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AN
ANTIDOTE
AGAINST
ATHEISM,

OR,

An Appeal to the Naturall
Faculties of the Minde of Man,
whether there be not a GOD.

By HENRY MORE Fellow of Christ
Colledge in Cambridge.

The *second Edition* corrected and enlarged :

WITH
AN APPENDIX
thereunto annexed.

Ἡ μεγάλη νόσος τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ ἀθεότης. *Trismegist.*


Οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς περὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὰ
πλείω τυγχάνουσι τῆς ἀληθείας. *Aristot.*

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T O
 THE HONORABLE,
 The Lady
Anne Conway.

M A D A M,



The high opinion or rather certain knowledge I have of your singular Wit and Vertues, has emboldened, or to speak more properly, commanded me to make choice of none other then your self for a Patroness of this present Treatise. For besides that I do your Ladiship that Right, as also this present Age and succeeding Posterity, as to be a witness to the World of such eminent Accomplishments and transcendent Worth; so I do not a little please my self, while I

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finde my self assured in my own conceit, that Cebes his mysterious and judicious Piece of Morality hung up in the Temple of Saturn, which was done in way of Divine Honour to the Wisdome of the Deity, was not more safely and suteably placed, then this carefull Draught of Naturall Theology or Metaphysicks, which I have dedicated to so Noble, so Wise, and so Pious a Personage. And for my own part, it seems to me as reall a point of Religious Worship to honour the Vertuous, as to relieve the Necessitous, which Christianity terms no lesse then a Sacrifice. Nor is there any thing here of Hyperbolism or high-flown Language, it being agreed upon by all sides, by Prophets, Apostles, and ancient Philosophers, that holy and good Men are the Temples of the Living God. And verily the Residence of Divinity is so conspicuous in that Heroicall Pulchritude of your noble Person, that Plato if he were alive again might finde his timorous Supposition brought into
absolute

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absolute Act, and to the enravishment of his amazed Soul might behold Vertue become visible to his outward sight. And truly Madame, I must confesse that so Divine a Constitution as this, wants no Preservative; being both devoid and incapable of Infection; and that if the rest of the World had attain'd but to the least Degree of this sound Complexion and generous frame of Minde, nay if they were but brought to an equilibrions Indifferency, and, as they say, stood but Neutralls, that is, If as many as are supposed to have no love of God, nor any knowledge or experience of the Divine Life, did not out of a base ignorant fear irreconcilably hate him, assuredly this Antidote of mine would either prove needless and superfluous, or, if Occasion ever called for it, a most certain Cure. For this Truth of the Existence of God being as clearly demonstrable as any Theorem in Mathematicks, it would not fail of winning as firm and as universall Assent, did not the fear of a sad After-

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clap pervert mens Understandings, and Prejudice and Interest pretend uncertainty and obscurity in so plain a matter. But considering the state of things as they are, I cannot but pronounce, that there is more necessity of this my Antidote then I could wish there were. But if there were less or none at all, yet the pleasure that may be reaped in perusal of this Treatise (even by such as by an holy Faith and divine Sense are ever held fast in a full assent to the Conclusion I drive at.) will sufficiently compensate the pains in the penning thereof. For as the best Eyes and most able to behold the pure Light do not unwillingly turn their backs of the Sun to view his refracted Beauty in the delightful colours of the Rainbow, so the perfectest Mindes and the most lively possessers of the Divine Image, cannot but take contentment and pleasure in observing the glorious Wisdom and Goodness of God, so fairly drawn out and skilfully variegated in the sundry Objects of externall Nature. Which delight though

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it redound to all, yet not so much to any as to those that are of a more Philosophicall and Contemplative Constitution; and therefore Madam, most of all to Your self, whose Genius I know to be so speculative, and Wit so penetrant, that in the knowledge of things as well Natural as Divine, you have not onely out-gone all of your own Sex, but even of that other also, whose ages have not given them over-much the start of you. And assuredly your Ladiships Wisdom and Judgement can never be highly enough commended, that makes the best use that may be of those ample Fortunes that Divine Providence has bestow'd upon you. For the best result of Riches, I mean in reference to our selves, is, that finding our selves already well provided for, we may be fully Masters of our own time: and the best improvement of this time is the Contemplation of God and Nature; wherein if these present Labours of mine may prove so grateful unto you and serviceable, as I have been bold to presage, next to the winning of

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*Souls from Atheism, it is the sweetest fruit
they can ever yield to*

Your Ladships humbly devoted

Servant,

HENRY MORE.

The



The Preface.

A *Theism* and *Entbusiasm*, though they seem so extremely opposite one to another, yet in many things they do very nearly agree. For to say nothing of their joynt conspiracy against the true knowledge of God and Religion, they are commonly entertain'd, though successively, in the same Complexion. For that temper that disposes a man to listen to the Magisterial Dictates of an over-bearing Fancy, more then to the calm and cautious insinuations of free Reason, is a subject that by turns does very easily lodge and give harbour to these mischievous Guests.

For as Dreams are the fancies of those that sleep, so Fancies are but the dreams of men awake. And these Fancies by day, as those Dreams by night, will vary and change with the weather
and

and present temper of the body : So those that have onely a fiery Enthusiastick acknowledgment of God, change of diet, feculent old age, or some present damps of *Melancholy*, will as confidently represent to their fancy that there is no God, as ever it was represented that there is one ; and then having lost the use of their more noble faculties of Reason and Understanding, they must according to the course of Nature, be as bold *Atheists* now, as they were before confident *Enthusiasts*.

Nor do these two unruly Guests only serve themselves by turns on the same party, but also send mutual supplies one to another, being lodg'd in several persons. For the *Atheists* pretence to wit and natural reason (though the foulness of his mind makes him fumble very dotingly in the use thereof) makes the *Enthusiast* secure that reason is no guide to God. And the *Enthusiasts* boldly dictating the careless ravings of his own tumultuous

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multuous fancy for undeniable principles of divine knowledge, confirms the *Atheists* that the whole business of religion and notion of a God, is nothing but a troublesome fit of over-curious *Melancholy*. Therefore, I thought I should not be wanting to Religion and to the Publick, if I attempted, some way, to make this fanciful *Theosophy* or *Theomagy*, as it is very ridiculous in it self, so also to appear to the world; and if it were possible, to the very favourers of it; it being the most effectual means in my judgement, to remove this dangerous evil out of the minds of men, & to keep it off from theirs that are as yet untainted.

And this I indeavored in those two late *Pamphlets* I wrote, namely my *Observations* and my *Reply*. In both which I putting my self upon the merry pin (as you see it was necessary so to do) and being finely warm'd with Anger and Indignation against the mischief I had in design to remove, if I may seem

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after the manner of men to have transgressed in any niceties, yet the ingenuous cannot but be very favourable in their censure, it being very hard to come off so clearly well, in the acting of so humorous a part; there scarce being any certain Judge of humors, but the humor of every man that judges.

And I am very well aware that some passages cannot but seem harsh to sad and weakly spirits, as sick men love no noise nor din, and take offence at but the smell of such meats, as are the most pleasant and strengthening nourishment of those that are well. But as for my self, I can truly pronouncethat what I did, I did in reason and judgement, not at all offending that Life that dwelleth in me. For there was that *Tonical* exertion and *steady Tension* of my spirits, that every chord went off with a clear and smart sound, as in a well-tuned instrument set at a high Pitch, and was good *Musick* to my self that

throughly

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throughly understood the meaning of it. And my agile and swift motion from one thing to another, even of those that were of very different natures, was no harsh harmony at all to me, I having the art to stop the humming of the last stroke, as a skilful *Harper* on his *Irish Harp*, & so to render the following chord clean, without the mixing or interfering of any tremulous murmurs from the strings that were touch'd immediately before.

And I did the more willingly indulge to my self this freedom and mirth, in respect of the *Libertines* whom I was severely and sharply to reprove, and so made my self as freely merry as I might, and not desert the realities of soberness, that thereby they might know that no *superstitious Sneaksby*, or *moped Legalist* (as they would be ready to fancy every body that bore no resemblance at all with themselves) did rebuke them or speak to them, but one that had in some mea-

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sure attain'd to the truth of that Liberty, that they were in a false sent after. Thus was I content to become a spectacle to the world, in any way or disguise whatsoever, that I might thereby possibly by any means gain some souls out of this dirty and dizzy whirl-pool of the Flesh, into the Rest and Peace of God; and to seem a fool my self to provoke others to become truly and seriously wise.

And as I thought to win upon the *Libertine* by my mirth and freeness, so I thought to gain ground upon the *Enthusiast*, by suffering my self to be carried into such high Triumphs and Exaltations of Spirit as I did. In all which (though the unskilful cannot distinguish betwixt vain-glory and Divine joy or Christian gloriation) I do really nothing but highly magnifie the simplicity of the life of Christ above all Magick, Miracles, Power of Nature, Opinions, Prophecies, & whatever else humane

humane nature is so giddily and furiously carried after, even to the neglecting of that which is the sublimest pitch of happiness that the soul of man can arrive to.

Wherefore many of those expressions in my *Reply* that seem so turgent, are to be interpreted with allusion to what this Divine life does deservedly triumph over, and particularly what *Magicians* boast they can do: As in that passage which seems most enormous page 49. *I still the raging of the Sea, &c.* Which is the very same that *Medea* vaunts of in *Ovid*,

— *Concussaque sisto,*

Stantia concutio cantu freta, nubila pello.

And for the rest that has fallen from me in those free heats, I am sure there is neither expression nor meaning that I cannot not only make good by reason, but warrant and countenance also by something plainly parallel thereto, in Scripture, Philosophers and Fathers, especially

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cially *Origen*, whom I account more profoundly learned and no less pious than any of them.

But as I said the Drift and Scope of all was, vigorously to witness to this busie and inquisitive Age, that the simplicity of the life of Christ though it be run over by most and taken no notice of, that is, that perfect Humility and divine Love, whence is a free command over a mans passions and a warrantable Guidance of them, with all Serenity, becoming Prudence, and Equity; that these are above all the glory of the World, curiosity of Opinions, and all power of Nature whatsoever.

And if the sense of this so plain a truth with all its power and loveliness did so vehemently possess my soul, that it caused for the present some sensible mutations and tumults in my very Animal spirits and my body, the matter being of so great Importance, it was but an obvious piece of prudence to record those

those circumstances, that professing myself so very much moved, others might be the more effectually moved thereby; according to that of the Poet,

— *Si vis me flere, dolendum est
Primum ipsi tibi.*

And I am no more to be esteemed an *Enthusiast* for such passages as these, then those wise and circumspect Philosophers, *Plato* and *Plotinus*, who upon the more then ordinary sensible visits of the divine Love and Beauty descending into their enravish'd souls, profess themselves no less moved, then what the sense of such expressions as these will bear, *ἀνακινεῖσθαι, ἐκβαλλεῖσθαι, ἐνθουσιασθαι* or *ἐνθουσιασθῆναι*. And to such *Enthusiasm* as is but the triumph of the soul of man, inebriated as it were, with the delicious sense of the divine life, that blessed Root, and Original of all holy wisdom and virtue, I am as much a friend as I am to the vulgar fanatical *Enthusiasm* a professed enemy. And eternal shame stop his mouth, that will dare to

deny, but that the fervent love of God and of the pulchritude of Virtue will afford the spirit of man more joy and triumph, then ever was tasted in any lustful pleasure, which the pen of unclean Wits do so highly magnifie both in verse and prose.

Thus much I thought fit to premise concerning my two late Pamphlets, which I have done in way of Civility to the world; to whom I hold my self accountable, especially for any publike actions, who now I hope will not deem those unexpected motions of mine so strange and uncouth, they so plainly perceiving what Musick they were measured to.

But as for this present Discourse against *Atheism*, as there is no humour at all in it, so I hope there is less hazzard of censure. For here is nothing to give offence, unless we be so weak sighted, that the pure light of Reason and Nature will offend us. Here's no lavish Mirth, no Satyrical Sharpness, no

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Writhing or Distorting the genuine frame and composure of mine own mind, to set out the deformity of anothers, no Rapture, no Poetry, no Enthusiasm, no more then there is in *Euclid's Elements*, or *Hippocrates his Aphorisms*. But though I have been so bold as to recite what there is not in this present discourse, yet I had rather leave it to the quick-sightedness of the Reader to spy out what there is, then be put upon so much Immodesty my self, as to speak any thing that may seem to give it any precellency above what is already extant in the world about the same matter. Onely I may say thus much, that I did on purpose abstain from reading any Treatises concerning this subject, that I might the more undisturbedly write the easie *Emanations* of mine own mind, and not be carried off from what should naturally fall from my self, by prepossessing my thoughts by the inventions of others.

I have writ therefore after no Cop

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but the eternal Characters of the mind of man, and the known *Phænomena* of Nature. And all men consulting with these that indeavor to write sense, though it be not done alike by all men, it could not happen but I should touch upon the same heads that others have, that have wrote before me. Who though they merit very high commendation for their learned atchievements, yet I hope my indeavors have been such, that though they may not deserve to be cor-rivals or partners in their praise & credit, yet I do not distrust but they may do their share towards that publick good, that such performances usually pretend to aim at.

For that which did embolden me to publish this present Treatise, was not, as I said before, because I flatter'd my self in a Conceit that it was better or more plausible, then what is already in the hands of men: but that it was of a different sort, and has its peculiar serviceableness and advantages apart and

distinct from others; whose proper pre-eminences it may aloof off admire, but dare not in any wise compare with. So that there is no Tautology committed in recommending what I have written to the publick view, nor any lessening the labours of others by thus offering the fruit of mine own. For considering there are such several complexions and tempers of men in the world, I do not distrust but that as what others have done, has been very acceptable and profitable to many, so this of mine may be well relish'd of some or other, and so seem not to have been writ in vain.

For though I cannot promise my Reader that I shall entertain him with so much winning *Rhetorick* and pleasant *Philology*, as he may find elsewhere, yet I hope he will acknowledge, if his mind be unprejudic'd, that he meets with sound and plain Reason, and an easie and clear *Method*.

And though I cannot furnish him

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with that copious variety of arguments that others have done, yet the frugal carefulness and safeness of choice that I have made in them, may compensate their paucity.

For I appeal to any man, whether the proposal of such as will easily admit of evasions (though they have this peculiar advantage that they make for greater pomp and at first sight seem more formidable for their multitude) does not embolden the *Athiest* & make him fancy, that because he can so easily turn the edge of these, that the rest have no more solidity than the former; but that if he thought good, and had leisure, he could with like facility enervate them all.

Wherefore I have endeavored to insist upon such alone, as are not only true in themselves, but are unavoidable to my Adversary, unless he will cast down his shield, forsake the free use of the natural faculties of his mind, and profess himself a meer puzzled *Sceptick*. But if he will with us but admit of this one *Postulate*

or *Hypothesis*, that *Our Faculties are true*, though I have spoke modestly in the Discourse it self, yet I think I may here without vanity or boasting, freely profess that I have no less then demonstrated that there is a God. And by how much more any man shal seriously endeavor to resist the strength of my arguments, by so much the more strong he shall find them; as he that presses his weak finger against a wall of Marble; and that they can appear slight to none but those that carelessly and slightly consider them. For I borrowed them not from books, but fetch'd them from the very nature of the thing it self and indelible *Ideas* of the Soul of Man.

And I found that keeping my self within so narrow a compass as not to affect any reasonings but such as had very clear affinity and close connexion with the subject in hand, that I naturally hit upon what ever was material to my purpose, and so contenting my self with my own, received nothing from

the great store and riches of others. And what I might easily remember of others, I could not let pass if in my own judgement it was obnoxious to evasion. For I intended not to impose upon the Atheist, but really to convince him. And therefore *Des-Cartes*, whose Mechanical wit I can never highly enough admire, might be no Master of *Metaphysics* to me. Whence it is that I make use but of his first Argument only, if I may not rather call it the Schools, or mine own. For I think I have manag'd it in such sort and every way so propt it and strengthened it, that I may challenge in it as much interest as any.

But as for his following reasons, that suppose the *Objective Reality* of the *Idea* of God does exceed the efficiency of the mind of man, and that the mind of man, were it not from another, would have confer'd all that perfection upon it self, that it has the *Idea* of, and lastly, that it having no power to conserve it self,

and the present and future time having no dependence one of another, that it is continually reproduc'd, that is conserv'd by some higher cause, which must be God; these grounds, I say, being so easily evaded by the Atheist, I durst not trust to them, unless I had the Authors wit to defend them, who was handsomely able to make good any thing. But they seem to me to be liable to such evasions as I can give no stop to.

For the mind of man, as the Atheist will readily reply, may be able of herself to frame such an actual *Idea* of God, as is there disputed of, which *Idea* will be but the present modification of her, as other notions are, and an effect of her essence, and power, and that power a radical property of her essence. So that there is no excess of an effect above the efficiency of the cause, though we look no further then the mind it self, for she frames this notion of God as naturally and as much without the help of an

higher Cause, as she does any thing else whatsoever.

And as for the Mindes contributing those perfections on her self, she has an *Idea* of; if she had been of her self, the *Atheist* will say, it implies a contradiction, and supposes that a thing before it exists, may consult about the advantages of its own existence. But if the minde be of it self, it is what it findes it self to be, and can be no otherwise.

And therefore lastly if the Minde finde it self to exist, it can no more destroy it self, then produce it self, nor needs any thing to continue its being, provided that there be nothing in Nature that can act against it and destroy it; for whatever is, continues so to be, unless there be some cause to change it.

So likewise from those arguments I fetch'd from external Nature, as well as in these from the innate properties of the minde of man, my careful choice made very large defalkations, insisting rather upon such things as might be

otherwise, and yet are far better as they are, then upon such as were necessary and could not be otherwise. As for example; when I consider'd the distance of the Sun, I did not conceive that his not being plac'd so low as the Moon, or so high as the fixed Stars, was any great argument of Providence, because it might be reply'd that it was necessary it should be betwixt those two distances, else the Earth had not been habitable, and so mankind might have waited for a being, till the agitation of the Matter had wrought things into a more tolerable fitness or posture for their production.

Nor simply is the Motion of the Sun or rather of the Earth, any argument of divine Providence, but as necessary as a piece of wood's being carried down the stream, or straws about a whirl-pool. But the Laws of her Motion are such, that they very manifestly convince us of a Providence, and therefore I was fain to let go the for-

mer, and insist more largely upon the latter.

Nor thought I it fit to Rhetoricate in proposing the great variety of things; and præcellency one above another, but to press close upon the design and subordination of one thing to another, shewing that whereas the rude motions of the matter a thousand to one might have cast it otherwise, yet the productions of things are such as our own Reason cannot but approve to be best, or as we our selves would have design'd them.

And so in the consideration of Animals, I do not so much urge my Reasons from their diversity and subsistence, (though the framing of matter into the bare subsistence of an Animal is an effect of no less cause then what has some skill and counsel) But what I drive at, is the exquisite contrivance of their parts, and that their structure is far more perfect, then will meerly serve for their bare existence, &c

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continuance in the world; which is an undeniable demonstration that they are the effects of wisdom, not the results of Fortune or fermented Matter.

Lastly, when I descend to the History of things miraculous and above the ordinary course of Nature, for the proving that there are Spirits, that the Atheist thereby may the easier be induced to believe there is a *God*, I am so cautious and circumspect, that I make use of no Narrations that either the avarice of the *Priest*, or the credulity and fancifulness of the *Melancholist* may render suspected.

Nor could I abstain from that subject, it being so pat and pertinent unto my purpose, though I am well aware how ridiculous a thing it seems to those I have to deal with. But their confident ignorance shall never dash me out of countenance with my well-grounded knowledge: For I have been no careless Inquirer into these things, and from my *Childhood* to this

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very day, have had more reasons to believe the Existence of God and a Divine Providence, then is reasonable for me to make particular profession of.

In this History of things Miraculous or Supernatural, I might have recited those notable Prodigies that happened, after the birth, in the life, and at the death of *Christ*; As the Star that led the Wise men to the young Infant; Voices from heaven testifying *Christ* to be the Son of God; and lastly that miraculous Eclipse of the Sun, made, not by interposition of the Moon, for she was then opposite to him, but by the interposition or totall involution, if you will, of those scummy spots that ever more or less are spread upon his face, but now overflowed him with such thickness, and so universally, that day-light was suddenly intercepted from the astonished eyes of the Inhabitants of the Earth. To which dire-ful Symptomes though the Sun hath in some measure at several times

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obnoxious, yet that those latent Causes should so suddenly step out and surprise him, and so enormously at the Passion of the *Messias*, he whose minde is not more prodigiously darkned then the Sun was then Eclips'd, cannot but at first sight acknowledge it a special designment of Providence.

But I did not insist upon any sacred History, partly because it is so well and so ordinarily known, that it seem'd less needful; but mainly because I know the *Atheist* will boggle more at whatever is fetch'd from establish'd Religion, and flie away from it, like a wilde Colt in a Pasture at the sight of a bridle or an halter, snuffing up the aire and smelling a plot afar off, as he foolishly fancies.

But that he might not be shie of me, I have conform'd my self as near his own *Garb* as I might, without partaking of his folly or wickedness; that is, I appear now in the plain shape of a meer *Naturalist*, that I might van-

quish *Atheism*; as I did heretofore affectedly symbolize in careless mirth and freedom with the *Libertines*, to circumvent *Libertinism*.

For he that will lend his hand to help another fallen into a ditch, must himself though not fall, yet stoop and incline his body: And he that converses with a Barbarian, must discourse to him in his own language: So he that would gain upon the more weak and sunk mindes of sensual mortals, is to accommodate himself to their capacity, who like the *Bat* and *Ole* can see no where so well as in the shady glimmerings of their own *Twilight*.

AN

ANTIDOTE

Against

A THEISME.

CHAP. I.

The seasonable usefulness of the present Discourse, or the Motives that put the Author upon these indeavours of demonstrating that there is a God.



He grand truth which we are now to be imployed about and to prove, is, *That there is a God*; And I made choice of this subject as very seasonable for the times we are in, and are coming on, wherein Divine Providence granting a more large release from Superstition, and permitting a freer perusal of matters of Religion, then in former Ages, the Tempter would take advantage where he may, to carry men captive out of one dark prison into another, out of *Superstition* into *Atheisme* itself. Which is a thing feasible enough for him to bring about in such men, as have adhered to Religion in a meer externall way, either for fashion sake, or in a blinde obedience to

the Authority of a Church. For when this externall frame of godliness shall breake about their ears, they being really at the bottome devoyd of the true fear and love of God, and destitute of a more free and unprejudic'd use of their faculties, by reason of the sinfulness and corruption of their natures; it will be an easy thing to allure them to an assent to that, which seems so much for their present Interest; and so being imboldened by the tottering and falling of what they took for Religion before, they will gladly in their conceit cast down also the very Object of that Religious Worship after it, and conclude that there is as well no God as no Religion; That is, they have a minde there should be none, that they may be free from all wringings of conscience, thought of correcting their lives, and fear of being accountable before that great Tribunall.

Wherefore for the reclaiming of these if it were possible, at least for the succouring and extricating of those in whom a greater measure of the love of God doth dwell, (who may probably by some darkening cloud of Melancholy, or some more then ordinary importunity of the Tempter be dissettled and intangled in their thoughts concerning this weighty matter) I held it fit to bestow mine indeavours upon this so useful & seasonable an enterprize, as to demonstrate *that there is a God.*

C H A P. II.

What is meant by demonstrating there is a God, and that the minde of man, unlesse he do violence to his faculties, will fully assent or dissent from that which notwithstanding may have a bare possibility of being otherwise.

BUt when I speak of demonstrating there is a God, I would not be suspected of so much vanity and ostentation, as to be thought I mean to bring no Arguments, but such as are so convictive, that a mans understanding shall be forced to confesse that it is impossible to be otherwise then I have concluded. For, for mine own part I am prone to believe, that there is nothing at all to be so demonstrated. For it is possible that *Mathematicall evidence* it self, may be but a constant undiscoverable delusion, which our nature is necessarily and perpetually obnoxious unto, and that either fatally or fortuitously there has been in the world time out of minde such a Being as we call *Man*, whose essentiall property it is to be then most of all mistaken, when he conceives a thing most evidently true. And why may not this be as well as any thing else, if you will have all things fatall or casuall without a God? For there can be no curb to this wilde conceip

ceipt, but by the supposing that we our selves exist from some higher Principle that is absolutely *good* and *wise*, which is all one as to acknowledge *that there is a God*.

Wherefore when I say that I wil demonstrate that there is a God, I do not promise that I will alwayes produce such arguments, that the Reader shall acknowledge so strong, as he shall be forced to confesse that it is utterly impossible that it should be otherwise. But they shall be such as shall deserve full assent, and win full assent from any unprejudic'd minde.

For I conceive that we may give full assent to that which notwithstanding may possibly be otherwise: which I shall illustrate by severall examples. Suppose two men got to the top of mount *Athos*, and there viewing a stone in the form of an *Altar* with *Ashes* on it, and the *footsteps of men* on those ashes, or some *words* if you will, as *Optimo Maximo*, or τῷ ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ, or the like, written or scralled out upon the ashes; and one of them should cry out, Assuredly here have been some men here that have done this: But the other more nice then wise should reply, Nay it may possibly be otherwise. For this stone may have naturally grown into this very shape, and the seeming ashes may be no ashes, that is, no remainders of any fewell burnt there, but some unexplicable and imperceptible motions of the Aire, or other

particles of this fluid matter that is active every where, have wrought some parts of the matter into the form & nature of ashes, & have fridg'd and plaid about so, that they have also figured those intelligible Characters in the same. But would not any body deem it a piece of weaknesse no less then dotage for the other man one whit to recede from his former apprehension, but as fully as ever to agree with what he pronounced first, notwithstanding this bare possibility of being otherwise?

So of *Anchors* that have been digged up, either in plain fields or mountainous places, as also the Roman *Urnes* with ashes and inscriptions, as *Severianus*, *Ful: Linus* and the like, or Roman *Coynes*, with *the effigies* and *names* of the *Casars* on them; or that which is more ordinary, the *Sculls* of men in every Church-yard, with the right figure, and all those necessary perforations for the passing of the vessels, besides those conspicuous hollowes for the Eyes and rowes of teeth, the *Os Styloides*, *Ethooides*, and what not? if a man will say of them, that the Motion of the particles of the Matter, or some hidden Spermatick power has gendered these both *Anchors*, *Urnes*, *Coyns*, and *Sculls* in the ground, he doth but pronounce that which humane reason must admit as possible: Nor can any man ever so demonstrate that those *Coyns*, *Anchors*, and *Urnes* were

were once the Artifice of men, or that this or that *Scull* was once a part of a living man, that he shall force an acknowledgment that it is impossible that it should be otherwise. But yet I do not think that any man, without doing manifest violence to his faculties, can at all suspend his assent, but freely and fully agree that this or that *Scull* was once part of a living man, and that these *Anchors, Vrnes, and Coyns*, were certainly once made by humane artifice, notwithstanding the possibility of being otherwise.

And what I have said of *Assent* is also true in *Dissent*. For the minde of man not craz'd nor prejudic'd, will fully and unreconcileably disagree, by it's own naturall sagacity, where notwithstanding the thing that it doth thus resolvedly and undoubtingly reject, no wit of man can prove impossible to be true. As if we should make such a fiction as this, that *Archimedes* with the same individuall body that he had when the Souldiers slew him, is now safely intent upon his Geometricall figures under ground, at the Center of the Earth, farre from the noise and din of this world, that might disturb his Meditations, or distract him in his curious delineations he makes with his rod upon the dust; which no man living can prove impossible: Yet if any man does not as unreconcileably dissent from such a fable as this, as from any falshood imagineable, assuredly that

that man is next door to madness or dotage, or does enormous violence to the free use of his faculties.

Wherefore it is manifest that there may be a very firm and unwavering assent or dissent, when as yet the thing we thus assent to may be possibly otherwise; or that which we thus dissent from, cannot be proved impossible to be true.

Which point I have thus long and thus variously sported my self in, for making the better impression upon my Reader, it being of no small use and consequence, as well for the advertising of him, that the Arguments which I shall produce, though I do not bestow that ostentative term of *Demonstration* upon them, yet they may be as effectually for winning a firm and unshaken assent, as if they were in the strictest notion such; as also to remind him that if they be so strong and so patly fitted and suteable with the faculties of mans minde, that he has nothing to reply, but only that for all this, it may possibly be otherwise, that he should give a free and full assent to the conclusion. And if he do not, that he is to suspect himself rather of some distemper, prejudice, or weakness, then the Arguments of want of strength. But if the *Atheist* shall contrary-wise pervert my candour, and fair dealing, and phansie that he has got some advantage upon

my free confession, that the arguments that I shall use are not so convictive, but that they leave a possibility of the thing being otherwise, let him but compute his supposed gains by adding the limitation of this possibility (*viz.* that it is no more possible, then that the clearest *Mathematicall evidence* may be false (which is impossible if our faculties be true) or in the second place, then that the Roman *Vrnes* and *Coyns* above mentioned may prove to be the works of Nature, not the Artifice of man, which our faculties admit to be so little probable, that it is impossible for them not fully to assent to the contrary.) and when hee has cast up his account, it will be evident that it can be nothing but his grosse ignorance in this kind of *Arithmetick* that shall embolden him to write himself down gainer and not me.

CHAP. 3.

An attempt towards the finding out the true Notion or Definition of God, and a cleer Conviction that there is an indelible Idea of a Being absolutely perfect in the mind of Man.

AND now having premised thus much, I shall come on nearer to my present designe. In prosecution whereof it will be requisite for me, first to define *what God is*, before

fore I proceed to demonstration *that he is*. For it is obvious for Mans reason to finde arguments for the impossibility, possibility, probability, or of necessity the existence of a thing, from the explication of the Essence thereof.

And now I am come hither, I demand of any *Atheist* that denies there is a God, or of any that doubts whether there be one or no, what *Idea* or *Notion* they frame of that they deny or doubt of. If they will prove nice and squeamish, and profess they can frame no notion of any such thing, I would gladly ask them, why they will then deny or doubt of they know not what. For it is necessary that he that would rationally doubt or deny a thing, should have some settled *Notion* of the thing he doubts of or denies. But if they profess that this is the very ground of their denying or doubting whether there be a God, because they can frame no notion of him, I shall forthwith take away that *Allegation* by offering them such a *Notion* as is as proper to God, as any *Notion* is proper to any thing else in the world.

I define God therefore thus, *An Essence or Being fully and absolutely perfect*. I say *fully and absolutely perfect*, in counterdistinction to such perfection as is not full and absolute, but the perfection of this or that *Species* or *Kind* of finite *Beings*, suppose of a Lyon, Horse, or

Tree. But to be fully and absolutely perfect is to be at least, as perfect as the apprehension of a man can conceive, without a contradiction. For what is inconceivable or contradictory, is nothing at all to us, who are not now to wag one Atome beyond our faculties. But what I have propounded is so far from being beyond our faculties, that I dare appeal to any *Atheist* that hath yet any command of Sense and Reason left in him, if it be not very easy and intelligible at the first sight, and that if there be a God, he is to be deemed of us, such as this *Idea* or *Notion* sets forth.

But if he will sullingly deny that this is the proper Notion of God, let him enjoy his own humour; this yet remains undenyable, that there is in man an *Idea* of a *Being absolutely and fully perfect*, which we frame out by attributing all conceivable perfection to it whatsoever, that implies no contradiction. And this notion is naturall and essentiall to the soul of man, & cannot be washt out, nor conveigh'd away by any force or trick of wit whatsoever, so long as the mind of man is not craz'd, but hath the ordinary use of her own faculties.

Nor will that prove any thing to the purpose, when as it shall be alledg'd that this Notion is not so naturall and essentiall to the Soul, because she framed it from some occasions from without. For all those undeniable

conclusions in Geometry which might be help'd and occasion'd from something without, are so naturall notwithstanding and Essentiall to the Soul, that you may as soon unfoul the Soul, as divide her from perpetuall assent to those Mathematicall truths, supposing no distemper nor violence offered to her Faculties. As for example; she cannot but acknowledge in her self the *several distinct Ideas of the five regular Bodies*, as also, *that it is impossible that there should be any more then five.* And this Idea of a Being absolutely perfect is as distinct and indelible an Idea in the Soul, as the Idea of the five Regular Bodies, or any other Idea whatsoever.

It remains therefore undeniable, that there is an inseparable *Idea of a Being absolutely perfect* ever residing, though not always acting, in the Soul of man.

C H A P. IV.

What Notions are more particularly comprised in the Idea of a Being absolutely perfect. That the difficulty of framing the conception of a thing ought to be no argument against the existence thereof: the nature of corporeall Matter being so perplex'd and intricate, which yet all men acknowledge to exist. That the Idea of a Spirit is as easy a Notion as of any other substance whatsoever. What powers and properties are contained in the Notion of a Spirit. That Eternity and Infinity, if God were not, would be cast upon something else; so that Atheisme cannot free the mind from such Intricacies. Goodness, Knowledge and Power, Notions of highest perfection, and therefore necessarily included in the Idea of a Being absolutely perfect.

BUT now to lay out more particularly the perfections comprehended in this Notion of a Being absolutely and fully perfect, I think I may securely nominate these; *Self-subsistency, Immateriality, Infinity as well of Duration as Essence, Immensity of Goodnesse, Omniscience, Omnipotency, and Necessity of Existence.* Let this therefore be the description of a being absolutely perfect, that it is a *Spirit, Eternall, Infinite in Essence and Goodnesse, Omniscient, Omnipotent*

nipotent, and of it self necessarily existent. All which attributes being attributes of the highest perfection that falls under the apprehension of man, and having no discoverable imperfection interwoven with them, must of necessity be attributed to that which we conceive absolutely and fully *perfect*. And if any one will say that this is but to dress up a Notion out of my own fancy, which I would afterwards slyly insinuate to be the Notion of a *God*; I answer, that no man can discourse and reason of any thing without recourse to settled notions deciphered in his own mind. And that such an exception as this implies the most contradictory absurdities imaginable, to wit, as if a man should reason from something that never entered into his mind, or that is utterly out of the ken of his own faculties. But such groundless allegations as these, discover nothing but an unwillingness to find themselves able to entertain any conception of *God*, and a heavy propension to sink down into an utter oblivion of him, and to become as stupid and senseless in divine things, as the very beasts.

But others it may be will not look on this Notion as contemptible for the easy composition thereof out of familiar conceptions which the mind of man ordinarily figures it self into, but reject it rather out of some unintelligible hard terms in it, such as *Spirit, Eternal,*

and *Infinite*, for they do profess they can frame no Notion of *Spirit*, and that any thing should be *Eternall* or *Infinite*, they do not know how to set their mind in a posture to apprehend, and therefore some would have no such thing as a *Spirit* in the world.

But if the difficulty of framing a conception of a thing must take away the existence of the thing it self, there will be no such thing as a *Body* left in the world, and then will all be *Spirit* or nothing. For who can frame so safe a notion of a *Body*, as to free himself from the intanglements that the extension thereof will bring along with it. For this extended matter consists of either indivisible points, or of particles divisible *in infinitum*. Take which of these two you will, (and you can find no third) you will be wound into the most notorious absurdities that may be. For if you say it consists of points, from this position I can necessarily demonstrate, that every *Spear* or *Spire-Steep*le or what long body you will, is as thick as it is long; that the tallest *Cedar* is not so high as the lowest *Musbrome*; and that the *Moan* and the *Earth* are so near one another, that the thickness of your hand will not go betwixt; that *Rounds* and *Squares* are all one figure; that *Even* and *Odde Numbers* are Equal one with another; and that the clearest *Day* is as dark as the blackest *Night*. And if you

you make choice of the other Member of the disjunction, your fancy will be little better at ease. For nothing can be divisible into parts it has not: therefore if a body be divisible into infinite parts, it has infinite extended parts: and if it has an infinite number of extended parts, it cannot be but a hard mysterie to the Imagination of Man, that infinite extended parts, should not amount to one whole infinite extension. And thus a *grain of Mustard-seed* would be as well infinitely extended, as the whole Matter of the Universe; and a thousandth part of that grain as well as the grain itself. Which things are more unconceivable then any thing in the Notion of a *Spirit*. Therefore we are not scornfully and contemptuously to reject any Notion, for seeming at first to be clouded and obscured with some difficulties and intricacies of conception; sith that, of whose being we seem most assured, is the most intangled and perplex'd in the conceiving, of any thing that can be propounded to the apprehension of a Man. But here you will reply, that our senses are struck by so manifest impressions from the Matter, that though the *nature* of it be difficult to conceive, yet the *Existence* is palpable to us, by what it acts upon us. Why, then all that I desire is this, that when you shall be reminded of some actions and operations that arrive to the notice

of your sense or understanding, which unless we do violence to our faculties we can never attribute to *Matter* or *Body*, that then you would not be so nice and averse from the admitting of such a substance as is called a *Spirit*, though you fancy some difficulty in the conceiving thereof.

But for mine own part I think the nature of a *Spirit* is as conceivable, and easy to be defined as the nature of any thing else. For as for the very *Essence* or bare *Substance* of any thing whatsoever, he is a very Novice in speculation that does not acknowledge that utterly unknowable. But for the *Essentiall* and *Inseparable properties*, they are as intelligible and explicable in a *Spirit* as in any other subject whatever. As for example, I conceive the intire *Idea* of a *Spirit* in generall, or at least of all finite created and subordinate *Spirits* to consist of these severall powers or properties viz. *Self-penetration*, *Self-motion*, *Self-contraction* and *Dilatation*, and *Indivisibility*; and these are those that I reckon more absolute; I will adde also what has relation to another, and that is the power of *Penetrating*, *Moving*, and *Altering* the *Matter*. These properties and powers put together make up the *Notion* and *Idea* of a *Spirit*, whereby it is plainly distinguished from a body, whose parts cannot intrate one another, is not *Self-moveable*, nor can

can contract nor dilate it self, is *divisible* and *separable* one part from another; But the parts of a *Spirit* can be no more separated, though they be dilated, then you can cut off the *Rays* of the *Sunne* by a paire of Scissors made of pellucide *Crystall*. And this will serve for the settling of the *Notion* of a *Spirit*; the prooffe of its *Existence* belongs not unto this place. And out of this description it is plain, that a *Spirit* is a notion of more perfection then a *Body*, and therefore the more fit to be an Attribute of what is *absolutely perfect*, then a *Body* is.

But now for the other two hard terms of *Eternall* and *Infinite*, if any one would excuse himself from assenting to the *Notion* of a *God*, by reason of the *Incomprehensibleness* of those attributes, let him consider, that he shall whether he will or no be forced to acknowledge something *Eternall*, either *God* or the *World*, and the *Intricacy* is alike in either. And though he would shuffle off the trouble of apprehending an *Infinite Deity*, yet he will never extricate himself out of the intanglements of an *Infinite Space*; which notion will stick as closely to his *Soul*, as her power of *Imagination*.

Now that *Goodnesse*, *Knowledge* and *Power*, which are the three following attributes, are Attributes of *perfection*, if a man consult his own *Faculties*, it will be undoubtedly conclu-

ded, and I know nothing else he can consult with. At least this will be returned as infallibly true, that a *Being absolutely perfect* has these, or what supereminently contains these. And that *Knowledge* or something like it is in God, is manifest, because without animadversion in some sense or other, it is impossible to be *Happy*. But that a *Being* should be *absolutely perfect*, and yet not happy, is as impossible. But *Knowledge* without *Goodness* is but dry Subtily, or mischievous Craft; and *Goodness* with *Knowledge* devoyd of *Power* is but lame and ineffectuall: Wherefore whatever is *absolutely perfect*, is *infinitely both Good, Wise, and Powerfull*.

And lastly it is more *perfection* that all this be *Stable, Immutabile* and *Necessary*, then *Contingent* or *but Possible*. Therefore the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely perfect* represents to our mindes, that that of which it is the *Idea* is *necessarily* to exist. And that which of its own nature doth *necessarily* exist, must never fail to be. And whether the Atheist will call this *absolute perfect Being*. God or not, it is all one, I list not to contend about words. But I think any man else at the first sight will say that we have found out the true *Idea* of God.

C H A P.

CHAP. V.

That the soul of man is not Abrasa Tabula, and in what sense she might be said ever to have had the actual knowledge of eternall truths in her.

AND now wee have found out this *Idea* of a *Being absolutely perfect*, that the use which we shall hereafter make of it, may take the better effect, it will not be amisse by way of further preparation, briefly to touch upon that notable point in Philosophy, *whether the soul of man be Abrasa Tabula, a Table book in which nothing is writ; or whether she have some innate Notions and Ideas in her selfe.* For so it is that she having taken first occasion of thinking from externall objects, it hath so imposed upon some mens judgements, that they have conceited that the Soul has no Knowledge nor Notion, but what is in a *Passive* way impressed, or delineated upon her from the objects of *Sense*; They not warily enough distinguishing betwixt extrinsecall occasions, and the adequate or principal causes of things. But the mind of man more free, and better exercised in the close observations of its own operations and nature, cannot but discover, that there is an *active and actual Knowledge*

in a man, of which these outward objects are rather the reminders than the first begetters or implanters. And when I say *actuell Knowledge*, I doe not mean that there is a certain number of *Ideas* flaring and shining to the *Animadversive faculty* like so many *Torches* or *Starres* in the *Firmament* to our outward sight, or that there are any *figures* that take their distinct places, & are legibly writ there like the *Red letters* or *Astronomical Characters* in an *Almanack*; but I understand thereby an active sagacity in the Soul, or quick recollection as it were, whereby some small businesse being hinted unto her, she runs out presently into a more clear and larger conception. And I cannot better describe her condition then thus; Suppose a skilfull *Musician* fallen asleep in the field upon the grasse, during which time he shall not so much as dream any thing concerning his musically faculty, so that in one sense there is no *actuell skill* or Notion nor representation of any thing musically in him, but his friend sitting by him that cannot sing at all himself, jogs him and awakes him, and desires him to sing this or the other song, telling him two or three words of the beginning of the song, he presently takes it out of his mouth, and sings the whole song upon so flight and slender intimation: So the *Mind of man* being jogg'd and awakened by the impulses of outward objects is stirred up

into a more full and cleare conception of what was but imperfectly hinted to her from externall occasions; and this faculty I venture to call *actuall Knowledge* in such a sense as the sleeping Musicians skill might be called *actuall Skill* when he thought nothing of it.

CHAP. VI.

That the Soul of Man has of her self actuall Knowledge in her, made good by sundry Instances and Arguments.

AND that this is the condition of the soul is discoverable by sundry observations. As for example, Exhibite to the Soul through the outward senses the figure of a *Circle*, she acknowledgeth presently this to be one kind of *figure*, and can adde forthwith that if it be perfect, all the lines from some one point of it drawn to the Perimeter, must be exactly *Equall*. In like manner shew her a *Triangle*, she will straightway pronounce that if that be the right figure it makes toward, the *Angles* must be closed in indivisible *points*. But this accuracy either in the *Circle* or the *Triangle* cannot be set out in any materiall subject, therefore it remains that she hath a more full and exquisite knowledge of things in her self, then the matter can lay open before her. Let us cast in a

third Instance, let some body now demonstrate this *Triangle* described in the Matter to have its three angles equall to two right ones. Why yes saith the Soul this is true, and not only in this particular *Triangle* but in all plain *Triangles* that can possibly be describ'd in the Matter. And thus you see the Soul sings out the whole song upon the first hint, as knowing it very well before.

Besides this, there are a multitude of *Relative Nations* or *Ideas* in the minde of Man, as well *Mathematicall* as *Logicall*, which if we prove cannot be the impresses of any materiall object from without, it will necessarily follow that they are from the Soul her self within, and are the naturall furniture of humane understanding. Such as are these, *Cause, Effect, Whole and Part, Like and Unlike*, and the rest. So *Equality* and *Inequality*, $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ and $\alpha\nu\alpha\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\alpha$, *Proportion* and *Analogy*, *Symmetry* and *Asymmetry* and such like: all which *Relative Ideas* I shall easily prove to be no materiall impresses from without upon the Soul, but her own active conception proceeding from her self whilest she takes notice of *externall Objects*. For that these *Ideas* can make no Impresses upon the outward senses is plaine from hence, because they are no *sensible* nor *Physicall* *affections* of the *Matter*. And how can that, that is no *Physicall affection* of the *Matter*, affect

our corporeall Organs of *Sense*: But now that these *Relative Ideas*, whether *Logicall* or *Mathematicall*, be no *Physicall* affections of the *Matter*, is manifest from these two arguments, First, they may be produced when there has been no *Physicall Motion* nor alteration in the Subject to which they belong; nay indeed when there hath been nothing at all done to the Subject to which they doe accrue. As for example, suppose one side of a Roome white-
 ned, the other not touch'd or medled with; this other has thus become unlike; and hath the Notion of *Dis simile* necessarily belonging to it, although there has nothing at all been done thereunto. So suppose two Pounds of *Lead*, which therefore are two *Equall* Pieces of that Metall; cut away half from one of them; the other Pound, nothing at all being done unto it, has lost its Notion of *Equall*, and hath acquired a new one of *Double* unto the other. Nor is it to any purpose to answer, that though there was nothing done to this Pound of *Lead*, yet there was to the other; For that does not at all enervate the Reason, but shews that the Notion of *Sub-double* which accrued to that *Lead* which had half cut away, is but our *Mode* of conceiving, as well as the other, and not any *Physicall affection* that strikes the corporeall Organs of the Body, as *Hot* and *Cold*, *Hard* and *Soft*, *White* and *Black*, and the like

like do. Wherefore the *Ideas* of *Equall* and *Unequall*, *Double* and *Subdouble*, *Like* and *Unlike*, with the rest, are no externall Impresses upon the Senses, but the Soules owne active manner of conceiving those things which are discovered by the outward Senses.

The second argument is, that one and the same part of the Matter is capable at one and the same time, wholly and entirely of two contrary *Ideas* of this kind. As for example, any peece of Matter that is a *Middle proportionall* betwixt two other pieces is *Double*, suppose, and *Sub-double*, or *Triple* and *Sub-triple*, at once. Which is a manifest signe that these *Ideas* are no affections of the Matter, and therefore do not affect our senses, else they would affect the senses of *Beasts*, and they might also grow good *Geometricians* and *Arithmeticians*. And they not affecting our senses, it is plain that wee have some *Ideas* that wee are not beholding to our senses for, but are the meer exertions of the Mind occasionally awakened by the Appulses of the outward objects. Which the outward Senses doe no more teach us, then he that awakened the *Musician* to sing taught him his skill.

And now in the third and last place it is manifest, besides these single *Ideas* I have proved to be in the mind, that there are also severall complex *Notions* in the same, such as are these;

these; *The whole is bigger than the part: If you take Equall from equall, the Remainders are Equall: Every number is either Even or Odd;* which are true to the Soul at the very first proposall; as any one that is in his wits does plainly perceive.

CHAP. VII.

The mind of man being not furnish'd of Innate Truth, that we are with confidence to attend to her naturall and unprejudic'd Dictates and Suggestions. That some Notions and Truths are at least naturall and unavoidably assented unto by the soul, whether she have of her self Abstruall Knowledge in her or not. And that the definition of a Being absolutely perfect is such. And that this absolutely perfect Being is God, the Creator and Contriver of all things.

AND now we see so evidently the Soul is not unfurnished for the dictating of Truth unto us, I demand of any man, why under a pretence that she having nothing of her own but may be moulded into an assent to any thing, or that she does arbitrarily and fortuitously compose the severall Impresses she receives from without, he will be still so suspicious or timorous, as to be afraid to close with his own faculties, and receive the Naturall

turall Emanations of his own mind, as faithfull Guides.

But if this seem, though it be not, too subtle which I contend for, viz. That the Soul hath *actvall knowledge in her self*, in that sense which I have explained, yet surely this at least will be confess'd to be true, that the nature of the Soul is such, that she will certainly and fully assent to some conclusions, however she came to the knowledge of them, unlesse she doe manifest violence to her own Faculties. Which truths must therefore be concluded not fortuitous or arbitrary, but Natural to the Soul: such as I have already named, as that *every finite number is either even or odde. If you adde equall to equall, the wholes are equall,* and such as are not so simple as these, but yet stick as close to the Soul once apprehended, as that *[The three angles in a Triangle are equall to two right ones: That there are just five regular Bodies neither more nor lesse,* and the like, which we will pronounce necessarily true according to the light of Nature.

Wherefore now to reassume what we have for a while laid aside, the *Idea of a Being absolutely perfect* above proposed, it being in such sort set forth, that a man cannot rid his mind of it, but he must needs acknowledge it to be the *Idea of such a Being*; it will follow that it is no arbitrary nor fortuitous conceipt,

ceipt, but *necessary*, and therefore naturall to the Soul at least, if not ever actually there.

Wherefore it is manifest, that we consulting with our own naturall light concerning the Notion of a *being absolutely perfect*, that this Oracle tells us, that it is *A spirituall substance, Eternall, Infinite in Essence and Goodness, Omnipotent, Omniscient, & of it self necessarily existent.*

For this answer is such, that if we understand the sense thereof, we cannot tell how to deny it, and therefore it is true according to the light of Nature. But it is manifest that that which is *Self-subsistent, infinitely Good, Omniscient and Omnipotent*, is the *Root and Originall* of all things. For *Omnipotency* signifies a power that can effect any thing that implyes no contradiction to be effected; and *Creation* implyes no contradiction: Therefore this *perfect Being* can *create* all things. But if it found the Matter or other Substances existing aforehand of themselves, this *Omnipotency* and power of *Creation* will be in vain, which the free and unprejudic'd Faculties of the minde of man do not admit of. Therefore the naturall notion of a *Being absolutely perfect*, implies that the same *Being* is *Lord and maker of all things*. And according to Naturall light that which is thus, is to be adored and worshipped of all that has the knowledge of it, with all humility and thankfulness, and what is this but to be acknowledged to be *God*?

Where-

Wherefore I conceive I have sufficiently demonstrated, that the *Notion* or *Idea* of *God* is as *Naturall*, *necessary* and *essential* to the *Soul* of *Man*, as any other *Notion* or *Idea* whatsoever, and is no more *arbitrariou*s or *fictitious* then the *Notion* of a *Cube* or *Tetraedrum*, or any other of the *Regular Bodies* in *Geometry*: Which are not devised at our own pleasure (for such figments and *Chimeras* are infinite,) but for these it is demonstrable that there can be no more then five of them. Which shews that their *Notion* is *necessary*, not an *arbitrariou*s compilement of what we please.

And thus having fully made good the *Notion* of *God*, *What hee is*, I proceed now to the next *Point*, which is to prove, *That he is*.

CHAP. VIII.

The first Argument for the existence of God taken from the Idea of God as it is representative of his Nature and Perfection: From whence also it is undeniably demonstrated that there can be no more Gods then One.

AND now verily casting my eyes upon the true *Idea* of *God* which we have found out, I seem to my self to have struck further into this businesse then I was aware of. For if
 this

this *Idea* or *Notion* of God be true, as I have undeniably proved; it is also undeniably true that he doth exist; For this *Idea* of God being no arbitrary Figment taken up at pleasure, but the necessary and naturall Emanation of the minde of Man, if it signifies to us that the *Notion* and *Nature* of God implies in it *necessary Existence*, as we have shown it does, unlesse we will wink against our own naturall light, we are without any further Scruple to acknowledge *that God does exist*. Nor is it sufficient grounds to diffide to the strength of this Argument, because our fancy can shuffle in this Abater, *viz.* That indeed this *Idea* of God, supposing God did exist, shews us that his Existence is necessary, but it does not shew us that he doth necessarily exist. For he that answers thus, does not observe out of what prejudice he is enabled to make this Answer, which is this: He being accustomed to fancy the *Nature* or *Notion* of every thing else without Existence, and so ever easily separating *Essence* and Existence in them, here unawares he takes the same liberty, and divides Existence from that *Essence* to which Existence it self is essentiall. And that's the witty fallacy his unwarinesse has intangled him in.

Again, when as we contend that the true *Idea* of God represents him as a *Being necessary*

vily Existent, and therefore that he does exist; and you to avoid the edge of the Argument reply, If he did at all exist; by this answer you involve your self in a manifest contradiction. For first you say with us, that the nature of God is such, that in its very Notion it implies its *Necessary Existence*, and then again you unsay it by intimating that notwithstanding this true *Idea* and *Notion*, God may not exist, and so acknowledge that what is absolutely necessary according to the free Emanation of our Faculties, yet may be otherwise: Which is a palpable Contradiction as much as respects us and our Faculties, and we have nothing more inward and immediate then these to steer our selves by.

And to make this yet plainer at least if not stronger, when we say that the *Existence* of God is *Necessary*, we are to take notice that *Necessity* is a *Logicall Term*, and signifies so firm a Connexion betwixt the *Subject* and *Predicate* (as they call them) that it is impossible that they should be dissevered, or should not hold together, and therefore if they be affirm'd one of the other, that they make *Axioma Necessarium*, an Axiome that is necessary, or eternally true. Wherefore there being a *Necessary Connexion* betwixt *God* and *Existence*; this Axiome, *God does Exist*, is an Axiome *Necessarily* and *Eternally* true. Which we shall

shall yet more clearly understand, if we compare *Necessity* and *Contingency* together; For as *Contingency* signifies not onely the *Manner of Existence* in that which is contingent according to its *Idea*, but does intimate also a *Possibility of Actuall Existence*, so (to make up the true and easie Analogy) *Necessity* does not onely signify the *Manner of Existence* in that which is *Necessary*, but also that it does *actuall Exist*, and *could never possibly do otherwise*. For ἀναγκαιὸν εἶναι and ἀδυνατόν μὴ εἶναι, *Necessity of Being* and *Impossibility of Not being*, are all one with *Aristotle*, and the rest of the *Logicians*. But the *Atheist* and the *Enthusiast*, are usually such profess'd Enemies against *Logick*; the one meerly out of Dotage upon outward grosse sense, the other in a dear regard to his stiffe and untamed fancy, that shop of Mysteries and fine things.

Thirdly, we may further adde, that whereas we must needs attribute to the *Idea* of God either *Contingency*, *Impossibility*, or *Necessity of Actuall Existence*, (some one of these belonging to every *Idea* imaginable) and that *Contingency* is incomperible to an *Idea of a Being absolutely perfect*, much more *Impossibility*, the *Idea* of God being compiled of no Notions but such as are *possible* according to the light of Nature, to which we now appeal: It remains therefore that *Necessity of Actuall*
Exi-

Existence be unavoidably cast upon the *Idea* of God, and that therefore God does *actually Exist*.

But fourthly and lastly, if this seem more subtle, though it be no lesse true for it, I shall now propound that which is so palpable, that it is impossible for any one that has the use of his wits for to deny it. I say therefore, that either God or this corporeall and sensible world must of it self *necessarily exist*. Or thus, Either *God*, or *Matter*, or *both* do of themselves *necessarily exist*. If *both*, we have what we would drive at, the *existency* of God.

But yet to acknowledge the necessary existence of the *Matter* of it self, is not so congruous and suteable to the light of Nature. For if any thing can exist *independently* of God, all things may; so that not onely the Omnipotency of God might be in vain, but beside there would be a letting in from hence of all confusion and disorder imaginable; Nay of some grand Devill of equall Power and of as large Command as God himself: Or, if you will, of six thousand Millions of such monstrous Gigantick Spirits, fraught with various and mischievous Passions, as well as armed with immense power, who in anger or humour appearing in huge shapes, might take the Planets up in their prodigious Clutches, and pelt one another with them as boyes are

wont to do with snowbals; And that this has not yet happened will be resolved onely into this, that the humour has not yet taken them. But the frame of Nature and the generation of things would be still liable to this ruine and disorder. So dangerous a thing it is to slight the naturall *dependencies* and *correspondencies* of our innate *Ideas* and *conceptions*.

Nor is there any Refuge in such a Reply as this, that the full and perfect Infinitude of the power of God, is able easily to overmaster these six thousand Millions of Monsters; and to stay their hands. For I say that six or fewer, may equalize the infinite power of God. For if any thing may be *self-essentiated* besides God, why may not a *Spirit* of just six times lesse power then God exist of it self? and then six such will equalize him, a seventh will overpower him. But such a rabble of *self-essentiated* and *divided* Deities, does not onely hazzard the pulling the world in pieces; but plainly takes away the Existence of the true God. For if there be any power or perfection whatsoever, which has its originall from any other then God, it manifestly demonstrates that God is not God, that is, is not a *Being absolutely and fully perfect*, because we see some power in the world that is not his, that is, that is not from him. But what is fully and wholly from him, is very truly

and properly his, as the *thought* of my minde is rather my mindes, then my thoughts.

And this is the onely way that I know to demonstrate that it is impossible that there should be any more then *one* true God in the world; For if we did admit another beside him, this other must be also *self-originated*; and so neither of them would be God. For the *Idea* of God swallows up into it self all power and perfection conceivable, and therefore necessarily implies that whatever hath any being, derives it from him.

But if you say the *Matter* does only exist and not *God*, then this *Matter* does necessarily exist of it self, and so we give that Attribute unto the *Matter* which our Naturall Light taught us to be contain'd in the Essentiall conception of no other thing besides *God*. Wherefore to deny that of *God*, which is so necessarily comprehended in the true *Idea* of him, and to acknowledge it in that in whose *Idea* it is not at all contain'd (for *necessary Existence* is not contain'd in the *Idea* of any thing but of a *Being absolutely perfect*) is to pronounce contrary to our Naturall light, and to do manifest violence to our Faculties.

Nor can this be excused by saying that the Corporeall *Matter* is palpable and *sensible* unto us, but *God* is not, and therefore we pronounce

confidently that it is, though God be not, and also that it is *necessary* of it self, sith that which is without the help of another must necessarily be and eternally.

For I demand of you then, sith you professe your selves to beleve nothing but *sense*, how could *sense* ever help you to that truth you acknowledged last, *viz. That that which exists without the help of another, is necessary and eternal?* For *Necessity* and *Eternity* are no sensible Qualities, and therefore are not the objects of any *sense*; And I have already very plentifully proved, that there is other knowledge and perception in the Soul besides that of *Sense*. Wherefore it is very unreasonable, when as we have other faculties of knowledge besides the senses, that we should consult with the senses alone about matters of knowledge, and exclude those faculties that penetrate beyond *Sense*. A thing that the profess'd *Atheists* themselves will not doe when they are in the humor of Philosophising, for their principle of *Atomes* is a businesse that does not fall under *Sense*, as *Lucretius* at large confesses.

But now seeing it is so manifest that the Soul of man has other cognoscitive faculties besides that of *Sense* (which I have clearly above demonstrated) it is as incongruous to deny there is a *God*, because *God* is not an object fitted to the *Senses*, as it were to deny there

there is *Matter* or a *Body*, because that *Body* or *Matter*, in the imaginative Notion thereof, lies so unevenly and troublesomly in our *fancy* and *reason*.

In the contemplation whereof our understanding discovereth such contradictory incoherencies, that were it not that the notion is sustain'd by the confident dictates of *Sense*, *Reason* appealing to those more crasse Representations of *Fancy*, would by her shrewd *Dilemma's* be able to argue it quite out of the world. But our Reason being well aware that *corporeall* matter is the proper object of the sensitive faculty, she gives full belief to the information of *Sense* in her own spear, slighting the puzzling objections of perplexed *Fancy*, and freely admits the existence of *Matter*, notwithstanding the intanglements of *Imagination*, as she does also the existence of *God*, from the contemplation of his *Idea* in our soul, notwithstanding the silence of the senses therein. For indeed it were an unexcusable piece of folly and madnesse in a man, when as he has cognoscitive faculties reaching to the knowledge of *God*, and has a certain and unalterable *Idea* of *God* in his soul, which he can by no device wipe out, as well as he has the knowledge of *Sense* that reaches to the discovery of the *Matter*; to give necessary *Self-existence* to the *Matter*, no Faculty

at all informing him so; and to take necessary Existence from *God*, though the naturall notion of *God* in the Soul inform him to the contrary; and onely upon this pretence, because *God* does not immediately fall under the Knowledge of the *Senses*; Thus partially siding with one kinde of Faculty onely of the Soul, and proscribing all the rest. Which is as humourfomely and foolishly done, as if a Man should make a faction amongst the *Senses* themselves, and resolve to beleve nothing to be but what he could see with his Eyes, and so confidently pronounce that there is no such thing as the Element of *Aire*, nor *Winds*, nor *Musick*, nor *Thunder*. And the reason forsooth must be because he can see none of these things with his Eyes, and that's the sole sense that he intends to beleve.

CHAP. IX.

The second Argument from the Idea of God as it is Subjected in our Souls, and is the fittest Naturall means imaginable to bring us to the knowledge of our Maker. That bare possibility ought to have no power upon the minde, to either hasten or hinder its assent in any thing. We being dealt with in all points as if there were a God, that naturally we are to conclude there is one.

AND hitherto I have argued from the naturall *Notion* or *Idea* of God as it respects that of which it is the *Idea* or *Notion*. I shall now try what advantage may be made of it, from the respect it bears unto our *Souls*, the *Subject* thereof, wherein it does reside.

I demand therefore who put this Indelible Character of God upon our Souls? why, and to what purpose is it there? Nor do not think to shuffle me off by saying, We must take things as we finde them, and not inquire of the finall Cause of any thing; for things are necessarily as they are of themselves, whose guidance and contrivance is from no principle of Wisdome or Counsel, but every substance is now and ever was of what nature and capacity it is found; having its Originall from none other then it self; and all those changes and varieties we see in the World, are but
the

the result of an Eternall Scuffle of coordinate Causes, bearing up as well as they can, to continue themselves in the present state they ever are, and acting and being acted upon by others, these varieties of things appear in the world, but every particular Substance with the Essentiall Properties thereof is self-originated, and independent of any other.

For to this I answer, that the very best that can be made of all this is but thus much; that it is merely and barely possible, nay if we consult our own faculties, and the Idea of God, utterly impossible: but admit it possible; this bare possibility is so laxe, so weak, and so undeterminate a consideration, that it ought to have no power to move the mind this way or that way that has any tolerable use of her own Reason, more then the faint breathings of the loose Air have to shake a Mountain of brasse. For if bare possibility may at all intangle our assent or dissent in things, we cannot fully misbeleive the absurdest Fable in *Aesop* or *Ovid*, or the most ridiculous figments that can be imagin'd; As suppose that *Ears of Corn in the field hear the whistling of the wind and chirping of the Birds: that the stones in the street are grinded with pain when the Carts go over them: that the Heliotrope eyes the Sun and really sees him as well as turns round about with him: that the Pulp of the wall-nut, as bearing the signature*

of the brain, is indued with *Imagination and Reason*. I say no man can fully mis-beleeve any of these fooleries, if bare *possibility* may have the least power of turning the Scales this way or that way. For none of these nor a thousand more such like as these imply a perfect & palpable Contradiction, and therefore will put in for their right of being deemed *possible*. But we are not to attend to what is simply *possible*, but to what our *natural faculties* do direct & determine us to. As for example, Suppose the question were, *whether the Stones in the street have sense or no*, we are not to leave the point as indifferent, or that may be held either way, because it is *possible* & implies no palpable Contradiction, that they may have *sense*, & that a *painfull sense* too. But we are to consult with our *naturall faculties*, and see whither they pre-pond, & they do plainly determinate the controversy by telling us, that what has *sense* & is capable of *pain*, ought to have also *progressive Motion*, to be able to avoid what is hurtfull & painfull, & we se it is so in all beings that have any considerable share of *Sense*. And *Aristotle* who was no doter on a *Deity*, yet frequently does assume this principle, Ἡ φύσις ἔδ' ἐν μάτην ποιεῖ, That *Nature does nothing in vain*. Which is either an acknowledgment of a *God*, or an appeal to our own *Rationall Faculties*, and I am indifferent which, for I have what I would

out of either; for if we appeale to the naturall suggestions of our own faculties, they will assuredly tell us there is a God.

I therefore again demand and I desire to be answered without prejudice, or any restraint laid upon our naturall faculties, To what purpose is this indelible *Image* or *Idea* of God in us, if there be no such thing as *God* existent in the world? or who seal'd so deep an impression of that Character upon our Minds?

If we were travailing in a desolate *wilderness*, where we could discover neither Man nor house, and should meet with *Herds* of *Cattell* or *Flockes* of *Sheep* upon whose bodies there were branded certain *Markes* or *Letters*, we should without any hesitancy conclude that these have all been under the hand of some man or other that has set his name upon them. And verily when we see writ in our Souls in such legible Characters the *Name* or rather the *Nature* and *Idea* of God, why should we be so slow and backward from making the like reasonable inference? Assuredly he whose *Character* is signed upon our Souls, has been here, and has thus marked us that we and all may know to whom we belong, That *it is he that has made us, and not we our selves; that we are his people, and the sheep of his Pasture.* And it is evidently plain from the *Idea* of God, which includes omnipotency in it, that wee can be

made from none other then he; as I have before demonstrated. And therefore there was no better way then by, sealing us with this *Image* to make us acknowledge our selves to be his, and to do that worship and adoration to him that is due to our mighty *Maker and Creator*, that is to our *God*.

Wherefore things complying thus naturally, and easily together, according to the free Suggestions of our *naturall Faculties*, it is as perverse and forced a businesse to suspend assent, as to doubt whether those *Roman Urnes* and *Coynes* I spoke of digg'd out of the Earth, be the works of Nature, or the Artifice of Men.

But if we cannot yet for all this give free assent to this Position, that *God does Exist*; let us at least have the Patience a while to suppose it. I demand therefore supposing God did *Exist*, What can the Mind of Man imagine that this God should do better or more effectually for the making himself known to such a Creature as Man, indued with such and such faculties, then we finde really already done: For God being a *Spirit* and *Infinite*, cannot ever make himself known Necessarily, and Adequately by any appearance to our outward *Senses*. For if he should manifest himself in any outward figures or shapes, portending either love or wrath, terror or protection,

our faculties could not assure us that this were *God*, but some particular *Genius* good or bad: and besides, such dazeling and affrightfull external forces are neither becoming the divine Nature, nor suteable with the Condition of the Soul of Man, whose better faculties and more free God meddles with, does not force nor amaze us by a more course and oppressing power upon our weak and brutish senses. What remains therefore but that he should manifest himself to our *Inward Man*? And what way imaginable is more fit then the indelible Impression of the *Idea* of himself, which is (not divine life and sense, for that's an higher prize laid up for them that can win it, but) a naturall representation of the God-head and a Notion of his *Essence*, whereby the Soul of Man could no otherwise conceive of him then an *Eternall Spirit*, *Infinite in Goodnesse*, *Omnipotent*, *Omniscient*, and *Necessarily of himself Existing*. But this, as I have fully proved, we find *de facto* done in us, wherefore we being every way dealt with as if there were a *God Existing*, and no *Faculty* discovering any thing to the contrary, what should hinder us from the concluding that he does really *Exist*?

C H A P. X.

Naturall Conscience, and Religious Veneration,
arguments of the Existence of God.

Hitherto we have argued for the Existency of the God-head from the naturall *Idea* of God, inseparably and immutably residing in the soul of Man. There are also other arguments may be drawn from what we may observe to stick very close to mans nature, and such is *Naturall remorse of Conscience*, and a fear and disturbance from the committing of such things as notwithstanding are not punishable by men : As also a *naturall hope* of being prosperous and successfull in doing those things which are conceived by us to be good and righteous ; And lastly *Religious Veneration* or *Divine worship* ; All which are fruits unforcedly and easily growing out of the nature of man ; and if we rightly know the meaning of them, they all intimate that *there is a God*.

And first of *Naturall Conscience* it is plain that it is a fear and confusion of Mind arising from the presage of some mischief that may befall a man beside the ordinary course of Nature, or the usuall occurrences of affairs, because he has done thus or thus. Not that what is supernaturall or absolutely extraordinary

nary must needs fall upon him; but that at least the ordinary calamities and misfortunes, which are in the world, will be directed and levelled at him some time or other, because he hath done this or that Evill against his *Conscience*. And men doe naturally in some heavy *Adversity*, mighty *Tempest* on the Sea, or dreadfull *Thunder* on the Land (though these be but from Naturall Causes) reflect upon themselves and their actions, and so are invaded with fear, or are unterrified, accordingly as they condemne or acquit themselves in their own *Consciences*. And from this supposal is that magnificent Expression of the *Poet* concerning the just man,

Nec fulminantis magna Jovis manus,

That he is not afraid of the darting down of *Thunder* and *Lightning* from Heaven. But this fear, that one should be struck rather then the rest, or at this time rather then another time, because a man has done thus or thus, is a naturall acknowledgement that these things are guided and directed from some discerning principle, which is all one as to confesse that *there is a God*. Nor is it materiall that some alledge that *Mariners* curse and swear the lowdest when the storm is the greatest, for it is because the usualness of such dangers have made them lose the sense of the danger, not the sense of a *God*.

It is also very naturall for a man that follows honestly the dictates of his own *Conscience*, to be full of good hopes, and much at ease, and secure that all things at home and abroad will go successively with him, though his actions or sincere motions of his Mind act nothing upon Nature or the course of the world to change them any way: wherefore it implies that there is a *Superintendent Principle* over Nature, and the materiall frame of the world, that looks to it so that nothing shall come to passe, but what is consistent with the good and welfare of honest and conscientious Men. And if it does not happen to them according to their expectations in this world, it does naturally bring in a belieef of a world to come.

Nor does it at all enervate the strength of this Argument that some men have lost the sense and difference betwixt good and evill, if there be any so fully degenerate; but let us suppose it, this is a monster, and I suspect of his own making. But this is no more prejudice to what I aim at, who argue from the *Naturall constitution* of a Man the *Existency* of a *God*; then if because *Democritus* put out his Eyes, some are born blind, others drink out their Eyes and cannot see, that therefore you should conclude that there is neither *Light* nor *Colours*: For if there were, then every one would

would see them, but *Democritus* and some others do not see them. But the reason is plain, there hath been force done to their *Naturall Faculties* and they have put out their sight.

Wherefore I conclude from *naturall Conscience* in a Man that puts him upon hope and fear of Good and Evill from what he does or omits, though those actions and omissions do nothing to the change of the course of Nature or the affairs of the world, that there is an *Intelligent Principle* over universall Nature that takes notice of the Actions of Men, that is that *there is a God*; for else this *Naturall Faculty* would be false and vain.

Now for *Adoration* or *Religious Worship* it is as universall as mankind, there being no Nation under the Cope of heaven that does not doe divine worship to something or other, and in it to God as they conceive; wherefore according to the ordinary *naturall light* that is in all men, there is a God.

Not can the force of this Argument be avoided, by saying it is but an universall *Tradition* that has been time out of minde spread among the Nations of the world. For if it were so (which yet cannot at all be proved) in that it is universally received, it is manifest that it is according to the *lights of Nature* to acknowledge there is a God. For that which all men

men admits as true, though upon the propo-
fall of another; is undoubtedly to be termed
true according to the *light of Nature*. As
many hundreds of *Geometricall Demonstrati-
ons* that were first the Inventions of some one
man, have passed undeniable through all ages
and places for true, according to the *light of
Nature*, with them that were but Learners,
not Inventors of them. And it is sufficient to
make a thing true according to the *light of Na-
ture*, that no man upon a perception of what
is propounded and the reasons of it (if it be
not clear at the first sight, and need reasons to
back it) will ever stick to acknowledge for a
Truth. And therefore if there were any Na-
tions that were destitute of the knowledge of
a *God*, as they may be it is likely of the Rudi-
ments of *Geometry*, so long as they will admit
of the knowledge of one as well as of the
other, upon due and fit proposall; the ac-
knowledgement of a *God* is as well to be said
to be according to the *light of Nature*, as the
knowledge of *Geometry* which they thus re-
ceive.

But if it be here objected that a thing may
be universally received of all Nations and yet
be so farre from being true according to the
light of Nature, that it is not true at all: As for
example, that the *Sun* moves about the *Earth*,
† that the *Earth* stands still as the fixed Cen-

ter of the world, which the best of Astronomers and the profoundest of Philosophers pronounce to be false: I answer that in some sense it does stand still, if you understand by Motion the translation of a body out of the vicinity of other bodies. But suppose it did not stand still, this comes not home to our Case; For this is but the just victory of Reason over the generall prejudice of Sense; and every one will acknowledge that Reason may correct the Impresses of Sense, otherwise we should admit the Sun and Moon to be no wider then a Sive, and the bodies of the Stars to be no bigger then the ordinary flame of a Candle. Therefore you see here is a clashing of the faculties one against another, and the stronger carries it. But there is no faculty that can be pretended to clash with the judgement of Reason and naturall Sagacity that so easily either concludes or presages that there is a God: wherefore that may well go for a Truth according to the *light of Nature* that is universally received of men, be it by what faculty it will they receive it, no other faculty appearing that can evidence to the contrary. And such is the *universall acknowledgement* that there is a God.

Nor is it much more materiall to reply, That though there be indeed a *Religious Worship* exercised in all Nations upon the face of

the Earth, yet they worship many of them but *stocks and stones*, or some particular piece of Nature, as the *Sunne, Moon, or Stars*; For I answer, that first it is very hard to prove that they worship any Image or Statue, without reference to some Spirit at least, if not to the omnipotent God. So that we shall hence at least win thus much, that there are in the Universe some more subtile and Immateriall Substances that take notice of the affairs of Men, and this is as ill to a slow Atheist, as to believe that *there is a God*.

And for that adoration some of them do to the *Sun* and *Moon*, I cannot believe they do it to them under the Notion of mere *Inanimate Bodies*, but they take them to be the habitation of some *Intellectuall Beings* as that verse does plainly intimate to us,

Ἡλιός θ' ὅς πάντ' ἑσποράς καὶ πάντ' ἐπακέραι.
The Sun that hears and sees all things, and this is very near the true Notion of a *God*.

But be this *universall Religions Worship* what it will as absurd as you please to fancy it, yet it will not faile to reach very far for the proving of a *Deity*. For there is no naturall Faculties in things that have not their object in the world; as there is meat as well as mouths, sounds as well as hearing, colors as well as sight, dangers as well as feare, and the like. So there ought in like manner to be a *God* as well as a naturall propen-

propension in men to *Religious worship*, *God alone* being the proper *Object* thereof.

Nor does it abate the strength of the argument that this so deeply radicated property of *Religion* in man, that cannot be lost, does so ineptly and ridiculouſly display it ſelf in *Mankind*.

For as the plying of a *Dogs feet* in his ſleep, as if there were ſome game before him, and the butting of a yong *lambe* before he has yet either horns or enemies to encounter, would not be in nature, were there not ſuch a thing as a *Hare* to be courſed, or an *horned Enemy* to be incountered with horns: So there would not be ſo univerſall an exerciſe of *Religious Worſhip* in the world, though it be done never ſo ineptly and fooliſhly, were there not really a due *object* of this worſhip, and a capacity in *Man* for the right performance thereof, which could not be unleſſe there were a *God*.

But the Truth is, *Mans Soul* in this drunken drowſy condition ſhe is in, has fallen aſleep in the body, and like one in a dream talks to the bed-poſts, embraces her pillow in ſtead of her friend, falls down before ſtatues in ſtead of adoring the *Externall and Inviſible God*, prays to ſtocks and ſtones in ſtead of ſpeaking to him that by his word created all things.

I, but you will reply that a yong *Lambe* has at length both his weapon and *Enemy* to en-

counter, and the dreaming *Dogge* did once, and may again pursue some reall game; And so he that talks in his sleep did once confer with men awake, and may do so once again; But whole Nations for many successions of Ages have been very stupid Idolaters, and do so continue to this day. But I answer that this rather informes us of another great Mystery then at all enervates the present argument or obscures the grand truth we strive for. For this does plainly insinuate thus much, that Mankind is in a laps'd condition, like one fallen down in the fit of an Epilepsy, whose limbs by force of the convulsion are moved very incomposedly and illfavorably; but we know that he that does for the present move the members of his body so rudely and fortuitously, did before command the use of his Muscles in a decent exercise of his progressive faculty, and that when the fit is over he will do so again.

This therefore rather implies that these poor barbarous Souls had once the true knowledge of *God*, and of his *worship*; and by some hidden providence may be recover'd into it again; then that this propension to *Religious Worship*; that so conspicuously appears in them, should be utterly in vain: As it would be both in them and in all men else, if there were no *God*.

C H A P. XI.

Of the Nature of the Soul of Man, whether she be a meer Modification of the Body, or a Substance really distinct, and then whether corporeall or incorporeall.

WE have done with all those more obvious faculties in the Soul of Man, that naturally tend to the discovery of the Existence of a God. Let us briefly, before we loose from our selves and lanch out into the vast Ocean of the External *Phænomena* of Nature, consider the Essence of the Soul her self, what it is, whether a meer *Modification* of the Body, or *Substance distinct* therefrom; and then whether *corporeall* or *incorporeall*. For upon the clearing of this point we may happily be convinced that there is a *Spiritual Substance*, really distinct from the Matter. Which who so does acknowledge will be easilier induced to beleieve there is a God.

First therefore if we say that the Soul is a meer *Modification* of the Body, the Soul then is but one univerrall Faculty of the Body, or a many Faculties put together, and those operations which are usually attributed unto the Soul, must of necessity be attributed unto the Body. I demand therefore to what in the body will you attribute *Spontaneous Motion*?

I understand thereby a power in our selves of wagging or holding still most of the parts of our body, as our hand suppose or little finger. If you will say that it is nothing but the *immission* of the *Spirits* into such and such muscles; I would gladly know what does *immit* these *Spirits*, and direct them so curiously. Is it *themselves*, or the *Brain*, or that particular piece of the Brain they call the *Conarion* or *Pine kernel*? What ever it be, that which does thus immit them and direct them must have *Animadversion*, and the same that has *Animadversion*, has *Memory* also and *Reason*. Now I would know whether the *Spirits themselves* be capable of *Animadversion*, *Memory*, and *Reason*; for it indeed seems altogether impossible. For these animal *Spirits* are nothing else, but matter very thin and liquid, whose nature consists in this, that all the particles of it be in Motion, and being loose from one another fridge and play up and down according to the measure and manner of agitation in them.

I therefore now demand, which of the particles in these so many loosely moving one from another, has *Animadversion* in it? If you say that they all put together have, I appeal to him that thus answers how unlikely it is that that should have *Animadversion* that is so utterly incapable of *Memory*, and consequently

quently of *Reason*. For it is impossible to conceive *Memory* competent to such a Subject, as it is, how to write Characters in the water or in the wind.

If you say the *Brain* immits and directs these Spirits, how can that so freely and spontaneously move it self or another that has no Muscles? besides *Anatomists* tell us that though the Brain be the Instrument of sense, yet it has no sense at all of it self; how then can that that has no sense, direct thus spontaneously and arbitrarily the animal Spirits into any part of the body? an act that plainly requires determinate sense and perception, But let the Anatomists conclude what they will, I think I shall little less then demonstrate that the *Brains* have no Sense. For the same thing in us that has Sense has likewise *Animadversion*; and that which has *Animadversion* in us, has also a faculty of free and arbitrary *Fancy* and of *Reason*.

Let us now consider the nature of the *Brain*, and see how comperible those alterations are to such a Subject. Verily if we take a right view of this lake pith or marrow in mans head, neither our sense nor understanding can discover any thing more in this substance that can pretend to such noble operations as free imagination and sagacious collections of Reason, then we can discern in a Cake

of Sewet or a Bowl of Curds. For this loose Pulp; that is thus wrapp'd up within our *Cranium*, is but a spongy and porous body, and pervious not only to the Animal Spirits but also to more Juice and Liquor, else it could not well be nourished, at least it could not be so soft and moistned by drunkenness and excess, as to make the understanding inept and sottish in its operations. Wherefore I now demand in this soft substance which we call the *Brain*, whose softness implies that it is in some measure liquid, and liquidity implies a several *Motion* of loosned parts; in what part or parcel thereof does *Fancy*, *Reason*, and *Animadversion* lye? In this laxe consistence that lies like a Net all on heaps in the water, I demand in what knot, loop, or interval thereof does this faculty of free *Fancy* and active *Reason* reside? I believe you will be asham'd to assigne me any: and if you will say in all together, you must say that the whole brain is figured into this or that representation, which would cancel Memory and take away all capacity of there being any distinct Notes and places for the several Species of things there represented. But if you will say there is in *Every part* of the Brain this power of *Animadversion* and *Fancy*, you are to remember that the Brain is in some measure *liquid body*, and we must inquire how these

loose parts understand one anothers several *Animadversions* and *Notions*: And if they could (which is yet very inconceivable) yet if they could from hence dorany thing toward the *immission* and *direction* of the *Animal Spirits* into this or that part of the body, they must do it by knowing one anothers minds, and by a joynt contention of strength, as when many men at once the word being given, lift or tugg together for the moving of some so: massie a body that the single strength of one could not deal with. But this is to make the several particles of the brain, so many *Individual persons*; A fitter object for laughter then the least measure of belief.

Besides, how come these many animadversions to seem but one to us, our mind being these, as is supposed? Or why if the figurati- on of one part of the brain be communicated to all the rest, does not the same object seem situated both behinde us and before us, above and beneath, on the right hand and on the left, and every way as the Impress of the ob- ject is reflected against all the parts of the brains? But there appearing to us but one animadversion and one site of things, it is a sufficient Argument that there is but one, or if there be many, that they are not mutually communicated from the parts one to another,

therefore there can be no such joynt endeavour toward one designe, whence it is manifest that the *brains* cannot *immit* nor direct these *Animal Spirits* into what part of the body they please.

Moreover that the *Brain* has *no Sense*, and therefore cannot impress spontaneously any motion on the *Animal Spirits*, it is no slight Argument in that some being dissected have been found without Brains, and *Fantanus* tells us of a boy at *Amsterdam* that had nothing but limpid water in his head in stead of Brains; and the Brains generally are easily dissolvable into a watery consistence, which agrees with what I intimated before. Now I appeal to any free Judge how likely these liquid particles are to approve themselves of that nature and power as to be able by erecting and knitting themselves together for a moment of time, to beare themselves so as with one joynt contention of strength to cause an arbitrary ablegation of the Spirits into this or that determinate part of the Body. But the absurdity of this I have sufficiently insinuated already.

Lastly the *Nerves*, I mean the Marrow of them which is of the self same substance with the Brain, have *no Sense*, as is demonstrable from a *Caniops* or *Catochus*: but I will not accumulate Arguments in a matter so palpable.

As for that little sprunt piece of the Brain which they call the *Comaion*, that this should be the very substance whose natural faculty it is to move it self, and by its motions and nods to determinate the course of the *Spirits* into this or that part of the Body, seems to me no less foolish and fabulous then the story of him that could change the wind as he pleased by setting his cap on this or that side of his head.

If you heard but the magnificent stories that are told of this little lurking *Mushrome*, how it does not only hear and see, but imagines, reasons, commands the whole fabrick of the body more dexterously then an *Indian* boy does an *Elephant*, what an acute *Logician*, subtle *Geometrician*, prudent *Statesman*, skilful *Physician* and profound *Philosopher* he is, and then afterward by dissection you discover this worker of Miracles to be nothing but a poor silly contemptible Knob or Protuberancy consisting of a thin Membrane containing a little pulposus Matter much of the same nature with the rest of the Brain,

Spectatum admisi risum teneatis amici?

Would you not sooner laugh at it then go about to confute it? And truly I may the better laugh at it now, having already confuted it in what I have afore argued concerning the rest of the brain.

I shall therefore make bold to conclude that the Impress of *Spontaneous Motion* is neither from the *Animal Spirits* nor from the *Brain*, & therefore that those operation that are usually attribute unto the Soul are really incompatible to any part of the Body, and therefore that the *Soul* is not a meer *Modification* of the *Body*, but a *Substance distinct* therefrom.

Now we are to enquire whether this *Substance distinct* from what ordinarily we call the *Body*, be also it self a *Corporeal Substance*, or whether it be *Incorporeal*. If you say that it is a *Corporeal substance* you can understand no other then *Matter* more subtile & tenuious then the *Animal Spirits* themselves, mingled with them & dispersed through the vessels & porosities of the *Body*, for there can be no Penetration of *Dimensions*. But I need no new Arguments to confute this fond conceipt, for what I said of the *Animal Spirits* before, is applicable with all ease and fitness to this present case. And let it be sufficient that I advertise you so much, and so be excused from the repeating of the same things over again.

It remains therefore that we conclude that that which impresses *Spontaneous Motion* upon the *Body*, or more immediately upon the *Animal Spirits*, that which *imagines, remembers, and reasons*, is an *Immaterial substance distinct* from the *Body*, which uses the *Animal*

Spirits

Spirits and the Brains for Instruments in such and such Operations: and thus we have found a *Spirit* in a proper Notion and signification that has apparently these faculties in it; it can both *understand* and *move* Corporeall Matter.

And now this prize that we have wonne will prove for our designe of very great Consequence. For it is obvious here to observe, that the Soul of man is as it were *ἀγαλμα θεῶ* a *Compendious Statue of the Deity*. Her substance is a *solid Effigies of God*. And therefore as with ease we consider the Substance and Motion of the vast *Heavens* on a little *Sphere* or *Globe*, so we may with like facility contemplate the nature of the *All-mighty* in this little *Meddal of God*, the Soul of Man, enlarging to Infinity what we observe in our selves when we transerre it unto God; as we do imagine those *Circles* which we view on the *Globe*, to be vastly bigger while we fancy them as described in the *Heavens*.

Wherefore we being assured of this, that there is a Spiritual Substance in our selves in which both these properties do reside, viz. of understanding and of moving Corporeal Matter, let us but enlarge our Minds so, as to conceive as well as we can of a Spiritual Substance that is able to move and actuate all Matter whatsoever never so farre extended, and after what way and manner soever it please

please, and that it has not the knowledge only of this or that particular thing, but a distinct and plenary Cognoscence of all things; and we have indeed a very competent apprehension of the Nature of the Eternal and Invisible God, who like the Soul of Man, does not indeed fall under sense, but does every where operate so, that his presence is easily to be gathered from what is discovered by our outward senses.

C H A P.

C H A P. I.

The Universal Matter of the World be it homogeneal or heterogeneal, self-mov'd or resting of its self, that it can never be contriv'd into that Order it is without the Super-intendency of a God.



THE last thing I insisted upon was the Specifick nature of the Soul of Man, how it is an immaterial substance indued with these two eminent Properties, of Understanding and Power of moving corporeal Matter. Which truth I cleared, to the intent that when we shall discover such Motions and contrivances in the largely extended Matter of the World as imply Wisdome and Providence, we may the easilier come off to the acknowledgement of that Eternal Spiritual Essence that has fram'd Heaven and Earth, and is the Author and maker of all visible and invisible Beings.

Wherefore we being now so well furnish'd for the voiage, I would have my *Atheist* to take Shipping with me, and leosing from this particular Speculation of our own inward nature, to lanch out into that vast Ocean, as I said, of the External *Phenomnes* of Universal Nature,

Nature, or walk with me a while on the wide Theatre of this *Outward World*, and diligently to attend to those many and most manifest marks and signes that I shall point him to in this outward frame of things, that naturally signify unto us that *there is a God*.

And now first to begin with what is most general, I say that the *Phænomena* of *Day* and *Night*, *Winter* and *Summer*, *Spring-time* and *Harvest*, that the manner of *rising* and *setting* of the *Sun*, *Moon* and *Stars*, that all these are signs and tokens unto us that there is a *God*, that is, that things are so framed that they naturally imply a principle of *wisdom* and *Counsel* in the *Author* of them. And if there be such an *Author* of external Nature, there is a *God*.

But here it will be reply'd, that meer *Motion* of the *universal Matter* will at last necessarily grinde it self into those more rude and general Delineations of Nature that are observed in the Circuits of the *Sun*, *Moon*, and *Stars*, and the general Consequences of them. But if the mind of man grow so bold as to conceit any such thing, let him examine his faculties what they naturally conceive of the *Notion* of *Matter*. And verily the great Master of this *Mechanical Hypothesis* does not suppose nor admit of any *Specificall difference* in this *Universal Matter*, out of which this outward frame of the *World* should arise.

Neither do I think that any Man else will easily imagine but that all the Matter of the world is of one kind for its very Substance or *Essence*.

Now therefore I demand concerning this universall uniform Matter, whether naturally *Motion*, or *Rest* belongs unto it. If *Motion*, it being acknowledg'd uniforme, it must be alike moved in *every part* or *particle* imaginable of it. For this Motion being naturall and essentiall to the Matter is alike every where in it, and therefore has loosened every Atome of it to the utmost capacity; so that every particle is alike, and moved alike. And therefore there being no prevalency at all in any one Atome above another in bignesse or Motion, it is manifest that this universall Matter, to whom motion is so essentiall and intrinsecall, will be ineffectuall for the producing of any *variety of appearances* in Nature, and so no *Sunnes*, nor *Starrs*, nor *Earths*, nor *Vortices* can ever arise out of this infinitely thin and still Matter, which must thus eternally remain unperceptible to any of our Senses, were our Senses ten thousand Millions of times more subtile then they are. Indeed there could not be any such thing as either Man or Sense in the world. But we see this Matter shews it self to us, in abundance of *varieties of appearance*; therefore there must be another principle besides the

Matter to order the Motion of it so, as may make these *varieties* to appear: And what will that prove but a *God*?

But if you'll say that *Motion* is *not* of the nature of Matter (as indeed, it is very hard to conceive it, the Matter supposed Homogeneous) but that it is inert and stupid of it self: then it must be moved from some other, and thus of necessity we shall be cast upon a God, or at least a Spirituall substance actuating the matter, which the Atheists are as much afraid of, as children are of Spirts, or themselves of a God.

But men that are much degenerate know not the naturall Emanations of their own Minds, but think of all things confusedly, and therefore it may be will not stick to affirm, that either the parts of the Matter are *Specifically different*, or though they be not, yet some are *moveable* of themselves, others inclinable to *Rest*, and was ever so; for it happened so to be though there be no reason for it in the thing it self: which is to wound our Faculties with so wide a gap, that after this they will let in any thing, and take away all pretence to any principles of Knowledge.

But to scuffle and combat with them in their own dark Caverns, let the universall Matter be a heterogeneous *Chaos* of confusion, variously moved and as it happens: I say there

is no likelyhood that this mad *Motion* would ever amount to so wise a *Contrivance*, as is discernable even in the generall *Delineations* of *Nature*. Nay it will not amount to a *Natural* appearance of what we see and what is conceived most easy thus to come to pass, to wit, a round *Sun*, *Moon*, and *Earth*. For it is shrewdly to be suspected that if there were no *Superintendent* over the *Motions* of those *Athereall Whirle-pooles*, which the French Philosophy supposes that the form of the *Sun* and the rest of the *Stars* would be *oblong*, not *round*, because the matter recedes all along the *Axis* of a *Vortex*, as well as from the *Centre*; and therefore naturally the *Space* that is left for the finest and subtilest *Element* of all of which the *Sun* and *Stars* are to consist, will be *long*, not *round*. Wherefore this *round* Figure we see them in, must proceed from some higher principle then the meer *Agitation* of the *Matter*: But whether simply *Spermatical*, or *Sensitive* also and *Intellectual*, I'll leave to the disquisition of others, who are more at leisure to meddle with such curiosities.

The *Business* that lies me in hand to make good is this, that taking that for granted which these great *Naturalists* would have allowed, to wit, that *the Earth moves about the Sun*: I say, the laws of its *Motion* are such, that if they had been imposed on her by humane rea-

son and counsel, they would have been no other then they are. So that appealing to our own faculties, we are to confess, that the motion of the *Sun* and *Stars*, or of the *Earth*, as our Naturalists would have it, is from a *knowing Principle*, or at least, hath passed the Approbation and Allowance of such a Principle.

For as Art takes what Nature will afford for her purpose, and makes up the rest her self, so the *Eternal Mind* (that put the universal Matter upon Motion, as I conceive most reasonable, or if the matter be confusedly mov'd of its self, as the Atheist wilfully contends) this *Eternal Mind*, I say, takes the easie and natural results of this general Impress of *Motion*, where they are for his purpose; where they are not, he rectifies and compleats them.

And verily it is far more sutable to reason, that God making the *Matter* of that nature, that it can by meer *motion* produce something, that it should go on so far, as that single advantage could naturally carry it, that so the wit of man, whom God hath made to contemplate the *Phenomena* of Nature, may have a more fit object to exercise it self upon. For thus is the understanding of Man very highly gratifi'd, when the works of God and their manner of production are made intelligible unto him by a natural deduction of one thing

thing from another; which would not have been, if God had on purpose avoided what the *Matter* upon *Motion* naturally afforded, and cancelled the laws thereof in every thing. Besides, to have altered or added any thing further, where there was no need, had been to *multiply Entities* to no purpose.

Thus it is therefore with Divine Providence, what that one single impress of *motion* upon the *universal matter* will afford that is useful and good, it doth allow and take in; what it might have miscarried in, or could not amount to, it directs or supplies. As in little pieces of wood naturally bow'd like a Mans Elbow, the Carver doth not unbow it, but carves an hand at the one end of it, and shapes it into the compleat figure of a Mans arm.

That therefore that I contend for is this, that be the *Matter moved* how it will, the *Appearances* of *things* are such as do manifestly intimate that they are either appointed all of them; or at least, approved by an *universal Principle of Wisdom and Counsel*.

C H A P. II.

The perpetuall Parallelisme of the Axis of the Earth and its due proportion of Inclination; as also the course of the Moon crossing the Ecliptick, evident arguments, that the fluid Matter is guided by a divine Providence. The Atheists Sophism of arguing from some petty inconsiderable Effects of the Motion of the Matter, that the said Motion is cause of all things, seasonably detest-ed and deservedly derided.

NOW therefore to admit the Motion of the Earth, and to talk with the Naturalists in their own Dialect, I demand, Whether it be better to have the *Axis* of the Earth *steady*, and *perpetually parallel* with its self; or to have it *carelessly tumble* this way and that way as it happens, or at least very variously and intricately. And you cannot but answer me, That it is better to have it *steady* and *Parallel*; for in this lies the necessary Foundation of the Art of *Navigation* and *Dyalling*. For that steady stream of Particles which is supposed to keep the *Axis* of the Earth parallel to it self, affords the Mariner both his *Cynosura* and his *Compass*. The *Loadstone* and the *Load-star* depend both on this. And *Dyalling* could not be at all without it. But both of these *Arts* are pleasant, and the one especially of mighty importance

portance to mankind: For thus there is an orderly measuring of Time for our affairs at home, and an opportunity of traffique abroad, with the most remote Nations of the world, and so there is a mutual supply of the several commodities of all Countreys; besides the enlarging of our understanding by so ample Experience we get of both men and things. Wherefore if we were rationally to consult, Whether the *Axis* of the Earth is to be held *steady* and *parallel* to it self, or to be left at *random*; we would conclude, That it ought to be *steady*. And so we find it *de facto*, though the Earth move floating in the liquid Heavens. So that appealing to our own Faculties, we are to affirm, That the constant direction of the *Axis* of the Earth was established by a principle of *wisdom* and *Counsel*, or at least approved of it.

Again, there being several Postures of this steady direction of the *Axis* of the Earth; *viz.* Either *Perpendicular* to a Plane going through the Centre of the Sun, or *Co-incident* or *Inclining*; I demand; Which of all these Reason and Knowledge would make choice of? Not of a *Perpendicular* posture; for both the pleasant variety and great conveniency of *Summer* and *Winter*, *Spring-time* and *Harvest* would be lost; and for want of accession of the Sun, these parts of the Earth that bring

forth fruit now, and are habitable, would be in an incapacity of ever bringing forth any, and consequently could entertain no Inhabitants; and those parts that the full heat of the Sun could reach, he plying them always alike, without any annual recession or intermission, would at last grow tired and exhausted. And besides, consulting with our own faculties we observe, that an orderly *vicissitude* of thing, is most pleasant unto us, and doth much more gratifie the contemplative property in Man.

And now in the second place, nor would reason make choice of a *Co-incident* position of the *Axis* of the Earth. For if the *Axis* thus lay in a Plane that goes through the Centre of the Sun, the *Ecliptick* would like a *Colure*, or one of the *Meridians*, pass through the *Poles* of the Earth, which would put the Inhabitants of the world into a pitiful condition: For they that scape best in the *Temperate Zone*, would be accloy'd with very tedious long nights, no less then forty days long; and they that now have their night never above four and twenty hours, as *Friseland*, *Iseland*, the further parts of *Russia* and *Norway*, would be deprived of the Sun above a hundred and thirty days together; our selves in *England*, and the rest of the same *Clime* would be closed up in darkness no less then an hundred or fifty continual days; and so proportionably

of the rest both in and out of the *Temperate Zones*. And as for *Summer* and *Winter*, though those vicissitudes would be, yet it could not but cause very raging diseases, to have the Sun stay so long describing his little Circles near the Poles, and lying so hot upon the Inhabitants that had been in so long extremity of Darknes and Cold before.

It remains therefore, that the posture of the *Axis* of the Earth be *Inclining*, not *Co-incident* nor *Perpendicular* to the forenamed Plane. And verily it is not onely *inclining*, but in so fit proportion, that there can be no fitter excogitated, to make it to the utmost capacity as well pleasant as habitable. For though the course of the Sun be curbed within the compass of the *Tropicks*, and so makes those parts very hot, yet the constant gales of wind from the East (to say nothing of the nature and fit length of their nights) make the *Torrid Zone* not onely habitable, but pleasant.

Now this best posture which our reason would make choice of, we see really establish'd in Nature, and therefore, if we be not perverse and wilful, we are to infer, that it was establish'd by a *Principle* that hath in it *Knowledge* and *Counsel*, not from a blind fortuitous jumbling of the parts of the Matter one against another, especially having found before in ourselves a *knowing Spiritual Substance*, that is also

able

able to move and alter the matter. Wherefore I say, we should more naturally conclude, That there is some such *universal knowing Principle*, that hath power to move and direct the Matter; then to fancy, that a confused justling of the Parts of the Matter should contrive themselves into such a condition, as if they had in them Reason and Counsel, and could direct themselves. But this directing Principle, what could it be but *God*?

But to speak the same thing more briefly, and yet more intelligibly, to those that are onely acquainted with the *Ptolemaical Hypothesis*: I say, that being it might have hapned, that the annual course of the *Sun* should have been through the *Poles* of the world, and that the *Axis* of the Heavens might have been very troublesomely and disorderly moveable, from whence all those inconveniencies would arise which I have before mentioned; and yet they are not, but are so ordered [as our own reason must approve of as best; it is natural for a man to conceive, that they are really ordered by a *Principle of Reason and Counsel*, that is, that they are made by an All-wise, and All-powerful *God*.

I will onely add one or two observables more, concerning the *Axis* of the Earth, and the course of the *Moon*, and so I will pass to other things.

It cannot but be acknowledged, that if the *Axis* of the Earth were *perpendicular* to the *Plane* of the Sun's *Ecliptick*, that her motion would be more easie and natural, and yet for the conveniences aforementioned, we see it is made to stand in an *inclining* posture: So in all likelihood it would be more easie and natural for that Hand-maid of the Earth, the *Moon*, to finish her monethly courses in the *Equinoctial Line*: But we see, like the Sun, she crosses it, and expatiates some degrees further than the Sun himself, that her exalted light might be more comfortable to those that live very much north, in their long nights.

Wherefore I conclude, That though it were possible, that the confused agitation of the parts of the Matter, might make a round hard heap like the *Earth*, and more thin and liquid bodies like the *Aether* and *Sun*, and that the *Earth* may swim in this liquid *Aether*, like a roasted Apple in a great bowl of Wine; and be carried about like straws or grass cast upon a Whir-pool, yet that its *Motion* and *Posture* would be so directed and attemper'd, as we our selves that have reason, upon due consideration would have it to be; and yet not to be from that which is *Knowing*, and in some sense *Reasonable*, is to our faculties, if they discern any thing at all, as absonous and absurd as any thing can be: For when it had been

easier

easier to have been otherwise, why should it be thus, if some *Superintendent Cause* did not oversee and direct the Motions of the Matter, allowing nothing therein but what our reason will confess to be to very good purpose?

But because so many *Bullets* joggled together in a mans hat, will settle to such a determinate figure, or because the *Frost* and the *Wind* will draw upon doors and glass-windows pretty uncouth streaks like feathers, and other fooleries, which are to no use or purpose, to infer thence, that *all the Contrivances* that are in *Nature*, even the frame of the *bodies* both of *Men* and *Beasts*, are from no other principle but the jumbling together of the Matter, and so because that this doth naturally effect something, that it is the cause of all things, seems to me to be a reasoning in the same *Mood* and *Figure* with that wise Market-mans, who going down a hill, and carrying his *Cheeses* under his arms, one of them falling and trundling down the hill very fast, let the other go after it, appointing them all to meet him at his house at *Gotham*, not doubting but they beginning so hopefully, would be able to make good the whole journey. Or like another of the same Town, who perceiving that his *Iron Treves* he had bought had three feet, and could stand, expected also that it should walk too, and save him the labour of the carriage. So our pro-

found *Atheists* and *Epicureans* according to the same pitch of Wisdom do not stick to infer, because this confused *Motion* of the parts of the *Matter* may amount to a rude delineation of hard and soft, rigid and fluid, and the like; that therefore it will go on further, and reach to the disposing of the *Matter* in such order as doth naturally imply a *Principle*, that some way or other contains in it exact *wisdom* and *Counsel*. A position more befitting the *Wise-men* above mentioned, then any one that hath the least command of his natural wit and faculties.

Wherefore we having sufficiently detected the ridiculous folly of this present Sophism, let us attending heedfully to the natural emanations of unprejudic'd reason conclude, that *the Rising and Setting of the lights of Heaven; the vicissitude of Day and Night, Winter and Summer*, being so ordered and guided, as if they had been settled by exquisite consultation, and by clearest knowledge; that therefore that which did thus ordain them is a *knowing Principle*, able to move, alter and guide the *Matter* according to his own will and pleasure; that is to say, that *there is a God*.

And verily I do not at all doubt, but that I shall evidently trace the visible foot-steps of this *Divine Counsel* and *Providence*, even in all things

things discoverable in the world. But I will pass through them as lightly and briefly as I can.

CHAP. III.

That Rivers, Quarries of stone, Timber-wood, Metals, Minerals, and the Magnet, considering the nature of Man, what use he can make of them, are manifest signs that the rude Motion of the Matter is not left to it self, but is under the guidance and Super-intendency of an All-wise God.

LET us therefore swiftly course over the *Valleys and Mountains*, sound the depth of the *Sea*, range the *Woods and Forrests*, dig into the *Entrailes of the Earth*, and let the *Atheist* tell me, which of all these places are silent, and say nothing of a *God*. Those that are most dumb, will at least compromise with the rest, that all things are by the guidance and determination (let the Matter move as it will) or at least by the allowance and approbation of a *Knowing Principle*: As a *Mason* that makes a wall, sometimes meets with a *stone* that wants no cutting, and so only approving of it, he places it in his work. And a *piece of Timber* may happen to be crack'd in the very place where the *Carpenter* would cleave

CHAP. 3. 19
cleave it, and he need not close it first, that he may cleave it asunder afterwards; wherefore if the meet Motion of the Matter can do any rude general thing of good consequence, let it stand as allowable: But we shall find out also those things which do so manifestly favour of *Design and Counsel*, that we cannot naturally withhold our assent, but must say *there is a God.*

And now let us betake our selves to the search, and see if all things be not so as our Reason would desire them. And to begin at the Top first, even those rudely scattered *Mountains*, that seem but so many Wens and unnatural Protuberancies upon the face of the Earth, if you consider but of what consequence they are, thus reconciled you may deem them ornaments as well as useful.

For these are Natures *Stillatories*, in whose hollow Caverns, the ascending vapours are congealed to that universal *Aqua vita*, that good *fresh-water*, the liquor of life, that sustains all the living Creatures in the world, being carried along in all parts of the Earth in the winding Channels of *Brooks and Rivers*. Geography would make it good by a large induction. I will onely instance in three or four; *Ana and Tagus* run from *Sierra Molina* in *Spain*, *Rhenus, Padus* and *Rhodanus* from the *Alps*, *Tanais* from the *Riphean*, *Garumna* from

from the *Pyrenean Mountains*, *Achelous* from *Pindus*, *Hebrus* from *Rhodope*, *Tigris* from *Niphates*, *Orontes* from *Libanus*, and *Euphrates* from the *Mountains of Armenia*, and so in the rest. But I will not insist upon this, I will now betake my self to what doth more forcibly declare an Eye of Providence, directing and determining, as well as approving of the results of the supposed agitation of the parts of the Matter.

And that you may the better feel the strength of my Argument, let us first briefly consider the nature of Man, what faculties he hath, and in what order he is, in respect of the rest of the Creatures. And indeed, though his body be but weak and disarmed, yet his inward abilities of Reason and Artificial contrivance is admirable. He is much given to Contemplation, and the viewing of this Theatre of the world, to traffick and commerce with forein Nations, to the building of Houses and Ships, to the making curious instruments of Silver, Brass or Steel, and the like. In a word, he is the flower and chief of all the products of Nature upon this Globe of the Earth. Now if I can shew, that there are designs laid even in the lowest and vilest products of Nature, that respect Man the highest of all, you cannot deny but that there is an *Eye of Providence* that respecteth all things,

things, and passeth very swiftly from the Top to the Bottom, disposing all things wisely.

I therefore now demand, Man being of this nature that he is, whether these noble faculties of his would not be lost and frustrate, were there not Materials to exercise them on. And in the second place I desire to know, whether the rude confused *Agitation* of the *particles* of the Matter do certainly produce any such Materials fit for Man to exercise his skill on, or no; that is to say, whether there were any Necessity that could infallibly produce *Quarries* of *Stone* in the earth; which are the chief Materials of all the Magnificent Structures of building in the world; And the same of *Iron* and *Steel*, without which there had been no use of these stones; And then of *Sea-Coal* and other necessary *Fuel*, fit for the working or melting of these Metals; and also of *Timber-Trees*, for all might have been as well brush-wood and shrubs; and then assuredly there had been no such convenient shipping, whatever had become of other buildings, And so of the *Load-stone*, that great help to Navigation, whether it might not have lain so low in the Earth, as never to have been reached by the industry of Man; and the same may be said also of other *Stones* and *Metals*, that they being heaviest, might have lain lowest.

Assuredly the *Agitated* Matter, unless there were some special over-powering guidance over it, might as well have over-slipt these necessary useful things, as hit upon them: But if there had not been such a Creature as Man, these very things themselves had been useless, for none of the brute Beasts make use of such commodities. Wherefore unless a man will do enormous violence to his faculties, he must conclude, that there is a contrivance of *Providence* and *Counsel* in all those things, which reacheth from the beginning to the end, and orders all things sweetly. And that *Providence* foreseeing what a kind of Creature she would make *Man*, provided him with materials, from whence he might be able to adorn his present Age, and furnish History with the Records of egregious exploits, both of Art and Valour. But without the provision of the forenamed Materials, the Glory and Pomp both of war and peace had been lost. For men in stead of those magnificent buildings which are seen in the world, could have had no better kind of dwellings then a bigger sort of Bee-hives or Birds-nests, made of contemptible sticks, and straws, and durty mortar. And in stead of the usual pomp and bravery of war, wherein is heard the solemn sound of the hoarse Trumpet, the couragious beating of the Drum, the neighing and prancing of the
Horses,

Horses, clattering of Armour, and the terrible thunder of Canons; to say nothing of the glittering of the Sword and Spear, the waving and fluttering of displayed Colours, the gallantry of Charges upon their well managed Steeds, and the like: I say, had it not been for the forenamed provision of *Iron, Steel and Brass*, and such like necessary Materials, in stead of all this glory and solemnity, there had been nothing but howlings and shoutings of poor naked men, belabouring one another with snag'd sticks, or dully falling together by the ears at Fisti-cuffs. Besides this, Beasts being naturally armed, and men naturally unarmed with any thing save their reason, and reason being ineffectual, having no materials to work upon, it is plain, that that which made Men, Beasts and Metals, knew what it did, and did not forget it self in leaving Man destitute of natural Armature, having provided Materials, and giving him wit and abilities to arm himself, and so to be able to make his party good against the most fierce and stoutest of all living Creatures whatsoever; nay indeed, left him unarmed on purpose, that he might arm himself, and exercise his natural wit and industry

CHAP. IV.

A further proof of Divine Providence, taken from the Sea, and the large train of Causes laid together, in reference to Navigation.

HAVING thus passed over the Hills, and through the Woods and hollow Entrails of the Earth, let us now view the wide *Sea* also, and see whether that do not inform us that there is a *God*; that is, whether things be not there in such sort as a rational Principle would either order or approve, when as yet notwithstanding they might have been otherwise. And now we are come to view those *Campos natantes*, as *Lucretius* calls them, that vast Champion of water, the *Ocean*; I demand first, Whether it might not have been wider than it is, even so large as to overspread the face of the whole Earth, and so to have taken away the habitation of Men and Beasts. For the wet particles might have easily ever mingled with the dry, and so all had either been *Sea* or *Quag-mire*. Secondly, though this distinction of *Land* and *Sea* be made, whether this watry Element might not have fallen out to be of so thin a consistency as that it would not bear Shipping; for it is so far from immobility, as there be *de facto* in Nature such waters,

waters, as the River *Silas* for example in *India*. And the waters of *Boristhenes* are so thin and light, that they are said to swim upon the top of the Stream of the River *Hypanis*. And we know there is some kind of wood so heavy, that it will sink in any ordinary kind of water.

Thirdly and lastly, I appeal to any mans reason, whether it be not better that there should be a distinction of *Land* and *Sea*, then that all should be mire or water: and whether it be not better that the Timber-trees afford wood so light that it swim on the water, or the water be so heavy that it will bear up the wood, then the contrary. That therefore which might have been otherwise, and yet is settled according to our own hearts wish, who are knowing and rational Creatures, ought to be deemed by us as established by *Counsel* and *Reason*. And the closer we look into the business, we shall discern more evident foot-steps of Providence in it: For the two main properties of Man being *Contemplation* and *Sociableness*, or love of *Converse*, there could nothing so highly gratifie his nature as power of *Navigation*, whereby he riding on the back of the waves of the *Sea*, views the wonders of the *Deep*, and by reason of the glibness of that Element, is able in a competent time to prove the truth of those sagacious suggestions of his

own mind; that is, whether the *Earth* be every way round, and whether there be any *Antipodes*, and the like; and by cutting the *Equinoctial line*, decides that controverſie of the habitableneſs of the *Torrid Zone*; or rather wipes out that blot that lay upon Divine Providence, as if ſo great a ſhare of the world had been loſt by reaſon of unfitness for habitation.

Besides, the falling upon *ſtrange Coaſts*, and *diſcovering* men of ſo great a diverſity of manners from our ſelves, cannot but be a thing of infinite *pleaſure* and advantage, to the enlargement of our thoughts from what we obſerve in their converſation, parts, and policy. Add unto this the ſundry *Rarities of Nature*, and *Commodities* proper to ſeveral Countreys; which they that ſtay at home enjoy, by the travels of thoſe that go abroad, and they that travel grow rich for their adventure.

Now therefore *Navigation* being of ſo great conſequence, to the *delight* and convenience of humane life, and there being both wit and courage in man to attempt the Seas, were he but fitted with right Materials; and other advantages requiſite; when we ſee there is ſo pat a proviſion made for him to this purpoſe in large *Timber*, for the building of his ſhip, in a *thick Sea-water* ſufficient to bear the ſhips burthen, in the *Magnet* or *Lodſtone* for his
Compaſs,

Compass, in the steady and parallel *direction of the Axis* of the Earth for his *Cynosura*; and then observing his natural *wit* and *courage* to make use of them, and how that ingenit desire of *knowledge* and *converse*, and of the *improving* of his own *parts* and *happiness* stir him up to so notable a design; we cannot but conclude from such a train of causes so fitly and congruously complying together, that it was really the counsel of an *universal* and *eternal Mind* that hath the overseeing and guidance of the whole frame of Nature, that laid together these causes so carefully and wisely; that is, we cannot but conclude that *there is a God*.

And if we have got so fast foot-hold already in this truth by the consideration of such *Phenomena* in the world that seem more *rude* and *generall*; what will the contemplation of the more *particular* and more *polished* pieces of Nature afford in *Vegetables*, *Animals*, and the *body of Man*?

Though the meer motion of the Matter may do something, yet it will not amount to the production of Plants and Animals. That it is no Botch in Nature that some Phænomena be the results of Motion, others of substantial Forms. That Beauty is not a meer fancy; and that the Beauty of Plants is an argument that they are from an Intellectual Principle.

Hitherto we have onely considered the more rude and careless strokes and delineaments of divine Providence in the world, set out in those more large *Phænomena* of Day and Night, Winter and Summer, Land and Sea Rivers, Mountains, Metals, and the like; we now come to a closer view of God and Nature in *Vegetables, Animals, and Man.*

And first of *Vegetables*, where I shall touch only these four heads, their *Form* and *Beauty*, their *Seed*, their *Signatures*, and their great *Use* as well for *Medicine* as *Sustenance*. And that we may the better understand the advantage we have in this closer Contemplation of the works of Nature, we are in the first place to take notice of the condition of that Substance which we call *Matter*, how fluid, and slippery, and undeterminate it is of it self; or if it be hard, how unfit it is to be chang'd into any thing else. And therefore all things rot into a moisture before any thing can be generated

of

of them, as we soften the wax before we set on the Seal.

Now therefore, unless we will be so foolish, as because the uniform motion of the Aire, or some more subtile corporeal Element, may so equally compress or bear against the parts of a little vaporous moisture, as to form it into round drops (as we see in the Dew and other Experiments) and therefore because this more rude and general Motion can do something, to conclude that it does all things; we must in all Reason confess that there is an *Eternal Mind*, in vertue whereof the *Matter* is thus usefully formed and changed.

But meer rude and undirected Motion, because naturally it will have some kind of Results, that therefore it will reach to such as plainly imply a wise contrivance of *Counsel*, is so ridiculous a Sophism, as I have already intimated, that it is more fit to impose upon the inconsiderate Souls of Fools and Children, then upon men of mature Reason and well exercis'd in Philosophy. Admit that *Rain* and *Snow* and *Wind* and *Hail* and *Ice* and such like Meteors may be the products of *Heat* and *Cold*, or of the *Motion* and *Rest* of certain small particles of the *Matter*; yet that the useful and beautiful contrivance of the *branches*, *flowers* and *fruits* of *Plants* should be so too (to say nothing yet of the bodies of *Birds*, *Fishes*, *Beast*.

Beasts and Men) is as ridiculous and supine a Collection, as to infer, that because meer Heat and Cold does *soften* and *harden wax*, and puts it into some shape or other, that therefore this meer Heat & Cold, or Motion and Rest, without any art and direction, made the *Silver Seal* too, and graved upon it so curiously some *Coat of Arms*, or the shape of some *Birds*, or *Beasts*, as an *Eagle*, a *Lyon*, and the like. Nay indeed, this inference is more tolerable far then the other, these effects of *Art* being more easie and less noble then those others of *Nature*.

Nor is it any botch or gap at all in the works of Nature, that some particular *Phænomena* be but the easie results of that *general Motion* communicated unto the Matter from God, others the effects of more curious *contrivance*, or of the *divine Art* or *Reason* (for such are the *λόγοι σπορματικοί*, the *Rationes Seminales*) incorporated in the Matter, especially the Matter it self being in some sort vital, else it would not continue the Motion that it is put upon, when it is occasionally this or the other way moved; and besides, the Nature of God being the most perfect fulness of life that is possibly conceivable, it is very congruous that this outmost and remotest shadow of himself be some way, though but obscurely vital. Wherefore things falling off by degrees from
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the highest perfection, it will be no uneven or unproportionable step, if descending from the Top of this outward Creation, *Man*, in whom there is a principle of more fine and reflexive Reason, which hangs on, though not in that manner in the more perfect kind of Brutes, as Sense also, loth to be curb'd within too narrow compass, lays hold upon some kinds of *Plants*, as in those sundry sorts of *Zoophyta*; but in the rest there are no further foot-steps discovered of an animadversive form abiding in them, yet there be the effects of an inadvertent form ($\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\textcircled{C}$. $\epsilon\iota\upsilon\lambda\textcircled{C}$) of materiaded or incorporated Art or Seminal Reason: I say, it is no uneven jot, to pass from the more faint and obscure examples of *Spermatical* life, to the more considerable effects of *general Motion*, in *Minerals*, *Metals*, and sundry *Meteors*, whose easie and rude shapes have no need of any particular principle of life, or *Spermatical form* distinct from the Rest or Motion of the particles of the Matter.

But there is that Curiosity of *form* and *beauty* in the more noble kind of *Plants* bearing such a suitability and harmony with the more refined sense and sagacity of the Soul of Man, that he cannot choose (his Intellectual Touch being so sweetly gratified by what it apprehends in such like Objects, but acknowledge that some hidden Cause much akin to his own

nature, that is intellectual, is the contriver and perfecter of these so pleasant spectacles in the world.

Nor is it at all to the purpose to object that this business of *Beauty* and *comeliness* of *proportion* is but a conceit, because some men acknowledge no such thing, and all things are alike handsom to them, who yet notwithstanding have the use of their Eyes as well as other folks. For, I say, this rather makes for what we aym at, that pulchritude is convey'd indeed by the outward Senses unto the Soul, but a more intellectual faculty is that which relishes it; as a *Geometrical Scheme* is let in by the Eyes, but the demonstration is discern'd by Reason. And therefore it is more rational to affirm, that some *Intellectual Principle* was the Author of this *Pulchritude* of things, then that they should be thus fashion'd without the help of that Principle. And to say that there is no such thing as *Pulchritude*, because some mens Souls are so dull and stupid, that they relish all objects alike in that respect, is as absurd and groundless, as to conclude there is no such thing as *Reason* and *Demonstration*, because a natural Fool cannot reach unto it. But that there is such a thing as *Beauty*, and that it is acknowledged by the whole generations of Men to be in *Trees*, *Flowers* and *Fruits*; the *orning* and beautifying of *Buildings* in all Ages

Ages is an ample and undeniable Testimony. For what is more ordinary with them than the taking in flowers and fruitage for the garnishing of their work? Besides, I appeal to any man that is not sunk into so forlorn a pitch of Degeneracy, that he is as stupid to these things as the basest of Beasts, whether, for example, a rightly cut *Tetraedrum*, *Cube* or *Icosaedrum* have no more pulchritude in them, than any rude *broken stone* lying in the field or highways; or to name other solid Figures, which though they be not Regular, properly so called, yet have a settled Idea and Nature, as a *Cone*, *Sphere* or *Cylinder*, whether the sight of these do not gratifie the minds of men more, and pretend to more elegance of shape, than those rude cuttings or chippings of *free stone*, that fall from the Masons hands, and serve for nothing but to fill up the middle of the Wall, and so to be hid from the Eyes of Man for their ugliness. And it is observable, that if Nature shape any thing near this Geometrical accuracy, that we take notice of it with much content & pleasure; as if it but be exactly *round* (as there are abundance of such stones found betwixt two hills in *Cuba*, an Island of *America*) or *ordinately Quadrangular*, or have the sides but *Parallel*, though the Angles be unequal, as is seen in some little stones, and in a kind of *Alabaster* found here in *England*: these

these stones, I say, gratifie our sight, as having a nearer cognation with the Soul of Man, that is rational and intellectual; and therefore is well pleased when it meets with any outward object that fits and agrees with those congenit Ideas her own nature is furnished with. For *Symmetry, Equality, and Correspondency of parts,* is the discernment of *Reason*, not the object of *Sense*, as I have heretofore proved.

Now therefore it being evident, that there is such a thing as *Beauty, Symmetry* and *Come-liness of Proportion* (to say nothing of the delightful mixture of colours) and that this is the proper object of the understanding & reason) (for these things be not taken notice of by the Beasts) I think I may safely infer, that whatever is the first and principal cause of changing the fluid and undetermined Matter into shapes so comely and symmetrical, as we see in *Flowers* and *Trees*, is an *understanding Principle*, and knows both the nature of man, and of those objects he offers to his sight in this outward and visible world. For these things cannot come by chance, or by a multifarious attempt of the parts of the matter upon themselves; for then it were likely that the *Species* of things (though some might hit right, yet most) would be maim'd and ridiculous; but now there is not any ineptitude in any thing, which is a sign that the fluidness of the Matter is

guided and determined by the overpowering counsel of an *Eternal Mind*; that is, of a God.

If it were not needless, I might now instance in sundry kinds of flowers, herbs and trees: but these objects being so obvious, and every mans fancy being branched with the remembrance of *Roses, Marigolds, Gillyflowers, Pionyes, Tulips, Pansies, Primroses, the leaves and clusters of the Vine*, and a thousand such like, of all which they cannot but confess, that there is in them *beauty and symmetry*, and grateful *proportion*; I hold it superfluous to weary you with any longer induction, but shall pass on to the three considerations behind, of their *Seed, Signatures* and *Usefulness*, and shall pass through them very briefly, the *Observables* being very ordinary and easily intelligible.

CHAP.

C H A P. VI.

*The Seeds and Signatures of Plants, arguments of
divine Providence.*

I Say therefore, in that every Plant has its *Seed*, it is an evident sign of divine Providence. For it being no necessary Result of the Motion of the Matter, as the whole con-
 erivance of the Plant indeed is not, and it be-
 ing of so great consequence that they have
~~seed~~ *seed* for the continuance and propagation of
 their own *Species*, and for the gratifying of
 mans Art also, Industry and necessities (for
 much of husbandry and gardening lies in this)
 it cannot but be an Act of *Counsel* to furnish
 the several kinds of Plants with their *Seeds*,
 especially the Earth being of such a nature,
 that though at first for a while, it might bring
 forth all manner of *Plants*, (as some will have
 it also to have brought forth all kinds of *Ani-
 mals*) yet at last it would grow so sluggish, that
 without the advantage of those small com-
 pendious Principles of generation, the grains
 of *Seed*, it would yield no such births; no
 more then a Pump grown dry will yield any
 water, unless you pour a little water into it
 first, and then for one *Bason*-ful you may
 fetch up so many *Soe*-fuls.

Nor is it material to object, that stinking *weeds* and *poysonous Plants* bear *Seed* too as well as the most *pleasant* and most *useful*. For even those stinking *weeds* and *poysonous Plants* have their use. For first the Industry of Man is exercised by them to weed them out where they are hurtful. Which reason, if it seem slight, let us but consider, that if humane Industry had nothing to conflict and struggle with, the fire of mans Spirit would be half extinguish'd in the flesh, and then we shall acknowledge that that which I have alledged is not so contemptible nor invalid.

But secondly, who knows but it is so with *poysonous Plants*, as vulgarly is phansied concerning *Toads* and other *poysonous Serpents*, that they link the venome from off the Earth: so *poysonous plants* may well draw to them all the malign juice and nourishment, that the other may be more pure and defæcate, as there are Receptacles in the body of Man and Emunctories to drain them of superfluous *Choler*, *Melancholy*, and the like.

But lastly, it is very well known by them that know any thing in Nature and Physick, that those herbs that the rude and ignorant would call *Weeds*, are the Materials of very soveraign Medicines; that *Aconitum hyemale* or *Winter-wolfs-bane*, that otherwise is rank *poyson*, is reported to prevail mightily against

the bitings of vipers and scorpions, which *Crollius* assenteth unto. And that that plant that bears death in the very name of it, *Solanum Lethiferum*, prevents death by procuring sleep, if it be rightly apply'd in a feaver. Nor are those things to be deemed unprofitable, whose use we know not yet; for all is not to be known at once, that succeeding Ages may ever have something left to gratifie themselves in their own discoveries.

We come now to the *Signatures* of Plants, which seems no less Argument that the highest original of the works of Nature is some *understanding Principle*, then that so careful provision of their *seed*. Nay indeed, this respects us more properly and adæquately then the other, and is a certain Key to enter Man into the knowledge and use of the Treasures of Nature. I demand therefore, whether it be not a very easie and genuine inference from the observing that several herbs are marked with some *mark* or *sign* that intimates their vertue, what they are good for; and there being such a creature as Man in the world that can read and understand these *signs* and *characters*, hence to collect that the Authour both of Man and them knew the nature of them both; For it is like the inscriptions upon Apothecaries Boxes that the Master of the Shop sets on, that the Apprentice may read them; nay,

may, it is better, for here is in herbs inscribed the very *nature* and *use* of them, not the meer *name*. Nor is there any necessity that all should be thus signed, though some be; for the rarity of it is the delight: for otherwise it had been dull and cloying, too much harping upon the same string. And besides, divine Providence would onely initiate and enter mankind into the useful knowledge of her Treasures, leaving the rest to imploy out industry, that we might not live like idle Loyterers and Truants. For the Theatre of the world is an exercise of Mans wit, not a lazy *Polyanthea*, or book of Common-places. And therefore all things are in some measure obscure and intricate, that the sedulity of that divine Spark, the Soul of Man, may have matter of conquest and triumph, when he has done bravely by a superadvenient assistance of his God.

But that there be some Plants that bear a very evident *Signature* of their *nature* and *use*, I shall fully make good by these following instances.

Capillus Veneris, *Polytrichon* or *Maydenhair*, the lye in which it is sodden or infus'd, is good to wash the head, and make the hair grow in those places that are more thin and bare.

And the decoction of *Quinces*, which are a downy and hairy fruit, is accounted good
 for

for the fetching again hair that has fallen by the French Pox.

The leaf of *Balm*, and of *Alleluia* or *wood-Sorrel*, as also the Roots of *Anthora* represent the heart in figure, and are *Cardiacal*.

Wall-nuts bear the whole *signature* of the head. The outward green *Cortex* answers to the *Pericranium*, and a salt made of it is singularly good for wounds in that part, as the kernel is good for the brains, which it resembles.

Umbilicus Veneris is powerful to provoke lust, as *Dioscorides* affirms. As also your several sorts of *Satyriums*, which have the evident resemblance of the genital parts upon them: *Aron* especially, and all your *Orchisses*, that they have given names unto from some beasts or other, as *Cynosorchis*, *Orchis Myodes*, *Tragorchis*, and the like. The last whereof, notorious also for its goatish smell, and tufts not unlike the beard of that lecherous Animal, is of all the rest the most powerful Incentive to Lust.

The leaves of *Hypericon*, are very thick prick'd, or pink'd with little holes and it is a singular good wound-herb, as useful also for deobstructing the pores of the body.

Scorpioides, *Echium*, or *Scorpion-grass*, is like the crooked tail of a Scorpion, and *Ophi-
ssum* or *Adders-tongue*, has a very plain
and

and perfect resemblance of the tongue of a Serpent, as also *Ophioscorodon* of the intire head and upper parts of the body; and these are all held very good against poyson, and the biting of Serpents. And generally all such plants as are speckled with spots like the skins of vipers or other venemous creatures, are known to be good against the stings or bitings of them, and are powerful Antidotes against Poyson.

Thus did divine Providence by natural *Hieroglyphicks* read short Physick lectures to the rude wit of man, that being a little entred and engaged, he might by his own industry and endeavours search out the rest himself, it being very reasonable that other herbs that had not such *signatures*, might be very good for Medicinal uses, as well as they that had.

But if any here object, that some herbs have the resemblance of such things as cannot in any likelihood refer to Physick, as *Geranium*, *Cruciata*, *Bursa Pastoris*, and the like; I say, they answer themselves in the very proposal of their Objection: For this is a sign that they were intended onely for ludicrous ornaments of Nature, like the flourishes about a great letter, that signifie nothing, but are made onely to delight the Eye. And 'tis so far from being any inconvenience to our first Progeni-

tors if this intimation of *signatures* did fail, that it cast them with more courage upon attempting the vertue of those that had no such *signatures* at all; it being obvious for them to reason thus, Why may not those herbs have medicinal vertue in them that have no *signatures*, as well as they that have *signatures*, have no vertue answerable to the *signs* they bear? which was a further confirmation to them of the former conclusion.

And it was sufficient that those that were of so present and great consequence as to be Antidotes against poyson, that so quickly would have dispatch'd poor rude and naked Antiquity, or to help on the small beginnings of the world, by quickning and actuating their phlegmatick Natures to more frequent and effectual Venery (for their long lives shew they were not very fiery) I say it was sufficient that herbs of this kind were so legibly *sign'd* with *Characters* that so plainly bewray'd their useful vertues, as is manifest in your *Satyrions*, *Ophioglossum*, and the like. But I have dwelt too long upon this Theory, wee'l betake our selves to what follows.

C H A P.

CHAP. VII.

Arguments of divine Providence, drawn from the Usefulness of Plants.

WE are at length come to the fourth and last consideration of *Plants*; viz. their *Use* and *Profitableness*. And to say nothing now of those greater *Trees* that are fit for *Timber*, and are the requisite Materials for the *building* of ships and magnificent *Houses*, to adorn the Earth, and make the life of Man more splendid and delectable; as also for the erecting of those *holy Structures* consecrated to divine *Worship*, amongst which we are not to forget that famous Edifice, that glorious Temple at *Ferusalem*, consecrated to the great God of Heaven and Earth: As indeed it was most fit that he whose Guidance and Providence permitted not the strength of the Earth to spend it self in base gravel and pebbles in stead of Quarries of Stone, nor in bryars and brush-wood in stead of Pines, Cedars and Oaks, that he should at some time or other have the most stately magnificent *Temple* erected to him, that the wit and industry of Man, and the best of those materials could afford. It being the most suitable acknowledgement of

thank

thanks for that piece of Providence that can be invented. And it is the very consideration that moved that pious King *David* to design the building of a Temple to the God of *Israel*: See now, says he, *I dwell in a house of Cedar, but the Ark of God dwelleth within Curtains*. But, as I said, I will add nothing concerning these things, being contented with what I have glanced upon heretofore.

We will now briefly take notice of the *profitableness* of Plants for *Physick* and *Food*, and then pass on to the consideration of *Animals*. And as for their *Medicinal* uses, the large *Herbals* that are every where to be had, are so ample Testimonies thereof, that I have said enough in but reminding you of them. That which is most observable here is this, that brute *Beasts* have some share in their vertue as well as *Men*. For the *Toad* being overcharged with the poyson of the *Spider*, as is ordinarily believed, hath recourse to the *Plantane leaf*. The *Weasel* when she is to encounter the *Serpent*, arms her self with eating of *Rue*. The *Dog* when he is sick at the stomach, knows his cure, falls to his *Grass*, vomits, and is well. The *Swallows* make use of *Celandine*; the *Linnet* of *Euphrasia*, for the repairing of their sight. And the *Asse* when he's oppress'd with melancholy, eats of the herb *Asplenium* or *Miltwaste*,

Milkwaste, and so eases himself of the swelling of the *Spleen*. And *Virgil* reports of the *Dictamnium Cretense* or *Cretian Dittany*, that the wild *Goats* eat it when they are shot with darts or arrows, for that herb has the vertue to work them out of their body, and to heal up the wound.

— non illa feris incognita Capris
Gramina, cum tergo volucres hæsere sagitte.

Which things I conceive no obscure indignation of *Providence*; For they doing that by instinct and nature, which men who have free Reason cannot but acknowledge to be very pertinent and fitting, nay such that the skilfullest Physician will approve and allow; and these Creatures having no such reason and skill themselves, as to turn Physicians; it must needs be concluded that they are inabled to do these things by vertue of that *Principle* that contrived them, and made them of that nature they are, and that that *Principle* therefore must have *skill* and *knowledge*, that is, that it must be *God*.

We come now to the consideration of *Plants*, as they afford *Food* both to *Man* and *Beasts*. And here we may observe, that as there was a general provision of *water*, by setting the *Mountains* and *Hills* abrocht, from whence

whence through the Spring-heads and continued Rivulets drawn together (that caused afterwards greater Rivers with the long winding distributions of them) all the Creatures of the Earth quench their thirst: So divine Providence has spread her *Table* every where, not with a juiceless green Carpet, but with succulent *Herbage* and nourishing *Grass*, upon which most of the beasts of the field do feed. And they that feed not on it, feed on those that eat it, and so the generations of them all are continued.

But this seeming rather *necessary* than of *choice*, I will not insist upon it. For I grant that Counsel most properly is there imply'd; where we discern a variety and possibility of being otherwise, and yet the best is made choice of. Therefore I will onely intimate thus much, that though it were necessary that some such thing as *grass* should be, if there were such and such creatures in the world, yet it was not at all necessary that grass and herbs should have that *colour* which they have; for they might have been red or white, or some such colour which would have been very offensive and hurtful to our sight. But I will not insist upon these things; let us now consider the *Fruits of Trees*, where I think it will appear very manifestly, that there was one & the same Author both of Man and them, and that assuredly

assuredly he knew what he did when he made them. For could *Apples*, and *Oranges*, and *Grapes*, and *Apricocks*, and such like fruit, be intended for *Beasts* that hold their heads downward, and can scarce look up at them, much less know how to reach them? When we feed our dogs, we set the dish or trencher on the ground, not on the Table. But you'll say, that at last these fruits will fall down, and then the beasts may come at them: But one thing is, there are not many that desire them, and so they would rot upon the ground before they be spent, or be squander'd away in a moment of time, as it might easily fare with the most precious of Plants, the *Vine*. But *Man* who knows the worth of the *Grape*, knows to preserve it a long season (for it is both eaten and drunk some years after the vintage) as he does also gather the rest of the fruits of the Earth, and lays up both for himself and his Cattel: Wherefore it is plainly discoverable, that Mans coming into the world is not a thing of *Chance* or *Necessity*, but a *Design*, as the bringing of worthy Guests to a well furnish'd Table.

And what I have intimated concerning the *Vine*, is as eminently, if not more eminently, observable in the ordinary kinds of *Grain*, as *Wheat* and *Barly*, and the like, which also like the *Vine*, are made either *Edible* or *Potable* by

Mans Art and Industry; But that's not the thing that I care so much to observe. That which I drive at now is this: That *Bread-corn* that brings so considerable increase by tillage and husbandry, would scarce be at all without it; for that which grows wildly of it self is worth nothing: But it being so wholesom and strengthening a food, that it should yield so plentiful increase, and that this should not be without humane Art and Industry, does plainly insinuate, that there is a divine *Providence* that intended to exercise the wit of Man in *Husbandry* and *Tillage*: Which we may the more firmly assure our selves of, if we add unto this the careful provision of *Instruments* so exactly fitted out for this imployment; *viz.* the laborious *Oxe*, and the stout, but easily manageable *Horse*; *Iron* for the plough-share, and *Ropes* for the horse-gears to pull by. And it is very seasonable to take notice of this last, it belonging to this consideration of the profitableness of *Plants*. And I appeal to any body that will but take the pains a while to consider of what great use and consequence *Cordage* is in the affairs of Men, whether it was not a palpable Act of Providence to send out such plants out of the Earth, which would afford it. For we can discover no necessity in Nature that there must needs be such plants as *Hemp* and *Flax*. Wherefore if we will but follow

follow the easie suggestions of free Reason, we must cast it upon *Providence*, which has provided Man-kind of such a Commodity, that no less affairs depend upon, then all the *Tackling* of Ships, their *Sayles* and *Cable-ropes*, and what not? and so consequently all forein *Traffick*, and then the transportation of wood and stone, and other necessary materials for building, or the carriage of them by land in Wains and Carts, besides the ordinary use of *Pulleys* or other *Engines* for the lifting up of heavy weights, which the strength of Man without these helps would not easily master; besides what I hinted before concerning the use of Cordage in *Husbandry*, in plowing and carrying home the fruits of the Earth. The uses indeed of the fore-named *Plants* are so universal, and take place so in every affair of Man, that if it were lawful to be a little merry in so serious a matter, a man might not unfittingly apply that verse of the Poet to this so general a commodity;

Omnia sunt homini tenui pendentia filo;

That all the busineses of Men do very much depend upon these little long fleaks or threds of *Hemp* and *Flax*. Or if you will say, that there may some scambing shift be made without them in long chains of Iron, or sails

of Woollen, and the like, yet we seeing our selves provided for infinitely better, are in all reason to judge it to proceed from no worse a Principle then *Divine Providence*.

I might now reach out to *Exotick Plants*, such as the *Cinnamon-tree*, the *Balsame-tree*, the Tree that bears the *Nutmeg* invelliped with the *Mace*, as also the famous *Indian Nut-tree*, which at once almost affords all the *Necessaries* of life. For if they cut but the twigs at Evening, there is a plentiful and pleasant Juice comes out, which they receive into Bottles, and drink in stead of *Wine*, and out of which they extract such an *Aqua vite*, as is very soveraign against all manner of sicknesses. The branches and boughs they make their *Houses* of; and the body of the Tree being very spongy within, though hard without, they easily contrive into the frame and use of their *Canoes* or *boats*. The kernel of the Nut serves them for *Bread* and *Meat*, and the shells for *Cups* to drink in, and indeed they are not meer empty *Cups*, for there is found a delicious cooling Milk in them: Besides, there is a kind of Hemp that incloses the Nut, of which they make *Ropes* and *Cables*, and of the finest of it *Sails* for their ships; and the leaves are so hard and sharp-pointed, that they easily make *needles* or *bodkins* of them, for stitching their Sails, and for other necessary purposes. And that Pro-
vidence

vidence may shew her self benign as well as wise, this so notable a Plant is not restrain'd to one Coast of the world, as suppose the *East-Indies*, but is found also in some parts of *Africa*, and in all the Islands of the *West-Indies*, as *Hispaniola*, *Cuba*, as also upon the Continent of *Carthage* in *Panama*, *Norembega*, and several other parts of the new-found world.

But I thought fit not to insist upon these things, but to contain my self within the compass of such Objects as are familiarly and ordinarily before our eyes, that we may the better take occasion from thence to return thanks to him who is the bountiful Authour of all the supports of life.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

The Usefulness of Animals an Argument of divine Providence.

WE are now come to take a view of the nature of *Animals*: In the contemplation whereof we shall use much what the same Method we did in that of *Plants*, for we shall consider in them also, their *Beauty*, their *Birth*, their *Make* and *Fabrick* of body, and *Usefulness* to Mankind. And to dispatch this last first. It is wonderful easie and natural to conceive, that as almost all are made in some sort or other for humane uses, so some so notoriously and evidently, that without main violence done to our faculties, we can in no wise deny it. As to instance in those things that are most obvious and familiar; when we see in the solitary fields a *Shepherd*, his *Flock*, and his *Dog*, how well they are fitted together; when we knock at a Farmers door, and the first that answers shall be his vigilant *Mastiff*, whom from his use and office he ordinarily names *Keeper*; and I remember *Theophrastus* in his character *ἐπι ἀγροικίας* tells us, that his Master when he has let the stranger in, *ἐπιλαβόμενος τὸ ρόσχος* taking his *Dog* by the snout, will relate long stories of his usefulness and his

his services he does to the house and them in it. Οὐτὸ φησὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ καὶ τὰς ἐνδοῦ.
 This is he that keeps the yard, the house and them within. Lastly, when we view in the open Champian a brace of swift *Grey-hounds* coursing a good stout and well-breathed *Hare*, or a pack of well tuned *Hounds*, and Huntsmen on their horse-backs with pleasure and alacrity pursuing their game, or hear them winding their Horns near a wood side, so that the whole wood rings with the Echo of that Musick, and chearful yelping of the eager *Dogs*: to say nothing of *Duck-hunting*, of *Fox hunting*, of *Otter-hunting*, and a hundred more such like sports and pastimes, that are all performed by this one kind of *Animal*; I say, when we consider this so multifarious congruity and fitness of things in reference to our selves, how can we withhold from inferring, that that which made both *Dogs* and *Ducks*, and *Hares* and *Sheep*, made them with a reference to us, and knew what it did when it made them? And though it be possible to be otherwise, yet it is highly improbable that the flesh of *Sheep* should not be designed for food for men; and that *Dogs* that are such a familiar and domestic Creature to Man, amongst other pretty feats that they do for him, should not be intended to supply the place of a servitour too, and to take away the bones and scraps, that

nothing might be lost. And unless we should expect that Nature should make Jerkins and Stockings grow out of the ground, what could she do better then afford us so fit materials for *cloathing* as the *Wool* of the Sheep, there being in Man Wit and Art to make use of it? To say nothing of the *Silk-worm*, that seems to come into the world for no other purpose, then to furnish man with more costly cloathing, and to spin away her very entrails to make him fine without.

Again, when we view those large Bodies of *Oxen*, what can we better conceit them to be, then so many living and walking powdering Tubs, and that they have *animam pro Sale*, as *Philo* speaks of fishes, that their life is but for Salt to keep them sweet till we shall have need to eat them? Besides, their *Hides* afford us *Leather* for *Shoes* and *Boots*, as the *skins* of other beasts also serve for other uses. And indeed Man seems to be brought into the world on purpose that the rest of the Creation might be improved to the utmost usefulness and advantage; For were it not better that the *hides* of Beasts and their *flesh* should be made so considerable use of as to *feed* and *cloathe* Men, then that they should rot and stink upon the ground, and fall short of so noble an improvement, as to be matter for the exercise of the wit of Man, and to afford him

him the necessary conveniences of life? For if Man did not make use of them, they would either dye of Age, or be torn apieces by more cruel Masters. Wherefore we plainly see that it is an Act of *Reason* and *Counsel* to have made Man that he might be a Lord over the rest of the Creation, and keep good quarter among them.

And being furnish'd with fit Materials to make himself weapons, as well as with natural wit and valour, he did bid battel to the very fiercest of them, and either chased them away into solitudes and deserts, or else brought them under his subjection, and gave laws unto them; under which they live more peaceably, and are better provided for (or at least might be, if Men were good) then they could be when they were left to the mercy of the *Lyon*, *Bear*, or *Tyger*. And what if he do occasionally and orderly kill some of them for food? their dispatch is quick, and so less dolorous then the paw of the *Bear*, or the teeth of the *Lyon*, or tedious *Melancholy* and sadness of old Age, which would first torture them, and then kill them, and let them rot upon the ground stinking and useles.

Besides, all the wit and Philosophy in the world can never demonstrate, that the killing and slaughtering of a *Beast* is any more then the striking of a bush where a birds Nest is.

where you fray away the Bird, and then seize upon the empty Nest. So that if we could pierce to the utmost *Catastrophe* of things, all might prove but a *Tragick-Comedy*.

But as for those *Rebels* that have fled into the *Mountains* and *Deserts*, they are to us a very pleasant subject of natural History; besides, we serve our selves of them as much as is to our purpose. And they are not onely for ornaments of the Universe, but a continual Exercise of Mans Wit and Valour when he pleases to encounter. But to expect and wish that there were nothing but such dull *tame* things in the world, that will neither bite nor scratch, is as groundless and childish, as to wish there were no *choler* in the body, nor *fire* in the universal compass of Nature.

I cannot insist upon the whole result of this war, nor must forget how that generous Animal the *Horse*, had at last the wit to yield himself up, to his own great advantage and ours. And verily he is so fitly made for us, that we might justly claim a peculiar right in him above all other Creatures. When we observe his patient service he does us at the *Plough*, *Cart*, or under the *Pack-saddle*, his *speed* upon the high-way in matters of importance, his *docibleness* and desire of *glory* and *praise*, and consequently his notable achievements in *war*; where he will snap the *Spears* apieces with

with his teeth, and pull his Riders Enemy out of the Saddle; and then that he might be able to perform all this labour with more ease, that his *hoofs* are made so fit for the Art of the *Smith*, and that round armature of Iron he puts upon them; it is a very hard thing not to acknowledge, that this so congruous contrivance of things was really from a *Principle of Wisdom and Counsel*. There is also another consideration of *Animals* and their *usefulness*, in removing those Evils we are pester'd with by reason of the abundance of some other hurtful Animals, such as are *Mice and Rats*, and the like; and to this end the *Cat* is very serviceable. And there is in the *West-Indies* a beast in the form of a Bear, which *Cardan* calls *Ursus Formicarius*, whose very business it is to eat up all the *Ants*, which some parts of that Quarter of the World are sometimes excessively plagued withal.

We might add also sundry Examples of living creatures, that not onely bear a singular good affection to Mankind, but are also fierce Enemies to those that are very hurtful and cruel to Man; and such are the *Lizard*, an Enemy to the *Serpent*; the *Dolphin* to the *Crocodile*; the *Horse* to the *Bear*; the *Elephant* to the *Dragon*, &c. but I list not to insist upon these things.

C H A P. IX.

Arguments of divine Providence, fetched from the Pulchritude of Animals, as also from the manner of their Propagation.

I Return now to what I proposed first, the *Beauty* of living Creatures; which though the coarse-spirited *Atheist* will not take notice of, as relishing nothing but what is subservient to his Tyranny or Lust; yet I think it undeniable, but that there is comely *Symmetry* and *Beautifulness* in fundry living Creatures, a tolerable useful *Proportion of parts* in all. For neither are all men and women exquisitely handsome, indeed very few, that they that are may raise the greater admiration in the minds of Men, and quicken their natural abilities to brave adventures either of *Valor* or *Poetry*: But as for the brute Creatures, though some of them be of an *hateful* aspect, as the *Toad*, the *Swine* and the *Rat*; yet these are but like discords in Musick, to make the succeeding chord go off more pleasantly, as indeed most of those momentary inconveniences that the life of Man ever and anon meets withal, they but put a greater edge and vigour upon his Enjoyments.

But it is not hard to find very many *Creatures*,

tures, that are either καλὰ χρίματα or ἀσεία, as the Philosopher distinguishes, that are either very *goodly* things and *beautiful*, or at least *elegant* and *pretty*; as most of your *Birds* are. But for *Stateliness* and *Majestie*, what is comparable to a *Horse*? whether you look upon him single, with his *Mane* and his *Tail* waving in the wind, and hear him coursing and neighing in the pastures; or whether you see him with some gallant *Heros* on his back, performing gracefully his useful postures, and practising his exploits of war; who can withhold from concluding, that a providence brought these two together, that are fitted so well to each other, that they seem but one compleat Spectacle of Nature? which imposed upon the rude people near *Thessaly*, and gave the occasion of the fabulous *Centaur*s, as if they had been one living Creature made up of *Horse* and *Man*.

That which I drive at is this, there being that *Goodliness* in the bodies of *Animals*, as in the *Ox*, *Grey-hound* and *Stag*; or that *Majestie* and *Stateliness*, as in the *Lion*, the *Horse*, the *Eagle* and *Cock*; or that grave *Awsfulness*, as in your best breed of *Mastives*; or *Elegancy* and *Prettiness*, as in your lesser *Dogs*; and most sorts of *Birds*; all which are several Modes of *Beauty*, and *Beauty* being an intellectual Object, as *Symmetry* and *Proportion* is (which I proved

proved sufficiently in what I spake concerning the beauty of *Plants*) that which naturally follows from all this is, that the *Author* or *Original* of these *Creatures*, which are deemed *beautiful*, must himself be *intellectual*, he having contrived so grateful objects to the *Mind* or *Intellect* of *Man*.

After their Beauty, let us touch upon their *Birth* or *manner* of *Propagation*. And here I appeal to any man, whether the contrivance of *Male* and *Female* in living *Creatures*, be not a genuine effect of *wisdom* and *Counsel*; for it is notoriously obvious that these are made one for the other, and both for the continuation of the *Species*. For though we should admit with *Cardan* and other *Naturalists*, that the *Earth* at first brought forth all manner of *Animals* as well as *Plants*, and that they might be fastned by the *Navel* to their common *Mother* the *Earth*, as they are now to the *Female* in the *Womb*; yet we see she is grown *steril* and *barren*, and her births of *Animals* are now very *inconsiderable*. Wherefore what can it be but a *Providence*, that whiles she did bear, she sent out *Male* and *Female*, that when her own *Prolifick* vertue was wasted, yet she might be a *dry-Nurse*, or an officious *Grand-mother* to thousands of generations? And I say it is *Providence*, not *Chance*, nor *Necessity*; what is there imaginable in the parts of the *Matter*,

Matter, that they should necessarily fall into the structure of so much as an *Animal*, much less into so careful a provision of difference of Sexes for their continual propagation?

Nor was it the frequent attempts of the moved Matter that first light on *Animals*, which perpetually were suddenly extinct for want of the difference of Sexes, but afterward by *chance* differenced their Sexes also, from whence their kinds have continued. For what is perpetual, is not by *chance*; and the births that now are by putrefaction shew that it is perpetual. For the Earth still constantly brings forth *Male* and *Female*.

Nor is it any thing to the purpose to reply (if you will make so large a skip as to cast your self from the land into the water to dive for Objections) that the *Eele*, though it be ζῷον ὑδατινόν, an *Animal* so perfect as to have blood in it, yet that it has no distinction of *Sexe*: For if it have not, there is good reason for it, that creature arising out of such kind of Matter as will never fail generation. For there will be such like mud as will serve this end so long as there be Rivers, and longer too, and Rivers will not fail so long as there is a Sea. Wherefore this rather makes for discriminative Providence that knew afore the nature and course of all things, and made therefore

he.

CHAP. VIII.

The Usefulness of Animals an Argument of divine Providence.

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This is he that keeps the yard, the house and them within. Lastly, when we view in the open *Champion* a brace of swift *Grey-hounds* cour-
 sing a good stout and well-breathed *Hare*, or a pack of well tuned *Hounds*, and *Huntsmen* on their horse-backs with pleasure and alacri-
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nothing might be lost. And unless we should expect that Nature should make Jerkins and Stockings grow out of the ground, what could she do better then afford us so fit materials for *cloathing* as the *Wool* of the *Sheep*, there being in Man Wit and Art to make use of it? To say nothing of the *Silk-worm*, that seems to come into the world for no other purpose, then to furnish man with more costly cloathing, and to spin away her very entrails to make him fine without.

Again, when we view those large Bodies of *Oxen*, what can we better conceit them to be, then so many living and walking powdering Tubs, and that they have *animam pro Sale*, as *Philo* speaks of fishes, that their life is but for Salt to keep them sweet till we shall have need to eat them? Besides, their *Hides* afford us *Leather* for *Shoes* and *Boots*, as the *skins* of other beasts also serve for other uses. And indeed Man seems to be brought into the world on purpose that the rest of the Creation might be improved to the utmost usefulness and advantage; For were it not better that the *hides* of Beasts and their *flesh* should be made so considerable use of as to *feed* and *cloathe* Men, then that they should rot and stink upon the ground, and fall short of so noble an improvement, as to be matter for the exercise of the wit of Man, and to afford him

him the neceſſary conveniences of life? For if Man did not make uſe of them, they would either dye of Age, or be torn apieces by more cruel Maſters. Wherefore we plainly ſee that it is an Act of *Reason* and *Counſel* to have made Man that he might be a Lord over the reſt of the Creation, and keep good quarter among them.

And being furniſh'd with fit Materials to make himſelf weapons, as well as with natural wit and valour, he did bid battel to the very fierceſt of them, and either chaſed them away into ſolitudes and deſerts, or elſe brought them under his ſubjection, and gave laws unto them; under which they live more peaceably, and are better provided for (or at leaſt might be, if Men were good) then they could be when they were left to the mercy of the *Lyon*, *Bear*, or *Tyger*. And what if he do occaſionally and orderly kill ſome of them for food? their diſpatch is quick, and ſo leſs dolorous then the paw of the Bear, or the teeth of the Lyon, or tedious Melancholy and ſadneſs of old Age, which would firſt torture them, and then kill them, and let them rot upon the ground ſtinking and uſeleſs.

Befides, all the wit and Philoſophy in the world can never demonſtrate, that the killing and ſlaughtering of a Beaſt is any more then the ſtriking of a buſh where a birds Neſt is; where

where you fray away the Bird, and then seize upon the empty Nest. So that if we could pierce to the utmost *Catastrophe* of things, all might prove but a *Tragick-Comedy*.

But as for those *Rebels* that have fled into the *Mountains* and *Deserts*, they are to us a very pleasant subject of natural History; besides, we serve our selves of them as much as is to our purpose. And they are not onely for ornaments of the Universe, but a continual Exercise of Mans Wit and Valour when he pleases to encounter. But to expect and wish that there were nothing but such dull *same* things in the world, that will neither bite nor scratch, is as groundless and childish, as to wish there were no *choler* in the body, nor *fire* in the universal compass of Nature.

I cannot insist upon the whole result of this war, nor must forget how that generous Animal the *Horse*, had at last the wit to yield himself up, to his own great advantage and ours. And verily he is so fitly made for us, that we might justly claim a peculiar right in him above all other Creatures. When we observe his patient service he does us at the *Plough*, *Cart*, or under the *Pack-saddle*, his *speed* upon the high-way in matters of importance, his *docibleness* and desire of *glory* and *praise*, and consequently his notable achievements in *War*; where he will snap the *Spears* pieces with

with his teeth, and pull his Riders Enemy out of the Saddle; and then that he might be able to perform all this labour with more ease, that his *hoofs* are made so fit for the Art of the *Smith*, and that round armature of Iron he puts upon them; it is a very hard thing not to acknowledge, that this so congruous contrivance of things was really from a *Principle of Wisdom and Counsel*. There is also another consideration of *Animals* and their *usefulness*, in removing those Evils we are pester'd with by reason of the abundance of some other hurtful Animals, such as are *Mice and Rats*, and the like; and to this end the *Cat* is very serviceable. And there is in the *West-Indies* a *beast* in the form of a *Bear*, which *Cardan* calls *Ursus Formicarius*, whose very business it is to eat up all the *Ants*, which some parts of that Quarter of the World are sometimes excessively plagued withal.

We might add also sundry Examples of living creatures, that not onely bear a singular good affection to Mankind, but are also fierce Enemies to those that are very hurtful and cruel to Man; and such are the *Lizard*, an Enemy to the *Serpent*; the *Dalphin* to the *Crocodile*; the *Horse* to the *Bear*; the *Elephant* to the *Dragon*, &c. but I list not to insist upon these things.

C H A P. IX.

Arguments of divine Providence, fetched from the Pulchritude of Animals, as also from the manner of their Propagation.

I Return now to what I proposed first, the *Beauty* of living Creatures; which though the coarse-spirited *Atheist* will not take notice of, as relishing nothing but what is subservient to his Tyranny or Lust; yet I think it undeniable, but that there is comely *Symmetry* and *Beautifulness* in fundry living Creatures, a tolerable useful *Proportion of parts* in all. For neither are all men and women exquisitely handsome, indeed very few, that they that are may raise the greater admiration in the minds of Men, and quicken their natural abilities to brave adventures either of Valor or Poetry: But as for the brute Creatures, though some of them be of an *hateful aspect*, as the *Toad*, the *Swine* and the *Rat*; yet these are but like discords in Musick, to make the succeeding chord go off more pleasantly, as indeed most of those momentany inconveniences that the life of Man ever and anon meets withal, they but put a greater edge and vigour upon his Enjoyments.

But it is not hard to find very many Creatures,

tures, that are either καλὰ χρίματα or ἀστία, as the Philosopher distinguishes, that are either very *goodly* things and *beautiful*, or at least *elegant* and *pretty*; as most of your *Birds* are. But for *Stateliness* and *Majestie*, what is comparable to a *Horse*? whether you look upon him single, with his *Mane* and his *Tail* waving in the wind, and hear him coursing and neighing in the pastures; or whether you see him with some gallant *Heros* on his back, performing gracefully his useful postures, and practising his exploits of war; who can withhold from concluding, that a providence brought these two together, that are fitted so well to each other, that they seem but one compleat Spectacle of Nature? which imposed upon the rude people near *Thessaly*, and gave the occasion of the fabulous *Centaur*s, as if they had been one living Creature made up of *Horse* and *Man*.

That which I drive at is this, there being that *Goodliness* in the bodies of *Animals*, as in the *Ox*, *Grey-bownd* and *Stag*; or that *Majestie* and *Stateliness*, as in the *Lyon*, the *Horse*, the *Eagle* and *Cock*; or that grave *Awsfulness*, as in your best breed of *Mastives*; or *Elegancy* and *Prettiness*, as in your lesser *Dogs*; and most sorts of *Birds*, all which are several Modes of *Beauty*, and *Beauty* being an intellectual Object, as *Symmetry* and *Proportion* is (which I

proved

proved sufficiently in what I spake concerning the beauty of *Plants*) that which naturally follows from all this is, that the *Author* or *Original* of these Creatures, which are deemed *beautiful*, must himself be *intellectual*, he having contrived so grateful objects to the Mind or Intellect of Man.

After their Beauty, let us touch upon their *Birth* or *manner of Propagation*. And here I appeal to any man, whether the contrivance of *Male* and *Female* in living Creatures, be not a genuine effect of *Wisdom* and *Counsel*; for it is notoriously obvious that these are made one for the other, and both for the continuation of the *Species*. For though we should admit with *Cardan* and other Naturalists, that the Earth at first brought forth all manner of *Animals* as well as *Plants*, and that they might be fastned by the Navel to their common Mother the Earth, as they are now to the *Female* in the Womb; yet we see she is grown steril and barren, and her births of *Animals* are now very inconsiderable. Wherefore what can it be but a *Providence*, that whiles she did bear, she sent out *Male* and *Female*, that when her own Prolifick vertue was wasted, yet she might be a dry-Nurse, or an officious Grandmother to thousands of generations? And I say it is *Providence*, not *Chance*, nor *Necessity*; for what is there imaginable in the parts of the
 Matter,

Matter, that they should necessarily fall into the structure of so much as an *Animal*, much less into so careful a provision of difference of Sexes for their continual propagation?

Nor was it the frequent attempts of the moved Matter that first light on *Animals*, which perpetually were suddenly extinct for want of the difference of Sexes, but afterward by *chance* differenced their Sexes also, from whence their kinds have continued. For what is perpetual, is not by *chance*; and the births that now are by putrefaction shew that it is perpetual. For the Earth still constantly brings forth *Male* and *Female*.

Nor is it any thing to the purpose to reply (if you will make so large a skip as to cast your self from the land into the water to dive for Objections) that the *Eele*, though it be ζῷον ἑλαφύον, an *Animal* so perfect as to have blood in it, yet that it has no distinction of *Sexe*. For if it have not, there is good reason for it, that creature arising out of such kind of Matter as will never fail generation. For there will be such like mud as will serve this end so long as there be Rivers, and longer too, and Rivers will not fail so long as there is a Sea. Wherefore this rather makes for discriminative Providence that knew afore the nature and course of all things, and made therefore her

her contrivances accordingly, doing nothing superfluously or in vain.

But in other *Generations* that are more hazardous, though they be sometimes by putrefaction, yet she makes them *Male* and *Female*, as 'tis plain in *Frogs* and *Mice*. Nor are we to be scandalized at it, that there is such careful provision made for such contemptible *Vermine* as we conceive them: For this onely comes out of pride and ignorance, or a haughty presumption; that because we are encouraged to believe that in some sense all things are made for Man, that therefore they are not made at all for themselves. But he that pronounces thus, is ignorant of the nature of God, and the knowledge of things. For if a good man be merciful to his beast, then surely a good God is bountiful and benign, and takes pleasure that all his Creatures enjoy themselves that have life and sense, and are capable of any enjoyment. So that the swarms of little *Vermine*, and of *Flyes*, and innumerable such like diminutive Creatures, we should rather congratulate their coming into Being, then murmur sullenly and scornfully against their Existence; for they find nourishment in the world, which would be lost if they were not, and are again convenient nourishment themselves to others that prey upon them.

But besides, life being individuated into infinite numbers that have their distinct use and pleasure, and are sufficiently fitted to contentments, those little Souls are in a manner as much considerable for the taking or carrying away to themselves the overflowing benignity of the first Original of all things, as the *Ox*, the *Elephant* or *Whale*. For sense, not bulk, that makes things capable of enjoyments.

Wherefore it was fit, that there should be a due provision made for the propagation and continuance of all the *kinds* of living Creatures, not onely of those that are good, but of those also that we rashly and inconsiderately call *evil*. For they are at least good to enjoy themselves, and to partake of the bounty of their Creator. But if they grow noysome and troublesome to us, we have both power and right to curb them: For there is no question but we are more worth then they or any the brute Creatures.

But to return to the present point in hand; there are also other manifest footsteps of Providence which the *Generation* of living Creatures will discover to us; as for Example, the manner of Procreation of *Fishes* and *Birds*. For there being that notable difference in Animals that some of them are *Oviparous*, others *viviparous*, that the τὰ ἄλλα (as *Philo* compr-

heads them by that general term) that *Fishes* and *Birds* should be *Oviparous* is a plain sign of *Counsel* and *Providence*. For though it will be granted that their *Species* might continue and subsist, though they had been *Viviparous*, yet it would have brought their *Individuals* to very small numbers.

For as for *Fishes*, since grass and herbs are no fruit of the Sea, it was necessary that they should feed one upon another, and therefore that they should multiply in very great plenty, which they could not have done any thing near to that fulness they now do, if they had been *Viviparous* as four-footed beasts are: but being now *Oviparous*, and the lesser kinds of them so many at first, and sending forth such infinite numbers of *Spawn*, their generations are neither extinct nor scanted, but are as plentiful as any *Creatures* on the Land.

And the reason why *Birds* are *Oviparous* and lay *Eggs*, but do not bring forth their yong alive, is because there might be more plenty of them also, and that neither the *Birds* of prey, the *Serpent* nor the *Fowler* should straiten their generations too much. For if they had been *Viviparous*, the burthen of their womb, if they had brought forth any competent number at a time, had been so big and heavy, that their wings would have failed them, and so every body would have had the

to catch the Old one. Or if they brought one or two at a time, they would have been troubled all the year long with feeding their young, or bearing them in their womb: besides there had been a necessity of too frequent Venery, which had been very prejudicial to their dry carcases. It was very reasonable therefore that *Birds* should propagate by *ing of Eggs.*

But this is not all the advantage we shall take of this consideration. I demand further, What is it that makes the *Bird* to prepare her Nest with that Artifice, to sit upon her eggs when she has laid them, and to distinguish betwixt these and her useless Excrement? Did she learn it of her Mother before her? or rather does she not do she knows not what, but yet what ought to be done by the appointment of the most exquisite knowledge that is? Wherefore something else is knowledge for her, which is the Maker and Contriver of all things, the Omniscient and Omnipotent *God.*

And though you may reply, that the *Hatching* of their *Eggs* be necessary, else their generations would cease; yet I answer, that all the Circumstance & Curiosities of *Brooding* them are not necessary. For they might have made shift in the ground in the grass, & not made themselves such curious and safe *Nests* in Bushes and
Trees.

Trees. Besides, if all things were left to *Chance*, it is far easier to conceive that there should have been no such things as *Birds*, than that the blind Matter should ever have stumbled on such lucky instincts as they that seem but barely necessary.

But you'll object, that the *Ostrich* lays Eggs and hatches them nor, so that these things are rather by *Chance* than *Providence*. But this rather argues a more exquisite discerning *Providence*, than is any Argument against it. For the heat of the ground (like those *Ovens* in *Egypt* *Diodorus* speaks of) whereon she lays them, proves effectual for the production of her young. So Nature tyes not the Female to this tedious service where it is needless and useless; as in *Fishes* also, who when they have spawn'd are discharg'd of any further trouble; which is a most manifest discovery of a very curious and watchful *Eye* of *Providence*, which suffers nothing to be done ineptly and in vain.

I will only make one advantage more of this Speculation of the *Birth* of *Animals*, and then pass on to what remains. It is observed by those that are more attentive watchers of the works of Nature, that the *fetus* is framed it of some homogeneal liquor or moysture, which there is no variety of parts of Matter, be contrived into bones and flesh; but, as

an Egg for Example, about the third day e Hen has fate on it, in that part where Nature begins to set upon her work of efformation, all is turned into a Cryſtalline liquid ſubſtance about her, as alſo ſeveral *Inſects* are made of little drops of *dew*: So in all *Generations* beſides it is ſuppoſed by them, that Nature does as it were wipe clean the Table-book of it, and then pourtray upon it what ſhe pleaſeth. And if this be her courſe to corrupt the ſubject Matter into as perfect Privation of Form as ſhe may, that is, to make it as homogeneal as ſhe can, but liquid and pliable to her wiſdom and Skill; it is to me very highly probable, if not neceſſary, that there ſhould be ſomething beſides this fluid Matter, that muſt ſteer and guide it into that wife contrivance of parts that afterwards we ſee in it. For how ſhould the parts of this fluid Matter ever come into this exquisite ſtructure of themſelves? And this may convince any *Atheiſt* that there is a Subſtance beſides coporeal Matter, which he is as loath to admit of as that there is a God.

For there being nothing elſe in Nature but *ſubſtantia* or *Modus*, this power of contriving the liquid Matter into ſuch order and ſhape as we ſee in it, being incompetent to the liquid Matter ſelf, it muſt be the *Modus* of ſome other ſubſtance latent in the fluid Matter, and really

distinguishable from it, which is either the Soul or some seminal Form or *Archeus*, as the *Chy-mist* calls it, and they are all alike indifferent to me at this time, I ayming here onely at a *Substance* besides the *Matter*; that thence the *A-sbeist* may be the more easily brought off to the acknowledgement of the existence of a *God*.

Nor can the force of this Argument be eluded, by saying the Matter is touched and infected by the *life* of the Female, whilés she bore the *Egg*, or that her *Phanſie* gets down into her womb.

For what *life* or *phanſie* has the Earth, which as they ſay, gendred at firſt all *Animals*, ſome ſtill: and what ſimilitude is there betwixt a *Bee* and an *Ox*, or a *Waſp* and an *Hoſe*, that thoſe Inſects ſhould ariſe out of the putrefi'd bodies of theſe Creatures? It is but ſome rude and general congruity of vital preparati-on that ſets this *Archeus* on work rather than another. As meer *Choler* engages the Phanſie to dream of fiering of Guns, and fighting of Armies: *Sanguine* figures the imagination into the representation of fair Women, and Beautiful children: *Phlegm* tranſforms her into Water and Fiſhes; and the ſhadowy *Melancoly* intangles her in colluctation with old Hags and Hobgoblins, and frights her with dead mens faces in the dark. But I have dwelt on this ſubject longer than I intended.

CHAP. X.

The Frame or Fabrick of the Bodies of Animals plainly argue that there is a God.

[Come now to the last consideration of Animals, the outward *Shape* and *Fabrick* of their *Bodies*, which when I have shew'd you that they might have been otherwise, and yet are made according to the most exquisite pitch of Reason that the wit of Man can conceive of, it will naturally follow that they were really made by *Wisdom & Providence*, and consequently that *there is a God*. And I demand first in general concerning all those Creatures that have *Eyes & Ears*, whether they might not have had only *one Eye & one Ear* a piece; and to make the supposition more tolerable, had the Eye on the one side the head, & the Ear on the other; or the Ear on the Crown of the head, & the Eye in the Forehead, for they might have lived and subsisted though they had been no better provided for then thus. But it is evident that their having *two Eyes* and *two Ears*, so placed as they are, is more safe, more sightly, and more useful. Therefore that being made so constantly choice of, which our own Reason deemeth best, we are to infer, that that choice proceeded from *Reason and Counsel*.

Again, I desire to know why there be no *three-footed Beasts*, (when I speak thus, I do not mean *Monsters*, but a constant *Species* or kind of *Animals*) for such a *Creature* as that would make a limping shift to live as well as they that have *four*. Or why have not some beasts more then four feet, suppose *six*, and the two middlemost shorter then the rest, hanging like the two legs of a *Man* a horse-back by the horse-sides? For it is no harder a thing for *Nature* to make such frames of *Bodies* then others that are more elegant and useful. But the works of *Nature* being neither useless nor inept, she must either be wise her self, or be guided by some higher principle of *knowledge*. As that *Man* that does nothing foolishly all the days of his life, is either wise himself, or consults with them that are so.

And then again for the *armature* of *Beasts*, who taught them the use of their *weapons*? The *Lion* will not kick with his Feet, but he will strike such a stroke with his *Tayl*, that he will break the back of his *Encounterer* with it. The *Horse* will not use his *Tayl*, unless against the busie flies, but kicks with his Feet with that force, that he lays his *Enemy* on the ground. The *Bull* and *Ram* know the use of their *Horns* as well as the *Horse* of his *Hoofs*. So the *Bee* and *Serpent* know their *Stings*, and the *Bear* the use of his *Paw*. Which things they

they know meerly by natural instinct, as the Male knows the use of the Female. For they gather not this skill by observation and experience, but the frame of their nature carries them to it, as it is manifest in young *Lambs* that wil *blat* before they have horns. Therefore it is some higher *Providence* that has made them of this nature they are. And this is evident also in *Birds* that will *flutter* with their wings, when there is but a little *Down* upon them, and they as yet utterly unuseful for flying. And now I have fallen upon the mention of this kind of Creature, let me make my advantage of that general structure observable in them. The form of their *Heads* being narrow and sharp, that they may the better cut the *Ayr* in their swift flight, and the spreading of their *Tayls* parallel to the *Horizon* for the better bearing up their *Body*; for they might have been perpendicular as the *Tayls* of *Fishes* in the water. Nor is it any thing that the *owl* has so broad a face, for her flight was not to be so swift nor so frequent.

And as for *Fishes* and the bladder of wind found in their *Bodies*, who can say, it is conveigh'd thither by a *chance*, but it is contriv'd for their more easie swimming, as also the manner of their *fins*, which consist of a number of gittly bones long and slender like pins and needles, and a kind of a skin betwixt,

which is for the more exactness, and makes them thin and flat like Oars. Which perfect artifice and accuracy might have been omitted, and yet they have made a shift to move up and down in the water.

But I have fallen upon a subject that is infinite and inexhaustible, therefore that I be not too tedious I will confine my self to some few observations in ordinary *Beasts* and *Birds*, (that which is most known and obvious, being most of all to our purpose) and then I shall come to the contemplation of *Man*.

And indeed what is more obvious and ordinary than a *Mole*, and yet what more palpable Argument of *Providence* than she? The members of her body are so exactly fitted to her nature and manner of life: For her dwelling being under ground where nothing is to be seen, Nature has so obscurely fitted her with *Eyes*, that Naturalists can scarce agree whether she have any sight at all or no. But for amends, what she is capable of for her defence and warning of danger, she has very eminently conferr'd upon her: for she is exceeding quick of *hearing*. And then her *short Tail* and *short Legs*, but broad *Fore-feet* armed with *sharp Claws*, we see by the event to what purpose they are, she so swiftly working her self under ground, and making her way so fast in the Earth, as they that behold it cannot

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but admire it. Her *Leggs* therefore are short, that she need dig no more then will serve the meer thickness of her Body. And her *Fore feet* are broad, that she may scoup away much Earth at a time. And little or no *Tayl* she has, because she courses it not on the ground like the *Rat* or *Mause*, of whose kindred she is, but lives under the Earth, and is fain to dig her self a dwelling there: And she making her way through so thick an Element, which will not yield easily, as the *Ayr* or the *Water*, it had been dangerous to have drawn so long a train behind her: for her *Enemy* might fall upon her *Reer*, and fetch her out before she had completed, or had got full possession of her works.

Cardan is so much taken with this contemplation, that though I find him often staggering, yet here he does very fully and firmly profess that the contrivance of all things is from *wisdom* and *Counsel*: his words are so generous and significant, that I hold them worth the transcribing. *Palam est igitur, Naturam in sanctis sollicitam mirum in modum fuisse, nec obiter sed ex sententia omnia praevidisse, hominesque quibus hoc beneficium Deus largitus est, ut Causam rerum primam inveniant, participes esse illius prima Natura, neque alterius esse generis Naturam qua hac constituit, ab illorum mente, qui causam eorum cur ita facta sint*

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plene asscqui potuerunt. This forcibly has the due contemplation of Nature carried him beyond Nature and himself, and made him write like a Man rap'd into a Divine Exstasie.

But there are as manifest foot-steps of divine Providence in other Creatures as in the *Mole*. As for Example, the *Hare*, whose temper and frame of body are plainly fitted on purpose for her condition.

For why is she made so full of *Fear* and *Vigilancy*, ever rearing up and listening while she is feeding? and why is she so exceeding *swift of foot*, and has her *Eyes* so *prominent*, and placed so that she can see better behind her then before? but that her flight is her onely safety, and it was needful for her perpetually to eye her pursuing enemy, against whom she durst never stand at the Bay, having nothing but her long soft *Limber Ears* to defend her. Wherefore he that made the *Hare* made the *Dog* also, and guarded her with these Properties from her eager foe, that she might not be too easie a booty for him, and so never be able to save her self, or afford the Spectator any considerable pastime. And that the *Hare* might not always get away from the *Greyhound*, see how exquisitely his shape is fitted for the Course: For the narrowness and slenderness of his parts are made for speed; and that

had seeming impertinent long Appendix of his body, his Tail, is made for more nimble turning.

There are other Animals also whose particular fabrick of Body does manifestly appear the Effect of Providence & Counsel, though Naturalists cannot agree whether it be in the behalf of the *beast* thus framed, or of *man*. And such is that Creature, which though it be Exotick, yet is ordinarily known by the name of a *Camel*: For why are those *bunches* on his back, but that they may be in stead of a *Pack-saddle* to receive the burthen? And why has he four *knees* and all his *Legs bending inwards*, like the four feet of other beasts, and a *Protuberancy* under his *Breast* to lean on, but that being a tall Creature he might with ease *kneel down*, and so might the more gainly be loaden?

But *Cardan* will by no means have this the design of Nature, but that this frame of the *Camel's* body is thus made for his own convenience: For he being a Creature that lives and seeks his food in waste and dry deserts, those *Bunches* he would have *Receptacles* of redundant *Moisture*, from whence the rest of his body is to be supply'd in a hard and tedious time of drought, and that his legs being very long, he ought to have *knees* behind and a *knob* beneath, to rest his weary limbs in

the wilderness, by sitting or kneeling in that posture he does, for he could not so conveniently lie along, as the Horse, or Ass, or other Creature. But I should not determine this to either alone, but take in both Causes, and acknowledge therein a richer design of *Providence*, that by this Frame and Artifice has gratifi'd both the *Camel* and his *Master*.

CHAP. XI.

The particular Frames of the Bodies of Fowls or Birds, palpable signs of Divine Providence.

WE pass now to the consideration of *Fowls* or *Birds*: where omitting the more general Properties of having two *Ventricles*, and picking up stones to convey them into their second *Ventricle*, the *Gizzard*, (which provision and instinct is a supply for the want of teeth) as also their having no *Paps* as *Beasts* have, their young ones being nourish'd so long in the *Shell*, that they are presently fit to be fed by the mouths of the old ones (which Observations plainly signify, that Nature does nothing ineptly and foolishly, and that therefore there is a *Providence*) I shall

Content my self in taking notice onely of some few kinds of this Creature that familiarly come into our sight, such as the *Cock*, the *Duck*, the *Swan*, and the like. I demand therefore concerning the *Cock*, why he has *Spurs* at all, or having them, how they come to be so fittingly placed. For he might have had none, or so misplaced that they had been utterly useless, and so his courage and pleasure in fighting had been to no purpose. Nor are his *Comb* and his *Wattles* in vain, for they are an *Ornament* becoming his Martial Spirit, yea an *Armature* too, for the tugging of those often excuses the more useful parts of his head from harm. Thus fittingly does Nature gratifie all Creatures with accommodations sutable to their temper, and nothing is in vain. Nor are we to cavil at the red pugged attire of the *Turkey*, and the long *Excreescency* that hangs down over his *Bill*, when he swells with pride and anger; for it may be a *Receptacle* for his heated blood, that has such free recourse to his head, or he may please himself in it as the rude *Indians*, whose *Jewels* hang dangling at their *Noses*. And if the bird be pleasur'd, we are not to be displeas'd, being always mindful that Creatures are made to enjoy themselves, as well as to serve us, and it is a gross piece of *Ignorance* and *Rusticity* to think otherwise.

Now for *Swans*, and *Ducks*, and such like *Birds* of the *Water*, it is obvious to take notice how well they are fitted for that manner of life. For those that swim, their *Feet* are framed for it like a pair of *Oars*, their *Claws* being connected with a pretty broad *Membrane*, and their *Necks* are long, that they may dive deep enough into the water. As also the *Neck* of the *Hern* and such like *Fowl* who live of *Fishes*, and are fain to frequent their *Element*, who walk on long stilts also like the people that dwell in the *Marshes*; but their *Claws* have no such *Membranes*, for they had been but a hindrance to those kind of birds that onely wade in the water and do not swim. It is also observable how *Nature* has fitted other *Birds* of *Prey*, who spy their booty from aloft in the *Air*, and see best at that distance, scarce see at all near at hand. So they are both the *Archer* and *shaft*, taking aim afar off, and then shooting themselves directly upon the desired *Mark*, they seize upon the prey having hit it. The works of *Providence* are infinite, I will close all with the description of that strange bird of *Paradise*, for the strangeness has made it notorious.

There is a *Bird* that falls down out of the *Air* dead, and is found sometimes in the *Molucco* Islands, that has no *Feet* at all no more than an ordinary *Fish*. The bigness of her
Body

Body and Bill, as likewise the form of them, is
 much what as a Swallows; but the spreading
 out of her Wings and Tail, has no less compass
 then an Eagles. She lives and breeds in the
 Air, comes not near the Earth but for her
 burial, for the largeness and lightness of her
 Wings and Tail sustain her without lassitude.
 And the laying of her Eggs and brooding of
 her young is upon the back of the Male, which
 is made hollow, as ~~is~~ the breast of the Fe-
 male for the more easie incubation. Whether
 she live meerly of the dew of Heaven or of
 Flyes and such like Insects, I leave to others
 to dispute: but *Cardan* professes he saw the
 Bird no less then three, and describes it ac-
 cordingly. Nor does *Scaliger* say with any
 thing but the bigness of the Wings and little-
 ness of the Body, which he undertakes to
 correct from one of his own which was sent
 him by *Oruesanus* from *Frava*. Now that
 such contrivances as these should be without
 divine Providence, is as improbable to me as
 that the *Copper Ring* with the Greek inscrip-
 tion upon it found about the Neck of an
Overgrown Pike, should be the effect of un-
 knowing Nature, not the Artifice and Skill
 of Man.

C H A P. XII.

Unavoidable Arguments for divine Providence taken from the accurate Structure of Mans Body, from the Passions of his Mind, and fitness of the whole Man to be an Inhabiter of the Universe.

BUT we needed not to have rambled so far out into the works of Nature, to seek out Arguments to prove a *God*, we being so plentifully furnish'd with that at home which we took the pains to seek for abroad. For there can be no more ample testimony of a *God* and *Providence* then the *frame* and *structure* of our own *Bodies*. The admirable *Artifice* whereof *Galen*, though a near Naturalist, was so taken with, that he could not but adjudge the honour of a hymn to the wise Creator of it. The contrivance of the whole and every particular is so evident an argument of exquisite skill in the Maker, that if I should pursue all that suits to my purpose, it would amount to an intire Volume. I shall therefore onely hint at some few things, leaving the rest to be supply'd by Anatomists. And I think there is no man that has any skill in that Art, but will confess the more diligently and accurately the frame of our *Body* is examined, it is found

and the more exquisitely conformable to Reason, Judgement, and Desire. So that supposing the same matter that our bodies are made of, if it had been in our own power to have made our selves, we should have fram'd our selves no otherwise then we are. To instance in some particular. As in our *Eyes*, the *number*, the *situation*, the *fabrick* of them such that we can excogitate nothing to be added thereto, or to be altered either for their *auty*, *safety* or *usefulness*. But as for their *beauty* I will leave it rather to the delicate wit and pen of Poets and amorous persons, then venture upon so tender and nice a subject with any severer style; I will onely note how *safely* they are *garded*, and *fitly framed* out for the use they are intended. The *Brow* and the *Nose* covers them from harder strokes: but such a curious part as the *Eye* being necessarily lyable to mischief from smaller matters, the *sweat* of the *Forehead* is fenced off by those two wreaths of hair which we call the *Eye-brows*: and the *Eye-lids* are fortifi'd with little stiff *rifles* as with *Palisadoes*, against the assault of Flies and Gnats, and such like bold *Animalcula*. Besides the *upper-lid* presently claps down and is as good a fence, as a *Portcullis* against the importunity of the Enemy: Which is done also every night, whether there be any present assault or no, as if Nature kept garrison for

son in this *Metropolis* of Mans body the *Head*, and look'd that such laws should be duly observ'd, as were most for his safety.

And now for the *Use* of the *Eye* which is *sight*, it is evident that this Organ is so exquisitely framed for that purpose, that not the least curiosity can be added; For first the *Humour* and *Tunics* are purely *Transparent*, to let in light and colours unscald and unsephisticated by any inward tincture. And then again the parts of the *Eye* are made *Convex*, that there might be a direction of many rays coming from one point of the *Object*: unto one point answerable in the bottom of the *Eye*; to which purpose the *Crystalline Humour* is of great moment, and without which the sight would be very obscure and weak. Thirdly the *Tunica Uvea* has a *Musculous power*, and can dilate and contract that round hole in it which is called the *Pupil* of the *Eye*, for the better moderating the transmission of light. Fourthly the inside of the *Uvea* is black'd like the walls of a *Tennis court*, that the rays falling upon the *Retina*, may not, by being rebounded thence upon the *Uvea*, be returned from the *Uvea* upon the *Retina* again, for such a repercussion would make the sight more confused. Fifthly the *Tunica Arachnoides*, which envelops the *Crystalline Humour*, by vertue of its *Processus Ciliares* can thrust forward or draw back

ick that precious useful part of the Eye, as the nearness or distance of the Object shall require. Sixthly and lastly the *Tunica-Retina* is white, for the better and more true reception of the *species* of things, (as they ordinarily call them) as a white paper is fittest to receive those images into a dark room. If the wit of Man had been to contrive this *Organ* for himself, what could he have possibly extogitated more accurate? Therefore to think that meer Motion of the Matter, or any other blind Cause could have hit so punctually (for Creatures might have subsisted without this accurate provision) is to be either mad or foolish.

And the *Eye* is already so perfect, that I believe the Reason of Man would have easily rested here, and admir'd at its own contrivance: for he being able to move his whole head upward and downward and on every side, might have unawares thought himself sufficiently well provided for. But Nature has added *Muscles* also to the *Eyes*, that no Perfection might be wanting; For we have oft occasion to move our *Eyes*, our Head being unmoved, as in reading and viewing more particularly any Object set before us: and that this may be done with more ease and accuracy, she has furnish'd that *Organ* with no less then six several *Muscles*. And indeed this framing

of *Muscles* not only in the Eye but in the whole Body is admirable; For is it not a wonder that even all our flesh should be so handsomely contriv'd into distinct pieces; whose Rise and Infections should be with such advantage that they do serve to move some part of the Body or other; and that the parts of our Body are not moved only so conveniently as will serve us to walk and subsist by, but that they are able to move every way imaginable that will advantage us? For we can fling our *Legs* and *Arms* upwards and downwards, backwards, forwards and round; as they that spin, or would spread a Mole-hill with their feet. To say nothing of *Respiration*, the constriction of the *Diaphragme* for the keeping down the *Guts* and so enlarging the *Thorax* that the *Lungs* may have play; and the assistance of the inward *Intercostal Muscles* in deep Suspirations, when we take more large gulps of Air to cool our heart overcharged with Love or Sorrow. Nor of the curious fabrick of the *Larynx* so well fitted with muscles for the modulation of the *Voyce*, tunable *Speech*, and delicious *Singing*. You may add to these the notable contrivance of the *Heart*, its two *Ventricles* and its many *Valvule*, so fram'd and situated as is most fit for the reception and transmission of the blood; which comes about through the *Heart*, and is sent thence away warm to

comfort and cherish the rest of the Body : For which purpose also the *Valvula* in the *Veins* are made.

But I will rather insist upon such things as are easie and intelligible even to Idiots, who if they can but tell the *Foynts* of their *Hands* or know the use of their *Teeth*, they may easily discover it was *Counsel*, not *Chance*, that created them. For why have we *three Foynts* in our *Legs* and *Arms* as also in our *Fingers*, but that it was much better then having but *two* or *four* ? And why are our *fore-teeth* sharp like cheefels to cut, but our *inward-Teeth* broad to grind, but that this is more exquisite then having them *all sharp* or *all broad*, or the *fore-teeth* broad and the *other* sharp ? But we might have made a hard shift to have lived though in that worser condition. Again, why are the *Teeth* so luckily *placed*, or rather why are there not *Teeth* in *other bones* as well as in the *jaw-bones* ? for they might have been as capable as these. But the reason is, Nothing is done foolishly nor in vain, that is, there is a divine *Providence* that orders all things. Again, to say nothing of the inward curiosity of the *Ear*, why is that outward frame of it, but that it is certainly known, that it is for the bettering of our *Hearing* ?

I might add to these, that Nature has made the *hind-most parts* of our body which we sit

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upon most fleshy, as providing for our Ease and making us a natural Cushion, as well as for instruments of Motion for our *Thighs* and *Legs*. She has made the *hinder-part* of the *Head* more strong, as being otherwise unfenced against falls and other casualties. She has made the *Back-bone* of several *Vertebra*, as being more fit to bend, more tough and less in danger of breaking than if they were all one intire bone without those gristly *Junctures*. She has strengthened our *Fingers* and *Toes* with *Nails*, whereas she might have sent out that substance at the end of the first and second joynt, which had not been so handsome nor useful, nay rather somewhat troublesome and hurtful. And lastly she has made all the *Bones* devoid of *sense*, because they were to bear the weight of themselves and of the whole Body. And therefore if they had had *sense*, our life had been painful continually and dolorous.

And what she has done for *us* she has done proportionably in the contrivance of all *other Creatures*; so that it is manifest that a divine *Providence* strikes through all things.

And therefore things being contrived with such exquisite *Curiosity* as if the most watchful wisdom imaginable did attend them, to say they are thus framed without the assistance of some Principle that has *Wisdom* in it, and that they

they come to pass from *Chance* or some other blind unknowing Original, is fullenly and humorously to assert a thing, because we will assert it, and under pretence of avoiding Superstition, to fall into that which is the onely thing that makes Superstition it self hateful or ridiculous, that is, a wilful and groundless adhering to conceits, without any support of Reason.

And now I have considered the fitness of the parts of Mans Body for the good of the whole, let me but consider briefly the fitness of the *Passions* of his *Mind*, whether *proper*, or *common* to him with the rest of Animals, as also the fitness of the *whole Man* as he is *part of the Universe*, and then I shall conclude.

And it is manifest that *Anger* does so actuate the Spirits and heightens the Courage of men and beasts, that it makes them with more ease break through the difficulties they encounter. *Fear* also is for the avoiding of danger, and *Hope* is a pleasant præmeditation of enjoyment, as when a Dog expects til his Master has done picking of the bone. But there is neither *Hope*, nor *Fear*, nor *Hate*, nor any peculiar Passion or Instinct in *Brutes* that is in vain; why should we then think that Nature should miscarry more in *us* than in any other Creature, or should be so careful in the Fabrick of our *Body*, and yet so forgetful or unlucky

in the framing of the faculties of our *Souls*; that that *Fear* that is so peculiarly natural to us, *viz. the fear of a Deity*, should be in vain, and that pleasant *Hope* and Heavenly Joys of the mind which man is naturally capable of, with the earnest direction of his Spirit towards God, should have no real Object in the world? And so Religious affection which Nature has so plainly implanted in the Soul of Man should be to no use, but either to make him ridiculous or miserable: When as we find no *Passion* or *Affection* in *Brutes* either common or peculiar but what is for their good and welfare.

For it is not for nothing that the *Hare* is so fearful of the *Dog*, and the *Sheep* of the *Wolf*; and if there be either *Fear* or *Enmity* in some Creatures for which we cannot easily discern any reason in respect of themselves, yet we may well allow of it as reasonable in regard of us, and to be to good purpose. But I think it is manifest that *Sympathy* and *Antipathy*, *Love* and *Enmity*, *Aversion*, *Fear*, and the like, that they are notable whetters and quickeners of the Spirit of life in all Animals, and that their being obnoxious to dangers and encounters does more closely knit together the vital Powers, and makes them more sensibly relish their present safety, and they are more pleased with an Escape than if they had never

met with any Danger. Their greedy assaults also one upon another while there is *hope* of Victory highly gratifies them both. And if one be conquer'd and slain, the Conqueror enjoys a fresh improvement of the pleasure of life, the Triumph over his Enemy. Which things seem to me to be contriv'd even in the behalf of these Creatures themselves, that their vital heat and moisture may not always onely simmer in one sluggish tenour, but sometimes boyl up higher and seethe over, the fire of life being more then ordinarily kindled upon some emergent occasion.

But it is without Controversie that these peculiar *Passions* of Animals many of them are useful to Men, (as that of the *Lizards* enmity against the *Serpent*) all of them highly gratifie his contemplative faculty, some seem on purpose contriv'd to make his Worship merry; For what could Nature intend else in that Antipathy betwixt the *Ape* and *Snayl*, that that Beast that seems so boldly to claim kindred of Man from the resemblance of his outward shape, should have so little Wit or Courage as to run away from a *Snayl*, and very ruefully and frightfully to look back, as being afraid she would follow him, as *Erasmus* more largely and pleasantly tells the whole story?

But that Nature should implant in Man such a strong propension to *Religion*, which

is the *Reverence of a Deity*, there being neither *God* nor *Angel* nor *Spirit* in the world, is such a *Slur* committed by her as there can be in no wise excogitated any *Excuse*. For if there were a higher *Species* of things to laugh at us as we do at the *Ape*, it might seem more tolerable. But there can be no end neither ludicrous nor serious of this *Religious property* in *Man*, unless there be something of an higher *Nature* than himself in the world. Wherefore *Religion* being convenient to no other *Species* of things besides *Man*, it ought to be convenient at least for himself: But supposing there were no *God*, there can be nothing worse for *Man* than *Religion*.

For whether we look at the *External Effects* thereof, such as are bloody *Massacres*, the disturbance and *subversion of Commonwealths*, *Kingdoms* and *Empires*, most salvage *Tortures* of particular persons; the *extirpating and dispossession* of whole *Nations*, as it hath hapned in *America*, where the remorseless *Spaniards* in pretence of being educated in a better *Religion* than the *Americans*, vilified the poor *Natives* so much, that they made nothing of knocking them on t'head meerly to feed their dogs with them, with many such unheard of cruelties. Or whether we consider the great affliction that that severe Governness of the life of *Man* brings upon those *Souls* she seises on by affright-

affrighting *horrors of Conscience*, by puzzeling and *befooling* them in the free use of their *Reason*, and putting a bar to more large searches into the pleasing *knowledge of Nature*, by anxious *cares* and disquieting *fears* concerning their *state in the life to come*; by *curbing* them in their natural and kindly *injoyments* of the *life present*, and making *bitter* all the *pleasures* and contentments of it, by some *checks of Conscience* and suspicions that they do something now that they may rue eternally hereafter; Besides those ineffable *Agonies* of mind that they undergo that are more generously *Religious*, and contend after the participation of the divine Nature, they being willing, though with unspeakable pain, to be torn from themselves to become one with that Universal Spirit that ought to have the guidance of all things, and by an unfeignable desire after that just and decorous temper of mind (whereby all Arrogancy should utterly cease in us, and that which is due to God, that is, all that we have or can do, should be lively and sensibly attributed to him, and we fully and heartily acknowledge our selves to be nothing, that is, be as little elated, or no more relish the glory and praise of Men, then if we had done nothing or were not at all in being) do plunge themselves into such *damps & deadness of Spirit*, that to be buried quick were less

torture by far, then such dark *privations* of all the *joys of life*, then such sad and heart-sinking *Mortifications*: I say, whether we consider these *inward pangs* of the Soul, or the *external outrages* caused by *Religion* (and Religious pretense will animate men to the committing such violences, as bare Reason and the single passions of the Mind unback'd with the fury of Superstition will never venture upon) it is manifest that if there were no *God*, no *Spirit*, no *Life to come*, it were far better that there were no such *Religious propensions* in Mankind, as we see univcrsally there is.

For the fear of the Civil Magistrate, the convenience of mutual ayd and support, and the natural scourge and plague of diseases would contain men in such bounds of Justice, Humanity and Temperance, as would make them more clearly and undisturbedly happy, then they are now capable of being, from any advantage *Religion* does to either publique State or private person, supposing there were *no God*.

Wherefore this *Religious Affection* which Nature has implanted, and as strongly rooted in Man as the fear of death or the love of women, would be the most enormous slip or bungle she could commit, so that she would so shamefully fail in the last Act, in this contrivance of the nature of Man, that in stead of a

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a *Plaudite* she would deserve to be hissed off the Stage.

But she having done all things else so wisely, let us rather suspect our own ignorance then reproach her, and expect that which is allowed in well approved Comedies, *θεός διὰ μυχάρης*, for nothing can unlose this knot but a *Deity*. And then we acknowledging Man to dwell as it were in the borders of the spiritual and material world (for he is *utriusque mundi nexus*, as *Scaliger* truly calls him) we shall not wonder that there is such tugging and pulling this way and that way, upward and downward, and such broken disorder of things; those that dwell in the confines of two Kingdoms, being most subject to disquiet and confusion. And hitherto of the *Passions* of the mind of Man, as well as those that tie him down to the Body, as those that lift him up towards God. Now briefly of the *whole Man* as he is *part* of the *Universe*.

It is true, if we had not been here in the world, we could not then have missed our selves; but now we find our selves in being and able to examine the reasonableness of things, we cannot but conclude that our Creation was an Act of very exquisite *Reason* and *Counsel*. For there being so many notable Objects in the world, to entertain such faculties as Reason & inquisitive Admiration, there ought

ought to be such a member of this visible Creation as *Man*, that those things might not be in vain: And if Man were out of the world, who were then left to view the face of *Heaven*, to wonder at the transcurſion of *Comets*, to calculate Tables for the *Motions* of the *Planets* and *Fix'd Stars*, and to take their *Heights* and *Distances* with Mathematical Instruments, to invent convenient *Cycles* for the computation of time, and conſider the ſeveral *forms* of *Years*, to take notice of the *Directions*, *Stations* and *Repedations* of thoſe Erratick lights, and from thence moſt convincingly to inform himſelf of that pleaſant and true Paradox of the *Annual Motion* of the *Earth*, to view the aſperities of the *Moon* through a *Dioptrick-glaſs*, and venture at the Proportion of her *Hills* by their ſhadows. to behold the beauty of the *Rain-bow*, the *Halo*, *Parelii* and other *Meteors*, to ſearch out the cauſes of the *Flux* and *Reflux* of the *Sea*, and the hidden vertue of the *Magnet*, to inquire into the uſefulneſs of *Plants*, and to obſerve the variety of the wiſdom of the firſt Cause in framing their bodies, and giving ſundry obſervable inſtincts to *Fiſhes*, *Birds* and *Beaſts*? And laſtly as there are particular *Prieſts* amongſt Men, ſo the whole *Species* of *Mankind* being indued with *Reason* and a power of finding out God, there is yet one ſingular end more diſcoverable of

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his Creation, *viz* that he may be a *Priest* in this magnificent *Temple* of the *Universe*, and send up prayers and praises to the great Creator of all things in behalf of the rest of the Creatures. Thus we see all filled up and fitted without any defect or useless superfluity.

Wherefore the *whole Creation* in general and *every part* thereof being so ordered as if the most exquisite Reason and Knowledge had contrived them, it is as natural to conclude that all this is the work of a *wise God*, as at the first sight to acknowledge that those inscribed *Urns* and *Coyns* digg'd out of the Earth were not the Products of unknowing Nature, but the Artifice of Man.

C H A P.



CHAP. I.

That, good men not always faring best in this world, the great examples of Divine Vengeance upon wicked and blasphemous Persons are not so convincing to the obstinate Atheist. The irreligious Jeers and Sacrileges of Dionysius of Syracuse. That there have been true Miracles in the world as well as false; and what are the best and safest ways to distinguish them, that we may not be impos'd upon by History.

Hitherto I have insisted upon such Arguments for the proving of the *Existence of God*, as were taken from the ordinary and known *Phenomena of Nature*; For such is the History of *Plants, Animals and Man*. I shall come now to such effects discovered in the World as are not deemed *natural*, but *extraordinary and miraculous*. I do not mean unexpected discoveries of Murthurs, a conspicuous Vengeance upon proud and blasphemous Persons, such as *Nicanor, Antiochus, Herod* and the like,

like, of which all Histories, as well Sacred as Profane, are very full, and all which tend to the impressing of this divine Precept, in the Poet, upon the minds of Men,

Discite Jusitiam moniti & non temnere Divos.

For though these Examples cannot but move indifferent men to an acknowledgment of divine *Providence*, and a *superior Power* above and different from the *Matter*; yet I having now to do with the obstinate and refractory *Atheist*, who, because himself a known contemner of the *Deity* he finds to be safe and well at ease, will shuffle all these things off, by asking such a Question as *he* did, to whom the Priest of *Neptune* shewed the many *Donaria* hung up in his Temple by his *Votaries* saved from ship-wrack, and therefore vaunted much of the Power of that God of the Sea; But what is become of all those, saith he, that notwithstanding their vows have been lost? So I say, the *Atheist* to evade the force of this Argument will whisper within himself; But how many proud blasphemous *Atheistical* men, like myself, have escaped, and those that have been accounted good have dyed untimely deaths?

Such as *Aesop* and *Socrates*, the *Prophets*, *Apostles* and *Martyrs*, with sundry other wise and good men in all Ages and Places, who

yet being not so well aware of the ill condition and restlessness of this wicked World, of which they have truly profest themselves no Citizens, but Strangers, have suffered the greatest mischiefs that can happen to humane Nature, by their innocent meaning and intermedling in *Aliena Republica*; It having usually been more safe, craftily and cautiously to undermine the honour of God, then plainly and honestly to seek the good and welfare of Men.

Nay outrageous affronts done on purpose to Religion, will the *Atheist* further reply, have not onely past applauded by the World, but unpunish'd by divine Justice: As is notorious in that Sacrilegious Wit, *Dionysius* of *Syracuse*, who spoiling *Jupiter Olympius* of his costly Robe very stiff and ponderous with Gold, added this Apologetical jeer to his Sacrilege, that this golden Vestment was too heavy for the Summer, and too cold for the Winter, but one of wool would fit both Seasons.

So at *Epidaurus* he commanded the golden Beard of *Esculapius* to be cut off and carried away, alledging that it was very unfit that the Son should wear a Beard when as his Father *Apollo* wore none.

That also was not inferiour to any of his rilegious jests, when taking away the den Cups and Crowns held forth by the hand

hands of the Images of the Gods, he excused himself, saying, that he received but what they of their own accord gave him; adding that it were a very gross piece of foolishness, when as we pray to the Gods for all good things, not to take them when they so freely offer them with their own hands.

These and other such like irreligious Pranks did this *Dionysius* play, who notwithstanding fared no worse then the most demure and innocent, dying no other death then what usually other Mortals do: as if in those Ages there had been as great a lack of *Wit*, as there was here in *England* once of *Latin*, and that he escaped a more severe Sentence by the benefit of his Clergy. But others think that he was pay'd home and punish'd in his Son that succeeded him. But that, will the *Atheist* reply; is but to whip the absent, as *Aristotle* wittily said to him that told him that such an one did unmercifully traduce him behind his back.

Wherefore I hold it more convenient to omit such Arguments as may intangle us in such endless Altercations, and to bring onely those that cannot be resolved into any *Natural* causes, or be phansied to come by *Chance*, but are so *Miraculous*, that they do imply the presence of some free subtile understanding essence distinct from the brute Matter, and ordinary power of Nature.

And these *Miraculous* effects, as there is nothing more cogent if they could be believed; so there is nothing more hard to the *Atheist* to believe than they are. For *Religionists* having for pious purposes, as they pretend, forged so many false miracles to gull and spoil the credulous people, they have thereby with the *Atheist* taken away all belief of those which are true. And the childish and superstitious fear of *Spirits* in *Melancholick* persons, who create strange Monsters to themselves and terrible *Apparitions* in the dark, hath also helped them with a further evasion, and to impute all *Spectres* and strange *Apparitions* to meer *Melancholy* and disturbed *Fansie*. But that there should be so universal a fame, and fear of that, which never was, nor is, nor can be ever in the world, is to me the greatest *Miracle* of all.

For if there had not been at some time or other *true Miracles* (as indeed there ought to be, if the faculties of Man, who so easily listens to and allows of such things, be not in vain) it is very improbable that Priests and cunning Deluders of the people would have ever been able so easily to impose upon them by their *false*. As the *Alchymist* would never go about to sophisticate *Metals*, and then put them off for *true Gold* and *Silver*, but that it is acknowledged that there is such a thing as *true Gold*.

and *Silver* in the world In like manner therefore as there is an indeavour of deluding the people with *false Miracles*, so it is a sign there have been, and may be those that are *true*.

But you'l say there is a *Touchstone* whereby we may discern the truth of *Metals*, but that there is nothing whereby we may discover the truth of *Miracles* recorded every where in *History*. But I answer there is, and it is this.

First, if what is recorded was avouched by such persons who had *no end* nor *interest* in avouching such things.

Secondly, if there were many *Eye-witnesses* of the same Matter.

Thirdly and lastly, if these things which are so strange and miraculous leave any sensible *effect* behind them.

Though I will not acknowledge that all those stories are *false* that want these conditions, yet I dare affirm that it is meer humour and sullenness in a man to reject the *truth* of those that have them; For it is to believe nothing but what he seeth himself: From whence it will follow that he is to read nothing of *History*, for there is neither pleasure nor any usefulness of it, if it deserve no belief.

CHAP. II.

The Moving of a Sieve by a Charm. Coskinomany. A Magical cure of an Horse. The Charming of Serpents, A strange Example of one Death-strucken as he walked the Streets. A story of a sudden wind that had like to throw down the Gallows at the hanging of two Witches.

AND now that I have premised thus much I will briefly recite some few of those many *miraculous* passages we meet with in Writers, beginning first with the *bare and simple effects* of *Spirits*, as I will aforchand adventure to pronounce them, and then afterwards we shall come to the *Apparitions* of *Spirits* themselves.

And of those *bare effects* we will not care to name what may seem slightest first. *Bodinus* relates how himself and several others at *Paris* saw a young man with a Charm in French, move a *Sieve* up and down. And that ordinary way of Divination which they call *Coskinomancy* or finding who stole or spoiled this or that thing, by the *Sieve* and *Shears*, *Pictorius Vigillanus* professeth he made use of thrice, and it was with success.

A friend of mine told me this story concerning Charms, that himself had an *Horse*, which
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if he had stood sound, had been of a good value. His servants carried him to several Farriers, but none of them had the skill to cure him. At last unknown to their Master, they led him to a Farrier, that had, it should seem, some tricks more then ordinary, and dealt in Charms, or Spells, and such like Ceremonies: in vertue of these he made the Horse sound.

The Owner of him after he had observ'd how well his Horse was, asked his servants, how they got him cured, whence understanding the whole matter, and observing also that that there was an *S.* branded on his buttock, which he conceited stood for *Satan*, chid his servants very roughly, as having done that which was unwarrantable and impious. Upon this profession of his dislike of the fact, the Horse forthwith fell as ill as ever he was, in so much that for his unserviceableness he was fain to be turned up loose in the pasture. But a kinsman of the Owners coming to his house, and after chancing to see the Horse in the Grounds, took the advantage of a low price for so fair a gelding, and bought him. The Horse had no sooner changed his Master, but presently changed his plight of body also, and became as sound as ever.

Charming also of Serpents is above the power of Nature. And *Wierus* tells us this

story of a Charmer at *Saltzburg*, that when in the sight of the people he had charmed all the *Serpents* into a ditch and killed them, at last there came one huge one far bigger then the rest, that leapt upon him; and winded about his waste like a girdle, and pulled him into the ditch, and so killed the Charmer himself in the conclusion.

That also I will adventure to refer to, the effects of *Spirits* which I heard lately from one *M^{is} Dark* of *Westminster* concerning her own *Husband*, who being in the flower of his Age, well in health and very chearful, going out of his house in the morning with an intent to return to dinner, was, as he walked the streets, sensibly struck upon the thigh by an invisible hand, (for he could see no man near him to strike him.) He returned home indeed about dinner-time, but could eat nothing, only he complain'd of the sad Accident that befell him, and grew forthwith so mortally sick, that he dyed within three days. After he was dead there was found upon the place where he was struck, the perfect figure of a mans hand, the four fingers palm and thumb, black and sunk into the flesh, as if one should clap his hand upon a lump of dow.

And hitherto there is nothing related which will not abide the exactest tryal and be clear-
 † from all suspicion of either *Fraud* or

Melancholy. But I shall propound things more strange, and yet as free from that suspicion as the former.

And to say nothing of *winds sold* to Merchants by *Laplanders*, and the danger of losing the *Third knot* (which was very frequent, as *Olans* affirms before those parts of the world were converted to *Christianity*) I shall content my self for the present with a true story which I heard from an eye-witness concerning these preternatural Winds. At *Cambridge* in the reign of *Queen Elizabeth* there was two *Witches* to be executed, the *Mother* and *Daughter*. The *Mother* when she was called upon to repent and forsake the *Devil*, she said, there was no reason for that, for he had been faithful to her these threescore years, and she would be so to him so long as she lived; and thus she died in this obstinacy. But she hanging thus upon the *Gallows*, her *Daughter* being of a contrary minde renounced the *Devil*. was very earnest in prayer and penitence; which, by the effect, the people conceived the *Devil* to take very heinously. For there came such a sudden blast of wind (when as all was calm before) that it drave the *Mother's* body against the ladder so violently, that it had like to have overturn'd it, and shook the *Gallows* with such force, that they were fain to hold the posts for fear of all being flung down to the ground.

CHAP. III.

That Winds and Tempests are raised upon meer Ceremonies or forms of words, prov'd by sundry Examples. Margaret Warine discharg'd upon an Oake at a Thunder-Clap. Amantius and Rotarius cast headlong out of a Cloud upon a house top. The Witch of Constance seen by the Shepherds to ride through the aire.

Wierus that industrious Advocate of Witches recites several Ceremonies that they use for the raising of Tempests, and doth acknowledge that Tempests do follow the performance of those Ceremonies, but that they had come to pass nevertheless without them: which the Devil foreseeing, excites the deluded Women to use those Magick Rites, that they may be the better perswaded of his power. But whether there be any causal connexion betwixt those Ceremonies and the ensuing Tempests I will not curiously decide. But that the connexion of them is *supernatural* is plain at first sight. For what is casting of Flint-Stones behind their backs toward the West, or flinging a little Sand in the Air, or striking a River with a Broom, and so sprinkling the Wet of it toward Heaven, the stirring of Urine or Water with their finger in a Hole in the ground, boyling of Hogs Bristles in a Pot? What are these

These fooleries available of themselves to gather *Clouds* and cover the Air with *Darkness*, and then to make the ground smook with peals of *Hail* and *Rain*, and to make the Air terrible with frequent *Lightnings* and *Thunder*? Certainly nothing at all. Therefore the ensuing of these *Tempests* after such like *Ceremonies* must be either from the prevision of the *Devil* (as *Wierus* would have it) who set the *Witches* on work, or else from the power of the *Devil* which he hath in his Kingdom of the *Air*. And it seems strange to me that *Wierus* should doubt this power, when he gives him a greater; For what is the transporting of vapours or driving them together, to the carrying of Men and Cattel in the Air (of which he is a confident Asserter) unless it require larger *Devils* or greater numbers? And that there are sufficient numbers of such *Spirits* will seem to any body as credible, as that there are any at all. But now for the truth of this, that certain *Words* or *Ceremonies* do seem at least to cause an alteration in the *Air*, and to raise *Tempests*, *Remigius* writes that he had it witnessed to him by the free confession of near two hundred men that he examined: Where he adds a story or two in which there being neither *Fraud*, nor *Melancholy* to be suspected, I think them worth the mentioning. The one is of a *Witch*, who to satisfy the

curiosity of them that had power to punish her, was set free that she might give a proof of that power she professed she had to raise *Tempests*. She therefore being let go, presently betakes her self to a place thick set with *Trees*, scrapes a *Hole* with her hands, fills it with *urine*, and stirs it about so long, that she caused at last a thick dark *Cloud* charged with *Thunder* and *Lightning*, to the terror and affrightment of the beholders. But she bade them be of good courage, for she would command the *Cloud* to discharge upon what place they would appoint her, which she made good in the sight of the Spectators.

The other Story is of a *young Girl*, who to pleasure her Father complaining of a drought, by the guidance and help of that ill Master her Mother had devoted and consecrated her unto, rais'd a *Cloud*, and water'd her Father's ground onely, all the rest continuing dry as before.

Let us adde to these that of *Cuinus* and *Margaret Warine*. While this *Cuinus* was busie at his Hay-making, there arose suddenly great *Thunder* and *Lightning*, which made him run homeward, and forsake his work, for he saw six *Oaks* hard by him overturned from the very *Roots*, and a seventh also shatter'd and torn apieces: he was fain to lose his hat, and leave his fork or rake for haste; which was

not so fast but another crack overtakes him and rattles about his ears; upon which Thunder clap, he presently espied this *Margaret Warine* a reputed Witch upon the top of an Oak, whom he began to chide. She desired his secrecy, and she would promise that never any injury or harm should come to him from her at any time.

This *Cuius* deposed upon Oath before the Magistrate, and *Margaret Warine* acknowledged the truth of it, without any force done unto her, several times before her death, and at her death. [See *Remigius Demonolatr.* lib. 1. c. 29.] *Remigius* conceives she was discharged upon the top of the Oak at that last *Thunder clap*, and there hung amongst the boughs; which he is induced to believe from two Stories he tells afterwards. The one is of a *Tempest* of *Thunder* and *Lightning*, that the Herdsmen tending their Cattel on the brow of the Hill *Alman* in the field of *Guicuria* were frightened with, who running into the Woods for shelter suddenly, saw two countrey men on the top of the Trees, which were next them, so dirty, and in such a pickle, and so out of breath, as if they had been dragg'd up and down through thorns and miry places; but when they had well eyed them, they were gone in a moment out of their sight they knew not how nor whither. These herdsmen talked of the

business

business, but the certainty of it came out not long after. For the free confessions of those two men they then saw, being so exactly agreeing with what the Herdsmen had related, made the whole matter clear and undoubted.

The other Story is of the same persons, known afterward by their names, *viz.* *Amantius* and his partner *Rotarius*, who having cursed it aloft again in the Aire, and being cast headlong out of a Cloud upon an house, the later of them being but a Novice and unexperienced in those supernatural exploits, was much astonish'd and afraid at the strangeness of the matter, but *Amantius* being used to those feats from his youth, his Parents having devoted him from his childhood to the *Devil*, made but a sport of it, and laughing at his friend called him Fool for his fear, and bade him be of good courage; for their Master, in whose power they were, would safely carry them through greater dangers than those. And no sooner had he said these words, but a *whirlwind* took them, and set them both safe upon the ground: but the house they were carried from so shook, as if it would have been overturn'd from the very foundations. This, both those men examin'd apart, confessed in the same words, not varying their story at all; whose confessions exactly agreed in all circumstances

stances with what was observed by the Countrey people concerning the time and the manner of the *Tempest* and shaking of the house.

I will onely adde one Relation more of this nature, and that is of a *Witch of Constance*, who being vex'd that all her Neighbors in the Village where she lived were invited to the *Wedding*, and so were drinking and dancing and making merry, and she solitary and neglected, got the *Devil* to transport her through the Aire, in the midst of day, to a Hill hard by the Village: where she digging a hole and putting Urine into it, rais'd a great *Tempest* of *Hail*, and directed it so, that it fell onely upon the Village, and pelted them that were dancing with that violence, that they were forc'd to leave off their sport. When she had done her exploit she returned to the Village, and being spied was suspected to have raised the *Tempest*, which the Shepherds in the field that saw her riding in the Aire knew well before, who bringing in their witness against her, she confes'd the fact. I might be infinite in such Narrations, but I will moderate my self.

CHAP. IV.

Supernaturall Effects observ'd in them that are Bewitch'd and Possess'd. The famous Story of Magdalena Crucia.

WE will now pass to those *supernatural effects* which are observed in them that are *bewitch'd* or *possess'd*. And such are, *Fore-telling things to come, Telling what such and such persons speak or do* as exactly as if they were by them; when the party *possess'd* is at one end of the town and sitting in a house within doors, and those parties that act and confer together are without at the other end of the town; to be able *to see some and not others*; to play at Cards with one certain person, and not to discern any body else at the table besides him; to act, and talk, and go up and down, and tell what will become of things, and what happens in those *fitts of possession*, and then so soon as the possessed or bewitched party is out of them, to *remember nothing* at all, but to enquire concerning the welfare of those whose faces they seemed to look upon but just before, when they were in their *fitts*. All which can be no symptomes nor signs of any thing else but the *Devil* got into the body of a man, and holding all the operations of his

his Soul, and then acting, and speaking, and sporting as he pleases, in the miserable Tenement he hath crouded himself into, making use of the Organs of the body at his own pleasure, for the performing of such pranks and feats as are far above the capacity, strength or agility of the party thus *bewitched* or *possessed*.

All these things are fully made good by long and tedious observations recorded in the *discovery of the Witches of Warbois in Huntingtoshire, Anno 1594.* The memory whereof is still kept fresh by an Anniversary Sermon preach'd at *Huntington* by some of the Fellows of *Queens Colledge in Cambridge.*

There is also lately come forth a Narration how one *Mrs. Muschamps* children were handled in *Cumberland*, which is very like this of *Mr. Throckmorton's* children of *warbois.*

That which is generally observed in them both is this, That in their *fitts* they are as if they had no Soul at all in their Bodies, and that whatsoever operations of sense, reason or motion there seems to be in them, it is not any thing at all to them, but is wholly that strangers that hath got into them. For so soon as their *fitts* are over, they are as if they had been in so profound a sleep, that they did not so much as dream, and so remember nothing at all of what they either said, or did, or where they had been; as is manifest by an infinite numbe

number of examples in the forenamed relations. Of the truth of which passages here at home we being very well ascertain'd, we may with the more confidence venture upon what is recorded concerning others abroad. As for example; The possession of the *Religious Virgins* in the Monastery of *Werts*, others in *Hesimont*, others also not far from *Xannes*, and in other places, where there were Eye-witnesses enough to take notice, how strangely they were handled, being flung up from the ground higher then a mans head, and falling down again without harm, swarming upon Trees as nimbly as Cats, and hanging upon the boughs, having their flesh torn off from their bodies without any visible hand or instrument, and many other mad pranks which is not so fit to name, but they that have a minde may read at large in *Vierus*.

I would pass now to other effects of *Witchcraft*, as the conveying of *knives*, *balls of hair*, and *nails* into the bodies of them that are bewitched; but that the mention of these *Nights* put me in minde of that famous story in *Vierus* of *Magdalena Cracia*, first a *Nun*, and then an *Abbesse* of a Nunnery in *Cordoba* in *Spain*. Those things which were miraculous in her were these; That she could tell almost at any distance how the affairs of the world went, what consultations or transactions there were

IN all the Nations of Christendome, from whence she got to her self the reputation of a *very Holy woman* and a great *Prophetesse*. But other things came to pass by her or for her sake, no less strange and miraculous; as that at the celebrating of the holy *Eucharist*, the Priest should alwayes want one of his round *Wafers*, which was secretly conveyed to *Magdalen* by the administration of Angels, as was supposed, and she receiving of it into her mouth ate it, in the view of the people, to their great astonishment and high reverence of the *Saint*. At the elevation of the Host *Magdalen* being near at hand, but yet a wall betwixt, that the wall was conceived to open, and to exhibite *Magdalen* to the view of them in the Chappel, and that thus she partaked of the consecrated bread. When this *Abbatesse* came into the Chappel her self upon some special day, that she would set off the solemnity of the day by some notable and conspicuous Miracle: For she would sometimes be lifted up above the ground three or four cubits high; other sometimes bearing the Image of Christ in her arms, weeping favourly, she would make her hair to increase to that length and largeness, that it would come to her heels, and cover her all over and the Image of Christ in her armes, which anon notwithstanding would shrink up again to its usual size; with

a many such specious though unprofitable Miracles.

But you'll say that the Narration of these things is not *true*, but they are *feigned* for the advantage of the *Roman Religion*, and so it was profitable for the Church to forge them and record them to posterity. A man that is unwilling to admit of any thing *supernaturall* would please himself with this generall shuffle and put-off. But when we come to the *Catastrophe* of the story, he will finde it quite otherwise; for this *Saint* at last began to be suspected for a *Sorceresse* as it is thought, and she being conscious, did of her own accord, to save herself, make confession of her wickedness to the Visitors of the Order, as they are called; *viz.* That for thirty years she had been married to the *Devil* in the shape of an *Ethiopian*, that another *Devil* servant to this, when his Master was at dalliance with her in her Cell, supplied her place amongst the *Nuns* at their publick Devotions; that by vertue of this Contract she made with this *Spirit*, she had done all those Miracles she did. Upon this confession she was committed, and while she was in durance, yet she appear'd in her devout postures praying in the Chappel as before at their set hours of Prayer; which being told to the Visitors by the Nuns, there was a strict watch over her that she should not stir out.

Nevertheless she appeared in the Chappel as before, though she were really in the Prison.

Now what credit or advantage there can be to the *Roman Religion* by this story, let any man judge. Wherefore it is no figment of the Priests or Religious persons, nor Melancholy, nor any such matter (for how could so many spectators at once be deluded by Melancholy?) but it ought to be deemed a real *Truth*: And this *Magdalena Crucia* appearing in two several places at once, it is manifest that there is such a thing as *Apparitions of Spirits*. But I must abstain as yet from touching that argument, I having not dispatch'd what I propounded concerning the vomiting up of *Nails*, the conveying of *Knives* and *pieces of wood* into the Bodies of men, and the like. Which things are so palpable and uncapable of delusion, that I think it worth the while to insist a little upon them.

C H A P. V.

Examples of Bewitch'd Persons that have had Balls of Hair, Nails, Knives, Wood stuck with Pins, pieces of Cloth, and such like trash convey'd into their Bodies, with examples also of other Supernatural Effects.

I Will begin with that memorable true Story that *Langius* tells of one *Ulricus Neufesser*, who being grievously tormented with a pain in his side, suddenly felt under his skin, which yet was whole, an iron *Nail* as he thought. And so it prov'd when the Chyrurgion had cut it out: But nevertheless his great torments continued, which enraged him so, that he cut his own Throat: The third day when he was carried out to be buried, *Eucharis Rosenbader*, and *Johannes ab Ettenstet*, a great company of people standing about them dissected the Corps, and ripping up the Ventricle, found a round piece of wood of a good length, four knives, some even and sharp, others indented like a Saw, with other two rough pieces of Iron a span long. There was also a ball of Hair. This hapned at *Fugenstal*, 1539.

Wierus tells also of one that was possessed, of which himself was an Eye-witness, that vomited up pieces of cloth with pins stuck in them,

s, needles and such like stuff: which he con-
ds doth not come from the stomach, but by
restigious sleight of the Devil is onely in-
ted into the mouth.

Cardan relates the like of a good simple
ountrey fellow and a friend of his, that had
en a long time troubled with vomiting up
Ass, Iron; Nails and *Hair*, and that at that time
told *Cardan* of it, he was not so perfectly
stored but that something yet crash'd in his
elly, as if there were a *Bag of Glass* in it.

I might add seasonably hereunto what is so
redibly reported of *M^{rs} Muschamp's Child*,
hat it was seen to vomit up pieces of *Wood*
with *Pins* stuck in it.

But I will conclude all with that Story of
about thirty Children that were so strangely
handled at *Amsterdam*, 1566. of the truth
whereof *wierus* professeth himself very well
assured. They were tortured very much, and
cast violently upon the ground, but when they
arose out of their fit knew nothing but thought
they had been onely asleep. For the remedy-
ing of this mischief they got the help of *Phy-
sicians, wizards* and *Exorcists*, but without suc-
cess. Onely while the *Exorcists* were reading,
the Children vomited up *Needles, Thimbles,*
shreds of Cloth, pieces of Pots, Glasse, Hair, and
other things of the like nature.

Now the advantage I would make of these
Relations.

Relations, is this, that these effects extraordinary and supernatural being so palpable and permanent, they are not at all lyable to such Subterfuges as *Atheists* usually betake themselves to, as of *Melancholy*, and disturbance of *Phansie* in those that profess they see such strange things, or any *Fraud* or *Imposture* in those that act.

All that can with any shew of reason be alledged is this, That such parties in their fits of distraction may devour such things as they vomit up, or at least put them into their mouths. But they that are by, might easily see that, distracted people doing things carelessly and openly. And these things happen to those that are thus handled against their wills; and as they are not discovered to do any such things, of themselves, so neither do they confess afterwards that they did it; when they are come to their right senses; and ordinarily it is found out that some Woman or other by *Sorcery* or *witchcraft* was the Author of it.

Besides it is evident that there can be no mistake at all in some of these passages; For how can an iron *Nail* get betwixt the skin and the flesh, the skin not at all ripped or touch'd? Or how is it possible for any body to swallow down Knives and pieces of Iron a span long? which besides that story of *Ulricus Neuseffer*, is made good in another of a young Wench, who

H A P. 5. 103
when she had made clean a pair of shoes
in a *Knife*, which she put in her bosom, she
er seeking for it, it could not be found any
ere; till at length it began to discover it self
a swelling on her left side, and at last was
illed out thence by a Chirurgion. You
ay read the whole Relation in *Wierus*, lib. 4:
was done at *Levensteet* in the Dukedom of
runswick, 1562. An old Woman had come
to the house in the morning, and a strange *black*
dog was found under the table.

There are also other miraculous and super-
natural effects; as in that maid of *Saxonies*
peaking of Greek; and in another, whom *Ca-*
lius Rhodiginus profest he saw, that spoke from
betwixt her legs. A third at *Paris* whom Dr.
Picard and other Divines would have dispos-
fest, whom one *Hollerius* a Physician deriding,
as if it had been nothing but Melancholy in the
Woman and Ignorance in those Divines, was
after convinc'd of the contrary, when he saw
her standing betwixt two other women, and
crying out of a sudden, discerning her hands
to be so fast bound that there was no loosing of
them without cutting the string. There was not
the appearance of any thing to any body but
to the *possessed* onely, who said she saw then a
white cloud come near her when she was
bound.

C H A P. VI.

The Apparition Eckerken. The Story of the pyed Piper. A Triton or Sea-God seen on the banks of Rubicon. Of the Imps of Witches, and whether those old women be guilty of so much dotage as the Atheist fancies them. That such things pass betwixt them and their Imps as are impossible to be imputed to Melancholy. The examination of John Winnick of Molesworth. The reason of Sealing Covenants with the Devil.

BUT it is now high time to clear up this more dim and cloudy discovery of Spirits into more distinct and articulate Apparitions, according as I did at first propound. And these I shall cast into two ranks: Such as appear near to us on the *Ground*, or such as are seen afar off, above in the *Air*. And here again to begin with small things first. Near *Elton* a Village half a mile distant from *Embrica* in the Dukedom of *Cleve*, there was a thing had its haunt, they called it *Eckerken*; there appeared never more then the shape of an *Hand*, but it would beat travellers, pull them off from their horses, and overturn carriages. This could be no *Phansie*, there following so real *Effects*.

The story of the *pyed Piper*, that first by his pipe gathered together all the *Rats* and

Mice

ce, and drown'd them in the River, and forward, being defrauded of his reward, which the Town promis'd him if he could deliver them from the plague of those *Vermine*, took his opportunity, and by the same pipe made the *Children* of the town follow him, and leading them into a Hill that opened, buried them there all alive; hath so evident proof of it in the town of *Hammel* where it was done, that it ought not at all to be discredited. For the fact is very religiously kept amongst their ancient Records, painted out also in their Church-windows, and is an *Epoche* joyned with the year of our Lord in their Bills and Intenures and other Law-Instruments.

That also seems to me beyond all exception and evasion which *Suetonius* relates of a *Spectrum* appearing on the banks of the River *Rubicon*: which was thus. *Julius Caesar* having marched with his Army to this River, which divides *Gallia Citerior* from *Italy*, and being very doubtful with himself whether he should pass over into *Italy* or not, there was seen on the River side a Man of a prodigious stature and form, playing on a Reed. The strangeness of his person as well as the pleasantness of his Musick had drawn several of the Shepherds unto him, as also many of the Souldiers, amongst whom were some Trumpeters; which this *Triton* (as *Melanchthon* ventures to call him)

him) or *Sea-god* wel observing nimblely snatches away one of the Trumpets out of their hands, leaps forthwith into the River, and sounding a March with that strength and violence, that he seem'd to rend the Heavens, & made the air ring again with the mighty forcibleness of the Blast; in this manner he passed over to the other side of the River: whereupon *Cesar* taking the *Omen*, leaves off all further dispute with himself, carries over his Army, enters *Italy*, secure of success from so manifest tokens of the favour of the Gods.

To confirm this truth of *Apparitions*, if we would but admit the free confessions of *Witches* concerning their *Imps*, whom they so frequently see and converse withal, know them by their names. and do obeisance to them; the point would be put quite out of all doubt, and their proofs would be so many, that no volume would be large enough to contain them. But forsooth these must be all *Melancholy old women* that dote and bring themselves into danger by their own *Phansies* and *Conceits*. But that they do not dote, I am better assured of, then of their not doting, that say they do. For to satisfy my own curiosity I have examined several of them, and they have discours'd as cunningly as any of their quality and education. But by what I have read and observ'd, I discern they serve a very perfidious Master,

who

plays wreacks many times on purpose to say them. But that is onely by the by. Demand concerning these *witches* who contract their contract and frequent converse with *Devil*; some with him in one shape, others another; whether meer *Melancholy* and *Imagination* can put *Powders, Rods, Oynments,* and such like things into their hands, and tell them the use of them, can impress *Marks* upon their bodies, so deep as to take away all sense in that place, can put *Silver* and *Gold* into their hands; which afterwards commonly proves but either *Counters, Leaves, or Shells,* or some such like useles matter? These real effects cannot be by meer *Melancholy*. For if a man receive any thing into his hand, be it what it will be, there was some body that gave it him. And therefore the *Witch* receiving some real thing from this or that other shape that appeared unto her, it is an evident sign, that it was an external thing that she saw, not a meer figuration of her *Melancholy Phansie*. There are innumerable examples of this kind, but the thing is so trivial and ordinary that it wants no instances. I will onely set down one, wherein there is the apparition of three Spirits.

John Winnick of *Molsworth* in *Huntingtonshire* being examined April 11. 1646. confessed as follows. “ Having lost his purse with seven
“ shillings in it, for which he suspected one in
“ the

“ the family where he lived, he saith that on a
 “ Friday while he was making hay-bottles in
 “ the barn, and swore and curs’d and rag’d, and
 “ wisht to himself that some *wife* body would
 “ help him to his purse and money again, there
 “ appear’d unto him a *Spirit* in the shape of a
 “ *Bear* but not so big as a *Coney*, who promis’d
 “ upon condition that he would fall down and
 “ worship him, he would help him to his purse.
 “ He assented to it, and the *Spirit* told him to
 “ morrow about this time he should find his
 “ purse upon the floor where he made bottles,
 “ and that he would then come himself also;
 “ which was done accordingly: and thus at the
 “ time appointed recovering his purse he fell
 “ down upon his knees to the *Spirit*, and said,
 “ *My Lord and God I thank you.* This *Spirit*
 “ brought then with him two other, in the
 “ shape the one of a white *Cat*, the other of a
 “ *Coney*, which at the command of the *Bear-*
 “ *Spirit* he worshipped also. The *Bear-Spirit*
 “ told him he must have his Soul when he dy-
 “ ed, that he must suck of his body, that he
 “ must have some of his Blood to seal the Co-
 “ venant. To all which he agreed, and so the
 “ *Bear-Spirit* leaping up to his shoulder, prick’d
 “ him on the head, and thence took blood. Af-
 “ ter that, they all three vanished, but ever
 “ since came to him once every twenty four
 “ hours, and suck’d on his body, where the

“ *Marks* are found. And that they had continually done thus for this twenty nine years together. That all these things should be a *meer dream* is a conceit more slight & foolish than any dream possibly can be. For that receiving of his purse was a palpable and sensible pledge of the truth of all the rest. And it is incredible that such a *series* of circumstances back'd with twenty nine years experience of being suck'd and visited daily, sometimes in the day time, most commonly by night, by the same three *Familiars*, should be nothing but the hanging together of so many *Melancholy Conceits* and *Phantasies*.

Nor doth the *sealing* of *Covenants* and *writing* with *Blood* make such stories as these more to be suspected: for it is not at all unreasonable that such Ceremonies should pass betwixt a *Spirit* and a *Man*, when the like palpable Rites are used for the more firmly tying of Man to God. For whatsoever is crass & external leaves stronger Impress upon the *Phansie*, and the remembrance of it strikes the mind with more efficacy. So that assuredly the *Devil* hath the greater hanck upon the Soul of a *witch* or *wizard*, that hath been perswaded to compleat their *Contract* with him in such a gross sensible way, and keeps them more fast from revolting from him, that if they had onely contracted in bare words.

C H A P. VII.

Four late notorious Examples of Exorcism or Conjuring up Spirits by one Anne Bodenham a Witch, who suffered at Salisbury, Anno 1653.

TO that of *John Winnick*, it will not be amiss to adde a more late and more notable Narration concerning one *Anne Bodenham* a Witch, who lived in *Fisherton-Anger* adjacent to the City of new *Sarum* in the County of *Wilt*s, who was arraigned and executed at *Salisbury* 1653. He that has a minde to read the Story more at large, he may consult *Edmond Bower*. But I shall onely set down here what is most material to our present purpose, partly out of him, and partly from others who were then at the Assizes, and had private Conference with the Witch, and spoke also with the Maid that gave evidence against her.

This *Anne Bodenham* it seems concealed not her skill in foretelling things to come, and helping men to their stoln goods, and other such like feats, that the more notable sort of Wizards and Witches are said to pretend to and to practise.

Amongst others that resorted to her, there was one *Anne Styles* servant to *Rich: Goddard* Esq; of the *Cloze* in new *Sarum*, sent by *Mr. Mason*

Mason this Goddards Son in Law (he having a design to commence a Law Suit against his Father) to learn of the Witch what would be the event of the Suit. *Who being asked by the Maid, who had three shillings to give her for her pains, she took her staff and there drew it about the house, making a kinde of a Circle, and then took a book, and carrying it over the Circle with her hands, and taking a green glasse, did lay it upon the book, and placed in the Circle an earthen Pan of Coals, wherein she threw something, which burning caused a very noisome stink, and told the Maid she should not be afraid of what she should then see, for now they would come (they are the words she used) and so calling Belzebub, Tormentor, Satan and Lucifer, appear, there suddenly arose a very high wind, which made the house shake, and presently the back-door of the house flying open, there came five Spirits, as the Maid supposed, in the likenesse of ragged Boyes, some bigger then others, and ran about the house, where she had drawn the staff; and the Witch threw down upon the ground crums of bread, which the Spirits picked up, and leapt over the Pan of coals oftentimes, which she set in the midst of the Circle, and a Dog and a Cat of the Witches danced with them; and after some time the witch looked again in her book, and threw some great white seeds upon the ground, which the said Spirits picked up, and so in a short time the wind wa-*

laid, and the Witch going forth at her back door the Spirits vanished. After which the Witch told the Maid, that Mr. Mason should demand Fifteen hundred pound, and one hundred and fifty pound per annum of Mr. Goddard, and if he denied it, he should prosecute the Law against him, and be gone from his Father, and then he should gain it: with which message the Maid returned and acquainted Mr. Mason.

But it may be it will be objected, That these were some poor ragged Boyes that plotted there with Anne Bodenham to get money upon pretence of Conjuring, and foretelling future events, when as it was indeed nothing else but a cheat within the power of an ordinary knavish wit. But the loudness of the wind, and the forcible shaking of the house upon those Magical Words and Ceremonies, may easily answer or rather quite blow away such frivolous evasions.

But if the Objector will yet persist in his opinion, let him reade the circumstances of the second Conjuration of this Witches. For the same Maid being sent again to her from the same party, to enquire in what part of the house the Poison was that should be given her Mistris: Hereupon she took her stick as before, and making therewith a Circle, the wind rose forthwith; then taking a besoms she swept over the Circle, and made another, and looking in her book

and

and glasse as formerly, and using some words softly to her self, she stood in the Circle and said, Bezebub, Tormentor, Lucifer and Satan appear: There appeared first a Spirit in the shape of a little Boy, as she conceived, which then turned into another shape something like a snake, and then into the shape of a shagged Dog with great eyes, which went about in the Circle; and in the Circle she set an earthen Pan of Coals, wherein she threw something which burned and stank, and then the Spirit vanished. After which the Witch took her book and glasse again, and shewed the Maid in the glasse Mistris Sarah Goddards Chamber, the colour of the Curtains, and the bed turned up the wrong way, and under that part of the bed where the Bolster lay, she shewed the poison in a white paper. The Maid afterward returned home, and acquainted Mistris Rosewel with what the Witch had shewed her in a glasse that the poison it lay under Mistris Sarahs Bed, and also spoke to her that they might go together and take it away.

The transformation of a Boy into a Snake, and of that Snake into a shagged Dog with staring eyes, is a feat far above all humane art or wit whatsoever.

Nor can it be imagined that Melancholy had so disturbed the minde of the Maid, that she told her own dreams or fancies for external sensible transactions. For she was imploy

ed by others in a reall Negotiation betwixt them and the Witch, and ever brought back her answers to them, receiving also things from her, by the help of those ragged Boyes she raised up, as appears in a third Conjunction of hers, when the Maid was another time sent to procure some exemplary punishment upon Mr. Goddard's two Daughters, who yet were unjustly, as it seems, aspersed with the suspicion of endeavouring to poison their Mother in law. *The Witch receiving the wenches errand, made a Circle as formerly, and set her Pan of Coals therein, and burnt somewhat that stank extremely, and took her boock and glasse as before is related, and said, Belzebub, Tormentor, Lucifer and Satan appear, and then appeared five Spirits, as she conceived, in the shapes of little ragged Boyes, which the Witch commanded to appear, and go along with the Maid to a Meadow at Wilton, which the Witch shewed in a glasse, and there to gather Verwine and Dill, and forthwith the ragged Boyes ran away before the Maid, and she followed them to the said Meadow, and when they came thither, the ragged Boyes looked about for the herbs, and removed the snow in two or three places before they could finde any, and at last they found some, and brought it away with them; and then the Maid and the Boyes returned again to the witch, and found her in the Circle, paring her Nails; and then she*

took

took the said herbs, and dried the same, and made powder of some, and dried the leaves of other, and threw bread to the Boyes, and they eat and danced as formerly, and then the Witch reading in a book they vanished away: And the Witch gave the Maid in one paper the powder, in another the leaves, and in the third the paring of the Nails, all which the Maid was to give her Mistris: The powder was to put in the young Gentlewomens, Mistris Sarah and Mistris Anne Goddards drink or broth, to rot their guts in their bellies; the leaves to rub about the brims of the Pot, to make their teeth fall out of their heads; and the paring of the Nails to make them drunk and mad. And when the Maid came home and delivered it to her Mistris, and told her the effects of the powder, and the other things, her Mistris laughed and said, that is a very brave thing indeed. But yet she had the discretion not to make use of it.

This powder was shewn at the Affizes (so that it could be no fancy or dream) together with a piece of Money that she received of the Spirits, which one of them first bit and gave it the Witch, and then the Witch gave it to the Maid. The hole also in her finger was then shown, out of which blood was squeezed to subscribe a Covenant with the Devil, as you may see in the fourth and last bout of Conjuring the Witch performed in the Maids presence. For she being advised

by

by Mr. Geddard's household to go to London, she went to the Witches first before she quit the Countrey; who being made acquainted with her journey, asked her whether she would go to London High or Low? To which she replied, what do you mean by that? she answered, If you will go on High, you shall be carried to London in the Air, and be there in two hours; but if you go a Low, you shall be taken at Sutton Towns end and before, unlesse you have help: But before she departed, the Witch earnestly desired the Maid to live with her, and told her if she would do so, she would teach her to do as she did, and that she should never be taken: Then the Maid asked her, what she could do? she answered, You shall know presently, and forthwith she appeared in the shape of a great black Cat, and lay along by the Chimney; at which the Maid being very much affrighted, she came into her own shape again, and told her, I see you are afraid, and I see you are willing to be gone; and told her if she was, she should say so, and not speak against her conscience; and the Maid replied, she was willing to go, and not to dwell with the witch; then the Witch said, She must seal unto her body and blood not to discover her: which she promising to do, she forthwith made a Circle as formerly she had done, and looking in her book; called, Belzebub, Tormentor, Lucifer and Satan appeare. Then appeared two Spirits in the likenesse of great Boyes, with long shagged black

the hair, and stood by her looking over her
 shoulder, and the Witch took the Maids forefinger
 of her right hand in her hand, and pricked it
 with a pin, and squeezed out the blood and put it
 in a Pen, and put the Pen in the Maids hand,
 and held her hand to write in a great book, and
 one of the Spirits laid his hand or Claw upon the
 Maids shoulder whilest she Maid wrote; and when she
 had done writing, whilest their hands were toge-
 ther, the Witch said Amen, and made the Maid
 say Amen, and the Spirits said Amen, Amen;
 and the Spirits hand did feel cold to the Maid as
 she touched her hand, when the witches hand and
 the Spirits were together writing; and then the Spirit
 gave a piece of silver (which he first bit) to the
 Witch, who gave it to the Maid; and also stuck
 three Pins in the Maids head-clothes and bid her
 keep them, and bid her be gone; and said also, I
 will vex the Gentlewoman well enough, as I did
 a man in Clarington Park, which I made walk
 out with a bundle of Pales on his back all night
 in a pond of water, and could not lay them down
 till the next morning.

All these things the Maid deposed upon
 oath; and I think it now, beyond all con-
 troversie, evident, that unless she did know-
 ingly forswear her self, that they are certain-
 ly true. For they cannot be imputed to any
 Dreamings, Fancy, nor Melancholy. Now
 had the Maid did not forswear her self, or in-

vent these Narrations she swore to, many Arguments offer themselves for eviction.

As first, that it is altogether unlikely that a sorry wench that could neither write nor read, should be able to excogitate such Magical Forms and Ceremonies, with all the circumstances of the effects of them, and declare them so punctually, had she not indeed seen them done before her eyes.

Secondly, if she had been so cunning at inventing lies, she could not but have had so much wit as to frame them better for her own advantage, & for theirs by whom she was employed, or told so much onely of the truth as would have been no prejudice to her self, nor any else to have it revealed.

For in brief, the case stood thus; Her Mistress either had, or fained her self to have, a suspicion that her two Daughters in law, Mistress *Sarah* and Mistress *Anne Goddard*, conspired to poison her. Hereupon this Maid *Anne Styles* was sent to the Witch, upon pretence to know when this poisoning would be, and how to prevent it; and at the second time she consulted her, the Witch sent her to the Apothecaries to buy her some white Arsenick, and bring her it, which she taking told her she would burn it, and so prevent the poisoning of her Mistress. The buying of this Arsenick was the great occasion of the Maids flying.

For it coming to the knowledge of the two Sisters how they were suspected to endeavour the poisoning of their Mother, and that they had bought an ounce and half of Arsenick lately at the Apothecaries, they to clear themselves from this suspicion, made diligent enquiry at all the Apothecaries shops throughout *Sarum*, and at last found where the poison was bought. Hereupon the Maid was desired by her Mistris to go away and shift for her self, to avoid that trouble and disgrace that might come upon them, if she should stay and be examined before some Justice. While she was upon her journey, Mr. *Chandler* Son in law to Mr. *God-dard*, hearing how his Mother in law was in danger of being poisoned, and that a Servant of hers that had bought the poison was fled, he forthwith with another man made after her, overtook her near *Sutton*, had her there into an Inne, where she confessed what has been above related. Which Confession, I say, cannot be any figment or forged tale, but certain truth, it making nothing for the parties advantage, or theirs that imployed her, but rather against them, and mainly against her self; when as if she had onely confessed the buying of the Arsenick, with the purpose of preventing her Mistrisses being poisoned, by the help and skill of the Witch or Wise-woman, it might have

gone for a tolerable piece of folly, could not seem so criminal and execrable as these other acts do. Nothing therefore but a guilty conscience, and the power of truth did extort from her this impartial Confession, which thus every way touches her friends, her self, and the Witch.

Thirdly, that her compact with the Devil was no fable but a sure truth (and if that be true, there is no reason to doubt of the rest) was abundantly evidenced by the real effects of it. For after she had delivered the piece of Money above mentioned, and the two pins to Mr. *Chandler*, she said she should be troubled for not keeping these things secret. For the Devil told her, so long as she kept them secret she should never be troubled; but now, she said, having revealed them, she feared she should be troubled. And that those grievous troubles and agonies she was after found in, were not meer freaks of her own disturbed fancy, but the Tyranny of *Satan*, will appear from several Circumstances.

For at her recovery from the first fit she fell into, both Mr. *Chandler* and *William Atwood* the man that went with him, saw a black shade come from her, whereupon presently she came to her self.

Again she was so strong in her fits, that six men or more could not hold her; and once

as they were holding her, she was caught up from them so high, that her feet touched their breasts. As also at another time about midnight, she being miserably tormented, and crying out, The Devil wil carry me away, she was pulled from them that held her, and cast from the low bed where she lay, to the top of an high bed, with her Clothes torn off her back, and a piece of her skin torn away: *The Candle in the room standing on the Table was thrown down and put out; at which time there being a little Boy that was almost asleep, but with this noise being affrighted, had no power with the rest to go out of the room, stayed there, and saw a Spirit in the likeness of a great black man with no head in the room, scuffling with the Maid, who took her and set her into a Chair, and told her that she must go with him, he was come for her soul, she had given it to him: But the Maid answered, that her soul was none of her own to give; and he had already got her blood, but as for her soul he should never have it; and after a while tumbling and throwing about of the Maid, he vanished away.*

And that that which the Boy heard and saw was no fancy of his own, but a reall object of his senses, the Witches condition in another Chamber at the same time does not obscurely argue. For she was then seen with her clothes off, in her fetters, running about like mad.

and being asked why she ran about the room, she replied, She could not keep her bed, but was pulled out by violence; and being asked the reason why, she replied, Pray you what is the matter in your Chamber? Nothing, said they, but a Childe is not well: To which she answered, Do not you lie to me, for I know what is the matter as well as your selves.

But to return to the Maid, from whom we may draw further Arguments relating also to the Witch. As that, when the Maid had not for many dayes and nights together taken any rest, and being then under most grievous hurryings and tortures of the body, the Witch being brought into the room where she lay, the design unknown to her, and the time of her entring, yet so soon as the Witch had set one foot into the room, she gave a most hideous glance with her eyes, and shut them presently after, falling asleep in a moment, and slept about three hours, so fast, that when they would have wakened her, they could not by any art or violence whatever, as by stopping her breath, putting things up her nostrils, holding her upright, striking of her, and the like. The Witch also declared her unwillingness that she should be wakened, crying out, *O pray you by no means awake the Maid, for if she should awake I should be torn in pieces, and*
the

the Devil would fetch me away bodily. And a further evidence that this sleep of the Maid did some way depend upon the Witch is, that so soon as the Witch had gone from under the roof where she was, the Maid wakened of her self, and so soon as the Maid awakened, and was at ease (the Devil, as she said, having gone out of her stomach, but doing her no violence, onely making her body tremble a little) the Witch began to roar and cry out, *The Devil will tear me in pieces.* These things you may read more fully and particularly in the Narration of *Edmond Bower*, who was an eye-witness of them. But what I have transcribed from thence I think is sufficient to convince any indifferent man, that what befel the Maid after her revealing those secrets she was intrusted with, was not counterfeited but real, nay, I may safely say, Supernatural.

Fourthly and lastly, her behaviour at the Assizes when she gave evidence against the Witch, was so earnest and serious, with that strength of mind and free and confident appeals to the Witch her self, that, as I was informed of those that were Spectators of that Transaction, it had been argument enough to the unprejudiced, that she swore nothing but what she was assured was true. And those floods of tears and her bitter weepings after Sentence was passed on the Witch, and her bewailing

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bemoaning of her own wickedness and madness, and professing her willingness notwithstanding, if it might be done without sin, that the Witch might be relieved, may further wash away all suspicion of either fraud or malice.

Nor can the Witches denying (even to her dying day) what the Maid swore to, enervate her testimony. For the Maid tells the whole truth; as it was, even to the hazard of her own life; which the Witch indeed denies, but for the saving of hers. And it is no wonder that one that would bid a pox on the hangman when he desired her to forgive him at her death, should lye and impudently deny any thing to save her own life.

But you'll object, that this reputed Witch may indeed be wicked enough, and willing enough to do any thing; but the power of her wickedness not reaching to such performances as the Maid witnessed against her, we may well believe her rather than the Maid. The sense of which objection, if I understand it, can be nothing but this; that either this *Ann Boderham* was no Witch, or else the things charged upon her were absolutely impossible. The meaning of the latter whereof assuredly is, that it is impossible any one should be a Witch, there being no such things as Spirits to be conjured up by them. Which is unskilfully to let

let go the premises as finding them too strong, and to quarrel with the conclusion.

But if the sense be (admitting there are *witches*) that she was none; I think it may be evidently evinced that she was, from what she undoubtedly both did and spake. As for example, from her shewing of the Maid in a Glass the shapes of sundry persons and their actions and postures in several rooms in her Masters house, whither when she had returned from the witch, she told them punctually what they had been doing in her absence, w^{ch} made *Elizabeth Rosewel* one of the Family profess, that she thought *M^{rs} Bodenham* was either a Witch or a woman of God. Besides what happened to her in reference to the fits of the Maid which has been already insisted upon, are shrewd suspicions of her being a Witch. As also what she boasted of to *Mr. Tuckers Clerk* concerning a purse that hung about her neck in a green string, that she could do many feats with it, and that if he would give her half a dozen of Ale, she would make a Toad spring out of it. Her confession to *Mr. Langley of Sarum*, that she lived with *D. Lamb* and learnt the art of raising Spirits from him, which she also confessed to *Edmond Bower* to whom also she acknowledged her skill of curing diseases by Charms and Spels, that she could discover stollen goods, and shew any one the thief in a Glass; and being asked by

him

him for the *Red Book* half wrote over with blood, being a *Catalogue* of those that had sealed to the Devil, she denied not the knowledge of the book, but said it was with one in *Hampshire*. She also professed that she used many good prayers, and said the Creed backwards and forwards, and that she prayed to the Planet *Jupiter* for the curing of diseases.

She also acknowledged she had a Book whereby she raised Spirits, calling it a *Book of Charms*, and said it was worth thousands of other books, and that there was a particular Charm in it for the finding of a Treasure hid by the old Earl of *Pembroke* in the north part of *Wilton* garden.

To another party, she being asked by him whether there were any Spirits, she made this reply, That she was sure there were, and confirmed it to him by several passages of late, and particularly by that of one forced to *walk about all night with a bundle of Pales on his back in a pond of water*, which is mentioned at the end of the fourth Conjurati^on above recited. She did also highly magnifie her own art to him, venturing at *Astrological* terms and phrases, and did much scorn and blame the ignorance of the people, averring to him with all earnestness and confidence that there was no hurt in these Spirits, but that they would do a man all good offices, attending upon him, and

and garding him from evil all his life long.

But certainly her *ragged Boys* were no such, who discharged the Maid from keeping the Commandments of God, and told her they would teach her a better way, as she also confessed to the same party.

Add unto all this, that this *Ann Bodenham* was searched both at the Gaol and before the Judges at the Assizes, and there was found on her shoulder a certain mark or teat about the length and bigness of the nipple of a womans breast, and hollow and soft as a nipple, with an hole on the top of it.

Wherefore to conclude, there being found upon her, there being done and spoken by her such things as do evidently indigitate that she is a Witch and has the power of raising Spirits, and she being accused by one of raising them up, who in no likelihood could excogitate any such either Magical Forms, Effects or Circumstances as are above recited, and who tells her story so indifferently that it touches her self near as much as the Witch, and upon her revealing of the villany was so handled that it was plainly above any natural distemper imaginable; it cannot, I say, but gain full assent of any man, whom prejudice and obstinacy has not utterly blinded, that what the Maid confessed concerning her self and the Witch is most certainly true.

C H A P. VIII.

A memorable story of a Shoemaker, Citizen of Breslaw in Silesia who cut his own throat, Anno 1591.

I Have insisted so long upon the foregoing Narration, partly because it is very fresh, so that any man may satisfy himself concerning the truth thereof that has any doubt of such things, and partly because it is so notorious, that it is hardly to be parallel'd by any we meet with in Writers, considering all circumstances. And yet if they were as new, I know not, but those Relations of *Martinus Weinrichius* a *Silesian* Physician and Philosopher, which by way of Preface are prefixt to *Picus Mirandula* his *Strix* or *De ludificatione Dæmonum*, may seem as convincing as that.

The stories are two and very memorable, and the more credible because the things happened in the age of the Narrator, some few years before he wrote them, and in his own Countrey; and he doth avouch them with all imaginable confidence to be most certainly true. The former of them is this. A certain Shoemaker in one of the chief Towns of *Silesia* in the year 1591. *Septemb. 20.* on a Friday times in the morning in the further parts of

his

his house, where there was adjoining a little Garden, cut his own throat with his Shoemakers knife. The Family to cover the foulness of the fact, and that no disgrace might come upon his widow gave out, that he died of an Apoplexie, declined all visits of friends and neighbours, in the mean time got him washed and laid linnens so handsomely about him, that even they that saw him afterwards, as the Parson and some others, had not the least suspicion but that he did dye of that disease, and so he had honest burial with a funeral Sermon and other circumstances becoming one of his rank & reputation. Six weeks had not past but so strong a rumour broke out that he dyed not of any disease but had laid violent hands upon himself that the Magistracy of the place could not but bring all those that had seen the corps to a strict examination. They shuffled off the matter as well as they could at first with many fair Apologies in the behalf of the deceased, to remove all suspicion of so hainous an act; but it being pressed more home to their conscience, at last they confessed he dyed a violent death, but desired their favor and clemency to his widow and children, who were in no fault; adding also that it was uncertain but that he might be slain by some external mishap, or if by himself, in some irresistible fit of frensie or madness.

Hereupon the Council deliberate what is to be done. Which the widow hearing, and fearing they might be determining something that would be harsh, and to the discredit of her husband and her self, being also animated thereto by some busie-bodies, makes a great complaint against those that raised these reports of her husband, and resolved to follow the Law upon them, earnestly contending that there was no reason upon meer rumours and idle defamations of malevolent people, that her husbands body should be digged up or dealt with as if he had been either *Magician* or *Self-murtherer*. Which boldness and pertinacity of the woman, though after the confession of the fact, did in some measure work upon the Council, and put them to a stand.

But while these things are in agitation, to the astonishment of the Inhabitants of the place, there appears a *Spectrum* in the exact shape and habit of the deceased, and that not onely in the night but at Midday. Those that were asleep it terrified with horrible visions, those that were waking it would strike, pull, or press, lying heavy upon them like an *Ephialtes*, so that there were perpetuall complaints every morning of their last nights rest, through the whole Town. But the more freaks this *spectrum* plaid, the more diligent were

H A P. 6. *Angustia Zambelime.* 211
re the friends of the deceased to suppress
: rumours of them, or at least to hinder the
ects of those rumours, and therefore made
eir addresses to the President, complaining
ow unjust a thing it was, that so much should
: given to idle reports and blind suspicions,
therefore beseech'd him that he would hin-
er the Council from digging up the corps of
e deceased, and from all ignominious usage
f him ; Adding also that they intended to
peal to the Emperours Court, that their
Visdoms may rather decide the Controver-
e, then that the cause should be here deter-
mined from the light conjectures of malicious
men.

But while by this means the business was still
protracted, there were such stirs and tumults
all over the Town, that they are hardly to be
described. For no sooner did the Sun hide
his head, but this *Spectrum* would be sure to
appear, so that every body was fain to look
about him and stand upon his guard, which
was a sore troub'e to those whom the labours
of the day made more sensible of the want of
rest in the night. For this terrible *Apparition*
would sometimes stand by their bed-sides,
sometimes cast it self upon the midst of their
beds, would lie close to them, would misera-
bly suffocate them, and would so strike them
and pinch them, that not onely blew marks,
but

but plain impressions of his fingers would be upon sundry parts of their bodies in the morning. Nay such was the violence and impetuosity of this Ghost, that when men forsook their beds and kept their dining rooms, with Candles lighted, and many of them in company together, the better to secure themselves from fear and disturbance, yet he would then appear to them and have a bout with some of them notwithstanding all this provision against it. In brief, he was so troublesome, that the people were ready to forsake their houses and seek other dwellings, and the Magistrate so awakened at the perpetual complaints of them, that at last they resolved, the President agreeing thereto, to dig up the Body.

He had lain in the ground near eight moneths, *viz.* from *Sept. 22. 1591.* to *April 18. 1592.* when he was digged up, which was in the presence of the Magistracy of the Town, his body was found entire, not at all putrid, no ill smell about him, saving the mustiness of the grave Clothes, his joynts limber and flexible, as in those that are alive, his skin only flaccid but a more fresh grown in the room of it, the wound of his throat gaping, but no gear nor corruption in it; there was also observed a Magical mark in the great toe of his right foot, *viz.* an Excrecency in the form of a
rose,

se, his body was kept out of earth from *April* 18. to the 24. at what time many both the same Town and others came daily to view him. These unquiet stirs did not cease for all this, which they after attempted to appease by burying the corps under the Gallows, but in vain; for they were as much as ever, if not more, he now not sparing his own Family; and so much that his widow at last went her self to the Magistrate and told them that she should be no longer against it, if they thought fit to fall upon some course of more strict proceedings touching her husband.

Wherefore the seventh of *May*, he was again digged up, and it was observable that he was grown more sensibly fleshy since his last interment. To be short, they cut off the Head, Arms and Legs of the corps, and opening his back took out his heart, which was as fresh and intire as in a calf new kill'd. These together with his body they put on a pile of wood and burnt them to Ashes, which they carefully sweeping together and putting into a Sack (that none might get them for wicked uses) poured them into the river, after which the *Spectrum* was never seen more.

As it also happened in his Maid that dyed after him, who appeared within eight days after her death to her fellow servant, and lay so heavy upon her that she brought upon her a

great

great swelling of her eyes. She so grievously handled a child in the cradle, that if the Nurie had not come in to his help, he had been quite spoiled, but she crossing her self and calling upon the name of *Jesus*, the Spectre vanished. The next night she appeared in the shape of an *Hen*, which when one of the Maids of the house took to be so indeed and followed her, the Hen grew into an immense bigness, and presently caught the Maid by the throat and made it swell, so she could neither well eat nor drink of a good while after.

She continu'd these stirs for a whole moneth, flapping some so smartly that the strokes were heard of them that stood by, pulling the bed also from under others, and appearing sometimes in one shape, sometimes in another, as of a Woman, of a Dog, of a Cat, and of a Goat. But at last her body being digged up and burnt, the Apparition was never seen more.

These things were done at *Breslaw* in *Silesia* where this *Weinrichius* then lived, which makes the Narration more considerable. This concealing the name of the parties, I conceive, was in way of civility to his deceased Towns man, his Towns mans Widow, and their Family.

*Another very memorable Story of Johannes Cuntius
a Citizen of Pentsch in Silesia.*

THe other Story he sets down he is not the first Penman of (though the things were done in his time, and as I conceive, some while after what has been above related; as a passage in the Narration seems to intimate) but he transcribed it from one that not onely dwelt in the place, but was often infested with the noisom occurfions of that troublesom *Ghost* that did so much mischief to the place where he dwelt. The Relation is somewhat large, I shall bring it into as narrow compass as I can.

Johannes Cuntius a Citizen of *Pentsch* in *Silesia*, near sixty years of age, and one of the *Aldermen* of the Town, very fair in his carriage, and unblameable, to mens thinking, in the whole course of his life, having been sent for to the *Maiors* house (as being a very understanding man and dexterous at the dispatch of businessses) to end some controversies concerning certain Waggoners, and a Merchant of *Pannonia*, having made an end of those affairs, is invited by the *Maior* to supper, he gets leave first to go home to order

some businesſes, leaving this ſentence behind him, *It's good to be merry while we may, for miſchiefs grow up faſt enough daily.*

This *Cuntius* kept five luſty Geldings in his Stable, one whereof he commanded to be brought out, and his ſhoe being looſe, had him tyed to the next poſt, his Maſter with a Servant buſied themſelves to take up his leg to look on his hoof, the horſe being mad and metalsom ſtrook them both down, but *Cuntius* received the greateſt ſhare of the blow; one that ſtood next by, helpt them both up again. *Cuntius* no ſooner was up and came to himſelf, but cry'd out, *wo is me, how do I burn and am all on a fire!* Which he often repeated: But the parts he complained of moſt, the women being put out of the room, when they were ſearched, no appearance of any ſtroke or hurt was found upon them. To be ſhort, he fell downright ſick and grievouſly afflicted in mind, loudly complaining, that his ſins were ſuch that they were utterly unpardonable, and that the leaſt part of them were bigger then all the ſins of the world beſides, but would have no Divine come to him, nor did particularly confeſs them to any. Several rumours indeed there were, that once he ſold one of his ſons, but when, and to whom, it was uncertain, and that he had made a Contract with the Devil, and the like. But it was obſerved

and

and known for certain, that he had grown beyond all expectation rich, and that four days before this mischance, he being witness to a Child, said, that that was the last he should be ever witness to.

The night he dyed, his eldest son watched with him. He gave up the Ghost about the third hour of the night, at what time a black Cat opening the casement with her nails (for it was shut) ran to his bed, and did so violently scratch his face, and the bolster, as if she endeavoured by force to remove him out of the place where he lay. But the Cat afterwards suddenly was gone, and she was no sooner gone, but he breathed his last. A fair tale was made to the Pastor of the Parish, and the Magistracy of the town allowing it, he was buried on the right side of the Altar, his friends paying well for it. No sooner *Cuntius* was dead but a great Tempest arose, which raged most at his very Funeral, there being such impetuous storms of wind with snow, that it made mens bodies quake and their teeth chatter in their heads. But so soon as he was interred, of a sudden all was calm.

He had not been dead a day or two but several rumours were spread in the town of a *Spiritus incubus* or *Ephialtes* in the shape of *Cuntius*, that would have forced a woman. This hapned before he was buried. After his

burial the same *Spectre* awakened one that was sleeping in his dining room, saying, 'I can scarce withhold my self from beating thee to death. The voyce was the voyce of *Cunnius*. The watchmen of the Town also affirmed that they heard every night great stirs in *Cunnius* his house, the fallings and throwings of things about, and that they did see the gates stand wide open betimes in the mornings, though they were never so diligently shut o're night. That his horses were very unquiet in the stable, as if they kicked and bit one another, besides unusual barkings and howlings of Dogs all over the Town. But these were but præludious suspicions to further evidence which I will run over as briefly as I may.

A Maid-servant of one of the Citizens of *Penisob* (while these Tragedies and stirs were so frequent in the Town) heard together with some others lying in their beds, the noise and tramlings of one riding about the house who at last ran against the walls with that violence, that the whole house shaked again, as if it would fall, and the windows were all fill'd with flashings of light. The Master of the house being informed of it, went out of doors in the morning to see what the matter was, and he beheld in the snow the impressions of strange feet, such as were like neither Horses, nor Cows, nor Hogs, nor any Creature that he knew.

Another time, about eleven of the Clock in the night, *Cuntius* appears to one of his Friends that was a witness to a Childe of his, speaks unto him, and bids him be of good courage, for he came onely to communicate unto him a matter of great importance. *I have left behind me*, said he, *my youngest son James, to whom you are Godfather. Now there is at my eldest son Stevens a Citizen of Jegerdorf a certain chest, wherein I have put four hundred and fifteen Florens: This I tell you that your God-son may not be defrauded of any of them, and it is your duty to look after it, which if you neglect, wa be to you.* Having said this, the *Spectre* departed, and went up into the upper rooms of the house, where he walked so stoutly, that all rattled again, and the roof swagged with his heavy stampings. This, *Cuntius* his Friend told to the Parson of the Parish a day or two after, for a certain truth.

But there are also other several notorious passages of this *Cuntius*. As his often speaking to the Maid that lay with her Mistress, his widow, to give him place, for it was his right, and if she would not give it him, he would writhe her neck behind her.

His galloping up and down like a wanton horse in the Court of his house. His being divers times seen to ride, not onely in the streets, but along the valleys of the field, and on the
Mountains,

Mountains, with so strong a trot that he made the very ground flash with fire under him.

His bruising of the body of a Child of a certain Smiths, and making his very bones so soft, that you might wrap the corps on heaps like a glove.

His miserably tugging all night with a Jew that had taken up his Inn in the Town, and tossing him up and down in the lodging where he lay.

His dreadful accosting of a Waggoner an old acquaintance of his, while he was bawling in the stable, vomiting out fire against him to terrifie him, and biting of him so cruelly by the foot, that he made him lame.

What follows, as I above intimated, concerns the Relator himself, who was the Parson of the Parish, whom this Fury so squeezed and pressed when he was asleep, that wakening he found himself utterly spent, and his strength quite gone, but could not imagine the reason. But while he lay musing with himself what the matter might be, this *Spectre* returns again to him, and holding him all over so fast that he could not wag a finger, rowled him in his bed backwards and forwards a good many times together. The same hapned also to his wife another time, whom *Cunius* coming through the casement in the shape of a little dwarf and running to her bed side, so wrung and pulled

as if he would have torn her throat out, had not her two daughters come in to help her.

He pressed the lips together of one of this *Theologers* sons so, that they could scarce get them afunder.

His house was so generally disturbed with this unruly Ghost, that the Servants were faine to keep together anights in one room, lying upon straw and watching the approaches of this troublesome Fiend. But a Maid of the house being more couragious then the rest would needs one night go to bed, and forsake her company. Whereupon *Dantius* finding her alone, presently assaults her, pulls away the bedding, and would have carried her away with him; but she hardly escaping fled to the rest of the Family, where she espied him standing by the candle, and straightway after vanishing.

Another time he came into her Masters Chamber making a noise like a Hog that eat grains, smacking and grunting very sonorously. They could not chase him away by speaking to him; but ever as they lighted a Candle he would vanish.

On another time about Evening, when this *Theologer* was sitting with his wife and children about him, exercising himself in Musick according to his usual manner, a most grievous stink arose suddenly, which by degrees spread

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it self to every corner of the room. Hereupon he commends himself & his family to God by prayer. The smell nevertheless encreased and became above all measure pestilently noysom, in so much that he was forced to go up to his chamber. He and his wife had not been in bed a quarter of an hour but they find the same stink in the bed-chamber; of which while they are complaining one to another, out steps the *Spectre* from the wall, and creeping to his bed-side breathes upon him an exceeding cold breath of so intolerable stinking and malignant a sent, as is beyond all imagination and expression. Hereupon the *Theologer*, good soul, grew very ill, and was fain to keep his bed, his face, belly and gurs swelling, as if he had been poisoned; whence he was also troubled with a difficulty of breathing, and with a putrid inflammation of his eyes, so that he could not well use them of a long time after.

But taking leave of the sick Divine, if we should go back and recount what we have omitted, it would exceed the number of what we have already recounted. As for example, the trembling and sweating of *Cuntius* his Gelding, from which he was not free night nor day. The burning blew of the Candles at the approaches of *Cuntius* his Ghost: His drinking up the milk in the milk-bowls, his
flinging

inging dung into them or turning the milk
into blood: His pulling up posts deep set in
the ground, and so heavy that two lusty Por-
ers could not deal with them: His discourfing
with several men he met concerning the af-
airs of the Waggoners: His strangling of old
men: His holding fast the Cradles of Chil-
dren, or taking them out of them: His fre-
quent endeavouring to force women: His
defiling the water in the Font, and fouling the
Cloth on the Altar on that side that did hang
towards his grave with dirty bloody spots: His
catching up Dogs in the Streets, and knocking
their brains against the ground: His sucking
dry the Cows, and tying their tails like the
tail of an Horse: His devouring of Poultry,
and his flinging of Goats bound into the
Racks: His tying of an Horse to an empty
Oat-tub in the Stable to clatter up and down
with it, and the hinder foot of another to his
own headstall: His looking out of the window
of a low Tower, and then suddenly changing
himself into the form of a long staff: His
chiding of a Matron for suffering her servant
to wash dishes on a Thursday, at what time he
laid his hand upon her, and she said it felt
more cold then ice: His pelting one of the
women that washed his corps so forcibly that
the prints of the Clods he flung were to be
seen upon the wall: His attempting to ravish

another, who excusing her self and saying, *My Countess, thou seest how old, wrinkled, and deformed I am, and how unfit for those kinds of sports,* he suddenly set up a loud laughter and vanished.

But we must not insist upon these things, only we will add one passage more that is not a little remarkable. His grave-stone was turned of one side, shelving, and there were several holes in the earth about the bigness of mouse-holes that went down to his very coffin, which how ever they were filled up with earth and all made plain over night, yet they would be sure to be laid open the next morning.

It would be a tedious business to recite all these things at large, and prosecute the story in all its particular Circumstances. To conclude therefore, their calamity was such from the frequent occurrsions of this restless Fury, that there was none but either pitied them or despised them, none would lodge in their Town, trading was decayed, and the Citizens impoverished by the continual stirs and tumults of this unquiet Ghost.

And though the *Atheist* may perhaps laugh at them as men undone by their own Melancholy and vain imaginations, or by the wagery of some ill neighbours, yet if he seriously consider what has been already related, there are many passages that are by no means to

be

re resolved into any such Principles, but what
I shall now declare, will make it altogether
unlikely that any of them are.

To be short therefore, finding no rest nor
being able to excogitate any better remedy,
they dig up *Cannus* his body with several o-
thers buried both before and after him. But
those both after & before were so putrif'd and
rotten, their skulls broken, and the Sutures of
them gaping, that they were not to be known
by their shape at all, having become in a man-
ner but a rude mass of earth and dirt; but it
was quite otherwise in *Cannus*: His skin was
tender and florid, his joynts not at all stiff, but
limber and moveable, and a staff being put
into his hand, he grasped it with his fingers
very fast. His eyes also of themselves would
be one time open and another time shut; they
opened a vein in his leg, and the blood sprang
out as fresh as in the living. His Nose was
entire and full, not sharp as in those that
are gastly sick or quite dead: And yet *Cannus*
his body had lien in the grave from *Feb. 8.*
to *July 10.* which is almost half a year.

It was easily discernible where the fault lay.
However, nothing was done rashly; but
Judges being constituted, Sentence was pro-
nounced upon *Cannus* his Carcase, which (be-
ing animated thereto from success in the like
case some few years before in this very Pro-

vince of *Silesia*, I suppose he means at *Breslaw* where the Shoemakers body was burnt) they adjudged to the fire.

Wherefore there were Masons provided to make a hole in the wall near the Altar to get his body through, which being pulled at with a rope, it was so exceeding heavy that the rope brake, and they could scarce stir him. But when they had pull'd him through, and gotten him on a Cart without, which *Curtius* his horse that struck him (which was a lusty bodied Jade) was to draw. yet it put him to it so, that he was ready to fall down ever and anon, and was quite out of breath with striving to draw so intolerable a load, who notwithstanding could run away with two men in the same Cart presently after, their weight was so inconsiderable to his strength.

His body, when it was brought to the fire, proved as unwilling to be burnt as before to be drawn; so that the Executioner was fain with hooks to pull him out, and cut him into pieces to make him burn. Which while he did, the blood was found so pure and spiritous, that it spurted into his face as he cut him; but at last, not without the expence of two hundred and sixteen great billets, all was turned into ashes. Which they carefully sweeping up together, as in the foregoing story, and casting them into the river, the *Spectre* never more appeared.

I must

I must confess I am so slow-witted my self, that I cannot so much as imagine what the *Atheist* will excogitate for a subterfuge or hiding place from so plain and evident Convictions.

Hitherto of Witches and other devoted Vassals of *Satan* in severall, we shall now consider their Assemblies and Conventicles, and urge further proofs of *Spirits* and *Apparitions* from thence.

CHAP. X.

The nocturnall Conventicles of Witches; that they have often dissolved and disappeared at the naming of the Name of God or Jesus Christ; and that the party thus speaking has found himself alone in the fields many miles from home. The Dancing of Men, Women, and Cloven-footed Satyres at mid-day; John Michaell piping from the bough of an Oake, &c.

P*aulus Grillandus* reports of one not farre from *Rome*, who at the perswasion of his wife anointing himself, as she had done before him, was carried away in the aire to a great *Assembly of Wizards and Wisches*, where they were feasting under a Nut-tree. But this

stranger not relishing his cheer without Salt, at last the Salt coming, and he blessing of *God* for it, at that *Name* the whole Assembly disappeared, and he poor man was left alone naked an hundred miles off from home; whether when he had got he accused his wife, she confess'd the fact, discovering also her companions, who were therefore burnt with her.

The same Author writes also of a young Girl thirteen years old in the Dukedome of *Spalatto*, who being brought into the like company, and admiring the strangeness of the thing, and crying out, *Blissed God, what's here to do!* made the whole Assembly vanish, was left her self in the field alone, and wandring up and down was found by a countreyman, to whom she told the whole matter.

So the Husband of the Witch of *Lochia*, whom she brought into the like Assembly, by saying, *O my God, where are we?* made all to vanish, and found himself naked alone in the field fifteen dayes journey from home.

Several other Narrations to this purpose *Bodinus* sets down, which these sensible effects of being so far distant from home, and being found naked in the fields, shew to be no freaks of *Melancholy*, but certain truth. But that the *Devil* in these junctetings appears to the Guests in the form of a *Satyr*, *black Goat*, or else sometimes in the shape of an ill-favoured

black

black man, is the ordinary Confession of *Witches*, by this way discovered and convicted.

I will onely adde a story or two out of *Remigius* concerning these kindes of *Conventicles*, and then I will proceed to some other proofs.

John of Hembach was carried by his Mother being a Witch to one of these Meetings, and because he had learn'd to play on the *Pipe*, was commanded by her to exercise his faculty and to get up into a Tree, that they might the better hear his Musick. Which he doing, and looking upon the Dancers, how uncouth and ridiculous they were in their motions and gestures, being struck with admiration at the novelty of the matter, suddenly burst out into these words, *Good God, what a mad company have we here?* which was no sooner said, but down came *John*, Pipe and all, and hurt his shoulder with the tumbling cast, who when he called to the company to help him, found himself alone, for they had all vanished. *John of Hembach* told what had hapned, but people knew not what to make of it, till some of that mad Crew that danc'd to his Pipe, were apprehended upon other suspicions, as *Catharina Praxavia*, *Kekvers Orilla*, and others, who made good every whit what *John* had before told (though they knew nothing of what h

told before) adding also more particularly that the place where he pip'd to them was *Maybuch*.

The other memorable story that I shall relate out of *Remigius*, is this. One *Nicolea Langbernhard*, while she was going towards *Affenunturia* along a hedge side, spied in the next field (it was about Noon-time of day) a company of men and women dancing in a ring; and the posture of their bodies being uncouth and unusual, made her view them more attentively, whereby she discerned some of them to have cloven feet, like oxen or goats (it should seem they were *Spirits* in the shape of lusty *Satyrs*) she being astonish'd with fear cries out, *Jesus help me and send me well home*. She had no sooner said so, but they all vanished saving onely one *Peter Grosspetter*, whom a little after she saw snatch'd up into the aire and to let fall his Maulkin (a stick that they make clean Ovens withall) and her self was also driven so forcibly with the wind, that it made her almost lose her breath. She was fain to keep her bed three dayes after.

This *Peter* (though at first he would have followed the Law on *Nicolea* for slandering him, yet) afterward freely confess'd and discovered others of his companions, as *Barbelia* the wife of *Ioannes Latomus*, *Mayetta* the wife of *urentius*, who confessed she danced with those

those cloven-footed Creatures at what time *Peter* was amongst them. And for further evidence of the business, *Fobn Michaell*, Herdsman did confess, that while they thus danced, he plaid upon his *Crooked staff*, and struck upon it with his fingers, as if it had been a Pipe, sitting upon an high bough of an Oak; and that so soon as *Nicolea* called upon the Name of *Iesus*, he tumbled down headlong to the ground, but was presently catch'd up again with a whirlwind, and carried to *Weiller Meadows*, where he had left his Herds a little before.

Adde unto all this, that there was found in the place where they danced a round *Circle*, wherein there was the manifest marks of the treading of cloven feet, which was seen from the day after *Nicolea* had discovered the business, till the next Winter that the Plough cut them out. These things happened in the year 1590.

C H A P. XI.

Of Fairy Circles. *A larger discussion of those Controversies betwixt Bodinus and Remigius, viz. Whether the Bodies of Witches are really transformed into the Shape of Wolves and other Creatures; Whether the Souls of Witches be not sometimes at those nocturnal Conventicles, their bodies being left at home; as also, Whether they leave not their bodies in those Extasies they put themselves in, when they promise to fetch certain news from remote places in a very short time.*

IF might be here very seasonable, upon the foregoing story, to enquire into the nature of those large *dark Rings* in the grass, which they call *Fairy Circles*, whether they be the *Rendezvous* of Witches, or the dancing places of those little Puppet-Spirits which they call *Elves* or *Fairies*. But these curiosities I leave to more busie wits. I am onely intent now upon my serious purpose of proving there *are Spirits*; which I think I have made a pretty good progress in already, and have produced such Narrations that cannot but gain credit with such as are not perversly and wilfully incredulous.

There is another more profitable question started, if it could be decided, concerning these *Night revellings* of Witches, whether they



they be not sometimes there, their bodies lying at home, as sundry Relations seem to favour that opinion: *Bodinus* is for it, *Remigius* is against it.

It is the same question, Whether when Witches or Wizards profess they will tell what is done within so many miles compass and afterwards to give a proof of their skill first anoint their bodies, and then fall down dead in a manner, and so lie a competent time senseless, whether, I say, their Souls go out of their bodies, or all be but represented to their imagination.

We may adde a third, which may happily better fetch off the other two; And that is concerning your *Λυκάνθρωποι* (which the *Germans* call *were-wolff*; the *French Loups garous*) *Men* transformed into *Wolves*; and there is much what the same reason of other *Transformations*. I shall not trouble you with any Histories of them, though I might produce many. But as well those that hold it is but a delusion of the *Devil*, and meer Tragedies in Dreams, as they that say they are real transformations, do acknowledge, that those parties that have confessed themselves thus transformed have been *weary* and *sore* with running, have been *wounded*, and the like. *Bodinus* here also is deserted of *Remigius*, who is of the same minde with *Wierus*, that fly, smooth Physic

cian, and faithful Patron of Witches, who will be sure to load the *Devil* as much as he can, his shoulders being more able to bear it, and so to ease the *Haggs*.

But for mine own part, though I will not undertake to decide the Controversie; yet I think it not amiss to declare, that *Bodinus* may very well make good his own, notwithstanding any thing those do alledge to the contrary. For that which *Wierus* and *Remigius* seem so much to stand upon, that it is too great a power for the Devil, and too great indignity to Man, that he should be able thus to transform him, are in my minde but sleight Rhetorickations, no sound Arguments.

For what is that outward mishapement of *Budy* to the inward deformity of their Souls, which he helps on so notoriously? And they having given themselves over to him so wholly, why may he not use them thus here, when they shall be worse used by him hereafter? And for the changing of the species of things, if that were a power too big to be granted the Devil, yet it is no more done here, when he thus transforms a Man into a Wolf, then when he transforms himself into the shape of a Man. For this Wolf is still a Man, and that Man is still a Devill. For it is so as the Poet sayes it was in *Ulysses* his Companions which *Circe* turned into Hoggs, They had the Head, the

the Voice, the Body and Bristles of Hogs;

————— Ἄντὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἦν ἔμπροσθεν ὡς τὸ παρόντες.

But their Understanding was unchanged, they had the Minde and Memory of a Man as before. As *Petrus Bourgotus* profesleth that when his companion *Michael Verdung* had anointed his body, and transform'd him into a Wolf, when he look'd upon his hairy feet he was at first afraid of himself.

Now therefore it being plain that nothing material is alledged to the contrary, and that men confesse they are turn'd into Wolves, and acknowledge the salvage cruelties they then committed upon Children, Women and Sheep, that they finde themselves exceeding weary, and sometimes wounded; it is more natural to conclude they were really thus transformed, then that it was a meer delusion of *Fancy*.

For I conceive the Devil gets into their body, and by his subtile substance, more operative and searching then any fire or putrifying liquor, melts the yielding *Compages* of the body to such a consistency, and so much of it as is fit for his purpose, and makes it pliable to his imagination; and then it is as easie for him to work it into what *shape* he pleaseth, as it is to work the Aire into such forms and figures

as he ordinarily doth. Nor is it any more difficulty for him to mollifie what is hard, then it is to harden what is so soft and fluid as the Aire.

And he that hath this power, we can never stick to give him that which is lesser, *viz.* to instruct men how they shall for a time *forsake their Bodies*, and come in again. For can it be a hard thing for him that can thus melt and take a pieces the particles of the body, to have the skill and power to loosen the Soul, a substance really distinct from the Body, and separable from it; which at last is done by the easie course of Nature, at that final dissolution of Soul and Body which we call *Death*? But no course of Nature ever transforms the body of Man into the shape of a Wolf; so that this is more hard and exorbitant from the order of Nature then the other.

I, but you'll say the greatness and incredibleness of the Miracle is this; That there should be an actual *separation* of *Soul* and *Body*, and yet no *Death*. But this is not at all strange, if we consider that *Death* is properly a disjunction of the Soul from the Body by reason of the *Body's unfitness* any longer to entertain the Soul, which may be caused by extremity of *Diseases*, outward *Violence* or *Age*; And if the Devil could restore such
bodies

Bodies as these to life, it were a miracle indeed. But this is not such a miracle, nor is the Body properly dead, though the Soul be out of it. For the *life* of the Body is nothing else but that *fitnessse* to be actuated by the Soul. The conservation whereof is help'd, as I conceive, by the *anointing* of the body before the *Extasie*; which ointment filling the pores, keeps out the cold and keeps in the heat and spirits, that the frame and temper of the body may continue in fit case to entertain the Soul again at her return. So the vital steams of the carcase being not yet spent, the pristine operations of life are presently again kindled, as a candle new blown out and as yet reeking, suddenly catches fire from the flame of another though at some distance; the light gliding down along the smoke.

Wherefore there being nothing in the nature of the thing that should make us incredulous, these *Sorceresses* so confidently pronouncing that they are *out* of their *Bodies* at such times, and see and do such and such things, meet one another, bring messages, discover secrets and the like, it is more natural and easie to conclude they be *really out* of their *Bodies*, then in them. Which we should the more easily be induced to believe, if we could give credit to that Narration *Wierus* tells of

Soul

Souldier, out of whose mouth whilest he was asleep a thing in the shape of a Weefel came, which nudling along in the grass, and at last coming to a brook side, very busily attempting to get over, but not being able, some one of the standers by that saw it, made a bridge for it of his sword, which it passed over by, and coming back made use of the same passage, and then entred into the Souldiers mouth again, many looking on: when he awaked he told how he dream'd he had gone over an iron bridge, and other particulars answerable to what the spectators had seen aforehand. *wicrus* acknowledgeth the truth of the Relation, but wil by all means have it to be the *Devil*, not the *Soul* of the Man; which he doth in a tender regard to the Witches, that from such a truth as this they might not be made so obnoxious to suspicion that their *Extasies* are not meer *Dreams* and *Delusions* of the Devil, but are accompanied with *reall effects*.

I will not take upon me to decide so nice a Controversie, onely I will make bold to intermeddle thus far, as to pronounce *Bodinus* his opinion not at all unworthy of a rational and sagacious man. And that though by his being much addicted to such like speculations, he might attribute some natural effects to the ministry of *Spirits*, when there was no need so to do, yet his judgement in other things of

kinde is no more to be sleighted for that, a *Cartesius* that stupendious Mechanicall t, is to be disallowed in those excellent inventions of the causes of those more general *phenomena* of Nature, because by his success those he was imboldened to enlarge his principles too far, and to assert that *Animals* themselves were meer *Machina's*: like *Aristonus* the Musician, that made the *Soul* nothing else but an *Harmony*; of whom *Tully* easantly observes, *Quòd non recessit ab arte*

Every *Genius* and *Temper*, as the sundry parts of Beasts and living Creatures, have their proper excrement: and it is the part of a wise man to take notice of it, and to chuse what is profitable, as well as to abandon what useles and excrementitious.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

The Coldness of those bodies that Spirits appear in witnessed by the experience of Cardan and Bourgotus. The natural reason of this Coldness. That the Devil does really lie with Witches. That the very substance of Spirits is not fire. Spirits skirmishing on the ground. Field-fights and Sea-fights seen in the Air.

BUT to return into the way, I might add other stories of your *Demonēs Metallici*, your *Guardian Genii*, such as that of *Socrates*, and that other of which *Bodinus* tells an ample Relation, which he received from him who had the society and assistance of such an *Angel* or *Genius*, which for my own part I give as much credit to as to any story in *Livy* or *Plutarch*: Your *Lares familiares*, as also those that haunt and vex families, appearing to many and leaving very sensible effects of their appearances. But I will not so far tire either my self or my Reader. I will onely name one or two more, rather then recite them. As that of *Cardan*, who writes as you may see in *Otho Melander*, that a *Spirit* that familiarly was seen in the house of a friend of his, one night laid his hand upon his brow which felt intolerably *Cold*. And so *Petrus Bourgotus* confessed that when the *Devil* gave him his hand to kiss, it felt

old. And many more examples there be
is purpose.

and indeed it stands to very good reason
the bodies of *Devils* being nothing but
stated Air should be *cold*, as well as *coagu-*
Water, which is *Snow* or *Ice*, and that it
ld have a more keen and piercing *cold*, it
isting of more subtile particles, then those
water, and therefore more fit to insinuate,
more accurately and stingingly to affect
touch the nerves.

Wherefore *witches* confessing so frequent-
is they do, that the Devil *lies with them*, and
that complaining of his tedious and offen-
e *coldness*, it is a shrewd presumption that he
th lie with them *indeed*, and that it is not
near *Dream*, as their friend *Wierus* would
ve it.

Hence we may also discover the folly of that
union that makes the very essence of *Spirits*
be *fire*: for how unfit that would be to co-
gulate the air is plain at first sight. It would
ther *melt* and dissolve these consistences then
constringe them and freeze them in a manner.
ut it is rather manifest that the essence of
pirits is a substance specifically distinct from
l corporeal matter whatsoever. But my
ment is not to Philosophize concerning the
ature of *Spirits*, but onely to prove their
existence. Which the *Spectre* at *Ephesus* may

be a further argument of. For that old man which *Apollonius* told the *Ephesians* was the walking plague of the City, when they stoned him and uncovered the heap, appear'd in the shape of an huge *black dog* as big as the biggest lyon. This could be no imposture of *Melancholy* nor *Fraud* of any Priest. And the learned *Grotius*, a man far from all Levity and vain Credulity, is so secure of the truth of *Tyaneus* his *Miracles*, that he does not stick to term him impudent, that has the face to deny them.

Our *English Chronicles* also tell us of *Apparitions*, *armed men*, *foot and horse*, *fighting* upon the ground in the North part of *England* and in *Ireland* for many Evenings together, seen by many hundreds of men at once, and that the grass was troden down in the places were they were seen to fight their *Battails*: which agreeth with *Nicolea Langbernhard* her Relation of the *cloven-footed Dancers*, that left the print of their hoofs in the *ring* they trod down, for a long time after.

But this *skirmishing* upon the Earth puts me in mind of the last part of this argument, and bids me look up into the *Air*. Where omitting all other Prodigies I shall onely take notice of what is most notorious, and of which there can by no means be given any other account, then that it is the effect of *Spirits*. And

this is the appearance of *armed men fighting* and encoutring one another in the *Sky*. There are so many examples of these Prodigies in *Historians*, that it were superfluous to instance in any. That before the great slaughter of no less then fourscore thousand made by *Antiochus* in *Jerusalem* recorded in the second of *Maccabees* chap. 5. is famous. The Historian there writes, “ that through all the City for
 “ the space almost of fourty days there were
 “ seen *Horsemen* running in the *air* in cloth of
 “ Gold, and arm’d with Lances, like a band
 “ of Souldiers, and *Troops* of Horsemen in
 “ array *encoutring* and running one against
 “ another, with shaking of shields and multi-
 “ tudes of pikes, and drawing of swords, and
 “ casting of darts, and glittering of golden
 “ ornaments, and harness of all sorts. And *Iosephus* writes also concerning the like Prodigies, that hapned before the destruction of the City by *Titus*, prefacing first, that they were incredible, were it not that they were recorded by those that were Eye-witnesses of them.

The like *Apparitions* were seen before the civil wars of *Marius* and *Sylla*. And *Melanchthon* affirms that a world of such Prodigies were seen all over *Germany* from 1524. to 1548. *Snellius* amongst other places doth particularize in *Amortsfort*, where these fightings

were seen not much higher then the house tops; as also in *Amsterdam*, where there was a Sea fight appearing in the air for an hour or two together, many thousands of men looking on. And to say nothing of what hath been seen in *England* not long ago, there is lately a punctual narration of such a Sea-fight seen by certain *Hollanders*, and sent over hither into *England*, but a *Lyon* appearing alone at the end of that *Apparition*, though it may be true for ought I know, yet it makes it obnoxious to *Suspicion* and evasion, and so unprofitable for my purpose. But the *Phanomena* of this kind, whose reports cannot be suspected to be in subserviency to any Politick design, ought in reason to be held true, when there have been many profest Eye-witnesses of them. And they being resolvable into no *natural* causes, it is evident that we must acknowledge *supernatural* ones, such as *Spirits*, *Intelligences* or *Angels*, term them what you please.

C H A P. XIII.

A very memorable Narration of a certain pious man, who had the continual Society of a Guardian Genius.

I Had here ended all my Stories, were I not tempted by that remarkable one in *Bodinus*, to out-run my method. I but named it heretofore, I shall tell it now more at large. I am the more willingly drawn to relate it, such examples of the consociation of *good Spirits* being very scarce in History. The main reason whereof, as I conceive, is because so very few men are heartily and sincerely good. The Narration is more considerable in that he that writes it, had it from the mans own mouth whom it concerns; and is as follows.

This Party, a holy and pious man, as it should seem, and an acquaintance of *Bodinus's*, freely told him, how that he had a certain *Spirit* that did perpetually accompany him, which he was then first aware of, when he had attain'd to about thirty seven years of age, but conceived that the said *Spirit* had been present with him all his life time, as he gathered from certain *Monitory Dreams and Visions*, whereby he was fore-warn'd as well of several dangers as vices. That this *Spirit* discovered

himself to him after he had for a whole year together earnestly pray'd to God to send a *good Angel* to him, to be the Guide and Governor of his life and actions; adding also, that before and after Prayer he used to spend two or three hours in meditation and reading the Scriptures, diligently enquiring with himself, what *Religion*, amongst those many that are controverted in the world, might be best, beseeching God that he would be pleased to direct him to it. And that he did not allow of their way, that at all adventures pray to God to confirm them in that opinion they have already preconceived, be it right or wrong. That while he was thus busie with himself in matters of Religion, that he light on a passage in *Philo Judæus* in his Book *De Sacrificiis*, where he writes, that a *good and holy Man can offer no greater nor more acceptable Sacrifice to God, then the Oblation of himself*, and therefore following *Philo's* counsel, that he offered his *Soul* to God. And that after that, amongst many other divine *Dreams* and *Visions*, he once in his sleep seemed to hear the voyce of God saying to him, *I will save thy Soul, I am he that before appeared unto thee*. Afterwards that the *Spirit* every day would knock at the door about three or four a clock in the morning, though he rising and opening the door could see no body, but that the *Spirit* per-

persisted in this course, and unless he did rise, would thus rouse him up.

This trouble and boisterousness made him begin to conceit that it was some *evil Spirit* that thus haunted him, and therefore he daily pray'd earnestly unto God, that he would be pleased to send a *good Angel* to him, and often also sung Psalms, having most of them by heart.

Wherefore the *Spirit* afterward knocked more gently at the door, and one day discovered himself to him waking, which was the first time that he was assured by his senses that it was he; for he often touched and stirred a Drinking glass that stood in his chamber, which did not a little amaze him.

Two days after when he entertain'd at supper a certain friend of his, *Secretary* to the *King*, that this friend of his was much abash'd while he heard the *Spirit thumping* on the bench hard by him, and was stricken with fear, but he bid him be of good courage, there was no hurt towards; and the better to assure him of it, told him the truth of the whole matter.

Wherefore from that time, saith *Bodinus*, he did affirm that this *Spirit* was always with him, and by some sensible sign did ever advertise him of things; as by striking his *right ear*, if he did any thing amiss; if otherwise, his *left*. If

any body came to *circumvent* him, that his *right ear* was struck, but his *left ear* if a *good man* and to *good ends* accosted him. If he was about to eat or drink any thing that would hurt him, or intended or purposed with himself to do any thing that would prove ill, that he was inhibited by a *sign*, and if he delayed to follow his business, that he was quickned by a *sign* given him.

When he began to praise God in Psalms and to declare his marvellous Acts, that he was presently raised and strengthened with a spiritual and supernatural power.

That he daily begg'd of God that he would teach him his Will, his Law and his Truth; And that he set one day of the week apart for reading the Scripture and Meditation, with singing of Psalms, and that he did not stir out of his house all that day; But that in his ordinary conversation he was sufficiently merry and of a chearful mind, and he cited that saying for it, *Vidi facies Sanctorum latas*. But in his conversing with others, if he had talked vainly and indiscreetly, or had some days together neglected his *Devotions*, that he was forthwith admonished thereof by a *Dream*. That he was also admonished to rise betimes in the morning, and that about four of the clock a voyce would come to him while he was asleep, saying, *Who gets up first to pray?*

He told *Bodinus* also how he was often admonish'd to give *Alms*, and that the more *Charity* he bestow'd, the more prosperous he was. And that on a time when his enemies sought after his life, and knew that he was to go by water, that his Father in a *Dream* brought two *Horses* to him, the one *white*, the other *bay*; and that therefore he bid his servant hire him two horses, and though he told him nothing of the colours, that yet he brought him a *white* one and a *bay* one.

That in all difficulties, journeyings and what other enterprises soever, he used to ask counsel of God, and that one night, when he had begged his blessing, while he slept he saw a *Vision* wherein his Father seem'd to blesse him.

At another time, when he was in very great *Danger*; and was newly gone to bed, he said that the *Spirit* would not let him alone till he had rais'd him again, wherefore he watched and pray'd all that night. The day after he escap'd the hands of his Persecutors in a wonderful manner; which being done, in his next sleep he heard a *voyce* saying, Now sing, *Qui sedet in latibulo Altissimi.*

A great many other passages this Parry told *Bodinus*, so many indeed, that he thought it an endless labour to recite them all. But what remains of those he has recited, I will

will not stick to take the pains of transcribing them.

Bodinus asked him why he would not speak to the *Spirit* for the gaining of the more plain and familiar converse with it. He answered that he once attempted it, but the *Spirit* instantly struck the door with that vehemency, as if he had knock'd upon it with a hammer: whereby he gathered his dislike of the matter.

But though the *Spirit* would not talk with him, yet he could make use of his judgement in the reading of books and moderating his studies. For if he took an ill book into his hands and fell a reading, the *Spirit* would strike it, that he might lay it down, and would also sundry times, be the books what they would, hinder him from reading & writing overmuch, that his mind might rest, and silently meditate with it self. He added also, that very often while he was awake, a small, subtile, inarticulate sound would come unto his ears.

Bodinus further enquiring whether he ever see the *Shape* and *Form* of the *Spirit*; he told him that while he was awake, he never see any thing but a certain light very bright and clear and of a round *Compass* and *Figure*; But that once being in great jeopardy of his life, and having heartily pray'd to God that he would be pleas'd to provide for his safety,

it break of day, amidst his slumberings wakings, he espy'd on his bed where he a young Boy clad in a white Garment, tinged somewhat with a touch of purple, and of a view admirably lovely and beautifull to behold. He confidently affirmed to Bodinus for a certain truth.

C H A P. XIV.

certain Enquiries upon the preceding Narration; as, What these Guardian Genii may be. Whether one or more of them be allotted to every man, or to some none. What may be the reason of Spirits so seldome appearing; And whether they have any settled shape or no. What their manner is of assisting men in either Devotion or Prophecy. Whether every mans complexion is capable of the Society of a good Genius. And lastly, Whether it be lawful to pray to God to send such a Genius or Angel to one, or no.

IT is beside my present scope, as I have already professed, to enter into any more particular and more curious Disquisitions concerning the nature of *Spirits*, my aime being now onely to demonstrate their *Existence* by those strange *Effects* recorded every where in History. But this last Narration is so extraordinarily remarkable, that it were a piece of

disrespect done to it, to dismiss it without some Enquiries at least into such *Problems* as it naturally affords to our consideration, though it may well seem plainly beyond the power of humane Wit, or laws of Modesty to determine any thing therein.

In the first place therefore, it cannot but amuse a mans minde to think what these officious *Spirits* should be, that so willingly sometimes offer themselves to consociate with a man; whether they may be *Angels* incapable of incorporation into humane Bodies, which vulgarly is conceived: Or whether the *Souls of the deceased*, they having more affinity with mortality and humane frailty then the other, and so more sensible of our necessities and infirmities, having once felt them themselves; a reason alledged for the Incarnation of *Christ* by the Author to the *Hebrews*: Which opinion has no worse favourers then *Plutarch*, *Maximus Tyrius*, and other *Platonists*: Or lastly, whether there may not be of both sorts. For separate Souls being *ἰσχυροί*, in a condition not unlike the *Angels themselves*, it is easie to conceive that they may very well undergo the like offices.

Secondly, we are invited to enquire, Whether every man have his *Guardian Genius* or no. That *Witches* have many, such as they are, their own *Confessions* testify. The *Pythagoreans*

means were of opinion, that every man
 wo *Genii*, a *good* one and a *bad* one. Which
met has taken into his Religion, adding
 that they sit on Mens shoulders with table-
 ts in their hands, and that the one writes
 n all the *good*, the other all the *evil* a man
 . But such expressions as those I look upon
 mbolical rather than natural. And I think
 ore reasonable that a man changing the
 e of his minde, changes his *Genius* with-
 Or rather, unless a man be very sincere
 single-hearted, that he is left to common
 vidence, as well as if he be not desperately
 ed or deplorably miserable, scarce any
 icular *evil Spirit* interposes or offers him-
 a perpetual *Assistent* in his affairs and for-
 s. But extreme Poverty, irksome old
 , want of Friends, the Contempt, Injury
 Hard-heartedness of evil Neighbours,
 king upon a Soul low sunk into the body,
 wholly devoid of the Divine life, does
 etimes kindle so sharp, so eager, and so
 cing a desire of Satisfaction and Revenge,
 the shrieks of men while they are a mur-
 ing, the howling of a Wolf in the fields
 he night, or the squeaking and roaring of
 ured Beasts, do not so certainly call to
 n those of their own kinde, as this power-
Magick of a pensive and complaining soul
 he bitterness of its affliction, attracts the

aid of these over-officious *spirits*. So that it is most probable that they that are the forwardest to *hang Witches*, are the first that *made* them, & have no more goodness nor true piety then these they so willingly prosecute, but are as wicked as they, though with better luck or more discretion, offending no further then the Law will permit them, and therefore they securely starve the poor helpless *man*, though with a great deal of clamour of Justice they will revenge the death of their *Hog* or *Cow*.

Thirdly, it were worth our disquisition, Why *Spirits* so *seldome* now adayes appear, especially those that are *good*; whether it be not the *wickedness* of the present *Age*, as I have already hinted; or the general *prejudice* men have against all *Spirits* that appear, that they must be straightwayes *Devils*; or the *frailty* of *humane nature*, that is not usually able to bear the appearance of a *Spirit*, no more then other *Animals* are; for into what agonies *Horses* and *Dogs* are cast upon their approach, is in every ones mouth, and is a good circumstance to distinguish a *reall Apparition* from our own *Imaginations*: Or lastly, whether it be the *condition* of *Spirits* themselves, who, it may be, without some violence done to their own nature cannot become visible, it being happily as troublesome a thing to *them* to keep themselves in one steady visible

sible consistencie in the aire, as it is for men that dive, to hold their breath in the water.

Fourthly, it may deserve our search, Whether Spirits have any settled *form* or *shape*. *Angels* are commonly pictured like good plump cherry-cheek'd Lads. Which is no wonder, the boldness of the same *Artists* not sticking to picture God Almighty in the shape of an old man. In both it is as it pleases the *Painter*. But this story seems rather to favour their opinion, that say that *Angels* and separate *Souls* have no settled *form*, but what they please to give themselves upon occasion, by the power of their own Fancy. *Ficinus*, as I remember, somewhere calls them *Aereal Stars*. And the *good Genii* seem to me to be as the benign Eyes of God running to and fro in the world, with love and pity beholding the innocent endeavours of harmless and single-hearted men, ever ready to do them good, and to help them.

What I conceive of separate Souls and Spirits, I cannot better express then I have already in my *Poem* of the *Praeexistency of the Soul*. And I hope it will be no sin to be better then my word, who in my *Preface* have promised no *Poetry* at all; but I shall not think much to offer to your view these two Stanzas out of the forenamed *Poem*.

Like

Like to a light fast lock'd in lanthorn dark,
 Whereby by Night our wary steps we guide
 In slabby streets, and dirty Channels mark;
 Some weaker rays from the black top do glide,
 And flusher streams perhaps through th' horny side.
 But when we've past the peril of the way,
 Arriv'd at home, and laid that case aside,
 The naked light how clearly doth it ray,
 And spread its joyful beams as bright as Sum-
 mers day!

Even so the Soul in this contracted state,
 Confin'd to these strait Instruments of Sense,
 More dull and narrowly doth operate;
 At this hole hears, the Sight must ray from thence,
 Here tastes, there smells; But when she's gone from
 Like naked Lamp she is one shining sphere, (hence,
 And round about has perfect cognoscence
 What ere in her Horizon doth appear;
 She is one Orb of Sense, all Eye, all airy Ear.

And what I speak there of the condition of
 the Soul out of the Body, I think is easily ap-
 plicable to other Genii, or Spirits.

The fifth Enquiry may be, How these good
 Genii become servicable to men, for either
 heightning their Devotions, or inabling them
 to Prophecy; whether it can be by any other
 ay then by descending into their bodies, and
 settling the heart and brain. For the Es-
 chites

chites, who affected the gift of *Prophecy* by familiarity with *evil Spirits*, did utterly obliterate in their Souls the *αυτηρια σμβολα*, the Principles of Goodness and Honesty (as you may see in *Pfellus περὶ ενεργειας δαιμονων*) that the *evil Spirits* might come into their bodies, whom those sparks of virtue, as they said, would drive away, but those being extinguisht they could come in and possess them and inable them to *Prophecy*. And that the Imps of Witches do sometimes enter their own bodies as well as theirs to whom they send them, is plain in the story of the Witches of *warbois*. It is also the opinion of *Trismegist*, that these Spirits get into the Veins and Arteries both of men and beasts.

Wherefore concerning the *Dreams* and *Visions* of this holy man that so freely imparted himself to *Bodinus*, it may be conceived reasonable that the *good Genius* insinuated himself into his very body, as well as the *bad* into the bodies of the wicked, and that residing in his *brain* and figuring of it, by thinking of this or that object, as we our selves figure it when we think, the external senses being laid asleep, those figurations would easily be represented to the *common sense*; and that *Memory* recovering them when he awaked, they could not but seem to him as other *Dreams* did, saving that they were better, they ever signifying something

thing of importance unto him.

But those Raptures of *Devotion* by day, might be by the Spirits kindling a purer kinde of Love-flame in his heart, as well as by fortifying and raising his Imagination. And how far a man shall be carried beyond himself by this redoubled soul in him, none, I think, can well conceive, unlesse they had the experience of it.

And if this be their manner of communion, it may well be enquired into, in the sixth place, Whether *all men* be capable of consociation with these *good Genii*. *Cardan* somewhere intimates that their approaches are apprehensible by certain *sweet smells* they cast. From whence it may seem not improbable, that those bodies that smell *sweet* themselves, where the minde does not stink with pride and hypocrisie, have some natural advantage for the gaining their society. But if there be any peculiar *complexion* or *natural condition* required, it will prove lesse hopeful for every one to obtain their acquaintance. Yet *Regeneration* come to its due pitch, though it cannot be without much pain and anguish, may well rectifie all uncleanness of nature; so that no singularly good and sincere man can reasonably despair of thir familiarity. For he that is so highly in favour with the *Prince*, it is no wonder he is taken notice of by his *Courtiers*.

But the last and most considerable question is, whether it be lawful to *pray* to God for such a *good Genius* or *Angel*. For the Example in the foregoing story seems a sufficient warrant. But I conceive Faith and Desire ought to be full-sail to make such Voyages prosperous, and our end and purpose pure and sincere. But if Pride, Conceitedness, or Affectation of some peculiar privilege above other Mortals, spur a man up to so bold an Enterprize, his Devotions will no more move either *God* or the *good Genii*, then the whining voice of a Counterfeit will stir the affection of the discreetly Charitable. Nay, this high Presumption may invite some real *Friends* to put a worse jest upon him than was put upon that rattered Rogue *Guzman* by those *Mock-Spirits*, for his so impudently pretending Kindred, and so boldly intruding himself into the knowledge and acquaintance of the Gentry and Nobility of *Genoa*.

But the safest Magick is the sincere consecrating a mans Soul to God, and the aspiring to nothing but so profound a pitch of Humility, as not to be conscious to our selves of being at all touched with the praise and applause of men; and to such a free and universal sense of Charity, as to be delighted with the welfare of another as much as our own. They that solely have their eye upon these, will finde

coming in what ever their heart can desire. But they that put forth their hand to catch at high things, as they fancy, and neglect these, prove at last but a Plague to themselves, and a Laughing-stock to the world.

These are the severall Speculations that the foregoing Narration would naturally beget in the mindes of the curious. But me thinks I hear the *Atheist* replying to all this, That I have run a long division upon uncertain grounds, and asking me, not without some scorn and anger, whether I believe that multifarious Fable I have rehearsed out of *Bodinus*, and so much descanted upon. To which I answer, That I will not take my oath that the most likely passage in all *Plutarchs Lives*, or *Livies History* is assuredly true. But however that I am not ashamed to professe, that I am as well assured in my own judgement of the *existence* of *Spirits*, as that I have met with men in *Westminster-Hall*, or seen beasts in *Smithfield*,

C H A P. XV.

That whether the Species of things have been from all Eternity, or whether they rose out of the Earth by degrees in Time, the Frame of them is such, that against all the Evasions of the Atheist they naturally imply that there is a God.

THUS have we gone through the many and manifold effects represented to our senses on this wide Theater of the World. The faintest and obscurest whereof are Arguments full enough to prove the existence of a *Deity*. But some being more palpable than other some, and more accommodate to awaken the dull and slow belief of the *Atheist* into the acknowledgement of a *God*, it will not be amiss to take notice of what *Evasions* he attempts to make for the extricating himself out of those that he phantasies the most sensibly to entangle him, and the most strongly to hinder his escape.

And such are especially these two last I insisted upon, the curious *frame of Mans Body, and Apparitions*. And [the force of the former some endeavour to evade thus; “That
“there hath ever been Man and Woman and
“other *Species* in the world; and so it is no
“wonder that like should propagage its like,

“ and therefore that there is no want of any
 “ other invisible or material cause but the
 “ *Species* of things themselves. And so these
 “ admirable contrivances in Nature must im-
 “ ply no divine *Wisdom* nor *Counsel* or any such
 “ thing.

But here I demand, whether there were ever any *Man* that was not *mortal*, and whether there be any *mortal* that had not a *beginning*, and if he had, it must be either by *Generati- on*, or *Creation*. If by *Creation*, there is a *God*. If by æquivocal *Generation*, as rising out of Earth, our argument will hold good still notwithstanding this evasion. But if you'll say there was never any man in the world but was born of a *Woman*, this must amount but to thus much, that there hath been an *infinite* number of *successions* of births. If there be meant by it any thing more then thus, it will not prove sense.

For though our *Phaasie* cannot run through an *infinite series* of *Effects*, yet our *Reason* is assured there is no *Effect* without a *Cause*, and be the *Progress* of *Causes* and *Effects* as *infi- nite* as it will, at last we resolve it naturally into some *First*; and he that denies this, seems to me wilfully to wink against the light of *Nature*, and do violence to the faculties of his mind. And therefore of necessity there must be at least one *first Man* and *Woman* which are

first *ordine Natura*, though *infinity* of time reckoning from the present causeth a confusion and obscurity in our apprehensions. And these which are thus *first in order of Nature or Causality*, must also exist first before there can be any other Men or Women in the World. And therefore concerning these first, it being manifest that they were born of no Parents, it follows they were *Created* or rose out of the Earth, and so the *Evasion* will be frustrated.

Besides, if you affirm that there was *never* any *Man* in the world but who was born of a *Woman*, and so grew to Mans estate by degrees, it will fall to some mans share to be a *Babe* and a *Man* at once, or to be both *Father* and *Child*. For so soon as Mandkind was (let it be from Eternity, and beyond Eternity is nothing) those that then existed were begot of *some body*, and there was *nothing* before them to beget them, therefore they begot *themselves*.

But that they should at once then have been *perfect men*, their substances being of alterable and passive matter, that is wrought diversly and by degrees into that frame it hath, is as rash, as if they should say that *Boots*, and *Shoes*, and *Stockings*, and *Pyes*, and *Peels*, and *Ovens* have been together with all *Eternity*: when as it is manifest there ought to be an orderly

derly intervall of time before these things can be, wherein must precede the killing of Oxen, and slaying of them, as also of Sheep, tanning, spinning, cutting, and many more such like circumstances. So that it is enormously ridiculous to say that *Mankind* might have been at once from all *Eternity*, unless the Omnipotency of a God, who can do what ever we can imagine and more, should by his unresistible *Fiat* cause such a thing in a moment so soon as himself was, which was ever, and he was never to seek for either power or skill.

But that the fluid *Matter* of it self should have been thus raised up from all *Eternity* into such compleat *Species* of things, is very groundless and irrational. I say, that there ever should be such a thing as this in the world, a *man* at once existing of himself in this corporal frame that we see, who notwithstanding did afterwards dye like other mortals; is a fable above all Poetical Figments whatsoever, and more incredible then the hardest Article that any Religion ever offered to the *Atheists* belief.

Others therefore deserting this way of *Evafion* betake themselves to another, which, though it seem more plausible at first view, is fully as frivolous. „ They say that all the *Species* of things, *Man* himself not ex-

“cepted,

CHAP. 15. *against Atheisme.* 265

“ cepted, came first out of the Earth by the
 “ omnifarious attempt of the particles of the
 “ Matter upon one another, which at last light
 “ on so lucky a construction and fabrick of
 “ the Bodies of Creatures as we see, and
 “ that having an infinite *series* of time to try
 “ all tricks in, they would of necessity at last
 “ come to this they are.

But I answer, that these particles might
 commit infinite *Tautologies* in their strokes and
 motions, and that therefore there was no such
 necessity at all of falling into those forms and
 shapes that appear in the world.

Again, there is that excellent contrivance
 in the *Body*, suppose of a *Man*, as I have here-
 tofore instanced, that it cannot but be the
 effect of very accurate *Knowledge* and *Coun-
 sel*.

And lastly this concurrence of *Atoms*, they
 being left without a guide, it is a miracle
 above all apprehension, that they should pro-
 duce no *inept Species* of things, such as should
 of their own nature have but three Legs, and
 one Eye, or but one Ear, rows of Teeth along
 the *Vertebrae* of their Backs, and the like, as I
 have above intimated, these *Ineptitudes* being
 more easie to hit upon, then such *accurate* and
 irreprehensible *frames* of Creatures.

But to elude the force of this Argument
 against the fortuitous concurrence of *Atoms*,

they'll excogitate this mad evasion; " That
 " Nature did indeed at first bring forth such
 " ill-favoured and ill-appointed *Monsters*, as
 " well as those that are of a more exquisite
 " frame; but those that were more perfect
 " fell upon those other and kill'd them, and
 " devoured them, they being not so well pro-
 " vided of either limbs or senses as the other,
 " and so were never able to hop fast enough
 " from them, or maturely to discover the ap-
 " proaching dangers that ever and anon were
 " coming upon them. But this unjust and
 audacious calumny cast upon God and Na-
 ture will be easily discover'd and convicted
 of falshood if we do but consider,

First that *Trees, Herbs and Flowers*, that do
 not stir from their places, or exercise such
 fierce cruelty one upon another, that they all
 in their several kinds are *handsom and elegant*,
 and have no *ineptitude or defect* in them.

Secondly that all Creatures born of putre-
 faction, as *Mice and Frogs*, and the like, as
 those many hundreds of *Insects*, as *Grashoppers,*
Flyes, Spiders and such other, that these also
 have a most *accurate contrivance* of *parts*, and
 that there is nothing fram'd rashly or ineptly
 in any of them.

Lastly in more perfect Creatures, as in the
Scotch Barnacles, which *Historians* write of, of
 which if there be any doubt, yet *Gerard* re-
 lates

lates that of his own knowledge, which is as admirable, and as much to our purpose, that there is a kind of *Fowl* which in *Lancashire* are called *Tree-Geese*, they are bred out of rotten pieces of broken ships and trunks of Trees cast upon a little Island in *Lancashire* they call the *Pile of Foulders*; the same Authour saith he hath found the like also in other parts of this Kingdom: Those *Fowls* in all respects, though bred thus of putrefaction (and that they are thus bred is undeniably true, as any man if he please may satisfy himself by consulting *Gerard* the very last page of his *History of Plants*) are of as an exact *Fabrick of Body*, and as fitly contriv'd for the functions of such a kind of living Creature, as any of those that are produced by propagation. Nay these kind of *Fowls* themselves do also propagate, which has imposed so upon the foolishness of some, that they have denied that other way of their generation; when as the being generated one way does not exclude the other, as is seen in *Frogs* and *Mice*.

Wherefore those productions out of the Earth and of Putrefaction being thus perfect and accurate in all points as well as others, it is a manifest discovery that Nature did never frame any species of things ineptly and foolishly, and that therefore she was ever guided by *Counsel* and *Providence*, that is, that

Nature her self is the effect of an all-knowing God.

Nor doth this consideration onely take away this present *Evasion*, but doth more palpably and intelligibly enervate the former. For what boots it them to flie unto an infinite propagation of *Individuals* in the same eternal *species*, as they imagine, that they might be able alwayes to assign a Cause answerable to the Effect; when as there are such Effects as these, and Products of Putrefaction, where *Wisdom* and *Counsel* are as truly conspicuous as in others? For thus are they nevertheless necessarily illaqueated in that inconvenience, which they thought to have escaped by so quaint a subtilty.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

That the Evasions of Atheists against Apparitions are so weak and silly, that it is an evident Argument that they are convinced in their own Judgments of the truth of these kinds of Phenomena, which forces them to answer as well as they can, though they be so ill provided.

NOW for their *evasions* whereby they would elude the force of that Argument for *Spirits*, which is drawn from *Apparitions*, they are so weak and silly, that a man may be almost sure they were convinced in their judgment of the truth of such like stories, else it had been better flatly to have denied them, then to feign such idle and vain reasons of them.

For first they say they are nothing but *Imaginations*, and that there is nothing *reall* without us in such *Apparitions*.

But being beaten off from this sleight account, for that many see the same thing at once, then they flie to so miraculous a power of *Phansy*, as if it were able to change the Air into a reall shape and form, so that others may behold it, as well as he that fram'd it by the power of his *Phansy*.

Now I demand of any man, whether this be not a harder Mystery and more uncon-

ceiveable then all the *Magical Metamorphoses* of Devils or Witches. For it is far easier to conceive that some *knowing thing* in the Aire should thus transform the Aire into this or that shape, being in that part of the Aire it doth thus transform, then that the *Imagination* of man, which is but a Modification of his own minde, should be able at a distance to change it into such like Appearances. But suppose it could, can it *animate* the Aire that it doth thus metamorphize, and make it *speak*, and *answer* to questions, and *put things* into mens hands, and the like? O the credulity of besotted *Atheism*! How intoxicated and infatuated are they in their conceits, being given up to sensuality, and having lost the free use of the natural faculties of their minde!

But shall this force of *Imagination* reach as high as the *Clouds* also, and make Men *fight* pitched Battels *in the Aire*, running and charging one against the other?

Here the same bold pretender to Wit and Philosophy *Cesar Vaninus*. (who cunningly and juggingly endeavours to infuse the poison of *Atheism* into the minde of his Reader on every occasion) hath recourse to those old cast rags of *Epicurus* his School, the *Exuvius Effluxes* of things: and attempts to salve these *Phenomena* thus; That the *vapours* ~~are~~ *bodies*, and it seems of *horses* too, are carried

carried up into the Aire, and fall into a certain proportionable posture of parts, and so imitate the figures of them aloft among the Clouds.

But I demand how the vapours of the *horses* finde the vapours of their *Riders*; and when and how long are they coming together; and whether they appear not before there be any Armies in the field to send up such vapours: and whether *harness* and *weapons* send up vapours too, as *Swords, Pikes & Shields*: and how they come to light so happily, into the hands of those Aerial men of war, especially the vapours of *Metals* (if they have any) being heavier in all likelyhood then the reek of *Animals* and *Men*: and lastly how they come to discharge at one another and to fight, there being neither life nor soul in them: and whether *Sounds* also have their *Exuvia* that are reserved till these solemnities; for at *Alborough* in *Suffolk* 1642 were heard in the Aire very loud beatings of *Drums*, shooting of *Muskets*, and *Ordinance*, as also in other such like Prodigies there hath been heard the sounding of *Trumpets*, as *Snellius* writes. And *Pliny* also makes mention of the sounding of *Trumpets*, and *clashing* of *Armour* heard out of the heavens about the *Cimbrick Wars*, and often before. But here at *Alborough* all was concluded with a melodious noise of *Musical Instruments*.

The *Exuvia* of *Fiddles* it seems flie up in to the Aire too, or were those Musical Accents frozen there for a time, and at the heat and firing of the Canons, the Aire relenting and thawing, became so harmoniously vocal: With what vain conceits are men intoxicated, that wilfully wink against the light of Nature, and are estranged from the true knowledge and acknowledgement of a God!

But there is another *Evasion* which the same sedulous Insinuator of *Atheism* would make use of in case this should not hold, which seems more sober but no lesse false: and that is this; That these fightings and skirmishings in the Aire are onely the *reflexion* of some real battel on the Earth. But this in Nature is plainly impossible. For of necessity these Armies thus fighting, being at such a *distance* from the Spectators, that the fame of the battel never arrives to their ears, their eyes can never behold it by any *reflexion* from the Clouds. For besides that *reflexion* makes the images more *dim* then *direct* fight, such a *distance* from the Army to the clouds, and then from the clouds to our eye, will lessen the *species* so exceedingly, that they will not at all be *visible*.

Or if we could imagine that there might be sometimes such an advantage in the figure of these Clouds as might in some sort remedy

are so exceeding *rudely polish'd*, and *reflexion* which, as I said, is ever *dim* enough of it self, is here so extraordinarily *imperfect*, that they can never be able, according to the course of Nature, to return the *species* of Terrestrial Objects back again to our sight, it being so evident that they are unfit for what is of far lesse difficulty. For we never finde them able to reflect the image of a *Star*, when as not only glasse, but every troubled pool or dirty plash of water in the high-way does usually do it.

But that it is far easier for a *Star*, then for any of *these Objects* here upon Earth to be *reflected* to our Eyes by those rude naturall Looking-glasses placed among the Clouds, fundry reasons will sufficiently inform us.

For first, The Stars do not abate at all of their *usnall magnitude* in which they ordinarily appear to us by this reflexion; the difference of many hundreds of Leagues making no difference of magnitude in them, for indeed the distance of the *Diameter* of the *Orbite* of the Earth makes none, as must be acknowledged by all those that admit of the annual motion thereof. But a very few miles do exceedingly diminish the usual bigness of the *species* of an Horse or Man, even to that littleness, that they grow invisible. What then will become of his *sword, shield or spear*? And in these

case

cases we now speak of, how great a journey the *Species* have from the Earth to the Cloud that reflects them, I have intimated before.

Secondly it is manifest, that a Star hath the preheminance above these *Terrestrial Objects*, in that it is as pure a light as the Sun, though not so big, but they but *opaque* coloured bodies, and that therefore there is no comparison betwixt the vigour and strength of the *Species* of a Star and of them.

Thirdly in the *Night-time*, the Eye being placed in the shadow of the Earth, those *reflexions* of a Star will be yet more easily visible; when as the great light of the Sun by Day, must needs much debilitate these reflected Images of the Objects upon the Earth, his beams striking our Eyes with so strong vibrations.

Fourthly and lastly, there being Stars all over the Firmament, so as there is, it should seem a hundred times more easie for natural Causes to hit upon a *Paraster* or *Parastron* (for let Analogie embolden me so to call these seldome or never seen *Phenomena*, the image of a single Star or whole Constellation reflected from the Clouds) then upon a *Parelios* or *Paraselene*. But now the story of these is more then an hundred times more frequent then that of the *Paraster*. For it is so seldome discovered, that it is doubted whether it be

or no, or rather acknowledged not to be, of which there can be no reason but that the *clouds* are so *ill-polished* that they are not able to reflect so considerable a light as a Star. From whence I think, we may safely gather, that it is therefore impossible that they should reflect so debile *Species*, as the colours and shapes of Beasts and Men, and that so accurately, as that we may see their swords, helmets, shields, spears, and the like.

Wherefore it is plain that these Apparitions on high in the Aire, are no reflexions of any Objects upon Earth; or if it were imaginable that they were, that some *supernatural cause* must assist to conglaciate and polish the surfaces of the clouds to such an extraordinary accuracy of figure and smoothness, as will suffice for such prodigious reflexions.

And that these *Spirits* that rule in the Aire may not act upon the materials there, as well as *Men* here upon the Earth work upon the parts thereof, as also upon the neighbouring Elements so far as they can reach, shaping, perfecting and directing things, according to to their own purpose and pleasure, I know no reason at all in Nature or Philosophy, for any man to deny. For that the help of some officious *Genii* is implied in such like Prodigies as these, the seasonableness of their appearance seems no contemptible argument, they being

according to the observation of Historians, the *Forerunners of Commotions and Troubles* in all Kingdomes and Common-wealths.

Yet nevertheless as good Artificers as I here suppose, they working upon Nature must be bounded by the Laws of Nature. And *reflexion* will have its limits as well as *refraction*, whether for conveyance of *species* or kindling of heat; the laws and bounds whereof that discerning Wit *Cartesius* being well aware of, doth generously and judiciously pronounce; *That a burning-Glass, the distance of whose focus from the Glass doth not bear a lesse proportion to the Diameter thereof, then the distance of the Earth from the Sun to the Diameter of the Sun, will burn no more vehemently then the direct rays of the Sun will do without it, though in other respects this Glass were as exactly shaped and curiously polished, as could be expected from the hand of an Angel.*

I have now compleated this present Treatise against *Atheism* in all the three parts thereof: upon which while I cast mine eye and view that clear and irrefutable evidence of the cause I've undertaken, the *external appearances of things* in the world, so faithfully seconding the undeniable dictates of the *innate Principles* of our own mindes, I cannot but with confidence aver, That there is not any one notion in *Philosophy* more certain and demonstrable
that there is a God. And

And verily I think I have ransacked all the corners of every kinde of Philosophy that can pretend to bear any stroke in this Controversie, with that diligence, that I may safely pronounce, that it is meer brutish *Ignorance* or *Impudence*, no *Skill* in *Nature* or the *Knowledge* of things, that can encourage any man to profess *Atheism*, or to embrace it at the proposal of those that make profession of it.

But so I conceive it is, that at first some famously *learned* men being not so indiscreetly zealous and superstitious as others, have been mistaken by *Idiots* and traduced for *Atheists*, and then ever after some one vain-glorious Fool or other, hath affected with what safety he could to seem *Atheistical*, that he might thereby forsooth be reputed the more *learned*, or the *profounder Naturalist*.

But I dare assure any man, that if he do but search into the bottom of this enormous *disease of the Soul*, as *Trismegist* truly calls it, he will find nothing to be the cause thereof, but either *vanity* of mind or brutish *sensuality*, and an untamed desire of satisfying a mans own *will* in every thing, an *obnoxious* Conscience, & a base *Fear* of divine Vengeance, *ignorance* of the scantness and insufficiency of second causes, a jumbled *feculency* and *incomposedness* of the spirits by reason of perpetual intemperance and luxury, or else a dark bedeadening *Melancholy* that

that so starves and kills the apprehension of the Soul, in divine matters especially, that it makes a man as inept for such Contemplations, as if his head was filled with cold Earth, or dry Grave-moulds.

And to such slow Constitutions as these, I shall not wonder, if as the *first Part* of my discourse must seem marvellous subtile, so the *last* appear ridiculously incredible. But they are to remember, that I do not here appeal to the Complexional humors or peculiar Relishes of men, that arise out of the temper of the *body*, but to the known and unalterable *Idea's* of the *mind*, to the *Phænomena* of *Nature* and *Records of History*. Upon the last wherof if I have something more fully insisted, it is not to be imputed to any vain credulity of mine, or that I take a pleasure in telling strange stories, but that I thought fit to fortifie and strengthen the faith of others as much as I could; being well assured that a contemptuous misbelief of such like Narrations concerning *Spirits*, and an endeavour of making them all ridiculous and incredible, is a dangerous Prelude to *Atheism* it self, or else a more close and crafty profession and insinuation of it. For assuredly that Saying was nothing so true in Politicks, *No Bishop, no King*; as this is in Metaphysicks, *No Spirit, no God*.

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A N
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ANTIDOTE
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
Wherein is contained an Answer to certain Objections made against several Passages thereof.

By HENRY MORE,
Fellow of Christ Colledge in Cambridge.

Πρὸς τὸ ἔξω λόγον αἰεὶ ἐστὶν ἐνσηθεῖαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἔσω λόγον ἔκ αἰ. Arist.

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A N
A P P E N D I X

To the late

A N T I D O T E

A G A I N S T

A T H E I S M.

C H A P. I.

The Authors reason of adding this Appendix to his Antidote. An enumeration of the chief Objections made against the first book thereof.



Unsuspected Innocency and misdoubted Truth can win no greater credit then by strictest examination. For the world is thereby *more fully* ascertain'd of the unblameableness of the one, and of the solidity of the other, then it can be possibly without so publick a Tryal, Wherefore that so great an advantage may not be

wanting to that weighty cause we have in hand, I was not contented onely to set down such *Reasons* for the *Existence of God* which in my own judgement I conceiv'd to be irrefutably firm; but that the firmness of them may appear more conspicuous to all men, I have brought into view the chiefest and most material *Objections* I could meet with, whether raised by those that of themselves have excepted against any Argument I have made use of, or by such as have been invited more curiously to search and discover, where they could; any weakness or inconsequency in any Argumentation throughout the whole Treatise. And the chiefest *Exceptions* and *Objections* against the first Book are these:

First, That the Ground of our Demonstration of the *Existence of God* from his *Idea* is, that there are *Innate Ideas* in the mind of Man; which, say they, is false.

Secondly, That there is no such *Idea* of God at all as we have describ'd, neither *Innate* nor *Acquisitious* or *Transcriptitious*; because it involves in it the Notion of a *Spirit*, which again consists of such particular Notions as are utterly unconceivable.

Thirdly, That *Existence* is no Term of *Perfection*, and therefore is not so inseparably involved in the notion of a *Being absolutely perfect* or of *God*.

Fourthly, That though *Necessary Existence* be included in the *Idea* of God, yet our inferring from thence that he does *exist*, is but a *Sophism*; because a Being absolutely *Evil* as well as absolutely *Perfect*, includes *necessary Existence* in the *Idea* thereof.

Fifthly, That if there be any *necessary Existent*, that it is plain that it is *Matter*, which we unadvisedly call *Space*, which we cannot imagine but did ever and will ever necessarily exist.

Sixthly, That God did not put this *Idea* of himself into the mind of Man, but the Subtler sort of Politicians that have always used Religion as a meer Engine of State.

Seventhly, That *Fear* and *Hopes* of Natural Conscience are nothing indeed but these *Passions* rais'd upon a belief of a God which men have had by Tradition or Education.

Lastly, That these Arguments whereby we prove the *Incorporeity* of the soul of Man, will also conclude the *Incorporeity* of the soul of a Beast, and that therefore they are *Sophistical*.

To these I shall answer in order with as little Pomp and Luxuriancy of words, and as much plainness and perspicuity, as I may, in so subtil and difficult a matter.

C H A P. II.

That the Ground of our Demonstration of the Existence of God from his Idea is not, that there are innate Ideas in the mind of Man, and yet that there are such innate Ideas, though we do not suppose it as the Ground of our Demonstration.

THAT some have excepted against our Demonstration of the Existence of God from his *Idea*, in that they have conceived that it is founded upon this Principle, *That there are innate Ideas in the soul of Man*; I can impute the mistake not so much to Ignorance as Inadvertency. For no mans parts can be so weak but that if he attend to what we have written, he must plainly see, that the stress of our Argument is not laid upon this Notion of *innate Ideas*, but upon that confessed Truth, That there are some things so plain, that however the soul came to the knowledge of them, that she cannot but assent to them, and acknowledge them to be undeniably true. See Chap. 7. lib. 1.

Now the *Idea of a Being absolutely perfect* being such that it must needs be acknowledged according to the light of Nature to be indeed

indeed the true *Idea* of such a Being, call it innate or not, it is all one, the demonstration will as inevitably follow as if it were acknowledged an *innate Idea*, as we shall more plainly discern if we instance in other *Ideas*; as for example in the *Idea* of a *Triangle* of a *regular Geometrical body*, and of a *round Solid*. For the nature of these *Ideas* is such, that the mind of man cannot possibly deny, but that they are such, and such distinct *Ideas*; and that such and such affections belong unto them. As for example, that every *Triangle* is either *Isopleuron*, *Isosceles*, or *Scalenum*, so that there are just *Three kinds* of them in reference to their sides and no more: That there are *Five regular Bodies* in Geometry, neither more nor less, viz. The *Cube*, the *Tetraedrum*, the *Octaedrum*, the *Dodecaedrum* and the *Icosaedrum*: That there is one only kind of *round Solid*; viz. The *Sphere* or *Globe*. And so contemplating the *Idea* of a Being absolutely perfect (be the *Idea* innate or not innate, it is all one) we cannot but conclude that there can be *but one only* such in number; and that *That one* also cannot fail to be, as we have demonstrated at large.

But however though we need no such Principle for the carrying on of our Demonstration as this of *Innate Ideas*; yet because I thought it true and of concernment to ani-

mate the Reader to attend the *Notions* of his own mind, and relish the excellency of that Judge we are to appeal to, I held it not unfit to insist something upon it; And I am ready now to make it good, that this Principle is true, notwithstanding any thing that I find alledged against it.

For what I contend for in the sixth Chapter of this first Book, that the exact *Idea* of a *Circle*, or a *Triangle* is rather hinted to us from those describ'd in Matter then taught us by them, is still true notwithstanding that Objection, that they seem exact to our outward senses carelessly perusing them, though they be not so. For we plainly afterward correct our selves not onely by occasion of the figure which we may ever discern imperfect, but by our *innate knowledge* which tells us, that the outward senses cannot see an exact *Triangle*, because that an Indivisible point in which the Angles are to be terminated, is to the outward sense utterly invisible.

Besides it is to be considered that though we should admit that a *Triangle* could be so drawn that to our outward sense, look on it as narrowly as we could, even through *Microscopes*, that it would ever seem exact; yet they that never see or took notice of any such accurate lineation, do of themselves upon the intition of ruder draughts frame to themselves
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the exact *Idea* of a *Triangle*, which they having not learned from any outward Object must needs be the inward representation of their own minds.

But now for other Objections, that a *Blind* man would be able to discourse of *Colours* if there were any *innate Ideas* in his soul, I say it does not at all follow; Because these *Ideas* that I contend to be in the Soul, are not *sensible* but *intellectual*, such as are those many *Logical*, *Metaphysical*, *Mathematical*, and some *Moral* Notions. All which we employ as our own *Modes* of considering sensible Objects, but are not the sensible Objects themselves, of which we have no *Idea*, but onely a capacity, by reason of the Organs of our body, to be affected by them. The reason therefore of a blind mans inability of discoursing of *Colours*, is onely that he has no *Substratum* or *Phantasm* of the Subject of the discourse, upon which he would use these innate *Modes* or frame of Notions that are naturally in his mind, and which he can make use of in the speculation of sundry other sensible Objects.

And whereas it is further objected, that these *Logical* and *Mathematical* Notions came in also at the senses because *Brutes* have the knowledge of them, upon whom we will not bestow so rich an inward furniture as these *innate*

Ideas;

Ideas; I answer, that *Brutes* have not the knowledge of any such *Notion*, but what they act is from a meer *Concatenation of sensible Phantasms* representing things grateful or ungrateful to the sense; as to instance in those particulars that are objected, That a Dog will bark at one noise, suppose the knocking at the door; and not at another; as the falling of a stool or of a dish from off a shelf: that he will follow one sent, as that of the Hare, and neglect another and the like; these are all done, not that he has any *notion of Effect and Cause*; but by meer *Concatenation of Phantasms* representing things as grateful or ungrateful, or neither grateful nor ungrateful to his sense, in which case he is not mov'd at all. And if a Dog chop at the bigger morsel, it is not that he considers the *notion of inequality*, but because that sensible objects does more powerfully move his appetite. So if he take one single side of a Triangle to come to the corner of it, where a piece of bread may be placed, it is not because he considers that a straight line is the shortest betwixt the same terms, but he sensibly feels that going directly to it he shall be sooner at it then if he went about, as *Zeno* instances well in an Ass at one corner of a Pasture and the fodder in the other, that he would go directly to that corner the fodder lay in; which he thought was a marvellous witty jeer

to *Euclide* his demonstration, that *any two sides of a Triangle are bigger then the third*, as being so plain a Truth that no *As* could miss of it.

But by the favour of so *Critical* a Philosopher we may very well suspect that neither Dog nor *As* that makes toward any Object goes directly in a straight line to it because he considers that a crooked one is further about, but because the visual line guides him straight to the Object he looks at, in which he goes as naturally without any reflexion upon *Mathematical* notions as a stone cast out of a sling, of it self indeavour to steer its course with a Motion rectilinear: Which having not so much as *Sense*, we can in no wise suspect to be capable of the rudest Notion in *Geometry*.

Wherefore it is a meer fallacy to argue that Brutes because they do such things as are Reasonable or Mathematical, that therefore they do them from notions of *Logick* or *Mathematicks*; when as in creatures inanimate that can think of nothing; we may read the footsteps of *Reason* and *Geometry* in their Motions and Figurations: As in the drops of rain that fall downwards, in the form of Hailstones, and in the beauty and symmetry of the leaves and flowers of Herbs and Plants: Which Objects while we contemplate, we apply to
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them the *innate modes* of our own mind which she uses in the speculation even of those things that themselves are *dead and thoughtless*.

CHAP. III.

That the Idea of a Being absolutely perfect which we have described, be it innate or acquisitious, is true; notwithstanding the pretended unconceivableness of the Notion of a Spirit included therein.

THAT the souls of Men, the lowest dregs of all the Intellectual Orders, should be plung'd and puzzled in the more close and accurate Speculation of things spiritual and intellectual, is but reasonable, especially considering that even Matter it self, in which they tumble and wallow, which they feel with their hands, and usurp with all their senses, if they once offer to contemplate it in an Intellectual and Rational manner, their fancies are so clouded in this dark state of incarceration in these earthly Bodies, that the *Notion* thereof seems unimaginable and contradictory, as I have largely enough already insisted on.

But that the *Notion* of a *Spirit* which seems

So to obscure the clearness of the *Idea* of God, is no such inconsistent and unconceivable *No-tion*, as some would have it; I hope I shall sufficiently evince by answering the shrewdest objections that I think can be made against it.

Whereas therefore we have defined a *Spirit* as well from those more *absolute powers* of *Self-contraction* and *dilatation*, as also from those *relative faculties* of *Penetrating, moving and altering of the Matter*, we will now set down the Objections made against them both.

And against the first it is objected, That it is impossible for the mind of Man to imagine any Substance having a power of *Self-dilatation* and *Contraction* to be unextended, and that *Extension* cannot be imagined without *diversity of parts*, nor *diversity of parts* without a *possibility* of *division* or *separation* of them; because *diversity of parts* in any substance supposes *diversity of substances*, and *diversity of substances* supposes *independency of one another*; from whence it will follow that *Indivisibility* is incompatible to a *Spirit*, which notwithstanding we have added in the definition thereof.

I confess the Objection is very ingenious and set on home, but withall conceive that the difficulty is easily taken off, if we acknowledge some such thing to be in the nature of a

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Spirit, as has been by thousands acknowledged in the Nature of *Intentional Species*: We will therefore represent the property of a Spirit in this *Symbole* or *Hieroglyphick*.

Suppose a Point of light from which rays out a luminous Orb according to the known principles of *Optiques*: This *Orb of light* does very much resemble the *Nature of a Spirit*, which is diffus'd and extended and yet indivisible. For wee'll suppose in this Spirit the Center of life to be indivisible, and yet to diffuse it self by a kind of *circumscrib'd Omnipresency*, as the point of light is discernible in every point of the Luminous Sphere. And yet supposing that Central lucid Point indivisible, there is nothing divisible in all that Sphere of light. For it is ridiculous to think by any Engine or Art whatsoever to separate the luminous rays from the shining center, and keep them apart by themselves, as any man will acknowledge that does but carefully consider the nature of the thing we speak of.

Now there is no difficulty to imagine such an Orb as this a substance as well as a Quality. And indeed this Sphere of light it self, it not inhering in any subject in the space it occupies; looks far more like a substance then any accident. And what we phansie unadvisedly to be *esal Light and Colours*, that any point of them

them will thus ray orbicularly, is more rationally to be admitted in Spiritual substances whose central essence spreads out into a secondary substance, as the luminous rays are conceiv'd to shoot out from a lucid point. From whence we are enabled to return an answer to the greatest difficulty in the foregoing objection, *viz.* That the conceived parts in a *Spirit* have an inseparable dependence upon the central Essence thereof, from which they flow, and in which they are radically contained, and therefore though there be an extension of this whole substantial power, yet one part is not separable or discernable from another, but the intire substance, as well *secondary* as *primary* or *central*, is indivisible.

But let us again cast our eye upon this lucid point and radiant Orb we have made use of; It is manifest that those rays that are hindered from shooting out so far as they would, need not lose their vertue or Being, but onely be reflected back toward the shining center: And the obstacle being removed, they may shoot out to their full length again: So that there is no generation of a new ray, but an emission of what was actually before: whereby we are well furnish'd with an answer to a further Objection that would insinuate that this Emanation or Efflux of the *Secondary Substance* from the *Central* is Creation properly so called, which

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which is deemed incompatible to any creature.

But we answer, that both the *Central* and *Secondary* Substance of a Spirit were created at once by God, and that these free active Spirits have onely a power in them of contracting their vitals rays and dilating of them, not of annihilating or creating of them: For we also added in the definition of a Spirit *Self-penetration* or the running of one part into another, if we may call them parts. And this answer I hold so satisfactory, that I think it needless to alledge the opinion of *Durandus*, who contends that Creation is not incompatible unto a creature, provided that it be acknowledged to be done by vertue of donation from the first Creator, and in an inevitable observance to his Laws. We might also further scruple whether any emanation may be properly call'd creation, but enough has been already said to satisfie this Objection.

But we are further yet urged concerning this *self-contraction* and *dilatation*; for it is demanded, why the Soul of Man which we acknowledge a Spirit, does not contract it self or withdraw it self from those parts which are pained, or why she does not dilate her self beyond the bounds of the Body. To which is answered, that the *Plantal faculty* of the Soul whereby she is unitable to this terrestrial body

is not arbitrary, but fatal or natural; which union cannot be dissolved unless the bond of life be loosened; and that vital congruity (which is in the body, and does necessarily hold the Soul there) be either for a time hindered or utterly destroy'd.

The last Objection against the *Self-extension* of a *Spirit* is, That there will be as many Wills and Understandings as Parts. But I have, in that *symbolicall* representation I have made use of, so represented the extension of a Spirit, that it is also acknowledged indivisible; whereby the Objection is no sooner propounded then answered, that engine lying in readiness to receive all such assaults.

Now for the Objections made against the *Relative faculties* of a Spirit, to wit, *the power of penetrating, moving and altering the Matter*, there is mainly this one, that Matter cannot be altered but by Motion, nor Motion be communicated but by Impulse, nor Impulse without Inpenetrability in the Impulsor, and that therefore how a Spirit should move Matter which does penetrate it, is not to be imagined.

But I answer, First, what our Imagination is baffled in, either our outward Senses or inward Reason often prove to be true. As for example; our Reason attending to the nature of an exact *Globe* and *Plain*, will undoubtedly

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pronounce that they will touch in a point, and that they may be moved one upon another: But our Imagination cannot but make this exception, That the Globe thus drawn upon the Plane, describes a line which must necessarily consist of points, point perpetually following point in the whole description; which how monstrous it is to be admitted, I have already intimated in the foregoing Discourse.

So likewise the Angle of Contact included betwixt the *Periphery* and a *Perpendicular* falling on the end of the *Diameter* of a *Circle*, Geometricians demonstrate by reason to be less than any acute angle whatsoever, in so much that a line cannot fall betwixt the *Periphery* and the *Perpendicular*: whence the fancy cannot but imagine this angle to be indivisible; which is a perfect contradiction and against the definition of an *Angle*, which is not the *coincidence* but the *inclination* of two lines. Besides, a lesser *Circle* inscrib'd in a greater, so that it touches in one point, through which let there be drawn the common *Diameter* of them both, and then let fall a *Perpendicular* on that end of the *Diameter* where the *Circles* touch, it will be evident that one *Angle of Contact* is bigger than the other, when yet they are both indivisible, as was acknowledged by our Imagination before: So that

that one and the same Angle will be both divisible and indivisible, which is again a plain contradiction.

And as Imagination is puzzled in things we are sure of by Reason, so is it also in things we are certain of by Sense; for who can imagine how it comes about that we see our image behinde the Looking-glass: for it is more easie to fancy that we should deprehend our faces either in the very surface of the glass, or else in the place where they are: For if the reflected rayes might serve the turn, then we should finde the distance of our image no greater then that of the glass; but if we be affected also by the direct rayes, we think we should be led by them to the first place whence they came, and finde our faces in that real situation they are.

But to instance in things that will come more near to our purpose. We see in some kindes of Matter almost an invincible union of parts, as in Steel, Adamant and the like; what is it that holds them so fast together? If you'll say, some inward substantial form, we have what we look'd for, a substance distinct from the Matter. If you say it is the quality of hardness in the Matter that makes it thus hard: That is no more then to say, it is so, because it is so. If you say it is a more perfect rest of parts one by another, then

there is in other Matter; if that be true, it is yet a thing utterly unimaginable; as for example, That upon Matter exactly plain, more plain and solid then a Table of Marble, if a man laid a little Cube upon it of like plainness and solidity, that this Cube by meer immediate touching of the Table should have as firm union therewith as the parts of the Cube have one with another, is a thing that the fancy of man cannot tell how to admit: For suppose at first you drew along this Cube on the Table, as it would easily go, both surfaces being so exactly smooth, and that then you left drawing of it, that these two smooth bodies should presently stick so fast together that a Hammer and a Chisell would scarce sever them, is a thing utterly unimaginable.

Wherefore the union betwixt the Parts of the Matter being so strong, and yet so unimaginable how it comes to pass to be so, why should we not admit as strong or stronger union betwixt a *Spirit* and a *Body*, though our fancy suggest it will pass through, as well as it does that smooth bodies will ever lie loose, unless there be some cement to hold them together. And this *union* once admitted, *Motion*, *Activity* and *Agitation* being so easie and prone a conception of the property of a *Spirit*, it will as easily and naturally follow that *does move or agitate the Matter it is thus*
related to.

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But again to answer more closely, I say this present Objection is nothing else but a Sophism of the fancy conceiving a *Spirit* as a *Body* going through some pervious hole or passage too wide and patent for it, in which therefore it cannot stick or be firmly settled in it. To which Imagination we will oppose that though Spirits do penetrate Bodies, that yet they are not such thin and lank things that they must of necessity run through them, or be unable to take hold of them, or be united with them, but that they may fill up the capacity of a body penetrable by Spirits: which penetrability of a Body or Matter when it is satiated or fill'd, that Spirit that thus fills it is more strongly rivetted in, or united with the Body or Matter, then one part of the Matter can be with another.

And therefore we will acknowledge one special faculty of a Spirit, which after penetration it doth either naturally or arbitrarily exert, which is this, to fill the *Receptivity* or *Capacity* of a *Body* or *Matter* so far forth as it is capable or receptive of a Soul or Spirit.

And this affection of a Spirit we will make bold to call, for more compendiousness, by one Greek term *ὑλοπαθεια*: which that there may be no suspicion of any fraud or affected foolery in words, we will as plainly as we can

define thus, *A power in a Spirit of offering so near to a corporeal emanation from the center of life, that it will so perfectly fill the receptivity of Matter into which it has penetrated, that it is very difficult or impossible for any other Spirit to possess the same, and of hereby becoming so firmly and closely united to a body, as both to actuate and to be acted upon, to affect and be affected thereby.*

And now let us appeal to Imagination her self, if Matter does not fit as close, nay closer to a Spirit, then any one part of Matter can do to another: For here union pervades through all, but there conjunction is onely in a common Superficies, as is usually fancied and acknowledged. And this *Hypothia* which we thus suppose in a finite Spirit or Soul, I further add may well answer in Analogy to that power of creating Matter which is necessarily included in the Idea of God.

But lastly, if the manner how a Spirit acts upon a Body, or is affected by a body, seems so intricate that it must be given up for inexplicable, yet as the mobility of an exact Globe upon a Plain is admitted as an evident & undeniable property thereof by our understanding, though we cannot imagine how it always touching in a point should by its motion describe a continued line, so supposing such

such manifest operations in Nature, that Reason can demonstrate not to be from the matter it self, we must acknowledge there is some other Substance besides the Matter that acts in it and upon it, which is spiritual, though we know not how motion can be communicated to Matter from a Spirit. And the strength of this our third and last answer consists in this, that there are indeed several such operations apparently transcending the power of Matter, of which we will onely here briefly repeat the heads, having more fully discoursed of them in the foregoing Treatise.

And first I instance in what is more general and acknowledged by *Des. Cartes* himself, who yet has entituled the *Laws of Matter* to the highest effects that ever any Man could rationally do: And 'tis this; That that Matter out of which all things are is of it self uniform, and of one kinde: From whence I infer that of it self therefore it all either rests or moves; If it all rest, there is something besides Matter that moves it, which necessarily is a Spirit; If it all move, there could not be possibly the coalition of any thing but every imaginable particle would be actually loose from another: Wherefore there is required a Substance besides Matter that must bind what we finde fix'd and bound.

The second instance is in that admirable wisdom discoverable in all the works of Nature, which I have largely insisted on in my Second Book, which do manifestly evince that all things are contriv'd by a wise Principle: But who but a fool will say that the Matter is wise, and yet notwithstanding out of the putrified parts even of the Earth it self, as also out of the drops of dew, rotten pieces of wood, and such like geer, the bodies of Animals do arise so artificially and exquisitely well framed, that the Reason of Man cannot contemplate them but with the greatest pleasure and admiration.

Thirdly, Those many and undeniable Stories of Apparitions do clearly evince, that an understanding lodges in sundry aery bodies, when as it is utterly impossible that Aire should be so arbitrarily changed into shapes, and yet held together as an actuated vehicle of life, if there were not something besides the Air it self that did thus possess it and moderate it, and could dilate, contract, and guide it as it pleased; otherwise it would be no better figured nor more steddily kept together then the fume of Tobacco or the reek of Chimneys.

Fourthly and lastly, It is manifest that that which in us understands, remembers
and

CHAP. 4. to the late Antidote. 315
and perceives, is that which moves our
bodies, and that those cognoscitive facul-
ties can be no operation of the bare Matter.
From whence it is evident that there is in our
Bodies an Intellectual spirit that moves them
as it pleases, as I have largely enough prov'd
in the last Chapter of the first Book of my
Antidote, and shall yet farther confirm, when
we come to the Objections made against it.

CHAP. IV.

*That Existence is a Term of Perfection, and
therefore necessarily included in the Idea of
a Being absolutely Perfect, or of God.*

TO avoid the Necessity and Evidence of
our Demonstration of the *Existence of
God* drawn from the inseparable connexion of
the Notion thereof with his *Idea* (we urging
*that necessary Existences must needs be included
in the Idea of a Being absolutely perfect*) there
are some that stick not to affirm that *Existence*
is no Term of intrinsecal perfection to any
thing. For say they, Imagine two pieces of
Gold equal in weight, purity and all other
respects, but onely duration or necessity of
Existence

Existence, we cannot justly, without being
humourfome or phanful, attribute præ-
eminence to one more then to the other. To
which I answer, that as two pieces of Gold
is better than one, so one piece of Gold that
will last twice as long as another, is twice as
good as the other, or at least much better than
the other, which I think is so evident that it
wants no further proof.

But further, that we may not onely apply
our selves to answer Objections, but abso-
lutely to ratifie the present Truth, *That Ex-
istence is a perfection*: First it is palpably plain,
according to that sensible Aphorism of *Solo-
mon, Better is a living Dog then a dead Lyon.*

But then again to argue more generally,
The Metaphysicians, as it is very well known,
look upon *Existence* as the formal and actual
part of a Being; And Form or Act is acknow-
ledged the more noble and perfect principle
in every Essence; and therefore if they can
be distinguished in God, is so there also: if
they cannot, then it is thereby confest, that
we cannot think of the *Idea* of God but it
immediately informs us that he doth *Exist*.
And I recommend it to the inquiry of the
Hebrew Criticks, whether *יהוה* from whence
יהוה does not rather signifie *Existence* then
Essence.

Thirdly let the *Metaphysicians* conclude
what

that they please, it is evident to ordinary
reason, that if there be one conception bet-
- then another, that implies no imperfection
in it, that it must be cast upon what is
most perfect: But Existence is better than
non-existence, and implies no imperfection
in it; therefore it must be cast upon an *Idea*
of a Being absolutely perfect.

But fourthly and lastly, Though it were
possible to cavil at the single Notion of Ex-
istence that it neither argued perfection nor
imperfection, nor belonged to either; yet there
can be no shew of exception against the high-
est and most perfect manner of existing, but
that that is naturally and undeniably included
in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect, and
that therefore we do but rightfully contend
that necessary Existence is inseparably contain-
ed in the notion of God.

For as for example, while it is confessed that
Matter is finite and cannot be otherwise, for
a Body to be figured implies neither Perfection
nor Imperfection, but is a natural and ne-
cessary affection thereof; yet to be *ordinately*
figured, is an undoubted Perfection of a
Body: So in like manner though it were con-
fessed, that meer Existence is neither Per-
fection nor Imperfection, yet so noble a Mode
thereof as necessarily to Exist, must without all
regrivation be acknowledged a notion of

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Perfection, and therefore to accrew naturally to the *Idea* of a Being absolutely perfect.

CHAP. V.

That the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil is in no sense a warrantable Idea, or if it be, that there is included no necessary Existence therein.

AS for those that admit *necessary Existence* to be included in the *Idea* of a Being absolutely Perfect, but would shew that our inference from thence, viz. *That this perfect Being doth Exist*, is false and sophistical, because *necessary Existence* is contained in the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Evil*, which notwithstanding we will not admit to Exist (for say they, that which is absolutely Evil is immutably and everunavoidably such and cannot but be so, and therefore it cannot but Exist and ever has Existed.) To these we answer, That we shall easily discover the grand difference betwixt such arbitrary and forced figments and fancies as these, and the natural and consistent *Idea's* of our own mind, if we look more carefully and curiously into the Nature

of

of what these Objectors have ventured to utter, and sift out what either themselves mean, or what must necessarily be understood by this *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Evil*; which they have thus forged.

By the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Evil* must be meant either the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely imperfect*, or *absolutely wicked*, or *absolutely miserable*, or *absolutely mischievous*.

Now the *Idea* of what is *absolutely imperfect* removes from it what ever sounds *perfection*, as if all perfectness were 1000, then this *Idea* removes from this *absolute imperfect*, every unite of these 1000 allowing not so much as an unite or a fraction of an unite, no not the possibility of them, to what is thus *absolutely imperfect*. So that what is *absolutely imperfect* is impossible to Exist. But necessary Existence is a Term of Perfection, as was plainly demonstrated before.

The *Idea* of a *Being absolutely wicked* removes from it all manner of Goodness, Equity, Decorum, Righteousness, and implies a firm and immutable aversation of the Will from all these, and a settled and unchangeable purpose of doing all things wickedly, but intimates nothing either of the necessity or Contingency of the Existence of the Substance of this Being, that being neither here nor there to the moral deformity thereof, as is evidently plain at first sight.

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The *Idea* of a Being *absolutely miserable*, is the Idea of a Being that sustains the fullest and compleatest torments that are conceivable; and this must be in a knowing, passive, and reflexive subject. Now I say this torture arising partly from the sense of present smart, and partly out of reflexion of what it has suffered, and a full belief that it shall suffer thus eternally; this *miserable Being*, though but a Creature, is as perfectly tormented as it could possibly be if it necessarily existed of itself: For if it were always though but contingently and dependently of another, the torture is equally perfect, and therefore *necessary Existence* is not included in the *Idea* thereof.

Again the Objector is to prove that a Being wholly Immaterial can suffer any torture, which till he do, it seeming more reason that it cannot, I shall flatly deny that it can, and therefore do assert, that a torturable Being is a Spirit incorporate, and affirm also as a thing most rational, that this Spirit, if very great pain was upon it, such as that it were better for him not to be at all than to be in it, that anguish by continuance would be so increased, (pain infinitely overpowering the vital vigour and overpoising the contents of life and sense) that it would dye to the body in which it is thus tormented; but if it be not in so ill a plight as to change its state of conjunction,

but that the torture proves tolerable; that necessary Existence would not be its misery, but some part of happiness, so that there can be no such thing as a Being absolutely miserable in the world.

Thirdly, The *Idea* of a Being *absolutely Perfect* is compos'd of Notions of the same denomination, all of them of themselves sounding absolute Perfection, but the *Idea* of a Being *absolutely Miserable* is not compiled of notions that sound absolute Misery of themselves. For what misery but rather good is there in necessary Existence? Wherefore if we should contend that an inference from the *Idea* of a thing to its necessary Existence is onely warrantable, there where the *Idea* consists of notions of one denomination, the Objector is to take of the distinction.

Or to speak more plainly, Absolutely necessary Existence and Self-existence is one and the same Notion: But Self-existence is the most high and perfect mode of Existence that is conceivable, and therefore proper to what is most absolutely Perfect. Wherefore to transplant Self-Existence to so pitifull an *Idea* as the *Idea* of a Being absolutely miserable, is as absonous and prodigious as to clap the head of a Lyon to the body of a Snail. Nay indeed it seems more contradictory, that being but the misplacing of Body and Figure

but this the implantation of an inward Property into a wrong Subject.

Fourthly and lastly, As for a Being *absolutely Mischievous*, it seems indeed to include necessary and unavoidable Existence as well as Omnipotency and Omniscieny, or else this *Sovereign Mischief* is not so full and absolute as our apprehension can conceive. These added to a peremptory and immutable desire or will of doing all mischief possible for Mischief sake, do fully complete the Notion of this *absolute Mischievous Being*.

But how spurious and unnatural this *Idea* is, is evident in that it does forcedly tye together Notions of a quite contrary Nature, the greatest imperfection with the highest Perfections, joyning the incommunicable Attributes of God with that which is happily worse then we can demonstrate to be in any Devil:

Wherefore, as I intimated before, if any man pretend our Argument to be a Sophism, and in imitating it would discover the fallacy in some other Matter, he is exactly to observe the Laws thereof in his imitation, and constitute an *Idea* of Notions that agree with the same Title, as they exquisitely do in the *Idea* of a Being absolutely Perfect; for there is no notion there but what sounds highest Perfection.

But in this *Idea* of a Being *absolutely Mischievous* there is nothing that of its own nature signifies mischief, but that wicked and malicious desire, which is a pitiful imperfect thing, and indeed cannot but arise out of ignorance and imperfection. But to be able accurately to destroy all good whatsoever, implies an Omnipotency in Power, and an Omniscieny in all manner of good. So that this *Idea* is not free from the intanglement of contradictions in the conception thereof.

But if by a Being *absolutely mischievous* were meant, a Being that has the power and skill of doing all mischief imaginable, and indeed far above all the Imagination and Conceit of man, and that so effectually and universally, that nothing possibly can prevent him: This is indeed the Eternal God, who is necessarily of himself, and prevents all things, and can be limited in his actions by none but by himself; But he being that absolute and immutable Good, and full and pure Perfection, he cannot but include in his *Idea* that precious Attribute of *Benignity*, and therefore acting according to his entire Nature, he is not onely good himself, but by the prerogative of his own Being, keeps out such *mischievous Sovereignities*, as have been here pleaded for from having any Existence in the world.

Wherefore to bring our answer to a head, I

say, we are to use that natural method in this Speculation, that men that know the use of their faculties observe in all others, *viz.* to assent to what is most simple, easie and plain first, and of which there can be no doubt but that the Notion is congruous and consistent, and such is the *Idea* of a Being absolutely perfect, no arbitrary or fortuitous figment, or forced compilement of Notions that jarre one with another, or may be justly suspected, if not demonstrated, to be incoherent and repugnant; such as for example would be a walking Tree, or an intelligent Stone, or the like: but such as wherein the Notions naturally and necessarily come together to compleat the conception of some one single Title as being homogeneal and essential thereunto.

And then what I contend for is this, That attending to this Natural *Idea* of God, or a *Being absolutely perfect*, we unavoidably discover the necessity of actual existence, as inseparable from him, it being necessarily included in this *Idea* of absolute Perfection: which is still more undeniably set on in the last part of my Argument, where I urge that either Impossibility, Contingency, or Necessity of actual Existence must needs belong to a Being absolutely perfect; but not Impossibility nor Contingency, therefore Necessity of actual Existence.

And

And therefore being so well secured of this Truth, I require the Objector to bring up his Argument to this last and clearest frame, and let him also urge that either Impossibility, Contingency, or Necessity of actual Existence belongs either to a Being absolutely miserable or absolutely mischievous; and I shall confidently answer, Impossibility of existence, and give him a further Reason, besides what I intimated before of the incongruity of the Notions themselves, that it is repugnant with the existence of God, whom, without any rub or scruple, attending to the natural and undistorted suggestions of our own faculties, we have already demonstrated to exist.

And still to make our answer more certain concerning a *Being absolutely mischievous*; It is most evident He is not, and therefore sith he must be of himself if he be at all, it is impossible he should be: And that he is not, is plain because things would then be infinitely worse they they are, when as I dare say they are now as well as it is fit or possible for them to be; if we had but the wisdom to conceive or comprehend the whole counsel and purpose of Providence, and knew clearly and particularly what is past, and what is to come.

But if we take up out of our own blindness

ness or rashness Principles concerning the Providence of God, that are inconsistent with his *Idea* (such as the *Ptolemaicall* Systeme of the Heavens, which (as some say) *Alphonso* look'd upon (though others tell the story of the misplacement of certain Mountains on the Earth) as so perplex'd a Bungle, that transported with zeal against that fond Hypothesis, did scoffingly and audaciously profess, that if he had stood by whil'st God made the World, he could have directed the Frame of it better) we shall indeed then have occasion to quarrell, but not with either the Counsels or Works of God, but rather with the Opinions of ignorant and mistaken men.

C H A P.

C H A P. VI.

That the frame of our Argument for the Existence of God from his Idea, will not serve to prove the God of the Manichees to exist. A perpetual defence of our Argument through all the four postures thereof.

AND now having thus clearly satisfied the Objection taken from the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely evil*, it will be easie to turn back the edge of any Argument of the like nature, be it never so skilfully and cunningly directed against us. As that which I had from an ingenious hand, which because it seems very witty to me as well as invincible to the Objector, I shall propound it in his own words; the tenour whereof runs thus:

If a man may have a true Idea or Notion of that which is not, yea and of that which is not and yet would necessarily be if it were, then your Argument for the Existence of God from necessary Existence, being comprehended in his Idea or Notion is unconcluding: How you can deny this Argument, I cannot possibly conceive, the substance of your first Argument from the Idea of God being contained therein in the first posture of it.

320 CH. II. 11. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

But a man may have a true Notion of that which is not, yea and of that which is not and yet would necessarily be if it were; As for instance, of the Evil God of the Manichees.

But I answer briefly to the Proposition thus, That it does not reach our Case, because we argue God does exist, not because the *Idea* of him is true, and if he did exist he would necessarily exist: For conditional necessary Existence, as being less perfect than absolute necessary Existence, cannot belong to a *Being* absolutely perfect. But because this true *Idea*, without any *If* or *And*, does suggest to our Natural Faculties, That necessary Existence being involved in his *Idea* alone, the like not happening in any other *Idea* beside, without any more a do, he doth of himself absolutely and really exist.

To the Assumption I answer, That the *Manichees* God, if he could exist at all, would so do necessarily, and my reason is, because God would never create so foul a Monster.

But if you still urge that the *Idea* of this evil God of the *Manichees* includes necessary Existence in it, it being the Notion of a God, and yet he is not existent; and that therefore the true God cannot be proved to exist, because necessary Existence is involved in his *Idea*: I further answer, That the Notion of the *Manichees* God does not naturally include
necessary

necessary Existence in it, because it is not the Notion of a Being *absolutely perfect*, and that the Notion of an *evil God* is a meer forced or fortuitous figment, and no better sense than a *wooden God*, whose *Idea* implies not *necessary Existence*, but an impossibility thereof.

But the Objector proceeds, and we must attend his motions; onely before he comes to the second posture of our Argument, he takes notice of my charging of all those with self-contradiction, that acknowledge that *necessary Existence* is contained in the *Idea* of God, and that thereby is signified that *necessary Existence* belongs unto him, and yet *unsay* it again, by adding, *if he do at all exist*. But I answer, my charge is true: For *necessary Existence* to belong to that which we notwithstanding profess may not be for all that, is to admit a contradiction; for thus the same thing by our faculties is acknowledged both *necessary* and *contingent*, that is, that it cannot but be, and yet that it may not be, which if it be not a *Contradiction*, I know not what is.

But the Argument will appear more plain in the second posture. For if there be any fraud or fallacy, it lies in this term, *Necessary*, which I have truly explain'd (and it is not denied) to signify nothing else but an inseparable connexion betwixt the *Subject* and the

3 3 0 2nd Appendix CHAP. 6
Pradicate. Wherefore Existence having an inseparable connexion with God, it must needs follow, that this Axiom, *God does Exist,* is eternally and immutably true. But here to reply, *if he did exist,* is to insinuate that for all this he may not exist, which is to say, that what is immutably true is not immutably true, which is a probable contradiction.

But the Objector here flies for aid to the God of the *Manichees*, desiring me to put the *Manichæan* god in stead of the God whose Existence I would prove, whereby I may discern my own Sophisme. Well, if it be not Idolatry, let us place him there, but how shrimplish he is and unfit to fill this place, you may understand out of what I said before. That the *Manichean god* does no more imply in the Notion thereof necessary Existence then a *Wooden god* does, nay it rather implyes impossibility of Existence. For the Notion of *God* is the same, that is of a *Being absolutely perfect*, which must involve in it the most absolute goodnesse that may be. Now bring the *Manichean god* into sight, and let us view his inscription: He is an *evil absolute good*, which as I said before is far worse sense in my conceit then a *wooden god*, and therefore *Impossibility* and not *Necessity of Existence* is contained in his *Idea*.

The third posture of my Argument is formidable

midable even to the Objector himself: for whereas I urge, That either *Impossibility*, *Contingency*, or *Necessity of Actual Existence* belongs to a *Being absolutely perfect*, he confesses here, that the *Manichean god* will succour him no longer; But as a man left in distress he complains, that it is an hard case, that we must be put to prove the Existence of God impossible, or else we must be forced to admit that he is. But afterwards being better advised, he takes notice that if he be not, it is impossible for him to be; and therefore, say I, it is but just that we expect of him that will deny that he is, to prove his being impossible, especially the force of our Argument so necessarily casting him upon it. But in my conceit he had better save his pains, then venture upon so frustraneous an undertaking: for he may remember that the *Idea* of this *Being absolutely perfect* is so fram'd, that in the judgement of any man that has the use of his faculties, there is no inconsistency nor impossibility therein, nor the least shadow for suspicion or shyness. And besides, since impossibility of existing is the most imperfect *or less* that any Being can bear to Existence, it must needs be an outrageous incongruity to attribute it to a *Being absolutely perfect*, it so naturally and undeniably belonging to a *Being absolutely imperfect*, as hath been noted before.

Where-

Wherefore if either the doubting or obstinate Atheist will say the Existence of God is impossible, that will not argue any weakness or vanity in my Argument, but rash boldness and blind impudency in him that shall return so irrational an answer.

But the Objector has arrived now to the fourth and last posture of our Argumentation, of which he conceives this is the utmost sum, that either there is a God or Matter is of it self: but Matter is not of it self, because necessary Existence is not included in the *Idea* thereof. Against which he alledges, that as thousands have the *Idea* of a triangle and yet have not any knowledge of that property of having the three angles equal to two right ones; so a man may have the *Idea* of Matter, and yet know nothing of the necessity of its Existence, though it have that property in it.

But I answer, This does not reach the force of our Argument; for look as curiously and skilfully as you will into the *Idea* of Matter, and you can discover no such property as necessity of Existence therein. And then again, the weight of my reasoning lieth mainly in this, That necessity of Self-existence being so plainly and unavoidably discoverable in the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely perfect*, but not at all discernible in the *Idea* of Matter, that we do
manifest

manifest violence to our faculties while we acknowledge Self-existence in Matter, no faculty informing us so; and deny it in God, the *Idea* of God so conspicuously informing us that necessary Self-existence belongs unto him. So that all that I contend for is this, That he that denies a God, runs counter to the light of his natural faculties, to which I perpetually appeal.

But if you will still say, it may be our faculties are false; I say so too, that it might be so if there were no God by whom we were made; for then we were such as we find our selves, and could seek no further, nor assure our selves but that we might be of that nature as to be then mistaken most, when we think we are most sure, and have used the greatest caution and circumspection we could to avoid error. But it is sufficient for us that we ask no more than what is granted to them that pretend to the most undeniable Methods of Demonstration, and which Geometry her self cannot prove but supposes; to wit, *That our faculties are true.*

CHAP. VII.

That necessary Existence is not included in the Idea of Matter. And that if we cannot but imagine Space to be a real thing and necessarily existing, that it is nothing else but a rude and confused representation of that true necessarily Existent which is God.

Others there are that seem to come neerer the mark, while they alledge against the fourth posture of our Argument that *necessary Existence* is plainly involved in the *Idea of Matter*. For say they, a man cannot possibly but imagine a *Space* running out in *infinitum* every way, whether there be a God or no. And this *Space* being extended thus, and measurable by Yards, Poles, or the like, it must needs be something in that it is thus extended and measurable; for Non-entity can have no affection or property. And if it be an Entity, what can it be but corporeal *Matter*.

But I answer, If there were no *Matter*, but the Immensity of the Divine Essence only, occupying all by his ubiquity, that *the Replication*, as I may so speak, of his indivisible substance, whereby he presents himself intirely every

every where, would be the subject of that Diffusion and Mensurability. And I adde further, that the perpetual obverfation of this infinite Amplitude and Mensurability, which we cannot difsmagine in our fancie but will neceffarily be, may be a more rude and obfcure Notion offered to our minde of that neceffary and felf-existent Effence which the *Idea* of God does with greater fulness and diftinctnefs represent to us. For it is plain that not fo much as our imagination is engaged to an appropriation of this *Idea* of *Space* to corporeal *Matter*, in that it does not naturally conceive any impenetrability or tangibility in the Notion thereof; and therefore it may as well belong to a *Spirit* as a *Body*. Whence as I faid before, the *Idea* of God being fuch as it is, it will both juftly and neceffarily caft this rudernotion of *Space* upon that infinite and Eternal Spirit which is God.

Now there is the fame reason for *Time* (by *Time* I mean *Duration*) as for *Space*. For we cannot imagine but that there has been fuch a continued duration as could have no beginning nor interruption. And any one will fay, it is non-fence that there fhould be fuch a neceffary duration, when there is no reall effence that muft of it felf thus be always, and for ever fo endure. What or who is it then that this eternal uninterrupted and never-fading duration muft

must belong to? No Philosopher can answer more appositely than the holy Psalmist, *From everlasting to everlasting thou art God*. Wherefore, I say, that those unavoidable imaginations of the necessity of an *infinite Space*, as they call it, and *Eternal duration*, are no proofs of a Self-existent Matter, but rather obscure subindications of the necessary Existence of God.

There is also another way of answering this Objection, which is this; That this Imagination of *Space* is not the imagination of any real thing, but onely of the large and immense capacity of the potentiality of the matter, which we cannot free our mindes from, but must necessarily acknowledge, that there is indeed such a possibility of matter to be measured, upward, downward, every way in *infinitum*, whether this *corporeal matter* were actually there or no. And that though this potentiality of Matter or Space be measurable by furlongs, miles, or the like; that it implies no more any real Essence or Being, then when a man recounts so many orders or kindes of the Possibilities of things, the compute or number of them will infer the reality of their Existence.

But if they urge us further, That there will be a real distance even in *Space* devoid of matter: as if for Example, Three balls of brass

or steel were put together in this empty Space, it is utterly unimaginable, but that there should be a Triangular distance in the midst of them: it may be answered, That Distance is no real or Physical property of a thing, but onely notional; because more or less of it may accrue to a thing, when as yet there has bin nothing at all done to that to which it does accrue: As suppose one of these balls mentioned were first an inch distant from another; this distance betwixt them may be made many miles, and yet one of them not so much as touch'd or stirr'd, though it become as much distant as the other.

But if they urge us still further, and contend, that this distance must be some real thing, because it keeps off those balls so one from another, that supposing two of them two miles distant in empty space, and one of them to lie in the mid-way, if that two miles distant would come to the other so soon as that but one mile distant, it must have double celerity of motion to perform its race: I answer briefly, that distance is nothing else but the privation of tactual union, and the greater distance the greater privation, and the greater privation, the more to do to regain the former positive condition: and that this privation of tactual union is measur'd by parts, as other privation of qualities are by degrees: And that parts
and

and degrees and such like notions, are not real things themselves any where, but our mode of conceiving them, and therefore we can bestow them upon Non-entities as well as Entities, as I have discovered elsewhere more at large.

But if this will not satisfy, 'tis no detriment to our cause: For if after the removal of corporeal matter out of the world, there will be still space and distance in which this very matter, while it was there, was also conceived to lye, and this distant space cannot but be something, and yet not corporeal, because neither impeneurable nor tangible, it must of necessity be a substance incorporeal necessarily and eternally existent of it self; which the clearer *Idea* of a *Being absolutely perfect* will more fully and punctually inform us to be the *self-subsisting God*.

But that we may omit nothing that may seem at all worth the answering, there are that endeavour to decline the stroke of our Argument in the third and fourth posture thereof, by saying that Contingency is not incompatible to God or any thing else. For all things that exist in the world, happen so to do, though they might have done otherwise. But no man would answer thus, if he attended to what he answered, or to the light of his own Reason, that would instruct him better. For, for example,

ample, if matter did exist of it self, it is evident that it does necessarily exist, and could not have done otherwise: For *Self-existence* prevents all impediments whatsoever, whereby a thing may seem to have been in danger possibly to have fallen short of actually existing.

And as for God it is as evident, that it is either impossible for him to be, or else that he is of himself; and if of himself, his existence is unpreventible and necessary; as any man must needs acknowledge that understands the terms he ventures to pronounce.

CHAP. VIII.

That the Idea of God or of a Being absolutely perfect, is a natural Notion to the Soul of man, and not conveyed thither by any politick juggle whatsoever.

THAT the *Idea of a Being absolutely perfect*, is a notion natural to the Soul, and such as she cannot deny but it is exactly representative of such a Being without any clashing of one part against another, all the Attributes thereof being homogeneal to the general Title of Perfection to which they belong, is a thing so plain that I dare appeal to any man that has the use

of his faculties, whether it be not undoubtedly and immutably true.

Nor can what is objected make it at all suspected of falsity, for whereas it is supposed, that the *Atheist* will pretend that the thousandth part of the world never had any such *Idea*, and that those that have had it have blotted it out of their souls, and those that have it most deeply imprinted upon them, are not so sure of it as two and two make four; I briefly answer, That all men ever had, and have this *Idea* in their souls, nor is it in their power to blot it out, no more then to blow out the Sun with a pair of bellows. Interest, diversion of their mindes to other matters, distemper of bodie by sensuality or melancholy, may hinder the actual contemplation or discovery of this *Idea* in the minde, but it cannot radically obliterate it.

For the last alledgement, That it is not so clear as two and two make four; suppose it were true, yet it does not invalidate our position, That this Truth we contend for is natural and undeniable. For many Truths on this side of that easiness at least, if not clearness, cannot but be acknowledged naturally and undenyably true.

But now to come more near to the business and that grand suspicion of *Atheists*; that this notion of a God is only a crafty figment of Politicians whereby they would contain the People in obedience, and that it is they that by their cunning and power have impressed this character upon the minds of men; I answer that what is naturally in man already they cannot put there. They may, I confess, make a political use of it, as indeed it is not so true as dreadful and detestable; That meer Statesmen make no conscience of prostituting the most sacred things that are, to their own base trivial designs. But to argue therefore that there is no such thing as religion, or a God, because they do so abominably abuse the acknowledgement of them to Political purposes, is as irrationally inferred as if we should contend that there is not naturally any self-love, love of wife and children, desire of Liberty, Riches, or Honour, but what Politicians and Statesmen have conveyed into the hearts of men; because by applying themselves skilfully to these affections, they carry and wade about the People as they please; and by the inflaming of their spirits by their plausible Orations, hurry them many times into an hazzard of losing the very capac-

of the enjoyment of those hopes, that they so fairly and fully spread out before them.

The most material Objection that I can conceive can be made against our second Argument from the *Idea* of God, as it is subjected in our soul, is this, That this *Idea* is so plain and conspicuous a Truth, that it cannot but be in an intellectual Subject, and therefore we cannot well argue as we do in the ninth Chapter of our first Book, That this *Idea* in our soul was put there that we might come to the knowledge of our Maker, for it is necessarily there, and what is necessary is not of counsel or purpose.

But to this I answer, first, That our bodies might have been of such a frame that our minds thereby had been ever hindered or diverted from attending this *Idea*, though it could not possibly but be there.

And in the second place that it is inconvenience to us to acknowledge, that the *Idea* of God is such that no intellectual Being can be conceived without it. That is, can be imagined of an intellectual nature, and yet not necessarily to acknowledge upon due proposal that this *Idea* is undeniably true; for hereby it is more manifest how absurd and irrational they are that will pretend to reason and understanding and yet excuse themselves, from the knowing of so plain a truth.

CHAP. IX.

That the natural frame of Conscience is such that it suggests such fears & hopes that imply that there is a God. That the ridiculousness of sundry Religions is not any proof that to be affected with Religion is no Innate faculty of the soul of man.

THe strength of my Argument from natural conscience is this, That men naturally fear misfortunes, and hope for success accordingly as they behave themselves. But I must confess that this proof or reason is the most lubricous and unmanageable of any that I have made use of, it being so plainly obnoxious to that cavil or evasion, That the fears and hopes of conscience are not from any natural knowledge of God, but from the power of education which is another nature.

Now there scarce being any nation, that hath not aw'd their children by some rudiments or other of religion, we are not able to give a sincere instance that will fitly set off the validity of our Argument, and we do not know how to help our selves but by a supposition.

We will therefore suppose a man of an ordinary stamp (for I do profess that some men are born so enormously deformed for their ingeny or inward nature, that a man can no more judge of what is the intellectual or moral property of a man by them, then what is the genuine shape of his body, by a *Mole* or *Monster*) not to have inculcated into him any Principles of Religion, or explicite or Catechistical doctrine of a God, but to be of such a temper only (whether by nature or education, tis all one) as to deem some things fit and right to be done, and others unfit and unjust. For what is just and unjust, good and evil, amiable and execrable, is more palpable and plain according to the judgement of some, then the existence of a Deity. I say suppose such a man should commit some things that he held very heinous and abominable crimes, as murder of Father or Mother, Incest with his Sister, betraying of his truest friends, or the like, and should after, not by the hand of the Magistrate be punished, (he doing these things so cunningly that they escap'd his cognifance) but should immediately thereupon be continually unfortunate, his Barns and Stacks of Corn burnt by lightning from heaven, his Cattel die in his grounds, himself afterward tormented with most noifome and grievous diseases, all which notwithstanding befall

be fall many in the course of nature; I appeal to any one whether he can think it at all probable but that this man will naturally and unavoidably be so toucht in conscience, as to suspect that these misfortunes are fallen upon him as a punishment from some invisible Power or Divine hand that orders all things justly.

What is alledged against our Argument from the *Universality of religious veneration*, viz. The manifold ridiculous religions in the world; from whence it is inferred that the minde of man has no innate principle of religion at all in it, it being mouldable into any shape or forme of worship, that it pleases the Supreme Power in every Countrey to propose; I answer to this,

First, That if every religionist would look upon extraneous religions with the same venerable candor, and awful sobriety that he does upon his own, he might rather finde them worthy to be pitied for their falseness; then laughed at for their ridiculousness. But it no more follows, that all religions are false because so many are, then that no Philosophick opinions are true, because so many are false.

But secondly, The multitude of various and, if you will, fond religions in the world, into which the Nations of the earth are mouldable, the more ridiculous, the never the worse for our purpose, who contend that religion is

a natural property of man. For the necessity of its adherence to our nature is more manifestly evidenced thereby, who can no more be without religion, then Matter can be without Figure, though few parts of it have the happiness to be framed into what is *Regular* or *Ordinate*, or to have any beauty or proportion in their shape; and yet break the matter as you will, it will be in some shape or other.

C H A P. X.

That those intellectual or cognoscitive operations we finde in our selves are not performed by the Conarion. That the Arguments whereby we prove the incorporeity of the soul of Man do not so certainly prove the Incorporeity of any Principle in Beasts. That the ineptness of the Body for such functions as we ordinarily attribute unto the soul, is a sufficient Argument that there is in us a soul or spirit distinct from the body, though we are puzzled in the speculation of the bare Essence thereof.

WE have in the last chapter of our first book, largely and evidently enough demonstrated, That neither the Animal Spirits

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rits nor the Brain are the first Principle of Spontaneous motion in us ; we touch'd also upon the *Conarion* ; but because our opposers will not be so slightly put off, we shall here more fully and particularly shew the impossibility of that part proving any such Principle of Motion, though I confess it bids very fair to be the Organical seat of Common sense, because it is so conveniently placed neer the center of the brain, and if the transmission of Motions which act upon the Organs had not some such one part to terminate in, it is conceiv'd by some (but I suspect more wittily then solidly) that these outward Organs of sense being two, the Objects would seem two also, which is contrary to experience.

But though the *Conarion* may be the Organ of sundry perceptions from corporeal Objects, and the Tent or Pavilion wherein the soul is chiefly seated ; yet we utterly deny that without an immaterial inhabitant this arbitrary Motion which we are conscious to our selves of, can at all be performed in us or by us ; for if we attend to the condition of our own natures, we cannot but acknowledge that that which moves our body thus arbitrarily, does not only perceive sensible objects but also remembers, has a power of free imagination and of reason.

And to begin with the first of these, I say that

that meer *Perception* of external Objects seems incompatible to the *Conarion*. For it being of like nature with the rest of the brain, it is not only divisible, but in a sort actually divided one particle from another, else it could not be so soft as it is, though it be something harder then the rest of the brain. . Now I say the Images of sensible Objects, they spreading to some space in the surface of the *Conarion* against which they hit, one part of the *Conarion* has the perception, suppose of the head of a man, the other of a leg, the third of an arm, the fourth of his breast; and therefore though we should admit that every particle of such a space of the *Conarion* may perceive such a part of a man, yet there is nothing to perceive the whole man unless you'll say they communicate their perceptions one to another; but then all will be confused. But this communication seems also impossible, for if *Perception* be by impression from the external Object, no particle in the *Conarion* shall perceive any part of the Object but what it receives an impress from. But if you will yet say that every part of the Object impresses upon every part of the *Conarion* wherein the Image is, it will be utterly impossible indeed but that the whole Image will be a confused blur, no distinct *Species* of any thing. For if perception be by impression, then if every

part

sion, and that the impression was lost in the *Conarion*, though retain'd in the brain, how can the *Conarion* ever say, that it had any such impression before? for the impression once wiped out, it is as if it never had any, and therefore can never remember that it had. Besides, the perception of this image in the brain, is as incompetible to the *Conarion* as the perception of any external Object, upon which we have already insisted.

And thirdly, For the power of free *Imagination* whereby the *Conarion* is supposed to excogitate the several forms or shapes of things which it never saw, I enquire, whether it be the thinne Membrane, or the inward and something soft and fuzzy Pulpe it contains that raises and represents to it self these arbitrary figments and Chimeras: And then what part or particle of either of them can perform these fine feats, and what is most material, whether the representations being corporeal, there be not a necessity of the *Conarions* being so affected or impressed as in external corporeal objects, and then I demand how this passive soft substance should be able to impress or signe it self, or how one part of this body should be able to act upon another for this purpose; And there being a memory also of these figmental impressions, how they can be sealed upon the brain the seat of Memory.

mory. For admitting the *Conarion* to imitate the manner of impression of outward objects in inventing images of her own, she then impressing these images upon the brain, it will be like as if we should make use of the impression of a seal upon some hard matter to seal some softer matter with, in which case the two impressions will be notoriously different, those parts that give out in the one, in the other giving in.

Fourthly, As concerning *Reason*, besides that it is manifest in the use thereof that we comprehend at once the Images or Phantasmes of not only different but contrary things in the very same part or particle of the *Conarion* (for if they be in different parts, what shall judge of them both?) as when for example, we conclude hot is not cold, or a crooked line is not a straight line, which cannot be conceived without a confusion of both impressions: there is also another consideration of notions plainly immaterial, which do not impress themselves upon the *Conarion*, nor any part of the brain or on the outward organs from sensible Objects, but are our own innate conceptions in the speculation of things; and such are sundry *Logical*, *Metaphysical*, and *Mathematical* notions, as I have elsewhere made good. Wherefore it seems altogether incredible that the *Conarion*, being so gross and palpable

pable a body as it is, should have any notions or conceptions that are not corporeal and conveyed to it from material Objects from without.

But fifthly and lastly, It is very hardly conceivable how the *Conarion* if it were capable of sense and perception should, being thus but a meer pulpy protuberant knob, by its nods or jogs, drive the animal spirits so curiously, as not to miss the key that leads to the motion of the least joynt of our body, or to drive them in so forcibly and smartly as to enable us to strike so fierce strokes as we see men do, especially these animal spirits being so very thin and fluid, and the *Conarion* so broad and blunt; for the one gives us to conceive, that the Spirits, especially being so faintly struck as they are likely to be by the *Conarion*, and certainly sometimes are, will gently wheel about all over the ventricles of the brain, and be determined to no key thereof that leads to the muscle of this or that particular joynt of the body: And the other, That if this impulse of the *Conarion* will forcibly enough drive forward the spirits in the ventricles of the brain, that that wind will sling open move doors then one, when as yet we see we can with a very considerable force move a finger or a toe, the rest of our body remaining unmoved. We might adde also, that it is hard to conceive

how

How this *Pineal Glandula* can move it self thus spontaneously without muscles and spirits or some equivalent mechanical contrivance, and if it do, to what purpose is that great care in nature of muscles and animal spirits in the frame of animals: if it do not, we shall further inquire concerning the spring of Motion, and demand what moves the animal spirits that must be imagined to move the *Conarion*. So demonstrable is it every way that the first principle of our spontaneous motions is not, nor can be seated in any part of our body, but in a substance really distinct from it which men ordinarily call the *Soul*.

Nor does that at all invalidate the force of our demonstration which some alledge, that our Arguments are Sophistical because they as certainly conclude that there is an *Incorporeal* substance in *Beasts*, as they do that there is one in *Men*.

For I answer, first, That they conclude absolutely concerning men, that there is an incorporeal soul in them, because we are certain here be in them such operations that evidently argue such a nature; but we are not so certain of what is in beasts; and very knowing men, but of a more mechanical *Genius*, have at least doubted whether beasts have any cogitation or no, though in the mean time they have professed themselves sure, that if they had

had they could not but have also immaterial souls really distinct from their bodies.

Secondly, Admit our Arguments proved that there were souls in Brutes really distinct from their bodies, is it any thing more than what all Philosophers and School men that have held *Substantial forms*, have either expressly or implicitly acknowledged to be true? But if they be incorporeal, say they, they will be also immortal, which is ridiculous; If they mean by immortal, unperishable, as Matter is, why should they not be so as well as Matter it self; this active substance of the soul, though but of a Brute, being a more noble essence and partaking more of its Makers perfection, then the dull and dissipable matter? But if they mean by immortality a capacity of eternal life and bliss after the dissolution of their bodies, that's a ridiculous consequence of their own, which we give the Authors of, free leave to laugh at; it concerns not us nor our present Argument. For we conceive that the Soul of a Brute may be of that nature as to be vitally affected only in a Terrestrial Body, and that out of it it may have neither sense nor perception of any thing; so as to it self it utterly perishes.

That seems an Objection of more moment, That being there are properties that cannot but be acknowledged to be in a body or mat-

ter, and yet such as imply strange repugnancies in the conception thereof, as suppose that perplexed property of *Divisibility*, which must be into points or *in infinitum*, either of which confounds our imagination to think of them, why may we not acknowledge that a Body may also have sense and understanding, though it seem never so contradictory in the more close consideration thereof. But I answer, This arguing is very Sophistical, because by the same reason we should admit that the head of an Onion understands and perceives as well as the *Conarion* in a Man. For you can bring no greater Argument against it then that it is contradictory and repugnant that it should so be. But you'll reply, That we plainly see that some part of the body of man must have sense and understanding in it, but we discern no such thing in an Onion. But I demand, by what faculty do we discern this? If you answer, our own sense tells us so; I say, our own sense, if we did not correct it, would confidently suggest to us that our finger feels and our eye sees, when as 'tis plain they do not: for the very same thing that feels and sees, moves also our body: But neither our eye nor our finger move the body, and therefore they neither feel nor see.

And yet without our eye we cannot see in this state of conjunction, as without the due

frame and temper of our Brain we cannot well understand; But it no more follows from thence, that the Brain understands, and not something distinct from it, then that the eye sees. Wherefore it is apparent, that there is no faculty in us that can clearly inform us that any part of our body is indued with Sense and Understanding.

From whence we see the great disparity betwixt admitting of *Divisibility* in Matter (though the Notion be never so perplex'd) and of Sense and Understanding in a Body, (which indeed brings on more perplexity then the other, if it be very accurately look'd into) because we are fully ascertain'd by Sense, and I may say by Reason too, that Matter is divisible, but no faculty at all can pretend to ascertain us that a Body is capable of either Sense or Reason.

But there seems to be a worser Objection then this, still behinde, which is this, That though we have evidently proved the impossibility of there being either Sense, Understanding or Spontaneous Motion in Matter or a Body, yet we are never the neerer: for the like difficulties may be urged against there being any Sense or Understanding in a Spirit, for the Spirit cannot but be extended, nor extended but divisible, nor divisible but incapable of Sense or Understanding, as we have argued

argued before against Matter.

But to this I answer, If by *Extension* be meant a *Juxta-position of parts* or placing of them one by another as it is in Matter, I utterly deny that a Spirit is at all in this sense extended. But if you mean only a certain *Amplitude of presence*, that it can be at every part of so much matter at once, I say it is *extended*; but that this kind of extension does not imply any divisibility in the substance thus extended; for *Juxta-position of parts*, *Impenetrability* and *Divisibility* go together, and therefore where the two former are wanting, *Extension* implies not the Third.

But when I speak of *Indivisibility*, that *Imagination* create not new troubles to her self, I mean not such an *Indivisibility* as is fancied in a *Mathematical point*; but as we conceive in a *Sphere of light* made from one lucid point or radiant Center. For that *Sphere* or *Orbe of light* though it be in some sense extended, yet it is truly indivisible, supposing the Center such: For there is no means imaginable to discern or separate any one ray of this Orbe and keep it apart by it self disjoyned from the Center.

Now a little to invert the property of this luminous Orbe when we would apply it to a soul or Spirit; As there can be no alteration in the radiant Center, but therewith it is ne-

cessarily in every part of the Orbe, as suppose it were redder, all would be redder; if dimmer, all dimmer; and the like: So there is also that unity and indivisibility of the exterior parts, if I may so call them, of a spirit or soul with their inmost Center, that if any of them be affected, the Center of life is also thereby necessarily affected; and these exterior parts of the soul being affected by the parts of the Object with such circumstances as they are in, the inward Center receives all so circumstantiated, that it has necessarily the intire and unconfused images of things without, though they be contrived into so small a compasse, and are in the very center of this Spiritual Substance.

This Symbolical representation I used before, and I cannot excogitate any thing that will better set off the nature of a Spirit, wherein is implied a power of receiving multitudes of particular figurations into one indivisible Principle of Sense, where all are exactly united into one Subject, and yet distinctly represented, which cannot be performed by the *Conarion* it self as I have demonstrated, and therefore it remains that it must refer to a Soul whose chief seat may happily be there as to the act of perception.

But if any shall abuse our Courtesie of
 indeavour.

indeavouring to help his Imagination (or at least to gratifie it) in this Symbolical representation we have made, by conceiving of this Center of the Soul, but as some dull and divisible point in Matter, and of no greater efficacy; and of the vital or arbitrary extension of it, as grossely as if it would necessarily argue as reall a divisibility and seperability of the parts as in a body; to prevent all such cavils we shall omit those spinosities of the extension or indivisibility of a Soul or Spirit, and conclude briefly thus:

That the manifold contradictions and repugnancies we finde in the nature of Matter to be able to either think or spontaneously to move it self, do well assure us that these operations belong not to it but to some other substance; wherefore we finding those operations in us, it is manifest that we have in us an *Immaterial Being really distinct from the body*, which we ordinarily call a *Soul*. The speculation of whose bare *Essence* though it may well puzzle us, yet those *Properties* that we finde incompetent to a body, do sufficiently inform us of the different nature thereof; for it is plain she is a substance indued with the power of *cogitation* (that is, of perceiving and thinking of Objects) as also of penetrating and *Spontaneously moving* of a *Body*, which properties are as immediate

diate to her as impenetrability and seperability of parts to the Matter ; and we are not to demand the cause of the one no more then of the other.

C H A P. X I.

That the subordinate serviceableness of things in the world are in the things themselves, not meerly in our Fancy. That the difficulty of obtaining such serviceable commodities is rather an Argument for Providence then against it. That Beauty is an intellectuall Object not taken notice of by Brutes, nor is any necessary Result from the meere motion of the Matter. That the preying of Animals one upon another is very well consistent with the goodness of the First Cause. That the immediate Matter of the Fœtus is homogeneous. That the notion of the Archei or Seminall formes is no such intricate Speculation.

WE have now gone through all the Objections against the first Booke of our *Antidote*, whereat if the more courselly complexioned, that they may still seem to have something further to object, shall scoffingly

cavill, as if we had used over much subtilty in the management of our Arguments, I can onely advertise them of this, That Subtilty is as consistent with Truth as the most grosse Theories, as is manifest in manifold *Mathematicall* Speculations, then which there is nothing more certain nor undeniable to the reason of Man. But that the coherence of Notions that are subtile in themselves should be as easily plain and conspicuous as the broad Objects of Sense, is a very incongruous concept, and can be the expectation of none but those that are utterly unskillfull in the nature of such like contemplations.

But the defence of our second Book will be not onely more short, but lesse obscure, our Arguments there for the most part being such that even the unlearned can judge of them, and few of them but so evidently convictive that there can be nothing materiall alledged against them: but such objections as there are I shall briefly set down and answer.

And the first is made against our reasoning for Providence from the excellent *Usefulness* of Stones, Timber, Metals, the Magnet &c. For those long and subordinate concatenations of instrumentall serviceableness of such things, say they, is but our fancy, no designe of any *First Cause*. And how easy a thing

it for the wit of Man to bring things together that are of a distant nature in themselves, and to imagine many *Series of means and ends* in matters that have no dependence one of another but what himself makes? But I answer, that the severall *Usefull dependences* of sundry matters of this kind we *onely find* them, *not make* them. For whether we thinke of it, or no, it is for example manifest that *Fewell* is good to continue fire, and *Fire* to melt *Metals*, and *Metalls* to make instruments, to build ships or houses, and so on. Wherefore it being true that there is such a subordinate *Usefulness* in the things themselves that are made to our hand, it is but reason in us to impute it to such a Cause as was aware of the usefulness and serviceableness of its own works.

Nor are we to cavill because these *usefull* things such as *Stones, Metalls, Coles*, and the like are to be had with so much labor, when as men were better released from all such drudgery that they may have the more time to contemplate the World and seek after God, and exercise those better Faculties of the humane Nature: For we see plainly that the lapsed condition of Man is such that Idleness is no spur to Vertue or Piety, but rather a Nurse to all beastliness and sensuality. Besides that few mens minds are of so *Speculative*

tative a temper that they can with any great pleasure attend such meditations as will prove worth their leaving of a more Practicall and laborious life, which does not exclude men from being pious and honest, as certainly no Calling at all does. Wherefore that to the generality of men all usefull things come hardly, is indeed rather an Argument of Providence, and that that Cause that framed the earth knew well-aforehand what the disposition of the terrestriall Man would be.

The second Objection is against our Argument from the *Beauty of Plants*, which I contend to have its first originall from an intellectuall Cause, *beauty* it selfe being such an intellectuall Object. But to this are objected two things. First that *Beauty* is a necessary result of the meere motion of the Matter. Secondly, that it is no intellectuall Object, sith Women and children seem to be more taken with it then Men, and Brutes as well as either.

The former they will prove thus, That *Colour*, which is one part of *Beauty*, is the result of meere Matter, is, say they, plaine from the *Rain bow* which is assuredly such a meere naturall result; And for *Symmetry*, which is the other part of *Beauty*, and in *Plants* consists in their leaves and branches parallely answering one another as also the severall parts of the same

same leaf; there is say they a kind of Naturall necessity that there should be such an uniforme correspondency as this in the se branches and leaves, because the nourishment must follow the tract of the Vessels of the seed, which being regular in their first conformation, the branches & leavs which sprout out must also be regular. Now this regular conformation of the seed came from the uniforme motion of particles in the *Mother-plant*; and lastly, the first *Mother-plant* of any kind, from the regular motion of the Matter.

But I answer, That though the *Positure* as well as the *Colours* themselves of the *Rain-bow* be necessary results of the meer Matter, and are nothing but the Reflexion and Refraction of the light of the Sun in the round drops of a rorid cloud, as *Cartesius* has admirably demonstrated; and that there is nothing at all further required hereunto saving the position of our eyes in a line drawn from the Sun and continued to this rorid cloud spread out so that the colored circle may have for its *Radius* either about forty two or fifty one degrees, for then this effect will necessarily follow; And if this rorid cloud extend it self so far every way that there will be at fifty one degrees distance from the aforesaid line, as well as at forty two, this dewy temper of the Aire, will necessarily appear two *Rain-bows*

at once, as has been frequently seen. And so I confess, some things being put, the *colours* of *Flowers* will be a necessary result of the Matter in such a motion or posture: Yet for all this, the *variety* of the *placing* of these *colours* of flowers cannot but shew that it is a thing either *fortuitous* or *arbitrariouz*, but being that they ever some way gratifie the beholder, it is a signe that it is not *fortuitous*, and therefore it must be *arbitrariouz* and from some Counsel contriv'd them thus.

But that I insist upon most and contend to proceed from an intellectual principle is their *Symmetry*, against which the Objection seems very invalid, the reason of it being thus, as you plainly see, That the regular Motion of the Matter made the first *Plant* of every kind; for we demand, what regulated the Motion of it so as to guide it to form it self into such a state that at last it appears a very pleasant intellectual spectacle, and exceeding hard, if not impossible, to be hit upon without some other Director distinct from the blinde Matter: As a man wil easily believe, if he do not think so much upon the *Trunks* and *Branches* of *Trees* (whose shooting out of the ground, & then having arms again shooting out of the trunk and branching themselves into a many subdivisions is not so difficult to conceive) as upon their *Blossoms*, *Fruits*, and *Leaves*. As in the *Leafe* of the *Oak* and

of *Holly*, and abundance of leaves of *Herbs* and their Flowers, as in *Monkshood*, *Snapdragon*, sundry sorts of *Bee-flowers* and the like. The *Matter* could never have hit upon such hard and yet regular shapes, had it not been regulated by something besides it self; the concinnity of which figures gratifying us that are rational, we ought in all reason to conclude that they came from a Principle Intellectual.

But it was objected in the second place, That *Beauty* is no *Intellectual* Object, because *Women* & *Children* are more taken with it then *Men*, & *Beasts* as well as either. To which I answer, That *Children* are not so much taken with the *Symmetry* as the gayness of colors in things that are counted beautiful, as *Larks* are mightily pleased at the shining of the *Glass* the *Lark-catcher* exposes to their view. But if they can also discover a want of *Symmetry* and correspondency, as supposing a flower which has some leaves cropt off, that Spirit w^{ch} is in them being intellectual, it is not at all unreasonable it should exercise it self upon such easy Objects as these betimes. But that *They* or *Women* are taken more with *outward beauty* then *Men*, is because *Men* employ their *Intellectuals* about *harder* tasks and so cannot minde these smaller matters. Otherwise there is no question but if they could be idle from other employments, they would be as devout admirers of beauty as

Women

Women themselves, and be as well pleased with theirs, if they have any, as they themselves are with it.

But as for *Brutes* I deny that they have any sense of so noble an Object as *Beauty* is, or take any notice of the chief requisite, in it which is *Symmetric* and concinnity of parts, or of any order of colours, but only of the colours themselves. And it is no wonder that as the sight of red stockings will inflame the Spirits of a *Turkey-cock* with anger, as also the sight of the blood of grapes or mulberies provoke the *Elephant* to fight; so other fresh colours of sundry sorts may please and exhilarate the spirits of several Animals, as *Light* does of most. And therefore if the *Horse* prance and carry himself proudly when he has gay and glittering furniture, it is from no other reason then what we have already declared. And if a *Dog* bark at a ragged Beggar more then at a handsomly clad Gentleman, it is to be inquired into, whether a Beggars *Curre* will not bark more at a Gentleman then at a Beggar, the sense of beauty neither pleasing nor provoking this Animal, but the unusualness of the Object stirring up his choler. And that *Birds* prune their feathers, is not any delight in decency and comeliness, but to rid themselves of that more uncouth and harsh sense they feel in their skins by the incomposure of their ruffled plumes. So for

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the choice of their *Mates*, in either *Birds* or *Beasts* for copulation, it is very hard to prove that they are guided so much by *sight* as *scent*, and then if by *sight*, whether it be not colour rather than exact symmetry of parts that moves them.

And lastly, if we should admit at any time that *Brutes* may be more pleased with a *beautiful* Object (taking *Beauty* in the entire Notion thereof) then with one less beautiful, it is but a confused delight, nor do they any more relish it as intellectual, than children (that are ordinarily well pleased to see *Geometrical* instruments that are made of Brass or Ivory or such like materials) do the exact cuttings and carvings of the characters and lines thereof as they are rational and Mathematical. And therefore we may very well conclude, that the *Beauty* of bodies is naturally intended no more for *Brutes*, than such *Mathematical* instruments for children: But all such *Objects* are directed to *Creatures Intellectual* from that eternal *Intellectual Principle* that made them.

The third Objection is against *Animals preying* one upon another, and Man upon them all. For this, say they, is inconsistent with that *Eternal Goodness* that we profess to have created and ordered all things. To which I answer, that it is not at all inconsistent: For the nature of that *Absolute Universal and Eternal Good-*

ness is not to dote upon any one particular, as we do (whose complexions happily may make us more then ordinarily compassionate (though most men have too little of that natural B^enignity) and whose short sight plungeth us too much into the sense of what is present) but taking a full and free view of the capacities of happiness in such kinde of Creatures, contriv'd their condition to be such, as was best for the generality of them, though the necessity and impossibility of things would be sure to load some particular Creatures with greater inconveniency then the rest.

And therefore that several kindes of terrestrial Creatures, more exactly might be happy in their animal nature, this *Sovereign Goodness* was content to let it be so, that ever and anon something, that by the animal sense would be necessarily accounted Tragical and miserable, should light upon some few; The *Species* of things in the mean time being still copiously enough preserved, and marching on safely, in this Theatre of the World, in their several successions.

Now it is evident that the main powers of the *Animal life*, are natural craft, strength and activity of body, and that any purchase by these is far more pleasant to a living Creature, then what easily comes without them. Wherefore what can be more grateful to a terrestrial

Animal,

Animal, then to hunt his prey and to obtain it? But all kindes of Creatures are not capable of this special happiness. Some therefore are made to feed on the fruits of the Earth, that they may thus not only enjoy themselves, but occasionally afford game and food to other Creatures. In which notwithstanding the *wisdom* of God as well as his *goodness* is manifest, in that, while they are thus a sport and prey to others, yet they are abundantly preserved in their several generations. But I have so fully and methodically treated of all such scruples against Providence, in my *Enquiry into the Causes and Occasions of Atheism*, that we will content our selves with this short intimation of an answer in this place.

Onely we will adde, that if the *Souls of Brutes* prove *immortal* (which the best of Philosophers have not been averse from) the Tragedy is still lesse horrid; but yet that ought not to animate us causelessly and petulantly to dislodge them, because we know not how long it will be till they have an opportunity to frame to themselves other bodies: and the interval of time betwixt is as to them a perfect death, wherein they have not the sense nor enjoyment of any thing. And for my own part I think, that he that slightes the life or welfare of a brute Creature, is naturally so unjust, that if outward Laws did not re-

strain

strain him, he would be as cruel to man.

The fourth Objection is against our Argument for Divine Providence, drawn from the consideration of that happy *Mitigation* of the *trouble* and *offensiveness* of *some* Animals by *others* that bear an *enmity* to them, and feed upon them as their prey, as the *Cat* for example does on the *Mouse*. Now say they, it were a more exact sign of Providence if there were no such offensive Creatures in the world to trouble us, then to bring on the trouble by making these Animals, and then to take it off again by making others to correct the mischief that would follow.

But no man would argue thus if it were not that he had over-carelessly taken up this *false Principle*, *That the world was made for man alone*, when as assuredly the Blessed and Benigne Maker of all things, intended that *other* living Creatures should enjoy themselves as well as *Men*, which they could not if they had no existence: Therefore Providence is more exact, in that she can thus spread out her goodness further, even to the enjoyments of the more inferior ranks of Creatures, without any considerable inconvenience to the more noble and superior.

Besides, all these Creatures that are thus a prey to others, are their sport and sustenance, and so pleasure others by their death, as well

as enjoy themselves while they are yet in life and free from their enemy. To say nothing how they are both in some sort or other useful to man himself, and therefore sometimes would be missed if they were wanting.

The fifth and last Objection is against our concluding a Substance distinct from Body, from the *Homogeneity* of that immediate *Crystalline Matter* out of which the *Fœtus* is efformed, suppose in an Egge, the same being also observable in other generations. To avoid the force of which Argument, it is denied, that there is any such *homogeneity* of parts, but that there are several *heterogeneous* particles, though to us invisible, which being put upon Motion by the heat of the Hen or some equivalent warmth, like particles will be driven to their like, and so the Chicken will be efformed: But that to acknowledge any other *Archeus*, brings inextricable difficulties along with it. For where, say they, were all the *Archei* which shap'd the Wasps out of an Horses Carcase? Are they parts of the Horses Soul, or new intruding guests upon the old ones being ejected? If the former, then the Soul of an Horse is divisible, and consequently material, or if you will, truly Matter: If the latter, where were those little Intruders before? Or be they so many sprigs or branches of the common Soul of the world?

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But if so, why have they not one common sense of pain and pleasure amongst them all? But to all these I answer in order.

And to the first part of this Objection I say, That it cannot but be a very strong presumption, that Nature intends an utter *homogeneity* of Matter, before she fall upon her work of efformation; she so constantly bringing it to as perfect *homogeneity* as we can possibly discern with our senses. And there being no conceivable convenience at all in the *heterogeneity* of parts, I think the conclusion is not rash if we averre that the *immediate matter* of efformation of the *Fœtus* is either accurately *homogeneous*; or if there be any *heterogeneity* of parts in it, that it is onely by accident; and that it makes no more to the first work of efformation, or organization of the matter, then those Atomes of dust that light on the limners colours make to the better drawing of the picture. For to say that those sundry sorts of particles put upon motion by external warmth do gather together, by vertue of similitude one with another, is to avouch a thing without any ground at all; against all grounds of Reason.

For what can this similitude of Parts consist in, if not either in the likeness of figure, or in the equality of agitation or magnitude? Now bodies of the like figure being put upon

motion, will not direct their courses one towards another any thing the more for being alike in shape. Indeed bodies of like figure of equal agitation & magnitude in a confused agitation may very likely go together as we see done (where yet we cannot promise our selves so exact similitude of the particles in their figure) in the thinner Spirits of distilled liquors that all mount upward, in the Tartarous parts of wine, that are driven outward to the sides of the vessel; in the feculency of urine that sinks to the bottom of the glass; in the subsidency of this dreggish part of the world, the Earth, if it may so properly be said to subside and be at the bottom, as in the midst of the more refined & subtile Elements. And so in like manner the *Fermentation* of the matter which precedes the efformation of Creatures, may happily arrive to some such rude effect as is seen in the forenamed instances: But it can never amount to such an artificial contrivance of Organs as are in living Creatures.

But if by *likenesse of Parts* they mean onely *fitnesse of Parts* for *figure* and *motion*, they both being so framed and moderated, that upon external warmth their agitation will necessarily
 † them to lock one with another, and to be
 ed into this admirable and useful frame
 the body of an Animal; that Artifice
 would

would be so particularly nice and curious, that it is utterly unconceivable but that it must imply either the attendance, or at least first contrivance of a *Knowing Principle*, that put the matter into so wonderful an order, as to be able by such precise laws of *Figure* and *Motion* to exhibit so noble Objects to our sense and understandings: And thus our Adversaries will gain nothing by this supposal.

But though this may seem barely possible, yet I conceive it is very improbable that such an infinite number of particles that must concur to make up a *Fœtus*, should have such a particular figuring & law of Motion impress'd upon each of them; as to enable it to take its right station or posture in the structure of a living Creature. For me thinks this is going about the bush, when as the more compendious way would be to make some immaterial Substance, such as are conceived to be the *seminal forms* of Plants and Animals, or the *Archei* as others call them. For this *Form* or *Archeus* is a thing more simple and plain, and requires a more simple and plain qualification of the subject it works upon, to wit, that it be onely *homogeneous*, and ductile or yielding to the tender assaults of that Substantial power of life that resides in it.

Nor is this opinion of the *Archei* or *seminal Formes* intangled in any such difficulties.

ries, but may be easily answered.

For as for those many pretended intricacies in the instance of the efformation of Wasps out of the Carcase of a Horse, I say the *Archei* that framed them are no parts of the Horses Soul that is dead, but several distinct *Archei* that do as naturally joyn with the matter of his body so putrified and prepared, as the Crows come to eat his flesh.

But you demand where these *Archei* were before. To which I answer, Can there want room for so small pieces of spirituality in so vast a compass as the comprehension of the Universe? I shall rather reply, Where were they not? the *world of life* being excluded out of no place, and the sundry sorts of Souls being as plentiful and as obvious there, as those Magnetick particles are in this corporeal world; and you can scarce place your Loadstone and Iron any where, but you will finde their presence by the sensible effects of them: Or if you will have a grosser comparifon, they are as cheap and common as dust flying in the Aire in a dry and windy Summer.

To the last puzzle propounded, whether these *Archei* be so many sprigs of the common Soul of the world, or particular subsistencies of themselves; there is no great inconvenience in acknowledging that it may be either

y. For it does not follow that if they be

so many branches or distinct rayes of the great Soul of the world, that therefore they are that very Soul it self; and if they be not, they may have their pleasures and pains apart distinct from one another: And what is pleasure and pain to them, may happily be *neither* to their Original, moving her no more then the chirping of a Cricket does those that are attentive to a full Consort of loud Musick, or the biting of a Flea does a man tortured on a Rack.

But suppose we say, they are so many Substances as independent on the Soul of the world, as the Matter it self is (though all depend on God) there is no difficulty at all, nor inconvenience in that position, nor need we trouble our selves where they are, or what becomes on them then, either before they actuate this or that part of the Matter, or after they have done actuating the same, no more then of the parts of the Matter actuated by them. For as every particle of the Matter is safely kept within the compass of the corporeall world, whether it be acted upon by any Soul or *Archens*, or not; so every *Archens* or Soul is as safe in the *world of life*, and as secure from being exterminated out of the comprehension of immaterial Beings, whether it act upon any part of the material world or no. For substance, be it of what nature it will, it can-

not

not perish without a Miracle. And why God should annihilate that which in succession of Time may again have opportunity to act its part, and prove serviceable to the world, no man I think can excogitate any Reason.

C H A P. XII.

Objections against the Story of the Charmer of Saltzburg, and the betwitched children at Amsterdamb, with some others of that kinde; as also that of John of Hembach and John Michael the Pipers. The disappearing of the Conventicle of Witches at the naming of God, as also against a passage of that Story of the Guardian Genius which Bodinus relates.

THE Passages excepted against in my third Book, are either *Historical* or *Philosophical*; The *Historical* are chiefly these: First against the Narration concerning the Charmer of *Saltzburg*, it is objected, That that last and greatest Serpent might not be the Devil but a meer Serpent. To which I answer, That it is very probable that that Serpent (he reserving himself so for the last, and bringing so sad a fate upon the Charmer, as if he would either imitate a revenge of the death of so many of his own kinde, or spitefully flurre the glory and

and victory of their now almost triumphant enemy) had more in it than an ordinary natural Serpent; that is, that it was either the Devil so transformed, or a Serpent actuated and guided by him; which we shall the easilier believe, if we consider, that the whole business of *Charming* is of no natural efficacy but supernatural, if it take any effect at all.

The second Objection is against those Stories of several possessed parties that have seemed to have vomited strange stuff out of their stomachs, as if it might be done by some sleight and cunning, onely to get money. In answer whereto I must needs confess, that there are no real strange effects or events in the world, but some or other, if it be possible, either out of design of gain or in waggery, may attempt the imitating of them. But this fraud might easily be discovered by prudent spectators, such as I suppose those two Physicians were, *Cardan* and *Wierus*, who, if there had been nothing in the business but the sleight of a Jugler, could not have been deceived by that Imposture.

And as for the Children at *Amsterdam*, the spectacle was so miserable, and their torture by report so great, and then the parties so many, and all attempts of Art or Religion so frustraneous, that it seems very incredible that there should be either fraud or foolery in the matter.

matter. As for the *Maid of Saxony* her speaking Greek, it were a ridiculous thing indeed to look upon it as supernatural, unless it were known that no body taught her that language, and therefore in such cases the judgement and sagacity of the first Relators is to be supposed, as in that Story that *Fernelius* tells us of a *Demoniack* in his time that spake Greek, and discovered the secrets of the Physicians, deriding their ignorance in that they had half kill'd a man, by administring Physick upon a false supposal of a natural disease. See *Fernel. de Abd. rerum caus. lib. 2. cap. 16.*

The third Objection is against the *Mirth* of some of the Stories recorded, as that of *John of Hembach* and *John Michael* the Pipers: But these Narrations are to seem never the more incredible for those passages of mirth, if we consider that those Apostate Spirits, that have their haunts near this lower Aire and Earth, are variously laps'd into the enormous love and liking of the *Animal life*, having utterly forsaken the *Divine*; and that there are such Passions and Affections in them as are in wicked Men and Beasts: And that some of them especially bear the same Analogy to an un-fallen Angel, that an Ape or Monkey to a sober man: so that all their pleasure is in unlucky ridiculous tricks, and that even those that are more ferocient, if they ever relaxate

into

into mirth, that it is foolishly antick and deformed, as is manifest in all those stories of their dancings and nocturnal Revellings: for they bear a secret hatred to what ever is comely and decorous, and in a perpetual scorn to it distort all their actions to the contrary Mode, applauding themselves onely in an unlimited liberty, and of doing whatever either their fond or foul Imagination suggest to them; affecting nothing but the lust of their own wills, and a power to make themselves wondred at and terrible.

The fourth Objection is against those Passages of the Nocturnall Conventicles of Witches, *disappearing* at the *naming of God or Jesus*. For the Devils (say they) are not at all afraid of these Names, but can name them by way of scorn or abuse themselves, and apply them to their own persons. But the exception is easily satisfied, if we do but distinguish betwixt the mindes of the speakers of these words. Therefore I say it does not follow, because they can stand the pronouncing of these words amongst themselves, that they can also when they are named with an honest heart and due devotion.

Besides it is not irrational (though they could withstand the power of these Names, and the devotion of them that use them) that it may be an indispensable ceremony amongst them

them not to continue their Conventicles if any be near or present that make an open and serious profession of the fear of God. And it is also evident how burthensome the presence of a truly religious person is to wicked men, especially at that time they have a minde more freely to indulge to their own wickedness.

The fifth and last Objection is against a Vision or Dream, wherein he that had for so many years the society of a *Guardian Genius* or *Good Angel*, seem'd to hear these words, *I will save thy Soul, I am he that before appeared unto thee*, as if this *Genius* or *Angel* had been himself the Eternal God. But this need breed no scruple: For first, there being no shape of any person represented to him in this Vision, it may go onely for a Divine suggestion of the Spirit of God assuring him of his love and providence over him now, as heretofore he had done in like Visions or Dreams.

And then secondly, if we should admit that the Angel should speak so unto him, the Angel in this case is not properly said to speak as a Person, but as an Instrument, so as a mans tongue speaks, whereas yet a mans Soul or himself more properly speaks then the Tongue. Wherefore if God take so full possession of all the powers and faculties of an Angel, that for a time he loses the sense
of

of his own personality, and becomes a meer passive Instrument of the Deity, being as it were the Eye or Mouth of God; what in this case he speaks, is to be understood of God, and not of himself.

Thus I have, I hope, satisfied the difficulties concerning all the *Historicall* passages of this third book, that are still remaining in it. For I must confess that I have expunged some, that seemed not so accurately agreeable with those laws I set my self upon my closer view. Not that I know any thing of them whereby I can discover them to be false, but because wanting that conformity, they must be acknowledged by me not so convincingly true.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

That the Transformation of an humane body into another shape may be done without pain. That there may be an actual separation of soul and body without death properly so called. That the Bodies of Spirits might be hot or cold or warm, and the manner how they become so. In what sense we may acknowledge a first in an infinite succession of generations. That the story of Tree-Geese in Gerard is certainly true. That the miraculous Operations and Apparitions of Spirits ordinarily so called are undeniable. Argument of the Existence of an Essence truly and properly Spiritual or Immaterial.

THE first Philosophical Objection is against the Transformation of an humane body into the shape suppose of a Wolf or any such like creature. For it is conceived that it cannot be done without a great deal of pain to the transformed. To which I answer, That though this Transformation be made in a very short time, yet it may be performed without any pain at all. For that part in the head which is the seat of Common sense I conceive is very small (suppose it to be the Conarion, it is not very big) wherefore the Devil getting into the body of a man and possessing that part with

the

the rest, can intercept or keep off all the transmissions of motion from other parts of the body, that, let him do what he will with them, the Party shall feel no pain at all; So that he may soften all the parts of the body besides into what consistency he please, and work it into any form he can his own Vehicle or Air, and the Party not be sensible thereof all the time. And there is the same reason of reducing the body into its own shape again, which is as painless to the Party that suffers it. Nor is there any fear that the body once loosned thus will ever after be in this loose melting condition: for it is acknowledged even by them that oppose *Bodinus*, whose cause I undertake, that a *Spirit* can as well stop and fix a body as move it. Wherefore I say when the Devil has fixed again the body in its pristine shape, it will according to the undeniable laws of Nature remain in that state he left it, till something more powerful dissettle and change it: and every body is overpowered at last and we must all yield to death.

The second Objection is against our acknowledging an actual separation of soul and body without death, death being properly, as we define it, a disjunction of the Soul from the body by reason of the *bodies unfitness* any longer to entertain the Soul, which may be caused by extremity of

disease

diseases, by outward violence or old age. Now say they, What is violence if this be not, for the Devil to take the Soul out of the body? But the answer is easie, That any separation by violence is not death, but such a violence in separation as makes the body *unfit* to entertain the Soul again, as it is in letting the bloud run out by wounding the body, and in hindring the course of the spirits by strangling it, or drowning, it or the like. For to revive such a body as this, would be a miracle indeed, in such cases as these, death having seised upon the body in a true and proper sense, and none but God himself can thus kill and make a-live.

The third Objection is against the notable coldness of the bodies of Devils. For at the great tryal of Witches at *S. Edmonds-Bury Assises* in *August 1645*, I heard some of them openly confess at the Bar, sayes the Objector, that when the Devil lay with them, he was warm. To which I might answer, if I had a minde rather to shuffle then precisely to satisfie the exceptions made against what we have wrote, that it may be some warm yong man had got into the place of the cold Devil: for who knowes what juggles there might be in these things?

But to answer more home to the purpose, I confess that the bodies of Devils may be

not only warm, but findglingly hot as it was in him that took one of *Melancthon's* relations by the hand, and so scorched her, that she bare the mark of it to her dying day. But the examples of *cold* are more frequent, as in that famous story of *Cuntius* when he toucht the arm of a certain woman of *Pentch* as she lay in her bed; he felt as cold as ice, and so did the Spirits claw to *Anne Styles*: and many other stories there are of that nature. But I will not deny but their bodies may be also warm, else it is not intelligible, how those two execrable *Magi* should reap such unexpressible pleasure; the one from his *Armellina*, the other from his *Florina*, as they profess themselves to have done; in a certain Dialogue of *Franciscus Picus* his; which he has entituled *Strix*, or *De Ludificatione Daemonum*, and assures us in his Epistle before it, that it is a true history, and that he sets down but such things as he has either seen with his eyes, or else heard from the confession of Witches themselves.

The force therefore of the Objection is levelled against what we do not assert, that the bodies of Devils are found only cold: but what we would intimate is, only this, that their bodies being nothing but coagulated or constringed Air, when they put them in such a posture as to constringe their vehicles in a greater measure by far then agitate the single particles of it, that it will then seem not only cold as

congealed water does, but more piercingly and stingingly cold, by reason of the subtilty of the parts.

But when they not only strongly constringe their vehicle in the whole, but also fiercely agitate the single particles thereof, their body will become findgingly hot, & imitate in some measure heated brass or iron wherein the particles keep close together, and yet every one is smartly moved in it self. As is plain to us if we spit upon those metals so heated; for they will make the spittle hizzle and bubble, the particles of the metals communicating their motion to the spittle that lies upon them; and will turn all-liquor into vapours, as we ordinarily see in the burning of Vinegar and Rose-water in a chamber to perfume the room. For what is this perfuming but the setting of the aqueous separable parts of the liquor on motion so strongly as to the mounting of them into the Aire and dispersing of them into fume, by the fierce and strong agitation of the inseparable parts of the heated fire-shovel?

But lastly, If a Spirit use his *Agitative* power moderately and his *constrictive* forcibly enough to feel solid or palpable to that man or woman he has to deal withal, he may not only feel warm but more pleasantly and gratefully warm, then any earthly or fleshly body that is; the subtilty of the Matter will more powerfully hit, and more powerfully reach the Or-

gans of Sense, and more exquisitely and enravishingly move the Nerves, then any terrestrial Body can possibly. But in the mean time the *Spirit* himself is neither hot, nor warm, nor cold, nor any thing else that belongs to a body, but a substance specifically distinct from all corporeal Matter whatsoever, as I have already intimated in the place we now defend.

The fourth Objection is against our asserting, That it is an incongruous, and self-contradicting position to hold, That there never was any man but was born of a woman, though we should admit the successions of mankind infinite. For, say they, in *infinite succession* there can be no *first* in no sense at all, for if a *first*, then a *second*, and so on to our own times, and thus the *Series* would be numerable and consequently finite, which is a contradiction, for then the succession would be both finite and infinite.

But I answer, First, that I can demonstrate, That there is a *first* in *infinite succession* out of such principles as the *Atheist* does or is necessarily to grant, and that is, that *Matter* is *ab Aeterno*, and that some part thereof at least moved *ab Aeterno*. Now it is plain that this Matter that moved *ab Aeterno*, either moved of it self or was moved by another. If the latter, then we have a *first* in an *infinite succession* of motions: for that which moved this Matter, moved *ab Aeterno*, is first in order of causality,

as is undeniably plain to any one that understands sense.

But you'll say that this Matter that moved *ab Aeterno* was moved of it self. Be it so, yet no part of it can move in this full Ocean of Matter that is excluded out of no space, but it must hit some other part of Matter, so soon as it moves, and that another and so on. And thus there might be a *Succession* of Motions *ab Aeterno* or *infinite*, and yet a *first* in order of causality. For that primordial Motion of the Matter is plainly *first* & the cause of all the rest: And our understanding can never be quiet till it has penetrated to some such *first* in the order of causes.

And then Secondly, to that subtile Argumentation that would prove that this *infinite* succession would be both finite and infinite; I answer, That it is a meer Sophisme, from the ambiguity of the term *first*, which signifies either Priority of *Succession* or Priority of *Causality*. In the first sense if we admit a *first*, the succession will be finite according to our own faculties, for we cannot but run beyond, we finding the succession bounded in that *first*. But in the other sense, *first* sets no bounds to succession, but leaves it free and infinite.

Or we may answer thus, That beginning from this moment and going on to the first primordial Motion, and calling this present moment *first*, and the next before it the *second*,

that it will amount to a number truly infinite, and that our understanding can never go through it; but, though Gods understanding can, that it does not follow that the number is therefore finite. For an infinite minde may well comprehend an infinite number. But for us whose capacities are finite, if we would venture to name a first in infinite succession, we should call it *απὸ τῆς ἀπειροσότητος*, the first infinitesimal, and acknowledge our selves unable to go through, our understandings being finite.

The fifth and last Objection, is against that story out of Gerard of the Tree-geese in the Island of the Pile of Foulders. For it is objected by one that inquired of some that lived near the place, that it was not confirmed to him, but that they told him only that at the time of the year it was a notable place for birds nests, & that one can scarce walk in the Island but he will tread on a nest of Eggs. But to this may be answered, either that those Parties that were consulted were men that looked not after such curiosities as these, or that the rotten pieces of ships or trunks of trees that were washed up thither by the sea, have been a long time ago washed away again, and so the examples of this rarity being not freshly renewed, that the memory of it may be lost with many of those Parts: For it is nigh threescore years since Gerard wrote, but while he was living, he offered to make his narration good by sufficient witnesses: and he

professes he declares but what his eyes had seen and his hands had touched.

And he also adds a story of another sort of *Tree-geese* which he gathered in their shells from an old rotten tree upon the shore of our English Coast betwixt *Dover* and *Rumney*; He brought a many of them with him to *London*, and opening the shells which were something like *Muscles*, he found these birds in several degrees of maturation; in some shapeless lumps only, in others the form of birds but bare, in others the same form and shape, and with down also upon them, their shells gaping and they ready to fall out.

I might adde a third kinde described to me by a Gentleman out of *Ireland* which he has often observed upon those Coasts, but it is not material to insist upon the description thereof. All that I aim at is this, That this truth of birds being bred of putrefaction is very certain, of which I am so well assured by this Gentlemans information, as well as that narration of *Gerard*, that I must confes for my own part I cannot doubt of it at all. And it might countenance my credulity, if I could be here justly suspected of that fault that the Objector himself upon further enquiry is at length fully satisfied concerning the same truth.

We have now answered all the Objections, as well *Philosophical* as *Historical* made against

There remains only one of a more universal nature, and indeed of such importance, that if I do not satisfy it, it does utterly subvert the main design of our whole Third book against *Atheism*, wherein we would fetch off men to an easier belief of a God, from the History of *Spirits*. For admitting all those stories to be true, yet, say they, it does not at all follow, that there are *Spirits* in that sense that I define *Spirits*, and in such a notion as is understood in my explication of the *Idea* of God, viz. *That there should be an immaterial or incorporeal Substance that can penetrate and actuate the Matter*; for they themselves are but a *thinner* kind of *body*, such as Air or Fire or some such like subtile Element, and not pure *Spirit* according to our definition thereof.

If this were true I must confess, that our last book against *Atheism* is of no efficacy at all, and can do nothing towards the end it was intended for. For if there be a God, of necessity he must be a Spirit properly so called; otherwise he cannot be infinite. Nor can he be this *Universal Matter* in the world, though we suppose it boundless; because he could not then be perfect. But he must be an Essence of which this matter depends, and in which he is, penetrating and possessing all things. Which any one will easily believe, if he were assured that there are particular Spirits that penetrate and actuate this or that part of the matter,

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which I contend that those stories which I have related do evidently evince.

For I appeal to any one that knows what Fire and Air is; whether they be not as truly a meer aggregation of loosned particles of the Matter, as an heap of sand; only they are so little, that they are invisible and insensible in their distinct particularities, but as truly disjoyned Atomes (if I may so call what is still divisible) as the grains of sand we speak of.

Now this being supposed, which nothing but ignorance can deny, we shall plainly discover that such things are done by Spirits, as we usually call them, as are altogether incompatible to any *compages* of these small grains or Atomes of Matter, of which Air and Fire do consist; For first, either all these Grains or Atomes have Sense, Imagination and Understanding in them, or but some few, or but one only. If all or some few, it is plain that they are so many distinct intelligent Beings, and a distinct intelligent Being is a Person; so that this one person is many persons, which is plainly contradictory, at least foolishly ridiculous. But if the residence of Sense, Imagination and Understanding be plac'd in one, how is it possible that that one Atome should be able spontaneously to move all the rest? And the same reason would be if we should seat Sense and Reason in some few inward Atomes. For
w could they bring away those behinde
them

them, or carry on those on the side of them, or drive them before them, so as that they would not divide and be left behinde? And yet it is a shrewd presumption that the seat of Sense is confined to some small compass in the vehicle of a Spirit, it being so in the body of a man. For if it were not, but that every part of the vehicle had Sense in it self, the external Object would seem, in God knowes how many places at once, and the Images of things would be either utterly confounded, or the Atomes, when they put themselves upon their march, would mistake their mark, and following directly their sense would of necessity break one from another and destroy the whole.

Again it is manifest that that which has the power of *Sensation* in a Spirit, has also the power of *Memory*, else they could not remember the Objects of Sense, if it were not one and the same thing in them that had both *Sense* and *Memory*: and that which remembers does also *imagine*, and that which *imagines* by the power of imagination *transforms* the vehicle into various shapes and figures, and holds it there in that shape so long as it thinks good.

Now I demand how this possibly can be done by either one or a few Particles or Atomes residing in any part of the vehicle, How can they either hold together the other, or lay hold upon them, to restrain them and constringe them into this or that form, suppose
of

of a Dog, Colt or Man? But to say that imagination is in every part of the vehicle, and to admit those particles to imagine that have not so much as Sense, is altogether unreasonable.

Thirdly, That which *Lucretius* alledges against the immortality of the Soul, supposing it such a congeries of little Atomes as here Spirits are supposed, is as strong an Argument against the existence of such kinde of Spirits. For they would be blown out like a candle, or torne in pieces with the windes, and be dissipated like smoke or clouds.

Fourthly and lastly, The transportation of Cattel, and of Witches themselves to their Nocturnal Conventicles through the Air, if Spirits or Devils be but a meer congestion of subtile Atomes Aery or Fiery, without an inward immaterial Principle that has a power to hold fast the particles together, is a thing altogether impossible. For it is evident that the weight of a man or a beast will sink through the Air & never rest till they reach the earth, & so they would do through the vehicle of a Spirit that is as subtile, fluid, and yielding as the Air it self is, were there not an internal essence and principle that was able to constringe and hold together this fluid body or vehicle of the Spirit, and so make it to sustain the weight. For all bodies hard or fluid are equally impenetrable, and therefore if any power should hold the Air together so as to restrain it neer within
one

one compass or space, and yet not change the usual consistency of it, it would be as wine in a bladder, and a man might lie upon it as safely as upon a soft bed & never fear sinking through.

But in this loose composure of Atoms which they say is all that is in a spirit (though we should admit of that ridiculous supposition that every Atome can imagine and apply it self to one joynt designe of holding all close together) yet it is hard to conceive, that this actual division of the whole into so many subtile exile invisible particles does not so enfeeble the spontaneous offers towards the sustaining and carrying away of the burden, that their endeavours would ever prove frustaneous.

But I need not insist upon that, which, it may be, may seem a point something more lubricous, when as we have what is more palpably incongruous presenting it self to our view. For this complement of Aery or Fiery particles being the only substance acknowledged in a Spirit, every Atome having Imagination and Reason in it to apply it self to one joynt designe, they must be, as I have intimated heretofore, as properly so many distinct persons, as the grains of sand are so many distinct individuals of Matter, and therefore every one Devil is indeed 5000 millions of Devils & more, a thing that a man would little dream of, or admit to be any more then a dream, if he thinks of it waking. But if such things as these will not be
acknow-

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acknowledged as absurd, but shamelessly admitted and swallowed down for true; I must confess that there is no demonstration against impudence and pertinacity, and that I am not able to prove to such, that either Brutes have life, or that the moats that play in the beams of the Sun are devoid of Sense and Reason.

The substance of these Arguments, as the Reader may remember, I have made use of elsewhere for the proving of an *Incorporeal Principle* residing and acting in the body of man; But the frame and management of them in this place is not a little different, and their force far more conspicuous and apparent, the fixt consistency and Mechanical fabrick of an humane body being able to perform many things that the fluid and unorganized vehicle of Fire and Aire cannot possibly doe, unless we admit an immaterial essence to be in it, and so thoroughly to possess it all over, as to have the power to constringe it and transform it into those various shapes it does appear in. And therefore though our Argumentations for an immaterial soul in the body of man be solid and irrefutable, yet because the truth is more palpably and undeniably demonstrable in the Fiery or Aery *Vehicles* of what we ordinarily call *Spirits*, I conceive, that our Third book against *Atheism* is very convenient, if not necessary, not at all needless nor unprofitable.

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X. *That these intellectual or cognoscitive operations we finde in our selves are not performed by the Conarion. That the Arguments whereby we prove the incorporeity of the soul of Man do not so certainly prove the Incorporeity of any Principle in Beasts. That the ineptness of the Body for such functions as we ordinarily attribute unto the soul, is a sufficient Argument that there is in us a soul or spirit distinct from the body, though we are puzzled in the speculation of the bare Essence thereof,* 346

XI. *That the subordinate serviceableness of things in the world are in the things themselves, not meerly in our Fancy. That the difficulty of obtaining such serviceable commodities is rather*

an Argument for Providence then against it. That Beauty is an intellectuall Object not taken notice of by Brutes, nor is any necessary Result from the meere motion of the Matter. That the preying of Animals one upon another is very well consistent with the goodness of the First Cause. That the immediate Matter of the Foetus is homogeneous. That the notion of the Archei or Seminall forms is no such intricate Speculation,

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XII. Objections against the Story of the Charmer of Saltzburg, and the betwitched children at Amsterdam, with some others of that kinde; as also that of John of Hembach and John Michael the Pipers. The disappearing of the Conventicle of Witches at the naming of God, as also against a passage of that Story of the Guardian Genius which Bodinus relates,

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XIII. That the Transformation of an humane body into another shape may be done without pain. That there may be an actual separation of soul and body without death properly so called. That the Bodies of Spirits might be hot or cold or warm, and the manner how they become so. In what sense we may acknowledge a first in an infinite succession of generations. That the story of Tree Geese in Gerard is certainly true. That the miraculous Operations and Apparitions of Spirits ordinarily so called are an undeniable Argument of the Existence of an Essence truly and properly Spirituall or Immateriall.

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ERRATA:

P Ag. 9. lin. 4. *read* or necessity of. p. 50. l. 19. *r.* Ἡ ἐπιδοσ θ.
 p. 55. l. 1. *r.* is as impossible, l. 23. *r.* those operations and
 powers are. p. 56. l. 5. *r.* more gross Juice. p. 60. l. 5. *r.* attributed.
 p. 67. l. 11. *r.* supposes, that. p. 79. l. 3. *r.* meer. p. 97. l. 17. *r.* lick.
 p. 103. l. 22. *r.* Temples. p. 105. l. 28. *r.* abroad. p. 127. l. 26. *r.*
 circumstances. p. 133. l. 26. *r.* by chance. p. 137. l. 15. *r.* forefeet.
 p. 145. l. 7. *r.* in a dark. p. 154. l. 29. *r.* fail. p. 155. l. 18. *r.* well
 those. p. 157. l. 5. *r.* fitted. p. 164. l. 2. *r.* Coskinomancy. p. 171.
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 l. 20. *r.* existence being. l. 21. *r.* Notion, is. p. 330. l. 8. *r.* palpable
 contradiction. p. 342. l. 20. *r.* it is not any. p. 349. l. 3. *r.* true fit
 and form. p. 352. l. 26. *r.* more doors. p. 354. l. 29. *r.* moment,
 being. p. 355. l. 6. *r.* we may. p. 359. l. 5. *r.* dull indivisible. p. 367.
 l. 6. *r.* requisite in it, which. p. 377. l. 18. *r.* of them. p. 383.
 l. 11. *r.* self, upon. p. 386. l. 10. *r.* drowning it, or. p. 214. *r.* His
 concealment.

25

VII. *That necessary Existence is not included in the Idea of Matter. And that if we cannot but imagine Space to be a real thing and necessarily existing, that it is nothing else but a rude and confused representation of that true necessarily Existent which is God,* 334

VIII. *That the Idea of God or of a Being absolutely perfect, is a natural Notion to the Soul of man, and not conveyed thither by any political juggles whatsoever,* 339

IX. *That the natural frame of Conscience is such that it suggests such fears and hopes that imply that there is a God. That the ridiculousness of sundry Religions is not any proof that to be affected with Religion is no Innate faculty of the soul of man,* 343

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[Faint, illegible handwritten text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page]

January the 20 1694
John Mowley and
James Harrison were
in one boat with coming
away safe wood

