length of time fall into such a system as this is. Wherefore they affirm, that this earth of ours, at first, brought forth divers monstrous and irregular shapes of animals;

being confounded together.—For what covenant of nature can there be in infinite chance? or what law can there be set to the absolutely-fortuitous motions of atoms, to circumscribe them by? Wherefore it must be acknowledged, that, according to the genuine hypothesis of the atomic Atheism, all imaginable forms of inanimate bodies, plants, and animals, as centaurs, scyllas and chimæras, are producible by the fortuitous motions of matter, there being nothing to hinder it, whilst it doth

^a *Omnimodis coire, atque omnia pertentare,
Quæcunque inter se possint congressa creare;*

put itself into all kind of combinations, play all manner of freaks, and try all possible conclusions and experiments.

But they pretend, that these monstrous irregular shapes of animals were not therefore now to be found, because by reason of their inept fabric, they could not propagate their kind by generation, as neither indeed preserve their own individuals. Thus does Lucretius declare the sense of Epicurus;

————— *Quoniam natura absterruit auctum,
Nec potuere cupitum ætatis tangere florem,
Nec reperire cibum, nec jungi per veneris res.*

Lamb. p. 476.
[lib. v. ver. 844.]

And that this atheistic doctrine was older than Epicurus, appeareth from these words of Aris-

totle; ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα συνέβη, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συστάντα ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο, καθάπερ Ἐμπε-

Nat. Ausc.
l. ii. c. viii.
[p. 475. tom.
i. oper.]

^a Lucret. lib. v. ver. 191.

δοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωρα· When animals happened at first to be made, in all manner of forms, those of them only were preserved, and continued to the present time, which chanced to be fitly made (for generation), but all the others perished, as Empedocles affirmeth of the partly-ox and partly-man-animals.—Moreover, the ancient both Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheists concluded, that, besides this one world of ours, there were other infinite worlds (they conceiving it as absurd to think, there should be but one only world in infinite space, as that, in a vast ploughed and sowed field, there should grow up only one ear of corn, and no more); and they would have us believe, that amongst these infinite worlds (all of them fortuitously made) there is not one of a thousand, or, perhaps, of ten thousand, that hath such regularity, concinnity, and harmony in it, as this world that we chanced to emerge in. Now it cannot be thought strange (as they suppose), if, amongst infinite worlds, one or two should chance to fall into some regularity. They would also confidently assure us, that the present system of things, in this world of ours, shall not long continue such as it is, but after a while fall into confusion and disorder again;

^a ——— Mundi naturam totius ætas
Mutat, et ex alio terram status excipit alter,
Quod potuit nequeat, possit quod non tulit ante:

The same wheel of fortune, which, moving upward, hath brought into view this scene of things that now is, turning round, will, some time or

^a Lucret. lib. v. ver. 832.

other, carry it all away again, introducing a new one in its stead:—and then shall we have Centaurs, and Scyllas and Chimæras again, all manner of inept forms of animals, as before.

But because men may yet be puzzled with the universality and constancy of this regularity, and its long continuance through so many ages, that there are no records at all of the contrary any where to be found; the atomic Atheist further adds, that the senseless atoms, playing and toying up and down, without any care or thought, and from eternity trying all manner of tricks, conclusions, and experiments, were at length (they know not how) taught, and by the necessity of things themselves, as it were, driven, to a certain kind of trade of artificialness and methodicalness; so that though their motions were at first all casual and fortuitous, yet in length of time they became orderly and artificial, and governed by a certain law, they contracting as it were upon themselves, by long practice and experience, a kind of habit of moving regularly; or else being, by the mere necessity of things, at length forced so to move, as they should have done, had art and wisdom directed them. Thus Epicurus in his epistle to

Herodotus,^a ἀλλὰ μὴν ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὴν φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναι τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι. It must be held, that nature is both taught and necessitated by the things themselves:—or else, as Gassendus interprets the words, “quadam veluti naturali necessariaque doctrina sensim imbuta;”—by little

^a Apud Diog. Laert. lib. x. segm. 75. p. 633.

and little embued with a certain kind of natural and necessary doctrine.

To which atheistic pretences we shall briefly reply, first, That it is but an idle dream, or rather impudent forgery, of these Atheists, that heretofore there were in this world of ours all manner of monstrous and irregular shapes of animals produced, Centaurs, Scyllas, and Chimæras, &c. and indeed at first none but such; there being not the least footstep of any such thing appearing in all the monuments of antiquity, and traditions of former times: and these Atheists being not able to give any manner of reason, why there should not be such produced as well at this present time, however the individuals themselves could not continue long, or propagate by generation; or at least why it should not happen, that, in some ages or countries, there were either all Androgyna, of both sexes, or else no animal but of one sex, male or female only; or, lastly, none of any sex at all. Neither is there any more reason to give credit to these Atheists, when (though enemies to divination) they would prophesy concerning future times, that, in this world of ours, all shall some time fall into confusion and nonsense again. And, as their infinity of worlds is an absolute impossibility, so, to their bold and confident assertion concerning those supposed other worlds, as if they had travelled over them all, that, amongst ten thousand of them, there is hardly one, that hath so much regularity in it as this world of ours, it might be replied, with equal confidence, and much more probability of reason, that were every planet about this sun of ours a habitable earth, and every fixed star a sun, having

likewise its several other planets or habitable earths moving round about it, and not any one of these desert or uninhabited, but all peopled with animals; we say, were this so extravagant supposition true, that there would not be found any one ridiculous or inept system amongst them all, but that the Divine art and wisdom (which being infinite, can never be defective, nor any where idle) would exercise its dominion upon all, and every where impress the sculptures and signatures of itself.

In the next place we affirm, That the fortuitous motions of senseless atoms, trying never so many experiments and conclusions, and making never so many combinations and aggregate forms of things, could never be able to produce so much as the form or system of one complete animal, with all the organic parts thereof so artificially disposed (each of these being as it were a little world), much less the system of this great world, with that variety of animals in it; but least of all could it constantly continue such regularity and artificialness every where: for, that the fortuitous motions of irrational, senseless, and stupid matter should in length of time grow artificial, and contract a habit of acting as regularly and methodically, as if perfect art or wisdom had directed them, this is the most prodigious nonsense imaginable, and can be accounted no other than atheistic fanaticism.

It is no more possible, that the fortuitous motion of dead and senseless matter should ever from itself be taught and necessitated to produce such an orderly and regular system as the frame of this whole world is, together with the bodies of ani-

mals, and constantly to continue the same, than that a man perfectly illiterate, and neither able to write nor read, taking up a pen into his hand, and making all manner of scrawls, with ink upon paper, should at length be taught and necessitated, by the thing itself, to write a whole quire of paper together, with such characters, as being deciphered by a certain key, would all prove coherent philosophic sense; or than that we ourselves writing down the mere letters of the alphabet, transposedly, any how, as it happens, without the least thought, either of words or sense, after our scribbling a long time together what was altogether insignificant, should at length have been taught and necessitated by the thing itself, without the least study and consideration of our own, to write this whole volume. Or, to use another instance, this is no more possible, than that ten or a dozen persons, altogether unskilled in music, having several instruments given them, and striking the strings or keys thereof, any how, as it happened, should, after some time of discord and jarring, at length be taught and necessitated to fall into most exquisite harmony, and continue the same uninterruptedly for several hours together.

Wherefore, if it be ridiculous for one, that hath read over the works of Plato or Aristotle, or those six books of T. Lucretius Carus, *De Natura Rerum*, to contend, that possibly the letters of those books might be all put together by chance, or scribbled at random, without the least thought or study of the writer, he having also no manner of philosophic skill in him; or for one, that hears ten or a dozen persons playing in concert upon instruments of music, and making ravishing har-

mony, to persuade himself, that none of those players had, for all that, the least of musical art or skill in them, but struck the strings as it happened; it must needs be much more ridiculous and absurd, to suppose this artificial system of the whole world to have resulted from the fortuitous motion of senseless atoms, without the direction of any art or wisdom, there being much more of sense, art, and philosophy therein, than in any philosophic volume or poem ever written by men; and more of harmony and proportion, than in any composition of vocal music. We conclude there-

fore with Aristotle, *ἀδύνατον δὲ ταῦτα τοῦτον*

Nat. Ausc. l.
ii. c. viii. [p.
475. tom. i.
oper.]

ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον that it is absolutely impossible things should have come to pass after this manner;—that is, by mere

fortune and chance, and without the direction of any Mind or God. The Divine Mind and Wisdom hath so printed its seal or signature upon the matter of the whole corporeal world, as that fortune and chance could never possibly have counterfeited the same.

Notwithstanding all which, the ancient Atheists would undertake, by their wonderful skill in logic, to demonstrate, that the frame of nature could not possibly be made by any intending cause, and for the sake of ends and uses; as, for example, that eyes could not be first of all made intentionally for the use of seeing, nor ears intentionally for the use of hearing, and so for the rest; because, forsooth, these things were all of them, in order of time and nature, before their several uses. The argument is seriously propounded by Lucretius, after this manner:—

Nec fuit ante, videre, oculorum lumina nata, Lamb. p. 367.
 Nec dictis orare, prius quam lingua creata est; [lib. iv. ver.
 Sed potius longe linguæ præcessit origo 834.]
 Sermonem, multoque creatæ sunt prius aures,
 Quam sonus est auditus; et omnia denique membra
 Ante fuere, ut opinor, eorum quam fuit usus.
 Haud igitur potuere utendi crescere causa.

To this sense: There was no such thing as seeing before eyes were made, nor hearing before ears, nor speaking before the tongue. But the original of the tongue much preceded speech: so likewise eyes and ears were made before there was any seeing of colours or hearing of sounds. In like manner, all the other members of the body were produced before their respective uses. And therefore they could not be made intentionally, for the sake of those uses.—The force of which argument consisteth in this proposition: That whatsoever is made for the sake of another thing, must exist in time after that other thing, for whose sake it was made: or, That, for which any thing is made, must not only be, in order of nature, but also of time, before that which is made for it.—And this that Epicurean poet endeavours to prove by sundry instances;

At contra conferre manu certamina pugnæ, Ibid.
 Ante fuit multo quam lucida tela volarent, &c.

Darts were made for the sake of fighting, but fighting was before darts, or else they had never been invented. Bucklers were excogitated and devised, for the keeping off of blows and strokes, but the declining of strokes was before bucklers. So were beds contrived for the sake of resting and sleeping, but resting and sleeping were older than beds, and gave occasion for the in-

vention of them. Cups were intended and designed for the sake of drinking, which they would not have been, had there not been drinking before.—According to the force of which instances, the poet would infer, that whosoever affirms eyes to have been made for the sake of seeing, must suppose, in like manner, there was some kind of seeing or other before eyes. But since there was no seeing at all before eyes, therefore could not eyes be made for the sake of seeing. And this is the atheistic demonstration, that the parts of men's bodies, and other things of nature, could not be made by any intending cause, for the sake of ends and uses.

But it is evident, that this logic of Atheists differs from that of all other mortals, according to which, the end, or that for which any thing is made, is only in intention before the means, or that which is made for it, but in time and execution after it. And thus was the more effectual way of fighting and doing execution, for whose sake darts were invented, in time after darts, and only in intention before them. It is true, indeed, that fighting in general was before darts, sleeping before beds, and drinking before cups; and thereby did they give occasion for men to think of means for the more effectual fighting, and more commodious sleeping and drinking; men being commonly excited from the experience of things, and the sense of their needs and wants, to cogitate and provide fit means and remedies. But it doth not therefore follow, that the Maker of the world could not have at once beforehand a preventive knowledge of whatsoever would be useful and for the good of animals, and so make them

intentionally for those uses. Wherefore the argument should have been framed thus; Whatsoever any thing is made for, as the end, that must needs be, in the knowledge and intention of the maker, before the existence of that which is made for it. And, therefore, if eyes were made for the sake or end of seeing, seeing must of necessity be in the knowledge and intention of the maker of eyes, before there were any eyes actually existing. But there could be no knowledge of seeing before there were any eyes. Wherefore eyes could not be made for the sake of seeing.

And this indeed is the genuine scope and drift of the premised atheistic argument, however it were disguised by them in their manner of propounding it. The reason whereof was, because they took it for granted, that all knowledge, as such, is derived by sense from the things themselves known pre-existing. From whence it follows, that there could be no knowledge of vision or seeing, before there was actual seeing and eyes; and so they think it to be demonstrated, that eyes could not be made by any Deity for the sake of seeing before there was seeing; no more than spectacles by men for the sake of eyes, before there were eyes. Thus does the Epicurean poet conclude triumphantly;

[L. iii. p. 368.
lib. iv. ver.
851.]

*Illa quidem seorsum sunt omnia, quæ prius ipsa
Nata, dedere suæ post notitiam utilitatis.
Quo genere imprimis sensus et membra videmus.
Quare etiam atque etiam procul est, ut credere possis,
Utilitatis ob officium potuisse creari.*

That is, The members of men's bodies, and organs of sense, were first made by themselves, and

then did they afterward give the notice or knowledge of their several utilities ; none of which could have been had before. Wherefore we affirm again and again, that it is impossible these things should have been made designedly for their uses.

So that the controversy is at last resolved wholly into this ; Whether or no, all knowledge and understanding, as such, universally does arise from things antecedently existing without the knower ? Which being asserted by Atheists, they conclude from thence, that the things of the world could not be made by the previous counsel, contrivance, and intention of any understanding Deity, but that they all blundered out themselves, one after another, according to the train or sequel of the fortuitous motions of matter ; and that from thence knowledge and understanding, counsel and intention, sprung up afterward, as junior to things, and the world. But this being already made the eleventh atheistic argument against a Deity, *viz.* That all knowledge and mental conception is the information of the things themselves known, existing before and without the knower, and a passion from them ; and therefore that the world must needs be before any knowledge or conception of it, and no knowledge or conception before the world, as its cause—we shall refer the answer to it, and confutation of it, to its proper place ; where we shall plainly demonstrate, that knowledge or understanding is not, in its own nature, ectypal, but archetypal ; and that it is older than the world and the Maker of all things.

But the Atheists yet further urge, against the proving of a God from the *τὸ εἶ και καλῶς*, the regular frame of the whole world in general, and

the artificial structure of the bodies of animals, after this manner; That it is altogether unreasonable to suppose, there should be no cause in nature for the phenomena thereof, especially for those things, which are daily generated, as the bodies of animals; but (as by the tragic poets) a god should be introduced, as it were from a machine, forcibly to solve them. And, indeed, though there were a god, yet they think he ought not to be detruded to such mean offices as this, *viz.* to make the body of every the most contemptible animal, as it were with his own hands miraculously; nor ought nature or the world to be supposed so imperfect, as if it must be bungled and botched up every where after this manner. It is nature, therefore, which is the cause of these natural productions and generations. Which nature, that it doth not intend nor act designedly for ends and uses, appears not only from hence, because it never consults or deliberates (which Aristotle^a intimates to have been the reason, why some of old denied the things of nature to have been made for ends), but also because it hath no animal sense or consciousness, no understanding or appetite. Wherefore this opinion of intending, and final causality in nature, can be accounted no other than an *idolum specus* (as some^b affect to phrase it), or a prejudice of men's minds, when they apply their own properties to things without them, and think, because themselves intend, and act for ends, that therefore nature doth the like. And they might as well say, that nature laughs and cries, speaks

^a Vide de Nat. Auscultat. lib. ii. cap. viii. p. 477. tom. i. oper.

^b Lord Bacon in his Novum Organum, p. ii. §. 53. p. 47.

and walks, syllogizes and philosophizes, because themselves do so. But, as a modern philosopher concludeth, “The universe, as one aggregate of things natural, hath no intention belonging to it.” And, accordingly, were all final causes rightly banished by Democritus out of physiology, as Aristotle^a recordeth of him, *τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα ἀφείξας λέγειν, πάντα ἀνάγει οἷς χρῆται ἡ φύσις*: That he reduced all things to natural and necessary causes, altogether rejecting final.

To all which we briefly reply: That there are indeed two extremes here to be avoided; the one, of those, who derive all things from the fortuitous motions of senseless matter, which is the extreme of the atomic Atheists; the other, of bigotical religionists, who will needs have God *αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα*, to do all things himself immediately—as if all in nature were miracle. But there is a middle betwixt both these extremes; namely, to suppose, that besides God, and in subordination to him, there is a nature (not fortuitous, but) artificial and methodical, which governing the motion of matter, and bringing it into regularity, is a secondary or inferior cause of generations. Now, this *natura artificiosa*, this artificial nature, though itself indeed do not understand the reason of what it doth, nor properly intend the ends thereof, yet may it well be conceived to act regularly for the sake of ends understood and intended by that perfect Mind, upon which it depends. As the manuary opificers understand not the designs of the architect, but only drudgingly perform their several tasks imposed by him; and as types

^a De Generat. Animal. lib. v. cap. viii. p. 713. tom. ii. oper.

or forms of letters, composed together, print coherent philosophic sense, which themselves understand nothing of. (Upon which artificial or spermatic nature, we have largely insisted before, in the Appendix to the third chapter.) And thus, neither are all things performed immediately and miraculously by God himself; neither are they all done fortuitously and temerarily, but regularly and methodically, for the sake of ends, though not understood by nature itself, but by that higher Mind, which is the cause of it, and doth, as it were, continually inspire it. Some, indeed, have unskilfully attributed their own properties, or animal idiopathies to inanimate bodies; as when they say, that matter desires forms, as the female doth the male; and that heavy bodies descend down by appetite towards the centre, that so they may rest therein; and that they sometimes again ascend in discretion, to avoid a vacuum. Of which fanciful extravagances, if the Advancer of Learning be understood, there is nothing to be reprehended in this following passage of his; “*Incredibile est quantum agmen idolorum philosophiæ immiserit naturalium operationum ad similitudinem actionum humanarum reductio:*” It is incredible, how many errors have been transfused into philosophy, from this one delusion, of reducing natural actions to the mode of human; or of thinking, that nature acteth as a man doth.—But if that of his be extended further, to take away all final causes from the things of nature, as if nothing were done therein for ends intended by a higher mind, then is it the very spirit of Atheism and infidelity. It is no idol of the cave or den (to use that affected language);

that is, no prejudice or fallacy imposed upon ourselves, from the attributing our own animalish properties to things without us, to think, that the frame and system of this whole world was contrived by a perfect understanding Being or Mind (now also presiding over the same), which hath every where printed the signatures of its own wisdom upon the matter. As also, that though nature itself do not properly intend, yet it acteth according to an intellectual platform prescribed to it, as being the manuary opificer of the Divine architectonic art, or this art itself as it were transfused into the matter, and embodied in it. Thus Cicero's^a Balbus long since declared concerning it, that it was not "*vis quædam sine ratione, ciens motus in corporibus necessarios; sed vis particeps ordinis, tanquam via progrediens, cujus solertiam nulla ars, nemo artifex consequi potest imitando:*" Not a force unguided by reason, exciting necessary motions in bodies temerarily; but such a force, as partakes of order, and proceeds as it were methodically; whose cunning or ingenuity no art or human opificer can possibly reach to by imitation.—For it is altogether unconceivable, how we ourselves should have mind and intention in us, were there none in the universe, or in that highest principle, from whence all proceeds. Moreover, it was truly affirmed by Aristotle,^b that there is much more of art in some of the things of nature, than there is in any thing artificially made by men; and therefore intention, or final and mental causality, can no more be secluded from the consideration of natural, than it can

^a De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxxii. p. 3001. tom. ix. oper.

^b Vide Natur. Auscult. lib. ii. cap. x. p. 476. tom. i. oper.

from that of artificial things. Now it is plain, that things artificial, as a house or clock, can neither be understood, nor any true cause of them assigned, without design or intention for ends and good. For to say, that a house is stones, timber, mortar, iron, glass, lead, &c. all put together, is not to give a definition thereof, or to tell what indeed it is, it being such an apt disposition of all these materials, as may make up the whole fit for habitation, and the uses of men. Wherefore this is not sufficiently to assign the cause of a house neither, to declare out of what quarry the stones were dug, nor in what woods or forests the timber was felled, and the like: nor, as Aristotle addeth,

εἴτις τὸν τοῖχον γεγενῆσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης νομίζοι, Nat. Ausc. l. ii. c. ix. [p. 478. tom. i. oper.]
ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρῆα κάτω πέφυκε φέρεσθαι, τὰ δὲ
κουφὰ ἐπιπολῆς· διὸ οἱ λίθοι μὲν κάτω καὶ θεμέλια,

ἢ δὲ γῆ ἄνω διὰ τὴν κουφότητα, ἐπιπολῆς δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ξύλα·
κουφότατα γάρ· If any one should go about thus to give an account of a house from material necessity (as the atheistic philosophers then did of the world and the bodies of animals), that the heavier things being carried downward of their own accord, and the lighter upward; therefore the stones and foundation lay at the bottom, and the earth for the walls, being lighter, was higher; and the timber, being yet lighter, higher than that; but above all the straw, or thatch, it being the lightest of all.—Nor, lastly, if, as the same Aristotle elsewhere ^a also suggesteth, one should further pretend, that a house was therefore made such, *ἐμπειρόντος τοῦ ὀργάνου,* &c. merely because the hands of the labourers, and the axes, and hammers, and trowels, and other instruments, chanced all to be moved

^a De Partib. Animal. lib. i. cap. i. p. 473. tom. ii. oper.

so and so; we say, that none of all these would be to assign the true cause of a house, without declaring, that the architect first framed in his mind a model or platform of such a thing to be made out of those materials, so aptly disposed into a foundation, walls, roof, doors, rooms, stairs, chimneys, windows, &c. as might render the whole fit for habitation, and other human uses. And no more certainly can the things of nature (in whose very essence final causality is as much included) be either rightly understood, or the causes of them assigned, merely from matter and mechanism, or the necessary and unguided motion thereof, without design or intention for ends and good. Wherefore to say,^a that the bodies of animals became such, merely because the fluid seed, by motion, happened to make such traces, and beget such stamina and lineaments, as out of which that compages of the whole resulted; is not to assign a cause of them, but to dissemble, smother, and conceal their true efficient cause, which is the wisdom and contrivance of that Divine Architect and Geometer, making them every way fit for the inhabitation and uses of their respective souls. Neither indeed can we banish all final, that is, all mental causality, from philosophy or the consideration of nature, without banishing at the same time reason and understanding from ourselves, and looking upon the things of nature with no other eyes than brutes do. However, none of the ancient Atheists would ever undertake to assign necessary causes for all the parts of the bodies of animals, and their efformation,

^a This seems to be levelled against Des Cartes' book *De formatione Fœtus*.

from mere matter, motion, and mechanism; those small and pitiful attempts in order thereunto, that have been made by some of them in a few instances (as that the *spina dorsi*^a came from the flexure of the bodies of animals, when they first sprung out of the earth, the intestines from the flux of humours excavating a crooked and winding channel for itself, and that the nostrils were broken open by the eruption of breath); these, I say, only shewing the unfeasableness and impossibility thereof. And therefore Democritus was so wise, as never to pretend to give an account in this way of the formation of the fœtus, he looking upon it as a thing absolutely desperate; nor would he venture to say any more concerning it (as Aristotle^b informeth us) than ὅτι οὕτως αἰεὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται, that it always cometh so to pass of necessity—but stopped all further inquiry concerning it after this manner, τὸ ἐρωτᾶν τὸ διὰ τί, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων τινός, τὸ ζητεῖν εἶναι τοῦ ἀπέιρου ἀρχὴν, that to demand, about any of these things; for what cause it was thus, was to demand a beginning of infinite.—As if all the motions from eternity had an influence upon, and contribution to, whatsoever corporeal thing was now produced. And Lucretius, notwithstanding all his swaggering and boasting, that he and Epicurus were able to assign natural and necessary causes for every thing without a God, hath no where so much as one word concerning it. We conclude therefore that Aristotle's judgment concerning final causes in philosophy is much to be preferred before that

^a Vide Aristot. de Partib. Animal. lib. i. cap. i. p. 471, 472.

^b De Generat. Animal. lib. ii. cap. vi. p. 629. tom. ii. oper.

Nat. Ausc. of Democritus, καὶ ἄμφω μὲν τῷ φυσικῷ
 l. ii. c. ix. λεκτέαι αἱ αἰτίαι, μᾶλλον δὲ, ἢ τινὸς ἕνεκα αἴτιον
 [p. 478. γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτῆ τοῦ τέλους,
 tom. i. oper.] that both kinds of causes (material and final) ought
 to be declared by a physiologer, but especially
 the final: the end being the cause of the matter,
 but the matter not the cause of the end.—And
 thus do we see plainly, that the atomic Atheists
 are utterly ignorant of the cause τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς,
 of the regular and artificial frame of the things in
 nature,—and consequently the whole mundane
 system, the true knowledge whereof necessarily
 leadeth to a God.

But it is prodigiously strange, that these Atheists should, in this their ignorance and sottishness, be justified by any professed Theists and Christians of later times, who atomizing in their physiology also, would feign persuade us in like manner, that this whole mundane system, together with plants and animals, was derived merely from the necessary and unguided motion of the small particles of matter, at first turned round in a vortex, or else jumbled all together in a chaos, without any intention for ends and good, that is, without the direction of any mind; God in the mean time standing by, only as an idle spectator of this *lusus atomorum*, this sportful dance of atoms—and of the various results thereof. Nay, these mechanic Theists have here quite outstripped and outdone the atomic Atheists themselves, they being much more immodest and extravagant than ever those were; for the professed Atheists durst never venture to affirm, that this regular system of things resulted from the fortuitous motions of atoms at the very first, before they had for a long time to-

gether produced many other inept combinations or aggregate forms of particular things, and nonsensical systems of the whole. And they supposed also, that the regularity of things here in this world would not always continue such neither, but that some time or other confusion and disorder would break in again. Moreover, that, besides this world of ours, there are at this very instant innumerable other worlds irregular, and that there is but one of a thousand, or ten thousand, amongst the infinite worlds, that have such regularity in them. The reason of all which is, because it was generally taken for granted, and looked upon as a common notion, that τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, οὐθέν αἰεὶ οὕτω γίνεται, as Aristotle expresseth it,* that none of those things, which are from fortune or chance, come to pass constantly and always alike. —But our mechanic or atomic Theists will have their atoms never so much as once to have fumbled in these their fortuitous motions, nor to have produced any inept system, or incongruous forms at all; but from the very first all along, to have taken up their places, and have ranged themselves so orderly, methodically, and discreetly, as that they could not possibly have done it better, had they been directed by the most perfect wisdom. Wherefore these atomic Theists utterly evacuate that grand argument for a God, taken from the phenomenon of the artificial frame of things, which hath been so much insisted on in all ages, and which commonly makes the strongest impression of any other upon the minds of men, they leaving only certain metaphysical arguments for a Deity; which, though never so good, yet, by rea-

* Natur. Auscult. lib. ii. cap. iv. p. 469. tom. i. oper.

son of their subtilty, can do but little execution upon the minds of the generality, and even amongst the learned do sometimes beget more of doubtful disputation and scepticism, than of clear conviction and satisfaction; the Atheists in the mean time laughing in their sleeves, and not a little triumphing, to see the cause of Theism thus betrayed by its professed friends and assertors, and the grand argument for the same totally slurred by them; and so their work done, as it were, to their hands, for them.

Now, as this argues the greatest insensibility of mind, or sottishness and stupidity in pretended Theists, not to take the least notice of the regular and artificial frame of things, or of the signatures of the Divine art and wisdom in them, nor to look upon the world, and things of nature, with any other eyes than oxen and horses do; so are there many phenomena in nature, which, being partly above the force of these mechanic powers, and partly contrary to the same, can therefore never be solved by them, nor without final causes, and some vital principle. As for example, that of gravity, or the tendency of bodies downward, the motion of the diaphragma in respiration, the systole and diastole of the heart, which was before declared to be a muscular constriction and relaxation, and therefore not mechanical but vital. We might also add, amongst many others, the intersection of the plains of the equator and ecliptic, or the earth's diurnal motion, upon an axis not parallel with that of the ecliptic, nor perpendicular to the plain thereof. For though Cartesius^a

^a Vide Principia.ejus Philosoph. part iii. §. 155. p. 136. et part iv. §. 2. p. 137.

would needs imagine this earth of ours once to have been a sun, and so itself the centre of a lesser vortex, whose axis was then directed after this manner, and which therefore still kept the same site or posture, by reason of the striate particles, finding no fit pores or traces for their passage through it, but only in this direction; yet does he himself confess, that because these two motions of the earth, the annual and diurnal, would be much more conveniently made upon parallel axes, therefore, according to the laws of mechanism, they should perpetually be brought nearer and nearer together, till at length the equator and the ecliptic come to have their axes parallel to one another, which, as it hath not yet come to pass, so neither hath there been, for these last two thousand years (according to the best observations and judgments of astronomers), any nearer approach made of them to one another. Wherefore the continuation of these two motions of the earth, the annual and diurnal, upon axes different or not parallel, is resolvable into nothing, but a final and mental cause, or the *τὸ βέλτιστον*, because it was best it should be so, the variety of the seasons of the year depending hereupon. But the greatest of all the particular phenomena is the organization and formation of the bodies of animals, consisting of such variety and curiosity, which these mechanic philosophers being no way able to give an account of from the necessary motion of matter, unguided by mind for ends, prudently therefore break off their system there, when they should come to animals, and so leave it altogether untouched. We acknowledge indeed, that there is a posthumous piece

extant, imputed to Cartesius, and entitled, *De la Formation du Fœtus*, wherein there is some pretence made to solve all this by fortuitous mechanism. But as the theory thereof is wholly built upon a false supposition, sufficiently confuted by the learned Harvey, in his book of *Generation*, “that the seed doth materially enter into the composition of the egg;” so is it all along precarious and exceptionable; nor does it extend at all to the differences, that are in several animals, or offer the least reason, why an animal of one species or kind might not be formed out of the seed of another.

It is here indeed pretended by these mechanic Theists, that final causes therefore ought not to be of any regard to a philosopher, because we should not arrogate to ourselves to be as wise as God Almighty is, or to be privy to his secrets. Thus in the *Metaphysical Meditations*;^a “*Atque ob hanc unicam rationem totum illud causarum genus, quod a fine peti solet, in rebus physicis nullum usum habere existimo; non enim absque temeritate me puto, investigare posse fines Dei.*” And again likewise in the *Principles of Philosophy*:^b “*Nullas unquam rationes circa res naturales a fine, quem Deus aut natura in iis faciendis sibi proposuit, admittimus, quia non tantum nobis debemus arrogare, ut ejus consiliorum participes esse possimus.*” But the question is not, whether we can always reach to the ends of God Almighty, and know what is absolutely best in every case, and accordingly make conclusions, that therefore the thing is, or ought to be so; but, whether any thing at all were made by God for

^a *Meditat. iv. p. 26. edit. Amstelod. 1685.*

^b *Vide part i. §. 28. p. 8. et part iii. §. 2, 3. p. 50.*

ends and good, otherwise than would of itself have resulted from the fortuitous motion of matter. Nevertheless, we see no reason at all, why it should be thought presumption, or intrusion into the secrets of God Almighty, to affirm, that eyes were made by him for the end of seeing (and accordingly so contrived as might best conduce thereunto), and ears for the end of hearing, and the like. This being so plain, that nothing but sottish stupidity, or atheistic incredulity (masked perhaps under a hypocritical veil of humility), can make any doubt thereof. And therefore Aristotle^a justly reprehended Anaxagoras for that absurd aphorism of his, *διὰ τὸ χεῖρας ἔχειν, φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζώων τὸν ἄνθρωπον*, that man was therefore the wisest (or most solert) of all animals, because he chanced to have hands. He not doubting to affirm on the contrary, *εὐλογον διὰ τὸ φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζώων χεῖρας ἔχειν· ἢ γὰρ φύσις αἰεὶ διανέμει καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος φρόνιμος, τῷ δυναμένῳ χρῆσθαι ἕκαστον· προσήκει γὰρ τῷ ὄντι ἀληθῆ δοῦναι μᾶλλον ἀλούς, ἢ τῷ ἀλούς ἔχοντι προσθεῖναι ἀληθειάν*· that it was far more reasonable to think, that because man was the wisest (or most solert and active) of all animals, therefore he had hands given him. For nature (saith he) distributeth, as a wise man doth, what is suitable to every one; and it is more proper to give pipes to one that hath musical skill, than upon him, that pipes, to bestow musical skill.

Wherefore these mechanic Theists would further allege, and that with some more colour of reason, that it is below the dignity of God Almighty to condescend to all those mean and trivial offices, and to do the things of nature himself

^a De Partib. Animal. lib. iv. cap. x. p. 559, 560. tom. ii. oper. *

immediately : as also, that it would be but a botch in nature, if the defects thereof were every where to be supplied by miracle. But to this also the reply is easy, that though the Divine wisdom itself contrived the system of the whole world for ends and good, yet nature, as an inferior minister, immediately executes the same ; I say, not a dead, fortuitous, and merely mechanical, but a vital, orderly, and artificial nature. Which nature, asserted by most of the ancient philosophers, who were Theists, is thus described by Proclus :^a ἡ Steph. Poet. φύσις ἐσχάτη μὲν ἐστὶ τῶν τὸ σωματοειδὲς τοῦτο Philos. καὶ αἰσθητὸν δημιουργούντων αἰτίων, καὶ τὸ πέρασ τοῦ τῶν ἀσωμάτων οὐσιῶν πλάτους· πλήρης δὲ λόγον καὶ δυνάμεων δι' ὧν κατευθύνει τὰ ἐγκόσμια· τοιαύτη δὲ οὐσα προελήλυθεν ἀπὸ τῆς ζωογόνου θεᾶς,

Νῶτοις δ' ἀμφὶ θεᾶς φύσις ἀπλετος αἰώρηται

ἀφ' ἧς πᾶσα ζωὴ πρόεισιν, ἢ τε νοερά καὶ ἡ ἀχώριστος τῶν διοικουμένων· ἐξηρητημένη δ' ἐκείθεν καὶ ἀπηρωρημένη, φοιτᾷ διὰ πάντα ἀκωλύτως, καὶ πάντα ἐμπνεῖ, δι' ἣν τὰ ἀψύχωτα ψυχῆς μετέχει τινός, καὶ τὰ φθειρόμενα μένει διαιωνίως ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, ταῖς ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν εἰδῶν αἰτίαις συνεχόμενα·

* Ἀρχει δ' αὖ φύσις ἀκαμάτη κόσμων τε καὶ ἔργων,

φησὶ τὸ λόγιον,

Οὐρανὸς ὄφρα θέη δρόμον αἰδίου κατασύρων·

Καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς· Nature is the last of all causes, that fabricate this corporeal and sensible world, and the utmost bound of incorporeal substances. Which, being full of reasons and power, orders and presides over all mundane affairs. It proceeding (according to the Magic Oracles) from that supreme goddess, the Divine wisdom, which is the fountain of all life, as well intellectual, as that which is concrete with matter. Which wisdom this nature

^a Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. i. p. 4. edit, Græc.

always essentially depending upon, passes through all things unhinderably; by means whereof even inanimate things partake of a kind of life, and things corruptible remain eternal in their species, they being contained by its standing forms or ideas, as their causes. And thus does the oracle describe nature, as presiding over the whole corporeal world, and perpetually turning round the heavens.—Here have we a description of one universal, substantial life, soul, or spirit of nature, subordinate to the Deity: besides which the same Proclus elsewhere^a supposeth other particular natures, or spermatic reasons, in those words of his: *Μετὰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν πρώτην, ψυχαί· καὶ μετὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, φύσεις*. After the first soul, are there particular souls, and after the universal nature, particular natures. Where it may be observed, by the way, that this Proclus, though he were a superstitious Pagan, much addicted to the multiplying of gods (subordinate to one supreme) or bigotic Polytheist, who had a humour of deifying almost every thing, and therefore would have this nature, forsooth, to be called a goddess too; yet does he declare it not to be properly such, but abusively only (viz. because it was no intellectual thing), as he saith the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, supposed to be animated, were called gods too, they being the statues of the gods. This is the meaning of those words: *Καὶ θεός· μὲν τῷ ἐκθεοῦσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἀντόθεν ἔχουσα τὸ εἶναι Θεός· καὶ γὰρ τὰ θεῖα σώματα, θεοὺς καλοῦμεν, ὡς ἀγάλματα τῶν θεῶν*. Nature is a god or goddess, not as having godship properly belonging to it, but as the Divine bodies are called gods, because they are statues of the gods.

^a Ibid. p. 118.

Wherefore we cannot otherwise conclude concerning these our mechanic Theists, who will thus needs derive all corporeal things from a dead and stupid nature, or from the necessary motions of senseless matter, without the direction of any mind or intention for ends and good ; but that they are indeed cousins-german to Atheists, or possessed, in a degree, with a kind of atheistic enthusiasm, or fanaticism, they being so far forth inspired with a spirit of infidelity, which is the spirit of Atheism.

But these mechanic Theists are again counter-balanced by another sort of Atheists, not mechanical nor fortuitous ; namely, the Hylozoists, who are unquestionably convinced, that "*opera naturæ sunt opera intelligentiæ,*" the works of nature are works of understanding ; and that the original of these corporeal things was not dead and stupid matter fortuitously moved : upon which account Strato derided Democritus's rough and crooked atoms, as mere dreams and dotages. But these notwithstanding, because they would not admit of any other substance besides matter, suppose life and perception essentially to belong to all matter as such ; whereby it hath a perfect knowledge of whatsoever itself could do or suffer (though without animal consciousness), and can form itself to the best advantage, sometimes improving itself by organization to sense in brutes, and to reason and reflexive understanding in men. Wherefore, according to the principles of these Hylozoists, there is not any need of a God at all ; that is, of one perfect mind or understanding being presiding over the whole world ; they concluding accordingly, the opinion of a God to be only a mistaking

of the inadequate conception of matter in general, its life and energetic nature taken alone abstractly, for a complete substance by itself. Nevertheless these hylozoic Atheists are no way able, by this hypothesis of theirs neither, to solve that phenomenon of the regularity and harmony of the whole universe; because every part of matter being, according to them, a distinct percipient by itself, whose knowledge extendeth only to its own concernment; and there being no one thing presiding over all, the things of the whole world (*ἐν ᾧ πάντα συντέτακται*, in which all things are co-ordered together—) could never have fallen into one such agreeing and conspiring harmony.

And as for those other Cosmo-plastic Atheists, who suppose the whole world to be as it were but one huge plant, tree, or vegetable, or to have one spermatic, plastic, and artificial nature only, orderly and methodically disposing the whole, but without sense and understanding; these can no way do the business neither, that is, solve the fore-mentioned phenomenon, it being utterly impossible, that there should be any such artificial and regular nature, otherwise than as deriving from, and depending upon, a perfect mind or wisdom.

And thus do we see plainly, that no Atheists whatsoever can solve the phenomena of nature, and this particularly of the regular frame and harmony of the universe; and that true philosophy, or the knowledge of causes, necessarily leadeth to a God.

But besides these phenomena of cogitation, or soul and mind in animals, local motion in bodies, and the artificial frame of things for ends and uses, together with the conspiring harmony of the

whole, which can no way be solved without a Deity; we might here further add, that the fortuitous, that is, the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheists, who universally asserted the novelty of this mundane system, were not able to give any tolerable account neither of the first beginning of men, and those greater animals, that are no otherwise begotten, than in the way of generation, by the commixture of male and female.

Aristotle, in his book of the Generation of Animals, writeth thus : *Περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τετραπόδων γενέσεως, ὑπολάβοι τις ἂν, εἴπερ ἐγένοντό ποτε γηγενεῖς, ὡσπερ φασί τινες, δύο τρόπων γίνεσθαι τὸν ἕτερον· ἢ γὰρ ὡς σκώληκος συνισταμένου τὸ πρῶτον, ἢ ἐξ ὠῶν.* If men and four-footed animals were ever generated out of the earth, as some affirm; it may be probably conceived to have been one of these two ways, either that they were produced, as worms; out of putrefaction, or else formed in certain eggs,—growing out of the earth. And then; after a while, he concludes again,^a *εἴπερ ἦν τις ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις; εὐλογον δεῖν τούτων εἶναι τὴν ἑτέραν,* that if there were any beginning of the generation of all animals, it is reasonable to think it to have been one of these two forementioned ways. It is well known; that Aristotle; though a Theist, elsewhere affirmeth the world's eternity; according to which hypothesis of his, there was never any first male nor female in any kind of animals, but one begat another infinitely; without any beginning: a thing utterly repugnant to our human faculties, that are never able to frame any conception of such an infinity of number and time, and of a successive generation from eternity. But here:

^a Ibid. p. 666.

Aristotle himself seems staggering, or sceptical, about it, “if men were ever generated out of the earth, and if there were any beginning of the generation of animals;” as he doth also, in his *Topics*; propound it for an instance of a thing disputable, Πότερον ὁ κόσμος αἰδῖος ἢ οὐ; Whether the world were eternal or no? he ranking it amongst *περὶ ὧν λόγον μὴ ἔχομεν ὄντων με- γάλων*, those great things, for which we can give no certain reason one way nor another. Now (saith he) if the world had a beginning, and if men were once *γηγενεῖς*, or *αὐτόχθονες*, earth-born—then must they have been, in all probability, either generated, as worms, out of putrefaction; or else out of eggs; he supposing (it seems) those eggs to have grown out of the earth. But the generality of Atheists in Aristotle’s time, as well as Theists, denying this eternity of the mundane system, as not so agreeable with their hypothesis, because so constant and invariable an order in the world, from eternity, hath not such an appearance or semblance of chance, nor can be easily supposed to have been without the providence of a perfect mind presiding over it, and senior to it (as Aristotle conceived) in nature, though not in time; they therefore, in all probability, concluded likewise, men at first to have been generated one of these two ways, either out of putrefaction, or from eggs; and this by the fortuitous motion of matter, without the providence or direction of any deity. But, after Aristotle, Epicurus fancied those first men and other animals to have been formed in certain wombs or bags growing out of the earth;

Lib. i. c. ix.
[cap. xi. p.
265. tom. i.
oper.]

Crescebant uteri terræ radicibus apti;

Lucret. lib. v. ver. 806.

And this no otherwise than by the fortuitous motion of atoms also.

But if men had been at first formed after this manner, either in wombs or eggs (growing out of the earth), or generated out of putrefaction, by chance; then could there be no reason imaginable, why it should not sometimes so happen now, the motions of atoms being as brisk and vigorous as ever they were, and so to continue to all eternity: so that there is not the least ground at all for that precarious fancy and pretence of Epicurus^a, that the earth, as a child-bearing woman, growing old, became at length effete and barren. Moreover, the men thus at first excluded out of bags, wombs or egg-shells, or generated out of putrefaction, were supposed by these Atheists themselves to have been produced, not in a mature and adult, but an infant-like, weak, and tender state, just such as they are now born into the world; by means whereof they could neither be able to feed and nourish themselves, nor defend themselves from harms and injuries. But when the same Epicurus^b would here pretend also, that the earth, which had been so fruitful a mother, became afterward, by chance too, as tender and indulgent a nurse of this her own progeny, and sent forth streams or rivers of milk after them out of those gaps of her wounded surface, which they had before burst out of, as Critolaus long since In Philo. Quod Mund. Incorr. [p. 945.] observed, he might as well have feigned the earth to have had breasts and nipples too, as wombs and milk; and then what should hinder, but that she might have arms and

^a Vide Lucret. lib. v. ver. 823, 824. et lib. ii. ver. 1149.

^b Vide Lucret. lib. v. ver. 810.

hands also, and swaddling-bands to boot? Neither is that less precarious, when the same atheistic philosopher adds, that in this imaginary state of the new-born world, there was for a long time neither any immoderate heat nor cold, nor any rude and churlish blasts of wind, the least to annoy or injure those tender earth-born infants and nurselings. All which things being considered, Anaximander^a seems of the two to have concluded more wisely, that men, because they require a longer time than other animals to be hatched up in, were at first generated in the bellies of fishes, and there nourished up for a good while, till they were at length able to defend and shift for themselves, and then were disgorged, and cast up upon dry land. Thus do we see, that there is nothing in the world so monstrous, nor prodigiously absurd, which men, atheistically inclined, will not rather imagine, and swallow down, than entertain the notion of a God.

Wherefore here is “*dignus vindice nodus*,” and this phenomenon of the first beginning of mankind, and other greater animals, cannot be solved otherwise than according to the Mosaic history, by admitting of *θεὸν ἀπὸ μηχανῆς*, a God out of a machine, —that is, an extraordinary manifestation of the Deity, in forming man, and other animals, male and female, once out of the earth; and that not in a rude, tender, and infant-like state, but mature and adult, that so they might be able immediately to shift for themselves, multiply and propagate their kind by generation: and this being once done, and now no longer any necessity of such an extraordinary way of proceeding, then putting a

^a Vide Censorinum de Die Natali, cap. iv. p. 26. edit. Lindenbrogii.

stop immediately thereunto, that so no more *terri-genæ*, nor *autochthones*, earth-born men,—should be any longer produced. For all these circumstances being put together, it plainly appears, that this whole phenomenon surpasses not only the mechanical, but also the plastic powers; there being much of discretion in it, which the latter of these cannot arrive to neither, they always acting fatally and necessarily. Nevertheless, we shall not here determine, whether God Almighty might not make use of the subservient ministry of angels or superior spirits, created before man, in this first extraordinary efformation of the bodies of animals out of the earth, in a mature and adult state; as Plato, in his *Timæus*^a, introduceth the supreme God (whom he supposeth to be the immediate Creator of all immortal souls) thus bespeaking the junior gods, and setting them a work in the fabrication of mortal bodies: Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑμεῖς, ἀθανάτῳ θνητὸν προσυφαίνοντες, ἀπεργάζεσθε ζῶα καὶ γεννᾶτε. It is your work now to adaptate the mortal to the immortal, and to generate or make terrestrial animals:—he afterwards adding^b, μετὰ τὸν σπόρον, τοῖς νέοις παρέδωκε θεοῖς, σώματα πλάττειν θνητὰ, that after the sowing of immortal souls (the supreme God) committed to these junior gods the task of forming mortal bodies.—Which of Plato's some conceive to have been derived from that of Moses, "Let us make man after our own image."

Moreover, these Atheists are no more able to solve that other common and ordinary phenomenon neither, of the conservation of the species of all animals, by keeping up constantly in the world a due numerical proportion between the

^a §. 27. p. 250.

^b §. 29. p. 252.

sexes of male and female. For did this depend only upon fortuitous mechanism, it cannot well be conceived, but that, in some ages or other, there should happen to be either all males or all females; and so the species fail. Nay, it cannot well be thought otherwise, but that there is in this a providence also, superior to that of the plastic or spermatic nature, which hath not so much of knowledge and discretion allowed to it, as whereby to be able alone to govern this affair.

Lastly, there are yet other phenomena, no less real, though not physiological, which Atheists can no way solve; as that of natural justice, and honesty, duty and obligation; the true foundation both of ethics and politics; and the *τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν*, liberty of will,—properly so called, not that of fortuitous determination, when there is a perfect equality or indifferency of eligibility in objects; but that whereby men deserve commendation and blame, rewards and punishments, and so become fit objects for remunerative justice to display itself upon, a main hinge upon which religion turneth; (though those two be not commonly so well distinguished as they ought). For when Epicurus (an absolute Atheist), departing here from Democritus, pretended to solve this by his “*exiguum clinamen principiorum*,” this attempt of his was no other than a plain delirancy, or atheistic frenzy in him.

And now have we already preventively confuted the third atheistic pretence also, to solve the phenomenon of religion and the belief of a God, so generally entertained; namely, from the fiction and imposture of politicians: we having not only manifested, that there is a natural pro-

lepis and anticipation of a God, in the minds of men, as the object of their fear, preventing reason; but also that the belief thereof is sustained and upheld by the strongest reason; the phenomena of nature being no way solvable, nor the causes of things assignable, without a Deity; so that religion being founded, both upon the instincts of nature, and upon solid reason, cannot possibly be any fiction or imposture of politicians. Nevertheless, we shall speak something particularly to this also. The Atheists therefore conceive, that though those infirmities of human nature, men's fear and ignorant credulity, do much dispose and incline them to the belief of a God, or else of a rank of beings superior to men (whether visible or invisible), commonly called by the Pagans, gods; yet would not this be so generally entertained as it is, especially that of the one supreme Deity, the first Original of all things, and Monarch of the universe, had it not been for the fraud and fiction of law-makers and civil foreigners, who, the better to keep men in peace and subjection under them, and in a kind of religious and superstitious observation of their laws, and devotion to the same, devised this notion of a God, and then possessed the minds of men with a belief of his existence, and an awe of him.

Now, we deny not, but that politicians may sometimes abuse religion, and make it serve for the promoting of their own private interests and designs; which yet they could not do so well neither, were the thing itself a mere cheat and figment of their own, and had no reality at all in nature, nor any thing solid at the bottom of it. But since

religion obtains so universally every where, it is not conceivable, how civil sovereigns throughout the whole world, some of which are so distant, and have so little correspondence with one another, should, notwithstanding, all so well agree in this one cheating mystery of government, or piece of state-cozenage; nor, if they could, how they should be able so effectually to possess the generality of mankind (as well wise as unwise) with such a constant fear, awe, and dread, of a mere counterfeit thing, and an invisible nothing; and which hath not only no manner of foundation neither in sense nor reason, but also (as the Atheists suppose) tends to their own great terror and disquietment, and so brings them at once under a miserable vassalage both of mind and body. Especially since men are not generally so apt to think, that how much the more they have of power and dignity, they have therefore so much the more of knowledge and skill in philosophy and the things of nature, above others. And is it not strange, that the world should not all this while have suspected or discovered this cheat and juggle of politicians, and have smelt out a plot upon themselves, in the fiction of religion, to take away their liberty, and enthrall them under bondage; and that so many of these politicians, and civil sovereigns themselves also, should have been unacquainted herewith, and as simply awed with the fear of this invisible nothing, as any others? All other cheats and juggles, when they are once never so little detected, are presently thereupon dashed quite out of countenance, and have never any more the confidence to obtrude themselves upon the world. But though the Atheists have,

for these two thousand years past, been continually buzzing into men's ears, that religion is nothing but a mere state-juggle and political imposture; yet hath not the credit thereof been the least impaired thereby, nor its power and dominion over the minds of men abated: from whence it may be concluded, that it is no counterfeit and fictitious thing, but what is deeply rooted in the intellectual nature of man; a thing solid at the bottom, and supported by its own strength. Which yet may more fully appear from Christianity, a religion founded in no human policy, nor tending to promote any worldly interest or design; which yet by its own, or the Divine force, hath prevailed over the power and policy, the rage and madness, of all civil states, Jewish and Pagan, and hath conquered so great a part of the persecuting world under it; and that not by resisting, or opposing force, but by suffering deaths and martyrdoms in way of adherence to that principle,^a "That it is better to obey God than men." Which thing was thus presignified in the prophetic Scripture;^b "Why do the heathen rage, and the people imagine a vain thing? The kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord, and against his Christ," &c. "He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh; the Lord shall have them in derision. Then shall he speak unto them in his wrath," &c. "Yet have I set my King upon my holy hill of Sion. I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession. Be wise now therefore, O ye kings," &c.

^a Acts v. 29.^b Psal. ii. 1.

But that Theism, or religion, is no gullery or imposture, will be yet further made unquestionably evident. That the generality of mankind have agreed in the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, as a being eternal and necessarily existent, absolutely perfect and omnipotent, and the maker of the whole world, hath been already largely proved in the foregoing discourse. To which purpose is this of Sextus the philosopher: *Ἄ Κοινὴν γὰρ πρόληψιν ἔχουσι πάντες ἄνθρωποι περὶ Θεοῦ, καθ' ἣν μακάριον τι ἐστὶ ζῶν καὶ ἀφθαρτον καὶ τέλειον ἐν εὐδαιμονία, καὶ παντὸς κακοῦ ἀνεπίδεκτον.* All men have this common prolepsis concerning God, that he is a living being, incorruptible, perfectly happy, and incapable of all manner of evil.—And the notion of that God, which Epicurus opposed, was no other than this, “An understanding Being, having all happiness, with incorruptibility, that framed the whole world.” Now, I say, that if there be no such thing as this existing, and this idea of God be a mere fictitious thing, then was it altogether arbitrary. But it is inconceivable, how the generality of mankind (a few Atheists only excepted) should universally agree in one and the same arbitrary figment. This argumentation hath been formerly used by some Theists, as appeareth from the forementioned Sextus: *Τέλειος δὲ ἐστὶν ἄλογον, τὸ κατὰ τύχην πάντα τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιβάλλειν ιδιώμασιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ φυσικῶς οὕτως ἐκκινεῖσθαι.* It is altogether irrational to think, that all men should by chance light upon the same properties (in the idea of God) without

^a Lib. i. advers. Physicos, sive lib. viii. advers. Mathemat. sect. 1. §. 33. p. 556. ed. Fabricii.

being naturally moved thereunto. Neither is that any sufficient account, which the Atheists would here give, that statesmen and politicians every where thus possessed the minds of men with one and the same idea ; the difficulty still remaining, how civil sovereigns and law-makers, in all the distant parts of the world, and such as had no communication nor intercourse with one another, should universally jump in one and the same fictitious and arbitrary idea.

Moreover, were there no God, it is not conceivable how that forementioned idea should ever have entered into the minds of men, or how it could have been formed in them. And here the Atheists again think it enough to say, that this notion or idea was put into the minds of the generality of mankind by law-makers and politicians, telling them of such a being, and persuading them to believe his existence ; or that it was, from the first feigner or inventor of it, propagated all along and conveyed down by oral tradition. But this argues their great ignorance in philosophy, to think, that any notion or idea is put into men's minds from without, merely by telling, or by words ; we being passive to nothing else from words but their sounds and the phantasms thereof, they only occasioning the soul to excite such notions as it had before within itself (whether innate or adventitious) which those words, by the compact and agreement of men, were made to be signs of ; or else to reflect also further upon those ideas of their own, consider them more distinctly and compare them with one another. And though all learning be not the remembrance of what the

soul once before actually understood, in a pre-existent state, as Plato somewhere would have it, according to that of Boëtius,*

Quod si Platonis musa personat verum,
Quod quisque discit, immemor recordatur:

yet is all human teaching but maieutical, or obstetricious; and not the filling of the soul as a vessel, merely by pouring into it from without, but the kindling of it from within; or helping it so to excite and awaken, compare and compound, its own notions, as whereby to arrive at the knowledge of that, which it was before ignorant of: as the thing was better expressed by the forementioned philosophic poet, in these words,

Hæret profecto semen introrsum veri,
Quod excitatur ventilante doctrina.

Wherefore the mere telling of men, there is a God, could not infuse any idea of him into their minds; nor yet the further giving this definition of him, that he is a being absolutely perfect, eternal, and self-existent, make them understand any thing of his nature, were they not able to excite notions or ideas from within themselves, correspondent to those several words. However, the difficulty still remains, how those civil sovereigns and law-makers, or how Critias's very first inventor of that cheat of a god, could form that idea within themselves; since upon supposition of his nonexistence, it is the idea of nothing, or of a nonentity. And this was judiciously hinted also by the same Sex,

* De Consolat. Philos. lib. iii. p. 79, 80.

Adv. Math. 313, 314. [p. 556.] **tus ; οἱ δὲ διαμφοδοκούντες φασίν, ὅ τι νομοθεταί τινες ἐνεποίησαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὴν περὶ Θεοῦ δόξαν, μὴ εἰδότες ὅτι τὸ ἀρχῆθεν ἄτοπον αὐτοὺς**

περιμένει, ζητήσαντος ἂν τινος, πόθεν δὲ οἱ νομοθεταί, μηδενὸς πρότερον παραδόντος, ἦλθον εἰς ἐπίνοιαν θεοῦ : The Atheists affirming, that certain law-makers first put this notion of a God into the minds of men, do not consider, that they still remain entangled in the difficulty, if any one further demands of them, how those law-makers themselves could first form that idea?—From whence it is afterwards concluded,^a *οὐ τοίνυν θέσει, οὐδὲ κατὰ τινα νομοθεσίαν, παρεδέξαντο οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι Θεόν ;* that therefore the notion of a God sprung not from the arbitratious fiction of law-makers and politicians.

But some Atheists will yet further reply, that there is a feigning power in the human soul, whereby it can frame ideas or conceptions of such things, as actually never were nor will be, as of a centaur, or of a golden mountain; and that by such a feigning power as this, the idea of God, though there be no such thing existing, might be framed. And here we deny not but that the human soul hath a power of compounding ideas and things together, which exist severally, and apart in nature, but never were, nor will be, in that conjunction: and this indeed is all the feigning power that it hath. For the mind cannot make any new cogitation, which was not before, but only compound that which is. As the painter cannot feign colours, but must use such as exist in nature; only he can variously

^a Ibid. p. 557.

compound them together, and by his pencil draw the figures and lineaments of such things as no where are; as he can add to the head and face of a man the neck, shoulders, and body, of a horse. In like manner, that more subtile painter or limner, the mind and imagination of man, can frame compounded ideas of things, which no where exist, but yet his simple colours, notwithstanding, must be real; he cannot feign any cogitation which was not in nature, nor make a positive conception of that which is absolutely nothing; which were no less than to make nothing to be something, or create something out of nothing. And though the whole of these fictitious ideas (as of a golden mountain) does not any where actually exist, yet forasmuch as it doth not absolutely imply a contradiction for it so to do, therefore hath it also a possible entity too, and otherwise it could not be conceivable. As a triangular square, for example, being a contradictory thing, hath not so much as a possible entity, and therefore is not conceivable as such (though both a triangle and a square severally be conceivable); it being mere nonsense, nothing, and no idea at all. Nay, we conceive, that a Theist may presume with reverence to say, that God Almighty himself, though he can create more or fewer really existent things, as he pleaseth, and could make a whole world out of nothing, yet can he not make more cogitation or conception, than is, or was before contained in his own infinite mind and eternal wisdom, nor have a positive idea of any thing, which hath neither actual nor possible entity.

But the idea of God is not a complement or aggregation of things; which exists scatteredly

and apart in the world; for then would it be a mere arbitrary thing, and it might be what every one pleased, one adding more things together, and another fewer, but each of them writing the name or title of God, as bungling painters did under these their several figures: whereas we have already proved, that the idea of God is one most simple idea of an absolutely perfect being, though having several partial and inadequate conceptions, so that nothing can be added to it, nor detracted from it, there being nothing included therein but what is demonstrable of a perfect being, and therefore nothing at all arbitrary.

Moreover, many of those partial conceptions contained in the entire idea of God are no where else to be found in the whole world, existing singly and apart; and therefore, if there be no God, they must needs be absolute nonentities; as immutability, necessary existence, infinity, and perfection, &c. So that the painter, that makes this idea, must here feign colours themselves, or create new cogitation and conception out of nothing, upon the atheistic supposition.

Lastly, if there be no God now existing, it is impossible that ever there should be any, and so the whole idea of God would be the idea of that, which hath no possible entity neither; whereas those other fictitious ideas, made by the mind of men, though they be of such things as have no actual existence, yet have they all a possible entity, as was said before.

But that we may conceal nothing of the Atheists' strength, we must here acknowledge, that some of them have yet pretended further, that besides this

power of compounding things together, the human soul hath also another ampliating, or increasing and improving power ; by both which together, though there be no God existing, nor yet possible, the idea of him may be fictitiously made; those partial ideas, which are no where else to be found, arising, as they say, from a *μετάβασις ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, a transition and gradual procession, from men, in way of amplification, augmentation, and improvement.—Thus do we read in Sextus :

Τὸ αἰδίον εἶναι τὸν Θεόν, καὶ ἀφθαρτον, καὶ τέλειον
 ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, παρῆλθε κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώ-
 πων μετάβασιν· ὡς γὰρ τὸν κοινὸν ἄνθρωπον
 αὐξήσαντες τῇ φαντασίᾳ, νόησιν ἔχομεν Κύκλω-
 πος, οὕτως ἄνθρωπον εὐδαίμονα νοήσαντες καὶ
 μακάριον καὶ συμπεπληρωμένον πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, εἶτα
 ταῦτα ἐπιτείναντες, τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις ἄκρον ἐνοήσαμεν
 Θεόν· καὶ πάλιν πολυχρόνιον τινα φαντασιωθέντες ἄνθρωπον
 οἱ παλαιοὶ, ἐπηύξησαν τὸν Χρόνον εἰς ἄπειρον, εἶτα ἐντεῦθεν
 εἰς ἔννοιαν αἰδίου παραγεγόμενοι, ἔφασαν καὶ αἰδίον εἶναι
 τὸν Θεόν. The ideas of the eternity, incorruptibility, and perfect happiness, of the Deity, were fictitiously made by way of transition from men ; for as, by increasing a man of an ordinary stature in our imagination, we fictitiously make the phantasm of a Cyclops ; so when beholding a happy man, that aboundeth with all good things, we amplify, intend, and, as it were, swell the same in our minds higher and higher, we then arrive at length to the idea of a being absolutely happy, that is, a God. So did the ancients, taking notice of a very longeve man, and increasing this length of age further and further infinitely, by that means frame the notion or idea of eternity, and attribute the same to God.

Adv. Math.
 p. 317. [lib.
 viii. seu adv.
 Physic. lib. i.
 sect. 2.
 §. 46. p. 559,
 560.]

But to this we reply, first, that, according to the principles of the Atheists themselves, there could not possibly be any such amplifying and feigning power of the soul, as whereby it could make more than is; because they suppose it to have no active power at all, but all our conceptions to be nothing but mere passions from the objects without; according to that of Protagoras

in Plato's *Theætetus*; Οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα
P. 167. Serr. δυνατόν δοξάζσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ' ἃ ἂν πάσχη·

It is neither possible for a man to conceive that which is not; nor any more or otherwise, than he suffers.—Again, as Sextus^a the philosopher also intimates, the Atheists are here plainly guilty of that fallacy or error in ratiocination, which is commonly called a circle, or *δι' ἀλλήλων*. For whereas they could not otherwise judge the greatest perfection and happiness, which ever they had experience of in men, to be imperfect, than by an anticipated idea of perfection and happiness, with which it was in their minds compared (by virtue of which idea also it comes to pass, that they are able to amplify those lesser perfections of men further and further, and can take occasion, from imperfect things, to think of that which is absolutely perfect): that is, whereas these Atheists themselves first make the idea of imperfection from perfection; they, not attending to this, do again go about to make up the notion or idea of that which is absolutely perfect (by way of amplification) from that which is imperfect. But that men have a notion of absolute perfection in them, by which, as the rule or measure, they

^a Vide lib. viii. adv. *Mathemat.* sect. 2. §. 47. p. 560.

(comparing other things therewith) judge them to be imperfect, and which is therefore in order of nature first, may appear from hence, because all theologers, as well Pagan as Christian, give this direction, for the conceiving of God, that it should principally be done “per viam remoti-
onis,” by way of remotion of all imperfection from him.—Thus Alcinoüs :^a Πρώτη μὲν αὐτοῦ νόησις ἢ κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν. The first way of conceiving of God is by remotion or abstraction.—We add, in the last place, that finite things put together can never make up infinite, as may appear from that instance of human longevity proposed; for, if one should amplify that never so much, by adding of more and more past time or years to it, yet would he never thereby be able to arrive at eternity without beginning. God differs not from these imperfect created things in degrees only, but in the whole kind. And though infinite space may perhaps be here objected, as a thing taken for granted, which being nothing but extension or magnitude, must therefore consist, or be made up, of finite parts, as it was before declared, we have no certainty of any more than this, that the finite world might have been made bigger and bigger infinitely, or without end; which infinity of magnitude is but like that of number, potential; from whence it may be inferred as well of the one as the other, that it can never be actually infinite. Wherefore, were there no infinitely-perfect being in nature, the idea thereof could never be made up by any amplifying power of the soul, or by the addition of finites. Neither is that of any mo-

^a Introduct. in Doctrin. Platon. cap. x. p. 602. printed at the end of Dan. Heinsius's edit. of Maximus Tyrius.

ment which Gassendus, so much objecteth here to the contrary, that though there were no God, or infinite being, yet might the idea of him as well be feigned by the mind, as that of infinite worlds, or of infinite matter, was by some philosophers : for infinite worlds, and infinite matter, are but words ill put together, infinity being a real thing in nature (and no fiction of the mind), as well as the world or matter, but yet proper to the Deity only. But it is no wonder, if they, who denied a God, yet retaining this notion of infinity, should misapply the same, as they did also other properties of the Deity, to matter.

To conclude this ; our human soul cannot feign or create any new cogitation, or conception, that was not before, but only variously compound that which is ; nor can it ever make a positive idea of an absolute nonentity, that is, such as hath neither actual nor possible existence : much less could our imperfect beings create the entity of so vast a thought, as that of an infinitely-perfect being, out of nothing ; this being indeed more than for God Almighty, or a perfect being, to create a real world out of nothing ; because there is no repugnancy at all in the latter, as there is in the former. We affirm therefore, that were there no God, the idea of an absolutely or infinitely perfect being could never have been made or feigned, neither by politicians, nor by poets, nor philosophers, nor any other. Which may be accounted another argument for a Deity.

But that religion is no figment of politicians,

* In *Disquisit. Metaphys. seu dubitationibus et instantiis ad Cartesii Metaphys. dubit. iv. p. 336. tom. iii. oper.*

will further unquestionably appear from that, which now shall follow. As the religion of an oath is a necessary vinculum of civil society; so obligation in conscience, respecting the Deity as its original, and as the punisher of the violation thereof, is the very foundation of all civil sovereignty: for pacts and covenants (into which some would resolve all civil power), without this obligation in conscience, are nothing but mere words and breath; and the laws and commands of civil sovereigns do not make obligation, but presuppose it, as a thing in order of nature before them, and without which they would be invalid. Which is a truth so evident, that the writer *De Cive* could not dissemble it (though he did not rightly understand this natural obligation), but acknowledgeth it in these words; “*Obligatio ad obedientiam civilem, cujus vi leges civiles validæ sunt, omni lege civili prior est.*—*Quod si quis princeps summus legem civilem in hanc formulam conciperet, Non rebellabis, nihil efficeret. Nam nisi prius obligentur cives ad obediendum, hoc est, ad non rebellandum, omnis lex invalida est; et si prius obligentur est superflua.*” The obligation to civil obedience, by the force of which all the civil laws become valid, is before those civil laws. And if any prince should make a law to this purpose, That no man should rebel against him, this would signify nothing, because unless they, to whom it is made, were before obliged to obey, or not to rebel, the law is invalid; and if they were, then is it superfluous.—Now this previous obligation to civil obedience cannot be derived (as the fore-mentioned writer *De Cive*, and of the *Leviathan*

*Imper. c. xiv.
sect. 21.
[p. 109.]*

supposes) from men's private utility only ; because every man being judge of this for himself, it would then be lawful for any subject to rebel against his sovereign prince, and to poison or stab him, whensoever he could reasonably persuade himself, that it would tend to his own advantage, or that he should thereby procure the sovereignty. Were the obligation to civil obedience made only by men's private utility, it would as easily be dissolved by the same. It remaineth therefore, that conscience, and religious obligation to duty, is the only basis, and essential foundation, of a polity or commonwealth ; without which there could be no right or authority of commanding in any sovereign, nor validity in any laws. Wherefore religious obligation cannot be thought to be the fiction or imposture of civil sovereigns, unless civil sovereignty itself be accounted a fiction and imposture, or a thing which hath no foundation in nature, but is either wholly artificial or violent.

Moreover, had a religious regard to the Deity been a mere figment or invention of politicians, to promote their own ends, and keep men in obedience and subjection under them, then would they doubtless have so framed and contrived it, as that it should have been every way flexible and compliant ; namely, by persuading the world, that whatsoever was commanded by themselves, was agreeable to the Divine will, and whatever was forbidden by their laws, was displeasing to God Almighty, and would be punished by him ; God ruling over the world no otherwise than by and in these civil sovereigns, as his vicegerents, and as the only prophets and interpreters of his will to

men. So that the civil law of every country, and the arbitrary will of sovereigns, should be acknowledged to be the only measure of just and unjust (there being nothing naturally such), the only rule of conscience and religion: for, from religion thus modelled, civil sovereigns might think to have an absolute power, or an infinite right of doing or commanding whatsoever they pleased, without exception, nothing being unlawful to them, and their subjects being always obliged, in conscience, without the least scruple, to obey.

But this is but a mere *larva* of religion, and would be but a mocking of God Almighty; and indeed this is the only religion that can be called a political figment. Neither could the generality of mankind be ever yet thus persuaded, that the arbitrary will of civil sovereigns was the only rule of justice and conscience; and that God Almighty could command nothing, nor reveal his will concerning religion to mankind otherwise than by these, as his prophets and interpreters. True religion and conscience are no such waxen things, servilely addicted to the arbitrary wills of men, but immorigerous, stiff, and inflexible; they respecting the Deity only, his eternal or everlasting laws, and his revealed will; with which whensoever human laws clash (a thing not impossible) they conclude, that then God ought to be obeyed and not men. For which cause the profane politicians declare open war against this religion, as a thing utterly inconsistent with civil sovereignty because it introduces a fear greater than the fear of the Leviathan, namely, that of him, who can

inflict eternal punishments after death ; as also because it clashes with that monstrous, infinite, and unlimited power of theirs, which is such a thing, as is not attributed by genuine Theists to God Almighty himself ; a power of making their mere arbitrary will the rule of justice, and not justice the rule of their will. Thus does a modern writer of politics condemn it for seditious doctrine, tending to the dissolution of a commonwealth ; That subjects may make a judgment of good and evil, just and unjust ; or have any other conscience besides the law of the land. As also this, That subjects may sin in obeying the commands of their sovereign. He likewise adds, That it is impossible a commonwealth should stand, where any other than the sovereign hath a power of giving greater rewards than life, and of inflicting greater punishments than death. Now, eternal life is a greater reward than the life present, and eternal torment than the death of nature. Wherefore, God Almighty being the dispenser of eternal rewards and punishments, this is all one as if he should have said, It is impossible a commonwealth should stand, where the belief of a God, who can punish with eternal torments after this life, is entertained. Thus does the same writer declare, That if the superstitious fear of spirits (whereof God is the chief), and things depending thereupon, were taken away, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience : and that they, who assert the immortality of souls, or their capability of receiving punishments after death,

Lev. p. 168.

De Civ. c. xii.
sect. 2.
[p. 83.]

Lev.
c. xxxviii.
p. 238.

Lev. p. 8.

fright men from obeying the laws of their country, with empty names, as men fright birds from the corn, with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick. Pag. 373. And accordingly he concludes, that civil sovereigns do not only make justice, but religion also; and that no Scripture or Divine revelation can oblige, unless it be first made law, or stamped with their authority. Now, since that which can make religion and gods must itself needs be greater than all gods, it follows, according to the tenor of this doctrine, that the civil sovereign is in reality the supreme Numen; or else at least, that the Leviathan (the king over all the children of pride) is the highest deity next to senseless omnipotent matter; the one of these being the Atheists' natural, the other their artificial god. Nevertheless we shall here observe by the way, that whilst these atheistic politicians thus endeavour to swell up the civil sovereign, and to bestow upon him an infinite right, by removing to that end out of his way natural justice, conscience, religion, and God himself, they do indeed thereby absolutely divest him of all right and authority, since the subject is now no longer obliged in conscience to obey him: and so instead of true right and authority, they leave him nothing but mere brutish force. Wherefore, since Theism and true religion are thus plainly disowned and disclaimed by these politicians, as altogether inconsistent with their designs, they cannot be supposed to have been the figments of civil sovereigns, or the mere creatures of political art. And thus have we abundantly confuted those three atheistic pretences, to solve the phenomenon of religion; from fear,

and the ignorance of causes, and the fiction of politicians.

But since, besides those ordinary phenomena beforementioned, which are no way solvable by Atheists, there are certain other phenomena extraordinary, that either immediately prove a God and Providence, or else that there is a rank of understanding beings, invisible, superior to men, from whence a Deity may be afterwards inferred ; namely, these three especially, apparitions, miracles, and prophecies (where the Atheists obstinately denying matter of fact and history, will needs impute these things, either to juggling fraud and knavery ; or else to men's own fear and fancy, and their ignorance how to distinguish dreams, and other strong imaginations, from vision and sense ; or lastly, to certain religious tales or legends, allowed by the public authority of civil sovereigns, for political ends) : we shall here suggest something briefly, to vindicate the historic truth of those phenomena against Atheists.

First, therefore, as for apparitions, though there be much of fabulosity in these relations, yet can it not reasonably be concluded, that there is nothing at all of truth in them ; since something of this kind hath been averred in all ages, and many times attested by persons of unquestionable prudence, and unsuspected veracity. And whereas the Atheists impute the original of these things to men's mistaking both their dreams, and their waking fancies, for real visions and sensations ; they do hereby plainly contradict one main fundamental principle of their own philosophy, that sense is the only ground of certainty, and the criterion of all truth : for if prudent and intelli-

gent persons may be so frequently mistaken, in confounding their own dreams and fancies with sensations, how can there be any certainty of knowledge at all from sense? However, they here derogate so much both from sense, and from human testimonies, as that if the like were done in other cases, it would plainly overthrow all human life.

Wherefore other Atheists, being apprehensive of this inconvenience, of denying so many sensible appearances, and testimonies, or relations of fact, have chose rather to acknowledge the reality of apparitions; nevertheless concluding them to be things caused and created, by the power of imagination only: as if the strength of imagination were such, that it could not only create fancies, but also real sensible objects, and that at a distance too from the imaginers, such as whereby the sense of others shall be for the time affected, though they quickly vanish away again. From which prodigious paradox, we may take notice of the fanaticism of some Atheists, and that there is nothing so monstrously absurd, which men infected with atheistic incredulity will not rather entertain into their belief, than admit of any thing that shall the least hazard or endanger the existence of a God. For, if there be once any invisible ghosts or spirits acknowledged as things permanent, it will not be easy for any to give a reason, why there might not be one supreme ghost also, presiding over them all and the whole world.

In the last place therefore we shall observe, that Democritus was yet further convinced by these relations of apparitions, so as to grant, that there

was a certain kind of permanent beings, and independent upon the imagination, superior to men, which could appear in different forms, and again disappear at pleasure, called by him idols, or images ; he supposing them to be of the same nature with those exuvius effluxes, that stream continually from the surface of bodies: only he would not allow them to have any thing immortal at all in them, but their concretions to be at length all dissolvable, and their personalities then to vanish into nothing. Thus Sextus the philosopher :

Adv. Math. Δημόκριτος εἰδωλά τινά φησιν ἐκπελάζειν τοῖς
p. 311. [lib. ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθοποιά,
viii. §. 19. π. 552.] τὰ δὲ κακοποιά· ἔνθεν καὶ εὐχεται εὐλόγων τυχεῖν

εἰδώλων· εἶναι δὲ ταῦτα μεγάλα τε καὶ ὑπερμεγέθη, καὶ δύσφθαρτα μὲν, οὐκ ἄφθαρτα δὲ, προσημαίνειν τε τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, θεωρούμενα καὶ φωνὰς ἀφιέντα. Democritus affirmeth, that there are certain idols or spectres, that do often approach to men, some of which are beneficent, and some maleficent. Upon which account he wisheth, that it might be his good hap to meet with fortunate idols. And he addeth, that these are of a vast bigness, and very longeve, but not incorruptible ; and that they sometimes do foreshow unto men future events, both visibly appearing to them, and sending forth audible voices.—Now, though Democritus were much blamed for this concession of his by his fellow Atheists, as giving thereby too great an advantage to Theists : yet, in his own opinion, did he sufficiently secure himself against the danger of a God from hence, by supposing all these idols of his to be corruptible, they being indeed nothing but certain finer concretions of atoms, a kind of aërial and ethereal animals, that were all body,

and without any immortal soul, as he supposed men also to be : so that a God could be no more proved from them, than from the existence of men. For thus he adds in Sextus: "Ὅθεν τούτων αὐτῶν φαντασίαν λαβόντες οἱ παλαιοὶ, ὑπενόησαν εἶναι Θεόν, μηδενὸς ἄλλου παρὰ ταῦτα ὄντος Θεοῦ, τοῦ ἀφθαρτον φύσιν ἔχοντος." Men, in ancient times, having a sense of these apparitions or idols, fell from thence into the opinion of a God, although there be, besides these idols, no other God, that hath an incorruptible nature.—However, though Democritus continued thus grossly atheistical, yet was he further convinced than our modern Atheists will be, that the stories of apparitions were not all fabulous, and that there are not only terrestrial, but also aërial and ethereal animals ; nor this earth of ours alone peopled and inhabited, whilst all those other vast regions above lie desert, solitary, and waste. Where it may be observed again, that divers of the ancient fathers, though they agreed not so far with Democritus, as to make the angelical beings to be altogether corporeal, yet did they likewise suppose them to have their certain subtile ethereal or aërial bodies. In which respect St. Austin, in his 115th epistle,^a calleth angels *æthereos*, and devils, *aëreos animantes*. Thus Psellus in his Dialogue : Περὶ ἐνεργείας δαιμόνων· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀσώματος, ὧ γένναίε, τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐστὶ φύλον, μετὰ σώματος δέ γε, καὶ ἀμφὶ σώματος διατέτυφε· Καὶ τοῦτό ἐστὶ μὲν καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν μαθεῖν τῶν σεμνῶν πατέρων· Καὶ Βασίλειος δὴ ὁ θεῖος, οὐ δαίμοσι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἀχράντοις ἀγγέλοις, ἐνεῖναι σώματα διατίενται, οἷά τινα πνεύματα λεπτὰ καὶ ἀερώδη καὶ ἄχραντα, καὶ ἐξῆς. But you are to know, that demons or devils are not

^a Epist. ix. ad Nebridium, p. 9. tom. ii. oper. edit. Benedict.

altogether incorporeal, but that they are joined to bodies, and so converse with bodies; which may be learned also from the fathers, the divine Basil contending, that there are bodies, not only in devils, but also in the pure angels themselves, as certain subtle, airy, defecate spirits. Where afterwards he shews, how the *συμφυνὲς ἀγγέλοις σῶμα*, that body which is connate with angels,—differs from that which devils are united to, in respect of the radiant splendour of the one, and the dark fuliginous obscurity of the other. Moreover, that devils are not without bodies, he endeavours further to confirm from the words of our Saviour, that they shall be punished with fire; which (saith he) were a thing impossible, were they all of them incorporeal. And some perhaps will attempt to prove the same concerning angels too, from those other words of our Saviour, where, speaking of the resurrection state, he affirmeth, that they, who shall be accounted worthy thereof, shall neither marry nor be given in marriage, but be *ἰσάγγελοι*,^a equal to the angels:—which comparative expression of men, as to their bodies with angels, would be thought not so proper, were the angels absolutely devoid of all body. But of this we determine not.

To this phenomenon of apparitions might be added those two others of magicians or wizards, demoniacs or *energumeni*; both of these proving also the real existence of spirits, and that they are not mere fancies, and imaginary inhabitants of men's brains only, but real inhabitants of the world. As also, that among those spirits there are some foul, unclean, and wicked ones (though not made such by God, but by their own apostacy), which is

^a Luke xx. 34. 36.

some confirmation of the truth of Christianity, the Scripture insisting so much upon these evil demons or devils, and declaring it to be one design of our Saviour Christ's coming into the world, to oppose these confederate powers of the kingdom of darkness, and to rescue mankind from the thralldom and bondage thereof. As for wizards and magicians, persons who associate and confederate themselves in a peculiar manner with these evil spirits, for the gratification of their own revenge, lust, ambition, and other passions; besides the Scriptures, there hath been so full an attestation given to them by persons unconcerned in all ages, that those our so-confident exploders of them, in this present age, can hardly escape the suspicion of having some hankering towards Atheism. But as for the demoniacs and *energumeni*, it hath been wondered, that there should be so many of them in our Saviour's time, and hardly any, or none, in this present age of ours. Certain it is, from the writings of Josephus, in sundry places, that the pharisaic Jews were then generally possessed with an opinion of these *δαμονιζόμενοι*, demoniacs, men possessed with devils, or infested by them. And that this was not a mere phrase or form of speech only amongst them for persons very ill affected in their bodies, may appear from hence, that Josephus^a declares it as his opinion concerning the demons or devils, that they were *πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων πνεύματα τοῖς ζῶσιν εἰσδύμενα*, the spirits or souls of wicked men deceased getting into the bodies of the living. From hence it was, that the Jews, in our Saviour's time, were

^a De Bello Judaico, lib. vii. cap. vi. § 3. p. 417. tom. ii. edit. Havercampii.

not at all surprised with his casting out of devils, it being usual for them also to exercise the same; an art which they pretended to have learned from

Solomon. Of whom thus Josephus: Πα-
Ant. Jud. lib. viii. c. ii. [p.] ρέσχε δ' αὐτῷ μαθεῖν ὁ θεός, καὶ τὴν κατὰ τῶν
419, 420.] δαιμόνων τέχνην, εἰς ὠφέλειαν καὶ θεραπείαν τοῖς

ἀνθρώποις· ἐπώδαστέ συντάξαμενος αἷς παρηγορεῖται τὰ νοσήματα, καὶ τρόπους ἐξορκώσεων κατέλειπεν, οἷς ἐνδούμενα, τὰ δαιμόνια ὡς μηκέτ' ἐπανελθεῖν, ἐκδιώκουσι. Καὶ αὕτη μέχρι νῦν ἡ θεραπεία πλεῖστον ἰσχύει. God also taught Solomon an art against demons and devils, for the benefit and cure of men; who composed certain incantations, by which diseases are cured, and left forms of exorcisms, whereby devils are expelled and driven away. Which method of curing prevails much amongst us at this very day.—Notwithstanding which, we think it not at all probable what a late atheistic writer^a hath asserted, that the heads of the Jews were then all of them so full of demons and devils, that they generally took all manner of bodily diseases, such as fevers and agues, and dumbness and deafness, for devils. Though we grant, that this very thing was imputed by Plotinus afterward to the Gnostics, that they supposed all diseases to be devils, and therefore not to be cured by physic, but expelled by words or charms. Thus he, En. ii. lib. ix. c. xiv.^b Νῦν δὲ ὑποστησάμενοι τὰς νόσους δαιμόνια εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα ἐξαιρεῖν λόγῳ φάσκοντες δύνασθαι, καὶ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι, σεμνότεροι μὲν ἂν εἶναι δόξαιεν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἱ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς μάγοις δυνάμεις θαυμάζουσι, τοὺς μὲντοι εὐφρονοῦντας οὐκ ἂν πείθοιεν, ὡς οὐκ αἱ νόσοι τὰς αἰτίας ἔχουσι, ἢ πλησμοναῖς, ἢ ἐνδείαις, &c. δηλοῦσι δὲ καὶ αἱ θεραπείαι αὐτῶν, γαστρος γὰρ ρύσις ἢ φαρμάκου δοθέντος, διεχώρησε κάτω τὸ νόσημα· καὶ

^a Hobbes. See Leviathan, cap. xl.

^b P. 212. oper.

αἵματος ἀφηρημένου καὶ ἐνδεία δὴ ἰάσατο ἢ πεινήσαντος τοῦ δαμονίου, καὶ τοῦ φαρμάκου ποιήσαντος τήκεσθαι. Now when they affirm diseases to be demons or devils, and pretend, that they can expel them by words, undertaking to do the same, they hereby indeed render themselves considerable to the vulgar, who are wont not a little to admire the powers of magicians. But they will not be able to persuade wise men, that diseases have no natural causes, as from repletion, or imitation, or putrefaction, or the like; which is a thing manifest from their cure, they being oftentimes removed by purgation, and bleeding, and abstinence; unless perhaps these men will say, that the devil is by this means starved, and made to pine away.—Nor can we think, that the Jews, in our Saviour's time, either suppose all madmen to be demoniacs, or all demoniacs madmen (though this letter seems to be asserted by an eminent writer of our own), we reading of devils cast out from others besides madmen; and of a woman, which had a spirit of infirmity only, and was bowed together, and could not lift up herself, which is said by our Saviour Christ to have been bowed by Satan. Wherefore the sense of the Jews formerly seems to have been this, that when there was any unusual and extraordinary symptoms in any bodily distemper, but especially that of madness, this being looked upon as something more than natural, was imputed by them to the possession or infestation of some devil. Neither was this proper to the Jews only at that time, to suppose evil demons to be the causes of such bodily diseases as had extraordinary symptoms, and especially madness; but the Greeks, and other gentiles also, were imbued with the same persuasion;

as appeareth from Apollonius Tynæus's curing a laughing demoniac^a at Athens, he ejecting that evil spirit by threats and menaces, who is said, at his departure, to have tumbled down a royal porch in the city with great noise ; as also,^b from his freeing the city of Ephesus from the plague, by stoning an old ragged beggar, said by Apollonius to have been the plague, which appeared to be a demon, by his changing himself into the form of a shagged dog.

But that there is some truth in this opinion, and that at this very day evil spirits, or demons, do sometimes really act upon the bodies of men, and either inflict or augment bodily distempers and diseases, hath been the judgment of two very experienced physicians, Sennertus and Fernelius. The former in his book *De Mania*, lib. i. cap. xv. writing thus ; “ *Etsi sine ulla corporis morbosa dispositione, Deo permittente, hominem obsidere et occupare dæmon possit, tamen quandoque morbis, et præcipue melancholicis, sese immiscet dæmon ; et forsan frequentius hoc accidit, quam sæpe creditur.*” Although the devil may, by Divine permission, possess men without any morbid disposition, yet doth he usually intermingle himself with bodily diseases, and especially those of melancholy ; and perhaps this cometh to pass oftener than is commonly believed or suspected.—The other in his *De abditis Rerum Causis*, where, having attributed real effects upon the bodies of men to witchcraft and enchantment, he addeth, “ *Neque solum morbos, verum etiam dæmonas, scelerati homines in corpora immittunt. Hi qui-*

^a Vide Philostrat. de Vita Apollonii Tyanæi, lib. x. cap. xx. p. 157.

^b Id ibid. lib. iv. cap. x. p. 147.

dem visuntur furoris quadam specie distorti ; hoc uno tamen a simplici furore distant, quod summe ardua obloquantur, præterita et occulta renuntiant, assidentiumque arcana reserent." Neither do these wicked magicians only inflict diseases upon men's bodies, but also send devils into them; by means whereof they appear distorted with a kind of fury and madness, which yet differs from a simple madness (or the disease so called) in this, that they speak of very high and difficult matters, declare things past and unknown, and discover the secrets of those that sit by.—Of which he subjoins two notable instances of persons, well known to himself, that were plainly demoniacal, possessed or acted by an evil demon ; one whereof shall be afterwards mentioned. But when maniacal persons do not only discover secrets, and declare things past, but future also, and, besides this, speak in languages which they had never learned ; this puts it out of all doubt and question, that they are not mere madmen, or *maniaci*, but demoniacs or *energumeni*. And that since the time of our Saviour Christ there have been often such, may be made evident from the records of credible writers. Psellus in his book *Περὶ Ἐνεργείας Δαιμόνων*, *De Operat. Dæm.* avers it of a certain maniacal woman, that though she knew nothing but her own mother-tongue, yet, when a stranger, who was an Armenian, was brought into the room to her, she spake to him presently in the Armenian language: Ἡμεῖς δὲ τεθηπότες ἦμεν, ὅτι κατ' Ἀρμενίων ἐφθέγγετο, γυνὴ μηδέποτε μηδ' εἰς ὄψιν ἀφιγμένη τούτοις, μηδὲ κερκίδος εἰδυῖα πλέον οὐδέν. We all stood amazed when we heard a woman, that had never seen an Armenian

before in all her life, nor had learnt any thing but the use of her distaff, to speak the Armenian language readily.—Where the relater also affirmeth the same maniacal person to have foretold certain future events, which happened shortly after to him-

self: *Σὺ δὲ, στραφεῖς πρὸς ἐμὲ, μεγάλων ἐν χοῦ*
 P. 65. [p. 99.] *συμφορῶν ὑποστήση· χολᾶ γάρ σοι δεινῶς τὰ δαι-*

μόνια παραλύοντι τὰς αὐτῶν λατρείας· ἀμέλει τοι καὶ χαλε-
ποὺς ἐπιρράψουσι καὶ βαρεῖς κινδύνους, οὓς οὐκ ἂν διαφεύ-
ξασθαι δυνήθεις, εἰ μήτις δύναμις κρείττων, ἢ κατὰ δαίμονας,
ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐξέλῃ· Then looking upon me, she (or rather the demon) said, Thou shalt suffer wonderful pains and torments in thy body, for the demons are extremely angry with thee for opposing their services and worship; and they will inflict great evils upon thee, out of which thou shalt not be able to escape, unless a power, greater than that of demons, exempt thee from them. All which things (saith he) happened shortly after to me, and I was brought very low, even near to death, by them; but was by my Saviour wonderfully delivered.—Whereupon Psellus concludes,

Τίς οὖν ἐκείνον τὸν χρησμὸν ἑωρακῶς, ἐρεῖ τὰς μανίας πάσας,
ὑλης πλημμελοῦς κινήσεις, ἀλλὰ πάθη τραγικὰ δαιμόνων·
 Who is there therefore that, considering this oracle or prediction, will conclude (as some physicians do) all kind of madnesses to be nothing but the exorbitant motions of the matter or humours, and not the tragic passions of the demons.—But because this instance is remoter from our present times, we shall set down another remarkable one of a later date, out of the forementioned Ferneilius, who was an eye-witness thereof. A young man of a noble family, who was strangely convulsed in his body, having sometimes one member,

and sometimes another, violently agitated, inso-much that four several persons were scarcely able to hold them ; and this at first without any distemper at all in his head, or crazedness in brain. To whom Fernelius, with other skilful physicians, being called, applied all manner of remedies ; blisters, purgations, cupping-glasses, fomentations, unctions, plasters, and strengthening medicines ; but all in vain. The reason whereof is thus given by the same Fernelius : “ Quoniam omnes longe aberamus a cognitione veri, nam mense tertio primum deprehensus dæmon quidam totius mali author, voce, insuetisque verbis ac sententiis tum Latinis tum Græcis (quanquam ignarus linguæ Græcæ laborans esset), se prodens ; is multa assidentium maximaque medicorum secreta detegebat, ridens, quod irritis pharmacis corpus hoc pene jugulassent.” Because we were all far from the knowledge of the truth ; for in the third month, it was first plainly discovered to us, that it was a certain demon who was the author of all this mischief ; he manifesting himself by his speech, and by unusual words and sentences, both in Greek and Latin (though the patient were altogether ignorant of Greek tongue) : and by his revealing many of the secrets of those who stood by, especially of the physicians, whom also he derided for tormenting the patient in that manner with their frustraneous remedies.—Here therefore have we an unquestionable instance of a demoniac in these latter times of ours, and such an one, who at first, for two months together, had no manner of madness or mania at all upon him, though afterward the demon possessing his whole body, used his tongue, and spake therewith.

Fernelius concludes his whole discourse in this manner : “ These things do I produce, to make it manifest, that evil demons (or devils) do sometimes enter into the very bodies of men, afflicting and tormenting them after an unheard-of manner ; but that at other times, though they do not enter into and possess their whole body, yet partly by exagitating and disturbing the profitable humours thereof, partly by traducing the noxious into the principal parts, or else by obstructing the veins and other passages with them, or disordering the structure of the members, they cause innumerable diseases.” There are many other instances of this kind; recorded by modern writers unexceptionable, of persons either wholly demoniacal, and possessed by evil demons (this appearing from their discovering secrets, and speaking languages which they had never learnt), or else otherwise so affected and infested by them, as to have certain unusual and supernatural symptoms ; which, for brevity’s sake, we shall here omit. However, we thought it necessary thus much to insist upon this argument of demoniacs, as well for the vindication of Christianity, as for the conviction of Atheists ; we finding some so staggering in their religion, that from this one thing alone of demoniacs (they being so strongly possessed, that there neither is nor ever was any such) they are ready enough to suspect the whole gospel, or New Testament itself, of fabulosity and imposture.

We come now to the second head proposed, of miracles and effects supernatural. That there hath been something miraculous or above nature, sometimes done even among the Pagans (whether

by good or evil spirits), appears not only from their own records, but also from the Scripture itself. And it is well known, that they pretended (besides oracles) to miracles also, even after the times of Christianity; and that not only in Apollonius Tyanæus, and Apuleius, but also in the Roman emperors themselves, as Vespasian and Adrian, but especially in the temple of Æsculapius; thus much appearing from that Greek table therein hung up at Rome,^a in which amongst other things this is recorded; "that a blind man being commanded by the oracle to kneel before the altar, and then passing from the right side thereof to the left, to lay five fingers upon the altar, and afterwards lifting up his hand, to touch his eyes therewith; all this being done accordingly, he recovered his sight, the people all applauding, that great miracles were done under the Emperor Antoninus," &c. But we have in the Scripture an account of miracles, both greater in number, and of a higher nature; done especially by Moses, and our Saviour Christ and his apostles.

Wherefore it seems, that there are two sorts of miracles or effects supernatural. First, such as though they could not be done by any ordinary and natural causes here amongst us, and in that respect may be called supernatural; yet might notwithstanding be done, God permitting only, by the ordinary and natural power of other invisible created spirits, angels or demons. As for example, if a stone or other heavy body should ascend upwards, and then hang in the air, without any visible either mover or supporter, this would be to us a miracle or effect supernatural;

^a Vide Gruteri Inscription. tom. i. p. lxxi.

and yet according to vulgar opinion, might this be done by the natural power of created invisible beings, angels or demons ; God only permitting, without whose special providence it is conceived they cannot thus intermeddle with our human affairs. Again, if a perfectly illiterate person should readily speak Greek or Latin, this also would be to us a miracle, or effect supernatural ; for so is the apostles speaking with tongues accounted ; and yet in demoniacs is this sometimes done by evil demons, God only permitting. Such also amongst the Pagans was that “*miraculum cotis*” (as Apuleius calls it), that miracle of the whetstone, done by Accius Navius, when, at his command, it was divided into two with a razor.^a But, secondly, there is another sort of miracles, or effects supernatural, such as are above the power of all second causes, or any natural created being whatsoever, and so can be attributed to none but God Almighty himself, the author of nature, who therefore can control it at pleasure.

As for that late theological politician, who, writing against miracles, denies as well those of the former as of this latter kind, contending that a miracle is nothing but a name, which the ignorant vulgar gives to “*opus naturæ insolitum*,” any unwonted work of nature, or to what themselves can assign no cause of ;—as also, that if there were any such thing done contrary to nature, or above it, it would rather weaken than confirm our belief of the Divine existence ;, we find his discourse every way so weak, groundless, and inconsiderable, that we could not think it here to deserve a confutation.

^a Vide Livium, lib. i. cap. xxxvi. p. 67.

^b Vide Spinosæ Tractat. Theologico-politic. cap. vi.

But of the former sort of those miracles, is that to be understood, Deut. xiii. "If there arise amongst you a prophet, or dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, and the sign or wonder come to pass whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, and serve them; thou shalt not hearken to the words of that prophet, or dreamer of dreams; for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul." For it cannot be supposed, that God Almighty would himself purposely inspire any man to exhort others to idolatry, and immediately assist such an one with his own supernatural power of doing miracles, in confirmation of such doctrine. But the meaning is, that by the suggestion of evil spirits, some false prophets might be raised up to tempt the Jews to idolatry; or at least, that by the assistance of them, such miracles might be wrought in confirmation thereof, as those sometimes done by the Egyptian sorcerers or magicians, God himself not interposing in this case to hinder them, for this reason, that he might hereby prove and try their faithfulness towards him. Forasmuch as both, by the pure light of nature, and God's revealed will, before confirmed by miracles, idolatry, or the religious worship of any but God Almighty, had been sufficiently condemned. From whence it is evident, that miracles alone (at least such miracles as these) are no sufficient confirmation of a true prophet, without consideration had of the doctrine taught by him. For though a man should have done never so many true and real miracles amongst the Jews, and yet should persuade

to idolatry, he was by them confidently to be condemned to death for a false prophet.

Accordingly in the New Testament do we read, that our Saviour Christ forewarned his disciples, that " false prophets and false Christs should arise, and shew great signs or wonders, insomuch that, if it were possible, they should seduce the very elect." And St. Paul foretelleth concerning the man of sin, or antichrist,^b " that his coming should be after the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, and wonders (or miracles) of a lie." For we conceive, that by τέρατα ψεύδους in this place, are not properly feigned and counterfeit miracles, that is, mere cheating and juggling tricks, but true wonders and real miracles (viz. of the former sort mentioned), done for the confirmation of a lie, as the doctrine of this man of sin is there afterwards called ; for otherwise how could his coming be said to be " according to the working of Satan, with all power?" In like manner also, in St. John's Apocalypse, where the coming of the same man of sin, and the mystery of iniquity, are again described, we read chap. xiii. of a two-horned beast like a lamb, " that he shall do great wonders, and deceive those, that dwell on the earth, by means of those miracles, which he hath power to do, in the sight of the beast." And again, chap. xvi. " of certain unclean spirits like frogs, coming out of the mouth of the dragon, and of the beast, and of the false prophet, which are the spirits of devils working miracles, that go forth to the kings of the earth." And, lastly, chap. xix. " of the false prophet, that wrought miracles before the beast." All which seem to be un-

^a Luke xxiv. 24.

^b 2 Thess. ii. 9.

derstood, not of feigned and counterfeit miracles only, but of true and real also, effected by the working of Satan, in confirmation of a lie, that is, of idolatry, false religion, and imposture; God Almighty permitting it, partly in way of probation or trial of the faithfulness of his own servants, and partly in way of just judgment and punishment upon those, who “ receive not the love of the truth, that they might be saved;” as the apostle declareth.* Wherefore those miracles, pretended, for divers ages past, to have been done before the relics of saints and images, &c. were they all true, could by no means justify or warrant that religious worship by many given to them; because true and real miracles, done in order to the promoting of idolatry, are so far from justifying that idolatry, that they are themselves condemned by it to be τέρατα ψεύδους, the miracles of a lie,—done by the working of Satan.

But as for the miracles of our Saviour Christ, had they been all of them only of the former kind, such as might have been done, God permitting, by the natural power of created spirits, and their assistance; yet forasmuch as he came in the name of the Lord, teaching neither idolatry, nor any thing contrary to the clear light and law of nature, therefore ought he, by reason of those miracles, to have been received by the Jews themselves, and owned for a true prophet, according to the doctrine of Moses himself: who, both in the 13th and 18th chapters of Deuteronomy, plainly supposeth, that God would in no other case permit any false prophet to do miracles by the assistance of evil spirits, save only in that of idolatry

* Thess. ii. 10.

(which is always understood of what is plainly discoverable by the light of nature to be false, or evil). The reason whereof is manifest, because if he should, this would be an invincible temptation, which it is inconsistent with the Divine goodness to expose men unto. And our Saviour Christ was unquestionably that one eximious prophet, which God Almighty by Moses promised to send unto the Israelites, upon occasion of their own desire made to him at Horeb. "Let me not hear again the voice of the Lord my God, nor let me see this great fire any more, that I die not."

Deut. xviii. Whereupon the Lord said, "They have well spoken that which they have spoken; I will raise them up a Prophet from among their brethren, like unto thee, and put my words in his mouth, and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him; and whosoever will not hearken to the words which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him." Which is all one as if he should have said, I will no more speak to them with thunder and lightning, nor reveal my will with a terrible voice out of flaming fire; but the next great manifestation of myself, or further revelation of my will, shall be by a Prophet from amongst their own brethren, I putting my words into his mouth, and speaking to them by him. Whose words they shall be as much obliged to hearken to, as if I had spoken them (as before) from the top of the fiery mount. And that they may have no colour for their disbelieving this great prophet especially, or their disobeying of him, I plainly declare, that whosoever cometh in my name, and does true and real miracles, shall be acknowledged undoubtedly for a true prophet

sent by me, and accordingly believed and obeyed ; and none rejected under the notion of false prophets, but only such, as either do not real miracles, or else if they do, come in the name of other gods, or exhort to idolatry. Nevertheless, our Saviour Christ wrought other miracles also, of a higher nature, by the immediate power of God Almighty himself ; as for example, when before himself he raised Lazarus, who had been dead four days, to life, since it cannot be conceived to be in the power of created spirits (whether bad or good), whenever they please, to bring back the souls of men deceased to their bodies again, or change the laws of nature and fate. However, it must not be thought, that God will ever set this seal of his to a lie, or that which is plainly contrary to the light and law of nature.

The conclusion is, that though all miracles promiscuously do not immediately prove the existence of a God, nor confirm a prophet, or whatsoever doctrine ; yet do they all of them evince, that there is a rank of invisible understanding beings, superior to men, which the Atheists commonly deny. And we read of some such miracles also, as could not be wrought, but by a power perfectly supernatural, or by God Almighty himself. But to deny and disbelieve all miracles, is either to deny all certainty of sense, which would be indeed to make sensation itself miraculous ; or else monstrously and unreasonably to derogate from human testimonies and history. The Jews would never have so stiffly and pertinaciously adhered to the ceremonial law of Moses, had they not all along believed it to have been unquestionably confirmed by miracles ; and that the Gen-

tiles should at first have entertained the faith of Christ without miracles, would itself have been the greatest of miracles.

The last extraordinary phenomenon proposed was that of divination, oracles, prophecies, or predictions of future events, otherwise unforeknowable to men; which either evince a God, or at least that there are understanding beings superior to men. For if there be presension or foreknowledge of such future events, as are to human understanding alone altogether unforeknowable, then is it certain, that there is some more perfect understanding, or knowledge in the world, than that of men. And thus is that maxim of the ancient Pagan Theists,^a in the genuine and proper sense thereof, unquestionably true; “*Si divinatio est, dii sunt;*” If there be divination, or presension of future events (undiscoverable by men), then are there gods:—which, in their language, was no more than to say, understanding beings superior to men.

Wherefore we must here distinguish of oracles and predictions, after the same manner as we did before of miracles, that they may be of two kinds. First, such as might proceed only from the natural presaging power of created spirits superior to men, whether called angels or demons. For these being supposed to have not only clearer understandings than men, and a greater insight into nature, but also by reason of their agility and invisibility, opportunity of knowing things remotely distant, and of being privy to men’s secret machinations and consultations; it is easily conceivable

^a The Stoics. Vide Ciceron. de Divinat. lib. i. cap. v, vi. p. 3113, 3114. tom. ix. oper.

that many future events nigh at hand, which cannot be foreknown by men, may be (probably at least) foreseen by them; and that without any miraculous Divine revelation, their causes being already in being. As men learned in astronomy can foretel eclipses of the sun and moon, which to the vulgar are altogether unforeknowable; and as princes or statesmen, that are furnished with great intelligence, foreign and domestic, can presage more of war and peace, either at home or abroad, and of the events of kingdoms, than ignorant plebeians. And such were those predictions, which Democritus, though otherwise much addicted to Atheism, allowed of; Cicero writing thus of him: “*Plurimis locis, gravis auctor Democritus præsentionem rerum futurarum comprobat;*” Democritus, a grave writer, doth in many places approve of the presension of future events.—The reason whereof was, because he supposed certain understanding beings superior to men, called by him idols, which having a larger comprehension of things, and other advantages of knowledge, could therefore foretel many future events, that men were ignorant of. And though perhaps it may be thought, that Democritus would not have entertained this opinion of the foreknowledge of human events, had he not asserted the necessity of all human actions and volitions, but held liberty of will, as Epicurus afterwards did (as if this were inconsistent with all manner of presage, and probable or conjectural foreknowledge); yet is it certain, that there is not so much contingency in all human actions, by reason of this liberty of will, as heretofore was by Epicurus, and still is by many sup-

posed ; it being plain, that men act according to an appearance of good, and that in many cases and circumstances it may be foreknown, without any Divine revelation, what such or such persons would do. As for example, that a voluptuous person, having a strong temptation to satisfy his sensual appetite, and that without incurring any inconvenience of shame or punishment, would readily close with the same. Besides which, such invisible spirits, as angels or demons, may sometimes predict also what themselves cause and effect.

Secondly, There is another sort of predictions of future events, which cannot be imputed to the natural presaging faculty of any such created spirits, but only to the supernatural prescience of God Almighty, or a Being infinitely perfect : as when events remotely distant in time, and of which there are yet no immediate causes actually in being, which also depend upon many circumstances, and a long series of things, any one of which being otherwise would alter the case ; as likewise upon much uncertainty of human volitions, which are not always necessarily linked and concatenated with what goes before, but often loose and free ; and upon that contingency that arises from the indifferency or equality of eligibility in objects. Lastly, such things as do not at all depend upon external circumstances neither, nor are caused by things natural antecedent, but by some supernatural power ; I say, when such future events as these are foretold, and accordingly come to pass, this can be ascribed to no other but such a being as comprehends, sways, and governs all, and is, by a pe-

cular privilege or prerogative of its own nature, omniscient. Epicurus, though really he therefore rejected divination and prediction of future events, because he denied Providence; yet did he pretend this further reason also against it, because it was a thing absolutely inconsistent with liberty of will, and destructive of the same; ἡ μαντικὴ ἀνύπαρκτος· εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑπαρκτικὴ, οὐδὲν Diog. Laert. in V. Epic. [lib. x. segm. 135. p. 660.] παρ' ἡμᾶς ἤδη τὰ γινόμενα. Divination is a thing, which hath no existence, nor possibility in nature: and if there were such a thing, it would take away all liberty of will, and leave nothing in men's own power.—Thus also Carneades, in Cicero ^a, maintained, “ Ne Apollinem quidem futura posse dicere, nisi ea, quorum causas natura ita contineret, ut ea fieri necesse esset;” that Apollo himself was not able to foretel any future events, other than such, as had necessary causes in nature antecedent.—And some Christian Theists of later times have, in like manner, denied to God Almighty all foreknowledge of human actions, upon the same pretence, as being both inconsistent with men's liberty of will, and destructive thereof. For, say they, if men's actions be free, then are they un-foreknowable, they having no necessary causes; and again, if there be any foreknowledge of them, then can they not be free, they being *ipso facto* necessitated thereby. But as it is certain that prescience does not destroy the liberty of man's will, or impose any necessity upon it, men's actions being not therefore future, because they are foreknown, but therefore fore-

^a De Fato, cap. xiv. p. 3281. tom. ix. oper.

known, because future; and were a thing never so contingent, yet upon supposition that it will be done, it must needs have been future from all eternity: so is it extreme arrogance for men, because themselves can naturally foreknow nothing, but by some causes antecedent, as an eclipse of the sun or moon, therefore to presume to measure the knowledge of God Almighty according to the same scantling, and to deny him the prescience of human actions, not considering, that, as his nature is incomprehensible, so his knowledge may well be looked upon by us as such too; that which is past our finding out, and too wonderful for us. However, it must be acknowledged for an undoubted truth, that no created being can, naturally, and of itself, foreknow any future events, otherwise than in and by their causes antecedent. If therefore we shall find, that there have been predictions of such future events as had no necessary antecedent causes; as we cannot but grant such things therefore to be foreknowable, so must we needs from thence infer the existence of a God, that is, a Being supernatural, infinitely perfect and omniscient, since such predictions as these could have proceeded from no other cause.

That there is foreknowledge of future events to men naturally unforeknowable, hath been all along the persuasion of the generality of mankind.

Thus Cicero: “*Vetus opinio est, jam usque ab heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque et populi Romani, et omnium gentium firmata consensu, versari quandam inter homines divinationem, quam Græci μαντικὴν appellant, id est,*

præensionem et scientiam rerum futurarum.”

This is an old opinion derived down all along from the heroic times (or the mythical age), and not only entertained amongst the Romans, but also confirmed by the consent of all nations, that there is such a thing as divination, and presension or foreknowledge of future events.—And the same writer elsewhere, in the person of Balbus :

“*Quamvis nihil tam irridet Epicurus, quam prædictionem rerum futurarum, mihi videtur tamen vel maxime confirmare, Deorum providentia consuli rebus*

De N. D. l. ii.
p. 239. Lamb.
[cap. lxx. p.
3046. tom. ix.
oper.]

humanis. Est enim profecto divinatio; quæ multis locis, rebus, temporibus apparet, cum in privatis tum maxime in publicis. Multa cernunt aruspices, multa augures provident, multa oraculis providentur, multa vaticinationibus, multa somniis, multa portentis.” Although Epicurus deride nothing more than the prediction of future things; yet does this seem to me to be a great confirmation of the providence of the gods over human affairs, because there is certainly divination, it appearing in many places, things, and times, and that not only private, but especially public. Soothsayers foresee many things, the augurs many; many things are declared by oracles, many by prophecies, many by dreams, and many by portents.—And indeed that there were even amongst the Pagans predictions of future events, not discoverable by any human sagacity, which accordingly came to pass, and therefore argue a knowledge superior to that of men, or that there are certain invisible understanding beings or spirits, seems to be undeniable from history. And that the augurs themselves were

sometimes not unassisted by these officious genii, is plain from that of Attius Navius beforementioned, as the circumstances thereof are related by historians; that Tarquinius Priscus having a mind to try what there was in this skill of augury,^a “dixit ei se cogitare quiddam; id possetne fieri, consuluit. Ille augurio acto, posse respondet. Tarquinius autem dixit se cogitasse cotem novacula posse præcidi; tum Attium jussisse experiri; ita cotem in comitium illatam, inspectante et rege et populo, novacula esse discissam;” told Navius, that he thought of something, and he would know of him, whether it could be done or no. Navius having performed his auguring ceremonies, replied, that the thing might be done. Whereupon Priscus declared what his thought was, namely, that a whetstone might be cut in two with a razor. Navius willed them to make trial: wherefore a whetstone being brought immediately into the court, it was in the sight of the king and all the people divided with a razor.—But the predictions amongst those Pagans were, for the most part, only of the former kind, such as proceeded merely from the natural presaging faculty of these demons; this appearing from hence, because their oracles were often expressed ambiguously, so as that they might be taken either way; those demons themselves, it seems, being then not confident of the event; as also, because they were sometimes plainly mistaken in the events. And from hence it was, that they seldom ventured to foretel any events remotely distant, but only what were nigh at hand, and

^a Cicero de Divinat. lib. ii. cap. xvii. p. 3129. tom. ix. oper.

shortly to come to pass; and therefore might be probably conjectured of from things then in being. Notwithstanding which, we acknowledge, that there are some few instances of predictions amongst the Pagans, of the other kind. Such as that intimated by Cicero in his book of Divination, ^a where he declareth the doctrine of Diodorus concerning necessity and contingency; “non necesse fuisse Cypselum regnare Corinthi, quamquam id millesimo ante anno Apollinis oraculo editum esset:” that it was not necessary Cypselus the tyrant should reign at Corinth, though that were a thing predicted by Apollo’s oracle a thousand years before. As also this recorded by Varro, ^b of Vectius Valens, an augur in the time of Romulus, who when Rome was a building, from the flying of twelve vultures presaged, that the continuance of that city would be for twelve hundred years: which seems to have been accordingly fulfilled, in the year of our Lord four hundred and fifty-five, immediately after the death of the third Valentinian (whom some make to be the last real emperor of the west or Rome), when Gensericus the Vandal took the city the second time and fired it. But above all, that of the sibyls; of whose prophecies such things are recorded by pagan writers, as makes it very suspicious, that they did foretel the coming of our Saviour Christ, and the times of Christianity. But were these, and the like pagan prophecies, real, then must they needs have had some higher original than the natural presaging faculty of their demons

^a It should be, *De Fato*, cap. vii. p. 3269.

^b In the Fragments of the 18th book of his *Antiquitates Rerum Humanarum*.

especially those of the sibyls ; who, for aught we know, might be as well assisted supernaturally to predict our Saviour Christ, amongst the Pagans in the west, as Balaam was in the east.

But here the Scripture triumpheth over Paganism, and all its oracles and divinations ; there being contained in it so many unquestionable predictions of events to follow a long time after, and such as can be imputed to nothing but the supernatural foreknowledge and omniscience of God Almighty. As for example, those concerning the Messiah, or our Saviour Christ, delivered by Jacob, Moses, David, Isaias, Jeremy, Daniel, and most of the prophets : foretelling sundry particular circumstances of his coming, and that grand event, which followed after, of the Gentiles or Pagans' so general reception and entertainment of Christianity ; that is, the belief of the Messiah promised to the Jews ; together with the shaking off of their gods and idols. Amongst which Scripture prophecies, concerning our Saviour Christ, we must needs reckon for one, and none of the least considerable neither, that of Daniel's weeks, or of four hundred and ninety years, to commence from the going forth of the word, or the decree made by Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes, in the seventh year of his reign, for the return of the people of Israel, priests and Levites, to Jerusalem ; and to terminate in the death of the Messiah and the preaching of the gospel to the Jews only : though we are not ignorant, how some learned men, both of the former and latter times, have stretched their wits, they sometimes using no small violence to divert this prophecy another way. For that these prophecies, concerning our

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Saviour Christ, could have no other original than the immediate supernatural revelation of God Almighty, is evident from the thing itself; it being such as depended on no natural causes, much less upon those constellations of the astrological Atheists,^a but only upon his own secret will and counsel.

But besides these prophecies concerning our Saviour Christ, there are others contained in the Scripture, concerning the fates and successions of the chief kingdoms, empires, and polities of the world; as of the rise of the Persian monarchy; of its fall and conquest by the Macedonian Alexander; of the quadripartite division of this Greekish empire after Alexander's death; of the succession of the Seleucidæ and Lagidæ, a prophetic history, so agreeable with the events, that it was by Porphyrius^b pretended to have been written after them; and, lastly, of the rise and continuance of the Roman empire. For notwithstanding the endeavours of some to pervert all those Scripture prophecies that extend to the present times, it is clearly demonstrable, that this was Daniel's fourth ten-horned beast, or the legs and toes of Nebuchadnezzar's statue, that fourth empire, strong as iron, which came at length to be broken or divided into ten or many principalities, called in the prophetic language, and according to the *eichon*, horns; amongst whom was to start up another horn with eyes, speaking great words against the Most High, and making war with the saints, and prevailing against them, for

^a Cardan, &c.

^b Vide Hieronymum Comment. in Daniel. tom. v. oper. p. 481.

a time, times, and half a time. Which prophecy of Daniel's is the ground-work of St. John's Apocalypse, it being there further insisted upon, filled up, and enlarged, with the addition of several particulars; so that both Daniel and John have each of them, from their respective ages, set down a prophetic calendar of times, in a continued series, (the former more compendiously and generally, the latter more copiously and particularly), to the very end of the world.

And thus do we see plainly, that the Scripture-prophecies evince a Deity; neither can these possibly be imputed by Atheists, as other things, to men's fear and fancy, nor yet to the fiction of politicians. Nor do they only evince a Deity, but confirm Christianity also; partly as predicted by them in its several circumstances, a grand one whereof was the Gentiles' reception of it; and partly as itself predicting future events, this spirit of prophecy being the testimony of Jesus. Both which Scripture-prophecies, of Christ in the Old Testament, and from him in the New, are of equal if not greater force to us in this present age, for the confirmation of our faith, than the miracles themselves recorded in the Scripture; we having now certain knowledge ourselves of many of those events, and being no way able to suspect, but that the prophecies were written long before.

To conclude; all these extraordinary phenomena of apparitions, witchcraft, possessions, miracles, and prophecies, do evince that spirits, angels or demons, though invisible to us, are no fancies, but real and substantial inhabitants of the world; which favours not the atheistic hypothe-

sis : but some of them, as the higher kind of miracles and predictions, do also immediately enforce the acknowledgment of a Deity ; a being superior to nature, which therefore can check and control it ; and which comprehending the whole, foreknows the most remotely distant and contingent events.

And now have we not only fully answered and confuted all the atheistic pretences against the idea of God, tending to disprove his existence ; but also occasionally proposed several solid and substantial arguments for a Deity : as, that all successive things, the world, motion, and time, are in their own nature absolutely incapable of an ante-eternity ; and, therefore, there must of necessity be something else of a permanent duration, that was eternal without beginning : that no Atheist, according to his principles, can possibly give any account of the original of his own soul or mind : that the phenomenon of motion cannot be solved without an incorporeal principle, presiding over the whole : that the τὸ εἶ και καλῶς, the artificial, regular, and orderly frame of things— together with the harmony of the whole, demonstrate an understanding and intending cause of the world, that ordered things for ends and good. Besides, that there are several other phenomena, both ordinary and extraordinary, which Atheists, being no way able to solve, are forced to deny.

True indeed, some of the ancient Theists have themselves affirmed, that there could be no demonstration of a God : which assertion of theirs hath been by others misunderstood into this sense, as if there were therefore no certainty at all to be

had of God's existence, but only a conjectural probability; no knowledge or science, but only faith and opinion. Whereas the true meaning of those ancient Theists, who denied that there could be any demonstration of a God, was only this, That the existence of a God could not be demonstrated *a priori*, himself being the first cause of all things. Thus doth Alexander Aphrodisius, in his Physical Doubts and Solutions, after he had propounded an argument for a God, according to Aristotelic principles, from motion,

L. i. c. ii.
[p. 2. edit.
Græc. Venet.
1536. fol.]

declare himself, ἢ δεῖξαι κατὰ ἀνάλυσιν, οὐ γὰρ οἶόντε τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων τε καὶ φανερῶν ἀρξαμένους,

κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμφωνίαν ἀναλύσει χρωμένους συστήσαι τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν· that this argument or proof of his was in way of analysis only; it being not possible, that there should be a demonstration of the first principles of all. Wherefore (saith he) we must here fetch our beginning from things that are after it, and manifest; and thence, by way of analysis, ascend to the proof of that first nature, which was before them.—

And to the same purpose Clemens Alexandrinus,

Strom. l. v.
p. 388. [cap.
xii. p. 695.
edit. Potteri.]

having first affirmed, ὡς δυσμεταχειριστότατος ὁ περὶ θεοῦ λόγος· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς πραγματος δυσέυρετος, πάντως πού ἢ πρώτη καὶ πρεσβυτάτη ἀρχὴ δύσδεικτος, ἥτις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν αἰτία τοῦ γενέσθαι, καὶ γενομένους εἶναι· that God is the most difficult thing of all to be discoursed of; because, since the principle of every thing is hard to find out, the first and most ancient principle of all, which was the cause to all other things of their being made, must needs be the hardest of all to be declared or manifested;—he

afterwards subjoins, Ἄλλὰ οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ· αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων συνίσταται· τοῦ δὲ ἀγεννήτου οὐδὲν προὔπαρχει· But neither can God be apprehended by any demonstrative science: for such science is from things before in order of nature, and more knowable; whereas nothing can exist before that which is altogether unmade.—And certain it is, that it implies a contradiction, that God, or a perfect being, should be thus demonstrated by any thing before him as his cause. Nevertheless it doth not therefore follow, that there can be no certainty at all had of the existence of a God, but only a conjectural probability; no knowledge, but faith and opinion only. For we may have a certain knowledge of things, the διότι whereof cannot be demonstrated *a priori*, or from antecedent necessary causes: as for example, that there was something eternal of itself, without beginning, is not at all demonstrable by any antecedent cause, it being contradictory to such a thing to have a cause. Nevertheless upon supposition only, that something doth exist, which no man can possibly make any doubt of, we may not only have an opinion, but also certain knowledge, from the necessity of irrefragable reason, that there was never nothing, but something or other did always exist from eternity, and without beginning. In like manner, though the existence of a God or perfect being cannot be demonstrated *a priori*, yet may we notwithstanding, from our very selves (whose existence we cannot doubt of), and from what is contained in our own minds, or otherwise consequent from him, by undeniable principles of reason, necessarily infer his exist-

ence. And whensoever any thing is thus necessarily inferred from what is undeniable and indubitable, this is a demonstration, though not of the *διότι*, yet of the *ὅτι* of it; that the thing is, though not why it is. And many of the geometrical demonstrations are no other.

It hath been asserted by a late eminent philosopher,^a that there is no possible certainty to be had of any thing, before we be certain of the existence of a God essentially good; because we can never otherwise free our minds from the importunity of that suspicion, which with irresistible force may assault them; that ourselves might possibly be so made, either by chance, or fate, or by the pleasure of some evil demon, or at least of an arbitrary omnipotent deity, as that we should be deceived in all our most clear and evident perceptions; and therefore in geometrical theorems themselves, and even in our common notions. But when we are once assured of the existence of such a God as is essentially good, who therefore neither will nor can deceive; then, and not before, will this suspicion utterly vanish, and ourselves become certain, that our faculties of reason and understanding are not false and imposturous, but rightly made. From which hypothesis it plainly follows, that all those Theists, who suppose God to be a mere arbitrary being, whose will is not determined by any nature of goodness or rule of justice, but itself is the first rule of both (they thinking this to be the highest perfection, liberty, and power), can never be reasonably certain of the truth of any thing, not so much as that two and two are four; because,

^a Des Cartes. See his *Meditat. Metaphys.* iv. p. 25. and v. p. 31.

so long as they adhere to that persuasion, they can never be assured, but that such an arbitrary omnipotent deity might designedly make them such, as should be deceived in all their clearest perceptions.

Now though there be a plausibility of piety in this doctrine, as making the knowledge of a God essentially good so necessary a præcognitum to all other science, that there can be no certainty of truth at all without it; yet does that very supposition, that our understanding faculties might possibly be so made, as to deceive us in all our clearest perceptions (wheresoever it is admitted), render it utterly impossible ever to arrive to any certainty concerning the existence of a God essentially good; forasmuch as this cannot be any otherwise proved, than by the use of our faculties of understanding, reason, and discourse. For to say, that the truth of our understanding faculties is put out of all doubt and question, as soon as ever we are assured of the existence of a God essentially good, who therefore cannot deceive; whilst this existence of a God is in the mean time itself no otherwise proved, than by our understanding faculties; that is, at once to prove the truth of God's existence from our faculties of reason and understanding, and again to prove the truth of those faculties from the existence of a God essentially good: this, I say, is plainly to move round in a circle, and to prove nothing at all; a gross oversight, which the forementioned philosopher seems plainly guilty of.

Wherefore, according to this hypothesis, we are of necessity condemned to eternal scepticism, both concerning the existence of a God, when,

after all our arguments and demonstrations for the same, we must at length gratify the Atheists with this confession in the conclusion, that it is possible notwithstanding there may be none ; and also concerning all other things, the certainty whereof is supposed to depend upon the certainty of the existence of such a God as cannot deceive.

So that if we will pretend to any certainty at all concerning the existence of a God, we must of necessity explode this new sceptical hypothesis of the possibility of our understandings being so made, as to deceive us in all our clearest perceptions ; by means whereof we can be certain of the truth of nothing, and to use our utmost endeavour to remove the same. In the first place therefore we affirm, that no power, how great soever, and therefore not Omnipotence itself, can make any thing to be indifferently either true or false, this being plainly to take away the nature both of truth and falsehood, or to make them nothing but words, without any signification. Truth is not factitious ; it is a thing which cannot be arbitrarily made, but is. The Divine will and Omnipotence itself (now supposed by us) hath no imperium upon the Divine understanding ; for if God understood only by will, he would not understand at all. In the next place we add, that though the truth of singular contingent propositions depends upon the things themselves existing without, as the measure and archetype thereof ; yet, as to the universal and abstract theorems of science, the terms whereof are those reasons of things, which exist no where but only in the mind itself (whose noemata and ideas they are) the measure and rule of truth concerning them

can be no foreign or extraneous thing without the mind; but must be native and domestic to it, or contained within the mind itself, and therefore can be nothing but its clear and distinct perception. In these intelligible ideas of the mind, whatsoever is clearly perceived to be, is; or, which is all one, is true. Every clear and distinct perception is an entity or truth, as that, which is repugnant to conception, is a nonentity or falsehood. Nay, the very essence of truth here is this clear perceptibility, or intelligibility; and therefore can there not be any clear or distinct perception of falsehood: which must be acknowledged by all those, who, though granting false opinions, yet agree in this, that there can be no false knowledge. For the knowledge of these universal abstract truths is nothing but the clear and distinct perception of the several ideas of the mind, and their necessary relations to one another: wherefore, to say, that there can be no false knowledge, is all one as to say, that there can be no clear and distinct perceptions of the ideas of the mind false. In false opinions, the perception of the understanding power itself is not false, but only obscure. It is not the understanding power or nature in us, that erreth, but it is we ourselves, who err, when we rashly and unwarily assent to things not clearly perceived by it. The upshot of all is this, that since no power, how great soever, can make any thing indifferently to be true; and since the essence of truth in universal abstract things is nothing but clear perceptibility, it follows, that Omnipotence cannot make any thing, that is false, to be clearly perceived to be, or create such minds and understanding faculties,

as shall have as clear conceptions of falsehoods, that is, of nonentities, as they have of truths or entities. For example, no rational understanding being, that knows what a part is, and what a whole, what a cause and what an effect, could possibly be so made, as clearly to conceive the part to be greater than the whole, or the effect to be before the cause, or the like. Wherefore, we may presume with reverence to say, that there could not possibly be a world of rational creatures made by God, either in the moon, or in some other planet, or elsewhere, that should clearly and distinctly conceive all things contrary to what are clearly perceived by us; nor could our human faculties have been so made, as that we should have as clear conceptions of falsehoods as of truths. Mind or understanding faculties in creatures may be made more or less weak, imperfect, and obscure, but they could not be made false, or such as should have clear and distinct conceptions of that which is not, because every clear perception is an entity; and though Omnipotence can make something out of nothing, yet can it not make something to be nothing, nor nothing something. All which is no more than is generally acknowledged by theologians, when they affirm, that God Almighty himself cannot do things contradictory; there being no other reason for this assertion, but only this, because contradictoryness is repugnant to conception. So that conception and knowledge are hereby made to be the measure of all power, even Omnipotence, or infinite power itself, being determined thereby; from whence it follows, that power hath no dominion over understanding, truth

and knowledge; nor can infinite power make any thing whatsoever to be clearly conceivable. For could it make contradictory things clearly conceivable, then would itself be able to do them; because whatsoever can be clearly conceived by any, may unquestionably be done by infinite power.

It is true indeed, that sense, considered alone by itself, doth not reach to the absoluteness either of the natures, or of the existence of things without us, it being, as such, nothing but seeming, appearance, and fancy. And thus is that saying of some ancient philosophers to be understood, that *πάσα φαντασία ἀληθής*, every phantasy is true—namely, because sense and fancy reach not to the absolute truth and falsehood of things, but contain themselves only within seeming and appearance; and every appearance must needs be a true appearance. Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that sense often represents to us corporeal things otherwise than indeed they are, which though it be not a formal, yet is it a material falsity. Wherefore sense in the nature of it is not absolute, but *πρὸς τὶ*, or *τινὶ*, relative to the sentient. And by sense alone, without any mixture of reason or understanding, we can be certain of no more concerning the things without us, but only this, that they so seem to us. Hence was that of the ancient atomic philosophers in Plato, Ἡ σὺ δι᾽ οὐκ ἴσθαι Theæt. p. 154.
 ἂν ὡς οἶόν σοι φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρώμα, τοιοῦτον [p. 119. edit. Ficini.]
 καὶ κύνι καὶ ὄψουσιν ζώῳ. Neither you nor any man else can be certain, that every other man and brute animal hath all the very same phantasms of colours, that himself hath.—Now were there no other perception in us but that of sense

(as the old atheistic philosophers concluded knowledge to be sense), then would all our human perceptions be merely seeming, fantastical and relative; and none of them reach to the absolute truth of things. Every one in Protagoras's language would then τὰ αὐτοῦ μόνον δοξάζειν, think or opine only his own things—all his truths being private and relative to himself. And that Protagorean aphorism were to be admitted also in the sense of that philosopher, that πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, every man is the measure of all things to himself; and, that no one man's opinion was righter than another's,—but τὸ φαινόμενον ἐκάστῳ, that which seemed to every one, was to him true, to whom it seemed—all truth and perception being but seeming and relative. But here lies one main difference betwixt understanding, or knowledge, and sense; that whereas the latter is fantastical and relative only; the former reacheth beyond fancy and appearance to the absoluteness of truth. For as it hath been already declared, whatsoever is clearly and distinctly perceived in things abstract and universal, by any one rational being in the whole world, is not a private thing, and true to himself only that perceived it: but it is, as some Stoics have called it, ἀληθές καθολικόν, a public, catholic and universal truth: it obtains every where, and, as Empedocles sang of natural justice,

b ————— Διὰ τ' εὐρυμέδοντος
 Αἰθέρος, ἠκεώς τέταται, διὰ τ' ἀωλέτου αἰγῆς.

It is extended throughout the vast ether, and

^a Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 118.

^b Apud Aristot. Rhetoric. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 737. tom. iii. oper.

through infinite light or space.—And were there indeed infinite worlds, all thickly peopled with rational animals, it would be alike true to every one of them. Nor is it conceivable, that Omnipotence itself could create any such understanding beings, as could have clear and distinct perceptions of the contrary to all that is perceived by us, no more than it could do things contradictory. But in all probability, because sense is indeed but seeming, fantastical and relative, this is the reason, that some have been so prone and inclinable to suspect the like of understanding, and all mental perception too, that this also is but seeming and relative; and that therefore men's minds or understandings might have been so made, by an arbitrary omnipotent deity, as clearly and distinctly to perceive every thing that is false. But, if notwithstanding all that hath been said, any will still sing over the old song again; that all this, which hath been hitherto declared by us, is indeed true, if our human faculties be true, or rightly made; but we can go no farther than our faculties; and whether these be true or no, no man can ever be certain; we have no other reply to make, but that this is an over-stiff and heavy adherence to a prejudice of their own minds; that not only sense, but also reason and understanding, and all human perception, is merely seeming or fantastical, and relative to faculties only, but not reaching to the absoluteness of any truth; and that the human mind hath no criterion of truth at all within itself.

Nevertheless, it will probably be here further objected, that this is too great an arrogance, for created beings to pretend to an absolute certainty

of any thing, it being the sole privilege and prerogative of God Almighty to be infallible, who is therefore styled in Scripture, *ὁ μόνος σοφός*, the only wise;—to which we briefly answer, that the Deity is the first original fountain of wisdom and truth, which is said to be the brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of his goodness. The Divine Word is the archetypal pattern of all truth; it is ignorant of nothing, and knoweth all things infallibly. But created beings have but a derivative participation hereof, their understandings being obscure, and they erring in many things, and being ignorant of more. And it seems to be no derogation from Almighty God to suppose, that created minds, by a participation of the Divine mind, should be able to know certainly that two and two make four; that equals added to equals will make equals: that a whole is greater than the part; and the cause before the effect; and that nothing can be made without a cause; and such-like other common notions, which are the principles from whence all their knowledge is derived. And indeed, were rational creatures never able to be certain of any such thing as this at all, what would their life be but a mere dream or shadow? and themselves but a ridiculous and pompous piece of fantastic vanity? Besides, it is no way congruous to think, that God Almighty should make rational creatures, so as to be an utter impossibility of ever attaining to any certainty of his own existence; or of having more than an hypothetical assurance thereof, if our faculties be true (which possibly may be otherwise), then is there a God. We shall conclude this discourse

against the Cartesian scepticism with that of Origen's, *Μόνον τῶν ὄντων βέβαιον ἐπιστήμη*, Knowledge is the only thing in the world, which creatures have, that is in its own nature firm ;—they having here something of certainty, but no where else.

Wherefore we having now that, which Archimedes required, some firm ground and footing to stand upon, such a certainty of truth in our common notions, as that they cannot possibly be false ; without which, nothing at all could be proved by reason : we shall in the next place endeavour, not to shake or dissettle any thing thereby (which was the undertaking of that geometrician), but to confirm and establish the truth of God's existence, and that from the very idea of him, hitherto made good and defended against all the assaults of Atheists.

It is well known, that Cartesius^a hath lately made a pretence to do this, with mathematical evidence and certainty, and he dispatches the business briefly after this manner : God, or a perfect being, includeth necessary existence in his very idea ; and therefore he is. But though the inventor of this argument, or rather the reviver of that, which had been before used by some scholastics, affirmeth it to be as good a demonstration for the existence of a God, from his idea, as that in geometry, for a triangle's having three angles equal to two right, is from the idea of a triangle ; yet nevertheless it is certain, that, by one means or other, this argument hath not hitherto proved so fortunate and successful, there being many, who cannot be made sensible of any efficacy therein, and not a

^a Vide Principia ejus Philosophiæ, part i. §. 13. p. 4. et Meditat. Metaphysic. v. p. 31. et alias.

few, who condemn it for a mere sophism. As for ourselves, we neither have any mind to quarrel with other men's arguments *pro Deo*; nor yet would we be thought to lay stress, in this cause, upon any thing which is not every way solid and substantial. Wherefore we shall here endeavour to set down the utmost that possibly we can, both against this argument, and for it, impartially and candidly; and then, when we have done, leave the intelligent readers to make their own judgment concerning the same.

Against it in this manner; first, because we can frame an idea in our own minds of an absolutely-perfect being, including necessary existence in it, it will not at all follow from thence, that therefore there is such a perfect being really existing without our minds; we being able to frame in our minds the ideas of many other things, that never were, nor will be. All that can be certainly inferred from the idea of a perfect being seems to be this, that if it contain nothing which is contradictory to it, then it is not impossible but that there might be such a being actually existing. But the strength of this argument, not lying merely in this, that because we have an idea of a perfect being, therefore it is; but because we have such an idea of it as includeth necessary existence in it, which the idea of nothing else besides doth; therefore may it be here further objected in this manner: That though it be very true, that a perfect being doth include necessary existence in it, because that cannot be every way perfect, whose existence is not necessary, but contingent; yet will it not follow from hence, that therefore there is such a perfect being actually existing;

but all that can be deduced from it, will be no more than this, that whatsoever hath no necessary and eternal existence, is no absolutely perfect being. And again, that if there be any absolutely perfect being, then was its existence always necessary, and will be always such ; that is, it did both exist of itself, from all eternity, without beginning, and must needs exist to eternity incorruptibly ; it being never able to cease to be. It seems indeed no more to follow, that because a perfect being includes necessary existence in its idea, therefore there is such a perfect being actually existing ; than because a perfect being includes necessary omniscience and omnipotence in it, that therefore there is such a perfect omniscient and omnipotent being : all that follows in both cases, being only this ; that if there be any being absolutely perfect, then it is both omniscient and omnipotent, and it did exist of itself necessarily, and can never cease to be. Wherefore here lies a fallacy in this argumentation, when from the necessity of existence affirmed only hypothetically, or upon a supposition of a perfect being, the conclusion is made concerning it absolutely. As some would prove the necessity of all human events, as for example of Adam's sinning, in this manner, that it always was true before, that either Adam would eat the forbidden fruit, or not eat it ; and if he would eat it, he would certainly eat it, and not contingently ; and again, if he would not eat it, then would he certainly and necessarily not eat it : wherefore whether he will eat it, or not eat it, he will do either necessarily, and not contingently. Where it is plain, that an absolute necessity is wrongly inferred in the conclusion from an hy-

pothetical one in premises. In like manner, when upon supposition of an absolutely perfect being, it is affirmed of it, that its existence must not be contingent, but necessary, and from thence the conclusion is made absolutely, that there is such a perfect being; this seems to be the very same fallacy. From the idea of a perfect being including necessary existence in it, it follows undeniably, that if there be any thing absolutely perfect, it must exist necessarily, and not contingently: but it doth not follow, that there must of necessity be such a perfect being existing; these two propositions carrying a very different sense from one another. And the latter of them, that there must of necessity be a God, or perfect being existing, seems to be a thing altogether indemonstrable, it implying, that the existence of God, or a perfect being, may be proved *a priori*, or from some antecedent necessary cause; which was before declared to be a thing contradictory and impossible.

And now in justice are we obliged to plead the best we can also on the defensive side. Thus, therefore, the idea of God, or an absolutely perfect being, including in it not an impossible, nor a contingent, but a necessary schesis, or relation to existence, it follows from thence absolutely, and without any *ifs* and *ands*, that he doth exist. For as of things contradictory, having therefore in the idea of them an impossible schesis to existence, we can confidently conclude, that they never were, nor will be; and as of other things not contradictory or impossible, but imperfect only, which therefore have a contingent schesis to existence, we can pronounce also, that possibly they

might be, or might not be: in like manner, a perfect being including in the idea of it a necessary schesis to existence, or an impossible one to non-existence, or containing existence in its very essence; we may by parity of reason conclude concerning it, that it is neither impossible to be, nor yet contingent to be, or not to be; but that it certainly is, and cannot but be; or that it is impossible it should not be. And indeed when we say of imperfect beings, implying no contradiction in them, that they may possibly either be, or not be, we herein tacitly suppose the existence of a perfect being, because nothing which is not, could be possible to be, were there not something actually in being, that hath sufficient power to cause or produce it. True, indeed, we have the ideas of many things in our minds, that never were, nor will be; but these are only such as include no necessary, but contingent existence in their nature; and it does not therefore follow, that a perfect being, which includes necessity of existence in its idea, may, notwithstanding, not be. Wherefore this necessity of existence, or impossibility of nonexistence, contained in the idea of a perfect being, must not be taken hypothetically only or consequentially after this manner, that if there be any thing absolutely perfect, then its existence both was, and will be necessary; but absolutely, that though contradictory things cannot possibly be, and things imperfect may possibly either be, or not be, yet a perfect being cannot but be; or it is impossible that it should not be. For otherwise were the force of the argumentation merely hypothetical, in this manner; If there be a perfect being, then its existence both was, and

will be necessary ; this would plainly imply, that a perfect being, notwithstanding that necessity of existence included in its nature, might either be, or not be, or were contingent to existence ; which is a manifest contradiction, that the same thing should exist both contingently and necessarily. And this hypothetical absurdity will more plainly appear, if the argument be expressed in other words, as that necessity of existence, and impossibility of nonexistence, and actual existence, belong to the very essence of a perfect being ; since it would be then ridiculous to go about to evade in this manner, that if there be a perfect being, then it is, and cannot but be. Which identical proposition is true of every thing else, but absurd. Wherefore there is something more to be inferred from the necessity of existence included in the idea of a perfect being than so ; which can be nothing else but this, that it absolutely and actually is. Moreover, no Theists can be able to prove, that God, or a perfect being (supposed by them to exist), might not happen by chance only to be ; if from the necessity of existence included in the idea of God, it cannot be inferred, that he could not but be. Notwithstanding which, here is no endeavour (as is pretended) to prove the existence of a God, or perfect being, *a priori*, neither, or from any necessary cause antecedent ; but only from that necessity, which is included within itself, or is concomitant and concurrent with it ; the necessity of its own perfect nature. And now we shall leave the intelligent and impartial reader to make his own judgment concerning the fore-mentioned Cartesian argument for a Deity, drawn from its idea, as including necessity of existence.

in it, that therefore it is ; whether it be merely sophistical, or hath something of solidity and reality in it. However, it is not very probable, that many Atheists will be convinced thereby, but that they will rather be ready to say, that this is no probation at all of a Deity, but only an affirmation of the thing in dispute, and a mere begging of the question ; that therefore God is, because he is, or cannot but be.

Wherefore we shall endeavour to make out an argument, or demonstration for the existence of a God, from his idea, as including necessary existence in it, some other ways : and, first, we shall make an offer towards it in this manner. Though it will not follow from hence, because we can frame an idea of any thing in our minds, that therefore such a thing really existeth ; yet nevertheless, whatsoever we can frame an idea of, implying no manner of contradiction in its conception, we may certainly conclude thus much of it, that such a thing was not impossible to be ; there being nothing to us impossible, but what is contradictory and repugnant to conception. Now, the idea of God, or perfect being, can imply no manner of contradiction in it, because it is only the idea of such a thing ; as hath all possible and conceivable perfections in it ; that is, all perfections, which are neither contradictory in themselves, nor to one another. And they, who will not allow of this consequence, from the idea of a perfect being, including necessity of existence in it, that it doth therefore actually exist, yet cannot deny, but that this at least will follow, from its implying no manner of contradiction in it, that it is therefore a thing possible, or not impossible to be.

For thus much being true of all other contingent things, whose idea implieth no contradiction, that they are therefore possible; it must needs be granted of that, whose very idea and essence containeth a necessity of existence in it, as the essence of nothing else but a perfect being doth. And this is the first step, that we now make in way of argumentation, from the idea of God, or a perfect being, having nothing contradictious in it, that therefore God is at least possible, or no way impossible to have been. In the next place, as this particular idea of that, which is possible, includeth necessity of existence in it; from these two things put together at least, the possibility of such a being, and its necessary existence (if not from the latter alone) will it according to reason follow, that he actually is. If God, or a perfect being, in whose essence is contained necessary existence, be possible, or no way impossible to have been; then he is: because upon supposition of his nonexistence, it would be absolutely impossible that he should ever have been. It does not thus follow concerning imperfect beings, that are contingently possible, that if they be not, it was therefore impossible for them ever to have been; for that which is contingent, though it be not, yet might it for all that possibly have been. But a perfect necessarily existent being, upon the bare supposition of its nonexistence, could no more possibly have been, than it could possibly hereafter be; because if it might have been, though it be not, then would it not be a necessary existent being. The sum of all is this, a necessary existent being, if it be possible, it is; because, upon supposition of its nonexistence, it

would be impossible for it ever to have been. Wherefore God is either impossible to have been, or else he is. For if God were possible, and yet be not, then is he not a necessary but contingent being ; which is contrary to the hypothesis.

But because this argumentation may perhaps run the same fate also with the former, and, by reason of its subtlety, do but little execution neither, if not be accounted sophistical too ; men being generally prone to distrust the firmness and solidity of such thin and subtle cobwebs (as these and the like may seem to be), or their ability to support the weight of so great a truth ; and to suspect themselves to be illaqueated, and circumvented in them : therefore shall we lay no stress upon this neither, but proceed to something which is yet more plain and downright, after this manner. Whatsoever we can frame an idea of in our minds, implying no manner of contradiction, this either actually is, or else if it be not, it is possible for it to be. But, if God be not, he is not possible hereafter to be ; therefore he is. The reason and necessity of the minor is evident ; because, if God be not, and yet possible hereafter to be, then would he not be an eternal and necessarily existent being, which is contradictory to his idea. And the ground of the major, upon which all the weight lies, hath been already declared, where we proved before, that if there were no God, or perfect being, we could never have had any conception or idea of him in our minds, because there can be no positive conception of an absolute nothing, that which hath neither actual nor possible existence. Here the posture of the argument is only inverted ; because we have an

idea of God, or a perfect being, implying no manner of contradiction in it, therefore must it needs have some kind of entity or other, either an actual or possible one; but God, if he be not, is not possible to be, therefore he doth actually exist.

But perhaps this argumentation also, how firm and solid soever, may prove less convictive of the existence of a God to the generality; because whatever is received, is received according to the capacity of the recipient: and though a demonstration be never so good in itself, yet is it more or less such to particular persons, according to their ability to comprehend it; therefore shall we, in the next place, form yet a plainer demonstration for a God from the idea of him, including necessary existence in it: it being first premised, that unquestionably something or other did exist from all eternity, without beginning. For it is certain, that every thing could not be made, because nothing could come from nothing, or be made by itself; and therefore if once there had been nothing, there could never have been any thing. Whence it is undeniable, that there was always something, and consequently there was something unmade, which existed of itself from all eternity. Now all the question is, and indeed this is the only question betwixt Theists and Atheists; since something did certainly exist of itself from all eternity, what that thing is, whether it be a perfect, or an imperfect being? We say, therefore, that whatsoever existed of itself from eternity, and without beginning, did so exist naturally and necessarily, or by the necessity of its own nature. Now, nothing could exist of itself from eternity, naturally and necessarily, but that

which containeth necessary and eternal self-existence in its own nature. But there is nothing which containeth necessary eternal existence in its own nature or essence, but only an absolutely perfect being; all other imperfect things being in their nature contingently possible, either to be, or not to be. Wherefore since something or other must and doth exist of itself naturally and necessarily from eternity unmade, and nothing could do this, but what included necessary self-existence in its nature or essence; it is certain, that it was a perfect being, or God, who did exist of himself from eternity, and nothing else; all other imperfect things which have no necessary self-existence in their nature, deriving their being from him. Here therefore are the Atheists infinitely absurd and unreasonable, when they will not acknowledge that, which containeth independent self-existence, or necessity of existence (which indeed is the same with an impossibility of nonexistence), in its nature and essence, that is, a perfect being, so much as to exist at all; and yet in the mean time assert that, which hath no necessity of existence in its nature, the most imperfect of all beings, inanimate body and matter, to have existed of itself necessarily from all eternity.

We might here add, as a farther confirmation of this argument, what hath been already proved, that no temporary successive being (whose duration is in a continual flux, as if it were every moment generated anew), and therefore neither our own souls, nor the world, nor matter moving, could possibly have existed from eternity, and independently upon any other thing, but must have had a beginning, and been caused by something

else; namely, by an absolutely perfect being, whose duration therefore is permanent, and without any successive generation, or flux.

But besides all these arguments, we may otherwise from the idea of God (already declared) be able both exactly to state the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists, and satisfactorily to decide the same. In order whereunto there is yet something again to be premised; namely this, that as it is certain every thing ~~was~~ not made, but something existed of itself from eternity unmade; so is it likewise certain, that every thing was not unmade neither, nor existed of itself from eternity, but something was made and had a beginning. Where there is a full agreement betwixt Theists and Atheists, as to this one point, no Atheist asserting every thing to have been unmade, but they all acknowledging themselves to have been generated, and to have had a beginning; that is, their own souls and personalities, as likewise the lives and souls of all other men and animals. Wherefore, since something certainly existed of itself from eternity, but other things were made, and had a beginning (which therefore must needs derive their being from that which existed of itself unmade), here is the state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists, whether that, which existed of itself from all eternity, and was the cause of all other things, were a perfect being and God, or the most imperfect of all things whatsoever, inanimate and senseless matter. The former is the doctrine of Theists, as Aristotle affirmeth of those Met. l. xii. c. 5. [cap. iv. p. 446. tom. iv. oper.] ancients, who did not write fabulously concerning the first principles, οἶον Φερε-

κύδης, καὶ ἕτεροί τινες, τὸ γεννησαν πρώτον τὸ Ἄριστον

τιθέασι, καὶ οἱ Μάγοι· καὶ τῶν ὑστέρων δὲ σοφῶν, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας; As namely, Pherocides, and the Magi, and Empedocles and Anaxagoras, and many others; that they agreed in this, that the first original of all things was the best, and most perfect.—Where by the way we may observe also, that, according to Aristotle, the ancient magi did not acknowledge a substantial evil principle, they making that, which is the best and most perfect being, alone by itself, to be the first begetter of all. This, I say, is the hypothesis of Theists, that there is one absolutely perfect being, existing of itself from all eternity, from whence all other lesser perfections, or imperfect beings, did gradually descend, till at last they end in senseless matter, or inanimate body. But the atheistic hypothesis, on the contrary, makes senseless matter the most imperfect thing, to be the first principle, or the only self-existent being, and the cause of all other things; and consequently all higher degrees of perfections that are in the world, to have climbed up or emerged by way of ascent from thence; as life, sense, understanding, and reason, from that which is altogether dead and senseless. Nay, as it was before observed, there hath been amongst the ancient Pagans, a certain kind of religious Atheists, such as acknowledging verbally a God, or soul of the world presiding over the whole, supposed this notwithstanding to have first emerged also, out of senseless matter, night and chaos; and therefore doubtless to be likewise dissolvable again into the same. And of these is that place in Aristotle Met. l. xii. c. 4. [p. 446. tom. iv. oper.] to be understood, βασιλεύειν καὶ ἄρχειν φασὶν οὐ τοὺς πρώτους οἷον Νύκτα, καὶ Οὐρανόν, ἢ

Χάος, ἢ καὶ Ὀκεανόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν Δία· They suppose, not the first things, as Night, and the Heaven, and Chaos, and the Ocean, but Jupiter (or God) to rule and govern all.—Where it is intimated, that the Heaven, Night, Chaos, and the Ocean, according to these, were seniors to Jupiter, or in order of nature before him; they apprehending that things did ascend upward from that, which was most imperfect, as Night and Chaos, to the more perfect, and at length to Jupiter himself, the mundane soul, who governeth the whole world, as our soul doth our body. Which same opinion is afterwards again taken notice of, and reprehended Met. l. xii. c. 5. Du Vall. [p. 448. tom. iv. oper.] by Aristotle in these words; οὐκ ὀρθῶς δ' ὑπολαμβάνει οὐδ' εἷς παρεικάζει τὰς τοῦ ὄλου ἀρχὰς, τῇ τῶν ζώων καὶ φυτῶν· ὅτι ἐξ ἀορίστων διὰ αἰὲν τὰ τελειότερα· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι σπέρμα πρῶτον· Nor would he think rightly, who should resemble the principle of the universe to that of animals and plants: where, from indeterminate and imperfect things (as seeds) do always arise the more perfect. For even here also is the case otherwise than they suppose; for it is a man that generates a man; nor is the seed the first.

The controversy being thus clearly stated betwixt Theists and Atheists, it may now with great ease, and to the full conviction of all minds unprejudiced and unprepossessed with false principles, be determined; it being on the one hand undeniably evident, that lesser perfections may naturally descend from greater, or at least from that which is absolutely perfect, and which virtually containeth all; but, on the other hand, utterly impossible, that greater perfections, and higher degrees of being, should rise and ascend

out of lesser and lower, so as that, which is the most absolutely imperfect of all things, should be the first fountain and original of all ; since no effect can possibly transcend the power of its cause. Wherefore it is certain, that in the universe things did not thus ascend and mount, or climb up from lower perfection to higher; but, on the contrary, descend and slide down from higher to lower : so that the first original of all things was not the most imperfect, but the most perfect being. But to speak more particularly ; it is certain, notwithstanding all the vain pretences of Lucretius, and other Atheists, or semi-Atheists, to the contrary, that life and sense could never possibly spring out of dead and senseless matter, as its only original, either in the way of atoms (no composition of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, being ever able to produce cogitation), or in the way of qualities, since life and perception can no more result from any mixture of elements, or combinations of qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, &c. than from unqualified atoms. This being undeniably demonstrable from that very principle of reason, which the Atheists are so fond of, but misunderstanding abuse (as shall be manifested afterward), that nothing can come from nothing. Much less could understanding and reason in men ever have emerged out of stupid matter, devoid of all manner of life. Wherefore we must needs here freely declare against the darkness of that philosophy, which hath been sometimes unwarily entertained by such as were no Atheists, that sense may rise from a certain modification, mixture, or organization of dead and senseless matter; as also that understanding and reason may result from sense : the plain consequence of both

which is, that senseless matter may prove the original of all things, and the only Numen. Which doctrine therefore is, doubtless, a main piece of the philosophy of the kingdom of darkness. But this darkness hath been of late in great measure dispelled by the light of the atomic philosophy, restored, as it was in its first genuine and virgin state, undeflowered as yet by Atheists; this clearly shewing, how far body and mechanism can go, and that life and cogitation can never emerge out from thence; it being built upon that fundamental principle, as we have made it evident in the first chapter, that *Nothing can come from nothing*. And Strato and the hylozoic Atheists were so well aware, and so sensible of this, that all life and understanding could not possibly be generated or made, but that there must be some fundamental and substantial, or eternal unmade life and knowledge, that they therefore have thought necessary to attribute life, and perception (or understanding), with appetite, and self-moving power, to all matter as such, that so it might be thereby fitly qualified to be the original of all things; than which opinion as nothing can be more monstrous, so shall we elsewhere evince the impossibility thereof. In the mean time, we doubt not to aver, that the argument proposed is a sufficient demonstration of the impossibility of Atheism; which will be further manifested in our answer to the second atheistic objection against a Divine creation, because nothing can come from nothing.

But this controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists may be yet more particularly stated from the idea of God, as including mind or understanding in it essentially, *viz.* Whether mind be eter-

nal and unmade, as being the maker of all; or else, Whether all mind were itself made or generated, and that out of senseless matter? For, according to the doctrine of the Pagan Theists, mind was *προγενέστατος, καὶ Κύριος κατὰ φύσιν*, the oldest of all things, senior to the world and elements, and by nature hath a princely and lordly dominion over all.—But, according to those Atheists, who make matter, or body, devoid of all life and understanding, to be the first principle, mind must be *ὕστερογενής*, a post-nate thing—younger than the world; a weak, umbratile, and evanid image, and next to nothing.

And the controversy, as thus stated, may be also clearly and satisfactorily decided. For, first, we say, that as it is certainly true, that if there had been once nothing at all, there could never have been any thing; so is it true likewise, that if once there had been no life in the whole universe, but all had been dead, then could there never have been any life or motion in it; and if once there had been no mind, understanding, or knowledge, then could there never have been any mind or understanding produced. Because, to suppose life and understanding to rise and spring up out of that which is altogether dead and senseless, as its only original, is plainly to suppose something to come out of nothing. It cannot be said so of other things, as of the corporeal world and matter, that if once they had not been, they could never possibly have been; because, though there had been no world nor matter, yet might these have been produced from a perfect, omnipotent incorporeal being, which in itself eminently containeth all

things. Dead and senseless matter could never have created or generated mind and understanding, but a perfect omnipotent mind could create matter. Wherefore, because there is mind, we are certain, that there was some mind or other from eternity without beginning; though not because there is body, that therefore there was body or matter from eternity unmade. Now these imperfect minds of ours were by no means themselves eternal or without beginning, but from an antecedent nonexistence brought forth into being; but since no mind could spring out of dead and senseless matter, and all minds could not possibly be made, nor one produced from another infinitely; there must of necessity be an eternal unmade mind, from whence those imperfect minds of ours were derived. Which perfect omnipotent mind was as well the cause of all other things, as of human souls.

But before we proceed to any further argumentation, we must needs take notice here, that the Atheists suppose no small part of their strength to lie in this very thing, namely, their disproving a God from the nature of understanding and knowledge: nor do they indeed swagger in any thing more than this. We have already set it for the eleventh atheistic argument, that knowledge being the information of the things themselves known, and all conception the action of that which is conceived, and the passion of the conceiver; the world and all sensible things must needs be before there could be any knowledge or conception of them, and no knowledge or conception before the world as its cause. Or more briefly thus: the world could not be

made by knowledge and understanding, because there could be no knowledge or understanding of the world, or of any thing in it, before it was made. For, according to these Atheists, things made knowledge, and not knowledge things; they meaning by things here such only as are sensible and corporeal. So that mind and understanding could not be the creator of the world and these sensible things, itself being the mere creature of them; a secondary derivative result from them, or a fantastic image of them; the youngest and most creaturely thing in the whole world. Whence it follows, that to suppose mind and understanding to be the maker of all things would be no better sense, than if one should suppose the images in ponds and rivers to be the makers of the sun, moon, and stars, and other things represented in them. And upon such a ground as this, does a modern writer presume to determine, that knowledge and understanding are not to be attributed to God Almighty, because they imply imperfection, and dependance upon corporeal things without: "Quoniam scientia et intellectus in nobis nihil aliud sunt, De Cive Rel. c. xv. sect. 14. quam suscitatus a rebus externis organa prementibus animi tumultus, non est putandum aliquid tale accidere Deo. Signum enim potentiae ab alio dependentis." Which is again Englished Lev. c. xxxi. thus: Knowledge and understanding being in us nothing else but a tumult in the mind, raised by external things, that press the organical parts of man's body; there is no such thing in God, nor can they be attributed to him, they being things, which depend upon natural causes.—Where this writer thus denying knowledge and

understanding to God, upon pretence, that it speaks imperfection, and dependance upon external corporeal things (it being nothing but a tumult raised by the motions and pressures of them), he must needs absolutely deny the first principle of all things to be any knowing understanding nature, unless he had asserted some other kind of knowledge distinct from that of men, and clearly attributed the same to God Almighty. Hitherto the sense of Atheists.

Now we shall, for the present, only so far forth concern ourselves in confuting this atheistic doctrine, as to lay a foundation thereby for the demonstration of the contrary, namely, the existence of a God, or a mind before the world, from the nature of knowledge and understanding. First, therefore, it is a sottish conceit of these Atheists, proceeding from their not attending to their own cogitations, that not only sense, but also knowledge and understanding in men, is but a tumult, raised from corporeal things without, pressing upon the organs of their body; or else, as they declare themselves more distinctly, nothing but the activity of sensible objects upon them, and their passion from them. For if this were true, then would every thing, that suffered and reacted motion, especially polite bodies, as looking-glasses, have something both of sense and of understanding in them. It is plain, that there comes nothing to us from bodies without us, but only local motion and pressure. Neither is sense itself the mere passion of those motions, but the perception of their passions in a way of fancy. But sensible things themselves (as, for example, light and colours) are not known or understood

either by the passion, or the fancy of sense, nor by any thing merely foreign and adventitious, but by intelligible ideas exerted from the mind itself, that is, by something native and domestic to it: nothing being more true, than this of Boetius,^a that, “*Omne, quod scitur, non ex sua, sed ex comprehendentium natura, vi, et facultate cognoscitur;*” Whatsoever is known, is known not by its own force and power, but by the force and power, the vigour and activity, of that thing itself, which knows or comprehends it.—Wherefore, besides the phantasms of singular bodies, or of sensible things existing without us (which are not mere passions neither), it is plain, that our human mind hath other cogitations or conceptions in it; namely, the ideas of the intelligible natures and essences of things, which are universal, and by and under which it understands singulars. It is a ridiculous conceit of a modern atheistic writer, that universals are nothing else but names, attributed to many singular bodies, because whatsoever *is* is singular. For though whatsoever exists without the mind be singular, yet is it plain, that there are conceptions in our minds objectively universal. Which universal objects of our mind, though they exist not as such any where without it, yet are they not therefore nothing, but have an intelligible entity for this very reason, because they are conceivable; for since nonentity is not conceivable, whatsoever is conceivable, and an object of the mind, is therefore something. And as for axiomatical truths, in which something is affirmed or denied, as these are not all passions

^a Vide Consolat. Philosoph. lib. v. p. 131.

from bodies without us; (for what local motions could impress this common notion upon our minds, that things which agree in one third, agree amongst themselves, or any other?) so neither are these things only gathered by induction from repeated and reiterated sensations; we clearly apprehending at once, that it is impossible they should be otherwise. Thus Aristotle* ingeniously: *Οὐδὲ ἐπίστασθαι δι' αἰσθήσεώς ἐστιν, ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἔχει τὰς γωνίας, ἐζητοῦμεν ἂν ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ οὐχ ὡς φασί τινες ἐπιστάμεθα· αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τῷ καθόλου γνωρίζειν ἐστὶ.* It is evident, that there is no knowledge (of the universal theorems of geometry) by sense. For if we could perceive by sense, that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right; yet should we not rest satisfied in this, as having therefore a sufficient knowledge hereof; but would seek further after a demonstration of it: sense reaching only to singulars, but knowledge to universals.—When from the universal idea of a triangle, which is neither here, nor there, nor any where, without our mind, but yet hath an intelligible entity, we see a plain necessity, that its three angles must be equal to two right, then do we know the truth of this universal theorem, and not before: as also we understand, that every singular triangle (so far as it is true) hath this property in it. Wherefore the knowledge of this, and the like truths, is not derived from singulars, nor do we arrive to them in way of ascent from singulars to universals; but, on the contrary, having first found them in the universals, we afterward

* Analytic. posterior. lib. i. p. 226. tom. i. oper.

descending, apply them to singulars : so that our knowledge here is not after singular bodies, and secondarily or derivatively from them, but in order of nature before them, and proleptical to them.

Now these universal conceptions, some of which are also abstract (as life, sense, reason, knowledge, and the like), many of them are of such things, whose singulars do not at all fall under sense; which therefore could never possibly be impressed upon us from singular bodies by local motion: and again some such, as though they belong to corporeal and sensible things, yet, as their accuracy cannot be reached to by sense, so neither did they ever exist in that matter of this lower world, which here encompasseth us, and therefore could not be stamped upon us from without: as for example, the ideas of a perfect straight line, and a plain superficies, or of an exact triangle, circle, sphere, or cube; no material thing here amongst us being terminated in so straight lines, but that even by microscopes there may be discovered much irregularity and deformity in them; and very probable it is, that there are no perfectly straight lines, no such triangles, circles, spheres, or cubes, as answer to the exactness of our conceptions, in any part of the whole material universe, nor never will be. Notwithstanding which, they are not absolute nonentities, since we can demonstrate things concerning them, and though they never were nor will be, yet are they possible to exist, since nothing can be conceived, but it either is, or else is possible to be. The human mind therefore hath a power of framing ideas and conceptions, not only of what actually is, but also of

things, which never were, nor perhaps will be, they being only possible to be. But when, from our conceptions, we conclude of some things, that though they are not, yet they are possible to be, unless there be something actually in being, which hath sufficient power to produce it; we do implicitly suppose the existence of a God or omnipotent being thereby, which can make whatsoever is conceivable, though it yet be not to exist; and therefore material triangles, circles, spheres, cubes, mathematically exact.

The result of what we have hitherto said is this, that since singular bodies are not the only objects of our mind and cogitation, it having also universal and abstract ideas of the intelligible natures or essences of things (some of which are such, whose singulars do not at all fall under sense; others, though they belong to bodies, yet sense can never reach to them, nor were they ever in matter); moreover, since our mind can conceive of things, which no where actually exist, but are only possible, and can have such a demonstrative science of universal truths, as sense can never ascend to: that therefore human knowledge and understanding itself is not the mere image and creature of singular bodies only; and so derivative, or ectypal from them, and in order of nature junior to them, but that, as it were hovering aloft over all the corporeal universe, it is a thing independant upon singular bodies, or proleptical to them, and in order of nature before them.

But what account can we then possibly give of knowledge and understanding, their nature and original? since there must be *νοητόν*, that which

is intelligible—in order of nature, before *νόησις*, or intellection.—Certainly no other than this, that the first original knowledge is that of a perfect being, infinitely good and powerful, comprehending itself, and the utmost extent of its own fecundity and power, that is, the possibilities of all things; their ideas, with their several relations to one another; all necessary and immutable truths. Here therefore is there a knowledge before the world and all sensible things, that was archetypal and paradigmatical to the same. Of which one perfect mind and knowledge all other imperfect minds (being derived from it) have a certain participation; whereby they are enabled to frame intelligible ideas, not only of whatsoever doth actually exist, but also of such things as never were nor will be, but are only possible, or objects of Divine power.

Wherefore, since it is certain, that even human knowledge and understanding itself is not a mere passion from sensible things, and singular bodies existing without (which is the only foundation of that forementioned atheistic argument, that things made knowledge, and not knowledge things), and consequently it must needs have some other original: moreover, since knowledge and understanding apprehend things proleptically to their existence (mind being able to frame conceptions of all possible entities and modifications), and therefore in their nature do plainly suppose the actual existence of a perfect being, which is infinitely fecund and powerful and could produce all things possible or conceivable; the first original Knowledge, or Mind, from whence all other knowledges and minds are derived, being that of an absolutely

perfect and omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or of its communicability, that is, the ideas of all possibilities of things, that may be produced by it, together with their relations to one another, and their necessary immutable truths; accordingly as wisdom and understanding are described to be, *ἀτμίς τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως, ἀπόρροια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης, ἔσοπτρον τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνεργείας, καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ*, the breath (or vapour) of the power of God, and an efflux (or emanation) from the glory of the Almighty, a clear mirror (or looking-glass) of his active energy or virtue, and the image of his goodness:—I say, the result of all is this, that the nature of knowledge and understanding is so far from being a ground of disproving a Deity (as the Atheists ignorantly pretend), that it affordeth a firm demonstration to us, on the contrary, of the existence of a God, a perfect omnipotent being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or all possibilities of things; a mind before the world, and senior to all things; no ectypal, but archetypal thing, which comprehended in it, as a kind of intellectual world, the paradigm or platform, according to which this sensible world was made.

And this may be further confirmed from what is generally acknowledged, and indeed cannot reasonably be denied by any, viz. that there are eternal verities, such as were never made, nor can ever be destroyed, or cease to be: as for example, such common notions as these, that equals added to equals make equals; that the cause is in order of nature before the effect, &c. together with all geometrical theorems; as Aristotle himself de-

clareth, he writing in his Ethics ^a after this manner : *περὶ αἰδίων οὐδεὶς βουλευέται, ὡς περὶ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι*. Concerning eternal (and immutable) things no man does consult ; as for example, concerning the diameter or diagonal of a square, whether it should be incommensurable to the sides, or no.—Where he plainly affirmeth this geometrical theorem, that the diameter or diagonal of a square is incommensurable to the sides, to be an eternal truth. Neither are there such eternal truths as these only in mathematics, and concerning quantity, but also in ethics concerning morality ; there being here *αἰώνια δίκαια*, as Justin Martyr calls them, things eternally just—which were not made such at certain times by law and arbitrary command, but, being such in their own nature immutably, were from everlasting to everlasting, and (as it is said of that eternal Word, which comprehends all truth) the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.^b For of these is that famous passage of Sophocles in his *Antigona*,^c

Οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθεις, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ποτε
Ζῆ ταῦτα, κούδεις οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου κφάν'

These are not things of to-day, or yesterday, but they ever live, and no man knows their date, or from whence they came.—No man can declare the time, when all common notions, and geometrical truths, were first made and generated out of nothing, or brought out of antecedent nonexistence into being. Certain it is, that such truths as these, that the diameter and sides of a square are

^a Ethicor. ad Nicomach. lib. iii. cap. v. p. 39. tom. iii. oper.

^b Heb. xiii. 8.

^c Ver. 467, 468.

incommensurable, or that the power of the hypothenuse in a rectangular triangle is equal to the powers of both the sides, were not made by any man's thinking, or by those first geometricians, who discovered or demonstrated the same; they discovering and demonstrating only that which was. Wherefore these truths were before there was any man to think of them, and they would continue still to be, though all the men in the world should be annihilated: nay, though there were no material squares and triangles any where in the whole world neither, no, nor any matter at all: for they were ever without beginning before the world, and would of necessity be ever after it, should it cease to be.

Now, if there be eternal truths, which were never made, and could not but be, then must the "rationes rerum," the simple reasons of things also, or their intelligible natures and essences, out of which those truths are compounded, be of necessity eternal likewise. For how can this be an eternal truth, that the diameter of a square is incommensurable with the sides, if the *rationes*, the reasons of a square, diameter, and sides, or their intelligible essences, were not themselves eternal? These are therefore called by Plato (a man of much meditation, and no contemptible philosopher) not only *ἀεὶ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα*, things which are always the same, and unchangeable—but also *τὰ μὴ γιγνόμενα, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ὄντα*, things which were never made, but always are—and sometimes, *μήτε γιγνόμενα, μήτε ἀπολλύμενα*, things that were neither made, nor can be destroyed—sometimes, *τὰ ἀγέννητα καὶ ἀνώλεθρα*, things ingenerable and incorruptible. —Of which Cicero

thus: "Hæc Plato negat gigni, sed semper esse, et ratione et intelligentia contineri." These things Plato affirmeth to have been never made, but always to be, and to be contained in reason and understanding.—And, though perhaps it may seem strange, even Aristotle^b himself also, notwithstanding his so often clashing with Plato's ideas, here really agreeth in the main, that the forms and species, or the universal intelligible essences of things, which are the proper and immediate objects of science, were eternal and never made: thus in his *Metaphysics*, *Τὸ εἶδος οὐδεὶς ποιεῖ οὐδὲ γεννᾶται*, No man makes the form, or species of a thing, nor was it ever generated; and again, *Τοῦ σφαῖρα εἶναι οὐκ ἔστι γένησις*, There is no generation of the essence of a sphere;—and, *Ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὰ εἶδη*, The forms or species of things are without any generation or corruption.—And he sometimes calleth these objects of science *ἀκίνητον οὐσίαν*^c or *φύσιν*, an immutable essence of nature.—Lastly, where he writeth against the Heraclitics, and those other sceptics, who denied all certainty of science he first discovers the ground of their error herein to have been this, that they supposed singular bodies, or sensibles existing without, to be the only things or objects of the mind, or knowledge: ^d *Ἄτιον τῆς δόξης τούτοις, ὅτι περὶ τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐσκόπουν, τὰ δὲ ὄντα ὑπέλαβον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον, ἐν δὲ τούτοις πολλὴ ἡ τοῦ ἀορίστου φύσις ἐνυπάρχει—ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν ὀρῶντες ταύτην κινουμένην τὴν φύσιν, κατάγει τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος οὐδὲν ἀληθευόμενον, περιγε τοῦ πάντως*

^a De Oratore ad Brutum, cap. ii. p. 685. tom. iii. oper.

^b Vide *Metaphysic.* lib. vii. cap. viii. p. 361. et lib. xiv. cap. iii. p. 473. tom. iv. oper.

^c Ibid. lib. xiv. cap. ii. p. 472. et cap. vi. p. 477.

^d Ibid. lib. iv. cap. v. p. 313.

πάντα μετάβαλλον, οὐκ ἐκδέχεσθαι ἀληθεύειν. The original of these men's mistake was this, because truth was to be looked for in things, and they conceived the only things to be sensibles, in which it is certain there is much of the indeterminate nature. Wherefore they, perceiving all the nature of sensibles to be moveable, or in perpetual flux and mutation, since nothing can possibly be verified or constantly affirmed concerning that, which is not the same but changeable, concluded, that there could be no truth at all, nor certainty of science; those things, which are the only objects of it, never continuing the same.—And then he subjoins, in way of opposition to this sceptical doctrine of theirs, and the forementioned ground thereof, Ἀξιόσομεν αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἄλλην οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, ἣ οὔτε κίνησις ὑπάρχει οὔτε φθορὰ οὔτε γενεαίσις τὸ παράπαν. We would have these men therefore to know, that there is another kind of essence of things, besides that of sensibles, to which belongeth neither motion, nor corruption, nor any generation at all.—By which essences of things, they have no generation nor corruption, he could understand nothing else but those intelligible natures, species, and ideas, which are the standing and immutable objects of science. And certain it is, that there could be no constant and immutable science at all, were there no other objects of the mind, but singulars and sensibles, because these are all mutable. Wherefore the proper and immediate objects of the geometrical science are no singular and material triangles, squares, spheres, and cubes, &c. not only because none of these are found mathematically exact, and because geometricians, in all the several distant ages and

places of the world, could not have the same singular bodies before them, but also because they do none of them continue immutably the same; all corporeal things being more or less in perpetual motion and mutation; whereas, that of which any geometrical theorem is verified and demonstrated, must be immutably and unalterably the same. The triangles and circles, spheres and cubes, of Euclid, Archimedes, Pappus, Apollonius, and all other ancient and modern geometicians, in all the distant places and times of the world, were both indivisibly one and the same, and also perfectly immutable and incorruptible, the science of geometry being such. For which cause it is affirmed also of these mathematical things, by the forementioned Aristotle, ^{Met. I. xii. c.} that they are no where as in a place, ^{v. [pag. 448.} as ^{tom. iv.oper.]} all singular bodies are, "Ατοπον δὲ καὶ τὸν τόπον ἅμα τοῖς στερεοῖς τοῖς Μαθηματικοῖς ποιῆσαι, ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόπος τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἴδιος· διὸ χωριστὰ τόπων· τὰ δὲ Μαθηματικὰ, οὐ ποῦ. It is absurd to make mathematical things to be in a place, as solid bodies are; for place belongeth only to singulars, which are therefore separable from one another by place; but mathematical things are not any where.—Because they being universal and abstract, are only in minds: nevertheless, for the same reason are they also every where, they being in every mind that apprehends them. Lastly, these intelligible essences and ideas of things are called also by Philo, ἀναγκαῖαταὶ οὐσίαι, the most necessary essences;—as being not only eternal, but having likewise necessary existence belonging to them: for though there be no absolute necessity, that there should

* Legis Allogor. lib. i. p. 68. oper.

be matter or body, yet is there an absolute necessity that there should be truth.

If therefore there be eternal intelligibles or ideas, and eternal truths, and necessary existence do belong to them; then must there be an eternal mind necessarily existing, since these truths and intelligible essences of things cannot possibly be any where but in a mind. For by the essences of things, when they are said to be eternal, must not be meant their very substances, as if every thing were in itself eternal and uncreated; or that God in creation, did only, as a modern writer abusively expresseth it, “sartoris instar, vestire essentias rerum nova existentia,” clothe the antecedent essences of things with a new garment of existence;—but only their *esse cognitum*, their possible and intelligible natures,—as they were objects of infinite power and understanding before they were made. There must be a mind senior to the world, and all sensible things, and such as at once comprehends in it the idea of all intelligibles, their necessary schemes and relations to one another, and all their immutable truths; a mind, which doth not *ὄτε μὲν νοεῖν, ὄτε δὲ οὐ νοεῖν* (as Aristotle^a writeth of it), sometimes understand, and sometimes not understand, as if it were sometimes awake, and sometimes asleep, or like an eye, sometimes open, and sometimes shut; but *οὐσία ἐνέργεια*, such a mind as is essentially act and energy, and hath no defect in it. And this, as we have already declared, can be no other than the mind of an omnipotent and infinitely perfect being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or how far itself is communicable, that is, all the possibi-

^b Vide Metaphys. lib. xiv. cap. ix. p. 483.

lities of things, that may be made by it, and their respective truths ; mind and knowledge, in the very nature of it, supposing the actual existence of an omnipotent or infinitely powerful being, as its νοητόν, or intelligible ;—it being nothing but the comprehension of the extent of infinite or Divine power, and the measure of the same.

And from hence it is evident also, that there can be but one only original mind, or no more than one understanding being self-existent ; all other minds whatsoever partaking of one original mind ; and being, as it were, stamped with the impression or signature of one and the same seal. From whence it cometh to pass, that all minds, in the several places and ages of the world, have ideas or notions of things exactly alike, and truths indivisibly the same. Truths are not multiplied by the diversity of minds that apprehend them ; because they are all but ectypal participations of one and the same original or archetypal mind and truth. As the same face may be reflected in several glasses ; and the image of the same sun may be in a thousand eyes at once beholding it ; and one and the same voice may be in a thousand ears listening to it : so when innumerable created minds have the same ideas of things, and understand the same truths, it is but one and the same eternal light, that is reflected in them all (“ that light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world”) ; or the same voice of that one everlasting Word, that is never silent, re-echoed by them. Thus was it concluded by Themistius, that one man by teaching, could not possibly beget in the mind of another the very same notions, conceptions, and knowledges, which himself had in his

own mind, *εἰ μὴ ταύτων ἦν τὸ νόημα τοῦ διδάσκοντος καὶ τοῦ μαθάνοντος*; were not the minds both of the teacher and of the learner, as it were, printed and stamped alike.—As also that men could not possibly so confer together as they do, presently apprehending one another's meaning, and raising up the very same senses in their minds, and that merely by occasion of words and sounds, *εἰ μήτις ἦν Εἷς Νοῦς οὗ πάντες ἐκοινωνοῦμεν*, were there not some one mind which all men did partake of.—As for that anti-monarchical opinion of many understanding beings, or minds, self-originated, and independent (none of which therefore could be omnipotent), it is neither conceivable, how such should all agree in the same truths, there being no common measure of truth betwixt them, no more than any common rule of their wills; nor indeed how they should have any knowledge or understanding at all, properly so called, that being the comprehension of the possibilities of things, or of the extent of infinite power: whereas, according to this hypothesis, there is no infinite power at all, the power of each of those many supposed principles or deities being limited and finite, and therefore indeed not creative of any thing neither, since that, which could create one thing, could create all, and consequently would have all depending upon it. We conclude therefore, that from the nature of mind and knowledge it is demonstrable, that there can be but one original and self-existent mind, or understanding being, from which all other minds were derived. And now have we, more copiously than we designed, confuted the first atheistic argument; we having not only asserted the idea of God, and fully answered

and refuted all the atheistic pretences against the same ; but also from this very idea of God, or a perfect being, demonstrated his existence. We shall dispatch the following atheistic objections with more brevity.

WE come, in the next place, to the Achilles of the Atheists, their invincible argument against a Divine creation and omnipotence ; because, “ Nothing could come from nothing.” It being concluded from hence, that whatsoever substantially or really is, was from all eternity of itself unmade or uncreated by any deity. Or else thus ; by God is always understood a creator of some real entity or other out of nothing ; but it is an undoubted principle of reason and philosophy, an undeniable common notion, that “ Nothing can be made out of nothing,” and therefore there can be no such creative power as this. And here we shall perform these three things ; first, we shall shew, that, in some senses, this is indeed an unquestionable truth, and common notion, that “ Nothing can come from nothing,” and what those senses are. Secondly, we shall make it evident, that in the sense of this atheistic objection, it is absolutely false, that “ Nothing can come from nothing,” or be made out of nothing ; and that a Divine creation and omnipotence can be no way impugned from the forementioned principle rightly understood. Thirdly, and lastly, we shall prove, that as from this principle or common notion, “ Nothing out of nothing,” there can be no execution at all done against Theism, or a Divine crea-

tion ; so from the very same, rightly understood, the impossibility of all Atheism may be demonstratively proved, it bringing something out of nothing in an impossible sense, as also the existence of a God evinced.

We grant therefore, in the first place, that this is in some sense an undoubted principle of reason, or an undeniable common notion, that " Nothing can come from nothing." For, first, it is unquestionably true, that " Nothing, which once was not, could ever of itself come into being ;" or, that " Nothing could bring itself out of nonexistence into being ;" that " Nothing can take beginning of existence from itself ;" or, that " Nothing can be made or produced without an efficient cause." And from hence, as hath been already intimated, it is demonstratively certain, that every thing was not made, but that there is something necessarily self-existent, and which could not but be. For had every thing been made, then must something of necessity have been made out of nothing by itself; which is impossible.

Again ; As nothing, which was not, could ever of itself come into being, or be made, without an efficient cause ; so is it certain likewise, that nothing can be efficiently caused or produced by that, which hath not in it at least equal (if not greater) perfection, as also sufficient power to produce the same. We say, nothing which was not, could ever be brought into being by that which hath not formally equal perfection in it ; because no thing can give what it hath not, and therefore so much of the perfection or entity of the effect, as is greater than that of the supposed cause, so much thereof must needs come from nothing, or be made

without a cause. Moreover, whatsoever hath equal perfection to another thing, could not therefore cause or produce that other thing ; because it might either have no active power at all, as matter hath not, it being merely passive, or else no sufficient active and productive power. As for example, though it be not impossible, that motion, which once was not, should be produced ; yet is it impossible, that it should be ever produced without a sufficient cause. Wherefore, if there were once no motion at all in the whole world, nor no life, or self-active power, in any thing, but all were dead ; then is it certain, that there could never possibly arise any motion or mutation in it to all eternity. There being no sufficient cause to produce the same ; since nothing can produce motion but that which hath life or self-activity in it ; and if motion, or any thing else, should begin to be, without a sufficient cause, then must it needs be caused by itself, or of itself come into being : which is a thing impossible. Now no imperfect being whatsoever hath a sufficient emanative power to create any other substance, or produce it out of nothing ; the utmost that can be done by imperfect beings, is only to produce new accidents and modifications ; as human souls can produce new cogitations in themselves, and new local motion in bodies. No imperfect being is substantially emanative, or can produce another substance out of nonexistence. Therefore, for any substance to be brought into being by an imperfect substance, which hath not sufficient emanative or creative power, is a thing plainly impossible ; it being all one as to say, that a substance might of itself come out of nothing into being.

And thus is it granted, that no substance could be created, or brought out of nonexistence into being, but by the sole efficiency of an absolutely perfect being, which hath both greater perfection (it eminently containing all things in it), and also a sufficient emanative or creative power.

And now have we given an account of two senses, wherein it is impossible for "any thing to come from nothing;" one, for a thing, which was not, to bring itself into being, or to be made without an efficient cause. Another, for a thing to be efficiently caused by that, which hath not at least equal perfection in it, or a sufficient emanative or productive power. Both which senses of this axiom respect the efficient cause; and thus was it frequently understood by divers of the ancients, and particularly by Cicero.^a We shall now propound a third sense, wherein this axiom is also verified, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing," respecting chiefly the material cause. For since no imperfect natural being hath any creative power, or can efficiently produce any new substance, or real entity, which was not before, into being, but only act upon pre-existing matter by motion, and modify the same, and since matter, as such, being merely passive, cannot cause any thing that was not before, or will not result from the composition or modification of it; it follows undeniably, that in all natural generations and productions out of pre-existent matter (without a Divine creation), there can never be any new substance or real entity brought out of nonexistence into being. And this was that very thing, and no other, which the ancient physiologers meant,

^a Vide lib. ejus de Fato.

when (as Aristotle, tells us) they so much insisted upon this principle, Τὸ γινόμενον ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον, That it was impossible, that any real entity should be (naturally) made or generated out of nothing;—or, as it is also otherwise expressed.^b Οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, that no real entity was either generated or corrupted.—That is, that in natural generations, corruptions, and alterations (where God is supposed not miraculously to interpose), there is no creation of any new substance, or real entity, out of nothing, nor annihilation, or destruction of any into nothing.

We are not ignorant, that the generality of modern writers have interpreted this doctrine of the old physiologers in Aristotle into quite different sense; as designing therein to take away all Divine creation out of nothing (or nonexistence); they making all things to have sprung out of matter (existing of itself from eternity) either without a God, or else rather (because Parmenides and Empedocles, and other assertors of this doctrine, were undoubted Theists) with him. So that God could not create any new entity out of nothing, but only make things out of pre-existing unmade matter, as a carpenter doth a house, or a weaver a piece of cloth. And thus it is commonly taken for granted, that no Pagan philosopher ever went so far, as to acknowledge a Divine creation of any thing out of nothing, in the sense of Christian theologers. And here we grant indeed, that, besides the Stoics, there have been some other philosophic Theists amongst the Pagans of this per-

^a Natural. Auscultat. lib. i. p. 451. tom. i. oper. vide etiam. cap. viii. p. 457, et alias.

^b Ibid. lib. i. cap. viii. p. 457.

suasion, that nothing was, nor could be made by God, otherwise than out of something pre-existing ; as Plutarchus Chæronensis for one, who in a place already cited positively affirmeth,^a τὸν μὲν κόσμον ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγονέναι, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἐξ ἧς γέγονεν, οὐ γενομένην, ἀλλὰ ὑποκειμένην αἰὲ τῷ δημιουργῷ ; that though the world were indeed made by God, yet the substance or matter, out of which it was made, was not made.—And then he subjoins this very reason for it, οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γένεσις, ἀλλ' οὐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς, μηδ' ἰκανῶς ἔχοντος, ὡς οἰκίας καὶ ἱματίου καὶ ἀνδριάντος· because there can be no making of any thing out of nothing, but only out of something pre-existing, not rightly ordered, or sufficiently disposed ; as in a house, garment, or statue.—From which conceit of Plutarch's, though he were otherwise ingenious, it may well be supposed, that the dull Bæotic air had too much effect upon him. However, neither Plutarch nor the Stoics, as we conceive, are for this to be accounted absolute and downright Atheists, but only imperfect, mongrel, and spurious Theists. And therefore were Atheists never so much able to prove, that there could be no creation out of nothing pre-existing, which they cannot at all do ; yet would not this overthrow Theism in general, there being a latitude therein. Nevertheless, it will undeniably appear from what shall follow, that those ancient Italics and Pythagorics were so far from intending here any such thing, to deduce all things out of matter, either without or with a God, as that they plainly designed the very contrary ; namely, to prove that no new real entity could be made out of matter, and particularly that souls

^a Libro de Procreat. Animæ ex Timæo, p. 1014. tom. ii. oper.

could not be generated out of the same ; which therefore of necessity must, according to them, have another Divine original, and be made by God, not out of matter, but out of nothing pre-existing ; since it could not be supposed by any, that all souls existed of themselves from eternity unmade. And indeed all those Pagan philosophers, who asserted the incorporeity of souls, must of necessity, in like manner, suppose them not to have been made out of pre-existing matter, but by God out of nothing. Plutarch being only here to be excepted, by reason of a certain odd hypothesis which he had, that was peculiarly his own, of a third principle, besides God and matter, a disorderly soul, or evil demon self-existent, who therefore seems to have supposed all particular human souls to have been made neither out of nothing, nor yet out of matter or body pre-existing, but out of a certain strange commixture of the substance of that evil soul and God blended together: upon which account does he affirm souls to be, not so much *ἔργον* as *μέρος θεοῦ*, not so much the work of God, as a part of him.—And now let any one judge, whether upon Plutarch's account, there be not yet further reason to complain of this Bœotic air. Wherefore we conclude, that those old physiologists in Aristotle, who insisted so much upon that principle, that no real entity could be made or generated out of nothing, acted only as physiologists therein, and not as theologers or metaphysicians ; they not opposing a Divine creation out of nothing pre-existing, but only contending, that no new entity could be made out of matter, and that in natural generations and corruptions there was no creation or annihilation of any thing.

But what the true scope and meaning of these physiologers indeed was, will more plainly appear from that use or improvement which themselves made of this philosophic principle; and this was twofold. For, first, it is certain, that upon this foundation, they all of them endeavoured to establish a peculiar kind of physiology; and some atomology or other, either a homœomery, a similar or dissimilar atomology. For Anaxagoras looking upon this maxim of the Italic philosophers, that nothing could be physically made out of nothing, or no real entity generated or corrupted, as an undoubted principle of reason; and being also not able to conceive otherwise of the forms and qualities of bodies, than that they were real entities, distinct from the substance of matter, or its modifications; concluded, that therefore in generations, corruptions, and alterations, these were not created out of nothing, and annihilated into nothing, but that every thing was naturally made, *ἐκ προὔπαρχόντων καὶ ἐνυπαρχόντων*, out of pre-existent, and in-existent things;—and consequently that there were, in all things, similar atoms and particles of every kind, though by reason of their parvitude insensible to us, and every thing seemed to be only that which was most predominant and conspicuous in it. To wit, that bone was made out of bony atoms, and flesh out of fleshy, hot things out of hot atoms, and cold things out of cold, black out of black, and white out of white, &c. and nothing out of nothing, but every thing out of pre-existing similar atoms. Thus was the sense of Anaxagoras plainly declared by Aristotle,^a that because contraries

^a Natural. Auscultat. lib. cap. v. p. 451. tom. i. oper.

were made out of one another, they were therefore before in-existent. For since every thing must of necessity be made, either out of something, or out of nothing, and all physiologers agree, that it is impossible for any thing to be made out of nothing; it follows unavoidably, that whatsoever is generated, must be generated out of things pre-existing and in-existing, though by reason of their parvitude insensible to us; that is, out of similar or homogeneal atoms, of which there are some of all kinds in every thing; every thing being mingled in every thing. Here therefore have we the Anaxagorean homœomery, or similar atomology, built upon this principle of reason, as its foundation, that "Nothing can naturally be made or generated out of nothing."

But the Italics or Pythagorics, as well before Anaxagoras as after him (with whom also hitherto concurred Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, those atheizers of the Italic physiology), did with much better reason from the same fundamental principle conclude, that since these forms and qualities of bodies were unquestionably generated and corrupted, they were therefore no entities really distinct from the substance of matter, or its modifications, but only different dispositions or modifications of the insensible parts thereof, causing in us different phantasms: and this was the first original of the dissimilar atomology. In matter or body therefore, as such, there was nothing else to these philosophers conceivable, but only magnitude of parts, figure, site, and motion, or rest; and these were those few elements, out of which in-existing, and variously combined together, they supposed all those

forms and qualities of bodies (commonly so called) in generations to result, without the production of any new real entity out of nothing. For as out of a few letters in the alphabet of every language, differently placed and combined, do result innumerable syllables, words, and sounds, signifying all the several things in heaven and earth; sometimes from all the very same letters, neither more nor fewer, but only transposed, are begotten very different phantasms of sounds in us, but without the production of any new real entity out of nothing: in the very same manner, from those fewer letters in the alphabet of the corporeal nature, variously combined, or from the different modifications of matter, in respect of magnitude of parts, figure, site, and motion, are made up and spelled out all those syllables of things, that are in the whole world, without the production of any new real entity. Many times the very same numerical matter, neither more nor less, only differently modified, causing very different phantasms in us, which are therefore vulgarly supposed to be forms and qualities in the things; as when the same water is successively changed and transformed into vapour, snow, hail, and ice. And to this very purpose is the forementioned similitude elegantly pursued by the Epicurean poet, in these following verses;

L. ii. p. 191. *Quin etiam refert nostris in versibus ipsis,*
 Lamb. *Cum quibus et quali sint ordine quæque locata.*
 [ver. 1012.] *Namque eadem coelum, mare, terras, flumina, solem,*
 Significant, eadem fruges, arbusta, animantes.
 Sic ipsis in rebus item jam materiai
 Concursus, motus, ordo, positura, figuræ,
 Cum permutantur, mutari res quoque debent.

For were those supposed forms and qualities,

produced in generations and alterations, entities really distinct from the substance of matter, or its different modifications, in respect of the magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts (there being no such things before in-existing, as Anaxagoras supposed); then would they materially proceed from nothing, which is a thing impossible. And this dissimilar atomology of the ancient Italics, so far as to these material forms and qualities, seems to be undoubtedly the only true physiology; it being built upon this sure principle of reason, that because nothing can give what it hath not, therefore no new substance of real entity can be materially produced in the generations and alterations of nature as such, but only modifications. As when an architect builds a house, or a weaver makes a piece of cloth, there is only a different modification of the pre-existent matter.

This is the first improvement which the ancient Italic philosophers made of this principle, that "Nothing can be (physically and materially) generated out of nothing;" or that "No real entity is naturally generated or corrupted;" that therefore the forms and qualities of bodies were no real entities, but only different modifications. But besides this, there was also another thing, which these philosophers principally aimed at herein, as a corollary deducible from the same principle concerning souls; that since the souls of animals, especially human, are unquestionably entities really distinct from matter, and all its modifications (no magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, being ever able to beget cogitation or consciousness, much less a power of understanding eternal verities); that therefore these could not

be generated out of matter, nor corrupted into the same. Because forms and qualities are continually generated and corrupted, made out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again; therefore are they no entities really distinct from matter, and its different modifications: but because souls, at least human, are unquestionably entities really distinct from matter, and all its modifications; therefore can they not possibly be generated out of matter, nor corrupted into the same. For if human souls were generated out of matter, then must some real entity be materially produced of nothing, there being nothing of life and cogitation in matter; which is a thing absolutely impossible. Wherefore, these philosophers concluded concerning souls, that being not generated out of matter, they were insinuated or introduced into bodies in generations. And this was always a great controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists concerning the human soul, as Lucretius expresseth it;^a

Nata sit, an contra nascentibus insinuetur,

Whether it were made or generated out of matter (that is, indeed, out of nothing), or else were *θύραθεν*, from without,—insinuated into bodies in generations? Which latter opinion of theirs supposes souls as well to have existed before the generations of all animals, as to exist after their deaths and corruptions; there being properly nothing of them generated, but only their union with those particular bodies. So that the generations, and corruptions, or deaths of animals, according to this hypothesis, are nothing but an anagrammatical transposition of things in the universe, pre

and post-existent souls being sometimes united to one body, and sometimes to another. But it doth not therefore follow, because these ancient philosophers held souls to be thus ingenerable, and to have pre-existed before the generation of animals, that therefore they supposed all souls to have existed of themselves from eternity unmade: this being a thing which was never asserted any more by Theist than Atheist; since even those philosophic Theists, who maintained *æternitatem animorum*, the eternity of human minds and souls,—together with the worlds, did notwithstanding assert their essential dependence upon the Deity, like that of the lights upon the sun; as if they were a kind of eternal effulgency, emanation, or irradiation, from an eternal sun. Even Proclus himself, that great champion for the eternity of the world and souls in this very case, when he writes against Plutarch's self-existent evil soul, expressly declaring, that *πᾶσα ψυχὴ γένημα ἐστὶ τοῦ θεοῦ*, there is no self-existent soul; but every soul whatsoever is the work, effect, and production, of God.—Wherefore, when they affirmed souls to be ingenerable, their meaning was no more than this, that they were not mere accidental things, as forms and qualities are, nor any more generated out of matter, than matter itself is generated out of something else; upon which account, as Aristotle^b informs us, souls were called also by them, *ἀρχαί*, principles,—as well as matter, they being both of them substances in the universe alike original; that is, neither of them made out of the other. But they did not suppose them to be ἀγε-

^a Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. ii. p. 116.

^b Vide lib. i. de Anima. cap. ii. p. 5. tom. ii. oper.

νήτους, ingenerate or unmade—in the other sense, as if they had been self-originated, and independent, as Plutarch's second and third principles, his evil soul, and matter, were by him imagined to be; but so doubtless, as that if the world had had any beginning, they should then have been all created together with it out of nothing pre-existing. But as for the perpetual creation of new souls, in the successive generations of animals, this indeed is a thing which these philosophers were extremely abhorrent from, as thinking it incongruous, that souls, which are in order of nature senior to bodies, should be in order of time juniors to them; as also not reasonable, that Divine creation (as it were prostituted) should without end perpetually attend and wait upon natural generations, and be intermingled with them.

But as for this pre-existence of souls, we have already declared our own sense concerning it, in the first chapter. Though we cannot deny, but that, besides Origen,^a several others of the ancient fathers before the fifth council, seem either to have espoused it, or at least to have had a favour and kindness for it; insomuch that St. Augustine^b himself is sometimes staggering in this point, and thinks it to be a great secret, whether men's souls existed before their generations or no; and somewhere concludes it to be a matter of indifferency, wherein every one may have his liberty of opening either way without offence. Wherefore, all that can be certainly affirmed in this case is, that human souls could not possibly

^a Vide Petr. Dan. Huetium in Origenianis, lib. ii. Quæst. vi. §. 4. p. 93. et §. 10. p. 97.

^b Vide Hen. Noris. Vindic. Augustian. cap. iv. p. 101.

be generated out of matter, but were some time or other created by God Almighty out of nothing pre-existing, either in generations or before them. Lastly, as for brute animals, we must confess, that if they be not mere machines or *automata*, as some seem inclinable to believe, but conscious and thinking beings; then from the same principle of reason it will likewise follow, that their souls cannot be generated out of matter neither, and therefore must be derived from the fountain of all life, and created out of nothing by him; who since he can as easily annihilate as create, and does all for the best, no man need at all to trouble himself about their permanency or immortality.

And now have we given a full and particular account of all the several senses wherein this axiom must be acknowledged to be undeniably true, that "Nothing can possibly be made out of nothing," or "come from nothing;" namely, these three. First, that "Nothing, which was not, could ever bring itself into being, or efficiently produce itself;" or, that "Nothing can possibly be made without an efficient cause." Secondly, that "Nothing, which was not, could be produced, or brought into being, by any other efficient cause, than such as hath at least equal perfection in it, and a sufficient active or productive power." For if any thing were made by that, which hath not equal perfection, then must so much of the effect, as transcendeth the cause, be indeed made without a cause (since nothing can give what it hath not), or be caused by itself, or by nothing. Again, to suppose a thing to be produced by that which hath no sufficient productive power, is really to suppose it also to be produced from itself with-

out a cause, or from nothing. Where it is acknowledged by us, that no natural, imperfect created being can create, or emanatively produce a new substance, which was not before, and give it its whole being. Hitherto is the axiom verified in respect of the efficient cause. But in the third place, it is also true in respect of the material likewise. Not that "nothing could possibly be ever made" by any power whatsoever, but only out of pre-existent matter; and consequently, that matter itself could be never made, but was self-existent. For the falsity of this is sufficiently evident from what hath been already declared concerning human souls, their being undoubtedly substances incorporeal, which therefore could never be generated out of matter; and it will be further manifested afterwards. But the third and last sense is this; that "Nothing, which is materially made out of things pre-existing (as some are), can have any other real entity," than what was either before contained in or resulteth from the things themselves so modified. Or, that there can be no new entities or substances naturally generated out of matter; and therefore that all natural generations are really nothing else but mixtures, or new modifications of things pre-existing.

These, I say, are all the senses wherein it is impossible, that any thing should be made out of nothing, or come from nothing; and they may be all reduced to this one general sense, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing causally;" or, that "Nothing cannot cause any thing, either efficiently or materially." Which as it is undeniably true, so is it so far from making any thing against a Divine creation, or the exist-

ence of a God, that the same may be demonstratively proved, and evinced from it, as shall be shewed afterward.

But there is another sense, wherein things may be said to be made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, or out of nothing,—when those words are not taken causally, but only so as to signify the *terminus a quo*, or term from which—they are made, to wit, an antecedent nonexistence. And then the meaning of this proposition, that “Nothing can possibly be made out of nothing,” will be this; that *nothing, which once was not*, could by any power whatsoever be afterwards brought into being. And this is the sense insisted on in this second atheistic argumentation, framed according to the principles of the Democritic or Epicurean Atheism; that no real entity, which once was not, could by any power whatsoever be made, or brought out of nonexistence into being; and consequently, that no creative power out of nothing can possibly belong to any thing, though supposed never so perfect.

In answer whereunto, we shall perform these two things; first, we shall make it appear, that “Nothing out of nothing,” taken in this sense declared, is so far from being a common notion, that it is not at all true. And secondly, we shall prove, that if it were true, yet would it of the two make more against Atheism, than it does against Theism, and therefore ought by no means to be used by Atheists, as an argument against a Deity. First, therefore, it is unquestionably certain, that this cannot be universally true, that nothing, which once was not, could possibly be made or brought out of nonexistence into being; because

if it were true, then could there be no such thing as making or causing at all ; no action nor motion, and consequently no generation nor mutation in the corporeal universe, but the whole world would belike a stiff immoveable adamantine rock ; and this would doubtless be a better argument against motion than any of Zeno's was. But we have all experience within ourselves of a power of producing new cogitations in our own minds, new intellectual and moral habits, as also new local motion in our bodies, or at least new determinations thereof, and of causing thereby new modifications in bodies without us. And therefore are the Atheists forced to restrain the sense of this proposition to substantial things only, that though there may be new accidents and modifications produced out of nothing, yet there can be no new substances made ; however they be not able in the mean time to give any reason, why one of those should be in itself more impossible than the other, or why no substance should be makeable. But that some are so staggered with the seeming plausibility of this argument, is chiefly upon these following accounts. First, by reason of the confusion of their own conceptions ; for, because it is certain, that " nothing can possibly be made out of nothing," in one sense, to wit, causally ; they not distinguishing senses, nor being aware of the equivocation, that is, in this $\xi\kappa$ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing,—inadvertently give their assent to those words in a wrong sense ; that no substance (as matter) could possibly be brought out of non-existence into being. Secondly, by reason of their unskilful arguing from artificial things ; when, because nothing can be artificially made but out

of pre-existing matter, as a house or garment, and the like (there being nothing done in the production of these things, but only a new modification of what before substantially was), they over hastily conclude, that no power whatsoever could produce any thing otherwise than out of pre-existing matter, and that matter itself therefore could not possibly be made. In which conceit they are again further confirmed from hence, because the old physiologers maintained the same thing concerning natural generations likewise, that nothing was in them produced *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, out of nothing—neither: or that there was no new substance or entity made in them really distinct from the pre-existing matter and its modifications; they unwarily extending this beyond the bounds of physics into metaphysics, and unduly measuring, or limiting infinite power accordingly. Lastly, because it is undeniably certain concerning ourselves, and all imperfect created beings, that none of these can create any new substance which was not before; men are therefore apt to measure all things by their own scantling, and to suppose it universally impossible, according to human reason, for any power whatsoever thus to create; whence it follows, that theology must in this be acknowledged to be contradictious to the principles of natural light and understanding. But since it is certain, that imperfect created beings can themselves produce some things out of nothing pre-existing, as new cogitations, and new local motion, new modifications and transformations of things corporeal; it is very reasonable to think, that an absolutely-perfect being could do something more, that is, create new substances out of nothing, or

give them their whole being. And it may well be thought to be as easy for God, or an omnipotent being, to make a whole world, matter and all, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing—as it is for us to create a thought, or to move a finger, or for the sun to send out rays, or a candle light ; or lastly, for any opaque body to produce the image of itself in glasses or water, or to project a shadow ; all these imperfect things being but the energies, rays, images, or shadows, of the Deity. For a substance, which once was not, to be made by God, or a being infinitely perfect, this is not for it to be made out of nothing, in the impossible sense, it coming from him who is all. Nor can it be said to be impossible, for any thing whatsoever to be made by that, which hath not only infinitely greater perfection, but also a sufficient active power to produce the same, it being substantially emanative. It is true, indeed, that infinite power itself cannot do things in their own nature impossible ; and this is therefore the only thing which the Atheists have to prove, that it is in itself absolutely impossible, for a substance (though not for an accident or modification) to be produced out of nonexistence into being. Whereas nothing is in itself absolutely impossible but what implies a contradiction ; and though it be contradictory for a thing to be, and not be, at the same time ; yet is there no manner of contradiction at all in this, for any imperfect contingent being, which before was not, afterwards to be. Wherefore, this being in itself no way impossible, it must be acknowledged to be a due object of infinite power, or that which may be done by a perfect omnipotent being existing.

If nothing could be made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing,—in this latter sense, that is, *nothing which before was not*, afterwards brought into being; then must the reason hereof be, because no substance or real entity can be caused by any other substance, so as to receive and derive its whole being from it: and consequently whatsoever substance or real entity is in the whole world, was not only from eternity without beginning, but also existed of itself necessarily and independently upon any thing else. But, first, it hath been already declared, that it is repugnant to the human faculties, that any temporary successive being whatsoever, or that time itself, should be eternal without beginning because upon that hypothesis there would always have been an infinity of time past; and if so, then See Enchir. Mel. c. x. would there of necessity have been time past, which was never present. But, to make every substantial thing, not only to have existed from eternity without beginning (which hath yet been done by some mistaken Theists), but also to have existed independently upon any thing else as its cause, or original, and therefore of itself necessarily; this, I say, is itself to make “something to come from nothing in the impossible sense,” to wit, causally. For as when some Atheists affirm, that “Nothing could ever move itself,” and yet suppose notwithstanding, that there hath been motion from all eternity, they plainly make this motion (however supposed to be eternal) to come from nothing in the impossible sense: so, in like manner, they, who suppose things to have existed of themselves necessarily, which have no self-existence, and necessary existence contained in their

nature (as nothing but a perfect being hath), do make this necessary existence of such things to have come from nothing. Wherefore though it be certain, that something did exist of itself necessarily from all eternity, namely, a perfect being (whose necessary existence is therefore not from nothing, because essentially included in its own nature), yet is it certain, likewise, that there can be but one such thing; necessity of existence being natural and essential to no more. But as for all other things, which are in their own nature contingently possible to be or not to be, reason pronounces of them, that they could not exist of themselves necessarily, but were caused by something else; and derived their original from that one absolutely-perfect, and necessarily-existent being. So that Plato's^a distinction must needs be here allowed of betwixt two kinds of beings, τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ ὄν, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, that which always is, and was never made, nor had beginning;—and τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν, ὄν δὲ οὐδέποτε, that which was made, or had beginning, but never truly is;—it having not a permanent, but successive or flowing duration. Accordingly whereunto, Aristotle also affirmeth,^b That there is no necessity all things should be unmade or self-originated; but some things might be made from others unmade.

Lastly, We shall disprove the truth of this assertion, that whatsoever substantially and really is, did exist of itself from all eternity unmade, after this manner. Because it would follow from thence, that not only matter, and unqualified atoms (as the Democritic Atheists suppose), but

^a Vide Phædon. p. 384, 385. et de Repub. lib. vi. p. 479.

^b Vide lib. ii. de Cælo. cap. ii. p. 674. tom. i. oper.

also souls, especially human, must needs have existed of themselves too, from eternity unmade. For as no man can be so sottish, as to conceive himself, or that which thinketh in him, his own soul or mind, and personality to be no real entity, whilst every clod of earth is such; so is it certain, that mind can never be generated out of dead and senseless matter or body, nor result, as a modification thereof, out of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, and therefore must needs be a thing really distinct from it, or substance incorporeal; the Democritic Atheists being here grossly deceived in thinking, that because forms and qualities of bodies may be resolved into these forementioned elements of matter, and consequently concluded to be no entities really distinct from the substance thereof, but only different modifications of the same, that therefore the like may be said of souls too, the rational not excepted. Wherefore, if no substance or real entity could ever be brought out of nonexistence into being, or be caused by any thing else, then must all human souls and personalities, as well as matter and atoms, have existed not only from eternity, without beginning, but also of themselves independently upon any other thing. But the Atheists are so abhorrent from this eternity of human souls, that they will by no means admit of their post-existence or immortality; they apprehending that if any living understanding being should prove immortal, they could not sufficiently secure themselves against the possibility and danger of a God. Some Theists, indeed, have asserted *æternitatem animorum*, not only the pre-existence, but also the eternity of all human minds,

together with the world, as Cicero more than once doth; who also, in his book of Divination,^a thus further declares himself concerning it: “*Animus, quia vixit ab omni æternitate, versatusque est cum innumerabilibus animis, omnia, quæ in natura rerum sunt, videt:*” Our mind, because it hath existed from all eternity, and conversed with innumerable minds, seeth all things that are in nature:—and again, “*Cum animi hominum semper fuerint futurique sint:*” Since the minds of men ever were, and ever will be.—Nevertheless none of these ever maintained, that human minds, and their distinct personalities, were thus all, of themselves, independently upon any thing as their cause or original. And, as it was before demonstrated from the nature of knowledge and understanding (it comprehending the possibilities of all things, and therefore supposing infinite power), that there can be but one mind, or understanding being, self-existent, all minds partaking of that one mind; so is it hardly possible for any one in good earnest to entertain such a conceit as this, that his own particular soul, mind, and personality, and consequently all human souls, though subject to such laws of fate as now they are, did not only pre-exist before their respective bodies, and were from eternity without beginning, but also existed of themselves necessarily and independently upon any thing else. Wherefore, if human souls, minds, and personalities, being unquestionably substantial things and really distinct from matter (which therefore could not possibly be generated out of it), did not all exist from eternity of themselves, necessarily and independently, it is certain, that

^a Lib. i. cap. li. p. 3174. tom. ix. oper.

they must derive their whole being from the Deity, or be created ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing,—or nonexistence by it. And if human souls were unquestionably thus created, it cannot reasonably be doubted, but that matter or body itself was created likewise out of nothing, or caused by the Deity: forasmuch as that, which created one thing out of nothing, could create every thing; and there is really more of substance, that is, a higher degree of entity, in minds and souls, conscious self-moving and understanding beings, than in senseless matter, or unactive bulk.

But forasmuch as this doctrine of a Divine creation out of nothing pre-existing lies under no small prejudice upon this account, because it is so generally taken for granted, that none of the Pagan Theists, who are supposed to have kept close to the simple light of nature, did ever acknowledge in the Deity any such creative power out of nothing, or that God was the cause of any substance; we must of necessity here declare this, how common soever it be, to be a great mistake. For besides that Plato, in his Sophist,^a having defined the efficient or effective power in general after this manner, ποιητικὴν πᾶσαν ἔφαμεν εἶναι δύναμιν, ἥτις ἂν αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὔσιν ὑστερον γίνεσθαι, to be a power or casuality, whereby that, which was not before, was afterwards made to be;—and then dividing this efficiency into Divine and human, he immediately subjoins concerning the former, Ζῶα δὴ πάντα, &c. μῶν ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὑστερον γίνεσθαι, πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα; Shall we not then say, that all animals, and other things, were by the Divine efficiency alone, after they had not

^a Pag. 168. oper. edit. Ficini.

been made to be?—Where thus much at least is certain, that Plato did not at all question the possibility of a thing's being made out of nothing in this sense; that is, brought into being, after it had not been, by a Divine power. But because it may be thought that he meant this no further than of the first compages of animals, in which notwithstanding every thing, souls, and all, might be made out of pre-existing matter; we shall here further add, what in his *Timæus*^a he declareth concerning the soul, τὴν ψυχὴν οὐχ ὡς νῦν ὑστέραν ἐπιχειροῦμεν λέγειν, οὕτως ἐμχανήσατο καὶ ὁ θεὸς νεωτέραν, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄρξασθαι πρεσβύτερον ὑπὸ νεωτέρου εἴασεν, ὁ δὲ καὶ γενέσει καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος, ὡς δεσπότην καὶ ἄρξουσιν ἀρξομένους συνεστήσατο· that God did not make it after body, and junior to it; since it was not fit that the elder should be ruled or governed by the younger; but he made soul before body, older than it, and superior to it, as well in respect of time as dignity.—Which notion is further pursued by him in his tenth de *Legibus*:^b Ὁρθῶς ἄρα καὶ κυρίως ἀληθέστατά τε καὶ τελεώτατα εἰρηκότες ἂν ἦμεν, ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος ἡμῖν· σῶμα δὲ δεύτερόν τε καὶ ὑστέρον ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν. Wherefore it was rightly, properly, and most truly affirmed by us, that soul was made first, as that which ruleth; but body afterward, as that which is to be ruled and governed thereby.—From whence also he draws this consecretary, ὡς εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ φανείη πρεσβύτερα σώματος οὔσα, καὶ τὰ ψυχῆς τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔσοιτο πρεσβύτερα· τρόποι καὶ ἦθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς, ἐπιμέλειαί τε καὶ μνήμαι, πρότερα μήκουσιν σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους, εἴη γεγονότα ἂν, εἴπερ καὶ ψυχὴ σώματος· that if the soul be older than

^a Pag. 528. oper.^b Pag. 669.

the body, then must the things of the soul also be older than those of the body; and therefore cogitation, and the several species of it, must be, in order of nature, not only before local motion, but also before longitude, latitude, and profundity of bodies.—From whence it is plain, that Plato's first *γένεσις*, or production of souls by God, could not be out of any pre-existing body or matter, they being affirmed by him to be before, not only this and that particular body, but all body whatsoever, before longitude, latitude, and profundity. Which may be further confirmed from hence, because in his *Sophist*^a he plainly condemns that opinion of some, *τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν σῶμά τι κεκτῆσθαι*, that the soul itself had something of body in it;—and he often elsewhere declares the soul to be incorporeal. It is certain also, that not only Plato, but all those other Pagan philosophers too, who asserted the incorporeity and immortality of human souls, could not possibly conceive souls to have been made out of pre-existent matter, but either *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, out of nothing,—they being not eternal, but having a newness of being (as Plato himself seemed to suppose); or else, if they were conceived to be eternal by them (which was the opinion of most of the junior Platonists, yet), to have derived their whole substance from the Deity, and always to depend upon it; as eternal light would depend upon an eternal sun. Plutarch and his followers being only here to be excepted, who would neither have souls made out of nothing by God, nor yet out of corporeal matter pre-existing (they being themselves incorporeal); but out of a strange commixture of the substance of God him-

^a Pag. 170.

self with the substance of a certain disorderly soul, self-existent and uncreated; of which we have spoken already. But that the genuine Platonists did universally suppose, that one substance might be caused by another, and derive its whole being from it, is undeniably evident from hence, because their second Divine hypostasis or substance (though eternal) was according to them derived from, or begotten by, their first, and their third hypostasis or substance produced both from the first and second; and other inferior orbs of being, as the particular souls of demons and men, from that whole trinity of Divine hypostases jointly concurring. And as for matter or body itself, it is certain also, that Proclus and other Platonists expressly denied it to have been *ἀγέννητον*, unmade or self-existent,—and conceived it to have derived its whole being from the Deity; who accordingly is styled by Proclus,^a *ἄρρητος αἰτία τῆς ὕλης*, the ineffable Cause of matter.—In like manner have we already shewed, that, according to the Chaldee oracles, matter itself was also caused or produced by the Deity, to which purpose is this verse cited by Proclus,^b *Ἐνθεν ἄδην θρώσκει γέ- νεσις πολυποικίλου ὕλης*. From whence (that is, from the Deity) abundantly springs forth the generation of the multiform matter.—The metre here requiring, that it should be read *ἄδην*, and not *ἄρδην*, as it is in Proclus's copy. Moreover, Jamblichus hath recorded in his *Mysteries*,^c that Hermes, and the old Egyptian theologers likewise, held matter not to be *ἀγέννητον*, that is, self-existent,

^a Comment. in *Timæum* Platon. lib. ii. p. 116.

^b *Ibid.* p. 118.

^c *De Mysteriis Ægyptior.* sect. v. cap. xxiii. p. 138. sect. viii. cap. iii. p. 159.

unmade, or underived—from the Deity, but to have been caused by it. Whence does Proclus^a conclude it probable, that Plato was of the same persuasion also; as likewise Orpheus before had been, he deriving this, as is supposed, with other things, from the Egyptians. It is true, indeed, that many of these philosophers asserted matter, souls, and the whole world, to have been eternal without beginning, and consequently not created

Thus Hierocles in Photius : *δημιουργῶν θεὸν ἀποφύλαττον ὁ Πλάτων πάσης ἐμφανῶς τε καὶ ἀφανῶς διακοσμήσας, ἐκ μηδενὸς ἀποκειμένου γεγονεμένος, &c.*
 Plato censuit mundum a Deo, ex nulla prius existente materia, productum, &c.

ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, in that stricter sense, that is, out of an antecedent nonexistence in time. Notwithstanding which, they did suppose them to have received their whole being from the Deity, and to have depended on it every jot as much, as if, having once not been, they had afterward been made by it. And that, which gives to any substance its whole being, though from eternity, so that it never was not; the same upon supposition, that it once had not been, could unquestionably have produced it, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing,—or an antecedent nonexistence.

We have now sufficiently disproved the truth of that assertion, that “ Nothing could be made out of nothing,” in the atheistic sense thereof; viz. that “ Nothing, which before was not, could afterwards possibly be made to be:” though this should not be extended so far, as to accidental things, and modifications, but restrained and confined only to substantial; “ That no substance whatsoever could have a newness of being, or be caused by any other substance:” but whatsoever substantial thing any where is in the world, the same did exist of

^a Comment in Timæum Platon. lib. ii.

itself from eternity, and independently upon any thing else; nothing but different modifications being made or produced. Which same assertion has been also sometimes otherwise thus expressed; "Nothing can be made but out of pre-existing substance:" the meaning hereof being this, that nothing can be made, but new accidental modifications of what before substantially was; no substance itself being makeable or producible by any other substance, neither in time (so as to have a newness or beginning of being), nor yet from eternity. Where the Atheists and some others taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body, or matter, do further limit and restrain the sense of that proposition in this manner; "Nothing can be made but out of pre-existing matter;" that is, nothing can be made but out of corporeal substance pre-existing. An *idolūm specus* (if I may use that language) which in all probability had its first original chiefly from men's measuring the extent of all power by their own production of artificial things. Because, forsooth, a carpenter or architect cannot make a house, but out of pre-existing timber, bricks, and stones; nor a tailor a garment, but out of pre-existing cloth; nor a cook, puddings or pies, but out of pre-existing materials or ingredients; that therefore no power whatsoever, no, not that of God Almighty, can extend any further, than to the new-modifying of pre-existent matter, but not to the production or causing of any substance. We shall in the next place make it appear, that were this assertion true, That no substance or real entity, which once was not, could be caused or produced, yet would it notwithstanding, of the two, more impugn Atheism

than Theism (it being possible for falsehoods, though not for truths, to disagree), forasmuch as the Atheists do bring more out of nothing, or non-existence, than the Theists do; and therefore ought not to make this an objection against Theism. For though, according to the true and genuine theology, God, or a perfect being, be supposed to be the only necessary self-existent thing, and the cause of all other substance, and consequently to have produced all imperfect things, not only souls, but also matter itself, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing,—or an antecedent nonexistence; yet is there, by reason of the weakness of human understandings, a latitude in Theism. Wherefore some there are, who though imposed upon by that *idolum specus*, or imprisoned in it, that “nothing can possibly be made, but out of pre-existing matter,” by the new modification thereof; do notwithstanding devoutly worship a Deity, according to their notion of it, a perfectly understanding being unmade; though not the creator of matter, yet the maker of the whole world out of it, and the supreme governor of the same; they thus supposing two principles in the universe, an active and a passive one, God and matter. Besides which, it is not impossible for others to think, that though matter or body be not the only substance, but human souls are incorporeal, yet the substance of these souls was not created out of nothing, no more than that of body, but they were made either out of some pre-existing common soul (as their intelligible matter), or out of the substance of the Deity itself; or else existed of themselves from eternity unmade: and yet nevertheless may these acknowledge one supreme understanding being

self-existent also, though neither the creator of matter, nor of souls, yet the supreme governor and orderer of all. And it is certain, that Plutarch's god was no better than this; and yet was that Pagan, notwithstanding, a devout religionist in his kind, as well as a hearty moralist. And such a Theism or theology, as either of those forementioned (though not genuine and sincere, but imperfect and mongrel things), would perhaps be to the Atheists little less troublesome and uneasy than the truth. Thus have we shewed, that this principle, "That nothing can come out of nothing," or be made, otherwise than out of pre-existing substance or matter, though it be indeed contradictory to the true and genuine theology, yet it is not absolutely inconsistent with all manner of religion; there being certain spurious or imperfect forms of Theism built upon this foundation. But now, on the contrary, we shall make it manifest, that this very principle, made use of by the Atheists, is in truth and reality contradictory to all manner of Atheism, and destructive of the same; the Atheists universally generating and corrupting real entities, and substantial things, that is, producing them out of nothing, or nonexistence, and reducing them to nothing again: forasmuch as they make all things whatsoever, the bare substance of matter only excepted (which to them is either no determinate thing, or else nothing but mere bulk, or resisting and divisible magnitude), to come out of nothing, and to go to nothing. Thus does Aristotle,^a in a place before cited, declare the atheistic sense: *Εἰσὶ γάρ τινες, οἱ φασιν οὐδὲν ἀγέννητον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι.* There are

^a De Cœlo, lib. iii. cap. i. p. 668. tom. i. oper.

certain men, who affirm, that nothing is unmade, but all things generated or made.—Whose sense is afterwards more distinctly thus proposed by him, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα γίνεσθαι τε καὶ ῥεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐδέν· ἐν δὲ τι μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν· that all other things are generated and flow, and none of them firmly is (they being perpetually educed out of nothing, and reduced to nothing), but that there is only one thing which remaineth; namely that, out of which all the other are made, by the transformation thereof.—Which one thing (to wit, matter) as the same Aristotle further adds, they affirmed to be the only substance, and from eternity unmade; but all other things whatsoever, being but πάθη καὶ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, passions, affections, and dispositions thereof, γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι ἀπειράκις, to be generated and corrupted infinitely;—that is, to be produced out of nothing, or nonexistence, and reduced again to nothing without end. And doubtless, this is the true meaning of that passage in Plato's tenth de Legibus,^a not understood by the Latin interpreters; where, being to represent the atheistic hypothesis of the system of the universe, he discovereth their grand arcanum, and that, which they accounted, σοφώτατον ἀπάντων λόγων, the wisest and most mysterious of all doctrines,—after this manner; λέγουσί πού τινες ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γιγνώμενα καὶ γενόμενα, καὶ γενησόμενα· τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ, τὰ δὲ διὰ τύχης. Certain men affirm, that all things are made, and have been made, and will be made; some by nature, and some by art, and some by fortune or chance.—For unquestionably here, Plato's λέγουσί πού τινες ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα

^a Pag. 665. oper.

γιγνόμενα, certain men affirm, that all things are generated or made, &c.—is the very same with Aristotle's *εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες, οἱ φασιν, οὐδὲν ἀγέννητον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι*, certain men affirm, that there is nothing unmade, but that all things are made or generated.—And perhaps this of Aristotle's was taken out of that of Plato's : which yet nevertheless is so to be understood as it is afterwards explained by Aristotle ; all things whatsoever, the bare substance of matter only excepted. Wherefore it is certain, that either there is no real entity in the whole world, besides the bare substance of matter ; that is, besides divisible and separable extension, or resisting magnitude, and consequently that life and cogitation, sense and consciousness, reason and understanding, all our own minds, and personalities, are no real entities ; or else, that there are, according to the atheistic hypothesis, real entities produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Whereas Theists suppose all the greatest perfections in the universe, as life and understanding, to have been eternal and unmade in a perfect being, the Deity, and neither brought out of nothing or nonexistence, nor reducible to nothing ; only imperfect beings to have been made out of nothing, or produced out of nonexistence, by this one perfect being or Deity : the Atheists, on the contrary, supposing the lowest and most imperfect of all beings, matter, bulk, or divisible and resisting extension, to be the only self-existent and unmade thing, conclude all the greatest perfections in the universe, life, cogitation, and understanding, to be made out of nothing or nonexistence, as also to be reduced to nothing again. Indeed the hylozoic Atheists,

being sensible somewhat of this inconvenience of making all life and understanding out of nothing, and that there must of necessity be some fundamental life and perception, which is not accidental but substantial, and which was never generated, and cannot be corrupted, have therefore attributed a kind of life and perception to all matter, as such. Notwithstanding which, even these also, forasmuch as they deny to matter animal sense, and consciousness, suppose all animal life or sense, and conscious understanding, to be generated and corrupted, produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Neither can life, cogitation, and understanding, be reckoned amongst the modes of matter, that is, of magnitude, or divisible and antitypous extension, since they may be conceived without the same: whereas modes cannot be conceived without their substance. Standing, sitting, and walking, cannot be conceived without a body, and that fitly organized too; and therefore are they nothing but different modes of such a body. When that human body, which before did stand, doth afterwards sit, or walk, no man can think, that here is the miraculous production of any new real entity out of nothing; nor when the same matter, which was square or cubical, is made spherical or cylindrical. But when there is life and understanding, which was not before, then is there unquestionably a new real entity produced. But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves, according to the tenor of the atomic physiology, acknowledge no other modes of matter or body, but only more or less magnitude of parts, figure, site, motion, or rest. And upon this very account do they explode qualities, considered as

entities really distinct from these modes ; because in the generation and alteration of them, there would be real entities made out of nothing, or without a cause : whereupon they resolve these qualities into mechanism and fancy. But life, cogitation, and understanding, are things which have more real entity in them, and can no way be solved by mechanism and fancy ; wherefore undoubtedly they are no modes of matter or body, but attributes of another kind of substance incorporeal. All cogitative beings, especially human souls, and personalities, are unquestionably substantial things ; and yet do the Atheists bring these, and consequently themselves, out of nothing or nonexistence, and reduce them to nothing again. The conclusion is ; that these very Atheists, who contend against Theists, that “ Nothing can be made out of nothing,” do themselves bring all things out of nothing or nonexistence, and perpetually reduce them to nothing again ; according to whose principles, as once there was no life nor understanding at all in the universe, so may there be none again. They who deny a God, because there can be no creative power belonging to any thing, do themselves notwithstanding attribute to matter (though a mere passive, sluggish, and unactive thing) a creative power of things substantial (as human souls and personalities) out of nothing. And thus is that formidable argument of the Atheists, that there can be no God, because nothing can be made out of nothing, not only proved to be false, but also retorted upon these Atheists themselves, they bringing all things besides senseless and unqualified matter out of nothing.

We have now declared, first, in what sense this

proposition is unquestionably true, that nothing can be made out of nothing, or come from nothing, *viz.* causally, that nothing which before was not, could afterward be made without a cause, and a sufficient cause. Or more particularly these three ways; first, that nothing which before was not, could afterward be brought into being by itself, or without an efficient cause. Secondly, that nothing which once was not, could be made or produced efficiently by any thing, which had not at least equal perfection in it, and a sufficient active or productive power; and consequently that no new substance can be made, but by a perfect being, which only is substantially emanative. Thirdly and lastly, that when things are made out of pre-existing matter, as in artificial productions, and natural generations, there can be no new real entity produced, but only different modifications of what before substantially was; the material cause, as such, efficiently producing nothing. And thus was this axiom understood by Cicero, that “Nothing could be made out of nothing,” *viz.* causally, in his book *de Fato*,^a where he reprehendeth Epicurus for endeavouring to avoid fate, and to establish liberty of will by that absurd figment of atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular. “*Nec cum hæc ita sint, est causa, cur Epicurus fatum extimescat, et ab atomis petat præsidium, easque de via deducat; et uno tempore suscipiat res duas inenodabiles, unam, ut sine causa fiat aliquid, ex quo existet, ut de nihilo quippiam fiat; quod nec ipsi, nec cuiquam physico placet.*” Nor is there for all that any reason, why Epicurus should be so much afraid of fate, and

^a Cap. ix. p. 3273. tom. ix. oper.

seek refuge in atoms, he supposing them, in their infinite descents, to decline uncertainly from the perpendicular, and laying this as a foundation for liberty of will ; whereby he plunged himself at once into two inextricable difficulties, the first whereof was the supposing of something to be made without a cause, or, which is all one, out of nothing ; a thing that will neither be allowed by any physiologer, nor could Epicurus himself be pleased or satisfied therewith.—The reason whereof is, because it was a fundamental principle of the atomic philosophy, that “ Nothing (in this sense) could be made out of nothing.” Moreover, we have in the next place declared, in what other sense this proposition, that “ Nothing can be made out of nothing,” is false, namely, when this out of nothing is not taken causally, but so as to signify the *terminus* from which ; that nothing can be made out of an antecedent nonexistence : that no real entity or substance which before was not, could by any power whatsoever be afterwards brought into being : or, that nothing can possibly be made, but out of something pre-existing, by the new modification thereof. And it appears from that of Cicero, that the true and genuine sense of this proposition, “ *De nihilo nihil fit*” (according to the mind of those ancient physiologers, who laid so great stress thereupon), was not, that nothing could by any power whatsoever be brought out of nonexistence into being ; but only, that “ nothing could be made without a cause.” Nor did they here by *cause* mean the material only, in this sense, as if nothing could possibly be made but out of pre-existing matter ; Epicurus being taxed by Cicero, for introducing that his third motion

of atoms, or *clinamen principiorum*,* out of nothing, or without an efficient cause; as indeed all motion also was, to those atomic Atheists in this sense, from nothing. Nevertheless, we have also shewed, that if this proposition, "Nothing out of nothing," in that atheistic sense (as levelled against a Deity), were true; yet would it of the two more impugn Atheism itself, than it does Theism; the Atheists generating and corrupting all things, the substance of matter only excepted, all life, sense, and understanding, human souls, minds and personalities, they producing these, and consequently themselves, out of nothing, and resolving them all to nothing again. We shall now in the third and last place, make it manifest, that the Atheists do not only bring real entities and substantial things out of nothing in the second sense, that is, out of an antecedent nonexistence (which yet is a thing possible only to God, or a perfect being), but also that they bring them out of nothing in the absolutely impossible sense; that is, suppose them to be made without a cause, or "nothing to be the cause of something."

But we must prepare the way hereunto, by setting down, first, a brief and compendious sum of the whole atheistic hypothesis. The Atheists therefore, who contend, that nothing can be made, but only new accidents, or modifications of pre-existing substance; taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body or matter, do conclude accordingly that nothing can be made, but out of pre-existing matter or body. And then they add hereunto, that matter being the only substance, the only unmade self-existent

* Vide Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 292.

thing, whatsoever else is in the world, besides the bare substance of this matter, was made out of it, or produced by it. So that there are these three things contained in the atheistic hypothesis; first, that no substance can be made or caused by any thing else, but only new modifications. Secondly, that matter or body is the only substance; and therefore whatsoever is made, is made out of pre-existing matter. Thirdly, and lastly, that whatsoever there is else in the whole world besides the substance of matter, it is made or generated out of matter. And now we shall demonstrate the absolute impossibility of this atheistic hypothesis, from that very principle of the ancient physiologers, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing," in the true sense thereof; it not only bringing real entities, and substantial things, out of an antecedent nonexistence (though nothing but an infinitely-perfect being neither can thus create), but also producing them without a cause.

First, therefore, when they affirm matter to be the only substance, and all things else whatsoever to be made out of that alone, they hereby plainly suppose all things to be made without an efficient cause, which is to bring them out of nothing, in an impossible sense. For though it be not true, that nothing can be made, but out of pre-existing matter (and consequently that God himself, supposed to exist, could in this respect do no more than a carpenter or tailor doth); I say, though it be not universally true, that every thing that is made must have a material cause (so that the quaternio of causes in logic is not to be extended to all things caused whatsoever); yet is it certain

that nothing, which once was not, could possibly be made without an efficient cause. Wherefore, if there be any thing made, which was not before, there must of necessity, besides matter, be some other substance existing, as the efficient cause thereof; forasmuch as matter alone could not make any thing; as marble cannot make a statue, nor timber and stones a house, nor cloth a garment. This is our first demonstration of the impossibility of the atheistic hypothesis; it supposing all things, besides the bare substance of matter, to be made out of matter alone, without any other active principle or Deity, or to be made without an efficient cause; which is to bring them from nothing, in an impossible sense. To which may be added, by way of appendix, that whereas the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists admit of no other efficient causality in nature, than only local motion, and allow to matter or body, their only substance, no self-moving power, they hereby make all the motion that is in the whole world to be without a cause, and from nothing: action without any subject or agent, and the efficiency of all things without an efficient.

In the next place, should we be so liberal as to grant to the atomic Atheists motion without a cause, or permit Strato and the hylozoic Atheists to attribute to matter a self-moving power; yet do we affirm, that this matter and motion both together could not possibly produce any new real entity which was not before; matter, as such, efficiently causing nothing, and motion only changing the modifications of matter, as figure, place, site, and disposition of parts. Wherefore, if matter, as such, have no animal sense and conscious

understanding, essentially belonging to it (which no Atheists as yet have had the impudence to assert); then can no motion or modification of matter, no contexture of atoms, possibly beget sense and understanding, soul and mind; because this would be to bring something out of nothing, in the impossible sense, or to suppose something to be made by itself without a cause. Which may serve also for a confutation of those imperfect and spurious Theists, who will not allow to God Almighty (whether supposed by them to be corporeal or incorporeal) a power of making any thing, but only out of pre-existent matter, by the new-modifying thereof; as a carpenter makes a house out of pre-existing timber and stone, and a tailor a garment out of pre-existing cloth. For since animal life and understanding are not by them supposed to belong at all to matter, as such; and since they cannot result from any modifications or contextures thereof, it would plainly follow from hence, that God could not possibly make animals, or produce sense and understanding, souls and minds, which nevertheless these Theists suppose him to have done; and therefore ought in reason to acknowledge him, not only to be the maker of new modifications of matter (and one, who built the world only as a carpenter doth a house), but also of real entities distinct from the same.

And this was the very doctrine (as we have already declared) of the most ancient atomic physiologists; not that every thing whatsoever might be made out of pre-existing matter; but, on the contrary, that in all natural generations there is no real entity produced out of the matter, which was

not before in it, but only new modifications ; and consequently, that souls and minds being not mere modifications of matter in respect of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, could never be produced out of it, because they must then of necessity come from nothing ; that is, be made either by themselves without a cause, or without a sufficient cause. It hath also been before noted out of Aristotle, how the old atheistic materialists being assaulted by those Italic philosophers after that manner, that nothing, which was not before in matter, besides its modifications, could possibly be produced out of it, because nothing can come out of nothing, and consequently, that in all natural generations and corruptions, there is no real entity made or destroyed ; endeavoured, without denying the words of that proposition, to evade after this manner ; *διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε γίνεσθαι οὐδὲν οἴονται, οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὡς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως αἰὲν σωζομένης, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν Σωκράτην, &c.* That there is indeed nothing generated or corrupted (in some sense), forasmuch as the same substance of matter always remains, it being never made or destroyed. For, as men do not say, that Socrates is made, when he is made musical or handsome ; nor destroyed, when he loseth these dispositions, because the subject Socrates was before, and still remaineth ; so neither is any substantial thing, or real entity in the world, made or destroyed in this sense ; because matter, which is the substance of all, perpetually remains ;—and all other things whatsoever are but *πάθη καὶ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις*, passions and affections, and dispositions thereof,—as musicalness and unmusicalness, in respect of Socrates. Which is all one, as if they should say,

that all things whatsoever, besides matter, being but accidents thereof, are generated out of it, and corruptible into it, without the production of any real entity out of nothing, or the deduction of any into nothing, so long as the substance of matter, which is the only real entity, remains always the same. Wherefore, though life, sense, and understanding, all souls and minds, be generated out of matter; yet does it not follow from thence, that therefore there is any real entity made or produced, because these are nothing but accidents, and modifications of matter. This was the subterfuge of the old hylopathian Atheists.*

Now it is true indeed, that whatsoever is in the universe, is either substance, or accidents; and that the accidents of any substance may be generated and corrupted, without the producing of any real entity out of nothing, and reducing of any into nothing; forasmuch as the substance still remains entirely the same. But the Atheists taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body or matter, do therefore falsely suppose that, which is really incorporeal substance, or else the attributes, properties, and modes thereof, to be the mere accidents of matter, and consequently conclude these to be generable out of it, without the production of any real entity out of nothing. We say, therefore, that it does not at all follow, because the same numerical matter (as for example a piece of wax) may be successively made spherical, cubical, cylindrical, pyramidal, or of any other figure; and the same man may successively stand, sit, kneel, and walk; both without the production of any thing

* Vide Aristot. *Metaphys.* lib. i. cap. iii. p. 264. tom. iv. opèr.

out of nothing; or because a heap of stones, bricks, mortar, and timber lying all together disorderly and confusedly, may be made into a stately palace, and that without the miraculous creation of any real entity out of nothing; that therefore the same may be affirmed likewise of every thing else, besides the bare substance of matter, as namely, life and understanding, soul and mind, that though there be no such thing in matter itself, yet the production of them out of matter would be no production of something out of nothing. One ground of which mistake hath been from men's not rightly considering what the accidents of a substance are, and that they are indeed nothing but the modes thereof. Now, a mode is such a thing as cannot possibly be conceived, without that whereof it is a mode; as standing, sitting, kneeling, and walking, cannot be conceived, without a body organized, and therefore are but modes thereof; but life and cogitation may be clearly apprehended without body, or any thing of extension; nor indeed can a thought be conceived to be of such a length, breadth, and thickness, or to be hewed and sliced out into many pieces, all which laid together, as so many small chips thereof, would make up again the entireness of that whole thought. From whence it ought to be concluded, that cogitation is no accident, or mode of matter, or bulky extension, but a mode or attribute of another substance, really distinct from matter, or incorporeal. There is indeed nothing else clearly conceivable by us in body or bulky extension, but only more or less magnitude of parts, figures, site, motion, or rest; and all the different bodies that are in the whole world, are but several com-

binations or syllables, made up out of these few letters : but no magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, can possibly spell or compound life and sense, cogitation and understanding, as the syllables thereof; and therefore to suppose these to be generated out of matter, is plainly to suppose some real entity to be brought out of nothing, or something to be made without a cause; which is impossible.

But that which hath principally confirmed men in this error, is the business of sensible qualities and forms, as they are vulgarly conceived to be distinct entities, from those forementioned modifications of matter, in respect of magnitude of parts, figure, site, motion, or rest. For since these qualities and forms are unquestionably generated and corrupted, there seems to be no reason, why the same might not be as well acknowledged of life, sense, cogitation, and understanding, that these are but qualities or accidents of matter also (though of another kind), and consequently may be generated out of it, without the making of any real thing out of nothing. But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves have, from the principles of the atomic philosophy, sufficiently confuted and rectified this mistake concerning sensible qualities; they exploding and banishing them all, as conceived to be entities really distinct from the forementioned modifications of matter, and that for this very reason, because the generation of them would, upon this supposition, be the production of something out of nothing, or without a cause; and concluding them therefore to be really nothing else but mechanism, or different modifications of matter, in respect of the magni-

tude of parts, figure, site, and motion, or rest ; they only causing different fancies and apparitions in us. And, in very truth, this vulgar opinion of real qualities of bodies seems to have no other original at all, than men's mistaking their own fancies, passions, and affections, for things really existing in the objects without them. For as sensible qualities are conceived to be things distinct from the forementioned modifications of matter, so are they really nothing but our own fancies, passions, and affections ; and consequently no accidents or modifications of matter, but accidents and modifications of our own souls, which are substances incorporeal. Now if these Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves concluded, that real qualities, considered as distinct from the modifications of matter, could not possibly be generated out of it, because this would be the production of something out of nothing ; they ought certainly much more to have acknowledged the same, concerning life and cogitation, sense and understanding, that the generation of these out of senseless matter would be an impossible production of something out of nothing ; and consequently, that these are therefore no corporeal things, but the attributes, properties, or modes of substance incorporeal ; since they can no way be resolved into mechanism and fancy, or the modifications of matter, as the vulgar sensible qualities may, and ought to be. For though the Democritics and Epicureans did indeed suppose all human cogitations to be caused or produced by the incursion of corporeal atoms upon the thinker ; yet did never any of them arrive to such a degree, either of sottishness or impudence, as a modern

writer^a hath done, to maintain, that cogitation, intellection, and volition, are themselves really nothing else but local motion or mechanism, in the inward parts of the brain and heart ; or that “*mens nihil aliud præterquam motus in partibus quibusdam corporis organici,*” that mind itself is nothing but motion in some parts of the organized body ;— who therefore, as if Cartesius had not been sufficiently paradoxical, in making brute animals (though supposed by him to be devoid of all cogitation) nothing but mere machines, and not contented herewith, hath advanced much further, in making this prodigious conclusion, that all cogitative beings, and men themselves, are really nothing else but machines and automata ; whereas he might as well have affirmed heaven to be earth, colour to be sound, number to be figure, or any thing else in the world to be any thing, as cogitation and local motion to be the very self-same thing. Nevertheless, so strong was the atheistic intoxication in those old Democritic and Epicureans, that though denying real qualities of bodies, for this very reason, because “Nothing could be produced out of nothing,” they notwithstanding contradicting themselves, would make sense, life, and understanding, to be qualities of matter, and therefore generable out of it ; and so unquestionably produced real entities out of nothing, or without a cause.

Moreover, it is observable, that Epicurus having a mind to assert contingent liberty in men, in way of opposition to that necessity of all human

^a Hobbes. vide *Physic. cap. xxv. et Leviathan, part i. cap. i. et ii.*

actions, which had been before maintained by Democritus and his followers, plainly acknowledges, that he could not possibly do this, according to the grounds of his own philosophy, without supposing something of contingency in the first principles, that is, in the motion of those atoms, out which men and other animals are made :

———Si semper motus connectitur omnis, L. ii. p. 134.
 Et vetere exoritur semper novus ordine certo, Lamb. [ver.
 Nec declinando faciunt primordia motus 251.]
 Principium quoddam, quod fati foedera rumpat,
 Ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur ;
 Libera per terras unde hæc animantibus extat,
 Unde est hæc, inquam, fati avolsa voluntas ?

The reason for which is afterwards thus expressed by him, *quoniam de nihilo nil fit*, because nothing can be made out of nothing.—Upon which account he therefore ridiculously feigned, besides his two other motions of atoms from *pondus* and *plagæ*, weight and strokes,—a third motion of them which he calls *clinamen principiorum*, a contingent and uncertain declination,—every way from the perpendicular ; out of design to solve this phenomenon of free-will in men, without bringing something out of nothing, according as he thus subjoineth,

Quare in seminibus quoque idem fateare necesse est,
 Esse aliam præter plagas et pondera causam
 Motibus, unde hæc est nobis innata potestas ;
 De NIHILO quoniam FIERI NIL posse videmus.
 Ponderus enim prohibet, ne plagis omnia fiant
 Externa quasi vi. Sed ne mens ipsa necessum
 Intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis,
 Et devicta quasi cogatur ferre patique,
 Id facit exiguum CLINAMEN PRINCIPIORUM,
 Nec ratione loci certa, nec tempore certo.

Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 283.

Now if Epicurus himself conceived, that liberty of will could not possibly be generated in men out of matter or atoms, they having no such thing at all in them (that is, no contingent uncertainty in their motion), without bringing of something out of nothing; which was contrary to the fundamental principles of the atomic philosophy), though this were intolerably absurd in him, thus to suppose contingency, and a kind of free-will in the motions of senseless atoms, so that indeed he brought his liberty of will out of nothing); certainly sense and understanding, soul and mind, in animals and men, could not possibly be generated out of atoms or matter, devoid of all sense and understanding; for the very same reason, *quoniam de nihilo nil fit*, because nothing can be made out of nothing. For unquestionably, were all life and understanding, all souls and minds, generated out of dead and senseless matter; and were there no substantial or essential life and understanding in the whole universe; then must it of necessity be all made out of nothing, or without a cause, and consequently real entities and substantial things be made out of nothing, which is absolutely impossible. For though we do not say, that life and cogitation, sense and understanding, abstractly considered, are substances; yet do we affirm them to be entities really distinct from matter, and no modifications or accidents thereof, but either accidents and modifications, or rather essential attributes, of substance incorporeal, as also that souls and minds, which are the subjects of them, are indeed substantial things. Wherefore, we cannot but here again condemn the darkness of that philosophy,

which educes not only species visible and audible (entities perfectly unintelligible), and real qualities, distinct from all the modes of body, and even substantial forms too (as they call them), but also sensitive souls themselves, both in men and brutes, *ex potentia materiæ*, out of the power of the matter;—that is, indeed, out of nothing. Forasmuch as this prepares a direct way to Atheism; because, if life and sense, cogitation and consciousness, may be generated out of dead and senseless matter, then might this well be supposed the first original of all things; nor could there reasonably be any stop made at rational souls, especially by these men, who also conclude them to be *rasæ tabulæ*, mere white sheets of paper,—that have nothing at all in them, but what is scribbled upon them by corporeal objects from without; there being nothing in the understanding or mind of man, which was not before in sense: so that sense is the first original knowledge, and understanding but a secondary and derivative thing from it, more umbratile and evanid.

Hitherto have we demonstrated, that all things whatsoever could not possibly be made out of matter, and particularly that life and sense, mind and understanding, being no accidents or modes of matter, could not by motion be generated out of it, without the production of real entities out of nothing. But because some may possibly imagine, that matter might otherwise than thus by motion, by a miraculous efficiency, produce souls and minds, we shall add in the last place, that nothing can efficiently produce any real entity or substantial thing that was not before, unless it

have at least equal perfection to it, and a substantially emanative or creative power. But scarcely any man can be so sottish, as to imagine that every atom of dust hath equal perfection in it to that of the rational soul in man, or to attribute a creative power to all matter (which is but a passive thing), whilst this is in the meantime denied by him to a perfect being; both these assertions also, in like manner as the former, producing real entities out of nothing causally. And thus have we demonstrated the impossibility and nonsense of all Atheism, from this very principle, by which the Atheists would assault Theism in the true sense thereof, that Nothing can be made without a cause, or that Nothing cannot be the cause of any thing.

Now, if there be no middle betwixt Atheism and Theism, and all things must of necessity either spring from senseless matter, or else from a perfect understanding being; then is this demonstration of the impossibility of Atheism a sufficient establishment of the truth of Theism; it being such a demonstration of a God, as the geometers call a deduction *ad impossibile*, which they allow of for good, and frequently make use of. Thus, either there is a God; or else matter must needs be acknowledged to be the only self-existent thing, and all things else whatsoever to be made out of it; but it is impossible, that all things should be made out of senseless matter: therefore is there a God. Nevertheless, we shall here, for further satisfaction, shew how the existence of a God may be directly demonstrated also from this very principle, which the Atheists endeavour to take sanctuary in, and from thence to impugn

Theism, *De nihilo nihil*, that Nothing can be made out of nothing causally, or that Nothing cannot be the cause of any thing.

In the first place, therefore, we shall fetch our beginning from what hath been already often declared, that it is mathematically certain, that Something or other did exist of itself from all eternity, or without beginning, and unmade by any thing else. The certainty of which proposition dependeth upon this very principle, as its foundation, that Nothing can come from nothing, or be made out of nothing, or that Nothing, which once was not, can of itself come into being without a cause; it following unavoidably from thence, that if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. And having thus laid the foundation, we shall in the next place make this further superstructure, that because something did certainly exist of itself from eternity unmade, therefore is there also actually a necessarily-existent being. For to suppose, that any thing did exist of itself from eternity, by its own free-will and choice, and therefore not necessarily, but contingently, since it might have willed otherwise; this is to suppose it to have existed before it was, and so positively to have been the cause of itself; which is impossible, as hath been already declared. When a thing therefore is said to be of itself, or the cause of itself, this is to be understood no otherwise, than either in a negative sense, as having nothing else for its cause; or because its necessary eternal existence is essential to the perfection of its own nature. That therefore, which existed of itself from eternity, independently upon any thing else, did not so exist continu-

gently, but necessarily ; so that there is undoubtedly something actually in being, whose existence is and always was necessary. In the next place, it is certain also, that nothing could exist necessarily of itself, but what included necessity of existence in its own nature. For to suppose any thing to exist of itself necessarily, which hath no necessity of existence in its own nature, is plainly to suppose that necessary existence of it to come from nothing, since it could neither proceed from that thing itself, nor yet from any thing else. Lastly, there is nothing, which includes necessity of existence in its very nature and essence, but only an absolute perfect being. The result of all which is, that God, or a perfect being, doth certainly exist ; and that there is nothing else, which existed of itself from eternity, necessarily and independently ; but all other things whatsoever derived their being from him, or were caused by him, matter or body itself not excepted.

That which hath staggered some Theists here, and made them so inclinable and prone to believe, that matter also existed from eternity unmade, is partly (as hath been already intimated) an idiotical conceit, that because nothing can be artificially made by men, otherwise than out of pre-existing matter, as houses and garments, puddings and pies ; therefore there could be no other making of any thing, by any power whatsoever : though even men themselves can produce something out of no pre-existent matter, as cogitations and local motion. And the same partly proceedeth also from certain false opinions entertained concerning matter. For some Theists

have supposed ὕλην ἀσώματον, an incorporeal first matter;—out of which incorporeal matter, together with an incorporeal form joined to it, they conceived the essence of body to have been compounded, and made. And no wonder, if these same fanciful philosophers have further added also hereunto, that from this incorporeal matter, by an incorporeal form, were begotten likewise incorporeal qualities of body. Now it is not conceivable, what else should be meant by this incorporeal *hyle*, or matter, but only a metaphysical notion of the potentiality, or possibility of things, respectively to the Deity; which, because it is indeed eternal, and as much unmade as God himself is, it being nothing but the Divine power considered passively or the reverse of it; therefore, in all probability, were these philosophers so prone to think the physical matter of this corporeal universe to have been eternal and unmade. Neither was this incorporeal *hyle*, or matter, a novel opinion, entertained only by some junior Platonists, but older than Aristotle himself, as appeareth plainly from these following words of his in his *Metaphysics*: Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ὕλην τὴν ἀρχὴν λέγουσιν, ἔαντε σῶμα, ἔαντε ἀσώματον τιθῶσιν. Some speak of the principle as matter; whether they suppose this matter to be body, or to be incorporeal.—But this incorporeal matter in physiology can be accounted no better than a kind of metaphysical nonsense. Again, others seem to have been the more prone to think matter or body to have been self-existent and unmade, because they both conceived it to be really the same

L. i. c. vi. [p. 273. tom. iv. oper.]

Thus Porphyry. Τῆς ὕλης τὰ ἴδια κατὰ τοὺς ἀρχαίους τὰδε, ἀσώματα, &c. *Materiae Proprietates, secundum Veteres, hæ sunt; Quod sit Incorporea, &c.* [In *Sentent. ad Intelligibilia ducentibus. §. xxi. p. 226. ed. Cantab.*]

thing with space, and also took it for granted, that space was infinite and eternal, and consequently necessarily existent. In answer whereunto, we reply, first, that though space and distance should be granted to be positively infinite, or to have no bounds nor limits at all, as also to have been eternal; yet according to the opinion of some, would it not follow from thence, that matter was infinite, eternal, and necessarily existent; not as if space or distance could exist alone by itself, an accident without a substance, it being plainly impossible, that nothing should have any accidents, modifications, and attributes, or be mensurable by yards and poles; but because this space is by them supposed, not to be the extension of body, but the infinite and unbounded extension of the Deity. But, in the next place, if space be concluded to be certainly nothing else but the extension and distance of body, or matter, considered in general (without respect to this or that particular body), and abstractly in order to the conception of motion, and the mensuration of things (for space thus considered, is necessarily immoveable, as to the parts thereof respectively; as the two extremes of a yard distance can never possibly come nearer to one another); then do we say, that there appeareth no sufficient ground for this positive infinity of space, we being certain of no more than this, that be the world, or any figurative body, never so great, it is not impossible, but that it might be still greater and greater, without end. Which indefinite increasableness of body and space seems to be mistaken for a positive infinity thereof. Whereas for this very reason, because it can

never be so great, but that more magnitude may still be added to it, therefore can it never be positively infinite. Nor is there perhaps so great an absurdity in this, that another world could not possibly be made a mile distant from this, forasmuch as there being nothing between them, they must needs touch; or that this finite world could have no mountains and valleys in the exterior surface of it, since it might be either spherical, cubical, or cylindrical, or of any other regular figure, whatsoever the maker pleased to form it in. To conclude therefore, by space without the finite world, is to be understood nothing but the possibility of body, further and further, without end, yet so as never to reach to infinity; and such a space as this was there also, before this world was created, a possibility of so much body to be produced. But space and actual distance, as really mensurable by yards and poles, though it may be greater and greater without end, yet can it not be positively infinite; so as that there could be no more added to it; and therefore there can be no argument from hence, to prove the necessary existence of matter.

Moreover, the existence of a Deity might be further demonstrated from this common notion, That nothing can come from nothing causally; because, if there were no God, as we could not have had any idea of him, or a perfect being, since it must have come from nothing, and have been the idea or conception of nothing; so neither could there have been indeed any knowledge or understanding at all. For singular bodies existing without us cannot enter into us, and put understanding in us; nor is there any thing but

local motions propagated from them to our organs of sense. The mind must have its immediate intelligibles within itself, for otherwise it could not possibly understand any thing; which intelligences and their relations to one another, or verities, are (as was said before) eternal. Moreover, the mind can frame ideas or conceptions, not only of things actually existing, but also of all possibilities; which plainly implies and supposes the actual existence of a being infinitely powerful, that could produce them. So that the proper object of mind and understanding is a perfect being, and all the extent of its power; which perfect being, comprehending itself and the extent of its own power; or the possibilities of all things, is the first original mind, of which all other minds partake. Wherefore, were there no perfect omnipotent being, comprehending itself, and its own power, or all the possibilities of things; the intelligible objects of the mind and ideas must have come from nothing.

However, it hath been already proved from this principle, Nothing from nothing, that the powers of sense and understanding, or the entities of soul and mind, could never have resulted from any modifications of senseless matter whatsoever. Wherefore, since it is mathematically certain, that our human souls and persons could not possibly have been generated out of matter, one of these two things will undeniably follow; that either they must all have existed of themselves, from eternity unmade; or else have been created *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, out of an antecedent nonexistence,—by a perfect understanding being unmade, or at least have derived their whole substance from it. So that it

is altogether as certain, that there is a God, as that our human souls and persons did not all exist from eternity of themselves. And that there must be some eternal unmade mind, hath been already demonstrated also from the same principle, Nothing out of nothing. Thus, have we abundantly confuted the second atheistic argumentation, that there can be no omnipotence, nor Divine creation, because nothing can be made out of nothing; we have plainly shewed, that this very principle, in the true sense thereof, affordeth a demonstration for the contrary.

THE six following atheistic argumentations, driving at these two things, first, the disproving of an incorporeal and then of a corporeal Deity (from both which, the Atheists conceive, it must follow of necessity, that there can be none at all); we shall take them all together, and, in order to the confutation of them, perform these three things. First, we shall answer the atheistic argumentations against an incorporeal Deity (contained in the third and fourth heads). Secondly, we shall shew that from the very principles of the atheistic corporealism (as represented in the fifth and sixth heads), incorporeal substance is demonstrable. And, lastly, that there being undeniably incorporeal substance, the two following atheistic argumentations also, against a corporeal Deity (in the seventh and eighth sections), prove altogether insignificant.

We begin with the first of these; to shew the invalidity of the atheistic argumentations against an

incorporeal Deity. It hath been already observed, that though all Corporealists be not therefore of necessity Atheists, yet Atheists universally have been Corporealists; this being always their first and grand postulatum, That there is no other substance besides body. Thus Plato long ago declared concerning them: Διῶσχυρίζονται τοῦ-
 Soph. p. 172.
 Fic. [p. 160.] το εἶναι μόνου ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν
 τινα, ταυτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὀριζόμενοι· τῶν δὲ
 ἄλλων εἴτις φησὶ μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τοπα-
 ράπαν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν. They contend strongly, that that only really is, which is tangible, or can resist their touch; concluding body and substance to be one and the self-same thing: and if any one should affirm, that there is any thing incorporeal, they will presently cry him down, and not hear a word more from him.—For there can be no doubt, but that the persons here intended by Plato were those very Atheists which himself spake of afterward in the same dialogue: Ἄ μὴν τῶ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι καὶ ῥήματι χρώμενοι φήσομεν, τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ πάντα γενεῶν ἀπὸ τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης, καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φουούσης; ἢ μετὰ λόγου καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας, ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης. Whether shall we assent to that opinion now-a-days entertained by so many, that nature generateth all things from a certain fortuitous cause, without the direction of any mind or understanding? or rather, that it produceth them, according to reason and knowledge, proceeding from God?—Indeed the philosopher there tells us, that some of these atheistic persons began then to be somewhat ashamed of making prudence, and justice, and other moral virtues, corporeal things, or bodies: Ἀποκρίνονται τὴν μὲν

ψυχὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν σφίσι σῶμά τι κεκτηῖσθαι, φρούνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὧν ἠρώτηκας, αἰσχύνονται τὸ τολμᾶν, ἢ μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν, ἢ πάντ' εἶναι σώματα δι-
 ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. Though they affirm concerning the soul itself, that this seems to them to be corporeal; yet, concerning prudence, and those other virtues mentioned, some have now scarcely the confidence to maintain these to be either bodies or nothing.—But this (saith he) was indeed no less than the quite giving up of the cause of Atheism; εἰ γάρ τι καὶ μικρὸν ἐθέλουσι τῶν ὄντων συγχῶρεῖν ἀσώματον, ἐξαρκεῖ because, if it be but once granted, that there is never so little incorporeal, this will be sufficient to overthrow the atheistic foundation.—Wherefore he concludes, that such as these were but mongrel and imperfect Atheists; ἐπεὶ τούτων οὐδ' ἂν ἐν ἐπαισχυνθεῖεν, οἱ γὰρ αὐτῶν σαρτοὶ καὶ αὐτόχθονες, ἀλλὰ διατείνονται ἂν, πᾶν δὲ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ συμπέζειν, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τοπαράπαν ἐστί· for they, who are thorough-paced and genuine Atheists indeed, will boggle at neither of those forementioned things, but contend, that whatsoever they cannot grasp with their hands, is altogether nothing.—That is, that there is no other substance nor entity in the world, but only body, that which is tangible, or resists the touch. Aristotle also representeth the atheistic hypothesis after the same manner: Τοῦτο καὶ τοσαύτην φασὶν εἶναι τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα πάθη τούτων· They affirm, that matter, or body, is all the substance that is; and that all other things are but the passions and affections thereof.—And again, in his Metaphysics: Ἐν τῷ πᾶν, καὶ μίαν εἶναι τινα φύσιν, ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχουσαν. These Met. l. i. c. vii. [p. 274. tom. iv. oper.] men maintain all to be one, and that there is but

one only nature, as the matter of all things, and this corporeal, or endued with magnitude.—And now we see plainly, that the ancient Atheists were of the very same mind with these in our days, that body, or that which is tangible and divisible, is the only substantial thing; from whence it follows that an incorporeal substance would be the same with an incorporeal body, *i. e.* an impossibility, and that there can be no incorporeal Deity.

But in the management of this cause, there hath been some disagreement amongst the Atheists themselves. For, first, the Democritics and Epicureans, though consenting with all the other Atheists, in this, that whatsoever was unextended, and devoid of magnitude, was therefore nothing (so that there could neither be any substance, nor accident, or mode of any substance, unextended); did notwithstanding distinguish concerning a double nature. First, that which is so extended, as to be impenetrable, and tangible, or resist the touch, which is body. And, secondly, that which is extended also, but penetrably and intangibly; which is space or vacuum: a nature, according to them, really distinct from body, and the only incorporeal thing that is. Now since this space, which is the only incorporeal, can neither do nor suffer any thing, but only give place or room to bodies to subsist in, or pass through; therefore can there not be any active, understanding, incorporeal Deity. This is the argumentation of the Democritic Atheists.

To which we reply, that if space be indeed a nature distinct from body, and a thing really incorporeal, as they pretend, then will it undeniably follow from this very principle of theirs, that there

must be an incorporeal substance ; and (this space being supposed by them also to be infinite) an infinite incorporeal Deity. Because, if space be not the extension of body, nor an affection thereof, then must it of necessity be, either an accident existing alone by itself, without a substance, which is impossible ; or else the extension, or affection, of some other incorporeal substance that is infinite. But here will Gassendus step in, to help out his good friends the Democritics and Epicureans at a dead lift ; and undertake to maintain, that though space be indeed an incorporeal thing, yet it would neither follow of necessity from thence, that it is an incorporeal substance or affection thereof ; nor yet that it is an accident existing alone by itself, without a substance ; because this space is really neither accident nor substance, but a certain middle nature or essence betwixt both. To which subterfuge of his, that we may not quarrel about words, we shall make this reply ; that unquestionably, whatsoever is, or hath any kind of entity, doth either subsist by itself, or else is an attribute, affection, or mode of something, that doth subsist by itself. For it is certain, that there can be no mode, accident, or affection of nothing ; and consequently, that nothing cannot be extended, nor measurable. But if space be neither the extension of body, nor yet of substance incorporeal, then must it of necessity be the extension of nothing, and the affection of nothing ; and nothing must be measurable by yards and poles. We conclude therefore, that from this very hypothesis of the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, that space is a nature distinct from body, and positively infinite, it follows undeniably, that there must be

some incorporeal substance, whose affection its extension is; and because there can be nothing infinite, but only the Deity, that it is the infinite extension of an incorporeal Deity; just as some learned Theists and Incorporealists have asserted. And thus is the argument of these Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, against an incorporeal Deity, abundantly confuted; we having made it manifest, that from that very principle of their own, by which they would disprove the same, it is against themselves demonstrable.

To which it might be here further added, that Epicurus, who professedly opposed Plato's incorporeal God, as an impossibility, did notwithstanding manifestly contradict himself, when he asserted such a democracy of monogrammous gods, as were not compounded of atoms and vacuum (though, according to him, the only principles of body), that so they might be incorruptible; nor yet could touch or be touched, but were penetrable, as is declared in those verses of Lucretius,^a

Tenuis enim natura deum, longæque remota
Sensibus a nostris, animi vix mente videtur.
Quæ quoniam manuum tactum suffugit et ictum,
Tactile nil nobis quod sit, contingere debet.
Tangere enim non quit, quod tangi non licet ipsum.

(though tangibility and impenetrability were elsewhere made by him the very essence of body); and, lastly, such as had not *corpus*, but *quasi corpus*, and therefore must needs be really incorporeal. Though there is no doubt to be made, but that Epicurus colluded in all this; himself not believing a jot of it, nor any such gods at all.

But other Atheists there were, who concluding

^a Lib. v. ver. 149.

likewise, that whatsoever was unextended was nothing, were sensible of the inconvenience of making space thus to be a thing really distinct from body (from whence it would follow unavoidably that it was an affection of incorporeal substance); and therefore acknowledged, not two natures of extended things, but as we had it before in Aristotle, *μίαν τιὰ φύσιν καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν*, one only nature, and that bodily;—space being therefore to them, either a mere imaginary thing, that hath no reality without our minds, but only a phantasm of our own, and, in their modern language, a kind of ghost, apparition, or spectre of a body; or else, indeed, the very extension of body itself, considered in general, and abstractly, from this or that singular body, moveable. And these men therefore framed their argumentation against an incorporeal Deity after this manner: nothing truly is, but what is extended, or hath a certain magnitude (because that which is unextended, and hath no magnitude, is no where, and consequently nothing). But whatsoever is extended, and in a place, is body. Therefore is there no other substance besides body; and consequently there can be no incorporeal Deity. Or else, to put the argument into a more approveable syllogistic form; whatsoever is extended, is body, or corporeal; but whatsoever is, is extended. Therefore whatsoever is, is body, or corporeal: and by consequence, there can be no incorporeal Deity.

To which argumentation the assertors of incorporeal substance have replied two manner of ways. For, first, the generality of the ancient Incorporealists taking it for granted, that whatsoever was extended in magnitude, and had parts

one without another, was divisible, as also probably impenetrable by any thing else extended, because there can be no penetration of dimensions; and therefore no one magnitude can be imbibed or swallowed up into another, but must of necessity stand without it, adding so much to the quantity thereof: they readily gave their assent to that proposition, That whatsoever is extended into longitude, latitude and profundity, is body. But being strongly persuaded of the existence of some other substance besides body, they denied that other proposition of theirs, That whatsoever is, is extended; or what is unextended, is nothing: maintaining, that besides body, or extended substance, there was another substance incorporeal, which therefore was *ἀδιάστατος*, and *ἀμεγέθης*, and *ἄποσος*, and *ἀμερῆς*, and *ἀδιάπετος*, unextended, and devoid of quantity and magnitude, without parts, and indivisible.—That Plato himself philosophized after this manner, might be proved from sundry passages of his writings; as that in his tenth *De Legibus*, where he affirmeth, that the soul itself, and those things which belong to it, as cogitative, are *πρότερα μήκους σωμάτων καὶ βάθους καὶ πλάτους*, in order of nature, before the longitude, and latitude, and profundity of bodies.—Where, doubtless, his meaning was not, as if there were longitude, latitude, and profundity in souls, but of a different kind from that longitude, latitude, and profundity of bodies, and before it; but that longitude, latitude, and profundity, being the essential properties of body only, soul and cogitation, as devoid of these, was in order of nature before them. Again, from that in his *Timæus*, where speaking

of place, space, and matter, he condemneth this for a vulgar error, That whatsoever is, must of necessity be in some place or other, and what is in no place, is nothing. Τρίτον δὲ αὐτὸ γένος τὸ τῆς χώρας, ἔδραν παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν—πρὸς ὃ δὲ καὶ ὄνειροπολοῦμεν βλέποντες, καὶ φημὲν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πον, τὸ ὄν ἅπαν ἐν τιμὶ τόπῳ, καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινά· τὸ δὲ μήτε ἐν γῆ, μήτε πον κατ' οὐρανόν, οὐδὲν εἶναι. The third kind is that of space, which gives room to all things that are generated. And when we look upon this, we dreamingly affirm, that every thing that is must of necessity be in some place, and possess a certain room and space, and that whatsoever is not somewhere, either in earth or in heaven, is nothing. Which drowsy or dreaming imagination (saith he), like a ghost, continually haunteth and possesseth men, and that even then, when they think of that true and awakened nature of the Deity.—Whereas this philosopher himself, discoursing elsewhere of God, under the title of πολὺ πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ, the vast sea of pulchritude, —describeth him after this manner; οὐδέπου ὄν, ἢ ἐν γῆ, ἢ ἐν οὐρανῷ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ, μεθ' αὐτοῦ, μονοειδὲς αἰεὶ ὄν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα· as that which is not any where, either in earth, or in heaven, but itself alone by itself, and with itself, all other beautiful things partaking of it.—And as for Aristotle's sense in this particular; that he here departed not, as he did in some other things, from his master Plato, may appear from that whole chapter, or section, at the end of his Physics, spent upon this very subject, to prove ὅτι τοῦτ' ἀμερὲς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν μέγεθος, that his first Immoveable Mover (which is God Almighty) must of necessity be devoid of parts, or indivi-

sible, and have no magnitude at all.—The conclusion of which section, and his whole book of *Physics*,^a is this: *Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, φανερόν ὅτι ἀδύνατον τὸ πρῶτον κινεῖν καὶ ἀκίνητον ἔχειν τι μέγεθος· εἰ γὰρ μέγεθος ἔχει, ἀνάγκη ἦτοι πεπερασμένον αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄπειρον· ἄπειρον μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μέγεθος εἶναι, δέδεικται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς· ὅτι δὲ τὸ πεπερασμένον ἀδύνατον ἔχειν ἄπειρον δύναμιν, δέδεικται νῦν φανερόν τοίνυν, ὅτι ἀδιαίρετόν ἐστι, καὶ ἀμερῆς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος·* These things being thus determined, it is manifestly impossible, that the first Mover should have any magnitude. For if it hath magnitude, that must of necessity be either finite or infinite. But that there can be no infinite magnitude, was before demonstrated in the *Physics*; and that nothing, which hath a finite magnitude, can have infinite power, hath been now proved. Wherefore it is plain, that the first Mover is indivisible, and devoid of parts, and hath no magnitude at all.—Which same doctrine is again taught and asserted by Aristotle, in his *Metaphysics*: *Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν οὐσία τις αἰδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος, καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, φανερόν ἐκ τῶν εἰρη- μένων. δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ ἀμερῆς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει δύναμιν ἄπειρον πεπερασμένον, καὶ ὅπως οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐδὲν ἄπειρον·* From what hath been declared, it is manifest, that there is an eternal and immoveable substance, separate from sensibles; as also, that this substance cannot possibly have any magnitude, but is devoid of parts, and indivisible. Because no finite thing can have infinite power, and there is no such thing possible as infinite

P. 14. c. vii.

[p. 480. tom. iv. oper.]

^a P. 608. tom. i. oper.

magnitude.—Neither doth Aristotle appropriate this to the supreme Deity, “to be thus devoid of magnitude and of parts, and consequently indivisible;” he somewhere^a attributing the same also to all other immaterial or incorporeal things, and particularly to the human mind, ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ὕλην ἔχον, ὡσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, every thing, that is devoid of matter, is indivisible, as the human mind.—And the like doth he assert, at once, both concerning the mundane and the human soul, that they are no magnitudes, though ridiculously (after his manner) imputing the contrary opinion to Plato: Οὐ καλῶς τὸ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν μέγεθος εἶναι. Ὁ δὲ νοῦς εἷς καὶ συνεχής, ὡσπερ καὶ ἡ νόησις· ἡ δὲ νόησις τὰ νοήματα· ταῦτα δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἐν, ὡς ὁ ἀριθμὸς, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς τὸ μέγεθος· διόπερ οὐδὲ νοῦς οὕτω συνεχής. ἀλλ’ ἦτοι ἀμερῆς, ἢ οὐχ ὡς τὸ μέγεθος τι συνεχής· πῶς γὰρ δὲ καὶ νοήσει μέγεθος ὦν, ὅτῳ οὖν τῶν μορίων τῶν αὐτοῦ; μορίων δὲ ἦτοι κατὰ μέγεθος, ἢ κατὰ στιγμὴν· εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ στιγμὴν, αὐταὶ δ’ ἀπειροὶ, δηλον ὡς οὐδέποτε διέξεισιν· εἰ δὲ κατὰ μέγεθος, πολλακίς ἢ ἀπειράκις νοήσει τὸ αὐτό. Ἐτι δὲ πῶς νοήσει τὸ ἀμερῆς μεριστῶ· It is not rightly affirmed either of the mundane, or rational soul, that they are magnitudes. For the Intellect is one and continuous, as Intellection is, which is the same with the Intelligibles. But these are one, not as magnitudes, but as numbers. Wherefore the Intellect is not so continuous, but either devoid of parts, or not continuous as magnitude. For how, being magnitude, could it understand with any of its parts, whether conceived as points, or as lesser magnitudes; since either way there would be an innu-

^a Metaphys. I. xiv. cap. ix. p. 484. tom. iv. oper.

merable company of intellections; moreover, how can it conceive any thing that is indivisible by what is divisible?—Furthermore, in this same book *De Anima*,^a Aristotle stiffly denies souls in general either to be in a place, or to be locally moved, otherwise than by accident, as they are said to be moved together with the motion of the body. Thus Simplicius :^b *Ὅρα ὡς πανταχοῦ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀποσείεται τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις.* See how Aristotle doth every where remove, or exclude from the soul, corporeal (or local) motions.—And again :

Fol. 6. *Ἀπαγορεύει μὴ κινεῖσθαι τὰ ἀσώματα τῆς κινήσεως αἷτια κὰν πρῶτα κὰν μέσα κὰν ἔσχατα ἤ,* Aristotle will by no means allow any incorporeal things whatsoever, whether of the first, second, or lowest rank (they being all the causes of motion), themselves to be moved.—Philoponus^c likewise : *Ὅρᾳς ὡς πρὸς τὰς σωματικὰς κινήσεις ἀποβλέπων, οὕτως αὐτὴν ἀκίνητον εἶναι φησι· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ σῶμά ἐστιν.* You see how Aristotle, respecting corporeal motions, pronounces of the soul, that it is immoveable. For whatsoever is in a place (and moveable) is body.—Lastly, in that passage before cited, Aristotle plainly makes the essence of corporeal substance, as opposed to incorporeal, to consist in magnitude.

Besides Plato and Aristotle, we might here instance in sundry other of the ancient Incorporealists, who clearly maintained the same doctrine. Philo doth not only assert in general a double es-

^a Lib. i. cap. iv. p. 12. tom. ii. oper.

^b Comment. in Libros Aristot. de Anima, fol. 6. ed. Græc. Franc. Asulani, Venet. 1527. fol.

^c Comment. in Libros tres Aristot. de Anima, fol. 13. ed. Græc. Venet. 1553. fol.

sence or substance, ἀδιάστατον, and διαστηματικὴν, a distant, and indistant one;—but somewhere writeth thus concerning the Deity: Ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ De Confus. Ling. p. 339. πεπλήρωται τὰ πάντα, περιέχοντος οὐ περιεχομένου, ᾧ πανταχοῦ τε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι μόνῳ· οὐδαμοῦ μὲν, ὅτι καὶ χώραν καὶ τόπον αὐτὸς τοῖς σώμασι συγγεγέννηκε· τὸ δὲ πεποιηκὸς ἐν οὐδενὶ τῶν γεγονότων θέμις εἰπεῖν περιέχεσθαι· πανταχοῦ δὲ, ὅτι τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ διὰ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος ἀέρος τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ τείνας, &c. All things are filled with God, as containing them, but not as being contained by them, or in them; to whom alone it belongeth to be both every where, and no where. No where, because himself created space and place, together with bodies, and it is not lawful to include the Creator within any of his creatures. And every where, because he extendeth his virtues and powers throughout earth and water, air and heaven, and leaveth no part of the world destitute thereof; but, collecting all things together under himself, hath bound them fast with invisible bonds.—But none hath more industriously pursued this business than Plotinus, who every where asserts body and magnitude to be one and the same thing; and that, besides this, there is another substance incorporeal, which, consequently, is ἀποσος, and ἀμεγέθης, and ἀμερῆς, devoid of quantity, and of magnitude, and of parts, locally distant from one another; ὃ ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ποσὸν εἶναι ὑπερβέβηκεν, it having in its nature transcended the imperfection of quantity.—And who hath also written two whole books^a upon this very subject, τὸ ὄν ἐν καὶ ταντὸν ἀριθμῷ ἅμα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον; that one and the self-same numerical thing may be all of it en-

^a Lib. iv. et v. Ennead. vi.

tirely every where.—Wherein his principal design was to prove, that the Deity is not part of it here, and part of it there; and so much thereof in one place, and so much in another (as if the very substance of it were mensurable by yards and poles); but the whole undivided Deity every where; *Πρὸ τῶν ἐν τόπῳ ἀπάντων* (saith he); “God is before all things, that are in a place.” And ^a *θαν- μάζειν οὐ δεῖ, εἰ αὐτὸ μὴ ὄν ἐν τόπῳ, παντὶ τῷ ἐν τόπῳ ὄντι, ὅλως πάρεστι, φησὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος, ὡς ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τόπον οὐκ εἰληχότι, ᾧ πάρεστι, τούτῳ ὄλον παρεῖναι*, it is not at all to be wondered at, that God, being not in a place, should be present to every thing, that is in a place, wholly and entirely; reason pronouncing, that he, having no place, must therefore of necessity be *ὅλως*, all of him indivisibly present to whatsoever he is present.—Neither is this, saith he, a thing only deduced by reason, but that, which is before reason, suggested by the instincts of mankind; *τὸ ἐν καὶ ταυτὸν ἀριθμῷ, πανταχοῦ ἅμα ὄλον εἶναι, κοινὴ ἔννοιά φησιν εἶναι, ὅταν πάντες κινούμενοι αὐτοφυῶς λέγωσι, τὸν ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν Θεόν, ὡς ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτόν* that one and the same numerical substance (to wit, of the Deity) is at once entirely every where, is agreeable to the common notions, as sentiments of mankind, when we do so often by the instincts of nature speak of that God, who is in every one of us, supposing him to be one and the same in all.—Where the philosopher subjoins, *Καὶ ἔστι πάντων βεβαιοτάτη ἀρχή, ἣν ὥσπερ αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν φθέγγονται*, &c. And this is the firmest of all principles, that, which our souls do, as it were, naturally and of themselves speak; and which is not collected by reason, but comes

^a Lib. iv. Ennead. vi. cap. iii. p. 647.

forth from them before ratiocination.—Moreover, he often affirmeth of the human soul, or rather takes it as a thing for granted, that this is the whole or all of it, in every part of the body, that is, undividedly : Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ αὐτὸ P. 644.

ἀριθμῶ, τὸ ἐν τῷ ποδὶ, καὶ τῇ χειρὶ ὑπάρχει.

As for the human soul, it is one and the same numerically in the hand, and in the foot.—And again : Εἰτά πως ἐν ποδὶ καὶ χειρὶ τὴν αὐτήν, τὴν δὲ ἐν τῷ δὲ μέρει τοῦ παντός, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν τὴν ἐν τῷδε. Since we commonly suppose our own soul to be the same, both in our foot and in our hand, why should we not, in like manner, acknowledge that of the mundane soul, or Deity,—which is in one part of the universe, to be the same with that in another? In like manner, Simplicius,^a proving that body is not the first principle, because there must of necessity be something self-moving, and what is so, must needs be incorporeal, writeth thus : Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀμερές εὐθὺς ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ ἀδιάστατον, μεριστὸν γὰρ καὶ διαστατὸν ὑπάρχον, οὐ δύναται ὅλον ὅλῳ εἶναι ἐφαρμόττειν, ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἶναι κινεῖν, καὶ ὅλον τὸ αὐτὸ κινούμενον. Because what is such, must of necessity be indivisible, and indistant; for were it divisible, and distant, it could not all of it be conjoined with its whole self; so that the whole should both actively move, and be moved.—Which same thing seems further evident in the soul's being all conscious of itself, and reflexive of its whole self; which could not be, were one part of it distant from another. Again, the same philosopher expressly denieth the soul, though a self-moving substance, to be at all locally moved, otherwise than by accident, in respect of the

^a Ubi supra, fol. 7.

body, which is moved by it, οὐ τὰς σωματικὰς κινούμενον κινήσεις (κατὰ γὰρ ἐκείνας ἀκίνητόν ἐστι) ἀλλὰ τὰς ψυχικὰς, αἷς ὀνόματά ἐστι σκοπεῖσθαι, βουλευέσθαι, διανοεῖν, δοξάζειν, κινεῖ τὰ σώματα κατὰ τὰς σωματικὰς κινήσεις. The soul, being not moved by corporeal, or local motions (for in respect of these it is immoveable), but by cogitative ones only, (the names whereof are Consultation and Deliberation, &c.) by these moveth bodies locally.—And that this was really Plato's meaning also, when he determined the soul to be a self-moving substance, and the cause of all bodily motion; that moving itself in a way of cogitation, it moved bodies locally (notwithstanding that Aristotle would not take notice of it), sufficiently appears from his own words, and is acknowledged by the Greek scholiasts themselves upon Aristotle's *De Anima*. Thus again Simplicius elsewhere: Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ ψυχή, οὐδ' ἂν κινεῖτο, τὰς τῶν ἐν τόπῳ ὄντων κινήσεις. Since the soul is not in a place, it is not capable of any local motion.

We should omit the testimonies of any more philosophers, were it not that we find Porphyrius so full and express herein, who makes this the very beginning of his ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ, his manuduction to intelligibles;—πᾶν σῶμα ἐν τόπῳ, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἀσωμάτων ἐν τόπῳ, that though every body be in a place, yet nothing, that is properly incorporeal, is in a place:—and who afterwards further pursues it in this manner:

P. 229, 230. [§. xxviii. ed. Cantab.] Οὐδὲ τοπικῶς διέρχεται τὸ ἀσώματον, ὅπου βούλεται ὄγκῳ γὰρ συνυφίσταται τόπος· τὸ δ' ἄογκον παντελῶς καὶ ἀμέγεθες, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ὄγκῳ ἀκράτητον, τοπικῆς τε κινήσεως ἄμοιρον, διαθέσει τοίνυν ποία ἔχει εὐρίσκειται, ὅπου καὶ διάκειται· καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ φανερά

ἡ παρουσία αὐτοῦ γίνεται' Neither does that, which is incorporeal, move locally by will, place being relative only to magnitude and bulk. But that, which is devoid of bulk and magnitude, is likewise devoid of local motion. Wherefore, it is only present by a certain disposition and inclination of it to one thing more than another; nor is its presence there discernible otherwise, than by its operations and effects.—Again, concerning the three Divine hypostases he writeth thus; ὁ P. 231.
 Θεὸς πανταχοῦ ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ, καὶ ὁ νοῦς πανταχοῦ ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ, καὶ ψυχὴ πανταχοῦ ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ, &c. The supreme God is therefore every where, because he is no where; and the same is true also of the second and third Divine hypostases, Nous and Psyche. The supreme God is every where and no where, in respect of those things which are after him, and only his own, and in himself. Nous, or intellect, is in the supreme God, every where and no where, as to those things that are after him. Pysche, or the mundane soul, is both in intellect and the supreme God, and every where and no where, as to bodies. Lastly, body is both in the soul of the world and in God.—Where he denies God to be locally in the corporeal world, and thinks it more proper to say, that the corporeal world is in God, than God in it; because the world is held and contained in the Divine power, but the Deity is not in the locality of the world. Moreover, he further declares his sense after this manner:^a Οὐδ' εἰ κενὸν οὖν τι ἐπινοηθεῖ ἀσώματον, ἐν κενῷ οἷόν τε εἶναι Νοῦν, σώματος μὲν γὰρ δεκτικὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ κενόν. Νοῦ δὲ ἐνέργειαν χωρῆσαι ἀμήχανον, καὶ τόπον δοῦ-

^a In Appendice sententiarum, sive graduum ad intelligibilia, § 45. p. 278. ed. Cantab.

ναι ἐνεργεία. Nor, if there were conceived to be such an incorporeal space, or vacuum (as Democritus and Epicurus supposed), could Mind, or God, possibly exist in this empty space (as coextended with the same), for this would be only receptive of bodies, but it could not receive the energy of mind or intellect, nor give any place or room to that, that being no bulky thing.—And again :^a Ὁ μὲν κόσμος ἐν τῷ νῷ διαστατικῶς παρέσσι, τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον τῷ κόσμῳ ἀμερῶς καὶ ἀδιαστάτως· τὸ δὲ ἀμερῆς ἐν διαστατῷ ὅλον γίνεται κατὰ πᾶν μέρος, ταυτὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ· αὐτὸ ἀμερῶς παρέσσι καὶ ἀπληθύντως καὶ ἀτόπως, κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, τῷ μεριστῷ, καὶ πεπληθυσμένῳ, καὶ ὄντι ἐν τόπῳ. The corporeal world is distantly present to the intelligible (or the Deity); and that is indivisibly and indistantly present with the world. But when that, which is indistant and unextended, is present with that which is distant and extended; then is the whole of the former one and the same numerically in every part of the latter. That is, it is indivisibly and unmultipliedly, and illocally there (according to its own nature) present with that, which is naturally divisible, and multipliable, and in a place.—Lastly, he affirmeth the same likewise of the human soul, that this is also οὐσία ἀμεγέθης, a substance devoid of magnitude,—and which is not locally present to this or that body, but by disposition and energy; and therefore the whole of it in every part thereof undividedly.^b

And as for the Christian writers, besides Origen, who was so famous an assertor of incorpo-

^a Par. ii. Sententiarum ad intelligibilia docentium, §. 35. p. 241.

^b Vide par. i. Sententiar. §. 18. p. 225.

real substance, that (as Socrates recordeth) the Egyptian monks and Anthropomorphites threatened death to Theophilus the Alexandrian bishop, unless he would at once execrate and renounce the writings of Origen, and profess the belief of a corporeal God of human form; and who also maintained incorporeal substance to be unextended, as might be proved from sundry passages, both of his book against Celsus, and that *Peri Archon*; we say (besides Origen, and others of the Greeks), St. Austin amongst the Latins clearly asserted the same; he maintaining in his book *De Quantitate Animæ*,^b and elsewhere, concerning the human soul, that being incorporeal, it hath no dimensions of length, breadth, and profundity, and is *illocabilis*, no where as in a place. We shall conclude with the testimony of Boethius, who was both a philosopher and a Christian: “*Quædam sunt (saith he)^c communes animi conceptiones, per se notæ, apud sapientes tantum; ut incorporalia non esse in loco.*” There are certain common conceptions, or notions of the mind, which are known by themselves amongst wise men only; as this, for example, that incorporeals are in no place.—From whence it is manifest, that the generality of reputed wise men were not formerly of this opinion, “*quod nusquam est, nihil est,*” that what is no where, or in no certain place, is nothing;—and that this was not

^a *Histor. Eccles. lib. vi. cap. vii. p. 310.*

^b It is published in the first volume of the Benedictine edition of St. Augustine's works.

^c Dr. Cudworth seems to have quoted this passage from memory out of Boethius's book, intitled, “*Quomodo Substantiæ in eo, quod sint, bonæ sint, cum non sint Substantialia bona,*” p. 167.

looked upon by them as a common notion, but only as a vulgar error.

By this time we have made it unquestionably evident, that this opinion of incorporeal substance being unextended, indistant, and devoid of magnitude, is no novel or recent thing, nor first started in the scholastic age; but that it was the general persuasion of the most ancient and learned assertors of incorporeal substance, especially that the Deity was not part of it here, and part of it there, nor the substance thereof mensurable by yards and poles, as if there were so much of it contained in one room, and so much and no more in another, according to their several dimensions; but that the whole undivided Deity was at once in every part of the world, and consequently no where locally after the manner of bodies. But, because this opinion seems so strange and paradoxical, and lies under so great prejudices, we shall in the next place shew, how these ancient Incorporealists endeavoured to acquit themselves in repelling the several efforts and plausibilities made against it. The first whereof is this, that to suppose incorporeal substances unextended and divisible is to make them absolute parvitudes, and by means of that, to render them all (even the Deity itself) contemptible: since they must of necessity be either physical minimums, that cannot actually be divided further by reason of their littleness (if there be any such thing), or else mere mathematical points, which are not so much as mentally divisible: so that thousands of these incorporeal substances, or spirits, might dance together at once upon a needle's point. To which it was long

since thus replied by Plotinus : Οὐχ οὕτω
 δὲ ἀμερές ὡς μικρόν· ὅτι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦττον καὶ
 μεριστὸν ἔσται· καὶ οὐ παντὶ αὐτὸ ἐφαρμόσει· οὐδ'
 ἂν ἀυξομένῳ τὸ αὐτὸ συνέσται· ἀλλ' οὐδ' οὕτως ὡς σημεῖον,
 οὐ γὰρ ἐν σημεῖον ὁ ὄγκος, ἀλλ' ἄπειρα ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐδ' ὡς
 ἐφαρμόσει· God, and all other incorporeal sub-
 stances, are not so indivisible, as if they were
 parvitudes, or little things, as physical points ; for
 so would they still be mathematically divisible;
 nor yet as if they were mathematical points nei-
 ther, which indeed are no bodies nor substances,
 but only the *termini* of a line. And neither of
 these ways could the Deity *congruere* with the
 world ; nor souls with their respective bodies, so as
 to be all present with the whole of them.—Again,
 he writeth particularly concerning the
 Deity thus : Οὐτε οὕτως ἀμερές, ὡς τὸ συμ-
 κρώτατον, μέγιστον γὰρ ἀπάντων, οὐ μεγέθει,
 ἀλλὰ δυνάμει·—ληπτέον δὲ καὶ ἄπειρον αὐτόν, οὐ τῷ
 ἀδιεξιτήτῳ, ἢ τοῦ μεγέθους, ἢ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπειρι-
 λήπτῳ τῆς δυνάμεως. God is not so indivisible, as if
 he were the smallest or least of things, for he is
 the greatest of all, not in respect of magnitude,
 but of power. Moreover, as he is indivisible, so
 is he also to be acknowledged infinite; not as if
 he were a magnitude, or a number, which could
 never be passed through, but because his power
 is incomprehensible.—Moreover, the same philo-
 sopher condemneth this for a vulgar error, pro-
 ceeding from sense and imagination, that what-
 soever is unextended, and indistant, must there-
 fore needs be little ; he affirming, on the contrary,
 the vulgar to be much mistaken, as to
 true greatness and littleness: Μέγα νομί-
 ζοντες τὸ αἰσθητὸν, ἀποροῦμεν, πῶς ἐν μεγάλῳ

P. 656.

[Ennead. vi.
lib. iv. cap.
xiii.]

P. 764.

[Ennead. vi.
lib. ix.]

P. 645.

[Ennead. vi.
lib. iv. cap. ii.]

καὶ τοσούτῳ ἐκείνῃ ἢ φύσιν ἐκτείνεται· τὸ δὲ ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ λεγόμενον μέγα μικρόν· ὃ δὲ νομίζεται μικρόν εἶναι μέγα· ἐπεὶ ὅλον ἐπὶ πᾶν τούτου μέρος φθάνει, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦτο πανταχόθεν τοῖς αὐτοῦ μέρεσιν ἐπ' ἐκείνο ἰὸν εὐρίσκει αὐτὸ πανταχοῦ πᾶν καὶ μείζον ἑαυτοῦ. We commonly, looking upon this sensible world as great, wonder how that (indivisible and unextended) nature of the Deity can every where comply, and be present with it. Whereas that, which is vulgarly called great, is indeed little; and that, which is thus imagined to be little, is indeed great. Forasmuch as the whole of this diffuseth itself through every part of the other; or rather, this whole corporeal universe, in every one of its parts, findeth that whole and entire, and therefore greater than itself.—To the same purpose also Porphyrius: Τὸ ὄντως ὄν οὔτε μέγα, οὔτε μικρόν ἐστὶ· (τὸ γὰρ μέγα καὶ μικρόν κυρίως ὄγκου ἴδια) ἐκβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρόν· καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ μέγιστον καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἐλάχιστον, ταυτὸ καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ ὄν· εἰ καὶ εὐρίσκεται ἅμα ὑπὸ παντὸς μεγίστου, καὶ ὑπὸ παντὸς ἐλάχιστου εὐρισκόμενον· μήτε ἄρα ὡς μέγιστον αὐτὸ ὑπονοήσεις· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀπορήσεις, πῶς μέγιστον ὄν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις ὄγκοις πάρεστι, μὴ μειωθὲν, ἢ συσταλὲν· μήτε ὡς ἐλάχιστον, εἰ δὲ μὴ, πάλιν ἀπορήσεις, πῶς ἐλάχιστον ὄν τοῖς μεγίστοις ὄγκοις πάρεστι, μὴ πολλαπλασιασθὲν, ἢ αὐξήθην. The Deity, which is the only true being, is neither great nor little (forasmuch as great and little properly belong to corporeal bulk, or magnitude); but it exceedeth both the greatness of every thing that is great, and the littleness of whatsoever is little (it being more indivisible, and more one with itself, than any thing that is little, and more powerful than any thing that is great); so that it is above both the greatest and the least; it being found all one and the same

by every greatest, and every smallest thing participating thereof. Wherefore you must neither look upon God as the greatest thing (that is, in a way of quantity), for then you may well doubt, how being the greatest, he can be all of him present with every least thing, neither diminished, nor contracted; nor yet must you look upon him as the least thing neither: for if you do so, then will you be at a loss again, how, being the least thing, he can be present with all the greatest bulks; neither multiplied, nor augmented.—In a word, the sum of their answer amounts to this, that an incorporeal unextended Deity, is neither a physical point, because this hath distance in it, and is mentally divisible; nor yet a mathematical one, because this, though having neither magnitude nor substance in it, hath, notwithstanding, site and position; a point being, according to Aristotle,^a a monad having site and position. It is not to be conceived as a parvitude, or very little thing, because then it could not *congruere* with all the greatest things; nor yet as a great thing, in a way of quantity and extension; because then it could not be all of it present to every least thing. Nor does true greatness consist in a way of bulk or magnitude, all magnitude being but little; since there can be no infinite magnitude, and no finite magnitude can have infinite power, as Aristotle before urged. And to conclude, though some, who are far from Atheists, may make themselves merry with that conceit of thousands of spirits dancing at once upon a needle's point; and though the Atheists may endeavour to rogue and ridicule all incorpo-

^a De Anima, lib. ii. cap. vi. p. 13. vide etiam Metaphys. lib. xiii. cap. xii. p. 471. tom. iv. oper.

real substance in that manner, yet does this run upon a clear mistake of the hypothesis, and make nothing at all against it; forasmuch as an unextended substance is neither any parvitude, as is here supposed (because it hath no magnitude at all), nor hath it any place, or site, or local motion, properly belonging to it; and therefore can neither dance upon a needle's point, nor any where else.

But in the next place, it is further objected, that what is neither great nor little, what possesses no space, and hath no place nor site amongst bodies, must therefore needs be an absolute non-entity, forasmuch as magnitude or extention is the very essence of being or entity, as such; so that there can be neither substance nor accident unextended. Now, since whatsoever is extended is bodily, there can therefore be no other substance, besides body, nor any thing incorporeal, otherwise than as that word may be taken for a thin and subtile body; in which sense fire was, by some in Aristotle,^a said to be *μάλιστα τῶν στοιχείων ἀσώματον*, and *ἀσωματώτατον*, the most incorporeal of all the elements;—and Aristotle^b himself useth the word in the same manner, when he affirmeth, that all philosophers did define the soul by three things, motion, sense, and incorporeity; several of those there mentioned by him understanding the soul to be no otherwise incorporeal, than as *σῶμα λεπτομερές*, a thin and subtile body.—In answer to which objection, we may remember, that Plato, in the passage before cited, declareth this to be but a vulgar error, that what-

^a De Anima, lib. i. cap. ii. p. 6. tom. ii. oper.

^b Ibid.

soever doth not take up space, and is in no place, is nothing. He intimating the original hereof to have sprung from men's adhering too much to those lower faculties of sense and imagination, which are able to conceive nothing but what is corporeal. And accordingly Plotinus: 'H

P. 656.

μὲν αἴσθησις, ἣ προσέχοντες ἀπιστοῦμεν τοῖς λεγόμενοις, λέγει ὅτι ὧδε καὶ ὧδε· ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ ὧδε καὶ ὧδέ φησιν, οὐκ ἐκταθεῖσαν ὧδε καὶ ὧδε γεγόνεαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκταθὲν πᾶν αὐτοῦ μετεληφέναι, ὄντος ἀδιαστάτου αὐτοῦ. Sense, indeed, which we attending to, disbelieve these things, tells us of here and there; but reason dictates, that here and there is so to be understood of the Deity, not as if it were extendedly here and there, but because every extended thing, and the several parts of the world, partake every where of that, being indistant and unextended.—

To the same purpose Porphyrius: Δεῖ τοι-

A. P. 242.

νυν ἐν ταῖς σκέψεσι κατακρατοῦντας τῆς ἐκατέρου ἰδιότητος μὴ ἐπαλλάττειν τὰς φύσεις· μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ προσόντα τοῖς σώμασιν, ἢ τοιαῦτα, μὴ φαντάζεσθαι καὶ δοξάζειν περὶ τὸ ἀσώματον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ σωμάτων, ἐν συνηθείᾳ πᾶς· ἐκείνων δὲ μόλις ἐν γνώσει γίνεται. ἀοριστῶν περὶ αὐτὰ, ἕως ἂν ὑπὸ φαντασίας κρατῆται· We ought therefore, in our disquisitions concerning corporeal and incorporeal beings, to conserve the property of each, and not to confound their natures; but especially to take heed, that our fancy and imagination do not so far impose upon our judgments, as to make us attribute to incorporeals what properly belongeth to bodies only. For we are all accustomed to bodies; but as for incorporeals, scarcely any one reaches to the knowledge of them; men always fluctuating about them, and diffiding them, so long as they are held under the power of

their imagination.—Where afterwards he propoundeth a form for this, how we should think of incorporeals, so as not to confound their natures with corporeals ; ἐν ἀπείροις μέρεσι τοῦ διαστατοῦ παρὸν ὅλον τὸ ἀδιάστατον, οὔτε μερισθὲν πάρεστι, τῷ μέρει διδὸν μέρος, οὔτε πληθυνθὲν τῷ πλήθει παρέχον ἑαυτὸ πολλά πλησιασθὲν ἀλλ' ὅλον πᾶσι τε τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὀγκωμένου, ἐνί τε ἐκάστῳ τοῦ πλήθους, ἀμερῶς καὶ ἀπληθύντως καὶ ὡς ἐν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δὲ μερικῶς καὶ διηρημένως ἀπολαύειν αὐτοῦ. That the indistant and unextended Deity is the whole of it present in infinite parts of the distant world, neither divided, as applying part to part ; nor yet multiplied into many wholes, according to the multiplicity of those things that partake thereof. But the whole of it (one and the same in number) is present to all the parts of the bulky world, and to every one of those many things in it, undividedly and unmultipliedly ; that in the mean time partaking thereof dividedly.—It was granted therefore by these ancients, that this unextended and indistant nature of incorporeals is ἀφάνταστον, a thing altogether unimaginable ;—and this was concluded by them to be the only reason, why so many have pronounced it to be impossible, because they attended only to sense and imagination, and made them the only measure of things and truth ; it having been accordingly maintained by divers of them (as Porphyrius tells us), that imagination and intellection are but two different names for one and the same thing : Ὀνόματος διαφορᾶς προστεθείσης τῇ τοῦ νοῦ ὑποστάσει, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας, ἢ γὰρ ἐν λογικῷ ζῶν φαντασία ἐδέδοκτο αὐτοῖς νόησις, There is a difference of names only, and no more, betwixt mind and fancy ; fancy and imagination,

P. 224. 'Αφ.

in rational animals, seeming to be the same thing with intellection.—But there are many things, which no man can have any phantasm or imagination of, and yet are they, notwithstanding, by all unquestionably acknowledged for entities, or realities; from whence it is plain, that we must have some other faculties in us, which extend beyond fancy and imagination. Reason indeed dictates, that whatsoever can either do or suffer any thing, must therefore be undoubtedly something; but that whatsoever is unextended, and hath no distant parts one without another, must therefore needs be nothing, is no common notion, but the spurious suggestion of imagination only, and a vulgar error. There need to be no fear at all, lest a Being infinitely wise and powerful, which acts upon the whole world, and all the parts thereof, in framing and governing the same, should prove a nonentity, merely for want of bulk and extension; or, because it swells not out into space and distance, as bodies do, therefore vanish into nothing. Nor do active force and power, as such, depend upon bulk and extension; because then whatsoever had the greater bulk, would have the greater activity. There are therefore two kinds of substances in the universe; the first corporeal, which are nothing but ὄγκοι, bulks, or tumours,—devoid of all self-active power; the second incorporeal, which are ἀόγκοι δυνάμεις, substantial powers, vigours, and activities;—which, though they act upon bulk and extension, yet are themselves unbulky, and devoid of quantity and dimensions; however, they have a certain βάθος in them in another sense, an essential profundity, according to this of Simpli-

In. Ar. Phys. *cius*: Μέριστή μὲν ἀπλῶς ἡ σωματικὴ οὐσία πᾶσα, P₂ 3. ἄλλων ἀλλαχοῦ τῶν μερίων κειμένων ἀμέριστος δὲ εἰλικρινῶς ἢ νοερά, πολὺ δὲ βάθος ἔχουσα. All corporeal substance is simply divisible, some parts of it being here, and some there; but intellectual substance is indivisible, and without dimensions, though it hath much of depth and profundity in it in another sense.—But that there is something ἀφάνταστον, unimaginable,—even in body itself, is evident, whether you will suppose it to be infinitely divisible, or not, as you must of necessity suppose one or other of these. And that we ought not always to pronounce of corporeal things themselves according to imagination, is manifest from hence; because, though astronomical reasons assure us, that the sun is really more than a hundred times bigger than the whole earth, yet can we not possibly, for all that, imagine the sun of such a bigness, nor indeed the earth itself half so big, as we know it to be. The reason whereof is, partly because we never had a sense or sight of any such vast bigness at once, as that of either of them; and partly because our sense always representing the sun to us, but ὡς πεδίαῖον, as of a foot diameter;*—and we being accustomed always to imagine the same according to the appearance of sense, are not able to frame any imagination of it, as very much bigger. Wherefore, if imagination be not to be trusted, nor made the criterion or measure of truth, as to sensible things themselves, much less ought it to be, as to things insensible. Besides all which, the ancient Incorporrealists argued after this manner, that it

* Vide Ciceron. Acad. Question. lib. iv. cap. xxvi. p. 2294. tom. viii. oper.

is as difficult for us to conceive a substance whose duration is unextended or unstretched out in time, into past, present, and future, and therefore without beginning; as that which is unextended as to parts, place, or space, in length, breadth, and thickness; yet does reason pronounce, that there must needs be not only a duration without beginning, but also *ἄχρονος αἰών*, a timeless eternity,—or a permanent duration, differing from that successive flux of time (which is one of Plato's^a *γεννητά*, things generated,—or that had a beginning), this parity of reason is by Plotinus thus insisted on: *Διὸ οὐδ' ἐν χρόνῳ*, P. 669. [En-
ἀλλὰ παντός χρόνου ἔξω, τοῦ μὲν χρόνου σκιδνα- nead. vi. lib.
μένου αἰεὶ πρὸς διάστασιν, τοῦ δ' αἰῶνος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ v. cap. xi.]
μένοντος καὶ κρατοῦντος, καὶ πλείονος ὄντος δυνάμει αἰδίῳ,
τοῦ ἐπὶ πολλὰ δοκοῦντος ἰέναι χρόνου. For the same reason, that we deny local extension to the Deity, must we also deny temporal distance to the same; and affirm, that God is not in time, but above time, in eternity. Forasmuch as time is always scattered and stretched out in length and distance, one moment following after another; but eternity remaineth in the same, without any flux, and yet nevertheless outgoeth time, and transcendeth the flux thereof, though seeming to be stretched and spun out more into length. Now, the reason, why we cannot frame a conception of such a timeless eternity, is only, because ourselves are essentially involved in time, and accordingly are our conceptions chained, fettered, and confined, to that narrow and dark dungeon, that ourselves are imprisoned in; notwithstand-

^aIn *Timæo*, p. 529. oper.

ing which, our freer faculties, assuring us of the existence of a being, which far transcendeth ourselves, to wit, one that is infinitely perfect; we have, by means hereof, *μαντείαν τινά*, a certain vaticination,—of such a standing timeless eternity, as its duration.

But as for that conceit, of immaterial or incorporeal bodies, or that God and human souls are no otherwise incorporeal than as *σῶμα λεπτομερές*, a thin and subtile body,—such as wind or vapour, air or ether; it is certain, that, according to the principles of the most ancient atomic philosophy (before it was atheized), there being no such real quality of subtilty or tenuity (because this is altogether unintelligible), but this difference arising wholly from motion, dividing the insensible parts, and every way agitating the same, together with a certain contexture of those parts; it is not impossible, but that the finest and most subtile body that is, might become as gross, hard, heavy, and opaque, as flesh, earth, stones, lead, or iron; and again, that the grossest of these bodies, by motion, and a different contexture of parts, might not only be crystallized, but also become as thin, soft, and fluid, as the finest ether. So that there is no specific difference betwixt a thick and thin, a gross and fine, an opaque and pellucid, a hard and soft body, but accidental only; and therefore is there no reason, why life and understanding should be thought to belong to the one rather than to the other of them. Besides which, the reasons of the ancient Incorporealists (afterwards to be produced) will evince, that the human soul and mind cannot possibly be any body whatsoever, though never so fine, thin, and subtile,

whose parts are by motion dividable, and separable from one another.

But it is further objected against this unextended nature, of incorporeal substances, as they are said to be all in the whole, and all in every part of that body, which they are united into, or act upon; that this is an absolute contradiction and impossibility, because if the whole of the Deity be in this one point of matter, then can there be nothing at all of it in the next adjoining, but that must needs be another whole, and nothing the same with the former. In like manner, if the whole human soul be in one part of this organized body, then can there be none at all of it in any other part thereof; and so not the whole in the whole. To which objection the ancient Incorporealists made this two-fold reply: first, in way of concession, That this is indeed an absolute contradiction for an extended substance, or body to be all of it in every one part of that space, which the whole occupieth. Thus Plotinus: *Σώματι ἀδύνατον ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὅλον εἶναι*, En. 4. l. vii. *καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅπερ τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχειν*. It is im- P. 460.
possible for a body, or extended substance, to be one and the same, all of it in every part of that space which it possesses; and for every part thereof to be the same with the whole.—But, secondly, as for an unextended and indistant substance, which hath no parts one without another, it is so far from being a contradiction, that it should be all of it in every part of that body, which it acts upon; that it is impossible it should be otherwise, only a part in a part thereof, so that an equal quantity of both should coexist together, because this is to suppose an unex-

tended substance to be extended. We say it is contradictory to the nature of that substance, which is supposed to be ἀμεγέθης, ἄποσος, ἀδιάστατος, ἀμερῆς, ἀδιαίρετος, devoid of magnitude, and of quantity, and of parts indistant, and indivisible;—that it should be otherwise united to, or conjoined with, an extended body, than after this way, which is looked upon as such conjuring; namely, that the whole of it should be present with, and act upon every part thereof. Thus

P. 662. Plotinus: Οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγμα-
τος, καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἀλλότριον οὐδέν, οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς
ἐτέρας φύσεως ἐλκύσας. This form of doctrine, concerning Incorporeals, is necessarily taken from the thing itself (viz. the nature of them as unextended), and hath nothing in it alien from that essence, as confounding the corporeal nature therewith.—Whatsoever is unextended and indistant, cannot possibly coexist with an extended substance, point by point, and part by part, but it must of necessity be ὅλον ἐν καὶ ταυτὸν ἀριθμῶ, all of it, one and the same numerically;—that is (like itself), undividedly, in every part of that which it acts upon. Wherefore the word ὅλον, in this form, when it is said, that the whole Deity is in every part of the world, and the whole soul in every part of the body, is not to be taken in a positive sense, for a whole consisting of parts, one without another, but in a negative only, for μὴ μεμερισμένον, an whole undivided;—so that the meaning thereof is no more than this, that the Deity is not dividedly in the world, nor the soul dividedly in the body, a part here and a part

P. 662. there; but the Τὸ Θεῖον is πανταχοῦ ὅλον μὴ μεμερισμένον, every where all of it, undi-

videdly.—Thus again Plotinus: Εἰ οὖν πανταχοῦ θεός, οὐχ' οἷόν τε μεμερισμένον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πανταχοῦ αὐτὸς εἴη, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ μέρος, τὸ μὲν ὠδὶ, τὸ δὲ ὠδὶ ἔσται, αὐτὸς οὐχ' εἷς ἔτι ἔσται, ὥσπερ εἰ τμηθεῖν τι μέγεθος εἰς πολλά, καὶ τὰ μέρη πάντα, οὐκ ἔτι τὸ ὅλον ἐκείνο ἔσται· πρὸς τούτοις δὲ καὶ σῶμα· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα, πάλιν ἂν ἀνεφάνη τὸ ἀπιστούμενον, ἐν φύσει ἀνθρώπου, ὁμοῦ θεὸν νομίζειν καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὅλον εἶναι· If therefore God be every where, it cannot possibly be, that he should be so dividedly; because then himself would not be every where, but only a part of him here, and a part of him there, throughout the world; himself being not one undivided thing. Moreover, this would be all one, as if a magnitude were cut and divided into many parts, every one of which parts could not be that whole magnitude.—Lastly, this would be the very same, as to make God a body.—Now if these things be impossible, then must that so-much-disbelieved thing (looked upon as such a puzzling *griphus*, or rather as contradictory nonsense) be an undoubted truth, according to the common notions of mankind, that God is every where; to wit, that he is all of him the same whole, undividedly, every where. The sum of all is, that though it be an absolute contradiction, for a body, or *quantum*, to be ὁμοῦ πᾶν, all of it in every part of that space,—which the whole is in; yet it is no contradiction at all for an unextended and indistant being, to be all of it undividedly, in every part of that body it acts upon; but, on the contrary, it would be flatly contradictory to it, to say, that it is only part of it in a part; this being to divide an indivisible thing into parts.

The fourth and last objection against incorpo-

real and unextended substance is from that illocality and immobility (which will follow thereupon) of human souls, and other finite particular spirits, such as demons or angels; that this is not only itself very absurd, to suppose these finite and particular beings, to be thus illocal and immoveable, no where, and every where (from whence it would seem to follow, that they might act the whole corporeal universe, or take cognizance of all things therein every where); but also, that this conceit is contradictory to the very principles of religionists themselves, and plainly confuted by the same; they acknowledging universally, that human souls (at death) departing out of this body, do locally move from thence into a certain other place, called Hades, Hell, or Inferi. Now the latter part of this objection is first to be answered. And this is indeed a thing, which the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, were not unaware of; that the vulgarly-received tradition, of human souls (after death) going into hades, might be objected against them. For the satisfying whereof, Plotinus suggesteth

these two things; first, *Τὸ μὲν εἰς Ἄιδου γίνεσθαι, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ Ἄιδεῖ τὸ χωρὶς λέγεται*
En. 6. 1. iv. [cap. xvi. p. 659.]

That if by hades be meant nothing but τὸ ἀειδές, the invisible (as many times it is), then is there no more signified by the soul's going into hades, than its no longer being vitally united to this earthy body, and but acting apart by itself, and so hath it nothing of place necessarily included in it. Secondly: *Εἰ δέ τινα χεῖρω τόπον τι θαυμαστόν; ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν οὐ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ τόπῳ κάκεινη λέγεται ἐκεῖ· ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄντος ἔτι σώματος; ἢ τὸ εἶδωλον εἰ μὴ ἀποσπασθείη, πῶς οὐκ ἐκεῖ οὐ τὸ εἶδωλον.* But if by hades

be understood a certain worser place (as sometimes it also is), what wonder is this? since now where our body is, there in the same place is our soul said to be also? But you will reply, How can this be, when there is now no longer any body left? We answer, that if the idol of the soul be not quite separated from it, why should not the soul itself be said to be there also, where its idol is? Where, by the idol of the soul, Plotinus seems to mean an airy or spirituous body, quickened and vitalized by the soul, adhering to it after death. But when the same philosopher supposes this very idol of the soul to be also separable from it, and that so as to subsist apart by itself too, this going alone into hades, or the worser place, whilst that liveth only in the intelligible world (where there is no place nor distance), lodged in the naked Deity, having nothing at all of body hanging about it, and being now not a part but the whole, and so situate neither here nor there; in this high flight of his, he is at once both absurdly paradoxical, in dividing the life of the soul as it were into two, and forgot the doctrine of his own school, which, as himself elsewhere intimateth, was this; τὴν ἡμετέραν

ψυχὴν τὸδε μὲν σῶμα καταλείψει, οὐ πάντη δὲ En. 4. l. iii. c. iv. [p. 374.]

ἔξω σώματος ἔσσειθαι that our soul, though it shall quit this body, yet shall it never be dis-united from all body. Wherefore Porphyrius answering the same objection, though he were otherwise much addicted to Plotinus, and here uses his language too, yet does he in this depart from him, adhering to the ancient Pythagoric tradition; which, as will appear afterwards, was Ἀφ. p. 235. this, "That human souls are always

united to some body or other." Ὡσπερ τὸ ἐπὶ γῆς εἶναι ψυχῆ ἐστίν, οὐ τὸ γῆς ἐπιβαίνειν, ὡς τὰ σώματα· τὸ δὲ προεστάναι σώματος, ὃ γῆς ἐπιβαίνει· οὕτω καὶ ἐν ᾄδου εἶναι ἐστὶ ψυχῆ, ὅταν προεστήκει εἰδώλου, φύσιν μὲν ἔχοντος εἶναι ἐν τόπῳ, σκότει δὲ τὴν υπόστασιν κεκτημένου· ὥστε εἰ ὁ Ἄδης υπόγειός ἐστι τόπος σκοτεινός, ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν ᾄδου γίγνεται ἐφελκομένη τὸ εἶδωλον· ἐξελθούσῃ γὰρ αὐτῇ τοῦ στερεοῦ σώματος, τὸ Πνεῦμα συνομαρτεῖ, ὃ ἐκ τῶν σφαιρῶν συνελέξατο· ἐπεὶ δὲ διήκει τὸ βαρὺ πνεῦμα, καὶ ἔνυγρον, ἄχρῳ τῶν ὑπογείων τόπων, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη λέγεται χωρεῖν ὑπὸ γῆν· οὐχ ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ οὐσία μεταβαίνει τόπους, καὶ ἐν τόποις γίνεται· ἀλλ' ὅτι τῶν πεφυκότων σωμάτων, τόπους μεταβαίνειν, σχέσεις ἀναδέχεται·

As the soul's being here upon earth (saith he) is not its moving up and down upon it, after the manner of bodies, but its presiding over a body, which moveth upon the earth; so is its being in hades nothing but its presiding over that idol, or enlivened vaporous body, whose nature it is to be in a place, and which is of a dark subsistence. Wherefore, if hades be taken for a subterraneous and dark place, yet may the soul nevertheless be said to go into hades, because when it quits this gross earthy body, a more spirituouse and subtile body, collected from the spheres (or elements) doth still accompany it. Which spirit being moist and heavy, and naturally descending to the subterraneous places, the soul itself may be said in this sense to go under the earth also with it, not as if the substance thereof passed from one place to another, but because of its relation and vital union to a body which does so. Where Porphyrius addeth, contrary to the sense of Plotinus; That the soul is never quite naked of all body, but hath alway some body or other joined with it suitable and agreeable to its own present

disposition (either a purer or impurer one). But that at its first quitting this gross earthy body, the spirituous body, which accompanieth it (as its vehicle), must needs go away fouled and incrassated with the gross vapours and steams thereof, till the soul afterwards by degrees purging itself, this becometh at length a dry splendour, which hath no misty obscurity, nor casteth any shadow.

But because all this doctrine of the ancient Incorporealists, concerning the human soul's being always (after death) united to some body or other, is more fully declared by Philoponus than by any other that we have yet met withal, we shall here excerpt some passages out of him about it. First, therefore, he declareth this for his own opinion, agreeable to the sense of the best philosophers ; *τὴν μὲν*

Procem. in
Aristot. de
An.

λογικὴν χωριστὴν, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον, τούτου μὲν χωριστὴν, ἄλλου μὲντοι τινὸς σώματος ἀχώριστον, λέγω δὲ τοῦ Πνευματικοῦ, ἔστιν ἀληθὴς δόξα, ὡς δεῖξομεν that the rational soul, as to its energy, is separable from all body ; but the irrational part, or life thereof, is separable only from this gross body, and not from all body whatsoever, but hath (after death) a spirituous or airy body, in which it acteth;—this I say is a true opinion, as shall be afterwards proved by us. And again: *Ἡ δὲ ἄλογος οὐκ ἔτι ἐν τούτῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ἐπιδιαμένει γὰρ καὶ μετὰ ἔξοδον τὴν ἐκ τούτου τῆς ψυχῆς, Ὀχημα καὶ Ὑποκείμενον ἔχουσα τὸ πνευματικὸν σῶμα· ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ ἔστι μὲν ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων, λέγεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζοντος τοῦ ἀέρος· ὡσπερ καὶ τοῦτο γῆϊνον, λέγεται ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζοντος.* The irrational life of the soul hath not all its being in this gross earthy body, but remaineth after the soul's departure out

of it, having for its vehicle and subject, the spirituous body; which itself is also compounded out of the four elements, but receiveth its denomination from the predominant part, to wit, air; as this gross body of ours is called earthy, from what is most predominant therein.—Thus do we see, that, according to Philoponus, the human soul after death does not merely exercise its rational powers, and think only of metaphysical and mathematical notions, abstract things, which are neither in time nor place, but exerciseth also its lower sensitive and irrational faculties, which it could not possibly do, were it not then vitally united to some body; and this body then accompanying the soul he calls pneumatical, that is (not spiritual in the Scripture-sense, but), spirituous, vaporous, or airy. Let us therefore, in the next place, see what rational account Philoponus can give of this doctrine of the ancients, and of his own opinion agreeable thereunto:

Proem. in
Aristot. de
An. Ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ ἡμετέρα, μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ-
του ἕξοδον, ὁμολογεῖται, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀποδείκνυται,
εἰς ἄδου ἀφικνεῖσθαι, καὶ ποινὰς ἐκεῖ τῶν οὐ καλῶς βεβιω-
μένων παρέχειν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τοῦ εἶναι ἡμῶν φροντίζει ἢ
πρόνοια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ εὔ εἶναι· διὸ οὐκ ἀμελεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ
εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἐξολισθήσασα, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνει τῆς προση-
κούσης ἐπιμελείας· καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτῇ διὰ γλυ-
κυθυμίαν ἐγένετο, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ καθαρῶθαι δι' ἀλγύν-
σεως αὐτῇ γενήσεται· κἀνταῦθα γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων
ιάματα. διὰ τοῦτο ἀλγύνεται ἡ καθαιρομένη ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ γῆν
δικαιωτηρίοις διὰ κολάσεως· Ἄλλ' εἰ ἀσώματος ἡ ψυχὴ ἀδύ-
νατον αὐτὴν παθεῖν· πῶς οὖν κολάζεται; ἀνάγκη οὖν πᾶσα
σῶμά τι αὐτῆς ἐξῆφθαι, ὃ διακρινόμενον ἀμέτρως ἢ συγκρινό-
μενον, ὑπὸ ψύξεως ἢ καύσεως ἀμέτρον, ἀλγύνει τὴν ψυχὴν
διὰ τὴν συμπάθειαν· ποῖον οὖν σῶμά ἐστὶ τὸ ἐξημμένον αὐ-

πῆς ; οὐ δῆπου τοῦτο ἀνελύθη γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν,
 ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, τὸ Πνευματικόν, ὃ λέγομεν, ἐν τούτῳ οὐκ εἰσι πάν-
 τως διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία· καὶ τὰ
 ἐξῆς· Our human soul (in those who are not purged
 and cleansed in this life), after its departure out
 of this body, is acknowledged, or rather demon-
 strated, to go into hades, there to receive punish-
 ment for its evil actions past. For Providence
 does not only take care of our being, but also of
 our well-being. Therefore is the soul, though
 lapsed into a preternatural state, yet not neglect-
 ed by Providence, but hath a convenient care
 taken of it, in order to its recovery. And since
 sinning had its original from the desire of plea-
 sure, it must of necessity be cured by pain : for
 here also contraries are the cures of contraries.
 Therefore the soul being to be purged, is pu-
 nished and pained in those subterraneous judi-
 catories and prisons, in order to its amendment.
 But if the soul be incorporeal, it is impossible for
 it to suffer. How then can it be punished? There
 must of necessity be some body joined with it ;
 which, being immoderately constricted or agi-
 tated, concreted or secreted, and discordantly
 moved by heat and cold, or the like, may make
 the soul sensible of pain, by reason of sympathy,
 as it is here in this life. What body therefore is
 that, which is then conjoined with the soul, after
 the dissolution of that earthy body into its ele-
 ments? Certainly it can be no other than this
 pneumatical, or spirituous body, which we now
 speak of ; for in this are seated, as their subject,
 the irascible and concupiscible passions, and
 they are inseparable from the same ; nor could
 they be in the soul disunited from all body : and

that soul which is freed from these, would be forthwith freed from generation ; nor would it be concerned in those subterraneous judicatories and prisons, but be carried up aloft to the higher celestial regions, &c.—After which he endeavours further to confirm this opinion from the vulgar phenomena : Δῆλον δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον ὅτι τί ἐστὶ τὸ πνευματικὸν σῶμα, καὶ τούτου ἀχώριστα θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία, ἐξ αὐτῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐνεργείας· πόθεν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τάφοις τὰ σκιοειδῆ φαίνονται φαντάσματα ; οὐ γὰρ δῆγε ἡ ψυχὴ ἐσχημάτισται, ἢ ὅλως ἐστὶν ὄρατὴ· ἀλλὰ φασὶ τὰς ἀκαθάρτους ψυχὰς, μετὰ τὴν ἕξοδον τούτου τοῦ σώματος πλανᾶσθαι ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον μετὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος, καὶ τοῦτο παραδεικνύειν περὶ τοὺς τάφους· διοφροντιστέον εὐζωίας· ὑπὸ τούτου γὰρ φασὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, παχυνθέντος ἐκ μοχθηρᾶς διαίτης, κατασπᾶσθαι περὶ τὰ πάθη τὴν ψυχὴν· Furthermore, that there is such a pneumatical (spirituous, vaporous, or airy) body, which accompanieth souls unpurged after death, is evident also from the phenomena themselves. For what account can otherwise be given of those spectres and phantoms, which appear shadow-like about graves or sepulchres, since the soul itself is neither of any figure, nor yet at all visible? Wherefore these ancients say, that impure souls, after their departure out of this body, wander here, up and down, for a certain space, in their spirituous, vaporous, and airy body, appearing about sepulchres, and haunting their former habitations. For which cause there is great reason, that we should take care of living well, as also of abstaining from a fouler and grosser diet; these ancients telling us likewise, that this spirituous body of ours, being fouled and incrassated by evil diet, is apt to render the soul, in this life also, more obnoxious to

the disturbances of passions.—And here Philoponus goes on to gratify us with a further account of some other of the opinions of these ancients, concerning this spirituous or airy body, accompanying the soul after death: Ἐχει γάρ τι καὶ αὐτὸ, φασὶ, τῆς φυτικῆς ζωῆς, καὶ γὰρ τρέφεσθαι. τρέφεσθαι δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ὡς τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀτμῶν οὐ διὰ μορίων, ἀλλ' ὅλον δι' ὅλον, φέρε εἰπεῖν, ὡς οἱ σπόγγοι, δέχονται τοὺς ἀτμούς· διὰ τοῦτο φροντίζουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῆς λεπτοτέρας διαίτης καὶ ξηροτέρας, διὰ τὸ μὴ παχύνεσθαι τὸ πνεῦμα ἀλλὰ λεπτύνεσθαι· πρὸς τοῦτο καὶ τοὺς καθαρμούς φασι παραλαμβάνειν· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ὕδατι πλύνεται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ καθαρμοῖς διὰ τῶν ἀτμῶν, διὰ γὰρ ἀτμῶν τινῶν τρέφεται τινῶν δὲ καθαίρεται· οὐ διωργανῶσθαι δὲ φασιν αὐτὸ, ἀλλ' ὅλον δι' ὅλον ἐνεργεῖν, κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· διὸ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν ἐν τοῖς μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ, ὅτι ἡ κυρίως αἴσθησις μία, καὶ τὸ κυρίως αἰσθητήριον ἓν· They further add, that there is something of a plantal and plastic life also, exercised by the soul, in those spirituous or airy bodies after death; they being nourished too, though not after the same manner, as these gross earthy bodies of ours are here, but by vapours; and that not by parts or organs, but throughout the whole of them (as sponges), they imbibing every where those vapours. For which cause, they, who are wise, will in this life also take care of using a thinner and dryer diet, that so that spirituous body (which we have also at this present time within our grosser body) may not be clogged and incrassated, but attenuated. Over and above which, those ancients made use of catharms, or purgations, to the same end and purpose also: for as this earthy body is washed by water, so is that spirituous body cleansed by

cathartic vapours ; some of these vapours being nutritive, others purgative. Moreover, these ancients further declared concerning this spirituuous body, that it was not organized, but did the whole of it, in every part throughout, exercise all functions of sense, the soul hearing, and seeing, and perceiving all sensibles, by it every where. For which cause, Aristotle himself affirmeth, in his *Metaphysics*, that there is properly but one sense, and but one sensory ; he, by this one sensory, meaning the spirit, or subtile airy body, in which the sensitive power doth all of it, through the whole, immediately apprehend all variety of sensibles. And if it be demanded, how it comes then to pass, that this spirit appears organized in sepulchres, and most commonly of human form, but sometimes in the form of some other animals? to this those ancients replied, That their appearing so frequently in human form proceedeth from their being incassated with evil diet, and then, as it were, stamped upon with the form of this exterior ambient body in which they are, as crystal is formed and coloured like to those things, which it is fastened in, or reflects the image of them ; and that their having sometimes other different forms proceedeth from the fantastic power of the soul itself, which can at pleasure transform this spirituuous body into any shape : for being airy, when it is condensed and fixed, it becometh visible ; and again invisible, and vanishing out of sight, when it is expanded and rarified.

Now, from these passages cited out of Philoponus ; it farther appeareth, that the ancient assertors of the soul's immortality did not suppose

human souls, after death, to be quite stripped stark naked from all body; but that the generality of souls had then a certain spirituous, vaporous, or airy body accompanying them, though in different degrees of purity or impurity respectively to themselves. As also, that they conceived this spirituous body (or at least something of it) to hang about the soul also here in this life, before death; as its interior indument or vestment, which also then sticks to it, when that other gross earthly part of the body is, by death, put off as an outer garment. And some have been inclinable to think (by reason of certain historic phenomena) these two to be things so distinct, that it is not impossible for this spirituous body, together with the soul, to be locally separated from the other grosser body, for some time before death, and without it. And indeed thus much cannot be denied, that our soul acteth, not immediately only upon bones, flesh, and brains, and other such-like gross parts of this body, but first and chiefly upon the animal spirits, as the immediate instruments of sense and fancy, and that, by whose vigour and activity the other heavy and unwieldy bulk of the body is so nimbly moved. And therefore we know no reason but we may assent here to that of Porphyrius,^a

τὸ αἷμα νομὴ καὶ τροφή ἐστὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ὄχημα τῆς ψυχῆς; that the blood is the food and nourishment of the spirit (that is, that subtle body called the animal spirits), and that this spirit is the vehicle of the soul, or the more immediate seat of life.

Nevertheless, the same Philoponus there add-

^a Vide lib. de Antro. Nymphar. p. 257. 259.

eth, that, according to these ancients, besides the terrestrial body, and this spirituous and airy body too, there is yet a third kind of body, of a higher rank than either of the former (peculiarly belonging to such souls after death, as are purged and cleansed from corporeal affections, lusts, and passions), called by them *σῶμα αύγοειδές*, and *ούράνιον*, and *αίθέριον*, &c. a luciform, and celestial, and ethereal body. The soul (saith he) continueth either in the terrestrial or the aërial body so long *ἕως εαυτὴν καθήρασα άνενεχθῆ, τῆς γενέσεως ἀπαλλαγείσα· τότε τοίνυν καὶ τὸν θυμὸν, καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀποτίθεται, μετὰ τούτου τοῦ ὀχήματος, τοῦ πνεύματος λέγω· εἶναι δέ τι καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄλλοτι αἰδίως αὐτῆς ἐξημμένον, σῶμα ούράνιον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αἰδίον, ὃ φασιν Αύγοειδές ἢ Ἀστροειδές· τῶν γὰρ ἐγκοσμίων οὔσαν ἀνάγκη πάντως ἔχειν τινα κλῆρον, ὃν διοικεῖ, μέρος ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου· καὶ εἰ ἀεκίνητός ἐστι, καὶ δεῖ αὐτὴν αἰεὶ ἐνεργεῖν, δεῖ ἔχειν αἰδίως ἐξημμένον τὸ σῶμα, ὃ αἰεὶ ζωοποιήσει· διὰ ταῦτα οὖν τὸ αύγοειδές φασι σῶμα αὐτὴν αἰεὶ ἔχειν*, until that, having purged itself, it be carried aloft, and freed from generation. And then doth it put off both the irascible and concupiscible passions at once, together with this second vehicle, or body, which we call spirituous. Wherefore these ancients say, that there is another heavenly body always conjoined with the soul, and eternal, which they call luciform, and star-like: for it being a mundane thing, must of necessity have some part of the world as a province allotted to it, which it may administer. And since it is always moveable and ought always to act, it must have a body eternally conjoined with it, which it may always enliven. And for these causes do they affirm the soul always to have a luciform body.—Which lu-

cid and ethereal body of the soul is a thing often mentioned by other writers also ; as Proclus, in his commentary upon the *Ti-* P. 290.
mæus : Καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς ἐξήρηται τι τοιοῦτον ὄχημα αἰθέριον, ὡς αὐτός φησιν· ἐμβιβάσαι γοῦν εἰς ὄχημα καὶ αὐτὴν φησι τὸν δημιουργόν· καὶ γὰρ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῶν θνητῶν σωμάτων, αἰδίους καὶ εὐκινήτοις χρῆσθαι σώμασιν, ὡς κατ' οὐσίαν ἔχουσαν τὸ κινεῖν. The human soul hath also (saith he) such an ethereal vehicle belonging to it, as Plato himself intimates, when he affirmeth the Demiurgus at first to have placed it in a chariot. For of necessity every soul, before this mortal body, must have an eternal and easily moveable body, it being essential to it to move.—And elsewhere the same Proclus:

P. 164.
 Ἄνω μένοντες οὐδὲν δεόμεθα τούτων τῶν μεριστῶν ὀργάνων· ἃ ἡμῖν συνήρηται κατελθοῦσιν εἰς γένεσιν, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ τὸ ὄχημα τὸ Ἀύγοειδές, πάσας ἔχον ἠνωμένας τὰς αἰσθήσεις. Whilst we remain above, we have no need of these divided organs, which now we have descending into generation ; but the uniform, lucid, or splendid vehicle is sufficient, this having all senses united together in it.—Which doctrine of the unorganized, luciform, and spirituous vehicles, seems to have been derived from Plato, he, in his *Epinomis*, writing thus concerning a good and wise man after death ; ὃν καὶ διῶχυρίζομαι παίζων καὶ σπουδάζων ἅμα ; ἑάνπερ θανάτῳ, τὴν αὐτοῦ μοῖραν ἀναπλήσει, μήτε μεθέξειν ἔτι πολλῶν τότε, καθάπερ νῦν αἰσθήσεων, μιᾶς μοίρας μετεληφότα μόνον, καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἕνα γεγονότα εὐδαίμονα ἔσεσθαι· of whom, whether I be in jest or earnest, I constantly affirm, that when dying he shall yield to fate, he shall no longer have this variety of senses, which now we have, but one uniform body, and live a happy life.—Moreover,

Hierocles^a much insisteth upon this, *αυγοειδές σώμα*, luciform and ethereal body,—*ὁ καὶ ψυχῆς λεπτόν ὄχημα οἱ χρησμοὶ καλοῦσι*, which also (saith he) the oracles call the thin and subtle vehicle or chariot of the soul; he meaning, doubtless, by these oracles, the magical or Chaldaic oracles before mentioned. And amongst those now extant under that title, there seems to be a clear acknowledgment of these two vehicula of the soul, or interior induments thereof; the spirituous and the luciform body, the latter of which is there enigmatically called *ἐπίπεδον*, or a plain superficies in these words:^b *Μὴ Πνεῦμα μολύνῃς, μηδὲ βαθύνῃς τὸ Ἐπίπεδον*. Take care not to defile or contaminate the spirit; nor to make the plain superficies deep.—For thus Psellus glosseth upon that oracle: *Δύο χιτῶνας ἐπενδύουσι τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ Χαλδαῖοι· καὶ τὸν μὲν Πνευματικὸν ὠνόμασαν, ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐξυφανθέντα αὐτῇ· τὸν δὲ Αὐγοειδῆ, λεπτόν καὶ ἀναφῆ, ὅνπερ Ἐπίπεδον*. The Chaldaic philosophers bestow upon the soul two interior tunics or vestments, the one of which they called pneumatical, or the spirituous body, which is weaved out, as it were, to it, and compounded of the gross sensible body (it being the more thin and subtle part thereof); the other the luciform vestment of the soul, pure and pellucid, and this is that which is here called the plain superficies.—Which, saith Pletho,^c is not so to be understood, as if it had not three dimensions (forasmuch as it is a body also), but only to denote the subtlety and tenuity thereof. Wherefore, when the aforesaid Hierocles^d also calls this luciform and

^a Comment in aurea Pythagor. Carmina, p. 214, 215.

^b Oracul. Zoroastr. sect. 10. vers. 275. p. 394. ed. Clerici.

^c Comment. in hoc Oraculum. ^d Ubi supra, p. 222.

ethereal body, τὸ Πνευματικὸν Ὀχημα τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς, the spiritual vehicle of the rational soul—he takes not the word πνευματικὸν, in that sense wherein it is used by Philoponus and others, as if he intended to confound this ethereal body with that other spirituous or airy body, and to make but one of them, but rather styles it spiritual, in a higher sense (and which cometh near to that of the Scripture), as being a body more suitable and cognate with that highest and divinest part of the soul, mind, or reason, than the other terrestrial body is (which, upon that account, is called also, by the same Hierocles,^a as well as it is by St. Paul,^b σῶμα ψυχικόν, the animal or natural body). So that this spiritual body of Hierocles is not the airy, but the ethereal body, and the same with Synesius's,^c θεσπέσιον σῶμα, Divine body.—And that this distinction of two interior vehicles or tunicles of the soul, besides that outer vestment of the terrestrial body (styled in Plato τὸ ὀστρεῶδες, the crustaceous, or ostraceous body)—is not a mere figment of the latter Platonists since Christianity, but a tradition derived down from antiquity, appeareth plainly from Virgil, in his sixth Æneid, where, though not commonly understood, he writeth first of the spirituous or airy body, in which unpurged souls receive punishment after death, thus:

Quin et supremo cum lumine vita reliquit,
 Non tamen omne malum miseris, nec funditus omnes
 Corporeæ excedunt pestes; penitusque necesse est
 Multa diu concreta modis inolescere miris.
 Ergo exercentur pœnis, veterumque malorum
 Supplicia expendunt; aliæ panduntur inanes
 Suspensæ ad ventos; aliis sub gurgite vasto
 Infectum eluitur scelus, aut exuritur igni.

^a Ubi supra, p. 214. ^b Cor. xv. 44. ^c D Insomniis, p. 140 oper.

And then again of the other pure ethereal and fiery body, in this manner :

Donec longa dies perfecto temporis orbe
 Concretam exemit labem, purumque reliquit
 Æthereum sensum, atque aurai simplicis ignem.

Now, as it was before observed, that the ancient assertors of the soul's immortality, supposing it to have, besides this terrestrial body, another spirituous or airy body, conceived this not only to accompany the soul after death, but also to hang about it here in this life, as its interior vest or tunicle (they probably meaning hereby the same with that, which is commonly called the animal spirits, diffused from the brain, by the nerves, throughout this whole body); in like manner it is certain, that many of them supposing the soul, besides those two forementioned, to have yet a third luciform, or ethereal body, conceived this in like manner to adhere to it even in this mortal life too, as its inmost clothing or tunicle; yet, so as that they acknowledged the force thereof to be very much weakened and abated, and its splendour altogether obscured by the heavy weight and gross steams or vapours of the terrestrial body. Thus Suidas, upon the word *Αύγοειδής*, tells us out of Isidore; *ὡς ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ Αύγοειδές Ὀχημα, λεγόμενον ἀστροειδές τε καὶ αἰθίου· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ Αύγοειδές σῶμα τῷδε ἀποκέκλεισται ἐνίοις μὲν εἶσω τῆς κεφαλῆς·* that, according to some philosophers, the soul hath a certain luciform vehicle, called also star, or sun-like, and eternal; which luciform body is now shut up within this terrestrial body (as a light in a dark lantern), it being supposed by some of them to be included within the head, &c.—With

whichagreeth Hierocles: Ἐν τῷ θνητῷ ἡμῶν σώματι, τὸ Αὐγοειδὲς ἔγκειται, προσπνέον τῷ ἀψύχῳ σώματι ζῶν, καὶ τὴν ἀρμονίαν αὐτοῦ συνέχον. The splendid or luciform body lieth in this mortal body of ours, continually inspiring it with life, and containing the harmony thereof.—The ground of which opinion was, because these philosophers generally conceived the human soul to have pre-existed before it came into this earthly body, and that either from eternity, or else from the first beginning of the world's creation; and being never without a body, and then in a perfect state, to have had a lucid and ethereal body, either coeternal, or coeve with it (though in order of nature junior to it), as its chariot or vehicle; which being incorruptible, did always inseparably adhere to the soul, in its after-lapses and descents, into an aëreal first, and then a terrestrial body; this being, as it were, the vinculum of union betwixt the soul and them. Thus Pletho^a declares their sense: Διὰ δὲ τοιούτου σώματος τῷ δήποτε τῷ θνητῷ τήνγε ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν συγγίγνεσθαι, ὅλου ὄλου τῷ τοῦ ἐμβρύου ζωτικῷ πνεύματι διὰ συγγένειαν ἐπιπλεκομένου ἅτε πνεύματος τινος καὶ αὐτοῦ ὄντος. By this ethereal body is our human soul connected with its mortal body; the whole thereof being implicated with the whole vital spirit of the embryo, for as much as this itself is a spirit also.—But long before Pletho was this doctrine declared and asserted by Galen, as agreeable both to Plato's and his own sense; he first promising, that the immediate organ or instrument of sight was ἀυγοειδὲς, a luciform and ethereal spirit:—Δεόντως οὖν ἐροῦμεν ἀ-

P. 293.
[p. 214. edit.
Needhami.]

Dog. Hip. et
Plat. l. vii.
[cap. xiii.
p. 1043.
tom. i. oper.]

^a In Orac. Chald.

γοειδές μὲν εἶναι τὸ τῆς ὄψεως ὄργανον, αἰροειδές δὲ τὸ τῆς ἀκοῆς, ἀτμοειδές δὲ τὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς, καὶ τὸ μὲν τῆς γεύσεως ὑγρὸν, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀφῆς γεῶδες, &c. Wherefore we may reasonably affirm, that the organ of sight is a luciform or ethereal body; as that of hearing is aërial; that of smelling vaporous; that of taste moist or watery; and that of touch earthy; like being perceived by like.—And he accordingly thus understanding those known verses of Empedocles, which, as Aristotle otherwise interprets them, are nonsense: Καὶ τοῦτ' ἄρ' ἦν ὃ βούλεται δηλοῦν ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐν οἷς φησι, Γαίη μὲν γὰρ γαίαν, &c. αἰσθανόμεθα γὰρ ὄντως τῷ μὲν γεωδιστέρῳ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, τῆς γεῶδους φύσεως, τῷ δ' ἀγγοειδιστέρῳ τῆς ὄψεως, τῆς Αὐγγοειδοῦς. And this was that, which Empedocles meant to signify, in those famous verses of his; it being certain, that by the most earthy of our senses, the touch, we perceive the earthy nature of sensibles; and by the most luciform, viz. that of sight, the passions of light; by that, which is aëreal, sounds; by that, which is moist and sponge-like, tastes; and lastly, by the organ of smelling, which is the extremity of those former cavities of the brain, as replenished with vapours, odours.—After which he writeth of the essence or substance of the soul, in this manner: Εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς οὐσίας ἀποφῆνασθαι χρῆ, δυοῖν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶπειν, ἢ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ οἶον Αὐγγοειδές, καὶ Αἰθερωδές σῶμα λεκτέον αὐτὴν, εἰς ὃ κὰν μὴ βούλωνται κατ' ἀκολουθίαν ἀφικνουῦνται στωϊκοί, ἢ αὐτὴν μὲν ἀσώματον ὑπάρχειν οὐσίαν, ὄχημά τε τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς εἶναι τοῦτ' ὃ σῶμα, δι' οὗ μέσου τὴν πρὸς τ' ἄλλα σώματα κοινωνίαν λαμβάνει· τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ δι' ὅλου λεκτέον ἡμῖν ἐκτετάσθαι τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου· τῇ δὲ γε πρὸς αὐτὸ κοινωνία τὸ κατὰ τὰς ὄψεις αὐτῶν πνεῦμα φωττειδές γίγνεσθαι. And if we should

now declare any thing concerning the essence or substance of the soul, we must needs affirm one or other of these two things ; that either itself is this luciform and ethereal body (which the Stoics, whether they will or no, by consequence will be brought unto, as also Aristotle himself), or else that the soul is itself an incorporeal substance, but that this luciform ethereal body is its first vehicle, by which, as a middle, it communicates with the other bodies. Wherefore we must say, that this ethereal lucid body is extended throughout the whole brain ; whence is that luciform spirit derived, that is the immediate instrument of sight.—Now from hence it was, that these philosophers, besides the moral purgation of the soul, and the intellectual or philosophical, recommended very much a mystical or teletic way of purifying this ethereal body in us, by diet and cathartics. Thus the forementioned Hierocles :

Ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῷ Ἀύγειδῇ ἡμῶν σώματι προσέφυ σῶμα θνητὸν ὄν, καθαρεῦσαι δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο, &c. Since to our lucid or splendid body, this gross mortal body is come by way of accession, we ought to purify the former also, and free it from sympathy with the latter.—And again afterwards : Αἱ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς καθάρσεις καὶ τοῦ Ἀύγειδῶς ὀχήματος προμηθοῦνται, ὅπως ἂν αὐταῖς ὑπὸ πτερον καὶ τοῦτο γινόμενον μὴ ἐμποδῶν ἴστηται πρὸς τὴν ἄνω πορείαν, καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς. Together with the purgations of the rational soul, the purification of the luciform or ethereal vehicle is also to be regarded, that this being made light, and elate or wingy, might no way hinder the soul's ascent upward : but he that endeavours to purify the mind only, neglecting

* Ibid. p. 216.

the body, applies not himself to the whole man.—Whereupon he concludes: Τὴν Τελεστικὴν ἐνέργειαν λέγω, Τὴν τοῦ Ἀγνοειδοῦς καθαριστικὴν δύναμιν. I therefore call this the telestic or mystic operation; which is conversant about the purgation of the lucid or ethereal vehicle.—And whereas philosophy was by Plato and Socrates^a defined to be a continual exercise of dying (which Pliny^b thought to be nothing but an hypochondriacal or atrabiliarian distemper in them, in those words of his, which Salmasius, and other critics, can by no means understand, “est etiam quidam morbus, per sapientiam mori:” that the dying by wisdom or philosophy, is also but a certain kind of bodily disease or over-grown melancholy)—though they supposed this principally to consist in a moral dying to corporeal lusts and passions; yet was the design thereof partly mystical and telestic also, it driving at this further thing, that when they should put off this terrestrial body, they might at once die also to the spirituuous or aëreal; and then their soul have nothing left hanging about it, but only the pure ethereal body, its light-winged chariot: in Virgil’s language is

——Purumque relinqui
Æthereum sensum, atque aurai simplicis ignem.

Notwithstanding which, the Pythagoreans and Platonists seem not to have been all of them of this persuasion, that the same numerical ethereal body, which the soul was at first created with, continueth still about it, and adhereth to it inseparably to all eternity, during its descents into

^a Vide Platon. in Phædon. p. 378.

^b Hist. Natur. lib. vii. cap. 50.

other grosser bodies; but rather to have supposed, that, according to the moral disposition of the soul, it always finds or makes a cognate and suitable body correspondently pure or impure; and consequently, that by moral virtue and philosophy, it might again recover that celestial body, which was lost by its fall and descent hither. This seemeth to have been Porphyrius's^a sense, in these words of his: 'Ὡς ἂν διετέθη ἡ ψυχή, εὐρίσκει σῶμα τάξει καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις διωρισμένον· διὸ καθαρώτερον μὲν διακειμένη σύμφυτον τὸ ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἀύλου σῶμα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰθέριον·' However the soul be in itself affected, so does it always find a body suitable and agreeable to its present disposition; and therefore to the purged souls does naturally accrue a body, that comes next to immateriality; that is, an ethereal one.—And probably Plato^b was of the same mind, when he affirmed the soul to be always in a body, but sometimes of one kind, and sometimes of another.

Now from what hath been declared, it appear-eth already, that the most ancient assertors of the incorporeity and immortality of the human soul supposed it, notwithstanding, to be always conjoined with a body. Thus Hierocles

plainly: 'Ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία συμφνὲς ἔχουσα σῶμα, P. 289. [p. 120. edit. Needhami.]
οὕτω παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρῆλθεν,
ὡς μήτε τὸ σῶμα εἶναι αὐτὴν, μήτε ἄνευ σώματος· ἀλλ' αὐτὴν μὲν ἀσώματον, ἀποπερατοῦσθαι δὲ εἰς σῶμα τὸ ὅλον αὐτῆς εἶδος. The rational nature having always a cognate body, so proceeded from the Demiurgus, as that neither itself is body, nor yet can it be with-

^a In Sententiis ad Intelligibilia ducentibus, §. 32. p. 233.

^b De Legibus, lib. x.

^c P. 214.

out body ; but though itself be incorporeal, yet its whole form, notwithstanding, is terminated in a body.— Accordingly whereunto, the definition, which he gives of a man, is this, *ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ συμφουῶς ἀθανάτου σώματος*, a rational soul, together with a cognate immortal body.— He concluding there afterwards, that this enlivened terrestrial body, or mortal man, is nothing but *εἶδωλον ἀνθρώπου*,^a the image of the true man,— or an accession thereunto, which is therefore separable from the same. Neither doth he affirm this only of human souls, but also of all other rational beings whatsoever, below the supreme Deity, and above men, that they always naturally actuate a body. Wherefore a demon or angel (which words are used as synonymous by Hierocles) is also defined by him after the same manner, *ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ φωτεινοῦ σώματος*, a rational soul together with a lucid body.—And accordingly Proclus upon Plato's *Timæus*^b affirmeth, *πάντα δαίμονα τῶν ἡμετέρων κρείττονα ψυχῶν, καὶ νοεράν ἔχειν ψυχὴν, καὶ ὄχημα αἰθέριον*^c that every demon, superior to human souls, hath both an intellectual soul and an ethereal vehicle, the entireness thereof being made up or compounded of these two things.—So that there is hardly any other difference left betwixt demons or angels, and men, according to these philosophers, but only this, that the former are lapsable into aëreal bodies only, and no further ; but the latter into terrestrial also.^c Now Hiero-

^a P. 214.^b Lib. v. p. 320.^c Vide Porphyr. de Abstinent. ab Esu Animal. lib. ii. §. 38. p. 81. et alios.

cles positively affirmeth, this to have been the true cabala, and genuine doctrine of the ancient Pythagoreans, entertained afterwards by Plato; *Καὶ τοῦτο τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἦν δόγμα, ὃ δὴ Πλάτων ὕστερον ἐξέφηεν, ἀπεικάσας ζυμφύτῳ δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἠνιόχου, πᾶσαν θείαν τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν.* And this was the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, which Plato afterwards declared; he resembling every, both human and Divine soul (that is, in our modern language, every created rational being) to a winged chariot, and a driver or charioteer, both together:—meaning by the chariot, an enlivened body; and by the charioteer, the incorporeal soul itself acting it.

And now have we given a full account, in what manner the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, answered that objection against the illocality and immobility of particular finite spirits, demons, or angels, and human souls; that these being all naturally incorporate, however in themselves and directly immoveable, yet were capable of being in sense moved, by accident, together with those bodies, respectively, which they are vitally united to. But as for that pretence, that these finite spirits, or substances incorporeal, being unextended, and so having in themselves no relation to any place, might therefore actuate and inform the whole corporeal world at once, and take cognizance of all things therein; their reply hereunto was, that these being essentially but parts of the universe, and therefore not comprehensive of the whole, finite or particular, and not universal beings (as the three hypostases of the Platonic trinity are), the sphere of

^a Ubi supra, p. 213.

their activity could not possibly extend any farther, than to the quickening and enlivening of some certain parts of matter and the world, allotted to them, and thereby of becoming particular animals; it being peculiar to the Deity, or that incorporeal substance, which is infinite, to quicken and actuate all things.

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