



## C H A P. VIII.

*The present and future Rewards of moral Virtue, considered more distinctly.*

- I. *God intended the moral Law should oblige.* II. *The Power of Conscience.* III, IV. *Answer to what is objected against it from Prejudice and Custom.* V, VI, VII. *The Reasonableness of supposing such a Principle, from the Wisdom and Goodness of a wise Legislator.* VIII. *The Force of it in very wicked Men.* IX. *Obduracy of Heart, a judicial Effect of God's Displeasure.*  
X.

X. *A flagrant Absurdity would follow, admitting there were no certain Principle of Conscience.* XI. *Of Shame, and* XII. *Of Impudence.* XIII. XIV. *Puffendorf's Opinion, concerning Shame, considered.* XV. XVI. *Two Ends of it assigned.* XVII, XVIII, XIX. *The moral Law considered, as a Law of Conveniency.* XX. *Very wicked Men, in their private Judgment, profess and esteem Virtue.* XXI. *Of Honour and Esteem, mentioned as the Rewards of Virtue.* XXII. *But not adequate.* XXIII. *Not necessary to know, distinctly, the Nature of future Rewards to Man.* XXIV. *Yet, in general, they will consist in being adapted to the Faculties of the Mind.* XXV. *Whether*

*ther the Resurrection of the Body may be proved from natural Principles. XXVI. Concerning future Punishments to wicked Men. XXVII. XXVIII. On what Accounts difficult to be conceived. XXIX. This no Objection against the Truth of them. XXX. A Passage cited from the Art of Thinking, concerning Sensations, answering to those which are felt by occasion of material Fire.*

**T**H E Law of Reason is the Law of human Nature; and it is sufficient to shew the obligatory Force of this Law, that it was intended to be obligatory by the Author of our Being. We ought to follow his Order in Making us, and in the Faculties

ties he hath given us, tho' he had annexed no consequent Reward to our Obedience, nor threatened to punish our Disorders. But as such metaphysical Considerations, how reasonable soever in themselves, would not have been forcible enough to restrain the Appetites, or Passions, of Men, arising from the Impression of sensible Objects ; God has enforced this Law, not only, as hath been above demonstrated, by giving us the Assurance of a future State of Happiness, or Misery, according to our good and evil Actions in this Life, but even by the Sanction of present Rewards and Punishments ; in both respects, as a Law-giver, *able to save and to destroy* ; since his Authority would, otherways, be precarious. And these Rewards and Punishments

ments may be considered, as affecting us either *internally*, or *externally*.

II. The Sanction to Man of internal Rewards or Punishments is from the Power and Judgment of Conscience. For as we experience in ourselves, when we follow Reason, and conform to Order, a secret Joy and Complacency of Mind, testifying an Approbation of what we have done; so, upon the Commission of Sin, especially, in any notorious Breach of our Duty, we naturally find the Mind full of Pain and Anguish; and cannot, therefore, but *condemn* ourselves *in what we allow*. It is possible, indeed, Men, by a long Habit of sinning, may stupify their Conscience to such a Degree, as to find no Remorse for the most atrocious



atrocious Crimes ; as some People  
 by taking repeated *Opiates* are  
 not sensible, for the Time, of their  
 ordinary and dangerous Effects.  
 But we are to not judge, concern-  
 ing the Nature, or proper Operati-  
 on of Things, from what happens  
 in particular Cases, for which  
 Reasons, from an habitual Use of  
 such Things, may be assigned ;  
 but from such Effects, as are most  
 common, and natural ; and where-  
 with, supposing the Subject in  
 a proper Disposition, they will,  
 most probably be attended. Now,  
 to judge whether a Person be in  
 a right State, so as to be affec-  
 ted with the Force of Conscience ;  
 we are not to consider him as  
 under the Power of any invete-  
 rate sinful Habit, or Habits ; but  
 as acting, after a Manner, with  
 such Dispositions, and upon such  
 G Principles

Principles as *are common to Men.*

III. I am sensible, some Persons have endeavoured to account for the Force of Conscience, upon other Principles than those who represent it as a *Judge*, appointed by God to give Sentence in his Name ; since he doth not interpose in the Government of Mankind by a visible Authority. Whenever his Laws, which are written on the Tables of our Hearts in so legible a Character, that they need no express Promulgation, are, at any time, disobey'd, this Minister of God has a Power of calling Men to an Account, and is armed with Terror: On the other Hand, by virtue of the same Authority, He not only absolves the Innocent, but dispenses proper Rewards for  
the

the Encouragement and *Praise* of *those that do well*. There are Persons, I say, who make Conscience, instead of ascribing it to so high and authoritative a Constitution, nothing but the Effect of those early Prejudices, which Men imbibe in their Infancy; and wherein they are, afterwards, gradually confirmed by Custom and Conversation.

IV. The Force of Prejudice and Custom is, confessedly, very great. But we are not to conclude, that every Thing we have learned in our Infancy, or wherein we have afterwards conformed to common Opinion, is, therefore, wholly owing to Prejudice, or common Opinion. Children are early taught to believe there is a God; and they are confirmed



in this Belief, by the publick Profession made of it, and the Worship daily paid to God: Does it, therefore follow, there is no God ; or that the Belief of a God has no true or real Foundation ? Is it not more natural to suppose Men do generally agree in this Belief, because they have Reasons for it, than that they mutually agree to deceive, and to be deceived, or only believe his Existence, upon the mere score of Custom, against Reason ? May we not argue after the same Manner, and upon the same Grounds, in respect to Conscience ; that Men are sensible of the Force of it, not because it is generally said and believed, there is such a Thing ; but Men generally believe

believe

lieve the Truth of the Thing, because it really subsists.

V. Supposing, indeed, a God, who made, and who governs Mankind, it is very reasonable to conclude, that in the present Administration of his Government, he would not leave himself *without a Witness* or internal Monitor to Man; by attending to which, tho' he should not hear God speaking to him with an audible Voice ; yet he would become bound to obey him, by attending to the Light of his own Mind, and the Responses of inward Truth : The Authority of enacting such a Law being the same, in the Nature and Reason of it, as if God had divulged it immediately by a Voice from Heaven.

VI. There is then a reasonable Supposition from the Ends of God's Government, why He should implant, in the Minds of Men, those lively and tender Sentiments of Good and Evil, concerning which we are speaking; so that where there should be no positive or written Law, Men might be a Law to themselves, *their own Consciences bearing Witnesses, and their Thoughts, in the mean while, accusing, or else excusing, one another.* Now where natural, probable, and very useful Reasons may be assigned for the Existence of Things, it is very unreasonable to ascribe such Things to Causes foreign to the Nature of them, and without which they may, therefore, be naturally supposed to exist.

VIII. Besides

VIII. Besides, if the Force of Conscience were wholly owing to the Prejudices of Education, or popular Opinion, What is the Reason why Men of the greatest Freedom of Thought, yet find themselves so incapable of being disabused, as to this Article? Why do they find it so difficult to stifle the Reproaches of Conscience, as they can easily do other frightful Accounts of Spectres and Apparitions; which they learned in the Nursery, or by reading romantique Stories, when, afterward, they come to reason, and reflect upon them. And yet it may be questioned, if, the most abandoned Wretch, in any Age, even, whether he believed a God, or not, could ever wholly, and at all times overcome

vercome the Reluctance, or stifle the Remorse of Conscience.

IX. Persons who are most obdurate, and insensible to all Impressions of Religion, have, commonly, their Intervals of Reflection ; wherein God is represented to them with a Rod of Vengeance in his Hand ; yet, supposing them really capable of extinguishing all Fear of his Wrath, such a State of Insensibility ought not to be considered, merely, as a natural Effect of their sinful Habits ; but, as a judicial Punishment inflicted by God upon them : Who, as they did not like to retain him, or this visible Character of his Power and Godhead, in their Knowledge, gave them up to a *reprobate* Mind.

X. Again,



X. Again, were the Power of Conscience founded only on Prejudice, or popular Opinion ; then, whenever a general Corruption of Principles or Manners is introduced, and Vice does become popular, Men would take the same inward Complacency in vicious Actions, as they now do in Actions, to which the Idea of Virtue is affixed. A Man, for Instance, who should betray his Friend, his Trust, or his Country, would, on this Supposition, than which Nothing can be more irrational or shocking, experience the like Satisfaction and Complacency of Mind in reflecting on his Infidelity, as good Men, now really experience, in doing beneficent, and generous Actions. Nay, the Performance of such Actions, to a  
 Person

Person, who is supposed wholly to regulate his Judgment by the Practice and Sentiments of other People, ought to give him a sensible Pain and Uneasiness; supposing their Judgment so corrupted that they call Evil Good, and Good Evil.

XI. The Judgment which we make of our own Actions, a Judgment that cannot be easily bribed or eluded, has not only been urged as an Argument to enforce the Law of Nature, but even, antecedently, to any Consideration of such a Law, it is said, a *conscious* Shame arises, which discovers itself in the mechanical Disposition of the Body; as presaging that some Evil, at which Conscience takes the Alarm, is approaching towards us. So careful has the wise Legislator

tor

tor been to secure our Innocence and Duty, by guarding the very Outworks, wherewith we are to defend them ; and by giving us Notice of the Enemy's Approach, before we come to engage directly with him. So that when we happen to be surprized, which, after all our Caution, is sometimes unavoidable, before Reason has sufficient Time to collect her whole Strength ; this inward Shame, or Modesty, often supplieth the Place, and doth the Duty of it ; and even, sometimes, when we are violently tempted, or inclined to betray the *Succours which Reason offers*, Shame lays *Restraints* upon ingenuous Minds, which they cannot overcome without much Confusion, and a very sensible Reluctance.

XII. So

Person, who is supposed wholly to regulate his Judgment by the Practice and Sentiments of other People, ought to give him a sensible Pain and Uneasiness; supposing their Judgment so corrupted that they call Evil Good, and Good Evil.

XI. The Judgment which we make of our own Actions, a Judgment that cannot be easily bribed or eluded, has not only been urged as an Argument to enforce the Law of Nature, but even, antecedently, to any Consideration of such a Law, it is said, a *conscious* Shame arises, which discovers itself in the mechanical Disposition of the Body; as presaging that some Evil, at which Conscience takes the Alarm, is approaching towards us. So careful has the wise Legislator

tor

tor been to secure our Innocence and Duty, by guarding the very Outworks, wherewith we are to defend them ; and by giving us Notice of the Enemy's Approach, before we come to engage directly with him. So that when we happen to be surprized, which, after all our Caution, is sometimes unavoidable, before Reason has sufficient Time to collect her whole Strength ; this inward Shame, or Modesty, often supplieth the Place, and doth the Duty of it ; and even, sometimes, when we are violently tempted, or inclined to betray the *Succours which Reason offers*, Shame lays *Restraints* upon ingenuous Minds, which they cannot overcome without much Confusion, and a very sensible Reluctance.



XII. So powerful, indeed, is this Principle, (and for which Reason, we suppose it designedly implanted by the Author of Nature to enforce the Law of Nature) that one of the vilest Characters, of a Person abandoned to all Manner of Vice and Dishonour, is *Impudence*; and, accordingly, the Prophet, whom I here cite, not under that Character, but, as speaking agreeably to the common Sentiments of Mankind, mentions it as a Sign of the most corrupt and incorrigible State of a *wicked* People, that *they are not ashamed, neither do they blush.*

XIII. *Puffendorf* was so sensible, an Argument might be formed contrary to his Opinion; from this Principle of Shame, to prove the Distinction of moral  
 Good

Good and Evil ; that he hath particularly endeavoured to obviate the Consequence we would draw from it : The Sum of what he says is, that a Sense of Shame, discovering itself in the Air of the Face, or some other exterior Appearance, is only a mere physical Effect, proceeding, solely, from a physical Cause, and not from a *moral* ; which he thinks it would be inconvenient to suppose. But where lies the Inconveniency in saying, that God may cause a different Movement or Fermentation of the Blood, upon the least Apprehension of Danger to the Soul ? Seeing the Body and the Soul reciprocally act upon one another, for their mutual Support, and Advantage. As the Soul takes so much Care of the Body, and of every Thing relating

relating to its Safety, Preservation, and Ease ; it is but reasonable that the Body, in Return, in some few Instances at least, should be the *Occasion*, since it cannot be a proper *Cause* of certain Sentiments in the Soul, necessary to prevent any Injury, or Disorder, which may happen to her.

XIV. And, therefore, this Author himself, confesseth, how consistently I do not here examine, that the all-wise Creator hath implanted this Affection of Shame in the Mind of Man, to be the Guard of his Virtue ; and a Restraint upon him from all sinful or irregular Appetites. Nay, he adds, it is probable, if it had not been the Intention of God, that Man should conform his Actions to the divine Law,  
 God

God would not have rendered him subject to this Passion of Shame ; since without such an Intention, no proper Use of Shame could be discovered.

XV. Neither is it of any Force to overthrow the moral Sense of Shame, that it does not only arise from the Apprehension of a shameful or sinful Action ; but, frequently, on occasion of other things, which have, confessedly, no moral Turpitude in them, yet whereby we may, on some Account, suffer in our Reputation. As we observe People, for Instance, frequently to blush, when any Thing happens to remind them of any natural Defect of Body, or of Mind ; of their Poverty ; their mean Appearance, or Extraction. Whence some have concluded, that  
Shame

Shame, is nothing, but a secret Motion of Self-love and *Pride*, the predominant Passion of human Nature, which makes him extremely apprehensive, and puts the Body in a State proper to fortify his Apprehension under any injurious Treatment; or any Appearance of Disrespect, that may tend to impair his Esteem in the World; for which Reason, it is further observed, that Persons are principally affected with Shame, and discover the most sensible Marks of it, when conscious to themselves, they are chargeable by others with such Things, as principally regard their Reputation; or which represent them acting in civil Life, out of their proper Character, or the Rules of common Decency.



Decency, or below the Dignity of their Station.

XVI. This only proves that an all-wise Architect, in forming Man, might so order the Construction of his Work, as to serve two different Ends by the same Movements in it. As Shame proceeds from Self-love, or a natural Desire of Esteem, without any Regard to the Morality of our Actions, we may consider it is a mere *physical* Effect ; but as it is designed a *Monitor* to us, that we should do Nothing really dishonourable or unworthy in itself, tho' no human Eye should see us, nor any Consequence relating to our Commerce in the World, might affect us ; it may be considered as having the Force of a moral Law to us, and to which God hereby

H plainly

plainly signifies his Intention, that we should conform.

XVII. Besides this Enforcement of Morality from Conscience and Shame : God has farther encouraged us to the Practice of moral Duties, by the natural Tendency they have to promote our present Happiness ; so that if all Men would agree to regulate their Behaviour by the moral Laws, nothing could be so instrumental, either to our private, or the publick Happiness, tho' we should consider it, merely, as a Law of Convenience.

XVIII. It is true, by Means of the Corruption which is in the World, through Lust ; the natural Course and Tendency of moral Virtue is much obstructed, and often fails of its proper End.

But



gument can be drawn from them, against the Truth of moral Virtue, as a Law of Conveniency; because it is, upon an evident Reason, convenient, that a less Interest should be sacrificed to a greater; and whatever Inequalities there are in the Condition of wicked and good Men, in particular Cases, at present, they shall be perfectly adjusted at a proper Time: and the Proof, that they shall be so adjusted, is as clear and evident as any Conclusions that can, in a strict Way of Arguing, be drawn from the Wisdom and Goodness of God. And if we may mistake in our Reasonings upon these divine Attributes, and when our Reasons are founded upon the most clear and distinct Ideas, which the Mind of Man is able to conceive of them: Should God condescend

scend to make a particular Declaration of any moral Duty to us ; I do not see how we could, in this Case, certainly prove the Truth of such a Declaration. For, were it not for these Attributes of Wisdom and Goodness in God, we could have no Assurance, either concerning the Truth of our Faculties, or our Obligation to obey his Commands. All our Reasonings, indeed, on the Subjects of Morality, whether relating to the natural Law, or to divine Institution, depend on our having right Notions concerning these divine Perfections ; and if we argue, justly, from them, we shall find no Difficulties, respecting the promiscuous Distributions of Providence in this Life to wicked and good Men ; but what may



easily be accounted for, without destroying the Notion of moral *Virtue*, as a Law of *Convenience*; tending to promote our Happiness.

XX. Another Argument, to prove the Truth of this Law, may be taken from the very Judgment of those wicked Men themselves, who, for the Sake of some present Advantage, are yet tempted to transgress it. Virtue, in its greatest Distress, is still amiable, and shines through all the Clouds which encompass it, with a beautiful and surprising Lustre. She commands, Respect, and Veneration from those who yet do not engage in her Service, or appear in her Retinue. There is no Man, how vicious soever, but, in his own Judgment, must esteem a Person  
of

of Honour and Probity, of Humanity and Piety, above one of a different Character, to whom he may, notwithstanding, give more sensible Proofs of an external Regard, as being more necessary to his Designs and Interests ; but notwithstanding the external and fallacious Homage, which Men do pay to very wicked Persons, who are capable of serving them, they commonly, in their Hearts, secretly detest and despise them, and are only restrained from shewing their Contempt by Considerations merely respecting themselves.

XXI. *Honour*, therefore, and *Esteem*, may be considered as farther Rewards, designed, by Providence, to enforce moral Virtue in this Life. *Rewards*, indeed, more general, more last-

H 4 ing,

ing, and, equally dispensed, than those which respect Man's temporal Prosperity, or Peace ; tho' it may too, sometimes, happen in a very corrupt Age, that Men shall be raised to the highest Dignities and Honours, by the most dishonourable and unworthy Means, and, even, caressed and applauded by great Numbers of mercenary Dependents, according to the Extent of their Power and Interests. But these accidental Deviations from the common Measure of what is truly great and honourable, being the Effect of a false Judgment, are only of a very short and transient Duration. When the partial Reasons, and sinister Motives, upon which they were formed, cease to operate, the World usually judges, concern-  
ing

ing the Character of such Persons, by other Rules, and sees their Actions in a very different Light from that wherein Flattery or Interest before represented them. Now, as a vicious Character is usually followed with Obloquy and Reproach; so Justice, one Time or other, is commonly done, (corrupt as the Judgments of the World sometimes are) to the Memory of injured and distressed Virtue.

XXII. Still we say these Rewards, ordinarily annexed to the Observance, and these Punishments to the Breach of the natural Law, are not, universally, of Force sufficient to bind Men to their Duty; and, as it is requisite, that all Laws should be enforced by Rewards and Punishments, the Hope, or Fear, of which,

which, respectively, may be strong enough to secure Obedience to them : So that the future Evil shall be greater than the present Benefit of transgressing them, and the future Good greater than the present Inconveniency in Obeying ; and, upon this Consideration, in order to give the natural Law all the Force, which it ought to have, it is necessary we should cast our Eyes forward, upon the Rewards and Punishments of another Life.

XXII. It is not so necessary that we should distinctly know the Kind, or Degree, of that Reward, or Happiness, to which the Practice of pure Morality will entitle us ; it is sufficient that we know, by consulting the Ideas of Wisdom and Goodness,  
in



in the Legislator, that the Reward will be such, as it is proper for him to give, or for us to receive; a Reward worthy of the Pains and Labour, of all the Sufferings and Self-denial, we can exercise in Pursuit of it. *He that cometh unto God, must, by his very Access, believe both that he is, and that he is a Rewarder of them who diligently seek him.* This is a Truth which I cite, not because it is confirmed by a divine Authority, but because it is evident from the clear and uncontested Reason of it. And if God hath interposed to reward Man, as his Action always bears the Character of his Attributes, it will assuredly be a God-like, a great, and a glorious Reward, which he will confer; a Reward proportioned to the Faculties and  
all

all those reasonable Desires, which are proper to Man.

XXIV. Now, the two Faculties of Man being Understanding and Will, his Reward, the Reward proper to him as Man, will consist in their Improvement and Perfection; in Man's knowing what is worthy to be known, and in his chusing and enjoying such Objects as are most worthy to be chosen and enjoyed. Whether the Soul will have the same Sensations in a separate State as at present, by means of its Union with the Body, and the Commerce it maintains with sensible Objects, is not evident from any natural Principle: But it is evident, if it should be the Pleasure of God, whether in the Body or out of the Body, the like Sensations may be continued in a separate State. For

as

as the Body is only the *Occasion*, and not the efficient Cause of conveying such Sensations to the Mind; God may imprint them upon the Mind, when no longer united to the Body, and appoint what other occasional Cause he pleases for that End. It is more probable, indeed, that the Soul, when released from the Body, and acting in its separate and pure State, will receive new Sensations, and those augmented to a great Number, rather than lose any of those which she has already: provided, They will really tend to her Perfection. We can no more argue that an Occasion of such new Sensations, or any indefinite Number of them, is impossible; than a blind Man now can argue against the Possibility of Colours, because he can form

no

no Manner of Conception concerning them.

XXV. Whether it may be proved from any Principles of natural Reason, that the Body will, any Time after Death, be reunited to the Soul, does not so evidently appear : Because the Power of God is sufficient to compensate Man for all the good Actions done in the Body, without such an Union ; and indeed to capacitate the Soul for such a Happiness, as will infinitely outbalance the Merit of them, according to the qualified Sense wherein I understand Merit. There is no Necessity then, from the bare Consideration of a future Reward, of supposing a future Union of two Substances, so wholly distinct in the Nature and Properties of them. The Belief  
of

of that Article must, therefore, depend upon other Considerations, and especially upon the Authority of divine Revelation, where God hath interposed, or may at any Time hereafter, think fit to interpose, by that means. Some pious Men, indeed, have argued, that as the Body bears a Part in the Service, by Abstinence, Maceration, and Self-denial, or other Exercises proper to it; it ought to share in the Reward: But we are not always to consider the common Dialect, not even that of learned Men, as strictly true and philosophical. The Body, except in a metaphorical Way of speaking, is not capable of *Reward*, as having, considered simply in it self, no Sensation of its Reward, nor any Possibility, according to the clearest Notions

we



no Manner of Conception concerning them.

XXV. Whether it may be proved from any Principles of natural Reason, that the Body will, any Time after Death, be reunited to the Soul, does not so evidently appear: Because the Power of God is sufficient to compensate Man for all the good Actions done in the Body, without such an Union; and indeed to capacitate the Soul for such a Happiness, as will infinitely outbalance the Merit of them, according to the qualified Sense wherein I understand Merit. There is no Necessity then, from the bare Consideration of a future Reward, of supposing a future Union of two Substances, so wholly distinct in the Nature and Properties of them. The Belief  
of

of that Article must, therefore, depend upon other Considerations, and especially upon the Authority of divine Revelation, where God hath interposed, or may at any Time hereafter, think fit to interpose, by that means. Some pious Men, indeed, have argued, that as the Body bears a Part in the Service, by Abstinence, Maceration, and Self-denial, or other Exercises proper to it; it ought to share in the Reward: But we are not always to consider the common Dialect, not even that of learned Men, as strictly true and philosophical. The Body, except in a metaphorical Way of speaking, is not capable of *Reward*, as having, considered simply in it self, no Sensation of its Reward, nor any Possibility, according to the clearest Notions

We

we can form concerning the Body of having any. So that whatever other Reasons God may have for reuniting Soul and Body, there do not appear any Reasons from the Consideration of such a Union, in order to the Reward of our present moral Obedience.

XXVI. As to the future Punishments of wicked Men, for the Breach of those immutable Laws of Reason and Order, which are prescribed for the Rule of their Conduct; they too will be such as are proportioned to their Nature and their Faculties. And whereof they may form some Notions, by that Pain, Disorder and Anguish of Mind, which Sinners do even now frequently feel, when they reflect upon their Sins and Impieties against an almighty and avenging God. Only there  
is



Principles, that the future Punishments, to be inflicted after this Life, are such, as may deter wicked Men from offending against the Law of God ; and that they ought to believe such Punishments will be so great as may have sufficient Force, when duly considered, to out-balance all the Evils, they could have suffered in this Life, in the Discharge of their Duty. Otherwise a sufficient Sanction to the moral Law, of which I have prov'd the Necessity, and which I all along suppose, would not have been given towards attaining the proper End of it, Obedience. And if, for this Reason, wicked Men ought to believe, and must expect, that God will inflict future Punishments upon them; there is great Reason, if not an absolute Necessity of believing,

he



he *will* inflict those Punishments : Otherwise, he has put Men under an Obligation, in order to the Attainment of his End, of making a false Judgment.

XXVII. What has rendred it so difficult for Men to conceive, how the Soul, in a separate State, should be capable of Punishment, especially of any other Punishment, than that of reflecting upon her own Vileness, Loss, and Disorder, has proceeded from hence, that they look upon the Death of the Body, as a Kind of *Annihilation*; for, having here scarce any pleasing or painful Notices, wherewith they are moved, except by Means of the Senses, and external Objects, they imagine, when the Soul goes into those invisible Regions, where the Spirits of Men departed are

I 2 sup-

supposed to reside ; she can no longer be capable of the Pains and Pleasures, which she now feels ; and wherewith her Capacity is, in a Manner, at present, wholly taken up ; so that, if they do not believe her to be utterly extinct, as ignorant and unthinking Persons are apt to do ; their Imagination, represents her, as retiring into such a State of Indolence, or Insensibility, as is but the next Remove to an utter Extinction.

XXVIII. This Error proceeds from a vulgar Notion, that the painful or pleasing Sensations of Men are not primarily in the Soul, but in the Senses ; and that the Senses are necessary and efficient Causes of exciting them in the Soul : Whereas they, who consider the Properties of Matter attentively, will never be able to  
discover

discover, however, it be modified, or whatever Situation it is in, how it can produce the least Effay towards Thought, or Perception: And, therefore, the Soul, when in the Body, or when out of the Body, it may have the very same Sensations, tho', probably, much more lively, strong, and operative, out of the Body. To convince us of which, we need only consider the Power of Imagination in delirious or dreaming Persons; who see, feel, and taste Things, which have merely an imaginary Subsistence, after as affecting a Manner, as they could have done, had such Things been the real and actual Objects of Sense.

XXIX. So that, in respect to the pleasing or painful Sensations of Men, it is indifferent, by what Occasion they are excited; whether by Means of circumam-

bient Bodies, or any new Modifications of the Soul; provided, we do but feel them. In order to which, it is not necessary, for Instance, there should be a *material* Fire, to give us all those painful Sensations, which we now feel when we burn a Finger, or when any other Part of the Body is exposed so near to the Flames, that the rapid Particles of Fire, that fly from it, penetrate the Pores of the Body like so many pointed Needles, and lacerate the Parts exposed to them; the Pain, that we then feel, not being in the Body, or effected by the Body, but wholly produced in the Soul. We must, therefore, look up for some higher Cause of our Sensations, than Matter, which has no Tendency of itself to produce them; which Cause can be

no other, than the Power and Will of God ; with whom it is equal to work with Means, or without Means ; and who can effect whatever he will, only by *willing* it.

XXX. The Author of *the Art of Thinking* argued therefore philosophically, in saying, “ It is  
 “ possible for a Soul separated  
 “ from the Body to be tormented  
 “ by the Fire, either of Hell, or  
 “ of Purgatory, and to feel the  
 “ same Smart which one feels  
 “ when burnt ; since even while  
 “ the Soul was in the Body, the  
 “ Smart of Burning was, in itself,  
 “ not in the Body ; and was no  
 “ other, than a Thought of Sor-  
 “ row, which she had, upon Oc-  
 “ casion of what passed in the  
 “ Body, to which God had united  
 “ her.” So that there is not



Reason to suppose it necessary\*, in order to give the Soul those Sensations, whether of Pain or Pleasure, which she now has by Occasion of the Body, that she should be afterward united to the same Body, or to any material Vehicle whatever: Some other Being altogether immaterial, or the Soul, by some internal Modification of herself, might produce the same Effect. If, now, in her Union with the Body, the Pain or Pleasure, which we feel, is ordinarily referred to some particular Part of the Body; this proceeds from the positive Will of God, and to the End greater Care may be taken towards preserving the several Parts of the Machine: But were it not for

\* See Mr. Bayle under the Article *Epicurus*.

this

this Cause, there could be no Reason, why the Soul should refer her Sensations to any particular Part of the Body, or, in any Respect out of herself. But she might be sensible of Pain and Pleasure, of Heat and Cold, by her own proper Act, without any foreign Cause; or if such a Cause might be necessary, there could, however, be no Grounds to suppose, why it should be a bodily or *material* Cause. And from hence I argue (tho' it is not my present Business to enquire concerning the Nature of future Punishments to wicked Men, and whether, possibly, those Punishments may consist in their having certain Sensations, which will answer to the Pain we now feel by Occasion of material Fire) that there is no Necessity, why the Soul, in order to become

capable

capable of such Punishments, should be restored again to the same Body, or be united to any other Body.



C H A P. IX.

*The Grounds of Error concerning moral Truth, with the Means of removing them.*

- I. *A Difficulty moved.*
- II. *The Consequence drawn from it denied; and what may be justly inferred.*
3. *Reasons of Ignorance in Men concerning moral Truths.*
- IV, V. *The two main Sources of Error, and the Tendency of them.*
- VI, VII. *Concerning Weakness of Mind,*

*Mind, and the Effects of it.*  
VIII. *A culpable Diffidence in Men.* IX. *Why the Principles of Morality are not known without a competent Application.*  
X. *Concerning Liberty of Mind.*  
XI. *Man not always governed by the Light of his Mind.*  
XII. *The Reason.* XIII, XIV.  
XV. *Why Men of the greatest Capacity are frequently observed to be more eminently virtuous or wicked.* XVI. *A Consideration respecting Mankind in general.* XVII. *The Levity of the Heart, how occasioned.* XVIII. *Why Men of Parts sometimes very ignorant in respect to the Principles of Morality.* XIX, XX. *We are most affected with Things present, and which actually please.*  
XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV. *The Method*

*Method, whereby the Causes of Error may be removed.*

**I**F the Laws of moral Virtue have that Force to oblige Men to Obedience, and to oblige under those Sanctions we have ascribed to them, they ought, you will say, to be written in such fair and legible Characters, that all Men, on every Occasion, may consult and apply them. For a Law, the Sense or Design whereof is not clear and intelligible, is, in Effect no Law. Men cannot follow a Light, which they do not see; or practise an unknown Duty: And yet it may be said, that Morality changes, in respect to Times and Places; that is *Morality*, under the Notion, it is frequently understood and explained, as a received Rule for the Conduct of human Life ;



Life; From whence some have concluded, there is no fixed or certain Standard of Morality; but that the Rules of it are different and mutable, according to the different Tempers, Opinions, or Circumstances of Men. So that what is reputed decent, praiseworthy, and of good Report ( all Characters of moral Virtue ) at one Time, or in one Place; at another Time, and in another Place, may be thought unbecoming, dishonourable and infamous; the proper Characters, on the other Hand, of moral Evil.

II. The Truth of this Observation is not denied; but we deny the Consequence, that Men would draw from it. It might, with equal Pretence be alledged, that there are no standing Laws to  
Men,

Men, for the Government of civil Society, for the Direction of their Conduct in it; or the Decision of those Differences, which may arise among them; because the Sense of those Laws is sometimes perverted, and misapplied, contrary to the real Intention, and sometimes to the very Letter of them. All, therefore, we can infer from that Variety, which is observable among different Persons and different Nations, with respect to their moral Conduct, is, that they do not attend, as they ought, to the Rule of it; or that they will not see the Reasons, according to which it ought to be explained; those Reasons being opposite to some prevailing Passion, Habit, or Interest wherewith they are affected. And how far such Prepossessions are of Force to blind the Eyes; to corrupt

rupt the Judgment, or to wrest the Construction of any Law, contrary to its true, original and proper Sense, it is unnecessary to prove by an Induction of Particulars. And if these Things be done, sometimes, in the Face of a standing and visible Legislature; which hath a Power of asserting and vindicating the Authority of the Laws, and may interpose to that End by a visible Authority; we are not to be surprized, that Men, under the Power of some violent Passion, are diverted from attending to the Design of a Law, the Misapplication whereof, they do not apprehend, will be attended with any *present* Consequences injurious to them.

III. Other Persons may, possibly, misapply the Laws of Nature, or be ignorant of them.

Not

Not because they are unwilling to undergo the Labour of Attention towards procuring better Light; but on account of some natural Incapacity or Defect of Mind, which renders them incapable of pursuing their Inquiries, till they are perfectly able to comprehend the Subject Matter of them. For Things, how true or intelligible soever in themselves, are not equally clear or intelligible to all Men. Some Persons, either for Want of natural Abilities; of Instruction, or Education; being of such very slow Apprehensions, and having the Eye of their Understanding so darkened; that they are not able to discover; in a distinct View, the Relation between moral Subjects; especially, in the more remote and consequential Deductions to be made from them.

IV.

IV. Here, then, we have found the two main Sources of Error, in the Mind of Man; Want of *Strength*, and Want of *Liberty*.

V. I shall consider, more particularly, how both these Defects tend to deceive and mislead Men in their Inquiries concerning moral Truth.

VI. And Ist, Where Men labour under any natural Weakness of Mind, and do not discover the Truth, which they seek after, without much Difficulty, they soon grow weary, dull, and discouraged; and secretly desire to give over the Work, as being very painful, and, at the same Time, without any *certain* Prospect of Reward: As People of an infirm or slender Constitution of Body, when they are put upon attempting any Thing, to

K

which



which they apprehend themselves unequal, are soon intimidated with the Apprehension of their attempting a Thing above their Strength. And tho' they might, perhaps, by Degrees and repeated Application, proceed in the Work, with more Facility, and through frequent Exercise, acquire a stronger Habit of Body ; yet they have not Resolution sufficient to overcome the Resistance, which renders their first Endeavours so painful and discouraging to them.

VII. Thus it is, with respect to the Operation of weak Minds, in the Search after Truth ; and, what I now, particularly, consider, of *moral* Truth. The great Lines of our Duty are visible to every Eye ; but, when Men are to draw Inferences or Conclusions from them, tho' they proceed  
upon

upon true and certain Principles, yet the Connection, in their Way of inferring one Thing from another, being less perceivable, and their Views short and narrow, the Mind grows impatient in the Pursuit, and, instead of Truth, what she cannot discover without Pain, takes up with any Thing, true or false, that may procure her *Repose*, and free her from her present uneasy State: And tho', notwithstanding her Complaints, she might, by reiterated Attempts, gather more Strength; for the Powers of the Mind, as of the Body, are augmented by Labour and Exercise, still the Desire of present Ease proves, upon the Competition, more prevalent, than the Desire of a future, distant, and as she apprehends very *precarious* Reward,

not to be acquired, after all, without doing great Violence to herself.

VIII. These are the lazy Pretences, which Men offer in Excuse of themselves, for neglecting the Culture and Improvement of their Minds. And they are not only the Pretences of Persons, more naturally weak and *saturnine*; but sometimes of those, to whom Nature has been more liberal of her Talents. There have been a great Number of Men, capable of distinguishing themselves in their several Professions; who yet, out of a weak Distrust of succeeding in their Endeavours, occasioned by their Idleness, and contrary to the natural Motions of Pride in most other Cases, have neglected the Pursuit, to which they were happily formed, and where-  
in,

in, with a proper Application and Industry, they might certainly have succeeded ; and so have lived and died undistinguished ; but not unaccountable, for neglecting to improve the Talents committed to them : If, perhaps, instead of the generous and beneficent Uses to which they should have employed them, they have not applied them in a Way of Commerce, rather tending to pervert, than to answer their proper End and Use ; by turning them wholly upon the Affairs or Business of the sensible Life ; and, instead of employing them to augment the Strength, making them directly instrumental to corrupt and debase the Mind ; as the richest Soul, if not well cultivated, serves only to produce the ranker, and more noxious Weeds.

IX. Neither is it any Cause of Objection, against the Clearness or Evidence of the natural Law, that the Knowledge of it is not to be attained, without competent Application. God hath given us Faculties with a Design they should be employed. And it is sufficient to justify the Reasons of his Procedure herein, that we can, in a sober and regular Use of those Faculties, attain the End, which he proposed to himself in giving them. It would rather have argued a Defect in the divine Wisdom, especially, in a probationary State of Man, where he is to give Tryal of his Abilities, had God rendred the Knowledge of his Duty, in all Cases, so very easy and obvious, as wholly to supersede his Endeavours in order to the Discovery of it. The Difficulty,



culty; therefore, which is pretended in the Search of Man, concerning the Rule of his Duty, to shew the Uncertainty of it, is so far from being an Objection against moral Truth, that the very Frame and Constitution of human Nature, under our present Circumstances, seem to require that *she should only be found of those, who diligently seek her.*

X. Another Source of Error in the human Mind, concerning moral Truth, proceeds from her Want of *Liberty*. We have always sufficient Means or Capacities to discover the necessary Rules of our Conduct. Where such Means, or Capacities are wanting, Men cannot, indeed, be, strictly considered, as moral Agents, obliged by a Law, and under *Pain* of transgressing it. For as it is not

consistent with Wisdom, that a Man should be required to practise what he doth not know; neither is it consistent with Justice, that he should be punished for what he could not remedy. So that Man, considered as a moral Agent, must always, in the necessary Reason of the Thing, have the Means or Capacity of knowing what is requisite to *denominate* him a moral Agent; and to give him a Right of being treated *as* such. And it is sufficient to my present Purpose, that every Person, who is accountable for his Actions, must have a competent Degree of Knowledge, for the moral Conduct of them; tho' a different Degree, of Knowledge, in Morality, may be communicated to different Persons, in a different Degree; according as *God has dealt*

*dealt to every One the Measure of his Abilities.*

XI. But, tho' every Man has, if he attend to it, a sufficient Measure of Light, to direct his moral Conduct; it does not therefore follow, that every Man *will* attend to this Light: For there are other Motives of Action, in Man, besides that of pure and simple Understanding. Nothing is more evident than that we do not always govern ourselves, according to the Principles of our Belief; even of those Principles, which are most uncontested; whose Truths we acknowledge; and to the Conduct to which we profess ourselves obliged to submit.

XII. This Contrariety between the Persuasion, and the Practice of Men, proceeds from hence, that we are differently affected  
with

with what we *feel*, and with what we only *see*: I do not mean with the sensible Eye; for the Impressions of Objects, which enter there, are often so strong, that it had been happy for us, if we could not have opened it: But I mean what we see only by a naked View, or Speculation of the Mind. In the former Case, we often, indeed, find ourselves carried away by a violent Impulse, which proves too strong for a fine and beautiful Thought: either to divert, or resist.

XIII. The Liberty, therefore, of human Mind may be considered, upon reasonable Grounds, as distinct from the Strength of it: If it do not frequently happen, that Men of the greatest Capacities, and strongest Minds, have yet the least *Liberty*: As  
with

with the greater Force a Torrent is carried, and the higher it rises, the more difficult it is to keep it in the proper Channel. And, therefore, it has been a common Observation, for which I shall presently assign a natural Reason, that Men of extraordinary Talents are commonly, and more eminently distinguished, either for their Virtues, or their Vices; according to the different *Course*, which they are inclined, from Constitution, or some prevailing Habit, or Interest, to pursue.

XIV. The Reason of a transcendent and superior Virtue in such Persons is, that when they apply their Minds to the Discovery of Truth; *when they search for her as Silver; and seek for her as for hid Treasure;* they do not only find her of less difficult Access,



cess, and their Pains rewarded, at once, by a more easy and more full Discovery but they see those great, beautiful and sublime Truths, that are proper to satisfy their enlarged Desires of Knowledge; which lie more concealed from less penetrating Minds, and are less proportioned to the Capacities of them. And, if all Pleasure ariseth from the Agreement of the Object with the Faculty, by the same Reason, in Proportion as the Faculty is of greater Extent, a greater Measure of Pleasure must necessarily arise from the Contemplation and Enjoyment of it. So that, as it is Pleasure which renders Man happy; when Knowledge thus becomes pleasant to the Soul, at once, by facilitating her Application, and by satisfying her Desires;

fires; How can a human Mind, reflecting upon its own Dignity, be so worthily employed, or, with equal Force and Activity, towards its proper End *Happiness*, than in an intimate Contemplation of Truth? And I do not doubt, but there are good Men of exalted Minds, who, in such Contemplations of Truth, are so transported with the Light and Beauty of it, that they enjoy, for the Time, a greater Pleasure, than the World, or any sensible Delights in it, can give; a Pleasure so great and refined, especially, when accompanied with a conformable Practice, that *neither Life, nor Death, nor Things present, nor Things to come, will be able to separate them from the Love of Truth.* For tho' we do not always follow the Light of  
our

our own Minds, yet the more strong, distinct and irradiating that Light is, we shall follow it still with so much greater Freedom and Complacency.

XV. It is no less easy to account, why Men of extraordinary Capacities, when their Minds take a wrong and different Turn, are the most luxuriant in Vice, and give themselves up to the greatest and most extravagant Disorders. Besides the natural Force of Thought in such Persons, which hurries them away, and renders them impatient of the Means necessary to rectify the wrong Bent they have taken, and so precipitates them into the very Excess, to which Humour or Inclination may prompt them; they being Persons of a fine, strong and copious *Imagination*, easily find,  
 or

or pretend to find some plausible Reason, even for their greatest Crimes; or where that cannot be found, so as to satisfy themselves, or others, they yet paint those Crimes in such lively and deceitful Colours, as to give them an Air and Force which hides their natural Deformity; or, at least, diverts them, in such a Manner, from giving a just Attention to it, that *seeing they see, and will not perceive.*

XVI. But the general Reason why all Persons, indifferently, are apt to be moved more by sensible, than by intellectual Objects, is, what I observed before; that the Impressions of Sense are stronger and more affecting, than those of naked Truth: Even the Minds of those, who are capable of a more steady Contemplation of  
 Truth,

our own Minds, yet the more strong, distinct and irradiating that Light is, we shall follow it still with so much greater Freedom and Complacency.

XV. It is no less easy to account, why Men of extraordinary Capacities, when their Minds take a wrong and different Turn, are the most luxuriant in Vice, and give themselves up to the greatest and most extravagant Disorders. Besides the natural Force of Thought in such Persons, which hurries them away, and renders them impatient of the Means necessary to rectify the wrong Bent they have taken, and so precipitates them into the very Excess, to which Humour or Inclination may prompt them; they being Persons of a fine, strong and copious *Imagination*, easily find,  
 or



or pretend to find some plausible Reason, even for their greatest Crimes; or where that cannot be found, so as to satisfy themselves, or others, they yet paint those Crimes in such lively and deceitful Colours, as to give them an Air and Force which hides their natural Deformity; or, at least, diverts them, in such a Manner, from giving a just Attention to it, that *seeing they see, and will not perceive.*

XVI. But the general Reason why all Persons, indifferently, are apt to be moved more by sensible, than by intellectual Objects, is, what I observed before; that the Impressions of Sense are stronger and more affecting, than those of naked Truth: Even the Minds of those, who are capable of a more steady Contemplation of  
 Truth,

Truth, and who take the greatest Delight in contemplating it, cannot always dwell or feed upon abstract Speculations. When, therefore, the Mind finds herself weary, or her Strength is much impaired, we naturally turn our Thoughts for Relief and Diverſion, upon Objects of another Kind; and meeting in the Way ſomething grateful and pleaſing in ſenſible Objects, our Deſire towards them is inflamed anew. As we may obſerve of Perſons, who, upon reading a good Book, have been ſo moved with ſome ſpiritual Truth inculcated to them, that they have thought, for the Time, Nothing could be able to withſtand the Force of it; but ſoon finding other Objects, or Affairs of the World, by Occaſion of which the Mind taſtes a preſent  
and

and sensible Pleasure, the former Ideas, which appeared so lively and strong, do not only give Way to them, but, by Degrees, are wholly obliterated.

XVII. This *Levity* of the Heart is occasioned by the Commerce, we are obliged to maintain, with the sensible World, for the Preservation of the Body, and other Ends of the sensible Life, which, I have observed before, could not be answered, if the Impressions of corporeal Objects, and the *Pleasure*, they occasion to us, were less strong, than, in Fact, they really are. However, this Necessity, we are under, of conversing with material Beings, and the continual Avocation of the Mind on that Account, from the nobler Subjects, and proper Exercise of it, very  
 L much

much tends to weaken its natural Force; and to render us less capable of considering any Thing, with an *intense* Application; especially, if the Subject of our Meditations be intricate and perplexed, and, by Consequence, painful.

XVIII. If we duly considered this, we should less admire at the Darknes, Ignorance and Confusion of Thought, even in Persons, who do not want good natural Capacities. For Application is to the Mind, what the Direction of the Sight, to any Object before us, is to the Eye; if we would see and examine it distinctly, discover its true Proportion, and several Parts, and the Relation wherein it stands to other Bodies, we must take a particular and close Survey of it. And thus it is, if we would  
fix

fix the Mind upon any intellectual Object, we must consider it with Attention, we must silence the Senses, Imagination and Passions; and observe, if we would have a clear Idea of it, what it really is in itself, and how it differs from other Objects.

XIX. The Mind is not only fatigued with a continual Attention to abstract Truths, and obliged, both for its Relief, and other Reasons above mentioned, to divert the Thoughts upon other Subjects; but we see such Truths, at a Distance, or, as having, at present, no immediate or necessary Relation to us or to our Interests: Whereas, corporeal Objects are continually at hand, offering themselves to us, and promising *actual* Délight and Satisfaction. Besides, when the

L 2 Mind



Mind of Man would really apply itself, with Ardour, to discover any Truth and is agreeably employed in its Inquiry, the least Thing in the World has Force sufficient to break in upon him, and to interrupt his Cogitations. Sometimes, an accidental Thought, whereof he cannot trace the Origin, which gives him some pleasing or painful Sentiment, quite disturbs the Order of his Ideas; and carries him off, from his former Speculations, into a Region altogether different; and perhaps into some new and *strange* World of his own forming.

XX. The Truths of Morality are, certainly, discoverable by the Mind, and agreeable to it; but they are not always discovered without Attention and Pain. And since the Soul naturally loves Plea-

Pleasure, and always tastes actual Pleasure, when the Senses are gratified; 'tis not without Violence and Difficulty, that she can disengage herself in such a Manner from them, as to dwell long, much less, continually, in the Contemplation of moral Truth.

XXI. Having observed the two principal Causes of Error, concerning moral Truth, the Method of Cure may more easily be prescribed.

XXII. In order to cure Weakness of Mind and to give it a greater Force and Extent, we should habituate the Soul to Labour and Exercise; and not be discouraged, tho' we cannot, always, readily find what we seek, in the Search after Truth: Repeated Attempts may at last bring us to the Place, where she inhabits,

tho' at first she is more difficult of Access. It would, in particular, be proper to accustom ourselves to an Acquaintance with the more abstract Studies, Logick, Mathematicks, and Metaphyicks. The Use of these Studies, were they of no other Use, being excellent to open, to strengthen and enlarge the Mind; the Habits of which are to be acquired and confirmed, as the bodily Habits are, by repeated Labour and Exercise.

XXIII. Metaphyicks, especially, which are only another Expression for natural Theology do not only require the greatest Abstraction and Intenfeness of Mind, and, thereby, visibly tend to enlarge, to fortify, and exalt it; but have, for their Object, the most important and glorious *Truths*, which  
can

can fall under human Consideration. And indeed it is, principally, the Knowledge of them, whereby we are enabled to ascertain the Truths of Morality, and resolve them into their true, proper and distinct Grounds. So that it may be affirmed, no Man can be, or ever was a good Moralist upon natural Principles, but one endowed with a competent Share of metaphysical Knowledge. This Science, therefore, or as some term it, *Sapience*, however neglected, is not merely to be considered, as a Help or instrumental Means towards strengthening the Mind; but in respect to Morality, *essential*, in order to enlighten and direct it.

XXIV. Towards encreasing the Liberty of the Mind, seeing Men of greater Capacities are so apt to

be diverted in their Pursuits of moral Truth, and that Diversion is occasioned by the Commerce they have with sensible Objects, and the sensible Pleasure they occasion to them, we should endeavour to draw the Mind, as much as possible, from such Objects, and so far as is consistent with the Necessities of the present State. So that the Soul, conscious of her innate Dignity, should aspire to employ herself, in the most worthy Manner, and on the noblest Objects; endeavouring, by that Means, not only to avoid the Occasions of Error, but to attain the Things that are *more excellent*, and go on to *Perfection*; acquainting herself, more and more, with the Beauty of Truth; and taking such Delight in her Conversation, as may out-balance any of the low and mean



mean Pleasures she can taste in foreign, especially, in sinful Gratifications; but should rather, indeed, towards lessening the Weight so apt to sink her down, and carry her towards sensible Goods, often withdraw from them and restrain herself, in many Cases, even from the Use of Things, in their own Nature, lawful and innocent.



## CHAP. X.

*Concerning the Use and Regulation of the Senses, the Imagination, and Passions, particularly in this Chapter of the Senses.*

I, II. *The Reasons of this Inquiry,*  
and III, IV. *Of the Inconsistency  
between*

*between the Principles and Actions of Men. V. Reason ought to assert her Sovereignty, and VI. Against what Enemies. VII. VIII. A particular Application of what has been said to the Senses. IX. The proper Use of them maintained against the mystical Writers. X. Especially of the Sight. XI. The Reasonableness and, in certain Cases, the Danger of gratifying this Sense. XII. How to avoid such Danger.*

I. **I**T will be, to little Effect, that we have discovered the Grounds of moral Virtue, the Obligation to practise it, and the Means of avoiding Error, in our Search after moral Truth; except Men, by some proper Means, may also

also be informed, how the Practice, the habitual Practice of it, may be attained.

II. To this End, it will be natural, in the first Place, to enquire, what those Things are, whereby, Man is, principally, obstructed when he endeavours to act according to the Light of his own Mind; which Light, it was the primary and direct Intention of Nature, that he should follow.

III. Now the very same Causes, which we have shewed, are apt to mislead and pervert the Judgment, have the greatest Force, even when the Judgment is not perverted, to influence the Will. This is the Reason of the Inconsistency, for which it is thought so difficult to account, between the Belief and Actions; the Principles and Practice of Men; so  
*that*

*that what we do, we allow not, and what we would do, what Reason does not only allow, but approve, that we do not.* Notwithstanding, therefore, we *con-*  
*sent* to the natural *Law*, that it is *holy*, and *just*, and *good*; yet this inward Approbation and Testimony of our Minds, concerning it, is not of Force sufficient to restrain us from an unholy, unjust and evil Choice, when we determine to act. But *the Good that we would*, when we simply consult the Light of Reason, *we do not*; and *the Evil, which we would not*, or which, when we consult the Light of our Minds, we have some transient Desires, at least, to avoid, *that we do*.

IV. How it comes to pass, that Man is so inconsistent with himself, as not to govern his Conduct  
by

by the Principles of his Belief, is a Question beside my present Purpose. I am now only to observe, that, in Fact, there are other Principles, whereby Man is governed, besides those of Light and Knowledge; and that every Man experiences in himself, whether he may be able, or not, to give a philosophical Account of the Effect, and to answer all Difficulties on so very nice a Subject, that *there is a Law in his Members warring against the Law of his Mind, and bringing him into Captivity to the Law of Sin which is in his Members.*

V. The first Thing, therefore, we have to do, if we would assert the Authority of Reason, and re-establish her in the Throne; if we would give her that sovereign Command which she ought to have,



have, and which she is designed by God to have over the whole Machine, and all the Springs of Action in it, is to consider where the main Strength of our Enemy doth lie? What the Order and Number of their Forces are, and where they will most probably attack us? To the End, we may not only be better prepared to defend ourselves, but to chastise their rebellious Attempts; and to make them sensible, it does not become Subjects to give, but to receive Laws.

VI. Now, the most dangerous Enemies to Reason, the most apt to excite rebellious Motions against her Orders and Authority, deriving their chief Force, either from the Senses, the Imagination, or Passions, what it principally concerns us to do is, to prevent

vent their Action so much as possibly we can; but, when that cannot be done, to resist it with all our Might, and thereby to weaken their Force, till, by Degrees, we reduce them to Obedience.

VII. I shall apply this Rule severally to the Senses, Imagination and Passions, according to the Order wherein they are here specified.

VIII. In respect to the *Senses*, the Use of them is absolutely necessary to the Preservation of the sensible Life; to which End, indeed, as they are admirably formed, they appear to be *solely* given. So that it is not only reasonable, if we would follow the Order of Nature, that we should use them; but we may, lawfully, in some convenient Measure, gratify and indulge them. IX.

IX. The Design, therefore, of those, who would lay down the Rules of a just and practicable Morality, is not, with the mystical Writers, to prescribe such *Denudations*, and abstract Flights of the Soul out of the Body, as if, for the Time, the Laws of Union, between these two Substances, were of no more Use or Occasion to the Soul, than if she really subsisted in a separate State: Leaving these sublime Mysteries to those, who are able to explicate them intelligibly, or to regulate the Motions of the Soul, and destroy the natural Effects of those in the Body, by them: I shall readily allow, that Man, while he is in the Body, and stands in his present Relation to other Bodies, ought, so far as the necessary Ends of such his present State may require, to

Bodies, ought, so far as the necessary Ends of such his present State may require, to maintain a Commerce in the sensible World agreeable to it, and to support himself in that State so long as he can: Which yet he has no other Way of doing, but by using his Senses, and by following, but still under the Direction and Restraint of Reason, the Motions of them; and using them no further, than in pursuing the true Ends for which they were given.

X. But, because it would carry me too far beyond the Bounds I have prescribed myself, to apply this Rule to every Sense in particular; I shall confine my present Reflections to that of Sight, this being the most capacious and extended of all the Senses, and whereby, indeed, those other

Objects of Sense, which have the greatest Power to move and corrupt us, are commonly first taken in : Or, if such Objects previously occur to any other Sense, it is yet the Light of the Eye, that shews them to greater Advantage, and the Lust of it, which represents them more pleasant and desirable.

XI. But shall we, therefore, shut our Eyes to avoid the Danger which may arise to us from the Impression of visible Objects? Shall we not look *upon the Wine when it is red, when it giveth its Colour in the Glass, when it moveth itself aright*, because we may be tempted to taste more liberally of what appears so agreeable to the Sight; or, because this is, moreover, a Sense of so quick and nice Discernment, that  
it



it, very rarely, or never, deceives us, in the Report it makes concerning the Goodness or Agreeableness of its Object: Except where we are not in a true Situation to judge of it, or some great Artifice is used to impose upon us? Or shall we, for the same Reasons, make a *Covenant with our Eyes*, not to see any rich, curious, and beautiful Production of Nature, or Art, lest certain Desires should be excited in us of Avarice, Envy, or criminal Love? Such a Rule as this, were it really practicable, yet, if reduced to Practice, would put an End to some of the most agreeable, and, considered, in themselves, very innocent Pleasures of human Life, from which, it is not the Business of Morality to restrain Men, absolutely, but only

to regulate their Use. Tho', in some Cafes, indeed, where the Danger of gratifying the Eye is more hazardous, or has been more frequently experienced, and attended with ill Confequences; it is better to lofe the Benefit of it, and even, by a voluntary Sacrifice, in the Cause of Honour and Innocence, to pluck it out, and caft it from us.

XII. But, ordinarily, if the Government of the Eye be well regulated, there is no Neceffity for fuch *Violences*. If an indifcreet, or irregular Look has been occafioned by certain Objects, it is in our Power to turn away the Eye from them; but, if that cannot always be done, it is ftill in our Power to prevent their Action, by meditating upon fome other Object, by calling the Mind off  
from

from a Train of Thought, which, she is inwardly conscious, ought not to be pursued ; and which, if pursued, must end in Guilt, Shame, and Disorder. Whatever Power we grant to sensible Objects, even to those Objects of Sight, which are apt to excite in the Soul the most strong and violent Agitations ; yet still we leave her in Possession of the Throne ; and it is her Fault, if she suffer it, on any Occasion, or by any other Power whatever, to be usurped.





C H A P. XI.

*Of the Imagination.*

- I, II. *The different Effects of the Senses, and the Imagination.*  
III. *The Force and Extent of it.* IV. *A Means of regulating it.* V. *That Men of Wit are sometimes most vicious, and VI. most imprudent; with a philosophical Conjecture, why they are so.* VII. *And how there happens so great a Difference in the Imaginations of Men.* VIII. *And why Vivacity is rather the Character of the Female Sex, than Strength of Mind.* IX, X. *How the*  
Ima-

*Imagination may be usefully employed. XI. What was said exemplified. XII. Concerning the Imagination of Homer. XIII, XIV. Of Seneca, superior as a moral Writer. XV. Of Isaiah. And, XVI. of Job. XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX. The Reason of mentioning these great Names, and the Use to be made of them, both for Encouragement and Reproof. XXI. Moral Virtue has, in all Ages, been asserted by the greatest Wits.*

I. **T**H E Senses are acted by such Objects, which, being present, cause an immediate Impression upon the Organs of the Body; so that the Objects of them, as such, properly subsist no longer, than we are conversant

M 4

with



with them; or have an actual Perception of their Force. But the Imagination is of much greater Extent; it recalls Things past to Remembrance; it represents Things that are not, as if they were; it puts future Cases, not only upon probable Grounds, and improbable Conjectures; but often upon impossible, and sometimes very chimerical Suppositions; it quite alters the natural State and Order of Things; flying to the remotest Part of the World, and back again in a Moment; and assuming a Kind of creative Power, whereby it makes new Worlds, new Empires, Kings, and other Potentates; and annihilates them again, at Pleasure, in a Moment. All this the Imagination of Man has a Power of producing, by painting, in his Mind, Resemblances of Things, that exist,

exist,

exist ; and supposing a thousand Things, that have no Existence, Upon both which Accounts, the more strong, lively and copious, the Imagination of any Person is, the more he will be exposed to the Danger, if it be not kept under a due Regulation, of having his Heart corrupted, and of being precipitated into innumerable Follies, and Disorders.

II. If the only Power, which sensible Objects have to affect the Soul, so as to be the Occasion either of Error, or of Sin, depended upon their present and immediate Action, by the Rules before laid down, we might inore easily avoid the ill Consequences, wherewith our Commerce in this World is too frequently attended ; we might find Means, under the Apprehension of any dangerous Assault,  
to

to retire; or if we have been so unhappy, at any Time, thro' Surprize or Importunity, to be too familiar with them, we might break off the Correspondence, by a final Separation: But the Imagination will not suffer us to part with them so. It is the same Thing, in a Manner, as to the ill Effects relating to Morality, when the Imagination is much heated, whether we *actually* see and feel the Object of it, or not. Nay, in certain more violent Commotions of the Brain, the Fibres of it are moved with as great a Force, as they would have been from an actual Impression, by Means of external Objects; from whence some Philosophers have concluded, that the Senses, and the Imagination, differ only in the Degrees of more, and less.

III. The

III. The Imagination acting with so great Force, and being capable of spreading itself so wide over the whole created *World*, in a Manner, at once, and even beyond it, into the extramundane Spaces; particular Care should be taken to lay it under some wholesome and convenient Restraints; if we would not suffer ourselves to be carried away with it, with a blind Impulse, besides the Rule of our Conduct, and beyond all Bounds.

IV. It concerns us, in the first Place, to avoid all Reflections on such Things, or Objects, by which the Imagination is most apt to be misled, or corrupted; especially, where, by natural Temper, by Custom, or former Application of our Thoughts the same Way, we are inclined to pursue, or desire  
such

such Things, or Objects, after an irregular Manner. There have been but few Persons, who were not naturally formed with particular Dispositions to certain Vices. And, as the Imagination of such Persons is more strong and lively, so much greater Difficulty they find in denying themselves the Pleasure of indulging it, if the Object, which it paints, not only be, in itself, agreeable, but set off, with such adventitious Ornaments and Colourings, which are apt to give it still a greater Force and Advantage.

V. Here we may discover the Reason, why Men of Wit, according to the popular Notion concerning that Quality, are not always Men of the strictest Virtue; or rather, that they sometimes run into the most extravagant

Ex<sup>o</sup>



Excesses of Vice ; and are the most flagrant Instances of a loose Morality. The lively and beautiful Images, which they form in their Minds, so pleasing to themselves, and wherewith they observe others, perhaps, both pleased and surprized, diverts them from attending to the *Dictates* of Reason, which they look upon as dry, empty, and tasteless Considerations, when compared to those gay, sprightly Scenes, that a luxuriant Fancy prepares for them ; and which, at the same Time, visibly tends to gratify a secret Pride, they take, in being caressed and admired.

VI. So pernicious is this Quality, that, however Men affect the Reputation of it, it often proves the greatest Occasion of betraying them, not only into the  
 most

most scandalous Disorders, but the most extravagant Follies. Whether it be that the Spirits of such Persons are carried towards the Brain, the supposed Seat of the Imagination, with a more impetuous Force; where, like a Torrent, they bear down all before them; or, that the Substance of the Brain, in such Persons, is capable of receiving more large and deep Impressions; or whether, on both these Accounts, from the stronger Action of the Spirits on any supposed Part of the Brain, and because the Temper of it is more ductile and susceptible of them, the Images, impressed on it, are more clear, large, and distinct; as the Strokes, made by a graving Instrument, are deeper, in Proportion to the more hard or soft Contexture of the Plate; and the  
Force,

Force, wherewith such Instrument is applied.

VII. From whence some Account may be given not only of that Variety of Imaginations, and of the different Degrees of Strength and Weakness, of Vivacity and Dullness of Fancy, observable in Men; but, probably, by the Researches of learned and able Physicians into the more occult interior Parts of the Machine; and by their discovering the secret Springs, whereby her Movements are performed; an Art, which, in other Respects, has been so happily improved to rectify certain natural Indispositions, might be applied, in order both to invigorate the Imagination, and to give it a greater Extent.

VIII. We

VIII. We may also form another very probable Conjecture, why the Character of the other Sex is rather Vivacity of Imagination than Strength of Mind. They sometimes, indeed, excel in the latter, but generally in the former of these Advantages. And the Reason of their Superiority, herein, is naturally deducible from what has been said, towards illustrating the present Subject. Women, being, in their natural Frame and Constitution, of a more tender, soft, and delicate Contexture, their Spirits find less Resistance, in their Passage to the Brain; and the Fibres of it being more flexible, and easily shaken, and its Substance, in general, more passive and yielding, the Images, which present themselves in it, are not only formed with greater

Cc.

Celerity; but are, at the same Time, more clear, lively, and distinct.

IX. But I return, from these incidental Reflections, to shew, how the Imagination, which, if not well regulated, is more dangerous to our Innocence, in Proportion, as it is more quick, lively, and copious; how, I say, this Faculty may not only be secured from Danger, but rendered highly subservient to the Ends of moral Virtue.

X. To secure it from Danger, since we cannot, many times wholly avoid the Action of those Objects, which are most apt to excite and inflame it; for then we must retire out of the World; and even in Solitude, in our Closets, or in our Beds, in Cells, or Desarts, where such Objects could not fol-



low us, the Images of them, tho' involuntary, would, perhaps, too often arise; if it may not be questioned, whether the Imagination is not, sometimes, struck with the most violent Emotions, in solitary Life. Since this Method of Cure is impracticable, we ought, however, and that is always in our Power, whether, in publick, or private, when any wicked or irregular Imagination does arise, so soon as we perceive the Motion and Tendency of it, to check and repress it; to turn our Thoughts upon some other Object; by that Means, to give the Spirits another Course, whose Diversion is naturally followed with a different Train of Thought. And, if we are particularly happy in the Talents of Imagination, there are not wanting a vast Variety of Objects,

jects, which may give it, not only a pleasing and innocent, but a very useful Entertainment, even in respect to the Subjects of Religion, or Morality.

XI. I might observe, to excite a generous Emulation, how happily several, of the greatest Wits in the World, have employed the Imagination to these most noble and excellent Ends. But I shall instance only in four of them, *Homer*, *Seneca*, *Isaiab* the Son of *Amos*, and *Job*. And tho' I shall observe a sensible Difference in the Imagination of these four great Characters; yet they all concurred, after a different Manner, in advancing the same Design.

XII. The Imagination of *Homer* was vast, lively, and comprehensive. The Greatness and Dignity of it is discoverable, in

the Choice he makes of such Things to furnish out his Work with proper Materials; such, as are of the greatest Importance in Nature to excite our Admiration. With this View, he ransacks Heaven and Earth, and seems to survey the whole Creation, at one Look, to find Something, which he may select, worthy to illustrate and embellish his Design. But this great Genius, whatever his private Opinion was, conformed to the Religion established by the Laws; and did not think it proper to engage the civil Magistrate in a theological Dispute. His principal Images are taken from the Characters or Manners of the Gods; which being, in many Respects, opposite to the common Principles of Morality, the Moral of his Poem is, upon that Account, and contrary to his Design,  
of

of much less Force, either to instruct, or persuade. The Vivacity of his Imagination appears, from his describing Things, after a Manner, as if they were really present Objects of Sense; and the Extent of it, from his taking in, and regularly sorting that Variety of Things and Circumstances, of Causes, Actions, and Events, which are the Materials of his Poem; a Work so happily conducted, with so much Ease and Regularity, that he seems, in the first Plan of it, to have seen every Particular, from the Beginning to the End, according to the Order, wherein he proceeded to compose it.

XIII. The Imagination of *Seneca* is less regular and strong; but fine, sprightly, and and adventurous; his Figures are beautiful,

well coloured and bold, but sometimes, too glaring ; and his Discourses are rather framed to take the Reader by Surprize, and pompous Appearances, than by Force of strict Argument ; though it is certain, he has laid down many excellent Precepts, founded on cogent Reasons. But what confirms my Observation is, that his Reasons are generally most forcible, when they are deliver'd in a plain, simple and natural Manner, without the Embellishments of Art, which he has not always the Art to conceal. His Imagination, therefore, may be compar'd to *Homer's*, as a neat beautiful rural Seat, to a Castle which overlooks all the Country, and at once fills the Eye with Pleasure and Astonishment.

XIV. But, whatever Advantage *Homer* had, on Account of the  
the



the Force, or Extent of his Genius ; it must be, allowed, *Seneca*, in the Character of a moral Writer, employed his Imagination more happily : As resolving Morality into better Principles, and enforcing the Precepts of it, not by mere, loose occasional Sentences, but by a Train of Arguments, in formed methodical Discourses.

XV. *Isaiab*, whom I do not consider here as a Person inspired, but as following the natural Bent of his Genius, was superior to both these celebrated Writers in the Talents of Imagination : Wherein he had, not only Strength and Beauty, Extent and Vivacity ; but a Degree of Fire and Rapidity peculiar to himself ; wherewith he is, sometimes, so transported, that if we

do not keep our Eye very steady, we are in Danger to lose Sight of him, or scarce able, if we have not a strong Eye, to bear the Force and Lustre of his Images. Especially, when he raises our Thoughts up to a Contemplation of the *eternal Power and Godhead*; when he describes the Works of Creation or Providence; or any Glory, in particular, of the visible or invisible World. And, indeed, that his Images, on these Subjects, are so sublime, lively and just, is not, merely, owing to a great or fine natural Capacity, but to his having more true, adequate, and distinct Apprehensions, concerning the divine Nature and Attributes; which, at once, tend to regulate, to enlarge, and refine the Imagination: So that, there

there have been few Persons, if any, in the World, more happy either in a strong, lively and copious Imagination, or who improved it more by an acquired Knowledge; to which, there is no Doubt, but his Conversation, at Court, very much contributed.

XVI. And, in that Respect, indeed, he had the Advantage of another Person I proposed to name, which is *Job*; or whoever is the Author of the Book, that goes under this Name. Tho' as to the Boldness, the Fire, and surprizing Force of the Images in that Book, he does not appear inferior to the Son of *Amos* himself. Nay he seems, upon one Account, to rise higher in his Images; at least, to raise our Devotions by them, still to a higher Pitch; and that is, by his  
great

great Skill in natural Knowledge; which he, every where, so happily applies, in order to enoble and embellish his moral Instructions; and, thereby, more effectually to persuade: For the Mind is never sooner captivated, than by such Images, which are taken from the admirable and surprizing Works of God, in the external Effects of his Power, Wisdom, and Goodness. Particularly, when he speaks concerning the original Formation of Things, he describes the divine Action, and the stupendous Effects of it, in so lively, strong and moving a Manner, as if he had actually seen God Almighty *laying the Foundations of the Earth*; or had heard all *the Sons of God*, upon the Construction of his glorious Work, *shouting for Joy.*

*Joy.* I do not hereby intend, as if the evangelical Prophet, as he is called, had neglected the Study, or were deficient in the Knowledge of Nature; for he abounds with noble Illustrations from her Works: All I intend is, that the Author of the Book of *Job* seems to have a Claim to this Knowledge, as his more peculiar Distinction. And, perhaps, there is no Book extant in the World, which, could any Person be found equal to the Undertaking, might be commented upon more usefully, in order to explain and establish the true Principles of natural Philosophy.

XVII. I mention these Names, among a great many others, to shew, of what Advantage it may be, to have a fine, lively and great Imagination; notwithstanding the Danger to Virtue, which  
 may



may accidentally attend the Abuse of this Talent; for a great many Instances, to the Shame, and Scandal of human Nature, may also be found of such Abuses.

XVIII. It may deserve the Consideration of such Persons, what Sentiments themselves would have had, and all the rest of the World ought to have had of the four great Writers last mentioned, if, instead of employing the Talents of Imagination, towards promoting Virtue and Piety, they had made use of them, to confound the very Distinction of Virtue, and Vice; *to call Good Evil, and Evil Good,* and after having thrown down the Boundaries between them; and given Men a discretionary Liberty, without any Restraints  
of

of Conscience, to take whatever Way they might be inclined to chuse, should, upon the whole Matter, recommend Vice, where it could be practised with Safety and Impunity, as more eligible to them, in their private Capacity; and, especially, as most conducing to the flourishing State of the Commonwealth; or as necessary to preserve it in a flourishing Condition.

XIX. Such a System of Morality, instead of transmitting the Names, or Works of any Person down to Posterity, with Honour and Lustre, would have rendered him the Object of universal Detestation. Even *Epicurus* and his Followers, tho' they destroyed the Obligation and proper Motives to Virtue, yet supposed a certain innate Decency and Comeliness

lines in it; for which it was of it self defireable; and many of them both practised it, and recommended the Practice of it to others, as most conducing to the Happiness of private and publick Life. *Lucretius* distinguished by that Kind of Wit, I am confidering, tho' more loose, in several Respects, than the Masters from whom he copied; yet never advanced any Thing, to the Prejudice of moral Life, like what we have seen in a Nation; I do not say, professing Christianity, but formerly celebrated in the World, for writing *justly*, and thinking *soberly*.

XX. If Persons of no great Talents, in the corrupt Essays of their Imagination, have yet been able to mislead weak and ignorant People, who either cannot give  
the

the requisite Attention towards the Discovery of Truth; or are incapable of detecting the Sophistry of false Reasoning: What ill Effects might have been apprehended from them, had they been distinguished by the Talents of a *Homer*, a *Seneca*, an *Isaiab*, or a *Job*. It is by a happy Disposition of Providence, that, as the Enemies of Religion are more *audacious*, and defy the living God with a higher Hand, their Abilities should, in Proportion, be less, and the Force of their Attacks more easily broken.

XXI. I grant, Men of very ill Principles have, sometimes, had an uncommon Measure of Wit; which they have employed as well, as they could, to defend those Principles: But still it may be observed, to the Advantage  
of

of Morality, that the greatest Wits have always declared on the Side of moral Virtue ; and even many of those, who have been far from conducting themselves, according to those very Rules, which they confessed to be pious, just, and reasonable. Few have been able, so far, to throw off all the Regards of Decency and Conscience, as openly to teach a loose Morality ; but scarce any, who have had the Effrontery to encourage it, as beneficial to Society ; Attempts of this Nature, one would be strongly inclined to suspect, could only be formed by Men of the most abandoned Principles, upon a *Presumption* of their living in the most corrupt and degenerate Age.

C H A P.





## C H A P. XII.

### *Of the Passions.*

- I. *How they differ from the Senses and Imagination.* II, III, IV, V. *The Laws of Communication between the Soul and Body only to be resolved into the Will of God.* VI. *The proper Inquiry concerning the Passions.* VII. *How they are to be regulated.* VIII. *Particularly, with respect to any complexional Vice.* IX. *Why strong Passions render Men capable of higher Attainments; with the Advantages of a good and generous Birth.* X. *The End*  
 O of

*of that Reflection. XI. Beneficial Uses of the Passions. XII. A Difficulty concerning them moved. And XIII. A Rule laid down. XIV. Another Rule. XV. The Passions are apt to impose upon us. XVI. A Third Rule. XVII. When we are, more especially, to take Care of them. XVIII. The Fourth and Last Rule towards their better Regulation.*

I. **T**HE great Obstacle to the Practice of moral Virtue still remains to be considered. There is some Difficulty in restraining the Use of our Senses, and in resisting the Action of sensible Objects; but still more Difficulty in governing the Imagination, when it is lively, strong and much heated, and moved,  
by

by Occasion of them; especially, when the Blood and animal Spirits are put into a violent Motion, which sensibly affects the Soul, and even renders the Operations of it, by the Air of the Face, or some other ordinary external Appearance, sensible to others. And these are what we call the Passions; which, tho' they have a great Dependance on the Imagination and Senses, may yet be considered as different Principles of Action; but as differing only from the Inclination, according to the Degrees of more or less. For we do not desire, or find our selves inclined to pursue any Thing, but what is, in some Measure, capable of affecting us. Our Inclinations, indeed, to Good in general, are necessary, and uninterrupted. We invincibly and

always desire to be happy : But our Passions are excited, *occasionally*, and by particular Objects; and, principally, by Means of such Things as relate to the Body; to the good or ill State, to the Safety or Destruction of it.

II. We no sooner perceive any Thing, considered as pleasing, or hurtful to us, but the animal Spirits disperse themselves through the several Parts of the Body, and put it in a proper Disposition to advance or retire, to chuse or refuse, according to the Quality, good or bad, of the Object presented; that so the Soul and the Body may, reciprocally, act, and be acted upon, and continually hold themselves in Readiness to assist, and support each other.

III. By what Laws this Communication is settled; or how these  
these

these inutual Offices are performed, so that when the Mind wills, the Hand moves, and when the Hand is wounded, the Soul feels Pain; this is a Problem not to be accounted for by any mechanical Principles; nay, it is contrary to the clearest Ideas we have, concerning a material and thinking Substance, (and there is no Way of arguing concerning the Nature of Things, but from the Ideas we have of their Nature and Properties) that there should be any Manner of Union between them. And, therefore, it is only to be resolved into the Institution, and Will of God, that, by Means of certain Impressions made upon the Body, the Mind should be affected with Pain, or Pleasure; and those Impressions be followed with Pas-



sions in the Soul, according as the Object is apprehended more salutary, or pernicious to the Body. So that if God should suspend his Will, or the ordinary Effect of it, in any Person, but for one Moment, his Soul, during that Suspension, would have no more Dependancy on his Body, than on the Body of any other Person.

IV. It is easy to conceive, indeed, how two Bodies, meeting, should communicate some Degree of Motion to each other, or receive by the Collision some Change in their Size, Figure or Contexture; but what are all these different Circumstances towards producing a Passion in the Mind? What Relation is there between a Blow upon the Head by an Enemy, and the Passion of  
 Anger

Anger and Revenge? And why should not such a Blow, if we merely consider it, as causing a certain Vibration of the Fibres in the Brain, as well produce the Passion of Love? There is no Reason from the simple Consideration of two or more Bodies, for Number and Magnitude make no Difference in the Case, why such a Collision should produce one of these Passions, rather than the other. Nay, upon an impossible Supposition, that Matter could produce any Sentiment in the Mind, a Blow, especially a more forcible Blow, upon the Head, ought rather to produce, in the Party who receives it, the Passion of Love; because if one Part of Matter could be, in any Degree, capable of sensibly affecting another, Love, not only im-

O 4                      porting

porting an Inclination to Union, but being encreased by it, the more the Parts of Matter should incorporate, or impel one another, the greater Affection ought naturally to be the Result of such an Incorporation and Impulse.

V. But the Mind and Body are, in the Nature of them, so opposite, that there can be no imaginable Concourse or Action between them. So that they, who think the Passions of the Soul naturally, and necessarily follow the Motion of the Blood and Spirits, argue not so much upon improbable, as, according to the clearest Notions we have of Matter and Mind, upon impossible Grounds.

VI. It is evident, however the Passions are occasioned, that we really experience the Effects, and  
some-

sometimes feel the Commotion and Power of them, to such a Degree, as is sufficient for the Exercise of the most improved Minds; and, therefore, it concerns us much rather to inquire, how the Passions may be regulated and rendered subservient to the great Ends of moral Virtue, than how they are excited ?

VII. And here the same Rules, in general, may be applied to the Government of the Passions, which have been prescribed for the Government of the Senses, and Imagination; but with this Difference; that where sensible Objects, or those of the Imagination, have proved dangerous, at any Time, to our Innocence, or, it may be apprehended, will act upon us with the like Force, on the present, or some future Occasion,

sion,

sion, Prudence will direct us to save our selves by Flight, in order to avoid the Action of them. But, the Passions being, in their own Nature innocent, and also the great Instruments of Action and a more sublime Virtue in moral Life, we do not seem under any prudential Restraints, totally, to suppress them, even where they have proved the Occasion of betraying us ; so much as to moderate the Force, or to divert the Current of them ; except in such Cases, where the Danger of Abuse, or Disorder from them, may be apparently greater, than the Advantage that can be proposed by giving Way, for a Time, to them. There are, for Instance, many lawful Occasions of Anger ; and such particularly, when the Honour of God, or the Interests of Religion,

are



are concerned; or when those, over whom we have any Authority, are guilty of Misconduct, wherein we may *do well to be angry*; and to shew our selves so: But, if we are, at the same Time, of a Temper more apt to be inflamed, and the Provocation be such, as may, probably, precipitate us into the more violent Excesses of this Passion; so as to deprive us of the Use of our Reason, and expose us to many Indecencies, to say Nothing of the more sinful and dangerous Effects of this Passion; it is certainly, in this Case, much safer and more prudent to resist the first Motions of Anger, though the Incitement to it might be just, than to run the Hazard of those evil Consequences, by giving Way to it, which would more than over-balance the good Effects we could

could propose to our selves by indulging it.

VIII. In this, and the like Cases with respect to the other Passions, every Man is to consider his own Strength; and, especially, should have an Eye to his predominant, and complexional Temper; for we are never sooner overcome, than when we fight against the Sin that *more easily besets us*; the Sin of our Inclination. The greatest Difficulty, therefore, will be in governing the Passion by which we are prompted to gratify it. Which yet *may* be done by restraining all irregular Incitements towards the more immediate Object of it, without extirpating the Passion itself. For, indeed, the stronger the Passions of a Man naturally are, provided they are kept with-

in due Bounds, the more capable he is, for the most Part, of attaining the Things, *that are excellent*; and of distinguishing himself by a more active and heroick Virtue. For Passions proceed from the more violent Emotion of the Blood and Spirits, or some other fluid Part of the Microcosm, whatever that is, which causes a sensible Change in it; which Change discovers itself in the exterior Parts of the Body, especially, in the Eye and the Face; from which we may generally conclude, in what Disposition the Persons are, with whom we converse; but it is always easy from these Parts to perceive, when Men are *transported* with Passion; and, for the most Part, with what Passion in particular; almost every Passion imprinting on them

them a different Signature visible to others, who will observe it with any Degree of Attention.

IX. Now, according to the Laws of Union between Soul and Body, the more forcible or violent the Actions of those Parts of the Body are, by Means of which we receive our Sensations, the more, in Proportion, is the Soul affected and put in Motion. So that it is not only true in Experience, that Men of the strongest Passions are the most active, enterprizing, and capable of the greatest Atchievements in Life; But a natural Reason may be assigned, why they should be so, from the Construction and Temper of the Machine, to which the Soul is united. And upon this Account it is, that Persons well born, and descended, value them-

themselves, not altogether without Reason, upon their Birth or Descent. For tho' the Soul is of celestial Extraction, and cannot be generated, yet the Operations of it so much depend upon the Frame and Temper of the Body, that Men generally excel in the Endowments of Mind, as the Body is more happily organized and disposed. And as a good, happy and generous Temper is, confessedly, as well as a vicious, crazy and weak one, transmitted from Parents to Children, there is a natural *Presumption* in Favour of Persons well born, that they should be endowed with an hereditary Virtue ; for Virtue, tho' there are Instances to the contrary, is always to be supposed the natural Consequence of great natural Abilities :



bilities : For which Reason, when Persons of Birth fail in the Qualifications, or Conduct expected from them, they are, by a forcible and significant Expression, said to *degenerate* : To avoid which dishonourable Imputation, in those Parts of the World, where Persons most value themselves, upon the Advantages or Honour of their Birth, they are most careful to preserve an ancient Descent, from ignoble, and debasing Intermarriages. It is possible, in some other Nations, where this Rule hath been less observed, there may have, sometimes, happened a Degeneracy in Persons of noble Birth, from the ancient Virtue, and Spirit of their Family ; which has not so much shewn a sensible Alteration, in the Blood of it, as a total Corruption.

X. My

X. My Design, in this Digression, is to shew, by a pertinent, and I hope, not unuseful Instance; how, by Means of the Union of Soul and Body, certain *Sentiments*, which we call Passions, are excited in the Soul, the Force whereof she has yet a Power so to moderate, that, as they were designed to raise her to a higher Pitch, (and are, therefore, called the *Wings* of the Soul,) they may be improved to that End, without being diverted, by an irregular or indirect Use of them, to any other End.

XI. We do not, therefore, condemn Men for being subject to Passions; nor, even, for being of a Temper naturally more inclined to some particular Passion. The Intention of Nature, in forming them with such a Temper

P

was

was good ; and the Abuses consequential to it, which they ought to have prevented, are wholly owing to themselves. A Man, indeed, without Passion will naturally be both indisposed, and unfit for Action. It is then rather a Benefit of Nature, than a Subject Matter of Complaint, that we are born with certain Passions, which are proper, under a due Regulation of them, to render us more active and considerable ; more useful to ourselves, to our Friends, and to human Society in general.

XII. The Question now is, supposing our Passions not only innocent, but, in certain Cases, and to a certain Degree, requisite ; what Methods are we to take, so that the Degree given may not be exceeded ? The Passions, as  
 we

we have described them, are occasioned in the Soul by a more violent Commotion of the Blood and Spirits ; and, according to the Force of that Commotion, are, proportionably, more strong and impetuous : How then can we be secure, that when they are once put in Motion, we shall be able to stop them, at Pleasure, and exactly at the Place, beyond which if we suffer them to go, they pass their proper Bounds, and become criminal and dangerous.

XIII. The Rule, in this Case, is always to keep a strict Guard, and watchful Eye over them ; and never to indulge them to the utmost Extent of what is *simply* lawful ; for besides that it is very difficult to discover where Virtue precisely ends, and Vice begins ;

their Frontiers are divided by such thin Partitions, that the Passage, from one Side to the other, is easy and insensible. And, therefore, all prudent Persons, who would preserve their Virtue, will rather consider, how far they may go with Safety, than how far Innocence will strictly permit them to go? *He that loveth Danger shall perish therein.* A Man may, perhaps, walk upon the very Brink of a Precipice without falling; but he *may* fall; and, if he escape with Life, repent of his Folly, with the Loss of a Leg, or an Arm; Accidents, comparatively speaking, of little Consideration to him. Even the Loss of Life, to a wise and good Man, is of no farther Importance, than the good or ill State of his Soul is affected with it. But the Loss of Innocence!



nocence! A Breach in the intellectual System! A reasonable Soul of Man, in a State of Confusion, Disorder, and *spiritual* Death! This is such a Departure from those Principles, which are the Glory and proper Character of Man, and distinguish him from all other Creatures, that Nothing can be said to aggravate the Folly or Madness of a Conduct, that should lead to it. And therefore

XIV. Another Rule, for the better Government of the Passions, and towards restraining them within due Bounds, is to consider the pernicious Effects of them, when permitted to exceed their Bounds; for as they may be very instrumental to Virtue, if kept in Subjection; so when they are permitted to usurp the Throne, and to reign; they subject the Soul,

P 3                      which

which ought to govern not only to the vilest and most abject Slavery; but introduce a Multitude of Evils into the State of the animal OEconomy it self. The Disorders, both of Body and Mind, which they occasion, are too *visible* to be mentioned: But they are also very pernicious, if we consider them, in Relation to our civil Commerce. The Maxim, that we should make no *Friendship with an angry Man*, will hold equally true, if we change the Term angry, for any other Term, that denotes a different Passion, to which a Person is violently addicted, and that has got the Dominion over him. Our Passions, indeed, when we are, in any extraordinary Degree, agitated by them, do not only cause us to break the Rules of strict Justice,

tice,

tice, and Fidelity towards those, with whom we converse, but, frequently, all the Measures of common Decency and Respect; and even, in certain Cases, betray us, so blind and precipitate are we, when transported with them, not only to do Things contrary to our standing Inclinations, Principles, and Interests; but to the Prejudice, and, perhaps, to the Dishonour of those, whose Interests are, at other Times, as dear, in a Manner, to us, as our own. So that whether in respect to Consequences that concern our selves, or others; whether we consult the good State of the Body or Mind; it imports us to take particular Care about the Government of the Passions.

XV. This Care is still more requisite, if we consider how apt the

Passions are to impose upon us, under false Appearances and Suggestions; to confound the Nature of Things about which they are conversant; and to put *bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter*; being, in themselves, innocent, and given to us with an Intention to promote our Good, particularly, the Good of the sensible Life, they are so ready to act upon the least Notice of any Thing which is pleasing, or hurtful to us, that, even, on such Occasions, they often act *spontaneously*, without consulting Reason, or waiting for her Orders. And, upon this Account of their Use and Facility in discharging the Functions proper to them, we less suspect them capable of betraying us, or of designing any Injury. But a little Experience will shew, we ought not

not to trust too much to them ; whatever Profession they may make of a sincere and disinterested Intention to serve us. For notwithstanding they are very capable of promoting our true Interests, and of being, on many Accounts, very serviceable to us, and do actually promise some real Good, and contribute towards it ; yet they always speak, though less directly, for themselves. Like those Ministers, who propose Things, under a specious Pretence, and, perhaps, some good Appearance of serving the Publick, but are, principally, acted by a sinister Regard to their own Interests, or some common Service of a Faction ; and, upon that View, lead the Sovereign very wide of the Measures, and beyond the Bounds first designed, into innumerable

Errors



Errors fatal to himself, and to the Commonwealth.

XVI. The third Rule, therefore, for the Government of the Passions is, that, however obsequious they appear, we should observe the Suggestions and Motions of them with a jealous Eye; in order to prevent those Illusions, to which we are subject, when we hearken too much to them. For as they speak for the Body, and promise us present Delight, or the Removal of some present Evil, they always find us accessible; and, even, when they have through false and flattering Insinuations misled us, they are often so audacious as not only to justify themselves; but to persuade Reason to defend them, as well as she can, by any Appearances of Argument, and so to make Use of her  
 very

very Name and Commission, against her own Authority. For it is the Nature of the Passions to be always in the Right; and from the sensible Conveniencies, that attend them, the Mind is so apt to give a partial Judgment in what relates to them, and to declare on their Side; that there is continual Occasion for examining, previously, whither they really tend? And, afterwards, if they have not deceived or misled us?

XVII. These Rules ought to be observed, even where the Object of our Desire is something, in the Nature of it, and simply considered, innocent, good, or laudable. For with all these Characters, if we do not carefully observe the Tendency and Consequences of such Desire, it may prove the Occasion of betraying  
us;

us : but if the Object of our Desire should not be so qualified ; if it is, in itself, criminal, unjust, or impure ; Reason will direct us to suppress the very first Volitions towards it ; and at the Moment, when they begin to rise. On the other Hand, Nothing ought to excite the contrary Passion of Hatred, or Averfation, but what is really evil and offensive to us ; or what we are obliged to detest, from some Motive of Piety towards God ; of Safety and real Benefit to ourselves ; of Justice or Charity to others.

XVIII. I shall prescribe but one Rule more, relating to the Conduct of our Passions, whether irascible, as they are commonly distinguished, or concupiscible. And that is, upon Supposition, they are perfectly regular, both in respect  
to

to the Origin, and the Tendency of them; yet a certain Proportion of Activity ought to be observed in applying them, according to the different Degrees of Excellency, or Evil, in their several Objects. The best, the most noble, useful, solid and lasting Things, are to be prosecuted with greater Ardor, than Things insignificant, or little; Things vain, transient, and of short Duration. The Reasons of Order and Proportion, upon which Morality is founded, require, that Things should be valued in the same Degree, wherein they appear in themselves, really valuable. And, by this Rule, whatever is absolutely, and of its own Nature, without Dependance on any other Being, worthy of our Love; that is to be loved primarily, and on Account  
of

of its own Dignity and Perfection. As what is, merely, instrumental or subservient toward some greater End, is only to be desired in the same Measure, as it has a Tendency to promote that End: That the supreme Good, therefore, ought to be the supreme Object of our Love; and that every Thing, which tends to obstruct our Enjoyment of it, is to be rejected with Detestation: That such Things, which respect the present Life; besides that they are of a more ignoble Kind, more unsatisfactory, mixed, and transient, are to be pursued with less Sollicitude; but never to be desired, when they come in Competition with our main End, the Happiness and Perfection of our Souls, so far as we may be able to attain them, whether in this, or in a  
future



future Life. These are Conclusions so evidently arising from the natural Reason of Things ; so strong and cogent ; that, however, Men oppose the practical Inferences from them : Yet, in Theory, they must necessarily assent to the Truth of them. As, on the other Hand, whatever is, in the Nature of it, more noxious, or more naturally tends to make us miserable ; especially, to bring us into such a State of Disorder, as may render us by a natural Efficiency, or thro' the Effect of an ill Habit, *eternally* miserable : This is what we ought to hate with a perfect Hatred ; and which to avoid, we should be willing to suffer, were that a necessary Condition of avoiding it, any present Evil, or temporary *Disgrace* whatever, to which we might be exposed.

C H A P.



C H A P. XIII.

*Of Desire and Inclination in  
general.*

- I. *Of the Import of these Terms.*
- II. *In what Respect, the same Inclination is common to all Men.*
- III. *This illustrated.* IV. *The Error of the ancient Philosophers concerning the supreme Good of Man.*
- V. *How Epicurus thought more justly as to that Article, than the other Philosophers.*
- VI. *The Prejudice under which he suffered.* VII. *Two of his fundamental Errors observed.*



are rarely moved, or discomposed by any Passion. The good or ill Use Men have formerly made of their Liberty, their particular Circumstances, Temper, Education, and Manner of Life, expose them to many different Passions; which act upon them with a very different, and unequal Force. But Men, under all Circumstances, have the same general standing Inclination to render themselves happy. So that it may be said, notwithstanding that Variety of Pursuits and Passions, wherewith Men compass Sea and Land, to gain their several Ends, that they have, properly speaking, if we would resolve Things, philosophically, in their true Origin, but *one* Inclination. This is the Center, towards which all the Lines of Motion, in Man, tend; and wherein they will ultimately

mately terminate, though he should draw them from every Quarter, or every Point, of the World, about him.

III. So that they, who appear to direct their Views, towards very different Ends, and to place their Happiness in the Attainment of them; as of Riches, Power, Fame, or sensual Pleasures; yet are really acted with the same general Desire of Happiness: As Persons at an Entertainment, which is furnished with all the Variety of Dishes that Luxury could prepare, do severally chuse what is most agreeable to their Taste; but all are supposed to have one common End, in their different Choice, which is to please the Appetite.

IV. Had the ancient Philosophers considered this, there would



not have been any Necessity for their differing so much, in Relation to the *supreme End* of Man; concerning which, according to *Varro's* Computation, there were, in his Time, two hundred eighty eight several Opinions. Here lay the Ground of their Error; which might have been very easily corrected. It is evident they considered Happiness, not in respect to the proper and formal Notion of it; but to its efficient Cause; that is, they called that Happiness, which, in any Measure, or Degree, contributed to make Men happy, or to put the Soul in a happy State; but they did not define, what that State of the Soul was, wherein she found, and actually felt herself happy. It might, to resume the former Instance, be as justly said, that the Pleasure  
with

with which a Man eats, when he is hungry; does not lie in his Palate, but in the Act of eating, tho' he should have no Taste; as that Riches, or other external Advantages of Life, make Men happy; and not an inward Conscioufness of Delight; to which yet we do not deny, they may be, in many Respects, instrumental.

V. *Epicurus*, great as his Errors, and impious as his Principles, were, on other Accounts, yet thought more regularly upon this Article, than the rest of the Philosophers: He considered Happiness, *formally*, as it was to be considered, in itself; not as it depended on external or foreign Causes; without which, how convenient soever they may be apprehended, yet the Soul may be conceived to subsist in a State of

Ease and Pleasure. As supposing, on the other Hand, a Man in the full and entire Possession of them, yet if he feel any inward Disorder, or Uneasiness of Mind, he is, necessarily, in Proportion, miserable and unhappy.

VI. His Maxim, therefore, was true, that the Happiness of Man consisted in his being easy and pleased; but it was a wrong Inference, to say, He taught, as he hath been charged, that Men had Nothing to do, but to give a full Scope to the Appetites of eating, and drinking; or to indulge themselves in Excesses of any Kind, to which their Inclinations might prompt them. For it appears sufficiently from *Cicero*, that he prescribed Temperance and Sobriety as proper Means of moderating the Passions, and of prevent-

ing

ing their irregular Effects ; and, as tending, on that Account, directly to make Men happy. For there can be no Happiness without Freedom from Pain; tho' we are, indeed, more perfectly happy in the Enjoyment of actual Pleasure. But the Word Pleasure carrying in it an ambiguous Signification, and importing both innocent and criminal Pleasures, the other Sects of Philosophers having a Jealousy from the atheistical Principles of *Epicurus*, that he intended Pleasure in the worst Sense, united in decrying his Doctrine, and in rendering his Memory odious; pretending, that his System, as it had Relation to the Conduct of human Life, directly opened a Way to all Manner of criminal Liberties; and, particularly, to that of an impure

Commerce between the two Sexes.

VII. His Notions, however, in general, as to the formal Cause of Happiness, were true and well founded ; but in these two Respects false : *That* he did not make God the Author of our Happiness, who alone can produce, in the Soul, those Sensations, which make us happy ; and *that* he denied the Existence of immaterial Beings ; which alone can have any Sensations, either of Happiness, or Misery.



C H A P.





C H A P. XIV.

*Whether moral Virtue is really practicable?*

- I. One Reason of proposing the Question, from what had been said before concerning the Passions. II, III, IV, V. The Difficulty on that Occasion removed; and of the Passions of Envy, and Ambition, in particular. VI. No Consequence from the latter of these Passions, especially, to the Prejudice of moral Virtue. VII. Other Arguments tending to shew, that moral Virtue is impracticable, proposed to be examined.

*examined.* VIII. *Concerning the Depravity of human Nature, and the Deceitfulness of human Virtues.* IX. *Objections from them formerly considered by the Author.* X. *But why here proposed to be summarily examined.* XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX. *Several Arguments in Confutation of them.* XXI. *A just Sentiment of St. Austin.* XXII. *Man's Destruction from himself.*

I. **A**FTER all that has been said, in the last Chapter, concerning the Passions; it may, perhaps, be pretended, that if moral Virtue should depend on the Government of them, according to the Rules there laid down, there is little Probability, that

we

we should be capable of practising moral Virtue. For totally to eradicate the Passions is impossible; or, were that possible, it would not yet be proper, or convenient, to oppose the End and Design of Nature in them; an End, on many Accounts, salutary and beneficial both to ourselves, and to others. There is, therefore, not only a physical Necessity, that we should be subject to the first Impulses of Passion, which are naturally unavoidable, and operate in Virtue of a mechanical Construction of our Body; but a moral Expediency, that they should very often be gratified. But yet we know the Nature of them is such, that they grow more bold, extravagant, and ungovernable, by Indulgence: The Consequence of which is, that instead  
of

of animating us, in Pursuit of what is really beneficial, and salutary; or in avoiding any Thing noxious and prejudicial to us; they pervert the very Use of Reason; cause such Emotions in the Body; and spread such a Darknes over the Mind; that we see Nothing in a true Light, but blindly chuse the worse instead of the better Part: And even, sometimes, Men are transported by Passion, to commit the most shameful and execrable Crimes. To this it is added, that Persons of the greatest Reputation for Wisdom, and other Abilities, have been, on certain Occasions, excited, by their Passions, to do Things that are not convenient; Things inconsistent with their known Principles, and below their Character: The meekest Men have been provoked by  
giving

giving Way to Anger, to speak *unadvisedly with their Lips*; and Persons of eminent Sanctity and Devotion, by hearkening to the Desires of impure Love, have involved themselves in the Guilt of very impious and unjust Actions. And the like ill Consequences might be exemplified in respect to all the other Passions; concerning which it has been farther observed, that as we find it difficult, at all Times, to oppose our Inclinations, especially, when more violently provoked, and put in Motion; so there are some Passions which appear to be, in themselves, directly criminal; and, as to these, we are told, Men ought not so much to consider the Method of Regulation, as how they may totally extirpate them.

II. That



II. That I may not be thought to have prescribed any Thing, in the Nature of it, above human Capacity; it may be proper to say Something distinctly in Answer to these several Objections.

III. As to the Power of the Passions, in order to pervert the Use of Reason; we grant this to be an Effect, which hath frequently happened; but it is an accidental and irregular Effect; which Men might have prevented, thro' a good Use of their Reason and Liberty, by which their Passions ought always to be regulated. The Fault, therefore, was not in the Passions, but in the Abuse of their Power and Liberty; and in exceeding those Bounds, wherein the Passions were intended by the Author of Nature to be restrained.

IV. As

IV. As to the Examples of great, and, in respect to their general Character, of good and pious Men; all that can be inferred from the Excesses, into which they have been betrayed, is ; that there are Seasons, wherein Persons animated with a strong and lively Sense of Virtue, are yet more unguarded ; or, wherein, there are some peculiar unhappy Circumstances of Temptation, adapted, in one Kind, or other, to the Situation they are in, attended with a Force, they are less able, or, at the Time, less inclined to resist. But, whatever, the violent Motives to such Disorders may be in great or good Men; their Conduct is no farther a Precedent to us, than it is agreeable to Reason; the *common* Law, by which all reasonable Beings are  
to

to be governed. Precedents, where there is any competent Authority to recommend them, may reasonably be followed, if no certain or stated Judgment can be made, in the Case, from the Letter, or Intention of the Law ; but they are never to be followed, or upon any Pretence of Authority whatever, against Law. And, as to the last Suggestion, that there are some Passions, of which Nature Envy is, pretended to be directly evil, and unreasonable in themselves: This is precariously spoken, and without Grounds. All the Passions, so far as they are natural, are good ; Envy therefore, as it imports a State of Uneasiness, or Discontent, at the Happiness, or superior Merit of another Person, not being a reasonable, cannot be a natural Passion, it being the  
De-

Design of Nature; which always proceeds according to a certain and well regulated Order, that there may be no opposite inconsistent Principles in her Work; but that the governing Principle in Man, should govern every Part; that there should be no *Schism in the Body*, or natural System; but a due Harmony and Subordination of every Member to the Head. Tho' even, in respect to *Envy* itself, that most ungenerous and ignoble Passion, as proceeding from the Motives before mentioned; yet if it only imported an Emulation of those Things, wherein Persons of real Merit excel, and a secret Regret at our own Defects, followed with an Endeavour to repair and amend them; it would be so far from being a culpable Passion,

R that

that it might be attended with many happy Consequences advantageous to ourselves, and to Society. The Sorrow or Grief, which attends it, is not, as such, criminal, but indifferent; and becomes good, or ill, according to the Occasion whereby it is excited, or the End which is proposed by it.

V. The same may be observed concerning another Passion; which, tho' not criminal in a qualified Sense, yet, in popular Acceptation, is reputed among the irregular Passions, I mean that of *Ambition*; to which Men of great Minds, of an active and enterprizing Spirit, are, in Proportion, commonly more addicted. But if the End of it be only a Desire, which a Man hath to distinguish himself by great and noble Actions, or to be put in a better

Ca.



Capacity of doing Good ; or of appearing in a better Light to that End ; for without this Advantage, the finest Qualities in the World will be of little Significancy ; Ambition, if confined to these Views, and regulated in all its Pursuits by them, is not only innocent, but highly laudable. Nay, a Man, to whom Nature has given a greater Extent and Elevation of Mind, is wanting to himself, and to her Intention, if his Views are not raised and extended in Proportion. The Difficulty is, lest, in affecting to strike too high or quick a Note on this String, he should give it too strong a Tone : Temerity and Boldness being more incident to such, who have more Fire and Spirit in their Temper. And, therefore, it is too common for the ambitious,

instead of endeavouring regularly to establish a Reputation by great, generous, and useful Services, in that Sphere of Action which Providence has assigned to them, to observe no Measures of Conscience towards God, or towards Man; so they may be able to remove every Thing, and every Person, that stands in their Way : For, when Ambition breaks out into this Tumour, there is no Consideration either of publick Good, or of private Right; no Respect of Justice, or Humanity; of Truth, or Honour; that will be of Force sufficient to restrain it. Bribery and Corruption, Cruelty and Oppression, Breach of Faith and Friendship, and of all Laws human and divine, even, in more brutal Tempers, those of common Decency, and good Nature, will

will be thought lawful; at least very excusable; under a Pretence of being necessary to the main End proposed.

VI. But these Consequences of an irregular Ambition, or whatever particular Effects of it might be enumerated, as destructive to the Peace and Tranquillity of private Men, of private Families, and frequently of whole Communities, which are made a Sacrifice to it, are only to be considered as Deviations from those Rules, whereby truly great Minds ought to regulate their Desires. Such abusive Characters of Ambition, may, however, afford an excellent Caution against all irregular Motions of it; and ought not to prejudice a Desire, which the Reader, if he pleases, may call Ambition, of excelling in such Things, where-

R 3

by

by a Man may really distinguish himself, as a more useful, or honourable Member of Society. An Ambition to be, and to do good, being an Ambition to be more like the most perfect and holy Being, the Fountain of all Goodness. This Passion, therefore, which is thought so peculiarly impatient of Restraint, and to set itself above all Rules, which are, indeed, inseparable Characters of it, when immoderate; is yet, when regulated by the Intention and Ends of Nature, capable of being very subservient, if not, of all other Passions, the most subservient, to great and glorious Actions.

VII. We must seek, therefore, for some other Reasons to shew, that moral Virtue is impracticable, than those, which are pretended from the Difficulty of governing