

This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the information in books and make it universally accessible.

Google™ books

<https://books.google.com>





THE
WORKS
OF
THE REV. DANIEL WATERLAND, D.D.

FORMERLY
MASTER OF MAGDALENE COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
CANON OF WINDSOR,
AND
ARCHDEACON OF MIDDLESEX;
NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND ARRANGED.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,
A REVIEW
OF THE
AUTHOR'S LIFE AND WRITINGS,
BY
WILLIAM VAN MILDERT, D. D.
LORD BISHOP OF LLANDAFF.

VOL. I. PART II.

OXFORD,
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS.
MDCCCXXIII.

Clar. Press.
1. f. 20.

A VINDICATION
OF
CHRIST'S DIVINITY:
BEING A
DEFENCE OF SOME QUERIES,
RELATING TO
DR. CLARKE'S SCHEME OF THE HOLY TRINITY,
IN ANSWER TO
A CLERGYMAN IN THE COUNTRY.

Ἐγώ εἰμι Ἰησοῦς ὃν σὺ διώκεις· σκληρόν σοι πρὸς κίττρα λακτίξαι.

Acts ix. 5.

P R E F A C E.

THE following Queries were drawn up, a few years ago, at the request of friends; when I had not the least apprehension of their ever appearing in print, as might be guessed from the negligence of the style and composition. The occasion of them was this. A Clergyman in the country, well esteemed in the neighbourhood where he lived, had unhappily fallen in with Dr. Clarke's notions of the Trinity; and began to espouse them in a more open and unguarded manner than the Doctor himself had done. This gave some uneasiness to the Clergy in those parts, who could not but be deeply concerned to find a fundamental article of religion called in question; and that too by one of their own order, and whom they had a true concern and value for. It was presumed, that a sincere and ingenuous man (as he appeared to be) might, upon proper application, be inclinable to alter his opinion; and that the most probable way to bring him to a sense of his mistake, was to put him to defend it so long, till he might perhaps see reason to believe that it was not defensible. With these thoughts, I was prevailed upon to draw up a few Queries, (the same that appear now, excepting only some slight *verbal* alterations,) and when I had done, gave them to a common friend to convey to him. I was the more inclined to it, for my own instruction and improvement, in so momentous and important an article: besides that I had long been of opinion, that no method could be more proper for the training up one's mind to a true and sound judgment of things, than that of private conference in writing; exchanging papers, making answers, replies, and rejoinders, till an argument should be exhausted on

both sides, and a controversy at length brought to a point. In that private way, (if it can be private,) a man writes with easiness and freedom; is in no pain about any innocent slips or mistakes; is under little or no temptation to persist obstinately in an error, (the bane of all *public* controversy,) but concerned only to find out the truth, which, on what side soever it appears, is always *victory* to every honest mind.

I had not long gone on with my correspondent, before I found all my measures broken, and my hopes entirely frustrated. He had sent me, in *manuscript*, an Answer to my Queries; which Answer I received, and read with due care; promised him immediately a reply; and soon after prepared and finished it, and conveyed it safe to his hands. Then it was, and not till then, that he discovered to me what he had been doing; signifying, by letter, how he had been over-persuaded to commit his Answer, with my Queries, to the press; that they had been there some time, and could not now be recalled; that I must follow him thither, if I intended any thing further; and must adapt my *public Defence* to his *public Answer*, now altered and improved, from what it had been in the *manuscript* which had been sent me. This news surprised me a little at the first; and sorry I was to find my correspondent so extremely desirous of instructing others, instead of taking the most prudent and considerate method of informing himself. As he had left me no choice, but either to follow him to the press, or to desist, I chose what I thought most proper at that time; leaving him to instruct the *public* as he pleased, designing myself to keep out of *public* controversy; or, at least, not designing the contrary. But, at length, considering that copies of my Defence were got abroad into several hands, and might perhaps, some time or other, steal into the press without my knowledge; and considering further, that this controversy now began to grow warm, and that it became every honest man, according to the measure of his abilities, to bear his testimony in so good a cause; I thought it best to revise my papers, to

give them my last hand, and to send them abroad into the world; where they must stand or fall, (as I desire they should,) according as they are found to have more or less truth or weight in them.

Dr. Clarke has lately published a second edition of his *Scripture Doctrine*: where, I perceive, he has made several additions and alterations, but has neither *retracted* nor *defended* those parts, which Mr. Nelson's learned friend had judiciously replied to, in his *True Scripture Doctrine Continued*. I hope, impartial readers will take care to read one along with the other.

One thing I must observe, for the Doctor's honour, that in his new edition he has left out these words of his former Introduction: "It is plain that every person may reasonably agree to such *forms*, whenever he can in any sense at all reconcile them with Scripture." I hope, none hereafter will pretend to make use of the Doctor's *authority*, for *subscribing* to *forms* which they believe not according to the *true* and *proper* sense of the words, and the *known* intent of the *imposers* and *compilers*. Such *prevarication* is in itself a bad thing, and would, in time, have a very ill influence on the *morals* of a nation. If either *state oaths* on the one hand, or *Church subscriptions* on the other, once come to be made light of, and *subtilties* be invented to defend or palliate such *gross insincerity*; we may bid farewell to *principles*, and *religion* will be little else but disguised *Atheism*.

The learned Doctor, in his Introduction, has inserted, by way of note, a long quotation out of Mr. Nelson's *Life of Bishop Bull*. He can hardly be presumed to intend any *parallel* between Bishop Bull's case and his *own*: and yet readers may be apt so to take it, since the Doctor has not guarded against it, and since otherwise it will not be easy to make out the pertinence of it. The Doctor has undoubtedly some meaning in it, though I will not presume to guess what. He ^a observes, "That there is an exact account given, what method that learned writer

^a Introduction, p. 25, 26.

“ (Bishop Bull) took to explain the doctrine of *justification*, (*viz.* the *very same and only* method which ought to be taken in explaining all other doctrines whatsoever,) how zealously he was accused by many *systematical* Divines, as departing from the doctrine and articles of the Church, in what he had done; how *learnedly* and *effectually* he defended himself against *all* his *adversaries*; and how *successful* at length his explication was, it being after some years almost *universally* received.” This account is true, but defective; and may want a supplement for the benefit of common readers, who may wish to know what that excellent method of Bishop Bull’s was, by means of which his explication proved so *successful*, and came at length to be almost *universally* received. It was as follows.

1. In the first place, his way was to examine carefully into *Scripture*, more than into the *nature* and *reason* of the thing abstractedly considered. He pitched upon such texts as were *pertinent* and *close* to the point; did not choose them according to the *sound* only, but their *real* sense, which he explained *justly* and *naturally*, without any *wresting* or *straining*. He neither *neglected* nor *dissembled* the utmost force of any texts which seemed to make against him; but proposed them *fairly*, and answered them *solidly*; without any *artificial illusions*, or any *subtile* or *surprising* glosses.

2. In the next place, however cogent and forcible his reasonings from Scripture appeared to be, yet he *modestly* declined being *confident* of them, unless he could find them likewise *supported* by the general verdict of the *primitive* Church; for which he always expressed a most *religious* regard and veneration: believing it easier for himself to err in *interpreting* Scripture, than for the *universal* Church to have erred from the beginning. To pass by many other instances of his *sincere* and *great* regard to *antiquity*, I shall here mention one only. He ^b tells Dr.

^b Bull. Apolog. contr. Tull. p. 7.

Tully, in the most serious and solemn manner imaginable, that if there could but be found any one proposition, that he had maintained in all his Harmony, repugnant to the doctrine of the *Catholic* and *primitive* Church, he would immediately give up the cause, sit down contentedly under the reproach of a *novelist*, openly *retract his error* or *heresy*, make a solemn *recantation* in the face of the Christian world, and bind himself to perpetual silence ever after. He knew very well what he said; being able to shew, by an historical deduction, that his doctrine had been the constant doctrine of the Church of Christ, ^c down to the days of Calvin, in the sixteenth century.

3. Besides this, he demonstrated very clearly, that the most ancient and valuable *confessions* of the *Reformed Churches* abroad were entirely in his sentiments. He examined them with great care and exactness, and answered the contrary pretences largely and solidly.

4. To complete all, he vindicated his doctrine further, from the concurring sentiments of our own most early and most judicious *Reformers*: as also from the Articles, Catechism, Liturgy, and Homilies of the Church of England: and this with great accuracy and strength of reason, without the mean arts of *equivocation* or *sophistry*.

5. I may add, fifthly, that his manner of writing was the most *convincing* and most *engaging* imaginable: *acute, strong, and nervous*; *learned* throughout; and *sincere* to a scrupulous exactness, without *artificial* colours or studied *disguises*, which he utterly abhorred. The *good* and *great* man breathes in every *line*: a reader, after a few pages, may be tempted almost to throw off his guard, and to resign himself implicitly into so safe hands. A man thus qualified and accomplished, having *true* judgment to take the *right side* of a question, and *learning, ability, and integrity*, to set it off to the greatest advantage, could not fail of success; especially considering that

^c Bull. Apolog. contr. Tull. p. 50, 51.

the most judicious and learned of our Clergy, and those best affected to the Church of England, (such as Dr. Hammond, &c.) had been in the same sentiments before; and Bishop Bull's bitterest adversaries were mostly *systematical* men, (properly so called,) and such as had been bred up (during the Great Rebellion) in the *Predestinarian* and *Antinomian* tenets, as Mr. Nelson^d observes. There was another circumstance which Mr. Nelson also takes^e notice of, namely, his writing in Latin: which showed his thorough judgment of men and things. He would not write to the *vulgar* and *unlearned*, (which is beginning at the wrong end, and doing nothing,) but to the *learned* and *judicious*; knowing it to be the surest and the shortest way; and that, if the point be gained with *them*, the rest come in of course; if not, all is to no purpose. This became a man who had a *cause* that he could *trust to*; and confided only in the *strength* of his *reasons*. By such *laudable* and *ingenuous* methods, that excellent man prevailed over his *adversaries*; *truth* over *error*, *antiquity* over *novelty*, the *Church of Christ* over *Calvin* and his disciples. If any man else has such a *cause* to defend as Bishop Bull had, and is able to manage it in such a method, by showing that it stands upon the same immoveable foundations of *Scripture* and *antiquity*, confirmed by the concurring sense of the *judicious* part of mankind; then he need not doubt but it will prevail and prosper in any Protestant country, as *universally* as the other did. But if several of those circumstances, or the most *considerable* of them, be wanting; or if circumstances be contrary, then it is as *vain* to expect the like *success*, as it is to expect *miracles*. It must not be forgot, that the same good and great Prelate, afterwards, by the same *fair* and *honourable* methods, the same strength of reason and profound learning, gained as complete a victory over the Arians, in regard to the question about the faith of the Ante-Nicene Fathers: and his *determination*, in that particular, was, and still is, among

^d Nelson's Life of Bull, p. 98.^e Ibid. p. 94.

men of the greatest learning and judgment, as *universally* submitted to as the other. His admirable treatise (by which "he being dead yet speaketh") remains *unanswered* to this day, and will abide *victorious* to the end. But enough of this.

I am obliged to say something in defence of my general title, (A Vindication of Christ's Divinity,) because I find Mr. Potter, since deceased, was rebuked by an ^f anonymous hand for such a *title*. The pretence is, that our adversaries do not disown Christ's *Divinity*, as the *title* insinuates. But to what purpose is it for them to contend about a *name*, when they give up the *thing*? It looks too like mockery, (though they are far from intending it,) and cannot but remind us of, "Hail, king of the Jews!" Nobody ever speaks of the *Divinity of Moses*, or of *magistrates*, or of *angels*, though called gods in Scripture. If Christ be *God*, in the *relative* sense only, why should we speak of his *Divinity*, more than of the other? The Christian Church has all along used the word *divinity*, in the strict and proper sense: if we must change the *idea*, let us change the *name* too; and talk no more of Christ's *Divinity*, but of his *Mediatorship* only, or at most, *Kingship*. This will be the way to prevent *equivocation*, keep up propriety of language, and shut out false *ideas*. I know no *Divinity*, but such as I have defended: the other, falsely so called, is *really* none. So much for the *title*.

In the *work* itself, I have endeavoured to unravel *sophistry*, detect *fallacies*, and take off *disguises*, in order to set the controversy upon a *clear foot*; allowing only for the *mysteriousness* of the subject. The gentlemen of the *new way* have hitherto kept pretty much in *generals*, and avoided coming to the pinch of the question. If they please to speak to the point, and put the cause upon a short issue, as may easily be done, that is all that is desired. I doubt not but all attempts of that kind will end

^f Apology for Dr. Clarke's Preface.

(as they have ever done) in the clearing up of the truth, the disappointment of its opposers, the joy of good men, and the honour of our blessed Lord; whose *Divinity* has been the rock of offence to the "disputers of this world" now for 1600 years; always attacked by some or other, in every age, and always triumphant. *To him, with the Father, and the Holy Ghost, three Persons of the same Divine power, substance, and perfections, be all honour and glory, in all churches of the saints, now and for evermore.*

CONTENTS

OF THE

FIRST VOLUME.

Compare the following Texts.

I am the Lord, and there is none else, there is no God beside me, Isa. xlv. 5.

Is there a God besides me? yea, there is no God; I know not any, Isa. xlv. 8.

I am God, and there is none like me; Isa. xlv. 9. Before me there was no God formed, neither shall there be after me, Isa. xliii. 10.

The Word was God, John i. 1.

Thy throne, O God, Heb. i. 8.

Christ came, who is over all, God blessed for ever, Rom. ix. 5.

Who, being in the form of God, Phil. ii. 6.

Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, Heb. i. 3.

QUERY I.

Whether all other beings, besides the one Supreme God, be not excluded by the texts of Isaiah, (to which many more might be added,) and consequently, whether Christ can be God at all, unless he be the same with the Supreme God?

1

QUERY II.

Whether the texts of the New Testament (in the second column) do not show that he (Christ) is not excluded, and therefore must be the same God?

5

QUERY III.

Whether the word (God) in Scripture can reasonably be supposed to carry an ambiguous meaning, or to be used

in a different sense, when applied to the Father and Son, in the same Scripture, and even in the same verse? See John i. 1. 34

QUERY IV.

Whether, supposing the Scripture-notion of God to be no more than that of the Author and Governor of the universe, or whatever it be, the admitting of another to be Author and Governor of the universe, be not admitting another God, contrary to the texts before cited from Isaiah, and also to Isaiah xlii. 8. xlvi. 11. where he declares, he will not give his glory to another? 52

QUERY V.

Whether Dr. Clarke's pretence, that the authority of Father and Son being one, though they are two distinct Beings, makes them not to be two Gods, as a king upon the throne, and his son administering the father's government, are not two kings, be not trifling and inconsistent? For if the king's son be not a king, he cannot truly be called king; if he is, then there are two kings. So if the Son be not God in the Scripture-notion of God, he cannot truly be called God; and then how is the Doctor consistent with Scripture, or with himself? But if the Son be truly God, there are two Gods upon the Doctor's hypothesis, as plainly as that one and one are two: and so all the texts of Isaiah cited above, besides others, stand full and clear against the Doctor's notion. 55

Texts proving an unity of divine attributes in Father and Son; applied

To the One God.

Thou, even thou only, knowest the hearts of all the children of men, 1 Kings viii. 39.

I the Lord search the hearts, I try the reins, Jer. xvii. 10.

To the Son.

He knew all men, &c. John ii. 24. Thou knowest all things, John xvi. 30. Which knowest the hearts of all men, Acts i. 24.

I am he that searcheth the reins and the heart, Rev. ii. 3.

CONTENTS.

xiii

I am the first, and I am the last; and beside me there is no God, Isa. xliv. 6.

I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, Rev. i. 8.

King of kings, and Lord of lords, 1 Tim. vi. 15.

The mighty God, Is. x. 21.

Lord over all, Rom. x. 12.

I am the first, and I am the last, Rev. i. 17.

I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, Rev. xxii. 13.

Lord of lords, and King of kings, Rev. xvii. 14. xix. 16.

The mighty God, Is. ix. 6.

He is Lord of all, Acts x. 36.

Over all, God blessed, &c. Rom. ix. 9.

QUERY VI.

Whether the same characteristics, especially such eminent ones, can reasonably be understood of two distinct Beings, and of one infinite and independent, the other dependent and finite? 63

QUERY VII.

Whether the Father's omniscience and eternity are not one and the same with the Son's, being alike described, and in the same phrases? 70

QUERY VIII.

Whether eternity does not imply necessary existence of the Son; which is inconsistent with the Doctor's Scheme? And whether the ^aDoctor hath not made an elusive, equivocating answer to the objection, since the Son may be a necessary emanation from the Father, by the will and power of the Father, without any contradiction? Will it be one thing, and arbitrary will another. 85

QUERY IX.

Whether the divine attributes, Omniscience, Ubiquity, &c. those individual attributes, can be communicated without the divine essence, from which they are inseparable? 117

QUERY X.

Whether if they (the attributes belonging to the Son) be not

^a Reply, p. 227.

individually the same, they can be any thing more than faint resemblances of them, differing from them as finite from infinite; and then in what sense, or with what truth, can the Doctor pretend, that “^b all divine powers, “ except absolute supremacy and independency,” are communicated to the Son? And whether every being, besides the one supreme Being, must not necessarily be a creature, and finite; and whether “ all divine powers” can be communicated to a creature, infinite perfection to a finite being.

124

QUERY XI.

Whether if the Doctor means by divine powers, powers given by God (in the same sense as angelical powers are divine powers) only in a higher degree than are given to other beings; it be not equivocating, and saying nothing: nothing that can come up to the sense of those texts before cited,^c or to these following?

129

Applied to the one God.

Thou, even thou, art Lord alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their hosts, the earth, and all things that are therein, &c. Neh. ix. 6.

In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. Gen. i. 1.

To God the Son.

All things were made by him, John i. 3. By him were all things created: he is before all things, and by him all things consist, Coloss. i. 16, 17.

Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the works of thine hands, Heb. i. 10.

QUERY XII.

Whether the Creator of all things was not himself uncreated; and therefore could not be ἕξ οὐκ ὄντων, made out of nothing?

138

QUERY XIII.

Whether there can be any middle between being made out of nothing, and out of something; that is, between being

^b Script. Doctr. p. 298.^c Query V. p. 63.

out of nothing, and out of the Father's substance; between being essentially God, and being a creature; whether, consequently, the Son must not be either essentially God, or else a creature? 144

QUERY XIV.

Whether Dr. Clarke, who every where denies the consubstantiality of the Son, as absurd and contradictory, does not, of consequence, affirm the Son to be a creature ἢ οὐκ ὄντων, and so fall under his own censure, and is self-condemned? 151

QUERY XV.

Whether he also must not, of consequence, affirm of the Son, that there was a time when he was not, since God must exist before the creature; and therefore is again self-condemned, (see Prop. 16. Script. Doctr.) And whether he does not equivocate in saying, ^delsewhere, that the second Person has been always with the first; and that there has been no time, when he was not so: and lastly, whether it be not a vain and weak attempt to pretend to any middle way between the orthodox and the Arians; or to carry the Son's divinity the least higher than they did, without taking in the consubstantiality? 152

Divine worship due

To the one God.

Thou shalt have no other gods before me, Exod. xx. 3.

Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve, Matt. iv. 10.

To Christ.

They worshipped him, Luke xxiv. 52. Let all the angels of God worship him, Heb. i. 6.

That all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father, John v. 23.

QUERY XVI.

Whether by these (of the first column) and the like texts,

^d Script. Doctr. p. 438. first ed.

adoration and worship be not so appropriated to the one God, as to belong to him only? 163

QUERY XVII.

Whether, notwithstanding, worship and adoration be not equally due to Christ; and consequently, whether it must not follow, that he is the one God, and not (as the Arians suppose) a distinct inferior Being? 179

QUERY XVIII.

Whether worship and adoration, both from men and angels, was not due to him, long before the commencing of his mediatorial kingdom, as he was their Creator and Preserver; (see Col. i. 16, 17.) and whether that be not the same title to adoration which God the Father hath, as Author and Governor of the universe, upon the Doctor's own principles? 189

QUERY XIX.

Whether the Doctor hath not given a very partial account of John v. 23. founding the honour due to the Son on this only, that the Father hath committed all judgment to the Son; when the true reason assigned by our Saviour, and illustrated by several instances, is, that the Son doth the same things that the Father doth, hath the same power and authority of doing what he will; and therefore has a title to as great honour, reverence, and regard, as the Father himself hath? and it is no objection to this, that the Son is there said to do nothing of himself, or to have all given him by the Father; since it is owned that the Father is the fountain of all, from whom the Son derives, in an ineffable manner, his essence and powers, so as to be one with him. 197

QUERY XX.

Whether the Doctor need have cited three hundred texts,

wide of the purpose, to prove what nobody denies, namely, a subordination, in some sense, of the Son to the Father; could he have found but one plain text against his eternity or consubstantiality, the points in question?

211

QUERY XXI.

Whether he be not forced to supply his want of Scripture-proof by very strained and remote inferences, and very uncertain reasonings from the nature of a thing confessedly obscure and above comprehension; and yet not more so than God's eternity, ubiquity, prescience, or other attributes, which we are obliged to acknowledge for certain truths?

214

QUERY XXII.

Whether his (the Doctor's) whole performance, whenever he differs from us, be any thing more than a repetition of this assertion, that being and person are the same, or that there is no medium between Tritheism and Sabelianism? Which is removing the cause from Scripture to natural reason, not very consistently with the title of his book.

230

QUERY XXIII.

Whether the Doctor's notion of the Trinity be more clear and intelligible than the other?

The difficulty in the conception of the Trinity is, how three Persons can be one God.

Does the Doctor deny that every one of the Persons, singly, is God? No: Does he deny that God is one? No: How then are three one?

Does one and the same authority, exercised by all, make them one, numerically or individually one and the same God? That is hard to conceive how three distinct Beings,

• Clarke's Reply, p. 7.

VOL. I.

b

according to the Doctor's scheme, can be individually one God, that is, three Persons one Person.

If therefore one God necessarily signifies but one Person, the consequence is irresistible; either that the Father is that one Person, and none else, which is downright Sabelianism; or that the three Persons are three Gods.

Thus the Doctor's scheme is liable to the same difficulties with the other.

There is indeed one easy way of coming off, and that is, by saying that the Son and Holy Spirit are neither of them God, in the Scripture-sense of the word. But this is cutting the knot, instead of untying it; and is in effect to say, they are not set forth as divine Persons in Scripture.

Does the communication of divine powers and attributes from Father to Son and Holy Spirit, make them one God, the divinity of the two latter being the Father's divinity? Yet the same difficulty recurs; for either the Son and Holy Ghost have distinct attributes, and a distinct divinity of their own, or they have not: if they have, they are (upon the Doctor's principle) distinct Gods from the Father, and as much as finite from infinite, creature from Creator; and then how are they one? If they have not, then, since they have no other divinity, but that individual divinity, and those attributes which are inseparable from the Father's essence, they can have no distinct essence from the Father's; and so (according to the Doctor) will be one and the same Person, that is, will be names only.

Q. Whether this be not as unintelligible as the orthodox notion of the Trinity, and liable to the like difficulties: a communication of divine powers and attributes, without the substance, being as hard to conceive, nay, much harder, than a communication of both together? 243

QUERY XXIV.

Whether Gal. iv. 8. may not be enough to determine the dis-

pute betwixt us; since it obliged the Doctor to confess, that Christ is ^f by nature truly God, as truly as man is by nature truly man?

He equivocates, indeed, there, as usual. For, he will have it to signify that Christ is God by nature, only as having, by that nature which he derives from the Father, true divine power and dominion: that is, he is truly God by nature, as having a nature distinct from, and inferior to God's, wanting ^ε the most essential character of God, self-existence. What is this but trifling with words, and playing fast and loose? 262

QUERY XXV.

Whether it be not clear from all the genuine remains of antiquity, that the Catholic Church before the Council of Nice, and even from the beginning, did believe the eternity and consubstantiality of the Son; if either the oldest creeds, as interpreted by those that recite them; or the testimonies of the earliest writers, or the public censures passed upon heretics, or particular passages of the ancient Fathers, can amount to a proof of a thing of this nature? 268

QUERY XXVI.

Whether the Doctor did not equivocate or prevaricate strangely, in saying, ^h "The generality of writers before the Council of Nice were, in the whole, clearly on his side:" when it is manifest, they were, in the general, no farther on his side, than the allowing a subordination amounts to; no farther than our own Church is on his side, while in the main points of difference, the ETERNITY and CONSUBSTANTIALITY, they are clearly against him? that is, they were on his side, so far as we acknowledge him to be right, but no farther. 276

QUERY XXVII.

Whether the learned Doctor may not reasonably be sup-

^f Reply, p. 81.

^ε Ibid. p. 92.

^h Answer to Dr. Wells, p. 28.

posed to say, the Fathers are on his side, with the same meaning and reserve as he pretends our Church forms to favour him; that is, provided he may interpret as he pleases, and make them speak his sense, however contradictory to their own: and whether the true reason, why he does not care to admit the testimonies of the Fathers as proofs, may not be, because they are against him? 299

QUERY XXVIII.

Whether it be at all probable, that the primitive Church should mistake in so material a point as this is; or that the whole stream of Christian writers should mistake in telling us what the sense of the Church was; and whether such a cloud of witnesses can be set aside without weakening the only proof we have of the canon of Scripture, and the integrity of the sacred text? 323

QUERY XXIX.

Whether private reasoning, in a matter above our comprehension, be a safer rule to go by, than the general sense and judgment of the primitive Church, in the first three hundred years; or, supposing it doubtful what the sense of the Church was within that time, whether what was determined by a council of three hundred bishops soon after, with the greatest care and deliberation, and has satisfied men of the greatest sense, piety, and learning, all over the Christian world, for one thousand four hundred years since, may not satisfy wise and good men now? 326

QUERY XXX.

Whether, supposing the case doubtful, it be not a wise man's part to take the safer side; rather to think too highly, than too meanly of our blessed Saviour; rather to pay a modest deference to the judgment of the ancient and modern Church, than to lean to one's own understanding? 336

CONTENTS.

xxi

QUERY XXXI.

Whether any thing less than clear and evident demonstration, on the side of Arianism, ought to move a wise and good man, against so great appearances of truth on the side of orthodoxy, from Scripture, reason, and antiquity; and whether we may not wait long before we find such demonstration? 340

Postscript to the first edition. 347

A

DEFENCE OF SOME QUERIES

RELATING TO

DR. CLARKE'S

SCHEME OF THE HOLY TRINITY:

IN ANSWER TO

A CLERGYMAN IN THE COUNTRY.

Compare the following Texts.

I am the Lord, and there is none else, there is no God beside me, Isa. xlv. 5.

Is there a God besides me? yea, there is no God; I know not any, Isa. xlv. 8.

I am God, and there is none like me; Isa. xlvi. 9. Before me there was no God formed, neither shall there be after me, Isa. xliii. 10.

The Word was God, John i. 1.

Thy throne, O God, Heb. i. 8.

Christ came, who is over all, God blessed for ever, Rom. ix. 5.

Who, being in the form of God, Phil. ii. 6.

Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, Heb. i. 3.

QUERY I.

Whether all other beings, besides the one Supreme God, be not excluded by the texts of Isaiah, (to which many more might be added,) and consequently, whether Christ can be God at all, unless he be the same with the Supreme God?

THE sum of your answer to this Query is, that "the texts cited from Isaiah, in the first column, are spoken of one Person only, (p. 34.) the Person of the Father,

VOL. I.

B

“ p. 39.) And therefore all other persons, or beings, (which “ you make equivalent,) how divine soever, are necessarily “ excluded; and by consequence our Lord Jesus Christ is “ as much excluded from being the one Supreme God, as “ from being the Person of the Father.” (p. 40.)

You spend some pages in endeavouring to show, that the Person of the Father *only* is the Supreme God; and that the Person of the Son is not Supreme God. But what does this signify, except it be to lead your reader off from the point which it concerned you to speak to? Instead of answering the difficulty proposed, which was the part of a respondent, you choose to slip it over, and endeavour to put me upon the defensive; which is by no means fair. Your business was to ward off the consequence which I had pressed you with, namely, this: That if the Son be at all excluded by those texts in the first column, he is altogether excluded, and is no God at all. He cannot, upon your principles, be the same God, because he is not the same Person: he cannot be another God, because excluded by those texts. If therefore he be neither the same God, nor another God; it must follow, that he is no God. This is the difficulty which I apprehend to lie against your scheme; and which you have not sufficiently attended to.

I shall therefore charge it upon you once again, and leave you to get clear of it at leisure.

I shall take it for granted, that the design and purport of those texts, cited from Isaiah, was the same with that of the *first Commandment*; namely, to draw the people off from placing any trust, hope, or reliance in any but God, to direct them to the only proper object of worship, in opposition to all things or persons, besides the one Supreme God. “ Neither Baal nor Ashtaroth, nor any “ that are esteemed Gods by the nations, are strictly and “ properly such. Neither princes nor magistrates, how- “ ever called Gods in a loose metaphorical sense, are “ strictly or properly such. No religious service, no “ worship, no sacrifice is due to any of them: I only am

“ God, in a just sense ; and therefore I demand your homage and adoration.” Now, upon your hypothesis, we must add ; that even the *Son of God* himself, however divine he may be thought, is really no God at all, in any just and proper sense. He is no more than a *nominal* God, and stands excluded with the rest : all worship of him, and reliance upon him, will be idolatry, as much as the worship of angels, or men, or of the Gods of the Heathen would be. God the Father he is God, and he only, and “ him only shalt thou serve.” This I take to be a clear consequence from your principles, and unavoidable.

You do indeed attempt to evade it by supposing, that when the Father saith, “ there is no God besides me,” the meaning only is, that there is no *Supreme* God besides me. But will you please to consider,

1. That you have not the least ground or reason for putting this sense upon the text. It is not said, there is no other *Supreme* God besides me ; but absolutely, *no other*.

2. If this were all the meaning, then Baal or Ashtaroth, or any of the Gods of the nations, might be looked upon as *inferior deities*, and be served with a subordinate worship, notwithstanding any thing these texts say, without any peril of idolatry, or any breach of the first Commandment. Solomon might sacrifice to Ashtaroth and Milcom, to Chemosh and Moloch, provided he did but serve the God of Israel with sovereign worship, acknowledging him *Supreme*. And this might furnish the Samaritans with a very plausible excuse, even from the Law itself, for serving their own Gods in subordination to the one Supreme God ; since God had not forbidden it.

3. You may please to consider farther, that there was never any great danger of either Jew or Gentile falling into the belief of many Supreme Gods ; or into the worship of more than one as Supreme. That is a notion too

• 1 Kings xi.

silly to have ever prevailed much, even in the ignorant Pagan world. What was most to be guarded against was the worship of inferior deities, besides, or in subordination to, one Supreme. It cannot therefore reasonably be imagined, that those texts are to bear only such a sense, as leaves room for the worship of inferior divinities.

The sum then is, that by the texts of the Old Testament it is not meant only, that there is no other *Supreme* God; but absolutely *no other*: and therefore our blessed Lord must either be included and comprehended in the one Supreme God of Israel, or be entirely excluded with the other pretended or nominal deities. I shall close this argument with St. Austin's words to Maximin, the Arian Bishop, who recurred to the same solution of the difficulty which you hope to shelter yourself in.

“^b Repeat it ever so often, that the Father is greater, the Son less. We shall answer you as often, that the greater and the less make two. And it is not said, Thy greater Lord God is one Lord; but the words are, The Lord thy God is one Lord: Nor is it said, There is none other equal to me; but the words are, There is none other besides me. Either therefore acknowledge that Father and Son are one Lord God; or in plain terms deny that Christ is Lord God at all.” This is the difficulty which I want to see cleared. You produce texts to show that the Father *singly* is the Supreme God, and that Christ is excluded from being the Supreme God: but I insist upon it, that you misunderstand those texts; because the interpretation you give of them is not reconcilable with other texts; and because it leads to such absurdities, as are too shocking even for yourself to admit.

^b Clama quantum vis, Pater est major, Filius minor, respondetur tibi; duo tamen sunt major et minor. Nec dictum est Dominus Deus tuus *major* Dominus unus est: sed dictum est Dominus Deus tuus Dominus unus est. Neque dictum est, non est alius *equalis* mihi, sed dictum est, non est alius præter me. Aut ergo confitere Patrem et Filium unum esse Dominum Deum, aut aperte nega Dominum Deum esse Christum. *August. l. ii. c. 23. p. 727.*

In short, either you prove too much, or you prove nothing.

QUERY II.

Whether the texts of the New Testament (in the second column) do not show that he (Christ) is not excluded, and therefore must be the same God?

THE texts cited, if well considered, taking in what goes before or after, are enough to show that Christ is not excluded among the *nominal* gods, who have no claim or title to our service, homage, or adoration. He is God before the world was, *God over all, blessed for ever*, Maker of the world, and worshipped by the angels; and therefore certainly he is not excluded among the *nominal* Gods, whom to worship were idolatry. But since all are excluded, as hath been before shown, except the one Supreme God, it is very manifest, that he is the same with the one Supreme God. Not the same *Person* with the Father, as you groundlessly object to us, but *another* Person in the same Godhead; and therefore the Supreme God is more Persons than one. You argue, (p. 40.) that “if Christ “ be God at all, it unavoidably follows, that he cannot be “ the same individual God with the Supreme God, the Fa- “ ther.” By *individual God*, you plainly mean the same *individual divine Person*, which is only playing upon a word, mistaking our sense, and fighting with your own shadow. Who pretends that the Son is the same Person with the Father? All we assert is, that he is the same Supreme God; that is, partaker of the same undivided Godhead. It will be proper here briefly to consider the texts, by which you attempt to prove, that the Son is excluded from being the one Supreme God: only let me remind you, once again, that you forgot the part you was to bear. Your business was not to *oppose*, but to *respond*; not to raise objections against our scheme, but to answer those which were brought against your own. You observe ^cfrom John viii. 54. Matt. xxii. 31, 32. and Acts

^c Page 34.

iii. 13. that God the Father was the God of the Jews, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Very right. But how does it appear that the Son was not? Could you have brought ever a text to prove, that God the Son was not God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, I must then have owned that you had argued pertinently.

You next cite John xvii. 3. 1 Cor. viii. 6. Eph. iv. 6. to prove, that the Father is sometimes styled the *only true* God; which is all that they prove. But you have not shown that he is so called in opposition to the Son, or exclusive of him. It may be meant in opposition to idols only, as all antiquity has thought; or it may signify, that the Father is ^d *primarily*, not *exclusively*, the only true God, as the first Person of the blessed Trinity, the Root and Fountain of the other two. You observe ^e that “in these and many other places, the one God is the Person of the Father, in contradistinction to the Person of the Son.” It is very certain, that the Person of the Father is there distinguished from the Person of the Son; because they are distinctly named: and you may make what use you please of the observation against the Sabellians, who make but one Person of two. But what other use you can be able to make of it, I see not; unless you can prove this negative proposition, that no sufficient reason can be assigned for styling the Father the *only* God, without supposing that the Son is excluded. Novatian’s remark upon one of your texts, John xvii. 3. (“Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent”) may deserve your notice. ^f He applies the title of the *only true God* to both, since they are joined together in the same sentence, and eternal life is made to depend upon the knowing of one, as much as of the other. He did not see that peculiar force of the exclusive term (*only*) which

^d Vid. Tertull. cont. Prax. c. 18.

^e Page 34.

^f Si noluisset se etiam Deum intelligi, cur addidit, et quem misisti Jesum Christum, nisi quoniam et Deum accipi voluit. *Novat. Trin.* c. 24.

See the same argument illustrated and improved by the great Athanasius, *Orat.* iii. p. 558. vol. i. edit. Bened.

you insist so much upon. He knew better; being well acquainted with the language and the doctrine of the Christian Church. His construction, to speak modestly, is at least as plausible as yours. If you can find no plainer or clearer texts against us, you will not be able to help your cause. As to 1 Cor. viii. 6. all that can be reasonably gathered from it, is, that the Father is there emphatically styled *one God*; but without design to exclude the Son from being God also: as the Son is emphatically styled *one Lord*; but without design to exclude the *Father* from being Lord also[†]. Reasons may be assigned for the emphasis in both cases; which are too obvious to need reciting. One thing you may please to observe; that the discourse there, v. 4, 5. is about idols, and nominal gods and lords, which have no claim or title to religious worship. *These* the Father and Son are both equally distinguished from: which may insinuate at least to us, that the texts of the Old or New Testament, declaring the unity and excluding others, do not exclude the Son, “by whom are all things:” so that here again you have unfortunately quoted a passage, which, instead of making for you, seems rather against you. You have another, which is Eph. iv. 6. “One God and Father of all, “who is above all, and through all, and in you all.” A famous passage, which has generally been understood by the^h ancients of the whole Trinity. *Above all*, as Father; *through all*, by the Word; and *in all*, by the Holy Ghost. However that be, this is certain, that the Father may be reasonably called the *one*, or *only* God, without the least diminution of the Son’s real Divinity: a fuller account of which matter you may please to see in Dr. Fiddes’s

† Si enim, ut existimant Ariani, Deus Pater solus est Deus, eadem consequentia, solus erit Dominus Jesus Christus, et nec Pater erit Dominus nec Filius Deus. Sed absit, ut non sit, vel in Dominatione Deitas, vel in Deitate Dominatio. Unus est Dominus et unus est Deus: quia Patris et Filii Dominatio una Divinitas est. *Hieron. Comment. in Ephes.* iv. 5.

^h Irenæus l. v. c. 18. p. 315. ed. Bened. Hippolytus contr. Noet. c. xiv. p. 16. Fabric. ed. Athanasius Ep. ad Serap. p. 676. Marius Victorin. B. P. tom. iv. p. 258. Hieronym. tom. iv. p. 1. p. 362. ed. Bened.

Body of Divinity, vol. i. p. 383, &c. As to the remaining texts cited by you, some are meant of Christ as *Man*, or as *Mediator*: and those which certainly respect him in a higher capacity, may be accounted for on this principle, that we reserve, with the ancients, a *priority of order* to the Father, the first of the blessed Three.

This may serve for a general key to explain the texts mentioned, or others of like import. I cannot, in this place, descend to particulars, without running too far into the defensive; and leading the reader off from what we began with. Had you pleased to observe the rules of strict method in dispute, you should not here have brought texts to balance mine; but should have reserved them for another place. All you had to do, was to examine the texts I had set down in the second column; and to give such a sense of them as might comport with your own hypothesis, or might be unserviceable to mine. You should have shown that John i. 1. Heb. i. 8. and Rom. ix. 5. may fairly be understood of a *nominal* God only; one that stands excluded, by the texts of the first column, from all pretence or title to religious homage and adoration: for, as I have before observed, he must either be entirely excluded, or not at all: and if he be not excluded, he is comprehended in the one Supreme God, and is one with him: or, at least, you should have set before the reader your interpretation of those texts, and have shown it to be consistent with the texts of Isaiah. For example, take John i. 1.

“ In the beginning was the WORD, and the WORD
 “ was with the ONE SUPREME GOD, and the WORD was
 “ ANOTHER GOD inferior to him, a CREATURE of the
 “ GREAT GOD: all things were CREATED by this
 “ CREATURE,” &c.

This interpretation, which is really yours, as shall be shown in the sequel, is what you should have fairly owned, and reconciled, if possible, with the texts of Isaiah, (purposely designed to exclude all inferior, as well as coordinate Gods,) and particularly with Isaiah xliii. 10.

“ Before me there was no God formed, neither shall there “ be AFTER ME:” words very full and expressive against any Creature-Gods. But, instead of this, you tell us, God could not be *with himself*, as if any of us said, or thought, that was St. John’s meaning. Thus you industriously run from the point, misrepresent our sense, and artfully conceal your own. In this slight manner, you pass over the three first texts already mentioned; but you think you have some advantage of the Querist, in respect of Phil. ii. 6. and Heb. i. 3. and, not content to say, that they come not up to the point, you are very positive, that “ they prove the direct contrary to that for which “ they are alleged;” and express your wonder, that “ they “ should be offered.” Whether you really wonder at a thing, which no man who is at all acquainted with books and learning can wonder at; or whether only you affect that way of talking, I determine not; but proceed to consider what you have to offer against my sense of the two texts.

Upon Phil. ii. 6. you press me with the authority of Novatian; whom, I do assure you, I very much respect, as I do all the primitive writers. As to Novatian’s interpretation of Phil. ii. 6. it shall be considered presently; only, in the first place, let me observe to you, that, as to the main of my argument, built upon that and other texts, he was certainly on my side. He ⁱ cites Isaiah xlv. 5. and understands it of God the Father; not so as to exclude the Son from being comprehended in the *one God*, but in opposition to false Gods only. He proves the divinity of Christ from his receiving worship of the Church, and his being every where present, ^k besides many other topics;

ⁱ Ego Deus, et non est præter me. Qui per eundem Prophetam refert: Quoniam majestatem meam non dabo alteri, ut omnes cum suis figmentis ethnicos excludat et hæreticos. Cap. iii. p. 708. See also the citation above, p. 6.

^k Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo adest ubique invocatus, cum hæc hominis natura non sit, sed Dei, ut adesse omni loco possit? Cap. xiv. p. 715.

and makes him ^l*consubstantial* with God the Father. This is as much as I mean by his being *one* with the *Supreme* God; and therefore I have nothing to fear from this writer, who agrees so well with me in the main, and cannot be brought to bear evidence against me, unless, at the same time, he be found to contradict himself. This being premised, let us now see what he says to the text above mentioned, Phil. ii. 6. "He saith of the Son, (I use your own words, p. 35.) "that though he was in the form "of God, yet he never compared himself with God his Father." You have translated the last words, as if they had run thus; *Deo, Patri suo*. The words are, "Nunquam se "Deo Patri aut comparavit, aut contulit: Never compared "himself with God the Father." The reason follows, "Memor se esse ex suo Patre: Remembering he was from "his Father;" that is, that he was *begotten*, and not *unbegotten*. He never pretended to an *equality* with the Father, in respect of his *original*, knowing himself to be *second* only in order, not the *first* Person of the ever blessed Trinity. You may see the like expressions in ^mHilary and ⁿPhœbadius; who can neither of them be suspected of Arianizing in that point. You afterwards cite some other expressions of Novatian, particularly this: "Duo equales inventi duos "Deos merito reddidissent." Which you might have rendered thus: "Had they both been equal, (in respect of "original, both unbegotten,) they had undoubtedly been "two Gods."

See the ^owhole passage as it lies in the author himself,

^l Unus Deus ostenditur verus et æternus Pater, a quo solo hæc vis Divinitatis emissa etiam in Filium tradita et directa rursus per *substantiæ communionem* ad Patrem revolvitur. Father is here styled emphatically the *one* God, but still comprehending, not excluding the Son, consubstantial with him. Ch. xxxi. p. 730.

^m Hilary Trin. l. iii. c. 4. p. 810. ed. Bened.

ⁿ Phœbad. p. 304.

^o Si enim natus non fuisset, innatus comparatus cum eo qui esset innatus, æquatione in utroque ostensa, duos faceret innatos, et ideo duos faceret Deos. Si non genitus esset, collatus cum eo (qui) genitus non esset et

and not maimed and mutilated as you quote it, from Dr. Clarke. There is nothing more in it than this, that Father and Son are not two Gods, because they are not both *unoriginated*: which is the common answer made by the Catholics to the charge of Tritheism; not only before, but after the Nicene Council; as might be made appear by a cloud of witnesses, were it needful. What you are pleased to call “a most strong testimony against an “absolute coequality,” (meaning this passage of Novatian,) is, if rightly understood, and compared with what goes before and after, a most strong testimony of such a *coequality* as we contend for. And therefore Dr. Whitby, having formerly cited the whole paragraph, as a full and clear testimony of the Son’s *real* divinity, concludes thus. The author, says he, in this passage, “*P* does, in the “plainest words imaginable, declare that Christ is God, “*equal* to the Father in every respect, excepting only “that he is God *of God*.” The doctor indeed has since changed his mind; and now talks as confidently the other way, upon [†] this very passage. Whether he was more likely to see clearly then, or since, I leave to others to judge, who will be at the pains to compare his former with some of his later writings.

You have given us the sum of the 31st chapter of Novatian, “as it stands collected by the learned Dr. Clarke in “his excellent answer to Mr. Nelson’s friend.” You may next please to consult the no less excellent reply, by Mr. Nelson’s friend, p. 170, &c. where you may probably meet with satisfaction.

But to return to our text, Phil. ii. 6. The words, *ὄχι*

æquales inventi, duos Deos merito reddidissent non geniti; atque ideo duos Christus reddidisset Deos, si sine origine esset, ut Pater, inventus, et ipse principium omnium, ut Pater, duo faciens principia, duos ostendisset nobis consequenter et Deos. Cap. 31. Conf. Hilar. de Trin. p. 1040. Neque ex innascibilitate innascibili cœqualem, sed ex generatione unigeniti non disparem.

[†] Ubi verbis disertissimis ostendit (Novatianus) Christum esse Deum, Patri æqualem paremque, eo tantummodo excepto, quod sit Deus de Deo. *Whit. Tract. de Ver. Chr. Deitate, p. 67.*

[†] Whitby, *Disquisitio Modest. p. 164.*

ἀρπαγμὸν ἠγάσαστο τὸ εἶναι Ἰσα Θεῶ, you translate; “He did not affect, did not claim, did not assume, take upon him, or eagerly desire, to be honoured as God.” Afterwards, (p. 36.) “He never thought fit to claim to himself divinity,” or more literally, you say, “he never thought the divinity a thing to be so caught at by him, as to equal himself with God his Father.” This you give both as Novatian’s sense, and as the true sense of the text. And you endeavour to confirm it from the authorities of Grotius, Tillotson, Whitby, and Clarke; who, by the way, are very different from each other in their interpretations of this place, hardly two of them agreeing together. † However, not to stand upon niceties, I may yield to you your own interpretation of this passage, “did not affect to be honoured as God;” for the stress of the cause does not seem so much to lie in the interpretation of those words, as of the words foregoing viz. ὁς ἐν μορφῇ Θεῆ ὑπέσχετο. “Who being in the form of God,” that is, “truly God, (which best answers to the antithesis following, the form of a servant signifying as much as truly man,) and therefore might justly have assumed to appear as God, and to be always honoured as such, yet did not do it, at the time of his incarnation; but for a pattern of humility, chose rather to veil his glories, and, in appearance, to empty himself of them, taking upon him human nature, and becoming a servant of God in that capacity,” &c. What is there in this paraphrase or interpretation, either disagreeable to the scope of the place, or the context, or to the sober sentiments of Catholic antiquity, not only after, but before the Council of Nice; as may appear from the testimonies cited in the †margin? Now if this be the sense

† I am persuaded that the words may very justly be translated; *he did not insist upon his equality with God, but condescended, &c.*

‡ Tertullian’s recital of this text, and comment upon it, are worth remarking. *Plane de substantia Christi putant et hic Marcionitæ suffragari Apostolum sibi, quod phantasma carnis fuerit in Christo, quum dicit, Quod in effigie Dei constitutus non rapinam existimavit parari Deo, sed exhausit semetipsum accepta effigie servi, non veritate; et similitudine hominis, non*

of it, which I might farther confirm by the authorities of Athanasius, Jerom, Austin, Chrysostom, Theophylact, Œcumenius, and others of the ancients, besides † Bishop Pearson and † Bishop Bull among the moderns, why should you wonder to find it again cited in the same cause, being so full and pertinent to the matter in hand? Next, we may proceed to the other text, which you as groundlessly pretend to be directly contrary to that for which it is alleged. It is Heb. i. 3. “Who being the “brightness of his glory, and the express image of his per- “son,” &c. Here you are so obliging as to cite only one passage out of Eusebius against me, I would say, for me. Eusebius, writing against the Sabellians, presses them with this text, and argues thus from it. “The image, “and that whereof it is the image, cannot both be the “same thing, (in the Sabellian sense,) but they are *two “substances, and two things, and two powers:*” from whence he rightly infers, or plainly means to do, that the *Father* is not the *Son*, but that they are *really* distinct. What is there in this at all repugnant to what the Querist maintains? The force of your objection lies, I suppose, in this, that Father and Son are called δύο ὁσίας, δύο πράγματα, and δύο δυνάμεις, inconsistently, you imagine, with *individual* consubstantiality.

I will not be bound to vindicate every expression to be met with in Eusebius: but, allowing for the time when it was wrote, before the sense of those words was fixed

in homine; *et figura inventus ut homo, non substantia, id est, non carne.* — Numquid ergo et hic qua in effigie eum Dei collocat? Æque non erit Deus Christus vere, si nec homo vere fuit in effigie hominis constitutus. *Contr. Marc.* l. v. c. 20. p. 486. Non sibi magni aliquid deputat quod ipse quidem æqualis Deo, et unum cum Patre, est. *Orig. in Epist. ad Rom.* l. 5. Θεὸς μὴν κενώσας ἑαυτὸν ἐκ τῆ ἰσῆαι Ἰου Θεῷ. *Concil. Antioch. Labb.* vol. i. p. 848. Ὁ μωσαϊκὸς τῷ Θεῷ λόγος, Θεὸς ἐπάχων ἰα Θεῷ, κενώσων ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐν ἀδελφῷ ταύτῃ σάρκα ἡμῶσιν. *Hippolytus*, vol. ii. p. 29. Fabrīc.

† On the Creed, Article 2.

* Def. Fid. N. 49. 70. Prim. Trad. p. 38. Qui unus locus, si recte expendatur, ad omnes hæreses adversus Jesu Christi Domini nostri personam repellendas sufficit. *Def. Fid.* p. 37.

and determined, as it has been since; there may be nothing in all this, which signifies more than what the Catholic Church has always meant by *two persons*; and what all must affirm, who believe a real Trinity. So ^x Pierius called Father and Son *ἑστας δύο*, meaning no more than we do by two distinct Persons: and Alexander Bishop of Alexandria, the first champion for the Catholic cause against Arius, in his letter to Alexander Bishop of Constantinople, scruples not to call Father and Son ^y *δύο πράγματα*; and Tertullian intimates that they are ^z *duæ res, sed conjunctæ*; and Methodius uses ^a *δύο δυνάμεις*, meaning two Persons. These or the like strong expressions, occurring in the Catholic writers, were only to guard the more carefully against Sabellianism, the prevailing heresy of those times. But after Arianism arose, there was greater danger of the opposite extreme: and therefore they began to soften this manner of expression, lest any should be led to think, that the Persons of the Trinity were so distinct as to be independent of, separate from, and aliene to each other. Thus instead of *δύο φῶτα*, which might be innocent before, and is used by ^b Origen, they chose rather commonly to say, ^c *φῶς ἐκ φωτός*: yet sometimes not scrupling the former way of expression ^d. Rather than say, *duæ essentiaë*, which might be liable to mistakes; they would say, *Essentia de Essentia*, as *Deus de Deo*. The design of all which was, so to assert a *real* distinction, as not to teach three absolute, independent, or separate substances; so to maintain the distinction of persons, as not to divide the substance. Three *real* Persons is what I, what every Trinitarian, what all sound Catholics assert. Now let us return to the text, Heb. i. 3. Having shown you that Eusebius's comment is not pertinent to our present dispute, nor at all affects the cause that I maintain, which, I assure you, is not Sabel-

^x See Phot. Cod. 119. p. 300.

^z Contr. Prax. c. viij. p. 504.

^b Comment. in Joh. p. 70.

^d Vid. Cyril. Alex. Thess. p. 110.

^y Apud Theod. l. i. c. 4.

^a Phot. Cod. 235. p. 137.

^c See Athanas. vol. i. p. 553.

lianism: now let me proceed a little farther, to vindicate my use of that text; which, you pretend, is strong against me. Origen perhaps may be of some credit with you; and the more for being admired by the Arians, and much censured by many of the Catholics, but after his own times. ^c His comment, upon a parallel text to this, together with this also, is pretty remarkable. “If he (Christ) be the image of the *invisible*, the image itself “must be *invisible* too. I will be bold to add, that since “he is the resemblance of his Father, there could *not* “have been a time when he was *not*.” He goes on to argue, that since God is light, and Christ the ἀπαύγασμα, or shining forth of that light, quoting this text, that they could never have been separate one from the other, but must have been coeternal.

^f Dionysius of Alexandria, another ante-Nicene writer, draws the very same inference from the same text. And Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, in his circular letter, extant in Athanasius, makes the like use of it. The latter part of the text especially, the words, “express image “of his person,” were very frequently and triumphantly urged by the Catholics against the Arians: by ^h Alexander of Alexandria, ⁱ Athanasius, ^k Hilary, ^l Basil, ^m Gregory Nyssen, ⁿ Gregory Nazianzen, ^o Cyril, and others.

This may satisfy you, that it was neither strange nor new, to allege this text in favour of Christ’s divinity. When you have any thing farther to object, it shall be fairly examined. In the mean while, let it stand, to support the second query; which returns upon you, and expects a fuller answer. That it may come to you recom-

^c Apud Athan. Decret. Syn. Nic. vol. i. p. 233.

^f Ἀπαύγασμα δὲ ὡν φωτὶς αἰθέριος, πάντως καὶ αὐτὸς αἰθέριος ἔστιν. Ἰσως γὰρ αἰὶ τοῦ φωτὸς, δῆλον ὡς ἔστιν αἰὶ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα. Apud Athanas. de Sent. Dionys. p. 253.

^g Πῶς ἀνόμοιος τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῷ πατρὶ. ἢ ὡν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία καὶ ἀπαύγασμα τῷ πατρὶ. Apud Athanas. vol. i. p. 399.

^h Epist. ad Alexand. Theodor. p. 17.

ⁱ Orat. i. p. 424. de Synod. p. 743.

^k De Trin. p. 975. 1085. 1159.

^l Contr. Eunom. p. 28. 89.

^m Ibid. p. 460.

ⁿ Orat. 36.

^o Dial. 5. de Trin.

mended in the best manner, and in the best company, I shall here subjoin the testimonies of the ante-Nicene writers, all declaring that the Son is not excluded from being the *one God*, but is included and comprehended therein: that is, though the one God *primarily* denotes the Father, yet not *exclusively*, but comprehends the Son too. Now, as often as the primitive writers speak of Father and Son together, as the one God, in the singular, they bear witness to this truth. See the testimonies of Irenæus, Athenagoras, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen, collected in ^p Dr. Fiddes's Body of Divinity; to which may be added, ^q Hippolytus, ^r Lactantius, and even Eusebius himself, who acknowledged ^s *one God in three Persons*, as Socrates informs us.

I proceed next to other testimonies more expressly declaring, that the Son is not excluded from being the one Supreme God, by the several texts of Scripture, which assert the unity; but is always understood or implied, as comprehended in the same one God. ^t Irenæus says, "that the Holy Scriptures declare the *one and only* God, excluding all others, to have made all things by HIS WORD." Others are excluded, but not his *Word*, that is, *his Son*, by whom he made all things, as Irenæus constantly understands it. At other times, he says, "God ^u made all things *by himself*; interpreting *himself*, by *his Word* and by *his Wisdom*; that is, *his Son*, and the

^p Vol. i. p. 387. &c.

^q Οικονομία συμφωνίας συνάγεται εις ἓνα Θεόν, οὗ γὰρ ἕστι ὁ Θεός. ὁ γὰρ κελύων πατὴρ, ὁ δὲ ὑπακούων υἱός, τὸ δὲ συντίθει ἅγιον πνεῦμα. Ὁ δὲ πατὴρ ἐστὶ πάντων, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς διὰ πάντων, τὸ δὲ ἅγιον πνεῦμα ἐν πάντων. Ἄλλως τι ἓνα Θεὸν νομίσαι μὴ δυναμῶσα, ἢ ἐν μὴ ἑνὸς πατρὸς, καὶ υἱῶ καὶ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι πιστεύομεν. *Hippol. contr. Noet.* p. 15, 16. Fabric. edit.

^r Lib. iv. c. 29.

^s Ἐνα Θεὸν ἐν τριῶν ὑποστάσει. *Socr. E. H.* l. i. c. 23. p. 48.

^t Universæ Scripturæ—unum et solum Deum, ad excludendos alios, prædicent omnia fecisse per *Verbum Suum*, &c. l. ii. c. 27. p. 155. Bened. edit.

^u Fecit ea per semetipsum: hoc est per Verbum et Sapientiam suam. Adest enim ei semper Verbum et Sapientia, Filius et Spiritus, per quos, et in quibus omnia libere et sponte fecit, lib. iv. cap. 20. p. 253.

“*Holy Spirit.*” Certainly, he could not think that God, in his declarations of the unity, meant to exclude what was so near to him, as to be justly (not in a Sabellian sense) interpreted *himself*. Many more passages of the like import might be cited from this primitive and excellent writer. I shall only add a † passage or two to show, that he looked upon the Son as the *only true* God, as well as the Father. He observes, that the Holy Scriptures never call any person absolutely God or Lord, besides the *only true God*; and yet presently after takes notice, that both Father and Son are by the same Scriptures absolutely so called. See the place in the margin: for though *absolutely* be not there expressed, yet it is necessarily implied, and is undoubtedly the author’s meaning.

We may go on to Tertullian, who is so full and clear to our purpose, that nothing can be more so. Out of many passages which might be cited, I shall here content myself with one out of his book against Praxeas. “* There

† Nunquam neque Prophetæ neque Apostoli alium Deum nominaverunt, vel Dominum appellaverunt, præter verum et solum Deum. L. iii. c. 8. p. 182. Neque igitur Dominus, neque Spiritus Sanctus neque Apostoli eum qui non esset Deus, definitive et absolute Deum nominassent aliquando nisi easset vere Deus. L. iii. c. 6.

Now see what follows.

Utrosque Dei appellatione signavit Spiritus et eum qui ungitur, Filium, et eum qui ungit Patrem. L. iii. c. 6. p. 180.

This Father goes on, in the same chapter, to produce several other instances from the Holy Scripture, to prove that the Son is called (definitively and absolutely) God. That is plainly his meaning, as any man may see by looking into the chapter. I may add, that he applies the title of Solus Deus to Christ. L. v. c. 17. p. 314.

* Igitur unus Deus Pater, et alius absque eo non est: quod ipse inferens, non Filium negat, sed alium Deum. Cæterum alius a Patre Filius non est. Denique, inspice sequentia hujusmodi pronuntiationum, et invenias fere ad idolorum factores atque cultores definitionem earum pertinere; ut multitudinem falsorum Deorum unio divinitatis expellat, habens tamen Filium quanto individuum et inseparatum a Patre, tanto in Patre reputandum, etsi non nominatum. At quin si nominasset illum, separasset, ita dicens, Alius præter me non est, nisi Filius meus. Alium enim etiam Filium fecisset, quem de aliis excepisset. Puta solem dicere: Ego sol, et alius præter me non est, ni radius meus; nonne denotasses vanitatem; quasi non et radius in

“ is therefore one God the Father, and there is none
 “ *other* besides him ; by which he does not mean to ex-
 “ clude the Son, but *another* God. Now the *Son* is not
 “ *another* from the Father. Furthermore, do but observe
 “ the drift and tendency of this kind of expressions, and
 “ you will find, for the most part, that they concern only
 “ the makers and worshippers of idols ; that the divine
 “ unity may exclude the multitude of false gods, while it
 “ includes the Son ; who, inasmuch as he is undivided
 “ and inseparable from the Father, is to be understood as
 “ implied in the Father, though he be not particularly
 “ named. Farther ; had he named the Son in this case,
 “ it had been tantamount to separating him from himself :
 “ suppose he had said, There is none *other* besides me,
 “ except *my Son* ; he would in effect have declared him to
 “ be another, (or aliene,) by excepting him in that manner
 “ out of others. Suppose the sun to say, I am the sun,
 “ and there is not another besides me, except my own
 “ ray ; would not you have marked the impertinence ; as
 “ if the ray were not to be reckoned to the sun, as in-
 “ cluded in it ?” Here you see plainly what Tertullian
 means ; namely, that the Son is so much one with the
 Father, that he cannot be supposed to be excluded among
 other deities : he is not *another*, but *the same* God with
 the Father : and yet this he asserts in a dispute against
 Praxeas, one of the same principles, in the main, with
 Noetus and Sabellius : so careful was he not to run things
 into the opposite extreme. He takes care so to assert the
 Son to be the *same God* with the Father, as not to make
 him the *same Person* : and on the other hand, while he
 maintains the distinction of Persons, he does not forget to
 keep up the true Catholic doctrine of the unity of sub-
 stance.

I shall next cite Athenagoras : this learned and ju-

sole deputetur. Cap. xviii. p. 510. Compare Irenæus, l. iv. c. 6. p. 234, 235.
 Non ergo alius erat qui cognoscebatur, et alius qui dicebat *nemo cognoscit
 Patrem, sed unus et idem, omnia subjiciente ei Patre, et ab omnibus accipi-
 ens testimonium quoniam vere homo, et quoniam vere Deus*—.

dicious writer, having proved at large that there is but one God, the Father, and that the Christians acknowledged no other God; yet immediately adds, *Υνοῦμεν γὰρ καὶ υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ*, cap. ix. p. 37. as much as to say, we comprehend and include the Son in that one God; we are always to be understood with this reserve, or ^z salvo, to the divinity of the Son; as does clearly appear from what follows in the same chapter, and in the next to it, where the Son is called ^a the Mind and Word of the Father, and declared to be ^b uncreated and ^c eternal. And in ^d another place he very plainly comprehends both in the *one God*. To avoid prolixity, I shall content myself with ^c referring only to the passages in others of the Ante-Nicene writers, leaving you to consult them at your leisure, if you can make any doubt of so clear a case. As to the Post-Nicene Fathers, Athanasius, Basil, the Gregories, Jerom, Austin, Chrysostom, &c. their sentiments are well known in the present point; and how they do not only reject, but abhor the principles which you are endeavouring to revive. However, I shall transcribe one passage out of Athanasius, part whereof has been given above, which may serve as a comment upon the Catholics which went before him, whose sentiments he was perfectly well acquainted with, and had thoroughly imbibed.

“^f When the prophet, speaking of the creation, saith, “Which *alone* spreadeth out the heavens,” Job. ix. 8. and when God says, “I *alone* stretch forth the heavens,” Isa.

^y Parallel to which is that in Athanasius, *Orat.* iii. p. 558. *Νοῦται δὲ εὐν τῷ μόνῳ καὶ ἰ υἱός*. And again: *Ἐν τῷ ἰνι, καὶ μόνῳ, καὶ πρῶτῳ ἐπιὸν νοῦται ἰ λόγος*. See Tertull. *contr. Prax.* c. 19.

^z Salvo enim filio, recte unicum Deum potest determinasse cujus est Filius. *Tertull. adv. Prax.* c. 18.

^a *Νῦς καὶ λόγος τῷ πατρί.* Cap. x. p. 39.

^b *Οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον.* ^c *Ἄιδιος.*

^d *Θεὸν ἔγοντες τὸν πατέρα τῷ τοῦ παντός καὶ εἰς καὶ αὐτῷ λόγῳ.* P. 122.

Compare p. 40.

^e Clemens Alexandr. p. 129. 135. 142. Origen. *contr. Cels.* l. viii. p. 386. et alibi. Hippolytus *contr. Noet.* passim. Novatian. c. 3. Dionysius Romanus, apud Athanas. Dionysius Alexand. apud Athanasium, p. 254.

^f Athanas. *Orat.* 3. *contr. Arian.* p. 558.

“ xliv. 24. it is very manifest to every man, that in him, “ who is said to be *alone*, the *Word* of that *alone* is also “ signified, in whom all things were made, and without “ whom nothing was made. If therefore the heavens “ were made by the *Word*, and yet God says, *I alone* ; “ and the Son, by whom the heavens were made, is un- “ derstood to have been with the *alone* God; for the same “ reason also, if it be said, *one God*, and *I alone*, and *I the* “ *first*, we are undoubtedly to understand, that in the *one*, “ *alone*, and *first*, is comprehended the *Word*, as efful- “ gency, ἀπαύγασμα, is implied in light.” Athanasius’s reasoning in this passage is so like ε Tertullian’s upon the same head, that one might think he had borrowed it from him. But indeed it is so entirely conformable to the true and genuine sentiments of the Catholics before him, that it may justly pass for the general sense of all.

To confirm what hath been said, I shall use one argument more, before I pass on to another query ; such as, if carefully considered, may be sufficient to silence all farther doubt or scruple, with regard to the sense of the Ante-Nicene writers.

It is well known, that they ever looked upon the Son, as the God of the Jews, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Many particular testimonies may be cited in proof of the fact, which, for brevity sake, I pass over ; and proceed to a more general proof drawn from their citing of texts out of the Old Testament, in which the God of the Jews is certainly spoken of ; and applying them to the Person of Christ, the second Person of the ever blessed Trinity.

“ ^h They heard the voice of the Lord God walking in “ the garden—And the Lord God called unto Adam,” &c. Gen. iii. 8, 9.

“ ⁱ The Lord appeared to Abram, and said unto him, I

ε Tertull. contr. Prax. c. 19.

^h Theophil. Antioch. p. 129. ed. Ox. Tertullian, adv. Prax. c. 16.

ⁱ Clem. Alex. Pædag. lib. i. c. 7. p. 131. Euseb. Demonstr. Ev. l. v. c. 9. Eccl. Hist. l. i. c. 2.

“ am the Almighty God; walk before me, and be thou perfect,” Gen. xvii. 1, 2.

“^k And the Lord appeared unto him in the plains of Mamre. The Lord said unto Abraham,” &c. Gen. xviii. 1, 13.

“^l The Lord rained upon Sodom and upon Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven,” Gen. xix. 24.

“^m And Abraham—stood before the Lord,” &c. Gen. xix. 27.

“ⁿ And God said unto Abraham,” &c. Gen. xxi. 12.

“^o And, behold, the Lord stood above it, and said, I am the Lord God of Abraham thy Father, and the God of Isaac,” Gen. xxviii. 13.

“^p I am the God of Bethel, where thou anointedst the pillar,” &c. Gen. xxxi. 13.

“^q And God said unto Jacob, Arise, go up to Bethel, —and make there an altar to God, that appeared unto thee,” &c. Gen. xxxv. 1.

“^r God called unto him out of the bush. He said,— I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob,” &c. Exod. iii. 4, 6.

“^s And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM.—

^k Just. Mart. p. 213. Sylburg. ed. Novat. c. 26. Tertull. Prax. c. 16, 17. Euseb. Dem. E. l. v. c. 9. Epist. Synod. Antioch. Labb. tom. i. p. 845.

^l Just. Mart. p. 215. Irenæus, l. iii. c. 6. p. 180. Tertull. Prax. c. 13. 16. Euseb. Eccl. Hist. l. i. c. 2. Novat. c. 21. 26.

^m Just. Mart. p. 216.

ⁿ Just. Mart. Dial. p. 162. ed. Jeb. Novat. c. 26.

^o Just. Mart. p. 218. Clem. Alex. Pæd. l. i. c. 7. p. 131.

^p Just. Mart. 218. Clem. Alex. Pæd. l. i. c. 7. p. 132. Novat. c. 27. Euseb. Demon. Ev. l. v. c. 10. Epist. Synod. Antioch. Labb. tom. i. p. 848.

^q Just. Mart. 218. Cyprian. Test. l. ii. c. 6. p. 35. ed. Oxon.

^r Just. Mart. p. 220. Irenæus, l. iii. c. 6. p. 180. l. iv. c. 12. p. 241. l. iv. c. 5. p. 232. Tertull. Prax. c. 16. Epist. Synod. Antioch. Labb. tom. i. p. 348. Origen. in Joh. p. 32.

^s Irenæus, ubi supra. That is, he must of consequence understand this of Christ as well as ver. 4. 8. 19. (See True Scripture Doctrine continued, p. 159, 160.) Tertull. adv. Prax. c. 17. Just. Mart. Apol. l. p. 123. Ox. ed. Euseb. contr. Marcel. l. ii. c. 20, 21.

“ The Lord God of your Fathers, the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, appeared,” Exod. iii. 14, 16.

“ † I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the name of God Almighty, but by my name Jehovah, was I not known unto them,” Exod. vi. 3.

“ † I am the Lord thy God, which brought thee out of the land of Egypt,” Exod. xx. 2.

“ † God of Israel,” Exod. xxiv. 10.

“ † The Lord strong and mighty, the Lord mighty in battle. The Lord of hosts, he is the King of glory,” Psalm xxiv. 8, 10.

“ † Be still, and know that I am God: I will be exalted,” &c. Psalm xlv. 10.

“ † God is gone up with a shout, the Lord (Jehovah)” &c. Psalm xlvii. 5.

“ † The mighty God, even the Lord, hath spoken— Our God shall come, and shall not keep silence,” &c. Psalm l. 1, 3.

“ † Let God arise, let his enemies,” &c. “ Sing unto God, sing praises,” &c. Psalm lxxviii. 1, 4.

“ † In Judah is God known,” &c. Psalm lxxvi. 1.

“ † God standeth in the congregation of the mighty; he judgeth among gods,” Ps. lxxxii. 1.

“ † The Lord reigneth,” Psalm xcix. 1.

“ † Behold, God is my salvation: I will trust, and not

† Just. Mart. p. 278. Sylbur. edit.

† Clem. Alex. Pædag. l. i. c. 7. p. 131.

† Euseb. Demonstr. Ev. l. v. c. 18.

† Just. Mart. Dial. p. 197. Cyprian. adv. Jud. l. ii. c. 49. p. 49, 50. Orig. in Mat. p. 438. Euseb. in loc.

z Cyprian. adv. Jud. l. ii. c. 6. p. 35.

* Just. Martyr. Dial. p. 197. Euseb. in Psal. xxiii. p. 91.

b Iren. l. iii. c. 6. p. 180. Cyprian. adv. Jud. l. ii. c. 28. p. 48.—it. de Bono Patient. p. 220. Euseb. in Psal. p. 209.

c Cyprian. adv. Jud. l. ii. c. 6. c. 28. p. 35, 49.

d Irenæus, l. iii. c. 9. p. 184. l. iv. c. 33. p. 273.

e Just. Mart. Dial. p. 277. Irenæus, l. iii. c. 6. p. 180. Novat. de Trin. c. 15. Cyprian. adv. Jud. l. ii. c. 6. p. 35. Eus. in loc.

f Just. Mart. p. 224. Iren. l. iv. c. 33. p. 274.

g Irenæus, l. iii. c. 10. p. 186.

“ be afraid: for the Lord Jehovah is my strength,” &c. Isa. xii. 2.

“ ^h Behold, your God will come with vengeance, even “ God with a recompence; he will come and save you,” Isa. xxxv. 4.

“ ⁱ That stretcheth out the heavens like a curtain,” &c. Isa. xl. 22.

“ ^k Thus saith the Lord that created thee, O Jacob, “ and he that formed thee, O Israel,” Isa. xliii. 1.

“ ^l Thus saith the Lord the King of Israel, and his redeemer the Lord of hosts; I am the first, and I am the last; and beside me there is no God,” Isa. xlv. 6.

“ ^m I am the Lord that maketh all things; that stretcheth forth the heavens alone; that spreadeth abroad the earth by myself,” Isa. xlv. 24.

“ ⁿ Surely God is in thee; and there is none else, there is no God. Verily thou art a God,” &c. Isa. xlv. 14, 15.

“ ^o I will save them by the Lord their God, and will not save them by bow, nor by sword,” Hosea i. 7.

“ ^p The Lord also shall roar out of Zion, and utter his voice from Jerusalem,” Joel iii. 16. Amos i. 2.

“ ^q Who is a God like unto thee, that pardoneth iniquity——” Mic. vii. 18.

“ ^r God came from Teman, and the Holy One from mount Ephraim,” Habakkuk iii. 3.

^h Irenæus, l. c. 20. p. 214. Novat. c. 12. Epist. Synod. Antioch. Labb. tom. i. p. 845. Tertull. adv. Jud. c. 9, 14.

ⁱ Hippolyt. contr. Noët. c. xviii. p. 19. *ὡς ἄν τις ἐπιμαρτυρῆσαι τὸν θεόν.*

^k Eusebius in loc.

^l Lact. Inst. l. iv. c. 9. p. 405.

^m Euseb. in loc.

N. B. I cite Eusebius, only as agreeing with the rest, in his application of such texts to God the Son: not determining any thing as to his other principles.

ⁿ Tertull. Prax. c. 13. Cyprian. ad. Jud. l. ii. c. 6. p. 34. Euseb. Dem. Ev. l. v. c. 4. p. 224. Lactan. Epitom. c. xlv. p. 116. edit. Dav. Inst. p. 404. edit. Ox. Epist. Synod. Antioch. Labb. tom. i. p. 845.

^o Novat. Trin. c. 12.

^p Irenæus, l. iii. c. 20. p. 214. l. iv. c. 33. p. 273.

^q Irenæus, l. iii. c. 20. p. 214. Tertull. contr. Marc. l. iv. c. 10.

^r Irenæus, l. iii. c. 20. p. 214. l. xiv. c. 33. p. 278.

“ * I am God, and not man,” Hosea xi. 9.

“ † I will strengthen them in the Lord— saith the “ Lord,” Zech. x. 12.

“ † This is our God, and there shall none other be “ accounted of in comparison of him,” Baruch iii. 35.

These several texts, besides others of like nature, the Ante-Nicene writers, in general, understood of Christ. And therefore it is exceeding clear, that, according to the doctrine of that time, the second Person of the Trinity is the “ Lord;” the “ Lord God;” the “ Almighty God;” the “ Lord God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob;” the “ Jehovah,” the “ Lord of hosts;” the “ Mighty God;” the “ Only God; and besides whom there is no God;” the “ God of Israel,” &c. All this, I say, Christ is, according to the doctrine of those early times: not exclusive of the Father, any more than the Father is such, exclusive of the Son; but together with the Father: that is, Father and Son both are the one Supreme God: not one in *Person*, as you frequently and groundlessly insinuate, but in *substance*, *power*, and *perfection*. I know you have an evasion, by which you hope to elude the force of all that has been urged. But when I have shown you how weak and insufficient your pretence is, I hope I shall hear no more of it.

‡ In another part of your book, (p. 20.) you pretend that Christ spake only in the *Person* of the Father; and that when he said, for instance, “ I am the God of Bethel,” (Gen. xxxi. 13.) the meaning is no more than this; Jehovah whom I represent and in whose name I speak, is the God of Bethel. Had you given it only as your *own* interpretation of this and the like texts, it might be very excusable: but having told us what you mean by speaking “ in the Person of God the Father,” you afterwards add,

* Cypr. Testim. l. ii. c. 6. p. 35. Euseb. Dem. Ev. l. v. c. 22. p. 249. Epist. Synod. Antioch. Labb. tom. i. p. 845.

† Cyprian. Test. l. ii. c. 6. p. 35. Eus. Dem. Ev. l. v. c. 26. p. 251.

‡ Cyprian. Test. l. ii. c. 6. p. 35. Lactant. Epit. p. 116. ed. Dav.

* See also Clarke's Scripture Doctrine, p. 102. alias p. 94.

that it was the “unanimous opinion of all antiquity,” that Christ appeared and spake “*in the person of God the Father,*” (p. 22.) leaving your English reader to believe, that your novel explication was the current doctrine of all antiquity. The thing may be true in *some sense*, such as is foreign to your purpose: but in *your sense*, it is notoriously false, as all that have looked into antiquity very well know. However, for the benefit of the common reader, I will show that the good Fathers applied these texts to Christ considered in *his own Person*, and not in the Father’s only. This shall be made clear, to a demonstration, both from particular testimonies of the same Fathers; and from the general scope, drift, and design of those writers, in quoting the texts before mentioned.

^γ Clement of Alexandria, citing Exod. xx. 2. “I am the Lord thy God,” &c. and understanding it of Christ, observes particularly, that Christ said this of himself, “in his own Person.”

^z Tertullian, interpreting Isa. i. 18. and Mic. vii. 18. of Christ, makes the like remark.

^a Irenæus, having cited Exod. iii. 6. (“I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac,” &c.) which he understands as spoken by Christ, goes on thus. “From hence (Christ) made it plain, that he who spake to Moses out of the bush, and manifested himself to be the God of the Fathers, is the God of the living.” And after a deal more in that chapter to show that the Father and Son are one and the same God, he concludes to this effect. “Christ himself therefore, with the Father, is the God

^γ Πάλιν δὲ ὅταν λέγῃ διὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ προσώπου, ἑαυτὸν ἰμελοῦναι παιδαγωγόν. Ἰγὼ Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς σου, ὁ ἐξαγαγὼν σε ἐκ γῆς Αἰγύπτου. *Clem. Alex. Pæd.* l. i. c. 7. p. 131. edit. Oxon.

^z Ex ipsius Domini persona &c. *Tert. contr. Marc.* l. iv. c. 10.

^a Per hæc utique manifestum fecit quoniam is qui de Rubo locutus est Moyse, et manifestavit se esse Deum Patrum, hic est viventium Deus— Ipse igitur Christus cum Patre vivorum est Deus, qui locutus est Moyse, qui et Patribus manifestatus est. *Iren.* l. iv. c. 5. p. 232. See l. iii. c. 6. l. iv. c. 12.

“ of the living, who spake to Moses, and was manifested
“ to the Fathers.”

Novatian, having observed that the angel which appeared to ^b Agar, Sarah's maid, was represented in Holy Scripture as Lord and God, after some reasoning upon it, suitable to the prevailing principles of his own times, as well as of the times preceding, sums up the whole in this manner. “^c Wherefore if the present passage cannot suit
“ with the *Person* of the Father, whom it would not be proper to call an angel, nor to the *person* of an angel, which
“ it would not be proper to call God; but it may comport
“ with the *Person* of Christ to be God, as the Son of
“ God, and to be an angel too, as sent to reveal his Father's will: the heretics ought to consider that they
“ run counter to the sacred writ, while they admit that
“ Christ is an angel, and yet refuse to acknowledge that
“ he is God also.” Here you will observe, that, according to Novatian, it was to the Person of Christ, not to the Person of God the Father, that the title of God and Lord, in this or the like instances, belonged; and that therefore they are given to him in his own Person, in his own right, as God's Son, and consubstantial with him; than which nothing can be more diametrically opposite to yours, or to Dr. Clarke's hypothesis. It is not said, God, only as having true dominion and authority, but as God's Son; and that implies, with Novatian, *substantiæ communione*, real and essential divinity^d.

^b See Genesis xvi.

^c Ergo si hic locus neque *Personæ* Patris congruit ne angelus dictus sit, neque *Personæ* angeli, ne Deus pronuntiatus sit: *Personæ* autem Christi convenit, ut et Deus sit, quia Dei Filius est, et angelus sit, quoniam paternæ dispositionis adnuntiator est; intelligere debent contra Scripturas se agere heretici, qui Christum quum dicant se et angelum credere, nolint etiam illum Deum pronuntiare—. *Novat. c. xxvi. p. 724.*

^d Ὁ δὲ ἄγγελος τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱὸς ἐστίν, αὐτὸς Κύριος καὶ Θεὸς ὢν. *Synod. Antioch. Ep.*

^d Cap. 31. compare chap. 11. Ut enim prescripsit ipsa natura hominem credendum esse, qui ex homine sit: ita eadem natura præscribit, et Deum credendum esse, qui ex Deo sit.

I shall next show you the same of Justin Martyr; and then beg your pardon for the impertinence of insisting so long upon what none, one might think, that has ever seen the ancients, could make the least question of. “Permit me,” says he, “to show you also out of the book of Exodus, how the very same Person, who appeared to Abraham and Jacob, as an angel, and God, and Lord, and man, appeared to Moses in a flame of fire out of the bush, and talked with him.” A little after, he adds these remarkable words. “^c You have seen, gentlemen, that the same Person whom Moses calls an angel, and who conversed with him in the flame of fire; that very Person being God, signifies to Moses that himself is the God of Abraham, and of Isaac, and of Jacob.” I will not so far distrust your judgment, as to add any farther comment to so plain words. I need but just hint to any who know Justin Martyr, that he, as well as Novatian, resolves the divinity of Christ into his sonship; and sonship into communication of the same divine substance: which I remark chiefly against Dr. Clarke, who seems to admit that those titles belonged to the *Person* of Christ; which is more than I apprehend you do. It were very easy to add particular passages to the same purpose from other Fathers; but it was, in a manner, needless to have mentioned these. For the general scope, drift, and design of the primitive writers, in this case, shows sufficiently what I contend for. Their design was to prove Christ’s Divinity; to show that there was another *Person*, besides the Father, who was really Lord and God; and that this *Person* was Christ. This

* Ω. ἄδεις, νισίκασι—ἔτι ἐν λόγῳ Μωσῆς ἄγγελος, ἐν πυρὶ φλογὶς λαλαλήσκει αὐτῷ, οὗτος αὐτὸς Θεὸς ὃν σημαίνει τῷ Μωσῆϊ ἔτι αὐτὸς ἔστι ὁ Θεὸς Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ. *Just. Mart. Dial.* p. 220.

Compare Apol. i. p. 123. Τὸ δὲ εἰρημῖνον ἐν βάνῳ τῷ Μωσῆϊ λόγῳ εἶμι ὁ ὢν, ὁ Θεὸς Ἀβραάμ καὶ ὁ Θεὸς Ἰσαὰκ καὶ ὁ Θεὸς Ἰακώβ, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς τῶν πατέρων σου, σημαίνοντο τοῦ καὶ ἀποδεικνύοντες ἐπιπέως μίνον καὶ εἶναι αὐτοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἀδελφῶν σου. See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, p. 53.

^f Page 183, 75, 278, 280, Sylb. ed.

^e Page 183, 373, ed. Jeb.

is the avowed design clear through Justin's Dialogue; and the like may be said of Novatian, Tertullian, Cyprian, Irenæus, and the rest, (except Eusebius, who sometimes varied in this matter,) where they cite these texts, which I have given you a list of.

The argument they used is this. There is a person frequently styled God and Lord, Jehovah, Almighty, &c. who conversed with Adam, appeared to the Patriarchs, and all along headed and conducted the people of the Jews. This Person could not be an angel only: such high titles could never belong to any mere angel. He could not be God the Father: his office was ministerial; he is called an angel; he appeared; he condescended to take upon him human shape, and other resemblances ^f. These things do not suit with the *first Person* of the Trinity. Well then, who could he be but God the Son? who being really God, might, in his own right, truly and justly assume those high titles; and yet being *second* only in the ever blessed Trinity, and designing, in his own due time, to take human nature upon him, might more suitably condescend to act ministerially among men, (a proper prelude to his incarnation, which should come after,) and so might be, not only God, but an angel too. This is their argument, as every one knows, that knows any thing of these matters. Now, suppose that these good fathers had understood, Gen. xxxi. 13. as you do; "I am the God of Bethel;" that is, My Father, whom I represent, is the God of Bethel; what a trifling argument would you here put into their mouths? "Christ declares that the Person whom he represents is God and Lord: therefore Christ is God," &c. Or propose the argument thus, upon your hypothesis: "The Lord God (the Fa-

^f I do not find, that the pure simplicity of the divine nature was ever urged, in this case, as a reason why it could not be the Father: nor, that the human affections and actions ascribed to this angel were understood literally, or otherwise than by way of figure. Tertullian gives a very different account of it, showing how all might be understood *Σιωπηρώς*. *Cont. Marc.* l. ii.

“ther) called unto Adam, Gen. viii. 9. God said unto “ Abraham, &c. Gen. xxi. 12. that is, God the Father “ spoke by his Son; therefore the Son is called God, and “ is God.” Can any thing be more ridiculous? The conclusion which Justin Martyr draws from the whole, and which he triumphantly urges against Trypho, is this; that Christ is really Lord and God, *ὁ Θεὸς καλεῖται, ὁ Θεὸς ἔστι καὶ ἕσται*. The other writers draw the same conclusion from the same premises; a conclusion without any thing to support it, had they understood these texts, as you pretend they did. In short, the very ground and foundation of all they say upon this article is built upon a supposition diametrically opposite to yours; so little countenance have you from antiquity. Farther, they all conclude that the Person declaring himself to be God and Lord, &c. could not be an angel; not a mere angel. There is some sense in this; if you suppose an angel declaring, *in his own person*, that he is God and Lord. It is blasphemous and absurd for any mere angel to make such declaration. But, supposing it meant of the Person of the Father, why might not any angel declare, what is certainly true, that the Father is God, or deliver God’s errand in his own words? Had the Fathers thought as you do, they must have argued thus, very weakly: It could not be a mere angel that appeared, or that spoke thus and thus. Why? Because the Person who sent him, and who undoubtedly is the God of the universe, is called God and Lord. Of all the silly things that ignorance and malice have combined to throw upon the primitive martyrs and defenders of the faith of Christ, I have not met with one comparable to this. I am therefore willing to believe that you did not mean to charge them with it, but only expressed yourself darkly and obscurely; which yet should not have been done, by one who would be careful not to mislead even an unwary reader.

¹ Just. Dial. p. 176. ed. Jebb. See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, p. 52, &c.

I would here make one remark, and leave it with you; and that is, of the ^k strict sense wherein the ancients used the word *God*, as applied to the Son. They argued that it could not be an angel that appeared. Why? Because the Person appearing was called God. Thus Novatian, who speaks the sense of all the rest. “*Quomodo ergo Deus si angelus fuit; cum non sit hoc nomen angelis unquam concessum* ^l? But how then is he God, if no more than angel, since angels never had the privilege of so high a title?” Novatian allows (ch. 15.) that angels have been called Gods, meaning in the loose figurative sense: but here he plainly signifies that the word *God*, when applied to the *Son*, is to be understood in the strict and proper sense: and thus the ancients in general understood it. Angels, the very highest order of creatures, were not by them thought worthy of the name and title of *God*. It would have been highly absurd, in their judgment, to have given it them, in such a sense, and in such circumstances, as they applied it to the *Son*. They knew nothing of your relative sense of the word: they knew better. But this by the way: let us return to our subject. You will ask me now, perhaps, what did some of the Fathers mean, those especially whom you have quoted in the margin, (p. 22.) by the *Son of God's* appearing, and speaking in the *Person of God the Father*? I have shown you what they certainly did *not* mean: and if I could not so readily account for the other, it is of less moment; the cause being little concerned in it. But I shall endeavour to satisfy you in this point also.

You have but two quotations which are any thing to the purpose; one out of Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch, and the other from Tertullian. And they indeed, *verbally*, may seem to countenance your notion; though, in *reality*, they meant nothing like it. But what did they mean;

^k Other arguments of the strict sense of the word *God*, as used by the Ante-Nicene writers, and applied to the Son, may be seen in Dr. Fiddes, p. 374, &c.

^l Cap. 26.

one by, ^m ἐν προσώπῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ, the other by, ⁿ *auctoritate et nomine (Patris ?)* Let it be considered, that the second Person, in the texts above cited, is not represented under his own personal distinguishing character, as a Son, or second Person, or Messiah, or Mediator, as he has been since. It is not said, that the *Son of the Lord God*, called unto Adam; but the “*Lord God called*,” &c. ° It is not, I am the *Son of the God of Bethel*, &c. but “I am the “*God of Bethel*,” and so in the rest. Christ therefore, in these, or the like texts, is not represented under his own peculiar character; but under such a character as is common to the Godhead, to the Father and him too. This character, since the distinction of persons has been revealed to us, has been, in a more eminent and peculiar manner, reserved to the Father. He is represented eminently now as *God*; and Christ, as *Son of God*, or *Mediator*, or *Messiah*. Christ having before took upon him that part, character, or office, which since that time has been reserved, in a peculiar manner, to the Father, may be said to have acted in the *Person* of the Father, or *in the name* of the Father; that is, under the same character or capacity which the Father now chiefly bears with respect to men. This he might well do, being equally qualified for either. As Son of God, he was really God; and as Son of the Almighty, he was Almighty, in his own right, as ^p Tertullian expresses it: and therefore might as justly bear the style and title of “*Lord God*,” “*God of Abraham*,” &c. while he acted in that capacity, as he did that of “*Mediator*,” “*Messiah*,” “*Son of the Father*,” &c. after he condescended to act in another, and to discover his personal relation.

You cited these words of Tertullian: “*Cujus auctoritate et nomine ipse erat Deus, qui videbatur, Dei Filius.*” Which might have been rendered thus. “The *Son of God who appeared, he was God (acting) in his*

^m Theoph. ad Autol. l. ii. p. 229. Ox. ed.

ⁿ Tertull. adv. Marc. l. ii. c. 27.

° Gen. iii. 9.

^p *Suo jure omnipotens quæ Filius Omnipotentis—cum et Filius Omnipotentis tam omnipotens sit, quam Deus Dei Filius. Præf. c. xvii. p. 520.*

^q Contr. Marc. l. ii. c. 27.

“ (the Father’s) name, and with his authority.” And had you but cited the next immediate words, you might have discovered the true meaning of that passage. “ Sed et “ penes nos, Christus in persona Christi, quia et hoc “ modo noster est:” that is to say, But with us (Christians) Christ is also understood under the character or Person of the Messiah; because he is ours in this capacity also; that is, he is not only our God, but our Mediator and Redeemer; and under that character we receive him, as being more peculiar to him, beyond what he has in common with the Father. Formerly he was received and adored under the one common character of God, Lord, and Jehovah; not merely as representative of God the Father, or as invested with his authority, but as strictly and truly *God, consubstantial* with God the Father; according to the unanimous opinion of all the ancients, and ^r of those in particular who speak of his acting in the name or Person of the Father. But now, having a new title to distinguish him by, we receive him in both capacities: as God, by *nature*; and as Messiah, or Mediator, by *office*.

The sum then of the case is this: when Christ appeared to the Patriarchs, and claimed their obedience, homage, and adoration, he did not do this under the name and character which he has since discovered to be personal and peculiar to him; but under another, which is his too, but in common with the Father; namely, that of “ Lord “ God,” “ God Almighty,” &c. and being since discovered not to be the Father himself, but the Son; not *unoriginated*, but *God of God*; all that he did must be referred back to the Father, the Head and Fountain of all; whose authority he exercised, whose orders he executed, and whose Person, Character, or Office, he (in some sense) represented and sustained. Thus, under the ^s New Testa-

^r See True Script. Doct. continued, p. 196.

^s Vid. Tertull. contr. Prax. c. xxi. p. 512. *Ego veni in Patris mei nomine*—Adeo semper Filius erat in Dei et Regis et Domini, et Omnipotentis, et Altissimi nomine.

ment also, he referred all that he did to the authority of the Father, as the first original, and fountain of all power, preeminence, dignity, &c. acting in his name, executing his will, and representing his Person. (“I and my Father are one,” John x. 30. “He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father,” John xiv. 9. “I can of mine own self do nothing,” John v. 30.) And yet whatever is said of Christ is to be understood of him in his own Person, and not of the Father only, whom he represented. In fine, it is not necessary, that every one who acts in the name, or by the authority, or in the person of another, should usurp the style of that other, and speak in the first person; e. g. a viceroy, or an ambassador, speaks in the king’s name, and by his authority, and represents his person: but does not personate the king, in the strictest sense; does not pretend to say, I am the king. And therefore you can draw no certain conclusion from the two passages of Theophilus and Tertullian. On the contrary, I have shown you, from the whole drift, tenor, and tendency, as well as from particular testimonies of the primitive writings, that they are far from favouring your pretences in this case, but are a perfect contradiction to them. From what hath been said, these three things are very plain and evident.

1. That, according to the mind of the ancients, the Son was *God*, and so called *in his own Person*.

2. That he was *God in his own Person*, as being *God’s Son*.

3. That he was *God’s Son*, as having the divine substance communicated from the Father.

These three considerations entirely take off the force of whatever either you or Dr. Clarke hath offered to perplex and puzzle a very clear and manifest truth.

I have insisted chiefly on the first particular, as was proper in this place; though I have, in passing, hinted enough of the two latter also; especially considering that they will often be glanced at again, in the process of our dispute.

Thus, I hope, I have sufficiently vindicated the argument of this second Query, having shown from plain Scripture texts, that Christ is not excluded from being the one Supreme God in conjunction with the Father; and taken off your exceptions: and lest this should seem insufficient, I have confirmed it farther, from the unanimous consent of all antiquity, before the Council of Nice; which is what yourself appeal to in the case. This article indeed has hereby been drawn out into a disproportionate length: but the importance of it is a sufficient apology. Were you able satisfactorily to answer the following queries, this one, while it stands unanswered, would be enough for all. But I proceed.

QUERY III.

Whether the word (God) in Scripture can reasonably be supposed to carry an ambiguous meaning, or to be used in a different sense, when applied to the Father and Son, in the same Scripture, and even in the same verse? See John i. 1.

HERE you make answer; that “the word (God) in Scripture hath a relative signification, and is used in a “supreme and a subordinate sense.” And you appeal to Exod. vii. 1. “I have made thee a god to Pharaoh;” and to Psalm lxxxii. 1. “God standeth in the assembly of “gods; judgeth among gods;” and you desire that John x. 34, 35. may be compared; “Is it not written in “your law, I said ye are gods?” &c. You are impatient, I perceive, to come to your distinction of supreme and subordinate, which, you imagine, clears all difficulties; and you will not stay to consider what ought to be said first. The first and most general distinction of the senses of the word *God*, should be into proper and improper; after which it will be soon enough to come to your famed distinction of supreme and subordinate. Dr. Clarke indeed would persuade us, that the proper Scripture notion of *God* is *dominion*; and that therefore any person

having dominion, is, according to the Scripture notion, truly and properly God. This shall be examined; but it will be convenient here to set down the Doctor's own words. "The word Θεός, *God*, has in Scripture, and in "all books of morality and religion, a relative signification; and not, as in metaphysical books, an absolute "one: as is evident from the relative terms, which in "moral writings may always be joined with it. For instance, in the same manner as we say, *my* Father, *my* King, and the like; so it is proper also to say, *my* God, "the God of *Israel*, the God of *the universe*, and the like: "which words are expressive of dominion and government. But, in the metaphysical way, it cannot be said, "my infinite substance, the infinite substance of *Israel*, "or the like ^a." He repeats the observation, (p. 290)^b; and is very positive, that the word *God*, in Scripture, is always a relative word of office, giving the same pretty reason for it as before. This shall be carefully considered; and the manner of speaking accounted for, in the sequel.

I shall only observe here, by the way, that the word *star* is a relative word, for the same reason with that, which the doctor gives for the other. For, the "star of "your God Remphan," (Acts vii. 43.) is a proper expression: but, in the metaphysical way, it cannot be said, the luminous substance "of your God Remphan." So again, *water* is a relative word; for it is proper to say, the water of *Israel*: but, in the metaphysical way, it cannot be said, the fluid substance of *Israel*; the expression is ^c improper. By parity of reason, we may make rela-

^a See Dr. Clarke's Reply, p. 284.

^b Compare also Script. Doctr. p. 296. alias 264.

^c It is very obvious to perceive where the impropriety of such expressions lies. The word *substance*, according to the common use of language, when used in the singular number, is supposed to be intrinsic to the thing spoken of, whose substance it is; and indeed, to be the thing itself. *My substance* is *myself*: and *the substance of Israel* is *Israel*. And hence it comes to be improper to join *substance* with the relative terms, understanding it of any thing extrinsic.

tive words almost as many as we please. But to proceed: I maintain that *dominion* is not the full import of the word *God* in Scripture; that it is but a part of the idea, and a small part too; and that, if any person be called *God*, merely on account of *dominion*, he is called so by way of figure and resemblance only; and is not properly God, according to the Scripture notion of it. We may call any one a *king*, who lives free and independent, subject to no man's will. He is a king so far, or in some respect; though in many other respects nothing like one; and therefore not properly a king. If by the same figure of speech, by way of allusion and resemblance, any thing be called *God*, because resembling God in one or more particulars; we are not to conclude, that it is properly and truly God.

To enlarge something farther upon this head, and to illustrate the case by a few instances. Part of the idea which goes along with the word *God* is, that his habitation is sublime, and "his dwelling not with flesh," Dan. ii. 11. This part of the idea is applicable to angels or to saints, and therefore they may thus far be reputed *Gods*; and are sometimes so styled in Scripture, or ecclesiastical writings. Another part of the complex idea of God is giving orders from above, and publishing commands from heaven. This was in some sense applicable to Moses; who is therefore called "a God unto Pharaoh:" not as being properly a God; but instead of God, in that instance, or that resembling circumstance. In the same respect, every prophet, or apostle, or even a minister of a parish, might be figuratively called *God*. *Dominion* goes along with the idea of God, or is a part of it; and therefore kings, princes, and magistrates, resembling God in that respect, may, by the like figure of speech, be styled *Gods*: not properly; for then we might as properly say, God David, God Solomon, or God Jeroboam, as King David, &c. but by way of allusion, and in regard to some imperfect resemblance which they bear to God in some particular respects; and that is all. It belongs to God, to receive

worship, and sacrifice, and homage. Now, because the heathen idols so far resembled God, as to be made the objects of worship, &c. therefore they also, by the same figure of speech, are by the Scripture denominated *Gods*, though at the same time they are declared, in a proper sense, to be no Gods. The belly is called the *God* of the luxurious, (Phil. iii. 19.) because some are as much devoted to the service of their bellies, as others are to the service of God; and because their lusts have got the *dominion* over them. This way of speaking is in like manner grounded on some imperfect resemblance, and is easily understood. The prince of the devils is supposed, by most interpreters, to be called the "God of this world," 2 Cor. iv. 4. If so, the reason may be, either because the men of this world are entirely devoted to his service, or that he has got the power and dominion over them.

Thus we see how the word *God*, according to the popular way of speaking, has been applied to angels, or to men, or to things inanimate and insensible; because some part of the idea belonging to God has been conceived to belong to them also. To argue from hence, that any of them is properly God, is making the whole of a part; and reasoning fallaciously, *a dicto secundum quid*, as the schools speak, *ad dictum simpliciter*. If we inquire carefully into the Scripture notion of the word, we shall find, that neither *dominion* singly, nor all the other instances of resemblance, make up the idea, or are sufficient to denominate any thing properly God. When the prince of Tyre pretended to be God, (Ezek. xxviii. 2.) he thought of something more than mere *dominion* to make him so; he thought of strength invincible, and power irresistible: and God was pleased to convince him of his folly and vanity, not by telling him how scanty his *dominion* was, or how low his office; but how weak, frail, and perishing his nature was; that he was man only, and "not God," ver. 2, 9. and should surely find so by the

event. When the Lycaonians, upon the sight of a miracle wrought by St. Paul, (Acts xiv. 11.) took him and Barnabas for Gods, they did not think so much of *dominion*, as of power and ability, beyond human: and when the Apostles answered them, they did not tell them that their *dominion* was only human, or that their office was not divine, but that they had not a divine nature; they were weak, frail, and feeble men, of like infirmities with the rest of their species, and therefore no *Gods*.

If we trace the Scripture notion of one that is truly and properly God, we shall find it made up of these several ideas; infinite wisdom, power invincible, all-sufficiency, and the like. These are the ground and foundation of *dominion*; which is but a secondary notion, a consequence of the former: and it must be dominion supreme, and none else, which will suit with the Scripture notion of God. It is not that of a governor, a ruler, a protector, a lord, or the like; but a sovereign Ruler, an almighty Protector, an omniscient and omnipresent Governor, an eternal, immutable, all-sufficient Creator, Preserver, and Protector. Whatever falls short of this is not properly, in the Scripture notion, *God*; but is only called so by way of figure; as has before been explained. Now, if you ask me why the relative terms may properly be applied to the word *God*, the reason is plain; because there is something relative in the whole idea of God; namely, the notion of Governor, Protector, &c. If you ask why they cannot so properly be applied to the word *God* in the metaphysical sense, beside the reason before given, there is another as plain; because metaphysics take in only part of the idea, consider the nature abstracted from the relation, leaving the relative part out.

From what hath been said, it may appear how useless and insignificant your distinction is, of a supreme and a subordinate God. For, not to mention that this must unavoidably run you into polytheism, and bring you to assert more Gods than one, contrary to the whole tenor

of holy Scripture; which is an ^dinsuperable objection to your hypothesis; I say, not to mention this at present, your hypothesis is built upon a false ground, as if any thing could be properly God that is not Supreme. Supreme, in the strict sense, supposes for its ground all the essential properties of one truly and properly God, as described in Scripture. Another God after this, is no God; because Scripture makes but one; besides that an ^einferior God is only God improperly, and so called by way of figure, or in some particular respect: so that at length your famed distinction of a supreme and subordinate God, resolves into a God and no God. The question then between us is, whether Christ be God properly or improperly so called; that is, whether he be God, or no. Your arguments to prove him a subordinate God only, I shall look upon as so many arguments against his divinity, and as designed to prove that he is not God.

You cite John x. 35, 36. "If he called them gods, unto whom the word of God came, and the Scripture cannot be broken; say ye of him, whom the Father hath sanctified, and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest; because I said, I am the Son of God?" From hence you endeavour to prove, that Christ is God in the subordinate sense only; that is, as I have said, not properly or truly God. But I can see no manner of ground for this inference from the words before us. Our blessed Lord had insinuated that he was really and truly God;

^d See what Dr. Bennet has very well urged upon this head, *Disc. of the Holy Trinity*, p. 178, &c.

^e Neque enim proximi erimus opinionibus nationum, quæ si quando coguntur Deum confiteri, tamen et alios infra illum volunt. Divinitas autem gradum non habet, utpote unica. *Tertull. adv. Hermog.* c. vii. p. 236. Deus non erit dicendus, quia nec credendus, nisi summum magnum. Nega Deum, quem dicis deteriorem. *Tertull. contr. Marc.* l. i. c. 6.

Qui super se habet aliquem superiorem, et sub alterius potestate est; hic neque Deus, neque magnus rex dici potest. *Iren.* l. iv. c. 2. p. 229.

Unus igitur omnium Dominus est Deus. Neque enim illa sublimitas potest habere consortem, cum sola omnium teneat potestatem. *Cypr. de Idol. Van.* p. 14. Ox. edit.

but had not asserted it in plain and express terms: upon this bare innuendo, the Jews charge him with direct blasphemy: he to evade their malice, and to keep to the truth, neither affirms nor denies that he meant it in the sense which they apprehended. However, his discourse being in general terms, and not explicit enough to found a charge of blasphemy upon, he appeals to their Law, in order to show, that it is not always blasphemy to make one's self *God*, or to apply the title of *God* even to mortal men, and men inferior to himself, considered only as man. This was answer sufficient to them; who could not from his own expressions clearly convict him of meaning more, than that he was God in the improper sense of the word, as it had been used, Psalm lxxxii. 6. Nevertheless, he leaves the point of his divinity undecided; or rather, still goes on to insinuate, in words which they could not directly lay hold on, the very thing which they charged him with. This enraged them so much the more: and therefore they again "sought to take him," ver. 39. "But he escaped out of their hand." This interpretation may suffice to take off the force of your argument. Yet the words may admit of other, and perhaps better interpretations, consistent with the principles which I here maintain ^f.

You proceed to cite Heb. i. 8, 9. and argue thus: "He who being God, calls another his God, and is sanctified by him, must needs be God in a subordinate sense;" that is, God improperly so called, or no God. To an old objection, I might return an old answer, in the words of Hilary, or words to the same effect. "ε This may signify only his subordination, as a Son, or as God of God, without any inferiority of nature. The Father is his God, as he is God by being begotten of him." This answer is direct and full, upon the supposition that

^f See True Script. Doct. continued, p. 178. Bisterfield contr. Crell. p. 317. Surenhus. in loc. p. 359.

^ε Ad nativitatem refertur; cæterum non perimit naturam; et idcirco Deus ejus est, quia ex eo natus in Deum est. *Hil. de Trin.* l. iv. c. 35. p. 848.

the text cited is meant of the divine nature of Christ, or of Christ in his highest capacity. But if it be meant, as ^h probably it may, of his human nature only, there is no weight in the objection.

As to the Son's being sanctified, I should hardly have thought it of any importance to the cause, had it not been twice insisted on by you. May not the Father design, appoint, consecrate his Son, considered in either capacity, to the office of Mediator, without supposing him of a different and inferior nature to him? Or suppose the sanctifying may be meant of the human nature, which the Father has sanctified, by uniting it to the *Λόγος*, what force will there remain in your objection? Having answered your pleas and pretences for a subordinate God, I proceed to show, that Christ is not called God in a subordinate or improper sense, but in the same sense, and in as high a sense, as the Father himself is so styled.

1. Because he is called the *Jehovah*, which is a word of absolute signification, and is the incommunicable name of the one true God.

ⁱ He is, very probably, called *Jehovah*, Luke i. 16, 17. "Many shall he" (viz. John the Baptist) "turn to the Lord their God, and he shall go before him." The Doctor owns that, in strictness of construction, the words (*the Lord their God*) must be understood of Christ. And therefore Christ is *Lord God*, or *Jehovah Eloim*, which comes to the same.

He is likewise called the "*Lord God* of the Prophets," as appears from Rev. xxii. 6. compared with ver. 16. of the same chapter. This may be farther confirmed by comparing the texts following.

Of old hast thou laid the foundation of the earth, Ps. cii. 25. &c.		k Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth, Heb. i. 10.
Addressed to the Jehovah.		

^h See Bennet's Discourse on the Trinity, p. 31. 33. &c.

ⁱ See this text excellently defended and illustrated in True Scripture Doctrine continued, p. 132, 133, &c. See also my Sermons, p. 203.

^k See Surenhusii Conciliation. in loc. p. 600.

And the Lord (Jehovah) said unto me, Cast it unto the potter: a goodly price that I was prised at of them, Zech. xi. 13.

They shall look on me (Jehovah speaking by the Prophet) whom they have pierced, Zech. xii. 10.

The voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, (Jehovah,) Is. xl. 3.

The Lord said—I will have mercy on the house of Judah, and will save them by the Lord (Jehovah) their God, Hos. i. 6, 7.

¹ Then was fulfilled that which was spoken, &c. Matth. xxvii. 9, 10.

Another Scripture saith, They shall look on him (Jesus Christ) whom they have pierced, John xix. 37.

^m The voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, Mark i. 3.

— is born in the city of David a Saviour, which is Christ the Lord, Luke ii. 11.

I have produced the texts again, in order to take notice of the very peculiar way which you have of evading. It is your avowed principle, that Christ is not *Jehovah* in his own Person, (p. 24. and elsewhere;) and that the Person called *Jehovah* is the Father only. What then must be said to these texts, which are so very plain and express to the contrary; insomuch that ⁿ Dr. Clarke himself owns, that the name "*Jehovah* is given to that visible Person (meaning Christ) who appeared as representing "the Person of the invisible God?" He does not say, it was given to the Person represented only, but to the Person representing also; which you seem to deny. But you confound yourself with your ^o own comment upon Hos. i. 7. "*Jehovah* would—save them by *Jehovah* their God;)" "that is," say you, "that *Jehovah* himself would save them, but not in his own Person." Well then, it is by another Person, which Person the text expressly calls *Jehovah*.

Upon Zech. xii. 10. compared with John xix. 37. you comment thus, (p. 26.) "The sufferings of Christ might

¹ Surenhus. in loc. p. 280.

^m Surenhus. in Matt. iii. 3. p. 207. I refer to this author, to obviate the pretence, that these texts might be understood only by way of accommodation.

ⁿ Reply, p. 163.

^o Page 25.

“ well be called the sufferings of *Jehovah*, being pierced “ in effigy in his Son, who is the express image of his “ Person.” What a fanciful turn is here, merely to elude the force of plain Scripture. Say rather, that since Christ is the effigies, the express image of the Father, he might justly be called *Jehovah*, which indeed he is, as well as the Father. I shall dwell no longer on so clear and indisputable a point. What you hint, that the Father and Son cannot both be *Jehovah*, or, as you express it, one individual being, meaning one person, is hardly deserving notice; because it is nothing but playing with the word *individual*, and disputing against nobody: either take the word in our sense of it, or pretend not that you oppose us. It has been observed above, that antiquity is every where full and express in this matter; never questioning, but constantly asserting, that the Son is *Jehovah*; and so called, in Scripture, in his own Person, and in his own right, as coessential Son of God. The next thing which I have to observe, is, that *Jehovah* is a word of absolute signification. The relative terms do not suit with it, as with the other. We do not read, *my Jehovah*, or *your Jehovah*, or the *Jehovah of Israel*, as is pertinently remarked by a learned ^pgentleman; and the same gentleman observes, that it is sometimes rendered by *Θεός*, or *God*: from whence we may just take notice, by the way, that the word *Θεός*, or *God*, in Scripture, is not always, perhaps very rarely, a mere relative word. That *Jehovah* is a word of absolute signification, expressing God, as he is, may be proved both from ^qScripture itself and the ^rauthorities of the best critics in this case. What you have to object against it shall be here examined with all convenient brevity. ^sYou make the import of the name

^p The True Script. Doct. of the Trin. continued, p. 134.

^q See this proved in the Appendix to the Considerations on Mr. Whiston's History. Pref. p. 101.

^r See the authorities cited in the second part of the Considerations, by the same author, p. 2, 3. and referred to in True Scripture Doctrine continued, p. 133, 134.

^s Page 19.

Jehovah to be, giving being to (i. e. performing) his promises. For reasons best known to yourself, you slip over Exod. iii. 14, 15. which might probably give us the most light into the matter, and choose to found all your reasonings upon Exod. vi. 2, 3. &c. an obscure place, on which you have made almost as obscure a comment. The words are, "I am the Lord, (*Jehovah* :) and I appeared "unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the "name of God Almighty, (*El Shaddai*,) but by my "name *Jehovah* was I not known to them."

You do not, I presume, so understand this text, as if this was the first time that God revealed himself by the name *Jehovah*: that he had done before, Exod. iii. 14. and even long before that, to Abram, Gen. xv. 7. and Abram had addressed him, under that name, sooner, Gen. xv. 2. nay, it may be run up yet higher, even to Adam and Eve, Gen. iv. 1.⁴

Your meaning therefore, I suppose, must be, that God had given many instances of his power before, conformable to his name *El Shaddai*: but now, he was to give them instances of his veracity and constancy in performing promises, conformable to his name *Jehovah*. This, I think, either is or should be your sense of this obscure passage. That it is not the true sense of the place is next to be shown.

1. It appears to be a very strained and remote interpretation. The primary signification of *Jehovah* is *Being*, by your own confession, and as all know, that know any thing: and the most obvious reason of the name is, that God is *Being itself*, necessarily existing, independent, immutable, always the same; according to that of Mal. iii. 6. "I am the Lord, (*Jehovah*,) I change not." After

⁴ M. Le Clerc thinks that all this may be solved by a prolepsis. *Com. in Exod.* iii. 15. To which it is sufficient to answer, that it may be otherwise; and that it is highly improbable, that Moses, who was particularly careful not to introduce the name of Abraham and Sarah before the proper time, should not be as careful in respect of a more venerable name, the name of God himself.

this, in the natural order, he may be considered as the fountain of being, or giving being to all other things: so that this seems but a secondary notion of *Jehovah*. Yours is more remote still: it is *giving being*, not to the world, to angels, or to men, but to words and promises; that is, fulfilling them. And this metaphorical sense, of *giving being*, you would put upon us, for the proper and special import of the name *Jehovah*, expressing *Being*. Who does not see that this is strained and far-fetched?

2. The reason which you assign for this interpretation, is as lame as the interpretation itself. God, it seems, was now coming to fulfil the promise made to Abraham; and therefore reminds his people of the name *Jehovah*, as importing one faithful and punctual to his word. But what if *Jehovah* should import one eternal and immutable God, the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever; might not the consideration thereof be very proper to raise in men's minds the greatest confidence and assurance imaginable, that he should never fail of his word?

3. Besides, what account will you give of many other places of Scripture, where God reminds his people, that he is *Jehovah*, and where there is no reference at all to promises or the like?

Thus, in this very chapter, Exod. vi. 29. "I am the Lord, (*Jehovah*;) speak thou unto Pharaoh king of Egypt all that I say unto thee." Again; "Against all the gods of Egypt I will execute judgment: I am *Jehovah*," Exod. xii. 12. "None of you shall approach to any that is near of kin to him—I am *Jehovah*," Lev. xviii. 6. "I am the Lord, (*Jehovah*;) that is my name; and my glory will I not give to another, neither my praise to graven images," Is. xlii. 8. "Many more places of like nature might be cited; but I choose

▪ Mons. Le Clerc, upon the place, endeavours by quirk and subtilty to turn several passages, wherein the *Jehovah* is mentioned, to one particular sense, in favour of the Sabellians. But that author and his manner are well known, and with what bias he writes. The very instances which he brings are enough to confute him.

to refer you to a concordance for them. What I intend from them is this; that if yours be the true account of the special import of the name *Jehovah*, it will be hard to find any sense or pertinency in those, or other frequent repetitions of it. But understanding the word as it has been generally understood by persons of the greatest learning and judgment, all is clear, pertinent, and consistent.

But, you will say, why then does God so particularly take notice, that by his name *Jehovah* he was not known to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob? Exod. vi. 3. Did not they know him, and worship him, as the true, eternal, independent, immutable God, the Creator of all things? Yes, certainly they did, and under the name *Jehovah* too; and probably understood the import of it. The most probable solution of the whole difficulty is this; that the words, in the latter part of the text, ought to be understood by way of interrogation, thus: But by my name *Jehovah* was I not also known unto them? that great and venerable name, which expresses more than *El Shaddai*, or any other name, and which I have chosen for my memorial to all generations?

If you please to consult the critics, you will find this interpretation supported by such reasons as will bear examining. It has been observed by the learned, that some of the Greek writers read the words, Καὶ τὸ ὄνομά μου, Κύριος, ἐδήλωσα αὐτοῖς; * that is, “My name, *Jehovah*, I “made known unto them;” which interpretation is likewise favoured by the Arabic version. This at least we may say; that from a passage so obscure, and capable of several constructions, no certain argument can be drawn, for the special import of the word *Jehovah*, in opposition to the best critics in the language, whether ancient or modern. Now, to resume the thread of our argument, since it appears that Christ is, in his own proper Person,

* Just. Martyr reads, Τὸ ὄνομά μου οὐκ ἐδήλωσα αὐτοῖς. *Dial.* p. 266. *Jebb.* vid. Gen. xxxii. 29. comp. Pseud. Athanas. tom. ii. p. 499, 503, 505.

called *Jehovah*, a word of absolute signification, expressing the Divine nature or essence, it must follow, that he is God, strictly so called, and not in the relative or improper sense, as is pretended.

This will appear farther, if it be considered that *Jehovah* is the incommunicable name of the one true God. This may be proved from ¹ several texts, which I shall only point to in the margin; referring you to ² a learned author, who has abundantly made good the assertion. I may remark, that this and the foregoing observation serve to support and confirm each other: for if *Jehovah* signify the eternal, immutable God, it is manifest that the name is incommunicable, since there is but one God; and if the name be incommunicable, then *Jehovah* can signify nothing but that one God to whom, and to whom only, it is applied. And if both these parts be true, and it be true likewise that this name is applied to Christ, the consequence is irresistible, that Christ is the same one God; not the same *Person* with the Father, to whom also the name *Jehovah* is attributed, but the same *substance*, the same *Being*; in a word, the same *Jehovah*; thus revealed to be more Persons than one. So much for my first argument, to prove that the word *God*, when applied to the Father and Son, in Scripture, does not bear a double meaning, one proper, and the other improper; but is to be understood in one and the same true and proper sense in respect of both.

2. My second argument for it shall be from John i. 1. pursuant to the words of the Query. "In the beginning was the *Word*, and the *Word* was with *God*, and the *Word* was *God*," ver. 1. "All things were made by *him*," &c. ver. 3. Here we find the Son expressly called *God*; and the only question is, whether in a proper or improper sense. The circumstances of the place must determine us in this inquiry. Here are three marks to

¹ Exod. iii. 14, 15. Deut. xxvi. 17, 18. Psal. lxxxiii. 18. Is. xlii. 8. Hosea xii. 5.

² Second Letter to the Author of the History of Montanism, p. 5. &c.

direct us how to form a judgment. 1. The word Θεός, *God*, is used in a proper sense in the very same verse. 2. The Word was *God* in the beginning, that is, before the creation. 3. The work of creation is attributed to him.

I say, first, the word Θεός, *God*, is once used, in a proper sense, in the very same verse. I have before shown, that the pretended relative sense is only an improper and figurative sense of the word *God*, according to the Scripture notion of it; and therefore, certainly, that cannot be the meaning of it here, being applied to the Father, who, without dispute, is properly *God*. Besides, that since Θεός in the Septuagint is frequently the rendering of *Jehovah*, as you may readily see by turning to Trommius's Concordance; and since St. John himself follows that rendering, as you may observe by comparing John vi. 45. with Is. liv. 13. we may reasonably think that ὁ Θεός, in the text, is of the same signification with *Jehovah*: which is a farther proof, that it is to be understood absolutely, and not relatively, as you term it, or as I, improperly. If therefore the word Θεός, *God*, be once used by St. John in the strict and proper sense, how can we imagine, that immediately after, in the very same verse, he should use the same word in a sense very different from that of the former? You remark, that "the article is prefixed before Θεός, in an absolute construction, when spoken of the Father; but omitted when predicated of the Λόγος." But if the want of the article be sufficient to prove that Θεός, *God*, when applied to the Word, is of a different meaning; by the same argument you might prove that the same word, Θεός, without an article, in no less than four places more of this chapter, (ver. 6. 12. 13. 18.) is not to be understood of the *one true God*. I cannot help thinking a remark trifling, which signifies so little, as either to prove too much, or to prove nothing. Could you show that Θεός, without the article, was always taken in a relative or improper sense, you would do something. All that you attempt to show is,

that *ὁ Θεός* is no where, in the New Testament, predicated of the *Word* in an absolute construction. And what if it is not? then it is not: for that is all you can make of it. *Θεός* without the article, in many places, confessedly means as much as *Θεός* with the article; which is enough for our purpose. Or, admitting that there is some reason and significancy in it, that the Son is not styled *ὁ Θεός* in an absolute construction, but that the title is generally reserved to the Father, as the title, *ὁ Πατήρ*; all that it signifies is, that the first Person of the Holy Trinity is eminently distinguished by an article; but not that the addition, or the omission, of an article makes any alteration in the sense of the word *Θεός*. You say, that “three of the most learned Ante-Nicene Greek Fathers insist upon this remark about the article; ^a Clemens of Alexandria, ^b Origen, and ^c Eusebius.” But what do they gather from it, or what do they mean by it? Do they mean that the Son is not *God* in the proper sense? Nothing like it. Do they mean that the article can never be properly applied when the Son is spoken of, or that the Scripture observes it as an invariable rule? That does not appear, but rather the contrary: for they understood many texts of the Old Testament, where *Θεός* occurs with the article, of Christ, as may appear, in some measure,

* Clem. Alex. Strom. iii. p. 558. ed. Ox. Clemens does not make his remark on John i. 1. nor does he mention, that the article is put to distinguish the Father's supereminent dignity of nature above the son; as your reader, or perhaps yourself, might imagine. His design was only to prove, against Tatian, that the true God (and not the Devil) was the author of conjugal procreation; for which he cites Gen. iv. 25. observing, that *Θεός* in that place has the article *ὁ* before it; and therefore must be understood of the true God, the *πρωτόγονος*. By the very same rule, Christ must be true God, in the same sense, according to Clemens. He is *ὁ Θεός*. See p. 72, 132, 251, 273, 436, 832; and likewise *ὁ πρωτόγονος*, p. 277. See also p. 148, 647.

^b In Joh. p. 46. Origen means no more than that the Father is *ἀυράδιος*, God unoriginated; the Son, God of God.

^c Eccl. Theol. l. ii. c. 17. Eusebius makes no farther use of the observation than to prove, against Marcellus, that the *Λόγος* is a distinct *real* Person; and not the Father himself.

from the texts before laid down; and might be more amply set forth by other evidence, were any needful in so clear a case.

The truth of the whole matter is, the title of $\delta \Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$, being understood in the same sense with Αὐτόθεος , was, as it ought to be, generally reserved to the Father, as the distinguishing *personal* character of the first Person of the Holy Trinity. And this amounts to no more than the acknowledgment of the Father's prerogative, as Father. But as it might also signify any Person who is truly and essentially God, it might properly be applied to the Son too: and it is so applied sometimes, though not so often as it is to the Father. However, it is hardly worth the while to dispute this point. The sum and substance of all is, that ^d the Father is absolutely and eminently styled $\delta \Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$, as the fountain of all; the Son, $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$, *God of God*; which is sufficient to our purpose. You observe, (p. 42.) that the LXXII have $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ without the article, wherever mention is made of God, in what you call the subordinate sense. The inference I should draw from thence is, that when $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ has the article prefixed, the supreme God is meant thereby. By this rule, if the concurrent sense of the Ante-Nicene writers be of any force or weight with you, our dispute would be at an end. For they apply innumerable texts, wherein $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ occurs with the article, to our Saviour Christ. But if you slight their authorities, yet I presume you will be concluded by the inspired writers, who apply some texts of the Old Testament, which have $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ with the article, to our blessed Lord. Compare

Numb. xxi. 5, 6, 7.

Isa. xlv. 22, 23.

| 1 Cor. x. 9.

| ^c Rom. xiv. 11. Phil. ii. 10.

I had almost forgot to take notice of one pretence more you have, for the subordinate sense of $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$, in John

^d See this more fully explained and illustrated in Dr. Fiddes's *Body of Divinity*, vol. i. p. 383, &c. and 397, &c.

^e Vid. Surenhus. *Conciliation*. p. 511.

i. I. You word it thus, (p. 41.) “ He who is *God*, and “ at the same time is *with God* who begat Him, must “ needs be God in a different meaning; unless the same “ God could be *with himself*,” &c. To this it is readily answered, that being *with God* is the same as being *with the Father*, (compare 1 John i. 2.) who is God, and eminently so styled, as being first in order^f. If he were not always with him, and inseparable from him, he could not be God in a proper sense. God and God, or God of God, supposes two *Persons*; and therefore there is no foundation for the objection of the Son’s being with *himself*. Having thus endeavoured to obviate your exceptions, I now proceed in the proof of my position. The *Word* is here (John i. 1.) said to have been God *in the beginning*; that is, *before the creation*; from whence it is farther probable, that he is God in the strict and proper sense. This circumstance may at least be sufficient to convince you, that the relative sense, which you contend for, is not applicable. He could have no relation to the creatures before they were made; no *dominion* over them when they were not: and therefore could not be God in the sense of *dominion* or *office*. But what most of all demonstrates the *Word* to be here called God in the proper sense is, that the creation of all things is ascribed to him. Creation is an indisputable mark of the one true God; the ^a distinguishing character by which he was to be known, and for which he was to be revered above all Gods; and on ^b account of which he claims to himself all homage, worship, and adoration. But of this I shall have occasion to say more hereafter, and therefore shall dis-

^f There is no inconsistency in admitting a priority of order, and yet denying the Son to be God in a subordinate or improper sense. There was a priority of order in respect of Adam and Seth; and yet Seth was not man in a subordinate sense, but in the same sense as Adam was. I use not the similitude, as if it would answer in other respects; but it may serve so far to illustrate my meaning; which is sufficient. See *Exposit. Fid.* attributed to Justin. Mart. p. 293. Sylb. ed.

^a Jerem. x. 11.

^b Rev. iv. 10, 11.

miss it for the present. I must not forget to add, that, besides what I have here urged, by virtue also of what hath been proved under Query the first, I may come at my conclusion. For no question can be made but that the *Word* is called God, by St. John, in a higher sense than any nominal God can pretend to. And therefore, since he is not excluded with the nominal Gods, he is included and comprehended in the one Supreme God; and consequently is coeternal and coessential with the Father. Enough hath been said in vindication of the argument contained in this Query; and so now I return it upon you, standing in full force, and expecting a more complete and more satisfactory answer.

QUERY IV.

Whether, supposing the Scripture-notion of God to be no more than that of the Author and Governor of the universe, or whatever it be, the admitting of another to be Author and Governor of the universe, be not admitting another God, contrary to the texts before cited from Isaiah, and also to Is. xlii. 8. xlvi. 11. where he declares, he will not give his glory to another?

YOUR answer is, (p. 42.) "Supposing the revealed sense of the word God, to imply *dominion*, and that he is *the Author and Governor of the universe*, the admitting a *second Person*, distinct from the one supreme God, to be *Author and Governor*, doth by no means contradict the passages cited from Isaiah, or any other, or introduce two Gods, viz. two supreme Beings or Persons." Give me leave to produce the texts of Isaiah once more, and to place others in an opposite column to them, only *mutatis mutandis*, putting *Author and Governor of the universe* instead of the word *God*; which, with you, amounts to the same.

I am the Lord, and there is none else, there is no <i>Author and Governor of the universe</i> beside me, Is. xlv. 5.		The Word was <i>Author and Governor of the universe</i> , John i. 1.
--	--	--

Is there an *Author and Governor of the universe* beside me? yea, there is no *Author*, &c. Isa. xliv. 8. Christ came, who is over all, *Author and Governor of the universe*, blessed for ever, Rom. ix. 5.

I hope you see plainly how the texts in the two opposite columns confront and contradict each other; and that two *Authors and Governors of the universe*, whom you suppose two distinct separate Beings, are as plainly *two Gods*, as if it were said so in terms. For indeed there is no difference more than that of putting the definition for the thing defined. But you have an evasion after, that they are not two *supreme Beings*. And what if they are not? Are they not still two *Authors and Governors of the universe*? And is not every such *Author and Governor*, by your own account, a God? This pretence then comes too late. Or admitting that *supreme* must be added to *Author and Governor*, to make a true definition of God, then *Author and Governor of the universe*, without *supreme*, is not sufficient to denominate a person God; and so you *ungod* the second Person; and what you gave with one hand, you take away with the other.

What you should have said is, (for it is what you really mean,) that there are *two Gods*; one supreme, and the other subordinate: which being a proposition utterly repugnant to the texts of Isaiah, and to the whole tenor of Scripture, and to all antiquity, you do not, I suppose, care to speak it at length. I have before endeavoured to expose this notion of two Gods, one supreme, and the other inferior; and have shown it to be unreasonable and unscriptural. I may add, that if there really be two Gods (supreme and inferior) in the proper scriptural sense of the word, the good Fathers of the three first centuries argued against the heathen Polytheism upon a very false principle, and died martyrs for an error; the angel in the Revelations may seem to have imposed upon St. John with an erroneous maxim, Rev. xix. 10. our Saviour's answer to the devil to have been defective, and not pertinent, Luke iv. 8. and the many declarations of the

Unity, scattered through the Old Testament, to be unintelligible and insignificant. But this shall be more distinctly explained when I come to the argument concerning worship.

Here let me only ask you, where does the Scripture give you the least intimation of two true Gods? Where does it furnish you with any ground for the distinction of a sovereign and an inferior Deity? What foundation can you find for adding *supreme* wherever the Scripture says absolutely there is but *one* God? You are apt to complain of us for adding to the text, and for pretending to speak plainer than the Holy Spirit has dictated; why do you add here, without any warrant? If the sacred writers intended to limit the sense by *supreme*, why could not they, in one place at least among many, have said so, and have told it us as plainly as Dr. Clarke and you do? I argue indeed here *ad hominem* only; and let it have just as much force with you, as the same way of arguing, when you take it up in your turn, ought to have with us. But farther; what account can you give of your leaving room for inferior Deities, when the reason of the thing, the drift, scope, and design of the Scripture seems plainly to have been to exclude not other Supremes only, or other independent Deities, (which few have been weak enough to suppose,) but other lesser, inferior, and dependent Divinities? Besides, God has declared that "he will not give his glory to another," Is. xlii. 8. xlvi. 11. This you say "has no difficulty." How so, I beseech you? It seems to me a very great difficulty in your Scheme. You add, that "his glory is, his being the one supreme independent cause and original of all things or beings." Now I thought it was his peculiar glory to be truly *God*, and to be acknowledged as such, exclusive of other Gods. This, I am sure, is what the one God inculcates and insists upon very particularly in the Old Testament. He discovers himself to be a jealous God, and looks upon it as the highest indignity to have any admitted as partners and sharers with him. All acts of

worship, all homage, service, adoration, and sacrifice, he claims, he challenges as his due, and due to him only, and that because he *only* is God. Now put the case of *another God*, another *Author and Governor of the universe*; that other will have a share, and divide, though unequally, with him in glory. Was this then the meaning of Isaiah xlii. 8. “I will not give *all* my glory to another?” I will have the greater share in every thing? How consistent might this be with the worship of inferior Deities, or with the rankest Polytheism? For many of the Pagans themselves paid their highest veneration to the one supreme God; only they defiled his worship with a multitude of inferior Deities; they gave not God the *sole* glory, but admitted others as sharers and partners with him. You add, that “whatever divine honour is justly given to any other, redounds ultimately to the glory of him, who commanded it to be given.”

But what if God, who best knows what redounds to his glory, has already and beforehand engrossed all divine honour to himself, as being the only God, and the *sole Author and Governor of the universe*? then all others are precluded from receiving any divine honour; and there is no more room left for God’s commanding it, than there is for his confronting and contradicting himself. But more of this hereafter, under the head of *worship*. I shall close this article with Grotius’s comment upon the text which we have been considering. The meaning of it is, says he, ⁱ “That God will take severe vengeance on those who give that name, which belongs to him, to Bel, Nebo, Merodach, and others, which by nature are no Gods.”

QUERY V.

Whether Dr. Clarke’s pretence, that the authority of Father and Son being one, though they are two distinct Beings, makes them not to be two Gods, as a king upon the

ⁱ Vult enim dicere, se vindicaturum severe in eos qui nomen, quod ipsius est, dant Belo, Neboni, Meraducho, et aliis τῶν μὴ φύου ὄντι Θεῶν.

throne, and his son administering the father's government, are not two kings, be not trifling and inconsistent? For if the king's son be not a king, he cannot truly be called king; if he is, then there are two kings. So if the Son be not God in the Scripture-notion of God, he cannot truly be called God; and then how is the Doctor consistent with Scripture, or with himself? But if the Son be truly God, there are two Gods upon the Doctor's hypothesis, as plainly as that one and one are two: and so all the texts of Isaiah cited above, besides others, stand full and clear against the Doctor's notion.

YOU trust, it seems, that "upon a second consideration of this fifth Query, the objector himself will not think it very pertinent or conclusive." But I can see no reason for your being so sanguine upon it. For as an argument so plain and strong needs not so much as a second consideration; so if the objector were to consider it ever so often, he could not but think it to be, as he finds it, both very pertinent and very conclusive. You add, that "he will not ask a second time, whether one divine Person exercising the authority of another, to whom he is subordinate, and by whom he is sent, proves that the two Persons are two Gods."

But let me intreat you, in a subject of this importance, not to trifle at this rate; talking backwards and forwards, saying and unsaying, asserting and then recanting, and contradicting yourself. What is Dr. Clarke's intention, and what is yours, in insisting so much on the *relative* sense of the word *God*, but to find a salvo for the divinity of the Son, that he may be acknowledged, consistently with your hypothesis, to be *truly, really, properly* God? Read but over again what you yourself have written, (p. 113.) and then deny this if you can. Well then, if the Son, a distinct separate Being, be *truly* and *really* God, and if the Father be so too, what can be plainer than that there are, upon your hypothesis, *two* Gods? But you say, one is supreme, the other subordinate. I

understand it; I consider it: and do not you allow that a subordinate being may be properly God? Do not you expressly plead and contend for it? Is it not essential in Dr. Clarke's Scheme, and yours too? What mean you then to deny that there are two Gods? Can you deny it, without recanting all that you had said before; without striking out every subordinate being from being *truly* and *properly* God; without disowning the very principle upon which you assert the Son to be *God*; in short, without manifestly confronting and condemning yourself? I do not charge you with asserting two supreme Gods; but I do charge you with holding two Gods, one supreme, another inferior; two real and true Gods, according to the Scripture-notion of the word *God*, as explained by yourself. This you cannot truly and sincerely, you should not otherwise, deny: and therefore, instead of shifting it off, your business should be to maintain your assertion, and to reconcile it, as far as possible, to Scripture, antiquity, and reason. I am sensible something may be pleaded, having seen what has been pleaded, for the notion of two Gods, as you understand it. But I think it is upon such principles, as will leave you no pretence from Scripture to object *Tritheism* to others; nor any just ground for insisting, as you generally do, upon the strict force of the exclusive terms, in order to *ungod* the Son. I will not however anticipate what you may have to say farther on this head; nor what may be pertinently replied to it. Let me see first, how far you will in good earnest espouse the notion of two Gods: in the interim I may fairly leave you to consider of it. I shall be content at present to follow you in the way that you are in, endeavouring to clear yourself of the charge of asserting two Gods, and yet, all the while, pleading for a subordinate God. To countenance your notion, you produce, ^a after the learned Doctor, the authority of Tertullian; the same Tertullian whom I have quoted above ^b as de-

^a Scrip. Doctr. p. 333.

^b See Qu. iii. p. 54.

claring expressly against any such vain imagination as that of a subordinate God, and throwing it off as a Pagan dream; the same that says, the Divinity has no *degrees*, being *one* only. Will you bring him for a voucher, so directly against himself? True, he uses the similitude of a king upon a throne, and a son administering his father's kingdom; but to a very different purpose from what you would have it serve. The objection against more Persons than one in the Godhead (as Tertullian resolves it) was, that the *authority* would not be *one*; that there would not be *unicum imperium*: see the place in the ^c margin. The similitude is pertinent to show how the *authority*, or *government*, may be *one* in the hands of *several* Persons. But if you ask Tertullian how Father and Son can be reputed *one God*, he tells you in the ^d chapter before, and in that very passage which the Doctor quotes, that it is by *unity of substance*, and *original*. *Unity of authority*,

^c *Monarchiam*, inquit, tenemus. Et ita sonum vocaliter exprimunt Latini, etiam opici, ut putes illos tam bene intelligere monarchiam, quam enuntiant. Sed monarchiam sonare student Latini; et œconomiam intelligere nolunt etiam Græci. At ego, si quid utriusque lingue præcepsi, *monarchiam* nihil aliud significare scio, quam *singulare et unicum imperium*: non tamen præscribere monarchiam, ideo quia unius sit, eum, cujus sit, aut filium non habere, aut ipsum se sibi filium fecisse, aut monarchiam suam non per quos velit administrare. Atquin, nullam dico *dominationem* ita unius sui esse, ut non etiam per alias proximas personas administraretur— Si vero et filius fuerit ei, cujus monarchia sit, non statim dividi eam, et monarchiam esse desinere, si particeps ejus adsumatur et filius. *Contr. Præx.* c. iii. p. 502.

The sense of this passage is very clear: the Praxeans (I suppose taking advantage of this, that the Church had always rejected *tria principia*, and *τρῆς ἀρχαί*) pleaded for themselves, and against a real Trinity; *μοναχίαν* tenemus. Tertullian tells them, that they misunderstood *μοναχίαν*: (as it might signify *unum principium*, he had answered the objection before, c. 2.) Here, he says, it signifies only one authority; and he shows that, taken in that sense, it was no just objection against a Trinity of Persons. Thus, having maintained, first, unity of principle, and afterwards unity of authority, he sufficiently guarded the doctrine of the Trinity against the cavils of Praxeas.

^d Unus omnia, dum ex uno omnia, per substantiæ scilicet unitatem, p. 501.

Filium non aliunde deduco, sed de substantia Patris, c. iv. p. 502.

and *unity of Godhead*, are, with Tertullian, distinct things, however you may please to confound them: God and his angels have, according to him, *one authority*; but he does not therefore say, that the angels are *Gods*; or that if they were, there would still be but *one God*.

•Athenagoras makes use of the same similitude for the same purpose with Tertullian, to illustrate the unity of *authority* and power common to Father and Son; not the unity of *Godhead*. It was the ^fgovernment divine which he undertook, in some measure, to illustrate by that comparison of a king and his son, (which however would argue an equality of nature, contrary to your tenets.) But as to unity of *Godhead*, he resolves it into ^gother principles, the same with Tertullian's; namely, *unity of substance* and *original*, making the Holy Ghost (and the reason is the same for the Son) to be a substantial ^hemanation from the Father, as light from fire. The common answer to the charge of Tritheism, or Ditheism, as well of the Post-Nicene as Ante-Nicene Fathers, was, that there is but one Head, Root, Fountain, Father of all; not in respect of *authority* only, but of *substance* also; as Tertullian before expresses it: "Non aliunde deduco, sed "de substantia Patris." This was the concurrent sense of ⁱall in general; and into this chiefly they resolved the unity of Godhead; as they must needs do, since they believed *God* to be a word denoting *substance*, not *dominion* only; and one *Divinity*, Θεότης, was with them the same thing as one *Divine substance*. The learned Doctor, after his manner of citing, ^kproduces, I think, thirteen vouchers (ten ancient, three modern) for his notion of the Unity. Tertullian, Athenagoras, and Novatian, (three of them,) evidently resolve the Unity, as before observed,

• Legat. c. xv. p. 63.

^f ἰσαρχίαν βασιλείαν.

^g Page 38, 39, 96.

^h Νοῦς, λόγος, σοφία, υἱὸς τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ ἀπόρρητος, ὡς φῶς ἀπὸ πυρὸς, τὸ πνεῦμα, p. 96.

ⁱ Some pretended exceptions will be considered in another place, Qu. 23.

^k Script. Doctr. p. 334, 335, &c. alias p. 301, &c.

into *communion of substance*. Justin, Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Pearson, Bull, Payne, (seven more,) most of them, in the very passages which the Doctor cites; all of them, somewhere or other, are known to resolve it into Sonship, or unity of principle; either of which comes to the same with the former. None of these authors so understood the Father to be one God, as to exclude the Son from being one God with him in nature, substance, and perfection: nor would they have scrupled to call Father and Son together one God; most of them doing it expressly, all implicitly.

Origen, another of the Doctor's authors, resolves the Unity into communion of Godhead, in the ^l passage cited. Θεότης is the word he uses; ^m generally, if not constantly, signifying substance in that very comment from whence the citation is taken; agreeably to the most usual sense of Θεός, in the Ante-Nicene writers; and of *Divinitas*, in Tertullian; and of Θεότης, in other ⁿ authors.

Lactantius, the twelfth of the number, would have spoken fully to our purpose, in the very ^o chapter referred to, if the Doctor would have suffered him. He would have told us, (however unhappy he may otherwise be in his explications of that mystery,) that Father and Son are *one substance*, and *one God*; so far, at least, contrary to what the learned Doctor cites him for. There remains only Eusebius, whose expressions are bold and free; and so far favourable to the Doctor, as they are different from those of the Catholics of his own time, or of the times

^l Comm. in Joh. p. 46.

^m See *ibid.* p. 35, 133, 154, 228, 262.

ⁿ Epist. Synod. Antioch. Labb. tom. i. p. 847. Eusebius Comm. in Psalm. p. 323, 592. et in Isa. p. 375, 382, 551. Athanas. passim. Epiphan. Hæres. lxiv. c. 8.

• Una utriusque mens, unus Spiritus, *una substantia* est; sed ille quasi exuberans fons est; hic tanquam defluens ex eo rivus: ille tanquam sol; hic quasi radius a sole porrectus.—Ad *utramque Personam* referens intulit, et *præter me* non est Deus; cum possit dicere, *præter nos*; sed fas non erat plurali numero separationem tantæ necessitudinis fieri. Lib. iv. c. 29. p. 403, 404.

before, and after. If they are really to be understood, so as to exclude the Son from being one God with the Father, they *ungod* the Son, and contain plain Arianism. But perhaps they may admit of such a favourable excuse as, P^rGelasius tells us, Eusebius, in effect, made for himself, in respect of any uncautious expressions, which, in the warmth of dispute, or out of his great zeal against Sabellianism, had dropped from him: "That he did not intend them in the impious sense, (of Arius,) but had only been too careless and negligent in his expressions." One may be the more inclined to believe it, since he admitted, at other times, (as I have observed above,) *one God in three Persons*: and elsewhere ⁹speaks very orthodoxly of the holy undivided Trinity, illustrating the *equality* of the Persons by a very handsome similitude. But to return to the learned Doctor. In the ^rclose of this article he has a peculiar turn, which should be taken notice of. "The Scholastic writers," says he, "in later ages, have put this matter" (meaning the Unity of the Godhead) "upon another foot:" that is, different from what himself, and perhaps Eusebius in those passages, had put it upon. They have not, it seems, put it upon a *real, proper numerical individuality*, as the learned Doctor would have had them do. They do not make the Godhead *μονοπρόσωπος*, one single hypostasis; which, in the main, is all one with the Sabellian singularity.

The reader should be told, that those Scholastic writers are as old as Tertullian, Irenæus, or Athenagoras; which brings it up almost to the middle of the second century. So early, at least, Father and Son together have been called, and all along believed to be *one God*. Let but the

^p Οὐ μὴν κατὰ τὴν ἀσειβῆ ἰαίου ἴναιαι, ἀλλ' ἔξ ἀπειρίργου ἀπλότητος. *Gelas.* l. 2. *de Syn. Nic.* c. i. p. 11.

⁹ Εἰκὸν δὲ ταῦτα μυστικῆς καὶ παναγίας καὶ βασιλικῆς τριάδος. ἢ τῆς ἀνάρχου καὶ ἀγενήτου φύσεως ἡρημίση, τῆς τῶν γεννητῶν ἀπάντων οὐσίας τὰ στίγματα, καὶ τοῖς λόγους, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας, ἀπειλήφι. *Orat. de Laud. Constant.* p. 511. ed. Vales.

^r *Script. Doctr.* p. 349.

reader understand, and take along with him, what I have now observed, and I shall not differ with you about names. Scholastic may stand for Catholic, as I perceive it often does with you also, if you think the Catholic faith may, under that borrowed name, be more safely or more successfully attacked. The Scholastic notion then, which has prevailed for fifteen centuries at least, is, that Father and Son are *one God*: yours, on the other hand, is, that the Father is one God, and the Son another God: and I am to convince you, if I can, that one God, and another God, make two Gods. You ask me seriously, “whether Herod the Great was not king of Judea, though the Jews” (that is, when the Jews) “had no king but Cæsar?” I answer, he was not: for Herod the Great had been dead above thirty years before; and the Jews had really no king but Cæsar when they said so. However, if there had been one king under another king, there would have been two kings. The same I say for one God under another God; they make *two Gods*. You ask, next, “whether there were more kings of Persia than one, though the King of Persia was king of kings?” I shall not dispute whether king of kings was titular only to the kings of Persia, or whether they had other kings under them. I shall only say thus: either the supposed kings of Persia were kings of Persia, or they were not: if they were, then there were more kings of Persia than one: if they were not kings of Persia, they should not be so called. To apply this to our present purpose; either there are two Authors and Governors of the universe, that is, *two Gods*; or there are not: if there are, why do you deny it of either? If there are not, why do you affirm it of both?

After all, please to take notice, that I do not dispute against the notion of one king under another; a petty king under a supreme. There is no difficulty at all in the conception of it. But what I insist upon is this: that a

great king and a little king make two kings ; or else one of them is no king, contrary to the supposition. The same I say of a *supreme* and a *subordinate* God, that they make *two Gods* ; or else one of them is *no God*, contrary to the supposition.

Texts proving an unity of divine attributes in Father and Son ; applied

To the one God.

Thou, even thou only, knowest the hearts of all the children of men, 1 Kings viii. 39.

I the Lord search the hearts, I try the reins, Jer. xvii. 10.

I am the first, and I am the last ; and beside me there is no God, Isa. xlv. 6.

I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, Rev. i. 8.

King of kings, and Lord of lords, 1 Tim. vi. 15.

The mighty God, Is. x. 21.

Lord over all, Rom. x. 19.

To the Son.

He knew all men, &c. John ii. 24. Thou knowest all things, John xvi. 30. Which knowest the hearts of all men, Acts i. 24.

I am he that searcheth the reins and the heart, Rev. ii. 23.

I am the first, and I am the last, Rev. i. 17.

I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, Rev. xxii. 13.

Lord of lords, and King of kings, Rev. xvii. 14. xix. 16.

The mighty God, Is. ix. 6.

He is Lord of all, Acts x. 36. Over all, God blessed, &c. Rom. ix. 9.

QUERY VI.

Whether the same characteristics, especially such eminent ones, can reasonably be understood of two distinct Beings, and of one infinite and independent, the other dependent and finite ?

IN this sixth Query (for so I choose to make it, thinking that method most convenient, on several accounts) are couched two arguments for the Son's being the *one true God*, as well as the Father.

The first is ; That the characteristics, applied to the *one true God*, are applied likewise to the Son : which consideration alone is of great force.

The second is ; That the attributes here applied to the

Son, are such eminent ones, that we might safely conclude they belong to no creature, but to God only.

How shall we know who or what the one God is, or what honour, and to whom, due; but by such marks, notes, and distinguishing characters as are given us of him in Scripture? If those are equally applied to two or more *Persons*, the honour must go along with the attributes; and the attributes infer an equality of nature and substance to support them. In a word; if divine attributes belong to each *Person*, each *Person* must be God; and if God, since God is one, the same God. This is the sum of the argument: now let us see what answer you give to it.

You admit that the attributes, specified in the texts, belong to both: only you observe, that "all powers and attributes are said to be the Father's only, because they belong to him primarily, or originally, as the self-existent ^a cause." This I can readily admit, as well as you, provided only the word *cause* be interpreted to a just, sober, and catholic sense, (as the Greek writers especially have understood it,) and *self-existent* be interpreted, as it should be, negatively. You add, "Our Lord Jesus Christ, having all communicable divine powers derived to him, with his being, from the Father, is said to do the same things which the Father doth, and to be, in a subordinate sense, what the Father is."

Here are many things in this answer liable to just exception. First, your using the word *divine* in an improper sense. *Angelical* powers are such as are peculiar to angels; and *divine* powers such as are proper to *God* only: but here you understand it in the same sense as one might call any kingly power or authority *divine*, because derived from God; and so any thing that comes from God is, in your sense, *divine*. In the next place, you clog it farther with the term *communicable*, telling us, that all *communicable divine* powers are derived to

Christ Jesus: whereas I contend, that the attributes in the text are strictly *divine*; and therefore incommunicable to any creature. Next, you speak of a *subordinate* sense, in which those attributes belong to Christ; which is the same as to say, (because you mean so,) that they belong not at all to him. For, I suppose, omniscience, or eternity, &c. in your subordinate sense, are very different from the other; and therefore are not the same attributes. It were better to deny roundly, that the same attributes belong to both; and then we should clearly apprehend each other. Lastly, I observe to you, that you understand the word *subordinate*, very differently from what catholic writers do in this controversy, and therefore, instead of it, should rather have said, in a *restrained, limited* sense; which is your meaning, otherwise you contradict not me.

Now then I must ask you, what ground or warrant you have from Scripture, or right reason, for putting restrictions and limitations upon the texts applied to Christ Jesus, more than to those applied to the one God? The expressions are equally general, and, seemingly at least, equally extensive. You are so sensible that you can give no solid proof of a restrained and limited sense, that you do not so much as offer at it; but only covertly insinuate your meaning, under dark and obscure terms. You speak of *subordination*, and quote Fathers for it, who understood it in the sober and orthodox sense: if you agree with those Fathers, you agree with me. But do not use their venerable names as a cover for what they never meant, but would have greatly abhorred^b. I allow the second Person to be *subordinately* wise, good, powerful, &c. That is not the question between us: he is *sapientia de sapientia*; as *lumen de lumine*, and *Deus de Deo*. What I contend for farther is, that his attributes are

^b The testimonies which you have cited from Dr. Clarke, I take no notice of; because they have been already considered by a learned Gentleman, and shown to be foreign to your purpose. *True Script. Doctr. continued*, p. 11.

strictly divine, and his perfections infinite. I prove it from hence; because the attributes which belong to the *one God*, and are therefore undoubtedly infinite, belong to him also; from whence it follows, that the Godhead belongs to him too; and that there are more Persons than one in the *one God*. Whatever I can find in your answer tending in the least to invalidate this reasoning, I shall take notice of; though you have been pleased to be very sparing in this article. You observe, that “the exercise of these attributes being finite, they do not necessarily infer an infinite subject.” I understand not what you mean by the *exercise* of eternity and omniscience, which are two of those attributes; nor how it can be finite, without an express contradiction; nor how either of them can be *exercised*, whatever you mean by it, but by an infinite subject. As little do I understand how infinite power, which, I presume, is what you chiefly allude to, must be finite in the exercise of it; as if there could not be an act of infinite power, or as if God could not do something which should infinitely exceed any finite power. These things very much want explaining; and so I leave them to your farther thoughts.

The clearest expression you have under this article is this: “When Christ is styled *Lord of all*, see it explained, Matt. xxviii. 18. and Ephes. i. 22. where Christ is said to *have all power given him*.” Here, I think, I do understand your meaning; and am sorry to find that it falls so low. Would your predecessors in this controversy, the ancient Arians, or Eunomians, have ever scrupled to acknowledge that our blessed Saviour was *Lord over all*, long before his resurrection, or even his incarnation? That he was “*Lord of all*” before his resurrection, is very plain from the Scriptures, which carry in them irrefragable

† Antequam faceret universa, omnium futurorum Deus et Dominus, Rex et Creator erat constitutus. Voluntate et præcepto (Dei et Patris sui) cœlestia et terrestria, visibilia et invisibilia, corpora et spiritus, ex nullis exstantibus, ut essent, sua virtute fecit. *Serm. Arianor. apud August.* tom. viii. p. 622.

proofs of it. "By him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible, and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him, and for him: and he is before all things, and by him all things consist," Col. i. 16, 17. "Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the works of thine hands," ^d Heb. i. 10.

Can you imagine that the Son could be *Creator* and *Preserver* of all things from the beginning, and yet not be *Lord over all* till after his resurrection? If this does not

^d It is not without good reason that we understand Heb. i. 10. of Christ.

1. The context itself favours it. The verse begins with *καὶ εὖ*, which properly refers to the same who was spoken of immediately before, in the second Person. The *εὖ* preceding and *εὖ* following, answer to each other. A change of person, while the same way of speaking is pursued, must appear unnatural.

2. The scope and intent of the author was to set forth the honour and dignity of the Son above the angels; and no circumstance could be more proper than that of his *creating* the world.

3. If he had omitted it, he had said less than himself had done before, in verse the 2d, of which this seems to be explanatory; and as he had brought proofs from the Old Testament for several other articles, nothing could be more proper or more pertinent, than to bring a proof from thence of this also.

4. Declaring him to be *Jehovah*, and *Creator* of the universe, might be very proper to show that he was no *ministering spirit*, but *εὐδερμης*; to sit at the right hand of God, which immediately follows.

5. To introduce a passage here about God's immutability or stability, must appear very abrupt, and not pertinent; because the angels also, in their order and degree, reap the benefit of God's stability and immutability. And the question was not about the duration and continuance, but about the sublimity and excellency of their respective natures and dignities.

6. I may add, that this sense is very consonant to antiquity; which every where speaks of the Son as *Creator*, and in as high and strong terms: such as these, *επιχρίτης, δημιουργός, ποιητής: ἀνθρώπων, ἀγγέλων, τῶν πάντων, τῶν ὄλων, τοῦ κόσμου*, and the like; testimonies whereof will occur hereafter. Barnabas, speaking of the sun in the heavens, calls it *ἔργον χειρῶν αὐτοῦ*, meaning Christ; though there is some dispute about the reading: of which see *Grab. Not. in Bull. D. F.* p. 23.

These considerations seem sufficient to overthrow the pretences of a late writer, *Exam. of Dr. Beane* on Trin. p. 40. As to former exceptions to this verse, they are considered and confuted by *Bishop Bull*, *Jud. Eccl.* p. 43. See also *Surenhus*. in loc. p. 600.

satisfy you, return to John i. 1. He was Θεὸς before the world was, by your own acknowledgment; which being a word of office, and implying dominion, he was certainly *Lord*, as soon as ever there was any thing for him to be Lord over. And when he came into the world, the world that was made *by him*, (John i. 10.) he came unto *his own*, (John i. 11.) Surely then he was *Lord over all* long before his resurrection.

You will ask, it may be, what then is the meaning of those texts which you have quoted? How was *all power given him*, according to Matt. xxviii. 18? Or how were *all things* then *put under his feet*, according to Ephes. i. 22? Nothing is more easy than to answer you this. The Λόγος, or Word, was from the beginning, *Lord over all*; but the God incarnate, the Θεάνθρωπος, or God-Man, was not so, till after the resurrection. Then he received, in that capacity, what he had ever enjoyed in another. Then did he receive that *full power* in both natures, which he had heretofore possessed in one only. This is very handsomely represented by Hermas, in his fifth Similitude: where the ^c Son of God is introduced under a double capacity, as a son and as a servant, in respect of his two natures, divine and human.

“^f The father calling his son and heir whom he loved, and such friends as he was wont to have in council, he tells them what commands he had laid upon his servant, and moreover what the servant had done; and they immediately congratulated that servant, for that he had received so full a testimony from his lord.”—(Afterwards the father adds,) “I will make him my heir together with my son.—This design of

^c See Bull. D. Fid. N. p. 38.

^f (Pater) adhibito filio quem carum et hæredem habebat, et amicis quos in consilio advocabat; indicat eis quæ servo suo faciendæ mandasset, quæ præterea ille fecisset. At illi protinus gratulati sunt servo illi, quod tam plenum testimonium domini assecutus fuisset—volo eum filio meo facere cohæredem.—Hoc consilium domini, et filius, et amici ejus comprobaverunt, ut fieret scilicet hic servus cohæres filio. *Herm. Past. Sim. v. c. 2. p. 104.* Cot. edit.

“ the lord both his son and his friends approved, namely, “ that this servant should be heir together with his “ son.”

It is much to the same purpose that Origen says to Celsus; “ ε Let those our accusers (who object to us, “ our making a God of a mortal man) know, that (this “ Jesus) whom we believe to have been God, and the “ Son of God from the beginning, is no other than the “ Word itself, Truth itself, and Wisdom itself: but we “ say farther that his mortal body, and the human soul “ that was therein, by means of their most intimate con- “ nection to, and union with the Word, received the “ greatest dignity imaginable, and, participating of his “ divinity, were taken into God.” It is difficult to express the full force of this passage in English: but you may see the original in the margin.

From hence you may perceive, how easy it is to account for our Lord’s having *all power given him*, after his resurrection; given him in respect of his human nature, which was never so high exalted, nor assumed into such power and privilege, till that time; having before been under a state of affliction and humiliation. There is a notable fragment of Hippolytus, which Fabricius has lately given us in the second volume; and which is so full to our purpose, that I cannot forbear adding it to the former. Speaking of that famous passage in the Epistle to the Philippians, chap. ii. and particularly upon these words; “Wherefore G^od also hath highly exalted him,” ver. 9. he comments upon it thus. “^h He is said to be *exalted*, as “ having wanted it before; but in respect only of his

ε “Ισωςαν οι ιγναλιωντες δε εν μιν νομιζομεν και πιστισμεθα αρχηθεν εστις Θεον και υιον Θεου, ουτος ε αντολογος εστι, και η αντοσοφια, και η αντοαληθεια. Το δε σπαιεν αυτου σωμα, και την ανθρωπιση εν αυτη ψυχην, τη προς λαϊνον, ου μόνον κωνοις αλλα και ιουσαι και ανακρασει, τα μεγαλα φεμεν προσουληφισαι, και της λαϊνου διωσθηης κατακωνησεται εις Θεον μεταβιβησιναι. *Orig. contr. Cels.* l. iii. p. 136, &c.

^h Hippolytus, vol. ii. p. 29. Fabric. edit. See a parallel place in Origen, Com. in Joh. p. 413.

“*humanity*; and he has a name *given* him, as it were a matter of favour, *which is above every name*, as the blessed (Apostle) Paul expresses it. But in truth and reality, this was not the *giving* him any thing, which he naturally had not from the beginning: so far from it, that we are rather to esteem it his returning to what he had in the beginning ⁱessentially and unalterably; on which account it is, that he having condescended, *οικονομικῶς*, to put on the humble garb of humanity, said, Father, glorify me with the glory which I had, &c. For he was *always* invested with divine glory, having been coexistent with his Father before all ages, and before all time, and the foundation of the world ^k.”

I hope this may suffice to convince you how much you mistake; and how contrary your sentiments are, both to Scripture and catholic antiquity, if you imagine that the *Λόγος*, or Word, then first began to be *Lord over all*, when that honour was conferred on the Man Christ Jesus.

QUERY VII.

Whether the Father's omniscience and eternity are not one, and the same with the Son's, being alike described, and in the same phrases? See the text above, p. 63.

YOUR answer, ^lwith respect to the Son's omniscience, is, “that he hath *a relative omniscience* communicated to him from the Father; that *he knows all things relating to the creation and government of the universe*; and that he is ignorant of the day of judgment.”

^l Οὐσιωδῶς καὶ ἀνασπεβλήτως.

^k I may add a passage of Novatian. *Ac si de cælo descendit Verbum hoc, tanquam sponsus ad carnem, ut per carnis adsumptionem Filius Hominis illuc posset ascendere, unde Dei Filius, Verbum, descenderat: merito, dum per connexionem mutuam, et caro Verbum Dei gerit, et Filius Dei fragilitatem carnis adsumit; cum sponsa carne conscendens illuc unde sine carne descenderat, recipit jam claritatem illam, quam dum ante mundi constitutionem habuisse ostenditur, Deus manifestissime comprobatur.* *Novat. c. 13.*

^l Page 48.

The Son then, it seems, knows *all things*, excepting that he is ignorant of many things; and is omniscient in such a sense, as to know infinitely less, than one who is really omniscient. Were it not better to say plainly, that he is not omniscient, than to speak of a *relative* omniscience, which is really no omniscience; unless an angel be omniscient, or a man omniscient, because he knows all things which he knows? What ground do you find in Scripture or antiquity for your distinction of *absolute* and *relative* omniscience? Where is it said, that he knows all things *relating to his office*, and no more? Or how can he be so much as omniscient, in this low sense, if he knows not, or knew not, the precise time of the day of judgment; a thing which, one would imagine, should belong to his office as much as any? Matt. xxiv. 36. as well as Mark xiii. 32. is plainly meant only of the *human nature*; and is to the same effect with Luke ii. 52. "That he increased in wisdom," which cannot be literally understood of the *Λόγος* with any tolerable consistency, even upon the Arian hypothesis^m. You tell us farther, that "all the Ante-Nicene writers understand by these two texts, that our Lord as the *Λόγος*, or Son of God, did not then know the day of judgment," (p. 49.) This is very new indeed; if you have read the Ante-Nicene

^m A late writer acquaints us, in the name of Dr. Clarke and the Arians, (I presume, without their leave,) "that the Word really emptied itself, and became like the rational soul of another man, which is limited by the bodily organs; and is, in a manner, dormant in infancy; and that the Word may be deprived of its former extraordinary abilities—in reality, and grow in wisdom, as others do." This is making the *Λόγος*, that greatest and best of beings, (upon the Arian scheme,) next to God himself, become a child in understanding; though once wise enough to frame and govern the whole universe. The author calls it, (I think very profanely,) "the true and great mystery of godliness, God manifest in flesh." One would think, instead of *manifest*, it should have been, *confined, locked up in flesh*; which is the author's own interpretation of this mystery, (p. 16.) What design he could have in all this, I know not; unless he considered what turn Arianism took, soon after its revival at the Reformation. See *Exam. of Dr. Bennet on the Trin.* p. 15, 16.

writers, you must know better: if you have not, how unaccountable a thing is it to talk thus confidently without book? If what you say was true, we should, without delay, give you up all these writers to a man; and never more pretend to quote any Ante-Nicene Father, in favour of the present orthodoxy. But as the point is of great moment, we must require some proofs of it: for writing of history by invention is really romancing. You cite Irenæus from ⁿ Dr. Clarke, who could find no other: or else we should have heard of it from the first hand. And yet you cry out, *all*; which is more than the learned Doctor pretended to say; who had his thoughts about him, and would not have let slip any fair advantage to the cause which he espouses.

But has the Doctor really proved that Irenæus meant so? Perhaps not: and then your *all*, which was but *one*, is reduced to *none*. Two things the Doctor, or you, should have proved: first, that Irenæus understood those texts of the *Λόγος*, or Word, in that capacity: and secondly, that he supposed him *literally* ignorant of the day of judgment. The Doctor knew full well what solutions had been given of the difficulty arising from this passage. Yet he barely recites Irenæus's words; and neither attempts to prove that such was his sense, nor to disprove it. You indeed do observe, from some learned person, that this passage of Irenæus "will admit of no evasion. "For he evidently speaks not of the *Son of man*, but of "the *Son of God*; even of that Son with whom, as it "follows, *in omnibus Pater communicat.*" Let this have its due weight: the argument may look so far plausible on that side: but let the other side be heard also, before we determine. ^o Bishop Bull has given some reasons, and weighty ones too, to show, that if Irenæus attributed any ignorance to Christ, he did it in respect of his *human nature* only. His reasons are,

ⁿ Script. Doctr. p. 146. alias 132.

^o Def. F. N. p. 82. Comp. Brev. Animadv. in G. Cl. p. 1056.

1. Because Irenæus, in the very same chapter, ^e ascribes *absolute omniscience* to the *divine nature* of Christ.

2. Because he everywhere else speaks of the Son, as of one *perfectly* acquainted with the nature and will of the Father.

3. Because the same ^f Irenæus upbraids the Gnostics for their folly, in ascribing any degree of ignorance to their pretended Sophia, or wisdom. How then could he imagine that the true Sophia, wisdom itself, could be ignorant of any thing?

4. Because the same Irenæus ^g uses an argument against the Valentinians, who pretended to know all things, which plainly supposes that Christ is omniscient. The argument is this. You are not *eternal* and *uncreated*, as the Son of God is; and therefore cannot pretend to be *omniscient*, as he is.

It might have concerned you to answer these reasons, and to make the good Father, at least, consistent with himself, before you lay claim to his authority for your side of the question. However, I am persuaded, that as Bishop Bull is very right in determining that Irenæus could not mean to ascribe any degree of ignorance to the *Λόγος*, or *divine nature* of Christ; so you are right so far in the other point, that Irenæus is to be understood of the *Λόγος*, in what he says. And now the question will be, whether he really ascribes ignorance to him, or only seems to do so, to an unattentive reader.

^e Spiritus Salvatoris, qui in eo est, scrutatur omnia, et altitudines Dei. L. ii. c. 28. p. 158.

^f See L. ii. c. 18. p. 140. Iren. Quomodo autem non vanum est, quod etiam Sophiam ejus dicunt in ignorantia——fuisse? Hæc enim aliena sunt a Sophia, et contraria——ubi enim est improvidentia et ignorantia utilitatis, ibi Sophia non est.

^g Iren. l. ii. c. 25. p. 152. ed. Bened. In quantum minor est, ab eo qui factus non est et qui semper idem est, ille qui hodie factus est et initium facturæ accepit: in tantum, secundum scientiam et ad investigandum causas omnium, minorem esse eo qui fecit. Non enim infectas es, O homo, neque semper coexistebas Deo, sicut proprium ejus Verbum: sed propter eminentem bonitatem ejus, nunc initium facturæ accipiens, sensim discis a Verbo dispositiones Dei, qui te fecit. The whole passage is fuller to the point.

Irenæus's words, I conceive, will most naturally bear this following interpretation, or paraphrase. ^h“ If any one inquires on what account the Father, who communicates in *all things with the Son*, (and consequently in *all knowledge*, and particularly in that of the day of judgment,) is yet here set forth as the only Person knowing that day and hour, he cannot, so far as I at present apprehend, find any fitter or more decent, or indeed any other safe answer than this, (considering that our Lord is a teacher of truth, and must mean something by it,) that it was to instruct us, as from himself, that the Father is above all, according to what he says elsewhere, ‘for the Father is greater than I.’ And therefore the Father is declared to have the priority and preference in respect of knowledge, by our Lord himself, for an example to us; that we also, while we live and converse here below, may learn to refer the perfection of knowledge, and all intricate questions to God.”

The design of Irenæus was to check the vain presumption and arrogance of the Gnostics, pretending to search into the deep things of God. And the argument he had used was this; that our Lord himself was pleased to refer the knowledge of the day of judgment to the Father only, as it were on purpose to teach us, that while we converse

^h Si quis exquirat causam, propter quam in omnibus Pater communicans Filio, solus scire et horam et diem a Domino manifestatus est; neque aptabilem magis, neque decentiorem, nec sine periculo alteram quam hanc inveniat, in præsentem, (quoniam enim solus verax magister est Dominus,) ut discamus per ipsum super omnia esse Patrem. Etenim Pater, ait, major me est. Et secundum agnitionem itaque præpositus esse Pater annuntiatum est a Domino nostro; ad hoc, ut et nos, in quantum in figura hujus mundi sumus, perfectam scientiam, et tales quæstiones concedamus Deo: et ne forte quærentes, &c. *Iren.* l. ii. c. 28. p. 158, 159.

He had said before;

Dominus, ipse Filius Dei, ipsum judicii diem et horam concessit scire solum Patrem, manifeste dicens: “De die autem illo et hora nemo scit, neque Filius, nisi Pater solus.” Si igitur scientiam diei illius, Filius non erubuit referre ad Patrem, sed dixit quod verum est; neque nos erubescamus, quæ sunt in quæstionibus majora secundum nos, reservare Deo, p. 158.

here below, it becomes us not to pretend to high things ; but to leave the deep things of God, to God alone. This is his argument, and a very good one it is. But the good Father apprehending that what he had said of our blessed Saviour might be liable to exception, and be misunderstood, comes afterwards to explain his sense more at large. He is sensible of the danger of ascribing any thing like ignorance to our blessed Lord, on one hand, and as sensible of the danger of contradicting the text, on the other. “Quoniam enim solus verax magister est Dominus ;” inasmuch as what Christ has said must be true, in some sense or other. Dr. Clarke slipped over these words in his translation of the passage, I suppose by inadvertency ; but they may serve to give light to the rest ; for the difficulty lay here : how can it be true that the Father communicates in *all* things, and consequently in the knowledge of the day of judgment, to the Son, and yet our Saviour say true, in ascribing that particular knowledge to the Father only ? His answer is, that we are thereby taught to refer every thing to the Father, as the *original* of all things. To him knowledge ought to be *principally*, and in the *first place*, ascribed : our Saviour therefore himself yields to him the *preference*, as became him, especially here on earth : not as if he knew less, but because what he knew, he knew by communication from the Father ; to whom therefore he refers such secrets as it was not proper to reveal, nor fit for men to inquire after.

That this is all that Irenæus meant, may reasonably be thought ; not only because otherwise it would be utterly inconsistent with many other parts of his writings, as has been before observed ; but also because several expressions in this very passage lead to it. Had he really believed the divine *Λόγος*, or *Word*, to be *literally* ignorant, why should he be so apprehensive of the difficulty of those texts ? Why so concerned about the fitness and decency of his interpretation ; and that it might be *sine*

periculo? The danger was, in interpreting seemingly against the text, to find a salvo for the Son's omniscience. For this reason, he does not ask, why the Father only *knew*, (not, *cur Pater solus scivit*,) but why, or on what account (*solus scire manifestatus est*) he was *represented* as alone knowing; or, he only was *said* to know. He does not say, as the Doctor's translation insinuates, that the Father is more knowing than the Son, but *præpositus* only; which signifies *set before, having the preference*, or the like; which may be conceived, though he be equally knowing: and, for the greater caution, it is not said absolutely, *præpositus est*; but *præpositus esse annuntiatus est*: he is *declared* to have the preference. So that the question, with Irenæus, is not why the Father is superior in knowledge; but why, since Father and Son are equally knowing, our Saviour makes such a declaration as gave the preference to the Father. And the reasons which he assigns are very much to the purpose.

1. To instruct us, that the Father is the fountain and original, even of the Son himself.

2. Because, in his then present state of condescension, it became him to refer all to the Father.

3. Because it may be an useful example of humility and modesty to us, that we, much rather, while we are here below, may not pretend to high things.

Upon the whole, it may appear, that Irenæus's solution of the difficulty is the very same with that which the ⁱ Doctor quotes from St. Basil, who had learned it from a child: namely this, "That our Lord meant to ascribe to " the Father the first (i. e. the primary, original) knowledge of things present and future; and to declare to " the world, that he is in all things the first ^k cause." As the Son is *God of God*, and *Light of Light*; so it is proper to say, *Omniscience of Omniscience*, &c. the attri-

ⁱ Script. Doctr. p. 147, 148. alias 134, 135.

^k Basil. ad Amphilocho. Ep. 391. Conf. Gregor. Nazianz. Orat. xxxvi. p. 584.

butes being derivative in the same sense as the essence is: which is St. Basil's meaning; and, I think, Irenæus's.

This defence may be fairly and justly made for Irenæus, supposing that what he said was meant of the *Λόγος*, or divine nature, as such: to which opinion I incline. Nevertheless, I should not affect to be dogmatical in that point, since learned and judicious men have been of both sides of the question. Petavius ¹ observes, that the sense is *ambiguous*; and that there are not *certain* grounds to determine us either way. If he understood it of the human nature only, then the difficulty is nothing: if of both, I have shown how fair an account may be given of it. Having thus got over Irenæus, I have at once taken from you all your Ante-Nicene writers. You will observe, that the texts might be understood of the *Λόγος*, or *divine nature*, as Basil understands them, in the place above cited; and yet that they, who so understood them, might be far from thinking that the *Λόγος*, or *Word*, was ever ignorant of any thing. ^m Dr. Clarke, to do him justice, is, in the main, so very fair and reasonable in his account of those two texts, that we have no occasion at all to differ with him. I wish, as you have in most other matters, so you had here also copied after him.

I will not leave this article, without giving you a specimen of the sense of the Ante-Nicene writers in regard to the Son's omniscience, that you may have a better opinion of those good and great men. We may begin with Ignatius. ⁿ "There is nothing hid from the Lord: " but our very secret things are nigh unto him. Let us

¹ Irenæus, libro secundo capite 29, *ambigue loquitur*; ut nescias incertiam illius Dei Christo, saltem qua est homo, tribuat, an non ac possit ad utramque deflecti sententiam.

^m Reply to Mr. Nelson's Friend, p. 171.

ⁿ Οὐδὲν λαθεῖσθαι τὸν Κύριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ κρυπτά ἡμῶν ἰγγὸς αὐτοῦ ἵσταν. *Ignat. Ep. ad Ephes.* c. xv. p. 17. Ox. ed. That *Κύριον* is meant of Christ, is very highly probable from the use of the word in this author, and from the context.

“therefore do all things, as having him dwelling in us ;
“that we may be his temples, and he our God in us.”

I proceed to Clement of Alexandria, who says thus :
“ °The Son of God never goes off from his watch-tower :
“ never parted, never separated, nor moving from place
“ to place ; but is always everywhere, and contained no-
“ where : all mind, all light, all eye of his Father, be-
“ holding all things, hearing all things, *knowing all*
“ *things.*”

¶ In another place : “ Ignorance (*in any degree*) cannot
“ affect God, him that was the Father’s counsellor before
“ the foundation of the world.”

¶ Origen is pretty large upon the very texts whereof we
have been speaking. He gives several interpretations :
but it is observable, that he studiously endeavours to find
some solution, which may acquit the *Λόγος* from the im-
putation of being literally ignorant of the day of judg-
ment. What Origen’s opinion was of Christ’s *omniscience*,
you may also see ¹elsewhere. To confirm what hath been
said, one general remark I will leave with you.

* Οὐ γὰρ ἕξισταται ποτε τῆς αὐτοῦ περιωπῆς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ· οὐ μερίζομενος, οὐκ ἀποστιγνίμωτος, ἢ μεταβαίνειν ἐν τόσῳ εἰς τόσον, πάντα δὲ ὡν πάντοτε, καὶ μαδαμῆ περιεχόμενος, ἕλος τοῦ, ἕλος φῶς, Πατρῆος ἕλος ὀφθαλμῶς, πάντα ἔρων, πάντα ἀκούων, εἰδὼς πάντα——— *Clem. Alex. Strom.* l. vii. c. 2. p. 831. See also p. 113, 611, 832.

† Ἐργον γὰρ ἔχ ἄστικται τοῦ Θεοῦ, τοῦ πρὶ καταβολῆς κόσμου συμβούλου γινόμενου τοῦ Πατρὸς. P. 832.

N. B. The Doctor’s criticisms (*Script. Doctr.* p. 326, alias 294.) upon Clemens are very slight. I need only hint, that *παντοκράτωρ* is applied to the Son at least twice, (p. 148, 277;) and *παγκρατής* once (p. 647.) by Clemens ; and that *παντοκράτωρ* may as well signify *omni-tenens*, as *omnipotens* ; and that *omni-tenente voluntate* is not improper, but agreeable to Clemens’s philosophy : (see the Notes to Clemens, p. 431. ed. Ox.) and that therefore Christ might be supposed *naturally omniscient*, by Clemens, notwithstanding the Doctor’s pretences : besides that the passages themselves referred to, if well considered, can bear no other sense. See my Sermons, p. 266.

¶ Hom. 30. in Mat.

¶ Comm. in Joh. p. 28. Huet. ed. He puts the very question, whether the Son knows *all* that the Father knows, and determines in the *affirmative* : blaming those who, under pretence of magnifying the Father, presumed to deny it. The passage is rather too long to be here inserted.

The Sabellian controversy began early, and lasted long in the Church. The dispute was, whether Father and Son were one and the same *hypostasis*, or *Person*. Had the Catholics interpreted these two texts, as you pretend they did, there could not have been any thing more decisive against the Sabellians. Tertullian, you know, encountered them in a pretty large book, his book against Praxeas; Hippolytus entered the lists against Noetus; and his book is still extant; Eusebius's famed piece, against Marcellus, is to the same purport; several fragments besides, of other authors, remain. Please to look them over; and see if you can find any one of them combating the Sabellians with these texts: and if you cannot, either be content to own, that it was a very strange and unaccountable omission in those writers; or else that they had quite other notions of things, than you have hitherto imagined. The Arians you find afterwards, perpetually almost, teasing the Catholics with those texts: strange they should never have been insisted on against the Sabellians, being so full to the purpose; especially if, as you suppose, the Ante-Nicene writers were themselves of that persuasion, which was afterwards called Arian. It is evident that the Sabellians must have understood the texts, if they are to be taken literally, of the Man Christ Jesus only: otherwise there had been a manifest repugnancy, in the words, "not the Son, but the Father;" since they supposed Father and Son one and the same *hypostasis*. It is as plain, that they must have thought that the Catholics agreed with them in that exposition; otherwise they would have charged them, not only with *Tritheism*, but with the denial of the Son's *essential Divinity*. It does not appear that those texts ever came into controversy betwixt them, or were ever urged by the Catholics; so that both seem to have agreed in

* Tertullian indeed cites the text, in passing; not drawing any such argument, as I mean, from it. What he meant will be shown hereafter, under Query 26th.

the same interpretation. So much for the point of *omniscience*.

I come next to consider what you have to object to my argument for the Son's *eternity*. I had put it upon this; that it is described in the same phrases with God the Father's; which, one would think, should be high enough. You tell me that "the Son's *metaphysical eternity* is no " where expressly revealed." What the fine word, *metaphysical*, signifies here, I know not. If his *eternity* is revealed, it is enough for me. That I understand to be revealed, in these two texts, Rev. i. 17. xxii. 13. "I am " the first, and I am the last." "I am Alpha and Omega, " the beginning and the end." That these and the like phrases respect duration, appears from Isa. xliii. 10. compared with Isa. xlv. 6. In the latter, the words are; "I am the first, and I am the last; and besides me there " is no 'God.'" The former, expressing the same thought, runs thus: "Before me was there no God formed, neither " shall there be after me." The phrase of "Alpha and " Omega, first and last," is, in like manner, explained Rev. i. 8. "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the " ending, saith the Lord, which is, and which was, and " which is to come." The phrase then respects duration; and it is applied to our blessed Saviour, as hath been shown, Rev. i. 17. xxii. 13. Therefore there was no God before him: therefore he is, in the strictest sense, *eternal*. You say, "the objector hath not brought one " text of Scripture that at all proveth it." I did not produce all the texts proper upon that head: I designed brevity. Besides, I had a mind to remove the cause, from criticism upon words, to one plain and affecting argument; viz. that the proof of the *Son's* eternity stands upon the same foot, in Scripture, with the proof of the *Father's*; and is expressed in as strong words. And for this I appeal, as to the texts above cited, so also to Prov.

* Compare also Isa. xlviii. 12. See my Sermons, p. 233.

viii. 22, &c. which you allow to be spoken of the Messias. The original word, which we translate, “from everlasting,” is the very same with what we meet with in Psal. xc. 2. where also we find a parallel description of *eternity*, applied to the *one God*. See also Psal. xciii. 2. I allow your observation, that the Hebrew word may, and sometimes does, signify a *limited*, as well as it does, at other times, an *unlimited* duration. And therefore I do not lay all the stress of my argument upon the critical meaning of the word; but upon that, and other circumstances taken together: particularly this circumstance; that the *eternity* of the Father is described in the same manner, and in the same phrases, with the other; as by “comparing Psal. xc. 2. with Prov. viii. 22, &c. and Rev. i. 8. (supposing that text to be meant of the Father) with Rev. xxii. 13. may fully appear. I do not argue from a single phrase, or the particular force of it; but from several; and these equally applied to both: as it were on purpose to intimate, that though these phrases singly might bear a limited sense; yet considering that God had made choice of them, as most significant to express his *own* duration; and again made choice of the very same, out of many others, to express his *Son’s* duration too, we might from thence be taught to believe that the Son is *coeternal* with him.

You are sensible of the objection lying against you; namely, that there is no certain proof, according to your way of reasoning, of the *eternity* of the Father, in the Old Testament: and so resolute you are in this matter, that, rather than admit the Son to be *eternal* too, you are content to leave us in the dark, so far as the Old Testa-

Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God, Ps. xc. 2.

The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was———Before the mountains were settled, before the hills was I brought forth, Prov. viii. 22, &c.

ment goes, about the other. But, for a salvo to the Father's *eternity*, you observe, that it is emphatically expressed in the New Testament, (Rom. i. 20.) forgetting that the word *αἰδιος* occurs but ² once more, in the New Testament; and then signifies *eternal* in a limited sense only, or *a parte post*, as the schools speak. Well then, for any thing I see to the contrary, we must contentedly go away, without any Scripture proof of the *eternity* of the Father, for fear it should oblige us to take in the Son's also. And this, indeed, is what you are beforehand apprehensive of, and prepared for; and therefore it is that you tell us, that "there appears no necessity at all, that the attribute of *eternity* should be distinctly revealed with respect to the *Father*; whose *eternity* our reason infallibly assures us of," (p. 50.) Infallibly assures: so you say; and, I believe, in my own way, I might be able to maintain your assertion. But I profess to you, that I do not, at present, apprehend how, upon your principles, you will be able to make any complete demonstration of it. It would be ridiculous to talk of proving from reason only, without revelation, that the Person whom we call the Father, the God of Jews and Christians, is the *eternal* God. I will therefore presume that you mean by *reason*, reason and revelation both together; and if you effectually prove your point from both, it shall suffice. You can demonstrate that there must be some *eternal God*, in the *metaphysical* sense, as you call it, of these words: but since the Father, the God of Jews and Christians, has not declared, either that he is eternal, or God, in the *metaphysical* sense, it does not appear how he is at all concerned in it. He has said, indeed, that there is no God besides him; but as he did not mean it in the *metaphysical* sense, there may be another, in that sense, besides him, notwithstanding: nay, it is certain there are and have been other Gods; even in the *same* sense: for Moses was a

² Jude 6.

God unto Pharaoh; and Christ is *God*; and therefore this cannot be literally true. It can only mean, that he is emphatically God, in some respect or other; perhaps as being God of our system; or God of the Jews and Christians, his *peculium*. It is true, he has called himself *Jehovah*; which if it signified necessary existence and independence, it would be an irrefragable proof of his being the *eternal* God. But it unfortunately happens that *Jehovah* signifies no more than a person of honour and integrity, who is true to his word, and performs his promises, (p. 19.) He has farther declared himself to be *Creator* of the world: but this “exercise of *creating*, “being finite, does not necessarily infer an infinite sub-
“ject,” (p. 48.) Besides “that this office and character, “relative to us, presupposes not, nor is at all more per-
“fect for, the eternal past duration of his being,” (see p. 50.) What shall I think of next? I must ingenuously own, I am utterly nonplused; and therefore must desire you, whenever you favour me with a reply, to make out your demonstration. But let us proceed.

Having given us a reason, why it was not necessary that the *supposed eternity* of the Father should be revealed, you go on to acquaint us, why it was not needful to declare the *supposed eternity* of the Son. And here you give either two reasons, or one; I hardly know whether. “His office and character,” you say, “relative “to us, does not presuppose it.” I know that very wise and judicious men have thought, that it does presuppose it. Bishop Bull, for instance, has spoke admirably well upon that head: but the passage being too long to transcribe, I shall only refer to ^v it. How you come to take for granted a thing which you know nothing of, and which it is impossible either for you or any man else to prove, I know not. It is very manifest that, unless you have a full idea of the whole work of redemption, and can tell as well what belongs to a Redeemer, and a

^v Judic. Eccl. p. 12.

Judge of the whole universe, as you can what belongs to a rector of a parish, you can pass no certain judgment. No man can certainly define the utmost of what was needful in the case; because no man can dive into the utmost depth of it. There may be more than you, or I, or perhaps angels, can see in that mysterious dispensation; and therefore it is the height of presumption to pronounce, that any power, less than infinite, might be equal to it. I do not say that the argument for Christ's Divinity, drawn from the greatness of the work of Redemption, and the honours consequent upon it, amounts to a perfect demonstration: but this I say, and am very clear in what I say, that it is much surer arguing for the affirmative, from what we know; than for the negative, from what we know not. It is possible our proof may not be sufficient: but it is, *a priori*, impossible that yours should. Whether we can maintain our point may perhaps be a question: but it is out of all question, that you cannot maintain yours.

Having answered this your first reason, why it was not necessary to reveal the Son's eternity, I proceed to the remaining words; which if I perfectly understood, I might know whether they are a distinct reason, or only an appendage to the former. They are these: "Nor is "it" (Christ's office and character) "at all more perfect "for the eternal past duration of his being," (p. 50.) I have been considering why that word *past* was inserted, and what it can mean, in that place. It seems to be opposed either to *present*, or else to, *to come*, tacitly understood. At first, I thought thus: that it might be put in to prevent our imagining that Christ's office might not be at all more perfect for the eternal duration of his being *to come*. But considering again, that if he does but continue till the office is completed and perfected, it is all one, in respect of that office, whether his duration hold longer or no, I thought, that could not be the meaning. Reflecting again, I conceived that *past* might possibly have relation to the office considered as *present*,

or commencing at such a time; suppose six thousand years ago: and you might think, what could it signify to date his being higher? If he did but exist soon enough for the office, it is sufficient. All the time run out before is of no consideration, having no relation to an office which was to commence after, and would still be but the self-same temporal office, commencing at such a time. If I have hit your thought at length, I assure you it has cost me some pains; and I wish you would express yourself more clearly hereafter.

Now then let us apply this manner of reasoning to another purpose: by parity of reason we may argue, that the office of God the Father, *commencing* at the creation; I say, the office of sustaining, preserving, and governing the world, has no relation to the time *past*, being but just what it is, whether a longer or a shorter, or no time at all be allowed for any *prior* existence; nor is it at all more perfect for the eternal *past* duration of his being. But does not this argument suppose that the office is such as may be discharged by a finite creature, or one that began in time? Certainly. And is not that the very thing in question in this, and in the other case too? Undoubtedly. How then comes it to be taken for granted? Besides, is not a person of unlimited, that is, eternal powers and perfections, more capable of discharging an office, than any creature? Well then, by necessary consequence, the *past* duration of the person is of great moment in the case; and the office must be thought as much more perfect, for the eternal *past* duration of his being, as God's perfections excel those of his creatures; and that is infinitely.

QUERY VIII.

Whether eternity does not imply necessary existence of the Son; which is inconsistent with the Doctor's Scheme? And whether the ^aDoctor hath not made an elusive, equi-

^a Reply, p. 227.

vocating answer to the objection, since the Son may be a necessary emanation from the Father, by the will and power of the Father, without any contradiction? Will is one thing, and arbitrary will another.

TO the former part of the Query you answer, that “simple and absolute eternity is the same with *necessary* or *self-existence*; which is no where supposed of the Son, “by Dr. Clarke.” Here are several mistakes: for, first, the idea of *simple eternity* is not the same with that of *necessary existence*. Nor, secondly, is it the same with both *necessary existence* and *self-existence*, supposing it were the same with the former; because these two are not the same. The idea of eternity is neither more nor less than duration without beginning, and without end. Some have supposed it possible for God to have *created* the world from all eternity; and they use this argument for it; that whatever he could once do, he could always do. Not that I think there is much weight in the argument; but it is sufficient to show, that the ideas are distinct; and that, though eternity may, in sound reasoning, infer or imply *necessary existence*, as is intimated in the Query; yet the ideas are not the same: for if they were, it would be nonsense to talk of one inferring or implying the other. Then for the second point; it is very manifest that the ideas of *necessary existence* and *self-existence* (however they may be imagined with or without reason to imply each other) are not the same ideas. ^b Aristotle and the later Platonists supposed the world and all the inferior Gods (as Plato and the Pythagoreans, some supramundane deities) to proceed, by way of emanation, without any temporary production, from a superior cause: that is, they believed them to be *necessary*, but not *self-existent*. Something like this has been constantly believed by the Christian Church, in respect of the *Λόγος*; which shows, at least, that the ideas are different: and not only

^b See Cudworth. *Intellect. System*, p. 250, &c.

so, but that, in the opinion of a great part of mankind, they do not so much as infer and imply each other; one may be conceived without the other. However, that is not the point I insist on now. All that I affirm at present is, that the ideas are distinct; and not the very same. After you had laboured to confound these things together, you proceed to argue against the Son's being *eternal*. But what is that to the Query? I supposed Dr. Clarke (Reply, p. 227.) to understand the word *eternal*, as I or any other man should; and objected the inconsistency of acknowledging the *eternity* of the Son, and yet denying his *necessary existence*; which, *eternity*, I thought, inferred and implied. You admit my reasoning to be just, if the Doctor meant the same, by *eternal*, as I do. But if he meant by *eternal*, *temporary*, then my argument fails; as most certainly it must. But why are we thus imposed on with so manifest an abuse of words? What occasion is there for putting the epithets of *simple*, *absolute*, or *metaphysical* to the word *eternal*; which every one, that knows English, understands better without? Unless you suppose that there is an unlimited and a limited eternity, which is, in reality, an eternity, and no eternity. You proceed to dispute against the *eternity* of the Son; which though it be something foreign to the purport of the Query, yet being pertinent to the cause in hand, I shall here consider it. You argue that, if the Son be *eternal*, he is *necessarily existing*; which I allow: and if *necessarily existing*, then *self-existent*; which I deny;

* 'Αλλὰ μὴ τις, τὸ αἰ, πρὸς ὑπόνοιαν ἀγιότητος λαμβανόμενος, ὡς εἶπεναι οἱ τὰ ψυχῶν αἰσθητήρια πιστηρομένοι' οὗτοι γὰρ τὸ ἦν, οὗτοι τὸ αἰ, οὗτοι τὸ πρὸ αἰῶνος, καθ' ὅτι τῆ ἀγιότητος. *Alex. Ep. apud Theod. l. i. c. iv. p. 17.* This was said in opposition to the Arians, who were willing to confound the idea of *eternity* and of *necessary existence* with *self-existence*. The learned Doctor cites this passage directly against himself. (*Script. Doctr. p. 283. alias 250.*) It was intended, and is diametrically opposite to the Doctor's leading principle, or rather fallacy, which runs through his performance, viz. That the Son cannot be strictly and essentially God, unless he be *self-existent*, or *unoriginate* in every sense.

and you cannot prove. You go on to a new consideration ; which, put into syllogism, stands thus.

Whatever has a *principium* is not eternal : the Son has a *principium*, the Father being *principium Filii*—Therefore, &c.

The middle term, *principium*, is equivocal, and bears two senses ; wherefore the syllogism consists of four terms. If *principium* be understood in respect of time, the minor is not true : if it be taken in any other sense, the major is not true : so that both cannot be true. You might, in the same way, argue that the sun's light is not coeval with the sun ; nor thought coeval with the mind, supposing the mind to think always. For in both cases a *principium* is admitted ; but no priority in respect of time. You add, that there is a reasonable sense in which the Son may be said to be *eternal*. I hope there is : but not your sense ; which is just as reasonable as to say, an angel is *eternal*, only because you determine not the time when he came into being. I should think it most reasonable to use words according to their obvious and proper signification ; and not to fix new ideas to old words, without any warrant for it. In this way of going on with the abuse of words, we shall hardly have any left full and express enough to distinguish the catholic doctrine by. It was once sufficient, before the rise of Arianism, to say, the Son is *God* : but by a novel sense put upon it, the word *God* was made ambiguous. To that were added, *truly* and *really* ; to be more expressive : but the ^dArians found out a sense for these terms too ; and could gravely say, that the Son was *truly, really* God. *God by nature*, one might think, is full and strong enough : but you are stealing away the sense of that expression from us. We can add no more, but *eternally* and *substantially* God ; and yet, I perceive, unless we put in *simply, absolutely, metaphysically*, or the like, even these words also may

^d See Socr. E. Hist. l. ii. c. 19. p. 82. Theod. l. i. c. 28.

lose their force and significancy. But to what purpose is all this? Might you not better say plainly, that the Son is not *eternal*; not *by nature*; nor *truly* God; in a word, not *God*? No; but Scripture reclaims; and the whole Catholic Church reclaims; and Christian ears would not bear it. So then, it seems, it is highly necessary to speak orthodoxly, whatever we think; to strip the words of their sense, and to retain the sound. But to proceed.

As to the latter part of the Query, I am to expect no clear or distinct answer: because “what is meant by a “necessary emanation by the will of the Father, you understand not; nor what again by the difference of *will*, “and *arbitrary will*,” p. 52. Had you but retained in mind what you must have observed when you read the ancients, you could not have been at a loss to apprehend my meaning. You may please to remember, that one of the principal arguments made use of by the ^e Arians against the Catholics was this:

“^f Either the Father begat the Son *with* his consent “and will, or *against* his will and consent.” If the former, then that act of the will was *antecedent* to the Son’s existence; and therefore he was not eternal: the latter was plainly too absurd for any Christian to own.

The Catholics took two ways of answering the dilemma. One, which was the best and safest, was, by ^g retorting upon the Arians the dilemma, thus: “Was God “the Father *God*, *with* or *against* his will?” By this short question, that so famous objection of the Arians was ^h effectually silenced.

^e See Athanas. Orat. contr. Arian. 2, 3, 4. Hilary, p. 1184. Greg. Nyss. p. 625. Petav. de Trin. p. 128.

^f Interrogant (Ariani) utrum Pater Filium *volens* an *volens* genuerit; ut si responsum fuerit quod *volens* genuerit, dicant, *prior* est ergo *voluntas* Patris; quod autem *volens* genuerit, quis potest dicere? *August. contr. Serm. Arian. l. i. p. 626. Bened. ed.*

^g Athanas. Orat. iii. p. 611. Bened. ed. Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xxxv. p. 565. August. de Trin. l. xv. c. 80. p. 994.

^h Viciassim quæssivit ab eo, utrum Deus Pater *volens* an *volens* sit Deus: ut si responderet, *volens*, sequeretur illa miseria quam de Deo credere magna

But besides this answer, they had also another. They admitted that the generation of the Son was *with the will and consent* of his Father; in the same sense that he is wise, good, just, &c. necessarily, and yet not against his will. Some thought it reasonable to say, that the Father might *eternally* will the generation of the Son, and that he could not but will so, as being *eternally good*. ⁱ See Petavius. This way of reasoning ^k Bishop Bull mentions, hardly approving it: and one would almost think that ^l Dr. Clarke was once inclinable to subscribe to it, understanding *eternal*, as we do. But he thought fit ^m afterwards to explain himself off into another meaning. There was another notion which ⁿ some of the primitive writers had; namely, this: “That since the *will* of God is God “himself, as much as the *wisdom*, &c. of God is God “himself; whatever is the fruit and product of God, is “the fruit and product of *his will*, *wisdom*, &c. and so “the Son, being the perfect image of the Father, is substance of substance, wisdom of wisdom, will of will, as “he is light of light, and God of God:” which is St. Austin’s doctrine, in the ^o place cited in the margin.

By this time, I presume, you may understand what I meant by the latter part of the Query. There is a sober, Catholic sense, in which the Son may be acknowledged to be *by*, or *from*, the *will* of the Father, and yet may be a *necessary emanation* also. And therefore Dr. Clarke did not do well in opposing those two, one to the other; as if they were inconsistent: especially considering that

insania est; si autem diceret, volens, responderetur ei, ergo et ipse Deus est, sua voluntate, non natura. Quid ergo restabat, nisi ut obmutesceret, et sua interrogatione obligatum insolubili vinculo se videret. August. ibid.

See this farther explained in the Postscript.

ⁱ Pag. 591, 592.

^k D. F. N. p. 222.

^l Script. Doctr. p. 280, &c. Reply, p. 113. Paper given in to the Bishops.

^m Clarke’s Lett. N. 8.

ⁿ See the testimonies collected by Cotelerius, in his Notes upon the Recognitions of Clem. p. 492. and by Petavius, l. vi. c. 8. l. vii. c. 12. See especially, Athanas. Orat. iii. p. 613. Bened. ed. Epiphani. Hæres. 74. p. 895.

^o De Trin. l. xv. c. 8.

he produces several authorities to prove the generation to be by a *power of will*, in opposition to *necessity of nature*, from writers who asserted both; and denied only such a supposed *necessity* as might be against, and a force upon the Father's will. This is manifest of his citations from the ^q Council of Sirmium, Marius Victorinus, Basil, and Gregory Nyssen; and hath been clearly shown by his learned ^r antagonist. The sum of all is, that the generation of the Son may be by *necessity of nature*, without excluding the concurrence or approbation of the will. And therefore *will* (i. e. consent, approbation, acquiescence) is one thing; and *arbitrary will* (that is, free choice of what might otherwise not be) is another. You endeavour to prove, that the Son derives his being from the *will* of the Father, in this latter sense; which is the same thing with the making him a *creature*. You recite some scraps of quotations, as collected by Dr. Clarke and Dr. Whitby, in your Notes, p. 51. Not one of the citations is to your purpose, or comes up to your point. For instance; Ignatius says, ^s "Christ is the Son of God, according to the will and power of God." Supposing this not to be meant of his ^t miraculous conception and incar-

^p Script. Doctr. p. 281, &c. alias, 247, &c.

^q Script. Doctr. p. 285, 286. alias, 252, 253.

^r True Script. Doctr. continued, p. 119, &c.

N. B. The Doctor manifestly perverts the sense of the Council of Sirmium, and of Hilary's comment upon it, by mistranslating them; putting *without his will*, instead of *against his will*. See the Preface to my Sermons, p. 20.

^s Ἀληθῶς ἴστα ἐκ γίνεσι Δαβὶδ κατὰ σάρκα, υἱὸς Θεοῦ κατὰ θίλημα καὶ δύναμιν Θεοῦ. *Ignat. Ep. ad Smyrn.* c. i. p. 1.

^t I can by no means think that the Son is here called υἱὸς Θεοῦ, in respect of his incarnation; which was really his nativity κατὰ σάρκα, to which this other is opposed, and which must therefore be understood of some higher sonship. The phrase of κατὰ σάρκα has been constantly so interpreted by the ancients; Irenæus, Tertullian, Origen, Novatian, the Synod of Antioch in the case of Paul of Samosata, Hippolytus, Eusebius, Lactantius, all explaining Christ's being the Son of David according to the flesh, by his birth of the blessed Virgin; and the phrase κατὰ σάρκα as opposed to a prior Sonship, in his *divine* nature before the world was: in which respect he was *Son of God* before he became *Son of man*. That Ignatius intended the

nation, (which the context has been thought to favour, and which Bishop Pearson inclined to, in his Notes,) yet see how many several interpretations it may bear, besides what you would fix upon it.

1. *The fruit and offspring of the will and power of God*: signifying no more than *God of God*, in the sense intimated above. P. 90.

2. By the *eternal* will and power of God, in a sense likewise before intimated, and owned by some of the Post-Nicene Writers.

3. With the approbation and acquiescence of God, in the same sense that he is pleased with, and acquiesces in, his own wisdom, goodness, and other perfections.

4. The passage may relate, not to the Son's *generation* in the highest sense; but to his *manifestation*, or *coming forth*, in order to create the world; which is a kind of *filiation* mentioned by Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Tertullian, Tatian, Novatian, and Hippolytus, and supposed as *voluntary* a thing as the incarnation afterwards; though the same authors asserted the *eternity* and *consubstantiality* of the *Λόγος*, or Divine nature of Christ; of which more hereafter.

From these four particulars, you may perceive how little you can be able to prove from that passage in Ignatius. As to Justin Martyr, I have already hinted in what sense he made the generation *voluntary*. But why you should choose to do that good Father a double injury, first in curtailing his words, and next in misrepresenting his sense, you can best account. The whole passage is

same is highly probable, not to say evident, from his own words elsewhere. *Πρὸ αἰῶνων παρὰ πατρί ἦν. Magnes. c. 6. Τῶ τῷ Θεῷ, ὅς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ λόγος αἰδῖος. Ibid. c. 8. Χριστῷ τῷ υἱῷ Θεοῦ τῷ γενεαίῳ, ἰν ὕψην, ἰν στίγματος Δακτῖδ. Rom. c. vii. Compare Apostol. Constit. l. viii. c. 1. Εὐδοκίᾳ Θεῷ ἔπερ αἰῶνων μονογενῆς, ἰν ὕψην κειρῶ ἰν παρθερίῳ γενένηται.*

▪ Clement of Alexandria seems to intend the same, (p. 654. ed. Ox.) expressing it by the word *πρωιθῶν*. And it is extremely probable that Ignatius had the very same thought. *Λόγος αἰδῖος οὐκ ἀπὸ σιγῆς πρωιθῶν. ad Magnes. cap. 8. Ἐνα Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν, τὸν ἀφ' ἰνῶς πατρὸς πρωιθῶντα, καὶ εἰς ἰνα ἴστα καὶ χωρῆσαντα. Ibid. cap. 7.*

this, literally translated: “^x Who, according to his (the “Father’s) good pleasure, is God, being his Son; and an angel too, as ministering to his Father’s will.” The meaning is not, as you represent it, “that Christ is *God*, “*by the will of the Father*,” (though even that might bear a good sense according to what has been observed above;) but that it was the Father’s good pleasure that he should not only be *God*, as he always was, being God’s Son; but that he should take upon him besides, the office of an angel. That he was *God*, was a ^y*necessary* thing, as he was God’s Son, of the same nature with him: but that he should be both; i. e. God and an angel too; this was entirely owing to God’s good pleasure. However, you have been something civiller to this ancient Father than Dr. Whitby has been, in his “Modest Disquisitions;” who, to serve a bad cause, uses a worse art; ^z cuts the quotation short at *υἰὸν αὐτοῦ*; and then, to make his own sense out of that passage, inserts (*et*) in his translation, rendering it thus: “*Qui ex voluntate ipsius et Deus est, “et Filius*,” leaving out “*et angelus*,” to which the former *et* referred. Strange that any should be so resolutely eager to *ungod* their Saviour, as not to permit the cause to have a fair hearing. It were pious, at least, to let the reader know what has, or what can be said on the other side of the question; and to give it its due weight and force. This is reasonable in any the most trifling

^x Τὸν κατὰ βουλὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ Θεὸν ὄντα, υἰὸν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἄγγελος, ἐκ τοῦ ἰσχυρισμοῦ τῆς γνώμης αὐτοῦ. P. 280. *Sylb. Jebb.* 370. Parallel to which is that of Novatian. Personæ autem Christi convenit ut et Deus sit, quia Dei Filius; et angelus sit, quoniam paternæ dispositionis adnuntiator est. *Novat. c. 26.*

^y For, though he was God, as being God’s Son, and a Son κατὰ βουλὴν, according to Justin, and other writers before mentioned; yet they did not think that he was *God*, κατὰ βουλὴν. But because he *came forth*, as a Son, from the Father; and was not produced ἔξ οὐκ ὄντων, (as all creatures are;) therefore he was *God*, having ever existed, before his *coming forth*, in and with the Father. Hic ergo quando Pater voluit, processit ex Patre: et qui in Patre fuit, processit ex Patre. *Novat. c. 26.*

^z Whitby’s *Disq. Modest.* p. 32.

matter, that can come before us: but certainly much more so, where *his* honour is concerned, whom all men are commanded to "honour, even as they honour the "Father," John v. 23. For my own part, I declare once for all; I desire only to have things fairly represented, as they really are; no evidence smothered or stifled on either side. Let every reader see plainly what may be justly pleaded here or there, and no more; and then let it be left to his impartial judgment, after a full view of the case: misquotations and misrepresentations will do a good cause harm; and will not long be of service to a bad one. But to return. The second citation which you bring from Justin, you give such an account of, as must make one think, either that you never saw the book you mention; or else—but see the passage in the ^a margin. Your words are, "He hath all these titles (before-mentioned, viz. that of Son, Wisdom, Angel, God, Lord, "and Word) from his being begotten of the Father by "his will;" directly contrary to the whole tenor of the dialogue, and the very immediate words preceding those you cite. In your third quotation, you are pleased for the sake of English readers, to mistranslate *προελλθόντα*, "produced," instead of, "coming forth," or "proceeding." Your next citation is from Clement of Alexandria: in which I find no fault but your referring to Strom. 5. instead of Strom. 7. and bringing a passage not certainly pertinent to the point in question. If you please to look into the ^b author himself, you will find it at least doubtful, whether he be speaking of the *generation* of the Son; or only showing how he, by the Father's good pleasure,

^a Ἐχουν γὰρ πάντα προσονιμάζεσθαι, ἢν τι τοῦ ὑπεριετιν τῆ πατρικῆ βουλήματι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς θελήσει γινινησθαι. *Dial.* p. 183. Jeb. It is not from his being begotten of the Father that he hath *all* these titles; but from that, and his administering to his Father's will. Both together (not either *singly*) will account for all these titles.

^b Clem. Alex. Strom. vii. p. 833. Ox. edit. Ἀπάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, θελήματι τοῦ παντοκράτορος πατρὸς, αἷτις ὁ υἱὸς καθίσταται, πρωτοουργὸς κινήσις, δύναμις ἄλλωτος αἰσθήσει· ὃ γὰρ ὅ ἦν, τοῦτο ὤφθη τοῖς χωρησαὶ μὴ δυναμίσις διὰ τὴν ἀεθίμιαν τῆς σεκεῖς. αἰσθητὴν δὲ ἀταλαζὼν σέμα, &c.

was at the head of affairs, and administered his Father's kingdom. Your next author is ^c Tertullian, who is indeed speaking of the generation, that is, *manifestation*, or *coming forth*, of the Son: and here you render *protulit*, "produced," meaning "into being," or "into a state of existence;" which is not Tertullian's sense, nor of any of the Fathers who speak of that matter. Tertullian expressly ^d excepts against it: so does ^e Tatian, the next author which you name: and so likewise ^f Athenagoras, and ^g Hippolytus, whom you have not named: but I choose to mention them, as being useful to explain the former. ^h Eusebius may reasonably be interpreted by those that went before him; or by the emperor Constantine's explication of this matter, which shall be cited hereafter; or by his own account of the holy undivided Trinity, before mentioned: if not, his authority against the Catholics before and after him, and against himself, must appear of small weight. The rest of your authorities I have already spoke to; and you may perceive by this time, I presume, that none of them speak home to the purpose for which they were cited. However, for the sake of such who, being little acquainted with these matters, may be liable to be imposed upon by a few specious pretences, I shall now go a little deeper into the point before us, and endeavour to set it in a true light.

The distinction of a ⁱ *threefold generation* of the Son, is well known among the learned, and is thus explained.

1. The first and most proper *filiation* and *generation*, is his eternally existing in and of the Father; the eternal *Abÿos*, of the eternal *mind*. In respect of this, chiefly,

^c Tunc cum Deus voluit, ipsum primum *protulit* Sermonem. *Tertull. contr. Prax. c. 6.*

^d *Contr. Prax. c. 5.*

^e *Tatian. sect. vii. p. 20. Ox. edit.*

^f *Legat. sect. x. p. 39. Ox. edit.*

^g *Contr. Noet. sect. x. p. 13. vol. ii. ed. Fabric.*

^h See *True Script. Doctr. continued, p. 123.*

ⁱ *Bull. D. F. p. 232. Brev. Animadv. in Gil. Clerke, p. 1054. Fabric. Not. in Hippol. vol. i. p. 242.*

he is the *only begotten*, and a distinct Person from the Father. His other generations were rather condescensions, first to creatures in general, next to men in particular.

2. His second generation was his *condescension, manifestation, coming forth*, as it were, from the Father (though never separated or divided from him) to create the world: this was in time, and a voluntary thing; and in this respect properly he may be thought to be *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*, *first-born of every creature*; or before all creatures.

3. His third generation, or filiation, was when he condescended to be born of a Virgin, and to become man. These things I here suppose or premise only, for the more distinct apprehension of what is to follow; not expecting to be believed farther than the proofs can justify. We may now proceed to speak of the doctrine of the ancients.

It is observable, that the Ante-Nicene writers are more sparing than those that came after, in speaking of the *first, the eternal generation*; sparing, I mean, as to the term, or phrase; not as to the thing itself. The eternity of the Word, or *Λόγος*, and the distinction of Persons, they all held; together with the consubstantiality, and unity of principle; which together are as much as can be meant by *eternal-generation*.

Irenæus is a ^k frequent and constant assserter of the *eternity of the Word*; but *eternal generation* we do not read in express terms. Yet we find what amounts to it, by necessary implication. In one particular place ^l he censures those who pretended to ascribe *any beginning* to

^k Pag. 153, 163, 209, 253. ed. Bened. We do not pretend to argue merely from the force of the word *semper*, or *ἀει*, but from that and other circumstances: as when *infectus* goes along with it, or the like, p. 153. And as "*semper aderat generi humano*," p. 209. intimates that he was with men, as soon as any men existed; so, "*existens semper apud Patrem*," intimates his being *coeval* with the Father.

^l Prolationis initium donantes. L. ii. c. 14. p. 132.

the nativity of the Word; which is in effect asserting an eternal *prolation*, or *generation*; for he makes these words ^m equivalent.

Origen, commenting upon the words of the second Psalm; "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee;" proceeds thus: " ⁿ They are spoken to him by God, with whom it is always to-day: for, I conceive, there is no evening nor morning with him; but the time coextended, if I may so speak, with his un-
" gotten and eternal life is the *to-day* in which the Son
" is begotten; there being no beginning found of his
" generation, any more than of the *to-day*." This is farther confirmed by what ^o Athanasius quotes from him, where Origen calls it presumption " ^p to ascribe any be-
" ginning to the Son;" and speaks of the *only begotten*, as being ^q *always* with the Father.

To Origen I may subjoin ^r Novatian, who says, the Son must have *always* existed in the Father, or else (which he takes to be absurd) the Father would not have been *always* Father. This, I think, can bear no sense, unless *always* be understood strictly. And it is very manifest that ^s Novatian supposes the Son to have existed before that *procession*, *coming forth*, or *nativity*, which he speaks of in that chapter. Some indeed have thought, that Novatian understands not the word *semper* there, in the strict sense of unlimited duration; wherein I humbly conceive

^m L. ii. c. 28. p. 158.

ⁿ Λίγισται πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὃ αὐὶ ἴσι τὸ σήμερον, οὐκ ἴνι γὰρ ἰστίρια Θεοῦ. ἰγὼ δὲ ἠγνώμην ὅτι οὐδὲ πρῶτα· ἀλλ' ὁ συμπαρακείμενος τῇ ἀγενήτῃ καὶ αἰδίῃ αὐτοῦ ζωῇ, ἴν' οὕτως ἴσται, χρόνος, ἡμέρα ἰσὶν αὐτῷ σήμερον, ἰν' ὃ γενήσεται ὁ υἱός, ἀρχῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ οὕτως ἔχ' ὑπερκομίτης, ὡς ἔστι τῆς ἡμέρας. *Com. in Joh.* p. 31. Compare with this, the citation from Origen, in Pamphilus's Apology.

^o De Decret. Synod. Nic. p. 233. ed. Bened.

^p Ἴσα τελευτήσας τις ἀρχὴν δὲ ἴσται υἱὸν πρότερον οὐκ ὄντος.

^q Τοῦ αὐὶ συνόντος αὐτῷ λόγου μεταγενῆς.

^r Semper enim in Patre, ne Pater non semper Pater. C. 31.

^s Et qui in Patre fuit, processit ex Patre: et qui in Patre fuit, quia ex Patre fuit, cum Patre postmodum fuit, quia ex Patre processit. C. 31.

they are mistaken. I have transcribed the ^t passage into the margin, and shall proceed to explain its meaning. After the author had said, "*semper est in Patre*," he immediately adds a sentence which shows that he understood *semper*, as we say, *a parte ante*. But withal there is a seeming restriction: "Sic dico, ut non innatum, sed *natum probem*." There might be some then, as well as now, who knew not how to distinguish between **ETERNITY** and **SELF-EXISTENCE**. The Sabellians in particular might pretend that the Son, being *eternal*, must be the *self-existent* Father himself. It was therefore necessary for the author to guard, in the manner he does, against any such mistake or misconstruction. So Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, while he maintains the strict eternity of the Son, to guard against the invidious misconstruction of the Arians, inserts the like caution ^u. "Let no *man*," says he, "mistake *eternal*, as if it were the same with *self-existent*, as the Arians, having their minds blinded, are wont to do." This may serve for a good comment upon Novatian. To proceed: Novatian adds, "*Qui ante omne tempus est, semper in patre fuisse dicendus est*." Here he explains *semper* by, *ante omne tempus*. Now this is the very same with him, as if he had said of the Son, "*quod non aliquando cæperit*;" as may appear by the ^x account he gives of the *eternity* of the

^t Hic ergo cum sit genitus a Patre, *semper est in Patre*. *Semper autem sic dico, ut non innatum, sed natum probem; sed qui ante omne tempus est, semper in Patre fuisse dicendus est: nec enim tempus illi assignari potest, qui ante tempus est. Semper enim in Patre, ne Pater non semper sit Pater; quia et Pater illum etiam præcedit, quod necesse est prior sit qua Pater sit: quoniam antecedit necesse est eum, qui habet originem, ille qui originem nescit.*

^u See p. 87. Vid. etiam Hilar. p. 1166, 1354. Prudent. Apoth. p. 172.

^x Nisi forte (quod absit) *aliquando esse cæperit*, nec super omnia sit, sed dum post aliquid esse cæperit, intra (leg. infra) id sit quod ante ipsum fuerit, minor inventus potestate, dum posterior denotatur *etiam ipso tempore*. *Novat. c. 2.* Mark the force of the words, *etiam ipso*; intimating that posteriority in time is a low degree of posteriority, and that a thing might be said to be *posterior* in a higher sense than that; viz. in *order of nature*, as we term it.

Father; explaining it by his not being *posterior to time*: and his having no time before, is the very same with having nothing *preceding*. Wherefore, when Novatian speaks afterwards of the Father's being *precedent* to the Son, he can mean it only in order of nature, not in respect of duration. And this I take to have been the meaning of the Catholic writers, before and after the rise of Arianism, by the phrases *ante tempus*, *πρὸ αἰώνων*, *πρὸ πάντων αἰώνων*, or the like, as applied to God the Son. So ^z Hilary, in the name of the generality of the Christians of his time, interprets it: so ^a Alexander of Alexandria, in his letter extant in Theodoret; the ^b Sardican Fathers in their synodical epistle; and the ^c Catholic bishops upon the opening of the council of Ariminum. Thus also we are to understand, *πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων*, in the Constantinopolitan creed. The ^d Arians indeed, equivocating upon the words *time* and *ages*, eluded the Catholic sense, still retaining the Catholic expression: but the Ante-Nicene Catholics were sincere, plain, honest men; and do not seem to have known any thing of those subtle distinctions. They understood those phrases as they would be commonly understood by the people; otherwise they would not have used them, without greater caution and reserve. ^e Sisinnius of the Novatian sect long ago observed, (which confirms what I have been mentioning,) that the ancients never would attribute any beginning to the Son of God, believing him to have been *coeternal* with the Father. The inquisitive reader may observe the use of those

^v Id quod sine origine est, præcedi a nullo potest, dum non habet tempus. *Ibid.* *Tempus* here manifestly signifies *duration*, in the largest sense; not *time*, in the restrained sense, as the Arians afterwards understood it.

^a Audiunt *ante tempora*; putant id ipsum, *ante tempora*, esse quod *semper* est. *Contr. Aur.* p. 1266. *Comp. Trin.* l. xii. p. 1129, 1136.

^b *Eccles. Hist.* l. i. c. 4. p. 13. &c.

^c *Apud Theod. E. H.* l. ii. c. 8. p. 80, 81.

^d *Hilar. Fragm.* p. 1343. ed. Bened.

^e See *Athanas. vol. i.* p. 418. *Hilar.* 1129. *Epiphan. Hær.* lxxiv. p. 887.

^f *Socrat. E. H.* l. v. c. 10.

phrases, in the places referred to in the † margin; all of them admitting, most of them requiring, the sense I contend for. I mention not the interpolator of Ignatius's Epistles, an Arian, probably, of the fourth century, or later. To return to Novatian: when he adds, "tempus illi assignari non potest;" he does not mean only, that no particular time of the Son's existence is assignable; but, that it was before all time, as himself expounds it, "ante tempus est," i. e. strictly *eternal*; ‡ which agrees with what follows, and makes it sense: "Semper enim in Patre, ne Pater non semper sit Pater." What can be more express for the *eternity* of the Son, than to declare that the Father was never without him? He plainly supposes it absurd to say, that the Father was ever no Father, or, which comes to the same, that ever the Son was not. What follows therefore, in that chapter, of the Father, "præcedit," and "antecedat necesse est," &c. can only be understood of a *priority of nature*, § not of *time*, or *duration*; and in this all Catholics agreed. You will excuse my dwelling so long upon Novatian: it was necessary, to clear his sense, and to obviate some † specious pretences, not only against Novatian, but other Catholic writers of whose meaning there is less dispute. From hence may be understood in what sense all the oriental bishops (if the fact be true, relying only on the doubtful credit of † Arius) might teach, προῦπάρχειν τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸν Θεόν

† Ignatius ad Magnes. c. vi. p. 22. Justin. Fragm. in Grab. Spic. vol. ii. p. 199. Melito in Cav. H. L. vol. ii. p. 33. Origen. in Pamph. Apolog. Hippolytus Fragm. Fabric. vol. ii. p. 29. Concil. Antioch. contr. Paul. Sam. Lab. tom. 1. Dionys. Alexandr. Resp. contr. Paul. Q. 4. Lucian. Symb. apud Soer. l. ii. c. 10. Apost. Constit. l. viii. c. 5. Vid. etiam Suicer. Thesaur. in voce *Αἰών*.

‡ Hilary's words may serve as a comment upon Novatian's. Quod ante tempus natum est, semper est natum. Quia id quod est ante æternum tempus, hoc semper est. Quod autem semper est natum, non admittit ne aliquando non fuerit: quia aliquando non fuisse, jam non est semper esse. *Hilar. de Trin.* p. 1127.

§ Vid. Origen. apud Pamph. Apolog. p. 230. Zen. Veron. in Exod. Serm. 9.

† Whitby, Modest Disq. Pref. p. 29, 30. Proem. p. 5. lib. p. 166.

† Apud Theodorit. E. lib. i. c. 5. p. 21.

ἀνάγκης. That it could not be meant in Arius's sense, is sufficiently evident from the determination of the Nicene Fathers, which has infinitely more weight in it than his single testimony, and shows the sense of the whole Church, in a manner, at that time. But enough of this: I shall only remark, before I part with Novatian, that he is an evidence both for the *first* and *second* nativity, or generation, of the Son. As he supposes the Son existing before the *procession*, (which is the *voluntary* nativity he speaks of,) and preexisting as a ¹ *Son*, he cannot be understood otherwise. See this more fully explained in ^m Bishop Bull. If any other writers, who expressly held an *eternal* generation, any where speak also of a *temporal procession*, or *nativity*, the same may be true of them also. I only give this hint by the way, and pass on.

ⁿ Dionysius of Alexandria, who lived about the same time with Novatian, asserts the same doctrine; viz. That the Father was *always* Father, and *never* was without his Son; which is the same as to maintain *eternal generation*, which he afterwards asserts in terms.

^o Dionysius, Bishop of Rome, contemporary with the other, declares that “the Son is eternal, and that there “never was a time when the Son was not;” adding in confirmation of it, that “he is the Word, the Wisdom,

¹ *Sive dum verbum est, sive dum virtus est, sive dum sapientia est, sive dum lux est, sive dum Filius est; non ex se est, quia nec innatus est.* That is, he is *natus*, considered under any capacity; whether as *λόγος*, *δύναμις*, or *σοφία*, or *φῶς*, or *υἶος*, whether before the procession, or after. This seems to be the most probable construction of the passage; and most consonant to what he had said before. *Comp. Athanas.* vol. i. p. 222.

^m Def. Fid. p. 222.

ⁿ *Ὁὐ γὰρ ἦν ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς οὐκ ἦν πατήρ. — ἔ γὰρ δὴ, τούτων ἀγνοῦν ὡς ὁ Θεὸς, εἴτα ἰσαπεδοκίμησάτο. αἰῶνος πρόκινται καὶ συνίστην αὐτῶ, τὸ ἀπαύγησμά ἀπερχοῦν καὶ αὐγάνη. Athan.* vol. i. p. 253.

^o *Εἰ γὰρ γέγονεν υἱός, ἦν ὅτι οὐκ ἦν αὐτὸν εἶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ἴσθη, ὡς αὐτός φησι, καὶ εἰ λόγος, καὶ σοφία, καὶ δύναμις ὁ Χριστός. Apud Athanas. Decret. Syn. IV. 232. Εἰ τοίνυν γέγονεν ὁ υἱός, ἦν ὅτι οὐκ ἦν ταῦτα ἦν ἅμα πατέρος, ὅτι χωρὶς τούτων ἦν ὁ Θεός ἀπεσώσθη δὲ τούτα. Ibid.* This and Novatian's testimony, both of the same age, may serve to illustrate each other.

“and the Power of God.” This, though it be express for the eternity of the Son, yet is not full for *eternal generation*; unless it had been said, “eternal, as a Son.” He might be supposed eternal, as the *Λόγος*, and his sonship commence afterwards. And therefore I do not put this among the clear unexceptionable authorities for *eternal generation*; though hardly any reasonable doubt can be made of it, since he supposed the Father, the *Head, Root, Origin*, of the *Λόγος*.

¶ Methodius speaks more close and home to the point. For, upon the words of the Psalmist; “Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee;” he comments thus. “It is observable that his being a Son, is here indefinitely expressed without any limitation of time. For he said, *Thou art*, not *Thou becamest* my Son; signifying that he did not acquire any *new filiation*, nor should ever have an end of his existence, but that he is *always the same*.” He [¶] goes on to speak of his after *filiation*, intimated in the words, “This day have I begotten thee;” and observes, that it was more properly a *manifestation* of him, consonant to what he had said before, that he could not have a *new filiation*. This may relate either to what I before called his *second*, or to his *third generation*: the words are ambiguous, and capable of either sense.

To Methodius I may subjoin Pamphilus, who, while he delivers Origen’s sense, in his Apology, does undoubtedly speak his own too. He is very [†] clear and full for the *eternal generation*, if we may rely on the translator.

¶ Παρατηρητέον γὰρ ὅτι τὸ μὲν υἱὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι ἀερίως ἀπιφάνηκε, καὶ ἀχρόνως· εἰ γὰρ υἱὸς, αὐτῷ ἴσθι, καὶ ἔ, γίγονας· ἰμφαίνων, μήτι πρόσφατος αὐτὸν σινευχησίαις τῆς υἱοθεσίας, μήτι αὐτὸν προῦπαρξάντα τίλος ἰσχυρίαις, ἀλλ’ εἶναι ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν. *Apud Phot. Cod.* 237. p. 960. *Comp. Athanas. Fragm. in Psalm.* p. 75. *Cyril. Cateches.* iii. p. 46. *Bened.*

[¶] Πρώτα ἦδη πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων ἐν ταῖς ἑρανοῖς, ἰβουλῆσθαι καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ γενῆσαι, ὁ δὲ ἴσθι, πρόσθεν ἀγγουόμενον γενέσθαι. *Ibid.*

[†] *Inter Op. Orig. ed. Basil.* p. 877.

Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, ^a reckons it among the singularities of Arius, that he would not own the Father to have been *always* so; but pretended that God was once *no Father*, and that the *Λόγος* was produced in time. I observe, that these two things are here joined together, as being explanatory one of the other, according to the reasoning of that age at least. And if the same reasoning held before, as may be probably inferred from other passages of the ancients, then it will follow that as many as asserted the *eternity* of the *Λόγος*, or Word, which were all without exception, did implicitly maintain the *eternal generation*. It appears to have been a maxim in the Church at this time, that is, about the year 315, ten years before the Council of Nice, that *the Father was always Father*. The same we have seen, about sixty years before, from what has been cited out of Dionysius of Alexandria, and Novatian. The testimony of ^uOrigen, cited by Pamphilus, with others mentioned, carry it up forty years higher, to about the year 210. Irenæus above thirty years higher, to about 173, within less than fourscore years of St. John. Tertullian, betwixt the two last named, seems to have understood this matter differently: for he says plainly, that “^x there was a time when the “Son was not;” meaning, *as a Son*; and that “God “was not *always* Father.” And this is agreeable to his principles, who always speaks of the *generation* as a vo-

^a Οὐκ αὖτις ὁ Θεὸς πατὴρ ἦν. ἀλλ’ ἄν’ ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς πατὴρ οὐκ ἦν. οὐκ αὖτις ἦν ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος, ἀλλ’ ἔξ ἕν ἔκκει γίγνεται. *Alexand. Ep. apud Socr. E. H.* l. i. c. 6. p. 10. Ἀπειράτου οὐκ ὁμοίου τῆς ἐξ ἕν ἔκκει ὑπαδείξις, ἀνάγκη τὸν πατέρα αὐτὸν οὐκ πατέρα. *Alexand. Ep. apud Theod.* l. i. c. 4. p. 13.

^u The charge brought against Dionysius of Alexandria, and which he cleared himself of, was this: Οὐκ αὖτις ὁ Θεὸς πατὴρ. ἕν αὖτις ἦν υἱός, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν Θεὸς ἦν χωρὶς τοῦ λόγου. αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ υἱὸς οὐκ ἦν χωρὶς γεννηθῆναι, ἀλλ’ ἦν ποτε ὅτι ἕν ἦν. *Athan. Ep. de Sentent. Dionys.* p. 253.

^x Non enim Deus, cum prius non esset Pater, postea Pater esse cepit, &c. *Pamphil. Apol.* p. 877. *Comp. Orig. in Joh.* p. 44, 45.

^y Pater Deus est, et Judex Deus est, non tamen ideo Pater et Judex semper, quia Deus semper. Nam nec Pater esse potuit ante Filium, nec Judex ante delictum. Fuit autem tempus cum et delictum et *Filius* non fuit. *Tertull. contr. Hermog.* c. 3.

luntary thing, and brought about in time; as do several other writers. From hence a question may arise, whether there was any difference of doctrine between those writers, or a difference in words only. This is a point which will deserve a most strict and careful inquiry.

The authors who make the generation *temporary*, and speak not expressly of any other, are these following: Justin, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Tatian, Tertullian, and Hippolytus. Novatian I mention not with them, because he asserted both. Let us then carefully examine what their doctrine was: and that it may be done the more distinctly, let us reduce it to particulars.

1. They asserted the *coeternity* of the Λόγος, or *Word*, though not considered precisely under the formality of a *Son*. This, I presume, is so clear a point, that I need not burden my margin with quotations for it. It shall suffice only to refer to the γ places, if any should doubt of it. It was a maxim with them, that God was always Λογικός, never ἄλογος; that is, never without his *Word* or *Wisdom*. So far they agreed perfectly with the other writers, either before, or after, or in their own time. The ancients, supposing the relation of the Λόγος to the Father to be as close and intimate as that of thought to a mind, and that this was insinuated in the very *name*, rightly concluded that the Father could not be ἄλογος, or without the Λόγος, any more than an eternal Mind could be without eternal thought². Some have pretended that the Ante-Nicene writers, who used that kind of reasoning, meant only an *attribute*, by the Λόγος, and not a *real Person*. But there is no ground or colour for this pretence, as shall be shown presently. I shall only note here, that the ^a later writers, who, undoubtedly and confessedly,

^γ Justin. Martyr. Apol. i. p. 122. Ox. ed. Athenag. Legat. c. x. p. 39. ed. Ox. Theophilus Antioch. p. 82, 129. ed. Ox. Tatian. p. 20, 22. ed. Ox. Vid. Bull. D. F. p. 209. Tertull. contr. Prax. c. v. p. 503. c. 27. Vid. Bull. D. F. p. 245. Hippolyt. contr. Noet. c. 10. p. 13. edit. Fabric.

² See Bull. D. F. p. 206. See this farther explained, serm. vii. p. 243, &c.

^a Alex. Epist. Encyc. Ath. Op. vol. i. p. 399. Athanas. vol. i. p. 221, 424,

took the *Λόγος* to be a *Person*, a *real, eternal Person*; yet make use of the same maxim, and the very same way of reasoning.

2. They did not mean by the *Λόγος*, or *Word*, any *attribute, power, virtue, or operation* of the Father; but a *real, subsisting Person*: whom they believed to have been always in and with the Father, and distinct from him, before the *temporary generation* they speak of. If this be well proved, other matters, as we shall see presently, will be easily adjusted.

The learned and judicious ^b Bishop Bull has sufficiently shown of every author singly, (except Justin, whom he reckons not with them,) that he must be understood to have believed the real and distinct *personality* of the Son; before the temporary *procession, or generation* mentioned. His reasonings upon that head, have not been answered, and, I am persuaded, cannot: so that I might very well spare myself the labour of adding any thing farther. But for the sake of such as will not be at the pains to read or consider what he has said at large, I shall endeavour to throw the substance of it into a smaller compass, in the following particulars; only premising this, that since all these authors went, in the main, upon the same hypothesis, they are the best commentators one upon another; and whatever explication we meet with in any one, two, or three, may reasonably stand for the sense of all; if they have nothing contradictory to it. Now to proceed.

1. ^c Before the *procession, or generation*, of which they

500, 619. et alibi. Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xxxv. p. 574. Greg. Nyss. Cat. Orat. c. 1. Cyrill. l. iv. in Joh. c. 48. Thesaur. p. 12, 23. Damasc. l. i. Marc. Diadoch. p. 115.

^b Defens. F. N. sect. iii. c. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.

^c Μόνος ἦν ὁ Θεός, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος. Theophl. p. 130. Αὐτός δι' ἑαυτοῦ ἦν παλὸς ἦν, οὗτοι γὰρ ἄλλοι, οὗτοι ἄσφατοι, οὗτοι ἀδύνατοι, οὗτοι ἀετούλῳτες ἦν. All which words correspond to the several names of the Son or Holy Spirit; *λόγος, σοφία, δύναμις, βουλὴ, (τοῦ πατρὸς)* and mean the same thing. Hippolyt. p. 13. contr. Noet. Comp. Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xxxv. p. 574.

Solus autem, quia nihil extrinsecus præter illum, cæterum ne tunc quidem

speak, they suppose the Father *not* to have been *alone*; which it is hard to make sense of, if they only meant that he was with his own attributes, powers, or perfections: as much as to say, he was *wise*, and *great*, and *powerful by himself*; therefore he was *not alone*. *Alone*, indeed, they own him to have been, with respect to any thing *ad extra*; but with respect to what was in himself, he was *not alone*; not *single*, but consisting of a *plurality*, having the *Λόγος* always with him.

2. The same *Λόγος*, or *Word*, was always ^d with him; conversed with him; was, as it were, assisting in council, according to those writers; and therefore, certainly, a distinct Person. It would be very improper to say that God was ^e *in*, or *with* one of his attributes, or *consulted* with it: all such expressions must denote a distinct personality.

3. The same individual *Λόγος*, who after the *procession* was undoubtedly a *Person*, is supposed to have existed before. ^f Novatian is express. "He who was in the "Father, proceeded from the Father." It is the same individual *Λόγος*, according to ^g Theophilus, who is *διαπαντός*, always, both before and after his procession, with the Father; and therefore, if he was a *real Person* after,

solus. Habebat enim secum, quam habebat in semetipso, rationem suam scilicet. Tertull. contr. Prax. c. v. p. 503.

^d *Σὺν αὐτῷ γὰρ, διὰ λογικῆς δυνάμει, αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ λόγος, ἐς ἧν ἐν αὐτῷ, ὑπάρτει. Tatian. c. vii. p. 20. Ὁ αὐτὸς συμπαρόν αὐτῷ. Theoph. p. 82. Τὸν ὄντα διαπαντός ἰδιάζοντα ἐν καρδίᾳ Θεοῦ. Id. p. 129. A little after, Ταῦτον ἵχτι σύμβουλον, ἑαυτοῦ τοῦν καὶ φέρειν ὄντα — τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ διαπαντός ἰμυλῶν. Idem. p. 29.*

Si necessaria est Deo materia ad opera mundi, ut Hermogenes existimavit; habuit Deus materiam longe digniorem — *Sophiam suam scilicet.* — Sophia autem Spiritus: hæc illi *consiliarius* fuit. *Tert. contr. Hermog.*

^e *Θεὸς ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ. τῆν δὲ ἀρχὴν λόγον δύναμι παρμυλήθημι. Tat. p. 19.*

^f Qui in Patre fuit, processit ex Patre. P. 31. Zeno Veronensis, of the following century, expresses it thus: "Procedit in nativitate, qui erat antequam nasceretur, in Patre." Which I add for illustration. Vid. etiam Pseud. Ambros. de Fid. c. ii. p. 349. Prudent. Hymn. xi. p. 44.

^g Page 129.

which is not disputed, he must have been so before. That ^hvery Λόγος, or Word, which had been from all eternity ἐνδιάδεται, ἐν καρδίᾳ Θεοῦ, becomes afterwards προφορικός. If therefore he was ever a *Person*, he must have been so always. So again: the Λόγος that spake to the Prophets, and who was undoubtedly a *Person*, is the ⁱvery same individual Λόγος, which was always with the Father; ὁ αὐτὸς συμπαραγὼν αὐτῶ. Tertullian, who distinguishes between *ratio*, and *sermo*, and asserts the former to be *eternal*, and the latter to be a *person*; yet ^kconnects both in one; and makes them, in substance, the very same; the self-same *person* both: only supposed under different capacities and different names, before and after the procession. It was one and the same hypostasis; once *ratio*, (according to this writer,) and as such, eternal; afterwards *sermo*, and as such, ^la *Son*. The seeming difference between the ancient Fathers upon this point is easily reconciled, says a ^mvery worthy and learned Prelate of our Church. “One saith, God was not *sermonalis* “a *principio*, or his *Word* did not exist till the creation; “others say, Christ is Λόγος αἰδῖος, the *eternal Word* of “the Father. They may all be understood in a sound “sense, with the help of this distinction. The *Word*, as “he is *inward* speech formed from the eternal Mind, was “for ever with God: but as God’s agent to display and “sound forth the wisdom of God in external works, “as *such*, he existed not till the creation—the creation

^h Τότεν τὸν λόγον ἐγέννησε προφορικός. Theoph. p. 129. Φῶς ἐν φωνῆς γέννησι, προῦσαι τῇ κρίσει αἰώνι, τὸν ἴδιον οὖν αὐτῆ μόνον κρίσις ἑαυτὸν ἐκδέχοντα. Hippol. c. x. p. 13. Νῦν, δὲ προῦσαι ἐν κρίσει ἰδίαν οὖν αὐτῆ Θεοῦ. C. xi. p. 14. Compare Theoph. p. 129. before cited.

ⁱ Theoph. p. 81, 82.

^k In usu est nostrorum—*sermonem* dicere in primordio apud Deum fuisse, cum magis *rationem* competat antiquiorem haberi; quia non *sermonalis* a principio, sed *rationalis* Deus etiam ante principium, et quia ipse quoque *sermo* *ratione* consistens, priorem eam ut *substantiam suam* ostendat. *Contr. Prax.* c. 5. Comp. Origen. in Joh. p. 43, 44.

^l See Bull, sect. iii. c. 10.

^m Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry, Sermon. p. 13, 14.

“ being, as it were, a *verbal* explication of what *reason* had first silently thought, disposed, and resolved within it-
“ self.”

4. If there still remains any doubt of this matter, there is a farther argument to be urged, which may be justly looked upon as clear, full, and decisive in the case. Had these Fathers believed that the *Λόγος*, or Word, was an attribute only, or power, &c. before the *procession*, or *generation*, which they speak of; then it would follow, that the Son began first to be, and was properly a *creature*, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, in their opinion; and that *procession* was but another word for being *created*. But these writers do expressly guard against any such notion. ⁿ Novatian very clearly distinguishes between *procession* and *creation*. Athenagoras is still more express to the same purpose; ^o declaring that the Son was not then *made*, but had existed in the Father, as the *Λόγος*, or Word, from all eternity.

Justin Martyr is the first and the most considerable of those writers; and therefore it will be proper to examine his sentiments with a more particular care and exactness. I have selected the most material passages I could find, which may help to give us a just idea of his doctrine; and have placed them in distinct columns in the P margin. It

ⁿ Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo dicit, “ Ego ex Deo prodii,” Joh. xvi.—cum constat, hominem a Deo factum esse, non ex Deo processisse? c. xxiii.

^o Οὐχ ὡς γινόμενος ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς πῶς ἀϊδίος ὄν, ἔχει αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν λόγον ἀϊδίως λογικὸς ὄν. c. x. p. 39.

P 1. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Μωϋσῆς, ὁ δὲ Ἰσραὴλ δὲ Πλάτων, τὸ ἔν. ἐκάτερον δι τῶν ἀρημίμων τῶν αἰν ὄντι Θεῷ προσέειπεν φαίνονται αὐτὸς γὰρ ἰσὶ μόνος ὁ αἰν ὄν γίνεσθαι δι μὴ ἔχων—τύχουσιν γὰρ αὐτὸν—τὸν μὲν ἀγίνεσθαι ἐπίδει ὄναι λίγοντα τοὺς δι γινεσθὸς ἢ δημιουργητοὺς—γινόμενος καὶ ἀπελλυμένος. *Parap.* p. 90, 91. Ox.

2. Ὅσα γὰρ ἰσὶ μετὰ τὸν Θεὸν ἢ ἰσὶ πατρὶ, ταῦτα φύσει φθαρτὴν ἔχουσι, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐξαφανισθῆναι ἢ μὴ ὄναι ἰσὶ. μὴ

ως γὰρ ἀγίνεσθαι καὶ ἀφθαρτος Θεὸς, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Θεὸς ἰσὶ. *Dial.* p. 21. Jebb.

3. Ἐγὼ γὰρ, φησὶ, εἰμὶ ὁ δὲ ἀντιδιατίλλων ἑαυτὸν θελοῦσι ὁ δὲ τοῖς μὴ ὄντι. *Parap.* p. 87.

4. Ὅμοια τῶ πάντων πατρὶ Θεοῦ, ἀγινεσθὸς ὄντι, ἔσ ἰσὶ. ἢ γὰρ ἔσ ἢ ὄνματι προσαγορεύεται, περιβύτιον ἔχει τὸν θείον τὸ ὄνομα. τὸ δὲ Πατὴρ, καὶ Θεὸς, ἢ Κτίστης, ἢ Κύριος, ἢ Διεσπότης, οὐκ ὀνόματά ἰσὶ ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐσῶτων

would signify little to translate them, because the arguments arising from them are proper only to scholars. I have distinguished the several citations by figures, for the more convenient referring to them.

1. I observe, first, (see notes 1, 2.) that he joins ἀγέννητος with ἀφάρτος and ἀίδιος; opposing them to φαρτός, γενόμενος, δημιουργητός, and ἀπολλύμενος: here therefore ἡ ἀγέννητος is not considered as the personal character of the Father, and as signifying *unbegotten*; but as it belongs to the τὸ θεῖον, and denotes eternal, uncreated, immutable existence. Either Justin must have believed that ἀγέννητος, in this latter sense, is applicable to the Son; or else he must have supposed him not only γεννητός, but γενόμενος, δημιουργητός, and φαρτός also, which must appear highly absurd to any one who has ever considered Justin's writings.

2. I observe (see note 2.) that God's being ἀγέννητος and

ὁ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν προερίσται. *Apol.* ii. p. 13. Θιῷ δὲ οὐτι ἰ τιδεις ἴσμομα, προῦσῆρχιν, ἔτι αὐτὸς ἰαυτὸν ἰσμάζειν ὡςδὴ δύν. ὡς ἔ μοίς ὑπέρχων. *Ρατση.* p. 87.

5. Ἰουδαῖοι ἔν ἡγήσάμενοι αὐτὸν τὸν πατέρα τῶν ὅλων λιλαληκίαι τῷ Μωσῷ, τῷ λαλέσαντος αὐτῷ ἔντος οὐ τῷ Θεοῦ, ἐς ἔ ἄγγελος ἔ ἀπέτολος κίληται, δικαίως ἰλίγχομαι καὶ διὰ τῷ προφητικῷ πνεύματος, ἔ δι' αὐτοῦ τῷ Χριστῷ, ὡς οὐτι τὸν πατέρα οὐτι τὸν υἱὸν ἰγνωσαι —δ; καὶ λόγος προῦσταις ἐν τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ Θεὸς ὑπέρχων. *Apol.* i. p. 122, 123.

Compare the citations before given in p. 27.

6. Ὁ δὲ υἱὸς ἰσίου, ὁ μοίς λιγόμενος κυρίως υἱός, ὁ λόγος πρὸ τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ οὐτῶν, καὶ γινόμενος ἔτι τὴν ἀρχὴν δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἰαυτὸς ἔ ἰσέρμοι, Χριστός μιν κατὰ τὸ πιχρίσθαι καὶ ποιῆσαι τὰ πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ τὸν Θεὸν, λίγιται, ἴσμομα ἔ αὐτὸν περιέχων ἄγνωστον σημασίαν ἔν τρέπον καὶ τὸ Θεὸς προεργίριμα ἔν ἴσμομα ἰσιν, ἀλλὰ πρῶγματος διωξηγίτη ἴμφυτος τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέξα. *Apol.* ii. p. 14. Ox.

I need but hint that the words ἀγέννητος and ἀίγιτος, with double or single τ, have been used very promiscuously in authors; and hardly came to be accurately distinguished, till the Arian controversy gave occasion for it. See *Swicer's Thesaurus*, upon the ecclesiastical use of these words; and *Cudworth* for profane writers, p. 253, 254. and *Montfaucon admon. in Athes. Decret. Syn. N.* p. 207. The Son is properly ἀίγιτος, as well as the Father; so Ignatius, so Irenæus, so Origen expressly styles him; and Athenagoras's ἡ γιγίμιτος is to the same effect. The similitude of the word and sound was, very probably, the chief reason why the title of ἀίγιτος was not oftener applied to the Son; which omission however is compensated by other equivalent expressions.

ἄφθαρτος is supposed, as it were, the very ground and foundation of his being *God*; on account of which he is *Θεός*; and without which, consequently, he could not be *Θεός*. If therefore the *Λόγος* be not, in this sense, *ἀγέννητος* and *ἄφθαρτος*, he is not *Θεός*, according to Justin Martyr: and yet no man is more express than Justin, every where, in making the Son *Θεός*, and insisting very much upon it.

3. Justin makes *ὁ ὦν* to answer to the Platonists' τὸ ὄν. (see note 1.) And either of them equivalent to *ἀεὶ ὦν*, and that to *γένεσιν μὴ ἔχων*, uncreated, immutable, necessarily-existing. Now compare note 5. and two more citations given above, p. 27. and from thence it is manifest that Justin makes the *Λόγος* to be *ὁ ὦν*, in his own proper person. And he gives the reason here why, or on what account, he might justly style himself *Θεός*; (and the same must hold for *ὁ ὦν*;) it is because *he is Θεός*, as God's Son; *πρωτότοκος ὦν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἢ Θεός ὑπάρχει* †.

4. Justin Martyr, having taken notice that the Father had properly no name, (see not. 4, 6.) as having nothing antecedent or preexistent, does immediately after repeat the observation of having no name, and applies it to the Son; observing that neither he, properly, has any name, but only some titles or appellations given him, from what he did in time; particularly from his coming forth to create and put into beautiful order the whole system of things. This seems to insinuate his *coeternity* with the Father; and the more so, because Justin observes, at the same time, that he is *emphatically* Son of the Father, (*ὁ μόνος λεγόμενος κυρίως υἱός*), and *coexistent* (*συνὸν*) with his Father before the world; though begotten, or sent forth, in time, to create the universe. These considerations convince me, that Justin as well as Athenagoras taught the

† Compare Dial. p. 364, 183, 371, 184. ed. Jebb. I add for illustration these words of Cyril. "Ὅτι ἂν ἐξ ἀγνότητος ἢ ἀφθάρτου γιγίνηται, εὖτε πάντως ἄφθαρτον, ἢ ἀγέννητον. Cyril. Alex. Thesaur. p. 34. Much to the same purpose is that of Philo before Justin. "Ὅς τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγος ὦν, ἐξ ἀκαταῆς ἢ αὐτῆς ἴπυ ἀφθάρτου. Phil. de Conf. Lingu. p. 326.

strict *coeternity* of the Son; which is equally true of all the other writers.

Besides this, the several ^s similitudes, which these authors used to illustrate the nature of that *procession*, such as the *sun and its rays*, the *fountain and its streams*, the *root and its branches*, one *fire lighting another*, and the *like*, manifestly show that they never dreamed of the Son's being *created*. Then, the care they took lest any one should imagine there was any *division* of the Father's substance, and their inculcating that he was *prolatus*, *non separatus*, brought forth, but not separated from the Father, demonstrate their meaning to be, that here was no production of a new substance, but an *emanation*, *manifestation*, or *procession* of what was before. Farther, their declaring that, though he proceeded from the Father, he was still in the Father, (taken together with the ^t maxim, that "nothing is in God but what is God,") sets the matter beyond all reasonable scruple. In a word; as they all held the *consubstantiality* of the Son with the Father, which is as clear as the light, in their writings; they must have been the most inconsistent men in the world, had they thought that the *procession*, or *generation*, of the Son was a *creation*, or *new production*, of him; or had they not firmly believed that he existed, the *living and substantial Word*, from all eternity.

Justin Martyr seems to have spoke the sense of all, in saying, "That the *Λόγος* coexisted with the Father before " the creatures; and was then begotten, when the Father " at first created and put into beautiful order the frame of " things." See the passage above ^u. The emperor Con-

^a Justin. M. Dial. p. 183, 373. Jebb. Athenagoras, p. 40, 96. Ox. ed. Tatian, c. viii. p. 21, 22. Ox. ed. Tertull. Apol. c. 21. adv. Prax. c. 8. Hippolytus contr. Noet. c. xi. p. 13. contr. Jud. p. 4. Fabric. vol. 2.

N. B. Athenagoras's words are, in strictness, meant of the *Holy Ghost* only, in both places. But the reason being the same for one as the other, they are equally applicable to either; and it is thus only I would be understood, wherever I apply either of the passages to the *Son*.

^t Vid. Bull. D. F. N. p. 198.

^u P. 109. Note 6.

stantine afterwards expresses the same thought something more fully and distinctly, thus. “^xThe Son, who was “*always* in the Father, was *begotten*, or rather *proceeded* “*forth*, for the orderly and ornamental methodising of “the creation.” I choose to follow the sense, rather than the strict letter. Whether those writers went upon any solid reasons, in assigning such or such parts, in the work of creation, to Father, Son, or Holy Ghost, is not very material. It is manifest they supposed the whole Trinity to be concerned in it; and to create, as it were, in concert. Their ascribing the orderly adjustment and beautifying part to the Son, seems to have been in allusion to his names of *λόγος*, and *σοφία*, and *φῶς*. In respect of the last of them, Hippolytus supposes the *generation* to be posterior to the creation, upon God’s saying, “Let there “be light.” Then did the Son *proceed* *φῶς ἐκ φωτός*. ^γTertullian seems to have had the same thought; and perhaps ^zOrigen. Athenagoras likewise supposes the *procession* to be after the creating of the unformed mass of things. And yet nothing is plainer than that ^aall these writers believed the *prior* existence of the Son; and that things were at first created by him, as well as afterwards adorned and regulated. In short, whatever the Father is supposed to have done, was by his Son and Holy Spirit; therefore frequently styled *manus Patris*: but the *αὐθεντία*, the designing part, was thought most properly to be reserved to the Father, as the first Person. These are things not to

^x Ἐγενήθη, μᾶλλον δὲ προῆλθεν αὐτὸς, ἢ πάντως ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ὢν, ἐπὶ τῆν τῶν ἰσὺν αὐτοῦ γεννημάτων διακρίμασιν. *Apud Gelas. Act. Syn. Nic. part. iii. p. 58.*

^γ *Contr. Prax. c. vii. 12.*

^a *Vid. Huet. Origenian. p. 41.*

^a As to Athenagoras, *vid. supra.* Tertullian says: Deum immutabilem et informabilem credi necesse est, ut æternum; quodcumque transfiguratur in aliud, desinit esse quod fuerat, et incipit esse quod non erat. Deus autem neque desinit esse, neque aliud potest esse; Sermo autem Deus, &c. *Contr. Prax. c. 27.* Hippolytus hath these words: Πατρὶ *συναΐδιος*, *adv. Jud. p. 4.* Τὸς ἰσότηει, *contr. Noct. p. 16.* Ἄτι γὰρ ἦν ἐν δόξῃ Θεοτριπτῷ, τῷ ἰδίῳ συνωπάρχον γενήσεσσι πρὸ πάντων αἰῶνος, καὶ χροῖου, ἢ τῆς τῷ κόσμῳ καταβολῆς. *Fabric. vol. ii. p. 29.* Origen we have seen before.

be too curiously inquired into, or too rigorously interpreted; but to be understood θεογενεῖς. In the whole they have a very good meaning, and were founded in the belief of a *coessential* and *coeternal* Trinity.

From what hath been said, I presume it is evident that there was no difference at all, in the main of the doctrine, between these and the other Catholic writers; but a different manner only of expressing the same things. The question was not whether the *hypostasis*, or *Person*, of the Son was from all eternity, coeval with the Father, and consubstantial with him; in that they all perfectly agreed. Nor was there any difference about the *procession*: for the ^blatter writers acknowledged it, as well as those before them; and made it *temporary* and *voluntary*, as those did. But the question was, whether the Son's eternal coexistence (I should rather say the coeternal existence of the Λόγος) should be deemed sonship and filiation or no; or whether the *procession* might not more properly be so styled. Tertullian (and perhaps others) was of opinion that this latter was ^c*perfecta nativitas Sermonis*, the perfect nativity or birth of the Word; who had been, as it were, *quiescent* and *unoperating* from all eternity, till he came forth to *create* the world. And ^dHippolytus carried this notion so far, as to think the filiation not *completed* till he had run through the last sort of sonship, in becoming man. All this is true, in some sense, and when rightly explained. But other Fathers, thinking this way of speaking liable to abuse and misconstruction; and considering, probably, that the Λόγος, or Word, might ^eproperly be

^b Vid. Bull. Def. F. N. sect. iii. c. 9.

^c Contr. Prax. c. 8.

^d Contr. Noet. c. xv. p. 17. Οὗτοι γὰρ ἄσκητος καὶ κατ' ἑαυτὸν ὁ λόγος εἴληκεν ἢ υἱός, καὶ τοὶ εἴληκεν λόγος ἔν μοιγενεῖς. It is remarkable, that he makes the Son perfectly *μοιγενεῖς*, though not perfectly *υἱός*, before the *incarnation*. Others might perhaps reason, in like manner, with regard to the *πρωίλιυσις*; thinking him to have been *λόγος*, or *μοιγενεῖς*, before it, but not *υἱός*.

^e Omnis origo parens est; omne quod ex origine profertur, progenies est. *Tertull. contra Prax.* c. 8. See *Novat.* above, p. 100.

called *Son*, in respect of that eternal existence which he ever enjoyed *in* and *from* the Father, as the head, root, fountain, and cause of all; they chose to give that the name of *generation*: and to call the other two ^f*condescensions, manifestations, proceeding forth*, or the like. So we have seen it in Methodius, before cited for the eternal generation: and he very probably had the notion from § Justin Martyr; who, in like manner, interprets generation, in the secondary sense, by *manifestation*. And even ^h Hippolytus, as before observed, explains the procession, or generation of the Son, a little after the creation, by *manifestation* of him.

After Arius arose, the Catholics found it highly necessary to insist much on the *eternal generation*. For, the Arians, taking advantage of it, that the *temporary condescension* of the Son, to create the world, had been often called his *generation*, were for looking no higher; but artfully insinuated that this was the first *production* of him; and that it was absurd to talk of the Son's existing before he was *begotten*: in opposition to which pretence we find the Nicene Fathers anathematising such as should say, that the “ⁱ Son existed not before he was *begotten* ;”

Γενῆ μὲν ἔσθ' ὁ ἥλιος τὴν αὐγὴν. *Eus. Eccl. Th.* l. i. c. 12. p. 73.

Τὸ ἴκ τις ἀπέχον υἱὸς ἴσιν ἰκίειν, ἔξ οὗ ἔστιν. *Athan. Orat.* iv. p. 628.

^f It is observable that Justin Martyr applies the word *προβάλλω* to the latter of them, as well as to the former. *Dial.* 228. Jebb.

And, in like manner, Clement of Alexandria uses *προβαλῶν* of both, p. 654. and Hippolytus, of the latter. *Contr. Noet.* c. 17.

^g On the words “Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee,” he comments thus: Τότε γίνεσθαι αὐτοῦ λόγῳ γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἔξουον ἢ γενῆσθαι αὐτῷ ἱμιλλῆ γίνεσθαι. *Dial.* p. 270. ed. Jebb.

^h Τὸν ἴδιον νῦν αὐτῷ μόνῃ πρότερον ἑρατὸν ἀπέχεσθαι, τῷ δὲ γινωσκίῳ κόσμῳ ἀέρατον ὄντα, ἑρατὸν ποιῶ. C. x. p. 13. A little before he had said, Τὸν δὲ γινωσκίῳ ἀρχηγὸν καὶ σύμβουλον καὶ ἑρατὸν ἰγίνα λόγῳ, ὃν λόγῳ ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀέρατος τε ὄντα, τῷ περὶ γινωσκίῳ κόσμῳ, ἑρατὸν ποιῶ, προτίθειν φωνὴν φθιγγόμενος, καὶ φῶς ἐκ φωστὸς γινῶν.

The words of Zeno Veronensis may be added, as a good comment upon the former. Cujus (*Patrie*) ex ore, ut rerum natura, quae non erat, fingetur, prodivit unigenitus Filius, cordis ejus nobilis inquilinus: exinde visibilis effectus, quia humanum genus visitaturus erat, &c.

ⁱ Ἦν ποτε ἔσθ' οὐκ ἦν, καὶ πρὶν γινῆσθαι οὐκ ἦν.

meaning in the sense now explained. However, the Arians might have known that the eternal existence of the *Λόγος* was universally taught, and even by those who asserted a temporal generation. Nor indeed were they ignorant of it; but ^k they contrived, for a salvo, to maintain, that the *Λόγος*, or Word, which was held to be *eternal*, was not the same with the *Λόγος*, or Word, begotten; the former being only the Father's own proper *Word*, and no substantial thing; the latter a *created* substance, directly contrary to all antiquity, which has nothing to countenance any such notion of a *twofold Λόγος*. Upon this it became necessary to explain in what sense any *temporal* generation had been asserted; and to keep up the true Catholic doctrine, which had obtained from the beginning; namely, of the eternal *Λόγος* distinct from the Father; *Son* of the Father, as partaking of the same divine substance from all eternity; ^l going out from the Father to create the world; and, lastly, condescending to become man: *Son*, in all these respects, but primarily and chiefly in respect of the first. From the whole we may remark, that an explicit profession of *eternal generation* might have been dispensed with; provided only that the eternal existence of the *Λόγος*, as a *real subsisting person*, *in, and of* ^m *the Father*, which comes to the same thing, might be secured. This was the point; and this was all. In this all sound Catholics agreed; and to dispute it was accounted heresy and blasphemy. If any one, disliking the name or the phrase of *eternal generation*, thinks it better to assert an *eternal Word*, instead of an *eternal Son*, (meaning thereby a distinct person, and *consubstantial* with God, whose Word he is,) and refers

^k See Bull. Def. F. p. 198. Athan. Orat. ii. p. 507.

^l This is well expressed by the Antiochian Fathers, against Paul of Samosata; and by Clement of Alexandria; *Τῶν τε πιστεύουσιν ἐν τῷ πατρὶ αὐτὸν ὄντα, ἰσοπληρωμένον τῷ πατρὶ καὶ βάλημα, πρὸς τὴν κτίσιν τῶν ὄλων. Ladd. Conc. tom. i. p. 845. Τίτλος αὐτῷ γένεσι, καὶ κληρονομίᾳ, ὡς πατρὶ ἰσὶ ἐνα ξυστασίαν ἰσοῦσα συμπλήρωσι, ὑπὸ μεγάλης οἰκονομίας, ἢ ἀναλογίας τῷ πατρὶ, δι' οὗ ἢ τὰ πατρὶ καὶ τὰ ἀφ' αὐτοῦ τῷ κόσμῳ διδραμύργηται. Clem. Alex. Quis Div. p. 955. Ox.*

^m Vid. Athan. vol. i. p. 222, 619, 628.

the generation to his first and last *manifestation*, at the *creation* and *incarnation*; there seems to be no farther harm in it, than what lies in the words, and their liableness to be misconstrued, or to give offence. Here therefore every man is left to his own discretion and prudence: only the safer way seems to be, to follow the most general and most approved manner of expression, together with the ancient faith; being, in all probability, the surest means to preserve both. I designedly said, first *and* last, not first *or* last. For such as interpret the generation of the *last* only, stand, I think, ^aclearly condemned by Scripture; many places whereof can never fairly be accounted for by the *miraculous conception* solely: besides that from Barnabas and Clemens Romanus, down to the Council of Nice, all the Christian writers speak unanimously of a higher, antecedent sonship; and, generally, even found *worship* upon it.

I shall just observe to you, in the close of this article, that, from what hath been said, you may know what judgment to make of an assertion of ^oDr. Clarke's, viz. "That the learnedest of the most orthodox Fathers, who asserted the *eternal generation of the Son*, did yet nevertheless assert it to be an act of the Father's eternal *power* and *will*." By which the Doctor seems to insinuate, that the good Fathers did not understand *eternal* in the strict sense. If the learned Doctor can show, that those who maintained only the voluntary and temporary procession of the Son, believed that the *Λόγος* was *eternally* preexisting in the Father, by an act of his will; or that those who expressly asserted an *eternal* generation, believed also that it was an *arbitrary* thing, and might

^a Sane in ista ex Maria Virgine nativitate, suprema et singularis ἕξχ^η atque excellentia filiationis Domini nostri adeo non consistit, ut ea ipsa natiuitas ad ejus stupendam συγκατάθεσιν omnino referenda sit. Hoc nos satis aperte docent, si modo a Spiritu Sancto edoceri velimus, multis in locis, S. literæ.—Ita semper credidit inde ab ipsis Apostolis Catholica Christi Ecclesia. *Bull. J.* p. 39. See also *Dr. Fiddes*, vol. i. b. iv. ch. 2.

• *Script. Doctr.* p. 280. alias 247.

have been otherwise, (which I suppose is the Doctor's sense of an "act of the will,") then he will do something. But as none of his authorities prove any thing like it, it would have been a prudent part, at least, not to have produced them to so little purpose. But enough of this matter: I have, I hope, sufficiently explained myself upon this head; and have therefore the more reason to expect a distinct answer from you, whenever you think proper to reconsider this subject.

QUERY IX.

Whether the divine attributes, Omniscience, Ubiquity, &c. those individual attributes, can be communicated without the divine essence, from which they are inseparable?

THE intent of this Query was to prevent equivocations, and to make the next clearer. You agree with me, that the *individual* divine attributes cannot be communicated without the *individual* nature in which they subsist. You add, that "Dr. Clarke, in the 230th page of his Replies, hath plainly shown, that *individual attributes*, divine or not divine, cannot possibly be communicated at all." Well then; we know what the Doctor means by "all divine powers," in his Scripture Doctrine, (p. 298.) which is one point gained: for when words are stripped of their ambiguity, we may be able to deal the better with them. As to the Doctor's aphorism laid down, (p. 230.) I may have leave to doubt of it; notwithstanding that it is set forth to us with the utmost assurance. It is not unusual with the Doctor to lay down maxims, in relation to this controversy, which himself would not allow at another time, or in another subject. For instance; "a necessary agents are no causes,"

* Whatever proceeds from any being, otherwise than by the will of that being, doth not in truth proceed from *that being*; but from some other cause or necessity extrinsic and independent of that being. Necessary agents are no causes, but always *instruments* only in the hand of some other power. Reply, page 227. Compare p. 113.

that is, they do not so properly act, as are acted upon. This is very true of all *finite* necessary agents; for all their necessary or natural acts proceed not so properly from them, as from God the author of their natures. But does it therefore follow, that if God acts by a necessity of nature in some instances, he is therein *acted upon* likewise? or that all the acts of the divine nature are voluntary and free; none natural and necessary? This should not be said by one who, elsewhere, speaks so much of God's being "infinitely wise," and "infinitely good," "infinitely happy," &c. by an "absolute necessity of nature;" unless he could be certain that knowing, loving, contemplating, and enjoying himself, do not imply perpetual *acting*, or that an infinitely active being can ever cease to *act*. I shall not scruple to assert, that by the same absolute necessity of nature that the Father *exists*, he exists as a Father; and *coexists* with his *coessential* Son proceeding from him. If you say, this supposes the Son *self-existent*, or *unoriginate*; I desire it may not be *said* only, but *proved*.^b In the interim, I take leave to suppose, that *unbegotten* and *begotten*, *unoriginate* and *proceeding*, are different ideas. Again, (p. 228.)^c he finds fault with "the author of some Considerations," for supposing that "the Son is something more than a mere name, and yet not a real distinct being:" and upon this lays down another aphorism; that there is no *medium* between a *being*, and *not a being*: which indeed is a very true one, if *being*, and *being*, are taken in the same sense, but not otherwise. For let me mention almost a parallel case. Upon the Doctor's hypothesis, that God's *substance* is *extended* every where;

^b Οὗτοι δύο ἀγίνητοι, οὗτοι δύο μονογενῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς εἶς πατὴρ ἀγίνητος (ἀγίνητος γὰρ εἶναι ὁ πατήρ αὐτὸν μὴ ἔχει) καὶ εἰς εἶς υἱός, ἀΐδιος ἐκ πατρὸς γεγεννημένος. Cyril. Catech. x. p. 141. Ox.

^c To avoid this consequence, he is forced to suppose (p. 29.) that the Son is something more than a *mere name*, and yet not a *real distinct being*; that is to say, that he is something between a *being*, and *not a being*. Cl. Reply, p. 223.

and that the same is the *substratum* of *space*; we may imagine two *substrata*, one pervading the sun, and the other the moon, which are both distinct and distant. Will you please to tell us, whether these two are *real distinct beings*, or no? If they are, you may leave it to others to prove them *intelligent beings*, that is, *persons*: and, perhaps, the very next consequence will make them two Gods, upon the Doctor's own principles. If they are not *real distinct beings*, then here is something admitted "between a being and not a being;" contrary to the Doctor's maxim: unless he makes them *nothing*; and supposes two spaces, without any *substratum* at all; two *extensions*, without any thing *extended*.

But let us consider, whether something may not be thought on, to help both the learned Doctor and us out of these difficulties. The truth of this matter, so far as I apprehend, is, that *being* may signify, either simply what *exists*, or what exists *separately*. This distinction seems to be just and necessary; and such as you will the more readily come into, having occasion for it, as well as we. I hope none are so weak, as to deny the *Persons* to exist in reality. The very schoolmen themselves never scruple to call them *tres res*, *tres entes*, or the like, in that sense; though at the same time, in the other sense of *being*, they are all but one being, *una summa res*, and *una res numero*; which comes much to the same with Tertullian's *una* (*indivisa*) *substantia in tribus cohærentibus*, (only setting aside his particular manner of explication,) and is the sense of all antiquity. Upon the foot of this distinction, you may readily apprehend those words of Gregory Nazianzen, spoken of the three Persons. Ζωῆς καὶ ζῶην, φῶτα καὶ φῶς, ἀγάδα καὶ ἀγαδὸν, δόξας καὶ δόξαν—Θεὸν ἑκαστον, ἃν θεωρῆται μόνον, τοῦ νοῦ χωρίζοντος τὰ ἀχώριστα^d. By the same distinction, you may probably understand a very noted Creed, which seems to have cost the learned

^d Orat. xiii. p. 211. Paris. ed.

Doctor some pains in explaining. To return to our instance of the two *substrata*. I suppose the Doctor, or yourself, will be content to allow, that this is *substance*, and that *substance*; and yet not *substances*, but one substance. In like manner also, this is *being*, and that *being*; and yet not two beings, but one being: this eternal, and that eternal; and yet not two eternals, but one eternal. I might go on almost the length of an Athanasian Creed. This must be your manner of speaking, if you come to particulars; and that because the *substrata* are supposed to have no separate existence independent on each other, but to be united by some common ligaments, which perhaps you will call *personal* attributes. And why then should you be severe upon us, for using the like language, and upon better reasons? We believe the three Persons to have no separate existence independent on each other; we suppose them more united in some respects, than the *substrata* are supposed in your Scheme, because equally present every where: we admit some common ties or bands of union, which we call *essential* attributes and perfections. Either therefore allow us our way of speaking, which we think decent and proper; suitable to the idea we have, and to the circumstances of the case; founded in the very nature and reason of things: or else find out a better for your own, that we may, at length, learn from you how we ought to speak in this matter.

You will say, it may be, that the instance I have chosen is not exactly parallel in every circumstance. No; God forbid it should. But it agrees so far as is sufficient for my purpose. There is this manifest difference, that you suppose the several *substrata* so many *parts* of God; though every one of them infinitely wise, infinitely good, infinitely powerful, infinitely every thing, but *extended*. We, more consistently, suppose three Persons *equal*, in all respects; none of them *singly* part of God; but every one perfect God.

A second difference is, that you suppose all the *finite*

parts, making one *infinite*, to be one being, one God, and one *Person*; by *continuity*, I presume, and a *personal* union of the parts. We suppose three Persons to be one God, by their *inseparability* and the *essential* union of the Persons: which, I humbly conceive, we are as able to explain, as you are to explain the other; and, I hope, more able to prove it.

A third difference permit me to mention, that you suffer your imaginations to wander, where you can find no footing; we are content to *understand* only, and that imperfectly, without *imagining* at all.

In fine, you have philosophized so far in these high and deep matters, that you really want all the same favourable allowances, which we are *thought* to do. Others may object several things to us, which would bear equally hard upon us both. The *simplicity* of the divine nature, for instance, is one of the strongest and most popular objections: but the learned Doctor has broke through it; and has contrived a solution, a very good one, both for himself and us ^e. I have often thought no hands so proper to be employed against the doctrine of the blessed Trinity, as those which are good only at pulling down, and not at building up. If once you come to settling and determining points of a mysterious nature, there will be as fair a plea for *this* also: and I doubt not, but the same thread of reasoning, which first brought you to question it, will, when carefully pursued, and as soon as you perceive the like difficulties almost in every thing, bring you to make less scruple of it. But lest others should imagine, from what hath been said, that they may have some advantage over us, let me add these few considerations farther.

1. That what hath been urged is not purely arguing *ad hominem*; but it is appealing to what good sense and impartial reason dictates equally to you or us, on such or such suppositions.

2. That if we come to reason minutely on any other

* Answer to the Sixth Letter, p. 39, 40.

matter, alike incomprehensible as this of the holy Trinity, we may soon lose ourselves in inextricable mazes.

3. That if they please to take any other hypothesis of the *omnipresence*, they may meet with difficulties there also, perhaps not inferior to the former.

4. That if they choose to rest in *generals*, without any hypothesis at all, and without descending to the *modus* and *minutiæ* of it: this is the very thing which we desire and contend for, in regard to the blessed Trinity, (which ought certainly to be equally dealt with,) and then we may soon come to a good agreement.

By pursuing this point, I had almost neglected the learned Doctor's third aphorism; "That nothing individual can be communicated." Here is as great a fallacy and ambiguity in the word *individual*, as before in the word *being*. I shall make this plain to you. That particular substance, which is supposed to pervade, and to be commensurate to the sun, is an *individual* being, in some sense; unless there be a *medium* between a *being* and *not a being*, which the learned Doctor admits not: the whole substance likewise is one *individual* being, and *Person* too, upon the Doctor's hypothesis: and we say farther, that three Persons may be one *individual* being; having, we think, a very good meaning in it. So here are plainly three senses of the word *individual*; and till you can fix a certain *principle of individuation*, (a thing much wanted, and by which you might oblige the learned world,) any one of these senses appears as just and reasonable as another. Now the Doctor's maxim, rightly understood, may be true, in all these senses. For, in respect of the first, what is peculiar and *proper* to one part, is not *communicated* or *common* to other parts: in respect of the second, what is *proper* to one *Person*, is not *common* to other *persons*: and so, in respect of the third, what is *proper* to one *essence* or *substance*, is not *common* to other *essences* or *substances*. All this is very true: but to what purpose is it, or whom does the learned Doctor contradict? This is only telling us, that *so far*, or *in such*

respect, as any thing is supposed *individual* or *incommunicable*, it is supposed *individual* or *incommunicable*; which nobody doubts of. But whether this or that be communicable, or how far, or in what manner (which is all the difficulty) remains a question as much as ever; and the Doctor's maxim will not help us at all in it. It may be the safest way, first to try the strength and the use of it upon the Doctor's own hypothesis. Let it be asked, whether the wisdom, &c. residing in that part which pervades the sun, (for it seems that it must be *intelligent*, and *infinitely* so; unless one infinite intelligent be made up of *unintelligents*, or *finite intelligents*;) I say, let it be asked, whether that be the very *individual* wisdom which resides in another part, at any given distance. I presume, to this question you must answer, *yes*: and then we are to observe, that here is but one *individual* infinite wisdom, which is *entirely* in the *whole*, and *entirely* in every *part*; *proper*, in some sense, to each single part, (since it can have only such attributes as inhere in it,) and yet *common* to all; *diffused* through extended substance, yet not *co-extended*; nor *multiplied*, because but *one*. If you admit thus far, as I think you must, we shall have nothing to apprehend, in point of reason, (which nevertheless is what you chiefly trust to,) against the doctrine of the Trinity. The *communication* of *essential* attributes, which we speak of, is at least as intelligible as what I have been mentioning; and every whit as consistent with the Doctor's maxim, that nothing which is *individual* can be *communicated*. Only you have your sense of *individual*, and we have *ours*; and you can account no better for so many and infinitely distant parts making *one Person*, than we for three Persons making *one substance*, or one God. Let us therefore be content to stop where it becomes us; and frankly confess our ignorance of these things: for by pretending farther, we shall not discover less ignorance than before, but much greater vanity. I would not have presumed to discourse thus freely of the tremendous substance of the eternal God, (infinitely surpassing human

comprehension,) were it not, in a manner, necessary, in order to expose the folly and the presumption of doing it. If the doctrine of the blessed Trinity is to stand or fall by this kind of reasoning, it was very proper to make some trial of it first, where it might be done more safely, to see how it would answer. You, I presume, cannot complain of me, for treating you in your own way, and turning upon you your own artillery. But to proceed. You are positive in it, "that the Son of God hath not the individual attributes of God the Father; for then," say you, "he must be the Father." On the contrary, I affirm, that he hath the *individual* attributes of God the Father, as much as he has the *individual* essence: for otherwise he must be a *creature* only: and therefore the question between you and me in plain terms is, whether the Son be *God*, or a *creature*?

QUERY X.

Whether if they (the attributes belonging to the Son) be not individually the same, they can be any thing more than faint resemblances of them, differing from them as finite from infinite; and then in what sense, or with what truth, can the Doctor pretend, that "all divine powers, except absolute supremacy and independency," are communicated to the Son? And whether every being, besides the one supreme Being, must not necessarily be a creature, and finite; and whether "all divine powers" can be communicated to a creature, infinite perfection to a finite being.

I HAVE put under one Query what before made two, because the substance of them is nearly the same, and contains but one argument. I have two things upon my hands at once; first to clear and fix your sense, which is industriously disguised; and next to confute it. The present Query relates chiefly to the former, to draw you

* Script. Doctr. p. 298.

out of general and ambiguous terms, that so we may come up the closer, and fall directly to the point in question. You tell me, in answer to the former part, that the divine "attributes of the Son are not *individually* the "same with those of the Father^b." By which you mean, that they are not *divine*: and so here you have discovered, that the Doctor does not understand *divine*, as others do in this controversy; and as a candid and ingenuous reader might be apt to understand him. You add, that "they (the attributes of the Son) are *notwithstanding*, more than faint resemblances; the Son being "the brightness of his Father's glory, and the express "image of his Person." I allow that this text does set forth a great deal more than a "faint resemblance:" but you have not shown that your hypothesis supposes so much; and therefore the quoting of this text is only arguing against yourself. The inference we draw from this text, consonant to all antiquity, is, that the resemblance between Father and Son is complete and perfect; and that therefore they do not differ as *finite* and *infinite*, since that supposition would set them at an *infinite* distance from any such perfect and complete resemblance. You observe farther, that there can be but one "intelligent being" (the same with you, as *person*) "absolutely "infinite in all respects," (p. 55.) which, though an assertion of great importance, you are pleased barely to lay down, without the least tittle of proof, or so much as pretence to it. Nay, you admit in your ^cNotes, that there may be *two infinite* beings, in the sense of *immense*; that is, two beings *omnipresent*, or *infinitely extended*. And why not as well two Persons infinitely perfect in all other

^b Page 64.

^c *One infinite*, in the sense of *immense*, does not (by taking up all space) exclude (necessarily) another immense, any more than it excludes any *finite*. For if a *finite* being doth not exclude (God) from a *finite* place, it is plain that an *infinite*, that is, an *immense* being, cannot exclude him from *infinite*, that is, from *immense* place. So that perhaps it is no such absolute *impossibility*, as some have thought it, to suppose *two distinct* immense beings. Note, p. 56.

respects, as well as *presence*? For, to use your own way of arguing in that very place, if *finite* power, wisdom, goodness, &c. do not exclude *infinite*; it is plain that *infinite* power, wisdom, goodness, &c. of one, do not exclude the *infinite* power, goodness; &c. of another. Besides, that two, infinite in all respects, are as easily conceived as two, infinite in any: and therefore here you seem, by your too liberal concessions, to have unsaid what you had said before; and to have unravelled your own objection. You are aware, that an adversary may take advantage of what you say; and endeavour, lamely, to prevent it, by telling us, (p. 56.) that though it be possible to suppose two *distinct* immense beings, yet it is impossible there should be two immense beings of the *same individual nature*; for so, they must *coincide, and be but one Person*. But what if those who assert *the same individual nature*, in more persons than one, understand the words in a larger sense than you here take them in? It is very certain they do not understand the phrase of *the same individual nature*, as you, who make it equivalent to *the same Person*, understand it: for they assert more persons than one to have *the same individual nature*. In the mean while, what a wonderful discovery is this, which you have laid such a stress on; that *two* persons cannot be *one* person, without *coinciding* and making *one* person. This is all that you have really said; and very true it is; only I am at a loss to find out the pertinency of it. To conclude this head: as to *infinite*, in the sense of *extension*, (into length, breadth, and height,) you will give me leave to suspend my judgment. I do not find either that it is asserted in Scripture, or generally maintained by the Fathers; but that it is liable to many difficulties, in point of reason, more than I am, at present, able to answer. See what a ^d late thoughtful writer has said, and what ^e Cudworth had before collected on that sub-

^d Impartial Inquiry into the Existence and Nature of God, by S. C. part ii. c. 1, 2, 3.

^e Intellectual System, p. 828—834.

ject. In my humble opinion, such intricate questions are too high for us, and are what our faculties were not made for. However that be, you and I need not differ. For if you can admit the possibility of *two infinite extended beings*, you can have nothing considerable to object against the *one infinity* of three infinite Persons, which I assert, and without determining the *modus* of it.

You proceed to observe, that “the Son’s office and character doth not require infinite powers:” to which I shall only say, that it may, for any thing you know; so that this is only guessing in the dark. Last of all, you come to interpret Dr. Clarke; supposing him to mean by *divine powers*^f, all divine powers *relating to the Son’s character*. If he meant so, he might easily have said so: and yet if he had, he had still left us in uncertainties as much as ever; to muse upon a distinction which he has no ground for; and which, when admitted, will make no man wiser. You “hope the Querist is so good a philosopher as to perceive, (though he doth not consider it,) that absolute infinite perfections include and infer *supremacy* and *independency*. And therefore, when Dr. Clarke excepted supremacy and independency, he plainly, in reason and consequence, excepted absolute infinite powers.”

Now I am persuaded, that Dr. Clarke would have thought it hard measure to have been charged by his adversaries with this so *plain consequence*, which you here so freely lay upon him. The Querist was aware that the Doctor’s words might bear an orthodox sense; namely, that to the Son are communicated all things belonging to the Father, excepting only what is *personal*; that is, excepting that he is not the *first in order*; not *supreme*, in that sense, nor *unoriginate*. The Doctor well knew that his words might bear this construction; and perhaps would not have took it well of any, but a friend, that should have tied down a *loose* and *general* expression to a *strict particular* meaning; and then have loaded it with conse-

^f Script. Doctr. p. 298.

quences too shocking to be admitted in plain and express terms. But to proceed. You seem to be much offended at the Querist for asking, "whether all divine powers can be communicated to a creature, infinite perfection to a finite being?" This, you say, is "an evident contradiction, which ought not to have been put by one scholar upon another." But, after this rebuke, you will please to hearken to the reason of the case. The difficulty, you know, with the Querist was, how to come at the Doctor's real sense, couched under general and ambiguous expressions; that so the controversy might be brought to a point; and it might be seen plainly what was the true state of the question: which, as appears now, is only this; whether God the Son be a *creature* or no. The Doctor talked of the Son's having *divine* powers, and *all* divine powers. It was very proper to ask you, whether he hereby meant *infinite* powers or no; and withal to show, if you should not answer directly, that he could not mean it, consistently with the Arian hypothesis; which he seemed, in other parts of his performance, to espouse. You will not yet say directly, that the Son's perfections are *finite*, nor deny them to be *infinite*: so hard a thing it is to draw you out of your ambiguous terms, or to make you speak plainly what you mean. All you are pleased to say is, that the powers or perfections of the Son are not *absolutely* infinite: as if *infinity* were of two sorts, *absolute* and *limited*; or might be rightly divided into *infinity*, and *not infinity*. Instead of this, I could wish that words may be used in their true and proper meaning. If you do not think the perfections of the Son are *infinite*, and yet are unwilling to limit them; let them be called *indefinite*, which is the proper word to express your meaning; and then every reader may be able to understand us, and may see where we differ. We are both agreed that the Doctor, by *divine* powers, did not mean *infinite* powers. Now let us proceed to the next Query.

QUERY XI.

Whether if the Doctor means by divine powers, powers given by God (in the same sense as angelical powers are divine powers) only in a higher degree than are given to other beings; it be not equivocating, and saying nothing: nothing that can come up to the sense of those texts before cited, or to these following?*

Applied to the one God.

Thou, even thou, art Lord alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their hosts, the earth, and all things that are therein, &c. Neh. ix. 6.

In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. Gen. i. 1.

To God the Son.

All things were made by him, John i. 3. By him were all things created: he is before all things, and by him all things consist, Coloss. i. 16, 17.

Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the works of thine hands, Heb. i. 10.

IF the Doctor means, by *divine* powers, no more than is intimated in this Query, I must blame him first for equivocating and playing with an ambiguous word; and next for restraining and limiting the powers of the Son of God; not only *without*, but *against* Scripture; and consequently for giving us, not the "Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity," but his *own*. That there is no ground, from the texts themselves, for any such limitation as is now supposed, is tacitly implied in the Doctor's own confession, that the Son is excluded from nothing but absolute supremacy and independency: "So naturally does truth sometimes prevail, by its own native clearness and evidence, against the strongest and most settled prejudices." Indeed the thing is very clear from the texts themselves cited above; especially when strengthened with those now produced under this Query. That the Son was and is endowed with *creative powers*, is plain from these texts, and others which might be added;

* Query V. p. 63.

and is confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of Catholic antiquity. And that the title of *Creator* is the distinguishing character of the one supreme God, is so clear from ^b Scripture, that he who runs may read it. Now let us consider what you have to except, in order to elude the force of this argument.

“The Son of God,” you say, “is manifestly the Father’s agent in the creation of the universe;” referring to Ephes. iii. 9. and to Heb. i. 2. from whence you infer, that he is “subordinate in nature and powers to him.” This you have, (p. 58.) and in your Notes (p. 55.) you insist much upon the distinction between *δι’ αὐτοῦ* and *ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ*, explaining the former of an *instrumental*, and the latter of an *efficient* cause; of which more in due time and place. As to the Son’s being *agent with*, or *assistant to* the Father, in the work of creation, we readily admit it; and even contend for it. The Father is *primarily*, and the Son *secondarily*, or *immediately*, Author of the world; which is so far from proving that he is *inferior*, in nature or powers, to the Father, that it is rather a convincing argument that he is *equal* in both. A *subordination of order*, but none of *nature*, is thereby intimated. ^c Eusebius, whom you quote (p. 55.) out of Dr. Clarke, and ^d mistranslate to serve your purpose, does not deny the proper *efficiency* of the Son in the work of creation. All he asserts is, that the creation is *primarily* and *eminently* attributed to the Father, because of his *αὐθεντία*, his *prerogative*, *authority*, *supremacy*, as Father, or first Person; not denying the Son’s *proper efficiency*, but only (if I may so call it) ^e *original efficiency*; that is, making him the

^b Nehem. ix. 6. Isa. xl. 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, 21, &c. Isa. xlii. 5, 8. Isa. xliii. 1, 10. Jer. x. 10, 11, 12. See Serm. iii. p. 94, &c.

^c See Euseb. contr. Marcel. l. i. c. 20. p. 84.

^d The learned Doctor, and, after him, you construe, *ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ*, and *δι’ αὐτοῦ*, by *efficient* and *ministering* cause. As if a *ministering* cause might not be *efficient*, or must necessarily be opposed to it.

^e This is excellently illustrated by the elder Cyril. Πατὴρὶς βουλόμενος τὰ πάντα κατασκευάσαι, τῷ τῷ πατρὶς νόματι ἰσὺς τὰ πάντα ἰδημέγενησι· Ἰσα εὖ μὲν νόμα τῆρῃ τῷ πατρὶ τὴν αὐθεντικὴν ἔξουσίαν, καὶ ἰσὺς δὲ πάλιν ἰχρῇ ἔξουσίαν τῶν

second and not the *first* Person; not *Father*, but *Son*. Indeed, the ^fgeneral opinion of the ancients centered in this; that the Father, as supreme, issued out orders for the creation of the universe, and the Son executed them. And this was asserted, not only by the Ante-Nicene writers, but ^gPost-Nicene too; and such as strenuously defended the Catholic faith against the Arians. I have before observed, that the ancients had a very good meaning and intent in assigning (as it were) to the three Persons their several parts or provinces in the work of creation: and let no man be offended, if, in this way of considering it, the Son be sometimes said *ὑπηγεῖν*, or *ὑπουργεῖν*, or the like^h. This need not be thought any greater disparagement to the dignity of the Son, than it is, on the other hand, a disparagement to the dignity of the Father to be represented as having the counsel and assistance of two other Persons; or as leaving every thing to be wisely ordered, regulated, and perfected by the Son and Holy Spirit. These things are not to be strictly and rigorously interpreted according to the letter; but *οικονομικῶς*, and *θεοπροκῶς*. The design of all was; 1. To keep up a more lively sense of a real distinction of Persons. 2. To teach us the indivisible unity and coessentiality of all Three, as of one ⁱCreator. 3. To signify wherein that unity consists, or into what it ultimately resolves, viz. into unity of *principle*, one *Ἀρχή*, Head, Root, Fountain of all. As to the distinction between *δι' αὐτῶ* and *ὑπ' αὐτῶ*, *per quem* and *ex quo*, or the like, it can be of very little

ὅτι οὐκ ἐπισημασθέντων καὶ μόντι πατρὸς ἀπαλλοτριωθῆ τῆς διοουσίας τῶν ὄντων δημιουργημάτων, μόντι ἰ οὐκ τῶν ὑπ' ἄλλου δημιουργηθῆντων βασιλείῃ, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶ. Catech. xi. p. 160. ed. Bened.

^f See Irenæus, p. 85. Tertullian. *contr. Prax.* c. 12. Hippolyt. *contr. Noet.* c. 14.

^g See Petavius de Trin. l. ii. c. 7. Bull. D. F. p. 80, 111.

^h Vid. Cotelieri Not. ad Herm. Mandat. v. p. 91, et ad Apost. Const. l. v. c. 20. p. 326.

ⁱ So Origen, who makes the Father *δημιουργός*, and the Son *δημιουργός*, *contr. Cels.* p. 317. yet, in the very same treatise, denies that the world could have more *Creators* than one. *Μὴ δυναμίτου ὑπὸ πολλῶν δημιουργῶν γεγονέναι*, p. 18.

service to your cause. The preposition *διὰ*, with a genitive after it, is frequently used, as well in Scripture, as in ecclesiastical writers, to express the *efficient* cause, as much as *ὑπὸ*, or *ἐκ*, or *πρὸς*, or any other. So that the argument drawn from the use of the prepositions is very poor and trifling, as was long since observed by ^kBasil the Great, who very handsomely exposes its author and inventor, Aëtius, for it. Please but to account clearly for one text, out of many, (Rom. xi. 36.) “Of him, and “through *him*, (*δι’ αὐτῆς*,) and to him, are all things: to “whom be glory for ever.” If you understand this of the Father; then, by your argument from the phrase *δι’ αὐτῆς*, you make him also no more than an *instrumental* cause: if you understand it of more persons, here is an illustrious proof of a Trinity in Unity. If it be pretended, which is the ^lDoctor’s last resort, that although the use of those prepositions singly be not sufficient, yet when they are used “in express contradistinction to each other,” they are of more significancy; I answer, first, that I desire to know of what significancy they are in Rom. xi. 36. where they seem to be used in *express contradistinction* to each other; and secondly, admitting that they are of significancy, they may signify only a *real* distinction of Persons, as ^mSt. Basil well observes; or some *priority of order* proper to the *first Person*: this is all the use which any Catholic writer ever pretended to make of the distinction. However, to countenance the distinction between the Father as the *efficient*, and the Son as the *instrumental* cause, you are pleased to say farther, (p. 56.) “it is remarkable, that (according to the sense of the “foregoing distinction) though Christ is frequently styled “by the ancients *Τεχνίτης* and *Δημιουργός*, yet *Ποιητής τῶν ὄλων* is (to the best of my remembrance) always confined by them to the Father only.”

Had your remark been true and just, yet it would not

^k De Spir. Sanct. p. 145, &c.

^l See Scriptr. Doctr. p. 90.

^m De Spir. Sanct. p. 148.

be easy to shew that τεχνίτης, or however δημιουργός, may not signify as much as ⁿ ποιητής. But your *memory* has much deceived you in this matter; and you should be cautious how you make your readers rely upon it. Those words (especially the two last of them) seem to have been used by the ancients promiscuously; and to have been applied indifferently to Father or Son, as they had occasion to mention either. If they are oftener applied to the Father, it is only because he is the *first Person*; and is therefore *primarily* and *eminently* τεχνίτης, δημιουργός, or ποιητής; not that the Son is not *strictly, properly, and completely* Creator also, according to the fullest sense and import of any, or of all those words. They were intended to signify that the Son is the *immediate* and *efficient* cause of all things; had ^o creative powers; and was, with the Father, *Creator* of men, of angels, of the whole universe. A late Pwriter is pleased to express himself, upon this head, in such a manner as may deceive ignorant and unwary readers. "I know not" (says he) "that either Arians, or any primitive Christian writers, ever adventured to give the character of *great Architect of the universe* to Jesus Christ; choosing rather, with the sacred writings, to say, in softer language, that *through him* God created all, and reserving the absolute title of *Creator of the universe* to another."

If he *knows not* these things, he might forbear to speak of them. What he says, even of the sacred writings, is *misrepresentation*: for they do not constantly follow that

ⁿ See Origen. contr. Cels. p. 317. where the Son is said ποιῆσαι τὸν κόσμον, and the Father to be ἀρχῆτος, that is, *primarily*, or *eminently*, δημιουργός. If ποιῆσαι signified more than δημιουργός, Origen spoke very inaccurately.

Cyril of Alexandria supposes God the Father to have been in reality τεχνίτης from everlasting; δημιουργός in power and intention only. *Thesaur. ass.* iv. p. 34. Yet Athanasius makes ποιῆσαι to signify more than τεχνίτης. *Orat. contr. Arian.* ii. p. 489. Authors do not always observe a critical exactness in the use of words.

^o The Arians themselves would say, *sua virtute fecit*, meaning it of the Son. See the citation above, p. 66.

^p Mr. Emlyn, Exam. of Dr. Bennet, p. 12. first edit.

soft language, which he so much approves of. They do it not in John i. 3, 10. Coloss. i. 16. Hebr. i. 10. Neither can that construction be ascertained, in any one of these texts, from any *necessary* force of the preposition *διά*. As to antiquity, which this gentleman pretends to, he may *know*, hereafter, that the character of “⁹great Architect “ of the universe,” is expressly given to *Jesus Christ*, by Eusebius; who was never suspected of carrying orthodoxy too high. A man must be a very stranger to the ancients, who can make any question whether they attributed the work of creation to the Son, as much as to the Father. They ascribed it equally to both; only with this difference, as before observed, that, for the greater majesty and dignity of the Father, as the *first Person*, they supposed him to ^rissue out orders, or to give his *fiat*, for the creation, and the Son to execute. From hence we may easily understand in what sense the title of *Creator* was ^s*primarily* or *eminently* attributed to the Father; and yet, as to any real *power* or *efficiency*, the Son is as truly and properly *Creator*; and is frequently so styled, by the primitive writers, in the ^tfullest and strongest

⁹ Ὁ μίγας τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν λόγος. *Euseb. E. H. l. x. c. 4. pag. 316.*

^r Τοῦ μὲν πατρὸς ὑποκῆτος καὶ κλιούμενος, τῷ δὲ υἱῷ πρῶτος καὶ δημιουργῶντος, τοῦ δὲ πνύματος τρίτος καὶ ἀξίος. *Iren. p. 285. ed. Bened.*

Πατὴρ ἄδιλος, υἱὸς ἰσότητος, πνύμα ἰσότητος. *Hippol. contr. Noct. p. 16.*

^s Πρῶτος δημιουργῶν. *Orig. contr. Cels. p. 317.*

^t Πρὸς αὐτῷ γὰρ καὶ δι' αὐτῷ πάντα γίνετο, ἰσὺς ὅτις τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῷ υἱῷ. *Athenag. p. 38. ed. Oxon. Observe πρὸς αὐτῷ, as well as δι' αὐτῷ.*

Αὐτὸς ἰαυτῷ τὴν ἄλλαν δημιουργήσας. Ἀγγίλων δημιουργῶν. *Tatian. p. 22, 26. ed. Ox.*

Τῷτοι μοιογιῆ, εὔται πάντων ποιητήν. *Iren. p. 44. ed. Bened. Τῷτοι κόσμου ποιητήν——αἰς τὰ ἴδια ἰληλοθότα. Ibid. Τὸν τῶν πάντων ποιητήν, καὶ δημιουργῶν, καὶ ποιητήν, λόγος τῷ Θεῷ, p. 79. Τῶν ἀπάντων τεχίστης λόγος, p. 190. Fabricator omnium, p. 219. Fabricator universorum, p. 307. Mundi factor, p. 315.*

^Ωι τὰ πάντα διδημῶνται. *Clem. Alexandr. p. 7. edit. Oxon. Συμπάντων Θεῶν ἵνα μόνον——δημιουργῶν υἱὸν ἰν πατρὶ, p. 142. Πάντα ὁ λόγος ποιῶ——τὰ ἴλα δημιουργῶν——τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ τοῦ ἀποθρόνου δημιουργῶν, p. 310. Ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχὴ, p. 669. Ὁ λόγος δημιουργίας αἴτιος, p. 654. Πάντων δημιουργῶν, p. 768. Τὶν*

terms. You may see some testimonies, in the margin, from Athenagoras, Tatian, Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen. It would be easy to add more, from Hippolytus, Gregory of Neocæsarea, Novatian, and indeed from the generality of the Church writers down from Barnabas to the Council of Nice. I must observe to you, that even your admired ^u Eusebius, (whom you before quoted in your favour, mistaking him very widely,) he applies the title of *πρωιητῆς τῶν ὄλων*, (the highest which you think the Father himself can have,) to the Son, no less than thrice; as Irenæus had done, thrice also, before, in words equivalent; and Origen, probably, once; as also ^x Hippolytus: not to mention that all the Fathers, by interpreting Gen. i. 26. (*ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον*, &c.) of Father and Son jointly, have implicitly and consequentially, though not expressly, said the same thing. To proceed.

You have an argument to prove that *creating* does not imply *infinite* power. "For," you say, "was the extent " of those powers then exercised, infinite, it is evident, " the world must be infinite also," (p. 58.) This indeed is doing the business at once: for, if this reasoning be just, the Father himself, as well as the Son, is effectually excluded from ever giving any sensible proof, or from exerting any act, of *infinite* power. St. Paul's argument from the creation, for the *eternal power and Godhead* of the Creator, is rendered inconclusive: for it will be easy

Τὸν λόγον πτωμαίνου πάντα, ἕκα ἰ κατῆρ αἰσῶ ἰντεῖλατε. Orig. contr. Cels. p. 63. Comp. Athanas. de Decret. S. N. p. 216.

Δημιουργὸν τῶν πάντων, κτιστὸν, ποιητὴν, τῶν πάντων. Origen. apud Huet. Origenian. p. 38.

N. B. This last citation, from a *catena*, is of less authority; but the citations from his other *certainly* genuine works are, in sense, equivalent.

^u Euseb. in Psalm. p. 125. de Laud. Const. c. 14. in Pa. p. 630. See also in Psalm. 631. in the first of the three places the words are remarkably full and strong. Ὁ δημιουργὸς λόγος, ἰ ποιητὴς τῶν ὄλων. The other two are equivalent in sense. Ἄπάντων ποιητὴς, and ἰ ποιητὴς αἰσῶν: where ὄλων is understood.

^x Contr. Beron. et Hel. p. 226. Comp. contr. Noet. p. 16.

The genuineness of the first is somewhat doubtful; but the last is not questioned.

to reply, in contradiction to the Apostle's reasoning, that the things which are made are *finite*, and therefore cannot prove the maker of them to be *infinite*: so that atheists and unbelievers were not so entirely *without excuse*, as the good Apostle imagined. If you think there is some difference between *infinite power*, and *eternal power and Godhead*; and therefore that the Apostle's argument is not pertinent to the point in hand; I shall be content, if *creating* be allowed a sufficient proof of the Son's *eternal power and Godhead*; since it brings me directly to the point I aim at: besides, that *infinite power* will come in of course afterwards, by necessary inference and implication. I had almost forgot to take notice of your way of wording your argument, which looks not very fair. You say, "was the *extent* of those powers infinite;" as if any one said it was, in the sense wherein you understand the word *extent*. For reasons best known to yourself, you do not distinguish between extent of power *ad intra*, in respect of *degree*; and extent of power *ad extra*, in respect of the *exercise* of it. It may require an *infinite degree* of power to *create* a grain of sand; though the *extent* of that outward act reaches no farther than the thing created. Now, you know, our dispute is only about *infinite extent* of power in the first sense. Let us therefore put the argument into plain words, and see how it will bear.

"Was the power exercised in the creation *infinite in degree*, or exceeding any *finite power*, then it is evident that the world must be *infinite*." Make this out, with any tolerable sense, or connection, and you will do something. Next let us put the argument in the other light.

"If the power exercised in the creation extended to an *infinite compass*, or to an *infinite number* of things, then it is evident that the world must be *infinite*." Right: if the creation had been *infinite in extent*, the creation must have been *infinite in extent*. But who is it that you are disputing against? Or whom do you oblige by these discoveries? The question is, whether the *creating*, that is,

producing out of nothing, any one single thing, however small in extent, be not an act proper to God only; exceeding any *finite* power; incommunicable to any *creature*. It is sufficient for *you*, to put *us* upon the proof of the *affirmative*: no considering man would ever attempt to prove the *negative*. As to the affirmative, there are many very probable presumptive proofs, such as ought to have great weight with us: particularly, *creation* everywhere in Scripture looked on as a *divine* act; not so much as a grain of sand, or a particle of matter, said to be created by an angel, or archangel, or any creature whatever; reasonable to suppose that nothing can come into being by any power less than his, who is the Author and Fountain of all being. To this agrees the general sense of the more sober and thinking part of mankind. This was the doctrine of the ν Ante-Nicene Catholic writers, so far as appears, as well as of those that came after. Wherefore the Arians, in ascribing creation to a *creature*, α innovated in the faith of Christ, copied after the Gnostics, β and exposed their cause. Since they resolved to make a *creature* only, of the Son of God, they should not have allowed him any power of *creating*; but should have interpreted all those texts which speak in favour of it, as the Socinians have done since, of a *metaphorical* creation. That indeed had been novel, and strained enough; but accompanied with less absurdity than the other. However, this use we may make of what the Arians so generally granted; first, to observe, that Scripture and tradition must have appeared to run very strong, at that time, for it: and it may farther shew, “how easy

ν Hoc Deus ab homine differt, quoniam Deus quidem facit, homo autem fit: et quidem qui facit, semper idem est. *Iren.* p. 240. ed. Bened.

Nihil enim in totum Diabolus invenitur fecisse, videlicet cum et *ipse creatura* sit Dei, quemadmodum et reliqui angeli. *Iren.* p. 228.

| See also Bull. D. F. Epilog. p. 291, 292.

α Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄγγελος δημιουργεῖν δύνασται, πνεύματα ὄντες καὶ αὐτοὶ, καὶ οὐαλινοὶ, καὶ Μαρτίων, καὶ Βασιλείδης ταυῦτα φρονέει, καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνῳ ζήλωται τυγχάνητε. *Athan. Orat.* ii. p. 489.

β See Serm. iii. p. 99, &c.

“and natural that notion must be allowed to be, which
 “so many could not forbear expressing clearly and dis-
 “tinctly; even frequently when, at the same time, they
 “were about to affirm, and endeavouring to prove, some-
 “thing not very consistent with it.” But we shall have
 more of this matter in the following Queries.

QUERY XII.

*Whether the Creator of all things was not himself un-
 created; and therefore could not be ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, made out
 of nothing?*

THIS and the four following Queries, “are,” you say,
 “all, at most, but arguments, *ad ignorantiam*, or *verecun-*
 “*diam*, (p. 59.) to put us upon determining things, on
 “either side, not clearly revealed.” To say the truth,
 you seem here to be very much perplexed; and therefore
 have reason to complain: and I am not to expect any
 very clear and distinct answers. You admit (p. 60.) that
 “the Creator of all things must be himself uncreated.”
 Well then; the Son is *Creator* of all things; therefore he
 is *uncreated*. The premises are both your own; the con-
 clusion mine: and, one might think, it should be yours
 too. But you are, it seems, very loth to come into it;
 and discover a strong inclination to elude and evade it,
 if it were any way possible for you to do it. Let us see
 what you can say; “If the *Scripture-sense* be the true
 “and only proper sense of the word *creature*, (to wit, the
 “visible and invisible worlds brought into being by the
 “power of the *Λόγος*, or Son of God, in subordination to
 “the will and power of the Father,) then it is manifest
 “that the *Λόγος*, who thus created them, must (whatever
 “is the nature of his own production or generation) be,
 “in this way of speaking, uncreated.” This is some-
 thing mysterious. It is however very plain that you are
 straining hard for some *odd, peculiar sense* of the word
creature, or *created*; which is to be called the *Scripture-*
sense; and if this does not relieve you, all is lost.

You give us the "Scripture Doctrine" of the *creation*; expressing both the *creation* itself, and the *Person* by whom it was *wrought*: and that whole doctrine, though set forth in *many* words, you call the "Scripture-sense" of that *one* word, *creature*, or *created*. As if I should say, the Scripture-account of the ark is, that it was made by Noah; therefore the "Scripture-sense" of the word *ark*, implies the making of it by Noah. Or, the Scripture-account of the temple is, that it was built by Solomon; therefore the Scripture-sense of the word *temple*, supposes it to be something made by Solomon: and if there were ever so many temples besides that one, yet they could not properly be called *temples*, unless built by Solomon. This is just as good as your pretence, that *creating* does not signify simply *creating*; but creating by the *Λόγος*. Give me leave to ask, whether the Jews, who kept their Sabbath in memory of the *creation*, and undoubtedly took their notion of it from *Scripture*, understood the word constantly in your sense, as created by the *Λόγος*? If they did, that is a point I may make some use of another time: if they did not, then the "Scripture-sense" of the word *creature*, before the coming of the Messiah, was something different from what you have given us. I shall only add, that your pretended sense of the word *creature*, or *created*, does not seem to have prevailed so early as St. John's time. He tells us, all things were made *by him*, that is, by the *Λόγος*; and "without *him* was not any thing made that was made." Might he not better have said, in short, all things were *created*, neither was there any thing but what was *created*? It was perfectly needless, if your pretence be true, to insert, *by him*; because, in the "Scripture-sense" of the word, it was implied, and the addition of it only renders it tautology.

You go on to say, "it is, I think, for this reason, that the Scriptures never say that he is created." Ingenuously confessed; and therefore I hope you will not presume, either to *say*, or to *believe*, that *he is created*. As

to the *reason* you assign for it, it is mere fancy and fiction: I hope, out of pure reverence to the sacred Writ, you will bethink yourself of some better. You add, on the other hand, that the Scriptures “never say that he is “uncreated;” forgetting what you had acknowledged, in the same page, viz. “that the Creator of all things “must be himself uncreated, is an unavoidable consequence in reason:” and that the *Λόγος* had *created* all things you admit, immediately after, as delivered in Scripture. Wherefore, if Scripture, by *unavoidable consequence*, does say, that he is *uncreated*; I hope Scripture does *say* it. The Scriptures, every where, carefully keep up the distinction between *Creator* and *creature*; and never confound both in one. They tell us not of any creature of the *Father's*, which is not a creature of the *Son's* also. They say, that “all things were made by him;” and to be more expressive and emphatical, “without him was “not any thing made that was made.” How can this be, if he himself was made? “Si ipse factus est, non per “illum sunt *omnia* facta, sed *cætera*,” saith St. Austin.

As to the sense of the Ante-Nicene writers, in this particular, it is well known that they do *implicitly* and *consequently*, almost every where, declare the Son to be *uncreated*. You may see some ^atestimonies referred to in the margin, where they do it also *directly*, and in *express* words. I scruple not to put Origen amongst them: his orthodoxy has been effectually defended by the incomparable Bishop Bull, in the opinion of the ablest and most impartial judges. The learned Doctor, notwithstanding, has been pleased to revive the dispute about Origen's sentiments: with what success, shall be here examined, as briefly as may be. The words of Origen,

^a Athenagoras, *Legat.* p. 39. ed. Ox. Ignat. ad Ephes. c. vii. p. 14. ed. Ox. Irenæus, l. ii. c. 25. p. 153. ed. Bened. Orig. contr. Cels. l. vi. p. 287. Dionys. Rom. apud Athanas. de Decret. Syn. N. p. 232. Dionysius Alexandr. apud Eund. 230, 253, 257. Theognostus — apud Eund. 230. Methodius apud Phot. p. 960. Hippolytus (probably) de Theol. et Incarn. p. 228.

which ^b he lays hold on, are these. ^c Πρεσβύτατον πάντων τῶν δημιουργημάτων, applied to the Son. Bishop Bull, like a skilful and a candid man, who did not care to set *one ambiguous* sentence against *many plain* ones, nor to make an author manifestly inconsistent, without as manifest a necessity, rendered the words, very rightly, “ancienter than all creatures.” The Doctor himself is forced to ^d admit that the words might bear this construction: and yet ^e afterwards says, that “Origen expressly reckoned the “Son among the δημιουργήματα.” But how *expressly*? This can never be proved merely from the force of πρεσβύτατον, as a *superlative*: unless ^f Eusebius *expressly* reckoned the Son among times and ages; or ^g Justin Martyr *expressly* reckoned the Pentateuch among *profane* histories; or the same ^h Justin *expressly* reckoned Moses and the Prophets among the *wise men* of Greece: which is ridiculous. The superlative, we see, hath been used sometimes comparatively; and why not by Origen? He may only *appear* to say what he *really* does not. There is certainly a wide difference between *verbally* seeming to assert, and *expressly* asserting; as much as between being barely capable of such a sense, and being capable of no other sense. How then will the learned Doctor be able to make good his pretensions? He ⁱ alleges the “whole tenor of Origen’s opinion;” in which he greatly mistakes: for the *whole tenor* of Origen, especially in that

^b Script. Doctr. p. 184, 278, 282, alias 164, 245, 249.

^c Orig. contr. Cels. l. v. p. 257.

^d Script. Doctr. p. 184, alias 164.

^e Script. Doctr. p. 282, alias 249.

^f Παντός χρόνου και πάντων αιώων πρεσβύτατος. *De Laud. Constant. c. i.* p. 501. Vales. Ἡ και αὐτῶν αἰώων ἐστὶ τεχνίτη και χρόνου παντός τοῦ πρεσβύτατος. *Cyrl. Alex. Dial. ii. de Trin. p. 446.* Vid. contr. Jul. l. i. p. 18. Et Theod. ad Græc. tom. iv. p. 462, 493.

^g Ἀρχαιοτάτη πασῶν τῶν ἔξωθεν Ἰσραῖων τῶν Μαυρίας Ἰσραῖαν. *Paræn. c. xii.* p. 70. ed. Oxon.

^h Πρεσβύτατος Μωϋσῆς και οἱ λοιποὶ προφῆται γινόμενοι πάντων τῶν παρ’ ἡμῶν σοφῶν. *Paræn. c. xxxv. p. 118.* Μωϋσῆς πάντων μὲν Ἑλλήνων πρεσβύτατος. *Euseb. Præp. Evang. l. xiv. c. 3.*

ⁱ Script. Doctr. p. 184, alias 164.

treatise from whence the passage is taken, is altogether contrary; as the learned well know, and Bishop Bull hath clearly shown. But the Doctor has a farther plea from a passage in ^kAthanasius, which he seems to be much pleased with; referring to it, once, and again, in his "Scripture Doctrine." The principal words are these: Τὸν καὶ τῆς κτίσεως κύριον, καὶ πάσης ὑποστάσεως δημιουργόν. The Doctor thinks he has here discovered a ^l*contradistinction* between τῆς κτίσεως (he neglects κύριον) and πάσης ὑποστάσεως δημιουργόν. We are to suppose πάσης ὑποστάσεως of larger extent and signification than πάσης κτίσεως would have been: and, because δημιουργόν goes along with it, we are to suppose that δημιούργημα was understood, by Athanasius, in a larger sense than κτίσις: lastly, we are to suppose that Athanasius is, in this instance, the best interpreter of Origen; though it does not appear from Origen's own writings, that he knew any thing of this peculiar sense of δημιούργημα, but the contrary. The bare recital of so many *suppositions*, advanced without proof, or any shadow of it, might suffice for an answer. But we may observe,

1. That if Athanasius, being then a young man and an orator, intended only to vary his phrase, either to be more emphatical, or to give the better turn and cadence to a period, (and this might be all, for any thing that appears to the contrary,) then the Doctor's *criticism* falls to the ground.

2. If any *contradistinction* was intended, it should seem, that the same must hold with respect to κύριον and δημιουργόν: the consequence whereof is, that God the Father is not κύριος so far and wide as he is δημιουργός. It will be some satisfaction to us, that if the Son be δημιούργημα, he has no *Lord over him*.

3. The constant use of δημιούργημα and δημιουργός, in

^k Τῶτον μόνον εἶναι Θεὸν ἀληθῆ, τὸν καὶ τῆς κτίσεως κύριον, καὶ πάσης ὑποστάσεως δημιουργόν. τίς δὲ ἔν ἑστὶν ἄλλ' ἢ ὁ παλαιός καὶ ἀειπαλαιὸς πάσης γιγντοῦ οὐσίας, ὁ τῷ Χριστῷ πατήρ. *Orat. contr. Genl.* p. 39. ed. Bened.

^l *Scriptr. Doctr.* p. 184, alias 164.

other authors, and even in ^m Athanasius himself, and in this very ⁿ treatise, is another strong presumption against the Doctor's criticism.

4. The consequences following from the supposition of such a sense, as the Doctor would impose upon Athanasius, may be demonstrably confuted from the same treatise; nay, from the very same page where that remarkable passage is ^o.

For, you must know, that, if the Doctor understands him right, Athanasius included the Son under πάσης ὑποστάσεως, whereof the Father is δημιουργός: and so the Son must be δημιούργημα according to Athanasius. Not only so, but he must also come under πάσης γενητῆς οὐσίας; which, for the purpose, the learned Doctor took care to render "all derivative being," answering to his rendering of δημιούργημα ^p afterwards. This might look fair and plausible, had we only that single sentence of Athanasius to form a judgment by: but it stands in a pretty large treatise; wherein we find that Athanasius is so far from supposing the Son to be δημιούργημα, that he makes him ^q ποιητῆς of all the invisible powers; nay, and ^r δημιουργός τοῦ παντός, which, I think, comes to as much as δημιουργός πάσης ὑποστάσεως; and that therefore the learned Doctor may almost as reasonably bring the Father in, among the δημιουργήματα of the Son, as vice versa. To conclude; Athanasius, within a few lines of that passage which the Doctor makes use of, exempts the Son, clearly and ex-

^m See Athanas. de Decret. Syn. Nic. pag. 235. where he expressly pleads that the Father cannot be said to be δημιουργός, in respect of the Son.

ⁿ Τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἰδιωμαίνουσι, τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα λατρίωσι πρῶτον πάσχοντες ἀνάσσει καὶ δουλεύουσιν. Ὁμοίον γὰρ εἴ τις τὰ ἔργα πρὸ τοῦ τιχθέντος θεοῦ μύσει, καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ πύλῃ δημιουργήματα καταπλαγίς τὸν τότε δημιουργὸν καταπαύειν, p. 46. The words δημιουργήματα and δημιουργὸν answer, in the similitude and analogy, to κτίσει and κτίσαντα, going before. Wherefore, I conceive, that, according to Athanasius, the two former, when understood with relation to God, are equivalent to the two latter.

^o Script. Doctr. p. 4, alias p. 5.

^p Script. Doctr. p. 278, alias 245.

^q Page 43.

^r Page 29.

pressly, from the rank of such *derivative beings*, as the Doctor would place him with: ἄλλος μὲν ἐστὶ τῶν γονητῶν, καὶ πάσης τῆς κτίσεως. So much for Athanasius, and the Doctor's criticisms upon him. Now, if you please, let Origen be ours again, till you can better make out your title to him. I do not know that the Doctor has said any thing considerable to weaken the evidence of any other of the authors, referred to in the margin. So we may leave them as they are, and proceed to another Query.

QUERY XIII.

Whether there can be any middle between being made out of nothing, and out of something; that is, between being out of nothing, and out of the Father's substance; between being essentially God, and being a creature; whether, consequently, the Son must not be either essentially God, or else a creature?

HERE, again, I have run two Queries into one, (being nearly allied to each other,) for the conveniency of method. Questions of this kind you like not: "It is," you say, pressing you to "determine things not clearly revealed:" as if you had not *determined* already upon the points in question, or were at all afraid of doing it. Permit me to say, you have determined: but because the conclusion is too shocking to appear in broad terms, and too weak to bear; therefore you keep it under cover, and lay colours upon it, the better to deceive and draw in an unwary reader: this is what I complain of. Let every reader be apprised, that the only question between us is, whether his Creator and Redeemer be a *creature*, or no: and then the cause will be brought to a short issue; and it will soon be seen where the truth lies. It is not that I desire to draw you into danger of *censure*, of which you are apprehensive; I could not have a thought so mean:

besides that I intended, and desired, for the greater freedom of debate, to be private: and you, perhaps, may be so still, if you please. It concerns every honest man to have the cause fairly laid open. While you are endeavouring to expose the *received* opinion, as much as you are able, let *your own* be shown in its *true colours*, and then set against it; that so we may the more easily judge, which has the advantage upon the comparison. You are very sensible, I doubt not, that the arguments against the Son's being a *creature* bear upon you with such strength, force, and full light, that you had rather have the pinch of the question concealed from the reader, or disguised under other terms. The ancient Arians, the immediate successors of Arius, found it absolutely necessary to *refine* upon their leader, to refine, I mean, in *language*; for their faith was the same. When the world was in a manner their own; and when they were so far from fearing *censure* themselves, that they employed the secular power to ^aplunder, persecute, and destroy as many as opposed them; even *then*, those men durst not say *directly*, that the Son of God was a *creature*. We have creed after creed drawn up by them; and Arius's positions ^bexpressly disclaimed by some of them; though, at the same time, they meant the same things. And what was the meaning of this wary proceeding; this walking in disguise, while they had nothing to fear from the powers in being? The reason is plain: their doctrine was *new*, and ^c*shocking* to Christian ears. It was not fit to appear in ^dclear and plain words. It was to be insinuated only in remote hints, and dark *inuendos*. People were to be decoyed, and gradually drawn into a *new* faith; which if they had fully understood, and seen

^a See Athanas. vol. i. p. 110, 317, 321, 345, 362, 386. Hilar. p. 1291. Basil. Ep. 70, 71, 282. Greg. Naz. Orat. 20, 23, 25, 32.

^b Athanas. vol. i. p. 176, 275. vol. ii. p. 735. Socrat. l. ii. c. 10. Sozom. E. Hist. l. iii. c. 5. Epiphan. Hæres. lxxiii. p. 845.

^c Athanas. vol. i. p. 234, 283. Alexand. Epist. Theod. H. p. 26, 30.

^d See Athanas. vol. i. p. 288.

what it led to, they would immediately have detested. See to this purpose a † passage of Hilary worth remarking; which I have thrown into the margin.

The Arians, or Semi-Arians, (for both come to one at last,) were so sensible that their tenets would not bear the light, that they were forced to disguise and conceal them under Catholic forms of speech, with all imaginable art and subtlety; as was much complained of by the Catholics, ‡ who abhorred such artifices. The mystery of these disguises has been already intimated. Had they ventured to speak out, they could not have deceived any great numbers. The greater part of their deluded followers were blinded and hood-winked; and hardly knew what their leaders intended, or whither they were driving. These were the arts by which Arianism prevailed; and yet hardly prevailed above forty years. Whether these or the like prudential reasons determine some now to proceed with the like caution, and to avoid declaring, in terms, that the Son of God is a *creature*, I know not. But this I know, that every careful reader ought to be well apprised of the tendency of your main doctrine. It should be told, that you assert, though not *directly* and *plainly*, yet *tacitly* and *consequentially*, that the Maker, Redeemer, and Judge of the whole world, is no more than a *creature*; is mutable, and corruptible; depends entirely upon the favour and good pleasure of God; has a precarious existence, and dependent powers, finite and limited; and is neither so perfect in his nature, nor so exalted in privileges, but that it is in the Father's power, according to his own good pleasure,

† Hujus quidem usque adhuc impietatis fraude perficitur, ut jam sub anti-christi sacerdotibus Christi populus non occidat, dum hoc putant illi *fidei* esse quod *vocis* est. Audiunt *Deum* Christum; putant esse quod dicitur. Audiunt *Filium Dei*; putant in Dei Nativitate inesse Dei veritatem. Audiunt *ante tempora*, putant id ipsum *ante tempora*, esse quod semper est. Sanctiores aures plebis quam corda sacerdotum. *Hilar.* p. 1266. See also Sozom. E. H. l. iii. c. 5.

‡ Athanas. p. 235, 224, 895. Theod. E. H. p. 27. Socrat. E. H. l. ii. c. 45. Sozom. E. H. l. iv. c. 29. Epiphani. Hæres. lxxiii. p. 845. Gregor. Nazianz. Orat. 21. p. 387.

to create another equal, or even superior to him. These are your tenets, if you please to speak out; and these, in the main, are what Arius, being a plain, open, and consistent man at the beginning, very frankly professed. But if these positions appear so harsh and shocking, that you yourselves, who admit them, do not care to own them in *plain terms*; it may be very excusable in *others* to contradict them; and to assert, upon so great evidences of truth from Scripture and antiquity, that God the Son is *infinitely* removed from the condition of a *creature*; is *really, truly, and essentially* God.

You have, perhaps, some few specious difficulties to urge against a "Trinity and unity, eternal generation," or the like; points too sublime for men, or, it may be, angels to comprehend. But why must these be thought to weigh down the many and unanswerable objections against your own scheme; or be esteemed sufficient to bear up against the united voice of Scripture and Catholic antiquity, nowhere asserting that the Son of God is a *creature*; but every where intimating, inculcating, proclaiming, that he is the *Creator, Preserver, and Sustainer* of all things; very and eternal God? You will pardon me this excursion, necessary to give the common reader a just idea of the dispute betwixt us, and of the *true state* of the question. A stranger in this controversy, finding how near we come to each other in *expression*, might be apt to wonder wherein we differ, or what it is that we dispute about; not being aware of the artifice you make use of, in giving an *uncatholic* meaning to *catholic* expressions. We say, the Son is not *self-existent*, meaning that he is not *unoriginate*: you do not only say the same, but contend for it; meaning, not *necessarily-existing*. We say, not *unoriginate*, meaning that he is not the *head* or *fountain*, not the *first Person* of the Trinity: you take up the very same word, and zealously contend that the Son is not *unoriginate*; understanding it in respect of *time*, or *duration*. We say, the Son is *subordinate*, meaning it of a subordination of *order*, as is just and proper: you also lay

hold of the word *subordinate*, and seem wonderfully pleased with it; but understanding by it, an *inferiority of nature*. We say, that the Son is not absolutely *supreme* nor *independent*; intimating thereby that he is *second* in order as a Son, and has no *separate, independent* existence from the Father, being *coessentially* and *coeternally* one with him: you also take up the same words, interpret them to a *low* sense, and make the Son an *inferior dependent* Being; *depending* at first on the *will* of the Father for his existence, and afterwards for the continuance of it. This is the way you choose to insinuate your heterodoxy into weak readers. In the mean while, notwithstanding our *seeming* or *verbal* agreement, there is as wide a difference between what you teach, and we, as between *finite* and *infinite*, *mutable* and *immutable*, a *dependent creature* and the *eternal God*. From what hath been said, you may perceive what the "*concessions of Catholics*," which the Doctor often boasts of, amount to. The Catholics have used some phrases in a *good* sense, which artful men have perverted to a *bad* one: that is all the case. But I return.

You was to find a *medium* between being *essentially God*, and being a *creature*: or else to declare in plain terms, that the Son is a *creature*. A *medium* you find not, nor indeed can there be any: and yet, instead of frankly acknowledging so plain and manifest a truth, you are pleased to shift, double, and wind about, in a manner unbecoming a grave disputant, or a sincere and ingenuous writer. In the first place, you put on an air of courage, and give me *one caution*, viz. "not to say or attempt to prove, that every being that is derived must be, for that reason, a creature," for fear of making my "own notion," which supposes the Son *generated*, that is, *derived*, to favour the Arians: but, admitting the Son to be *derived*, as it may be understood in a Catholic sense, yet what is that to your purpose? Does not my argument turn upon the words, *out of nothing*? Point me out any being *so derived*, a being which now is, and once *was*

not; and deny him to be a *creature*, if you can. But you go on; “As to what is said in the Queries, that either “the Son of God must be the *individual* substance of the “Father, or else ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, with the Arians; I answer, “if both Scripture and reason clearly demonstrate that “the Son is not the *individual* substance of the Father, “who must look to that consequence, if it be one?”

Here, at a strait, (as usual,) the word *individual* comes in; a word capable of several meanings, and so necessary to help invention, that you would often be at a loss what to say, if you wanted that poor pretence for equivocation. It is evident, that you all along use the word in a Sabelian sense, different from what either the Schoolmen, or more ancient Catholics intended by it. The thing which I assert is this; that you must either own the Son to be of the same *undivided* substance with the Father; or else declare him a *creature*. If you deny the former, you must, of consequence, admit the latter; and you *really* do so. The consequence *you* are to look to, as necessarily flowing from *your* premises; which you pretend to found on Scripture and reason, without any ground or warrant from either. You are resolved, it seems, to disown the “certainty of the disjunction,” (p. 61.) so afraid you are of determining the Son to be a *creature* ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων. Let us hear what a disputant may have to plead against a thing as clear and evident as any axiom in geometry.

You say, “^hThe Nicene Fathers thought the Son to be “neither the οὐσία τοῦ Πατρὸς, the substance of the Father, “nor ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, but ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρὸς, from the “substance of the Father.” The Nicene Fathers explain their meaning, both in the Creed itself, and in the anathemas annexed to it; determining the Son to be no *creature*, nor a different God from the Father; but of the same *undivided* substance with him, “*God of God, Light of Light,*” *consubstantial* with him, and a distinct Person from him.

Next, you say, “you dare not determine that God pro-

^h See Dr. Clarke's Reply to the Convocation, p. 29.

“duced all things, or any thing, (strictly and metaphysically speaking,) out of nothing.” Extreme modesty! That you dare not determine whether God has properly *created* any thing; or whether all things were not *necessarily-existing*. *Matter* itself may have been *coeval* and *coeternal* with God the Father; any thing, it seems, but his own *beloved* and *only-begotten* Son: or else why are you so shy, at other times, of acknowledging his eternity? Or why so resolute in disputing against it? An *eternal Son*, methinks, is much better sense than an *eternal substance*, *not divine*, and a *Son made* out of it; which is what you must mean, or mean nothing. But to proceed. You add, “how God brings beings into real existence we know not, because we know not their essences.” Therefore, I suppose, we know not, whether he brings them into existence at all; or whether they had a being before they were *created*. That is the consequence you intend, if any thing to the purpose. You go on: “or whether it be a contradiction to predicate existence of them before their coming into that state which they now are in, and which we call their creation, we know not.” Very ignorant! And yet you can be positive in things, which you know a great deal less of; presuming to make the *generation* of the Son of God *temporal*; and determining it a contradiction to predicate *existence* of him before his *generation*. Such things as these carry their own confutation with them; and only show that truth is too stubborn to bend. Let it be said then plainly, and without disguise, that the Son of God is either *consubstantial* with God the Father, or else a *creature*. There is no *medium*, neither can there be any, consistent with Scripture, and with the truth and reason of things. This being settled, our dispute may be brought into a narrower compass; and we may hereafter dismiss doubtful and ambiguous terms.

† Page 51, 63.

QUERY XIV.

Whether Dr. Clarke, who every where denies the consubstantiality of the Son, as absurd and contradictory, does not, of consequence, affirm the Son to be a creature ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, and so fall under his own censure, and is self-condemned?

IT hath been questioned by some, whether Dr. Clarke has really given into the Arian scheme, or no. From what he saith, in some places of his Scripture Doctrine, (particularly ^a Prop. 14. and 16.) one might imagine that he stood *neuter*, neither determining for nor against the Catholic faith in that Article: but, from his declaring ^b expressly against the *consubstantiality* of the Son, whether *specific* or *individual*, (between which he allows no *medium*,) and from his reckoning the Son among the *δημιουργήματα*, (though he gives an artificial gloss to it;) as also from his excluding the Son out of the *one* Godhead; from these considerations, to mention no more, it is exceeding clear, that he has determined against the Church, and declared for Arianism. He has, by necessary consequence, asserted the Son to be ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, which is the very essence and characteristic of Arianism. By so doing, he is self-condemned, (see Prop. 14.) unless affirming a thing *expressly* be highly blameable; and affirming the same thing, *implicitly* and *consequentially*, be just and good. It is unaccountable to me, how there comes to be such a charm in words, that a man should be blameable for saying a thing of this nature, plainly and directly, which he may affirm indirectly and consequentially, without any fault at all. Doth the offence lie only in sounds or syllables? Or was Arius more culpable for saying, the Son was a *creature*, and *from nothing*, than another who says, he is not *consubstantial* with the Father, nor *one God* with him, or the like; when it is so very manifest, and hath been proved above, that they are only different ex-

^a Script. Doctr. p. 276, 279.

^b See Script. Doctr. p. 465. first ed.

than to the cause, dropped. But since you have thought fit to *publish* them, presuming yourself able to defend the Doctor in every thing; you have brought a kind of necessity upon me, of showing how little ground you have for your assurance in this particular; and that the Doctor will still want some better advocate.

He condemns, in his ^b Scripture Doctrine, those “who pretending to be wise above what is written, and intruding into things which they have not seen, have presumed to affirm, that there WAS A TIME WHEN THE SON WAS NOT.” Who would think, after this, that he should be the man who should *presume* to do it? Yet nothing is more evident than that he denies the *eternity* of the Son; which is the very same as to affirm, that “there was a time when the Son was not.” He denies it, by plain consequence, in supposing the Son to be *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, as was shown under the last Query; and besides, he expressly says, in his ^c comments on the Athanasian Creed, (which contain what himself subscribes to,) that “are not three eternal Persons.” It must indeed be owned, that in his paper laid before the Bishops, July 2, 1714. he professes that the Son was “eternally begotten by the eternal will and power of the Father.” But, after a friend of his had discovered some uneasiness at that passage, as looking like a *retractation* of his former opinion, and as admitting the Son’s *eternity*, he ^d took care to explain it away, and to signify that, though he had said the Son was *eternally* begotten, he did not mean it in the strict and proper sense. “My intention,” says he, “was not to assert any thing different from what I had before written; but only to show that I did not in any of my books teach (as had by many been industriously reported) the doctrine of Arius, (viz. that the Son of God was a creature made out of nothing, just before the beginning of the world,) but that he was begotten

^b Prop. vi. p. 279. alias 246.

^c Script. Doctr. p. 429. This part is left out in his second edition.

^d Letters, Numb. 8.

“*eternally*, that is, without any limitation of time, (*ἀχρό-
τως, πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων, ἀρραιοῦτος, πρὸ πάντων αἰώνων,*)
“in the incomprehensible duration of the Father’s eter-
“nity.” This is too plain to need any comment.

I shall only observe to the reader, how the Doctor singles out one particular point, wherein he differs from Arius; whereas it is justly questionable whether that was Arius’s settled opinion or no. Any one that will be at the pains to read over Arius’s Letters, extant in ^cTheodoret and ^fAthanasius, will easily see, that the principal thing which stuck with him was the τὸ ἀίδιον, or *συναίδιον*, the strict *eternity* or *coeternity* of the Son. As to other lesser matters, he would easily have compounded with the Catholics; and would never have scrupled in the least to carry the point as high as the Doctor does. He was content, for the most part, to say, “There was a time when “the Son was not,” without defining the *precise* time of his *generation*, or *creation*. To make it the more clearly appear that he was perfectly of the Doctor’s sentiments, in this particular, it is observable, that he uses nearly the very same words which the Doctor does: (*ἔ ἀχρότως, ἢ πρὸ χρόνων ἢ πρὸ αἰώνων, ἰ πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων*) words, though not exactly the same, yet full as high and strong as those which the Doctor explains his own sense of *eternity* by. So that the Doctor has no reason to disclaim Arius; or to endeavour to persuade the world that he differs from him in any thing material relating to this controversy. But to return. The words *eternal*, *always*, or the like, are plain English words, and should either not be used in this case at all, or used in their *true* and *proper* sense. You apologize for it, as far as the matter will bear; but it would be wiser, and better, and more ingenuous, to give that point up. Let us hear, however, what you have to say.

^c E. H. lib. i. cap. 5.

^f De Synod. Arim. p. 729.

^e Epist. apud Athanas. p. 730.

^h Athanas. *ibid.* Theod. cap. v. p. 21.

ⁱ Confess. Arii et Euz. apud Sozom. l. ii. c. 27. p. 395.

“ God could eternally act; that is, could in any point of duration of his own existence exercise his eternal power and will in producing beings——and therefore beings distinct from the one supreme God may be said to be *eternal*, as far as we are able to reason about eternity, (I mean as it is a negative idea,) so that we cannot conceive time when they were not.” (P. 61.) What a number of words are here, only to tell us, in a round about way, that the Son is *not eternal*. What is this *negative* eternity, but no eternity? And why are not angels or archangels called *eternal*, since we know not precisely when they were made, nor in what time they began to exist; which is all the meaning of this new sort of eternity. Besides, is not every *creature* produced in some “point of duration,” in which God exercises his “eternal power and will” upon them? Are they therefore *eternal*? As to your intimating of the Son, that “we cannot conceive time when he was not,” it is not true, upon your principles. We can conceive it as well of him as of any other creature, angel, or archangel; if he was made in time, that is, if he was made at all. We can conceive, and must conceive, that there were millions and millions of ages backwards; an eternity, *a parte ante*, before he came into being. I hope you intended not any equivocation in the word *time*: but if you did, it is only putting *duration* in the room of it, and then all will be right. The Arians would have been content to have had but one moment of time admitted for the Father to be *prior*, and to *will* the existence of the Son. This would have been enough to make the *generation* of the Son sit easy upon their minds. But the misfortune was, that one moment’s *priority* of time must infer an *infinite priority*. The Arians saw it, and submitted to it: the Catholics abhorred the thought, and could not bear the impiety of making the Son of God a *creature*.

You endeavour to show that Dr. Clarke takes a middle way between the *orthodox* and the *Arians*; by which you

only happen to show how little you have been acquainted with the *forms, creeds, and confessions* of the ancient Arians. The first ^k instance you give of the Doctor's middle way is, that he does not plainly and directly say that the Son was *created*; he denies him to be *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*. But herein he only copies after many of the ancient Arians; who, when accused by the Catholics of making the Son a *creature*, rejected the charge with great disdain; having this reserve, ^l *not a creature*, like other creatures which are created *mediately* by the *Λόγος*; the same evasion, which you are pleased to adopt for your own, (p. 60.) And it was ^m frequent with the Arians to deny the Son to be *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, or even to *anathematise* those that should affirm it. A second instance you give, of the Doctor's refining upon the Arians, is in the point of the Son's *eternity*, (p. 61.) But I have shown you that he does not so much as go beyond Arius himself in that point: besides that the ⁿ ancient Arians condemned those that should presume to say, that "there was a time when the Son was not," equivocating upon the word *time*. Both your instances, you see, fail you, being neither of them sufficient to the purpose.

But, to set this matter in a somewhat clearer light, it may not be improper, in this place, to exhibit a draught or representation of the Arian tenets or principles; by which it will appear what Arianism really is, when pursued in its remotest consequences; and what the difference is between those who only admit some part of it, (as the Doctor and yourself,) and those who receive the whole.

^k Pag. 60.

^l See Socrat. E. H. l. ii. c. 10. p. 73. Hieron. Dial. contr. Lucif. p. 300.

^m See Arian Creeds. Athanas. p. 738. Socrat. l. ii. c. 8, 19, 30. Sozom. l. iii. c. 11.

ⁿ See Arian Creeds. Athanas. p. 738. Socrat. l. ii. c. 18, 19. Sozom. l. iii. c. 11.

◦ *Positions of some or other of the Arians in respect of the Son.*

1. *Not* ^p *consubstantial* with God the Father.
2. *Not* ^q *coeternal*, however begotten before all ages, or without any known limitation of time.
3. Of a *distinct inferior nature*, however otherwise perfectly like the Father.
4. *Not strictly and essentially God*, but partaking of the Father's divinity.
5. *A creature of the Father's*, however unlike to the rest of the creatures, or superior to them.
6. ^r *Not like the Father*; but in nature and substance like other creatures.
7. ^s *Made in time*; there having been a time when he was not, made from nothing.
8. ^t *Far inferior to the Father* in knowledge, power, and perfections.
9. *Mutable in his nature*, as a creature, though unchangeable by decree.
10. *Dependent* on the good pleasure of the Father, for his past, present, and future being.
11. *Not knowing the Father* perfectly, nor himself: his knowledge being that of a *creature*, and therefore *finite*.
12. *Made a little before the world was made*; and for the sake of those that should be after him.

These are the Arian principles brought down as low as they can well go. Arius, the author and founder of the sect, seems to have gone through all those steps at the first: and indeed all of them, except the last, hang together; and are but the necessary consequences of each

◦ Athanas. p. 282, 398, 728. Sozom. l. i. c. 15. Theod. Hæret. Fab. l. iv.

^p This was agreed to unanimously.

^q This point disputed by the Psathyrians. Theod. Hæret. Fab. l. iv. c. 4. p. 238.

^r This denied by all but those called Anomæans.

^s This denied, in words, by many.

^t Few bold enough to maintain expressly this or any of the following propositions.

other. Those that stopped in the midway, or sooner, might be more pious and modest, but less consistent men. A little experience convinced, as well Arius himself as his followers, that those positions, all together, were too grating upon, and too shocking to every pious Christian at that time. And therefore (without considering how one depended on another, or how a principle could be maintained, and yet its plain, necessary consequences disowned) they immediately went to work, to cut off what should appear most offensive, and retain only what might sound tolerably; especially when worded in *ambiguous* or *Catholic* terms.

The nine last particulars were for some time, and by the Arians in general, waved, dropped, not insisted on, (as being too gross to take,) or else artfully insinuated only, under specious and plausible expressions. The *first* they all owned, and insisted the most upon; having many pretences to urge against *consubstantiality*, either name or thing. The *second* and *third* they divided upon, as to the way of expression; some speaking their minds plainly, others with more reserve; not so much denying the *co-eternity*, as forbearing to affirm it. This was the method which the Arians took to propagate their heresy. We need not wonder if they were often forced to make use of collusions, equivocations, and double entendres. For, being obliged, for fear of offence, to use *Catholic* words, though without a *Catholic* meaning; and to maintain their main principle, without seeming to maintain its necessary consequences; (nay, seeming to deny and reject them;) it could not be otherwise. And not only the Catholics frequently complain of those smooth gentlemen, but some even of their own party could not endure such shuffling; thinking it became honest and sincere men, either to speak out, or to say nothing. Of this kind were Aëtius and Eunomius, with their followers, called Anomæans, and Exoucontii; being indeed no other, in respect

▪ See Epiphan. Hæres. lxxvi. p. 916.

to the Son's divinity, than such as Arius was at first; and speaking almost as plainly and bluntly as he did. After the disguises, and softenings, and colourings had been carried on so long, till all men of sense saw plainly that it was high time to leave off trifling, and to come from words to things; and that there was no *medium*, but either to settle into orthodoxy, or to sit down with the pure Arians and Anomæans, (if they would determine any thing, and be *sincere* and *consistent* men,) some chose the former, and some the latter, according as they more inclined to one way, or the other. There is certainly no *medium* betwixt *orthodoxy* and *Arianism*, (for ² *Semi-Arianism*, if so understood, is perfect nonsense and contradiction,) there being no *medium* between *God* and *creature*, between *unmade* and *made*. Men may conceal their sentiments, suppress consequences, and speak their minds but by halves; and so one Arian may be more cautious or more artful than another: but, in truth and reality, every man that disowns the *consubstantiality*, rightly understood, is as much an Arian as Eunomius or Aëtius, or any of the ancient Arians were; or even as Arius himself, excepting only some few particulars, which were not his standing and settled opinions.

In fine, there is but one middle way to take between the *orthodox* and the *Arians*, and that is, to avoid determining on either side; to leave the point *in medio*, and to suspend assent to either; to believe as much, and as high, as any of the Arians did; and as to the rest, neither to believe nor disbelieve it. But this is not the case, either with the Doctor or yourself. You have declared against the *consubstantiality*, and the proper *divinity* of Christ, as well as *coeternity*: and are therefore so far from refining upon, that you really come short of many of the ancient Arians; though, to do you justice, you are the more consistent with yourselves for it. I have now sufficiently

² Semi-Arianus, et Semi-Deus, et Semi-creatura perinde monstra et portenta sunt, quæ sani et pii omnes merito exhorrent. *Bull. D. F.* p. 284.

vindicated every part of the Query; having shown, that the *equivocation*, in respect of the Son's *eternity*, is justly chargeable upon the Doctor; and that he has not observed a *neutrality* in this dispute; nor carried the point higher than the ancient Arians; but has really and fully given into their sentiments, and therein determined against the Catholic Church. The use which I make of this, at present, is to observe to the reader;

1. That the Doctor has not invented any new or more excellent scheme than was *thought of, considered, and condemned*, near fourteen hundred years ago, by a very wise, numerous, and unbiassed council. 2. That he cannot justly cite any Catholic, Post-Nicene writer, (nor perhaps Ante-Nicene,) as certainly favouring his *main doctrine*. 3. That his attempt to reconcile the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds to Arianism, formed in direct opposition to it, is endeavouring to bring light and darkness, and the most irreconcilable inconsistencies to meet together. This for the present: the future use I shall make of it is to come directly to the point in question: for when it is certainly known what the drift, design, and meaning of an author is, much pains may be spared, and a dispute shortened.

I hardly know whether strict method would permit me to take notice of the latter part of your Reply, (contained in pages 62, 63, 64.) it is so wide and foreign. You must have had a great mind to say something of *eternal generation*; otherwise you would never have introduced it in a place so improper. The pretence is, that we *equivocate* in talking of eternal generation; and therefore it is proper to retort it upon us, in answer to a charge of *equivocation*. But wherein do we *equivocate*, or do any thing like it? Is it in the word *eternal*? But we undoubtedly mean it in the strict and proper sense. Is it in the word *generation*? That is a word of latitude, capable of more senses than one. We use it in the sense which has prevailed in the Church fifteen hundred years; and in a proper sense, according to the rule of Tertullian, *Omnis origo parens est*.

And where then is the impropriety or *equivocation* in the word *generation*, as used by us? True, it is not the same with human *generation*. But who will pretend that *human* is to be the measure and standard of all *generation*? *Generation*, you say, implies *beginning*; and yet we call it *eternal*. Admit that it did so; yet, till that can be made appear, we may be very *sincere* in calling it *eternal*, intending no *equivocation*: you have not proved that all *generation* implies beginning; and what is more, cannot. You endeavour to make the notion of it absurd; but, unless you can demonstrate the absurdity of it, how will you charge us with *equivocation*; which was the point? All you have to say turns only upon your misconstruction of, I should say *equivocation* in, the word *individual*; which, you must needs know, we understand not in your sense of it; unless we are weak enough to suppose Father and Son to be *one Person*. You make another argument, by *equivocating* in the word *production*; which if we use at all, we always take care to explain to a good sense; and never once imagine, that the *eternal* generation is a *temporal* production. You are very unhappy, to *equivocate* all the way, while you are retorting the charge of *equivocation*; besides that, could you have retorted it in a handsomer manner, it would not have been pertinent, because it comes out of place. For your proper part here is, not so much to object against our scheme, as to defend your own: please to clear your own hypothesis first; and then we may hear what you can say against ours. The Church of Christ has been in possession of the present prevailing doctrines, at least, for fourteen hundred years: it concerns us, before we part with them, to see that we may have something better in their stead. What if the Catholic doctrine has some difficulties? Has

Ἴ Μὴ χρειαζὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ καταδίδῃ τινὲς λίγαντες, ἀλλὰ ἔχρουσι ἀρχὴν γίνωσκαι τὸν πατέρα. Ἀρχὴ γὰρ υἱῷ ἔχρουσι, ἀκατάληπτες, ἀναρχοὶ ὁ πατήρ· πηγὴ τῆ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ποταμοῦ, τοῦ μοιγενοῦς ὁ πατήρ, ὁ γινώσκας αὐτὸν, καθὼς εἶδον αὐτὸς μόνος. *Cyrlil. Catech. xi. p. 145.*

VOL. I.

M

Arianism none? Or must we change the former for the latter? No; let us first consider whether Arianism has not more and greater; and then perhaps we may see reason enough to keep as we are.

It is an usual thing with many, (moralists may account for it,) when they meet with a difficulty which they cannot readily answer, immediately to conclude that the doctrine is false, and to run directly into the opposite persuasion: not considering that they may meet with much more weighty objections there than before; or that they may have reason sufficient to maintain and believe many things in *philosophy* or *divinity*, though they cannot answer every question which may be started, or every difficulty which may be raised against them. As to the point we are upon; while some are considering only the objections against the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, (how *three* can be *one*; how the *Son* could be *generated*; how *person* and *being* can be different; and the like;) they imagine presently, that the world, in a manner, has been hitherto miserably mistaken; and that they are the happy men, who see clearly *how*, and *why*. Let but the very same men have patience awhile, and not embark in the opposite cause, till they are able to find out a truer and a juster scheme, and to clear it of all considerable difficulties; I say, let them but do thus, and then, I am persuaded, they will be much less sanguine in their pursuit of novelties. In the present controversy there are three schemes, which I may call Catholic, Sabellian, and Arian: one of the three must, in the main, be true. The way to know which, is to weigh and consider the difficulties attending each respectively; and to balance them one against another. The advocates of the two latter have performed reasonably well, in the *offensive* part; and especially against *each other*: but have neither of them yet been able to *defend* tolerably their respective schemes; nor, I suppose, ever will be. But I proceed.

Divine worship due

To the one God.

Thou shalt have no other gods before me, Exod. xx. 3.

Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve, Matt. iv. 10.

To Christ.

They worshipped him, Luke xxiv. 52. Let all the angels of God worship him, Heb. i. 6.

That all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father, John v. 23.

QUERY XVI.

Whether by these (of the first column) and the like texts, adoration and worship be not so appropriated to the one God, as to belong to him only?

THIS is a very material inquiry, relating to the object of religious worship; than which nothing can be of greater concernment. Here, therefore, if any where, we might expect and demand of you a very full, clear, and satisfactory answer. I shall examine your answer, in due time and place. But, first, it will be proper to show what reasons we have to think that all *religious* worship is appropriated to God only. I shall inquire into the sense of Scripture, in this article; and next proceed to the judgment and practice of the ancient Church, the best comment upon Scripture.

Exod. xx. ver. 3. hath been already produced. The words are, "Thou shalt have no other gods before (or besides) me." Which is farther explained, ver. 5. (the reason being the same, both with respect to images and false gods,) "Thou shalt not bow down to them, nor serve them^z." All acts of religious worship are forbidden to be offered to any other *being*, besides the one supreme God: to him they are appropriated, to him only. So Deut. vi. 13. "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and serve him:" and again, Deut. x. 20. "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God; him shalt thou serve." Which is quoted and explained by our blessed

* See also Exod. xxii. 20. xxxiv. 14. Dan. iii. 28.

Lord himself, in these words: "Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve," Matth. iv. 10. This was said in answer to Satan, who did not pretend to be *supreme*, nor desire to be acknowledged as such: (see Luke iv. 6.) all he required was, that a solemn outward act of adoration and worship should be paid him: and the reason given for refusing it is not that he was a *bad spirit*, an enemy to God; or that God had *not commanded* that he should be worshipped; but the reason is general, that none are to be worshipped, but God only. And that these and the like texts were intended to exclude all beings, beside the one supreme God, from being worshipped, either at *that time*, or at any time *after*, appears, not only from the reason of the thing, but from plain Scripture. "Before me was there no God formed, neither shall there be after me," Isa. xliii. 10. "If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or wonder, and the sign or wonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, *Let us go after other gods*, (which thou hast not known,) and let us *serve them*; thou shalt not hearken," &c. Deut. xiii. 1, 2, 3. The worship of the same one God, exclusive of all others, is by this for ever made unchangeable: miracles could not be sufficient to give credit to any one who should pretend to introduce another object of worship, or to set up another god, beside the one supreme God. All creatures whatever are hereby effectually precluded from receiving any religious homage and adoration. This is confirmed by St. Paul, (Rom. i. 21.) &c. who censures those that "knew God," (that is, acknowledged one supreme God,) "and yet glorified him not as God," because "they served the creature more than (or besides) the Creator, who is blessed for ever." Wherein the Apostle plainly intimates, that the *Creator* only is to be *served*; and that the idolatry of the heathens lay in their worshipping of the *creature*. He does not blame them for giving *sovereign* or *absolute* worship to the *creatures*, (they could hardly be so silly as to imagine there could be more than one supreme God,) but for

giving any *worship* at all, sovereign or inferior, absolute or relative, to any thing but the *creature*. To the same purpose, Gal. iv. 8. he condemns those who “did service unto them, which by nature were no gods:” which text I shall take care to explain particularly in another place. All this is confirmed and illustrated by the angel, (Rev. xix. 10. xxii. 9.) who refused to receive so much as the outward act of adoration; giving this rule and maxim upon it, “Worship God:” intimating thereby, that God only is to be *worshipped*; that all acts of *religious* worship are appropriated to God only. He does not say, Worship God, and *whom God shall appoint to be worshipped*; as if he had appointed any besides God: nor, Worship God with *sovereign* worship; as if any *inferior* sort of worship was permitted to be paid to creatures: but simply, plainly, and briefly, *Worship God*. To this I may add, that the reasons which God insists upon and inculcates, in the Old Testament, why he, and he alone, in opposition to all others, is to be *worshipped*, are such as exclude all *creatures*. His being Jehovah, ^aCreator, Sustainer, Preserver of all things, having no God before him nor after him, and the like.

This is the Scripture-account of the object of worship: there is neither rule nor example in it for the worshipping any creature whatever; but all the texts relating to this matter are full, strong, and clear for the worship of God only. Now, whatever reasons human wisdom may invent for the worshipping of creatures, besides the Creator, (as Celsus and Porphyry of old, and the Romanists of later times have pretended,) those are never to be set against a clear and plain law; or opposed to the unerring wisdom of God, who best knows to whom worship is proper to be paid, and to whom not.

I shall not here argue the point from the nature of the thing itself. I will suppose (without granting) that creatures may be wise enough to know, ready enough to

^a See Isa. xl. xlv. 5, 6, 7. 2 Kings xix. 15. Jer. x. 10, 11, 12.

hear, and able to relieve our wants, at any distance. I will suppose also, that one creature may be appointed to bear rule, and to have dominion over many; as some have thought particular *angels* to preside over such and such kingdoms or countries. I will suppose likewise, that it may seem to human wisdom very fit and proper, that such creatures as can assist, or have the charge of others, should be respected, *worshipped*, and *adored* by them. I will suppose also, that we may be so ignorant as not to perceive any great harm in these suppositions, from the nature of the thing, barely and singly considered. But God's "thoughts are not our thoughts:" he has been pleased to enter an express *caveat* and prohibition in the case; and has, no doubt, good reason for it. Possibly he may apprehend it to be more for his own glory, and more for our good, that our *whole* worship and service be paid to him, than a *part* only. Possibly he may know, (such is human infirmity,) that if any part, or kind, or degree of religious worship was permitted to be given to *creatures*, it might insensibly alienate our minds from the *Creator*; or eat out all our reverence and respect for God. Or, it may be, that while our acknowledgments are ordered to be paid to him, and to him *alone*, we may thereby be induced to live more in dependence on him; become more immediately united to him; and have the greater love and esteem for him. He will not, perhaps, leave his favours in the hands, or in the disposal of his *creatures*, lest we should forget whom we are principally obliged to; or lest we should imagine that he is not always every where present, to hear all our petitions, and to answer them, according to his own good pleasure. These, or a thousand better reasons, infinite Wisdom may have, for appropriating all acts of religious worship to God. It is sufficient for us to know that he has done it: and of this holy Scripture has given abundant proof, as we have before seen.

Now I come to consider what you have to except against so clear a truth. All is comprised in one short

sentence; one remarkable distinction. "Absolute supreme honour is plainly appropriated to the person of the Father only, (by Exod. xx. 3. Matt. iv. 10.) as the "absolute supreme Being, or the one God." (P. 94.) From which I am to infer, that *relative inferior* worship may be paid to the *creatures*, notwithstanding what has been urged, from the whole tenor of Scripture and antiquity, to the contrary. This is the famed *distinction*, pleaded by the heathens of old, for *Pagan*, by the Romanists of late, for *Popish*, and by you, for *Arian* idolatry. I shall endeavour to convince you how little there is, either of truth or probability, in this so celebrated *distinction*; and then put an end to the argument of this Query.

You set out unfortunately under a mistake, as if we were inquiring about respect and esteem, when the question is entirely about *acts of religious* worship. My words were *worship* and *adoration*: instead thereof you put *honour*, an ambiguous word; and so slip over the difficulty, which you was pinched with; and insensibly lead your reader off from the point it concerned you to speak to. Please to remember that we are disputing about *acts* of worship, *religious* worship. Let us keep to the *terms* we began with; lest, by the changing of words, we make a change of *ideas*, and alter the very state of the question. This being premised, now I come directly to the point in hand. Your pretence is, that *ultimate, absolute, supreme, sovereign* worship is due to the *Father* only; *mediate, relative, inferior, petty* worship may be paid to *creatures*: the outward acts and circumstances supposed alike in both, so far as to make them *religious*, not *civil* worship. Your *considering* the Father as *supreme*, and your *intending* him the *highest* respect imaginable, are to make *his* worship become *supreme, absolute, sovereign* worship: but your *considering* another being as *inferior, dependent*, and a *creature* only, and your *intending* him no more than a *proportionate* respect, are to make the worship of him become *inferior, relative, petty* worship. Worship therefore

is to take its quality from the *esteem* and *intention* of the worshipper, and is to be supposed *higher* and *lower* accordingly. This, I think, is your real and full meaning, in as few and as plain words as I am capable of expressing it. In answer to it, I observe as follows.

1. I can meet with nothing in Scripture to countenance those fine-spun notions. *Prayer* we often read of; but there is not a syllable about *absolute* and *relative*, *supreme* and *inferior* prayer. We are commanded to pray *fervently* and *incessantly*; but never *sovereignly* or *absolutely*, that I know of. We have no rules left us about *raising* or *lowering* our *intentions*, in proportion to the *dignity* of the *objects*. Some instructions to this purpose might have been highly useful; and it is very strange, that, in a matter of so great importance, no directions should be given, either in Scripture, or at least in antiquity, how to regulate our *intentions* and *meanings*, with *metaphysical* exactness; so as to make our worship either *high*, *higher*, or *highest* of all, as occasion should require.

2. But a greater objection against this doctrine is, that the whole tenor of Scripture runs counter to it. This may be understood, in part, from what I have observed above. To make it yet plainer, I shall take into consideration such acts and instances of worship, as I find laid down in Scripture; whether under the old or new dispensation.

Sacrifice was one instance of worship required under the Law; and it is said, "He that sacrificeth unto any god, save unto the Lord only, he shall be utterly destroyed." Exod. xxii. 20. Now suppose any person, considering with himself that only *absolute* and *sovereign* sacrifice was *appropriated* to God, by this law, should have gone and *sacrificed* to other gods, and have been convicted of it before the judges; the apology he must have made for it, I suppose, must have run thus: "Gentlemen, though I have sacrificed to other gods, yet I hope you will observe, that I did it not *absolutely*: I meant not any *absolute* or *supreme* sacrifice, (which is all that the Law

“forbids,) but *relative* and *inferior* only. I regulated my “*intentions* with all imaginable care, and my *esteem* with “the most critical exactness: I *considered* the other gods, “whom I sacrificed to, as *inferior* only, and *infinitely* so; “reserving all *sovereign* sacrifice to the *supreme* God of “Israel.” This or the like apology must, I presume, have brought off the criminal with some applause for his acuteness, if your principles be true. Either you must allow this, or you must be content to say, that not only *absolute supreme* sacrifice, (if there be any sense in that phrase,) but *all sacrifice* was, by the Law, *appropriate* to God only.

Another instance of *worship* is making of *vows*, *religious* vows. We find as little appearance of your famed distinction here, as in the former case. We read nothing of *sovereign* and *inferior*, *absolute* and *relative* vows; that we should imagine *supreme* vows to be appropriate to God, *inferior* permitted to *angels*, or *idols*, or to any *creature*.

Swearing is another instance much of the same kind with the foregoing. Swearing by *God's name* is a plain thing, and well understood: but if you tell us of *sovereign* and *inferior* swearing, according to the inward respect or intention you have, in proportion to the dignity of the person by whose name you swear, it must sound perfectly new to us. All swearing which comes short in its respects, or falls below *sovereign*, will, I am afraid, be little better than *profaneness*.

Such being the case in respect of the acts of religious worship already mentioned, I am now to ask you, what is there so peculiar in the case of *invocation* and *adoration*, that they should not be thought of the same kind with the other? Why should not *absolute* and *relative* prayer and prostration appear as absurd as *absolute* and *relative* sacrifice, vows, oaths, or the like? They are acts and instances of *religious* worship, like the other; appropriated to God in the same manner, and by the same laws, and upon the same grounds and reasons. Well

then, will you please to consider, whether you have not begun at the wrong end, and committed an ὕστερον πρότερον in your way of thinking? You imagine that acts of *religious* worship are to derive their signification and quality from the *intention* and *meaning* of the worshippers; whereas the very reverse of it is the truth. Their *meaning* and *signification* is fixed and determined by God himself; and therefore we are never to use them with any other meaning, under peril of profaneness or idolatry. God has not left us at liberty to fix what sense we please upon *religious* worship, to render it *high* or *low*, *absolute* or *relative*, at discretion; *supreme* when offered to God, and if to others *inferior*; as when to angels, or saints, or images, in suitable proportion. No; religion was not made for *metaphysical* heads only; such as might nicely distinguish the several degrees and elevations of respect and honour among many objects. The short and plain way, which (in pity to human infirmity, and to prevent confusion) it has pleased God to take with us, is to make all *religious* worship his *own*; and so it is *sovereign* of course. This I take to be the true *scriptural*, as well as only *reasonable* account of the object of worship. We need not concern ourselves (it is but vain to pretend to it) about determining the sense and meaning of *religious* worship. God himself has took care of it; and it is already fixed and determined to our hands. It means, whether we will or no, it means, by divine institution and appointment, the *divinity*, the *supremacy*, the *sovereignty* of its object. To misapply those marks of dignity, those appropriate ensigns of divine majesty; to compliment any *creature* with them, and thereby to make *common* what God has made *proper*, is to deify the works of God's hands, and to serve the *creature* instead of the *Creator*, God blessed for ever. We have no occasion to talk of *sovereign*, *absolute*, *ultimate* prayers, and such other odd fancies: *prayer* is an address to God, and does not admit of those novel distinctions. In short, then, here is no room left for your distinguishing between *sove-*

reign and *inferior* adoration. You must first prove, what you have hitherto presumed only and taken for granted, that you are at liberty to fix what meaning and signification you please to the acts of *religious* worship; to make them *high* or *low* at discretion. This you will find a very difficult undertaking. Scripture is beforehand with you; and, to fix it more, the concurring judgment of the earliest and best Christian writers. All *religious* worship is hereby determined to be what you call *absolute* and *sovereign*. *Inferior* or *relative* worship appears now to be contradiction in sense, as it is novel in sound; like an *inferior* or *relative* God. To what hath been said I may add a few farther considerations from Scripture. The Apostles Barnabas and Paul, when the ^b Lycaonians would have done *sacrifice* unto them, did not tell them that *sacrifice* was of *equivocal* meaning; and that they might proceed in it, provided only that they would rectify their *intentions*, and *consider* them as *apostles* only; but they forbade them to *sacrifice* to them at all. The *angel*, in the Revelations, did not direct St. John to *consider* him only as an *angel*, and then to go innocently on in his *worship* of him; but he ordered him to *worship* God. Our blessed Lord did not tell the Devil that all external worship was *equivocal*, and might be offered to angels or men, provided the *intention* was regulated, and respect *proportioned*; but he told him plainly that all *religious* worship was appropriate to God. In fine, nothing is more evident, than that the design, both of the Law and the Gospel, was to establish this great truth, and to root out *creature-worship*. "And this was," as Dr. Cudworth rightly observes, "the grand reason why the ancient Fathers so zealously opposed Arianism; because that Christianity, which was intended by God Almighty for a means to extirpate *Pagan idolatry*, was thereby itself *paganized* and *idolatrized*; and made highly guilty of that very thing which is so much condemned in the

^b Acts xiv.

“ Pagans, that is, *creature-worship*. This might be proved
 “ by sundry testimonies of Athanasius, Basil, Gregory
 “ Nyssen, Gregory Nazianzen, Epiphanius, Chrysostom,
 “ Hilary, Ambrose, Austin, Faustinus, and Cyril of Alex-
 “ andria ; all of them charging the Arians, as guilty of
 “ the very same idolatry with the Gentiles, or Pagans, in
 “ giving *religious worship*, even to the *Word and Son of*
 “ *God* himself, (and consequently to our Saviour Christ,)”
 “ as he was supposed by them to be a *creature* ^c.”

But in answer, perhaps, to this, it may be said, by such as run things off in a confused manner, and do not stay to distinguish, that certainly there is a wide and great difference between giving honour to heathen idols, and doing it to our Saviour Christ, though a *creature* only. No doubt but there is ; and God forbid that any Christian should say or think otherwise. But that is not the point. The worship even of *saints* and *angels* is much preferable to Pagan worship. But still they are both *equally*, though not equally *culpable, idolatry* ; and are breaches of the first Commandment. Whatever love, respect, *gratitude*, &c. may be due for what our Lord and Saviour has wrought for us, if he be still a *creature*, all cannot come up to *worship*, which is appropriate to God alone. Well, but it may be farther pleaded, that here is God’s *command* in the case, which makes it widely different from any of the former. Very true ; there is so ; and we shall make a proper use of that hereafter : but the question is, what is the fundamental rule of *religious worship* ? Is it *to worship God only* ? Or is it *to worship God, and whomsoever besides, God shall appoint to be worshipped* ? They who pretend the latter must show some foundation, if they can, in Scripture for it. Where is it intimated, either in the Old or New Testament, that worship should be paid to any besides God ? Neither the Law nor the Prophets, neither Christ nor his Apostles ever intimated any thing like it. Our Saviour did not say, *Worship God, and*

^c Cudw. Intell. Syst. p. 628.

whomsoever God shall order to be worshipped; nor did the angel, in the Revelations, insinuate any such thing: St. Paul never told us of *servng* the Creator, and whom the Creator should nominate besides; but *Creator* only. The like may be observed upon other occasions, where this might have been properly intimated, but is constantly omitted. Nothing therefore can be plainer, than that the fundamental rule for worship is, that *God only is to be worshipped*. All worship, inconsistent with this *primary* and perpetual law, must, of consequence, appear *idolatrous*, either in the practice or the principle: and it is thus that the Arians, following a *Scripture-command*, but not upon *Scripture-principles*, and practising a *Christian* duty upon a *Pagan* foundation of *creature-worship*, and *polytheism*, stand charged with idolatry.

2. To confirm us farther in the truth of the principles here asserted, I shall subjoin a second consideration, drawn from the practice of the primitive martyrs; who may be presumed to have understood the principles of that religion, for which they cheerfully laid down their lives. It is well known, that they readily submitted to all kinds of torment, and to death itself, rather than offer adoration, incense, or sacrifice, to the heathen deities. Now, if *sovereign* worship be all that is appropriated to God; and if no worship be *sovereign*, but what the inward *intention*, and secret *esteem* of the worshipper make so; how thoughtless were they, to resist even unto blood, for fear of committing a sin, which it was not possible for them to have been guilty of? They could never have blundered so egregiously, as to have *considered* the heathen deities (which they heartily despised) as *supreme* gods; or to have *intended* them *sovereign* worship; and therefore could not have been guilty of giving them that *worship* which is appropriate to God. They had so mean and despicable an opinion of the Pagan deities, that if the quality of the worship is to be estimated from the secret *esteem* and *intention* of the *worshipper*, such acts of worship must have dwindled into no worship in reality; hardly amounting to

so much as an empty ceremonious compliment. Where then was the harm of *sacrificing* to idols? What law had condemned it, if your principles be true? The outward act being *equivocal*, this could not be interpreted *sacrifice*, such as God had forbid to be offered to any but himself. But those primitive saints were unacquainted with your refined subtilties, having learned their logic from Scripture, and the plain common sense and reason of mankind. They knew that the signification of worship and sacrifice depended not on their arbitrary esteem, or secret intention; but had been before fixed and determined by God. To offer sacrifice to the heathen deities, was, by construction and implication, declaring them to be *immutable, eternal, supreme*, and strictly *divine*. They could not be guilty of such a solemn lie, or commit such barefaced profaneness and idolatry. They would not prostitute the marks and characters of divinity to those who were *by nature no Gods*; nor give that to idols, which was appropriated to God only. This was their manner of reasoning; and this was right: for, indeed, upon the other hypothesis, there is nothing so mean or low, but what a man might pay *religious* worship to. For instance; pray to *angels*, but *consider* them as *angels*, with *proportionate* respect, and there will be no harm in it. Worship saints departed, but *intend* them only such respect as is due to *saints*, and all is right. Fall down before a crucifix with humble prostration, but *consider* it as a *crucifix*, and *intend* little or nothing by it, and all is well. These seem to me the unavoidable consequences of this famed distinction, and these are the uses which have actually been made of it, since men have learned to be subtle, instead of wise; and have departed from the fundamental maxim of revealed religion, that *God alone is to be worshipped with religious worship*. The sum of what hath been said, on this important article, may be comprised in the following particulars.

1. That, under the Old Testament, all *religious* worship was declared to belong to God only; and upon such rea-

sons as exclude all *creature-worship*; namely, because he is God, Jehovah, Eternal, Immutable, Creator, Preserver, Sustainer, and Governor of all things.

2. That our blessed Lord made no alteration in this law, but explained and confirmed it: his Apostles, after him, inculcated the same thing, long after our Saviour's *exaltation* and *ascension*; and an angel from heaven reinforced it, thereby proclaiming its perpetual obligation. No distinction of worship, *mediate* and *ultimate*, was ever intimated; nor of *inferior* and *sovereign*: but all *religious* worship supposed to have one *meaning*, one *significancy*, one *object*, viz. the *divine nature*; whether subsisting in one Person, or more.

3. Such being the rule and standing law for *religious* worship, none can have any right, title, or claim to *worship*, but in conformity to the same rule.

4. If the Son of God be *very* God, *Jehovah*, *Creator*, *Sustainer*, and *Preserver* of all things; then he both may, and ought to be worshipped, in conformity to the Scripture-rule, and upon Scripture-principles: but if he be a *creature* only, the worship of him is not consistent with the fundamental rule both of the Law and the Gospel. In a word; if the Son of God is to be *worshipped*, he is not a *creature*: if a *creature*, he is not to be *worshipped*.

It remains now only to inquire, whether the primitive Church, which had the same Scriptures that we have, and better opportunities of knowing and understanding them, made the same or the like conclusions from them. It is an argument of no small importance; and therefore I shall think it worth the while, to give you a brief summary of the sentiments of the earliest Christian writers; and in their own words, that every impartial reader may be able to judge for himself.

Justin Martyr, giving account of the Christian worship, says plainly, “^c We worship God alone;” and, “None but “ God ought to be worshipped.”

^c Θεὸν μὴ μόνον προσκυνῶμεν. *Apolog.* i. c. 23. Τὸν Θεὸν μόνον δεῖ προσκυνῆναι. c. 21.

^d Athenagoras, in like manner, speaks to this effect: "We are not to worship the world, but the *Maker* of it; "we worship not the *powers* of God, but their *Creator* and *Governor*."

Theophilus says, "I will *honour* the king, but I will not *worship* him. ^e I will worship God, the real and true God: no one ought to be worshipped but God alone."

^f Tatian, to the same purpose, though not so fully, says; "The *works* of God, made for our sakes, I will not worship."

^g Tertullian says, "What we worship is one God, who made the whole mass of things purely from nothing. I am commanded not to call any other, God, nor to *adore*, or in anywise *worship* any other besides that one."

^h Clement of Alexandria has more to this purpose: "Angels and men" (says he) "are the works of God's hands: let none of you worship the *sun*, but let him set his heart upon the *sun's Creator*: neither let him deify the world, but to the *Maker of the world* let his desires be. I seek after God, the *Creator* of the world, him that lighted up the *sun*, and not after the *creatures* (ἔργα) which God hath made. The Gentiles ought to learn,

^d Οὐ τοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τεχνίτην αὐτοῦ προσκυνοῦσι, p. 55. Οὐ τὰς δυνάμεις (τῷ Θεῷ) προσκύουσιν θεοποιούμενοι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ποιητὴν αὐτῶν καὶ διοίκητην, p. 56.

^e Θεῷ δὲ τῷ ὄντι Θεῷ καὶ ἀληθεῖ προσκυνοῦν—οὐκ ἄλλῃ ἔξῃ ἵσταν—προσκυνοῦντο ἀλλ' ἢ μόνῃ Θεῷ, p. 30, 33.

^f Δημιουργίαν τὴν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνημένην χάριν ἡμῶν προσκυνῶν οὐ θίλω, p. 18. Vid. et p. 79.

^g Quod colimus, Deus unus est; qui totam molem istam—de nihilo expressit. *Apol.* c. 17.

Præscribitur mihi ne quem alium Deum dicam,—ne quem alium adorem, aut quoquo modo venerer, præter unicum illum qui ita mandat. *Scorp.* c. iv. p. 450. Rignalt.

^h Ἀγγέλῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἔργα τῶν δεατύλων αὐτοῦ—μὴ τὸν ἥλιόν τις ἡμῶν προσκυνῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἥλιου ποιητὴν ἰσπευθεῖσιν. μηδὲ τὸν κόσμον ἰαθιαζέτω, ἀλλὰ τὸν κόσμου δημιουργὸν ἰσπευθεῖσιν, p. 53. ed. Ox. Τὸν κόσμου δημιουργὸν, τὸν ἥλιου φωταγωγὸν Θεὸν ἰσπευθεῖσιν, οὐ τὰ ἔργα τῷ Θεῷ, p. 59. Τοῦ Ἑλλήνας χρεὶ διὰ νόμου, καὶ προφητῶν ἰκαριθάσειν ἵνα μόνον σέβωσιν Θεὸν τὸν ὄντως ὄντα παντοκράτορα, p. 825. Τὸ δ' ἐστὶ θεοποιούμενον τὸ θεῖον διὰ τῆς ὄντως δικαιοσύνης ἔργων τε καὶ γνώσεως, p. 778.

“from the Law and the Prophets, to worship the one
“only God, the necessarily-existing Almighty. This it
“is to worship the *divine Being* in true righteousness of
“practice and knowledge.”

ⁱ Irenæus expresses himself thus: “You ought to wor-
“ship the Lord your God, and to serve him alone, and to
“give no credit to him who deceitfully promised things
“which were not his own, saying; ‘All these things will
“I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me’—
“The system of creatures is not under his dominion, since
“he himself is one of the *creatures*.”

^k Origen has a great deal to our purpose, in his book
against Celsus. I shall select a few passages: he blames
the Gentiles, “who from the stupendous greatness of the
“things in the world, and the beautiful order of *creatures*,
“(*δημιουργημάτων*), could not look up and consider that
“they ought to admire, worship, and adore him only that
“made them.” In another place he says, “To worship the
“*sun* and the *creatures* of God (*Θεοῦ δημιουργήματα*) is for-
“bidden us, who are taught, not to *serve the creature*
“*besides the Creator*.” He observes, a little after that;
“We ought not to honour those in the place of God, or
“of the *Son of God*.” Which I take notice of here par-
ticularly, that you may see how clearly Origen distin-
guishes the Son from the *δημιουργήματα Θεοῦ*: as, indeed,
he does every where. In another place, he observes that

ⁱ Dominum Deum tuum adorare oportet, et ipsi soli servire, et non credere
ei qui falso promissit ea, quæ non sunt sua, dicens: *Hæc omnia tibi dabo, si
procidens adoraveris me.*—Neque enim conditio sub ejus potestate est,
quandoquidem et ipse unus de *creaturis* est, p. 320. ed. Bened.

^k Οἱ ἱε τοῦ τηλικούτου μεγάλους τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ τοῦ πάλους τῶν δημιουργη-
μάτων μὴ διαμένει ἀνακλίψαι καὶ θεωρεῖν, ὅτι προσκυνῶν καὶ θυσιάζων καὶ εἰς αὐ-
τὸν χρὴ μόνον τὸν ταῦτα ποιητήν, p. 158.—εἶς αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν ἥλιον, καὶ τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ
δημιουργήματα ἅσπερ ἡμῶν ἀσχηρόντα διδασκαλείοις μὴ λατρεύειν τῇ κτίσει παρὰ
τὸν κτίσαντα, p. 375.

I shall add another passage.

Οὐδὲς γὰρ βλίπων ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἰφθαλμοῖς ἄλλη τρέση εἶς τὸ εἶναι παρὰ τὸν
ὀπωκυμένοντα ἰσχυρὸν αἰὶ τῷ αὐτῷ κτιστῆς δημιουργῆ, καὶ πᾶσαι ἰσχυρὸν ἀναφέρειν ἑαυτῶν,
p. 367.

Christians are bred up to thoughts elevated far ¹ *above all creatures*, and might very justly disdain to worship any of them. The like he remarks of the Jews, “that they were taught to ^m ascend up to the *uncreated nature* of God; to fix their eyes upon him only; and on him alone to rest all their hopes and expectations.”

I might add many more testimonies, to the same effect, from the Ante-Nicene writers; but these are sufficient to give us a just idea of their principles, in relation to the object of worship. This we shall find run through them all, that God alone is to be worshipped; the *Creator*, in opposition to all *creatures* whatever; the τὸ Θεῖον, (as Clement of Alexandria and Origen sometimes accurately express it,) which also Tertullian seems to intimate, in the words, *quod colimus*, above cited. The sum then of the case is this: if the Son could be included, as being *uncreated*, and very God; as *Creator, Sustainer, Preserver* of all things, and one with the Father; then he might be worshipped upon their principles, but otherwise could not. What their practice was, shall be considered in its proper place. For the present, let it be a rule and maxim with us, fixed, as far as Scripture and the concurring judgment of antiquity can fix it, (besides what might be justly pleaded from the reason of the thing,) that no kind or degree of *religious* worship is due, or can be lawfully paid, to any creature. The conclusion from all is; if our blessed Lord is a *creature*, ⁿ he is not to be worshipped; if he is to be worshipped, he is not a *creature*. Now we may pass on.

¹ Τῶς διδαχθίνται μεγαλοθυῶς ὑπεραναικίαινα πάντα τὰ δημιουργήματα, &c. p. 237.

^m Ἀνακίαινα ἐπὶ τὴν ἀγίητον τοῦ Θεοῦ φύσιν ἀκίαινη μόνη ἱερῆν, καὶ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ μόνου ἰστίδας προσδεκῆν, p. 189.

Compare p. 160. where Origen insists upon the necessity of elevating our thoughts and devotions above and beyond all *created* being, ἰ, εἰσοσῶν γινεσῶν, in one place, πικεῖς γινεσῶν in the other. See also Clem. Alex. p. 809, 816. Ox. ed.

ⁿ Κτίσμα γὰρ κτίσματι οὐ προσκυνῆ, ἀλλὰ δούλες διοσότης, καὶ κτίσμα Θεοῦ. *Ath. Orat.* ii. p. 491.

QUERY XVII.

Whether, notwithstanding, worship and adoration be not equally due to Christ; and consequently, whether it must not follow, that he is the one God, and not (as the Arians suppose) a distinct inferior Being?

YOU answer, that "equality of divine honour is never attributed in Scripture to the Son with the Father;" and then, in proof of a matter of fact, you assign a reason of your own devising; "for then the Son would be absolutely equal with the Father, which is contrary to Scripture and reason," (p. 94.) But why do you not keep close to the words of the Query, and to the point in question? *Worship* and *adoration* are my words; not *divine honour*, which is ambiguous, and leads us off from the argument in hand. Suppose it had been said *sacrifice*: would you answer thus? Equality of *divine sacrifice* is never attributed, &c. Do not you see the impropriety? Well, but, as it is, you must say, *equality of divine worship* is never attributed, &c. And then, pray tell me, what you mean by *equality* or *inequality* of *worship*; whether you mean longer or shorter prayers, more or less frequent addresses, or any thing else. Be that as it will, *worship*, *religious* worship, greater or smaller, longer or shorter, has the same import and significancy; and speaks the Person addressed to, to be *divine*: just as *sacrifice*, whether offered once a year only or once a day, or whether it were a *lamb* or only two *young pigeons*, carried the same acknowledgment with it of the *divinity*, *sovereignty*, and *supremacy* of the person to whom it was offered. Now, *worship* being, as hath been said, an acknowledgment of the true God, in opposition to all *creatures* whatever, which are by nature no gods; and being offered to the Father, not for the recognizing his *personal* properties, as he stands distinguished from the *Son* and *Holy Spirit*, but his *essential* perfections, common to all, and by which he is distinguished from the *creatures*; it is very manifest, that if the Son is to be *worshipped* too, he is equally God,

and true God, with the Father; has all the same essential excellencies and perfections which the Father hath, and is at as great a distance from the creatures; in opposition to whom, and as a mark of his superior and infinitely transcendent excellency, he is *worshipped*. If then *honour* consists in the acknowledgment of his essential perfections, *equality of divine honour is attributed in Scripture to the Son with the Father*; because *worship* is attributed to both, and is always of the same import and significancy, by God's own order and appointment. But then you will say, the Son will be *absolutely* equal with the Father; which you think inconsistent with Scripture and reason. If you mean by *absolutely* equal, that the Son must be the *first Person*, as well as the Father, I deny your inference: if any thing else, I allow it to be true. The Son will be *equal* in all those respects, for which worship is due to the Father himself. He will be *equally divine, equally eternal, immutable, wise, powerful, &c.* in a word, *equally God and Lord*. As to the *subordination* of Persons in the same Godhead, that is of distinct consideration; and we may never be able perfectly to comprehend the relations of the three Persons, *ad intra*, amongst themselves; the ineffable order and economy of the ever blessed coeternal Trinity. You have many things to say, in hopes to lessen the honour and worship attributed to the Son in holy Scripture. But unless you could prove that no worship at all is to be paid him, you prove nothing. However, that I may not seem to pass any thing slightly over, I shall take the pains to examine your exceptions.

As to what you say, to weaken the force of Joh. v. 23. the answer to it will properly fall under a distinct Query; which is entirely upon it. You ^a cite Phil. ii. 11. Joh. xiv. 13. against the Querist; as if it was any question betwixt us, whether God was *glorified in his Son*; or whether the honour of either did not redound to both. "It was," you

^a Page 90.

say, "the prayer of Christ to glorify his Father, and the "Father only." But read that part of the prayer again, and believe your own eyes, Joh. xvii. 1. "Father, the "hour is come, *glorify thy Son*, that thy Son also may "glorify thee." How familiar, how equally concerned, as well for his *own*, as his *Father's* glory. So again, a little after; "I have glorified thee on the earth: I have finished "the work which thou gavest me to do. And now, O Fa- "ther, glorify thou me with thine own self, with the glory "which I had with thee, before the world was," Joh. xvii. 4, 5. See also Joh. xiii. 31, 32. and then tell me whether it was Christ's design, or desire, that his Father *only* might be *glorified*. How could you miss such plain things? You go on; "The Father is the object, to which "he commands us to direct our prayers." What! Will you dispute whether Christ is to be worshipped, or invocated? Consider, I beseech you, Joh. v. 23. mentioned above; recollect with yourself, that he is sometimes distinctly and personally ^b *invocated*. *Grace, mercy, and peace, or grace and peace, or grace only*, are frequently, in twenty places of the New Testament ^c, implored of him, together with the Father. He is to be worshipped and adored, as well as the Father, by men, by ^d *angels*, by the ^e *whole creation*. *Glory and dominion for ever and ever* are ^f ascribed to him, as well as to the Father. This is the sense of Scripture: I need not add, it being a thing so well known, the sense also of the earliest and best Christian writers, who unanimously declare for the worship of Christ; and their practice was conformable thereto. And now, that you may see how consistent those good men were (suitably to their strict sincerity) with Scripture, with themselves, and with each other; I shall step a little aside, to show you upon what principles they might, and did give religious worship to Christ.

^b Acts vii. 59. 1 Thess. iii. 11. Rom. x. 13. 1 Cor. i. 2.

^c See Clarke's Script. Doctr. ch. ii. sect. 4.

^d Hebr. i. 6.

^e Rev. v. 8.

^f 2 Pet. iii. 18. Rev. v. 13. See also Rev. vii. 10.

We have heard Justin Martyr, before, declaring that "God alone is to be worshipped." Very true: but then he constantly teaches us that the Son is God; and therefore might consistently say, that the Son is to be ^fworshipped, and, in the name of the whole Church, "we ^gworship "Father, Son, and the prophetic Spirit."

Athenagoras has before intimated that nothing less than the ^hCreator of the world is to be worshipped. But then he tells us too, that all things were ⁱcreated by the Son: and therefore no wonder if, giving account, to the emperor, of the God whom the Christians worshipped, he ^kjoins the Son with the Father.

Theophilus declares, as before seen, for the worship of God only; and says, the king is not to be worshipped, because *he is not God*. But then, as to the Son, he ^lowns him to be God; and therefore of consequence must suppose worship due to him.

Tatian teaches that God only is to be worshipped; not ^mman, not the *elements*, not the *creatures*, δημιουργία. Very good: but the Son who ⁿcreated matter, and is ἀγγέλων δημιουργός, might be worshipped notwithstanding.

Tertullian is so scrupulous, that he says, he will not so much as *call* any other, God, but the God whom he worshipped, and to whom alone he pronounces all worship due. But he must certainly include the Son in that only God; as every one knows who ever looked into his writings: and accordingly he ^oadmits the worship of him.

Clement of Alexandria, as we have observed above, ^pprotests against the worship of *creatures*; and allows no worship but to the Maker and Governor of all things.

^f Πρωσκυνητός, Apol. i. p. 94. Apol. ii. 35. Ox. Dial. pag. 191, 209, 231, 365. Jebb.

^g Ἐπιών τις, καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἴδόντα—πνεῦμά τι τὸ προφητικὸν σιβήμιθα καὶ προσκυνούμεν. Apol. i. p. 11.

^h See the passage above, p. 176. ⁱ See above, p. 134.

^k Θιὸν ἄγοντες τὸν πατρὸς τούτου πάντες καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγον, p. 122.

^l Pag. 130.

^m Pag. 17, 18, 79.

ⁿ See above, p. 134.

^o Apol. c. 21. Ad Uxor. l. ii. c. 6. Adv. Jud. c. 7.

^p Pag. 176.

But then no man more [¶] express than he, for the *worshipping* of God the Son. The reason is plain: the Son is [†] *Maker* and *Governor* of the world, and even παντοκράτωρ, according to this excellent writer.

Irenæus likewise, as above cited, gives his testimony for the worship of God only; and against the worship of any *creature*. But the same Irenæus as constantly supposes the Son to be truly God, and one God with the Father, and expressly [§] exempts him from the number of *creatures*; and therefore no wonder if he admits the Son to be [‡] *invoked*, as well as the Father.

I shall observe the like of Origen, and then have done; referring the reader, for the rest, to the complete collection of testimonies lately made by the learned ^υ Mr. Bingham, with very judicious reflections upon them.

Origen, as we have seen above, declares for the worship of the one God, in opposition to all *creatures*, δημιουργήματα, every thing *created*, γενητόν. But the good Father had his thoughts about him: he clearly distinguishes the Son from the δημιουργήματα, or *creatures*; and, besides, expressly makes him ^ξ ἀγένητος, *uncreated, immutable, &c.* According to Origen, the *Creator of the universe*, and he only, is to be worshipped ^γ, pag. 367. Very well; and look but back to page 308, and there the Son is ^ζ *Creator of the universe*. So, in ^α another place, he tells us, we are to worship him only *who made (all) these things*; and if we inquire farther we shall find, in the same author, that God the Son ^β *made all things*, the very words. It is therefore a very clear case, that Origen thought the Son to have the fullest right and title to *religious* worship, the same that the Father himself had, as being eternal, immutable, Creator and Governor of all things. And there-

[¶] Vid. p. 311, 851. ed. Ox.

[•] Vid. p. 153, 243. ed. Bened.

[•] Origin. Eccl. B. xiii. c. 2.

^γ Τοῦ πατρὸς δημιουργός.

^α Σίβων χρῆ μόνον ἐν ταῦτα πτωικηότα, p. 158.

^β Τὸν λόγον πτωικηότα πάντα, ἵσα ἰ πατρὶ αὐτῷ ἰνιτίλατο, p. 63.

[†] See above, p. 134, 49.

[‡] Pag. 166, 232.

^ξ Contra Cels. p. 287, 169, 170.

^ζ Δημιουργός τοῦτον τοῦ πατρὸς.

fore he speaks of his being ^c worshipped *as God*, by the Magi; and calls it *εὐσέβεια*, the very same word which he uses, ^d speaking of the worship due to the Father. In ^e another place, he speaks of the worshipping Father and Son jointly as *one God*, and ^f elsewhere mentions the worship of the Son, in his distinct *personal* capacity. The sum then of Origen's doctrine, as it lies in his book against Celsus, (the most valuable of all his works, and almost the only one to be entirely depended on, as giving the true sense of Origen, or of the Church in his time,) is contained in these particulars.

1. That God the Son, if a *creature*, or not *Creator*, or not truly *God*, should not be *worshipped* at all.

2. That being *truly God*, and *Creator*, &c. he may be worshipped; either *jointly* with the Father, as one τὸ Θεῖον, or *distinctly*, as *one Person* of the Godhead.

3. That though he be *God*, and *Creator*, yet the *Father* is so *primarily* and *eminently* as *Father*, and *first Person*; and therefore the distinct worship of the Son, considered as a Son, redounds to the Father, as the Head and Fountain of all. Hence it is, that, as the Father is *primarily* and *eminently* God, Creator, and object of worship; so also all worship is *primarily* and *eminently* the Father's: and thus it is that I understand Origen, in a ^ε certain place which has been often misinterpreted.

4. That the worship of the Son, considered as a Son, is not an *inferior* worship, nor any other than proper *divine* worship; being an acknowledgment of the same *divine*

^c Pag. 46. ^d Τὴν εἰς τὸν ἅν ὅλων δημιουργὸν ἐπέβηκεν, p. 160.

^e "Ἐνα δὲ Θεὸν, ὡς ἀποδιδώκαμεν, τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν θεοποιημένον, p. 386.

^f Εὐχόμεθα τῇ λόγῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ, δυναμένη αὐτὸν ἰάσασθαι, p. 238. Τὸν δάκνον αὐτῶν λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ προσκυνήσομεν, p. 239.

N. B. Here the translator (as it is usual with him to misrepresent such passages as relate to the Son) renders δάκνον αὐτῶν, *ejus ministrum*. The sense is, *dispenser* of them, i. e. *prophecies*, just before mentioned.

^ε Διησόμεθα δὲ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου, καὶ ἰσχυροῦμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ εὐχαριστήσομεν, καὶ προσευξόμεθα δὲ ἰὰν δυήμιθα πατακίου τῆς περι προσωχῆς περιολέξιας καὶ παταχρήσις, p. 233.

Vid. Bull. D. F. p. 121. Bingham, Origin. Eccl. l. xiii. c. 2. p. 45, &c.

excellencies, and *essential* perfections communicated from Father to Son: and hence it is, that there is still but *one worship*, and *one object* of worship; as one *God*, one *Creator*, &c. by reason of the most intimate and ineffable union of the two Persons; which Origen himself ^h endeavours to express in the fullest and strongest words he could think on.

From what hath been said, we may know what judgment to make of the ancient *doxologies*. They ought certainly to be understood according to the prevailing doctrine of the primitive Church. They were different in form, but had all one meaning; the same which I have shown you from the primitive writers. The Arians were the first who interpreted some of them to such a sense, as either favoured *creature-worship*, or excluded the Son and Holy Ghost from proper *divine* worship. It was low artifice to value one sort of *doxology* above another, only because more *equivocal*; and to contend for *ancient* words, in opposition to the *ancient* faith. The Catholics understood the subtilty of those men, and very easily defeated it: first, by asserting the only true and just sense of those *doxologies*, which the Arians had wrested to an heretical meaning; and next, by using, chiefly, *doxologies* of another form; which had been also of long standing in the Church; and which, being less *equivocal*, were less liable to be perverted. But the subject of *doxologies* being already in better hands, I shall here dismiss it, and proceed.

You observe, that “it was the constant practice of the “Apostles to pray and give thanks to God, through Jesus Christ,” (p. 91.) And so it is the constant practice of the Church at this day. What can you infer from

^h Ἀναβίβηται δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεὸν, ὁ ἀρχὴν καὶ ἀκρίβητος, καὶ ἀμείβητος αὐτὸν εἶπεν διὰ τοῦ προσάγοντος ἑαυτὸν υἱοῦ, τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου καὶ σοφίας, &c. p. 382.

The same thought is thus expressed by Cyril.

Μήτις διὰ τὸ τιμᾶν τὸν πατέρα νομίζουσιν, ἵνα τι τῶν δημιουργημάτων τὸν υἱὸν ὑπαπεισώμεν, ἀλλ' ὡς πατὴρ δι' ἑοῦ υἱὸς προσκυνεῖται, καὶ μὴ μισρίζεσθαι ἢ προσκυνῆσαι. Cyril. Catech. xi. p. 143. Oxon.

thence? That the Father and Son are not equal, or are not to be equally honoured? Nothing less: but, as the Son stands to us under the particular character of *Mediator*, besides what he is in common with the Father, our prayers, ⁱ*generally*, are to be offered rather *through* him, than *to* him: yet not forgetting or omitting, for fear of misapprehension and gross mistakes, to offer prayers directly to him, and to join him with the Father, in *doxologies*; as the ancient Church did, and as our own, God be thanked, and other churches of Christendom still continue to do. You add, that “whatever honour is paid *to the Son*, is commanded, on account of his ineffable relation “to God, as the only begotten Son,” &c. But this *ineffable* relation is not that of a *creature* to his *Creator*; but of a *Son* to a *Father*, of the same nature with him. *This* may be styled *ineffable*: the other cannot, in any true or just sense. If the Son is to be *worshipped*, as you seem here to allow, it can be on no other account, but such as is consistent with the Scriptures; on the account of his being one with the Father, to whom worship belongs; and to whom it is appropriated in opposition to *creatures*, not in opposition to him who is of the same nature with, coessential to, and inseparable from him. The “*worship*,” you say, “*terminates not in the Son*.” How this is to be understood, and in what sense admitted, I have explained above. Strictly speaking, no honour is paid to either, but what redounds to the glory of both; because of their intimate union; and because both are but *one God*. “But,” you say, “the Father begat him:” very well; so long as he did not *create* him, all is safe: the *eternity*, the *perfections*, the *glory* of both are one. “And,” you say, “gave him dominion over us.” That is more than you can prove; unless you understand it of Christ, considered as *God-man*, or *Mediator*.

In some sense every thing must be referred to the Father, as the first Person, the Head and Fountain of all.

¹ See Bull, D. F. p. 121. Fulgent. Fragm. p. 629, 633, 638, 642, &c.

But this does not make two worships, *supreme* and *inferior*; being all but one acknowledgment of one and the same essential excellency and perfection, considered *primarily* in the Father, and *derivatively* in the Son; who, though personally distinguished, are in substance undivided, and essentially one. All your arguments, on this head, amount only to a *petitio principii*, taking the main thing for granted; that a *distinction of persons* is the same with a *difference of nature*; and that a subordination of the Son, as a Son, to the Father, implies an essential disparity and inequality betwixt them; which you can never make out. Instead of proving the Son to be a *creature*, and that he is to be worshipped notwithstanding, (which are the points you undertake,) all that you really prove is, that the *Son* is not the *Father*, or first Person, nor considered as the *first Person* in our worship of him; which is very true, but very wide of the purpose. What follows in your reply, (p. 91, 92, 93.) does not need any farther answer; being either barely repetition, or comments on your own mistake of the meaning of the word *individual*; of which enough hath been said before. You are pleased (pag. 94.) to make a *wonder* of it, that I should quote Heb. i. 6. in favour of my *hypothesis*. But if you consider that the angels are there ordered to *worship* the Son; and that that text is a proof of the Son's being *Jehovah* (see Psal. xcvi.) and that worship is appropriated to God only, by many texts of Scripture, and the concurring sense of antiquity, as I have shown above; there will be little farther occasion for *wondering*, in so clear a case. In that very chapter (Heb. i.) it is sufficiently intimated what it was that made the *Son* capable of receiving worship and adoration. He is declared to have "made the worlds;" to be the "shining-forth of his Father's glory, and the express image of his Person;" and to "uphold all things by the word of his power," (ver. 2, 3.) Strong and lively expressions of his *divine, eternal, uncreated* nature; such as might give him the justest claim to the worship and adoration of men and angels. In the close, you have a

remark about the error of Arius; which, you say, “did not consist in making the Son distinct from, and really subordinate to the Father, (for that was always the Christian doctrine.”) Here you come upon us with *general* terms, and *equivocal* expressions; leaving the reader to apprehend that the Christian Church believed the Son to be a *distinct, separate, inferior* being; in short, a *creature*, as Arius plainly, and you *covertly* assert: whereas there is not an author of reputation, among all the ancients, before Arius, that taught or maintained any such thing. A *subordination*, in some sense, they held; and that is all; not in Arius’s sense, not in yours. Well, but you proceed to tell us wherein his error consisted, viz. “in presuming to affirm, upon the principles of his own uncertain philosophy, and without warrant from Scripture, that the Son was ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, and that ἦν πρὸς ὄντα ἐκ ἧν.” Arius had so much *philosophy*, or rather common sense, as to think, and so much frankness and ingenuity, as to confess, that there neither is nor can be any *medium* between *God* and *creature*. He was not so ridiculous as to imagine that God first made a *substance*, and then out of that *preexisting created* substance made the Son; besides that, even this way, the Son had been, in the last result, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων: nor was he weak enough to believe that any thing, *ad extra*, had been *coeval* or *coeternal* with God himself. If he had, he need not have scrupled to have allowed the like privilege to the *Son*; the first and best of all Beings, except God himself, in his opinion.

But since you think your own *philosophy* so much better than Arius’s, will you be so kind as to tell us plainly, whether the Son be of the *same divine substance* with the Father; or of some *extraneous* substance which *eternally preexisted*; or from *nothing*? The *first* you deny directly, as well as Arius; and the *second* also, by plain necessary consequence: and why then should you differ upon the *third*, which is the only one left, and must be true, if both the other be false? If Arius was rash in affirming this, he was equally rash in denying the Son’s *coeternity* with the

Father, and again in denying his *consubstantiality*; and so your censure of him recoils inevitably upon yourself. Then, for the other error of Arius, in asserting that the Son *once was not*; as having been produced, or *created*, by the Father; in your way, you correct it thus^k: True, the Son was *produced, brought into existence, had a beginning*, and was not, metaphysically, *eternal*; but yet, for all that, it was an error, in *philosophy*, for Arius to say, that *he once was not*. Unhappy Arius! detested by his *adversaries*, and traduced by his own *friends*, from whom he might reasonably have expected kinder usage. Let me intreat you, hereafter, to be more consistent: either value and respect the man, as the great reviver and restorer of *primitive Christianity*; or renounce his principles, and declare him a *heretic*, as we do.

QUERY XVIII.

Whether worship and adoration, both from men and angels, was not due to him, long before the commencing of his mediatorial kingdom, as he was their Creator and Preserver; (see Col. i. 16, 17.) and whether that be not the same title to adoration which God the Father hath, as Author and Governor of the universe, upon the Doctor's own principles?

YOU answer, that “ though the world was created by the Son, yet no adoration was due to him upon that account, either from angels or from men; because it was no act of *dominion*, and he did it *merely ministerially*, (p. 94.) just as no adoration is now due from us to angels, for the benefits they convey to us; because they do it *merely instrumentally*.” This is plain dealing; and however I may dislike the thing, I commend the frankness of it. You are very right, upon these principles, in your parallel from angels: had the ancients thought the office of the Son *ministerial*, in your low

^k Pag. 51, 63.

sense, they would have paid him no more respect than they paid to *angels*; and would certainly never have *worshipped* him. But I pass on: "Creation," you say, "is "no act of dominion;" and therefore is not a sufficient foundation for worship. The same reason will hold with respect to the Father also; for *creating* is one thing, and *ruling* another. Yet you will find that Scripture makes *creation* the ground and reason of worship, in so particular and distinguishing a manner, that no person whatever, that had not a hand in creating, has any right or title to worship, upon Scripture-principles; to which Catholic antiquity is entirely consonant, as we have observed above. I did not found his right of worship on *creation* only, but *preservation* too; referring to Coloss. i. 17. "By him all things consist;" to which may be added, Heb. i. 3. "Upholding all things by the word of his "power." The titles of *Creator*, *Preserver*, *Sustainer* of all things, sound very high; and express his supereminent greatness and majesty, as well as our dependence; and therefore may seem to give him a full right and title to religious worship; especially if it be considered, that they imply *dominion*, and cannot be understood without it. Besides that *Creator*, as hath been shown, is the mark, or *characteristic* of the true God to whom all honour and worship is due. Add to this, that by Joh. i. 1. the Son was *Θεός*; before the foundation of the world; which implies, at least, *dominion*, upon your own principles: and when he came into the world, "a He came unto "his own," (Joh. i. 11.) having been their *Creator*, ver. 20.

* Unus Deus Pater super omnes, et unum Verbum Dei quod per omnes, per quem omnia facta sunt, et quoniam hic mundus proprius ipsius, et per ipsum factus est voluntate Patris, &c.—Mundi enim factor vere Verbum Dei est. *Iren.* p. 315.

Verbum autem hoc illud est, quod in sua venit, et sui eum non receperunt. Mundus enim per eum factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit. *Novat.* c. xiii. p. 714.

Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo veniens in hunc mundum in sua venit, cum homo nullum fecerit mundum? *Novat.* p. 715. Vid. et Hippolyt. contr. Noct. c. xii. p. 14.

and, as is now explained, *Governor* from the first. Wherefore, certainly, he had a just claim and title to adoration and worship from the foundation of the world, even upon your own *hypothesis*. As to his creating *ministerially* only, I have said enough to that point, under the eleventh Query, whither I refer you.

From what hath been observed, it may appear sufficiently, that the divine *Λόγος* was our King and our God long before; that he had the same claim and title to religious worship that the Father himself had; only not so distinctly revealed; and that his enthronization, after his resurrection, was nothing more than declaring the dignity of his person more solemnly, and investing him as ^b *God-man*, in his whole person, with the same power and authority, which, as God, he always had; and now was to hold in a different capacity, and with the addition of a new and special title, that of *Redeemer*. ^cThey therefore who endeavour to found the Son's title to worship, only upon the powers and authority of the *Mediator*, or *God-man*, after the resurrection, (alleging John v. 22. Phil. ii. 10. Heb. i. 6. and the like,) give us but a very lean and poor account of this matter; neither consistent with truth, nor indeed with their own *hypothesis*. You quote Phil. ii. 6. in favour of your notion; and say, that Christ "was from the beginning in the form of God; yet he did not assume to himself to be honoured like unto God, till after his humiliation." But this position can never be made out from that text. Allowing you your interpretation, about *assuming to be honoured*, yet this can mean only, that he did not assume *during his humiliation*, without any reference to what he had done before. It is very clear from John xvii. 5. that our blessed Saviour was to have no greater glory after his exaltation and ascension, than he had "before the world

^b Εἰ δὲ ὀψώσθαι λίγεται, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ χαρίσματος τὸ ὅτι πᾶν ὄνομα δίχεται, εἰς ἑαυτοῦ δηλοῖται μιστὰ σεαυτοῦ ἰσχυρίζεται, εἰς ὅτι ἢ καὶ δίχεται σεαυτοῦ. *Cyrl. Alex. Thes.* p. 130.

^c Clarke's Script. Doct. Prop. 48, 50, 51. Clarke's Reply, p. 239.

“ was. Glorify me with thine own self, with the glory “ which I had with thee, before the world was.” His glory had, to appearance, been under an eclipse, during the state of his humiliation: but after that, he was to appear again in full lustre; in all the brightness and splendor of his divine majesty, as he had done ever before. You think, that “ our worship of him, in his own distinct person “ and character, commenced after his resurrection from “ the dead.” I might allow this to be so in fact; and yet maintain, that he always had the same just right and title to *religious* worship; which must have had its effect, had it been clearly and distinctly revealed sooner. This is enough for my purpose; inasmuch as I contend only, that the worship due to him is not founded merely upon the power and authority supposed to have been given him after his resurrection; but upon his *personal* dignity and *essential* perfections. He might have had the very same right and claim all along, that ever he had after; only it could not take effect, and be acknowledged, till it came to be clearly revealed. Thus, God the Father had, undoubtedly, a full right and title to the worship and service of men, or of angels, from the first: but that right could not take place before he revealed and made himself known to them. This, I say, is sufficient to my purpose; and all that I insist upon. Yet, because I have a religious veneration for every thing which was universally taught and believed by the earliest Catholic writers, especially if it has some countenance likewise from Scripture; I incline to think that worship, distinct worship, was paid to the Son, long before his incarnation.

Irenæus is ^d express, that the *Λόγος* was worshipped of old, together with the Father. And this must have been the sense of all those Fathers, before the Council of Nice, who understood and believed that the person who ap-

^d Qui igitur a prophetis adorabatur Deus vivus, hic est vivorum Deus et Verbum ejus—. L. iv. c. 5. p. 232. ed. Bened.

See also Novatian, c. 15. Deum et angelum invocatum.

peared to the *patriarchs*, who presided over the Jewish Church, gave them the law, and all along headed and conducted that people, was the second Person of the ever blessed Trinity. Now, this was the general and unanimous opinion of the Ante-Nicene writers, as hath been shown at large, under Query the second. And it is observable, that Eusebius and Athanasius, (two very considerable men, and thoroughly versed in the writings of the Christians before them,) though they were opposite as to party, and differed as to opinion, in some points; yet they entirely agreed in this, that the Son was worshipped by Abraham, Moses, &c. and the Jewish Church. And herein, had we no other writings left, we might reasonably believe that they spake the sense of their predecessors, and of the whole Christian Church, as well before, as in their own times. You will say, perhaps, that the worship, supposed to have been then paid to the Son, was not *distinct* worship. But it is sufficient that it was (according to the sense of the Christian Church) paid to the *Person* appearing, the *Person* of the Son, and he did not refuse it; which is the very argument that some of the Ante-Nicene writers use in proof of his divinity. The *Patriarchs* worshipped that *Person*, who appeared and communed with them; supposing him to be the God of the universe, to whom of right all worship belongs. Had he not been what they took him for, he should have rejected that worship, as the angel in the Revelations rejected the worship which St. John would have offered him. In a word, since the Son received that worship in

* Euseb. E. H. l. i. c. 2. See also Comm. in Isa. p. 381, 386. Athanas. vol. i. p. 443, 445.

Vid. Fulgent. ad Monimum. l. ii. c. 3, 4. &c.

f Novatian may here speak the sense of all. On Gen. xxxi. he comments thus: Si angelus Dei loquitur hæc ad Jacob, atque ipse angelus infert, dicens: Ego sum Deus qui visus sum tibi in loco Dei: non tantummodo hunc angelum, sed et Deum positum, sine ulla hesitatione conspicimus; quique sibi votum refert ab Jacob destinatum esse, &c. — Nullius alterius angeli potest hic accipi tanta auctoritas, ut Deum se esse fateatur, et votum sibi factum esse testetur, nisi tantummodo Christi—, C. 27.

his *own Person*, (according to the ancients,) it must be said, he was then *distinctly* worshipped, and in his own right, as being *truly* God. However that be, my argument is still good, that the Son (having been in "the form of God," and *God*; *Creator, Preserver, and Sustainer* of all things, from the beginning) had a right to worship, even upon *your* principles, (much more *mine*,) long before the commencing of his *mediatorial kingdom*: and therefore his right and title to worship was not *founded* upon the *powers* then supposed to have been given him: consequently, those texts which you refer to, for that purpose, are not pertinently alleged; nor are they of strength sufficient to bear all that stress which you lay upon them. This point being settled, I might allow you that, in some sense, *distinct* worship commenced with the *distinct* title of *Son*, or *Redeemer*: that is, our blessed Lord was then first *worshipped*, or *commanded* to be worshipped by us, under that *distinct* title or *character*; having before had no other *title* or *character* peculiar and *proper* to himself, but only what was $\text{\textcircled{c}}$ *common* to the Father and him too. Though Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are all jointly concerned in *creation, redemption, and sanctification*; yet it may seem good to Infinite Wisdom, for great ends and reasons, to attribute *each* respectively to one *Person* rather than another; so that the Father may be *emphatically* *Creator*, the Son *Redeemer*, the Holy Ghost *Sanctifier*: and upon the commencing of these titles respectively, the *distinct* worship of each (amongst men) might accordingly commence also. Excellent are the words of ^h Bishop Bull to this

$\text{\textcircled{c}}$ Sic Deus voluit novare sacramentum, ut *nove* unus crederetur per *Filium* et *Spiritum*, ut coram jam Deus in suis propriis *nominibus* et *personis* cognosceretur, qui et retro per *Filium* et *Spiritum* predicatus non intelligebatur. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* c. 30.

^h Profecto admiranda mihi videtur divinarum personarum in sacrosantissima *Triade simplici*, qua unaquaeque persona *distincto* quasi *titulo* humanum imprimis genus imperio suo divino obstrinxerit, *titulo* illi respondente etiam *distincta* uniuscujusque imperii *patefactione*. *Patrem* colimus sub *titulo Creatoris* hujus universi, qui et ab ipsa mundi *creatione* hominibus

purpose; which I have thrown into the margin. I shall only add, that while you endeavour to found Christ's right and title to *worship* solely upon the powers supposed to be given him after his resurrection, you fall much below the generality of the ancient Arians, (whom yet you would be thought to exceed,) and are running into the Socinian scheme, not very consistently with your *own*. Thus you seem to be fluctuating and wavering between two, (at the same time *verbally* condemning both,) *certain* in nothing, but in opposing the Catholic doctrine; which when you have left, you scarce know where to *fix*, or how to make your principles hang together. To explain this a little farther: I *found* the Son's title to worship upon the *dignity* of his *Person*; his *creative* powers declared in John i. and elsewhere; his being Θεός from the beginning; and his *preserving* and *upholding* all things (according to Colos. i. 16, 17. and Heb. i.) antecedently to his *mediatorial* kingdom: you, on the other hand, *found* it entirely upon the powers given him after his humiliation, (alleging such texts as these, Matt. xxviii. 18. John v. 22, 23. Phil. ii. 10, 11. Rev. i. 5, 6. v. 8, 9, 10.) as if he had no just claim or title to *worship* at all, before that time: for, though you put in the equivocal word *distinct*, (very ingeniously,) yet your meaning really is, and the tendency of your argument requires it, that no worship, *distinct* or *otherwise*, was due to him, till he received those full powers. This pretence, I say, might come decently and properly from a Socinian or a Sabel-

innotuerit: *Filium* adoramus sub titulo *Redemptoris* ac *Servatoris* nostri, cujus idcirco divina gloria atque imperium non nisi post peractum in terris humanæ *redemptionis* ac *salutis* negotium fuerit *patefactum*; *Spiritum* denique *Sanctum* veneramus sub titulo *Paracleti*, *Illuminatoris*, ac *Sanctificatoris* nostri, cujus adeo divina majestas demum post descensum ejus in Apostolos primosque Christianos donorum omne genus copiosissima largitione illustrissimum, *clarius emicuerit*. Nimirum tum demum Apostoli, idque ex Christi mandato, Gentes baptizabant in *plenam atque adunatam Trinitatem*, (ut cum Cypriano loquar) h. e. in nomine Patris, Filii, et Spiritus Sancti. *Bull. Prim. Trad.* p. 142.

¹ See Dr. Clarke's Reply, p. 239, 249.

lian, who either makes creation *metaphorical*, or interprets such texts as John i. 1. Col. i. 16, 17. and the like, of the *reason* or *wisdom* of the Father; that is, the Father, *indwelling* in the man Christ Jesus. But in *you* it must appear very improper, and very inconsistent with your other principles: wherefore I must again desire you to be more consistent, and to keep to one constant scheme. Take either Arian, Sabellian, or Socinian, and abide by it; and then I may know what I have to do: but do not pretend to hold two schemes at a time, utterly repugnant to each other.

As to Scripture's seeming, in some places, to found Christ's title to worship, not so much upon what he is *in himself*, as upon what he has *done for us*; a very good reason may be given for it, if it be well considered by what springs and movements moral agents are actuated, and that we *love* even God himself, with reference to ourselves, ^k "because he first loved us." *Abstracted reasons* of esteem, honour, and regard, are unaffecting, without a mixture of something *relative* to us, which ourselves have a near concern in. The *essential* dignity of Christ's Person is really the ground and foundation of honour and esteem, (and consequently of *worship*, the highest expression of both,) which ought always to bear proportion to the intrinsic excellency of the object: but his offices *relative* to us, are the *moving* reasons which principally affect our wills; and without which we should want the strongest incitement to pay that honour and worship which the *essential* excellency of his Person demands. Scripture has sufficiently apprised us of both, discovering at once both his *absolute* and *relative* dignity; that so we being instructed as well concerning what he is in himself, as what he is in respect to us, might understand what honour justly belongs to him, and want no *motive* to pay it accordingly. Add to this, that Christ's office, *relative* to us, naturally leads us back to the *ante-*

^k 1 John iv. 19.

cedent excellency and perfection of that Person, who was able to do so great and so astonishing things for us : besides that it must appear in the highest degree probable, that no *creature* whatever (supposing him to have suitable abilities) could have been intrusted with so *great* and so *endearing* a charge; such as must inevitably draw after it a larger share of our love, respect, and esteem, than seems consistent with our duty to God, and the rules laid down in Scripture for our behaviour towards the *creatures*. But enough of this : I proceed.

QUERY XIX.

Whether the Doctor hath not given a very partial account of John v. 23. founding the honour due to the Son on this only, that the Father hath committed all judgment to the Son; when the true reason assigned by our Saviour, and illustrated by several instances, is, that the Son doth the same things that the Father doth, hath the same power and authority of doing what he will; and therefore has a title to as great honour, reverence, and regard, as the Father himself hath? and it is no objection to this, that the Son is there said to do nothing of himself, or to have all given him by the Father; since it is owned that the Father is the fountain of all, from whom the Son derives, in an ineffable manner, his essence and powers, so as to be one with him.

IN answer to this, you say, "The only honour due to our Saviour is plainly supposed by St. John to be given him, upon account of his being appointed by the Father Judge of the world," p. 96. This is very strange indeed! What! was there no honour due to him on account of his having been *Θεός*; from the beginning? None for his having *created* the world? None on account of his being the "only begotten Son," which St. John represents as a circumstance of exceeding great glory? Surely these were

¹ John i. 14.

things great enough to demand our tribute of honour and respect; and therefore St. John could never mean that he was to be honoured only upon that *single* account, as being constituted *Judge of all men*. This could never be the only reason why "all men should honour the Son even as they honour the Father." What then did St. John mean? Or rather, what did our blessed Lord mean, whose words St. John recites? He meant what he has said, and what the words literally import; that the Father, (whose honour had been sufficiently secured under the Jewish dispensation, and could not but be so under the Christian also,) being as much concerned for the *honour* of his *Son*, had been pleased to commit *all judgment* to him, for this very end and purpose, that men might thereby see and know that the Son, as well as the Father, was *Judge of all the earth*, and might from thence be convinced how reasonable it was, and how highly it concerned them, to pay all the same honour to the Son, which many had hitherto believed to belong to the Father only. And considering how apt mankind would be to lessen the dignity of the Son, (whether out of a vein of disputing, or because he had condescended to become man like themselves,) and considering also that the many notices of the *divinity* of his Person might not be sufficient, with some, to raise in them that esteem, reverence, and regard for him, which they ought to have; for the more effectually securing a point of this high concernment, it pleased the Father to leave the final judgment of the great day in the hands of his Son: men therefore might consider that this Person, whom they were too apt to disregard, was not only their *Creator*, and *Lord*, and *God*, but their *Judge* too, before whose awful tribunal they must one day appear: an awakening consideration, such as might not only convince them of his exceeding excellency and supereminent perfections, but might remind them also, how much it was their interest, as well as duty, to pay him all that honour, adoration, and ser-

vice, which the dignity and majesty of his Person demands ^m.

Let us but suppose the present Catholic doctrine of the coequality and coeternity of the three Persons to be true, what more proper method can we imagine, to secure to each Person the honour due unto him, than this; that every Person should be manifested to us under some peculiar title or character, and enforce his claim of homage by some remarkable dispensation, such as might be apt to raise in us a religious awe and veneration? This is the case in fact; and on this account, chiefly, it seems to be that the Son, rather than the Father, (whose personal dignity is less liable to be questioned,) is to be Judge of all men, that “so all men may honour the Son,” *καθὼς τιμῶσι τὸν πατέρα*. The learned Doctor ⁿ pleads that *καθὼς* often signifies a *general similitude* only, not an *exact equality*: which is very true; and would be pertinent, if we built our argument on the critical meaning of the participle. But what we insist on, is, that our blessed Lord, in that chapter, draws a *parallel* between the *Father* and *himself*, between the *Father's* works and his *own*, founding thereupon his title to honour; which sufficiently intimates what *καθὼς* means; especially if it be considered that this was in answer to the charge of making himself ^o “equal with God.” This is what I intimated in the Query; upon the reading whereof, you are struck with “amazement at so evident an instance, how prejudice “blinds the minds,” &c. But let me persuade you to forbear that way of talking, which (besides that it is taking for granted the main thing in question, presuming that all the prejudice lies on one side, and all the reason on the other) is really not very becoming in this case, considering how many wise, great, and good men, how many churches of the saints, through a long succession of ages, you must, at the same time, charge with *prejudice* and

^m Vid. Jobium ap. Phot. Cod. ccxxii. p. 604.

ⁿ Reply, p. 260.

^o John v. 18.

blindness; and that too after much canvassing and careful considering what objections could be made against them; to which you can add nothing new, nor so much as represent the old ones with greater force than they have been often before, 1300 years ago. It might here be sufficient, for you, modestly to offer your reasons; and, however convincing they may appear to you, (yet considering that to men of equal sense, learning, and integrity, they have appeared much otherwise,) to suspect your own judgment; or, at least, to believe that there may be reasons which you do not see, for the contrary opinion. Well, but after your so great assurance, let us hear what you have to say. "If our Lord had purposely designed, "in the most express and emphatical manner, to declare "his real subordination and dependence on the Father, "he could not have done it more fully and clearly than "he hath in this whole chapter." Yes, sure he might: being charged with *blasphemy*, in making himself *equal* with God, he might have expressed his abhorrence of such a thought; and have told them that he pretended to be nothing more than a *creature* of God's, sent upon God's errand; and that it was not by his *own power* or *holiness*, that "he made the lame man to walk," (see Acts iii. 12.) Such an apology as this would have effectually took off all farther suspicion, and might perhaps have well become a *creature*, when charged with *blasphemy*, who had a true respect for the honour of his *Creator*. But, instead of this, he goes on, a second time, to call himself "Son of God," v. 25. declaring farther, that there was so perfect a union and intimacy between the Father and himself, that he was able to do any thing which the Father did; had not only the same right and authority to work on the *sabbath*, but the same power of giving life to whom he pleased, of raising the dead, and judging the world; and therefore the same right and title to the same honour and regard: and that the execution of those powers was lodged in his hands particu-

larly, lest the world should not be sufficiently apprehensive of his high worth, eminency, and dignity; or should not "honour the Son even as they honour the "Father."

This is the obvious natural construction of the whole passage: you have some pretences against it, which have been examined and confuted long ago by Hilary, Chrysostom, Cyril, Austin, and other venerable Fathers of the Christian Church; so that I have little more to do, than to repeat the answers. *The Jews*, you say, *falsely* and *maliciously* charged him with making himself equal with God. So said the Arians: but what ground had either they or you for saying so? It does not appear that the Evangelist barely repeated what the Jews had said: but he gives the reasons why the Jews sought to kill him; namely, because he *had broke the sabbath*, and because he "made himself equal with God." So thought P Hilary; and he is followed therein by others, whom you may find mentioned in 9 Petavius. And this † Socinus himself was so sensible of, that he could not but allow that the Apostle, as well as the Jews, understood that our blessed Lord had declared himself *equal* to God; only he is forced to explain away the *equality* to a sense foreign to the context.

But supposing that the Apostle only repeated what the Jews had charged him with; how does it appear that the charge was false? It is not to be denied that he had *really* wrought on the sabbath, and had *really* called God *his Father*, and in a sense peculiar; and why should not

† Non nunc, ut in cæteris solet, Judæorum sermo ab his dictus refertur. Expositio potius hæc Evangelistæ est, causam demonstrantis cur Dominum interficere vellent. *Hil. Trin.* l. vii. p. 935.

9 De Trin. p. 152.

† Ex modo loquendi quo usus est Evangelista, sentiam cum omnino una cum Judæis censuissæ Christum, verbis illis, se æqualem Deo fecisse—necesse sit intelligere hoc ipsum eum quoque sensissæ, non minus quam senserit Christum appellasse Deum *Patrem suum*, quod ab ipso, uno et eodem verborum contextu, proxime dictum fuerat. *Socin. Resp. ad Vujek.* p. 577.

the rest of the charge be as true as the other? The context and reason of the thing seem very much to favour it. His saying, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work," must imply, either that he had an equal right to do any thing his Father did; or, that he was so intimately united to him, that he could not but act in concert with him: which is farther confirmed by what follows, v. 19. "What things soever he doth, these also doth the Son "likewise." Besides, that had this been only a malicious suggestion, a false charge of the Jews, the Evangelist, very probably, would have given intimation of it, as we find done in other cases of that nature, (John ii. 21. Matt. xvi. 12.) This is the substance of St. Chrysostom's reasoning, in answer to your first objection; and I am the more confirmed in its being true and right, by observing, as before said, that Socinus himself, a man so much prejudiced on the other side, could not help falling in with the same way of thinking, so far, as to believe that the Apostle and the Jews both agreed in the same thing, viz. that our Lord did, by what he had said, make himself *equal with God*, in some sense or other; such as the Jews thought to be *blasphemy*, and in consequence whereof, they would have *killed*, i. e. *stoned* him. Another exception you make from the words, "the Son can "do nothing of himself:" the obvious meaning of which is, that being so nearly and closely related to God, as a *Son* is to a *Father*; the Jews might depend upon it, that whatever he did, was both agreeable to and concerted with his Father; and ought to be received with the same reverence and regard, as if the Father himself had done it. He, as a *Son*, being perfectly one with his Father, could do nothing *ἐναντίον τῷ Πατρὶ*, *against his Father*, nothing *ἀλλότριον*, nothing *ξένον*, (as Chrysostom expresseth it,) both having the same nature; and harmoniously uniting always in *operation* and *energy*. Hence it was, that, if one *wrought*, the other must *work* too; if one did any thing, the other should do *likewise*; if one *quicken*ed whom he would, so should the other also; and if one

had *life in himself*, (or the *power of raising the dead*,) so should the other have too: and if the Father was primarily *Judge of the world*, in right of his prerogative as *Father*, the Son should have it in the *exercise and execution*, to manifest the equality. Now, here is no straining and forcing of texts, but the literal, obvious, natural interpretation. But the interpretation which you give is plainly forced, makes the context incoherent, and the whole passage inconsistent. For, be pleased to observe your sense of verse the 19th. The Son can do nothing but by *commission* from the Father: Why? then follows, “For what things soever he doth, these also doth the Son likewise.” Does it follow, because he “can do nothing of himself,” in your sense, that therefore he can do every thing which the Father does? Where is the sense, or connection? Is he here limiting and lessening his own powers, as, upon your principles, he should have done, in answer to the charge of blasphemy? No; but he extends them to the utmost; and, instead of retracting, goes on in the same strain, and says more than he had said before. To make good sense and coherence of the passage, upon your scheme, you must fill up the deficiency thus: The Son can do nothing but by commission; *and commission he has*, to do every thing that the Father doth: which, though it sounds harsh, and looks too familiar for a *creature* to pretend, yet might make the context coherent. However, since the interpretation I have before given is more natural and more obvious, argues no deficiency in the text, makes the whole coherent, and has nothing harsh or disagreeing in it, it ought to be preferred. For, after all, it must be thought very odd and strange for a *creature* to be *commissioned* or empowered to do *all things* that the *Creator* doth; and to do them *ὁμοίως* in the *same manner*, also I do not make any forced construction: for so the 20th verse, immediately following, interprets it; “For the Father loveth the Son, and showeth him *all things* that “himself doth.” You endeavour indeed to make some

advantage of this very text; alleging that "this power " which the Son exercised, was given him, not by *necessity*, (which is no gift,) but by *free love*." But why must *love* imply freedom? Doth not God *love* himself? And if the love of himself be no matter of choice, why must the love of his Son, his *other self*, be represented otherwise? You are forced to *add* to the text, to give some colour to your argument; and to call it *free love*, when the text says only, that the Father *loveth*.

Thus far I have endeavoured to clear up the sense of St. John; and to vindicate it from your exceptions: which are not of so great weight, that you need be *amazed* at any man's thinking slightly of them. Hilary well observes, that the drift and design of our Saviour's words was to declare his *equality* of nature with the Father, and his *Sonship*, at the same time. ^s No *inferior* nature could be capable of *having all things*; nor could a *Son* have them but as *communicated*. So that, in the whole, it is directly opposite to such as either disown an *equality* of nature, or a *real* distinction; wherefore Hilary concludes triumphantly, both against Arians and Sabellians, in words very remarkable, which I shall throw into the 'margin.

But you add, as a recapitulation of what you had said upon this article: "If therefore to be freely sent, and to " act in the name and by the authority of another, be, to " assume an equality of honour and regard with that " other, by whom he was sent; we must for ever despair " to understand the meaning of words, or to be able to " distinguish between a delegated and a supreme unde- " rived power," (p. 97.) To which I make answer: if declaring himself to be the *proper Son* of that other, which

^s Omnia habere sola natura possit indifferens; neque nativitas aliquid habere possit, nisi datum sit, p. 928.

^t Conclusa sunt omnia adversum hæretici furoris ingenia. *Filius est, quia ab se nihil potest. Deus est, quia quæcunque Pater facit, et ipse eadem facit. Unum sunt, quia exæquatur in honore, eademque facit non alia. Non est Pater, quia missus est, p. 929.*

He has more to the same purpose, p. 1015, 1251.

both the Jews and the Apostle understood to be the same with making himself *equal* with him: if his claiming to himself the same right, power, and authority which the other hath; and asserting that he is able to do whatever the other doth; and that the *exercise* of those powers is left to him, for this very end and purpose, that all men may honour the one even as they honour the other: if this be not assuming an equality of honour and regard with that other; we must for ever despair to understand the meaning of words, or to be able to distinguish between what is proper to a *creature*, and what to the *Creator only*.

As to what you hint concerning a *delegated* power, it is not to your purpose; unless you could prove that one person cannot be *delegate* to another, without being unequal, in *nature*, to him; which would prove that one man cannot be *delegate* to another man^a; besides other absurdities. Acting by a *delegated* power does by no means infer any *inferiority* of *nature*, but rather the quite contrary; especially, if the charge be such, as no *inferior nature* could be able to sustain; or if the honour attending it, or consequent upon it, be too great for an *inferior nature* to receive; as the case is here. However, the divine administration, and wonderful *οικονομία* of the Three Persons, with their order of acting, is what we must not presume perfectly to understand; nor can any certain argument be drawn against the thing, from our imperfect and inadequate conceptions of it.

If it be objected, that there is a *supremacy* of *order* lodged in one more than in the other; let that be rightly understood, and I shall not gainsay it. The Father, as *Father*, is *supreme*; and the Son, as *Son*, *subordinate*. We pretend not to make the Son the *first*, but the *second* Person of the Godhead. Whatever inequality of honour such a *supremacy* of one, and *subordination* of the other necessarily imply, while the *nature* or *essence* is supposed *equal*,

^a See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, p. 59.

it may be admitted: but I am not apprised that they infer any; because, though there are two Persons, there is but one ^x*undivided* nature; which makes the case widely different from that of one man (a distinct and *separate* being) acting under another.

What follows, of your answer to the present Query, is only ringing changes upon the old objection, drawn from your imaginary sense of *individual substance*. And here you let your thoughts rove, and abound much in flight and fancy; conceiving of the *Trinity*, after the manner of bodies, and reasoning from corporeal and sensible images. A blind man would thus take his notion of colours, perhaps, from his *hearing* or *feeling*; and make many fanciful demonstrations against the *doctrine* of *vision*; which would all vanish, upon the opening of his eyes. Were we as able to judge of what may, or may not be, in relation to the *modus* of the divine existence, as we are to judge of common matters, lying within the sphere of our capacity, there might then be some force in the objections made against the doctrine of the Trinity from natu-

^x Unius autem substantiæ, et unius status, et unius potestatis, quia unus Deus. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* c. 2. *Unius divinitatis Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus. Id. de Pud.* c. 21.

Ἐνὶ τῷ Θεῷ καὶ τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ λόγῳ υἱῷ, νομίσθη ἀμείστη, πάντα ὑποστάσθαι. *Athenag. Leg.* c. xv. p. 64.

Unam et eandem omnipotentiam Patris ac Filii esse cognoscas; sicut unus atque idem est cum Patre Deus et Dominus. *Orig. περὶ Ἀρχ.* l. i. c. 2.

Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλην δόξαν πατρὸς, καὶ ἄλλην υἱὸς ἔχου, ἀλλὰ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτήν. *Cyrril. Catech.* vi. p. 77. ed. Ox.

Ὁ ἰν αὐτῷ τὸν πατέρα ἔχων, πᾶσαν περιέχει τὴν πατρικὴν ἰξουσίαν καὶ δύναμιν, ὃ δὲ ἄλλο ἔχων (πατέρα) καὶ τὴν ἰξουσίαν αὐτοῦ πάντως ἔχου. *Greg. Nys. contr. Eunom.* l. i. p. 14.

Totum Pater, totum possidet Filius: unius est quod amborum est, quod unus possidet singulorum est; Domino ipso dicente; *Omnia quæcunque habet Pater, meo sunt*; quia Pater in Filio, et Filius manet in Patre. Cui, *affectu non conditione, charitate non necessitate, decore* subjicitur, per quem Pater semper honoratur. Denique inquit: *Ego et Pater unum sumus*. Unde non *diminutiva*, sed *religiosa*, ut dixi, subjectione est Filius Patri subjectus: cum originalis perpetuique regni una possessio, coæternitatis omnipotentiamque una substantia, una æqualitas, una virtus majestatis augustæ, unito in lumine una dignitas retinetur. *Zen. Veronens. cit. a Bull. D. F.* p. 266.

ral reason: but since many things, especially those relating to the incomprehensible nature of God, may be true, though we cannot conceive how; and it may be only our ignorance, which occasions some appearing inconsistencies; we dare not reject a doctrine so well supported by Scripture and antiquity, upon so precarious a foundation as this; that *human understanding is the measure of all truth*: which is what all objections of that kind, at length, resolve into.

This being premised, let us next proceed to examine your pretences, that I may not seem to neglect any thing you have, that but looks like reasoning. The Query had intimated, that the Son *derives* his essence and power in a manner *ineffable*. Against which you object thus: "But is it not self-evident, that, let the *manner* of the Son's generation or derivation be ever so *ineffable*, if any *thing* was generated, or derived, it must be a *distinct individual substance*?" No; but we think it sufficient to say, that it must be a distinct individual *Person*. All the difficulty here lies in fixing and determining the sense of the words *individual substance*. Would you but please to define the terms, we should soon see what we have to do. But you go on: "It could not be part of the Father's substance; that is absurd: and to say, it was the whole, is so flagrant a contradiction, that I question whether there can be a greater in the nature and reason of things. Can the same *individual substance* be *derived*, and *underived*? Or, can there be a *communication*, and *nothing communicated*? For, it is supposed, that the *whole* essence, or *substance*, is *communicated* to the *Son*, and yet remains *whole* and *uncommunicated*, in the *Father*; which is evidently *to be*, and *not to be*, at the same time." This is your reasoning, founded only on your mistake and misapprehension: by *Father's substance*, as it seems, you understand the *Father's Hypostasis*, or *Person*; and are proving, very elaborately, that the *Father* never communicated his own *Hypostasis*, or *Person*, either *in whole* or *in part*. You should first have

shown us what body of men, or what single man, ever taught that doctrine, which you take so much pains to confute. Let me now propose a difficulty, much of the same kind, and nearly in the same words, to you; only to convince you that objections of this nature are not peculiar to the doctrine of the Trinity, but affect other points likewise, whose truth or certainty you make no manner of doubt of. What I mean to instance in, is God's *omnipresence*: that God, the same *individual* God, is every where, you will readily allow; and also that the *substance* of God, is God. Now, will you please to tell me, whether that *divine substance*, which fills heaven, be the same *individual* substance with that which filleth all things? If it be not the *same individual substance*, (as by your reasoning it cannot,) it remains only that it be *specifically* the same; and then the consequence is, that you make not one substance *in number*, but *many*; the very thing which you charge the doctrine of the Trinity with. But farther, the *divine* substance is in heaven; that is without question: now, I ask, whether the *substance* which fills heaven, be *part* only of that substance, or the *whole*? If it be *part* only, then God is not in heaven, but a *part* of God only; and the attributes belonging to the whole substance cannot all be contracted into any one *part*, without defrauding the other *parts*; and therefore there can be only *part* of infinite power, *part* of infinite wisdom, *part* of infinite knowledge, and so for any other attribute. For if you say, that the *whole* infinite wisdom, power, &c. residing in the *whole*, is *common* to every part, "it is" (to use your own words) "so flagrant a contradiction, that I question whether there can be a greater "in the nature and reason of things." Can the same *individual* power, wisdom, &c. be communicated, and not communicated? Or, *can there be a communication, and nothing communicated?* For it is supposed, that the whole *wisdom, power, &c.* is communicated to one particular

As to your gird upon Tertullian, in your notes, I refer you to Bull, D. F. p. 95. for an answer.

part; and yet remains *whole* and uncommunicated in the other parts; “which is evidently *to be*, and *not to be*, at the “same time.” If you tell me, that *part* and *whole* are not properly applied to *wisdom*, *power*, &c. I shall tell you again, that they are (for any thing you or I know) as *properly* applied to the *attributes*, as they are to the *subject*; and belong to both, or neither. And since you are pleased to talk of *parts* and *whole* of God’s substance, of which you know little, give me leave to talk in the same way, where I know as little. The learned Doctor represents it as a great *solecism* to speak of an *ℓ*, or a *mile* of *consciousness*. He may be right in his observation: but the natural consequence deducible from it is, that *thought* is not compatible with an *extended* subject. For there is nothing more unintelligible, or, seemingly at least, more repugnant, than *unextended* attributes in a subject *extended*: and many may think that an *ℓ*, or a *mile* of God (which is the Doctor’s notion) is as great a *solecism* as the other. Perhaps, after all, it would be best for both of us to be silent, where we have really nothing to say: but as you have begun, I must go on with the argument, about the *omnipresence*, a little farther. Well, if it cannot be *part* only of the divine substance, which is in heaven, since *God* is there, and since all the perfections and attributes of the Deity have there their full exercise; let us say that the *whole* divine substance is there. But then how can he be omnipresent? Can the same *individual* substance be *confined* and *unconfined*? Or can there be a *diffusion* of it every where, and yet *nothing diffused*? For it is supposed that the whole essence or substance is diffused all over the universe, and yet remains whole and undiffused in heaven. Which, again, is “evidently *to be*, “and *not to be*, at the same time.”

I should hardly forgive myself, upon any other occasion, such trifling in serious things. If you take to this kind of *reasoning* (which is really not *reasoning*, but run-

• Clarke’s Lett. p. 40.

ning riot with *fancy* and *imagination*) about matters infinitely surpassing human comprehension, you will make lamentable work of it. You may go on, till you reason, in a manner, God out of his attributes, and yourself out of your faith; and not know at last where to stop. For, indeed, all arguments, of this kind, are as strong for *atheism*, as they are against a *Trinity*: wherefore it concerns you seriously to reflect, what you are doing. This, and the like considerations, have made the wisest and coolest men very cautious how they listened to the roving of wanton thought, in matters above human comprehension. The pretended contradictions, now revived by many, against the doctrine of the Trinity, are very old and trite. They were long ago objected to the Christians, by the heathen idolaters. They almost turned the heads of Praxeas, Noëtus, Sabellius, Manichæus, Paul of Samosata; not to mention Arius, Nestorius, Eutyches, and other ancient heretics. The Catholics were sensible of them: but having well considered them, they found them of much too slight moment, to bear up against the united force of Scripture and tradition. The doctrine of the Trinity, with all its seeming contradictions, has stood the test, not only of what human wit could do, by way of dispute; but of all that rage and malice could contrive, through a persecution almost as bitter and virulent, as any that had ever been under heathen emperors. This is to me an additional confirmation, that the doctrine we profess is no such gross imposition upon the common sense and reason of mankind, as is pretended. It was neither force nor interest that brought it in; nor that hath since, so universally, upheld it: and men are not generally such idiots, as to love contradictions and repugnancies, only for humour or wantonness, when truth and consistency are much better, and may be had at as easy a rate. These reflections have carried me rather too far: but they may have their use among such readers as know little of the history of this controversy; or how long it had been buried; till it pleased some amongst us to call it up again,

and to dress it out with much art and *finesse*; to take the populace, and to beguile the English reader. Many things have fallen under this Query, which properly belonged not to it. But it was necessary for me to pursue you, what way soever you should take. You was more at liberty: my method is determined by yours.

QUERY XX.

Whether the Doctor need have cited 300 texts, a wide of the purpose, to prove what nobody denies, namely, a subordination, in some sense, of the Son to the Father; could he have found but one plain text against his eternity or consubstantiality, the points in question?

YOUR answer to this is very short, not to say negligent. You say, "if the Doctor's 300 texts prove a real subordination, and not in name only, the point is gained against the Querist's notion of *individual consubstantiality*; unless the same individual intelligent substance can be subordinate to itself, and consubstantial with itself." Here you are again doubling upon the word *individual*. The Querist never had such a notion as that of *personal consubstantiality*, which is ridiculous in the sound, and contradiction in sense; and yet you are constantly putting this upon the Querist, and honouring him with your own presumptions. Let me again show you, how unfair and disingenuous this method is. Do not you say that the same *individual substance* is present in heaven, and, at the same time, filleth all things? That it *pervades* the sun, and, at the same time, *penetrates* the moon also? I might as reasonably argue that you, by such positions, make the *same individual substance* greater and less than *itself*, remote and distant from *itself*, higher and lower than *itself*, to the right and to the left of *itself*, containing and contained, bounded and unbounded, &c. as you can pretend to draw those odd surprising consequences

* Clarke's Reply, p. 7.

upon the Querist. Would not you tell me, in answer, that I misinterpreted your sense of *individual*, and took advantage of an ambiguous expression? Let the same answer serve for us; and you may hereafter spare your readers the diversion of all that unmanly trifling with an *equivocal* word. But enough of this matter. I might have expected of you, in your reply to this Query, one text or two to disprove the Son's *eternity* and *consubstantiality*, and to supply the deficiency of the Doctor's treatise: but since you have not thought fit to favour me with any, I must still believe that the Doctor's 300 texts, though very wide of the purpose, are all we are to expect; being designed, instead of *real* proof, to carry some show and appearance of it, that they may seem to make up in number what they want in weight. All that the learned Doctor proves by his 300 texts, or more, is only that the Son is *subordinate* to the Father: whether as a *Son*, or as a *creature*, appears not. However, the *tacit* conclusion which the Doctor draws from it, and insinuates carefully to his reader, is, that the Son is not strictly and *essentially* God; but a *creature* only. This inference we deny utterly; alleging that a *subordination* may be, and may be understood, between two persons, without the supposition of any *inferiority of nature*: but all the answer we can get to this is, that ^b*nature* and *essence* are *obscure metaphysical* notions; (which is neither true, nor to the purpose, nor consistently pleaded by one who builds so much upon *self-existence*, a *metaphysical* term, the word *equivocal*, and the *notion* sufficiently *obscure*.) And thus, as soon as the learned Doctor comes up to the pinch of the question, not being willing to own the force of what is urged, he very wisely dissembles it, and goes off in a mist of words.

I cannot but take notice, upon this occasion, of your charging us frequently, in an invidious manner, with the use we make of *metaphysical* terms. I know no reason

^b Reply, p. 17, 19, 21.

you have for it, except it be to anticipate the charge, as being conscious to yourselves how notoriously you offend in this kind. Any man, that is acquainted with the history of Arianism, knows that its main strength lay in *logical* and *metaphysical* subtilties. The faith of the Church was at first, and might be still, a plain, easy, simple thing; did not its adversaries endeavour to perplex and puzzle it with *philosophical* niceties, and *minute* inquiries into the *modus* of what they cannot comprehend. The first Christians easily believed that *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, in whose name they were *baptized*, and whom they *worshipped*, were equally *divine*; without troubling themselves about the manner of it, or the reconciling it with their belief in one *God*. As men generally believe that *God foreknows* every thing, and that man notwithstanding is a *free agent*, (scarce one perhaps in a thousand concerning himself how to reconcile these two positions, or being at all apprehensive of any difficulty in it;) so, probably, the plain honest Christians believed every Person to be *God*, and all but one *God*; and troubled not their heads with any nice speculations about the *modus* of it. This seems to have been the artless simplicity of the primitive Christians, till prying and pretending men came to start difficulties, and raise scruples, and make disturbance; and then it was necessary to guard the faith of the Church against such cavils and impertinencies as began to threaten it. *Philosophy* and *metaphysics* were called in to its assistance; but not till *heretics* had shown the way, and made it in a manner necessary for the Catholics to encounter them with their own weapons. Some new terms and particular *explications* came in by this means; that such as had a mind to corrupt or destroy the faith, might be defeated in their purposes. It was needless to say that generation was *without division*, while nobody suspected or thought of any *division* in the case: but after *heretics* had invidiously represented the Catholics as asserting a *division*, it was high time for the Catholics to resent the injury, and to deny the charge. There was no occa-

sion for the mentioning of three *Hypostases*, till such as Praxeas, Noëtus, and Sabellius, had pretended to make *one Hypostasis* an article of faith; drawing many very *novel* and dangerous consequences from their prime position. The *ἰμωούσιον* itself might have been spared, at least out of the *creeds*, had not a fraudulent abuse of good words brought matters to that pass, that the Catholic faith was in danger of being lost, even under Catholic language. To return to our point: there would be no occasion now for distinguishing between *subordination of order* and of *nature*, were it not manifest how much the Catholic faith may be endangered by the endeavours of some, to slip one upon us for the other. Such as know any thing of *fair* controversy, may justly expect of you, that you support your cause, not by repeating and inculcating the word *subordinate*, (as if there was a charm in syllables, or men were to be led away by sounds,) but by proving, in a rational manner, that *all subordination* implies such an *inferiority* as you contend for. If this can be done, the Doctor's 300 texts (which are very good texts, and have undoubtedly an excellent meaning) may appear also to be pertinent to the cause in hand.

QUERY XXI.

Whether he be not forced to supply his want of Scripture-proof by very strained and remote inferences, and very uncertain reasonings from the nature of a thing confessedly obscure and above comprehension; and yet not more so than God's eternity, ubiquity, prescience, or other attributes, which we are obliged to acknowledge for certain truths?

TO the former part of the Query, you "answer directly "in the negative." To which I rejoin, that I still maintain the *affirmative*, and can readily make it good. The Doctor's insinuating from the 300 texts (which style the Father *God* absolutely, or the one God) that the Son is not strictly and *essentially* God, not one God with the Father,

is a strained and remote inference of his *own*; not warranted by Scripture, nor countenanced by Catholic antiquity; but contradictory to both. Besides this, I must observe to you, that the main strength of the Doctor's cause lies, first, in his giving either a ^c *Sabellian* or *Tritheistic* turn (admitting ^d no *medium*) to the Catholic doctrine; and then charging it with *confusion* of *Persons*, *polytheism*, *nonsense*, or *contradiction*. Take away that, to which his constant resort is, whenever he comes to the pinch of the question, and there will be little left considerable. He shows his reader *Tritheism*, and he shows him *Sabellianism*, (keeping the Catholic doctrine, which is neither, out of sight,) and then recommends *Arianism* (disguised) to him, as the best of the three. Now, since the Catholic doctrine has been generally thought different from any of the three, and more followed than all the rest put together, it ought to have been fairly presented, in company with the other; that so the reader, having all the *four* before him, might be the more able to pass a right judgment of them. You will frequently find the learned Doctor combating the *Catholic* faith under the disguise of *Sabellianism*, as if there was no difference between them: or if it be at all distinguished from *Sabellianism*, it immediately commences *Tritheism*; and a plurality of *coordinate* *Persons* is inevitable with the learned Doctor: this is the sum of his performance. Scripture, indeed, is brought in, and Fathers too, which is still more surprising: but the whole, in a manner, is this one *sylogism*.

If the Son be *consubstantial* with God the Father, he must be either *individually* or *specifically* so: but the former is *Sabellianism*, the latter *Tritheism*, both absurd: therefore, &c.—

The learned Doctor very well knows, how easy it

^c See instances, *Script. Doctr.* p. 99, 102, 293, 426, 465. first ed. Reply, p. 35, 38, 51, 53, 93, 121.

^d *Script. Doctr.* p. 86, 132, 415, 430, 435, 437, 441, 447, 455, 465. first ed.

would be to match this *syllogism*, or *sophism*, with others of the like kind, against *omnipresence*, *eternity*, *prescience*, and even *self-existence*: which, in reverence to the subject, and for prudential reasons, I forbear; sorry to find the cause put upon such a way of reasoning, as tends to undermine something more than the doctrine of the Trinity. But I proceed.

To give the better colour to his charge of *Tritheism*, the Doctor every where takes it for granted (which was the only way, when it could not be proved) that God the Son cannot be *really* distinct, and strictly *divine* too, unless he be *coordinate*, in all respects, with the Father; which would be contrary to the supposition of his being a *Son*, and *second* Person. Two *coordinate* Persons, it seems, they must be; or else one of them must inevitably be a *creature*: this is plainly his meaning, however studiously he avoids the word *creature*; choosing rather to insinuate covertly, what is too gross to appear in broad terms. The whole, you see, terminates in a *philosophical* question: And what occasion have we for Scripture or Fathers, (except it be to amuse our readers,) if *philosophy* can so easily end the dispute? For it is very certain that neither Scripture nor Fathers can add force to, if *concurring*; nor, if *reclaiming*, be able to stand against clear and evident demonstration. But *demonstration* is the thing wanting: as to *presumptions* and *conjectures*, we are in no pain about them. I shall have a farther occasion to consider the charge of *Tritheism* hereafter; and therefore, dismissing it for the present, shall return to the business of the Query.

To the latter part of it you answer, that "God's attributes are so far from being above comprehension, that they are all strictly demonstrable by reason." You was sensible this was wide; and therefore very justly corrected it, in the words immediately following. "But I am willing to suppose" (how could you make any

• Script. Doctr. p. 86, 415, 430, 437, 441, 447, 455, 465. first ed.

doubt of it?) "that the author meant, that the MANNER "of their existence in the divine nature is above comprehension; and so indeed it is." Very well; and yet you believe the *reality* of those *attributes*. Why then so *unequal* and *partial*, with respect to the Trinity, the case being exactly the same? why may not the thing be true, though the MANNER, or *modus* of it, be above comprehension? You add, "Though the manner of the Son's "derivation is above comprehension, yet his real subordination is strictly demonstrable," p. 99.

Tantamne rem tam negligenter?

Here the argument was, in a manner, brought to a head; and the fate of the controversy depended on this article. Here you had a fair opportunity given you of laying on your charge of contradiction, if you had any you could depend on; and of clearing God's attributes (particularly the three mentioned) from being liable to the same or the like charge. But, instead of this, you walk calmly off with one sentence; in which, to be plain with you, it will be hard to find either weight or pertinency. If you mean, by *real subordination*, the subordination of a *creature* to God; or of one Person inferior in *nature* to another of a *higher, superior, or more perfect* nature; it is not *demonstrable from Scripture*; nor can it any way be proved: if you mean any thing else, it is not pertinent.

You are so kind as to allow the *manner* of the Son's *derivation*, or generation, to be *above comprehension*. The Eunomians, your predecessors in this controversy, thought (and they thought right) that, in order to support their cause, it would be necessary to affirm the nature of God to be *comprehensible*, or not above human comprehension; and therefore it is, that † Philostorgius censures Eusebius

† Epiph. Hæres. lxxvi. p. 916. Socrat. E. H. l. iv. c. 7. p. 176. Theodoret. Hæret. Fab. l. iv. c. 3. Cyril. Alex. Thesaur. p. 260. ed. Paris. Chrysostom. Hom. xxvii. tom. i. p. 307.

‡ Philostorg. lib. i. p. 468. ed. Valçq.

for closing in with the contrary opinion. You are more modest; they more consistent: for indeed this controversy, managed upon the foot of mere reason, terminates at length in that single question, *Whether the essence of God be above comprehension, or no.* The Catholics stood up for the *affirmative*; the wiser, but bolder, Arians maintained the *negative*: and this is what, if you understand your own principles, and will be at the pains to trace them to the last result, you will be obliged to take shelter in, or to give up your cause, so far as concerns all arguments drawn from the nature and reason of the thing. Some of our English Socinians have expressed themselves as roundly, upon this head, as any of the ancient Arians, or Eunomians; declaring the divine nature to be no more *mysterious* than that of his creatures. Such assertions are shocking; but there is a necessity for them, if some men will be consistent, and ingenuous enough to speak out. They would not advance such bold paradoxes, if they were not forced to it.

Before I leave this Query, it will be proper to acquaint our readers what we mean by believing *mysteries*. For I find that this is a matter which is apt to give great offence, and to occasion many sad and tragical complaints. ^b Dr. Whitby is one of the most considerable men that I have observed giving into that popular way of reasoning, which had been formerly left (as it ought to be still) to writers of a lower class. He is very much disturbed that any thing should be proposed as an *article of faith*, which is not to be *understood*: and observes, that no man in his sober senses can give his assent to what he *understands* not; meaning, understands *not at all*. He is certainly very right, I do not say pertinent, in the remark: and I may venture to add, that no man, whether *sober* or otherwise, can do it. For, undoubtedly, where there is no *idea*, there can be no assent: because *assenting to nothing*, is the very same with *not assenting*. Thus far we are per-

^b Disquis. Modest. Praef. p. 19.

fectly agreed. But for the clearing up of this matter, I shall endeavour to reduce what relates to it, to the following particulars, as so many distinct cases.

1. Let the first case be, where the terms of a proposition, subject and predicate, (or either of them,) are not at all understood by the Person to whom it is given. For instance; the words, *Mene mene tekel upharsin*, carried no idea at all with them, till the Prophet had interpreted them; before which king Belshazzar could give no assent to them. The same is the case of any proposition given in an unknown language, or in such words, of a known language, as a person understands not. Only, I would have it observed, that, in such a case, a man neither admits nor rejects the *proposition*; because to him it is no *proposition*, but merely sounds or syllables.

2. A second case is, when the proposition is given in a language well understood, and in words which ordinarily convey *ideas* to the mind; but words so put together, in that instance, as to furnish us with no certain determinate meaning. A late anonymous writer has hit upon a very proper example of this very case. "A woman ought to have power on her head, because of the angels." The words, *woman, power, head, angels*, are all plain words, and carry with them obvious familiar *ideas*. And yet a man may have no *idea* of what is asserted in that proposition; and therefore can give no assent to it, more than this; that it is true in some sense or other, or that something should be believed, if he understood what: which is not assenting to that proposition, but to another; namely, that "whatever Scripture asserts, is true." The aforesaid author observes, very shrewdly, that having no certain *ideas* of the terms of the *proposition*, it is to him a *mystery*. I may add, that the *pertinency* of his observation is another such *mystery*; and the justice and equity of his drawing a parallel between this and the *mysteries* of *Christianity*, properly so called, must be a *mystery* to as many as cannot perceive either the *sense* or the *ingenuity* of doing it. But,

3. Another case may be, when the terms of a proposition are understood, but are so connected or divided, as to make a proposition manifestly repugnant. *A triangle is a square, A globe is not round,* or the like. Such propositions we reject; not because we do not understand them, but because we do; and understand them to be false. Sometimes indeed a contradiction lies concealed under the words it is couched in, till it be resolved into plainer. For instance: this proposition, *The existence of a first cause is demonstrable, a priori*: as it lies under these terms, it seems reducible to case the second; as being sound without sense. But resolve it into this; *There is a cause prior to the first*; and then the ⁱrepugnancy appears. So again: *Necessity of existence is antecedently (in order of nature) the cause or ground of that existence.* These are only so many syllables. But put it thus: *A property is, in order of nature, antecedent to, and the ground and cause of the subject which supports it*; and the contradiction is manifest. Once more: *Necessity absolute and antecedent (in order of nature) to the existence of the first cause must operate every where alike.* This proposition seems to fall under case the second. But let it be resolved into plainer words; and then it will appear that this is the proper place for it.

4. A fourth case is, when the terms of the proposition carry *ideas* with them, *seemingly*, but not *plainly* repugnant. For example: *God certainly foreknows events depending on uncertain causes. The omnipresent substance is not extended.* Propositions of this kind may be, and are assented to; because there may be a greater appearance of repugnancy on the opposite side of the question; or, because there is not reason sufficient for suspending assent.

5. A fifth case is, when a proposition is formed in *ge-*

ⁱ 'Αλλ' οὐδὲ ἰσότητι λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ. αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐκ πρώτων, καὶ γνωσιμότητι συνίσταται, τοῦ δὲ ἀγνώτου οὐδὲν πρὸς αὐτῆς. Clem. Alex. Strom. p. 696.

neral terms, and reaches not to *minute* particulars. "The pure in heart shall see God." The phrase of *seeing God* conveys some *idea*, but *general* only; not particular, precise, or determinate. "At God's right hand are pleasures for evermore." God's *right hand*, and *pleasures*, we have only *general* confuse *ideas* of: yet *ideas* we have; and we assent as far as our *ideas* reach. Having no more than a general confuse perception, our faith in such points can rise no higher, or reach no farther; nor can more be expected of us.

6. A sixth case is, when the terms of a proposition convey *ideas*, but *ideas* of *pure intellect*; such as *imagination* can lay no hold of. Philosophers have illustrated this by the instance of a *chiliagon* and a *triangle*. We *understand* what is meant by a figure of a *thousand* sides, as clearly as we do what is meant by one of *three* only: but we *imagine* one more distinctly than the other. This instance belongs more properly to *distinct* and *confuse* imagination, than to the purpose it is brought for. *Ideas* of numbers, in the abstract, are properly *ideas* of *pure intellect*: and so are, or should be, our *ideas* of our own souls, of *angels*, of *God*: we may *understand* several things of them; but *imagination* has very little to do in such matters. However, our not being able to *imagine*, provided we do but *understand*, is no hindrance to our assent, in propositions of this kind.

7. The last and easiest case is, when the terms convey full and strong *ideas* to the *understanding* and *imagination* also. For instance: The man *Christ Jesus ate, drank, slept, was crucified, died, and was buried, &c.* Here, all is easy, clear, and plain, even to those who love not to think upon the stretch, or to be under any pain in assenting.

Now for the application of the foregoing particulars to the point in hand. Those articles of faith, which the Church has called *mysteries*, belong not to *case* the *first* or *second*, wherein no assent can be given: or if they do, they are no articles of faith, but so many sounds or syl-

lables. It is to be hoped, they come not under *case* the *third*: for *plain* contradictions are certainly no *mysteries*, any more than *plain* truths; as is justly observed by the learned ^kDr. Clarke. For the same reason, they fall not under *case* the *seventh*, where every thing is supposed distinct, clear, and particular as can be desired. Whatever is plainly reducible to any of the *four* cases now mentioned, is either no *matter of faith* at all, or no *mystery*. There remain *three* cases; where the *ideas* are either seemingly *repugnant*, or such as reach not to *particulars*, or such as *imagination* has no concern with. Assent may be given in all these cases, as hath been already observed; and so, possibly, here we may find *articles of faith*: and, if some gentlemen will give us leave, after we have thus explained what we mean by the *term*, we will call such articles *mysteries*. For example:

The belief of *three Persons*, every one singly *God*, and all together *one God*, seems to fall under *case* the *fourth*: the *ideas* are *seemingly*, not *really*, repugnant. We know what we mean, in saying *every one*, as clearly as if we said *any one*, is *God*; a Person having such and such *essential* perfections. We see not perfectly how this is *reconciled* with the belief of *one God*, as we see not how *prescience* is reconciled with *future contingents*. Yet we believe both, not doubting but that there is a *connection* of the *ideas*, though our faculties reach not up to it.

Omnipresence, I think, is another *mystery*, and falls chiefly under *case* the *fifth*. We have a *general confuse idea* of it, and mean something by it. The *particular manner* how it is, we have no notion of; and therefore are not obliged to believe any particular *modus*. Fix upon this or that, there are *appearing* repugnancies and inconsistencies; and so far, this is reducible to *case* the *fourth*, as well as *fifth*.

The *incarnation* of the Son of God is another *mystery*, and comes under *case* the *fourth* and *fifth*. There are

^k Reply, p. 38.

some *seeming*, not *real* repugnancies; and the *ideas* we have of it are *general* and *confuse*, not *particular* nor *special*. Such as our *ideas* are, such must our *faith* be; and we cannot *believe* farther than we *conceive*, for *believing* is *conceiving*; *confusely*, if *ideas* are *confusely*; *generally*, if *general*; *distinctly* and *adequately*, if *distinct* and *adequate*.

The *generation* of the Son of God is another *mystery*. *Ideas* we have of it, and know what we mean by it. But being *spiritual*, *imagination* can lay no hold of them; being *general* and *confuse*, we cannot reach to *particulars*; and being *seemingly* repugnant, we cannot make out the entire connection. *Equality of nature* (which is part of the notion) is a *general* idea, and well understood; *reference to a head, or fountain* is *general* too, but more *confuse*, and besides, *figurative*; *eternal* reference *very* *confuse*, as the *idea* of *eternity* necessarily must be; *inseparability* is *general*, *obscure*, *negative*; and we know but very imperfectly what the union of *spiritual* things means. Nevertheless we *understand* enough (though we can *imagine* little) to make it properly an article of belief; and no man can reasonably pretend to reject it, as having no meaning, or carrying no *idea* at all with it. We assent as far as our *ideas* reach, for we can do no more: we believe in *part*, what is revealed in *part*; our *faith* keeping pace with our *ideas*, and ending where they end.

The *simplicity* of God is another *mystery*, of which we have some, but a very imperfect, *general*, and *obscure* *idea*. It may fall under *case* the *fifth* and *sixth*. *Scripture* says little of it: we have took it chiefly from *metaphysics*, which are short and defective. When we come to inquire, whether *all extension*, or *all plurality*, *diversity*, composition of *substance* and *accident*, and the like, be consistent with it, then it is that we discover how *confuse* and *inadequate* our *ideas* are. And hence it is, that while all parties admit the divine *simplicity*, in the *general*, yet when they come to be pressed with it in dispute, they often give different accounts of it; and easily so ex-

plain and state the notion, as to make it suit with their particular schemes. To this head belongs that perplexing question, (beset with difficulties on all sides,) whether the divine substance be *extended* or no. And if *extension* be admitted, ingenious thoughtful men will divide again, upon another question, whether *infinite* or no; some thinking it very absurd for any attribute of God not to be *infinite*; others thinking it no less absurd to admit any *infinite* extension, *number*, or the like, at all. They that suppose the divine substance *extended*, lest they should be obliged to conceive it as a *point* only; and lest they should admit that any thing can *act where it is not*, are, when pressed with difficulties about *aliquot parts*, forced to admit that any part of that substance, how great soever, or of whatever dimensions, must be conceived only as a *point*, in proportion to the *whole*: from whence it follows, that, unless the *world* be *infinite*, all that *acts* (of that infinite substance) in the *world*, is but a *point*; and so the whole *substance*, except that *point*, either acts not at all in the *world*, or acts *where it is not*. But to proceed.

Self-existence is another *mystery*, of which we know little: and the learned are hardly agreed whether it be a *negative* or *positive* idea. Yet every body believes it in the gross, *confusedly* and *undeterminately*. It is manifest, on one hand, that the *first cause* has no *cause*; neither itself (much less any property of itself) nor any thing else: and yet it may seem very wonderful how any thing should exist without a *reason a priori*; that is, without a *cause* for it¹.

To name no more: *eternity* itself is the greatest *mystery* of all. An *eternity past*, is a thought which puzzles all our philosophy; and is too hard for the sharpest wits to reconcile. The *nunc stans* of the *schools* (though older than the *schools*) has been exploded; and yet *succession*

¹ Οὐ γὰρ δύχεται λογισμὸς εἶδέναι πῶς εἶν τι εὐσίαν εἶναι, μήτι παρ' ἑαυτοῦ, μήτι παρ' ἑτέρου τι εἶναι ἔχουσαν. *Chrys. Hom. xxv. tom. i. p. 298.*

carries with it insuperable difficulties. There is nothing peculiar to the doctrine of the Trinity, any thing near so perplexing as *eternity* is: and yet the gentlemen who are for discarding *mysteries* are forced to believe it. I know no remedy for these things but an humble mind; a just sense of our ignorance in many things, and of our imperfect knowledge in all. Now to return to the learned Dr. Whitby.

After a view of the premises, it might be proper to ask him, whether he dislikes the Catholic doctrine of the holy Trinity, as *perceiving contradictions* in it. If this be the case, however concerned I am for that doctrine, (believing it to be true,) I will venture to say, it would be an acceptable piece of service, if he could any way help others to *perceive* them too. Truth, *certain* truth, will be always welcome, in any cause, and from any hand, to all sober and considerate men. But if this should be done, he should not then complain that he *understands not* the doctrine, but that he *understands* (i. e. *distinctly* perceives) it to be *false*.

If he means that he has no *idea* at all of the *mystery*, not so much as a *general*, *confuse*, or *inadequate* apprehension of it; that must be a mistake; as may appear from what hath been before observed. Besides that having once, or oftener, wrote for it, (though he has since laboured very much to perplex, puzzle, and disparage it,) every candid man must believe that he understood, in some measure, formerly, what he engaged in the proof of.

If the case be, that he does not thoroughly, fully, and adequately comprehend it, and therefore demurs to it; then it should be considered, that the result of all is this only, that he will not admit so far as he may understand, unless he may have the privilege to understand something more: which, whether it be not too familiar from a *creature* towards his *Creator*, and articling more strictly with Almighty God than becomes us, let any wise man judge.

If, lastly, it be pretended that it is a *human*, not a *divine* doctrine, which he is pleased to quarrel with; let him censure it as *human* and *unscriptural* only; and not as *unintelligible*, and *impossible* to be assented to: and then we may bring the cause to a short issue, by inquiring whether the doctrine be *scriptural*, or no. Let things be called by their right names, and set in their true and proper light; that truth may not be smothered, nor any doctrine (especially so ancient and so important a doctrine) condemned, before we know why. So much we owe to the Church of Christ, which receives this faith; to the blessed saints and martyrs, many centuries upwards, who lived and died in it; to truth, to God, and to ourselves, as to see that it be fairly and impartially examined; that “proving all things,” as we ought to do, in sincerity and singleness of heart, we may, at length, be both wise enough to know, and suitably disposed to “hold fast that which is good.”

It is excellently remarked by the ingenious Mr. Emlyn, in the Appendix to his ^m Narrative, “that the holy Scriptures require no accurate, philosophical notions of God’s *eternity*, *omnipresence*, and *immensity*, &c. They are content to give us popular, easy accounts of these matters—they trouble not men with the niceties of *eternal successions*, or an eternal τὸ νῦν, without *succession*; nor with *infinite spaces*, or of God’s being present in *part*, or in *whole*; and the like *metaphysical* difficulties.—Our religion imposes no such difficulties on us, of believing with the understanding what we cannot so much as *perceive* by it; it only requires us to believe what it reveals to us, *i. e.* to our *understanding* and *apprehension*.”

All this is very rightly and judiciously observed. God’s *eternity* and *omnipresence* we have only *general* and *confuse ideas* of; Scripture has not revealed to us the particular *modus*, or *minute* circumstances of either; and we

are not obliged to *believe* any otherwise than as we *apprehend*, (*i. e.* confusely and inadequately;) nor indeed is it possible. The same is the case of three Persons, *every one truly God*, and all but *one God*; so far evident from Scripture, and *apprehended*, in the general, as fully and clearly (perhaps more so) as *eternity*, *omnipresence*, or the like. But the particular *modus*, how the *three* are *one*, and the *minute* circumstances of their *union* and *distinction*, are as much a secret to us, as how God foresees future contingents, or is present in all places at once. Many have been prying and inquisitive into this matter, hoping to know something more particularly of it, till they have come to doubt even of the thing itself, and so have fallen into *heresy*: and Catholics have sometimes exceeded in this way, endeavouring to *explain* beyond their *ideas*; which is really nothing else but multiplying words. The *notion* is soon stated, and lies in a little compass. All that words are good for, after, is only to fix and preserve that *notion*, which is not improvable (without a new revelation) by any new *idea*; but may be obscured and stifled in a multitude of words. The most useful words for fixing the notion of *distinction*, are *person*, *hypostasis*, *subsistence*, and the like: for the *divinity* of each Person, ἑμμοούσιος ἀγένητος, *eternal*, *uncreated*, *immutable*, &c. For their *union*, περιχώρησις, *interior generation*, *procession*, or the like. The design of these terms is not to enlarge our views, or to add any thing to our stock of *ideas*; but to secure the plain fundamental truth, that *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost* are all strictly *divine* and *uncreated*; and yet are not *three Gods*, but *one God*. He that believes this simply, and in the general, as laid down in Scripture, believes enough; and need never trouble his head with nice questions, whether the union of three Persons should be called *individual* or *specific*; whether *Person* and *Being* are *reciprocal* terms; whether every person may be properly said to be *self-existent*; how three persons can be all in the *same place*; whether *all perfection* might not as well have been confined to *one*

Person only; or whether one might not have been as good as *three*, and the like. These are *difficiles nugæ*, mostly *verbal*, or *vain* inquiries; and do not concern *common* Christians, any farther than to be upon their guard, that they be not imposed on by these *subtilties*, invented to puzzle and perplex a plain *Scripture truth*, which is easily *perceived* and *understood* in the *general*, that is, as far as required to be *believed*. *Minute* particulars about the *modus*, may be left to "the disputers of this world," as a trial of their good sense, their piety, modesty, and humility.

We do not take it well to be reproached, as running too far into *metaphysical* subtilties, by men whose peculiar talent it is, to play their *metaphysics* (that is, their *presumptions* about the nature of a thing whereof they know little) against *Scripture* and antiquity, the best guides in those searches. If the Catholics have sometimes gone farther than was necessary, in particular explications, it should be remembered for whose sake they did it; and that it was chiefly with a view to satisfy such as would not be contented with the *general* truth laid down in *Scripture*. I shall show, by an instance or two, how that matter is. The *περιχώρησις*, and *interior generation*, are two *specialities* taught by the Catholics, and heavily complained of by your friend ⁿ Dr. Whitby, as *unscriptural* definitions. Now, these are but appendages to our prime (and, as we think, *scriptural*) positions, and we are no farther concerned for them, than as they are conceived to hang upon the other; so that your quarrel with us for these, is really finding fault with our leading and *fundamental* doctrine of *one God in three Persons*. But to show you how unequal you are in censuring us for *unscriptural* terms, observe the course and method of dispute which draws us first into them. You argue, suppose, that the Son cannot be *God*, in the strict sense, without making *two Gods*: we answer, that *Father* and *Son*, by a most

ⁿ *Disquisit. Modest. Pref.* p. 26.

intimate and ineffable union of *substance, will, power, presence, operation, &c.* (which we call *περιχώρησις*,) may be one God. You argue again, that if the *Son* be a *Son*, in our sense, there must be a *division* and *separate* existence: we say, No; alleging that he may be a *Son* in a *proper* sense, and in our sense, without *division*, and without a *separate* existence; and the name for this is *interior generation*. After we are come thus far, pursuing your wanderings into the *philosophy* of the thing; you step back again, and tell us, that Scripture says nothing of this *περιχώρησις*, or *interior* generation. Supposing (not granting) your pretence true; did you set out upon the foot of Scripture? Does Scripture any where tell you that two divine Persons cannot be one God? or that *Father* and *Son* must have a *separate* existence? You argue only from the nature and reason of the thing itself, of which you have no adequate *idea*; and we answer what is sufficient, and more than sufficient, to confute mere conjectures in matters above your reach. Lay you aside your *unscriptural* objections, and we shall have no occasion for *unscriptural* answers.

I shall just take notice of an artificial turn of Mr. Emlyn's, relating to this subject; and then put an end to this long, but, I hope, useful digression. His words are as follow: "The *pride of reason*, which hindered (*the Pagan philosophers*) from believing in Christ, did not lie in refusing to submit their faith to *mysterious* speculations, which puzzled their reason: but, on the contrary, it lay in a proud affectation of swelling words and philosophic mysteries, and not humbling their understandings to receive a plain Gospel, and familiar doctrine."

The thought is ingenious, and might pass well, if *history*, like *metaphysical arguments*, were to be made merely by strength of wit. He forgets that the *mystery* of the *resurrection* was one of those *plain familiar* things,

° Exam. of Dr. Bennet, &c. p. 5. Introduct.

which the *pride of their reason* refused to submit to. He considers not that the Jews, and the earliest *heretics*, (much of the same temper with the Pagan philosophers,) were offended at nothing more than at the *mystery of God incarnate*; which we learn from Ignatius, Justin, P Irenæus, q Tertullian, and r other ancient writers: and he need but look into Justin, Tatian, and Origen, to find that the Pagans, in particular, were in the same sentiments, and joined in the same common charge against the Christian doctrine. Nay, it may farther appear from other s evidences, that the very *mystery of the Trinity*, which is the “rock of offence” to some even at this time, gave very early offence to the Pagan wits; and was much disrelished by them: so averse were they to the receiving of *mysteries*: and the *pride of reason* wrought, at that time, much after the same manner as it does at this day; human nature being always the same. But it is now high time to proceed.

QUERY XXII.

Whether his (the Doctor's) whole performance, whenever he differs from us, be any thing more than a repetition of this assertion, that being and person are the same, or that there is no medium between Tritheism and Sabelianism? Which is removing the cause from Scripture to natural reason, not very consistently with the title of his book.

IT is of small importance to observe how the Doctor has proved such points, as he and we both agree in. He

p Secundum nullam sententiam hæreticorum Verbum Dei caro factum est. *Iren.* l. iii. c. 11. p. 189.

q Incredibile præsumperant Deum carnem. *Tertull. contr. Marc.* l. iii. c. 8.

r Alii quoque hæretici usque adeo Christi manifestam amplexati sunt divinitatem, ut dixerint illum fuisse sine carne; et totum illi susceptum detraxerint hominem, ne decoquerint in illo divini nominis potestatem si humanam illi sociassent, ut arbitrabantur, nativitatem. *Novat.* c. 18.

s Lucian. Philopatr. Athan. Orat. p. 564.

might have spared the unnecessary pains, and have took a shorter way with us, had his cause been such as could be served by close argument. He need not have told us so often that the Father is *eminently* styled the one God, or that the Son is *subordinate*. We allow all that: the consequence which he draws from it, and covertly insinuates to his reader, is the thing we doubt of. This was the point which should have been laboured, for the conviction of wise and considering men. He has a deal to say in defence of what nobody opposes; and may there triumph securely without an adversary: but when he comes to the *point of difference*, the *pinch* of the *question*, there it is that he discovers his want of proof, and how little he has to depend on, besides that one *precarious* principle intimated in the Query; which indeed runs through his whole performance, and is often *supposed*, but never *proved*.

By this principle he eludes the force of the first chapter of St. John's Gospel: and he refers to it again upon ^u Acts xx. 28. ^x 1 Tim. iii. 16. John v. 18. By the same principle he evades the force of ^y John viii. 58. ^z xii. 41. ^a v. 23. And so he might have done with any number of texts, however full and express for the *received* doctrine: for, by the same ^b maxim, he draws over the Nicene Creed, and does not despair of bringing in the ^c Athanasian also. From hence it is visible, wherein the strength of his performance lies; and what it is that he chiefly trusts to. It is not *Scripture*, it is not *antiquity*, but a *philosophical* principle; to which Scripture, Fathers, Councils, Creeds, every thing, must yield. And indeed had it been a principle of *true* and *sound* philosophy, every reasonable man would be willing to pay the utmost deference to it: but it appears, at length, to be that kind of *vain philosophy*, which is often intruding where it has

^t Script. Doctr. p. 86.

^v Id. p. 99.

^b P. 465.

^u Id. p. 87.

^x P. 102.

^y P. 428, 430, 435, &c. first ed.

^z Id. p. 88, 97.

^a P. 132.

nothing to do. The subject is sublime, and above comprehension. We have no *intrinsic* evidence, no *ideas*, to build any thing *certainly* upon. *Extrinsic* evidence, *divine* revelation, is *here* all in all; and the only proper use of our rational faculties, is to inquire into the true and genuine sense of it. To *philosophize* here from the *nature* and *reason* of the thing itself, of which we know little, is choosing to be still in the dark, when we have light before us; and is not, properly, following our *reason*, but our *conceits*, *fancies*, and fond *conjectures*. You are pleased to say, in defence of the learned Doctor, that “if he had done no more than proved *intelligent being* and *person* to be the same, it must for ever remain an unanswerable difficulty,” &c. Right, if he had *proved* what he has not, something might be said. I have ^d before observed to you, that the word *being* bears two senses; and that you yourselves will not call any thing a *being*, but a *separate* being. Excuse the Trinitarians for being reserved, after your example, in so tender a point; and for endeavouring to speak *properly*, as well as to think *justly*, in things pertaining unto God. All that the Doctor hath proved, or can prove, is only this; that *separate* persons are so many *intelligent beings*; which we readily admit: but *united* persons, or persons having *no separate existence*, may be *one Being*, *one Substance*, *one God*, notwithstanding. And that you may not think that I screen myself under *dark* words, or *obscure* distinctions, I will tell you frankly the meaning of what I have now said. It is little more than this, that persons so united as to make *one Being*, may be *one Being*. I suppose the *affirmative*, that they *may be so united*; having sufficient grounds for it in Scripture, and in Catholic antiquity. It lies upon you, in this case, to prove the *negative*, *viz.* that no union whatever can make two persons *one Being*, *one τὸ Θεῖον*, *one God*: you are to show the supposition to be impossible, in the nature of the thing: that is, (as I

^d Qu. ix. p. 119.

humbly conceive,) you are to prove what you can know nothing of; and are to work up a demonstration without *ideas*. There the matter rests, and, I am persuaded, must rest, till you please to come out of *metaphysics*; and to put the cause upon the foot of *Scripture* and *antiquity*, the only lights in this matter. Strange that, at this time of day, any need to be told (what *unbelievers* only doubted of formerly) that *Scripture* is our rule to go by, for forming our notions of God; and not the light of nature, which is darkness in comparison.

You are offended at the Querist for saying, that the Doctor admits no *medium* between *Tritheism* and *Sabellianism*. I should have said, it seems, *no medium* for his *adversaries*; and you wonder at so *palpable* a mistake. Indeed the meaning of what I said was so *palpable*, that there was no occasion for *guard*, while I supposed myself writing to a man of sense. You have took it right so far: the Doctor allows us, his *adversaries*, no *medium*. But I had an eye to something more, *viz.* that he has, by the same principle, left no *medium* for himself; as I shall show you in due time. I am only to observe now, that it is not from *Scripture*, or from *Catholic antiquity*, that the Doctor has learned this maxim, of *no medium* (for such as believe Christ to be *essentially* God) between *Sabellianism* and *Tritheism*. This was what I complained of, his making a pompous appearance of *Scripture* and *Fathers*, when the whole is made to depend upon a mere *philosophical* question, which is to be the rule and measure to try *Scripture* and *Fathers* by. Let *Scripture* or *Fathers* appear ever so strong and clear for such a *medium*, they are condemned beforehand, either to speak another sense, or to be of no weight or authority. If

* Οὐτι γὰρ φύσι, οὔτι ἀνεξεκλήνη ἰσοία, οὔτω μὲν ἀλα καὶ θία γινώσκων ἀνεξέ-
παις δυνατὸν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἕνωθιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀγίους ἀνδρας τηκεαῦτα κατελθεύθη δουρῖ.
Just. Mart. Paræn. p. 60.

Πανταχόθιν τείνου ιδίαι προήκω, ὅτι οὐδαμῶς ἰτέρως περιθεοῦ ἢ τῆς ἐρθῆς θιο-
συνείας μακράνιν εἶν τι, ἢ παρὰ τῶν προφητῶν μόνου, τῶν διὰ τῆς θείας ἰσισυνείας
διδασκόντων ὑμᾶς. *Ibid.* p. 129. ed. Ox. *Conf. Hippolyt. contr. Noët.* c. 9.

this be the case, (as you seem to admit,) you ought to go upon very sure grounds. And yet the learned Doctor, instead of favouring us with any proof of his main position, which gives the law to the rest, has only often repeated it; which is no more than to say, there cannot be any *medium* in the case; no, there cannot. We do not pretend to be wise enough to know any thing, *a priori*, whether there *can*, or there *cannot*; but, *a posteriori*, we may inquire after *fact*: and if we find by Scripture, rightly understood, that there really is such a *medium*; we shall not be concerned for any pretended strength of your *maxim* against it.

Our defence then against the charge of *Tritheism* will be as follows. By comparing Scripture with Scripture, we plainly find that the *divine* unity is not an unity of *Person*: we observe, that there are more Persons than one dignified with the same high titles of *Lord, God, &c.* invested with the same high powers, attributes, and perfections; and entitled to the same honour, worship, and adoration: and yet the Scripture never tells us of two *true Gods*; but constantly asserts that God is one. We take notice, that the Father is *Jehovah*, and Son is *Jehovah*, and yet the Lord *Jehovah* is one Lord; the Father *creates*, and the Son *creates*, and yet we have no warrant to say *two Creators*; the Father is *worshipped*, and the Son is *worshipped*, and yet we find no foundation for asserting *two objects of worship*, or *two worships*: in a word, the Father is *God*, and the Son is *God*, and yet we are nowhere taught to call them *two Gods*. The obvious conclusion, from these premises, is, that they are both *one God*, (otherwise indeed *Ditheism* is unavoidable,) and thus the Scripture-notion of unity is of more Persons than one in the same Godhead. What confirms us in this reasoning, is, that our blessed Lord has told us, that he and the Father *are one*; that whosoever hath *seen* him, hath *seen the Father*; that he is *in the Father*, and the Father *in him*; and very familiarly speaking of the Father and himself, he says, “we will come unto him,”

(that loveth Christ,) “and make our abode with him.” St. Paul, in his Epistles, asks for the same *grace, mercy,* and *peace* from the Father and Son; and also prays that they may *direct his way*, 1 Thess. iii. 11. These things serve to illustrate and explain each other; and, all together, abundantly make good the position before laid down, that ^f Father and Son are *one God*. Accordingly the Prophet ^ε Isaiah, as may be inferred from ^h St. John, makes them both to be one *holy, holy, Lord of hosts*, therein signifying both the distinction of Persons and unity of Godhead. These considerations (with many others too long to recite) convince us that there is a *medium* (saving the Son’s *essential* divinity) between *Sabellianism* and *Tritheism*. We assert not three absolute, original, coordinate divinities, like the Marcionites; we *separate* not the Persons from each other, with the Arians; we hold not a *specific* unity, (such as between two individuals of any species, two men, for instance.) If we did any of these, there might be some colour for the charge of *Tritheism*. But we acknowledge, with the Scriptures, one God the Father with his *coessential* and *coeternal* Son and Spirit; one head and fountain of all, the three divine Persons being one in nature, one in knowledge, in presence, in operation, and energy; never separate, never asunder; distinct without division, united without confusion. If this be *Tritheism*, it is what the Scripture has taught us, and what God, who best knows his own nature, hath recommended to us. But it is not *Tritheism*; it is the true and only *medium*, which may be found by looking in Scripture for it; and which you seem to have lost by

^f I have hitherto waved the consideration of the Holy Ghost; for which reason also I pass it over here, confining myself chiefly to the point of the Son’s divinity, which if sufficiently cleared, the other, I suppose, may be admitted without scruple.

^ε Isa. ch. 6.

^h John xii. 41.

Vid. Athanas. p. 108, 877, 889. ed. Bened. Basil. contr. Eunom. l. v. p. 115. Hieron. in Isa. vi. et Epist. ad Damas. de eod. Epiph. Ancorat. p. 15, 31.

following a false light, and wandering too far in fanciful speculations.

To confirm us still more in this, we perceive, upon due inquiry, that those who lived nearest the apostolical age, and best knew the mind of the Scriptures, they also taught the same doctrine which we teach. There was some appearance of *Tritheism* in it then, as there is now; which is an argument to us, that it is still the same: but if any Christian seriously took upon him to charge the doctrine with *Tritheism*, and persisted in it, he was immediately rejected by the wiser and soberer Christians, as a *heretic*.

Praxeas, about the year 186, began openly to charge the Catholics with *Tritheism*. But his pretences were easily despised by the Church; and his arguments answered by Tertullian.

Not long after, Noëtus revived the charge, and his plea was, that God is one, and that there could not be a *plurality* in the Godhead: but he went away with the character of a weak and rash man; and was condemned by the Christian Church. At the same time, the Noëtians had so high an opinion of the divinity of Christ, (Scripture and tradition running strong for it,) that ^k they had no way of solving the difficulty, but by making Father and Son *one Person*, and, in consequence, were Patripassians.

About the middle of the third *century* arose Sabellius. He pretended to be extremely zealous for the *unity*, and ^l charged the Catholics with asserting *three Gods*. He has been thought to have refined upon the Noëtian scheme,

ⁱ Epiphan. Hær. lvii. p. 480. Theod. Hæret. Fab. l. iii. c. 3. Hippol. contr. Noët. c. xi. p. 14.

^k Ne videantur *duos Deos* dicere, neque rursus negare Salvatoris Divinitatem, unam eandemque substantiam Patris ac Filii asseverant: id est duo quidem nomina secundum diversitatem causarum recipientem, unam tamen Hypostasim subsistere, id est, unam Personam duobus nominibus subjacentem, qui Latine Patripassiani appellantur. *Orig. apud Pamph. Apol.* p. 226. ed. Bened.

^l Epiphan. Hæres. lxii. p. 514.

(if we may call it *refining*,) by denying a *God incarnate*, after the example of the earlier *heretics*; by which he avoided the error of the Patripassians. If so, he may be looked upon as holding nearly the same principles with the modern Socinians. This conjecture is grounded on a passage in ^m Epiphanius. But ⁿ St. Austin understood the matter otherwise, and the Sabellians have been generally reckoned with the Patripassians.

Within a few years after Sabellius, Paul of Samosata carried on the same charge of ^o *Tritheism* (or rather *Ditheism*) against the Catholics; and was a warm, injudicious Passerter of the *unity*, confining it to the *Father* only, exclusive of the other Persons. But the Catholic Bishops, as ^q Eusebius informs us, ran together against him, as against a wolf, that was endeavouring to destroy the flock of Christ.

About fifty years after him appeared Arius; who, to avoid ^r *Tritheism*, (as he thought,) and to preserve the unity of the Godhead, and that there might be *one* ^s *self-existent Being*, or *Person*, (the same pretexes, in the main, which had been handed down by some ^t before Praxeas, as well as by Praxeas himself, and Noëtus, Sabellius, and Paul of Samosata,) denied the *divinity* of the second Person, only allowing a *real* preexistence, and so making him more ancient than the others before-mentioned did. Such were the men who formerly (joining therein with ^u Jews and Pagans) charged the Catholics with holding a *plurality* of Gods; while the Catholics notwithstanding retained the faith; despising the accusation, as weak, false, and groundless; and defending themselves upon such princi-

^m Epiphanius. Synops. tom. i. l. 2. p. 398. tom. ii. p. 146. ed. Petav.

ⁿ Aug. Hæres. 41.

^o Epist. Synod. Antioch. Lab. tom. i. p. 845.

^p Theodoret. Hæret. Fab. l. ii. c. 8. Athanas. vol. ii. p. 942.

^q Euseb. Eccl. Hist. l. vii. c. 27.

^r Ep. Alexand. apud Theod. E. H. l. i. c. 4. Ambr. de Fid. l. i. c. 1.

^s *Εἰς τὸ ἀγίνωσκον, εἰς ἀγίνωσκον.

^t Vid. Novatian. c. 30.

^u Athan. vol. i. p. 564. Lucian. Philopat. p. 770, 774.

ples as have been before mentioned. None were ever condemned by the Church as *Tritheists*, but such as either denied the *unity of principium*, or made the *Hypostases* heterogeneous, separate, or *alien* from each other.

We have seen then that there is no just ground from *Scripture* or *antiquity* to charge our doctrine with *Tritheism*. If there be any pretence from the nature and reason of the thing itself, it is of very slight moment. The *divine nature* is best known from *Revelation*: it is from thence we discover that God is not *μονοπρόσωπος*, a single *Hypostasis*, but that the Father has his coessential and coeternal Son and Holy Spirit always in him and with him. We can have no other right conception of the *one God*, (to use the words of * Hippolytus,) but by believing in a *real* Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. This is the faith of the ever blessed *Trinity*; which *Scripture* and *Fathers* hold forth to us; and which is too strongly supported, to be weakened by any wit or criticism. As to those who take *Trinity* and *Tritheism* for synonymous terms, they may go on to value themselves upon it. They have Jews, Pagans, and Heretics, fifteen hundred years backwards, to countenance them in it. It is sufficient to have shown, that wiser and better men, the truly *primitive* and *Catholic Church*, never thought it *Tritheism*; but condemned those that thought so.

Having taken off the charge from our doctrine, I come, next, to fix it upon yours; where, I humbly conceive, it ought to lie. I do not pretend that you are *Tritheists*, in every sense; but in the same sense that the Pagans are called *Polytheists*, and in the *Scripture-sense* of the word *God*, as explained and contended for by yourselves. *One divine Person* is, with you, equivalent to *one God*; and

* Ἄλλως τι ἴσα Θεὸν νομίσαι μὴ δυνάμιθα, ἰὰν μὴ ὄντως Πατρὶ, καὶ υἱῷ, καὶ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι πιστεύσωμεν. Hippol. contr. Noët. p. 16.

I shall add his *doxology*, because it has but lately appeared in the Greek, and so has been less took notice of.

Ὅσους ὁ Θεὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος δι' ἡμᾶς γεγονώς, ᾧ πάντα ὑπέταξεν Πατὴρ, αὐτῷ ἡ δόξα καὶ τὸ κρᾶτος ἅμα Πατρὶ καὶ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι, ἰν εἴῃ ἁγίῳ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἔ νῦν, καὶ ἀί, καὶ ἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων, ἀμήν. P. 20. vol. 2. Fabric.

two, to two Gods; and three, to three Gods: the case is plain; the consequence unavoidable. One *supreme* and two *inferior* Gods, is your avowed doctrine: and, certainly, the asserting three Gods (whether *coordinate* or otherwise) is *Tritheism*; against the *first commandment*, against the whole tenor of Scripture, and the principles of the primitive Church. It is, to me, an instance of the ill effects of *vain philosophy*, and shows how the “puter of this world” may get the better of the Christian; when men appear so much afraid of an *imaginary* error in *metaphysics*, and, to avoid it, run into a *real* one, against Scripture and antiquity. You tell me, indeed, that if I am positive in this, you will bring both ^γ Ante-Nicene and Nicene Fathers against me. But let me advise you to read them (a second time) over; and you will see no reason to be sanguine in this matter. The Doctor has cited some passages from them, and made them seemingly speak his sense; though, in the main doctrine, they are clearly against him, as I have observed ^z above. You appeal to these Fathers, as vouchers for you. But let us attend, however, to what you say.

“The ancient writers of the Church unanimously

^γ The sense of Ante-Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, in relation to *Tritheism*, may be seen in the following passages.

Ἐξῆς ὃ ἂν εἰκότως λίγωμι καὶ πρὸς διαφυῆντας καὶ κατατίμουντας καὶ ἀναιρῶντας τὸ σημειώτατον κήρυγμα τῆς ἰαυλησίας τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὴν μοιραχίαν εἰς τρεῖς δυνάμεις τινὰς καὶ μμερισμῖνας ὑποστάσεις, καὶ Διότητας τρεῖς—αἱ τρεῖς Θεοὺς τρεῖσιν τινὰ κηρύττουσιν, εἰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις ζῆνας ἀλλήλων παντάπασι κίχωρισμῖνας διαφυῶντας, ἐπὶ ἀγίαις μοιάδῃ. *Dionys. Roman. apud Athanas. vol. i. p. 231.*

Ὁ μὲν ἀρχὰς εἰσάγων δύο, δύο κηρύττει Θεοὺς· αὐτὴ Μαρκίωτος ἡ δισθεῖσμα—παύλι ὁ Θεὸν ἀγίνητοι ἵσαι λίγων, ἄλλον δὲ Θεὸν γίνητοι, δύο καὶ αὐτοὶ λίγι Θεὸς, διὰ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας διαφερὰν, ἢν βλασφήμω εἰσάγου· ὅπου δὲ μία μὲν ἡ Ἀρχὴ, ἢ δὲ τὸ ἰξ αὐτῆς γίνηται—ἴς Θεὸς, τιλείας μὲν ἰν Πατρὶ τῆς Διότητος νομῖνας, τιλείας δὲ καὶ ἰν υἱῷ τῆς πατριῆς Διότητος ὑπαρχούσης. *Athanas. contr. Sabell. Greg. p. 42. Comp. Basil. Hom. 27. contr. Sabell. p. 604, 605.*

Πῶς ἂν ἵσαι μία Διότης, εἰ οὐκ ἴσιν, καὶ ὁμῶς Ὁμοουσίως τῷ Πατρὶ, εἰ γὰρ ἴχιν τινὰ διάστασι, ἦται διαφερὰν κατὰ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον, ἰτερεῖος μὲν ἂν εἴη Θεὸς ὁ υἱός, ἰτερεῖος δὲ ὁ πατήρ, καὶ δύο κατὰ τοῦτο Θεοὺς ἀνάγκη λίγειν· ὅτι εἰσιν ἀετίς, καὶ οὐδὲ μίχωρι μόνον ἀποῖς παραδικτόν. Ὁμοουσίως ἄρα τῷ Πατρὶ ὁ υἱός· οὐτω γὰρ τὸ ἰν Διότητι σωθήνεται. *Cyril. Alex. Thesaur. p. 78.*

^z Query 5.

“agree, that nothing but an absolute equality and coordination in God the Father and the Son, can make them two Gods; and that the real subordination of the Son to the Father preserves the Church from *Polytheism*,” (p. 100.) In the next page, you appeal to Athanasius for the sense of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers,” and to Hilary and Basil, in order to clear your doctrine from the charge of *Tritheism*; little imagining that these good and great men have ^acondemned your doctrine, as *Polytheism* and *Paganism*, over and over; as all know, that are any thing conversant in their works. Well: but what have they said to countenance your notion? This only; that *unity of principle* clears the Church’s doctrine from the charge of *Tritheism*. Not your doctrine, not the Arian doctrine; but the Catholic doctrine. For since *equality of nature*, and *unity of principle* too, are both requisite; the Catholics admitting the former (as their adversaries well knew) had nothing farther needful to insist upon, in answer to the charge of *Tritheism*, but the latter. Unity of principle and sameness of nature together might make two Persons *one God*, (according to the unanimous opinion of the ancients,) but not either of them alone.

But now, in respect to the Arian (that is, your) doctrine, the pretence of unity of principle is perfectly absurd. The Son is supposed a *creature* of the *Father’s*: if his being of, or from, the Father, in this sense, makes him *one God* with the Father, it will follow, that *angels*, or *men*, or even things inanimate, are one God with the Father also. Indeed, to do you justice, you do not so much as pretend, that *unity of principle*, or any thing else, can make him *one God* with the Father. Which is enough to show, how very widely you differ from the *ancients*, in the main point of all. They thought it necessary to assert, that *Father* and *Son* were both *one God*. So Irenæus, Athenagoras, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen,

^a Athanas. Orat. iii. p. 565, 566. Hilar. p. 916. Basil. Ep. lxx. p. 863. Hom. xxvii. p. 601, &c.

Hippolytus, Lactantius, and even Eusebius himself, after some debates upon it: as may appear from the testimonies ^b before referred to: and of the Post-Nicene Catholic writers, in general, every body knows how they contended for it. They thought that the *divinity* of the Son could not be otherwise secured, and *Polytheism* at the same time avoided, than by asserting Father and Son to be *one God*; and they thought right. But what do you do? Or how can you contrive to clear your scheme? We ask if the Son be *God*, as well as the Father? You say, Yes: how then is there but *one God*? Your answer is, The Father is *supreme*, and therefore he, *singly*, is the *one God*. This is taking away what you gave us before, and retracting what you asserted of the *Son*. If *supremacy* only makes a Person *God*, the Son is no God, upon your principles: or, if he is *God* notwithstanding, then Father and Son are *two Gods*. Turn this over, as often as you please, you will find it impossible to extricate yourself from it. You can say only this; that you do not admit *two supreme* Gods. This is very true: no more did the Pagan Polytheists, nor the idolatrous Samaritans, nor others condemned in Scripture for *Polytheism*. You stand pretty fair upon the principles of *philosophy*; and are not guilty of any manifest error in *metaphysics*, upon this article. But you are such a *Tritheist*, as, upon Scripture-principles, and upon the principles of the Catholic Church, both ^c before and after the Nicene Council, must stand condemned. Your belief of the Fathers being for you, in this particular, is pure fancy and fiction; owing, I suppose, to your seeing only some pieces of them in Dr. Clarke. You can find but very little among the ancients, which either directly or indirectly favours your notion of a *supreme* and a *subordinate* God. They condemned it

^b Qu. ii. p. 16.

^c N. B. I do not say that the Ante-Nicene writers would have called the Arian doctrine *Tritheism*; perhaps, *blasphemy* rather. But they would have charged it with *Paganism*, (see Tertullian above, p. 39.) which comes to the same with what the Post-Nicene said of it.

implicitly, in their disputes with the Pagans, all along: and no sooner was it started in the Church, but the Catholics were alarmed at it; and immediately condemned it as reviving of *creature-worship*, and restoring *Gentilism*, and Pagan *Polytheism*. Two Gods, a greater and a less, a supreme and an inferior, no Scripture, no sound reason, no good Catholic ever taught; no church would have endured. A *separate* God from the Supreme, an *inferior* created God, would not only have been looked upon as *Polytheism* and *contradiction*, considered in itself; but as *heresy* and *blasphemy*, if understood of God and Christ.

To conclude this head: if we understand the word *God* in the strict sense, it is ridiculous to charge the Arian scheme with *plurality* of Gods. But, if it be understood in the loose popular sense, or in your own sense of it, it is equally ridiculous to deny it. Mr. Nye, who, you know, has studied this controversy much and long, and is no friend either to the truly Catholic scheme or *yours*, condemning both as *Tritheism*, is pleased however so far to give the preference to the former, as to declare, that “the Arian heresy is only a more absurd and “less defensible *Tritheism* ^d.” Of all the four schemes which have been followed, the Sabellian, Catholic, Arian, and Socinian; the Sabellian only, which entirely *ungods* the *Son*, (that is, by denying him any distinct *divine* personality, and admitting only a *human* personality, viz. of the man Christ,) and *annihilates* the *Holy Ghost*, stands perfectly clear of any appearance of *Polytheism*. The Catholic appears chargeable, but really is not so: the Arian and Socinian both appear so, and are so; wherefore a charge of *Tritheism* must come from them with a very ill grace. For, was the charge really just, and were we weak enough to assert three *coordinate* Gods; yet even that could not be more repugnant to the whole drift, scope, and tenor of the sacred writ, than the admitting a *plurality* of Gods, *great* and *little*, *sovereign* and *inferior*,

^d Explicat. of the Articles of Div. Unity, p. 91.

infinite and finite, uncreated and created, to receive our addresses, and to be the objects of our love, faith, hope, confidence, and religious adoration.

QUERY XXIII.

Whether the Doctor's notion of the Trinity be more clear and intelligible than the other?

The difficulty in the conception of the Trinity is, how three Persons can be one God.

Does the Doctor deny that every one of the Persons, singly, is God? No: Does he deny that God is one? No: How then are three one?

Does one and the same authority, exercised by all, make them one, numerically or individually one and the same God? That is hard to conceive how three distinct Beings, according to the Doctor's scheme, can be individually one God, that is, three Persons one Person.

If therefore one God necessarily signifies but one Person, the consequence is irresistible; either that the Father is that one Person, and none else, which is downright Sabelianism; or that the three Persons are three Gods.

Thus the Doctor's scheme is liable to the same difficulties with the other.

There is indeed one easy way of coming off, and that is, by saying that the Son and Holy Spirit are neither of them God, in the Scripture-sense of the word. But this is cutting the knot, instead of untying it; and is in effect to say, they are not set forth as divine Persons in Scripture.

Does the communication of divine powers and attributes from Father to Son and Holy Spirit, make them one God, the divinity of the two latter being the Father's divinity? Yet the same difficulty recurs; for either the Son and Holy Ghost have distinct attributes, and a distinct divinity of their own, or they have not: if they have, they are (upon the Doctor's principle) distinct Gods from the Father, and as much as finite from infinite, creature from Creator; and then how are they one? If they have not, then, since they have no other divinity, but

that individual divinity, and those attributes which are inseparable from the Father's essence, they can have no distinct essence from the Father's; and so (according to the Doctor) will be one and the same Person, that is, will be names only.

Q. *Whether this be not as unintelligible as the orthodox notion of the Trinity, and liable to the like difficulties: a communication of divine powers and attributes, without the substance, being as hard to conceive, nay, much harder, than a communication of both together?*

YOU are pleased to say, that "had the author at all understood Dr. Clarke's books, he would not have offered these considerations, they are such gross mistakes," (p. 105.) It might be very pardonable to mistake the Doctor, who deals much in general and ambiguous terms; and I am the more excusable, as mistaking on the tender and candid side. I must own to you, I was not then aware, that the Doctor had denied *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be one God*. I did not apprehend, he would scruple to call them all together *one God*; because that would be manifestly excluding *Son and Holy Ghost* from the *one Godhead*; and then our dispute about his meaning would be perfectly at an end. I should have been very unwilling to make so home a charge as that upon him: but since you are a friend, and declare in public that this is his meaning, so it shall be hereafter. And now, I will not ask *how three Persons can be one God*, upon the Doctor's principles; but I will put the question thus: *How can it be true (upon the Doctor's principles) that every Person of the Trinity is God; and true likewise, that there is but one God?* The question or difficulty being thus fairly stated, I conceive that my reasoning against the other will, in the main, hold good against this too; only *mutatis mutandis*. Now then, clear me up this difficulty in the Doctor's scheme, and free it from *self-contradiction*, if you are able. I have been searching diligently several pages of your answer, to see if I might

find any thing like a solution: but I perceive, at length, you was so wise as to drop it. You was to tell me how, notwithstanding that there are three *divine Persons*, (that is, *Gods*, according to you,) there is still but one God. But instead of this, you run wandering wide and far, to show how three may be *one*. What? Three Gods one God? That was what I asked; the rest is not pertinent, but foreign to the point. Finding so little satisfaction from you, in a point so material, in the very pinch of the question between the Doctor and us, I thought proper to have recourse to the Doctor's books again; to see if any thing could be found there to our present purpose.

I perceived, that “^c dominion and authority,” according to him, “make God to be God.” Upon this principle, he supposes the Son, “^f by nature truly God, having “true divine power and dominion:” and he says, “^g The “word *God*, in Scripture, is always a relative word of “office, signifying personal dominion.” The obvious conclusion, from these premises, is, that if *dominion* and *authority*, such as make any Person *truly God*, be lodged in three Persons; those three Persons, upon the Doctor's principles, must be *three Gods*. The Doctor being sensible of this difficulty in his scheme, and not being able to solve it, nor willing to profess *three Gods*, tries to disguise and elude it. He asks; “^h Why must three divine Beings, “of necessity, be conceived as three Gods?” The answer is very easy: Because *three divine Beings*, or *Persons*, is exactly the same, in other words, with *three Gods*, upon his principles; and because every one of the three is supposed to have *personal dominion*, that very *dominion* which is sufficient to make a Person *truly God*; and such as *makes God to be God*. ⁱ He goes on to distinguish the three Persons by the names of *God*, *Lord*, and *Holy Spirit*; as if he had forgot, or had no mind to own, that either of the two last is *God*. He proceeds: “They can “no more truly be said to be three Gods, than each of

^c Reply, p. 301.

^h Ib. p. 222.

^f Ib. p. 81.

ⁱ Ib. p. 223.

^g Ib. p. 290.

“ them, singly, can be truly said to be the God and Father of all, who is above all; which is the Apostle’s definition of the one supreme God.” But this is not to the purpose; unless no one can be *God*, that is not the *supreme* God. If the Doctor says that, he contradicts himself strangely; having took a great deal of pains to show that the *Son*, though not the *supreme* God, is yet *truly* God, *having true divine power and dominion*. If he thinks the Apostle’s definition of *God* to be better than his own, why did he not stand to it? And then it would be seen plainly, that his meaning is, that no one can be *God* but the *Father*; which is making short work with the doctrine of the *divine* Trinity, and striking out *Son* and *Holy Ghost* at once. It is evident to a demonstration, that the three Persons are, upon the Doctor’s *hypothesis*, as *really* and *truly* three Gods, as that every one, singly, is *God*: and therefore either let him say plainly, that there are three Gods; or that neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost is *God*. The difficulty then still remains unanswered; how (upon the Doctor’s principles) three Persons can be every one, singly, *God*; and yet Scripture say true, that there is but one *God*.

And now, I return to you again, whom I left instructing the reader, very particularly, how *three* may be *one*; viz. in *agreement* of mind, in their joint *care of the Church*, in *testimony*, &c. which might have been pertinent, had I been arguing from the text, “ I and my Father are one;” or from 1 Joh. v. 7. But your answering so copiously to what I did not ask, and slipping over the main difficulty, looks as if you were more concerned how to keep your reader from the sight of the question, than how to give him any reasonable satisfaction. The first pertinent thing I meet with from you is in page 108, where you charge me with a *manifest error*, for supposing it *Sabellianism* to make the *one God* but *one Person*; namely, the Person of the Father. What I assert is, that it is *Sabellianism* to say, that there is but one who is God, one *Person* only, instead of one *nature*: or to suppose the Godhead to be

but one single *Hypostasis*; or *μονοθεός*, a Father without his substantial *Word* or *Spirit* eternally and essentially subsisting with him and from him. This is what I maintain, and what you will not be able to disprove. But let us see how you go about it. "One God," you say, "is one Person only; otherwise one Person could not be one God." I answer, that no one Person is one God, *exclusively* of the other two Persons. You add, "if one God be two Persons or more, it is impossible for one Person to be God." When we say one Person is *God*, we mean that he is a *divine Hypostasis, Deitatem habens*, as the schools speak: but when we say God is three Persons, we understand it of the divine *essence, or substance*: so that the word *God* is sometimes taken *essentially* and sometimes *personally*, which makes the difference. You proceed: "The defenders of the scholastic notion" (you mean the defenders of the Trinity in unity) "profess the Father alone, and distinct from the Son and Spirit, is God, or the one God." Very true: in the *personal* sense before mentioned, *distinct* from, not *exclusive* of, the Son and Holy Spirit. In the same sense, either of the other Persons is God, and the one God. There is a farther reason, why the Father is *peculiarly* and *eminently* styled the *one God*: not to exclude the other Persons; but to signify his *priority* of order, as Father, and as Fountain of all. Thus I have answered your reasons, which you are pleased to call *demonstration*; though it is manifest that, all along in your reasoning, you take it for granted, that *God* is one Person only, and suppose the very thing in question. You next proceed to confute my assertion, that the making the one God but one Person is Sabellian. And you say thus: "If by one Person he means one intelligent agent, he makes the Sabellians Catholics, and condemns his own friends for *Tritheists*." I certainly mean a *real* Person, an *Hypostasis*, no *mode, attribute, or property*, as you might easily have perceived. The charge of *Tritheism* I have sufficiently answered before, and returned it to its proper owners. I shall only

add here, that each divine Person is an individual intelligent agent: but as subsisting in one undivided substance, they are all together, in that respect, but one undivided intelligent agent^k; and thus my friends stand clear of *Tritheism*. You observe, that “Sabellius held one *Hypostasis*, or divine substance, in opposition to the “Church, who professed three *Hypostases*.” Why did you not add, or *three divine substances*, having rendered *hypostasis, divine substance*, just before? is not the reason of it visible? You would not say that the Sabellians held one *substance*, and the Church *three substances*, (though you say it in effect,) because the thing is notoriously false. But taking advantage of the ambiguity of the word *hypostasis*, sometimes used to signify *substance*, and sometimes *person*, you contrive a fallacy. The Church never professed three *Hypostases* in any other sense, but as they mean *three Persons*; nor would Sabellius have been censured for holding one *Hypostasis* only, had he meant *one substance*. If you have a mind to see clearly in what sense the Catholics professed either three *Hypostases*, or one only, you may please to consult ^l Athanasius and ^m Gregory Nazianzen, referred to in the margin.

The truth is, the Church always professed *one substance*; one eternal, immutable, uncreated *substance*; and this they understood by *God*. Notwithstanding, they believed the Son and Holy Spirit to be *substantially God*. Praxeas, Noëtus, Sabellius, and others, not conceiving how *one substance* could be more than *one Person*, ⁿ one

^k See Preface to my Sermons.

^l Athanas. ad Antioch. p. 973.

^m Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xxii. p. 396. Orat. xxxii. p. 521.

ⁿ Origen expresses the Sabellian notion very distinctly in the following passage.

Μὴ διαφίρω τῷ ἁριθμῷ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀλλ' ἓν ἔστι μοῖνον ἕν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁμοουσιον, συγγενεστας ἀμφοτέρους κατὰ τινος ἰσότητος, οὐ κατὰ ὑπόστασιν λόγιον πατέρα καὶ υἱόν. *Orig. Com. in Joh.* p. 186. ed. Huet.

That is to say, The Sabellians did not only make Father and Son *one in essence*, (as the Church did also,) but they carried it so far as to make them

Hypostasis, innovated upon the faith of the Church, and made one single *Hypostasis* the *one God*, with three names. You tell us, with great assurance, that “this never was, nor could be *Sabellianism*,” (p. 109.) To which I shall only say; read, and you will find. You add farther, that “the one God is one Person only, and the “Father that Person;” and that this is the “assertion of “St. Paul.” We will see to St. Paul presently; in the meanwhile, I again tell you, that this is the very essence of *Sabellianism*, and the doctrine of ° Paul of Samosata, (as hath been observed to you above,) and for which he was condemned by the Church. Your pretence from the Apostle’s words (“To us there is but one God, even the “Father”) has been sufficiently answered under the former Queries. I shall only observe here, that the text mentioned is much stronger against the Doctor and yourself, than against us. For how can you, after so plain and express a text to the contrary, pretend that the *Son* also is *God to us*, really and truly God, and in the Scripture-sense of the word *God*? Whether, think you, do we, who make him essentially the same God with that one, and suppose but *one God* in all, more flatly contradict St. Paul; or you, who make *two Gods*, and in the same relative sense, in which St. Paul is supposed to use the word *God*? To take up your own words, upon this very occasion; you will, I trust, be ashamed when you consider, that you plainly falsify St. Paul. He says, there is but *one God*, even the *Father*: but you say, there are more Gods than one; and particularly, that the *Son* is *God* also, *God to us*. How come you off of this? by the help of a *distinction*, I suppose: and so can we; by a *distinction* much older, and much better warranted than yours; and therefore, be so kind as either to take some part of the *shame* with us, or else to acquit both. You

one subject, *suppositum*, or *hypostasis*, having only a nominal, not a real distinction.

° Ἰνα ὁὐς ἑῷ, φησὶ, ἰ ἰωὶ πᾶντα θεὸς ἰ κωρῆ. *Athan. contr. Apollinar.* l. ii. p. 942.

proceed to acquaint us that the "Father is the only true God." Very good: and do not the Doctor and you tell us, notwithstanding, that the Son is *true God*, having *true divine power and dominion*? If you can reconcile *two true Gods* with the doctrine of that text; sure, we need not despair, nor have any thing to fear from that text, who agree so far with it already, (more than you,) as to acknowledge but one God. We can give a reason why the Son was tacitly included, being so intimately united to the Father, as partaker of the same *divine* nature: but that any *creature* should not be excluded from being God, or that there should be two Gods, notwithstanding the text, must appear very strange. After this, you have two or three subtilities. The *Father*, you say, will be but a *third part*. You might, in this way, revive all the impertinencies of Aëtius, and throw them before English readers. I refer you to ^p St. Austin in the margin for an answer. Let me desire you not to give so great a loose to your fancy in divine things: you seem to consider every thing under the notion of extension, and sensible images. A reverential silence may well become us in so awful a subject, in which imagination has nothing to do, and of which our most refined and elevated thoughts are infinitely unworthy. But to proceed: you add, "If Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are the only true God, then they are the Father." But if the *only true God* may

^p Page 110.

^q Putas Deum Patrem cum Filio et Spiritu Sancto unum Deum esse non posse: times enim ne Pater solus non sit unus Deus, sed *pars unius Dei* qui constat ex *tribus*: noli timere, nulla fit partium in Deitatis unitate divisio. In Trinitate—quæ Deus est, et Pater Deus est, et Filius Deus est, et Spiritus Sanctus Deus est, simul hi tres unus Deus: nec hujus Trinitatis *pars* est unus, nec major pars duo quam unus est ibi, nec majus aliquid sunt omnes quam singuli: quia *spiritualis* non *corporalis* est magnitudo. *Aug. contr. Maxim.* l. ii. c. 10. p. 697, 698.

Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, et propter *individuum* Deitatem unus Deus est, propter uniuscujusque *proprietaem* tres *Personæ* sunt, et propter singulorum *perfectionem partes* unius Dei non sunt. *Id. ibid.* p. 699. *Conf. August. de Trin.* p. 849. Fulgent. Respons. contr. Arian. in fine.

be sometimes used in a *personal*, sometimes in an *essential* sense, there is no force in this reasoning. I might retort the argument upon you, who, in your way of conceiving God by extended parts, apply the phrase of *one God*, sometimes to one *part*, sometimes to another, and sometimes to the *whole*, almost in the ^r same manner, as we do to *one*, or to all the three *Persons*: but I am weary of trifling.

You ask me, “wherein the present scholastic notion “disagrees with the Sabellian?” I answer, in admitting three *real* subsisting persons. But since you are so often charging us with *Sabellianism*, it may be proper to observe here, how near akin the Sabellians and Arians are to each other; both, as it were, growing of the same stock.

1. In the first place, both seem to suppose, or take for granted, that if the *modus*, or *manner*, be unintelligible, the thing itself is incredible.

2. Both agree in the fundamental principle of *heresy*, that one substance, or being, can be only one *real* person, or *hypostasis*. As Nestorius and Eutyches, though taking different ways, yet proceeded upon the same bottom, that two *natures* could not make one *Person* in Christ: so Sabellius and Arius, before them, though differing in the last result, yet set out upon the same principle; that two *real* persons cannot be one *being* or *substance*.

3. In consequence of their prime position, both conspire to discard, in *reality*, the Son and the Holy Ghost from the *one true Godhead*; looking upon it as *Tritheism* to make the Persons *real* and *divine* too. One *Hypostasis* in the *Godhead* is all that either of them admits; both Judaizing, as ^s Gregory Nyssen justly observes, in that respect: and the Sabellian’s *Τριάνθρωπος* (or God with three

^r E. G. *God* exists, *God* is in heaven above, *God* is on earth below. The word *God* here (upon the Doctor’s *hypothesis* of infinite extension) has three several *ideas* annexed to it.

^s Ὅτι γὰρ Σαβίλλιος λίγυ Τριάνθρωπον, τοῦτον Εὐνόμιος ἀνμάξυ Ἀγίνυται. *Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom.* p. 676.

names) answers to the Arian's 'Αγέννητος, *self-existent*, or *unbegotten* God. Thus far they amicably agree: let us next observe where they differ.

Supposing them fixed and settled in the preliminary principle, it is manifest that the *Word* and *Spirit* must either be *names* only, or, if *real* distinct persons, *creatures*. The Sabellians were at liberty to choose this or that: but, finding Scripture run high, and tradition strong for the *divinity* of the *Word* and *Holy Spirit*, they made choice of the former; interpreting *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, as different names of one and the same *Hypostasis*, or *real Person*. By this, they effectually guarded against the supposed *Tritheism* of the Catholics, as well as against *Pagan Polytheism*: and, being wise men so far, secured the point which they aimed at. The Arians, who came after, (and who, as I before said, set out upon the same preliminary principles,) finding that the Sabellian *confusion* of Persons had been utterly routed, baffled, and exploded by all good Catholics, had really no option left, but either to make the Son and Holy Spirit *creatures*, or to give up their *preliminaries*. Accordingly, they took the way which the Sabellians had left them; and were very unhappy in this particular, that, endeavouring to avoid one kind of *Tritheism*, they fell into another.

The Arian scheme, besides its failing in its principal design of avoiding *Polytheism*, has many real and great difficulties; being as well too *high* for some texts, as too *low* for others; which the Catholics, or Sabellians can much better deal with. Hence, I suppose, it was, that the Unitarians, at the beginning of the Reformation, having modestly begun with *Arianism*, for the most part, settled into *Socinianism*; which is near to *Sabellianism*: and our English Unitarians, who, for acuteness of wit, and subtilty of thought, have not been inferior to any of their brethren, have been still refining upon the Socinian scheme, (which had struck

† Socin. contr. Erasm. Johan. p. 496.

upon *Ditheism*, in like manner as the Arian had upon *Tritheism*,) and have brought it still nearer to *Sabellianism*. After all, when men have run their course from *orthodoxy* to *Arianism*, from *Arianism* to *Socinianism*, and from thence to *Sabellianism*; if they will but give themselves leave to reflect and look back, they may perhaps perceive, at length, that *Catholicism* is the only *Scriptural*, as well as the *ancient* scheme; liable to the fewest difficulties, and best guarded against objections. It is therefore no wonder that the bulk of Christians, learned and unlearned, have, for as many centuries upward as we have any clear records extant, espoused it. It is an easy matter for men of wit and fancy to find fault with any thing: but it requires thought and judgment to settle things upon their true bottom. Let those who are displeased with the *received* doctrine show us a better; and make any other consistent scheme, (consistent with Scripture and with itself,) if they can. Wise and good men will be always willing to reform, if there be cause for it: but they will not be forward to pull down what appears to be founded on a rock, in order only to build upon the sand. It is some satisfaction to the Trinitarians to observe, how long some great wits have been new modelling Christianity; and have not yet been able to agree in any one certain scheme. The Arians fall upon the Sabellians, and the Sabellians again upon them: one defends the *personality*, and the other the *divinity* of the *Δεῦος*, or *Word*, and cannot yet be brought to any agreement. ^u Betwixt them, the principles of the Catholic Church are supported, and they condemn each other, in the very things which the Church condemns in both. If I may give a judgment of the two schemes, the Sabellian appears to be the neater of the two, and most consistent with itself: the Arian is more pious and modest, tender

^u Uterque hostis Ecclesie res Ecclesie agit: dum Sabellius Deum ex natura in operibus predicat; hi vero, ex sacramento fidei, Filium Dei confitentur. *Hist.* p. 919.

of degrading the Son of God too far. As men grow bolder and more learned in *heresy*, they will, very probably, be drawing nearer and nearer to the Sabellians. Two of the ablest and acutest men of the later Unitarians (one here, the other abroad) have preferred the Sabellian way: and as they have given proofs of their learning, so have they sufficiently shown their *boldness* also, by treating so sublime and tremendous a subject in the way of scoff and ridicule. To return: you are pleased to say, that you "have answered for Dr. Clarke's notion not being Sabellian, and have proved that it is not Tritheistic." But give me leave to say, that you are deceived in both: the ground is Sabellian, and the superstructure Tritheistic; and the whole contrived in such a way, as to hang loosely together.

It is obvious, at first sight, that the true Arian or Semi-Arian scheme (which you would be thought to come up to at least) can never tolerably support itself, without taking in the Catholic principle of a *human soul* to join with the *Word*. If you come thus far, it will then be easy to perceive that the Sabellian scheme is the simpler and plainer; besides that it better answers the *high* things spoken of the *Word*; in respect of which your scheme is as much too *low*, as before too *high*. But then again, the arguments for the distinct *personality* of the *Word* and Holy Spirit, bear so full and strong, that there will appear a necessity for taking in another Catholic principle; and that will completely answer all. And why then should not the Catholic doctrine (so apparently necessary to make Scripture consistent) be admitted? The case, in few words, appears to be only this. You cannot understand *how three* can be *one*; you see no reason, *a priori*, why, if the Son and Holy Spirit be *coeval* and *consubstantial*, they should not be *coordinate* too; you *know not* why the Father might not as well be said to be *begotten*, as to *beget*; to *be sent*, as to *send*; or the like. Very true: but you *may see* a reason, *a priori*, why creatures, of yesterday, may not be able to search

the “deep things of God:” you *may know* how well it becomes them to submit their fancies, or presumptions, to divine revelation; content to “see *through* a glass “darkly,” till the time come to know God more perfectly, and to “see him as he is.” This may be a sufficient answer to a pious and humble mind, in all cases of this nature; where the difficulty is owing only to our imperfect and inadequate conception of things.

I was obliged to pass over some remarks you had in your notes *, for the sake of method: but it will not be too late to consider them here. I had made no use of John x. 30. (“I and my Father are one,”) but you had a mind to bring it in, to let us know how well you could answer it, from the *primitive writers*. I am always willing to defend those good men, and to rescue them out of the hands of those, who either knowingly or ignorantly abuse them. You begin thus, triumphantly: “The defenders of the scholastic explication of the Trinity in unity, though they pretend much that the most ancient writers of the Church are on their side, yet, in expressing their notion of the unity in the divine Persons, they do not only leave Scripture and reason, but plainly run against the *whole stream of antiquity* also. “The text on which they so much rely (John x. 30.) “is understood by Tertullian himself of the unity of love, “and consent, and power.” You go on to cite Tertullian and others, from Dr. Clarke. But writers in a cause are very often known to represent things by halves. You shall see, presently, what little reason you have to talk of the “*whole stream of antiquity*.” The text, which you speak of, has all along been made use of by the Catholics, in two respects; first, in proof of our Lord’s *real* divinity, against as many as denied it; and secondly, in proof of his *real* distinction from the Father, against the Noëtians or Sabellians. There was very little occasion to insist much upon *unity of substance*, with those who

* Page 106.

had carried *unity of substance* so high, as to make but one *Hypostasis*. It might be sufficient, in dispute with those men, to observe, that that text did by no means prove an *identity of person*, unless Paul and Apollos were one person, which is absurd. Whatever the text might otherwise prove, it certainly did not prove, what the Sabellians pretended, an *unity of person*. This the Post-Nicene Fathers frequently observe, against the Sabellians, (as the Ante-Nicene had done before;) though at the same time that text might be of good use against the Arians; as it had been all along against the *impugners of Christ's divinity*. For your clearer apprehension of this matter, I shall set down, γ in two distinct columns, the

γ Against impugnors of Christ's divinity.

TERTULLIAN.

Nunquam separatus a Patre aut alius a Patre, quia *Ego et Pater unum sumus*. Adv. Prax. c. viii. Qui tres unum sunt, non unus, quomodo dictum est, *Ego et Pater unum sumus*. Ad substantiæ unitatem, non ad numeri singularitatem. Adv. Prax. c. 25.

NOVATIAN.

Quod si, cum nullius hominis hæc vox esse posset, *Ego et Pater unum sumus*, hanc vocem de conscientia divinitatis Christus solus edicit—merito Deus est Christus. C. 13.

Si homo tantummodo Christus, quid est quod dicit, *Ego et Pater unum sumus*: si non et Deus est, et Filius, qui idcirco unum potest dici, dum ex ipso est, et dum Filius ejus est, et dum ex ipso nascitur, et dum ex ipso processisse reperitur, per quod et Deus est. C. 23.

ORIGEN.

Λικείναι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα, ὅτι ἑστίν

Against Sabellians.

TERTULLIAN.

Unum dicit neutrali verbo, quod non pertinet ad singularitatem sed ad unitatem, ad conjunctionem, ad dilectionem Patris, qui Filium diligit, et ad obsequium Filii, qui voluntati Patris obsequitur. *Unum sumus*, dicens, quos æquat et jungit. Adv. Prax. c. 22.

NOVATIAN.

Quia dixit *unum*, intelligant hæretici quia non dixerit *unus*. *Unum* enim pætraderiter positum societatis concordiam, non unitatem Personæ sonat—merito unum sit Pater et Filius per concordiam, et per amorem, et per dilectionem—Novit hanc concordie unitatem et Apostolus Paulus cum Personarum distinctione—*Qui plantat et qui rigat unum sunt*. Quis autem non intelligat alterum esse Apollo, alterum Paulum, non eundem atque ipsum Apollo pariter et Paulum. C. 22.

ORIGEN.

Τὸ πανίκα, τῆς ἀληθείας ἢ τὸν οὐρανόν

sentiments of the primitive writers on this head; that you may perceive how they defended such an *unity* as

νιοῦμαι ὁ Κίλσος τὸ, Ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἴν ἴσμεν — οὐκ ἂν ᾤετο ἡμᾶς καὶ ἄλλων θρησκυῖον παρὰ τὸν ἱπὶ πᾶσι Θεῶν, — ἴνα οὖν Θεὸν ὡς ἀποθεώκαμεν, τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν θρησκυῖομεν. *Contr. Cels.* l. viii. p. 386.

DIONYSIUS ROM.

Ὅτι (χρῆ) ποιῆσαι καλοῦν τὸ ἀξιωμα καὶ τὸ ὑπερέβαλλον μέγεθος τοῦ κυρίου — ἠνωθεῖναι δὲ τῷ Θεῷ τῶν ἄλων τὸν λόγον, ἰγὼ γὰρ, φησι, καὶ πατὴρ ἴν ἴσμεν. *Ap. Athan.* p. 232.

HIPPOLYTUS.

Ὁ δύο Θεοὺς λίγου, ἀλλ' ὡς φῶς ἐκ φωτός, ἢ ὡς ὕδωρ ἐκ πηγῆς, ἢ ὡς ἀκτίνα ἀπὸ ἡλίου, δύναμις γὰρ μία ἢ ἐκ τοῦ παντός, τὸ δὲ πᾶν πατὴρ, ἔξ ἧς δύναμις λόγος. C. 11.

ALEXANDER ALEX.

Ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἴν ἴσμεν. ὅτι φησὶν ὁ κύριος, οὐ πατέρα ἑαυτὸν ἀναγορεύων. οὐδὲ τὰς τῆ ὑποστάσει δύο φύσεις μίαν ὕψιν σαφηνίζων. ἀλλ' ὅτι τὴν πατρικὴν ἰσφύριαν ἀκριβῶς ἀφύσαι σώζων ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ πατρὸς, τὴν κατὰ πάντα ὁμοίτητα αὐτοῦ ἐκ φύσεως ἀπομαζάμεις, καὶ ἀπαρέλλακτος ἰκὸν τοῦ πατρὸς τυγχάνων, καὶ τοῦ πρωτοτύπου ἰστυπας χαρακτηρῆ. *Theod. E. H.* l. i. c. 4. p. 15.

EPIPHANIUS.

Καὶ πρὸς τοῦτους μὲν τοὺς νομιζοντας ἀλλότριον εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ πατρὸς — λίγου, ἰγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἴν ἴσμεν — διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἴν μῶ ἰσότης θείας, καὶ ἴν μῶ γῶμῃ καὶ δυνάμει. P. 488. *Hæc.* 57.

τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὅτι δύο τῆ ὑποστάσει πράγματα, ἴν δὲ τῆ ὁμοιοῖς, καὶ συμφωνία, καὶ τῆ ταυτότητι τοῦ βουλήματος. ὡς τὸν ἰσρακύτα τὸν υἱὸν (ἴνα ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης, καὶ χαρακτηρῆς τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ) ἰσρακύται ἴν αὐτῷ ἴντι ἰκὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὸν Θεῶν. *Contr. Cels.* l. viii. p. 386.

HIPPOLYTUS.

Ὁὐκ εἴσιν ὅτι ἰγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἴν ἴμει, ἀλλ' ἴν ἴσμεν. τὸ γὰρ ἴσμεν οὐκ ἰφ' ἰνὸς λίγεται, ἀλλ' ἰπὶ δύο πράγματα ἴδουξιν, δύναμιν δὲ μίαν — τὴν δέξαν ἢ ἴδωκάς μοι, ἴδωκα αὐτοῖς ἴνα ὄσιν ἴν, καθὸς ἡμῖς ἴν — τί πρὸς ταῦτα ἴχουσι λίγου οἱ Νοσητιοῖ; μὴ πάντες ἴν εῶμά ἴσται κατὰ τὴν ἰσίαν, ἢ τῆ δυνάμει καὶ τῆ διαδίσει τῆς ὁμοφροῖας ἴν γινόμενα; τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρέπον ὁ παῖς — ὁμολόγησιν εἶναι ἴν τῷ πατρὶ δυνάμει, διαδίσει; ἴσ γὰρ νῦν πατρὸς ὁ παῖς. *Contr. Noet.* c. vii. p. 11.

EPIPHANIUS.

Πρὸς τοὺς νομιζοντας αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι υἱὸν διὰ τὸ ἰσρηκύται, ἰγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἴν ἴσμεν, λίγου, ποῖσιν αὐτοὺς ἴνα ὄσιν ἴν καθὸς ἰγὼ καὶ εὐ ἴν ἴσμεν, ἴνα καταισχύρη Νοσητὸν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ σχολῆν, παραγαγὼν εἰς τὸ μέσον τῆν τῶν μαθητῶν ἴσται. Πῶς γὰρ ἠδύνατο Πίστερ καὶ ἰσάνης, καὶ οἱ καθ'ἑξῆς εἶναι ἴν ὡς κατὰ εὐταλαφῆν; P. 488.

we maintain, at the same time that they strenuously opposed the Sabellians. I shall make particular remarks upon the authors, singly, as I pass along; and afterwards throw in some general observations.

To begin with Tertullian: you will observe, that he interprets the text *expressly of unity of substance*, in one citation: and he is to be so understood in the other, had you but thought how to construe *unitatem*, as you should have done. I suppose, *unity of love, consent, and power*, may very well follow, after so good a foundation laid for it. Tertullian elsewhere ² intimates the strict and inviolable harmony of the three Persons, resolving it into *unity of substance*.

Novatian is your next author: you may please to observe, how absurd he thinks it would have been for any mere man to have said, "I and my Father *are one*." And why so? might not there be unity of *will, consent, authority*, between God and man? Undoubtedly there might. Well then; Novatian did conceive the text to speak of unity of *love, &c.* but *equality of nature presupposed*: for even Paul and Apollos were not of a *different* nature; one was as *truly man* as the other: and so, if Christ was *truly God*, as well as the Father, he might say, "I and my Father are one." This is ¹ plainly Novatian's sense, in the citations of the first column; and it is very consistent with the other, in the opposite column. All that unity of *consent, love, &c.* is founded upon, and resolves into *unity of substance and principle*, according to this writer.

CYRIL. HIROS.

"Ἐν δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν Διότητα ἀξίωμα
ἰσότηθ Θεοῦ Θεοῦ ἰγίνησιν. "Ἐν δὲ τὸ
κατὰ τὴν βασιλείαν—Ἰν δὲ τὸ μηδι-
μίας εἶναι διαφανίαν ἢ διόστασιν.—"Ἐν
διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἄλλα χριστοῦ δημιουργή-
ματα καὶ ἄλλα πατρὸς· μία γὰρ ἡ πά-
των δημιουργία. P. 142, 143. Ox. ed.

CYRIL. HIROS.

Οὐκ εἶσι ἕνὸν καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἵν εἶμι,
ἀλλ' ἕνὸν καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἵν ἴσμεν, ἵνα μὴ
τι ἀπαλλοτριώσωμεν, μήτε συλαλοφῆν
οὐσατορίας ἰγνασώμιθα. P. 142.

¹ Tam consortibus substantiæ Patris. *Contr. Prax.* c. 3.

² Compare a passage of Novatian, cited above, p. 26.

Origen comes next. I have set against him a passage of Dionysius of Rome, who quotes the text in confirmation of what he had just before said, that we ought not by any means to undervalue the supereminent dignity of the Son, by supposing him a *creature*. As to Origen particularly, it is to be considered, that, if he had resolved the unity of Godhead, in that passage, into unity of *consent*, mentioning no other; yet no certain argument could be drawn from thence, that he held no other; any more than from the passages of Novatian and Tertullian before cited. Had they been left *single*, they had been liable to the same charge; and yet it seems merely accidental that they were not. Authors do not always speak their whole thoughts upon a particular occasion; but are content only to say as much as the occasion requires. Origen was guarding against the Sabellian abuse of the text, and his thoughts were turned to that chiefly. However, in that very place, he made so much use of the text, as from thence to infer, that Father and Son are *one God*, and *one object* of worship; which, to any one who is acquainted with Origen's principles in that book, must appear to denote the *divine* and *uncreated* nature of the Son; and consequently a *substantial* unity betwixt him and the Father: besides, that this is farther intimated, in the passage cited, by the words, ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης, and χαρακτῆρα τῆς ὑποστάσεως, which seem to have been added to qualify the former; and are hardly pertinent but on some such supposition. To confirm which, please to compare Origen with Alexander Bishop of Alexandria's comment on the same text, and you will find them very nearly the same; which is sufficient to acquit Origen of any suspicion of *Arianizing* in this point.

I come next to Hippolytus, who has but lately appeared, and whom neither the Doctor nor you have took notice of. He argues against the Sabellians, in the very same way with Tertullian, Novatian, and Origen: but

then, in the other citation oppositely placed, he clearly resolves the unity of the Godhead into unity of *substance* and *principle*. But besides this, it deserves your special notice, that while he speaks of unity of *will* and *concord*, (admitting a kind of parallel between the union of Christians, and the union of God and Christ,) he clearly signifies how infinitely more perfect the latter is; resolving it into this, that the Son is the *νοῦς παρὰς*, the living and substantial *mind*, or *thought*, of the Father. This then is the case: there is an unity ^b of concord, and harmonious love, founded upon unity of substance: and the words, "I and my Father are one," express both the unity itself, and the foundation of it. Paul and Apollos were one in heart and will, in such measure and degree as they were capable of: and so God and Christ are *one* likewise; but by an union infinitely more perfect, and upon an infinitely higher foundation. You need not be told, that *καθὰς* often signifies, not an *exact equality*, but a *general similitude* ^c: the remark is just; and, as it is at other times urged against us, so let me here claim the benefit of it.

I have added to the number two Post-Nicene writers, Epiphanius and the elder Cyril; which are enough to show, that the same way of reasoning against the Sabellians (which prevailed before the Nicene Council) obtained likewise afterwards. Some are apt to triumph extremely, if they can but find any the least difference between the Ante-Nicene and Post-Nicene writers. If there be but a text or two differently interpreted, a solemn remark is made upon it; and sometimes a trifling note of some obscure *scholiast*, or an *imaginary* difference, (having no foundation but the *writer's* ignorance, or negligence in

^b Etiam nos quippe incomparabilem consensum voluntatis atque individuae caritatis, Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti confitemur, propter quod dicimus, Hæc Trinitas unus est Deus. *August. contr. Maxim.* l. ii. p. 720.

Vid. etiam Greg. Nyss. *contr. Eunom.* l. i. p. 389. Hilar. *de Trin.* p. 958.

^c Vid. Athanas. *Orat.* l. iii. p. 572.

comparing,) is improved into an argument of *change of doctrine*; and *Athanasianism* is made the name for what has been constantly held in the Christian Church. If there be occasion to speak of the things seemingly derogatory to the honour of the Son, (his being *subordinate*; his referring all things to the Father, as *head, root, fountain, cause*; his executing the Father's will, and the like,) or of a *real* distinction between Father and Son, (as their being *δύο ἀριθμῶν, duæ res*, or one of them *ἀριθμῶν ἕτερος*, that is, *personally* distinct from the other,) then only Ante-Nicene Fathers are quoted; as if the Post-Nicene did not teach the very same doctrine: but if any thing, which seems to make more for the honour of the Son, be mentioned, (as his being *uncreated, eternal, one God* with the Father, *Creator* of all things, and the like,) this is to be represented as the doctrine of the Post-Nicene Fathers only; though nothing is more evident than that they varied not a tittle, in any material point of doctrine, from their predecessors; but only preserved, as became them, with an upright zeal, the true faith of Christ, "which was once delivered to the saints."

To return. It is needless almost to take notice of other testimonies: those in the margin are sufficient to show the true and constant sense of the Christian Church. The ^d Doctor quotes Basil and Chrysostom, as saying Father and Son were one, *κατὰ δύναμιν*: and, lest the reader should understand what those Fathers meant by *κατὰ δύναμιν*, he cuts Chrysostom short; whose words immediately following (*εἰ δὲ ἡ δύναμις ἡ αὐτῆ, εὐδηλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ οὐσία*) show that he meant by *δύναμις*, not the same *authority*, but the same inherent, essential, *omnipotent* power.

Athenagoras's *δυνάμει* may be rightly interpreted by Hippolytus before cited; or by Chrysostom; or by himself, in several places where he is clear for the *consubstantiality*. Justin Martyr's sentiments have been explained

^d Page 100.

above; and the Council of Antioch's expression (τῆ συμφο-
 νίᾳ) is vindicated by ^c Hilary; who himself may be readily
 understood by such as remember how the primitive Fa-
 thers held the Holy Ghost to be, as it were, *vinculum Tri-
 nitatis*, and sometimes *amor Patris et Filii*; as the Son
 himself is also styled *charitas ex charitate*, by ^f Origen.
 These things I can only hint to the intelligent reader,
 having already exceeded the bounds of a digression.

QUERY XXIV.

*Whether Gal. iv. 8. may not be enough to determine the dis-
 pute betwixt us; since it obliged the Doctor to confess,
 that Christ is ε by nature truly God, as truly as man is
 by nature truly man.*

*He equivocates, indeed, there, as usual. For, he will have
 it to signify that Christ is God by nature, only as having,
 by that nature which he derives from the Father, true
 divine power and dominion: that is, he is truly God by
 nature, as having a nature distinct from, and inferior to
 God's, wanting ^h the most essential character of God,
 self-existence. What is this but trifling with words,
 and playing fast and loose?*

IN answer hereto, you begin: "Will the Querist in-
 sist upon it, that the Son cannot be God by nature, un-
 less he be self-existent?" And you proceed: "I can
 assure him, the learnedest, even of his own friends, are
 ashamed of this: and there are few so hardy, as directly
 to affirm it." But have a little patience, and I will
 endeavour to make you easy. Where were your thoughts?
 Where were your eyes? Either I am strangely mistaken,
 or the line, which offended you so grievously, was *scored*
underneath; and pag. 92. of the Doctor's Reply referred
 to, as you find now: and my charging the Doctor with
playing fast and loose, immediately after, might have been
 a sufficient intimation of my meaning. Whether I think

^c Page 1170, 1171.

^e Reply, p. 81.

^f Pamph. Apol. p. 235. ed. Bened.

^h Ibid. p. 92.

the Son *self-existent* or no, is not now the question. I took hold of the Doctor's expression, charged him with *fast and loose*, that is, saying and unsaying, contradicting himself. If *self-existence* be the *most essential character* of God, it seems to me to follow, that the *Son*, who by the Doctor's confession wants that *character*, cannot be *truly* and by *nature* God, any more than any thing can be *truly* and by *nature* man, without the *essential character* of man. As to my own part: I never pretended that *self-existence* is an *essential* character of God: you might have considered that we deny it absolutely; we suppose it *negative* and *relative*, and call it a *personal* character. *Necessary-existence* is an *essential* character, and belongs equally to *Father* and *Son*: if that be what you mean by *self-existence*, then that also belongs to both. Explain yourself, and deal not so much in *ambiguous* terms, which we have just reason to complain of. The Doctor knows how *self-existent*, by custom, sounds among common readers; and that denying the *Son* to be *self-existent* may be thought by many the same thing with denying him to be *God*. Had he pleased, in his translations of *ἀγενήτος*, and elsewhere, to say oftener *unbegotten* or *un-derived*, instead of *self-existent*, it would have been kind towards his readers, and perhaps as kind to himself: for it will be always thought as much beneath a *grave* writer to take the poor advantage of an *equivocal* word, as it is a disparagement to any cause to be served by it. But to proceed.

You wanted, it seems, to bring in a parcel of quotations, which you might as well have referred to only, where they ^k lie, and may be seen to greater advantage.

^l Sicut—secundum *substantiam* aio, *homo* est, sic secundum *substantiam* nego, cum dico, *non-homo* est, &c. *Relative* autem negamus dicendo *non-filius*: *relative* igitur negamus dicendo *non-genitus*. *Ingenitus* porro, quid est nisi *non-genitus*?—quod autem *relative* pronuntiatur, non indicat *substantiam*. *Aug. de Trin.* l. v. c. 6. *Comp. Fulgent. contr. Arian.* p. 52. ed. Paris.

^k *Script. Doctr.* p. 306, &c. alias 273, &c.

Whatever they are, they contradict not me; nor are they at all pertinent to the business of the Query. My design was to show, at once, the Doctor's inconsistency with Scripture and with himself: both which are intimated in the Query. It was your part to defend him, as fairly as you could. The Doctor, I observed, was obliged from Gal. iv. 8. to confess that the Son is *by nature truly God*. From thence I infer, that his scheme cannot stand with that text; being an express contradiction to it. You insist upon it notwithstanding, that the Son may be *by nature truly God*, agreeable to the text, and consistent with the Doctor's principles. This then is the sole point between us, to be here discussed.

“ You have,” you say, “ proved, that in Scripture there are *different* and *subordinate* acceptations of the word “ God.” True, you have proved that *men* have been called *Gods*; and *idols Gods*; the *devil* is also a God, (2 Cor. iv. 4.) and the *belly* a God. But, I think, St. Paul hath sufficiently intimated, (1 Cor. viii. 5, 6.) that the Son is not to be reckoned among the *nominal* Gods; besides that you yourselves confess it. If he be God at all, he is a *real* one: and now I want to see what Scripture warrants or permits us to profess two *real* and *true* Gods. You say, the Son is God, *truly*, and *properly*, and *by nature*, in the *Scripture-sense* of the word *God*, (p. 110.) Then, say I, he must be the same with the one *supreme* God, because there is but *one*. If he is *truly* so, he is the same with the *only true God*; if *properly* so, his substance is *properly* divine; if *by nature* so, he has the same *nature* with the one God. Yet I very well know that you intend nothing like it: only, from the concurring language of Scripture and antiquity, you find it necessary to say as we say; and are afterwards to rack and strain invention, to find out some subtile and surprising meaning for it. What may we not do with any writings in the world at this rate, so long as words are capable of being pressed and tortured into diverse meanings? But let us go on, to see how you account for the Son's being *God by nature*.

“ If divine power and dominion be derived and exercised “ partially, temporarily,” or in “ certain emergencies only, “ it makes the Persons to be, and to be styled Gods ; not “ by nature, but by grace.” Your notion of *dominion* making *God* to be *God*, has been sufficiently exposed in the former parts. I need only ask here, what was God before the creatures were made? Or did he then commence *God, by nature*, when he created the universe, and began to have *dominion* over it? The Doctor appears to be in the utmost perplexity, how to account for the Son’s being called God, Joh. i. 1. He is forced to quit his notion of *dominion*¹. Sometimes it is because he was in μορφή Θεοῦ after the creation, and ^m sometimes because he was *partaker of divine power and glory* (he knew not how to say *dominion*) before the creation : and sometimes ⁿ μετοχῆ τῆς αὐτοῦ Θεοῦ Δεότητος. So that now we have the Doctor’s own authority for contradicting him, if he tells us again, that the word *God* is *always* a word of *office*. When he was considering the Son as *God* before the creation, he should have thought a little farther, that the Father was then also *God*, and should have told us in what sense he was so. But to proceed : give me leave to observe here, that the Son is God, not *by nature*, but *by grace*, in consequence of your own principles. Being a *creature*, and *finite*, he can exercise the *divine* power and dominion no otherwise than *partially* ; and since he did not exercise the divine power and dominion to the utmost, before his resurrection, he exercised it only in *certain emergencies* ; and since the *exercise* began then, and is to end after the day of judgment, it is barely *temporary* : and so, by your own *characters*, you make him God, *by grace*, like *angels, magistrates, and prophets* ; only his *dominion* is larger, and for a longer period of time : this is your God *by nature*. But you are very excusable for not doing what it is ridiculous, at first sight, even so much as to pretend to. For

¹ Script. Doctr. p. 73. ed. 2.

^m Ibid. p. 240. ed. 2.

ⁿ Ibid. p. 73.

how should the *Son* be God *by nature*, upon your principles, when the *Father* himself, whatever his *metaphysical nature* may be, (which the ° Doctor allows not to come into consideration,) is GOD by *office* only; might not have been *God* at all, if he had pleased to make no creatures; and may cease to be *God*, in the *Scripture-sense* of the word, whenever he will, by letting all things drop into their primitive nothing. Now unless *nature* and *office* signify the same, it is not easy to conceive, upon the Doctor's principles, how any Person can be *God, by nature*, at all. You say, "if the divine powers and dominion be derived to, and exercised by a nature, person, or intelligent substance, UNIVERSALLY," (which is impossible to suppose in a finite creature,) "PERMANENTLY," (which is contrary to your own supposition of a kingdom which is to have an end,) "UNALTERABLY," (though an *alteration* is presumed in respect of the Son, and might be supposed even in respect of the Father himself;) if these things be so; that is, if contradictions be true, what then? Then "such a Being, or Person, is God-by nature," &c. And this you give us as "the true meaning of Gal. iv. 1." But, I hope, we shall have more respect for an inspired Apostle than to father any such meaning upon him. For the true sense and import of it, I refer you to the P learned gentleman, who has so well defended this text against Dr. Clarke. You add, "Had not the Scriptures this sense of the word *God*, they could not be intelligible or reconcilable," (p. 113.) But are you well assured that you understand whatever is intelligible or reconcilable? "The metaphysical definition," you say, "cannot be the only Scripture-sense of the term *God*." You allow then that it may be the *principal*, though not the *only* Scripture-sense; which I am glad to hear from you. The learned Doctor will not admit the *metaphysical* sense to be [¶] ever

• Script. Doctr. p. 243, 296. alias 210, 263. Reply, p. 301.

¶ True Script. Doctr. continued, p. 73, &c.

¶ Script. Doctr. p. 296. Reply, p. 119, 290.

the *Scripture-sense* of the term *God*. The *metaphysical* sense, he expressly says, is “never intended;” but the “constant usage of Scripture” is different. “The word “*God*, in Scripture, is ALWAYS a relative word of office:” which though the Doctor has no proof of, nor ground for, nor is himself well satisfied in; yet he knew *why* he said it, having very good *prudential* reasons for it. For, if the *metaphysical* sense be ever intended, when the word *God* is spoken of the Father, no good reason can be assigned why it should not be so always, when spoken of the same Person: and if this be the current and most usual sense of the word *God*, in Scripture, we shall have a fair handle to prove that it was intended in the same sense, when spoken, in such and such circumstances, of the Son: or, at least, the Doctor will have little or no pretence left, upon his principles, for saying that the Son is *truly* and *properly* God. You observe, that the *metaphysical* definition of one *self-existent, underived, independent, supreme* Being, would *exclude* the Son, who is *derived*. This is the sum of your argument, and clearer than you have put it. But I must observe to you, that this *definition*, or something like it, hath long passed current with men who believed a *Trinity of divine Persons*, and were never apprehensive of any such consequence as you would draw from it. It is properly a definition of the τὸ Θεῖον, the divine nature, *abstracting* from the consideration of the *distinction* of Persons, which is the usual method that the Schoolmen and others have taken; and there the words *self-existent, underived, independent*, are not considered as *personal*, but *essential* characters. *Necessarily-existing, uncreated, immutable, all-sufficient*, are what they mean in that *definition*: otherwise it is a definition of the Person of the Father only, singly considered. But if, instead of *metaphysics*, (which must always be content to stand corrected by Gospel Revelation,) we choose to take our definition of God from Scripture, then that of † Me-

† Deus est essentia spiritualis, intelligens, verax, bona, pura, justa, misericors, liberrima, immensæ potentæ, et sapientiæ, Pater æternus qui Filium

lancton, which I have put into the margin, will be more full and complete.

QUERY XXV.

Whether it be not clear from all the genuine remains of antiquity, that the Catholic Church before the Council of Nice, and even from the beginning, did believe the eternity and consubstantiality of the Son; if either the oldest creeds, as interpreted by those that recite them; or the testimonies of the earliest writers, or the public censures passed upon heretics, or particular passages of the ancientest Fathers, can amount to a proof of a thing of this nature?

YOU tell me, in answer, that it is “not clear that the “Ante-Nicene Church professed the notion of INDIVIDUAL consubstantiality:” that “the objector cannot “produce one single passage in all Catholic Ante-Nicene “antiquity, which proves an INDIVIDUAL OR NUMERICAL consubstantiality in the three divine Persons.” This answer is scarce becoming the gravity of a man, or the sincerity of a Christian, in so serious and weighty an argument. Did I speak of *individual* consubstantiality? or, if I had, could I mean it in your sense? I ask, whether the Fathers believed the three Persons to be *one substance*; and do affirm that they did, *universally*. You answer, that they did not assert the three Persons to be *one Person*; which is the constant sense you make of *individual*. And here you would make a show, as if the *objector* had been mistaken, and as if you contradicted him: when all resolves into a trifling equivocation, and you really contradict him not at all. That *present scholastic* notion, as you call it, of three Persons being one *Person*, *Hypostasis*, or *Suppositum*, is nowhere *present*, that I know of, amongst any that own a *Trinity*: neither is it the scholastic notion; as any man may see, that will

imaginem suam ab æterno genuit, et Filius imago Patris cœterna, et Spiritus Sanctus procedens a Patre et Filio. *Melanct. Loc. Theolog. de Deo.*

but look into the Schoolmen, and read with any judgment. *Individual* has been generally owned, but not in your sense; and *numerical* too, but in a sense very different from what you pretend to oppose it in: and therefore, to be plain with you, this way of proceeding, in an important controversy, is neither *fair* towards your adversaries, nor *sincere* towards the readers; but, at best, is only solemn trifling. You know, or you know little in this controversy, that all the Fathers, almost to a man, either expressly or implicitly, asserted the *consubstantiality* of the Son with the Father. Call it *individual*, or call it *specific*; that is not now the question. They unanimously maintained that the Son was not of any *created* or *mutable* substance, but strictly *divine*; and so closely and nearly allied to the Father's Person, (in a mysterious way above comprehension,) that the substance of the Son might be justly called the *Father's* substance, both being one. And this is all that ever any sober Catholic meant by *individual* or *numerical*; as I have often observed.

Is not this sufficient to urge against Dr. Clarke and you, who make the Son of an *inferior* substance, differing entirely in *kind* from the Father's; in short, a *creature*, though you care not to speak it in broad terms? This is what you have not so much as one Catholic Post-Nicene or Ante-Nicene writer to countenance you plainly in. The main of your doctrine, the very points wherein your scheme is contained, and on which it turns, and which distinguish you from the present orthodox, stand condemned by all antiquity. Do you imagine all this is to be turned off, only by equivocating upon the word *numerical*; or by throwing out the term *scholastic*; to make weak persons believe, that we have borrowed our doctrine from the Schoolmen only? No: we know, and you may know, if you please to examine, that, as to the main of our doctrine of the blessed Trinity, we have the universal Church, as high as any records reach, concurring with us. To them we appeal, as well as to the Scriptures,

that, together with Scripture, we may be the more secure that we follow the true interpretation. I need not go on to prove that the primitive writers asserted the *consubstantiality*, because you have not denied it in the sense I intended; and indeed could not. Your slipping a word upon us, and sliding off to another point, may be taken for a confession and acknowledgment, that the Query was just; and should have been answered in the *affirmative*, could your cause have subsisted, after so large and frank a confession. "As to creeds," you say, "none of the three first centuries express the Querist's notion:" meaning your own notion of *individual*, which is not the Querist's. What follows (p. 118.) is still pursuing the same mistake. Since you have told us, that there is no proof of *individual consubstantiality*, (that is, of *personal identity*, as you understand it, and in which sense nobody opposes you,) it would have been fair and ingenuous to have owned that the Fathers did unanimously hold a *consubstantiality*, in some sense or other. If not *numerical*, or *individual* in the strictest sense, was it, think you, *specific*? Yet, if so, it will follow that all the Fathers were directly opposite to the Doctor and you; and condemned your notion of the Son's being inferior in *kind, nature, substance, &c.* *Specific* unity implies *equality* of nature; as two men, specifically one with each other, are in *nature* equal; and so, any other two things of the same *sort* and *kind*. This notion, if it were what the Fathers held, you might charge with *Tritheism*: and, at the same time, you must give them all up, as no way favourable to your *hypothesis*. But the Fathers constantly took care to signify that they did not mean that the *Persons* were *specifically* one, like three human persons having a *separate* existence independent of each other: nor would they allow *three suns*, which would be *specifically* one, to be a proper or suitable illustration; but the rays of the same sun, the streams of the same fountain, and the like; all to intimate a much closer tie, a more *substantial* union, than

specific amounts to. The *Persons*, the *Hypostases*, were three; and yet *una substantia*, as Tertullian expresses it, in all.

You would persuade us, (finding, I suppose, that either *specific* or *individual* consubstantiality would be equally against you,) I say, you would persuade us, that it was some *oratorical* and *figurative* consubstantiality which the Fathers meant. This I apprehend from what you drop in page 121. where you expressly apply this new solution to the difficulty arising from *Ὁμοούσιος* in the Nicene Creed. I will not suffer the English reader to go away with this groundless notion, instead of a just answer. Such as know any thing of antiquity do not want to have such pretences confuted: such as do not, may please to take along with them these following considerations.

1. The doctrine of the *consubstantiality* appears to have been a constant settled thing; a sort of ruled case, running through all in general. Strange, that they should all *rhetoricate* in a matter of faith, of so great weight and importance; and that we should not meet with so much as one grave sober writer, to strip the matter of all flourish and varnish, and to tell us the naked truth.

2. It is to be observed, that the notion does not occur only in popular harangues, but in dry debates; chiefly in controversy with *heretics*, where it concerned the Catholics to speak accurately and properly, and to deliver their sentiments very distinctly.

3. This is farther confirmed from the objections made by *heretics* to the Catholic doctrine. There were two standing objections made by *heretics* to the Catholic doctrine: one was, that it inferred a *division* of the Father's substance: the other, that it was *Tritheism*. We find footsteps of the former as early as Justin Martyr. We meet with it in Tertullian, as urged by Praxeas. Tatian and Theophilus both allude to it. Sabellius was full of it;

* Dial. p. 183, 373. Jeb. See Bull. D. F. p. 66, 67, 33.

† Contr. Prax. c. 8. ‡ Tat. p. 21. ed. Worth. § Theoph. l. ii. p. 129.

¶ Alexand. apud Theod. E. H. l. i. c. 4. p. 17. Athanas. p. 942.

and it was afterwards one of the chiefest pretences of Arius ; as may appear from his own Letters, besides many ^zother evidences. Now, what colour or pretence could there have been for the objection, had not the Catholics professed a proper communication of the same substance ? Need we be told that angels and archangels, or any created beings, were derived from God without any *abscission* from, or *division* of, his *substance* ? Or could it ever enter into any man's head to make so weak an objection to the Catholic doctrine, unless a *proper consubstantiality* had been taught by them ? Yet this was the principal, the standing pretence for, and support of, heresy, for near two hundred years together.

The other was *Tritheism* ; objected all along by the Sabellians, and afterwards (though more sparingly) by the Arians. What kind of *Tritheism* the Sabellians meant (*Tritheism* in the highest and strictest sense) appears, not only from the former objection about the *division* of the Father's substance, but also from the way they took to solve the difficulty ; namely, by making Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, one and the same *Hypostasis*, as well as one *substance* ; and their thinking it not beneath the Father himself to have submitted to *passion*. This makes it extremely probable that the Church, at that time, believed the three Persons to be *consubstantial* in a proper, not *figurative*, sense ; in consequence whereof it was pretended that there would be three Gods ; in like manner as three human persons, of the same *specific* nature, are three men.

4. What puts this farther beyond all reasonable doubt, is the method which the Catholics took to answer the two fore-mentioned objections. As to that about *division of substance* : they never tell the *heretics*, that there was no manner of ground or colour for the objection : they never say, that the same difficulty would lie against God's creating angels, or archangels, or any other creature ; as

^z See Bull. D. F. N. p. 33.

they might, and should have done, had they been of Dr. Clarke's principles, or of yours. No; ^a they only deny any *division* or *diminution* of the Father's substance, and illustrate, as well as they are able, so sublime a mystery, by one *light* kindled, as it were, from *another*; by the *sun* and its *rays*; by *fountain* and *streams*; *stock* and *branch*: all instances of the same *specific* nature, and ^b answering in some circumstances, though defective in others. One would not desire a fuller and clearer testimony, that those or the like *similitudes* were intended to signify the same with a proper *consubstantiality*, than we meet with in Dionysius of Alexandria^c.

Then, for their answers to the charge of *Tritheism*, as understood by the Sabellians, how easy it would have been for them to have told the objectors, that they did not take the word *God* in the strict sense; that Moses and other mortal men had been called *Gods*; that they believed the Son to be no more than a *creature*, though the most perfect of all creatures; and that the Sabellians did them a very great and manifest injury, to imagine otherwise of them. This would, this must have been their answer to the charge of *Tritheism*, as understood by the objectors, had they not otherwise "learned Christ." Instead of this, they appear to be very sensible of the just weight and importance of the objection. They must secure the *divinity* of the Son, and yet preserve the unity too. They have recourse to *unity of substance*, (even against those who made *one substance* to signify one *Hypostasis*,) as Tertullian frequently does, in his dispute with Praxeas: and notwithstanding that the Sabellians had, if I may so speak, carried the Son's *divinity* too high, insomuch as to make him the very same *Hypostasis* with the *Father*; yet

^a Just. M. Dial. p. 183, 373. Tat. p. 21, 22. Athenag. p. 40, 96. Origen. Pamph. Apol. Tertull. Apol. c. 21. adv. Prax. c. 8. Theognost. apud Athanas. vol. i. p. 230. Hippolyt. contr. Noët. c. 11. p. 13. Dionys. Alexand. Resp. ad Quest. 5. Conf. Prud. Apotheos. p. 172.

^b See Bull, D. F. p. 120.

^c Apud Athanas. de Sentent. Dionys. tom. i. p. 255, 256.

the utmost that the Catholics could be brought to say, in *degradation* of him, was only this; that he was *subordinate* as a *Son*; equal in every respect, but as a *Son* can be equal to a *Father*; inferior, in point of *original*, (the *Father* being head and fountain of all,) but still of the same nature, power, substance, and perfections; subsisting in and from the *Father*, inseparably and constantly, always and everywhere; and therefore *one God* with him. And if any person, though in the warmth of dispute, did but happen to drop any doubtful expressions, tending any way to lessen the dignity of the *Son*, or was but suspected to do so; the alarm was soon taken, and it awakened the jealousy of the Catholics; who could not bear any appearance of it. This was remarkably seen, in the famous case of Dionysius, Bishop of Alexandria, sixty years before the rise of Arius, and is recorded by Athanasius in his works.

5. To this we may add, that while the Sabellian controversy was on foot, (which was at least a hundred years, and could never have lasted so long, had the Catholics been of any other principles than those which I here maintain,) I say, while this was on foot, how easy would it have been for the Catholics to have pinched them close, and to have pressed them with variety of arguments, more than they did, had they been of your principles, or of Dr. Clarke's? The *Father* is *eternal*, but the *Son* not so; the *Father* is *omniscient*, but the *Son* *ignorant* of the day of judgment; the *Father* is *omnipotent*, but the powers of the *Son* finite and limited; in a word, the *Father* is *Creator*, but the *Son* a *creature*; and therefore they cannot be one and the same *Hypostasis*, or *Suppositum*. This argument had been irrefragable, and could not have failed of being urged and pressed home, by men of such acute parts as Tertullian, Origen, Hippolytus, and others, had it been consistent with Catholic principles; or had they not believed, that the *Son* was *consubstantial*, in the proper sense, enjoying all the *essential* perfections of the *Father*, in common with him.

6. It would be endless almost to proceed in this argument: the rest I shall throw into a narrower compass, and only give hints for your leisure thoughts to inquire into. The strict sense which the ancients had of the word *God*, as signifying *substance*, and applying it to the Son, in the same sense; their admitting but one substance to be strictly divine, and their utter abhorrence of any inferior deities; their appropriating worship to the one true God, and worshipping the Son notwithstanding; their unanimous belief of the Son's being *eternal, uncreated, omnipotent*, and of his being Creator, Preserver, and Sustainer of the universe: any one of these, singly almost, would be sufficient for the proof of a *proper consubstantiality*, as asserted by the Ante-Nicene Catholic writers: but all together, and taken with the other particulars before mentioned, they make so full, so clear, so ample a demonstration of a matter of fact, that a man must be of a very peculiar constitution, who, after having well considered the evidences, can make the least doubt or scruple of it. And this I hope may be sufficient in answer to your pretence of an *oratorical* or *figurative* consubstantiality; a pretence, which you lay down with an unusual diffidence, and without so much as one reason, or authority, to support it.

It being evident, from what hath been said, that it was a *proper*, not *figurative*, consubstantiality, which the Ante-Nicene Fathers inviolably maintained; this is all I am concerned for. As to the question, whether it shall be called *specific* or *numerical*, I am in no pain about it. Neither of the names exactly suits it; nor perhaps any other we can think on. It is such a *consubstantiality* as preserves the *unity*, without destroying the *distinct personality*; such as neither Sabellians nor Arians would come into, but the Catholics maintained, with equal vigour, against both. It is a *medium*, to preserve the *priority* of the *Father*, and withal the *divinity*, the *essential* divinity, of *Son* and *Holy Ghost*: in a word; it is the sober, middle way, between the extravagancies of both extremes.

QUERY XXVI.

Whether the Doctor did not equivocate or prevaricate strangely, in saying, ^d“ The generality of writers before the Council of Nice were, in the whole, clearly on his side :” when it is manifest, they were, in the general, no farther on his side, than the allowing a subordination amounts to ; no farther than our own Church is on his side, while in the main points of difference, the ETERNITY and CONSUBSTANTIALITY, they are clearly against him ? that is, they were on his side, so far as we acknowledge him to be right, but no farther.

IN defence of the Doctor, you appeal to his very *numerous*, and, as you say, *plain* quotations from the ancient authors. And this, you promise beforehand, will be made further evident to all *learned* and *unprejudiced* persons, as soon as “ Dr. Whitby’s Observations on Bishop Bull’s “ Defens. Fid. Nic. appear in the world.” As to the Doctor’s pretended *plain* quotations from the ancient authors, they have not *plainly*, nor at all determined against the *coeternity* and *consubstantiality* of the Son, the *points in question* ; and therefore can do the Doctor no service : but, on the contrary, the Ante-Nicene writers, in general, have determined *plainly* against him, as to the main of his doctrine, wherein he differs from us. In asserting which, I say no more than the great Athanasius told the Arians long ago ; and it is fact, that all the writers before them, of any repute or judgment, were directly against them. “ ^eWe give you demonstration,” says he, “ that “ our doctrine has been handed down to us from fathers “ to fathers. But you, ye revivers of *Judaism* and disciples of Caiphas, what writers can you bring to father “ your tenets ? Not a man can you name, of any repute “ for sense or judgment. All to a man are against “ you,” &c. To the same purpose speaks St. Austin, in a

^d Answer to Dr. Wells, p. 28.

^e Athanas. de Decret. Syn. Nic. p. 233.

studied discourse, which may be supposed to contain his coolest and most serious thoughts. “† All the Catholic “ interpreters of the Old or New Testament, that I could “ read, who have wrote before me on the Trinity, which “ is God, intended to teach, conformable to Scripture, “ that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost do, by the insepara- “ ble equality of one and the same substance, make up “ the unity divine.” Here you may observe the sum of the ‡ Catholic doctrine. The same *homogeneous substance*, and *inseparability*. The first makes each Hypostasis, *res divina*; the last makes all to be *una substantia, una summa res*, one *undivided*, or *individual*, or *numerical* substance; one God. This is the ancient Catholic doctrine; and, I think, of the Schools too; though the Schoolmen have perplexed it with innumerable subtilties. Hilary expresses it briefly thus: “ *Naturæ indissimilis, atque inseparabilis unitas.*” This, I say, is the doctrine; confute it, if you please, or if you can: in the meanwhile, however, let us honestly own the fact. But to proceed.

There were many writings extant in the times of Athanasius and Austin, which have not come down to us; and therefore *their* testimonies, in the case, are of the greater force. I might mention other Catholics, about that time, who appealed to antiquity, with all the assurance and freedom imaginable. But the most remarkable instance to our purpose is, that when in the time of Theodosius

† Omnes, quos legere potui, qui ante me scripserunt de Trinitate, quæ est Deus, divinorum librorum veterum et novorum Catholici tractatores hoc intenderunt secundum Scripturas docere, quod Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus, *unius ejusdemque substantiæ inseparabili æqualitate divinam insinuent unitatem.* *Aug. Trin.* l. i. c. 3. p. 753.

‡ I shall add another passage of St. Austin, to explain his sense more clearly.

Trinitas propter Trinitatem Personarum, et unus Deus propter inseparabilem Divinitatem, sicut unus Omnipotens propter inseparabilem Omnipotentiam. Ita ut etiam cum de singulis quæritur, unusquisque eorum et Deus et Omnipotens esse respondeatur; cum vero de omnibus simul, non tres Dii, vel tres Omnipotentes, sed unus Deus Omnipotens: tanta inest in tribus inseparabilis unitas, quæ sic se voluit prædicari. *August. in Civit. Dei,* l. xi. c. 24.

the Arians were pressed by the Catholics in dispute, and fairly challenged to refer the matter in controversy to the concurring judgment of the writers before them, and to put it upon that issue; the Arians declined it, and durst not abide the trial. See the story at large, in ^hSocrates and ⁱSozomen. So dull were the Catholics at that time, nay, so unthinking were the Arians too, that *they* could not perceive, what is now so *clear* to the Doctor, that the *generality of writers, before the Council of Nice*, were on the Arian side: but one party was confident, and the other suspected, at least, that the *contrary* was true.

But I need not take this *indirect* way of confuting the Doctor's assertion; though it affords us a very strong presumption, and is of much greater weight and authority than the single judgment of any of the moderns: many of the Ante-Nicene writings, by the good providence of God, are yet extant, and can speak for themselves; besides that the incomparable Bishop Bull has unanswerably defended them, and vindicated them from all such exceptions as appeared to have any shadow of truth or probability in them. To show you how little reason the Doctor or yourself hath to boast of the Ante-Nicene writers as favourable to your cause, I shall here set down several positions, in which the Doctor and you run manifestly counter to the whole stream of antiquity.

1. *That the Son is not consubstantial with God the Father.* You are directly opposite to all antiquity in this your leading position, on which the rest hang, and on which the controversy turns. This is very clear from the testimonies collected by Bishop Bull, and from what additional observations I have made under the last Query.

2. *That the Son is not coeternal with the Father.* Consubstantiality implies *coeternity*: besides that the aforementioned learned Prelate has given us numerous direct testimonies for it from the Ante-Nicene Fathers, above

^h Lib. v. c. 10.

ⁱ Ibid. vii. c. 12.

twenty of them; not one of any note plainly contradicting them. These two main points being determined against you, the rest are of less moment. Yet I cannot find that the *ancients* agreed with you in your other inferior positions, which you bring in as under-props to your scheme.

3. *That God is a relative word, θεός and θεότης signifying not substance, but dominion and authority.* This is directly ^k contrary to all Catholic antiquity, a very few instances excepted.

4. *That God the Father only was God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.* This position I have shown to be contrary to the sentiments of the Ante-Nicene writers.

5. *That the titles of one, only, &c. are exclusive of the Son.* This also I have shown, in these papers, to be directly contrary to the judgment of the ancients.

6. *That the Son had not distinct worship paid him till after his resurrection.* This, in the sense wherein you understand it, is not true; nor agreeable to the sentiments of the ancient Church.

7. *That Father and Son (or any two Persons) ought not to be called one God.* I have referred to the Ante-Nicene writers, who so called them, more than once. Some of the testimonies may be seen at large in Dr. Fiddes.

8. *That the title of God, in Scripture, in an absolute construction, always signifies the Father.* Directly con-

^k See Fiddes, vol. i. p. 375, &c. and what I have observed above, p. 60. Nothing more common than θεότης for *divine nature* (as ἀνθρωπότης also for the *human*) in ecclesiastical writers. I shall point to a few instances only out of many.

Melito apud Cav. Hist. Lit. vol. ii. p. 33. Grabe, Spicileg. vol. ii. p. 245. Hippolyt. vol. i. p. 226. vol. ii. p. 24. Orig. contr. Cels. p. 342, 404. Cyril. Hierosol. Catech. xi. p. 142. Cyril. Alex. Thesaur. p. 232. Dial. i. de Trin. p. 405. Damasc. de Orth. Fid. l. iii. c. 11.

N. B. There is, in strictness, some difference between τοῦ Θεοῦ and θεότης, (though the latter is often used for the former,) such nearly as between *concrete* and *abstract*; but still θεότης refers to *nature* and *substance*, (as Θεός also generally does,) not *dominion*. *Abstract* names of substances are not very common indeed. (See Locke, H. U. l. iii. c. 8.) but here there was a necessity for it.

trary to the stream of antiquity; as may appear, besides other arguments, from their application of Scripture texts, of the Old Testament, in which God is spoken of absolutely, to the Son.

9. *That an inferior God may be admitted besides the supreme, and worship paid to both.* Nothing can strike more at the very fundamentals of religion than this position, in the judgment of the ancients in general.

10. *That the Son is not efficient cause of the universe, and of all created beings.* This I take to be contrary to all the ancients. See the testimonies above¹.

11. *That the Son himself is made, or created.* This neither you nor the Doctor admit *in terms*; but in *reality*, and *in other words*, you both do; as hath been shown. This position is flatly contrary to the doctrine of the ancients. The testimonies have been referred to above. There are other particulars, which I may at present forget, or which may less deserve notice. These are enough to show that the Doctor's pretences to the Ante-Nicene Fathers are groundless.

What then has the Doctor to plead for himself, and for his so great assurance in this particular? First, that the Ante-Nicene (as did also the Post-Nicene) Fathers allowed a *subordination*; which is very true, but not at all pertinent; nor can any consequence be certainly drawn from it, in favour of the Doctor's *hypothesis*; which he himself seems to be aware of, as I have remarked above^m. Another thing is, that the Ante-Nicene writers, some of them, spoke of a *temporal* generation by the *will* of the Father; which I have accounted for in my former pages. And a third thing is, that the generality of the *ancients*, when they speak of God absolutely, ordinarily mean the *Father*, and they distinguish his Person by some eminent titles and peculiar appellations; which may be easily accounted for.

Can these three considerations, or if there be more such,

¹ Query 11.

^m Page 212.

be ground sufficient for the Doctor to say, that the generality of the Ante-Nicene writers are *clearly* on his side, when they expressly contradict him in so many particulars as I have mentioned; several of them *essentials* of his *hypothesis*? The most that in truth can, or in justice ought to be said, is that, in some particulars, they *seem* to favour him; but could not *really* mean it, unless they notoriously contradicted themselves. The very utmost which the most sanguine man of your side should hope for, is, that the Fathers may be found contradictory to one another, or to themselves, in order to null their evidence. If they are consistent, they are ours certainly. And this difference there is plainly between us and you: that, as to your principles, the Fathers are express, clear, and full against them; no possibility of reconciling them together: as to ours, they are nowhere directly and expressly against us. If they are at all against us, it is only *indirectly*, and must be made out by *inference, deduction, and remote consequences*, neither *clear* nor *certain*. They may be reconciled to our *principles, to themselves, and to one another*: but as to any consistent agreement with yours, it is utterly impracticable.

Now supposing the Doctor ever so strongly to believe that the Ante-Nicene writers, in general, held principles which necessarily infer and imply his conclusion; yet we insist upon it, that they ought not to be judged of from any obscure disputable *consequences* which the Doctor draws for them, against what they drew for themselves. If we once take the liberty of denominating, sorting, or ranking of men with any side, not according to what themselves, perhaps rightly, professed, but according to what some *imagine*, in reason and good consequence, they ought to have professed, we may call *Protestants, Papists; Arminians, Calvinists; Orthodox, Heretics*; and what not. There are some common principles which all mankind agree in; and the several differences and distinctions amongst them arise only from their drawing conse-

quences differently; and it is this that gives them their particular and special denomination. Now since it is evident and visible, as the light, that the Ante-Nicene writers did not own the *consequences* which the Doctor makes for them, but expressly and clearly rejected them; constantly affirming the *eternity* and *consubstantiality* of the Son, (the very points of difference between us and the Doctor,) it is plain and obvious to common sense, that the Doctor has no just claim or title to them, but that we have: they were, in the main points, *clearly* on our side, (consistent, or not consistent, is not now the question,) and as *clearly* against him. It is to no purpose to plead, in this case, that *premises* only are of any weight, and that *conclusions* always stand for nothing. This may be allowed in *argumentation*; but not in determining on what side any person, or any body of men were in this particular question; whether such *conclusions* follow from such *premises*. In this, the Ante-Nicene writers were *directly* and *plainly* Anti-Arian; and therefore it is a great abuse of language, and as great an injury to them and to the truth, for the Doctor to say that they were, "in the whole, clearly on his side."

But you had promised the world great matters from a book of Dr. Whitby's, which has since seen the light; and I am therefore obliged to say something to it, though otherwise I should much rather wave it; because it is wrote only to *scholars*, with whom it can do no harm; and because, I believe, you are sensible, before this time, how uncautious a thing it is to promise in the dark; and to be sponsor for another's performance so long beforehand. Dr. Whitby is a person that has done good service to the Church, and to the learned world; and one would be willing to throw a veil over his late misconduct in this controversy, did not the imprudent triumphs of others oblige us to take some notice of it. But let us come to the point: I shall show you, in some short strictures upon the performance, how little you are to hope for

from it; and how far it comes short of expectation. I will divide what I have to say into two kinds of observations.

1. Upon general fallacies, running through the whole book.

2. Upon particular defects, misquotations, misconstructions, misrepresentations, &c.

His principal and most general fallacy, is his making *essence* and *person* to signify the same. One *individual* or *numerical* essence, he everywhere interprets to a Sabellian sense; understanding by it one *individual Hypostasis*, or *real Person*. And this ridiculous sense he fixes upon ⁿall that now pass for *orthodox*; and, I think too, upon the generality of those who have been reputed Catholics down from the Council of Nice: for he ^ocharges Athanasius himself with it; who has been generally looked upon as the standard of orthodoxy in this article. The charge is weak and groundless, and more especially in regard to Bishop Bull; who is ^pknown to have declared himself against it, as frequently, as strongly, and as fully, as it was possible for a man to do. The learned *Examiner*, though ^qhe seems to have known this, is forced to ^rpretend ignorance, to give the better colour to what he was going about. For, otherwise, who would not, at first sight, observe the peculiar extravagancy of the undertaking, to confute Bishop Bull, only by showing that the Bishop has *not* proved what he never intended to prove, nor so much as believed, but rejected as heartily as the

ⁿ Præf. p. 32.

^o Ibid.

^p I shall here only cite one passage of Bishop Bull, speaking of Sandius; whose steps Dr. Whitby has too closely followed.

Auctor ille, ubique in libro suo illud pro certo et rato habet Homoousianorum, quos vocat, et Sabellianorum de Filio Dei sententiam prorsus eandem esse. Quo nihil a vero remotius est; siquidem supra clare ostendimus, neminem Dei Filium Patri *ipsius* posse dicere, nisi absurde admodum et improprie, qui cum Sabellio sentiat. *D. F. N.* p. 148.

See also *D. F.* p. 230. *Animadv.* in *Gilb. Clerke*, p. 1004.

^q See *Modest. Disquisit.* p. 107. where he charges Bishop Bull with holding a *specific* unity; and *Præf.* p. 31.

^r *Præf.* p. 31.

learned *Examiner* himself can do. However, since this was, in a manner, necessary, that the learned *Examiner* might *appear* at least to have something to say, all due allowances are to be made for it. Let us now observe how, in the entrance, he is pleased to state the general question.

“Whether *all* the Ante-Nicene Fathers professed the very same doctrine which *we ascribe* to the Nicene Council; that is, whether all acknowledged the same *numerical* essence of the Father to have been *communicated* to the Son and Holy Ghost, and that therefore both are one God in *number* with the Father.”

See how many *guards* he has put in; as it were conscious of what he had taken in hand, and fearing lest otherwise there should not be left him strength sufficient to secure a handsome retreat. He does not say, the *generality* of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, but *all*; so that if there happens to be but one exception, he may still be safe and secure. Next, he does not say the doctrine of the Nicene Council, but which *we ascribe* to that Council: now, who can tell what *we* he means? Perhaps himself and two or three more. Then again, *same essence* will not serve, but it must be the same *numerical* essence: and this he interprets, everywhere throughout his book, in a Sabellian sense. So here the *state* of the *question* is entirely changed: and unless the Bishop has proved (which God forbid) that all the Ante-Nicene Fathers were heretics and something worse, professing what themselves condemned as heresy, he has not, it seems, done enough to satisfy the learned *Examiner*. Not content with this, he demands farther to have it proved that this same *numerical* essence, that is, (according to him,) *Person*, was *communicated* to two other *Persons*; and

• Utrum Patres OMNES Ante-Nicæni eandem QUAM Concilio Nicæno TRIBUIMUS sententiam amplexi sunt: hoc est, utrum omnes EANDEM NUMERO Patris essentiam Filio et Spiritui Sancto fuisse COMMUNICATAM, eoque nomine utrumque cum Patre unum numero Deum esse agnoverunt? *Proem.* p. 2.

he has some pretence for cavil at the word *'communicated*. Yet, as if all this were not sufficient, it must be also by *interior production*; as he observes a little after in page 2. and he has some turns of wit upon the word *production*. Was this the way to answer such a writer as Bishop Bull; a wise, grave, learned, judicious author, and one that was above trifling?

In short, the plain question between Bishop Bull and the Arians is only this: Whether the Ante-Nicene Fathers, in general, believed the Son to be of an *eternal, uncreated, immutable*, and strictly *divine* substance, or no? Bishop Bull maintained the affirmative, and has unanswerably proved it, in the opinion of most men of true learning and judgment, whether here or abroad. This is what the learned *Examiner* should neither have concealed nor disguised; but have frankly and honestly confessed, as he did ^xformerly. If, notwithstanding, the learned Prelate has not proved that the Fathers held a *numerical* essence, in the *Examiner's* sense, (such as he thinks necessary to preserve the unity,) the Bishop should not be represented as failing in the proof of what he intended; but should be given up for a *Tritheist*, and the Catholic Church with him, whose advocate he is, and with whom he stands or falls. This would have been the fair and ingenuous way; unless the learned *Examiner* would have undertaken to prove that the Fathers before the Nicene Council were of Arian principles, which he durst not do. What does it signify to show that they were not Sabelians? Did Bishop Bull, or does any man of sense, pretend they were?

You may judge of the performance, from his stating the question so strangely; and his setting out with such diffidence, as if he thought the cause desperate. When

^t Præf. p. 21.

^u Ibid. p. 23.

^x Opus aggredior quod Bullus nostras, pietate summa et doctrina vir præditus, atque in antiquitatis totius scriptis versatissimus, opere ære perenniori, ad doctorum invidiam, et novorum cordolum, summo judicio et industria peregit. *Whitby. Tractat. de vera Chris. Deit. pag. 59.*

you come to the book itself, you will find two thirds of it, in effect, little more than retreating to the Sabellian sense of *numerical* and *individual*, which is only so much impertinence. This is the principal and the most general fallacy which he trusts to; and is, in a manner, the turn of the whole book.

He has another *general fallacy*, which he serves himself of sometimes; and it is this.

When he finds some expressions run pretty high and strong for the divinity of Christ, he says the Arians used the same or the like expressions. There is very little force or weight in the argument: for it amounts only to this. The ²Arians, perfect masters of dissimulation, and notoriously accustomed to equivocating, used such or such expressions, meaning little by them; therefore the Ante-Nicene writers, men of a very different stamp and character, meant no more by those expressions. But, besides this, it is well known that the ¹Arians, at first, did not use those high expressions of the Son, but came into them by degrees, as they found their doctrine too shocking to be endured in broad terms; and as they perceived the necessity of using Catholic language. We can easily show, how, and when, and why the Arians were obliged to speak higher than they thought. But it can never be shown that the Ante-Nicene Fathers were under any such temptation; or that

¹ Præf. p. 4, 29. Lib. p. 8, 9, 40, 90, 109, 153, 157. and elsewhere.

² Scilicet tenebriones isti parati erant quamlibet fidei confessionem suo suffragio comprobare, quæ modo vocem *ipsosiviu* non haberet: etiamsi quocumque in ea ponerentur verba alia quæ apud sanos omnes idem prorsus significarent. *Bull. D. F.* p. 285.

³ Arianos Jesum Christum *Deum de Deo, lumen de lumine, vitam ex vita, ante omnia sæcula ex Deo Patre genitum* dixisse, Eusebio adhuc in vivis agente, me legisse non memini: utcumque postea, ad declinandam invidiam in publicis formulis has voces fraudulenter usurparent, &c. *Cav. Epist. Apolog. p.* 65.

Qui artes Eusebii, reliquorumque Arianorum vocum ambiguitate perpetuo abutentium, non olfaciet hac in re; ei quid aliud optem non video, præter nasum. *Cler. Epist. Crit.* ii. p. 52.

they affected to speak otherwise than they really meant, or than they would be generally understood. They were plain open men; unacquainted with those principles of latitude, and studied refinements, which came in afterwards. I may use almost a parallel instance from what has been lately seen among ourselves. From the year 1712, Arians have been taught to subscribe the Nicene and Athanasian creeds. But our good forefathers would have thought it horrid prevarication to do it; they were not so subtle and refined: and therefore, though *subscription* is now no certain argument of men's sentiments, it was formerly; when men were otherwise instructed, and loved Christian plainness and simplicity. This may serve for a brief *general* answer to the learned *Examiner's* second *general* fallacy.

There is a third *general salvo*, which occurs pretty often; that the Ante-Nicene writers distinguish God from Christ, (that is, the Father from the Son,) and call the Father *God* absolutely: now, since the Post-Nicene writers do so too, and since nobody scruples it, even at this day; I need not give myself the trouble of any more particular answer. Thus far for the general fallacies, running through his performance: after which, it may be needless to take notice of any *particular* mismanagement; but, for a specimen, you shall have a few instances of his misquotations, misconstructions, misrepresentations, reviving of old and trite objections, concealing the answers, and the like.

To begin with *misquotations*: page 22. he cites part of Polycarp's *doxology*, recorded in the Epistle of the Church of Smyrna. There he ^b leaves out the two most material words, (σὺν αὐτῷ,) on which the argument chiefly depended, and then insults over the learned Prelate.

Page 62. citing a passage from ^c Athenagoras, he

^b He reads it δι' ἑσῶ ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ δόξα, instead of δι' ἑσῶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ δόξα. *Vid. Euseb. l. iv. c. 15.*

^c Πρὸς αὐτῷ γὰρ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα γίνονται. *Athenag. Leg. p. 38. Ox. ed.*

changes *πρὸς αὐτοῦ* into *πρὸς αὐτὸν*, without giving any notice of it, or reason for it; only to make a weak insinuation against the *divinity* of God the Son.

Page 75, 76. he has a citation from Methodius, part of which you may see above, (p. 102.) the remainder I have here set down in the ^dmargin. After giving a construction diametrically opposite to the intent and *letter* of the author, he breaks out into this expression; ^e “ See “ how he (Methodius) manifestly acknowledges the Son “ to have been made, and before begotten,” (that is all the sense that I can make of what he says,) “ in spite of “ the Bishop.” He might have said, in spite of grammar and common sense: nothing can be clearer than that passage of Methodius for the eternal generation of the Son; which he does not only assert, but guards it against the objection from that text, (“ This day have I begotten “ thee,”) explaining it, not of any *temporal* generation, (for he allows no such thing,) but of a temporal *manifestation*.

Page 97. you may see how he deals with a modern author, the learned Dr. Cave. He first applauds his great knowledge of ecclesiastical antiquity, (in which he is extremely right,) and then cites a passage from him, which, as represented, seems to say, that many of the earliest Fathers were against Christ’s divinity. He had done this once before in his ^fPreface, so that one may see he is pleased with the discovery. I have given the passage at large in the ^gmargin, including that part in

^d Τὸ δὲ ἐγὼ σήμερον γιγίνησθαι σε, ὅτι πρότερον ἦδη πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων, λέγει, ἐν ταῖς οὐρανῶσι, ἰκουλάθην καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ γενῆσαι, ἃ δὴ ἔστι πρότερον ἀγορεύουσαν γυναιξίαν. *Ap. Phot.* p. 960.

^e En quam clare agnoscit Filium *γενῆσαι* et *προγενῆσαι*, factum et prægenitum esse, frustra præsole renitente. *Modest. Disq.* p. 76.

^f *Pref.* p. 28.

^g *Nævos*, qui in scriptis ejus (Lactantii) notantur, *de divinitate*, *de æterna Filii existentia* [de animarum præexistentia et futuro post hanc vitam statu, de fine sæculi et mille annorum imperio, de adventu Eliæ multos ad Dei cultum conversuro] aliisque capitibus, de quibus obscure, incaute, quandoque etiam periculose locutus sit, excusabunt, apud candidos rerum

hooks which our learned *Examiner* has left out. The whole turns upon this; whether Dr. Cave, by *in quibus*, intended the same as *in quibus singulis*, in every one of the foregoing particulars, or rather in many, or most of them. It is impossible to prove that he meant it strictly of every one; and therefore no certain argument can be drawn from this passage: but I will give you a reason or two, why I think Dr. Cave did not, or could not so mean it. You will observe, that *de divinitate* stands by itself, as a distinct article; and very probably is to be construed of the Deity: Lactantius is ^h known to have had very absurd notions of the Deity, supposing God to have had a *beginning*, and to have *made himself*. Dr. Cave could never mean that Lactantius had *ὁμοψήφους complures*, many of his mind, in this article: and therefore could not intend *in quibus*, strictly, of every particular, but of the whole, and in the general. Then, as to Dr. Cave's judgment of the sense of the Fathers, in respect to the divinity of the Son and his eternal existence, it is so ⁱ well known, and so often appears in his writings, that he should not be presumed to contradict his declared and repeated sentiments, without a manifest necessity. Wherefore Dr. Whitby does a great injury to the memory of that good man, by taking an advantage of an *ambiguous* expression. To proceed.

æstimatores, sæculi quo vixit circa istas res imperitia, dogmata ipsa paulo abstractiora, nec dum a theologis dilucide explicata nec synodorum decretis definita, et in quibus ὁμοψήφους habuit complures præcedentium sæculorum Patres. *Cav. Hist. Liter.* vol. i. p. 112.

^h Lactant. Institut. l. i. c. 7.

ⁱ Sancti Patres Catholicæ Fidei Nicænorumque dogmatum testes sunt in-concussi, vindices acerrimi; qui fidem ab Apostolis traditam, a majoribus acceptam, ad nos usque propagarunt, acceptam vita. Voce, etiam sanguine suo confirmarunt, invictisque argumentis contra omnia hæreticorum molimina sartam tectam conservarunt; quique nullis sophismatibus flecti queunt, ut in Unitariorum causam testimonium dicant. Hinc illæ lachrymæ, hæc fundi calamitas. Adeo ut de antiquitate ecclesiastica dici potest, quod de ratione alicubi habet Malmbsburiensis philosophus; ubicunque ratio homini repugnat, hominem ipsi rationi repugnaturum. *Cav. Epist. Apologet.* p. 17.

VOL. I.

U

Page 60. he tells us, that the titles of τοῦ παντὸς ποιητῆς, and τῶν ὅλων δημιουργοῦς, (that is, *Creator* and *Framer* of the universe,) were such as the writers of that age (the second century) always distinguished the Father from the Son by. If he means that the Son had not then those or the like titles given him, it is a notorious untruth, (as you may see by the quotations ^k above, from Irenæus and Clemens Alexandrinus;) if he means only, that those and the like titles were *eminently* and *emphatically* given to the Father, that indeed is very true of the *second* century; and as true of all the *centuries* following, down to this present, as appears by our creeds; which, I suppose, is no great discovery.

In his Preface, (p. 32.) he misrepresents Basil as declaring against unity of *essence*, where the good Father intended nothing but against unity of *Person*. In the same page, he brings in ^l Athanasius, and interprets what he said against the ὁμοούσιον, as if it had been meant of the ὁμοιούσιον, betwixt which, that accurate Father always carefully distinguished. A little lower, he represents Athanasius as maintaining *numerical* identity; which (in the sense of the learned *Examiner*) is making him a Sabellian. Thus, it seems, he is to confute Bishop Bull, only by puzzling and confounding such things, as that incomparable Prelate had made plain and clear.

Page 9. he represents Barnabas's Epistle, ἐν νόθοις, which he interprets *spurious*, (page 19.) neglecting and concealing in what sense ^m Eusebius had reckoned it in ἐν νόθοις and what had been said by very ⁿ learned men in defence of it.

^k Qu. xi. p. 134.

^l Vid. Athanas. tom. i. p. 767. compare tom. ii. p. 31.

Athanasius distinguished very particularly, more than Hilary and some other Fathers did, between the ὁμοούσιον and the ὁμοιούσιον. He thought that to say the Son was only *like* God, was as much as *denying* him to be *God*: as if we should say a thing is only *like* silver, therefore not *silver*; or only *like* gold, therefore not *gold*. This was his sense of the matter.

^m See Cave, *Histor. Literar.* vol. i. p. 11.

ⁿ Pearson, *Vindic.* p. 276, 282. *Bull. D. F.* p. 15. *Pr. Trad.* p. 3.

Page 23. he gives a partial account of the ancient *doxologies*. No one that has seen St. Basil, the eighth book of the Clementine Constitutions, Polycarp's *Doxology*, and the Church of Smyrna's, besides Clement of Alexandria's, and Hippolytus's, can make any reasonable doubt, whether *to* or *with* were not applied in *doxologies* to the *Son* or *Holy Ghost*, as well as *by*, *through*, or *in*, by the earliest Ante-Nicene writers. To pretend Athanasian forgeries in answer to all, is only giving up the point, with the ridiculous circumstance of appearing to maintain it.

His account of Justin Martyr is one continued misrepresentation, as may appear in some measure by comparing it with what hath been observed in these papers °.

Page 61. he takes occasion from the Latin version to misrepresent Athenagoras, and to insinuate that the Son is not *like* the Father. If the Greek words be rendered, as they signify, *infecti, et facti*, the equivocation upon *genitus*, and therewith the argument, is lost.

Page 62. he undertakes another passage in Athenagoras, a very famous one, and of singular use in this controversy; plainly showing the true and genuine sense of such Fathers as spoke of a temporal generation, and being of equal force both against Sabellians and Arians, as the P learned Prelate has judiciously and admirably demonstrated against Petavius, Sandius, and others. Sandius, being sensible of its weight and force, thought it the wisest way to say, that the place was corrupt; and being a man of wit, he invented something of a colour for it. Gilbert Clerke, afterwards, thought of a more plausible solution of the difficulty: but the learned 9 Bishop had too much *acumen* to let it pass. Last of all comes Dr. Whitby with a new device, which, I suppose, is entirely

° See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, p. 49. &c. where Justin Martyr is vindicated at large.

† Bull. Def. F. N. p. 204, 205.

‡ See Bull, Animadv. in Gilb. Cl. Op. Post. p. 1052, 1053.

his own. You see the passage in the 'margin. The words *οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον*, he construes thus; "not as eternally generated;" as if he had read *γεννώμενον*, supplying *ἀϊδίως* by imagination. The sense and meaning of the word *γενόμενον*, signifying *made*, or *created*, is so fixed and certain in this author, that no doubt or scruple can be reasonably made of it. And that he intended to signify the Son's *immutable, eternal, necessary* existence, in this passage, is so manifest, that a man must be of a peculiar complexion that can so much as question it; especially considering the other high things said of the Son, by this author, in other places; some of which have been above cited. I mention not how the learned *Examiner* endeavours to elude them; putting off one with a jest, (p. 60.) pretending an *interpolation* for another, (p. 61.) and, for fear all should not suffice, retreating at length to his quibble upon the word *numerical*.

Page 108. he makès a ridiculous representation of Tertullian, as if that writer believed two *angels* to be as much *one*, as God the Father and God the Son are. I shall only 'transcribe the passage, and trust it with the intelligent reader.

Page 110, 113. you find him tampering with Irenæus; first, insinuating as if that excellent ^uwriter had supposed the "Son was our Lord and God, according to the

^r Πρῶτον γέννημα εἶναι τῷ πατρὶ, ἔχ ὡς γενόμενον, ἔξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς, τοῦ ἀϊδίου ὄν, εἶχεν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν λόγον ἀϊδίως λογιστὸν ὄν. *Athen. Leg.* c. x. p. 38.

^s "Ἐπεὶ Θεὸν ἄγει τὸν τοῦδε τοῦ πατρὸς ποιητὴν, αὐτὸν μὲν οὐ γενόμενον, ὅτι τὸ οὐ γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν.— P. 21. Τὸ δὲ αἰεὶ, γίνεσθαι τι οὐκ ἔχον· ἢ τί τὸ γενόμενον μὲν, ὃν δεὶ οὐδέποτε. P. 67. Οὐ φύσει ὄντων, ἀλλὰ γινεσθῶν. P. 68.

^t Et nos etiam sermoni atque rationi, itemque virtuti, per quæ omnia molitum Deum ediximus, propriam substantiam *Spiritum* inscribimus; cui et sermo insit prænuntianti, et ratio adsit disponenti, et virtus perficienti. Hunc ex Deo prolatum d'edicimus, et prolatione generatum, et idcirco Filium Dei et Deum dictum, ex *unitate substantia*. Nam et *Deus Spiritus*.— Ita de *Spiritu Spiritus* et de Deo *Deus*, ut *lumen de lumine accensum*. Tertull. *Apol.* c. xxi. p. 202. ed. Havercamp. Lugd.

^u Irenæus, lib. i. c. 10. p. 48 ed Bened.

“good pleasure of the invisible Father;” but admitting the more probable construction to be, that every *knee might bow*, according to the *good pleasure* of the invisible Father.

It is well known that Irenæus ^x allows no *creature*, nothing that had a beginning, to be justly called *God*; ^y looks upon the notion of an *inferior God* as a contradiction; does not ^z admit that any *creature* can *create*: and yet he makes the Son ^a truly God, ^b *coeternal* and ^c *consubstantial* (though he uses not the very word) with God the Father; Creator of men, of angels, of all things. Testimonies of the last particular are so many and so clear, (some of which have been cited above,) that I need not here refer to them. In contradiction to all this, Dr. Whitby would persuade us (from two or three passages which say no such thing) that Irenæus resolved all the dignity of the Son into the powers given him after his resurrection ^d. I may, upon this occasion, take notice of another ^e writer, who has lately misrepresented Irenæus. He imagines that the good Father supposed the *Λόγος*, or Word, as such, *passible*. The passages, which he builds this fiction upon, you have in the ^f margin, according to

^x Iren. lib. iii. c. 8. p. 183. ed. Bened.

^y Lib. iv. c. 2. p. 229.

^z Lib. iv. c. 41. p. 288.

^a Lib. iii. c. 6. p. 180. lib. iv. c. 6. p. 235.

^b Lib. ii. c. 13. p. 132. lib. ii. c. 25. p. 153.

^c Lib. iii. c. 21. p. 217. lib. ii. c. 13. p. 132. lib. ii. c. 25. p. 153.

^d Irenæus's genuine principles may be seen in one short sentence. Pater — verbum suum visibile effecit omni fieri carni, incarnatum et ipsum, ut in omnibus manifestus fieret rex eorum. Etenim ea quæ judicantur, oportebat videre judicem, et scire hunc a quo judicantur. Iren. l. iii. c. 9. p. 184.

^e Emlyn, Exam. of Dr. Bennet, p. 18. first edit.

^f Solus vere magister Dominus noster; et bonus vere Filius Dei, et patiens, verbum Dei Patris Filius hominis factus. Iren. l. iii. c. 18. p. 211.

Ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ εὐλόγιστος, καὶ ἱκανός. L. i. c. 10. p. 50.

Compare the following places.

Verbum, unigenitus qui semper humano generi adest, et conspersus suo plasmati, secundum placitum Patris et caro factus, ipse est Jesus Christus Dominus noster, qui passus est. P. 206.

Ὅτι καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ σαρκί, ἐν ᾗ καὶ Ἰησοῦν ἐλώσινται. P. 207. Conf. Hippolyt. contr. Noët. c. 15.

the last edition. The most that you can espy in them is, that the *Λόγος* *suffered* in the flesh: one of the quotations does not *certainly* say so much, but might bear another construction. It might as reasonably be pretended that the *Λόγος*, as such, was *visible*, and *comprehensible*, and changed into a *frail man*, as that he was *passible*: see the margin. All that Irenæus intended to prove against the *heretics* was, that the *Λόγος* was constantly united to the man Christ Jesus, and did not desert the *human nature* in the *passion*, it being ‡ necessary that the suffering Redeemer should be both God and man: this is all the case. But to proceed with the learned *Examiner*.

Page 147. he represents Tertullian as making the Son, in his highest capacity, “ignorant of the day of judgment.” Let the reader see the ^h whole passage, and compare it with another, four chapters lower; and from thence judge of Tertullian’s meaning. No reasonable doubt can be made, but that Tertullian understood the Son’s being *ignorant*, &c. in respect only of his *humanity*, as well as he understood the other things, mentioned together with it in the same paragraph. Such as consider how highly Tertullian, elsewhere, speaks of the Son, as being of one *undivided* substance with the Father, can make no question of it.

Invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis, et impassibilis passibilis, et Verbum homo. P. 206.

‡ See Irenæus, l. iii. c. 18. p. 211. See also the famous passage about *quiescence*, p. 213. which plainly supposes all that was suffering and low to belong to the *man* only, all that was high and great to the *Λόγος*, or divine nature.

^h Ignorans et ipse diem et horam ultimam, soli Patri notam; disponens regnum discipulis, quomodo et sibi dispositum dicit a Patre, habens potestatem legiones angelorum postulandi ad auxilium a Patre si vellet, exclamans quod se Deus reliquisset, in Patris manibus Spiritum ponens. *Tertull. adv. Prax.* c. xxvi. p. 516.

Habes ipsum *exclamantem* in passione, *Deus meus, Deus meus*, ut quid me dereliquisti?—Sed hæc vox carnis et animæ, id est, hominis, non *Sermonis*, nec *Spiritus*, id est, non *Dei*, propterea emissa est, ut impassibilem Deum ostenderet, qui sic Filium dereliquit, dum hominem ejus tradidit in mortem. *Tertull. adv. Prax.* c. xxx. p. 518.

Here it will be proper to obviate a difficulty which may naturally, upon the first thoughts, arise in one's mind. Why should the Catholics so often urge the texts relating to Christ's *human* nature only, against the Sabellians? For it may seem that, if they thereby proved two *Hypostases*, they proved only a *divine* and a *human Hypostasis*; and there might still be but one *Hypostasis* in the *Godhead*, as the Sabellians pretended. But it is to be considered, that both Catholics and Sabellians were agreed in one point, that God was incarnate, the *divine* nature personally united to the *man Christ Jesus*: and the main question between them was, whether the *Father* himself made one Person with Christ's human nature, or no. If the Catholics could prove the *negative*, (as they could easily do,) then the Sabellians must, of course, and upon their own principles, acknowledge another *divine Hypostasis*, besides the *Father*. The Catholics therefore urged all the texts, wherever Christ speaks of himself as a *distinct* Person from the *Father*; though many of these texts are meant of him in his *human* capacity only. Had our Saviour *Christ* spoke of the *Λόγος*, or *Word*, in the same manner as he does of the *Father*: had he prayed to the *Λόγος*, or *Word*, complained of being forsaken by him; or had he said, I know not the day of judgment, but he, the *Λόγος*, or *Word*, does; it could never have been presumed, that the *I* and *HE*, the *Λόγος* and *Christ*, made one *Person*. It appearing therefore, from that manner of expression, that the *Father* was not *personally* united with the human nature of *Christ*; this was sufficient against the Sabellians, who allowed that the man *Christ Jesus* was personally united with *God*: and if it could not be with the *Father*, it must of consequence be with another *divine Hypostasis*, a *distinct* and *real* Son of the *Father*. Thus you see the force and significancy of those texts (and of all texts which intimated a plain *personal* distinction between the *Father* and *Christ*) against the Sabellians. They showed that the Person speaking was not the *Father*. And yet the Person who spake, having (as both

sides allowed) a *divine* and *human* nature, might speak of himself in different respects; in this or in that capacity. Thus, in regard to the Son's *ignorance of the day of judgment*, it is manifest that the *Father* and *Son* are there spoken of, as of two Persons; and one as *knowing*, the other as *not knowing*, though only in a certain respect: one *ignorant* in such a capacity, the other not ignorant in any capacity at all, as having never taken *human nature*, and therewith *human ignorance*, into a *personal* union with himself. Thus far to clear this point, and to acquit myself of a ⁱ promise made you some time ago.

I shall proceed a little farther in remarking on your friend's performance. It is frequent with him to bring up old objections, neglecting and concealing the Bishop's answers. I shall give a few instances only, that I may not be tedious.

Pag. 17. he pretends that the Bishop has not shown, that the Fathers of the *second century* resolved the unity into the same principle with the Nicene Fathers. Yet the Bishop ^k has shown it, and Dr. Whitby allows as much in the very next page; and has nothing to retreat to but the miserable evasion about *individual*.

Page 84. he refers to Basil as an evidence that Gregory Thaumaturgus believed the Son to be a *creature*. This he again repeats in the next page; and again in his Preface, p. 10. Yet the fact is evidently false; Basil himself a full witness on the contrary side; and this Bishop Bull had ^l given notice of, and made clear to a demonstration. When a writer strains so hard to put a *false* sense upon another, there is no uncharitableness in believing that he gives us at least his *own true* meaning.

Page 87. he revives an old objection, which the learned Prelate had ingenuously ^m set forth in its full force; and given it as full an answer. Your friend is here pleased

ⁱ Qu. vii. p. 79. See Athanasius farther, upon the thing whereof I have been speaking, vol. i. p. 261.

^k Bull. D. F. sect. iv. c. 4.

^l Ibid. p. 155, 156, 157.

^m Ibid. p. 267.

to speak with great contempt of the Bishop's answer; for no other reason, that I can see, but because he was not able to confute it. Being however resolved to say something, he stoutly denies a plain matter of fact. *Oixovopia*, says he, is never used by the Fathers, in the Bishop's sense. Please to turn to the places noted in the ^a margin, and judge whether the Bishop or he be the more faithful and accurate in this matter. If any thing farther be wanting in defence of Bishop Bull, in this article, let him speak for himself, in another ^o work, in answer to Gilbert Clerke; who, it seems, was much offended at the *oixovopia*, grieved, as he well might, to see his most pompous and plausible pretences entirely baffled by it. I should weary my reader, and myself too, if I went on remarking every place, where old objections are brought up, and either none or very slight notice taken of the answers: if you have a mind to compare, you may note some pages referred to in P the margin. I shall proceed

ⁿ Tertullian. adv. Prax. c. 2, 3. Clem. Alexandr. p. 831, 955. Tatian. c. 8. ed. Ox. Hippolytus contr. Noët. p. 12, 15.

Valesius had observed the thing long ago, and without any view to controversy.

Vetus omnis Christianorum theologia Deo quidem Patri monarchiam attribuit, Filio vero et Spiritu Sancto *oixovopia*, id est, administrationem et dispensationem. *Vales. Not. ad Euseb.* p. 5, 6. See also p. 90, 253.

• Bull's Posth. Works, p. 1045, 1046, 1047, &c.

† Modest. Disquisit. Bull's Def. F.

Page 27.	—	—	Page 258, 120, 70.
29.	—	—	66.
30.	—	—	165.
40.	—	—	69. Judic.
50.	—	—	217.
62.	—	—	205.
69.	—	—	119.
74.	—	—	161, 162, 163.
77.	—	—	165—80, 111, 136.
82.	—	—	118.
95.	—	—	168, 202, 964.
96.	—	—	169.
107.	—	—	206.
109.	—	—	41.
120.	—	—	77.

Page 122.

no farther in this tedious and disagreeable employment; except it be to observe to you one peculiar piece of management, which I leave you to reflect on. The learned *Examiner* labours, for ¶ two pages together, to show that Clemens of Rome was far from speaking or thinking so highly of our blessed Lord, as St. Paul did. A little after, † he proposes Clemens to us as a very good interpreter of Scripture; and commends him highly, for laying Christianity before us in its naked simplicity. What can we think of this? The best construction I can make of it is, that he intended in p. 14, 15, not St. Paul himself, but St. Paul as now generally understood: and so he was to insinuate something, which was not fit to be expressed. But a man of art would have conducted better; would not have discovered himself so soon, but have trusted more to the sagacity of his reader. This manner of proceeding, in an important cause, is what I cannot account for. It seems to me, that if there be not reasons of conscience obliging a *good* man to speak out, there are always reasons of prudence which should make a *wise* man hold his tongue.

You may perceive, by this time, that Bishop Bull's book is like to stand, till something much more considerable appears against it. Several attempts of this kind have been made before; but to as little purpose: and if there be ever so many more, by ever so good hands, I will venture to say, they will succeed no better. The book will stand as long as clear sense, sound reasoning, and true learning have any friends left. The main substance of it is not to be confuted; any more than you can

Modest. Disquisit.	Bull's Def. F.
Page 122. —	— Page 77, 78.
141. —	261.
169. —	293.

¶ Aliter plane D. Paulus loquitur:—Argumento potius est Clementem de Christo aliter plane quam Paulum sensisse—magnam suspicionem injicit, eadem Clementem cum Paulo minime docuisse. *Whitb. Disq.* p. 14, 15.

† Solus Clemens Christianæ Fidei simplicitatem præ oculis lectoris ponit. *Whitb. Disq.* p. 19.

extinguish truth, or put out the light of the sun. The Fathers have been tried, and are found *faithful*: what they defended while living, the *divinity* of our blessed Lord, against the insults of Jews, Pagans, and Heretics, they still maintain in their works: and their works will be held in great esteem and veneration, while every weak attempt to blast their credit will meet with what it justly deserves—I was going to say what, but it may sound severe: I proceed to another Query.

QUERY XXVII.

Whether the learned Doctor may not reasonably be supposed to say, the Fathers are on his side, with the same meaning and reserve as he pretends our Church forms to favour him; that is, provided he may interpret as he pleases, and make them speak his sense, however contradictory to their own: and whether the true reason, why he does not care to admit the testimonies of the Fathers as proofs, may not be, because they are against him?

IN answer to this, you tell me, that it contains only an *invidious* suggestion, not any *argument*. The suggestion, I do assure you, is just, and *argumentative* too; and was *kindly* intended towards you; that you might not take things implicitly and upon trust from others, but might examine them first yourself, and then pass a judgment of them. As to the *invidious* appearance of it; had I ever intended, or in the least thought of making the Queries public, you might, with a better grace, have told me of it. But as I had not the liberty of revising my papers, nor so much as any previous apprehension of your design, (presuming all along the very contrary, as I reasonably might,) these things considered, I hope the *invidious* part you will take to yourself; the *argument* (for an *argument* it is, in its kind) you may leave to me. It is of some moment to us, not only to have the primitive writers on our side, (as we plainly have,) but to have them *thought* so too. The learned Doctor has made some pre-

tences that way; and they are of weight with such readers as are not duly apprehensive of the Doctor's uncommon manner of setting things off, with great advantage to his cause, and as great detriment to truth. Two reasons are intimated, in the Query, why his claim to *antiquity* ought to have the less force with considering men: first, because he lays claim to our Church's *forms*; which every common reader may see are directly against him; and secondly, because, notwithstanding his appeal to *antiquity*, he is wiser than to put the matter upon that issue. He endeavours to lessen the esteem of the ancients, all the while that he presumes they are on his side, (a sure mark that he suspects them,) and is securing a retreat when they fail him; as they certainly will, whenever strictly inquired into. I would leave it with any discerning man (who cannot examine farther into the merits of the cause) to judge, whether it be at all likely, that those who speak always contemptibly of the ancients, and endeavour to the utmost to abuse and expose them, can reasonably be presumed to have a greater interest in them, than they who speak honourably and handsomely of them; who defend their character, and have, as it were, an affectionate tenderness and concern for them. Thus much for the second reason intimated in the Query. As to the first reason suggested, the import of it is this. If the learned Doctor can espy *Arianism* in our Liturgy or Articles, where it certainly is not; he may reasonably be supposed to mistake as much among the Fathers. He sees, in our Liturgy, the doctrine of one God the Father, *inclusive* of Son and Holy Ghost; but does not see one God *exclusive* of both; which is his doctrine. He finds a *subordination of order* taught in our public forms; but does not find any subordination or inferiority of *nature*; which is his principle. And yet, upon these slight grounds, he scruples not to say, that the *main branches* of his own doctrine are *expressly affirmed* in our Liturgy; meaning,

* Script. Doctr. p. 379. first ed.

by a tacit *consequence* of his own making. And since this *consequential*, that is, *imaginary*, countenance is all that he can claim from our Liturgy, and all that he really means, when he says the Church's forms are on his side; possibly he may mean no more, when he speaks of the Fathers. The generality of readers, it may be, understand him, as if he had intended to say, that the Ante-Nicene writers especially had declared against the *coeternity* and *consubstantiality* of the Son, the points in question: but I humbly conceive he intended no more than this; that the Ante-Nicene writers have declared something, which, he really believes, does by *consequence* destroy the *consubstantiality*, &c. though, at the same time, those writers admitted no such *consequence*; but *expressly* and *constantly* disowned it. This is all that he *can mean*, with respect to our Liturgy; and therefore, probably, all he *does mean*, in respect of the other; or however, certain I am, that it is all he *should mean*. Now you see the full of my argument. If it look *invidious*, I cannot help it; I am persuaded it is just; and I think it of as much importance to our readers to have the matter fairly stated, as it is that truth may not be smothered; nor any stress laid upon the Doctor's citations, beyond what they do really bear. The learned Doctor owns, as to Post-Nicene Fathers, that they are, in the whole, against him. And he should have owned as much of the generality, at least, of the Ante-Nicene Fathers too; and then he has no claim to any thing but *concessions*; of which he endeavours to make the utmost advantage *three ways*. First, by making more *concessions* than there really are: secondly, by representing those *concessions* in so promiscuous and confused a light, that a common reader cannot readily distinguish when or where the Doctor intended the full and entire meaning of an author, or a *concession* only: thirdly, by slipping his own conclusion upon those *concessions*, as if they were the same thing; though there really is no connection between them, no just consequence from one to the other. I would not be knowingly guilty

of charging the Doctor falsely, in these or in any other particulars, for any consideration; and therefore it may be expected of me, that I explain myself more at large; which accordingly I shall do, in the order and method which I have already laid down.

I. The learned Doctor has taken several passages for *concessions*, which are really none: but only as he has given them such a particular air and aspect; either by *prefacing* them, and holding out a false light to the reader; or by *commenting* upon them; or by *ill translating* of them. I shall proceed to particulars; and you must not take it amiss, if we call upon you to return us back what you have unfairly wrested from us.

Scripture Doctrine, page 3. the Doctor produces a passage of Athanasius, part of which, so far as concerns us, you see in the †margin; with so much farther as is necessary to clear the sense of the author. The Doctor's version runs thus: "For he (*the Father*) is the one God, and the only one, and the first. And yet *these things do not destroy the divinity of the Son.*" This rendering is flat and low; and neither answers the *intent* nor *letter* of the author. Οὐκ εἰς ἀναίρεσιν, literally, is, *not to exclude the Son*: plainly meaning not to exclude him from being the *one God*, and the *only one*, and the *first*, together with the Father. And so Athanasius interprets himself in the words immediately following: for he (*the Son*) also is *πρῶτος*, the *first*, the fulness of the Godhead of him who is the *first*, and *only* God. You will observe that the Doctor renders ἀπαύγασμα, as if it had been ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης, *brightness of glory*: which is again concealing and stifling the sense of the author. Athanasius intended to signify the Son's *issuing* or *streaming* forth, as it were, from the Father's substance, as light from the sun; which

† Εἰς γὰρ Θεὸς καὶ μόνος καὶ πρῶτος ἴσται· οὐκ εἰς ἀναίρεσιν δὲ τοῦ υἱῷ λέγεται μὴ γίνωσθαι. ἴσται γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ ἰνὶ, καὶ πρῶτος, καὶ μόνος, ὡς τοῦ υἱὸς καὶ μόνου καὶ πρῶτου καὶ μόνου λόγος, καὶ σοφία, καὶ ἀπαύγασμα ἦν· ἴσται δὲ καὶ πρῶτος καὶ αὐτὸς, πλήρωμα τῆς τοῦ πρῶτου καὶ μόνου Θεότητος ὅλος καὶ πλήρης ὁ Θεός. Athanas. 3. Orat. contr. Arian. p. 556. ed. Bened.

“above all derivative being;” insinuating to his reader as if the Son were to be included under *derivative being*; than which nothing can be farther from the sense of the author in that very page; as I have observed ^a before, on another occasion. All the *concession* that is there, lies only in the Doctor’s *translation*, and the turn he gives to it in the sequel: Athanasius himself has granted nothing that can do you any service; at least, not in that passage; and therefore let that also return to us again.

Page 89. (alias 79.) the Doctor cites a passage of Eusebius, which, he says, “expresses the unanimous sense “of the Catholic Church:” and it may be true, as it lies in Eusebius. But, as it is represented in the Doctor’s translation, excluding the Son from any proper *efficiency* in the work of creation, it is diametrically opposite to the *unanimous sense* of the ancients, and to Eusebius too; as hath been shown above ^b.

Page 100, 101. (alias 92.) the learned Doctor has two citations from Chrysostom and Basil; who interpret the texts, of *power*, as the Doctor also does of *power*. But if the Doctor means one thing by *power*, and they another, and the *ideas* be entirely different; their interpretation and his must be as different as the *ideas* are: and it is not fair to quote them as agreeing in the *thing*, when they agree only in the *name*. I have ^c before took notice how the Doctor dealt with Chrysostom, in order to conceal the good Father’s true meaning. I shall here observe, how he perverts Basil’s sense, by a small and seemingly slight turn in his translation. ^d Basil’s words are ἰσου καὶ ταυτοῦ κατὰ δύναμιν; that is, *equal and the very same in respect of power*. The Doctor drops *equal*, which would have discovered Basil’s meaning; and renders it, “one “and the same in power.” And thus Basil’s words, which are utterly repugnant to the Doctor’s *hypothesis*, are improved into a *concession* in favour of it.

^a Qu. xii. p. 143.

^b Qu. xi. p. 130.

^c Qu. xxiii. p. 261.

^d Σαφῶς εὐὶ ἴ, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἰσου καὶ ταυτοῦ κατὰ δύναμιν περιλαμβάνων. Basil. contr. Eun. l. i. p. 35.

Page 102. (alias 94.) he gives us a low and lame construction of a noble passage in ^eIrenæus. The words *κατὰ τὸ θεϊκὸν καὶ ἰσδοξον* he renders, “in a divine and glorious manner:” the true rendering is, *in his divine and glorious character*: namely, that which he had as God, and Son of God. Irenæus, in that chapter, is representing the Son as acting at different times in a different character or capacity. When he appeared to the Patriarchs, then he acted in his highest capacity, in his *divine* character. What that *character* is, ^fIrenæus explains, a little above, in the same chapter: it is, as he is the *Word*, the *Framer* (or *Maker*) “of all things, who sitteth upon the cherubims, and containeth all things,” who is the Son of God, and God. This shows what is meant by the *τὸ θεϊκὸν καὶ ἰσδοξον*, and at the same time shows that, according to Irenæus, the *Λόγος*, who is God, then acted in his own proper character, and not in the *Person* of the *Father* only, which the Doctor would infer from this passage. For it must be observed that the Son was *Θεὸς* (Joh. i. 1.) before the time that he is supposed by the Doctor to have acted *ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ*, as God’s *representative*: and it is of that *antecedent* character Irenæus speaks; as is plain from his referring to Joh. i. 1.

Page 115. (alias 106.) he cites a place of Justin Martyr, where he renders the words which you see in the ϵ margin thus: “It was not God the Creator of the uni-

* Καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῖς μὲν πρὸ Μωσέως πατριάρχαις, κατὰ τὸ θεϊκὸν καὶ ἰσδοξον ὁμίλει· τοῖς δὲ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, ἱερατικῇ—τάξιν ἀπίθιμιν μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀνθρώποις γινόμενος, &c. *Iren.* l. iii. c. 11. p. 191.

^f Ὅ τῶν ἀπάντων τεχνοῦντος λόγος, ὁ καθήμιος ἐπὶ τῶν Χερουβίμ, καὶ συνίχων τὰ πάντα. *Iren.* p. 190.

^g Ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἡγμενουμένη αὐτοῦ—καὶ ἰσδοξον γινιάς.

Illam quæ est a Patre, principalem, et efficacilem, et gloriosam generationem ejus enarrat, dicens sic, “In principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum,” et “omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil.” *Ibid.* 191.

ϵ Οὐχ ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ἔλων ἴσται Θεὸς ὁ εἰς Μωσὶ εἰπὼν αὐτὸν εἶμαι Θεὸν Ἀβραμᾶ, καὶ Θεὸν Ἰσαὰκ, καὶ Θεὸν Ἰακώβ. *Justin. Mart. Dial.* 180. Jebb.

“verse, which then said to Moses, that he was the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.” An uncautious reader might imagine from this passage, put into this view, that the Son is not *God* absolutely, nor *Creator* of the universe, according to Justin. But the meaning is, that that divine Person, who called *himself* God, and was God, was not the Person of the *Father*, (whose *ordinary* character is that of *Maker of all things*,) but another divine Person, viz. God the Son. The unlearned reader should be told, that what is here said by Justin was in dispute with a Jew, who would not acknowledge more *divine* Persons than one. It was Justin’s business to show, that there was a *divine* Person, one who was God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and was not the *Father*; and therefore there were two *divine* Persons. The learned Doctor, upon his principles, could not, in that way, have confuted the Jew; so far as I apprehend of Justin’s argument: for the Jew might reply, that it was an angel speaking *in the Person of God*; and that therefore the *Father* only was *God* notwithstanding. But Justin insists upon it, that there was another Person, besides the *Father*, who was really “God of Abraham,” &c. If this is to be taken for a *concession*, it may be easily seen on what side it is.

Page 116. (alias 108.) the Doctor does not justice to Hilary. Instead of *called* Lord and God, which is *diminutive*, it should have been, *declared to be* Lord and God: but this may appear slight. Such another slight inaccuracy appears in his affecting to translate *God his Father*, instead of *God the Father*, (p. 104, 179.) which however shows too much leaning to a cause; and helps to convey a false idea to the English readers.

Page 251. (alias 218.) he has a long citation from Novatian; in which all proceeds so fair and plausible, that a reader, already possessed with the Doctor’s scheme, and carrying it in his head, may think that every thing falls in naturally with it. But, at length, the Doctor comes to

^h some cross words, and such as, if suffered to appear, would have made the reader construe all backwards, and have given quite another light to all that goes before or after. Here he stops short, breaks off in the middle of a sentence, passes over the offensive words, draws a line, skips to the next sentence, and goes gravely on to amuse his reader. A writer is not to be blamed, in some cases, for taking what is to his purpose, and omitting the rest: but, as the case is here, the best, and indeed only light, to direct the reader to the true meaning of what is cited, is left out. The word *divinity*, for instance, (which occurs twice in that passage,) an English reader will be apt to take in the Doctor's sense; and indeed can hardly do otherwise: but had the whole appeared, he could not but see how much the Doctor is mistaken. I must observe to you, that (p. 336, 337.) the Doctor deals with Novatian, and this very passage, almost in the same manner, again; excepting that, growing a little bolder, he takes more freedom in his translation. Mind the words (p. 337.) by the Son in *acknowledgment* returned; and compare *per substantiæ communionem*, a little before. Novatian, in this place, had no thought of *acknowledgments*, nor any thing like it: but was intent upon quite another thing; explaining and illustrating, as well as he was able, the union and communion of *substance* in Father and Son; and showing how all recurs to one head and fountain: on which account the Father might be reasonably stiled the one God, inasmuch as the Son is so intimately one with him, as to be reckoned, in a manner, to him, and not another God from him. It is all but one *divinity*, or *divine substance*, of the Father in both.

^h Unus Deus ostenditur verus et æternus Pater, a quo solo hæc vis divinitatis emissa, etiam in Filium traditu et directa rursus per substantiæ communionem ad Patrem revolvitur. Deus quidem ostenditur Filius cui divinitas tradita et porrecta conspicitur, et tamen nihilominus unus Deus Pater probatur. *Novat. c. 31.*

ⁱ The Latin is, *reciproco meatu* illa majestas atque divinitas ad Patrem qui dederat eam rursus ab illo ipso Filio missa revertitur et retorquetur. *Ibid.*

Page 254. we may observe another turn, by way of translation. The ^kGreek you may see in the margin, which the Doctor renders thus: "That Jesus Christ, our Lord and God incarnate, is not the Father, nor, as the Sabellians would have it, that same Person who is styled the only God; this the Holy Scriptures everywhere testify." The literal and plain translation is thus: *That Jesus Christ, our Lord and God incarnate, is not the Father, nor (in the Sabellian sense) the only God, the holy Scriptures everywhere testify.* This meaning, you see, is clear, plain, and easy, without the Doctor's embarrassments; and is undoubtedly the true sense of the author. But such a hint as this might have made an unlucky discovery to the reader; namely, that a man may believe the Son to be the *only God*, without being a Sabellian.

In the same page, the Doctor has another quotation from Athanasius, (if that treatise be his,) which, had he gone on but a few words farther, would have appeared contradictory to the purpose for which it was brought. "There is but one God, because one Father; but the Son also is God, having a sameness with the Father, as a Son; not that he is the Father himself, but in nature united with the Father; two indeed in number, but one entire essence." This is the whole sentence literally translated; and the sense of it is clear. The cutting it into halves, only to represent one part under another view, is not giving the sense of a writer, but *making* one for him.

Page 255. (alias 222.) the Doctor cites another passage from Athanasius; and, by the turn he gives it, stifles the true sense of the author: "The Word has no other sort

^k "Ὅτι διὰ τὸ σαρκωθεῖς Κύριος καὶ Θεὸς ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ Πατὴρ οὐκ ἴσται, οὐδ' ὡς ἰκίται φαῖναι, ὁ μόνος Θεός, ἅπαντα μαρτυροῦσιν αἱ θείαι γραφαί. *Athan. contr. Sabell.* p. 47.

^l Εἰς Θεὸς, ἵσι καὶ πατὴρ εἰς Θεὸς διὰ καὶ υἱὸς, ταυτότητα ἔχον, ὡς υἱὸς πρὸς πατέρα· οὐκ αὐτὸς ὢν ὁ πατήρ, ἀλλ' ἡνωμένος πρὸς τὸν πατέρα τῇ φύσει· δύο μὲν ἀριθμῶ, μία δὲ ἴσα οὐσία τριμία. *Ibid.* p. 41.

^m Μίαν ἀρχὴν εἰδόμεν, τὸν τι δημιουργὸν λόγον φάσκομεν οὐχ ἰστέον εἶνα τρεῖσιν

“of divinity, but that which he derives from the only
“God, as being begotten of him.”

The true construction is this :

“The Word has no other kind of divinity, but that of the
“only God ; because he is begotten of him.” The plain
meaning is, that the Godhead of Father and Son is all one :
directly contrary to what the Doctor cites the passage
for. After I had wrote this, I found that the Doctor him-
self (p. 317, alias 285.) had translated the sentence in the
very same words that I have done ; excepting his putting
derived, (instead of *begotten*,) which might convey a low
idea to his reader. But, not content with that, for fear a
sagacious reader should chance to discover the true sense
of the author, he inserts a note upon *divinity* ; interpret-
ing it (*divine power*) in contradiction to the author’s
known ordinary sense of *θεότης*, as well as to the con-
text.

P. 256. (alias 223.) he cites ⁿ Gregory Nazianzen,
and translates him thus : “There is but one God ; the
“Son and the Holy Ghost being referred to the one
“cause.” But then he adds a note,¹ which confounds
all : “namely,” says he, “as being divine Persons by
“whom the one God, or one cause and original of all
“things, made and governs the world.” Right ; if we
are to teach the Fathers how to speak : but what said
Gregory Nazianzen ? It is this : “We may, as I con-
“ceive, preserve (*the doctrine of*) one God, by referring
“both the Son and Holy Ghost to one cause, without
“composition or confusion ; and by asserting (as I may
“say) one and the same movement and will of the God-
“head, together with the sameness of essence.” Here is

Ἰχθυὶ θεότητος, ἢ τὸν τοῦ μόνου Θεοῦ, διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ προϋμῖναι. *Athan. contr. Arian. Orat. iii. p. 564. ed. Bened.*

¹ Τηρωτο δ' εἶν, ὡς ὁ ἱμὸς λόγος, εἰς μὴν Θεός, εἰς ἴν αἰτίον καὶ υἱὸ καὶ πνεῦματος ἀκαταμερίμων ἢ συνθεθερίμων, οὐδὲ συνακλουφίμων καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἴν καὶ ταυτὸ τῆς θεότητος, ἴνα αὐτως ἰσομάσω, αἰσημά τι καὶ βύλημα. καὶ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ταυτέτατα. *Greg. Naz. Orat. xxix. p. 490. ed. Paris.*

not a syllable about the one God's governing the world by his Son and his Spirit; which, though a true notion, is not sufficient to account for the *unity*; nor is it Gregory's account of it, as the reader must have imagined from the Doctor's comment.

Page 323. (alias 292.) the learned Doctor, by wrong pointing and mistranslating, perverts a passage of Justin Martyr. But I have explained and vindicated the true sense of it elsewhere.

P. 325. (alias 293.) he produces an excellent passage of Irenæus, and translates it justly. But fearing it may be found too high, he subjoins a lessening note, to draw off the reader's thoughts. "This passage," says he, "is parallel to those wherein he calls the Son and Spirit the hands of the Father; namely, *executing his will as perfectly* as a man's own hands perform the will of the man." But why may it not be rather *parallel* to those passages wherein the author says, the *Son and Holy Spirit* are (in a qualified sense) the very *self* of the Father? They are here called his *own offspring*, and his *own figure*; and *all the angels* are said to *serve and do obeisance* to them. Does not this sound something higher than *executing the Father's will*, however *perfectly*? Or, than the low *metaphor* about a *man* and his *hands*, as the Doctor represents it? True, Irenæus, and many other of the Fathers, used that expression, which they took from Scripture; but they understood a great deal more by it; the same as by ρ δύναις, or *virtus*, the *mighty power* of God, and God himself.

In the same page he cites another excellent passage of ρ Irenæus; and I am glad to have this opportunity of

\circ Qu. viii. p. 93.

ρ Vid. Tertull. contr. Hermog. c. 45. Euseb. in Psalm. p. 701, 722. Athanas. p. 214, 880. ed. Bened. Hieron. tom. iv. p. 49. ed. Bened. Basil. contr. Eunom. l. v. p. 111.

ρ Ὁ γινητός και πτωλασμίος ἄνθρωπος κατ' εἰκόνα και ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ ἀγαπίου γίνεσθαι Θεοῦ τοῦ μὴ πατρὸς ὑπονοῦντος και κελύοντος, τοῦ δὲ οἰοῦ πράσσοντος και δημιουργοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ πνύματος τρέφοντος και κῆζοντος. Iren. l. iv. c. 38. p. 285.

setting before the reader, in its true light, so illustrious a testimony of a *coeternal* and *coessential* Trinity. The *literal* translation of the Greek may run thus: "Man " being *created* and *fashioned*, is *made* after the image " and likeness of the *uncreated* God: the Father *designing* " and giving out orders; the Son *executing* and *creating*; " the Holy Ghost *supplying* nutriment and increase." Here you will observe, that the joint operations of the three divine Persons, concurring in the creation of man, are set forth in such a manner, as to intimate both the distinct personality and unity of essence. That Irenæus supposed the three Persons to be the one ἀγέννητος Θεός, or *eternal God*, here spoken of, may appear; 1. From his introducing the three Persons immediately after, as explanatory of it^r. 2. From ^s his understanding Gen. i. 26. of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, *Let us make*; and also, *after our image*; so that the image of any one is the image of all. 3. From Irenæus's other known principles; his asserting the Son to be *infectus*, or ἀγέννητος, (*uncreated*;) and supposing the Son and Holy Ghost to be the ^t *self* of the Father; and speaking of Father and Son together, as *one God*. 4. From several hints in the same chapter, all confirming this sense. One character of the ἀγέννητος, there given, is τέλειος: the same character is, in the same chapter, ^u applied to the Son, in the same sense. All things but the ἀγέννητος are said to be *in* ^x *subjection*: among which things Irenæus can never be supposed to include the Son and Holy Spirit. And farther, every thing that is not ἀγέννητος, comes short of

^r Compare a passage of Hippolytus cited above, p. 16.

^s Manus Dei ad quas Pater loquens, dicit, FACIAMUS *hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem* NOSTRAM. Iren. l. v. c. 1. p. 293.

Idem ipse qui initio plasmavit Adam, cum quo et loquebatur. Pater: FACIAMUS *hominem secundum imaginem et similitudinem* NOSTRAM, l. v. c. 15. p. 312. Vid. et l. iv. c. 20. p. 253.

^t Lib. ii. c. 30. p. 163.

^u Τίς τοῦ Θεοῦ τέλειος ἔν. p. 284.

^x Τὰ ἅ λικτὰ πάντα ἐν ὑποταγῇ μίσι τοῦ Θεοῦ. p. 285.

perfection, according to [†] Irenæus; who, at the same time, asserts the perfection of the Son, as before said. These things considered, the meaning of Irenæus, in this passage, appears to be, that the three divine Persons are one eternal, or *uncreated* God, as also one *Creator*. How then came the Doctor to cite such a passage, which threatens nothing but ruin and destruction to his principles? The case is this: the learned Doctor, by a strange oversight, read τοῦ μὲν Θεοῦ, instead of τοῦ μὲν Πατρὸς, though both the Greek and the old Latin agree in this last reading. This alteration, in the *text*, spoils all the elegance, and alters the whole turn of the sentence: besides this, the Doctor translates ἀγεννήτου, *unbegotten*, instead of *unmade*; not observing the *antithesis*, between γεννητὸς ἄνθρωπος, and ἀγεννήτου Θεοῦ, nor attending to *infecti Dei*, in the old translation; which might have set him right. Thus far I have gone on with some of the Doctor's quotations; but give me leave to step back for a few more, which I have overlooked.

Page 308. (alias 276.) the learned Doctor produces a passage of [‡] Basil, which he renders thus, very surprisingly; "We affirm that, according to the natural order of *causes* and *effects*, the Father must have the preeminence before the Son." Who ever heard before from any Catholic, that the Son was an *effect* of the Father? Could Basil say this? If the Doctor would but have suffered the very next immediate words, which make part of the sentence, to appear, they would have undeceived his reader. The literal construction of the whole sentence is this: "We do indeed allow that, in respect of the natural order of (*emanative*) causes, and things issuing from them, the Father is *prior* in order to the Son: but as to any difference in *nature*, or *priority* of time, we allow no such thing." Basil had just before

[†] Καθὼ δὲ μὴ ἴστω ἀγίνεσθαι, κατὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἰσχυρίζεται τοῦ τιλειῖ. p. 283.

[‡] Ἡμεῖς δὲ, κατὰ μίον τὴν τῶν αἰτίων πρὸς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν σχίσιν, προτινάχθαι τῷ υἱῷ τὸν πατέρα φασίν· κατὰ δὲ τὴν τῆς φύσεως διαφορὰν, οὐκ ἴστω, εἰδὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρεῖνου ὑπεροχήν. *Basil. contr. Eun.* l. i. p. 31.

^a explained what he meant by the Father's being *prior* in order of *causality*, by the instance of *fire*, and *light* streaming from it.

Page 317. (alias 285.) the Doctor has another citation from ^b Basil, which he renders thus: "Therefore our Lord saith, *all mine are thine*, as referring to the Father, the original cause of all things; and *thine are mine*, as signifying that from the Father was derived to him the power of producing things." The true rendering is thus, very near the *letter*: "Therefore our Lord saith, *all mine are thine*, inasmuch as the original of the *creatures* is referred up to the Father; and *thine are mine*, inasmuch as the power of *creating* descends from him to the Son:" that is, with his *essence*, as Basil explains it a little after. The Doctor, I presume, did not care that his reader should know how clearly Basil distinguishes the Son from the (*δημιουργήματα*) *creatures*; and not only so, but supposes the *creatures* of the *Father* to be *creatures* of the *Son* likewise. The Doctor intended something by *all things*, in one place, and *things* only, in the other. But Basil is unconcerned in it.

I must just take notice, how particularly fond the learned Doctor is of the phrase, *was produced*, (see p. 275, 277, 281, 291.) which he uses frequently, without any warrant from the *authors* he translates; and for no other reason, that I can see, but because it is apt to convey a low idea (the *idea* of a *creature*, though the Doctor does not like the *name*) to the English reader.

I shall proceed no farther in this article, having given instances enough to show that some abatements and al-

^a "Ἐστι τι τάξις ἰδὸς, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς παρ᾽ ἡμῶν Δίσις συνεισάμεινον, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ τῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθίᾳ συμβαίνον, ὡς τῷ κυρίῳ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἰσὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ. Basil. *contr. Eun.* l. i. p. 30.

^b Διὰ τοῦτο φησὶν ὁ κύριος, τὰ ἰμὰ πάντα εἶ ἰσὶν, ὡς ἰσ' αὐτὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς τῶν δημιουργημάτων ἀναγομένης, καὶ τὰ εἶ ἰμὰ, ὡς ἰκιδίον αὐτοῦ τῆς αἰτίας τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ θεοῦ. Basil. *de Sp. Sanct.* c. viii. p. 161. It seems from what follows, that *αὐτῷ*, rather than *αὐτοῦ*, is the reading.

lowances should be made us, for such *concessions* as are really no *concessions* in the authors themselves. Upon the whole, one might really wonder that the learned Doctor, who had so wide a field of antiquity to range in, and was only to pick out such passages as, running in general terms, or taken separately, might be made to appear under such a view as he intended, should produce no more; but be forced even to wrest and torture several of those he had found, by prefacing, commenting, and translating, to accommodate them at length hardly, and after great reluctance, to his purpose. You will say, perhaps, that the Doctor sets light by the Fathers, and lays no stress upon them; I shall believe you, when he fairly gives them up. At present, it must be thought that they are esteemed of some moment, when a book is stuffed with quotations out of them, and so much pains taken to make them any way serviceable. One that sets so great a value upon the mere *appearance* and *shadow* of antiquity, can hardly be supposed to slight the thing itself: if the learned Doctor is so well contented with *concessions* only, snatched, in a manner, and extorted from the *ancients*; how would he have rejoiced to have found them come heartily, readily, and throughly into his scheme, as they do into ours!

II. But supposing all the Doctor's quotations from the Post-Nicene or Ante-Nicene writers had been at least real and full *concessions*; yet there is something so peculiar in this new way of quoting *concessions*, without taking notice of what should come in to explain or balance them, that we have reason to except against it, as not a fair way of dealing.

I. Because, though the learned Doctor does give notice in his Preface, that we are not to take the opinion of the authors, in the whole, from those quotations; yet many may happen to read the book without considering or remembering a short hint in the Preface; and so may lay a greater stress upon those authorities than the Doctor intended.

2. Because the Doctor nowhere (in Scripture Doctrine) gives any marks of distinction for an ordinary reader to understand, where he intended a *concession* only of an author, and where his entire opinion; where he agreed with the Doctor in *part* only, and where in the *whole*. Instead of this, he rarely lets his English reader see more of any passage, than may appear to comport with and favour his own *hypothesis*; either striking out what might have discovered it to be a *concession* in part, or disguising it in his translation, or explaining it away, by his pre-facing it, or commenting upon it. Besides, since authors have very seldom, if ever, been cited in this manner (by men of character) in favour of such principles as they really disowned and rejected in the main; readers will be apt to carry that presumption and prejudice along with them; and a short advertisement in the Preface will not be sufficient to prevent it.

3. Another reason against this method is, that it gives a handle to many to boast of the numerous collections of Dr. Clarke against the *received* doctrine. See (besides others) "the Dissuasive from inquiring into the Doctrine of the Trinity," (p. 28.) where this very use is made of it. By this means, truth is darkened, evidences perplexed, and the common readers rather puzzled and confounded, than let into the true state of the fact; so far as relates to the judgment of the *ancients*.

4. It should be considered that the *moral* obliquity and *turpitude* of misquoting or misrepresenting authors consists in this; that it is a means to deceive the simple, to surprise the unwary and unlearned, (who must or will receive things upon trust;) it is taking advantage of the blind side of human nature, laying a snare for such readers, (perhaps ninety-nine in a hundred,) as read not with due care and thought. I do not see but this very method of the Doctor's (though he has endeavoured to lessen the scandal of it) is big with all this mischief. He has indeed given notice; and wise men and scholars would have been secure enough *without* it: others will

will not be so *with* it: and therefore he is still to take advantage of the ignorance of one, the partiality of another, the forgetfulness of a third, the credulity, simplicity, haste, and inadvertency of as many as come unprepared and unfurnished to the reading his citations. The thing itself, you may perceive, is equally mischievous, however gilded over with specious pretences. And there is no more in it than this; *misrepresentation practised*, and, at the same time, seemingly *defended*: and (though the learned Doctor does not perceive it) it is really nothing else but contriving a way how to reconcile (if possible) a *good name* and an *ill thing* together.

5. It might be of ill example, should this method of citing authors (never before used by good and great men) grow into vogue. A Romanist, for instance, might, in this way, undertake to defend some of the Romish tenets. It would be easy for him to make a numerous collection of testimonies from the Fathers; and as much to the purpose as the Doctor's collection is. Two inconveniences he might foresee; one to his own *character*, upon discovery; the other to his *cause*, because his own citations might be turned against him. To obviate the former, he might declare beforehand, that "he did not cite places out of these authors so much to show what was the opinion of the writers themselves, as to show how naturally truth sometimes prevails by its own native clearness:" and to obviate the latter, he might say, he alleged the *testimonies*, not as *proofs*, but as *illustrations* only. Thus the writer might seem to come off pretty handsomely: but, in the meanwhile, the unlearned and unthinking might be led aside by the fair show of authorities; and all the remedy left for them is, *Si populus vult decipi, decipiatur*. These are my present sentiments of the nature and tendency of this new and extraordinary method of citing; which, however, I shall be very glad to alter, if I see any good reason for it. To me it seems that it ought never to be practised, though to serve the best cause in the world.

III. After all, I must observe to you, supposing the method to have been ever so fair, and the *concessions* both many and real, the Doctor has still failed in his main point, of making out the *importance* of those *concessions*, to the cause in hand. There the stress should have been laid: we did not want to know what *concessions* the Fathers, in general, had made; being ready at any time to make the same *concessions*: but show us the *connection* between these *concessions* and the Doctor's *conclusion*. This is the point which should have been laboured; and which required all the learning and acuteness which the Doctor is master of. As thus: the Fathers asserted the *first Person* only to be *begotten*, or *unoriginate*; therefore they must of consequence make the Son no more than an *inferior God*, or no God. The Fathers supposed the Son *subordinate*, as a Son; therefore they must, by necessary consequence, deny his *consubstantiality* and *coeternity*. This was the *conclusion* which the Doctor was to draw out of those premises, and show to be just and true. But, instead of this, he drops the principal thing; repeats indeed the *concessions*, such as they are, over and over; and by a multitude of words (not to show any *certain connection*, but only a *verbal resemblance*) he at length slips his *conclusion* into their places. There is really nothing more, in this management, than interpreting *ill* what the good Fathers meant *well*; giving a *low* sense to words and phrases which they intended in a *high* one; and putting an Arian construction upon Catholic expressions. This is all that the learned Doctor hath really done by the help of those *concessions*. In the same way a man may quote all the *concessions* of the *Fathers* about a *proper sacrifice*, in favour of the *sacrifice of the mass*: or their *concessions* about a *real presence*, in favour of a *substantial presence* of Christ's body and blood in the *Eucharist*. Only, if he would do it artfully and plausibly, he should take care to rest in *generals*; and supply what is farther wanting by *intimations* and *innuendos*. This seems to have been the very method which the learned

Doctor has taken to grace and set off many of his *propositions*; the 9, 11, 12, 17, 34, 35, 36, 39, 43, &c. The *concessions* there cited come not up to the points in dispute betwixt us, being mostly such *general* things as may be admitted on either side; and such as would not have been suspected to favour the Doctor's cause, in *opposition* to us, but by appearing in the Doctor's book. To make them suit the better, the Doctor has formed his *propositions*, for the most part, in *general*, or *ambiguous* terms; content to scatter intimations of his meaning here and there, as he saw proper; and to trust the rest to the sagacity, should I say, or weakness of his readers. And now, what is the result of the method of citing, or what does it really prove? I will tell you frankly and plainly. First, it proves that general expressions are capable of being put into different views, and may be made to look this way or that, (taken separately,) by men of wit. Secondly, it proves that when pertinent authorities cannot be had, writers in a cause will be content with any: this is all. Having seen what the learned Doctor's evidence from antiquity amounts to, I shall next attend to what you have to say in defence of him.

You persist in it, that "the Ante-Nicene Fathers and Councils—agree with the Doctor in every interpretation of Scripture, wherein he disagrees with the school-notions." By *school-notions* (a term of art) I am to understand the Catholic prevailing notions of the blessed Trinity. And will you pretend to say that the Ante-Nicene writers agree with the Doctor in every text? How strangely you deceive yourself? Do the Ante-Nicene writers interpret the first of St. John, so as to make the Father *one God supreme*; the Word *another God*, an inferior God besides him? This is the Doctor's real and intended interpretation of it; and yours too, however carefully you disguise it. Did the Ante-Nicene writers interpret the Doctor's 300 texts, or any one of them, so as to exclude the Son from being *one God* with the *Father*? No certainly: they declare the contrary, and proclaim

Father and Son to be *one God*. Is it possible that the Ante-Nicene writers (who understood all the texts to be consistent with the Son's *consubstantiality* and *coeternity*, which the Doctor cites in opposition to both) should interpret the texts as he does? It is too great an affront to common sense to pretend it. But the way is this: when the Doctor produces the texts, he expresses but part of his sentiments; and in such general words as Catholics and Arians may both agree in: and so far he and his authorities go on together. Afterwards he comes out of *generals*, bringing the words down to a particular reserved meaning, before concealed, (and which the *ancients* would have rejected with abhorrence,) and still he appeals to the *ancients*, as agreeing with him in his *interpretations*. Thus, for instance; in interpreting the texts which speak of the *Father* as the one God, he finds some of the *ancients* say, the Father is *αὐτόθεος*, the Son *second* only, or *subordinate*, God of God. Very well: so *says* the Doctor too: and now, who can make any doubt whether the *ancients* agreed with him in his interpretations? But observe the sequel: when the learned Doctor comes to explain his *own* meaning of *αὐτόθεος*, and *subordinate*, it appears, from many broad hints scattered here and there, to be this; that the Father only is *necessarily existing* and strictly *divine*; the Son another Being, inferior in kind, (or, what comes to the same, a *creature*;) directly contrary to all the *ancients*. Thus you see, while the Doctor keeps in *generals*, and speaks his mind but by halves, he and the *ancients* may agree together; as he and we also do: but as soon as ever he comes to particulars, and discovers his real and full sentiments, there the *ancients* desert him; as well as he us. But besides this general answer, give me leave to observe that, as to several particular texts, the Doctor has no reason to pretend that the Ante-Nicene writers, in general, were on his side. Rev. i. 8. is one of the Doctor's texts, which he interprets of the *Father*; and insists much upon it, that the *ancients* applied the title of *παντοκράτωρ*, the *Almighty*, to the Father only. And yet

nothing more certain than that that very text was understood, by the Ante-Nicene writers, in general, of God the Son: Catholics and Heretics both agreed in it. The text was urged against the Catholics, in the Sabellian controversy; and was as plausible a text as any in the New Testament, on the Sabellian side: yet the Catholics admitted that it was to be understood of God the Son; and readily allowed, in consequence of that text, that the Son was *ὁ παντοκράτωρ*, the *Almighty*, as well as the Father. See ^cTertullian, Hippolytus, and, probably, Origen, agreeing in this: the Doctor has not pretended to cite any Ante-Nicene, or any ancient writer, who understood the text otherwise; though he makes a show of having the *ancients* in general on his side, in this very particular, (Script. Doctr. p. 63.) without proving any thing more than that the *Father* was *ordinarily* or *emphatically* styled *ὁ παντοκράτωρ*, which is true, but not pertinent; nor is it giving us the sentiments of the *ancients*, with regard to this text; but his *own*. Joh. xii. 41. is another noted text, which the Doctor endeavours (Script. Doctr. p. 102.) to interpret in favour of his own *hypothesis*; and makes a show of authorities as countenancing him in it. But none of his authorities come up to this point: so far from it, that they are all against him; as I have sufficiently proved under Query the second, and elsewhere. The like may be observed of the *authorities* which he produces (p. 114, 115.) to confirm his interpretation of Acts vii. 30, 31, 32. And I have, above, shown you as much of Joh. x. 30. and other the like texts; where you pretend to have some countenance from the *ancients*, for your interpretation. In short, there is not a text which the Doctor can pretend to urge in favour of his *main* doctrine, and against ours; and at the

^c Tert. contr. Prax. c. 17. Hippol. contr. Noët. c. vi. p. 10. Orig. 'Αρχ. l. i. c. 2. Vid. et Athan. p. 554, 684, 762. ed. Bened. Greg. Naz. Orat. xxxv. p. 573. Andreas Caesar. in loc. Hieron. in Zech. c. ii. p. 1718. Epiph. vol. i. p. 488. That the Son is *παντοκράτωρ* might be shown from other texts. Ps. xxiv. 10. Is. vi. 5. Zech. ii. 8. See Euseb. Dem. Ev. l. vi. c. 16. Just. Mart. Dial. p. 107. Jeb. Hieron. vol. iii. p. 519, 1718. ed. Bened. See my Sermons, p. 228, &c.

same time show that the ancients agree with him. As soon as ever you interpret any text directly against the divinity of Christ, as understood by us in the strict sense, you go off entirely from the *ancients*, and go on by yourselves. But enough of this.

In answer to the latter part of the Query, you observe, that the reason why the Doctor doth not admit the testimonies of the Fathers as *proofs*, “is not because they are against him; but because, though they are clearly for him, yet, in matters of faith, he allows of no other proof than the infallible testimony of the Word of God.”

One might be willing to believe this to have been the reason, why he *would not* admit them as *proofs*, if there were not another very plain one, why he *could not*; could not, without inevitable ruin and destruction to his whole *hypothesis*. An adversary need not desire any fairer advantage of the learned Doctor, than to have the issue of the cause put upon the Doctor's citations; taking in no more than is absolutely necessary to clear the sense of the authors in those very passages. But waving this, let me ask you farther, why the testimonies of Fathers may not be admitted as *proofs*, inferior or collateral proofs? If I can know from *Church-writers*, and from *Scripture* too, what was believed by the Church (in sundry articles) from the beginning; I have then two proofs of the same thing, though not both equally strong, or equally authentic. The proof from *Church-writers* is an additional, inferior proof; but still a *proof* it is, probable at least, of something, as to *fact*; and not barely an *illustration* of a *dogma*, or doctrine. Are we able to *prove* what were the opinions of several sects of *philosophers* from the books which are extant; and may we not also prove what was the faith of Christians, in the same way, from the books which they have left us? You add, “The authority of the Fathers, could it be proved to be unanimous against Dr. Clarke, ought not to determine any article of faith.” No; but it is a strong presumptive proof, that his *inter-*

pretation of Scripture is not the true one: a proof so considerable, that I know not whether any thing less than clear and evident demonstration ought to overrule it. For you must remember, that Dr. Clarke, or any *moderns*, as well as the *ancients*, are *fallible* men; and have only the same *human reason* to work with, which others had sixteen hundred years ago, in an age of miracles, and near to the days of inspiration. *Moderns*, at so great a distance off, may, at least, as easily mistake, in interpreting Scripture, as you suppose the ancient and universal Church to have done, in a momentous article of faith. Well then; supposing that we had been for some time debating this very point of the blessed Trinity, on the foot of Scripture: men's wits are so various, that several interpretations may be invented of the same texts; and perhaps none of them so manifestly absurd, but that they possibly may be true; nor so manifestly right, but that they possibly may be wrong. What can we do better, in such a case, than to appeal to those who lived nearest the times of the inspired writers? Their judgment, their decisions, and consequent practice, are at length the safest rule to go by; at least till you can show us a better. *Scripture*, you will say, is the *rule*; and so say I. You bring your Scripture proofs; and I produce mine. You have your solutions of such difficulties as I press you with; I have solutions too, and such, as I think sounder, better, and juster than yours: you think the very contrary. Thus far, it is combating text with text, criticism with criticism, reason with reason; and each side will think his own superior. Now, suppose I can farther produce a cloud of witnesses, a numerous company of primitive saints and martyrs, confirming my interpretation, concurring in my sentiments, and corroborating my reasons; and suppose I find also that those who took your side of the question were condemned by the generality as *heretics*, and *corrupters* of the faith of Christ; this will add such weight, strength, and force to my pretensions, that impartial men will soon perceive which is the most probable, which the safer side,

and which it behoves them to cleave to. This is so agreeable to the common sense and reason of mankind; and the advantage of having *antiquity* of one's side is so apparent, that I will venture to say, none ever talked against it, who did not suspect, at least, that *antiquity* was against them: and this I take to be one of your greatest misfortunes in this controversy; that you are sensible how much it would weaken your cause to give up the Fathers; and yet, you are certain, in the result, to weaken it as much, by pretending to keep them.

QUERY XXVIII.

Whether it be at all probable, that the primitive Church should mistake in so material a point as this is; or that the whole stream of Christian writers should mistake in telling us what the sense of the Church was; and whether such a cloud of witnesses can be set aside without weakening the only proof we have of the canon of Scripture, and the integrity of the sacred text?

IN answer hereto, you admit that “the testimony of the whole stream of antiquity is sufficient to determine, in fact, what faith the Church hath always professed and declared in her public forms.” I am content to put the matter upon this issue; and let the point be decided from their professions in baptism, creeds, doxologies, hymns, which were public forms; and from public censures passed upon *heretics*, which are as clear evidence as the other of the Church's faith at that time. Only I would not exclude collateral proofs; such as the declared sentiments of eminent Church-writers, the interpretations of creeds, left us by those that recite them, (such as those of Irenæus, Tertullian, and others;) and ecclesiastical history, telling us what the tradition of the Church was, down to such a time. From these put together, we have very clear and full proof that the Catholic Church did all along profess a Trinity of *consubstantial, coeternal* Persons, in unity of nature, substance, and Godhead. This,

the incomparable Bishop Bull has sufficiently shown in his *Defensio Fidei Nicenæ, Judicium Ecclesiæ, and Primitiva Traditio*. Bishop Stillingfleet pursued the same argument, with variety of learning, in his Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, chapter the 9th, which he concludes in these words: "Taking the sense of those articles, as the Christian Church understood them from the Apostles' times, then we have as full and clear evidence of this doctrine, as we have *that we received the Scriptures from them.*" Dr. Clarke's and Dr. Whitby's pretences to the contrary have been sufficiently answered; partly by the learned gentleman who wrote the True Scripture Doctrine continued, and partly by these sheets. You have little to object, but that the Fathers did not assert an *individual consubstantiality*, in your sense; which is true; and is no more than telling me, that they were not mad, when I contend that they were sober.

But you add; the question is, whether, supposing the Fathers had unanimously declared for our notion, "whether (in a question not of fact, like that concerning the canon of Scripture, but of judgment and reasoning) such a testimony would prove that those Scriptures reveal it; or whether such an interpretation of Scripture — would be as infallible as Scripture itself." But this is no question at all between us. What we pretend is, that we have as good proof of *the doctrine of the Church*, as of the *canon of Scripture*. Whether the Church, after the Apostles, was as infallible as the Apostles themselves, is quite another question. We think it very unlikely that the apostolic churches should not know the mind of the Apostles; or should suddenly vary from it, in any matter of moment. We look upon it as highly improbable that the faith of those churches should so soon run counter to any thing in Scripture; since they had the best opportunities of knowing what Scripture meant; were made up of wise and good men, men who would sooner die than commit any error in that kind wilfully. Upon this, we believe the concurring judgment of antiquity to be, though

not *infallible*, yet the *safest* comment upon Scripture; and to have much more weight in it, than there generally is in wit and criticism; and therefore not to be rejected, where the words of Scripture will, with any propriety, bear that interpretation. This is sufficient for us to say or pretend. We have as plausible arguments, to speak modestly, from Scripture, as you can pretend to have: nay, we think your notions utterly irreconcilable with Scripture, according to the natural, obvious, grammatical construction of words. And besides all this, we have, what you want, the concurring sense of the *ancients* plainly for us. The question then is not, whether Scripture and Fathers be equally infallible: all the Fathers together are not so valuable, or so credible, as any one inspired writer. But it is plainly this: whether the ancient *Heretics* or *Catholics*, as they have been distinguished, have been the best interpreters of disputed texts; and whether we are now to close in with the former, or the latter. You would insinuate that you have *Scripture*, and we *Fathers* only: but we insist upon it, that we have *both*; as for many other reasons, so also for this, because *both*, very probably, went together: and as you certainly want one, so it is extremely probable that you have *neither*; for this very reason, among many others, because you have not *both*. This argument is of force and weight; and will hardly yield to any thing short of *demonstration*; much less will it yield to such sort of reasonings as you are obliged to make use of, wanting better, to support your *novel* opinions.

The sum of the whole matter is this. The unanimous sense of the ancients, upon any controversial point, is of great moment and importance towards fixing the sense of Scripture, and preventing its being ill used by desultorious wits, who love to wander out of the common way; and can never want some colour for any opinion almost whatever. We do not appeal to the *ancients*, as if we could not maintain our ground, from *Scripture* and *reason*, against all opposers: this has been done over and over.

Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, the two Gregories, Chrysostom, Austin, Cyril, and others, undertook the cause on the foot of Scripture, and were easily superior to all the Arians. But since we have an advantage, over and above Scripture evidence, from the concurring sentiments of antiquity, we think it very proper to take that in also; and we shall not easily suffer it to be wrested from us.

QUERY XXIX.

Whether private reasoning, in a matter above our comprehension, be a safer rule to go by, than the general sense and judgment of the primitive Church, in the first 300 years; or, supposing it doubtful what the sense of the Church was within that time, whether what was determined by a council of 300 bishops soon after, with the greatest care and deliberation, and has satisfied men of the greatest sense, piety, and learning, all over the Christian world, for 1400 years since, may not satisfy wise and good men now?

HERE you tell me, as usual, when you have little else to say, that the Council of Nice knew nothing of *individual* consubstantiality: and then you add, pleasantly, that you “turn the Query against the Querist; and lay claim to the Nicene Confession.” What! lay claim to a *confession* made in direct opposition to the men of your principles? You say, if any consubstantiality is to be found in that Creed, it is the *specific*, not *individual*. And what if it were? Would that give you any claim to the Nicene Confession? Are God and his creatures *consubstantial*, of the same rank, sort, kind, or species? You are forced to have recourse to a *figurative* sense, which pretence I have obviated above. You are so kind to the Querist, as to be “willing to suppose and believe,” that he “is not ignorant of the true and only sense of the word ὁμοούσιος;” meaning thereby the *specific* sense. In return, I will be so just to you, as to say, that you understand the word very right: and yet the Nicene Fathers

did not teach a *merely* specific *consubstantiality*. The word *ὁμοούσιος* expresses their sense; but not their *whole* sense, in that article. It expresses an *equality* of nature, and signifies that the Son is as truly *equal* in nature to the Father, as one man is *equal* to another, or any individual equal to another individual of the same sort or *species*. And this was chiefly to be insisted on against the Arians, who denied such *equality*, making the *Son* a *creature*. Wherefore the true reason, to use Dr. Cudworth's words, only *mutatis mutandis*, why the Nicene Fathers laid so great a stress upon the *ὁμοούσιον*, was not because this *alone* was sufficient to make Father and Son *one God*; but because they *could not be so without it*. ^d *Ὁμοούσιος* the Son must be, or he could not be God at all, in the strict sense; and yet if he was barely *ὁμοούσιος*, like as one human person is to another, the *two* would be *two Gods*. And therefore the Nicene Fathers, not content to say only that the Son is *ὁμοούσιος*, insert likewise, "God of God, Light of Light, begotten," &c. and, "of the substance of the Father;" and this they are known to have declared over and over, to be "without any divi-
"vision:" all which taken together expresses a great deal more than *ὁμοούσιος* would do alone; and are, as it were, so many qualifying clauses, on purpose to prevent any such misconstruction and misapprehension, as the word

^d Hi tres, quia *unius substantiæ* sunt, *unum* sunt; et *summe* unum sunt, ubi nulla naturarum, nulla est diversitas voluntatum. Si autem *natura unum* essent, et consensione non essent, non *summe* unum essent: si vero *natura dispares* essent, unum non essent. Hi ergo tres, qui unum sunt propter ineffabilem conjunctionem Deitatis, qua ineffabiliter copulantur, *unus Deus* est. *Aug. contr. Maxim.* l. ii. p. 698.

This is very full to our purpose; and, by the way, may show how far St. Austin was from *Sabellianism*; which some have weakly pretended to charge him with. But there are many passages in this piece against Maximin, one of his very latest pieces, full against *Sabellianism*, as well as against *Arianism*. I may just remark, that there is a deal of difference between *unius substantiæ*, and *una substantia*. Two men are *unius ejusdemque substantiæ*, not *una substantia*. But the three Persons are not only *unius substantiæ*, but *una substantia*. The *modern* sense of *consubstantial* takes in both.

might otherwise be liable to. The good Fathers, like wise men, at once maintained the *equality of nature*, which ὁμοούσιος expresses, and the *unity* of the Godhead too. Guarding equally against *Arianism* and *Tritheism*, they took all prudent care to preserve the *coequality* of the two *Persons*, without *dividing* the *substance*, which was what they intended. The learned Doctor ^c represents this matter somewhat crudely. He observes upon the word in the Nicene Creed, (γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μόνου γενῆ, τοῦτέστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς,) that the Son was not himself that *individual substance*, from which he was begotten. This he has so worded, that *individual substance*, with him, can only signify *individual Hypostasis*, or *Person*: and it is very true, that the Son is not *that Person*, from whom, or of whom, he proceeded: but the *substance* might be *undivided* notwithstanding; which is all that any Catholic means by *individual substance*. “But their meaning,” he says, “was; he was produced, “not from any other substance, (as man was formed “from the dust of the earth,) but after an ineffable manner, from the substance of the Father only.” Here he leaves out the principal thing, which the Arians asserted, and which the Catholics guarded against, viz. *not from nothing*, not ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων. If therefore the Son, according to the Nicene Fathers, was not from any other substance besides the *Father's*, nor from nothing; it is very plain that (unless they supposed a *division* of substance, which they absolutely reject) they supposed the Son to be of the same *undivided*, or *individual* substance with the Father. As to the supposition of his being produced from any other substance, (as Adam was formed from the dust of the earth,) there was very little occasion to guard against it: the notion is, in itself, too silly for any man to own. The Arians themselves (against whom the creed was contrived) never pretended it, but ^f expressly dis-

^c Reply, p. 35.

^f Memorant Filium Dei neque ex aliqua subjacente materia genitum esse, quia per eum creata omnia sint. *Hilar.* p. 832.

owned it: their noted tenet was, that the Son was the *first* thing made. The Nicene Fathers designed, chiefly, to guard against the supposition of the Son's being *from nothing*, which was what the Arians insisted upon; they and the Catholics equally believing it ridiculous to imagine any *substance* to have been first made, and then the Son to have been made out of it. Wherefore I humbly conceive, the true reasons why the Nicene Fathers were so very particular in the words, *τουτέστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς*, were, ε first, to signify that they understood *generation* in a *proper*, and not *figurative* sense, as the Arians did; and, secondly, withal to ^hsecure the *divine unity*. For, if the Son were *ab extra*, and *independent of the Father*; the *alliance*, the *relation*, the *unity* of the Persons, in the same Godhead, had (upon their principles) been lost, and *Ditheism* unavoidable.

This may be enough to satisfy you, that whatever the word *ὁμοούσιος* may commonly signify, yet the Nicene Fathers meant a great deal more than a *specific* unity; if not by that word, singly considered, yet by that taken together with the rest, which were put in to explain it. The word may indifferently serve to express an *equality* of nature, whether the *Hypostases* be *undivided*, or whether they have a *separate existence*. It was therefore properly enough applied in the Creed: and care was taken that both *generation* and *consubstantiality* should be understood in a sense suitable to things *divine*; that is, taking from the *idea* all that is low, mean, and imperfect; and applying only so much as might comport with the majesty, dignity, and perfections of the adorable and incomprehensible Trinity.

ε Vid. Bull. Def. F. N. p. 114, 115. Εἰ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστὶ μόνος, ὡς υἱὸς γένεσις—λιχθίζη ἂν εἰκότως καὶ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ υἱός. Ath. p. 228.

h Ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἄληθῶς γινώσκται Θεὸς ἐκ Θεοῦ, Θεὸς ἄληθινός ἐκ Θεοῦ ἄληθινῶ; οὐκ ἔκωθεν ὢν, ἀλλὰ ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ οὐσίας. Epirhcan. p. 610.

Ὁὐκ ὡς ἀρχὴ ἰστέα καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὄφιστος, ἀδ' ἔκωθεν ταύτης γαιγοῦς, ἵνα μὴ τῆ ἰτερίηται, δυναρχία γίνηται. Athanas. Orat. iv. p. 617.

Ὁὐδὲ ἄλλος Θεὸς ὁ υἱός, οὐ γὰρ ἔκωθεν ἰκισοῦθι. Orat. iii. p. 553.

You seem to be apprehensive, that you must, at length, be obliged to give up the Nicene Creed, as utterly inconsistent with your principles; as indeed it is. And therefore, in the next place, you endeavour to lessen the credit of it; alleging that "the Council of Antioch before, and "the Council of Ariminum, and other councils, after, " (some of them with a greater number of bishops than "met at Nice,) determined against the *ἁμοούσιος*." The objection drawn from the determination of the Council of Antioch, about sixty years before the Council of Nice, you find largely answered by ⁱ Bishop Bull. They condemned the word, as it had been misunderstood and misapplied by Paul of Samosata; but established the very same doctrine with the Nicene Fathers. I may answer you briefly, upon your own principles. You say, Paul of Samosata was condemned for holding *ἁμοούσιος* in the sense of *individual* consubstantiality, (p. 118.) which, if it be true, was reason good enough for condemning him; as you understand *individual*, that is, in a Sabellian sense. The remark of Hilary, who goes upon the same supposition which you do, may here be pertinently ^k cited; and may serve as a sufficient answer. It is observable that Hilary makes the number of bishops in the Antiochian Council no more than eighty; Athanasius, but seventy; Eusebius, an indefinite number; very many. It does not appear that they were near so considerable as the famous Council of Nice of three hundred and eighteen bishops.

You next mention the Council of Ariminum, and give a hint of *other councils*. It would have been but fair to have told us what *other councils* you meant, which had, as you say, a *greater number* of bishops than met at Nice. You know, I presume, or at least might know, that you

ⁱ Def. F. N. p. 29, &c. See also Mr. Thirlby, Answer to Whiston, p. 103. Defence, p. 96.

^k Male intelligitur Homousion: quid ad me bene intelligentem? Male Homousion Samosatenu confessus est: sed nunquid melius Arii negaverunt? Octoginta episcopi olim respuerunt; sed trecenti et decem octo nuper receperunt. *Hilar. de Synod.* p. 1200.

cannot name one, besides the Council of Ariminum; which I shall speak to presently.

In your Appendix (p. 154.) you say the determination of the Council of Nice, for the *ὁμοούσιος*, was rejected by a *greater council* than that of Nice, met at Jerusalem. But in these few words you have two mistakes; or, at least, you have said what you cannot prove. ¹ Eusebius's words, which you refer to, may mean no more than this, that the Council of Jerusalem was the greatest he had known, since the famous one of Nice. Your other mistake is, that "they rejected the determination of the " Council of Nice," &c. How doth this appear? Did they say a word against it? Or did they make any declaration against either the Council of Nice, or the *ὁμοούσιον*? Not a syllable. But ^m they received Arius to communion, partly upon the good Emperor's recommendation, who believed him to have recanted, and to have come in to the ⁿ true Catholic faith, as established at the Council of Nice; and partly upon Arius's ^o own *confession of faith*, which was so plausibly worded, that it might easily pass for *orthodox*, though it wanted the word *ὁμοούσιος*. Now, is it not very unaccountable in you to call this rejecting the determination for the *ὁμοούσιον*, when it was only receiving a man, supposed by the Emperor, and perhaps by many of the Council, to have repented of his *heresy*, and to have embraced every thing that the Nicene Council had determined; the very sense and meaning of *ὁμοούσιος* itself, though not the word.

Pass we on now to the Council of Ariminum, in the

¹ De Vita Constant. l. iv. c. 47. p. 454. See Valesius's Notes.

^m See the history in Socrat. l. i. c. 33. Sozom. l. ii. c. 27. Athanas. p. 734.

ⁿ Arius swore to the Emperor, calling God to witness, that he believed in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as the *whole* Catholic Church taught, which the Emperor could take in no other sense, but as it had been lately determined by the Catholic Nicene Fathers. See Sozom. l. ii. c. 27.

And this may farther appear by the Emperor's putting Arius to the test afterwards, to see whether he really acknowledged the Nicene faith or no. See Socrat. l. i. c. 38. Comp. Phot. Cod. 256. p. 1413.

^o Extat. in Sozom. l. ii. c. 27.

year 359, when the Arians had the *secular* power on their side, and made use of it with all imaginable severity. The whole number of bishops in council are computed at about P 400, and q not above eighty of them Arians. † All the Catholics, at first, declared their unanimous adherence to the Nicene Creed; and protested against any new form of faith. All manner of artifices, frauds, and menaces were contrived to bring them and the Arians to something like an agreement. Yet the utmost they could do, was only to bring the Catholics to subscribe a ‡ *confession* artfully worded in general terms. And no sooner did the Catholic Fathers, after their return home, perceive how they had been imposed upon by ambiguous terms, and overreached by craft and subtilty; but they † confessed their error, and repented of it with tears. The history of the Council at large is too tedious for me to recite here: it may be seen either in the original authors, Athanasius, Sulpicius Severus, Hilary, Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, and Jerome; or with less trouble, and in less compass, in Cave's Life of Athanasius, or lastly in Montfaucon's. When you have well considered the arts and practices of the Arians, much the smaller number, in that Council, you may perhaps see reason to be ashamed of having mentioned it, but no reason for opposing it to the celebrated Nicene Council. While the Council of Ariminum was free, and left to give their real opinions; the Arians were condemned by a great majority, and their *principals deposed*. Even, at last, you have no reason to boast of their unanimous agreement to a new faith. It was a *verbal* agreement only to expressions

‡ Sulpic. Sev. p. 267. Athanas. p. 720, 749. Maximin the Arian makes the whole number 330. *August. Collat.* tom. viii. p. 650.

q Sulpic. Sever. p. 269.

† Hilar. Fragm. p. 1341.

‡ Quæ Catholicam disciplinam, perfidia latente, loqueretur. *Sulpic.* p. 273. Sonabant verba pietatem, et inter tanta mella præconii, nemo venenum insertum putabat. *Hieron. contr. Lucifer.*

† Vid. Ep. Liber. apud Socr. l. iv. p. 183. Hieron. contr. Lucif. Dial. Sulpic. Sever.

seemingly Catholic: and probably the *majority* ^u departed with the same high value and opinion of the Nicene faith, which they brought with them. Four years after the Synod of Ariminum, ^x Athanasius reckons up particularly the churches which still embraced the Nicene faith. Those of Spain, Britain, Gaul, all Italy, Dalmatia, Dacia, Mysia, Macedonia, Greece, Africa, Sardinia, Cyprus, Crete, Pamphylia, Lycia, Isauria, Egypt, Libya, Pontus, Cappadocia, and the churches of the East; excepting a few that followed Arius. He calls them the *whole world*, and *all* the churches throughout the world. He declares that he *knows* it, and has their *letters* by him to prove it. And it is worth reciting what account the bishops of Egypt and Libya, and among them Athanasius, give of the extent of the Nicene faith, about ten years after the time that you pretend there was a *general council* against it. Writing to the bishops in Africa, they begin thus: “ ^y It is the greatest satisfaction to us to have seen what “ Damasus, our fellow-minister, and Bishop of the great “ city of Rome, and such a number of bishops in council “ with him, besides other synods in Gaul and Italy, have “ wrote in defence of the true orthodox faith: that faith “ which Christ delivered, and the Apostles taught, and “ our Fathers assembled at Nice, from out of the whole “ Christian world, handed down to us. So intense was “ their zeal at that time, in regard to the Arian heresy; “ that they who had fallen into it, might be reclaimed;

^u Vid. Ambros. Ep. cap. i. p. 862.

^x Athanas. Ep. ad Jovian. pag. 781. Theod. E. H. l. iv. c. 3. See Liberius's Letters an. 366. apud Socrat. l. iv. c. 12. Damasus's Lett. Sozom. l. vi. c. 23.

Hoc est illud *Homousion*, quod in Concilio Nicæno adversus hæreticos Arianos, a Catholicis patribus, veritatis auctoritate, et auctoritatis veritate firmatum est: quod postea in Concilio Ariminensi (propter novitatem verbi, minus quam potuit intellectam, quod tamen fides antiqua repererat) *multis paucorum fraude* deceptis, hæretica impietas sub hæretico imperatore labefactare tentavit. Sed post non longum tempus, libertate fidei Catholicæ prævalente,—Homousion Catholicæ fidei sanitate *longe lateque* defensum est. *August. tom. viii. p. 704.*

^y Apud Athanas. p. 891.

“ and that the heads or authors of it might have a mark
 “ set upon them. To this determination (*of the Nicene*
 “ *Fathers*) formerly the ² whole Christian world consent-
 “ ed: and at this very time, many councils have con-
 “ firmed and published the same: by means of which
 “ all they of Dalmatia, Dardania, Macedonia, Epirus,
 “ Greece, Crete, and the other islands, Sicily, Cyprus,
 “ and Pamphylia, Lycia, Isauria, all Egypt, the two
 “ Libyas, and the most of Arabia, have acknowledged it.”
 They go on to set forth the great respect and veneration
 due to the decisions of the Nicene Council; and show
 how far it was preferable, in every respect, to all the
 Arian synods: and particularly to the pretended General
 Council of Ariminum, which some presumed, at that
 time of day, to set against it. The whole would be well
 worth the reader’s perusal; and thither I refer you for a
 more particular answer; that you may learn hereafter
 not to call every thing *hugely romantic*, which may have
 happened to escape your notice or observation. I must
 take leave to tell you, there never was a synod on your
 side, so free, so large, so, in every respect, unexception-
 able, as the Council of Nice was. Nay farther; that
 whatever opposition was made to it, was carried on with
 such wiles, crafts, subtilties, and refined artifices, as every
 honest man would be ashamed of: and farther; that,
 notwithstanding all they could do, the Arians were not
 able long to maintain their ground; but the men who
 sustained the shock, and kept up the credit of the Nicene
 Creed, were not only the most numerous, but appear to
 have been as wise, as judicious, and as pious men, as ever
 the Church was adorned with, since the times of the
 Apostles.

I do not pretend that there is demonstration in this

² To the same purpose says Marinus Victorinus, speaking of the *ἐπαύριον*.

Conditum juxta veterum fidem (nam et ante tractatum) et multi orbis
 episcopi, trecenti quindecim in civitate Nicææ, quam per totum orbem de-
 cretam fidem mittentes, episcoporum millia in eadem habuerunt, vel illius
 temporis, vel sequentium annorum. l. 3. *contr. Arian.*

kind of reasoning, in favour of any cause. But it will have its weight with cool and considering men: who, reflecting that religion is not a thing to be coined and re-coined every month; that it has been thought on so long and well, and by persons blessed with as good a share of understanding, and as great sincerity, as any are, or have been; and that the generality of the wisest and most excellent men have hitherto gone on in such a way, and that too after a strict and severe examination, being well apprised of the objections made against it; I say, who, reflecting thus, will be very cautious of contradicting what seems to have been so well and so deliberately settled; and will be rather willing to suspect their own judgment, and modestly decline what looks like leaning too much to their own understandings. However, such considerations may be of use to those who, not having leisure, inclination, or patience to examine thoroughly into this controversy, (as perhaps few have,) must be content to judge as they can: and since they find the same Scriptures so very differently interpreted by the contending parties, till they can themselves enter into the very heart of the controversy, how can they do better than close in with those who have been in possession of this faith for so many centuries, and have had, in a manner, in every age, for at least fourteen hundred years, I will venture to say sixteen, the most eminent lights and ornaments of the Christian Church to support and defend it? This I mention as the safest way; and such as will be taken by modest, humble, and discreet men; being what they can best answer to God and their own consciences, even though, at length, it should prove erroneous; which yet has not hitherto, nor ever will be, I am persuaded, made appear. As for those who choose to go out of the common road, and to run counter to all that has hitherto been called and reputed *Catholic*, or *orthodox*; let them look to it, and be it at their own peril. They must believe that the ancient *heretics* were the soundest Christians; that the first general council which met from all parts

of Christendom, and having no bias, so far as appears, to determine them this way or that, either did not know what was the faith of their respective churches, and what had been handed down to them by their predecessors, or else wilfully and unanimously agreed to corrupt it; and that too in a very material article, in which the sum of the Christian religion is contained; and in which the nature and object of our worship is very nearly concerned. They must believe farther that the churches, in general, throughout the Christian world, through every age, (and even since the Reformation, upon which matters were strictly looked into and carefully reexamined,) have fallen into the same error; and so continue, even to this day; some few private men only, here and there, showing their dislike of it. Now, they who pretend this, must bring some very strong proofs to make good their pretences. If they have not something very weighty and momentous to urge; something that carries the force and evidence of *demonstration* with it, they are first very unreasonable in calling us to attend to what so little deserves it; and next very inexcusable in their attempts to draw others into their *precarious* sentiments, and to raise doubts and perplexities in the minds of simple well meaning men. But I pass on to

QUERY XXX.

Whether, supposing the case doubtful, it be not a wise man's part to take the safer side; rather to think too highly, than too meanly of our blessed Saviour; rather to pay a modest deference to the judgment of the ancient and modern Church, than to lean to one's own understanding?

UPON the question, whether it be not safer and better (supposing the case doubtful) to think too highly, rather than too meanly of our blessed Saviour; you answer, "questionless it is;" which one might think a very fair and ingenuous confession; and you need not have added a word more. You go on to say, that this is our "most

“plausible pretence;” in which, I think, you do it a deal too much honour. I did but just hint it; and lest it should not be of force sufficient, immediately strengthened it with another consideration, which I am persuaded will bear, if this should not; and the rather, because you have not thought fit so much as to take notice of it. I must however follow you, upon the former point, that *plausible* plea, and which is so just, that you seem yourself to give into it. Yet, I know not how, by some peculiar turn of thought, you at length come to say, that it “proves as weak and false as any other they ever allege.” If it prove no *weaker*, I shall be satisfied. Let us hear what you have to say. Your argument is this: “Since Revelation is the only rule in the case, if we go beyond, or if we fall short, are we not equally culpable?” I am very glad to hear from you, that *Revelation* is the *only* rule in the case: abide by that, and matters may easily be adjusted. To the argument I answer; that you *equivocate* in the word *equally*, and make a *sophistical* syllogism with four terms. *Equally* culpable, signifies, either that one is culpable *as well* as the other, or that one is culpable *as much* as the other; *equally* a fault, or an *equal* fault. Our dispute is about the *latter*, and yet all that you really prove is only the *former*. *Revelation* undoubtedly is the rule; and to go beyond it is certainly culpable, as well as it is to fall short of it; and yet not *culpable* (at least not in this instance) in the same degree. Is there no such thing as an error on the right hand, (as we say,) or a fault on the right side? Of two extremes, may it not often happen, that one is more dangerous than the other? This I assert to be the case here: and I will give you my reasons for it. Our blessed Lord hath done great and wonderful things for us. If our respect, duty, and gratitude happen, through our ignorance and excessive zeal, to rise too high; this is the overflowing of our good-natured qualities, and may seem a pitiable failing. But, on the other hand, if we happen to fall short in our regards, there is not only ingratitude, but *blasphemy* in it. It is degrad-

ing and dethroning our Maker, Preserver, King, and Judge; and bringing him down to a level with his creatures.

Besides; we have many express cautions given us in Scripture, not to be wanting in our respects and services towards God the Son; but have no particular cautions against honouring him too much. We know that we ought to "honour him, even as we honour the Father;" which, if it be an ambiguous expression, we are very excusable in taking it in the best sense, and interpreting on the side of the precept. We know that by dishonouring the Son, we do, at the same time, dishonour the Father: but we are nowhere told, that the Father will resent it as a dishonour done to himself, if we should chance, out of our scrupulous regards to the Father and Son both, to pay the Son more honour than strictly belongs to him. On these and the like considerations, (especially when we have so many and so great appearances of truth, and such a cloud of authorities to countenance us in it,) the error, if it be one, seems to be an error on the right hand. Now you shall be heard again. "Can any man think to please the Son of God, by giving that to him which he never claimed or could claim?" Positive enough. But will you please to remember that the Query *supposes the case doubtful*, (which was abundantly civil to you,) *doubtful* whether the Son of God has *claimed it*, or no; and the whole argument runs upon that supposition. This therefore discovers either some want of acumen, or great marks of haste. You add; "It can be no detraction from the dignity of any Person (how great soever that dignity be) to forbear professing him to be that which he really is not." I perceive your thoughts are still absent; and you do not reflect, that you are begging the question, instead of answering to the point in hand. You are to *suppose* it, if you please, *doubtful*, who or what the Person is. In such a case, it may be better to give him what he does not require, than to defraud him of what he does: it is safer and more prudent to run the risk of one, than of

the other. You go on; "It may well become serious and sincere Christians to consider, whether it is not possible, that while, adventuring to be wise beyond what is written, they vainly think to advance the honour of the Son of God, above what he has given them ground for in the Revelation, they may dishonour the Father that sent him," &c. I am weary of transcribing. Consider, on the other hand, whether it be not more than possible, that, while others *adventuring to be wise beyond what is written*, (teaching us to profess *three Gods*, making the Creator of the world a *creature*, inventing new *unscriptural* distinctions of a *supreme* and a *subordinate* worship, with many other things equally *unscriptural* and unwarrantable,) they *vainly* think to bring down *mysteries* to the level of their low understandings, and to search the "deep things of God;" they may not dishonour both Father and Son, and run into heresy, blasphemy, and what not; and sap the very foundations of the Christian religion. You proceed; "It may become them to consider what they will answer at the *great day*, should God charge them with not observing that declaration of his, *I will not give my glory to another.*" They may humbly make answer, that they understood that *his glory* was not to be given to *creatures*; and therefore they had given it to none but his own Son, and his Holy Spirit, whom they believed not to be *creatures*, nor other Gods; and whom himself had given his glory to, by commanding all men to be *baptized* in their names, equally with his own; and ordering particularly, that "all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father." If they happened to carry their respect too high, yet it was towards those only whom the Father principally delighteth to honour; and towards whom an ingenuous, grateful, and well-disposed mind can hardly ever think he can pay too much. Upon these and the like considerations they may humbly hope for pity and pardon for a mistake; such an one as the humblest, most devote, and most conscientious men might be the aptest to fall into.

But what must an Arian have to say, at that *great day*, if it appears that he has been uttering *blasphemies* against the Son of God, and reviling his Redeemer, (the generality of sober Christians looking on, all the while, with horror; shocked at the impiety; and openly declaring and protesting against it,) and for no other reasons, in the last result, but because he thought *generation* implied *division*, and *necessary* generation implied outward *coaction*; and he could not understand whether the unity should be called *specific* or *individual*, nor *how* there came to be three Persons; nor *why* one might not have been as good as three; nor *why* the Father should be said to beget the Son, rather than *vice versa*; and the like? Is this kind of reasoning suitable to, or becoming Christians, who have their Bible to look into; which alone can give any satisfaction in these matters? To go upon our own fancies and conjectures, in a thing of this kind, is only betraying too little reverence for the tremendous and unsearchable nature of God, and too high an opinion of our own selves. You have a farther pretence, built upon your mistaken notion of *individual*, which I need not take notice of; having already almost surfeited the reader with it.

QUERY XXXI.

Whether any thing less than clear and evident demonstration, on the side of Arianism, ought to move a wise and good man, against so great appearances of truth on the side of orthodoxy, from Scripture, reason, and antiquity; and whether we may not wait long before we find such demonstration?

IN your answer to this, I am rebuked, first, for giving the name of *orthodoxy* to a *scholastic* notion; and, secondly, for calling your doctrine *Arianism*. As to the first, I stand so far corrected, as to beg the privilege of using the word *orthodoxy*, for the *received doctrine*. You are pleased to call it a *scholastic* notion. How far it is *scholastic*, I do not certainly know; but sure I am that it is

primitive and Catholic; and I do not know that the *Schoolmen* were *heretics* in this article. If they were; so far, you may depend upon it, our notion is not *scholastic*. As to your doctrine being justly called *Arianism*, I hope, without offence, I may say, I have made it plain to a demonstration, (excepting only that, in some particulars, you fall below *Arianism*,) and I should advise you hereafter, for your own sake, to dispute so clear a point no farther. But let us go on. You add: "If it be impossible, by the rule of Scripture and reason, and the sense of the most ancient writers and councils of the Church, that the *scholastic* notion should be true; and if there be no *medium* betwixt (the *scholastic notion*) and the notion of Dr. Clarke, (that is, *Arianism*,) then it will be demonstrated that (*Arianism*) is the true doctrine of Jesus Christ and his Apostles, as revealed in Scripture, and the true sense of Scripture interpreted by right reason, and as understood by the best and most ancient Christian writers." This is your *demonstration*; only I have thrown in a word or two, by way of parenthesis, to make it the clearer to the reader. The sum of it is this; if the *scholastic* notion (by which you mean *Sabellianism*) be not true; and if there be no *medium* between *Sabellianism* and *Arianism*; then *Arianism* is the true doctrine, &c. That is, if *supposing* be *proving*, and if *begging the question* be the same thing with *determining* it; then something will be *demonstrated* which is not *demonstrated*. You do well to refer us to your *Appendix* for proof, and to shift it off as far as possible. *Demonstrations* are good things, but sometimes very hard to come at; as you will find in the present instance. You may take as much time longer, as you think proper, to consider of it. Give me a *demonstration*, justly so called; a chain of clear reasoning, beginning from some plain and undoubted axiom, and regularly descending by necessary deductions, or close connection of *ideas*, till you come at your *conclusion*. Till you can do this, it will be but labour lost, to endeavour to shake the *received doctrine* of the

ever blessed *Trinity*. For, unless you can give us something really solid and substantial, in an article of so great importance, the reasons which we have, on our side of the question, are so many, so plain, and so forcible, that they must, and will, and ought to sway the minds of modest, reasonable, and conscientious men, while the Church stands, or the world lasts. Any man that duly considers what we have to plead from holy Scripture, and what from the concurring judgment and practice of the primitive and Catholic Church; and reflects farther upon the natural tenderness which every pious and grateful mind must have for the honour of his blessed Lord and Saviour, the dread and horror of blasphemy, and how shocking a thing it must appear to begin now to abridge him of that respect, service, and supreme adoration, which has been so long and so universally paid him, and by the blessed saints and martyrs now crowned in heaven; I say, any man that duly considers this, will easily perceive how impossible it is for *Arianism* ever to prevail generally, except it be upon one or other of these suppositions: either that the age becomes so very *ignorant* or *corrupt*, that they know not, or care not, what they do; or that some new light spring up, on the side of *Arianism*, some hidden reserve of extraordinary evidences, such as, in 1400 years' time, the wit of man has not been able to discover. As to the latter, neither yourself nor yet the learned Doctor has been pleased to favour us with any such discovery: as to the former, I have too good an opinion of you to suspect that you can either hope or wish for it. You will have a mind to try what you can do; and so give me leave to represent to you a short summary of what we are to expect of you.

1. You are to prove, either that the Son is *not Creator*; or that there are *two Creators*, and one of them a *creature*.

2. You are to show, either that the Son is not to be *worshipped* at all; or that there are *two objects of worship*, and one of them a *creature*.

3. You are to prove, either that the Son is not *God*; or that there are *two Gods*, and one of them a *creature*.

4. You are to show, that your *hypothesis* is high enough to take in all the high titles and attributes ascribed to the Son in holy Scripture; and, at the same time, low enough to account for his “increasing in wisdom, not knowing the day of judgment,” his being “exceeding sorrowful, troubled, crying out in his agonies,” and the like. You are to make all to meet in the one *Λόγος*, or *Word*; or else to mend your scheme by borrowing from ours.

5. I must add, that, whatever you undertake, you are either to prove it with such strength, force, and evidence, as may be sufficient to bear up against the stream of antiquity, full and strong against you; or else to show that antiquity has been much misunderstood, and is *not* full and strong against you.

Now you see, what you have to do; and our readers, perhaps, may understand what we are talking about, the dust being, I hope, in some measure thrown off, and the cause opened. Now proceed as you think proper: only dispute fair; drop ambiguous terms, or define them; put not gross things upon us; condemn every thing but truth in the search after truth; and keep close to the question: and then it will soon be seen, whether *Arianism* or *Catholicism* is the *Scripture doctrine of the Trinity*.

There remain only two Queries, which I have any concern in; and I hardly think it needful to take farther notice of them, the substance of them being contained in the former: besides that this Defence being drawn out into a length beyond what I expected, I am willing to come to a conclusion. You will excuse me for not returning a particular answer to *your* Queries, having obviated all that is of weight in them, in this Defence of my own. Besides, you have now had some years to consider this subject, and may probably see reason to alter some things; to contract your Queries into a shorter compass, and to put them closer and stronger; though that part, I

think, should come, after you have made a *defence* of your own principles: otherwise, you know, it is nothing but finding faults, without proposing any way to mend them; which is only a work of fancy, and is both fruitless and endless. My design chiefly was to be upon the *offensive*: the *defensive* part, on our side, has been handled over and over, in books well known, and easy to be had. What was most wanting was, to point out the particular defects of Dr. Clarke's scheme, which was thought to contain something *new*; and was certainly set forth in a very *new* method.

In conclusion, give me leave to tell you, that I have entered into this cause (after a competent weighing what I could meet with, on either side) under a full conviction both of the truth and importance of it; and with a resolution (by God's assistance) to maintain it; till I see reason (which I despair of) to alter my judgment of it. Make you the best you can of your side of the question, in a *rational* and *fair* manner. Truth is what I sincerely aim at, whether it be on your side or on mine. But I may be allowed to speak with the greater confidence in this cause, since the controversy is not *new*, but has been exhausted long ago; and all had been done on your side, that the wit of man could do, long before either you or Dr. Clarke appeared in it. You may, if you please, traverse over again *Scripture*, *antiquity*, and *reason*. As to the first; all the texts you can pretend to bring against us have been weighed and considered; and we have solutions ready for them; while you are yet to seek how to give a tolerable account of several texts; those, especially, which declare the *unity* of God, and proclaim the Son to be *God*, *Creator*, and *object of worship* and *adoration*. If you proceed to Fathers, they stand pointed against you; and you are certain to expose your cause, as often as you hope for any relief or succour from them. If, lastly, (which you think your strongest hold,) you retire to *philosophy* and *metaphysics*, I humbly conceive, you will still be able to do nothing. It will be only falling to *conjecture*, after you

INDEX

OF

PRINCIPAL MATTERS.

- A.
- ADORATION, see Worship
- Ante-Nicene writers, include the
 Son in the one God 15
- admit no inferior God 39
- disown creature-worship 175
- Arians conceal their heretical tenets under Catholic terms 88, 146
- are afraid to express their notions clearly 144
- have more difficulties to get over than the Catholics 120, 122, 125, 161, 252
- the positions of some or other of them in respect of the Son 156
- the methods they made use of to propagate their heresy 157
- how far they agree with, or differ from, the Sabellians 251
- misrepresent the Catholic doctrine 214
- their notions of the Trinity not more intelligible than the Catholic 244
- supposing the case doubtful, not on so safe a side as the Catholics 336
- what is requisite to defend their scheme 340
- Ariminum (the Council of) vainly opposed to the Council of Nice 331
- Article *δ* before *Θεός*, the addition or omission of it makes no alteration in the sense of the word 48
- St. Athanasius cited and explained 142
- Attributes applied to the Son, such as can belong to no creature 63
- strictly Divine and infinite 65
- St. Austin vindicated 348
- Author and Governor of the universe, whosoever is so, is, in the Arian notion, allowed to be God 52
- B.
- Being, the word bears two senses 119, 232
- how distinguished from Person, when applied to the Trinity 232
- whether there can be any medium between a Being and not a Being 118
- Bull, (Bishop) his method of managing controversy— vi. &c. — the sum of the question between him and the Arians 284
- C.
- Characteristics of the true God applied to the Son 63
- Christ understood by the ancients to be meant in those texts which undoubtedly speak of the one supreme God 20
- A a

- Christ spake to the Jews in his own Person, when he assumed the titles of the supreme God 24
 — called God in Scripture in as high a sense as the Father himself 41
 — called Jehovah in his own Person 42
 — proved to be God from his being the object of religious worship 179
 — proved to be God by nature 263
- Clemens of Alexandria cited and vindicated 77
- Coeternity of the Logos with the Father asserted by the ancients 104
- Consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, how eluded by the Arians, and how asserted by the ancients 268
- Creation, the Scripture meaning of the word 138
- Creation of the universe, attributed to the Son as much as to the Father 129
 — implies an infinite power 135
- Creature, the Son asserted to be uncreated implicitly and consequentially by the holy Scriptures 139
 — the same affirmed directly by many of the ancients 140
 — that he was created, not affirmed or supposed by Origen *ibid.*
 — no medium between being a creature and being essentially God 148
- D.
- Divine attributes and powers attributed to the Son, by Dr. Clarke in an equivocating sense 124
- Divinity, how absurdly ascribed to Christ by the Arians ix
- Dominion, not the full import of the word God 35, 37, 265
- Doxologies of the ancient Church, what judgment to be made of them 185
- E.
- Mr. Emlyn noted 67, 71, 133, 229, 292
- Eternity, a distinct idea from necessary existence 85
 — how abused when attributed to the Son by Dr. Clarke 153
- Eternity of the Son, described in Scripture by the same phrases as that of the Father 80
 — and therefore the Scripture proof of the Father's eternity given up by the Arians to avoid that of the Son's 81
 — whether the Son's eternity be necessary to his office and character 83
 — implies the Son to be necessarily existent 87
- Eusebius, cited and explained 12, 15, 60, 130, 135
- F.
- Fathers, several points instanced in which they are against the Arians 278
 — how cited and made use of by Dr. Clarke 301
 — what use to be made of them in controversies 321
 — the advantage of a cause that has them on its side 323
- G.
- Generation of the Son, a threefold one asserted by the ancients, and how distinguished 95
 — they who assert the generation of the Logos, or his filiation to have been temporary; yet assert his existence to have been coeternal with the Father's 103
 — how far an explicit profession of the Son's eternal generation may be dispensed with 115
- God, what the word implies 36
 — not merely relative 34
 — denotes substance, and not dominion only 59
 — his nature or essence denied by the Eunomians and some of the Arians to be above human comprehension 217
- H.
- Hypostasis, in what sense the ancient Catholics professed three Hypostases or one only 248

- I.
- Jehovah, Christ so called in his own Person 42
 — what the word signifies 44
 — the incommunicable name of the one true God 46
 Ignatius cited and explained 91
 Individual, whether any thing individual can be communicated 122
 Irenæus, whether he can be understood to ascribe ignorance to the Son 72
 Judgment committed to the Son, not the sole foundation of his honour 197
 Justin Martyr explained 93, 108
- M.
- Metaphysics, the Catholics wrongfully charged with the abuse of them 212, 228
 Mysteries, what meant by believing them 218
- N.
- Necessary agency no absurdity 117
 Necessary existence, a distinct idea from self-existence, and from eternity 86
 — an essential character of God 263
 Nominal God, Christ not excluded from worship among the nominal Gods 5
 Novatian, on the Catholic side 9
 — his explication of Philip. ii. 6. 10
 — his belief of Christ's eternity 97
- O.
- ο (the article) before Θεός makes no alteration in the sense of the word 48
 Omniscience of the Son, as infinite as the Father's 70
 — asserted by the Ante-Nicene writers 77
 ὁμοούσιος, what the word expresses 331
 One God, or only true God, not ascribed to the Father, in opposition to, nor exclusive of, the Son, either in the Scripture, or by the ancients 6, 15
 Origen's orthodoxy asserted and vindicated 140, 177, 182
- P.
- Person and Being, how they differ, when applied to the Trinity 232
 Personality of the Son, whilst in and with the Father, and before his temporary generation, asserted by the ancients 104
 Priority of the Father's order, does not imply that the Son is a subordinate God 51
- S.
- Sabellianism, how far it agrees with, and differs from, Arianism 251
 — the medium between that and Tritheism 234
 Self-existence, a distinct idea from necessary existence, and from eternity 86
 — a personal, not an essential character of God 263
 Semi-Arianism perfect nonsense and contradiction 158
 Subordination in order, does not imply an inferiority of nature 211
 Subordinate God, the absurdity of calling Christ so 3, 38, 39
 — he being not subordinate in nature or power, but only in order 130
 Substance not joined with relative terms, when understood of any thing extrinsic 35
 — One Divine substance, and not three, professed by the ancient Catholics 248
 Supreme God, Christ so, or not God at all 3
 Supremacy in order consistent with equality of nature 205
- T.
- Time, the word used by Dr. Clarke and the Arians in an equivocating sense 153
 Trinity in Unity, how far the notion of it is capable of explanation 227

- Trinity in unity, the modus of it not to be too curiously inquired into 227
- Tritheism, the charge of it removed from the Catholics 215
- fixed upon the Arians 238
- the medium between that and Sabellianism 234
- the sense of the ancient Fathers in relation to it 239
- Two Gods, the consequence of the Arian scheme 56
- U.
- Unity of Godhead, not to be inferred from unity of authority 55
- cannot be asserted but upon an equality of nature, and unity of principle 240
- Unity of Father and Son, in what sense defended by the ancients 255
- W.
- Whitby, (Dr.) an instance of his unfair dealing in his authorities 93
- short strictures upon his modest disquisitions 282
- his notion of mysteries exposed, &c. 218
- Will, and arbitrary will, distinct things 90
- how the Son may be said to have been begotten with the will of the Father 89, 348
- Worship (religious) appropriated to the supreme God only, in Scripture 162
- no distinction in Scripture between absolute and inferior worship 166
- the same proved from the practice of the primitive martyrs 173
- and from the doctrine of the ancient Church 175
- that religious worship is due to Christ, proved from Scripture 178
- upon what principles given him by the primitive Christians 181
- how the worship paid to the Son terminates in the Father 185
- due to him as Creator and Preserver of the universe, and before the commencing of his mediatorial kingdom 203

END OF VOL. I.

fail of *proof*; and giving the world your *wishes*, when they looked for *demonstrations*. I do not expect you should believe one word of what I have now said; neither say I it to discourage any *rational* inquiries; let truth have its utmost trial, that it may afterwards shine out with greater lustre: only let not your *zeal* outrun your *proofs*. If your arguments have weight sufficient to carry the point with men of sense, let us have them in their full strength; all reasonable men will thank you for them. But if, failing in *proof*, you should condescend (which yet I am persuaded you will not) to wile and stratagem, to colours and disguises, to misrepresentation and sophistry, in hopes to work your way through the unlearned and unthinking part of the world; then let me assure you beforehand, that that method will not do. Every man, that has a spark of generous fire left, will rise up against such practices; and be filled with disdain to see parts and learning so prostituted, and readers so used.

I am, Sir,

Your Friend and Servant.

POSTSCRIPT

TO

THE FIRST EDITION.

I HAVE just run over the second edition of Dr. Clarke's Scripture Doctrine; where I observe, that most of the passages, which I have animadverted upon, stand as they did, without any correction or amendment. Where the Doctor has attempted any thing, which may seem to weaken the force of what I have offered above, I shall here take notice of it. I had noted (as the learned Mr. Welchman had done before me) the Doctor's unfair manner of suppressing some words of Chrysostom, which were necessary to let the reader into the author's true meaning. The Doctor here endeavours ^a to bring himself off, by saying, that the words left out are Chrysostom's "own inference, and not the explication of the "words of the text." But the truth is, Chrysostom's inference shows plainly what his *explication* of the text was; which *explication* represented separately without that *inference*, by the help of the Doctor prefacing it, was made to appear in another light, and to speak another sense than what the author intended. *One in power* (κατὰ δύναμιν) is the same, with Chrysostom, as *equal* in power or ability, and *essentially* so. He could never have imagined, that *one in power* should signify no more than the Doctor pretends. One having *infinite* and the other only *finite* power, could not, according to Chrys-

^a Page 92.

ostom, be properly said to be one, *κατὰ δύναμιν*, in power. His interpretation then, being not only different but contrary to the Doctor's, should not have been represented in such a manner (by suppressing a part of it) as to be made to appear to countenance a notion which it clearly contradicts.

The learned Doctor ^b has put in an explanatory *parenthesis* to his translation of a passage of Irenæus. I have took notice ^c above, that he had not done justice to Irenæus in that passage: and I am glad to find that the Doctor himself is now sensible of it. He has not yet come up to the full sense of the author; as you may perceive, by comparing what he hath said with what I have remarked above. But he has said as much as could be expected of him: the wiser way would have been, to have struck the quotation out of his book.

Page 248. the learned Doctor criticizes a passage of St. Austin; which I am obliged to take notice of, having made use of that passage in these sheets ^d: I will give you the Doctor's own words, that you may be the better able to judge of the matter. After he had cited several passages out of Justin Martyr, where, probably, Justin was speaking of the temporary *προέλευσις*, or *manifestation*, or *generation* of God the Son, he proceeds thus. "Note: in all these passages, the words *κατὰ βουλήν*, and *βουλῆ*, and *θελήσει*, and *δυνάμει*, signify evidently, not *volente*, but *voluntate*; not the mere *approbation*, but the *act* of the *will*. And therefore St. Austin is very *unfair*, when he *confounds* these *two* things, and asks (*utrum Pater sit Deus, volens an nolens*) whether *the Father himself be God, with or without his own will?* The answer is clear: he is God (*volens*) *with* the approbation of his will; but not *voluntate*, not *κατὰ βουλήν*, not *βουλῆ*, *θελήσει*, and *δυνάμει*, not by an *act* of his will, but by *necessity of nature*." Thus far the learned Doctor. This is strange misrepresentation. I pass by his miscon-

^b Page 94.

^c Page 305.

^d Page 89.

struction of Justin Martyr, and his insinuation (grounded upon it) that the Son became *God*, by an *act* of the *Father's will*. Admitting it were so; how is St. Austin concerned in this matter, and how comes in the Doctor's *therefore*, where there is no manner of connection? Was St. Austin commenting upon Justin Martyr? The Doctor's thought seems to have been this: that St. Austin, having admitted that the Son was *God* by an *act* of the *Father's will*, and being pressed with the difficulty arising from that supposition, had no way of coming off, but by asking, whether the Father *himself* was not *God* by his own *will*. If this was not the Doctor's thought, it is at least what his readers, very probably, will have, upon the reading the Doctor's note. But to clear up this matter, I will tell you the whole case. The Arians, formerly, as well as now, being very desirous to make a *creature* of God the Son, set their wits to work to find arguments for it. They had a great mind to bring the Catholics to admit that the Son was first produced, or generated, by an *act* of the *Father's will*, (in the sense of *free choice*,) and the consequence they intended from it was, that the Son was a *creature*. The Catholics would not admit their *postulatum* without proof; and so the Arians attempted to prove it thus, by a *dilemma*. The Father begat his Son, either *notens*, or *volens*; *against* his will, or *with* his will: it could not be *against* his will, that is absurd; therefore it must be *with* his *will*; therefore that *act* of the will was precedent to the Son's existence, and the Father *prior* to the Son. Here the Doctor may see who the men were that first *confounded* two distinct things, *mere approbation*, and an *act* of the *will*: not the acute St. Austin, not the Catholics; but the Arians. To proceed: the Catholics, particularly Athanasius, Gregory Nazianzen, Cyril of Alexandria, and St. Austin, (men of

* Athanas. Orat. iii. p. 610, 611. Gregory Nazianz. Orat. xxxv. p. 565, 566. Cyril. Alexandr. Thesaur. p. 50, 52. August. tom. viii. p. 626, 994. ed. Bened.

excellent sense, and who knew how to talk pertinently,) easily contrived to baffle their adversaries with their own weapons. Tell us, say they to the Arians, whether the *Father* be *God, nolens, or volens; against his will, or with his will*. This quite confounded the men, and their *dilemma*; and they had not a word to say more. For, if they had said *nolens, against his will*; that was manifestly absurd: if they had said *volens, with his will*; then, by their own argument, they made the *Father prior* to himself. The Doctor perhaps might have helped them out. Let us see then: "The answer," he says, "is clear." But what is *clear*? Does he imagine there was any difficulty in answering St. Austin's question, taken by itself? This required no *Œdipus*; any man might readily answer it: but the difficulty was for an Arian to make an answer, which should not recoil upon himself. Let us take the Doctor's answer, and observe whether it could be of use. "The Father," says he, "is God with the approbation of his will, (*volens*,) not by an act of his will." But if an Arian formerly had thus answered St. Austin, it would have made the good Father smile. For he would immediately have replied: Well then; so the Father had his Son (*volens*) *with the approbation of his will*, and not by an *act* of his *will*: and now what becomes of your *dilemma*, and your *nolens volens*? What could the Arian have pretended farther, except it were to persist in it, that the Son was *God* by an *act* of the *will*? To which it would be readily answered, that this was begging the question: and so the whole must have ended. Judge you now, whether the Doctor or St. Austin had the greater *acumen* in this matter; and which of them is most apt to be *very unfair*, and to *confound* distinct things.

TEXTS OF SCRIPTURE

ILLUSTRATED AND EXPLAINED.

EXODUS.			Chap. Ver.	Page
Chap. Ver.	Page		xvii. 3.	6
vi. 3.	45, &c.		I COR.	
ISAIAH.			viii. 6.	6
xl.iii. 10.	} 2		GALATIANS.	
xliv. 8.			iv. 8.	264
xlv. 5.			EPHESIANS.	
xlvi. 9.			i. 22.	66
xlviii. 11.	54		iv. 6.	6
ST. MATTHEW.			PHILIPPIANS.	
xxviii. 18.	66		ii. 6.	} 11 } 191
ST. JOHN.			HEBREWS.	
i. 1.	47		i. 3.	13, 14
v. 19.	202		8, 9.	40
23.	197		10.	67
x. 30.	255			
35, 36.	39			

