

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
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THE
WORKS
OF
THE REV. DANIEL WATERLAND, D. D.

FORMERLY
MASTER OF MAGDALENE COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
CANON OF WINDSOR,
AND
ARCHDEACON OF MIDDLESEX;
NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND ARRANGED.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,
A REVIEW
OF THE
AUTHOR'S LIFE AND WRITINGS,
BY
WILLIAM VAN MILDERT, D. D.
LORD BISHOP OF LLANDAFF.

VOL. III.

OXFORD,
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A
SECOND VINDICATION
OF
CHRIST'S DIVINITY:
OR, A
SECOND DEFENCE OF SOME QUERIES,
RELATING TO
DR. CLARKE'S SCHEME OF THE HOLY TRINITY,
IN ANSWER TO THE
COUNTRY CLERGYMAN'S REPLY.
WHEREIN
THE LEARNED DOCTOR'S SCHEME, AS IT NOW STANDS, AFTER
THE LATEST CORRECTION, ALTERATION, AND EXPLANATION,
IS DISTINCTLY AND FULLY CONSIDERED.

Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ. For in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. *Coloss. ii. 8, 9.*

Quid tibi visum est, homo Ariane, tam multa dicere, et pro causa quæ inter nos agitur nihil dicere: quasi hoc sit respondere posse, quod est tacere non posse? *Augustin. contr. Maxim. p. 677. ed. Bened.*

P R E F A C E.

IT is now about three years and a half since I offered to the world a Vindication of Christ's Divinity, or, A Defence of some Queries, in answer to a Country Clergyman. Within a few months after the publication, some notice was taken of it in an anonymous pamphlet, entitled, Modest Plea, &c. Continued; or, A Brief Answer (not to my Defence, but) to my Queries. To which I replied, soon after, as much as I thought needful, in a Preface to my Eight Sermons. I was promised, in an Advertisement at the end of Modest Plea, &c. *a large and particular answer to my Defence*: and this, I presume, is what has now lately appeared, entitled, A Reply to Dr. W.'s Defence, &c. under the name of A Clergyman in the Country. To this the following sheets are intended for a full and distinct answer: how far they are really so, or how far they come short, is submitted to the judicious reader.

The book, which I here profess to examine, may be allowed to contain, in a manner, the whole strength of the Arian cause, *real* or *artificial*; all that can be of any force either to *convince* or to *deceive* a reader. And if there appears to be a great deal more of the *artificial* than there is of the *real*, there is certainly a *fault* in the men; but, at the same time, some great *defect* in the *cause* too, which wanted to be thus supplied. For whether we consider the *hands* supposed to have been employed in drawing up the Reply, or the *time* and *pains* spent in revising and polishing, we may be confident, that had it been possible to find out any *real* and *firm* foundation for *Arianism* to rest upon, it would never have been left to

stand upon *artificial* props, or to subsist by subtilty and management.

This is not the place to give the reader a full list of all the *artificial* advantages made use of by those gentlemen in support of *Arianism*: a few hints may here suffice. Their disclaiming the *name* all the while they are inculcating the *thing*; to keep their readers in *ignorance*, and to steal upon them by *surprise*: their wrapping up their doctrine in *general* and *confuse* terms; to prevent its being narrowly looked into, or pursued in its remote, or even immediate *consequences*: their elaborate and studied prolixity in proving such points as nobody calls in question, and then slipping upon the reader, in their stead, something very different from them, without any proof at all: their avoiding as much as possible the *defensive* part, where the main stress lies, and keeping themselves chiefly to the *offensive*; perpetually *objecting* to the Catholic scheme, instead of clearing up the difficulties which clog their own: their bending their main force against our *consequential* doctrine, of *three Persons being one God*, instead of directly attacking our premises, that the *Divine titles* and *attributes belong equally to every one*; as to which the Scripture is very full and *express*: these and other the like *artifices* will be easily seen to run through their whole performance. But their masterpiece of subtilty lies in contriving a set of *ambiguous* and *equivocal* terms, to put the main *question* into; such as may be capable of a Catholic sense, or at least look very like it, in order to claim some countenance from Catholic antiquity; but such as may also be drawn to an Arian meaning, that so they may secure the point which they intend. Thus, betwixt the two senses or faces of the same words, chosen for the purpose, they shall never want pretence or colour from *antiquity*, even while endeavouring to prove things the most opposite and repugnant thereto in real sense and significancy. Such is the convenient use of *equivocal* words or phrases, when ingeniously made choice of, and managed by rules of art.

In the following papers, I have particularly endeavoured to clear the sense of the Ante-Nicene Church; and to vindicate the same from misrepresentation. All that remains to be done in this Preface is to obviate *two objections*, of very different kinds, which have been lately made by men of very opposite principles. One ^a pretends that we are very *singular*, in claiming the suffrage of the Ante-Nicene Church in favour of the Athanasian doctrines: the other ^b is for entirely waving all searches into *antiquity*, in relation to this controversy, as being either *needless* or *fruitless*.

I. As to the first, we are confidently told, "that few of the truly learned and impartial Athanasians themselves, from the very days of their founder, till our late writers of controversy, Bp. Bull, Dr. Grabe, Dr. Waterland, have denied the truth of this fact; that the Ante-Nicene Fathers were generally against the Athanasian, and for the Eusebian doctrines^c." To countenance this pretence, a long and pompous detail of Athanasian Confessions (as they are called) are packed together, and laid before the English reader.

It will be proper here, in the entrance, to examine what truth or justice there is in this strange report; that so, prejudices being removed, the reader may come with the greater freedom to the examination of what is offered, in the following papers, on the head of *antiquity*.

We must trace this matter down from the first beginnings of the Arian heresy, about the year 319. It may be known from Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, what opinion the Catholics in general then had of the *novelty* of the Arian or Eusebian ^d doctrines.

In the year 321, he with his Clergy, in their *circular*

^a Mr. Whiston in his reply to Lord Nottingham.

^b The author of *Two Letters*, one to Lord Nottingham, the other to Mr. Whiston.

^c Mr. Whiston's Reply to the Earl of Nottingham, p. 3.

^d Note, They were called Eusebians from Eusebius of Nicomedia, one of the chief promoters of the Arian cause.

letter ^c, represent the Arians or Eusebians as fallen into a great *apostasy*, and as forerunners of Antichrist. They exclaim against the Arian doctrines in this manner and in these words; "Who ever heard such things as these? or who, that now hears them, is not astonished at them, does not stop his ears for fear of polluting his ears with such impurity of doctrine? Who that hears St. John declaring that *in the beginning was the Word*, does not condemn those that say that *he once was not?*" &c. In conclusion of the Epistle, they compare them with Hymenæus and Philetus, and the traitor Judas: and they anathematize them as enemies to God, and subverters of souls. Now can we well suppose that Alexander, a very pious and good man, with great numbers of his Bishops and Clergy, would have gone these lengths in their censure, had they had the least suspicion that the Arian doctrines were at all agreeable to the faith of the Ante-Nicene churches?

Two years after this, in the year 323, the same Alexander, in his letter ^f to Alexander of Constantinople, persists in the same warmth of zeal against the Arian doctrines. The abettors and favourers of them he ranks with the Ebionites, Artemonites, and Samosatensians ^g, (condemned heretics,) brands them as novellists of late appearing ^h, as men that thought none of the *ancients* worthy to be compared with them, pretending to be the *only wise men themselves*, and to be *inventors of doctrines which never before entered into man's head* ⁱ. This was what Alexander thought of the Arians at that time. Little did he suspect that the Ante-Nicene Church had been at all favourable to their notions.

In the year 325, as is well known, the Arian doctrines were proscribed and anathematized in the famous Council of Nice, consisting of three hundred and eighteen Bishops,

^c Extat apud Athanas. p. 397. ed. Bened. ap. Socrat. Eccl. Histor. lib. i. cap. 3.

^f Extat Theodorit. E. Hist. lib. i. cap. 4.

^g Theodoret. E. H. p. 15. ed. Cant.

^h Ibid. p. 16.

ⁱ Ibid. p. 17.

very unanimous in their resolutions, excepting a few reclaimants. In their Synodical Epistle^k, they declare that they had condemned the Arian doctrines of the *Son's being from nothing*, and that he once was not, as full of blasphemy and madness, and such as they had not patience to hear. So far were they from any apprehension that the Arian or Eusebian doctrines had been held by the *ancient Church*. This was the year before Athanasius (our *founder*, as Mr. Wh. calls him) was Bishop of the Church, and about fifteen years before he drew his pen in defence of the doctrines established in that Council.

Much about the same time, the good Emperor Constantine, after a fair and full hearing of the cause in the Nicene Council, bears his testimony against Arius, as being the *first broacher* of that doctrine, by the *instigation* of the Devil^l. And he makes an order to have the Arians branded with the name of Porphyrians^m, as being followers of the Pagan Porphyrius, either in their avowed *opposition* to Christ, (as some think,) or in their adopting the Platonic gradations into the Christian Trinity, as others conjecture.

In the year 335, Marcellus and Eusebius engaged on opposite sides: from which time Mr. Whiston begins the date of the Athanasian Confessions. What he produces from Eusebius himself is not to the purpose, since he reckons not him with the Athanasians, about whom our present question is. However, it is of no great moment, if Eusebius could ever so justly appeal to the *ancient Doctors* against Marcellus's particular tenets; many of which (as Eusebius was pleased to understand them) were undoubtedly *novelties*. As to Marcellus, he charges the Eusebian or Arian heresy, as a thing then newly inventedⁿ. He gives up nothing in respect of the Ante-Nicene Fathers in general, but in respect of Origen only: whom

^k Apud Socrat. E. Hist. lib. i. cap. 9. Compare Athanas. vol. i. p. 283.

^l Socrat. E. H. lib. i. cap. 9. p. 30.

^m Ibid. p. 31.

ⁿ Euseb. contr. Marcell. lib. i. cap. 4. p. 20.

he supposes to have been, in some points, not very consistent°. Neither does he *confess* that Origen was entirely in the sentiments of the Eusebians; but only that he agreed with them in making the Son a *second Hypostasis* P: which Marcellus scrupled to allow, not considering that Origen's sense of a *second Hypostasis* (intended only in opposition to the Noëtian heresy) was a quite different thing from what the Eusebians or Arians were contending for. It is to be noted, that Marcellus and the other Eustathians were, for some time, too nice and scrupulous about admitting *three Hypostases*; differing therein from the wiser and more judicious Athanasians.

About the year 352, Athanasius wrote his Epistle concerning the decrees of the Nicene Council. What he thought of the doctrine of the Ante-Nicene Church may appear sufficiently from one passage, running thus:

“ We give you demonstration that our doctrine has been handed down to us from Fathers to Fathers. But you, ye revivers of *Judaism*, and disciples of Caiaphas, what writers can you bring to father your tenets? Not a man can you name of any repute for sense or judgment: all abhor you, excepting only the Devil, who has alone been the father of such an apostasy^q,” &c.

Many other passages^r of the like import may be produced from Athanasius, who every where appeals to constant *tradition*, along with Scripture, for the truth of his doctrine, against the Arian novelties. Neither are the pretended *Confessions*, which Mr. Whiston alleges out of him, of any the least moment; amounting to no more than his proposing of some Arian objections; which he abundantly confutes in the very places, showing them to be nothing else but misrepresentation and calumny.

In the year 355, Hilary, one of the greatest Bishops of the west, and who may be justly called the Western

° Euseb. contr. Marcell. lib. i. cap. 4. p. 22.

P Id. *ibid.*

q Athanas. de Decret. Syn. Nicæn. p. 233.

r Athanas. p. 111, 262, 412, 502, 676, 723. ed. Bened.

Athanasius, wrote his first letter to Constantius the Emperor; in which we have the following testimony relating to our present purpose.

“ After four hundred years almost, since the only begotten Son of God vouchsafed to take pity on lost mankind, as if there had been *no Apostles* before, or as if after their martyrdoms and deaths there had been *no Christians*, now at length is come abroad the Arian pestilence, *novel* and direful, not a plague of *infected air*, but of execrable blasphemies. Have they then, who *believed* before, entertained false hopes of immortality? It is but *late*, we know, that these imaginations have been *invented* by the two Eusebius's and Narcissus, and Theodorus, and Stephanus, and Acacius, and Me-nophantus; and the two ignorant and immoral youths, Ursatius and Valens, whose letters are published, and who are farther convicted by credible witnesses, such as have heard them, not so much *disputing*, as *barking* against us^s.” In another treatise, published three years after, the same Hilary, having shown how he had received his faith from the Prophets, Evangelists, and Apostles, goes on thus: “ By these have I been taught to believe as I do: in this faith am I imbued beyond recovery. Pardon me, O God Almighty, that I *cannot* be moved from this belief; but I *can* die for it. This age is tardy, I conceive, in bringing me these most *impious* teachers: these masters are too *late* for my *faith*, a faith which *thou* hast taught me. Such was my faith in thee, before ever I so much as heard of *these names*: by thee was I thus regenerated, and from that time forwards thus am I ever thine^t.” Such is the constant strain of this blessed saint; who every where brands the Arian doctrine as the *new, novel*, upstart heresy, folly, madness; and the broachers of it as the *new* apostolate, emissaries of Antichrist, *blasphemers*, and the like. Little did he suspect, though a knowing and a learned man, that any

^s Hilar. ad Constant. lib. i. p. 1220.

^t Hilar. de Trin. lib. vi. p. 892.

such doctrine had been received or taught by the Ante-Nicene churches.

About the year 360, Basil entered the lists in this controversy. We shall often ^u find him appealing to the *tradition* of the Fathers for the Athanasian doctrine. His *confession*, (in Mr. Whiston's phrase,) relating to Gregory of Neocæsarea, amounts only to this, that Gregory had made use of some expressions which evil-minded men had perverted to a false and bad sense, directly contrary to Gregory's true meaning. Basil himself bears full and clear testimony to Gregory's orthodoxy; as Bishop Bull has largely demonstrated ^r, beyond contradiction.

As to what Basil says of Dionysius of Alexandria, that he was *the first who laid the seeds of the impiety of the Anomæans*: thus much, at least, may be gathered from it, that, in Basil's judgment, none of the writers before Dionysius (who wrote against Sabellius, about the year 259) had any tincture of *that impiety*; but that the Ante-Nicene Church in general was very free from it. And as to Dionysius himself, (however hardly Basil might once think of him,) he has been abundantly vindicated by Athanasius among the ancients, and by several learned moderns.

What Basil is said to *confess* of Origen, shows that in his opinion, custom and common consent was, in Origen's time, on the side of the doctrines called Athanasian; and that Origen himself, sometimes at least, conformed to it. But I shall vindicate Origen at large in a proper place.

Nazianzen, a contemporary of Basil's, in more places than one, bears testimony to the antiquity and uninterrupted succession of the Nicene faith, from the times of the Apostles. As to a pretended *Confession* of his looking the other way, it will be considered at large in the following sheets.

Epiphanius, about the year 375, says, that the *apo-*

^u Basil. contr. Eunom. lib. i. p. 5. De Spir. S. p. 167. Ep. 79.

^r Bull. D. F. sect. ii. cap. 12.

stolical faith (that is, the Athanasian in his account) continued pure and uncorrupted till the time of Arius, who divided the Church ^y: and who by the instigation of the Devil, and with an impudent forehead, let his tongue loose against his Lord ^z: so little did he imagine that *Arianism* was *primitive Christianity*. He observes farther, that had it not been for the subtle practices of Eudoxius, Bishop of Constantinople, in perverting and corrupting the most pious Emperor Valens, the very *women and children*, and all that had been in any tolerable measure instructed in Christian principles, would have reprov'd and routed the Arians, as *blasphemers* and murderers of their Lord ^a, &c. Such was the assurance the Athanasians then had, that their faith was the settled and standing doctrine of the primitive churches all the world over, till the time of Arius.

As to Epiphanius's opinion of Lucian and Origen, (two single men,) it was severe enough, and indeed not just; as Bishop Bull hath abundantly proved. Yet, from Epiphanius's censure of Origen, one may perceive plainly, that he thought the Ante-Nicene Church in general, both before and after Origen, to be of a very contrary judgment to that which he condemns in Lucian and Origen, that is, to *Arianism*.

At this time lived Gregory Nyssen; who about the year 381 encountered Eunomius, the shrewdest and sharpest Arian of that age. In his reply to him, he takes notice that the Church had been in possession of this doctrine, that *God the Son is essentially true God, of the essence of the true God*: and that if Eunomius should undertake to *confute* that doctrine, he ought to fix upon some firm and certain principles whereon to proceed, and trace them down by just and regular deductions, in order to come at his conclusion. After he had said this, he goes on in these words.

“ Let no one here tell me, that we ought also to give

^y Epiphanius. *contr. Hæres.* l. xix. p. 728.

^z *Ibid.* p. 736.

^a *Ibid.* p. 737.

“ *rational* demonstration of what we profess : it is sufficient demonstration of our doctrine, that we have a *tradition* coming down to us from our father ; a kind of inheritance successively conveyed to us by the primitive saints from the Apostles themselves. They that have *changed* those doctrines *for* the present *novelty*, will have very great need of the succours of reason and argumentation, if they mean to convince, not the grovelling herd or giddy populace, but the grave and staunch men, men of sobriety and firmness. While they offer us discourses without any argument or demonstration to support them, it is only playing the fool, and is even brutishly stupid : as if greater regard should be had to empty talk, void of all proof, than to the doctrine of the Evangelists and of the Apostles, and their *successors*, the lights of the Christian churches ^b.”

Here we see with what confidence Nyssen appeals to constant *tradition* for the truth of the Athanasian doctrine : so little did he imagine that the Ante-Nicene faith was any way different from, much less repugnant to, his *own*.

I may next mention a famous case which happened in the year 383. The Arians, Eunomians, and Macedonians, were then formally and solemnly challenged by the Catholics, to refer the matter in dispute to the concurring judgment of the writers that lived before the controversy began : but they declined the offer ; refusing absolutely to put their cause upon that issue. This is decisive in the case, that the Athanasians had all the assurance imaginable as to the faith of the primitive churches ; and that the Arians were very sensible that their doctrine could never bear so fair and just a trial. The story is thus told in Socrates, lib. v. cap. 10.

“ The Emperor (Theodōsius) sending for Nectarius, the Bishop (of Constantinople), conferred with him about the properest method of putting an end to the dissen-

^b Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom. lib. iii. p. 125, 126.

“ sions, and restoring the unity of the Church. He pro-
 “ posed to have the matter in dispute, which had divided
 “ the churches, to be fully canvassed ; that, removing the
 “ causes of their differences, the churches might be re-
 “ duced to concord. Upon the hearing of this, Nectarius
 “ was under some concern : and calling for Agelius the
 “ Novatian Bishop, of the same faith with himself, he ac-
 “ quainted him with the Emperor’s design. He, (Agelius,)
 “ though otherwise a very worthy man, yet having no
 “ talent for disputation, recommended Sisinnius, his Lec-
 “ tor, to engage in a conference. Sisinnius was a man of
 “ great wisdom and experience, well versed in Scripture,
 “ and also in philosophy : but being very sensible that
 “ disputations generally are so far from healing differ-
 “ ences, that they rather foment and inflame them ; he
 “ suggested to Nectarius this method. He very well
 “ knew that the *ancients* had ever avoided the ascribing
 “ any *beginning* of existence to the Son of God, believing
 “ him to be *coeternal* with the Father : he advises there-
 “ fore to set aside all logical wranglings, and to produce
 “ the testimonies of the *ancients* ; leaving it to the Em-
 “ peror to put the question to the heads of the several
 “ sects, whether they would make any account of the
 “ Doctors of the Church who lived before the difference
 “ began ; or whether they would reject them also, as
 “ strangers to the faith of Christ. For if they should re-
 “ ject them, let them also pronounce an *anathema* upon
 “ them : which if they should dare to do, they will be
 “ immediately detested by the generality, and truth will
 “ thus be manifestly victorious. But if they reject not
 “ the ancient Doctors, then will it be our business to pro-
 “ duce the writings of the *ancients*, by which the truth of
 “ our doctrine shall be attested.”

Thus far Socrates : who farther relates that Nectarius
 and the Emperor well approved of the design, and im-
 mediately put it in execution. Whereupon the heads of
 the several sects were at first much confounded, and di-

vided among themselves ; some commending what the Emperor had proposed, and others not : but in conclusion, they all chose rather to rest the cause solely on logical *disputation*, than upon the testimonies of the *ancients*. Thus the design came to nothing. This we may learn from it, that at that time of day, when many primitive writings, since lost, were extant, the Athanasians were very willing and desirous to have their cause tried by the verdict of the *ancient* writers ; being confident of victory in that method : and that the Arians, as being sufficiently sensible of the same thing, prudently declined it.

Mr. Whiston did not care to give more than short, general hints of this famous challenge, and the issue of it : but he endeavours to wind and turn himself every way to evade its force^c. He pretends, first, that the question between the Athanasians and their adversaries was not whether the *ancients* admitted the *coeternity* of the Son, but whether they admitted his existence to have been *without any limitation of time* : as if the Athanasians intended no more than that the *ancients* never assigned any *particular point* of time for the Son's beginning. But not to mention how silly such a challenge had been, and how unserviceable such a discussion to the Athanasian cause, which required a great deal more than that comes to ; I say, not to mention this, Socrates' and Sozomen's account of that affair sufficiently obviate every such weak surmises or insinuation. Both say, that Sisinnius well knew that the *ancients* never durst ascribe any *beginning* at all to the Son : and why ? because they thought or believed him to be *coeternal* with the Father^d. The question then was not, whether the *ancients* had assigned any particular time of the Son's beginning to exist : but whether they

^c Whiston's Reply to Lord Nottingham, Append. p. 63.

^d Εἰ ἐπιστάμενοι ὡς οἱ παλαιοὶ ἀρχὴν ὑπέδειξαν τῷ υἱῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ δοῦναι ἀπίσταν κατελήφισαν γὰρ αὐτὸν συναΐδιον τῷ πατρὶ. *Socrat.* lib. v. c. 10. p. 273.

Εἰ γὰρ ᾔδει, ὡς οἱ παλαιοὶ συναΐδιον τῷ πατρὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἐδέξαντο, οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν εἰπεῖν ἢ τινας ἀρχῆς τὸν γίνεσθαι αὐτὸν ἔχου. *Sozom.* lib. vii. c. 12. p. 292.

ascribed *any beginning* at all to him. And Sisinnius was ready to maintain that they ascribed *no beginning* to him, but believed him to be *coeternal*.

Mr. Whiston has another very extraordinary evasion, that the *ancient Doctors* appealed to were not those of the *three first centuries*, but only such as Father Eustathius, Father Marcellus, Father Alexander, &c. about or a little before the Council of Nice. A very likely matter indeed, that the Emperor should ask the Arians whether they would be tried by the verdict of those who had before condemned the Arians by name; or that the Arians should be at all afraid of pronouncing an *anathema* upon such as Father Eustathius or Father Marcellus, who had been deposed and condemned by the Eusebians or Arians before; one in a synod at Antioch, A. D. 329. the other in a synod at Constantinople, A. D. 335. Socrates observes, that the *heads* of those parties durst not anathematize those *ancient Doctors*, lest the people should abhor them for so doing; or as Sozomen expresses it, lest their *own party* should take offence, and desert them^e: is it at all likely that their *own party* should take such offence in this case, or should pay any great respect and deference to the memory of Eustathius, Marcellus, &c.? Besides this, those *ancient Doctors* are styled *οι παλαιοι*, a word not very proper for such as lived but about fifty or sixty years before; and some of them alive within twenty, nay within ten years of the time; as is particularly true of Marcellus, who died A. D. 374. Add to this, that Socrates and Sozomen are express that the *ancient Doctors* appealed to were those that *lived before the rise of the differences*^f, (as common sense also must tell us they ought to be:) and who could those be but the Ante-Nicene Fathers?

Come we now down to the next century, beginning

^e 'Τὰ τοῦ τῶν οἰκτιρῶν ἐξιλαθῆσονται. Sozom. p. 292.

^f Τῶν πρὸ τῆς διαιρέσεως, ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ προσεαρμοσάντων διδασκάλων. Socrat. p. 273.

Πρὸ τῆς διαιρέσεως τῆς ἐκκλησίας, καθηγητὰς καὶ διδασκάλους τῶν ἱερῶν λόγων γινόμενους. Sozom. p. 292.

with 400, where we find Ruffinus a strenuous advocate for the faith of the Ante-Nicene Church as conformable to his own. The pretended *Confessions*, which are partially represented from him, amount to little more than this, that Origen's and the two Clemens's works were originally *orthodox*, but had been afterwards *corrupted*, and *interpolated* by heretics in some parts of them. This shows what Ruffinus really thought of the orthodoxy of the Ante-Nicene writers themselves, that they were of the same faith with the Athanasians. And though Jerome endeavours to expose Ruffinus's account with all the keenness and satire of an adversary; yet he himself was forced to allow it in the main, and almost to say the same thing. "It may be," says he, "that they erred in their simplicity, or wrote with a different meaning, or that their writings have been corrupted by little and little, by unskilful transcribers; or however, that before the rise of the meridian demon, Arius, they might speak some things innocently and incautiously."

The pretended *Confessions* out of Jerome relate chiefly to Origen, whose case will be considered at large in the following sheets: and so I need not here say more of it. The like may be said of Theophilus.

We may now come down to St. Austin, who delivers his mind in the words here following, in his Treatise of the Trinity, finished in the year 416.

"All the Catholic interpreters of the Old or New Testament, that I could read, who have wrote before me on the Trinity which is God, intended to teach, in conformity to Scripture, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost do, by the inseparable equality of one and the same substance, make up the Unity divine." Surely St. Austin must have reckoned the Ante-Nicene Doctors among his Catholic interpreters, of whom he gives this full and plain testimony. What he has said of Origen will be considered in another place.

‡ Augustin. de Trin. lib. i. cap. 3. p. 753.

I pass over Anastasius, and Justinian's pretended Confessions, as respecting none but Origen.

Photius is an author of the *ninth* century; who is known to have been often too severe in his remarks upon the Ante-Nicene writers: not considering the difference of times, or how unreasonable it is to expect that those who lived before the rise and condemnation of heresies, should come up to every accurate form of expression, which long experience afterwards found necessary, to guard the faith against the subtle practices or provoking insults of its adversaries. Bishop Bull has abundantly shown, how easy it is to vindicate the Ante-Nicene Fathers against every thing that can be objected out of Photius.

Leaving the *ancients*, we may now descend to *moderns*, to see what judgment they have made in the present question.

Cardinal Perron, no longer ago than the reign of King James I. (A. D. 1620.) began the pretence, that the Arians themselves would readily submit to be tried by the doctrine of the Ante-Nicene writers. The occasion of it was this: the Protestants having well studied the Fathers, were now willing to rest their cause, not upon Scripture only, but Fathers too; so far at least as the *three* first centuries. And they thought that a much greater deference was due to the judgment of those early ages of the Church, than to that of the ages succeeding: while the Romanists were used to value the latter equally with the former, or even to give them the preference. The Cardinal, being pressed in dispute on this head, could think of no better an answer than that before mentioned. What Mr. Whiston calls his *confession* is, in truth, nothing else but a poor pretence, or subterfuge, made use of in a case of extremity, only to serve the interests of the corrupt Church of Rome.

Fisher, the Jesuit, in the year 1626 seconded the Cardinal in the same plea and upon the same views: but still little notice was taken of it, till a greater than both, the Jesuit Petavius, (who in the year 1622 had intimated

something of it, in his notes upon Epiphanius,) did by his learned writings on the Trinity, (A. D. 1644,) give new countenance and credit to it. And if we consider well the *time* when Petavius first began to talk in that manner, (a very little after Cardinal Perron had opened the way to it,) or the use that was to be made of it in regard to the interests of the Romish cause; he may be suspected, by Protestants, to have had some *bias* in this matter, without any breach of charity^h. Some learned Romanists, such as Huetius and Valesius, scrupled not to join in some measure (after so great an authority) in the like charge against the Ante-Nicene writers; referring to Petavius for proof of it. This passed for a while, till the Unitarians began to take advantage of it, and to triumph upon it. In the years 1658 and 1662, Daniel Zwicker made his boasts of the Ante-Nicene Fathers as favouring *Arianism*: and though Comenius and Hoornbeckius entered the lists against him, they were hardly thought a sufficient match for him. In the year 1676, Sandius seconded Zwicker in the Arian cause: in the year 1678, our countryman Dr. Gardiner professedly undertook to clear and defend the orthodoxy of the Ante-Nicene writers: and several controversial letters passed between him and Sandius. The next that engaged in the same cause was the learned Le Moyne, in the year 1684. Soon after, in the year 1685, followed Bishop Bull, then a private clergyman; who so learnedly and so effectually defended the Ante-Nicene faith, that the Arian cause has been sinking under the weight of his elaborate pieces ever since.

When Bishop Bull's books came to be known abroad, they met with the universal esteem of the learned in Europe, as well Papists as Protestants; who from that time at least have appeared generally well satisfied in the faith of the Ante-Nicene writers, and have stood up in defence

^h See Bull. Procem. sect. 8. p. 6. Nelson's Life of Bull, p. 287. Grab. Præfat. ad Bulli Opera.

of it. As to Protestants, I might mention our own countrymen, Bishop Stillingfleet, Dr. Cave, and many others, to whom I take leave to add the very pious and learned Dr. Grabe, who long resided among us. As to the foreign Reformed, Fabricius and M. Bayle, two very learned men, have declared themselves in favour of the same sentiments: as also have several other learned Protestants abroad, whose names and treatises are recited by Fabriciusⁱ; as to Romanists, I might mention M. Bossuet, late Bishop of Meaux, with the Clergy of France[†], and even the best learned men amongst them. Du Pin is one who has taken all occasions of answering the objections made to the Ante-Nicene writers in the article of the Trinity: Noel Alexander and Lewis Thomassin have done the same. So also has M. Massuet as far as concerned Irenæus; whereof he is editor. Montfaucon has done the like, so far as properly came in his way; though he gives up Eusebius, who is not in strictness to be reckoned with the Ante-Nicenes. But the learned Le Nourry has exceeded them all, in his Apparatus ad Bibliothecam maximam; where he is so zealous in defending the Ante-Nicene writers in general, that he will scarce allow Bishop Bull to have done justice to some of them; particularly to Tertullian and Lactantius, whom therefore he undertakes to vindicate even beyond what the Bishop had pretended. Thus stands the matter of fact among the learned *moderns*; to whom I might add several now living amongst us, whose names I am willing to spare. What then can be meant by the strange report made of the Athanasians, from the days of their *founder*? a report without truth; and I had almost said, without any sobriety or modesty. Enough hath been said to take off the pretended *singularity* of our appeal to the Ante-Nicene writers in this controversy. It remains only to throw in

ⁱ Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. vol. viii. p. 312, &c.

[†] Nelson's Life of Bull, p. 344, 385.

a word or two, in answer to another objection of a very different kind.

II. There was a pamphlet published the last year, entitled, *Two Letters, &c.* one to the Earl of Nottingham, the other to Mr. Whiston. The author writes on the *orthodox* side, and has said many excellent things, which deserve commendation. But as he has took the freedom to pass his censure upon others, he will give me leave, I doubt not, to use the like freedom with him. What I most find fault with is his narrowing too much his own bottom, and his unwary sapping the foundation on which he stands. To avoid *perplexities* and *uncertainties*, (as he is pleased to call them,) he is for waving all searches into *antiquity*, and is for confining the debate to *Scripture* alone: and because many *texts* made use of in this controversy have not been perfectly settled to the satisfaction of both parties, as to *readings, translations, or interpretations*, and it requires some *learning* and *critical skill* to fix and ascertain them; these *texts* therefore are to be laid aside also, and the merits of the cause left to be tried by those only that remain; “such as have never yet been disputed by the *adversaries*, or against which they have nothing to say.” Pref. p. 8. He does not consider,

1. The difficulty of finding out any texts, of *real weight* in this controversy, which have not been *controverted*, either as to their *reading, or translation, or interpretation.*

2. That the *strongest* and most *important* texts are those which have been *controverted*; and for that very reason, because they are the *strongest, &c.* For it was worth the while for the *adversary* to rack invention, and to call in all the succours of *learning* and *critical skill* to assail them, if possible, and to wrest them out of our hands. Thus the first chapter of St. John has had more pains and art spent upon it, by our *adversaries*, than any other part of *Scripture.*

3. That if once the issue of the cause be put upon other

texts which have been more neglected, it will be as easy, nay much easier, to invent some pretence or other against the *reading, version, or construction*, to defeat every argument built upon them.

4. That therefore the method which this author proposes is in reality (without intending it) laying the weight of the dispute upon what least deserves it, and can least of all bear it. It is deserting our *strong holds*, and engaging the adversary upon *unequal ground*, and at the greatest disadvantage: in a word, it is to expose and betray the cause which we are endeavouring to support.

What I have here observed in relation to our use of *Scripture texts* is in some measure applicable to the *testimony* of the *ancients*. The reason why this also has been so warmly and resolutely contested with us, is because it is of *real weight*, and of very *considerable moment* for determining the main question. It would be a very weak thing to give up so momentous a point as that is, only because it has been *contested*; that is, because it is *worth the contending* for. If the illiterate vulgar be not competent judges of this branch of the dispute, (as indeed they scarce are of any dispute through its whole compass, though confined to *Scripture* alone,) yet there are others, whom the vulgar will take for their *guides* in this matter, (and they ought to do so,) who can understand and judge of it.

The Author had but little reason to be concerned at Mr. Whiston's followers boasting of his performance as a *victory*, in regard to the *ancients*: it was natural for them so to do, either through *ignorance* or through *prejudice*, where they had no manner of reason. Knowing and impartial judges will easily see the difference between obtaining a *victory* and giving the *last word*. I must do my Lord Nottingham the justice to say, that he effectually performed his part, with great integrity, learning, and acuteness; with the exactness of a *scholar*, and the judgment of a complete *Divine*. Had Mr. Whiston, in his Reply, confined himself (as he ought to have done, and

as my Lord very justly had required of him) to those points and those citations only which were before in debate, instead of pouring in new impertinencies, and many foreign matters, to conceal and cover his defeat; the very meanest reader must have seen plainly on which side the advantage lies. But to return.

The low notion which this *gentleman* every where, through both his Letters, appears to have conceived of the *primitive saints*, may, I hope, be corrected by his more careful perusing them, when disposed to it. His chief argument against them (*viz.* that the adversaries have been able to raise *cavils* and to *perplex* their meaning) will carry him farther than he is well aware; even to the laying aside, not some texts only, and those of the greatest weight, as it hath already done; but those *very texts* on which he would at length have the whole stress of the controversy laid. If this *gentleman* be of opinion, as he declares in his preface, that the *gates of hell* should never prevail over that *foundation*, over the *doctrine of Christ's Divinity*; and if he thinks it of such moment that *later ages* have universally adhered to it, (a point which would be disputed with him as well as the other, were it of half the moment or concern as the other,) certainly he must think it of some importance to clear and vindicate the faith of the most pure and primitive churches in this article; lest otherwise what he calls the *foundation* (if it cannot be proved to have been constantly upheld) appear at length not to be the *foundation*, but rather so much *wood, hay, or stubble* built upon it. To conclude, as I would not detract from the merit of whatever this worthy gentleman has well urged in proof of our Lord's *Divinity*; so neither were it adviseable in him to detract from those who, in defence of the same cause, and to very excellent purpose, have laboured in searching both *Scripture* and *antiquity*.

To the *law* and to the *testimony* let the appeal be in the first place; and next to the united suffrage of the *primitive churches*, as the best and safest comment upon the

other. On these two pillars will our faith for ever stand, firm and unmoveable, against all attempts; whether of *vain philosophy*, to batter the *doctrine*, or of vainer *criticisms* to corrupt or stifle the *evidence*: and “the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.”

I should here advertise the reader, that in the following papers I have endeavoured always to express myself fully and particularly in the most material points: but as to incidental matters of slighter moment, I have sometimes, purely for the sake of brevity, passed them off in general hints only; such as will not be perfectly understood without looking into the Reply which I am answering, or sometimes into my former Defence.

I suppose the inquisitive, and such as have leisure, will not think it much trouble to compare all the *three* together as they read; especially where any thing occurs which may appear obscure by reason of its brevity. As to others, they will be content with a more confuse and general perception of such parts as are of least concernment, and require a little more pains and care in the examining than they have leisure or inclination to spend upon them.

THE ANSWER

TO

THE PREFACE.

YOU begin with big words: you have, you say, “clearly shown, that Dr. W’s notion is entirely contrary to reason, Scripture, and all primitive antiquity.” Your design, no doubt, is to magnify your work, and to help it forwards in the opinion of the reader. But wise men will not expect much from a performance that needs a proclamation in the entrance: had your arguments been just, and your proofs clear, a reader might have been trusted to find them out.

You proceed to complain of my “manner of writing,” as being “greatly fitted to deceive.” You apprehend, it seems, that it may still have some influence, notwithstanding that you have so *clearly* and so *entirely* confuted it: which, if it does not betray a great degree of mistrust, is a very ill compliment to the understanding of your readers.

After this general charge, you go on to particular complaints, drawn up in form.

The first is, my *entitling* my book “A Vindication of Christ’s Divinity:” being so rude as to insinuate, that the men I have to deal with, are *impugners* of Christ’s *divinity*. I confess the charge; and am so far from thinking it a fault, that I have a second time very deliberately done the same thing in this very treatise. Till you give us a better account of our Lord’s *divinity* than you have hitherto

done, I must persist in it: because it is very proper that the world be made justly sensible of your prevarication, and indeed shameful banter, in a momentous article of the Christian faith. I use the word *divinity* in the plain and usual sense of it, as the Christian Church hath long done. I know of no *divinity*, but such as I have here defended. The other, falsely so called, is really none. While you maintain the principles you do, I must look upon you as *impugners* of Christ's *divinity*; well knowing, that the Christian Church in all ages would have thought the same of you, and that your doctrine was condemned as *blasphemy* long before Arius appeared; and that, upon his first appearance, he and his adherents were charged, as you now are, and very justly, with *denying* the *divinity* of their God and Saviour^a.

You have invented a very soft name for it: it is not *denying* the *divinity* of Christ; but it is differing about the "particular manner of explication of that doctrine," p. 4. Which pretence, like many others, has a great deal more of *art* than of *solidity* in it. Explaining a doctrine is one thing, explaining it *away* is quite another. There is some difference, for instance, between explaining the *doctrine* of the *resurrection* of the *body*, and explaining the *texts* relating to it in such a manner, as to make void the very doctrine itself. When Basilides, Valentinus, Cerdo, and Marcion, so interpreted Scripture, as wholly to destroy the supreme divinity of the *Creator*, or *God* of *Israel*; was this, think you, no more than differing concerning the "particular manner of explication of his divinity?" They acknowledged, indeed, his *divinity* still; that is, in words, and in Scripture words too; but in a sense peculiar to themselves. The plain truth is, you and we differ about the *sense of Scripture*, in the question of Christ's *divinity*. We find Christ's *divinity* in our Bibles: you find not the

^a Τὴν Διότητα τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν ἀρνούμενοι. *Alexand. Epist. apud Theod. E. H. lib. i. cap. 4. p. 10.*

^b Ἀρνούμενοι ἐπὶ Διότητα τοῦ μονογενοῦς υἱοῦ—παραχίθιν ἄδεις γενέσθαι, ἕστε μάλιστα Διὸς κἀντὸ ἐπιγνωσκειν, μήδ', &c. *Athan. ad Adelpk. p. 912.*

doctrine there. Accordingly, we assert Christ's *divinity*, and you deny it; that is, you deny the *thing*, and retain nothing but the *name*. The difference then is, not concerning the manner of explaining our *doctrine*, (which with you is *no doctrine*,) but concerning the manner of explaining the *texts* which relate to it. You speak of Christ's *divinity* however; you have some awe and reverence for the *language* of the Church, though you have left her *faith*. Some concern you have also for your own characters, and for the interest of the cause you are engaged in; which can never prevail, no not with the populace, but under the benefit of a mask. If it be asked why we have no such doctrine as that of the *divinity* of *angels* and of *magistrates*, (called *Gods* in Scripture,) or why the *divinity* of Christ should be asserted, while the other is absolutely denied, I am persuaded you will be much at a loss for any satisfactory answer, upon your principles. It will be a vain thing for you to plead, that you assert as much of Christ's *divinity* as Scripture hath asserted. For, were the fact really so, (as it certainly is not,) then indeed Scripture might justify you in your *denial* of Christ's *divinity*; but it can never justify you in calling that *divinity* which, according to the language of the Church, and just propriety of speech, you yourselves, as well as we, know to be none.

You tell me, that the "whole and only design of the "authors I oppose, has been, soberly, and in the fear of "God, to collect and consider what it is that our Saviour "himself and his Apostles have in Scripture taught us, "concerning that doctrine, separate from the *metaphysical* "hypotheses of *fallible* and *contentious* men." Now, to pass by the extraordinary *civility* of these reflections upon others, and the *modesty* of assuming so much to yourselves; as if you had no *hypotheses*, no *metaphysical* fancies, were never *contentious*, scarce *fallible*, like other men: waving this, yet give me leave to say, that be your designs ever so *good*, your intentions ever so *sober*, and your searches directed in the *fear of God*; if the result of all be,

that you cannot find Christ's *divinity* (properly so called) in Scripture, you ought not to pretend, either that you are advocates for Christ's *divinity*, or that any man is to blame for charging you as *impugners* of it.

You say farther, that by the *divinity* of Christ, I mean my own particular *metaphysical* explication of it. A suggestion as false as it is mean. For neither is my sense any *particular sense*, but the *common sense* of all men, learned or unlearned, that know the difference between *God* and *creature*: neither is there any thing of *metaphysics* in it, more than there is in the declaration of the *God of Israel*, as often as he proclaimed himself to be *God*, (in opposition to such as were *no Gods*,) on the score of his *almighty power, wisdom, greatness*, and other *divine* perfections. However, supposing my account of the Son's *divinity* to be *metaphysical*, is not your account of the Father's *divinity* as *metaphysical* as the other? And if you, through your *false* metaphysics, exclude the Son from the *one Godhead*, I shall not be ashamed of making use of *true* metaphysics to correct your errors, and to establish the Son's *divinity*, upon the same foot whereon Scripture has fixed it. You might be ashamed to mention *metaphysics*, when every body knows that you have little else to rely upon, for the support of your novel doctrine^b. Who sees not what a stress has been laid upon a false notion of the *self-existence* of the Father, to degrade and separate his beloved Son from the one true Godhead? What batteries have you not raised against a proper *sonship*, from *metaphysical* reasonings, should I say, or reveries? That generation implies *division*, and necessary generation outward *coaction*; that generation must be an *act*, and every *act* must mean *choice*; that necessary agents are *no agents*, and necessary causes *no causes*; that nothing *individual* can be communicated; that three persons must be *three intelligent agents*, and three intelligent agents, reciprocally, three persons; that three agents cannot be

^b See my *Defence*, vol. i. p. 212, 213, 228.

one being, one substance, one Lord, or one God; that there can be no *medium* between *being* and *not being*; that inseparable union, without *identical life*, will not suffice to make two Persons *one God*; and that if there be *identical* life, then they are no longer *two Persons*; nor can there be any *equality* or *subordination*; that the same living God necessarily signifies the *same individual intelligent agent*, or Person; that God the Son must be either the same *identical whole substance*, or an *homogeneous undivided part* of the infinite substance, upon my principles; and that he can be *neither*; and therefore not one and the *same God* with the Father. Here are *metaphysics* in great plenty, sufficient, one may think, to furnish out an ordinary *schoolman*. Nevertheless, we should not, on this account, be so unreasonable, as to censure either Dr. Clarke or his friends, for procuring all the *real* assistance they can from *metaphysics*; true metaphysics being nothing else but true divinity: let but your reasonings be clear, solid, and pertinent, and we shall never find fault with them for being *metaphysical*. The truth is, you have pretended to *metaphysics*; but have betrayed very great mistakes in that part, as you have also done in your other pretences, relating to *Scripture* and *antiquity*. To return to the business of the title.

You observe, very shrewdly, that you could with "much greater justice" (and yet you did not think it reasonable so to do) "have entitled your Reply, A Vindication of the Divinity of God the Father Almighty." Truly, if you had done it, you would not have found me complaining of the *injustice* of it: for, what hurt could you have done to me or my cause, by making yourself ridiculous? I hope, therefore, you do not expect any thanks from me upon this head. You go on, however, seriously to show, how you could have defended so conceited a title. You could have pleaded, that the "denying the Father to be *alone* supreme in authority and "dominion over all," (in which consists the true notion of *his divinity*,) "is denying his divinity." That is to say,

you could have begged the main question, and have thereupon founded a charge against me, with the same, nay, *greater justice*, than I charge you with a plain matter of fact, no part of the main question between us. The question is, Whether the *one true Godhead* be *common* to Father and Son, or *proper* to the Father only? You have determined for the latter; therefore you have struck the Son out of the *one true Godhead*, previously to our dispute; therefore you have denied his proper *divinity*: and the question now is, not whether you have denied it, (which is out of question,) but, whether you have *justly* denied it? If you see no difference between the two cases, I can only pity your confusion. Whether *divinity*, strictly so called, can be *common* to more Persons than one, remains to be considered. In the mean while, it is evident that you, by making it *proper* to the Father only, have denied the *divinity* of all besides.

2. A second complaint is of a *motto* in my title page: "I am Jesus whom thou persecutest: it is hard for thee to kick against the pricks." Now, I thought a writer might be at liberty to follow his judgment or fancy in such a trifle as a *motto*, without being so solemnly called to account for it. But, it seems, this must be now brought to the bar, and deliberately scanned. "As if," say you, "the not receiving Dr. W's notions in metaphysics was persecuting Christ." As if, say I, the abusing of *metaphysics*, to the destruction of a *plain* Scripture doctrine, and the undermining the *Christian faith*, were not, by a very easy figure, justly called the "persecuting of Christ," "crucifying the Son of God afresh," and "putting him to an open shame."

Since I am called upon in this case, I will tell you, so far as I remember, what I principally intended by the *motto*.

1. One thing was, to intimate the great awe and dread which every man ought to have upon his mind, when he takes pen in hand to write in opposition to his Saviour's *Godhead*, and with a formed design to deprive him of that

worship, and those *divine* honours, which have been constantly paid him by innumerable martyrs and confessors, by the whole Church of Christ for fourteen centuries at least, I doubt not to say seventeen. Whatever may be pleaded for disputing points of an inferior nature, and less set by; this particularly is a cause not to be entered into without "fear and trembling," by any pious man; lest haply he be found to "fight against God." You may think, perhaps, you have no need of such caution: but for that very reason, I should be apt to conclude you have.

2. Another thing intended by the *motto* was, to insinuate, how impracticable and vain (in all probability) any attempt must be to defeat the doctrine of our Lord's *divinity*; which has now stood the test for a long tract of centuries, though all imaginable endeavours and artifices have been from the beginning employed to overthrow it. A late writer^c very well observes, that "this foundation has been so upheld, that where the first institution were, as it were, sunk out of memory, by the weight of impure mixtures, as in the Greek Church; and where every other article of faith had received wounds by the innovations of error, as in the Roman Church; yet all of them have adhered to and preserved this main and *fundamental* point to this day." The same is likewise true of all the Churches of the *Reformation*: and God has visibly blasted and defeated all attempts against the *eternal Godhead* of our blessed Saviour. "It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks." So said a pious Father of the Church, applying it to this very case^d, (one would think with a prophetic spirit,) thirteen hundred years ago. Such were then the sentiments of the wisest and best men of those times. They were *fallible*, they were *men*: but

^c Two Letters to the Earl of Nottingham and Mr. Whiston. Pref. p. 19.

^d Τι γὰρ κινῶθετε, πολέμῳ τὸν ἀνατασσεύμενον; τί μάχη σὺ ἀνασταμαχίῃσιν; ἐκλήρῳ σοι πρὸς κίνητρα λακτίζων εἰμυτὸν σκαυδαλίζεις, καὶ οὐ τὸν λόγον σουτὸν ἠλίσκεαι, καὶ ἔ τὸ πνεῦμα. σουτὸν ἀπαλλοτριῶς ἀπὸ τῆς τῷ Θεῷ χάριτος, καὶ ἔ τὸν υἱὸν ἀπὸ πατρὸς, οὐδὲ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἀπὸ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ. Eriphan. Ancor. cap. xiv. p. 20.

if posterity, *fallible* as they, grow bold and daring, where the other would have trembled, let them look to it. They had the same Scriptures we have, and better helps for the understanding them: they had their faculties of discerning no less than we; and they spared no pains, or care, in their searches. This is a consideration of some moment, especially in a *fundamental* article. We should not, at least, go *rashly* into contrary sentiments, nor without *plain* Scripture to warrant it. We may be apt to flatter ourselves too much, and think we see farther than those before us; when in reality, perhaps, it is not that we have more *sense* than they, but that we want their *piety*.

You tell me how *carefully* the men of your way have "studied the Scripture," and how *sincerely* they have "made use of all the helps God has given them, to understand it rightly." Be it so: and I do not know any one that can lay it to the charge of St. Paul, that he had not, in such a sense, *sincerely* studied the Scripture, or had not *sincerely* made use of the helps God had given him, though still a *persecutor* of *Christ*. However *sincere* you may have been, yet believe also that others, as *sincere* as you, have carefully studied the same Scriptures; and that the most eminent lights of the Christian Church in all ages, have as *sincerely* thought it their indispensable duty to pronounce an *anathema* upon the doctrine you give us, as you do that you ought to receive and follow it. We have nothing to do to inquire after your *sincerity*, of which *God* is judge. Neither civil judicatures, nor ecclesiastical courts, ever proceed upon that bottom. Our business is not to consider the *sincerity* of the men, but the nature, quality, and tendency of the doctrine. There have been sincere Photinians, sincere Samosatensians, sincere Sabellians, sincere Papists, sincere Jews and Mahometans. And indeed, what sects are there that have not *sincere* men amongst them? The more *sincere* you are, the better it will fare with you at the great day of account. In the mean while, give us leave to be *sincere* too, in condemning heartily what we heartily disapprove. And let the *sin-*

cerity of each be tried by the nature and quality of the cause you and we are engaged in, and by the strength of the evidence on either side; on which, as I conceive, chiefly hangs the proof of our *sincerity*. You proceed to invective. "It concerns those who thus affect to sit in the seat of God, and to equal their own disputable notions with the express word of God, to consider a little more seriously what spirit they are of." But, laying aside childish wrath, let us argue this matter coolly and sedately with you. Is it "affecting to sit in the seat of God," that we are doing our bounden duty in condemning *false* doctrine, or what we take to be such; and in "contending earnestly for the faith which was once delivered to the saints?" And how is it "equalling our own disputable notions with the express word of God," when we stand up for the "express word of God," against those who appear to us to contradict and pervert it, in favour of their *metaphysical* conceits and ill-grounded *hypotheses*? What right have a few private men to claim *express Scripture*, and to equal their own disputable notions with the "express word of God," in opposition to the *Christian world*, as capable of judging what *Scripture* is, as they that so vainly boast of it? Charge us no more, so fondly, with "affecting to sit in the seat of God," lest it be told you, in return, that there appears to be infinitely more pride, vanity, and arrogance, in a few *private men* sitting in judgment upon whole Churches, and throwing their *hasty*, ill-grounded censures upon *Fathers*, and *Councils*, and all the greatest and wisest men that have lived in past centuries, than any can be imagined in those whom you so injuriously reflect on; for no cause, but for honestly declaring their abhorrence of your *novel* and *dangerous* opinions. Surely we may presume, without "affecting to sit in the seat of God," to think some very *fallible* men liable to *errors*: and when in fact it appears that they are so, we may presume, according to our bounden duty, to take all proper care to prevent such errors spreading. But enough has been said in vindication of a *motto*.

3. A third complaint is of my *unrighteous* use of the term *Arians*, and *Arianism*. But that this censure of yours is very *unrighteous* may appear sufficiently from what I have elsewhere demonstrated^e, and may again, as occasion offers. In truth, it is complimenting you; to call you Arians; for you really come short of the old Arians, in more points than one, (as I shall observe hereafter,) and have not so *honourable* thoughts of God the Son, as the generality of the *ancient* Arians had. As to what you pretend about the “particular tenets of Arius,” I showed you long ago^f, that yours differ not in any thing material from them. You are pleased to say, that by my “way of consequential deductions the Fathers of the Council of Nice, and all their Catholic predecessors, may with equal justice be charged with *Arianism*.” You mean, I suppose, provided in drawing *consequences*, no regard be had to what is *plain* or *obscure*, *right* or *wrong*, *true* or *false*. Such a *consequential way*^g as this, never was *my way*; and, I hope, never will be: whether it be *yours*, we shall see. You are to prove, that the Council of Nice is chargeable with *Arianism*, upon my principles. I perceive, you are sanguine enough to undertake it; we are now to examine how you perform.

I must abridge your long tedious train of argument, to bring the parts nearer together, and to save myself the trouble of transcribing. But I will take care that your argument shall not lose a tittle of its force or strength; having indeed none to spare.

“The Council of Nice, by asserting that the Son was not (ποίησις ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων) *made* or *formed out of nothing*, but (γεννησις ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς) *generated from the substance of the Father*—confessedly, did not mean either, that the Son was (which is the first of Dr. W’s

• Supplement to the Case of Arian Subscription, vol. ii.

^f Defence, vol. i. p. 154.

^g See my Supplement, vol. ii. where I justify my charging our adversaries with *consequences*, and also intimate in what cases such a conduct is allowable or otherwise.

“two senses of the term *individual*) the *same identical*
 “*whole substance* with the Father—or (which is the Doc-
 “tor’s other sense of the term *individual*) that he was a
 “*homogeneous undivided part* of that infinite and insepara-
 “ble substance which is the Father’s—But their mean-
 “ing evidently was, that as one fire is lighted from an-
 “other without any *division, abscission, diminution, &c.* so
 “the Son was generated from the Father without any
 “*division, abscission, &c.* of the Father’s *substance*, or of
 “his *alone supreme authority and dominion over all*. And
 “this notion of theirs, because it supposes the Son to be
 “—not the *substance of the Father*, but *from the sub-*
 “*stance of the Father*: and because it supposes the gene-
 “ration of the Son to be an *act* of the Father—and be-
 “cause it reserves inviolably to the Father, his *αὐθεντία*,
 “his *alone supreme authority and dominion over all*, which
 “makes him to be in the absolute sense, *the one God*:
 “therefore, I say, this notion Dr. W. is pleased to rank,
 “among other things, under the head of *Arianism*.”

This is the *consequential* thing, which you have been pleased to bring forth. The sum is thus: If Dr. W. supposes the Son to be a *part* of the Father’s substance, (which he does not,) and if the Nicene Council denies the Father and Son to be one *undivided substance*, (which it doth not,) and if the Council supposes the eternal generation to be an *act*, in the sense of *free choice*, (which is a *false* supposition,) and if the Council supposes the Father *alone* to have supreme dominion over all, (which is another *false* supposition,) if these several false and groundless suppositions be evidently true; then Dr. W. by charging some persons with *Arianism*, who deserve it, has *consequentially* charged others also, who have not deserved it. That I may be certain of doing you justice, as to this marvellous thread of reasoning, I will come to particulars.

In the first place, where do you find me saying that the Son is either the “same identical” (that is, same, same) “whole substance with the Father,” or an “undivided part of that substance which is the Father’s?” I

leave *whole* and *parts*^h to those gentlemen of strong *imagination*, who consider every thing in a *corporeal* way, under the notion of *extension*. All that I say is, that Father and Son are *one undivided substance*; which is also the sense of the Nicene Fathers. For,

2. Where do you find that the Nicene Council ever supposes the Father and Son not to be *one* and the *same undivided substance*? They say, *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*, *from the substance of the Father*: this is all you have to ground your cavil upon. But the Council supposes the Son to be both *from* the substance of the Father, and *of* the substance of the Father, and but *one substance* in both, because of the inseparable union and connection of both. The doctrine is plainly this, *God of God*, and both *one God*; *light of light*, and both *one light*; *substance of substance*, and both *one substance*ⁱ. This is the Catholic doctrine, which it is much easier to carp and cavil at, than to confute. I should take notice of your words, not *ποιηθεὶς ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, *not made or formed out of nothing*. Why do you here insert *ποιηθεὶς*, and pretend to give the sense of the Council in a way wherein they never expressed it? Is it not to insinuate, that the Council imagined the Son to be *made*, or *formed*, only *not out of nothing*? One may believe that this was in your head, by your silyly remarking, presently after, that Tertullian, Origen^k, and Lactantius affirmed the same thing of *angels* and *souls*, as the Nicene Fa-

^h Κυρίως Διὸς ὄσπερ οὐκ ἔστι μέρος, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἕλον, καὶ τὸ ἕλον ἐκ μερῶν ἔστι. καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ λόγος παραδίξασθαι τὸν ἐστὶ αἰῶσι Διὸν εἶναι ἐκ μερῶν, ὡς Ἰουλιανὸς ἐν δυνάμει ἔπειτὰ ἄλλα μίση. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 18.

ⁱ Quemadmodum lumen de lumine, et utrumque unum lumen, sic intelligatur sapientia de sapientia, et utrumque una sapientia: ergo et una essentia, quia hoc est ibi esse quod sapere—Pater et Filius simul una sapientia quia una essentia, et singillatim sapientia de sapientia, sicut essentia de essentia. *August. de Trin.* lib. vii. cap. 1, 2. p. 855.

Consilium de consilio, et voluntas de voluntate, sicut substantia de substantia, sapientia de sapientia. *Ibid.* lib. xv. cap. 20. p. 994.

See other examples of the same way of speaking, collected by Petavius de Trin. lib. vi. cap. 10. p. 351.

^k See Origen fully vindicated in this respect by Huetius Origenian. p. 30, 93.

thers did of the Son. Your report of every one of them is utterly *false*, (as shall be shown in a proper place;) but were it true, what is it to the Nicene Fathers, who were wiser men than to countenance any such detestable doctrine? What they meant by *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς*, is very plain from the Creed itself, and has been fully explained and vindicated¹ from misconstructions. The sum of what they intended was, that the Son was not *from nothing*, nor from any *extraneous* substance, but from the substance of the Father; as light streaming out from light, but without *division*, or *abscission*, or *diminution*; being eternally *in* the Father, as well as *from* him, and inseparably included with him. Indeed, the Arians invidiously charged them with making the Son *a part of the Father's substance*^m, as you also are pleased to charge me. Which is to me an argument that my notion is still the same with that of the Nicene Fathers, and yours not different from that of the Arians.

3. Where do you find that the Council ever supposes the generation of the Son to be an *act*, in your sense of *act*? The Council has not a word about *act*, that I know of: nor, if it had, would it be at all to your purpose. The question about *act* will depend upon another question,

¹ See my Defence, vol. i. p. 328, 329. Bull. D. F. p. 114. Athanas. p. 224, 295. Eusebius of Nicomedia may be an evidence of the meaning of *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*, (while he is endeavouring to expose it,) by what he uses as *parallel*, and what as *opposite* to it.

Parallel.	Opposite.
'Εξ αὐτοῦ, ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἄν μέρος αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἕξ ἀπρόβουλης τῆς οὐσίας.	Τῆς φύσεως τῆς ἀγινότητι μὴ μετέχων.
"Ἐχει τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς φύσεως.	"Ἐστὶν τῆ φύσει καὶ τῆ δυνάμει.
Φύσις ἐκ τῆς φύσεως.	Κτιστόν.
	"Τα' αὐτοῦ γεγονόσι.
	Βουλήματι γινόμενος.

Euseb. Nicomed. apud Theod. lib. i. cap. 6. p. 24.

Some of these expressions which Eusebius uses as *parallel*, are put *invidiously* and *injuriously*. But still, we may see what in the main was the Catholic sense of the phrase, through the *false* colours whereby he hoped to expose it.

^m See Arius's Letter. Apud Theod. E. H. lib. i. cap. 5. And Eusebius of Nicomedia. Theod. lib. i. cap. 6.

viz. Whether the Council intended an *eternal* or *temporal* generation? Upon either supposition, I can allow the generation to be an *act*; but not in your novel sense of *act*, in both cases. Suppose it *eternal*, then the generation was an *act*; but in the *ancient* sense of *act* and *necessary* agency: as the *sun* was supposed to *act* in generating *rays*; fountains to *act* in generating streams; the mind to *act* in generating thoughts; trees to *act* in generating branches; bodies to *act* in generating effluvia, vapours, or perfumes; the earth to *act* in generating fruits; and the like. No matter whether, in strictness, these kinds of generations should be called acts: they are such as the *ancients* called so; and when we are interpreting the *ancients*, we must attend to the *ancient* sense of words. Necessary *acts* were then called *acts*; and therefore no wonder if *eternal* generation was looked upon as an *eternal act*. But, suppose the Council intended only *temporal* generation, (as some have thought, and it seems not improbable,) then I readily allow it to be an *act*, even in your sense of *choice*; as much as was the Son's generation of the blessed Virgin. But then I insist upon it, that the Nicene Fathers maintained the Son's eternal and necessary existence, antecedent to the generation; which is a doctrine opposite to yours, as light to darkness.

4. In the last place, where do you find one word of the Father's *alone* supremacy of dominion in the Nicene decrees? This is purely a fiction of your own, without the least shadow of a reason for it. Do you find the Nicene Fathers telling you of a *sovereign* producing to himself a *subject*, or of a *lord* and master producing a *servant*? Is it *subject of sovereign*, *very subject of very sovereign*; instead of *God of God*, *very God of very God*? You will see that one is *of the other*, not that one is *above the other*. If the Father be there called *Almighty*, (*παντοκράτωρ*;) yet they understood the Son to be *Almighty of Almighty*, (*παντοκράτωρ ἐκ παντοκράτορος* ⁿ;) as well as *God of God*:

ⁿ Παντοκράτωρ ἐκ παντοκράτορος. πάντων γὰρ, ὃν ἔχει ὁ πατὴρ καὶ κρᾶτῆ, ἔχει καὶ κρᾶτῆ καὶ ὁ υἱός. *Athan. Expos. Fid.* p. 99.

all perfections common to both, only not *coordinately*; the Father having his perfections *from none*, the Son having the same perfections *from him*; *equal* in every thing, but still *deriving* that very *equality*. If this be the *αἰσθηρία* you speak of, the thing is *true*, but not *pertinent*; if you mean more, it may be *pertinent*, but it is not *true*; nor have you a syllable of proof for it, either in *Scripture* or *antiquity*.

We have now seen how well you have acquitted yourself in the *consequential* way, under this article; not quite so well, I think, as before in your charge upon me as *denying* the Father's *divinity*. I must do you the justice to say, that you can sometimes manage an argument to greater advantage: or if you could not, I should have made it my resolution not to exchange a word more with you. How you came to perform so much below yourself, here in your Preface, I know not; except it be, that your *passions* were more deeply engaged in this part, than in the rest. To proceed.

4. A fourth head of *complaint* is, that I have "talked about calling in question a fundamental article of religion." I have so; and, I pray, where is the offence of so doing? Your first reason against it lies in these words; "as if the first article of the Creed was not as fundamental as the second." But who are they that set the *first* and *second* articles at variance with each other, when for fourteen centuries, and more, they have agreed most amicably together? Do not be surprised, when I tell you, that you are the men that impugn the *first* article, by impugning the *second*. I have learned from the *first* article, that God is a *Father*: which, in the sense of the Christian Church, and according to the intention of the compilers of the Creeds °, supposes him to have a *Son* †; a coeternal,

° See my Sermons, p. 198. Bull. Judic. Eccl. p. 36, &c. Stillingfleet, Trin. cap. ix. p. 229.

† Πατέρα τὸν Θεὸν ὀνομάσαμεν, ἵνα ἅμα τῷ νοῦν πατέρα, νοήσωμεν καὶ τὸν υἱόν. υἱὸς γὰρ καὶ πατὴρὸς οὐδὲν ἐστὶ μεταξὺ τῶν ὄντων. Cyril. Hieros. p. 114. Bened.

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coequal, and coessential Son, of the *same nature* with him. And I readily submit the case to the pious and considerate reader to judge of, whether I, who, among the other perfections and glories of the Father, reckon this for one, that he has always had with him so great and so divine a Son⁹, equal to himself; or you, who, out of the abundance of your *metaphysics*, contrive to rob him of that superlative glory, show the greater zeal and concern for the honour of God the Father. The Pagans, I know, thought it very much for the honour of their *supreme God*, to have *other Gods* under him. This they looked upon as an article of grandeur, and the very top of magnificence^r. But *Christians* never talked at this rate: they thought it most for the honour of the supreme Father to have a *Son, equal* to him in *nature*, and *one God* with him. You go on to another exception: “As if an article’s being fundamental, was a reason why—even the most learned and able men should by no means be suffered to consider or inquire what this fundamental article is.” You have very little reason to use this kind of talk with me; because, when I first entered into conference with you, my whole design and desire was, to have the thing amicably debated betwixt us, and with *equal freedom* on both sides, in a *private* way, without troubling the *press*. And though the article I am defending be a *fundamental* one, yet it was never such to me, till I had well *examined*

Ecclesie fides solum verum Deum *Patrem* confessa, confitetur et *Christum*. *Hilar.* p. 1006. *Bened.*

Patrem cum audis, *Filii* intellige *Patrem*, qui filius supradictæ sit imago substantiæ. *Ruffin. Symb.* p. 540.

⁹ Δόξα υἱῷ ἐκ τιμῆς πατρὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ πάλιν υἱῷ δεξαζομένου, μεγάλως τιμᾶται ἰ τοῦ ποσοῦτε πατρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. *Cyrl. Hieros.* p. 87. *Bened.*

Ζήλομαι γὰρ τὸν πατέρα, θαυμάζοντες αὐτοῦ τὸν υἱόν, λόγον, καὶ σοφίαν, καὶ ἀλήθειαν, καὶ δικαιοσύνην, καὶ πάντα ἅσπερ εἶναι μιμηθῆκαμεν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, οὗτω δὲ καὶ τὸν γεννηθέντα ἀπὸ τοῦ τοιοῦτου πατρὸς. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 387.

Honor Filii dignitas sit Paterna; et gloriosus auctor sit, ex quo is, qui tali gloria sit dignus, extiterit. *Hilar.* p. 832.

^r Onatus apud Stob. *Eccl. Phys. cap. 3.* Plotinus *Enn. ii. lib. ix. cap. 9.* p. 207.

it: nor do I expect it should be such to you, without the like method. However, there is a great deal of difference between settling one's own *private* faith, and undertaking to *publish* and *propagate* the same among others. While a man pretends no farther than to judge *for himself*, he ought to rest unmolested, to enjoy the freedom of his own *private* sentiments, wherein others are not concerned. But when he endeavours to draw *disciples* after him, the case is altered; and it then becomes the *common* concern of all that have *truth* at heart, and more especially of those who are the appointed *guardians* of the Christian faith, to be upon the watch against seducers, and to interpose their reasonable offices to prevent the growth of any dangerous error. There must be some *public* restraints to hinder conceited men from venting *crudities*; as well as a just and due regard to the interests of *truth*, if any man, with *sobriety* and modesty, has any *new* thing to offer. Where to fix the true *medium* between *liberty* and *restraint* is not my business here to inquire: I think, our governors in Church and State have already fixed it, beyond all reasonable exception. But to return.

Let those *learned* and *able* men you speak of consider and examine, that they may find out the *truth*; and when they have done, *defend* it. But if the result of their inquiries is the embracing and propagating of *errors*; be they ever so *learned* or *able*, they must be rebuked and reproved for it. What if a learned *Jew* or a *deist*, after examining and considering, thinks it right and just to reject, and openly to vilify the *Christian revelation*? May he not therefore be told that his labours have been ill laid out, and that his *infidelity* is a very great, a very unpardonable crime? And if another, after inquiry, sets himself publicly to oppose any momentous article of the *Christian faith*; it is the duty and the business of those that know better, and of those that are in authority, to *stand up* for the true religion, and to use all proper means for its preservation. What would have become of the

Christian faith, if such *learned* and *able* men as Praxeas, Noëtus, Paul of Samosata, Photinus, Arius, Eunomius, Apollinarius, &c. had not been vigorously opposed, and expelled the Christian Church? *Errors* once entered have been sometimes kept in by the same methods, as *truth* hath been preserved; just as the *banks* intended to keep out the *waters*, if once overflowed, serve afterwards to keep them in: which is yet no argument, I suppose, for having no *banks* at all, or for throwing all open to inundations. You add, “as if taking great pains—to find out the sense and meaning of a doctrine, was calling in question the doctrine itself:” which I have answered above. In your next words, you betray an unbecoming heat, which should be avoided always, if you desire to see clear. “Wonderful,” you say, “that the very foundations of all religion and of all truth should be thus turned into ridicule by men of learning, without their perceiving what they are doing!” A heinous and heavy charge; not upon me, not upon a few private men, but upon the Church of Christ in all ages, and upon the best men of it. For, what is it, I beseech you, that you are here so severely declaiming against, under the opprobrious name, of “turning all religion into ridicule?” I say, what is it, but the Church’s acknowledging that there are *fundamentals* in religion, and her defending those *fundamentals*, in such a way as Christ and his Apostles have taught her, against all opposers? Be you ever so *able* or so *learned*, (which I dispute not,) yet we know, that if an *angel from heaven* comes to teach us any *other doctrine* than what we have received from *Scripture*, we have St. Paul’s warrant for pronouncing an *anathema* upon that and him. You will say, no doubt, that you have *truth* and *Scripture* on your side. Well: that is saying something, if you can make it good: it is the very point which we are going to try. In the mean while, argue not against the properest methods of defending and preserving the *truth*, (which are undoubtedly right and

good, in the *general*,) but show, if you are able, that there is something *particular* in the present case, to put a bar to the *general* rule.

5. The last article of complaint is, my “artificially concealing from the reader the true and indeed only material point in question, and amusing him with matters of a quite different kind.” In this affected charge, (which, I am unwilling to say, you do not believe one word of,) I blame not so much the *injuriousness* of it, since it is too weak to do hurt, as the *indiscretion*. Might you not have been content to set out upon a *new foot*, and, as it were, silently and unobserved, to alter the terms of the question; but you must begin with laying your sin at my door, and charging me with the very fault which you are, that instant, committing? I will show you, first, that my manner of stating the main question was right: and I shall afterwards tell you what I have to say to *yours*; which in reality (when stripped of its *ambiguity*) is not different from mine. All my labour and endeavour was, to bring the dispute to this short question, whether the Son of God be a *precarious* being, that is, a *creature*, or no^s. This was the only point I was concerned for; being that upon which all the rest turn. There therefore I laid the stress; making it my business to confute whatever I could find in Dr. Clarke’s pieces, tending to degrade the Son of God into *precarious* existence, or to make a *creature* of him. If this point be but once secured, that the Son is *no creature*, but *necessarily existing*; the Doctor may go on talking of *supremacy*, and whatever else he pleases; they are incidental points only, and must either fall of course, or else be understood in a sense *consistent* with the resolution of the other question.

You are sensible of this yourself; and therefore you all the way resolutely dispute with me the point of the

^s See my Supplement, where I have shown *nine* several ways, from the writings of Dr. Clarke, and his disciples, that they do by immediate and necessary consequence make the Son a *creature*.

Son's *necessary existence*, as much as the other point of the Father's *supremacy*: you are as resolute in denying the Son to be *one God* with the Father; you are scrupulous as to calling him *Creator*, and never directly assert his creating of the world by his *own* power, or his *coeternity*. In short, you dispute every thing with me that is pleaded to exempt him from the number of *precarious* beings, or *creatures*. Were it not for this, you should be permitted to talk of the Father's *supremacy* as much as you pleased, and to make sense of it at leisure. Indeed, the determining of the point of *supremacy*, and how it is to be held, depends entirely upon the other question; which is therefore the *main question* betwixt us. Do but allow me, that the Son is *no creature*, that he exists not *precariously*, but *necessarily*, that he is *one God* with the Father, that he is properly *Creator*, and by his *own* power, with other the like things; and you shall then go on, without let or hindrance, in your talk of the *supremacy*. Now then, will you please to answer me: Do you understand the *supremacy* in a sense which you believe *consistent* with the points which I maintain, viz. the Son's *necessary existence*, *uncreatedness*, &c.? If you do, the dispute is ended; go on and prosper with so Catholic a notion of the *supremacy*. Or do you understand the *supremacy* in a sense *not consistent* with those other points which I maintain? If this be the case, (as I presume it is,) then do not pretend that those other points are not *material*; for, by maintaining them, I overthrow your pretended *supremacy*, as much as you, by maintaining the *supremacy*, design to overthrow the Church's faith: and so it matters not, whether the main question be put into your terms or mine; since both, in reality, come to the same thing. Only there is this difference in the case; my way of stating the main question is *plain* and *clear*; yours, *obscure* and *ambiguous*: mine is fitted to *instruct* and *inform*; yours, to *perplex* and *confound* a reader: mine is proper to bring the debate to a short and clear issue; yours, to protract and lengthen out a dispute: in a word,

mine is sincere and open, like that of a man that knows his cause is good; yours is fallacious and disguised, as of one that is diffident of his cause, and is retiring behind the curtain. You will have the question put thus: *Whether the Father alone hath supreme authority, sovereignty, and dominion over all?* When this is stripped of ambiguity and chicanery, I suppose it will fall into mine. You determine in the *affirmative*. The Son then is naturally a *subject* of the Father, and the Father is his *sovereign* Lord and Ruler. He has an absolute right over him, to call him to account, to *reward* him, if he does well, to *punish* him, if he does amiss. This all men understand to be implied in *supreme dominion*; a right and power over *subjects*, to compel, constrain, and punish, as occasion serves; and in short, to bridle them at pleasure. Is this your meaning? Pray then, where is the difference between saying it, and calling God the Son a *creature*?

And, do you imagine that you have any the least syllable of proof of such *alone dominion*, either in *Scripture* or *antiquity*? Yet there is certainly no *medium* between this, and what I assert of the *equality* of Father and Son. They are either naturally and strictly *equal*; or else one is *infinitely* superior to the other, as *God* and *creature*. Well; be the consequences what it will, you are attempting to prove your point syllogistically, after this manner:

“ If the Father never acts in subjection to the will of any other person, and every other person acts in subjection to his will; then the Father *alone* is the one supreme Governor of the universe.

“ But it is fact that the Father never acts in subjection, &c. and that every other person acts in subjection, &c.

“ Therefore, &c.”

This is the wonderful demonstration; lame and deficient in every part. To prove that the Father *alone* hath supreme dominion, &c. you should show, not only that all other persons *act in subjection*, (for an *equal* may act in subjection to an *equal*, or even to an *inferior*, as our

Lord acted in subjection to Joseph and Mary, and *washed his disciples' feet*,) but that they are *really* subject, and under his absolute power and authority. Your reasonings therefore on this head amount only to what the Schools call *ignoratio elenchi*; proving beside the question, or talking wide of the purpose. And how easy is it for a man to fill a book with quotations, as you have done, that can be content with any thing, however foreign to the question? You have proved, that the Son acted sometimes a *ministerial* part, or that he submitted to an *inferior* office: this is all that you have proved; and it is no more than I would have readily granted you, without quoting so much as a *single* Father for it. You are not advanced one tittle towards the proof of what you intend, that the Father and Son naturally have not one *common dominion*. I affirm that they have; and that at the very same time that the Son is executing any *inferior office*, he is still *Lord of the whole universe*, in common with the Father; and that their dominion over all is one and the same *undivided dominion*, as they are *one God* and *one Lord*. You would gladly slip upon us *supremacy of dominion*, instead of *supremacy of order*, or *office*. Instead of saying that the Father *alone* has his supreme dominion *from none*, you pretend that he *alone* has *supreme dominion*; to make *two dominions* where there is but *one*. You play with the ambiguous word *authority*, that you may have something to blind the readers with: while you quote Fathers who affirmed it in *one sense*, and you intend it in *another*. *Auctoritas* is often no more than *paternitas*, with the Latin Fathers, as *auctor* is *pater*: but you are wresting it to the sense of *dominion*. The like use you make of the *equivocal* word *dignity*; which is of *order*, or *office*, or *dominion*, or *nature*; and you artificially blend and confound all together. None, I hope, can be imposed upon by such weak fallacies, but they that want their faculties of discerning. Let the reader carefully distinguish *three* things, and he will then be able of himself to unravel all your pretences, and to throw off that studied con-

fusion which you are labouring to introduce in a *plain* thing.

1. *Supremacy of nature*, or supremacy of *perfection*, is to be possessed of all perfection, and the *highest* excellency possible: and this is to be *God*. There is nothing of this kind but what is *common* to Father and Son; who are therefore *one God supreme*. And as supremacy of *dominion* and *sovereignty* (properly so called) over all creatures (as soon as they exist) is included in it, and consequent upon it; Father and Son have one *common* and *undivided sovereignty* over all; the constant doctrine of *antiquity*.

2. *Supremacy of order* consists in this; that the Father has his *perfections, dominion, &c. from none*; but the Son *from the Father*. All that the Son has, is referred up to the *Father*, and not *vice versa*. This kind of supremacy is of the *Father alone*: and the Son's *subordination*, thus understood, is very consistent with his *equality of nature, dominion, perfection, and glory*, according to all antiquity.

3. *Supremacy of office*. This, by mutual agreement and voluntary *economy*, belongs to the *Father*: while the Son out of voluntary condescension submits to act *ministerially*, or in capacity of *mediator*. And the reason why the condescending part became God the *Son*, rather than God the *Father*, is because he is a *Son*, and because it best suits with the *natural* order of Persons, which had been inverted by a contrary *economy*. These things being fixed and settled, there will be no difficulty in replying to any thing you have offered, or can offer in this cause. You may amuse us with *Scripture* and *Fathers*: but every man sees, before this time, where the whole pinch of the controversy lies: you think the *Unity* of the *Godhead*, as we teach, is not consistent with the distinction of *persons, order, and offices*. While you pretend to be disputing against me, you are really disputing against the standing doctrine of the *ancient churches*, from some *concessions* which they made, and in which I agree with

them. And your way is to wrest and strain some principles, maintained both by them and me, to a sense *repugnant* with their other known doctrines. If you can prove any thing, we are ready to hear you: if you cannot, it is high time to desist from an impracticable attempt, that can bring nothing in the end, but shame and confusion to as many as engage in it. I take no notice of your reflections upon my *hardiness*, as you call it, (in denying what no good Catholic ever affirmed,) and my *metaphysical excursions*, and my fixing names of *reproach*. It will be seen in the sequel who are most remarkable for *hardiness*, who make *excursions*, and who *reproach*, not their brethren only, and the whole Church of Christ, but the *Lord of heaven and earth*, the *living God*; to whom be honour and glory, now and for ever.

That the reader may not imagine our dispute to be any thing *new*, or that you have advanced any thing beyond what the ancient Arians and Eunomians vainly endeavoured in the same cause; I shall just give him a specimen of what some of the *Fathers* of that time answered to the same pretences which you are now reviving. When Eunomius had been magnifying the Father, as *alone* subject to none, on purpose to degrade and depress the Son, under the notion of a *subject*; the great Basil rebukes him, for thereby reducing God the Son to the condition of a *creature*, in these words: “Forasmuch as there are
“two things, the *creature* and the *Godhead*, and the
“creature is ordained to *subjection* and *servitude*, while
“the *Godhead* is regnant and paramount; is it not manifest, that he that deprives (*the Son*) of the honour of
“*absolute dominion*, (*δασποτίας*,) and casts him down to
“the meanness of *servitude*, does at the same time rank
“him with the rest of the creation ^t?”

^t Δύο γὰρ ὄντων πραγμάτων, κρείωνι τι καὶ θείοντος· καὶ τῆς μὲν κρείωνις ἐν δουλείᾳ καὶ ὑποκειῖ τσαγαμίνας, ἀρχικῆς δὲ οὐσης καὶ δισπωτικῆς τῆς θείοντος· ἡ ἀφαιρούμενος τῆς δασποτίας τὸ ἀξίωμα, καὶ εἰς τὸ τῆς δουλείας ταπεινὸν καταβάλλων, ἔχῃ θῆλῆς εἶναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο συσχεῖσθαι αὐτὸν τῇ πάσῃ κρείου δουλείᾳ; *Basil. contr. Eux. lib. ii. p. 73.*

Gregory Nyssen thus more at large answers the Euno-
mian pretence, of the *alone* supremacy. I shall give it in
English only, because of its length, and to save myself
trouble.

“ He (Eunomius) says, that the Father has no *sharer*
“ (*μερίτην*) in glory with him : wherein he says the truth,
“ though he knows not what he says. For the Son doth
“ not *share* (or *divide*) the glory with the Father; but he
“ has the Father’s *whole glory*, as the Father has also the
“ *whole glory* of the Son. For thus he said, speaking to
“ the Father, *All mine are thine, and thine are mine*,
“ Joh. xvii.—He who is *heir of all things*, who is
“ *Creator of the worlds*, who shines out from the *glory of*
“ *the Father*, and together with it, and in himself, carries
“ the *express image* of the Father’s *hypostasis*; he has
“ all things whatsoever the Father himself hath, and is
“ also *Lord of all power*. Not that the majesty passes
“ away from the Father; but it abides with him, and at
“ the same time rests upon the Son. For while he is *in*
“ *the Father*, he is together with his *whole power*, in the
“ Father: and as he hath the Father in himself, he must
“ contain the *whole power and authority* of the Father.
“ For, he has the entire Father in himself, and not a *part*
“ only : wherefore having the Father entire, he must have
“ his authority also entire. What then does Eunomius
“ mean by pretending that the Father has no *consort* in
“ (power or) authority?—He says, there is one only
“ God, *Supreme Ruler* (*παντοκράτωρ*). If he means a *Fa-*
“ *ther*, by the name of *Supreme Ruler*, he says the same
“ as we do, and nothing contrary : but if he means it of
“ any *Supreme Ruler* that is not a *Father*; he may preach
“ up *circumcision*, if he pleases, along with his other Jew-
“ ish tenets : the faith of Christians looks to a *Father*.
“ The *Father* indeed is all and every thing, he is *Most*
“ *High, Supreme Ruler, King of kings, and Lord of*
“ *lords*; whatever titles sound high or great, they are
“ the Father’s own : and all things that are the *Father’s*
“ belong to the *Son*. Allow but this, and we admit the

“ other. But if, instead of a *Father*, he introduces another kind of *Supreme Ruler*; his doctrine is *Judaism*: “ or he strikes in with Plato’s sentiments. For they say, “ that that philosopher also taught that there is a certain “ supreme *Creator* and *Maker* of some *inferior* Gods. As “ therefore a *Jew* or a *Platonist*, though he admits a “ *supreme Governor*, is yet no *Christian*, as not believing “ in a *Father*: so also Eunomius does but belie his profession, while, when his doctrine is either *Judaism* or “ *Paganism*, he pretends to the name of *Christianity*.”

I have recited thus much out of Gregory Nyssen, (who in the same place^u has a great deal more to the same purpose,) to give the reader a just notion of Christian and Catholic principles. For this acute writer has really hit the true point of difference between the Catholics and their adversaries; whether Pagans, Jews, or heretics. It lay chiefly in the acknowledging, or the not acknowledging a true and proper *Father* in the *Godhead*. Pagans, Jews, Sabellians, Samosatensians, Arians, Eunomians, &c. all denied it: while there was no true Catholic but strenuously contended for it. Hence it was manifest, that the Arians were the *innovators*, in endeavouring to introduce a *Creator* and a *creature*, a *Sovereign* and a *subject*, instead of a *Father* and a *Son*. They professed the relation in *words*, but in reality they disowned it. The considering God as a *Father*, in a just and proper sense, (as the *ancients* always did,) is breaking the neck of *Arianism* at once. It gives a quite different turn, from what they aim at, to all their pretences of the *Father* being the *only God*, the *highest*, &c. For none who believed God to have a *Son*, (properly so called,) could ever be fools enough to imagine that such expressions were intended in *opposition* to him. On the contrary, they always understood, that magnifying the *Father* was at the same time magnifying the *Son* too: their relation being so close and intimate, that whatever *per-*

^u Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom. Orat. i. p. 13, 14, 15.

fections belonged to one, must of course be supposed *common* to both. He who reads the *Fathers* that lived before or after the Council of Nice, with this key, will find them clear and consistent throughout; and will the less wonder at the exceeding great offence taken against Arius, for attempting to *divide* Father and Son; and indeed to divest the one of his *Paternity*, (according to the Catholic sense of it,) and the other of his *Filiation*. Fulgentius is a late writer, of the fifth and sixth centuries; but a judicious man, and well instructed in the true and ancient principles of the Christian Church; especially in regard to our present subject: wherefore I shall close this, with an account from him^{*}; not because of his *authority*, but because what he says is true and just, and very well expressed, in his comment on the *Creed*, written in opposition to the Arians of that time. The sum is this, that whatever high things are said of the Father in the *Creed*, are to be understood to belong equally to the *Son*: and there was no need of any more particular application, since the very name of *Son* is sufficient.

* Inaniter tibi visum est, *male intelligendo*, ad tuum sensum velle rectitudinem *symboli* retorquere, et inde præscribere sanctæ fidei Catholicæ, quia in *symbolo* non omnia dicta sunt de *Filio*, quæ sunt dicta de *Patre*: cum utique propterea plenitudo divinitatis, quantum oportebat, debuerit in *origine* commendari, quia non debuit aliter in *prole* cognosci. Cum enim quisque se dicit credere in Deum Patrem *omnipotentem*, hoc ipsum quod in Deum Patrem dicit, sicut in eo veritatem naturalis divinitatis, ita veritatem *naturalis* quoque *Paternitatis*, et ex hac veritatem *naturalis* etiam *generationis* ostendit.—Totum igitur in se habet illa generatio divina, quicquid in se habet Dei Patris æterna substantia. Proinde *sufficiebat ut diceretur de Patre solo, quicquid æqualiter intelligendum esset in Filio*. Pater enim sic *omnipotentem Filium* genuit, sicut est ipse Pater *omnipotens*; sic *universorum Creatorem*, sicut ipse *universorum Creator est*; sic *regem seculorum*, sicut ipse *rex seculorum est*; sic *immortalem et invisibilem*, sicut ipse *immortalis est et invisibilis*. Omnia igitur, quæ Deo Patri dantur in *symbolo*, ipso uno *Fili* nomine naturaliter tribuuntur et Filio. *Fulgent. Fragm. xxxvi. pag. 652, &c.*

A SECOND
DEFENCE OF SOME QUERIES

RELATING TO
DR. CLARKE'S
SCHEME OF THE HOLY TRINITY:
IN ANSWER TO
THE COUNTRY CLERGYMAN'S REPLY.

Compare the following Texts.

I am the Lord, and there is none else, there is no God beside me, Isa. xlv. 5.

Is there a God beside me? yea, there is no God; I know not any, Isa. xlv. 8.

I am God, and there is none like me; Isa. xlvi. 9. Before me there was no God formed, neither shall there be after me, Isa. xlviii. 10.

The Word was God, John i. 1.
Thy throne, O God, Heb. i. 8.
Christ came, who is over all, God blessed for ever, Rom. ix. 5.
Who, being in the form of God, Phil. ii. 6.

Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, Heb. i. 3.

QUERY I.

Whether all other beings, besides the one Supreme God, be not excluded by the texts of Isaiah, (to which many more might be added,) and consequently, whether Christ can be God at all, unless he be the same with the Supreme God?

YOUR general answer to this Query is, that the texts of Isaiah expressly and uniformly speak of a *Person*; and therefore all other persons, besides the *He*, the *I*, the *Me*,

are excluded from being what *He*, who there speaks, declares himself *alone* to be. To which I reply, first, that the *exclusive* terms *need not* be interpreted with any such rigour: and secondly, that they *ought not*, because such interpretation leads you into absurdities which you have not been able to answer.

1. I say, *exclusive terms* are not always to be interpreted with such rigour, as to leave no room for *tacit* exceptions, such as reason and good sense will easily supply.

Matth. xi. 27. speaking of the *Person* of the Son, says, "No one knoweth the Father but the Son." Doth it therefore follow, that *no Person* but the Son, no, not the *Father* himself, knows the Father?

So, I Cor. ii. 11. "The things of God knoweth no one, but the Spirit of God;" no person but he. Doth it therefore follow, that neither the *Father* nor the *Son* knoweth the things of God as much as the *Holy Spirit*?

Rev. xix. 12. it is said of the Son of God, that he had a name written, that "no one (*οὐδεις*) knew, but he himself." Doth it therefore follow, that neither the *Father* nor *Holy Ghost* knew it? See more instances of like kind in my fourth Sermon. I say then, that *exclusive terms* are not always to be interpreted up to the utmost rigour: and there are many reasons why they should not be so interpreted in this particular case; as I have shown at large in the same Sermon.

2. I am next to observe, that such interpretation, in the present case, has led you into absurdities which you have not been able to answer. For, if the Son be excluded at all, by those texts of Isaiah, and others of like kind, he is *entirely* excluded. He cannot be *another God*, all *other Gods* being excluded by those texts; and you will not admit that he is the *same God*: since therefore he is not *another God*, nor the *same God*, it follows, upon your principles, that he is *no God*. That the texts exclude not only all other *supreme Gods*, but absolutely all *other Gods*, I prove, not barely from the force of the *exclusive terms*,

but from the scope, drift, and intent of those texts; which was to exclude *inferior* as well as *supreme* Deities; and to leave no room for *idolatry*; which might be consistent with paying *sovereign* worship (to use your phrase) to the *God of Israel*. You take a great deal of pains to wind yourself off; or rather, to show how much you can have to *say*, when you have nothing to *reply*. You tax me with *quibbling* in the word *beings*, as standing in the Query: which is a rebuke that comes late, now you are answering, not my Queries, but my Defence. However, since all *other Gods* are by me shown to be excluded, and not all other *Persons*, the expression is just, and no other but what should be. You observe, next, that the Son cannot be the *same God* with the Father on any but Sabellian principles: which is begging the question. It is sufficient to say, that the *Fathers* in general (as we shall see hereafter) acknowledged *both* to be *one God*, and not *one Person*. You cite Eusebius^a as your voucher, that the words of Isaiah, (“besides *me* there is no God,”) denote one *Person*. When you look again into Eusebius, you will find that the words are Marcellus’s, not Eusebius’s: though little depends upon them either way. You have another piece of a quotation from Eusebius, p. 4. where he makes it *Sabellianism*, to say that the Father and Son are ἐν καὶ τ’ αὐτὸν, *one and the same thing*. Add, as Eusebius there does, ὀνόμασι μὲν διαφόροις, &c. *under different names only*; and then I condemn it for *Sabellianism*, as well as Eusebius. Your quoting Tertullian in this case is very extraordinary; when every body knows that he makes Father and Son *one God*, in the very same treatise where he is confuting the Sabellians; that is, the Praxeans, men of the same principles with those of Sabellius. Was Tertullian then a Sabellian? Ridiculous! You have a farther shift, (but still in the way of *retorting*, not *answering*,) that I myself, *when I come to explain*, do not in reality make the Son to be the *same God*, but only

^a Euseb. Eccl. Theol. lib. ii. cap. 19. p. 133.

to be *in his substance undivided*. Add, from the Father as his *Head*, and *consubstantial* with him; and then I insist upon it, that he is therefore the *same God* with the Father, upon the certain and standing principles of all Catholic antiquity.

But what becomes of the *difficulty* all this while, which it concerned you to answer? You were to tell us, whether the Son (since he is not the *same God*) be *another God*, or *no God*. You say, he is not *another God*, in that sense wherein the Father is: that is your meaning. But if he be received as an object of *worship*, he is then *God* in such a sense, as none but the *God of Israel* was, and must either be the *same God*, or *another God*. By your argument, the Jews might have admitted as many *inferior Gods* as they pleased, consistent with the *first commandment*; for that would not have been admitting *other Gods*, because not *Gods* in the same sense. So you leave a gap open to all manner of *idolatry*. You say farther, that the texts do not exclude Moses from being a *God* unto Pharaoh, nor *magistrates*, nor *angels*, from being *Gods*. But the texts do exclude Moses, and *angels*, and *magistrates*, and all *creatures* whatever, from being *adorable Gods*: and therefore they can be no more than *nominal Gods*; that is to say, *no Gods*. The Jews might have had *nominal Gods* what they would: but they were to pay *worship* to one only; which comes to the same as having *no other Gods* but one. The receiving more *adorable Gods* than one, is making *another God*. Well then, will you cast off the *worship* of God the Son, or will you frankly own that you make of him *another God*? You discover a great inclination to own him for *another God*: you do not scruple in one place, to call him *another Lord*^b: and yet, when you come to the pinch, you pause, you hesitate, you are at a loss what to resolve on: *another God*, or *two Gods*, sound very harsh; no Scripture, no Fathers, ever ventured upon it; and Christian ears cannot bear it. What then

^b Page 197.

must be done? You at length put on an air of assurance, and intimate to us, (p. 6.) that an inferior God besides the supreme, is not *another God*; and that *two Gods*, in the nature of language, must signify two *coordinate Gods*, or Gods in the *same sense*. But, as the *nature of language* hitherto has been always different, and you can give no examples in any writings, sacred or profane, of this *new* kind of language; that any two Gods, and each of them received and adored as *a God*, were not *two Gods*, as well as *one God*, and *another God*^c; you must give us leave to think that this kind of answering is really *saying* nothing. All the heathens that acknowledged one *supreme* God, over many *inferior* deities, will, by your way of reasoning, stand clear of the charge of admitting *more Gods* than *one*. Strange! that you should appeal to the *nature of language*, in a case where the *language* of mankind, Jews, Pagans, and Christians, hath been always contrary.

You have two or three references at the bottom of the page; which I pass over, as not coming up to the point in hand. If you have any countenance from Eusebius, it will amount to no more than that great man's contradicting himself, and the Catholics before him, as well as those of his own time: his authority therefore, especially for a plain blunder and solecism in *language*, will be very inconsiderable, and weigh little with us.

As to my argument, concerning Baal, and Ashtaroth, and the Pagan *deities*; you answer it by telling me, you know not how to excuse it from *profaneness*. You should have said, (for that the reader will see to be plainly the case,) that you *knew not how* to evade its force. A rebuke is much easier than a solid reply; which was here wanted. Tell me plainly, if the first *Commandment* excludes only other *supremes*, and not *inferior* deities; why Baal, or Ashtaroth, or any Pagan deity might not have been worshipped along with the *God of Israel*, without any violation of *that Commandment*? The Law indeed

^c See the Preface to my Sermons.

says, you shall have *no other Gods* before, or besides me; that is, according to you, no other *supreme God*, or Gods. How then are inferior and subordinate deities, how many, or whatsoever, at all excluded by that law? Here lay the pinch of the difficulty; which, because you could not take it off, you are pleased to dissemble, and to run to another point. You represent it, as if I had intended a comparison between *Christ* and the Pagan *deities*; and you remind me of the difference betwixt them; which is only solemn trifling. I made no *comparison*, nor did my argument imply any: but this is plain, that the texts which exclude only *supreme deities*, do not exclude any that are *not supreme*, or not considered as *supreme*: and so you, by your interpretation of those texts, have, in a manner, voided and frustrated every law of the Old Testament against *idolatry*. If the very mention of this evident consequence be a thing so *profane*, what must your doctrine be, that involves this very consequence in it? I showed you, in my Defence, vol. i. p. 168. how, upon your principles, any man might easily have eluded every law of the Old Testament, relating to *worship*, or *sacrifice*. One plain and direct answer to that difficulty would have been more satisfactory to the reader, than all your studied diversions.

You proceed to a tedious harangue about *mediatorial worship*; which shall be considered in its place, but is here foreign, and not pertinent. You should have shown how, by the force of these texts, (which declare the *Unity*, and ascribe the worship to *God* alone,) *inferior deities* can be excluded, but upon this principle, that the texts are to be understood as excluding all *other Gods* absolutely, and not with your restriction of all other *supremes* only. You have indeed contrived a way, such as it is, to bring in the *worship* of *Christ*: but it is by making so wide a breach in the *laws* of the Old Testament, that had it been discovered by the Jews of old, there had been room enough to let in all imaginable kinds of inferior deities. They might easily have pleaded, that the texts were intended of one

supreme God; and that he *alone* was to be worshipped as such: but as to *subordinate* deities, as the texts did not reach them, so neither need they be scrupulous about the worship of them. This is the pressing difficulty, to which, after sufficient time to consider, you have not been able to make any tolerable answer. Wherefore it may fairly be concluded, that the argument is unanswerable; and that this Query having bore the test, will now stand the firmer. You seem to think that you have done your part, when you have found out a reason why *Christ* should be worshipped: but the main thing wanting, was, to give a reason (upon your principles) *out of the Law*, why any *inferior deities*, along with the *supreme*, might not be worshipped also. You do well to plead for the worship of *Christ*: it is a doctrine of the *Gospel*, and I think of the *Law* too. But you had done better, if you had contrived to make the *Law* and the *Gospel* hang together; and had not entirely frustrated the main intent and design of one, in order to maintain the other.

You have some observations, p. 9, 10, 11, which seem to me foreign to the business of this Query: they may deserve some notice in a more proper place.

QUERY II.

Whether the texts of the New Testament (in the second column) do not show, that he (Christ) is not excluded, and therefore must be the same God.

THE sum of my argument is, that since all *other* adorable Gods are excluded by the texts of *Isaiah*; and yet it appears from the same Scripture, that *Christ* is *adorable*, and *God*, it must follow, that he is not *another* God; but the *same* God with the Father.

This Scripture argument I confirm from testimonies of *antiquity*, declaring,

1. That *other* Gods only, (not God the Son,) or *idols*, are excluded by the texts which concern the *Unity*.
2. That God the Son is not *another* God.

3. That he is the *same God*, or *one God*, with the Father.

4. That the one God of Israel (confessedly *God supreme*) was Christ, speaking in his *own Person*; being God, not as God's *representative*, but as God's *Son*, of the *same substance* with the Father.

This is the sum of what I endeavoured to make out, under the second Query. I am first to consider what you have to offer, in order to take off the force of my evidence; and next, to examine any counter-evidence which you may have produced to balance mine. In this method I design to proceed: and let the reader, who desires to see distinctly into the merits of the cause, take it along with him. My *Scripture argument* was formed upon the following texts: Joh. i. 1. Heb. i. 8. Rom. ix. 5. Phil. ii. 6. Heb. i. 3. Let us now examine them in their order.

JOHN i. 1.

My argument here is, that the *Λόγος*, *Word*, is called *God*, not in any improper, or loose, figurative sense; but in the proper and strict sense of the word *God*. Therefore he is not excluded among the *nominal* Gods; therefore he is *one* and the *same* God with God the Father.

You reply, p. 15. that God the *Word*, is not God in as "high a sense as the Father himself." The reason why he is not, or cannot, you assign, because by him, or through him, "all things were made; which cannot," you say, "be truly affirmed of the one supreme God and "author of all." On the contrary, I affirm, that since "all things were made by him," he is not of the number of the things *made*; therefore *no creature*; therefore *God* in the strict sense; and, since God is *one*, the *same God*.

The most which you can justly infer from the Father's creating all things *by* or *through* Christ, is only this; that they are *two Persons*, and that there is a *priority of order* betwixt them; not that the Son is not God in as *high* a sense, or in the *same* sense as the Father.

What you cite from Eusebius signifies little; except it

be to expose the weakness of a great man: whose authority is of no value with me, any farther than he is consistent with himself, and with the Catholics before, and in, and after his own times. Not to mention that his authority is late; and I may almost as well produce Athanasius, Hilary, and the elder Cyril against you, as you produce Eusebius against me: who, after all, is so different from himself, in different places of his works, that, upon the whole, it is extremely difficult to know what judgment to make of him. To return to John i. 1.

In my Defence, vol. i. p. 8. I give the reader a view of your real and intended construction of St. John. The Word was with the *one supreme God, another God* inferior to him, a *creature of the great God*.

This representation, you say, is *unjust*, p. 45. It seems, your own real sense, when put into plain terms, is too frightful for yourself to admit. You endeavour therefore to wrap it up, and disguise it, in these words: "The Word was with the *one supreme God* and Father of all; and the Word was himself a *divine Person*,—in subordination to the *one supreme God*, and by him did the *one supreme God* and Father of all make all things." All the difference between this and mine is, that I spoke out your *whole sense*, and you insinuate it, or mince it; being ashamed to say all that you mean. This *divine Person* you speak of, you own to be *God*, neither dare you say otherwise; you do not allow him to be the *same God*; therefore your meaning is, and must be, that he is *another God*: so far my representation is manifestly just. But farther, this same *divine Person* you, with your whole party, deny to be *necessarily existing*; therefore you make of him a *precarious* being, which is nothing but another name for *creature*; therefore he is, upon your principles, a *creature of the great God*: and so my interpretation, or representation of your reserved and real meaning, is true and just to a tittle. Your next attempt is, not to represent, but to corrupt and mangle my construction of St.

John. I refer the reader to my Sermons, for a full view of my sense in that particular. Let us see what you can make of it by the help of chicane and cavilling. "The Word was with the one supreme God—himself the same one supreme God, (yet meaning *another supreme God* in the same undivided substance,) and by the same *one supreme God*, did the *one supreme God* make all things." That is to say, "The Word was with the Father the one *God supreme*, and was himself, though not the *same Person*, yet one and the same *God^d supreme*, and by the Son, who is *God supreme*, and *Creator^c*, the Father, supreme God also, made the worlds." What is there absurd or contradictory in all this? I have given you three Ante-Nicene writers (Irenæus, Clemens of Alexandria, and Hippolytus) interpreting St. John in the same way as I do. Show me one that ever interpreted him in your manner. You are forced to disguise the matter, and to give your meaning but by halves; because you know you have not one Ante-Nicene or Post-Nicene Catholic writer on your side, so far as concerns your construction of St. John. You pretend, that I make of the Son *another supreme God*; not the *same God*. But as this is only said, not proved, it must pass for nothing but a trifling begging of the question. Prove you that, as plainly as I have proved that you make the Son *another God*, a *creature God*; or else acknowledge the difference between a just representation and an injurious misrepresentation. So much for Joh. i. 1. The second text is,

^d Dei verbum, imo magis ipse Deus. Iren. p. 132.

"Ἐν γὰρ ἡμῶν, ὁ Θεὸς. ὅτι εἶπεν, ἐν ἀρχῇ ὁ λόγος ἦν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. Clem. Alex. p. 135. conf. p. 86.

Εἰ δὲ οὖν ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, Θεὸς ἂν, τί οὖν φήσιν ἂν τις δύο λόγους Θεῶν; δύο μὲν οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ἢ ἓνα, πείρασι δὲ δύο, &c. Hippol. contr. Noët. cap. xiv. p. 15.

^c Mundi enim factor, vere verbum Dei est. Iren. p. 132.

Θεὸς καὶ δημιουργός· πάντα γὰρ δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἓν. Clem. Alex. p. 156.

HEB. i. 8.

My argument here is, that Christ, who in this text is declared to be *God*, must be the *same God* with the *Father*, because Scripture admits but *one God*; and expressly declares against every *other God*. To which you reply, p. 13. that the Apostle sufficiently explains himself by the words, "God, even thy God;" verse the ninth: and that I "ought not to have omitted it." But I had abundantly answered that pretence^f, by interpreting the words of Christ considered in his *human* capacity, referring to Dr. Bennet for a vindication of it: which is what you ought not to have omitted. This text will come up again under Query III.

ROM. ix. 5.

From this text I form my argument after the same manner as in the two former. You pretend it "dubious, whether it may not possibly be meant of the Father;" referring to Dr. Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 75. 2d edit. On the contrary, I maintain, that no reasonable doubt can be made of its being meant of *Christ*; referring to such as have proved it *ε*.

But allowing the words to be intended of Christ, (which is no great courtesy,) you have still something farther to say, viz. that the meaning of this text "is distinctly explained," 1 Cor. xv. 27. and Eph. i. 22. But how explained? so as to make the Son *another God*? I see nothing like it: neither does God's being the *head* of Christ, nor his "putting all things under him," conclude any thing against what I assert, that both together are *one God supreme*. See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 134. A distinct personality, together with a supremacy of *order*, or *office*, are sufficient to account for all, upon my principles. You remind me of Hippolytus's comment on this text, in these

^f Defence, vol. i. p. 41.

^ε My Sermons, vol. ii. p. 133. Grabe, Not. in Bull. D. F. sect. ii. cap. 3. Grabe's Instances of Defects, &c. p. 24. Second Review of Doxologies, p. 15, 16. Dr. Calamy's Sermons, p. 38.

words: "Christ is God over all: for thus he himself says "plainly, All things are *given* me from the Father^b." But, why did you overlook the words immediately following; "Who being over all God blessed, was begotten (*of the Virgin*), and becoming man, is God for ever?" You see, Hippolytus supposes him to have been *God* before the commencing of his *mediatorial* kingdom, before the time when all things were said to be *given* him; and therefore Hippolytus may reasonably be supposed to mean no more, than that all things were intrusted with him, because he, so *great* and so *divine* a Person, was the most proper to sustain so *great* a charge. The consideration thereof leads back to his *antecedent* dignity and excellency, which qualified him for so *great* and so *endearing* a charge. Wherefore it was right in Hippolytus to make mention of it, in order to confirm what was said, Rom. ix. 5. that he is "over all God blessed for ever." Epiphanius, who cannot be suspected of *Arianizing*, scruples not to argue upon the same text, just as Hippolytus does, and almost in the same wordsⁱ. And they did not quote Matt. xi. 27. (or Luke x. 22.) to show how, or when, Christ was *appointed* God; they had no such thoughts, believing him to have been always God; but to confirm what was said in Rom. ix. 5. so as to show withal, that he was *distinct* from the *Father*, not the *same Person* with him, as Noëtus pretended.

You bring up Hippolytus^k again, to confirm, as you

^b Οὗτος ἰ ὦν ἐπὶ πάντων θεὸς ἰσθι, λίγου γὰρ εἶπαι μετὰ κρήνης· πάντα μοι παραδίδοται ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς. Ὁ ὦν ἐπὶ πάντων θεὸς ἰλόγητος γογινηται, καὶ ἀδελφωτος γινόμενος θεὸς ἰσθι εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας. Hippol. contr. Noët. p. 10.

ⁱ Ὁ ὦν ἐπὶ πάντων θεός, θαυμαστῶς διηγίγται. ὅτος γὰρ ἰ ὦν, ἰσθι ἐπὶ πάντων θεός. ἰσθιδάν γὰρ αὐτὸς διδάσκει ἡμᾶς, λίγων πάντα μοι παραδίθη ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς μοι διὰ τοῦτο ἰσθι πάντων ἰσθι θεός. Epiiph. Her. lvii. p. 487.

^k Καλῶς ἰσθι παντοκράτορα χριστὸν—μαρτυροῦν γὰρ χριστὸς ἰσθι, πάντα μοι παραδίδοται παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ πάντων κρατῶν, παντοκράτορα παρὰ πατρὸς κατιστάθη χριστὸς—πάντα ὑποτίνακται αὐτῷ ἰσθι τοῦ ὑποτάξαντος, πάντων κρατῶν, αὐτοῦ δι ἰσθι πατὴρ, ἰσθι ἰσθι εἰς θεὸς φαιῆ, ὅ τὰ πάντα ὑποτάσσονται ἡμῶν χριστῷ. ὅ τὰ πάντα πατὴρ ὑποτάξει παρὶξ ἰσθι τοῦ. Hippol. contr. Noët. p. 10.

Καὶ πάλιν φησὶν ἰσθι Ἀποκαλύψαι ἰσθι ἂν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, καὶ ἰσθι ἰσθι παντοκράτορα,

imagine, your fancies upon 1 Cor. xv. 27. Hippolytus answering the objection of Noëtus, drawn from Rev. i. 8. where Christ is styled *παντοκράτωρ*, (and from whence Noëtus inferred, that Christ must be the very *Father* himself incarnate;) I say, Hippolytus, in his answer, hath the words which you recite: “If therefore all things are put under him, excepting him that did put all things under him, he hath dominion over all, and the Father over him; that in all things may be made appear *one God*, to whom all things are subject, together with Christ, to whom the Father hath subjected all things, himself only excepted.”

Hippolytus here speaks not of the *Λόγος*, but of *God incarnate*, Christ Jesus; showing that *Christ*, since his incarnation, has been *subject* to the Father, and will be so also, in his human capacity, after he has delivered up his mediatorial kingdom. From whence it is manifest, against Noëtus, that the *Father* himself was not *incarnate*, was not *Christ*; for then whom could Christ be *subject* to, but to *himself*? which is absurd. This I take to be the sense of Hippolytus, and his full sense; his argument requiring no more: besides that, it is not consistent with Hippolytus’s other writings, to make the Son, in his highest capacity, *subject* to the Father, and under his *dominion*. For, not to mention that Hippolytus, in this very tract, plainly teaches that the Son is of the same substance with the Father, and *one God* with him, (as shall be shown

καλῶς κατὰ πάντα εἶπαι· καλῶς γὰρ εἶπαι, πάντα μοι παραδόντι ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς μου
— ἵπαι πάντας μὲν οὖν ἄνθις, ἔχων δὲ ἴδιον αὐτῷ πατέρα, &c. *Epiiph. Hier. lviij.*
p. 488.

Omnipotens Christus appellatur. Si enim omnia Patris Filii sunt, et ut ipse loquitur in Evangelio, “data est mihi omnis potestas in cælo et in terra;” “omnia mea tua sunt;” cur non etiam *omnipotentis* nomen referatur ad Christum: ut sicut Deus Dei, et Dominus Domini; sic *omnipotens omnipotentis* Filii sit? *Hieronym. in Isa. tom. iii. p. 13.*

Nec mirum si Christus dicatur *omnipotens*, cui “tradita est omnis potestas in cælo et in terra.” Et qui dicit; “omnia quæ Patris sunt, mea sunt.” Si autem omnia, id est, Deus ex Deo, Dominus ex Domino, lumen de lumine; ergo et ex *omnipotente omnipotens*: neque enim fieri potest ut, quorum una natura est, diversa sit gloria. *Hieron. in Zach. tom. iii. p. 1718.*

more fully hereafter,) he concludes his treatise with ascribing *glory* and *dominion* to the Son *with the Father and the Holy Ghost*. Now it would be very absurd thus to join *sovereign* and *subject* together, ascribing the same *glory* and *dominion* to both¹. And in the words going before, speaking of Christ, he says, “He being God, became man for our sakes, to whom the Father subjected “all things^m.” Which shows that all his discourse before, relating to the *subjection* of things to the Son, and of the Son to the Father, is after his incarnation; and is to be understood of the θεάνθρωπος, the *God-man*; who, as God, had all things under him; as man, was himself under the Father. To confirm which, we may observe that Hippolytus interprets Christ’s *praying* to the Father, as being done οἰκονομικῶς. These are his words: “Christ “made all these prayers economically, as man, being “himself very Godⁿ. Does this look as if Hippolytus believed God the Father to have *sovereign dominion* over Christ, in his highest capacity? Might not any *subject* of God have prayed to God, as such?

You say (p. 16.) that the “doctrine which I allege “this text (Rom. ix. 5.) to prove, is a contradiction to “the whole stream of antiquity.” And here again you quote Hippolytus, (the *spurious* and *interpolated* Hippolytus, according to you,) as a just interpreter of the ancients. It seems, you are willing to admit him, when he says any thing that looks for your purpose. The words you chiefly value are παντοκράτωρ παρὰ πατρός καταστάθη Χριστός: *Christ was constituted Ruler over all by the Father*. On occasion whereof, let me observe a thing to you which you are not aware of; that though the ancients scrupled not to say, that Christ was *constituted* by the Father,

¹ Αὐτῷ ἢ δόξα καὶ τὸ κράτος ἅμα πατρὶ καὶ ἀγίῳ πνεύματι, &c. Hippol. contr. Νοῦτ. p. 20.

^m Οὕτως ὁ Θεὸς, ὁ ἄνθρωπος δι’ ἡμᾶς γεννητὸς, ὃ πάντα ἐπίσταται πατήρ. Ibid.

ⁿ Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα χριστὸς οἰκονομικῶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἤρχιστο, Θεὸς δὲ ἄν ἀληθινός. Ἄλλ’ ὡς Θεὸς ὕπαι, ἢ μορφή τοῦ δούλου ἢ ταῦτα λίγισμα καὶ πάσχυσμα. Hipp. contr. Jud. p. 3.

Ruler, or Lord, or even Creator, (according to Prov. viii.) or any thing coming under the notion of *office*, (the Father being ever looked upon as *first* in order, and, in virtue thereof, the Fountain of every *office*, according to his own voluntary appointment,) yet you will never find it said by the ancients, that the Father *constituted* Christ a God, or *appointed* him to be *God*. Which observation is highly deserving your special notice; as it may discover to you a fundamental flaw in your *hypothesis*, and may show that you have took a great deal of pains with the ancients, upon a very wrong view, and (give me leave to add) to very little purpose. Had you found ever an ancient testimony, declaring that Christ was constituted *God over all*, you would have done something: the rest are impertinent, and come not up to your point. The word *God* was never looked upon as a word of *office* or *dominion*, but of *nature* and *substance*: and hence it is, that the ancients never speak of Christ's being *constituted* God. One use indeed you may make of your observation from Hippolytus, that *παντοκράτωρ*, though it be often in the LXX the rendering of יהוה צבאות *Lord of hosts*, yet the Fathers sometimes used it in a lower sense, such as comes not up to the strength of the Hebrew: and therefore I readily acknowledge to you, that such passages of the Fathers as style Christ *παντοκράτωρ*, are not pertinently alleged to prove him to be the *Jehovah* in the strict sense of that name, according to those Fathers. But enough of this. Upon the whole, it may appear that you have not been able to take off the force of Rom. ix. 5.

PHIL. ii. 6.

My argument from this text runs thus: He that was in the *form of God*, that is, *naturally* Son of God, and *God*, and as such *equal* with God^o, is God in the same high sense as the Father himself is; and since God is one, the same God. To this you only reply, (p. 14.) that “nothing

* See my fifth Sermon.

“ can be more directly against me” than this text. Which decretory sentence, void of all proof, and coming from a man *fallible* as myself, deserves no farther notice. You have a great deal more upon this text from p. 50 to p. 64. but put together in so confused a manner, with a mixture of foreign matters, that I shall not spend time in pursuing you; but refer the reader to my fifth Sermon upon this very text: where all that you have material is already answered, or obviated. Your incidental pleas and pretences relating to Novatian, and other ancients, will be answered in their place. I proceed to another text.

HEB. i. 3.

My argument here is, that he who is “ the brightness of his Father’s glory, and the express image of his per-son,” cannot reasonably be supposed to be *excluded* among the *nominal Gods*. But if he be not excluded, he is included in the *one supreme God*. Therefore, &c. Now, in page the fourteenth, you are content only to say, which I can as easily gainsay, that this text is *directly against* me. But you resume it again, p. 65. out of method; and thither I must attend you. There you talk much of *by* his Son, and *by* whom, and of the Father’s being *his God*: which kind of reasoning I have sufficiently answered above. But you add, that “ the image of the one supreme God cannot be himself that one supreme God, whose image he is.” But what mean you by the words “ that supreme God?” Plainly, “ that supreme Father, who is God:” and thus I readily allow, that he cannot be himself *that very Person* whose *express image* he is. But why do you thus perpetually quibble with the phrase “ that supreme God;” as if there were *two Gods*; *this* and *that*, and making the *supreme God* a name for one *Person* only? This, you must be sensible, is taking the main point for granted; and poorly begging of the question: which is a thing beneath the character of an able disputant. To proceed: I had been pressed with a passage of Eusebius, relating to this text; and I returned a clear

and full answer to it in my Defence, vol. i. p. 13, 14. You bring another passage out of Eusebius, in his Demonstratio Evang. though you know that even Bishop Bull, who otherwise is a defender of Eusebius, yet makes no account of what he wrote before the Nicene Council: as neither do I. I shall not therefore give myself the trouble of attending you, as often as you fill your margin with that author. I had said however, what was true, in relation to the passage brought against me before, that by δύο οὐσίαι, Eusebius might mean no more than what Pierius, Methodius, Alexander, and Tertullian, meant by the like expressions; that is, *two Persons*. To which you reply, (p. 68.) that I, “by adding what the ancient writers “constantly disclaimed,” (viz. an equality of supreme authority in the two Persons,) “do necessarily make, what “they never did, two supreme Gods, however inseparable “or undivided, as to their substance.” But you are under a double mistake; first, in imagining that the ancients did not acknowledge an “equality of supreme authority,” as much as I do; and next, in fancying that they and I (for the charge affects both, or neither) thereby make “two “supreme Gods.” The ancients, and I conformable thereto, always suppose a *headship*, or *priority* of order of the Father, referring his *consubstantial* Son to him as his *head*. And “this origination in the divine Paternity” (as Bishop Pearson speaks^p) “hath anciently been looked upon as “the assertion of the *Unity*: and therefore the Son and “Holy Ghost have been believed to be but *one God with “the Father*; (N. B.) because both from the Father, who “is *one*, and so the *Union* of them.” If you ask how the *authority*, or *dominion*, (for so I understand you here, and not as *authority* sometimes signifies *Paternity*, and *auctor*

^p Pearson on the Creed, p. 40.

Ὅμοιαι δὲ τοῖς ἁριστοῖς μία, θεός· ἑνώσις δὲ ὁ πατὴρ ἐξ ἡ καὶ πρὸς ὃν ἀνάγεται τὰ ἐξῆς. ἦνχ ὡς συναλείφεισθαι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχουσθαι. Greg. Naz. Orat. xxxii. p. 520.

In illa quippe una substantia Trinitatis, *Unitas* est in origine, æqualitas in prole, in *caritate* autem Unitatis æqualitatisque communio. Fulgent. ad Monim. lib. ii. cap. 11. p. 37.

is *Pater*;) I say, if you ask how it can be *supreme* in both, if it be *original* here, and *derivative* there; I answer, because it is the *same* in both, only existing in a different manner: neither are there *two dominions* or *two sovereignties*, any more than two *essences*, *substances*, or *Gods*. The question *from whence* the Son's *dominion* is, is one point, and *how great*, or *how high*, is quite another. If you ask *from whence* the Son's *dominion* is, I say *from the Father*; as his *essence* also is: if you ask *from whence* the Father's *dominion* is, I say, *from none*, as I say also of his *essence*. But if you ask me, *what*, or *how great*, or *how high*; I say *equal*⁹ in both, and indeed one undivided *same*, just as the *essence* is. Thus your charge of *two Gods*, which you so frequently repeat, through your abounding in false *metaphysics*, is proved a fallacy, and a groundless calumny.

You proceed to examine my authorities for my construction of Heb. i. 3. one by one. This being but a very small and incidental part of the controversy, I could be content to pass it over, for fear of being tedious to the reader. But I will endeavour to be as short as possible. You begin with rebuking me for citing Origen out of Athanasius; *who lived*, you say, above a hundred years after Origen's death. It was not quite a hundred when Athanasius wrote the piece from whence I cited the pas-

⁹ *Æqualem ergo Patri credite Filium; sed tamen de Patre Filium, Patrem vero non de Filio. Origo apud illum, æqualitas apud istum. August. Serm. cxl. tom. 5. p. 681.*

Quod si dixeris, eo ipso major est Pater Filio, quia *de nullo* genitus genuit tamen *æqualem*; cito respondebo, imo ideo non est major Pater Filio, quæ genuit *æqualem*, non *minorem*. Originis enim quæstio est, quis *de quo* sit; æqualitatis autem, *qualis* aut *quantus* sit. *August. tom. viii. p. 718.*

Cum sit *gloria, sempiternitate, virtute, regno, potestate*, hoc quod Pater est; omnia tamen hæc *non sine auctore*, sicut Pater, Deus ex Patre tanquam Filius, sine initio et *æqualis* habet: et cum ipse sit omnium caput, ipsius tamen caput est Pater. *Ruffin. in Symb.*

Cum Pater omnia quæ habet gignendo dedit, *æqualem* utique genuit, quoniam nihil minus dedit: quomodo ergo tu dicis, quia ille *dedit*, ille *accepit*, ideo *æqualem* Filium Patri non esse; cum eum cui data sunt omnia et ipsam *æqualitatem* videas accepisse? *August. contr. Maxim. lib. ii. cap. 14. p. 707.*

sage. But no matter. I question whether you can bring any thing of Origen's, that is of *better*, or indeed so *good* authority; considering how carefully Athanasius's Works have been preserved, how negligently most of Origen's, and how much they have been *corrupted*; as the best critics allow. Will you produce me any MSS. of Origen, above the age of Athanasius? Or will you assure us that later scribes were more faithful in copying than he? To pass on; you think however that the passage cited from Origen is "nothing to my purpose;" it does not show that the Son is the *one supreme God*. But it shows enough to infer it, though it does not directly say it. It shows that, in Origen's opinion, the *image* must be perfectly like the *prototype*; both alike *invisible*, and like *eternal*: so far he is *express*; and his premises infer a great deal more, by parity of reason. Wherefore Origen, in his book against Celsus, carries the argument up to a formal *equality in greatness*. His words are^s, "The God and Father of all is not, according to us, the only one that is *great*. For he hath imparted even his *greatness* to his only begotten, begotten before the creation: that he being the *image* of the invisible God, might keep up the resemblance of the Father, even in *greatness*. For it was not possible for him to be (if I may so speak) a commensurate and fair image of the invisible God, without copying out his *greatness*."

Now to me it seems, that this and the other passage of Origen are both very much to my purpose. For Origen was never weak enough to imagine that there were *two Gods*, equal in *invisibility*, in *eternity*, in *greatness*: but that the Father and Son, thus *equal* to each other,

^r Εἰ ἴσται εἰκὼν τῷ Θεῷ τοῦ ἀοράτου, ἀόρατος, εἰκὼν. ἐγὼ δὲ τολμήσας προσθήσειν αὐτῷ, ἵνα καὶ ἰμοίωσιν τυχράνοι τῷ πατρὶ, οὐκ ἔστιν δεῖ οὐκ ἦν. Orig. apud Athan. p. 233.

^s Οὐ μόνος δὲ μέγας καὶ ἡμᾶς ἴσται ὁ τῶν ὄλων Θεὸς καὶ πατήρ· μετῴκει γὰρ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῆς μεγαλειότητος τῆ μονογενεῖ καὶ πρωτοτόκῃ πάσης κτίσεως· ἵνα, εἰκὼν αὐτὸς τυχράνοι τῷ ἀοράτῳ Θεῷ, καὶ ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ σώζῃ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ πατρὸς· οὐ γὰρ εἶεν ἦν εἶναι σύμμετρον (ἵν' ὅτως ἰμοίωσω) καὶ καλλὴν εἰκόνα τῷ ἀοράτῳ Θεῷ, καὶ τῷ μεγάλῳ πατρὶ ἴσται τὴν εἰκόνα. Orig. contr. Cels. p. 323.

were together the one God supreme. If you have any passages to allege to the contrary, out of Origen's less accurate, or perhaps *interpolated* works, they are by no means to be brought in competition with those I have cited: besides that most of them may admit of a fair and candid construction, as meaning no more than that the Father is naturally *prior* in order to the Son, or in *office* superior by mutual concert and agreement.

Nor shall I think myself obliged (which I mention once for all) to answer such testimonies as have been before completely answered by Bishop Bull; unless you have something *new* to add upon the subject. We shall have more concerning Origen in another place.

You proceed to Dionysius of Alexandria, (p. 71.) whom I had also cited in relation to Heb. i. 3. You call it citing at *second hand*, because out of Athanasius. May not any writings whatever be almost with equal justice said to be cited at *second hand*? They must be conveyed to us by some hand or other: and we cannot be more certain of any parts of old writings than we are of these parts especially which were long ago cited, higher up than any MSS. now reach. But enough of this trifling. You bring up again the stale pretence about what Basil and Photius said of Dionysius: which has been answered over and over, by considerable writers^t. This is what you ought not to have concealed from your reader. You observe farther, that Dionysius does not draw the *same inference* from the text that I do, viz. that the Son is the "one supreme God." Very true: neither should I draw that inference, if I was only proving the *eternity* of God the Son; but I should stop there. However, if there be occasion to advance farther, nothing is easier than from the *coeternity* to deduce all that I desire, viz. that the Father and Son are together the one God *supreme*: which is

^t Bull. Def. Fid. Nic. p. 142. Mr. Thirby's Answer to Mr. Whiston's Suspicions, p. 91; &c. Ruinart. Act. Mart. p. 181. Le Moyne, Not. ad var. Sacr. p. 235. Athanasius de Sententia Dionysii.

indeed the plain certain doctrine of the same Dionysius, in the same treatise. "The undivided Monad we extend to a Triad, and again the undiminished Triad we contract into a Monad." Now, I beseech you, what is his *Monad*, but the *one God supreme*? And what doth it consist of, but of *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, according to this excellent writer?

My next authority was Alexander of Alexandria^x; whom, you say, I cite out of Athanasius. You should have said, out of Montfaucon's edition of Athanasius's works, into which he has inserted this epistle of Alexander. The reader perhaps otherwise may suspect that this was again at *second hand*, as you would call it, from Athanasius. Well, what have you to say to the thing? It amounts, you think, to no more than what Arius himself might have said, viz. that the Son is not (ἀνόμοιος τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῷ πατρὸς) of *unlike substance to the Father*. You should have added the other words by me cited, εἰκὼν τελεία καὶ ἀπαύγασμα τῷ πατρὸς, *the perfect image and shining forth of the Father*. Which I believe neither Arius, nor yourself would be willing to admit. However, Arius had denied that the Son was ὅμοιος τῇ οὐσίᾳ, *of like substance with the Father*; as appears from that very epistle^y. And neither Arius nor you would have said ἀπαύγασμα τοῦ πατρὸς, but ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης τοῦ πατρὸς, which kind of expression Dr. Clarke contends for in opposition to the other. You proceed to cite a pretty large passage from Alexander's other epistle in Theodoret, to show, as you pretend, that "he has nothing agreeable to my notion;" though the whole epistle is exactly agreeable to my notion, and indeed contains it. Alexander no where says, with you,

^x Οὕτω μὲν ἡμῶς εἰς τὴν τριάδα τὴν μονάδα πλατύνομεν ἀδιαίρετον, καὶ τὴν τριάδα πάλιν ἀμείωτον εἰς τὴν μονάδα συγκαταλαμβάνομεν. *Dionys. Alex. apud Athanas.* vol. i. p. 255.

^x Πῶς ἀνόμοιος τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῷ πατρὸς, ὃ ὡν εἰκὼν τελεία καὶ ἀπαύγασμα τῷ πατρὸς; *Alexand. Alexand. Ep. inter Op. Athanas.* p. 399.

^y Among Arius's tenets, this is one. Ὅστι δὲ ὅμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν τῷ πατρὶ ἴσιν. *Ibid.* p. 396.

that the Father *alone* has “supreme authority, sovereignty, “and dominion:” he was too wise and too good a man to *divide* the Son from the Father. He expresses their *inseparability*^z in all things, in very full and express terms; together with the Son’s *necessary existence*^a, and *supreme divinity*^b; blaming the Arians for laying hold of Christ’s acts of submission, and condescension, in order to sink and lessen it. All you can find in this writer that looks for your purpose is, that the prerogative of *unbegotten* belongs to the Father, (which I also constantly maintain,) and that the Son was neither *unbegotten*, nor *created*, but between both: which Alexander observes, in opposition to the Arians, who pretended there was no *medium*, but that the Son must be either *unbegotten* or a *creature*. You cite part of this passage, but omit what would have shown fully the sense of the author; which runs thus:

“For these inventors of idle tales (the Arians) pretend, “that we, who reject their impious and unscriptural “blasphemy against Christ, as being from nothing, assert “two *unbegotten* Beings: alleging, very ignorantly, that “one of these two we must of necessity hold; either that “he (Christ) is *from nothing*, or that there must be two “*unbegotten* Beings. Unthinking men! Not to consider “the great distance there is between the *unbegotten* Fa- “ther, and the things *created* by him out of nothing, (as “well rational as irrational,) betwixt which two, comes “in the intermediate *only-begotten* nature of God the “*Word*, by whom the Father made all things out of “nothing^c.”

^z Ἀλλήλων ἀχώριστα πράγματα δύο, τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱόν, &c. *Alexand. Epist. Ap. Theod.* lib. i. cap. 4. p. 12. Μεταξὺ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ οὐδὲν—διάστημα, οὐδ’ ἄχρι τινὸς ἰσότητος ταῦτο φαντασιῶσαι τῆς ψυχῆς δυναμένης. *Ibid.*

^a Ἀριστοι τοῦτοι καὶ ἀναλλοίωτοι ὡς τὸν πατέρα, ἀπροσδιῆ καὶ τέλειον υἱόν—μόνη τῇ ἀγιότητι λοιπόμενοι ἰκίνα. p. 18. Τὸ γὰρ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης μὴ εἶναι λίγην, συναίρει καὶ τὸ πρῶτόνσουον φῶς, οὐ εἶναι ἀπαύγασμα. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν τῷ θεῷ οὐκ ἦν αἰ, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ οὐ εἶναι εἰκὼν, ἴσιν αἰ. p. 14.

^b Ἡ υἰότης αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν τυγχάνουσα τῆς πατρικῆς Διότητος, &c. p. 14. Τῆς ἀνωτάτου καὶ ἀρχῆθεν αὐτοῦ Διότητος, p. 16.

^c Φασι γὰρ ἡμᾶς οἱ φληνάφων ἰφωρεται μύθων, ἀποσερφεμένους τὴν ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων

I see nothing in this passage, but what I can heartily assent to; understanding by nature, *person*, as Alexander himself understood it; which Valesius observes. One thing the reader may remark, that the main principle upon which you and your friends found all your opposition to the doctrine of a *coequal* and *coeternal* Trinity, is no other than what you have borrowed from the ancient Arians; and which Alexander, in this passage, severely condemns; namely, that God the Son cannot be God in the strict and proper sense, unless he be *unoriginate* and *self-existent*, as the *unbegotten* Father himself; there being, as you conceive, no *medium* between *self-existence*, in the highest sense, and *precarious* existence: that is, in plain words, (though you love to disguise it,) between being *unbegotten*, and being a *creature*. And thus we have done with Heb. i. 3. Some Post-Nicene writers I had added, not to “make a show,” as you frowardly and falsely suggest; but, as you very well knew, to correct your *wonder*, and your representing it before as *strange*, and *new*, to offer this text in proof of Christ’s *divinity*.

You have not been able, we see, to invalidate the force of those few texts, laid down in this Query, with design to prove that Christ is *not excluded*, by any texts of the Old Testament, or New, from being *one God* with the Father, but necessarily included in the one *God supreme*. To these I might add many other texts, signifying that the Father and Son are *one*; that the Son is *in the Father*, and the Father *in him*; that he who hath seen *one*, has therein seen the *other* also; that the Son is in the *bosom* of the *Father*, and as intimate as *thought to mind*; that *all things* which the *Father* hath are the *Son’s*; and that *whatsoever* the *Father* doth, the *Son* doth likewise;

ἀποτῆ καὶ ἄγραφον κατὰ χριστοῦ βλασφημίαν, ἀγίνητα δδάσκου δύο, δυῶν θάτεροι
 λόγουσι δὲν εἶναι οἱ ἀπαίδευτοι, ἢ ἐξ οὗ ἐνταν αὐτοὶ εἶναι φρονεῖν, ἢ πάντως ἀγίνητα
 λόγου δύο ἀγνοοῦντες οἱ ἀπίστηται, ὡς μακρὸν ἂν εἴη μεταξὺ πατρὸς ἀγνήτου, καὶ
 τοῦ κτισθέντων ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ἐξ οὗ ἐνταν, λογικῶν τε καὶ ἀλόγων. ὡν μισοτιτύουσα φύσει
 ποικιλῆς, δὲ ἥς τὰ θλα ἐξ οὗ ἐνταν ἐκρίθησιν ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ θιαῦ λόγου, &c. p. 17, 18.

See Bull, sect. iii. cap. 9. n. 11. Animad. in Gilb. Clerke, p. 1027.

that they are represented as *one temple*, Rev. xxi. 22. and as having *one throne*, Rev. xxii. 1. and as making *one light*, Rev. xxi. 23. These and many other considerations, suggested in Scripture, serve to confirm and illustrate the same thing. But it is now time to examine your pretended *counter-evidence* drawn from Scripture: after the discussion of which, we may come regularly to our inquiry into the sense of *antiquity* upon this head.

You had produced John xvii. 3. 1 Cor. viii. 6. Eph. iv. 6. which prove that the Father is styled, sometimes, the *one God*, or *only true God*; and that he is God of the Jews, of Abraham, &c. I asked, how those texts proved that the Son *was not*? You say, (p. 26.) “very plainly.” Let us hear how. You add, “Can the Son of the God of Abraham, (Acts iii. 13.) be himself *that God* of Abraham, who glorified his Son?” But why must you here talk of *that God*, as it were in opposition to *this God*, supposing *two Gods*; that is, supposing the thing in question? If I allow that there is a *this God*, and a *that God*, or *two Gods*; you can prove, it seems, that *two Gods* are not *one God*. Very ingenious! But if I tell you that *this divine Person* is not *that divine Person*, and yet both are *one God*; the quibble is answered. You are very often at this kind of play: and therefore it may be here proper to say something more to it. Let us make trial of the like argumentation in another case. It is the Doctor’s principle, as hath been observed, that the divine substance is infinitely *extended*, and yet the *same substance* every where. Let us now argue much after the same manner as you do against me; *this divine substance* here on earth is not *that divine substance* which fills heaven: for *this* and *that* cannot be the *same*. It is but repeating the argument, and one may prove that the Divine Being, according to the Doctor, consists of an infinite number of *different substances*, no two *parts* whatever being the *same substance*. Such is the force of your logic, by the help of *this* and *that*. But if the Doctor, on the other hand, can allow that the substance may be the *same*, where there is

a distinction of *this* and *that*; then give us leave to take the benefit of the Doctor's own principles; and to conclude in the present case, that *Father* and *Son* may be *one substance, one Being, or one God*, notwithstanding the distinction of *this* Person and *that* Person. Having once fully answered your quibble, you will not, I hope, expect that I should do it again and again, as often as you get into this trifling way. It will be sufficient just to hint to the reader, that you are again playing, as usual, with *this* and *that*; and so to dismiss it. Now let us proceed. You ask farther, upon Acts iii. 13. "Can the one supreme God be exalted, or glorified by another?" In answer to which I refer you to my fifth Sermon. You add, is it not true, that "the less is blessed of the greater?" But what has *benediction* to do with *exaltation* and *glorification*? I am weary of answering such things.

You come to take off the answer I had made to such texts as style the Father the *only God*, &c. I had said, he was not so styled in *opposition* to the Son, or to *exclude* him from being the *one God*. That is, say you, "The Father, though *expressly distinguished*, is still both *Father and Son*." That is your mistake: we do not say, that in these, or the like instances, both persons are included in the term *Father*; but that the exclusive terms, *alone*, or *only*, are not to be so rigorously interpreted, as to leave no room for *tacit* exceptions. To make this a little plainer to you.

Rev. xix. 12. it is said of the Son, "He had a name written, which *οὐδεις, no person*, knew but himself." This was not said in *opposition* to the Father, or as *excluding* him from that knowledge: for, it is still *tacitly* supposed, that he *knew* as much as the Son; and no question could be made of it. This is not *including Father and Son* under the term *Son*; but is *speaking* of one only, *abstracting* from the consideration of not *excluding* the other. I had said, that the *Father* is *primarily*, not *exclusively*, the one true God. You do not understand

primarily: I am sorry for it. *First* in order, *first* in conception, God *unbegotten* and proceeding *from none*, as distinguished from God *begotten* and *proceeding*. You add, that "when *one person* is in *any* respect declared to "be the *only*, &c. he must needs be so, *exclusively* of all "others, in *that sense* wherein he is declared to be the "only, &c. otherwise there is no *certainty* or *use* in language." That is to say, since *no one knoweth the Father, but the Son*, the Father must be *excluded* from *knowing* in the same, or in so high a sense: and if *no one* knoweth the things of God but *the Spirit*, both Father and Son are *excluded* from *knowing* in so high a sense, or in the same sense. And if *no one* knew the *name written* but the *Son himself*, both the *Father* and the *Holy Ghost* must be *excluded* from *knowing*; "otherwise there is no *certainty* or *use* in language."

And if Christ be styled by the primitive Fathers, as he often is, (see my Sermons, vol. i. p. 82.) the *only Judge*, the *only Lord*, the *only God*, the *only King*; the Father must be excluded from being *Judge*, *Lord*, *King*, or *God*, in such a *sense* as those authors intended of God the Son: "otherwise there is no *certainty* or *use* in language." But I think the use of language and custom of speech, in all authors I have met with, has gone upon this rule, or maxim, that *exclusive* terms are always to be understood in *opposition* only to what they are *opposed* to, and not in *opposition* to what they are *not opposed* to: and there is both *use* and *certainty* enough in *language*, in this way, so long as men are blessed with any tolerable share of common sense, and are but capable of understanding the design, drift, or purport of any speaker or writer. I see where your confusion lies: and if you will bear a while with me, I will endeavour to help you out of it. I consider the matter thus: the *God of Israel* (be it Father, or Son, or both, or the whole Trinity) is styled the *one God*, God in the strict and *emphatical* sense of the word *God*, in opposition to *creature-Gods*; which are none of them Gods in the same sense of the word *God*.

Here you will observe that I lay the *emphasis* upon the sense of the word *God*: and in this very *highest* and most *emphatical* sense of the word, I suppose as well *Son* and *Holy Ghost*, as the *Father*, to be *God*.

Again, the *Father* may be *emphatically* styled the *only God*, because of his *emphatical* manner of existing. Here I lay the whole *emphasis* upon the *manner* of existing, existing *from none*. Either *Son* or *Holy Ghost* is *God* in the very *highest sense*, in the *same sense* of the word *God*, but not in the same *emphatical manner*. If therefore the *emphasis* be laid upon the sense of the word *God*, every person of the three is *emphatically God*, in opposition to *creature-Gods*: but if the *emphasis* be laid upon the *manner* of existing, the *Father* only is *God* in that *emphatical* manner, and for that very reason is most frequently styled, in Scripture and antiquity too, the *only God*. I perceive, you do not distinguish between being *God* in a *different sense* of the word *God*, and being *God* in a *different manner*, though in the *same sense* of the word: and hence arises your perplexity upon this head. I will give you one example, out of many, which may help to illustrate the case. The *Father* is *Spirit*, and the *Son* is *Spirit*; but yet the *Holy Ghost* is *emphatically the Spirit*. Not that he is *Spirit* in any *higher*, or any *different sense* of the word *Spirit*; but upon other accounts, the name of *Spirit* is *emphatically* and more peculiarly attributed to him. In like manner, the *Father* is *God*, the *Son* *God*, and the *Holy Ghost* *God*; yet the *Father* is *emphatically the one God*. Not that he is *God* in any *higher*, or any *different sense* of the word *God*: but upon other accounts, (either as he is *first known*, or as being most *universally* acknowledged^d, or chiefly as being *first*

^d Quin et illud observatione dignum est, Judæos per id tempus, ut erant rudes et occæcati, solum Deum agnovisse quem Patrem suum esse Christus docuerat—idcirco Joh. viii. sic illos Christus alloquitur: “ Est Pater meus, qui glorificat me, quem vos dicitis quia Deus vester est, et non cognovistis eum.” Itaque de hoc ipso Deo, quem Judæi animo capiebant, necnon Judaizantes hæretici plerique, ad quos dedocendos vel refutandos Johannes

Personæ, and *head* of the other two,) the name of *God*, or *only God*, has been emphatically and more peculiarly appropriated to him. These things being cleared, and set right, let us now pass on. What you have, p. 27, 28. about the Son's being *sent*, considered even in his divine nature, I readily admit, and never doubted of. Neither do I dispute but that he that *sends*, is for that very reason *greater* than him that is *sent*; greater in respect of *office* voluntarily entered into; and greater in respect of natural *order of priority*, which made it proper for one to submit to the *inferior* office rather than the other. And therefore I have not scrupled, after Cyprian, Novatian, Athanasius, Basil, and others, in my Sermons ^f, to admit that the *Son* is *greater* than the *Holy Ghost*; of which, if you please, see a full and brief account, in a book referred to in the margin ^g.

Your testimonies therefore upon that head might have been spared, as containing nothing contradictory to me: unless perhaps Eusebius, or the Council of Sirmium (neither of which are of any great authority with me) might strain the notion rather too far; as it is certain you do.

You go on to 1 Cor. viii. 6. where you say the Son is in the most *express words* excluded. Excluded from being *one God* with the Father? Where? Show me the *express words*, if you can. I say, the Father is there *emphatically* styled the *one God*; and the reason of it is intimated, because *of him* are all things; whereas in respect of the

ista scribebat, loqui sic necesse habuit, ut diceret verbum erat *αὐτὸς τὸ θεῖον*, hoc est apud *illum Deum*, quem vos, O Judæi et hæretici, solum novistis. *Petav. Dogm. Theol.* tom. v. part 2. p. 352. lib. xvi. cap. 4.

* *Salvo enim Filio*, recte *unicum Deum* potest determinasse, cujus est Filius. Non enim desinit esse qui habet Filium *ipse unicus*, suo scilicet nomine, quotiens sine Filio nominatur. Sine Filio autem nominatur cum *principaliter* determinatur. ut *prima persona*, quæ ante Filii nomen erat proponenda, quia pater ante cognoscitur, et post patrem filius nominatur. *Tertul. contr. Prax.* cap. 18.

^f Sermon vi. vol. ii. p. 114.

^g Leo Allatius's Notes upon Methodius, p. 102. in Fabricius's second volume of Hippolytus.

Son, they are only *by him*: which shows a difference of order betwixt them, in existing and operating. And this is all you can make of 1 Cor. viii. 6. However, as all things are *by the Son*, as well as *of the Father*; it appears from that very passage, that they are *both one Creator*, one *joint-cause* of all things. But of this text I have said more in my Sermons^h. You wonder *I should not see in* 1 Cor. viii. 6. “that if the one Lord is included in the one “God,” (*there spoken of*, you should have added,) “the “whole reasoning of the Apostle is quite taken away.” But it is easy to answer, that *one God* there is taken *personally*: and so I do not pretend that it there stands both for Father and Son, but for Father only; as *one Lord* is also taken there *personally* for the Son only. Nevertheless, the giving the name sometimes to one singly, is no argument that the *same name* may not also justly belong to both together. On the contrary, it is certain, that if both are joined in the same one *common Godhead*, either of them singly has a right to be called the *one God*, not excluding the other from the same right.

What you add about *Sabellianism*, I pass over here as foreign. Your quotation from Bp. Pearson is shamefully abusing your reader, while you conceal what would have shown that the Bishop’s notion was diametrically opposite to yours. I have set down his words aboveⁱ. As to Origen’s way of solving the *Unity*, it will be seen hereafter to be directly contrary to yours; as are also the Ante-Nicene Fathers in general, as will be seen presently. Eusebius I reckon not with the Ante-Nicenes; unless you will take in Athanasius too, who has two treatises written before any books now extant of Eusebius. What I had said of Novatian, stood corrected in my two later editions of my Defence, which you might have been so fair as to look into. I say, if Novatian did not mean that Christ was *God* in the same sense with the Father, and *only God* as well as the Father, it will be

^h Serm. ii. vol. ii. p. 28, 29, &c.

ⁱ Page 45.

hard to make out the sense or connection of his inference^k from John xvii. 3. His reasoning is plainly this; that when our Lord said, "They might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent," his joining himself to the Father in that manner shows that he must be *God also*. The strength of his argument lies only in the conjunction *and*: there are but two constructions of it; either thus, Know thee, *and also* know Jesus Christ, (according to which there is nothing like an argument, at least not according to Novatian,) or else thus, Thee the only true God, *and also* Jesus Christ. Thus indeed the text does afford an argument of Christ's being *God*, and *only God* too. For it comes to this, that the Father, *and also* Christ, is the *only true God*. And thus Ambrose^l reasons upon that text, much after the same way with Novatian: as also do Athanasius^m and Austinⁿ. Wherefore I do not see that I have at all misrepresented the sense of Novatian. What you farther pretend from other parts of his treatise is by no means made out: all being easily reconciled upon the foot of the Son's *subordination* as a Son, or his voluntary *condescensions*, without the least diminution of his supreme authority, naturally

^k Si noluisse se etiam *Deum* intelligi, cur addidit, et quem misisti Jesum Christum, nisi quoniam et *Deum* accipi voluit: quoniam si se *Deum* nollet intelligi, addidisset, et quem misisti hominem Jesum Christum; nunc autem neque addidit, nec se hominem nobis tantummodo Christus tradidit, sed *Deo junxit*, ut et *Deum* per hanc conjunctionem, sicut est, intelligi vellet. Est ergo credendum in Dominum, unum verum deum, et in eum quem misit Jesum Christum consequenter: qui se nequaquam patri, ut diximus, junxisset, nisi *Deum* quoque intelligi vellet. *Novat.* cap. 14.

^l " Ut cognoscat te solum verum Deum, et quem misisti Jesum Christum;" conjunctione illa Patrem utique copulavit et Filium, ut Christum verum Deum a majestate Patris nemo secernat: nunquam enim conjunctio separat. *Ambrosii de Fid.* lib. v. cap. 1. Compare Hilary, p. 815.

^m Athanas. Orat. iii. p. 558.

ⁿ " Et quem misisti Jesum Christum." Subaudiendum est, " unum verum Deum;" et ordo verborum est, " ut te et quem misisti Jesum Christum cognoscat unum verum Deum." *Augustini de Trin.* lib. vi. cap. 9. p. 849.

Petavius remarks, that Novatian's was the same with St. Austin's. *Petavius de Trin.* lib. ii. cap. 4.

and essentially adhering to him. But Novatian shall be more distinctly and accurately considered in the sequel. You tell me, p. 36. that the Nicene Creed professes the Father to be *the one God*; as if any one questioned it, or thought it of any weight in the controversy! Do not I also profess the same thing? You add farther, that even the Post-Nicene writers referred the title of *ὁ μόνος ἀληθινὸς Θεός*, *the only true God*, to the Father only, (which is a mistake °;) but what if they did? Then they reserved some peculiar titles to the Father, by way of *eminency*, to distinguish the *first* Person of the *Godhead*: and that is all. And if the Post-Nicene writers, notwithstanding their reserving some peculiar and eminent titles to the Father, yet believed all the three Persons to be the *one God*; why should the reserving of the same, or like titles to the Father, among the Ante-Nicenes, be made any argument against their having the *same* faith with those that came after? What you say of Epiphanius, (p. 37.) that he understood the words *τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν Θεὸν*, in John xvii. 3. of the *Father only*, is true: but you are prodigiously out in your account, when you pretend from the same Epiphanius, that *ὁ ἀληθινὸς Θεός*, *the true God*, in 1 John v. 20. “was in his time universally understood of the Father.” Athanasius quotes the words seven times; constantly understanding them of God the Son: Basil applies them in the same manner †. So also do Ambrose, Jerome,

° I think it not worth while to search particularly for a thing of little or no weight. But so far as I remember, the title of *only true God*, is very often applied by the Post-Nicene writers to all the Persons together; though perhaps rarely to any *single* Person, except the Father. Two instances of the latter may here suffice.

Ὁ γὰρ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος μόνος υἱὸς ἀληθῆς, διὸ καὶ μονογενὴς διὰ τὸ μόνος εἶναι υἱὸς ὡς ὁ πατήρ. Athanas. in Psal. Nov. Collect. p. 83.

Est ergo *solus et verus Deus Filius*; hæc enim et Filio prerogativa deferitur. Ambros. de Fid. lib. v. cap. 2. p. 556.

As to the want of the *article*, it is of no moment, since the words without the article are as full and expressive of the Catholic sense of the Son's *divinity* as possible.

† See the places referred to, Sermon. vi. vol. ii. p. 127.

Faustinus, and Didymus. These were all contemporaries of Epiphanius. And I have not yet met with so much as one ancient writer that ever understood those words in 1 Joh. v. 20. of *God the Father*. Cyril of Alexandria, Austin, Fulgentius, Vigilius, Eugenius, and the rest that wrote in the age next to Epiphanius's, interpret the text the same way: and if Epiphanius did otherwise, he is very *singular* in it, and his judgment of very little weight, against so many considerable authors his contemporaries. But it is as wild a consequence as ever was drawn, that because Epiphanius did not insist upon this text, where he had occasion, therefore all the other Fathers, (though we have their own words to vouch the contrary,) understood that place of *God the Father*. Mr. Whiston, whose zeal sometimes transports him, yet did not care to come up to your lengths in this matter; being content only to say, that "Epiphanius was utterly a stranger to the Athanasian *exposition* 4:" which perhaps may be very true; and to the Arian exposition also. For I will frankly own, I am inclinable to suspect, that Epiphanius made use of some faulty copy which had not the word Θεός, but ἀληθινός only; though I have not observed that any other Greek writer had any such faulty copy. But it is certain, that some Latins read, *hic est verus, et vita æterna*. Hilary^r for one: and probably Faustinus, though the present editions have *Deus*: and there is a Latin treatise among the supposititious pieces ascribed to Athanasius^s, which reads the text the same way. The author, probably, Idatius Lemicensis, about the year 458.

You have something more to say on 1 Cor. viii. 6. in page 38. But, I think, I need not add any thing to what I have before said, referring also to my Sermons.

The next text we are to consider is Eph. iv. 6. "One God and Father of all, who is above all, and through

4 Whiston's Reply to Lord Nottingham, p. 35. Append. p. 47.

r Hilarius, p. 908. ed. Bened.

s Athanasii Opera Suppos. p. 608. ed. Bened.

“all, and in you all:” a passage which, I said, had by the *ancients* been generally understood of the whole Trinity. Upon which you say, “a man must have a strange opinion of the ancients, who can think so.” Your reason is, because he is there distinguished from the *one Spirit*, and the only *Lord*. And what if the *one Lord*, and one *Spirit* be there first distinctly named, I see no absurdity in afterwards mentioning and summing up the three Persons in the *one God*, under a threefold consideration of *above all, through all, and in all*. But we are not now inquiring into the sense of the text, but into the sentiments of the *ancients* upon it, whose testimonies I have now given in one view in the margin^t. As to Irenæus, you deny that he understands the text of the *Trinity*; referring to Dr. Clarke’s Reply to Mr. Nelson, p. 71. In return for which I refer to *True Scripture Doctrine continued*, p. 67, 103. Nor is there any thing more absurd in this construction of Irenæus, than there is in his often reckoning the Son and Holy Ghost to the Father, as being his very *self* in a qualified sense. Indeed, nothing is more common than for the *head* of a family, suppose Abraham, to be understood in a stricter or larger sense;

^t Unus Deus Pater ostenditur, qui est “super omnia, et per omnia, et in omnibus.” Super omnia quidem Pater, et ipse est caput Christi: per omnia autem Verbum, et ipse est Caput Ecclesiæ: in omnibus autem nobis Spiritus, &c. *Iren.* p. 315.

Οικονομία συμφωνίας συνάγεται εις ἕνα Θεόν, εις γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ Θεός. Ὁ γὰρ κελύων πατὴρ, ὁ δὲ ὑπακῶν υἱός, τὸ δὲ συντίζον ἅγιον πνεῦμα. Ὁ ὢν πατὴρ ἐστὶ πάντων, ὁ δὲ υἱός διὰ πάντων, τὸ δὲ ἅγιον πνεῦμα ἐν πᾶσι. ἄλλως τε ἕνα Θεόν νομίζουσι μὴ δυναμένα, ἢ ἂν μὴ ἦεντος πατρὸς καὶ υἱῶ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος αἰσιτύσωμεν. *Hippol. contr. Noët.* p. 16.

Εἰς Θεός ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ κηρύσσεται, ὁ ἐστὶ πάντων, καὶ διὰ πάντων, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι ἐπὶ πάντων μὴν ὡς πατὴρ, ὡς ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ, διὰ πάντων δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἐν πᾶσι δὲ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ. *Athanas.* p. 676.

Diversitas autem præpositionum, in quibus dicitur; “unus Deus, et Pater omnium, qui super omnes, et per omnes, et in omnibus,” diversam intelligentiam sapit. *Super omnes* enim est Deus Pater, quia Auctor est omnium. *Per omnes* Filius, quia cuncta transcurrit, vaditque per omnia: *In omnibus* Spiritus Sanctus, quia nihil absque eo est. *Hiero. in locum*, tom. iv. part 1. p. 362.

either as denoting his own proper person, or as denoting himself and all his descendants considered as contained in him, and reckoned to him. There is therefore nothing strange or absurd in it, if the *ancients* sometimes considered God the *Father*, the *Head* of both the other Persons, either in a more restrained, or more enlarged signification: it is fact that they did so, as will be seen presently.

You proceed to Hippolytus, and speak of his *spuriousness* with as much confidence, as if you were able to prove it: of which more in the sequel. You tell me also that "he is against me;" though I think he is clearly for me, and that the Father who *gives orders*, the Son who *executes*, and the Holy Ghost who *finishes*, are, with him, *one God*, as plainly as words can make it, both before and after: which I leave to the learned reader to judge of. Only I may add, in confirmation of Hippolytus's comment on Eph. iv. 6. that he^u, as well as Tertullian^x and Irenæus, considers the *Father* sometimes in a *restrained* sense, for the Person of the Father, and sometimes in a *larger*, as containing both the other Persons. Neither is Athanasius against me, as you pretend, but directly for me, when he is justly translated, without your *interpolations*. "In the Church, there is preached *one God*, who "is *above all*, and *through all*, and *in all*. *Above all*, as "Father, as Head, and Fountain; and *through all* by the "Word; and *in all* by the Holy Spirit." You, by putting in *he* in one place, and *his* twice, have endeavoured to pervert the author's true meaning; as if Athanasius had been speaking of the *Father* all the way, when the *one God* is his subject, and he is showing how the *one God* is considered in the several Persons of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

What you have farther in page 40, 41. betrays either

^u εἰ δὲ πᾶν πατρὸς, ἐξ οὗ δύναιμι λόγος. Hipp. p. 14.

^x Unus omnia, dum ex uno omnia, per substantias scilicet unitatem. Tertull. contr. Prax. c. 2.

Pater tota substantia est; Filius vero derivatio et portio totius. Ibid. c. 9.

such strange confusion of thought, or such a peculiar talent at misrepresenting, that I hardly know what to say to it. But I must make some short strictures upon it. I had said, some texts are meant of Christ as *Mediator*; upon which you gravely tell me, that the one *Mediator* is not a *part* of Christ, but the *same Christ*, the *same Person incarnate*, and *Mediator* in respect of both natures. I hope you will remember this, when we come to speak of *mediatorial* worship, which by this account will appear to be strictly *divine* worship; since a *Mediator* is *God*, as well as *man*. But that by the way. I must however observe, that a *Mediator* is considered two ways, by *nature* or by *office*, as the Fathers distinguish. He is *Mediator* by *nature*, as partaking of both natures, *divine* and *human*: and *Mediator* by *office*, as transacting matters between God and man. The submitting to this *office* is a great instance of the Son's *condescension*; and if any low things be said of him considered as executing an *inferior* office, voluntarily undertaken, they affect not his real *inherent dignity*, or his *essential equality* in all things with the Father. It is not that he is really a *servant*, or *subject*, under the Father's *dominion*; but that he has been pleased to take upon him a *ministerial* part: so that now you may see how little pertinence or sense there is in your wide and loose talk (p. 41.) about *two Persons* in Christ, and about Cerinthus, or whatever else came into your head; to give you a handle to fill your margin with strange, frightful, impertinent quotations, to prejudice weak readers.

Your 43d, 44th, and 45th pages, containing little but *declamation*, I pass over: when you have any thing that looks like serious reasoning, I will attend you.

I have, I hope, sufficiently made it appear, that the texts which you brought to *exclude* the Son, prove nothing like it; as I before showed, that you could not answer the texts alleged to prove the contrary. I should now be willing to go regularly on to *antiquity*, after the method laid down above. But in your 25th

page, you have thrown some *metaphysical* jargon in my way, and of which you are so confident as to say, that unless I can reply to it, "all other things are to no purpose." This is the man that builds nothing upon *metaphysics*. Indeed, I cannot but wonder at your unaccountable conduct in this controversy. If you really think the *received* doctrine of the Trinity to be *absurd in itself*, and therefore *impossible* to be proved, why do you amuse us with *Scripture* and *Fathers*; as if the stress of the question lay there, when, according to you, it doth not? You should rather have wrote a *philosophical* dissertation to show, that the notion itself is contradictory, and such as no *Scripture* or *Fathers* can prove. This is really your meaning. And as the first question always is, whether a thing be *possible*, and next whether it be *true*; you should have begun with the point of the *possibility*, without meddling at all with *Scripture* or *Fathers*: which are impertinently brought in, while the question of the *possibility* remains in suspense. But if you resolve to put the cause upon *Scripture* and *Fathers*, then your *metaphysics*, which relate to the *possibility* of the doctrine, are very impertinent, and come out of place: because the *possibility* is to be always presupposed before we join issue upon *Scripture* and *antiquity*. But to leave you to take your own way, however peculiar or preposterous, let us examine a little into those marvellous subtilties, which you lay such weight upon. Your design is to prove that the *same God* is and must be the *same Person*, and that therefore *two* or more *Persons* cannot be *one God*. If you can make this out, the business is done at once; and our dispute is at an end. Several ways have been attempted by Dr. Clarke before, which now seem to be given up as unsatisfactory. It was once a principle, a maxim with him, that a person is a *being*, and that two individual beings cannot be one individual being. I have heard no more of this, since the Doctor has been apprised, that his own *hypothesis* of the divine substance being extended, could not stand with his famed maxim; every *part* of that substance being consi-

dered as *Being*, and yet all but *one Being*. The Doctor however, and you, still resolve to hold to your *conclusion* against the *Trinity*; and to seek for new *premises*, wherever you can find or make them. After some deliberation, comes out this *syllogism*:

There must be *identicalness* of *life*, to make the *same* God.

But three *different* Persons cannot have *identicalness* of *life*.

Therefore three *different* Persons cannot be the *same* God.

This *afterthought*, which has took you up so much time and pains, is at length good for nothing; except it be to set weak persons a musing upon the new thing, called *identical life*. Whatever it be, you might as well have formed twenty *syllogisms* as one, and all of the same value. For you might have argued, that three persons cannot have *identicalness* of power, or *identicalness* of will, or *identicalness* of wisdom; or, to say all in a word, *identicalness* of *essence*, which includes every thing. But when you have done your utmost, the main question, viz. what is or is not *identical*, stands just where it did, and you are not advanced a tittle farther than before. There is the same rule for *life*, and for every thing else you can invent, as there is for the *essence*. The *life* is *common* to all the Persons, as the *essence* is; and it is *identical* in all, y just as the *essence* is *identical*. So much for *syllogism*: pity it could be no more serviceable, in a case of extremity.

You are often puzzling your reader, and yourself, upon a very abstruse and intricate question; whether any thing, or what, can make two persons or more *one God*. The short of the case is this; the Christian Churches have collected from *Scripture*, that three Persons are *one God*:

† Propter unam eandemque naturam, atque *inseparabilem vitam*, ipsa Trinitas—intelligitur unus Dominus Deus noster. *August. Epist. x. ad Max.* p. 609.

and believing the thing to be *fact*, they have, according to the best of their judgment, resolved the *Unity* into *consubstantiality*, *inseparability*, and *Unity of origination*; finding, (or at least believing that they had found,) that *Scripture* had also signified the three things now mentioned. This account appears as probable as any; neither perhaps can human wit invent any thing beyond it. But still it must be said, that little depends upon stating the manner *how* the three Persons are conceived to be *one God*: the *fact* is the one material point. If *Scripture* really makes them expressly, or by necessary consequence, *one God*; I know not what men have to do to dispute about *intelligent agents*, and *identical lives*, &c. as if they understood better, than God himself does, what *one God* is; or as if *philosophy* were to direct what shall or shall not be *Tritheism*. Jews, and Pagans, and Heretics of several denominations, have often charged the Christian and Catholic doctrine of the *Trinity* with *Tritheism*. The Fathers of the Church have as constantly denied the charge; giving such reasons as I have mentioned, why it is not, and therefore should not be called, *Tritheism*. One general reason might have sufficed for all, viz. That the *Unity* of the *Trinity* is too strict and close to admit of the name or notion of *Tritheism*. This is ending the dispute at once, without farther inquiry into the nature of that *Unity*; unless the adversary can show (which is impossible) that *no Unity* whatever can be sufficient to make more Persons than one, *one Being*, *one Substance*, *one God*. If we are to build our faith on *Scripture*, such an *Unity* there may be, because there really is. *Philosophy*, falsely so called, may reclaim against it; but having no certain principle of reason to go upon, no rule whereby to judge, whether the *one God* be one Person or more; it is evident, that this point must at length be determined by *Scripture* alone; and that must be the true *Unity* of the Godhead, which *Scripture* (according to its most reasonable and natural construction) has given us for such.

But it is high time now to come to *antiquity*; which

has been so long staved off, and yet must make a great part of our discourse under this Query. I shaped out my method into four particulars, which may be seen above.

1. The first particular is, that the *ancients* have in accounting for the texts relating to the *Unity*, declared their judgment, that *idols* only, or *other Gods*, are thereby *excluded*, and not God the Son.

I cited Irenæus for this purpose, where he says, that the holy Scriptures declare, that the *alone* God, excluding *others*, made all things by his *Word*^z. That is, *other Gods* are excluded, not God the Son, who is not *another God*, according to Irenæus; as we shall see under the next article. I observed farther, that the Son and Holy Ghost are the very *self* of the Father, according to Irenæus; as the Father is also the *self*^a of them: wherefore it can never be imagined that either of them is excluded from the *one God*.

Let us go on to Clemens of Alexandria, who frequently teaches the same thing. He says, that “the Father of all things is alone perfect;” immediately adding, “for in him is the Son, and in the Son the Father^b.” This writer could never believe, that the *exclusive* terms were intended in opposition to *God the Son*. In another place, he says, “he that is the alone God, is also the alone just:” and soon after adds, that “he, (the Father) considered as Father, is called that only which he is, good; but as the Son, who is his Word, is in the Father, he is styled just, on account of the mutual relation to each other^c.”

^z Universæ Scripturæ—unum et solum Deum, ad excludendos *alios*, prædicent omnia fecisse per verbum suum, &c. *Iren.* lib. ii. cap. 27. p. 155.

^a Si enim existens in Patre cognoscit, hunc in quo est, hoc est *semetipsum*, non ignoret. *Iren.* p. 139.

Fecit ea per *semetipsum*, hoc est per *Verbum* et *Sapientiam* suam. p. 163.

Fecit ea per *semetipsum*: hoc est per *Verbum* et *Sapientiam* suam. Adest enim ei semper *Verbum* et *Sapientia*, *Filius* et *Spiritus*, per quos et in quibus omnia libere et sponte fecit. p. 253.

^b Ἀπιδίξασιν—μόνος δι ἵνα εἴλωσι τὸν πατέρα τῶν ἄλων ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ὁ υἱός, καὶ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ ὁ πατήρ. *Clem. Alex.* p. 129.

^c Αὐτός μόνος ὢν Θεός, καὶ δίκαιός ἐστιν ὁ αὐτός καὶ μόνος—καθὼ μὲν πατήρ

A few pages lower, he observes that "no one is good, but the Father;" adding presently after, that "the God of the universe is one only, good, just, Creator, *the Son* "in the Father, to whom be glory^d, &c." What a stranger must Clemens have been to your *novel* divinity, whereby you would *exclude* the Son from being *one God* with the Father?

Tertullian's doctrine in this point is very well known, and that he expressly interprets the *exclusive* terms in opposition to *idols* only, or *false Gods*, or *other Gods*; not to God the Son, who is not *another God*^e. And so now I may come to the proof of my second article.

2. That the *ancients* always declared against admitting *another God*, and denied constantly that the Son was *another God*.

Justin M. in his Dialogue with Trypho^f, declares, that there never was nor will be (*ἄλλος Θεός*) *another God* besides the Maker of the universe. And in a fragment cited by Irenæus, he says, he could not have given credit even to our Lord himself, had he preached up any *other God* (*ἄλλον Θεόν*) besides the *Creator*^g.

Irenæus is very express to the same purpose in more places than one, declaring against admitting *another God*^h.

νοῦται, ἀγαθὸς ὃν αὐτὸ μόνον ὁ ἴσθι κέλῃται ἀγαθός, καὶ δὲ οὐδὲ, ὡς ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ, ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ἴσθι, δικαίως προσμαρτυροῦνται, ἐν τῇ κρῆσι ἄλλαλα οὐκ ἴσθι. *Clem. Alex.* p. 140.

^d Οὐδὲς ἀγαθὸς εἰ μὴ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ—καταφανὲς ἐν τῷ συμπάντων Διὶ ἴσθι μόνον ἴσθι, ἀγαθὸς, δικαίως, δημιουργὸς, οὐδὲ ἐν πατρὶ, ἢ ἄ ἄλλα, &c. *Clem. Alex.* p. 142.

^e See my Defence, vol. i. p. 17, 18.

Itaque præter *semetipsum* non esse alium Deum; hoc propter idololatriam tam *nationum* quam *Israelis*: etiam propter *hæreticos*, qui sicut nationes *manibūs*, ita et ipsi *verbis* idola fabricantur, id est, alium Deum, et alium Christum. *Tert. contr. Prax.* cap. 18.

^f Just. M. Dial. p. 34. ed. Jeb. See this explained at large in my Reply to Dr. Whitby, IX. 1. &c. vol. ii.

^g Just. M. Fræ. . . p. 408. ed. Jeb.

^h *Alterum Deum*, præter eum qui est, non requiremus. *Iren.* p. 156.

Alterum Deum minime possitis ostendere, p. 157.

Nec tunc quidem oportuit *alterum Deum* annuntiari, p. 233.

And if you would know, how then he could consistently admit another Person to be God, besides the Father; he will tell you, as before seen, that the Son is considered as the very *self* of the Father, and that they are not *another* and *another* God ⁱ.

Tertullian is another voucher of the same thing. “There is,” says he, “one God, the Father; and there is none other besides him. By which he does not mean to exclude the Son, but *another* God; now the Son is not *another* besides the Father ^k.”

Origen shall be our next evidence; who in his famous piece against Celsus, (the most to be depended on, both for the uncorruptness of the copies, and the accuracy of the thoughts contained in it,) does in a very remarkable manner teach the same doctrine.

He having charged his adversary with the worship, not of one God, but of *Gods* ^l, (N. B.) though all the inferior deities were supposed *subordinate* to one supreme, comes afterwards to answer the like charge, retorted by Celsus ^m; the charge of worshipping *ἄλλον* (Θεόν), another God, besides the one supreme God. Now, how does Origen answer it? Plainly, by denying the fact, that the Christians did worship *ἄλλον*, *another*, (i. e. *God*), besides the God of the universe. His reason is, because Father and Son are *one* ⁿ. This was the only way he had to get off

ⁱ Non ergo *alius* erat qui cognoscebatur, et *alius* qui dicebat, *nemo cognoscit patrem*, sed unus et idem, omnia subjiciente ei Patre, et ab omnibus accipiens testimonium, quoniam vere homo, et vere Deus, &c. p. 235. *Vid: Massuet. Dissert. Præv.* p. 131.

^k Unus Deus, Pater, et *alius* absque eo non est: quod ipse inferens, non Filium negat, sed *alium* Deum. Cæterum *alius* a Patre Filium non est. *Tert. contr. Præx.* cap. 18.

^l Ἐκείνος δὲ πολλοὺς ἡμᾶς διδάσκων εἶπεν Θεοὺς, Θεῶν μᾶλλον ἄφελισι—λίγους βασιλείας, ἥτις Θεοῦ. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 385.

^m Εἰ μὴν δὲ μηδὲνα ἄλλον ἰδεράσκουσιν οὗτοι πλὴν ἑνα Θεοῦ, ἦν ἂν τις αὐτοῖς ἴσως πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτινὲς λόγους· οὐδὲ δὲ, &c. *Ibid.*

ⁿ Δικαίον δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο, εἶπαι νοοῦμαι ὁ Κέλσος τὸ, ἰγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἓν ἴσμεν καὶ τὸ ἐν εὐχῇ ἰρημίον ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν τῇ, ὡς ἰγὼ καὶ εὐ ἓν ἴσμεν ἂν ἂν ἦντο ἡμᾶς καὶ ἄλλοι θεομακίονι κατὰ τὸν ἰσὶ πᾶσι Θεῶν. N. B. After *ἄλλον* must be understood *Θεῶν*: for Origen could not pretend to say, that the Christians

the charge of worshipping *another God*, besides the Father, by taking both into *one*, and considering both as one in the worship. Wherefore he concludes, a little after, "we therefore worship, as before said, one God, the "Father and the Son." This was Origen's resolution of the grand point in debate, between Christians and Pagans, as to the charge of *Polytheism*; in answer to one of the sharpest adversaries the Christians ever had, in a solemn and accurate treatise, wrote in the name and in defence of the Church, wrote by the author then above sixty years old; and (as critics now agree) after he had been admonished by Fabian of Rome, for his want of caution at other times, and therefore was the more likely to keep strictly up to the sense of the Church, in an article especially of so momentous importance. He did not pretend that a *subordinate* God, purely because *subordinate*, would not be *another God*, or would not make *two Gods*: the Pagans, in that silly way, might have cleared themselves of the charge of *Polytheism*; as Origen well knew. He did not pretend to say, that the Father *only* was God, because God in a *high* sense, (which the Pagans could also have said of their *one supreme* God, and so have got clear of *Polytheism*;) but he answered upon the true and standing principles of the Christian Church, that Father and Son were *one God*, and the Son not *another God*. This acquitted the Christians of *Polytheism*, and left the charge fixed and unremovable upon the Pagans.

We have seen then that the *ancients* never would own *another God*, that they constantly declared against it; and even in the particular case of *God the Son*. It is to

worshipped no other *Person*, besides the Father, (when immediately after he owns, that they worshipped both Father and Son,) but only that they worshipped not *another God*; Son and Father being *one God*, as he also in the same place expressly asserts.

I may here add a passage out of the Acts of Pionius's Martyrdom; which have the appearance of being true and genuine.

Polemon, (rogat,) Quem Deum colis? Respondet, (Asclepiades,) Christum. Polemon. Quid ergo? Iste alter est? Respondit: Non; sed ipse quem et ipsi paulo ante confessi sunt. *Ruinart. Act. Martyr. p. 144.*

the same purpose, that they as constantly denied *two Gods*, or *three Gods*: as may appear from many testimonies: which being well known, I shall only refer to one or two in the margin°. Nay, it was a principle so fixed and rivetted in the heart of every pious Christian, that they would rather have died than have ever admitted *Gods*, or *Lords*; as is plainly intimated by Tertullian P.

Hitherto, perhaps you tell me, that you and the *ancients* can agree, (that is, in *words*;) for neither do you assert *another God*, or *another Lord*, nor *two Gods*, or *two Lords*. To which I answer, that as to *another Lord*, you have said it in terms: and by necessary consequence, you assert *another God*; yea, *two Gods*, and *two Lords*. Nor have I ever met with a more deplorable example of self-contradiction, and resolute opposition to the most evident truth, than your pretending that Father and Son are not *two Gods*, while you affirm each to be *a God*, and deny their being both together *one God*. But we will go on with the *ancients*; who, like wise and honest men, as they would not admit *another God*, or *two Gods*, so, consistently with themselves,

3. They as constantly taught, that Father and Son were *one God*, or the *same God*: and thus they settled that grand article of the Christian faith. I will show this plainly by clear and express evidence, and shall answer your exceptions to every *writer*, as I go along. I have, in some measure, anticipated myself upon this head, in my Sermons ¶, and elsewhere: and therefore shall sometimes content myself with references. Let us take the

° Εἰ δὲ οὖν ὁ λόγος ἀρῆς τὸν Θεόν, Θεὸς ἄν, τί οὖν φησὶς ἂν τις δύο λόγους Θεούς; δύο μὲν οὐκ ἰσῶ Θεοὺς, ἀλλ' ἢ ἓνα, πρῶτον τε δι' δύο &c. Hipp. contr. Noët. p. 15. Vid. Epist. Synod. Antioch. contr. Samosat. Labbé tom. i. p. 845.

¶ Cæterum si conscientia nostra, quâ scimus *Dei* nomen et *Domini*, et Patri, et Filio, et Spiritui Sancto convenire, *Deos* et *Dominos* nominaremus; extinxissemus faces nostras, etiam ad martyria timidiore, quibus evadendi quoque pateret occasio, jurantibus statim per *Deos* et *Dominos*, ut quidam hæretici, quorum *Dii plures*. Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. 13.

¶ See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 180, &c.

authors in order of time, fixing also the time of their *writing*, according to the latest and best accounts.

A. D. 145. JUSTIN MARTYR.

As to Justin Martyr, I do not here produce him as one, who, in express terms, has ever styled Father and Son *one God*. But that he believed the thing may be made out two ways. 1. As he declares for the worship of God *alone*, at the same time admitting the worship of all the three Persons: which is implicitly including all the three in the *alone God*. (The pretence of *inferior* worship shall be answered in its place.) 2. As declaring that God the Son is not *another God*, besides the Maker of all things, (that is the *Father*), as hath been remarked above^r. You have some things to object to what I produce from Justin, under another article: and there I shall consider them as I come to them.

A. D. 170. LUCIAN, a Pagan writer.

The famous testimony out of Lucian's Dialogue, inscribed *Φιλόκαρις*, I produced in my eighth Sermon^s, to prove that, at that time, the Christians believed *three in one*, and *one in three*, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, *one God supreme*. It is so noted a testimony that I need not here repeat it.

There has been some doubt, as I intimated in my Sermons; whether Lucian was the author of the Dialogue; but all agree, that it was either Lucian himself, or a *contemporary*, if not a more ancient writer^t; which serves our purpose as well.

A. D. 177. ATHENAGORAS.

I produced also, in my Sermons^u, this ancient and ex-

^r See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, IX. 1. &c. vol. ii.

^s Sermon viii. vol. ii. p. 181, &c.

^t Vid. Bull. Def. F. p. 73. Jud. 32. Fabricius Bibl. Græc. lib. iv. cap. 16. p. 504. and Le Moyne, *Varia Sacr.* vol. ii. p. 187.

^u Sermon viii. vol. ii. p. 181.

cellent writer, as a voucher for the truth of this doctrine, that Father and Son are *one God*. I shall not repeat what I there said, or in my Defence, vol. i. p. 18, 19. but referring the reader thither, shall proceed to answer your objections. You begin with lessening the credit of the author, (p. 105.) as being “full of very obscure notions;” a character you would give to any writer that is *full* of the doctrine of a *coeternal* and *consubstantial* Trinity. You object, that “he describes this very doctrine in a way directly condemned by Justin Martyr, and even by Athanasius himself, for Gnostic or Sabellian; making the Holy Ghost an emanation, like a ray shot forth from the sun, flowing from it, and returning to it.” But Athenagoras’s doctrine is far from being the same with that which Justin condemns. He always speaks of the *Son* and *Holy Ghost* as *real* and *permanent*, not as the heretics in Justin did, who supposed them to be *dissolved*, and in a manner *extinct* ^x. And Athenagoras did not teach a *nominal* distinction only of the Persons, but a real distinction of *order* ^y; which is directly opposite to the tenets of those heretics described in Justin. Athenagoras always speaks of the *Spirit* as *united* with the Father and the Son: and as he took the *Father* and *Son* for real Persons, he must of consequence think the same of the *Holy Spirit*; so that there is little or no resemblance between the two notions. Besides that, if you had carefully observed the passage on which you ground your remark, you might have perceived that nothing more is meant, than that the Spirit was sometimes sent to the *Prophets*, and again returned to him that sent him. As to the use of the word ἀπόρροια, and the doctrine of *emanation*, it was

^x Justin. M. Dial. p. 102, 372. Jeb.

^y Λόγῳ διδμημιέργησαι, καὶ τῇ σαφῇ αὐτῷ πνεύματι συνέχεται τὰ πάντα. Athen. p. 28.

Συνάδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ προφητικὸν πνεῦμα—καὶ σοὶ καὶ πᾶσι τὸ ἐπιργῶν ταῖς ἐκφορῶσι προφητικῶς ἅγιον πνεῦμα ἀπόρροιαν εἶναι φαμὶν τῷ Θεῷ, ἀπορροῖον, καὶ ἐκκαταφειρόμενον ὡς ἀκτίνα ἡλίου, p. 40. Δεικνύοντας αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ ἐνώσει, δύναμιν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ εὐθείᾳ διαίρειν, p. 40. Vid. p. 46, 96.

neither simply approved nor condemned in the Christian Church, but according as it was understood; just as *προβολή*, or *prolatio*, was condemned by Irenæus and Tertullian in one sense, admitted in another: and as the notion of a *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος*, or *προφορικός*, was either approved or condemned, according to its various construction and acceptation; as I have remarked in my first Sermon^z. You find fault with my construction of *νοοῦμεν γὰρ καὶ υἰὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ*. For we understand, or tacitly include, *God's Son also*, in *God* before spoken of^a. That this is the true meaning, I prove first from the words immediately preceding. Athenagoras having declared, that the Christians could not be *atheists*, because they acknowledged *one God*, who had made, adorned, and preserved the universe by his *Logos*, or *Word*, immediately adds, *νοοῦμεν γὰρ καὶ υἰὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ*, referring to the *λόγος* he had just before mentioned, as contained in *God*, that did all things by him.

2. This sense is also confirmed by what follows; where he says, “Father and Son are one; the Son being in the Father, and the Father in the Son, *by the Unity and power of the Spirit* b.”

3. The same thing is farther proved from Athenagoras's joining (when he is again answering the charge of *atheism*) Father and Son together: and as before he had the phrase of *Θεὸν ἄγοντες*, speaking of the Father singly, now he applies the same phrase to both c.

4. I farther vindicated this construction, in my Defence, vol. i. p. 19. by parallel expressions of Athanasius and Tertullian: wherefore, I conceive, it may still stand.

But, though you seem to allow that Athenagoras com-

^z Sermon i. vol. ii. p. 5, 6.

^a Ἐφ' οὗ γιγίσηται τὸ πᾶν διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου, καὶ διακρίσθηται, καὶ συζητησάται, θεὸν ἄγοντες ἰκανῶς μοι δίδεικται νοοῦμεν γὰρ καὶ υἰὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, &c.

^b Ἐνὸς ὄντος τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ ὄντος διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐν πατρὶ, καὶ πατρὸς ἐν υἱῷ, ἰσότησι, καὶ δυνάμει πνύματος, p. 38.

^c Οὐκ ἴσμεν ἄθεοι, θεὸν ἄγοντες τὸν ποιητὴν τοῦτοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ τὸν παῖρα αὐτοῦ λόγον θεὸν not θεός.

“We are not atheists, inasmuch as we receive the Maker of the world as *God*, and also his *Word*.”

prehends both in *one God*, yet you say, he does “not so comprehend both in the one God, as that one is as much the one supreme God as the other:” which I cannot make sense of. “Nor does he,” say you, “any where suppose the Son, *as such*, but only the internal Reason of the Father, to be *αἰδιος, eternal*.” But if Reason or Wisdom be only a different name of the same Person, the Person of the Son, considered in different circumstances, and at different times, (as Bishop Bull has fully demonstrated,) then the Son is *αἰδιος* according to this writer. “On the contrary,” you say, “that Athénagoras expressly affirms the unbegotten God alone to be eternal.” But the reading there should be *ἀγένητος*, with single *ν*, as I shall show hereafter, and in the one *unmade*, or *necessary existing* God, is contained *God the Word*^d.

You go on, (p. 108.) to charge Athenagoras with the ridiculous notion of the Son’s being nothing (before his generation) but the Father’s *internal Reason*; that is, nothing but an *attribute*. I hope you do not expect an answer to these pretences, so long as Bishop Bull’s confutation of them stands untouched. The English reader may see what is sufficient on that head, in my Defence^e and Sermons^f. Bishop Bull, you say, acknowledges Athenagoras meant that the “Son is the same with respect to the Father, as the internal reason is to the mind of men.” Bishop Bull says no such thing. How shall we trust you in your reports of the *Fathers*, when you scruple not to misrepresent even a modern author, which is in every body’s hands?

Bp. Bull only says^g, that Athenagoras meant that the

^d “Ὅτι τὸν λόγοντα ἀγένητον, καὶ παντοκράτορα τὸν πατέρα, οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἀγένητῳ, καὶ τῷ παντοκράτῳ, καὶ τὸν ἐν τούτῳ λόγον καὶ σοφίαν, ἢ τις ἴσται ὁ υἱός. *Athanas. Decret. Syn. Nic.* p. 236.

Ὁ γὰρ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο παρεκεῖ τὸν τοῦ λόγου φύσιν, οἶδὲ πάλιν τὸ ἀγένητον πρὸς τὸν οἶον ἔχει τὸ σημαίνοντος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰ διὰ τοῦ οἴου γινόμενα. *Ibid.* p. 235.

^e Defence, vol. i. p. 105, &c.

^f Sermon vii. vol. ii. p. 147.

^g Ita ut Filius Dei intelligatur verbum Patris, quod nempe se habeat ad

relation of *thought to mind* resembles the relation of the Son to the Father in *several respects*, which he there mentions. I have said the same thing, and explained the resemblance at large elsewhere^h. After some pains taken to falsify and misrepresent Athenagoras, (which pains had been much better spent in replying to Bp. Bull,) you come at length to charge me home with running counter to Athenagoras's notion, in "two fundamental points." I must give you the hearing in things more trifling than these; so let us inquire what they are.

1. You say, his notion makes the Son's *generation* an *act*, which mine does not. If that will please you, I will allow a *double act* in the Son's *generation*, according to Athenagoras. One of the *Father* in sending forth his Son, *another* of the Son in going forth; viz. to *create*. Did I ever deny the *procession* of the Son, which Athenagoras and several others intend by *generation*? But I assert *eternal generation*, which Athenagoras does not: there, I suppose, is the main difference. Yet Athenagoras acknowledges the *λόγος* to have been eternally *of* and *in* the Father, and referred up to him as his *head* and *source*: which is acknowledging the selfsame thing which other Catholics intended by *eternal generation*; so that the difference lies only in *words*, as I before intimated in my Defenceⁱ.

2. You say, that Athenagoras's notion "never supposes "two Persons of equally supreme authority and worship, "but ascribes every thing the Son does to the supreme "authority and will of the Father." But where do you learn that Athenagoras ever excludes the Son from *supreme authority* (properly so called) or from *supreme worship*? Athenagoras indeed is express, that there is a difference of order among the divine Persons: but where do

Patrem, ut ad mentem humanam verbum ejus interius, quod et *Spirituale* est, minimeque per se cadit in sensus; et *in mente*, unde procedit, manet, nec ab ea se jungitur, &c. *Bull.* p. 203.

^h Sermons, vol. ii. p. 3, &c.

ⁱ Defence, vol. i. p. 111, &c.

you find a difference of *dominion* or *worship*? You could not have chose an author more directly opposite to your sentiments, or more favourable to mine, in the very point of *dominion*; on which you are pleased to lay so much stress. For Athenagoras, addressing himself to the emperors Marcus Antoninus, and his son Lucius Commodus; styles them both equally *μέγιστοι Αυτοκράτορων*, which I might translate *supreme Rulers*. And he observes, that all things were under their common rule and dominion^k; and from thence draws his comparison for the illustration of the one common rule and government of God the Father and the Son; to whom, as being *inseparable*, all things are subject. Is this making the Father *alone* supreme Governor? Or is it likely that a *Creator* and *creature* should be thus familiar, and rule all things equally and in *common*? Where were your thoughts? To be short, all that you can possibly extract out of Athenagoras is no more than a *priority* of *order*, as the Father is Head and Fountain to which the Son and Holy Ghost are referred. The *dominion*, the *authority* is *equal*, is *supreme* in all: only in the Father *primarily*, in the other two *derivatively*; the same thing under a different *order* and *manner*. After you had endeavoured to puzzle and perplex Athenagoras, you go on (p. 110.) to do the like with Tatian, Theophilus, and some others. I shall not attend you now, but proceed in my method. If you have dropped any thing that is worth the notice, it shall be considered

^k Διήσονται δι' ὑμῶν, μέγιστοι Αυτοκράτορες, πρὸ τῷ λόγῳ, ἀληθῶς περιχομένω τὰς λογισμὰς συγγνώμῃ—ἔχουσι ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν καὶ τὴν ἰσχυράν βασιλείαν ἐξιστάζον ἑω γὰρ ὑμῶν, πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ πάντα κειχόμενται, ἀναδιν τὴν βασιλείαν εἰληφότες—ἕως ἐν τῷ Θεῷ καὶ τῷ παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγῳ υἱῷ νομίνῳ ἀμείβω, πάντα ὑποτάσσονται. p. 64.

“ Before I enter upon discourse, I beseech you, O ye greatest of Emperors, to bear with me, while I offer true reasonings—From your own selves you may form a notion of the *heavenly empire*. For like as all things are in subjection to you, being Father and Son, (having received your empire from above,) so also to the *one God* and to the *Word* who is with him, considered as a *Son inseparable*, are all things subject.” *Vide Le Moyne, Var. Sacr. Not. et Observ.* p. 169.

in a more proper place, under Query VIII. which you have often robbed to fill up this.

A. D. 187. IRENÆUS.

Irenæus is the next author cited to prove that “the Father and the Son are one God.” He asserts it *in sense*, and *indirectly* many ways; some of which have been hinted above; see also my Sermons¹. He does it also *in terms* more than once^m. I must now attend your exceptions to the evidence. To what I had observed from Irenæus, in my Defence, you say, (p. 92.) “The sense “then of Irenæus, according to you, is, the one and “only God, the Father and Son, made all things by his “Word, or Son:” No; but, if you please to leave off this vein of cavilling, (which is below the character of a grave writer,) the sense is not that the Son was included under the term *Father*, which undoubtedly there stands for the *Person* of the *Father* singly, (and therefore the Son is *excluded* from being the *Person* of the *Father*,) but that he is not excluded from doing what the *Father alone* is said to do, or from being *God*, though the *Father alone* is

¹ Sermon viii. vol. ii. p. 182, &c.

^m Ita ut is, qui omnia fecerit, cum Verbo suo juste dicatur Deus et Dominus solus. *Iren.* p. 183.

Qui igitur a prophetis adorabatur Deus vivus, hic est vivorum Deus, et Verbum ejus, qui et loquutus est Moysi &c.—Ipse igitur Christus cum Patre vivorum est Deus, qui loquutus est Moysi, &c. p. 232.

Propter hoc manifestissime Dominus ostendit se et Patrem quidem suis discipulis, ne scilicet quærerent alterum Deum præter eum qui *plasmaverit* hominem. p. 311.

Quoniam autem in ventre *plasmavit* nos Verbum Dei, &c. p. 312.

“He who made all things, he alone with his *Word*, is justly styled God and Lord.

“He who was adored as the *living God* by the prophets, he is the *God of the living*, and his *Word*, who also spake to *Moses*, &c.—Christ therefore himself, with the Father, is the *God of the living* that spake to *Moses*.

“For this reason our Lord manifested both *himself* and the *Father* to his disciples, that they might not look for any *other God* but him that *formed* man—The *Word* of God *forms* us in the womb, &c.”

said to be so; because the *exclusive* terms are not intended in *opposition* to God the Son.

You are often imposing this kind of sophistry upon us; wherefore I would once for all endeavour to show you the weakness and absurdity of it, when our Saviour told his disciples that they had left him *alone*, he did not mean by this to *exclude* the Father, but *others*: will you therefore say, that *Father* and *Son* both are meant by the *him* left alone? When our Saviour is said to have a name given which no one knew but *himself*, the Father is not *excluded* by the term *oidels*; will you therefore plead that he is included in the *Person* of the Son, and that both are *one Person*? How ridiculous is it, that you cannot distinguish between being not excluded with respect to the *predicate* of a proposition, and being included in the *subject* of it. In this proposition, "The Father is the only God," we say the Son is not *excluded*; how? not with respect to the *predicate*; not from being *only God*, as well as the Father, because the *exclusive* term affects him not. But we do not therefore say that he is included in the *subject* of the proposition; or that *Father* means both Father and Son. So much in answer to this cavil, which had deserved no notice, but for your so often repeating it. Now to return; you pretend it absurd that all things should be made *by* or *through* the one supreme God. But you have not shown that all *ministration* is inconsistent with any *supremacy*, but a supremacy of *order* or *office*; which I admit. What you add from Irenæus, about the Father's *commanding* the *Word*, I have answered in my Sermons^a, and shown it to be, as understood by the *ancients*, directly opposite to your principles. You are next labouring to take off the force of what I had pleaded in respect of Irenæus's making the Son and Holy Ghost the *self* of the Father. But this was too hard a task: I will trust the reader with what you have said, to compare it with mine; and to see if he can make

^a Sermon. ii. vol. ii. p. 42, &c.

sense of your *immediate* obedience: as if any *obedience*, mediate or immediate, were a reason sufficient for styling the Person obeying, *one's self*. You refer to Irenæus^o saying, that *by the Son and Spirit*, (that is, *per semetipsum, by himself*, as he says in the same chapter,) he made all things *freely*, and of *his own will*. And so he well might, when the *Son and Spirit* are so much his *self*, as to have but one and the *same will* with him. Others might have *contrary* wills: they could not. You misconstrue his next immediate words: he "produced," you say, "the substance of the creatures from himself, i. e. from "his own original underived power." But *himself* means there, the *Son and Spirit*; as is plain from *exemplum factorum*; (which you took care to leave out :) God the *Son* being the *exemplar* by which things were formed^p. And Tertullian may serve to explain Irenæus's meaning in the other article^q.

You next tell us of his citing a *remarkable* passage of Hermas: as if there were any thing so very *remarkable*, in respect to our present purpose, in Hermas's saying that there is but *one God*. But Irenæus, you observe, *adds presently after*, that the *Son* "receives the power of all "things from him who is the one God the Father, &c." And what wonder if he receives all things from him, from whom he receives his *essence*? We are not inquiring *whence* the *Son's* power or dominion is, but *what* it is;

^o Ipse est qui per semetipsum constituit, et elegit, et adornavit, et continet omnia—Adest enim ei semper Verbum et Sapientia, Filius et Spiritus per quos, et in quibus omnia libere et sponte fecit. Lib. iv. cap. 20. p. 253. Vid. Bull. D. F. p. 87.

Ad quos et loquitur dicens, "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram;" ipse a *semetipso* substantiam creaturarum, et exemplum factorum, et figuram in mundo ornamentorum accipiens. *Ibid.* p. 253.

^p Vid. Iren. lib. v. cap. 16. p. 313. comp. p. 163. and Clem. Alex. p. 78.

^q Si necessaria est Deo materia ad opera mundi, ut Hermogenes existimavit, habuit Deus materiam longe digniorem—Sophiam suam scilicet—Quis non hanc potius omnium fontem et originem commendet, *materiam* vero *materiarum*—quali Deus potuit eguisse, sui magis quam alieni egens? *Tert. contr. Hermog.* cap. 18.

and whether it be not of the same quality and extent with the Father's, the same being *common* to both. But you say, "this power and dominion became plenary over all things both in heaven and earth, when he had been incarnate." Plenary, did you say? and over all things? I think not; nor is even the *Father's* dominion yet so *plenary* as this comes to. (See 1 Cor. xv. 28.) But what strange thing are you here discovering, that Christ became *Lord* in a sense which he was not before! So did the *Father* become *Lord* over the Jews in a sense he was not before, when he made them his *peculiar* people. He became their *Lord*, first, when he *created* them, and again, in a more *peculiar* sense, when he chose more immediately to govern them. In like manner, Christ who was *Lord* of all men in right of creation, became *Lord* again, in a more special sense, in right of *redemption*^r; and will be their *Lord* again, in a still more *plenary* sense, after the day of judgment; as will also God the Father. What difficulty is there in these plain common things? But, I suppose, the force of your argument lies in the words *accipiens potestatem*, and *tradita sunt*^s. And yet you will think it no argument against the Father's supremacy, that he is to *receive* a kingdom, which is to be *delivered* to him by the Son, 1 Cor. xv. 24. though I need not insist upon it here, being ready to admit, that while all power

^r See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 104, &c.

^s No one ever better understood this matter than the great Athanasius, who wrote a tract on purpose to show how all things are said to have been *delivered* to God the Son. The sum is, that when all things, in a manner, were lost and sunk, and no one ready at hand to undertake their recovery and restitution, in this exigency, Christ stepped in to *redeem* those whom he had at first *created*. To him therefore were they *delivered*; into his hands were they committed, who alone was both able and willing to recover and restore them; and who accordingly took flesh upon him, and wrought their *redemption* for them.

Πάντα ἔδωκεν ἐν τῇ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ—Ἰν' ἕσται δὲ αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα γίνονται, οὕτως ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα ἀνακαταστήσονται δυνατῶν. *Athan.* vol. i. p. 104.

Eusebius's account of the same thing is not much different.

Ὁ μὲν Θεὸς ἰδίῳ, καὶ παρ᾽ ἑἰς ἐπὶ βελτιώσει, καὶ ἀφελείῃ ὡς Σουτῆρι καὶ ἰδρυφ, καὶ συζευγίῃ τῶν ἑλῶν, &c. *Euseb. de Eccl. Theolog.* lib. i. cap. 19. p. 86.

and authority is common to both, yet it is primarily considered in the Father, and referred up to him: and it was the more proper for our Saviour, during his state of condescension and humiliation here on earth, to refer all to the Father; as Irenæus intimates in another case, of his referring the *knowledge* of the day of judgment. I might farther observe to you, that though Irenæus sometimes represents the power and authority of the Son as descending from the Father, he at other times represents the Son as *assuming it himself*, and making *himself* † *the head over the Church, &c.* which is also very true, and much in the same way, as he is sometimes said to have *raised himself* from the dead, and sometimes to have been *raised by the Father*: for what one does both do, diversly considered as to the *order* and *manner* of acting.

I had cited a plain passage^u or two, to prove that the Son is *the only God*, according to Irenæus, as well as the Father. You reply, that, in the *first passage*, “true and “only God is evidently meant of the Father,” which I readily allow: and so you may see in Clemens, cited above, how he applies the like title to the Father, and yet immediately, in the same breath, makes Father and Son together the *only God*. The reason is, that neither he, nor Irenæus, nor indeed any of the ancients, ever had a thought of excluding the *Son* by the word *only*, or the like. How

† Uti sicut in supercælestibus, et spiritalibus, et invisibilibus, princeps est Verbum Dei; sic et in visibilibus, et corporalibus, principatum habeat, in semetipsum principatum assumens, et apponens semetipsum caput Ecclesie; universa attrahat ad semetipsum apto in tempore. *Iren.* lib. iii. cap. 16. p. 206.

u Nuncquam neque Prophetæ neque Apostoli alium Deum nominaverunt vel Dominum appellaverunt præter verum et solum Deum. Multo magis ipse Dominus, qui et Cæsari quidem quæ Cæsaris sunt reddi jubet, et quæ Dei sunt Deo. *Iren.* p. 182.

Neque igitur Dominus, neque Spiritus Sanctus, neque Apostoli eum, qui non esset Deus, definitive et absolute Deum nominassent aliquando, nisi esset *vere Deus*, p. 180.

Compare the following words:

Utrosque *Dei* appellatione signavit *Spiritus*, et eum, qui ungitur, *Filium*, et eum, qui ungit, *Patrem*, p. 180.

have you read the *Fathers*, not to see these plain things? You go on, endeavouring to elude and perplex Irenæus's meaning. But your attempts are so feeble, and your efforts so weak, that I am almost ashamed to make any reply to them. You would have it, that Irenæus does not call the Son God in the *supreme* and *absolute* sense; though you can never show that Irenæus had two senses of the word *God* as applied to Father and Son. The Son, you imagine, is not *God* in the *absolute* sense, but as being God's anointed, our Lord, and our God, (p. 98.) I read of the Father's *anointing*, and the Son's being *anointed*, (that is, to his *office*;) but could you have shown, that he was anointed to his *Godship*, (pardon the oddness of the word, it contains your sense,) that would have been a discovery indeed. You refer to several passages, (I could add many more,) where the Father is styled the *only God*. But to what purpose is it? Irenæus never meant thereby to exclude the Son from being, with the alone Father, *Deus et Dominus*^x; *God and Lord*, or from being with the Father, *vivorum Deus*; *God of the living*, or from being the *self* of the Father, or from being *Deus ipse*^y, *God himself*: nor would he ever allow, that the Son was not God in the *definitive*, or *absolute* sense, or that he was *another God*. What can you do with such a man as Irenæus, all the way contrary to your principles, directly for mine? He styles the Father *only God*, in opposition to the *Valentinian Æons*, or other monstrous deities; never, not once, in opposition to God the Son.

After what hath been said, the reader, I hope, will not be *surprised*, to find me quoting another passage of Irenæus^z to the same purpose as before. It is where he

^x See above.

^y Dei Verbum, imo magis ipse Deus. *Iren.* p. 132.

^z Peccata igitur remittens, hominem quidem curavit, semetipsum autem manifeste ostendit quia esset. Si enim nemo potest remittere peccata nisi solus Deus, remittebat autem hæc *Dominus*, et curabat homines; manifestum est quoniam *ipse* erat *Verbum Dei*. Filius hominis factus, a Patre potestatem remissionis peccatorum accipiens, quoniam *homo* et quoniam *Deus*: ut

proves our Lord to be the *Word* of God, and *God*, from his *remitting* of *sins*; upon the strength of this maxim, that none can forgive sins but *God alone*. I take the argument to lie thus: None can forgive sins but the *God of Israel*, the true and only God, (so the Jews understood and intended it :) Christ forgave sins: therefore Christ is *God*, in the same sense as intended, i. e. *God of Israel, &c.* I defy any man to come at Irenæus's conclusion from that passage any other way: and though he words it *Verbum Dei*, it is plain from the following words, that the phrase is with him equivalent to *Deus*; the *Word* of God being necessarily *God*, or, as he elsewhere expresses it, *Deus ipse*. What you have to object is, that *solus Deus* is there predicated of the Father; I grant it: and yet Irenæus's argumentation necessarily infers, that Christ is *Deus* too, in the same sense; and therefore with the Father, *solus Deus*; the *only God* that can remit sins; and he received this power because he is *God of God*. Irenæus plainly enough intimates, that if he had not been *God*, he could not have had the power; which shows that he is speaking of such a kind of remission, by inherent power and right, as is proper to *God alone*^a; otherwise there is no sense in the argument.

quomodo homo compassus est nobis, tanquam *Deus* misereatur nostri, et remittat nobis debita nostra, quæ factori nostro debemus *Deo*. *Iren.* p. 314.

“ Remitting sins, he healed the man, and at the same time plainly showed who himself was. For if none can *forgive sins*, but *God alone*, and yet our Lord *forgave sins*, and healed men; it is manifest that he was the *Word* of God, made Son of man, receiving from the Father the power of forgiving sins, because *man*, and because *God*: that as he suffered with us, being *man*, so he might also have mercy upon us as he is *God*, and might forgive us our debts, which we owe to God our Maker.”

^a Bene igitur *Verbum* ejus ad hominem dicit, “ Remittuntur tibi peccata;” idem ille in quem peccaveramus in initio, remissionem peccatorum in fine donans. Aut si *alterius* quidem transgressi sumus præceptum, *alius* autem erat qui dixit, “ Remittuntur tibi peccata tua;” neque bonus, neque verax, neque justus est hujusmodi. Quomodo enim bonus, qui non ex suis donat? Aut quomodo justus, qui aliena rapit? Quomodo autem verè remissa sunt peccata, nisi ille ipse in quem peccavimus donavit remissionem? *Iren.* p. 313 Vid. Grab. in Bull. D. F. p. 85.

“ Well

You here (p. 101.) take notice of another passage of Irenæus, which I incidentally brought in (p. 39. of my Defence, vol. i.) to prove that, according to Irenæus, none that has any *superior*, any God *above him*, can be justly styled *God*^b. A famous passage, and directly opposite to your principles; while you pretend to ascribe divinity to the Son, at the same time subjecting him to a *superior God*, and putting him *sub alterius potestate, under the dominion and power of another*. You do well to labour to take this off; but *how*, we shall see presently. You pretend, that Irenæus, in “numberless other passages, expressly asserts the superiority of the Father to the Son.” I deny that he ever does it, so much as in any *single* passage, in your sense of *superiority*. Nay, to see how consonant to himself Irenæus is, I will show you where^c he, by necessary consequence, declares the Son to have *no superior*.

The argument will stand thus :

“He that is the *God of the living*, and who spake to “Moses out of the bush, has *no other God* above him.

“Well therefore did his *Word* say to the man, *Thy sins are forgiven thee*; he the same against whom we had sinned in the beginning, in the “end vouchsafes remission of sins. Otherwise had the precept against which “we transgressed come from *one*, and it had been *another* that said, *Thy sins are forgiven thee*, he could neither have been good, nor just, nor true “in doing it. For how can he be *good*, who gives what is none of his own? “Or how can he be *just*, that assumes what belongs to another? Or how “could sins be really forgiven, if he that forgave them were not the very “same against whom we had sinned?”

^b Qui super se habet aliquem superiorem, et sub alterius potestate est, hic neque *Deus*, neque Rex magnus dici potest. *Iren.* p. 229.

^c Is qui de rubo loquutus est Moysi, et manifestavit se esse Deum Patrum, hic est viventium *Deus*. Quis enim est *vivorum Deus*, nisi qui est *Deus super quem alius non est Deus*?—Qui igitur adorabatur *Deus vivus*, hic est *vivorum Deus*, et Verbum ejus, qui loquutus est Moysi, qui et Sadducæos redarguit, &c.—Ipse igitur *Christus cum Patre vivorum est Deus*, qui loquutus est Moysi.— *Iren.* p. 232. Vide Bull. sect. ii. cap. 5.

“He that spake to Moses out of the bush, and manifested himself to be “the God of the Fathers, he is the *God of the living*. For who else can be “the *God of the living*, but the God that has no other God above him?— “Christ with the Father is the *God of the living*, who spake to Moses, &c.”

“ Christ is the *God of the living*, and who spake to *Moses* out of the bush.

“ Therefore Christ has *no other God above him.*”

The premises are both of them Irenæus's own: and the conclusion from them is evident. We see then, that Irenæus does not only lay down the *general* maxim, that whoever is *God*, properly so called, can have no other God above him: but in the *particular* case of God the Son, he applies the very maxim, and declares that there is no other God above him. What will you say to these manifest truths, which so directly strike at your whole *hypothesis*? You endeavour to find some shelter, by turning *Deus* into Greek, making it *ὁ Θεός*, which will not do, because it is frequent with Irenæus to give the Son the title of *ὁ Θεός*.^d And if he did not, yet he never appears to lay any such stress upon an *article*. Nor will the occasion of Irenæus's maxim at all serve you. For though the discourse there is of *God the Father*, yet his reasoning, whereby he proves that the Person, there styled *ὁ Θεός*, could have “ no other God above him,” will prove the same thing of every other Person so styled, or prove nothing. You produce some citations from Irenæus to prove the “ Father superior in authority” (*another God above him*, you should have said, because you mean it) “ to the Son, and the Son subject to him.” None of them prove any thing like it, in your meaning of *superiority* and *subjection*.

The Father *commanded*, the Son *executed*. What then? I answered this above^e. Another pretence is from the words, “ *conditionem simul, et Verbum suum portans:*” which I may leave as I find it, till you make out the consequence: or I may oppose to it, “ *mensura enim Patris Filius, quoniam et capit eum.*” Iren. p. 231. *Porto* may as well signify to *bear*, or *contain*, as *sustain*. Besides that the creatures are said, in the very same place, *por-*

^d Vid. Iren. p. 211, 215, 271. ed. Bened.

^e See also Bull. D. F. p. 80.

tare eum; to sustain him, you will say. And much will you make of it, that the *Creator* of them, *mundi Factor*, (Irenæus's own words of God the Son, in the same chapter,) was *sustained* by his creatures. You proceed to observe, that the Son *ministered* to the Father: you might have observed farther, that "he washed his disciples' feet." But see Bishop Bull, who had fully answered these pretences, before you produced them. You farther take notice out of Irenæus, that the "Word incarnate hung upon the cross." Who doubts it? You should have took notice likewise of what Irenæus says, in the very same chapter, that this *Word* was really "Maker of the world, and containeth all things^f." But I am weary of pursuing trifles. If Irenæus had had a mind to express the *subjection* of the *Son*, and superior *dominion* of the Father, he knew how to do it. See how he expresses himself, where he declares the *subjection* of all things to God the *Son*, and the *Holy Spirits*, at the same time speaking of their *ministration* (not *subjection*) to the Father: which may be sufficient to show you how wild your *hypothesis* is, and how little countenance for it you can reasonably hope to find among the *ancients*.

A. D. 192. CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS.

I have already produced one plain and express passage, wherein Clemens includes the Father and the Son in the *only God*. He has more to the same purpose, where he says, "both are one, namely, God^h;" and where he ad-

^f *Mundi enim Factor vere Verbum Dei est—et secundum invisibilitatem continet, que facta sunt omnia. Lib. v. cap. 18. p. 315.*

"The *Word* of God is really *Maker of the world*—and in respect of "his invisibility, (or *invisible nature*,) contains all things which are made."

§ *Ministrat enim ei ad omnia sua progenies, et figuratio sua, id est, Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus, Verbum et Sapientia; quibus serviunt, et subjecti sunt omnes angeli. Iren. p. 236. Comp. p. 183.*

"His own *offspring*, and *figure*, that is, the *Son* and *Holy Ghost*, the "*Word*, and *Wisdom*, to whom all the angels are subject, and do obeisance, "*minister to him* (the Father) *in all things*."

^h "Ἐν γὰρ ἑμῶν, ἰ Θεῶν. Clem. Alex. p. 135.

dresses both as *one Lord*ⁱ, and the whole Trinity as *one*^k. Which I took notice of in my eighth Sermon^l.

You are forced to confess, (p. 80.) that in Clemens's first writings, there are "some sublime expressions, which, "if taken literally, would favour either my notion or the "Sabellian." A pretty fair confession; but it would have been still fairer to have said, (which is what the reader must see,) *some expressions, too plain and strong to admit of any evasion.* All you have to say is, that they are highly *rhetorical*; which is saying nothing. You are next to oppose other passages of Clemens, to take off their force. Upon which, I may observe, by the way, how disingenuous your claim to the *ancients* is, in comparison with ours. You think it sufficient, if you can but find any passages which look at all favourable to your scheme, however contradictory (as you understand them) to other clear and express testimonies of the same author. On the other hand, we think ourselves obliged to *reconcile* the seemingly opposite passages, and to make an author *consistent* with himself: which if we cannot do, we give him up as *neuter*, and make his evidence *null*; unless there be reason to believe, that the author, upon better consideration, had changed his mind, or that some parts of his works are more certainly genuine than others. But to proceed, you begin with attempting to deprave the sense of a celebrated place in Clemens, which I shall transcribe into the margin^m. In English it runs thus: "The divine "Word, who is most manifestly *true God*, who is *equal-* " *ized* with the Lord of the universe, because he was his "Son, and was the *Word* in *God*." This is a passage very little favourable to your invention of a *superior dominion* of the Father, and a *subjection* of the Son: for the

ⁱ Τὸ καὶ πατὴρ, ἐν ἑμφω Κύριε. p. 311.

^k Clem. Alex. p. 311.

^l Sermons, vol. ii. p. 183, &c.

^m Ὁ Θεὸς λόγος, ὁ φανερώτατος ὄντως Θεός, ὁ τῷ διακότῳ τῶν ἑλλων ἕνωθεὶς ὢν ἦν υἱὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ. p. 86. Adm. ad Gent.

Vid. Bull. D. F. p. 88. Anim. in Gilb. Clerke, p. 1010.

Son is here said to be *equalized*, that is, *proclaimed equal* to the Lord of the whole universe. You say, *equalized* implies an *exaltation*, a *delegation*, &c. Ridiculous. Can any thing or person be *made equal* to God the Father, *exalted* to a parity with him? But a person may be *proclaimed equal*; which is only showing what he was before. And Clemens assigns two substantial reasons, why the Son was thus proclaimed; it was his natural and essential dignity that demanded it; for he was God's *own Son*ⁿ, of the same nature with him; and he was the *Word* that existed *in God*^o himself; most manifestly therefore *true God*, and accordingly *equalized* with God, as he had a right to be. You give us two or three words of Eusebius, as expressing the sense of Clemens. But let Clemens speak for himself, who is a plainer man, and a more consistent writer, than Eusebius; and of whom it is easier to pass a certain judgment. Suppose the words in Clemens to signify *equalized in honour*, or advanced to *equal honour and glory*: still, would you have a *subject* thus *equalized* with his sovereign? If Christ was *equalized* in honour and glory, the inference will reach to an *equality* of nature; which alone could be any sufficient reason or foundation for honouring him so highly. You would have it only, *receiving dominion* (you do not care to say *equal dominion*) from the Father. But this comes not up to Clemens's strong expression of *equalizing*; nor to his *reasons* assigned for it; the very reasons which he elsewhere gives, why the Father and Son are the *one God*, &

ⁿ Τίς τῷ εὐ γνήσιος, ὁ Θεὸς λόγος, φωνὴ ἀρχιτυπος φῶς. Clem. Admon. p. 78.
Τὸν λόγον εἶπαι ἐκ τοῦ εὐ φόντα πατρός. Pædag. p. 113.

^o Compare the following passages of Clemens, explanatory of the phrase *in τῷ Θεῷ*.

*Ὁ τῷ μεγάλῳ Θεῷ ὁ τῷ εὐ εὐλοίου παιδίου υἱὸς ἐν πατρὶ καὶ πατρὶ ἐν υἱῷ. Pæd. lib. i. cap. 5. p. 112.

Τῶν νεμπάντων Θεῶν ἵνα μένον εἶναι, ἀγαθὸν, δίκαιον, δημιουργόν, υἱὸν ἐν πατρὶ. Pædag. lib. i. cap. 8. p. 142.

*Ἐν γὰρ ἄμφω, ὁ Θεός· ἓτι εἶπεν, ἐν ἀρχῇ ὁ λόγος ἦν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. Clem. Alex. p. 135.

Θεός, absolutely so called, and jointly the one *only* God and *Creator* of all things.

Next, you are to search out some other expressions of Clemens, to be pleaded in the way of abatement. Clemens, it seems, says in the same page, that “he sprung from the will of the Father.” But let the reader see the whole sentence, that he may be apprized of your unrighteous method of citing authors. “Being with utmost celerity diffused upon all men, rising swifter than the sun, out of the very will (*or heart*) of the Father, he most readily darted forth God upon us P.” Would you have your reader here deceived into an opinion that Clemens is speaking of the Son’s *existing* by his Father’s *free* choice and pleasure? No doubt but that is your meaning, or something very little better; though Clemens is only speaking of his *mission* to mankind. *Elsewhere*, you say, *he calls him* inspector of our hearts by the *will* of the *Almighty*⁹. But you are as unfortunate in this place as in the other; misconstruing the words, and perverting the sense; as I have elsewhere^r shown. Παντοκρατορικῆ θελήματι signifies by his own *sovereign, all-containing* will. That there is no impropriety in applying the epithet παντοκρατορικὸς to *will*, I proved by parallel instances from other authors; and shall now add one more of the like kind^s. You appear very unwilling to have the Doctor’s criticisms on this passage taken from you: and therefore you endeavour, feebly, to prop them up again, in a note, p. 227. You tell me, that the parallel passages I alleged, do not signify that God is omnipresent or omniscient by his *will*, but by “his active governing wisdom.” Be it so: then let the same answer

^r Τάχιστα δὲ εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους διαδοθεὶς, θῆντος ἡλίῳ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀνωσίτας τῆς πατρικῆς βουλῆτος, ἵστα ἡμῶν ἐπίλαμψε τὸν Θεόν. Clem. p. 86.

^s Τὸν κύριον Ἰησοῦν, τὸν ἐν παντοκρατορικῆ θελήματι ἐπίσκεπον τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν. p. 611.

^r Defence, vol. i. p. 78. Sermons, vol. ii. p. 160.

^s Τὸ θεῖον καὶ παντοκρατορικῆ καὶ ἄλλων τῆς ἀγαθότητος ἀντὶς ἴσως. Pacudo Dionys. Arcop. de Divin. Nomin. cap. x. p. 829.

serve for the expression of Clemens; and let Christ be *omniscient* by his "active governing wisdom," and now all is right again. I am not contending for *God's* or Christ's knowing all things by his *will*, in the Doctor's sense: but why must Clemens be tied up to the Doctor's strict sense of *will*, in the word *δέληματι*, more than other authors, who have likewise used the phrase of *all-containing will*, as well as Clemens? The Doctor's fanciful speculations against the phrase (Script. Doctr. p. 294.) are of as much weight against the phrase in other authors, as in Clemens; that is, of no weight at all, but to show the folly of interpreting phrases by speculation and fancy, instead of looking into authors, to see how they have been used. You was to say something, it seems, however wide, rather than give up a favourite criticism.

You say, Clemens calls the Son *δέλημα παντοκρατορικόν* which is true; but it does not there signify the same as *πατρικόν δέλημα*, but *all-containing wisdom*, or *will* again; as is plain from the very place itself, where Clemens also styles him *δύναμις παγκρατής*, *all-containing power*^t. And it is the very reason given by Clemens, why he may be *known to all*, even to those that have not acknowledged him; he is *παγκρατής*, and *παντοκρατορικός*, *present to all*, or containing all. Had Clemens intended your sense, he would rather have expressed it by *πατρικῶ δέληματι*, as usual^u; or *δέληματι τοῦ πατρὸς*^x, or the like. Nor can you give any instance out of Clemens, of *παντοκρατορικός*, but where it either must, or however may, bear the sense I have given. The phrase *παντοκρατορικόν βούλημα* (p. 857.) comes the nearest to the other. But it is there manifest, from the context, that it ought to be interpreted in the same way as I have construed *δέλημα παντοκρατορικόν*. I much question whether *παντοκρατορικός* is ever used for τοῦ

^t Σοφία δὲ καὶ χρησίμους φανερωτάτη τῷ Θεῷ, δύναμις τε παγκρατής, καὶ τῆ ἁγίας Θεῶν ἁπλῆ τοῖς μὴ ὁμολογῶσιν ἀκαταίτητος, δέλημα παντοκρατορικόν. Clem. p. 647.

^u Vid. Clem. p. 99, 150. Comp. p. 86, 125.

^x Vid. Clem. p. 156, 710.

παντοκράτορος, in the way that Dr. Clarke contends for. It is certain, that the other which I contend for is most proper, and is most usual and customary in Greek writers. This, I hope, may be sufficient to put an end to a weak criticism, which has nothing in it. Now let us go on.

As to the Son's *ministering*, I have before answered: and as to the passages you have selected, one would think you had took them out of Bishop Bull; only leaving out the Bishop's solutions^γ: which is a very unfair way of protracting a controversy.

As to *second cause*, you do not meet with it in Clemens; δεύτερος αἴτιος^z signifies no more than *secondary causer*, τάξει δεύτερος, second in order in causal operations. Besides that, if it strictly meant more, allowance must be made for Clemens, while he is adapting the *Platonic* to the Christian Trinity, if he uses the *Platonic* terms; though they may not quadrate exactly.

You next cite Clemens for styling the Father μόνον ὄντως Θεόν, and introducing the Son as joining in hymns of praise to him. As to μόνος, or other the like exclusive terms, Clemens made no account of them, in exclusion to the Son, as before seen; besides that, the Son is not only ὄντως Θεός, *truly God*, with Clemens, very frequently^a, but even μόνος Θεός, *only God*^b, and *only Judge*^c, and *only Master*^d. All authors I have met with thus use *exclusive* terms; it being a rule of common sense, and custom of language, that such *exclusive* terms are to be strained no farther than they are intended in opposition to such or such things. As to the Son's joining in *hymns of praise*,

^γ Vid. Bull. Def. F. p. 90.

^z Clem. Alex. p. 710.

^a Clem. Alex. p. 86, 647, 690.

^b Clem. Alex. p. 84, 142. See also another passage of his Pædagogus, where he seems to be speaking of God the Son: the words are, ὁ ὄντως Θεός, ἢ ὁν ἀπὸς τὰ πάντα, καὶ τὰ πάντα ὁ ἀπὸς, ὅτι αὐτὸς Θεός, ὁ μόνος Θεός. p. 150. Compare a passage of the Stromata, l. 4. οὐ γίνισται ἀπεικῶς ἑν ὡς ἑν, οὐδὲ πολλὰ ὡς μέγα ὁ υἱός, ἀλλ' ὡς πάντα ἑν, ἴσθις καὶ πάντα.

^c Clem. p. 99.

^d Ibid. p. 309.

you should have told your reader, that he is supposed by Clemens, in that very place, to do it as in capacity of *High-Priest*^e. I can scarce without indignation find such things as these offered by men pretending to *letters*, or the least *ingenuity*.

You run on, about Clemens's styling the Father the *one God, supreme over all*; though every body knows it never was intended in *opposition* to God the *Son*, but to Pagan deities: as is plain from what hath been said. You next come to observe that Clemens styles the Son Πρωτόκτιστος^f. This indeed was worth remarking, and a thing fit to be offered in the way of objection; though Bishop Bull had given a good answer to it long ago⁵. It is an allusion to Proverbs viii. 22. where *Wisdom* is said to have been *created*, that is, *appointed head* over the works of God^h; which I shall show, in due time and place, to have been the ancient and Catholic sense of that text: nor can any Ante-Nicene Father be produced for the other sense of *creation*, in regard to that text. The stale pretence about Photius and the *hypotypeses*, hath been answered over and overⁱ. However, it is a mere fancy of yours, that Photius's censure upon the *hypotypeses* was grounded upon a passage found in his *Stromata*. I have now said enough in vindication of Clemens; and he must be a very orthodox writer indeed, when in so large a volume, and wrote before the Arian controversy was started, he appears to have been so well guarded as to leave room only for very frivolous exceptions; such, perhaps, as might most of them be found even in many of the Post-Nicene writers, or in Athanasius himself.

^e Ἀμφὶ τὸν ἀγίνητον (leg. ἀγίνητος) καὶ ἀνώλιθρον, καὶ μόνον ὄντως θεῖον, συν-
μαρτυροῦντες ἡμῖν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγῳ. ἀίδιος οὗτος, Ἰησοῦς υἱός, ὁ μίγας ἀρχιερεὺς θεοῦ τοῦ
πατρὸς, τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ πατρὸς, ὅστις ἀνθρώπων εὐχεται, καὶ ἀνθρώποις ἰσχυλιεύεται.
Clem. Alex. p. 92, 93.

^f Clem. p. 699.

⁵ Bull. D. F. p. 90.

^h Οὗτος ἀπάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, θελήματι τοῦ παντοκράτορος πατρὸς, αἴτιος ὁ υἱὸς
καθίσταται, πρωτοεργὸς κτίσεως, δόξαμις ἄληκτος αἰσθήσει. Clem. p. 833.

ⁱ Bull. Def. F. p. 91. Grabe, Instances of Defects, p. 13, &c.

What you say after in p. 83. is worth the taking notice of, for the peculiar turn of it; and because it may let the reader into the true state of the dispute between us. You tell me, I am "forced into the absurd inconsistency of "confounding a *priority of mere order* (which expresses a "perfect *coordination* of persons equally supreme in authority) with a subordination of authority and dominion." You are troubled, it seems, that I will not suffer two of the Persons to be thought really *subjects*, or *servants*, that is, *creatures* of the *first*. I am very earnest and serious in it; nor will I yield that momentous point to you, till you are able to prove it. As to *inconsistency*, you shall see that there is none of *mine*, it is all your *own*. I have sometimes wondered with myself, how I came to be charged by the *modest Pleader*, &c. with making a *coordination* of the Persons; when I every where admit a *priority of order* in one, a *subordination* in the other two. But now the secret is out: a *coordination* is not a *coordination*, and a *subordination* is not a *subordination*, if it be only of *order*; though I was so weak as to think that the words *coordination* and *subordination*, strictly and properly, respected *order*, and expressed an *equality* or *inequality* of order. But you have a mind to use the word *coordination* for what an accurate man would call *coequality*: and so I am charged with holding a *coordination*. I confess the charge: I always held a *coequality* of the Persons, though I never before knew that it must be called *coordination*. And while I profess a *subordination*, I as constantly declare against *inequality*. If this does not content you, I cannot help it: it is not my fault, nor indeed yours, (for you have done your utmost,) that your arguments demand no more. I will still maintain a *priority of order*, together with *coequality*. And if you insist upon it, that *priority of order* is *no priority of order*, but a *coordination*; every reader, I suppose, may see whose is the *inconsistency*, yours or mine. Besides a subordination of *order*, which is *natural*, I have also allowed a subordination in *office*, which is *economical*. Is this also nothing

more than a "mere position and order of words?" True, it is not making the Father a *sovereign* over the Son as his *natural* subject, because I never intended it: nor will you ever be able to prove any thing like it. But let us proceed.

A. D. 206. TERTULLIAN.

Tertullian is so full and clear for all the three Persons being *one God*, that I need not again ^kproduce things so well known. You yourself have confessed it: but now you come in to plead for abatements; which, if you have ever so good a right to them, will not, however, make Tertullian an advocate on your side, but a *neuter* at most, as being inconsistent, and of no credit. But let us see: perhaps he may prove a consistent evidence for us; though it is utterly impossible he ever should for you. You remind me of his being a *Montanist*, when he wrote against Praxeas; which was scarce worth your observing, when you allow in the same page that Tertullian makes Father and Son *one God*, even in his *Apology*^l, wrote very probably before he was a *Montanist*: and I should be content to try the merits of the cause by that Treatise alone, which would furnish you with few or no pretences against his orthodoxy in this article. But to come to the business.

You first fall upon him for making the Son no more than a "small part of the Father's substance." To which I answer, that if Tertullian indulged his fancy too far in explaining the doctrine, yet he may be a good evidence of the Church's general doctrine, that Father and Son are *one God*. However, I think this objection has been well answered by Bishop Bull^m and Le Nourryⁿ; whither I

^k See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 184, &c.

Pater et Filius et Spiritus, Tres crediti, unum Deum sistunt. Tertull. contr. Prax. c. 31.

^l *Quod de Deo profectum est Deus est et Dei Filius, et unus (suppl. Deus) ambo. Apol. c. xxi. p. 203.*

^m Bull. D. F. p. 95. ⁿ Nourrii Apparatus ad Bibl. Max. vol. ii. p. 1305.

refer the reader. All I shall add is this; that if Tertullian, as I have shown above, sometimes used the term *Father* in a large sense, (as a *head* of a *family* sometimes stands for the whole family together with their head,) then it is no wonder, if God the Son might be called *Portio totius*, being but one Person of the Trinity, not all; as he styles the Father, *unus omnia, dum ex uno omnia*°. This might be illustrated from the case of Abraham, considered as the *father* of many nations, and containing, in a certain sense, all his descendants. Thus was Abraham *totu familia*, and Levi only *derivatio et portio totius*; that is, of Abraham, considered in capacity of *head* and *fountain*. I do not pretend to be confident, that Tertullian had this thought in his mind: but I propose it as a probable conjecture, to be farther inquired into, to make Tertullian appear the more reasonable and consistent; who was certainly no downright idiot, such as your representation would make of him. Allowing such a supposition as I have here offered, there will be no difficulty in accounting for Tertullian's saying, that the Father is *major Filio, greater than the Son*, in the manner that he does. For it will amount only to this, that the *head*, considered as such, is *major singulis*, as containing all; though it cannot be said of any but the *head*, because the rest are considered only as *single* Persons. In the other way, it is certainly downright *nonsense* to suppose the Father, in his own proper *personal* capacity, to be the *whole*: for however small a *part* you suppose the Son to be, that *part* must go in to make up the *whole*; and no *single* Person, barely considered as such, can be called the *whole*. But consider the *Father* in capacity of *Head*, in the sense before intimated, and then the notion is just,

• The like way of speaking obtained among the Pagans, in respect of their supreme Jupiter, father of the other gods.

Jupiter omnipotens regum rerumque deumque

Progenitor, genitrixque deum, Deus unus et omnis.

August. de C. D. lib. vii. cap. 9. p. 170.

and has nothing absurd, or strange in it. I may farther argue against Tertullian's making the Son a *small part*, as you say, of God's substance, from what he says of the *omnipresence* of the Son, in as full and ample terms as can be used of the omnipresence of the Father himself^p.

You go on (p. 77.) to speak of the Son's exercising the *Father's* power: right; because the Father's and his are one^q. You add, "by the Father's will:" yes, and by his *own* too, for both are the same, because their substance is one^r. You say indeed in your Preface, p. 6, 7. that Tertullian affirmed the same thing even of *angels*, or *rational* souls, that "they were generated from the substance of the Father:" and to show that you really believe it, you quote (p. 55.) three places of Tertullian, to prove it. Had this been the case, I would have given you up Tertullian for a madman. But it is your misfortune,

^p Habes Filium in terris, habes Patrem in cælis: non est separatio ista, sed dispositio divina; cæterum scimus Deum etiam intra abyssos esse, et ubique consistere, sed vi et potestate: Filium quoque, ut individuum, cum ipso ubique. Tamen in ipsa œconomia, Pater voluit Filium in terris haberi, se vero in cælis. *Tertull. adv. Prax.* c. xxiii. p. 514.

"The Son you have upon *earth*, and the Father you have in *heaven*. This is no *separation*, but a divine *economy*. Furthermore, we are certain that God is even in the *abysses*, and present *every where*, but in virtue and power; the *Son* also, as individual, (or *undivided*,) is with him *every where*. But, according to the *economy*, the Father would so have it, that the Son should be considered as being upon *earth*, and himself as being in the *heavens*."

^q *Omnia*, inquit, *Patris mea sunt*.—Suo jure omnipotens, qua Sermo Dei omnipotentis, quaque omnium accepit potestatem. cap. 17.

Pater omnia tradidit in manu ejus—a primordio tradidit. Ex quo, a primordio Sermo erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Sermo, cui data est omnis potestas in cælo et in terra—Omnem enim dicens potestatem—et omnia tradita in manu ejus, nullam exceptionem temporis permittit; quia omnia non erunt, si non omnis temporis fuerint. cap. 16.

^r Quale est ut Deus divisionem et dispersionem pati videatur in Filio et Spiritu Sancto—tam *consortibus substantiæ Patris*, &c.—Cæterum, qui Filium non aliunde deduco, sed *de substantiæ Patris*, nihil facientem sine *Patris voluntate*, omnem a Patre consecutum potestatem, &c. *Adv. Prax.* cap. 3, 4.

in two of the places, very innocently to give us Marcion's tenet for Tertullian's own. And as to the *third* place, out of his book against Praxeas, it is very wide of the purpose; being no more than this, that God breathed into man the breath of life, a peculiar privilege of man above all the animal creation. See below* what he says of *angels*.

But to proceed; You talk of the Son's *subjection*, as from Tertullian: concealing from your reader that it is of a *subjection* posterior to the incarnation, an *economical* subjection: and that Tertullian denies any *subjection*, such as you are aiming at, in full and express terms^t. You add, "upon this disparity of the Son to the Father, (directly contrary to your notion of an *equality* in supreme *authority*), as well as upon his notion of *consubstantiality*, does he ground his denial of two Gods." False every word: how can you let your pen loose, to write at this rate? Tertullian's notion of *one common supreme authority* is exactly the same with mine^u: that the three Persons are of *one state, one substance, one divinity, one supreme power and authority, as being one God*. When Tertullian says, *non statu sed gradu*, by *gradus* he means *order*, as Bishop Bull hath observed, *D. F.* p. 96.

And where does Tertullian found his denial of *two Gods* upon the *disparity* of Father and Son? Or where does he resolve the *Unity*, as you do, into the *Father alone*, casting out God the Son from the *one Godhead*? His constant way is to take in *both*, and thus he makes of both but *one God*. What you cite from his 13th chapter

* Angelorum—aliorum a substantia Patris. *Contr. Prax.* cap. 3.

^t Sophiam—non sibi subditam, non statu diversam, &c. *Tert. cent. Hermog.* cap. 18.

^u Tres autem non statu sed gradu, nec substantia sed forma, nec potestate sed specie: unius autem substantie, et unius status, et unius potestatis, qui unus Deus. *Contr. Prax.* cap. 2.

Trinitas, unius divinitatis, Pater, Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus. *De Pudicit.* cap. 21.

is not at all to your purpose. He plays awhile with Praxeas, telling him, that if he would be so *hard*, as to insist upon it that Father and Son must be *two Gods*, on the Catholic scheme, than let them be so; and let him at least grant, that Father and Son may be *two Gods*, the Son having certainly as good, or much better right to be called *God*, than many others whom Scripture has so styled. But after he had thus argued awhile *ad hominem*, and *ex hypothesi*, he returns to his position, that they are not *two Gods*^x, but *one God*, because of *unity of substance* and *original*. His reasoning, in short, comes to this, that if the Catholic doctrine, as Praxeas insisted, must be *Ditheism*, then let it be so; so long as it is *Scripture Ditheism*, and the doctrine certainly true, whatever *name* it be called by: but still a very good reason may and has been assigned why it is not, and therefore ought not to be called *Ditheism*; because Father and Son are really *one God*, as being of *one substance*, and the Son referred up to the Father as his *head* and *source*. This is the sum of Tertullian's thoughts on that head; which are as contrary to yours, as light to darkness.

You have another little shift grounded upon Tertullian's blaming Praxeas for making the Father incarnate, whom he there calls *ipse Deus* and *Dominus omnipotens*; as if Tertullian might not emphatically style the Father *God*, without denying it of the Son. Those phrases there are nothing but so many *periphrases* for God the Father, and

^x Duos tamen Deos et duos Dominos nunquam ex ore nostro proferimus — Nam etsi soles duos non faciam, tamen et solem et radios ejus tam duos res et duas species *unius indivise substantie* numerabo, quam Deum et sermonem ejus, quam Patrem et Filium. *Tert. contr. Prax.* cap. 13.

Si Filium nolant *secundum* a Patre reputari, ne *secundus* duos faciat Deos dici, ostendimus etiam duos Deos in Scriptura relatos, et duos Dominos; et tamen ne de isto scandalizentur, rationem reddidimus; qua Dei non duo dicantur, nec Domini, sed qua Pater et Filius due: et hoc non ex *separatione substantie*, sed ex dispositione, cum *individuum* et inseparatum Filium a Patre pronuntiamus, nec statim sed gradu alium; qui etsi Deus dicatur, quando nominatur singularis, non ideo duos Deos faciat sed unum, hoc ipso, quod et *Deus ex unitate Patris vocari* habeat. cap. 19.

do not at all relate to your purpose: unless denying the Father to be *incarnate*, be denying *Christ's supreme divinity*; where I see nothing like a consequence.

As to Tertullian's asserting a *temporary generation*, it is common to him and many Catholic writers, both Ant-Nicene and Post-Nicene^y; and has no difficulty in it, when rightly understood. What you add from Tertullian's Tract against Hermogenes, is indeed of some weight, and the most material objection that his works can furnish you with. Yet you should not have concealed from your reader, that Bishop Bull^z has spent a large chapter particularly in answer to it: and it must appear very strange, that Tertullian, who at other times speaks so highly of God the Son, should designedly contradict so many clear and plain passages of his works, by denying the *coeternity* of the Son, and reducing him to a *creature*. Is the *divinity*, subsisting in *three*, similar with itself, *one only*, and capable of no *degrees*, (the express doctrine of this writer,) and yet made up of *eternal* and *temporary*, *Creator* and *creature*, differing *infinitely*? Is *eternity* and *immutability* contained in the name and notion of *God*, and particularly as applicable to God the Son^a, and yet the Son have neither *eternity* nor *immutability*? In a word, can Tertullian pretend, that an *inferior* God is nonsense and contradiction^b, and at the same time assert a creature, a

^y Hilarius in Matt. p. 742. Zeno Veron. ap. Bull. p. 200. Phœbadius. Bibl. Patr. tom. 4. Prudentius. Hymn. xi. p. 44. Rupertus Tuitiensis. Pseud-Ambros. de Fid. Orthod. cap. ii. p. 349.

^z Bull. D. F. sect. iii. cap. 10.

^a Deum immutabilem et informabilem credi necesse est, ut æternum. Transfiguratio autem interemptio est pristini. Omne enim quodcumque transfiguratur in aliud, desinit esse quod fuerat, et incipit esse quod non erat. Deus autem neque desinit esse, neque aliud potest esse. *Sermo* autem *Deus*; et *Sermo Domini* manet in ævum, perseverando scilicet in sua forma. *Adv. Prax.* cap. 27. Vid. Bull. p. 245.

^b Neque enim proximi erimus opinionibus nationum, quæ si quando coguntur Deum confiteri, tamen et alios infra illum volunt. Divinitas autem gradum non habet, utpote unica. *Contr. Hermog.* cap. 7. Deus non erit dicendus, quia nec credendus, nisi summum magnum. Nega Deum quem dicis deteriorem. *Contr. Marc.* lib. i. cap. 6.

being of yesterday, to be *God*, nay, and *one God* with the Father? These are such glaring and palpable absurdities, that a man of any tolerable capacity or thought (and Tertullian was a man of no mean abilities) could scarce have been capable of admitting them. Wherefore they are to be commended, who have endeavoured to bring Tertullian out of these difficulties, and to reconcile, if possible, the seeming repugnances. There was one way left for it, which the excellent Bishop Bull, and after him the learned Le Nourry, has taken. Tertullian is known to have distinguished between *Ratio* and *Sermo*, both of them names of the selfsame *Λόγος*, considered at different times, under different capacities; first as *silent* and unoperating, alone with the Father, afterwards *proceeding*, or going forth from the Father; to *operate* in the creation. With this *procession* he supposes (as do many others) the *Sonship* properly to commence. So that though the *Logos* had always existed, yet he became a *Son* in time; and in this sense there was a time when the *Father had no Son*; he had his *Λόγος*, his living substantial *Logos*, his *Σοφία*, with whom he conversed, as his *Counsellor*: but the *Logos* was not yet a *Son*, till he came out to create. This notion of a temporal Sonship was what Tertullian endeavoured to make some use of in his dispute with Hermogenes, who asserted matter to be *eternal, unmade, and unbegotten*; in short, *self-existent* in the highest sense. Tertullian thought it might be an argument *ad hominem*, against Hermogenes, that he hereby made matter in some sense higher than even God the Son; while he supposed it absolutely *underived*, and in no sense *derived* or *begotten* at all; which was more than could be said of God the Son, who was *begotten*, and *proceeded* of the Father. This appears to have been Tertullian's real and full meaning, however he happened, in the prosecution of the argument, to run some expressions rather too far; as is often seen in the heat of dispute, in very good writers. Allowing him only the favour of a candid construction, he may at length be made consistent; and his other expressions stand without

contradiction: and he has the greater right to it, upon the principles of common equity; since one *obscure* passage ought never to be set against *many*, and *plain* ones.

You proceed to obviate a passage which we are wont to cite for the *equality*. I have cited others stronger and fuller, which you have not took notice of. Your correction of *patrem* for *parem*, is what I had met with before, and it seems to me very just. But your quotation from his book *de Jejuniis*, to take off the force of the words *æquat et jungit*, does not so well satisfy me: because there is a great deal of difference betwixt *æquat* when used absolutely, and when only in a certain respect. However, as I never insisted upon the force of the word *æquat* in that place, nor have any occasion for it, after so many other more certain and less exceptionable evidences of Tertullian's making Father and Son *one God supreme*; so I shall not be at the trouble to inquire farther about it.

Our next author is,

A. D. 240. HIPPOLYTUS.

This writer you bear somewhat hard upon: *spurious* and *interpolated* are the names you give him. I must first see upon what grounds; and then proceed with him, if we find him genuine. In a note to p. 39, you are pleased to favour me with your reasons. We need say nothing of Dr. Mill, who I presume had never seen the Greek of Hippolytus against Noëtus. Neither need we lay any great stress upon Photius's calling the whole piece against heresies, *βιβλιδάριον*, a *little book*, as you say, since we know not by what rules and measures Photius judged of the greatness or littleness of a book, or to what kind of tracts he confined the name of *βιβλιδάριον*. These things are slight, and such as *critics* would scarce mention. I find that some very good judges, as Tillemont and Fabricius, (I do not know how many more,) take the piece to be genuine: and nobody can doubt but it is at least so in part; as one may perceive by what is borrowed from it by Epiphanius. The only question is about *interpolations*.

Mr. Whiston was so sanguine as to say, he had *evidently demonstrated*^c, that it was one half of it *interpolated*, and by an Achanasian; because Theodorit and Pope Gelasius had both of them quoted a passage out of it, which appears much shorter there than in Hippolytus, as now published. You are so wise as to drop Theodorit, being apprised, perhaps, that Theodorit's quotation was not from this treatise against Noëtus, but out of another work of Hippolytus, upon the *second Psalm*^d: and what great wonder is it, if an author, in two distinct tracts, borrows from himself; expressing the same thought here more briefly, there more at large? Gelasius indeed refers to the *Memoria Hæresium*: but as his quotation is exactly the same with Theodorit's, and probably taken from him, at second hand; Theodorit is the more to be depended on, as being the *elder*, and as being a Greek writer, and noted for his accuracy; and his works preserved with greater care than Gelasius's. Whether the mistake of *Memoria Hæresium* was Gelasius's own, or his transcriber's, an easy account may be given of it; since Hippolytus's piece against *heresies* was the most noted of any, and was preserved entire for a long season, and besides really had in it a passage very like that other out of his Comments on the Psalms; and it might seem no great matter, which of the pieces they referred to. These considerations show how little your critical censure of a book is to be *depended on*: I will therefore still continue to quote Hippolytus as genuine, till I see some better reasons against it than you have here offered: What you hint of its being changed into a *homily* in latter times, is sufficiently answered by Fabricius, vol. ii. p. 6. Let us now see what Hippolytus has to offer in relation to our main dispute.

I produced the passages which I most insist upon (to prove that Father and Son are *one God*) in my De-

^c Mr. Whiston's Answer to Lord Nottingham, p. 10.

^d Τὸ ἀγίον Ἰσπολύτου, ἐκ τῆς ἱερηνίας τοῦ β. ψαλμοῦ. *Theod. Dial.* ii. p. 167.

fence, first briefly, (vol. i. p. 16.) and afterwards more at large in my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 185, &c. whither, to save myself the trouble of repeating, I beg leave to refer the reader. You have some pretended *counter-evidence* to produce, as usual, in order to evade the force of what I offered. You say, (p. 90.) that “though he seems to “aim at including the Son and Spirit; in some sense in “the one God,” (it is well however that he does not aim at *excluding* them, having quite other intentions than you have,) “yet he expressly ascribes to the Father, not a “priority of order only, but a real supremacy of authority and dominion.” Where are your proofs? The first is, that he talks of the Father’s *commanding*, the Son *obeying*: so did Athanasius, Basil, Cyril, Hilary, Marius Victorinus, and others^e, who notwithstanding would have detested your notion: for they never suspected any thing of *subjection* or *servility* in it, but only a different *order* or *manner* of operating, so far as concerns the work of *creation*; and a voluntary condescension, or *οικονομία*, as to other matters. But Hippolytus says, by this *Trinity* the Father is *glorified*. No doubt of it, since nothing can be more for his *glory*, than to have two such divine and glorious Persons proceeding from him, and ever abiding with him: and they that lessen this *glory*, lessen him; who, in a certain sense, is the τὸ πᾶν. You add, as from Hippolytus, that the Father “begat the Son” (that is, sent or showed him to the world, which is Hippolytus’s meaning^f) “when he willed, and as he willed.” Undoubtedly, in Hippolytus’s sense, just as he sent him to be incarnate of the blessed Virgin, “when he willed, and as he willed.” All you have farther material, I have answered above.

^e See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 42.

Or Bull. D. F. p. 80. et alibi.

Or Petavius de Trin. lib. ii. cap. 7.

^f “Ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, καθὼς ἠδίκησεν, ἰδοὺ τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ—λόγον ἔχον ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀφ’ οὗ ἐκείνου τῆς κτίσεως κόσμου, ἐκείνου αὐτοῦ—ὅπως ἐκ φωτὸς γινώσκων προῦνεν τῆς κτίσεως κόσμου, τὸν ἴδιον κῆν, αὐτῷ μόνῳ ἀρίστου ἐκείνου ὑπέσχεσθαι, &c. Hipp. contr. Noët. p. 13.

You will never be able to shew, that either *subordination*, or *ministration*, or the Son's condescending to become man, and in that capacity a *servant* to the Father, is at all inconsistent with the notion of both the Persons being one *God supreme*. You make a show of producing the *ancients* against me; whereas, in reality, you can pick nothing from them more than I am ready to allow, as well as they: and you endeavour to turn what they and I agree equally in, against them, as well as me, by the imaginary strength of two or three false maxims, which you have laid down to yourself, as so many principles of reason. It might be pleasant to observe, what a dance you are leading us through *Scripture* and *Fathers*, and all for amusement; while the true secret of the business is kept behind the scenes.

The case lies here. *Scripture* and *Fathers* agree in these three things, as I also do. 1. That the Son, from the time of his incarnation, was really *subject*, in one capacity or other, to God. 2. That before his incarnation he *ministered* to the Father; as well in the creation, as in all transactions between God and man. 3. That, as a Son, he is *subordinate* to the Father, referred to him as his *Head*. Now your way is to take one or more of these three premises, and from thence to draw your *inference* against the Son's being *God supreme*. This inference you draw from *these premises*, first, as found in *Scripture*. The same *inference* you draw from the same *premises*, as found perhaps in Justin Martyr; the same *inference* again from the same *premises*, as found in Irenæus; and so quite through the *Fathers*. But a man may ask, since the *premises* are taken for granted on both sides, might it not be a much shorter and clearer way, to wave farther proof of the *premises* from *Scripture* and *Fathers*, and to lay all the stress upon making out the *inference*, in a set *dissertation* to that purpose? Right: but then every body would see (what is not to be told) that it is not *Scriptures* or *Fathers* you depend on, but *philosophy*; which, while you mix it all the way with *Scripture* and *antiquity*, is

not thought to be, what it really is, the true source and spring of the opposition you make to us; and which, while it is behind the curtain unperceived, is yet the only thing that raises all the disturbance. But to proceed.

A. D. 249. ORIGEN.

Origen, one of the most learned and considerable writers of his age, was another voucher I had produced for the truth of the doctrine that Father and Son are *one God*¹. I have before vindicated the true construction of the passage², and have observed, from the circumstances, of what moment such a resolution as that of Origen, in so critical and nice a point, (on which depended the grand question of *Polytheism* between Christians and Pagans,) is, and ought to be, when duly considered. You pretend, p. 82. it is *not clear* that Origen's words must bear my sense. I do not wonder at your holding out in such a place as this: it must trouble you to find yourselves condemned in the most important article of all; and that by Origen too, whom you would have to be a *favourer* of you, as he is much a *favourite* with you. But as to the sense of his words, it is so exceeding *clear*, from the whole scope and context, that nothing can be more so. See what I have said above. What then must be done next? Still you say, admitting my construction, it is *not to my purpose*. What! not to my purpose that Father and Son are *one God*; which is what I quoted it for? And if they are *one God*, they are *one God supreme*. You add, that Origen, in that very place, "explains at large *how* the Father and Son are *one*, and also what sort of *worship* is to be paid the Son." The sense, you pretend, is, "that Christians still worshipped but *one God*," (the *Father*, I suppose, you mean,) "because they worshipped the Father by or

¹ Ἐνα ἦν Θεός, ὃς ἀποθεώσατο, τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἑαυτούτου. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 386.

"We therefore, as we have shown, worship one God, the Father and the Son."

² See what I have said above; and compare my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 186.

“through the Son.” Ridiculous: for so Celsus and all the wiser Pagans worshipped but *one God*; because they worshipped the *one supreme*, by and through all their other *deities*. How then did this answer clear the *Christians* from the worship of *Θεοί*, *Gods*, more than the *Pagans*? Was Origen no wiser than to expose himself and his cause to ridicule, by so weak a reply? The strength of his solution rests entirely upon this; that Father and Son are but *one God*; and therefore the Christians worshipped not *many*: he takes in *both*, to make the *ὅν*, the *unum*, the *one thing* worshipped: otherwise there was no occasion for saying that they were *one*; *one in nature*, (as I understand by his instance of *believers*, who were all of the *same nature*, and as such *equal*;) and *one* also in *concord*, *agreement*, and *sameness of will*: which is the very account which *Post-Nicene* Fathers also give of the *Unity*; as Hilary, Epiphanius, Cyril of Jerusalem, Gregory Nyssen, and Austin, referred to in my Defence^h. I shall here only cite the last of themⁱ, who may speak for all the rest. I shall have occasion hereafter to discourse you fully upon the head of *worship*, and to vindicate Origen from your misrepresentations. It may suffice, for the present, to say, that the considering the two Persons under *distinct offices* (a good rule for the regulating the *direction* of our prayers) is no argument either against the Son’s being *supreme God*, (which is no word of *office*;) or for *two worships*, *sovereign* and *inferior*, which you contend for.

^h Defence, vol. i. p. 256, &c.

ⁱ Hi tres, quia unius substantiæ sunt, unum sunt; et summe unum ubi nulla naturarum, nulla est *diversitas voluntatum*. Si autem *natura unum* essent, et *consensione* non essent; non *summe unum* essent: si vero *natura dispares* essent, unum non essent. *Augustin. contr. Max.* lib. ii. p. 698.

Etiam nos quippe incomparabilem *consensum voluntatis*, atque individue caritatis, Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, *confitemur*; *propter quod* dicimus, Hæc Trinitas *unus est Deus*. *August. contr. Max.* lib. ii. p. 720. See my Defence, vol. i. p. 260.

To the same purpose speaks Theodorit, or Maximus.

Εἰς Θεός, οὐχ ὡς τριώνυμος, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἰν Χριστῷ κατηρησμένοι, εἰς τῷ λόγῳ τῆς συμφωνίας, & τῆς φύσεως. *Theod. Dial. IV. ad Maced.* tom. v. p. 373.

The other passages of Origen which you refer me to (in pages 4, 5, 10, 23, 28, 31, 49, 56, 70.) are most of them taken from Origen's less accurate, or interpolated writings; which are of no weight, any farther than they agree with his piece against Celsus. And what you have out of that very piece, has been mostly answered by Bishop Bull, and is not to your purpose.

The passage you quote (p. 10.) shows one advantage the Christians had, that they could plead a *command* for the worship of Christ, which the Pagans could not for their *deities*: not that this was all they had to say, but it was *something*, and too considerable to be omitted. What you cite p. 24, I answered in my Defence, (p. 260.) referring also, in my later editions, to Bishop Bull and Mr. Bingham^k. What you have, p. 28, is only that God the Son was *sent*. Your citation, p. 31, is answered by Bishop Bull^l. What you have, p. 49, is full for a *perfect equality* of all essential *greatness*^m, and therefore is directly against you. And I must charge it on you as a false and groundless report of Origen, when you say (p. 83.) that he is one who in his whole works does "most fully, clearly, and expressly insist on the direct "contrary to my notion." So far from it, that in his latest, best, and most certainly genuine work, he is all the way directly contrary to *your* notion, and conformable to mine; as Bishop Bull has abundantly demonstrated: nor have you so much as pretended to confute what the Bishop has said.

A. D. 256. CYPRIAN.

I cited Cyprian in my Sermonsⁿ, in proof of the three Persons being *one God*. He does not use the very words, but he sufficiently intimates the thing. I shall not here repeat what I said, but refer the reader to it.

^k Bull, Def. F. p. 121. Bingham, Orig. Eccl. lib. xiii. cap. 2. p. 45.

^l Bull. Def. F. p. 262.

^m See above, p. 42.

ⁿ Sermon viii. vol. ii. p. 187.

A. D. 260. DIONYSIUS of Rome, with his clergy.

This author I also cited in my Sermons^o. We have but a small fragment of him preserved by Athanasius : but it is of admirable use for showing the doctrine of the *Trinity*, as professed by the Church of Christ at that time. Sabellius, who had started up but a few years before, gave occasion to the Church to reconsider and to clear this article.

One may see from Dionysius, not only what speculations some at that time had, but also what were approved, and what not. We have no less than four *hypotheses* there intimated : and all condemned but the one only true one.

1. One was the Sabellian, making the Son the Father, and the Father the Son^p ; which Dionysius condemns.

2. A second was of those who, in their extreme opposition to *Sabellianism*, made *τρεις αρχας*, *three principles* ; and, of consequence, *τρεις υποστασεις ξενας αλληλων πανταπασι χωρισμενας*, *three independent, separate Hypostases, unallied to each other*, and not united in one head. This is condemned as *Tritheism* ; and as being near akin to the *Marcionite doctrine of three principles* ; (against which I presume the *Canon*, that goes under the name of *apostolical*^q, was first made ;) and which Dionysius censures as *diabolical*^r doctrine. Here it is observable, that we meet with *three Hypostases*, first introduced in the third century, in opposition to the *Noëtian* and *Sabellian doctrine of one Hypostasis*, and thought very proper to express the sense of the Church ; provided the *Hypostases* were not made *separate*, as so many *heads*, or *principles*. For the Church has always condemned the notion of *τρεις αρχικαι υποστασεις*^s. Origen is, I think, the first writer now extant

^o Sermon viii. vol. ii. p. 188.

^p Ὁ μὴν γὰρ (Σαβήλιος) βλασφημῶν, αὐτὸν τὸν υἱὸν εἶναι λέγων τὸν πατέρα, καὶ ἑμαυτόν. p. 231.

^q Apost. Can. 49. ubi damnatur quisquis baptizaverit in τριῶ ἀνάρχω.

^r Μαρκιανὸς γὰρ τῷ ματαιόφρονος δίδαγμα, εἰς τρεῖς ἀρχὰς τῆς μονερχίας τομὴν ἔδιδασκεν, παῖδιμα ἐν διαβολικόν, &c. *Dionys.* p. 231.

^s See Basil. de Sp. S. p. 130.

that makes mention of two or more *Hypostases* in the Trinity.

3. A third opinion which some were likewise apt to fall into, in opposition to Sabellius, was to make the Father only the *one God*; reducing the Son, and, of consequence, the *Holy Ghost*, to the condition of *precarious beings*, or *creatures*. But this also is condemned by Dionysius, in smart terms, as *blasphemy*† in a very high degree.

4. After rejecting the former three false and heretical tenets, he at length gives us the true faith of the Church, to this purpose. “Therefore it concerns us by all means “not to divide the venerable divine Unity (or *Monad*) “into *three Deities*, nor to lessen the superlative majesty “and greatness of our Lord by making him a *creature*; “but to believe in God the Father Almighty, and in “Christ Jesus his Son, and in the Holy Ghost; and that “the *Word* is united with the God over all: for, he says, “‘I and my Father are one;’ and ‘I am in the Father, “and the Father in me.’ So shall the divine *Trinity*, as “also the sacred doctrine of the *Unity*, be preserved^u.” This was his decision of that important article; which he had also expressed before in words to the same effect, which may here also be cited. “The divine Word must “of necessity be united with the God of the universe, “and the *Holy Ghost* abide and dwell in God; and the “*divine Trinity* be gathered together and united into *one*, “as into a certain *Head*, I mean the God of the universe, “the Almighty^x.”

† Βλάσφημον οὗτ, ἃ τὸ τυχεῖν, μίγιστον μὲν οὖν, χειροποίητος, τρίτος τοῦ θεοῦ, λέγειν τὸν κύριον. εἰ γὰρ γίγνεται υἱός, ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἦν — ἀποσώσασταυ δι' αὐτοῦ. *Dionys.* p. 232.

^u Οὗτ' ἔν καταμερίζειν χερὶ εἰς τρεῖς θείότητας τὴν θαυμαστὴν καὶ θείαν μονάδα· οὐτε ποιήσει κωλύειν τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἢ τὸ ὑπερέβαλλον μίγιστος τοῦ πατρὸς ἀλλὰ πωτιστικίαι εἰς θεὸν πατέρα παντοκράτορα καὶ εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν τοῦ υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, ἠνώσθαι διὰ τῆς Θεῶ τῶν ὅλων τοῦ λόγου ἰγὰ γὰρ, φησι, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ, ἢ ἰσμιον ἢ ἰγὰ ἢ τῆς πατρὸς, ἢ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἡμῶν οὕτω γὰρ ἄν ἢ ἡ θεία τριάς, καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα τῆς μοναρχίας διασώζονται. *Dionys.* p. 232.

^x ἠνώσθαι γὰρ ἀνάγκη τῆς Θεῶ τῶν ὅλων τοῦ θείου λόγου ἰμφλοχωρεῖν διὰ τῆς Θεῶ καὶ ἰδιαίτωσθαι διὰ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα· ἢ διὰ καὶ τῆς θείας τριάδος εἰς ἓκ ὡσπερ εἰς

You will observe how the *Unity* is solved by Dionysius, not by making the Son and Holy Ghost *subject* to the Father, but by *including them in* the Father; not by the Father's *governing* them, but by his *containing* and *comprehending* them. And though Dionysius styles the Father the God of the universe, and emphatically *παντοκράτωρ*, he at the same time declares the Son to be strictly *God*, or no *creature*: and he does not afterwards weakly retract what he had said of the Son, by throwing him again out of the *one Godhead*; but wisely and consistently takes him in, as "one with the Father," included in him, and reckoned to him. These were true and Catholic principles sixty years before Arius was heard of; and they will be such while the world stands.

I might here add the other Dionysius of the same age, and witness of the same faith. But, having produced him twice before, once in my Sermons^y, and again in these papers^z, I shall here pass him over.

A. D. 318. LACTANTIUS.

I had barely referred to this author, as an evidence of the Church's faith, that Father and Son are *one God*, and that the Son is not excluded by the texts of the *Unity*: and of this he is as full and plain an evidence as it is possible for a man to be, however he may differ in other points; as I never pretended to say he did not. But here you exclaim, (p. 83.) of the "strange abuse made of quotations and second-hand representations." One would think you had had some such book as *Scripture Doctrine* before you; which would indeed have furnished you with "variety of strange abuses^a." And had you found one, by chance, in me, you might have spared the exclamation for the Doctor's sake. But to proceed: we

καρφίη ενα, τὸν Θεὸν τῶν ὅλων τὸν πανταρχέτατα λίγην, συγκοινωνησάτω τε καὶ ἐνάργισθαι πῶσα ἀνάγκη. p. 231. *Atkan.* vol. i.

^y Sermon viii. vol. ii. p. 189.

^z See above, p. 48.

^a See the Doctor's manner of quoting exposed in my *Defence*, vol. i. p. 314, &c.

may learn this from Lactantius, that the common way of answering the charge of *Tritheism* was, not by excluding the Son from being *one God* with the Father, but by *including* both in the *one God*^b. We learn farther, that they are *consubstantial* to each other, and to be *adored together* as one God. Nevertheless, since Lactantius had elsewhere dropped some expressions which appeared hardly, if at all defensible, I never laid much stress upon Lactantius's authority, as to the main question: though I might with a much better right have done it than you generally lay claim to *Fathers*, while you think it sufficient if you can but cite a passage or two which you imagine to be on your side; never regarding how to reconcile many other much stronger ones against you. I am persuaded, if I have been to blame, it has been on the *modest* side; not insisting so far upon Lactantius as I might justly have done. I shall now examine whether you have not claimed a great deal too much, and I too little, in respect of this author.

It is certain you can never make him a *consistent* evidence on your side. You can never reconcile his *consubstantiality*, and his doctrine of the two Persons being *one*

^b Cum dicimus Deum Patrem, et Deum Filium, non diversum dicimus, nec utrumque secernimus, quia nec Pater sine Filio esse potest, nec Filius a Patre secerni: siquidem nec Pater sine Filio nuncupari, nec Filius potest sine Patre generari. Cum igitur et Pater Filium faciat, et Filius Patrem, *una* utriusque mens, unus Spiritus, et una substantia est. Sed ille quasi exuberans fons est, hic tanquam defluens ab eo rivus; ille tanquam sol, hic tanquam radius a sole porrectus: qui quoniam summo Patri et fidelis et charus est, non separatur, sicut nec rivus a fonte, nec radius a sole, quia et aqua fontis in rivo est, et solis lumen in radio: æque nec vox ab ore sejungi, nec virtus aut manus a corpore divelli potest. Cum igitur a prophetis idem manus Dei, et virtus, et sermo dicatur, utique nulla discretio est: quia et lingua sermonis ministra est, et manus in qua est virtus, *individua* sunt corporis portiones. Lact. lib. iv. cap. 29.

Filius et Pater, qui unanimes incolunt mundum, *Deus unus est*; quia et unus tanquam Duo, et Duo tanquam unus — *Unum Deum* esse tam Patrem quam Filium Esaias ostendit, &c. Ad utramque personam referens, intulit, *præter me non est Deus*, cum posset dicere *præter nos* — merito *unus Deus* uterque appellatur, quia quicquid est in Patre ad Filium transfuit, et quicquid est in Filio a Patre descendit. Lib. iv. cap. 29.

God, to your principles; so that you have little reason to boast of an evidence which at best is not for you, but either against you, or else *null*, and *none*: and could you have been content to have had him set aside, without insulting me upon it, I might perhaps have let you pass. But now I shall examine what right you have to him. You say, p. 55. and again, p. 86. that his sense of *una substantia* is not clear, and that it might not perhaps be taken in the *metaphysical* sense. But nothing can be clearer than his sense of *una substantia*, both from his *similitudes*, (as that of the *same water* in *fountains* and *streams*, and the *same light* in the *sun* and its *rays*,) as also from the name of *Manus* given to the Son of God, and his observing that the tongue and hands are *individue corporis portiones, undivided parcels of the same body*. Where, though the comparison be gross, and the explication savouring too much of corporeal imaginations; yet the meaning is evident, that he intended the selfsame substance, both in *kind* and in *number*, to belong to Father and Son; as much as you design the *same substance* in *kind* and in *number*, of any two *parts* of the one extended divine substance. You observe also, (p. 55.) that Lactantius makes *angels* to be from the "substance of God." If he did, he has disparaged a *certain* truth relating to the *Son* of God, by mixing with it a foolish *Manichæan* error about *angels*; having been imposed upon by some *heretical* books. Yet Lactantius has no where said what you affirm of him. He has no where said that *angels* are "of God's substance," as he has said plainly of God the Son. You can only collect it from obscure hints and dark innuendos. He uses some coarse comparisons about God's *breathing out* *angels*, and *speaking out* his Son. But he never pretends that *angels* are *one substance*, or *one God* with the Father. He says of the Son, that he was conceived in the *mind* of the Father, (*mente conceperat*,) which he never says of *angels*. He says of *angels*, that they were "created for service:" of

the Son, he only says, that he *proceeded*^c. In a word, allowing only for his including the *Son* and *angels* together under the general name of *breathings*, which may mean no more than *productions*, and differing infinitely in kind, though agreeing in the common name; (as *γενερά* likewise is a name comprehending things that proceed by *creation* or *generation*, in time or eternally,) I say, allowing only this, there appears nothing in Lactantius but what may fairly stand with his other principles, above recited^d. For if, according to Lactantius, God *breathed*, that is, *produced* his *Son* from his *own substance*, but *breathed*, or produced angels not from his *own substance*, but *from nothing*, as he *breathed* into man a soul^e; (Gen. ii. 7.) then there is no farther ground for your censure upon him. That this was really his meaning, and all his meaning, I incline to think, as for several reasons before hinted, so also for this, that in the very chapter of the *Epitome* (cap. 42.) you refer to^f, he makes a manifest difference between the production of the *Son* and of *angels*. The Son was *de æternitatis suæ fonte*, and *de Spiritu suo*. There was not only *breathing*, but breathing from the very “fountain of his eternity;” that is, from his *own substance*: whereas angels are only said to be *de suis spiritibus*, from his *breathings*. So he makes it the peculiar privilege of God the Son, that he was breathed out, *tanquam rivus de fonte*, and *ex Deo Deus*^g: which

• Ad ministerium Dei creabantur. Ille vero, cum sit et ipse spiritus, tamen cum voce et sono ex Dei ore processit, &c. *Lib. iv. cap. 8. Comp. cap. 6.*

^d Vid. Nourrium, Appar. ad Bibl. vol. ii. p. 798.

• Vid. Lactant. lib. ii. cap. 13.

^f Deus in principio, antequam mundum institueret, *de æternitatis suæ fonte*, deque divino ac perenni *spiritu suo*, filium sibi progenuit, incorruptum, fidelem, virtuti ac majestati patriæ respondentem—Denique ex omnibus angelis quos idem Deus *de suis spiritibus* figuravit, solus in consortium summæ potestatis adscitus^g est, solus Deus nuncupatus. *Lactant. Epit. cap. 42. p. 104, 105.*

^g Lactant. Instit. lib. iv. cap. 8.

Quoniam pleni et consummati boni fons in ipso erat, sicut est semper, ut

he never says of *angels*, any more than of *human souls*; which he also derives *de vitali fonte perennis Spiritus*^b, from the *fountain* of his *breathings*, but not from his *substance*; as I have also remarked of Tertullian above. Indeed most of the Fathers laid great stress upon the text in Genesis ii. 7. God's *breathing* into man's *nostrils* the "breath of life;" a privilege peculiar to man above the animal creationⁱ: something of God's own *infusing* and *inspiring*, something of a purer and diviner substance, *spiritual* and *enduring*; the breath of the Almighty, a resemblance, a shadow, an imperfect copy of the *Divinity* itself. Thus far the Fathers carried the notion: and you seem to have mistaken it for the *Marcionite* and *Manichæan* notion of *souls* being the very *substance* of God: a notion which the Fathers detested; and I doubt not, Lactantius among the rest.

Your next objection against Lactantius is, that he supposed the Son to be only *mentally contained* in God, and afterwards begotten into a Person. You ground your conjecture upon a passage which you cite p. 88. and again, p. 120. I have certainly a better right here to say

ab eo bono tanquam rivus oriretur, longeque profueret, produxit similem sui spiritum, qui esset viribus Patris præditus, lib. ii. cap. 9.

^b Lactant. Instit. lib. ii. cap. 12. p. 182.

ⁱ Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κελύων μόνον κισσίοηκιν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον δὲ αὐτῷ ἰχυροῦργησιν, ἔτι αὐτῷ ἴδιον ἐπιφύσησιν—ἕπει ἰμφύσημα λέγεται Θεῷ. Clem. Alex. p. 101.

Ὅτι γὰρ ἡ τῷ ἰμφυσήματος ἐν τῷ γένει μεταλαβὴν ἀναγίγραται, καθαρῶταίς ἕναις παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα ζωᾶ μετασχόν. Clem. Alex. p. 698.

Incorporales animæ, quantum ad comparationem mortalium corporum. *Insufflavit enim in faciem hominis Deus flatum vitæ*—. Flatus autem vitæ incorporalis. Sed ne mortalem quidem possunt dicere ipsum *flatum vitæ* existentem. *Irenæus*, p. 300.

Animæ suæ umbram, Spiritus sui auram, oris sui operam. *Tertull. de Resurr. Carn.* cap. 7.

Intellige *afflutum* minorem Spiritu esse; etsi de Spiritu accidit, ut *aurulam* ejus, non tamen Spiritum—capit etiam imaginem Spiritus dicere *flatum*, nam et ideo homo imago Dei, id est Spiritus. Deus enim Spiritus—. In hoc erit imago minor veritate, et *afflatus* Spiritu inferior, habens illas utique *lineas* Dei, qua *immortalis* anima, qua *libera* et sui arbitrii, &c. tamen in his *imago*, et non usque ad *ipsam vim divinitatis*. *Tert. contr. Marc.* lib. ii. cap. 9.

that the *sense is not clear*, than you had with relation to *una substantia*: and the liberty you take of translating *comprehendit in effigiem*, (or *ad effigiem*, as some editions have it,) *formed into a real Person*, is pretty extraordinary. The learned Le Nourry gives a quite different construction of that obscure passage: and which to me appears more probable than yours. But supposing the author to have expressed himself somewhat *crudely* in this place, in relation to the Son's generation, (which he at the same time professes to be inexplicable,) you very well know that the same author elsewhere speaks as *crudely* even of the *Father* himself; whom he supposes to have had a *beginning*, and to have *made himself*. His words are, "Since it cannot otherwise be, but that whatever exists *must have sometime begun to be*, it follows, that since *nothing was before him*, he must have sprung from *himself*, *Deus ipse se fecit*, God made himself." *Lactant. lib. i. cap. 7.*

This is strange divinity: but the author was a novice; and he at other times talks in a soberer manner. He ought therefore to be interpreted with candour, and with some grains of allowance. If you take advantage of every obscure or uncautious expression, you will make him as heterodox in respect of the real divinity of the Father, as you suppose him to be with regard to the Son. But if you please to interpret him with candour, and to explain any obscure or incidental passage by what is *plain*, and is expressed more at large; he may then perhaps be found, upon the whole, sound and orthodox in relation both to the Father and Son. You next speak (p. 89.) of the Son's entire subjection and obedience to the *will and commands* of the Father: yet taking no notice of Lactantius vindicating to both the same *inseparable honour*, as being *one God*^k. The *subjection* you mention is intended

^k Duo esse dicentur, in quibus *substantia, et voluntas, et fides una est*. Ergo et Filius per Patrem, et Pater per Filium. *Unus est honos utrique tribuendus, tanquam uni Deo, et ita dividendus est per duos cultus, ut divisio*

only of what was since the *incarnation*, and therefore nothing to the purpose. And as to Christ's not setting himself up for *another God*, (which appears to be Lactantius's real and full meaning in the passage you cite¹;) I suppose it may be admitted without any scruple. Or at most, it can amount to no more than this; that in the opinion of Lactantius, Christ (during his state of humiliation) never called himself *God*, lest he should thereby give offence, and be misconstrued as preaching up *another God*. How otherwise shall the Apostles or Lactantius himself be justified (by that way of reasoning) in giving the title and character of *God* to Christ?

I conclude with repeating what I before said, that admitting some things in Lactantius (a *catechumen* only, and not fully instructed) to be such as do not perfectly agree with *Catholic* principles; yet on the other hand it must be confessed, that there are many other things taught by him, which can never be tolerably reconciled with yours^m: so that you have the less reason to boast on that head. You are pleased to observe, (p. 120.) that Bishop Bull gives up "this author as not reconcileable to his opinion:" you should have said, not reconcileable, *upon the whole*. For the Bishop suspected some passages to have been foisted in, being not reconcileable with others; or else that the author himself, being a very raw *divine*, had fallen into gross *contradictions*. But Bishop Bull insisted upon it that some passages of Lactantius were di-

ipsa compage inseparabili vinciatnr; neutrum sibi relinquit, qui aut Patrem a Filio, aut Filium a Patre secernit. Lactant. Epit. cap. 49. p. 140, 141.

¹ *Fuisset enim hoc non ejus qui miserat, sed suum proprium negotium gerere, ac se ab eo, quem illustratum venerat, separare. Lactant. lib. iv. p. 354.*

Vid. Nourrii Apparatus. vol. ii. p. 799.

^m *Solus habet rerum omnium cum Filio suo potestatem: nec in angelis quicquam nisi parendi necessitas. Lact. Inst. lib. ii. cap. 16. p. 197.*

"The Father alone, with his Son, has dominion over all: nor doth any thing belong to the angels, but the necessity of obeying."

Here Lactantius plainly ascribes one common dominion to the Father and the Son; and intimates, that God the Son is exempt from any *necessity* or *obedience* by the opposition made between him and *angels*.

rectly opposite to the men of your principles, and not reconcilable with *Arianism*: as they certainly are not.

A. D. 335. EUSEBIUS.

We now come to a man that lived after the rise of the *Arian* heresy; and who is supposed by all sides and parties to have had a tincture of it more or less; and especially in his writings before the Council of Nice. A testimony therefore from him in proof of the Father and Son being *one God* is the more considerable; since nothing could extort it from him, but either the *force of truth*, or the strength of *tradition*, or the *currency and prevalence* of that persuasion in his time. And which soever of these it were, it is very much to my purpose, though Eusebius might at other times contradict it. I cited Socratesⁿ for the truth of the fact, that Eusebius himself confessed *one God* in three *Hypostases*: nor do I see any reason to suspect his credit. He had his account, as he declares, from original letters which passed at that time. And whatever Eusebius might privately write, he might not have assurance enough, in *public* debate, to gainsay a thing which all Catholics allowed. Any one may see, by Eusebius's oration before Constantine, how tender he was of dropping any thing like *Arianism* in the face of the Catholics, who, he knew, would not bear it. He there speaks as orthodoxly of the blessed Trinity as a man can reasonably desire. His words are: "The ternary
" number first showed justice, teaching *equality*; having
" *equal* beginning, middle, and end: and these are a re-
" presentation of the mystical, most holy, and majestic
" Trinity; which compacted of a nature that had no
" beginning, and is uncreated, contains in it the seeds,
" reasons, and causes of all things that have been made.
" And the power of the number *Three* is rightly styled
" the ἀρχή, the source of all things^o."

ⁿ Socrat. Eccl. Hist. lib. i. cap. 23.

^o Πρώτη δὲ τριᾶς δικαιοσύνη ἀνιδείξει, ἰσότητος καθήρησεμίην ὡς αὖ ἀρχὴν, καὶ μίσηντα, ἔ τειλιότην ἰσην ἀπολαβῶσα· οὐκ ἂν ταῦτα μυθικῆς, ἔ πανταγίας, καὶ

Thus far Eusebius : and he that could say this, (which is really stronger,) may very well be supposed to say the other, which Socrates reports of him. Now, either Eusebius was *sincere* in what he has here said, or he was not. If he was, then he is an evidence on my side, and I have a right to claim him as such : if he was not, still it shows what the *prevailing doctrine* was, and which Eusebius durst not but comply with in his *public* speech ; and this is an additional confirmation of Socrates's report, which relates to what Eusebius acknowledged in *public conferences*. The same also is confirmed by his subscribing the *Nicene faith*, drawn up upon the same principles which I am here defending.

Let this suffice in proof of my third article, that the *ancients* have all along believed and taught, that Father and Son are *one God* ; and therefore God the Son was never thought to be *excluded* from the *one Godhead* by the texts which concern the *Unity*. I have waved all disputable authorities : but because there are some considerable testimonies in Ruinart's select Acts of Martyrs, which though not so certainly *genuine* as those before given, have yet no certain mark of *spuriousness*, I may throw them into the margin, for the reader to judge of as he sees cause. There can hardly be any clearer, or

βασιλευς τριαδος ἡ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἢ ἀγινήτου φύσεως ἡρτημένη, τῆς τῶν γεννητῶν ἀπά-
των οὐσίας ἐν σπέρματι, ἢ τῆς λόγου, ἢ τῆς αἰτίας ἀσπίλητος· καὶ τριαδος μὴ δύ-
ναμις ἐκόντως ἀν ἕνα παντός ἀρχῆ· νομοθεσίη. *Euseb. Orat. Paneg. cap. 6.*
p. 730.

Conf. Jobium, apud Photium. *Cod.* 223. p. 605, 612.

Τῆς τῷ ἱερωτάτῳ τριγώνῳ δυνάμει, ὅτι ἐστὶ ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων γένεως. *Phil. de Vit. Contempt.* p. 899.

† Christum cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto, Deum esse confiteor. *Act. Epi-
podi Mart. A. D.* 178. *Ruin.* p. 76.

Dominum enim Christum confiteor, Filium altissimi Patris, unicum unicum.
Ipsum cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto, *Unum solum Deum* esse profiteor. *Act. Vincentii Mart. A. D.* 304. *apud Ruinart.* p. 369.

Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum adoro : Sanctam Trinitatem adoro,
preter quam non est Deus. *Acta Eupli Mart. A. D.* 304. *apud Ruin.*
p. 407.

Adorem Trinitatem inseparabilem, quæ Trinitas Unitas Deitatis est.
Id. p. 408.

less contested point than this I have been mentioning. It runs, in a manner, quite through the Fathers down to the times of Arius. The only writer I have met with within this compass, that can with any show of reason be thought to make an exception, is Novatian, Presbyter of Rome; who, with Novatus of Carthage, in the year 251, began the schism called after his name; and in the year 257, or thereabout, (it could not well be sooner by his mentioning Sabellius,) wrote a tract upon the *Trinity*, still extant. That he was in the main orthodox, as to the point of the Trinity, I think plain enough from the tract itself; as has been shown also by Le Moyne, Gardiner, Bull, and other great men. But his way of resolving the Unity of *Godhead* into the Father *alone*, (not very consistently with his comment on John xvii. 3. if it is to be made sense of,) appears to me somewhat particular, and not very agreeable to the Catholics of that time. He seems to me (which I speak however with submission to better judgments) to have taken much such a method in explaining the doctrine of the Trinity, as some very worthy men[†] amongst ourselves did about thirty years ago, when the controversy was rife in England. It was to admit of a *higher* and a *lower* sense of the word *God*; the higher supposed to have nothing above the other but *self-existence* or *unoriginateness*: the Father then was supposed to be God in the highest sense as *unoriginate*, but still the Son and Holy Ghost each God in a sense infinitely higher than any *creature* can be; being *necessarily existing*, and wanting nothing but *unoriginateness*. This, I say, was the scheme which some worthy men amongst us at that time took into; and which Dr. Clarke has endeavoured to make some advantage of, as falling *partly* in with his scheme; though differing in the main point of all, the *necessary existence*. This method of solving the *Unity* was thought the more plausible, as most easily accounting for the Fathers being so often styled the *one*, or *only*

[†] Bishop Fowler and others.

God: and there was this thing farther to recommend it, that it seemed very happily to stand clear of the most considerable difficulties raised about *one* being *three*, and *three one*. The main charge it lay liable to, was that of *Tritheism*: which yet neither Arians nor Socinians could with any face object to it; their respective schemes being equally liable to the like charge; and whatever evasions they should contrive, the *same* would, with a very small change, serve as well this, or better. But after all, to say the truth, this scheme can never be perfectly cleared. *Tritheism* may be retorted upon an Arian, as *Ditheism* upon a Socinian, and so they may throw the charge back one upon another; while a Sabellian, a Jew, or a Pagan might maintain the charge against them all. Nor is there any way of avoiding it, but the same which the ancient Church in general went into, viz. the including all the three Persons in the *one God*. I have shown however, what may be justly pleaded for Novatian's orthodoxy, in the main point, the *essential divinity* of all the three Persons; though he otherwise took a way somewhat peculiar, and almost dropped the *Unity*: *Unity of Godhead*, I mean; for as to *Unity of substance*, he is clear enough for it: and therefore he seems to have supposed Father and Son to be *two Gods in one substance*; though he never so called them, but endeavoured, in his way, to fence off the charge as well as he could, not very judiciously nor consistently. Upon the *same* scheme perhaps Eusebius's orthodoxy so far may possibly be defended, especially as to God the Son; notwithstanding what the learned Montfaucon has objected, in a dissertation to that purpose. But this by the way only; I shall have another opportunity, lower down, of saying more of Eusebius. Having cleared three of the points which I undertook, viz. that the ancients in general never thought the exclusive terms to affect the Son, never admitted *another God*, or *two Gods*; but constantly supposed Father and Son together *one God*; there remains now only my fourth article, to complete the demonstration of what I intend; namely,

4. That the ancients applied such texts of the Old Testament as undoubtedly belong to the *one God supreme*, to God the *Son*; considered in his own *Person*, and as really being all that those texts in their fullest sense imply. The authors by me cited for this purpose, in my Defence, vol. i. p. 20, &c. are Justin Martyr, Theophilus, Irenæus, Clemens of Alexandria, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Origen, Cyprian, Novatian, the Antiochian Fathers, Lactantius, and Eusebius. Most of these have been before considered under the former article, but must now be traversed over again upon this article also, distinct from the other.

Before you come directly to attack the general argument, you have some previous considerations thrown in to prejudice the reader against it: these I must take some short notice of, in the entrance, following your method.

1. You say, my asserting Father and Son to be the “one supreme God, not one in Person but in substance, “is directly affirming *two supreme Gods* in *Person*, though “subsisting in one *undivided* substance,” p. 126. To which I answer, that this is directly begging the question. *One substance*, with *one Head*, cannot make *two Gods*, upon the principles of the primitive churches: nor are your *metaphysics* strong enough to bear up against their united testimonies, with *Scripture* at the head of them.

2. You ask, “How comes it to pass that the ancients “never say that Christ is the one, or only God?”

Answ. They do say it *sometimes* of Christ singly^r, *often* of Christ with the Father; as hath been shown under the last article: besides that the making Christ the “God of “Israel, &c.” is saying the same thing; unless there be *two Gods of Israel*.

3. You ask, “Why do they expressly condemn the “applying the title of the one supreme God” (God over all, you mean) “to Christ?”

Answ. They never do condemn the applying the title

^r See my Sermons, vol. ii, p. 82, 83.

of *God over all* to Christ, but the applying it in a *wrong sense*, and under a *false meaning*^s, as some *heretics* applied it. Your references I have answered above.

4. You object, that “all the texts I allege style the “Son Angel, or Messenger.” Right: and so the *ancients* came to know that the texts were not meant of *God the Father*. The Son is an *Angel* and *Messenger*; not by *nature*^t, but by *office*, and voluntary condescension.

5. You object, that the *ancients* thought it “absurd and blasphemous to suppose that the supreme God “should appear, be styled an angel, &c.”

Answ. Blasphemous only for the supreme Father to appear; who could not submit to an *inferior* office (as they thought) without inverting the *order* of the *Persons*. See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 270, &c. And I may observe that the *Post-Nicene* writers, who undoubtedly believed the essential divinity of Christ, yet talked the same way upon that head^u. I may further take notice to you, that the Catholics, in their charge of *blasphemy* upon the Sabellians, did not go upon any such principle as you imagine; that the difference of the *natures* of Father and Son made it *blasphemy* to ascribe that to *one* which might be innocently ascribed to the other, but upon quite an-

^s See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 227.

^t Dictus est quidem *Magni Consilii Angelus*, id est Nuntius; *officii*, non *naturæ* vocabulo.—Non ideo tamen sic *angelus* intelligendus ut aliqui Gabriel aut Michael. Nam et *Filius* a Domino vineæ mittitur ad cultores, sicut et *famuli*, de fructibus petitur. Sed non propterea *unus ex famulis* deputabitur Filius, quia *famulorum* succedit *officio*. *Tertull. de Carn. Christ.* cap. 14.

“He is called, indeed, the *Angel of the great Council*; that is, the *Messenger*; which is a name of *office*, not of *nature*.—He is not therefore to “be thought an *angel*, like any Gabriel or Michael. For even the *Son* is “sent to the husbandmen by the Lord of the vineyard, as the servants are, “to gather the fruits. But we must not therefore reckon the *Son* as one of “the *servants*, because of his succeeding to their *office*.”

^u Pater non dicitur *missus*; non enim habet *de quo sit*, aut *ex quo procedat*—Si voluisset Deus Pater per subjectam creaturam, visibiliter apparere, *absurdissime* tamen aut a Filio quem genuit, aut a Spiritu Sancto qui de illo procedit, *missus* diceretur. *August. de Trin.* lib. iv. cap. 28, 32.

Vid. Prudentium, p. 165, 168.

other foundation; namely, that they thought it *blasphemy* to ascribe any thing to the Father, seemingly derogatory, or lessening to his *Majesty*, beyond what *Scripture* had warranted. And as to their ascribing some *inferior* offices and services to the Son, they did not justify it by alleging the *inferiority* of his nature or person, but by showing that *Scripture* had ascribed those things to him, and without *blaspheming*. For the truth of what I say, I appeal to Tertullian in the margin^x; who was one of those that argued in the manner you mention: and his answer to Praxeas, in relation to this very charge of *blasphemy*, in a similar case, plainly and evidently discovers what was meant by it; and how little there was of what you suspect in it. For when Praxeas, replying to the charge of *blasphemy*, had said that there was no *blasphemy* in supposing the Father to *suffer*, on his *hypothesis*, any more than it was *blasphemy* to make the Son suffer, on the other *hypothesis*, since neither of them imagined the *divine* nature to suffer, but the *human* only; how does Tertullian answer? Not by telling Praxeas of the great *disparity* between Father and Son; not by insisting upon *any inequality*; but only by alleging that *Scripture* warranted their ascribing *sufferings* to the Son, and did not warrant their ascribing any such to the Father.

6. You add, that the “ absurdity of the supposition (in the manner the ancients express it) evidently arises always not from the consideration of *paternity*, but of the *Father’s supremacy*, his being the one supreme,

^x Ergo, inquis, et nos eadem ratione *Patrem mortuum* dicentes, qua vos *Filium, non blasphemamus* in Dominum Deum: non enim *ex divina*, sed *ex humana* substantia, mortuum dicimus. To which Tertullian thus answers.

Atquin *blasphematis*, non tantum quia *mortuum* dicitis *Patrem*, sed et quia *crucifixum*. Maledictione enim crucifixi quæ ex Lege in *Filium* competit, (quia *Christus pro nobis maledictio factus est, non Pater*,) *Christum* in *Patrem* convertentes, in *Patrem blasphematis*. Nos autem dicentes *Christum crucifixum*, non maledicimus illum, sed *maledictum legis referimus*; quia nec *Apostolus hoc dicens blasphemavit*. Sicut autem, de quo quid capit dici, sine *blasphemia* dicitur; ita quod non capit, *blasphemia* est, si dicatur. *Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. 29.*

“self-existent, independent God of the universe,” (p. 128.)

Answ. This being a *secret* piece of history which will want proof, we may pass it over: you have told us what *you* would have said in such a case; but the *ancients*, I think, had “not so learned Christ.” Let us now proceed to see what those good men say; and how handsomely they can plead for the *divinity* of their blessed Lord.

A. D. 145. JUSTIN MARTYR.

My argument from Justin stands thus: (see my Defence, vol. i. p. 21.) The *Jehovah* mentioned, Gen. xviii. 1, 13. and Gen. xix. 24, 27. The God (ὁ Θεός) speaking, Gen. xxi. 12. The “Lord God of Abraham, and God of “Isaac,” spoken of, Gen. xxviii. 13. “The God of Bethel,” (Gen. xxxi. 13.) *God*, (ὁ Θεός,) absolutely so called, Gen. xxxv. 1. *God* calling out of the bush, and saying, “I am “the God of Abraham, &c.” Exod. iii. 4, 6. and “I AM “that I AM,” the “Lord God, &c.” Exod. iii. 14, 15. “God Almighty,” mentioned Exod. vi. 3. “Lord of “hosts,” Psalm xxiv. 8, 10. The *Jehovah* spoken of, Psalm xlvii. 5. The *God* mentioned, Psalm lxxxii. 2. and xcix. 1. is the one true God, the one eternal God of the universe, supreme. But, according to Justin Martyr, our blessed Lord is what hath been said, and all that hath been said, in his *own Person*. Therefore, &c.

Now let us consider what you can have to except against this plain and evident demonstration. I have indeed already answered, or obviated, all you have to say, in another place: and therefore shall be so much the shorter now.

You plead, that according to Justin, it were *presumption* to say that the “Maker and Father of the universe left “the super-celestial mansions, and appeared here in a “little part of the earth.” Right; because the *Father*, upon their principles, was never to be *sent*, or to act a

✓ Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 254, &c.

ministerial part, any more than he was to be *incarnate*; so that the appearing, even by *visible symbols*, (which was the only kind of appearing they ascribed to God the Son,) was not thought suitable to the *first* Person of the Trinity; who, as he is *from none*, could not, without inverting the *order* of Persons, be *sent* by any. It was therefore proper, in that *economy*, to assign *heaven* as the seat of residence to the Father, though filling all things, and the *earth* to the Son, though at the same time filling all things as well as the Father².

I must farther remind the reader, that you have not a syllable here to plead beyond what Bishop Bull had fully and completely answered long ago^a. And therefore the fair way would have been, not to bring up again those obsolete, and now stale things, fit only to be offered to very ignorant readers, but to have set yourself to answer what the Bishop has said; which might have been an employment worthy of a scholar.

You pretend it to be undeniably certain, from Justin, that "the divine Person" appearing was not the "supreme God," &c. whereas it is undeniably certain, that he was the *supreme God*, only not the *supreme Father*; another Person from him, not *another God*, but the same God. See above.

You bid me take notice, (p. 134.) that "the beginning and conclusion of every argument is to show that Christ "is not [*ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός, ὁ Κύριος τῶν ὅλων, ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων,*] but always subordinately *Θεός καὶ Κύριος, γεγραμμένος Θεός, Ἄγγελος καὶ Θεός, καὶ Θεός καὶ Κύριος.*" You may fancy there is something of weight in what you say: but all that know any thing of Justin, know there is nothing in it. Justin uses the several phrases you have mentioned to denote the *Person* of the Father; and they amount to no more than if he had said *ὁ Πατήρ*; only there was a cause, a very just one; as I have elsewhere^b intimated,

^a See Tertullian above, p. 97.

^a Bull, D. F. sect. iv. cap. 3. p. 267, &c.

^b Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 251.

why he chose the other generally, rather than that of ὁ Πατήρ.

There was therefore good reason for Justin's forming his conclusion in the terms he did: and it had been ridiculous to do otherwise. Yet you will find that the *titles* given to God the Son in those *texts* which Justin cites, are as high and strong as the highest you have mentioned, and are indeed the very same, many of them, by which Scripture sets forth the supreme majesty, dignity, and perfections of God the Father.

What you say of the title of Κύριος δυνάμεων, *Lord of hosts*, applied to Christ in Psal. xxiv. by Justin, is rightly observed. And therefore I have hinted above, that the title is understood by Justin, as a name of *office*; not of *nature*, as in the Hebrew original: and so we cannot draw so cogent an argument from that title, considered by Justin, as we may from the same title as it signifies in the Hebrew. This I allow, and also that every *office* is justly referred to the *Father*, as being first in order, and therefore first considered in every *economy* and *dispensation*.

You farther argue, that Christ was "made παθητός, "passible, by the will of God, for our sakes." Very true, because he was *made man* for our sakes: not that his *divine* nature was *passible*, any more than the *Father's*. Such is Justin's own account of it, *passible* as man^c. None of the Fathers ever thought him *passible* any otherwise. But I am ashamed to remind a scholar of those *known* things.

You come next to misreport Bishop Bull. *You say*, (p. 135.) that "to all the places in Justin's unquestionably genuine writings, which thus declare *the Word to be the minister of God's will*, the learned Bishop Bull opposes one single passage out of an epistle to Diognetus "judged to be spurious." Who would not from hence

^c Σαρκωσανθεις, καὶ ἀνθρώπος ἀληθης, ἄτιμος, καὶ παθητός ὑπέμεινε γινώσθαι.
Just. Dial. p. 255. Sylburg.

imagine that the whole cause, in a manner, depended on a single passage of a *spurious* epistle? But this is a most unjust representation. Let that passage or that epistle be *spurious*, though if it be not Justin's, yet it is certainly very ancient, and about the same age with Justin; and you yourself have quoted it, without scruple, as Justin's own, (p. 27.) The cause stands very safe without it: and Bp. Bull has defended Justin admirably, and unanswerably from his other certainly *genuine* pieces^d. All the service that passage does, is only to show that Justin once expressly denies the Son to be *ὑπερέτης*. And has he not done the same thing twenty times over, and more, by making him the *Jehovah*, and *God of Israel*, *God Almighty*, &c. But still he allows him to be *ὑπερέτης*, as he does *ἄγγελος*, a *minister* and *angel* by *office*, which has nothing absurd or improper in it; since he condescended much lower, even to become man.

You next give us a long passage of Bishop Bull, which shows the great *ingenuity* of that excellent Prelate. You produce the *objection*, which the Bishop frankly proposed, at length; but you mangle and misrepresent his solution of it. You say, "he thinks they meant no more than, &c." Thinks? He has *demonstrated* that they meant no more. Bishop Bull's own last account of this matter, in answer to Gilbert Clerke, is as follows.

"The sum of my answer is this. Those Doctors of the Church who wrote before the rise of Arius's heresy, as oft as they reason thus, It was not God the Father but the Son that *appeared* under the Old Testament, and became *incarnate* in the fulness of time; the Father is *infinite*, and cannot be included in a *place*; is *invisible*, and cannot be *seen* by any; they did not intend to deny the Son of God to be *immense* and *invisible*, as well as the Father, but only signified barely that both all those appearances of God, and even the incarnation itself, had relation to the *economy* which the Son of God had taken

^d See Bull. D. F. p. 269.

“ upon him ; which *economy* could no way suit with the
 “ Father because of his having no *principle* from whence
 “ he is, nor deriving his authority from any besides him-
 “ self. That this was the *certain* intent and opinion of
 “ those ancients, I have made appear upon these two
 “ accounts. 1. Because, upon other occasions, they in
 “ many places *all confess* God the Son to be, as well as
 “ the Father, in his own nature, *immense, omnipresent, and*
 “ *invisible*. 2. And again, because *some* of them do them-
 “ selves expressly interpret these their sayings of the
 “ *economy*. What therefore has Mr. Clerke to say to
 “ this c ?”

The short of the matter then is, that it did not suit with the Father to act a *ministerial part*, or to be *subject to any*, (as Bp. Bull expresses it elsewhere, meaning the same thing,) because he is *from none*, and therefore sent *from none* ; lest it should be inverting the *order* of the Persons.

To this you object, (p. 139.) “ the impossibility of the
 “ Father’s being a visible messenger is not founded upon
 “ his Paternity, but upon his absolute supremacy ; upon
 “ his being subject to none, which is inseparable from his
 “ being the unoriginate Author.” But why do you change the terms ? Who ever said that it was absolutely or physically *impossible* for the Father to act as the Son did ? All that is said is, that he could not do it suitably, as not being consistent with that *priority of order* which as *Father* he is possessed of. And it is ridiculous of you to found his being *subject to none* upon his *being subject to none*, which is *idem per idem*. But his being *subject to none*, that is, his never *acting a ministerial part*, is founded upon this, that he is *Father*, first Person, *Head*, from whom every thing descends ; which *order* would be inverted, if the Son were to be at the head, and the Father *minister* to him. Such ministration therefore is a contradiction to his *Paternity*, but to nothing else.

• Bull. Op. Posth. p. 972, &c.

You add, "Nor do the primitive writers ever lay the stress of this argument upon the relation of *Paternity*, "but upon the supremacy." That is to say, they do not lay it upon the *Paternity*, but upon the *Paternity*: for laying it upon the supremacy of *order*, which he is possessed of as *Father*, and no otherwise, is laying it, I think, upon the *Paternity*. And when you add, (p. 140.) that the Fathers, in ascribing *omnipresence* to the Son, did not intend thereby "to infer any equality of supreme independent authority;" you only show how much you are at a loss to make any thing like an answer to Bp. Bull's solution of the main difficulty. For so long as the Son's *omnipresence* is secured, (which seemed most to be affected by that argument,) the rest is all taken off at once, by allowing a *supremacy* of order, or, if you will, a *paternal authority*; which comes to the same, and is no way inconsistent with the Son's *equality*, either of *nature* or *dominion*.

Your quotation out of Clemens, in these words, ("This is the greatest excellency of the Son, that he orders all things according to the will of the Father,") is contrived, as your custom is, in a way very proper for the *deception* of a thoughtless or ignorant reader. Who would not imagine from the words, as you cite them, that the *highest honour* of the Son is only to be *obedient*, and to *serve*? The reader will be surprised to find how very different the *thought* is from what Clemens is there upon. His words run thus:

"The most *perfect*, most *holy*, most *lordly*, most *princely*, most *kingly*, and most *beneficent*, is the nature of the Son, which is most intimately allied to the alone Almighty. This is that greatest excellency which orders all things according to the will of the Father, and steers the universe in the best manner, and worketh all things by his indefatigable unexhausted power, &c f."

† Τελειωτάτη δὴ, καὶ ἀγιωτάτη, καὶ περιωτάτη, καὶ ἡγμονικωτάτη, καὶ βασιλικωτάτη, καὶ ἐνεργητικωτάτη ἢ τοῦ φύσις, ἢ τῶ μόνῳ παντοκράταρι προσεχιστάτη.

Does not the reader see, by this time, what a cheat you would have put upon him, under the name of Clemens? I mention not, that the Greek will not bear your construction: or if it would, the whole context serves to discover your fraud in it. But perhaps you did not look into the author.

A. D. 181. THEOPHILUS.

Theophilus, in his little piece, afforded me but one text, (Gen. iii. 8, 9.) where God the Son is (according to him) twice styled “the Lord God;” that is, as I understand it, the one *true God*, the Creator of man, (Κύριος ὁ Θεός;) God absolutely so called, the *Jehovah*.

You cite (p. 142.) a passage of Theophilus, which you say (according to your usual style) is “directly contrary to what I refer to him for.” I humbly conceive not. But let us see: Theophilus argues after the same way with other ancients; that the *Lord God* there spoken of could not be the *Father*; who never *appears* because never *sent*, and is never sent because he has no Father to *send him*; which is the sum of what all the ancients thought in that matter. The Father was not to be in a *place*, even by *visible symbols*; which yet the Son might be, because a *Son*.

You observe that Theophilus speaks of the *Father*, not under the character of *Father of Christ*, but as being ὁ Θεός καὶ Πατὴρ τῶν ὄλων, *the God and Father of all things*. Right; because he was talking to a Pagan; to whom therefore he adapted his style, calling the *Father* by such a name as Pagans gave to their “supreme Father of gods and men.” So Justin Martyr, in his Apology, written to the Pagans, gives the Father that title; but in his Dialogue he generally gives him another, more proper to the Jews, because he had then to deal with Jews: and it would not have been proper to give him the name of

αὐτὴ ἡ μίγξις ὑπερβολὴ, ἢ τὰ πάντα διασθασίται κατὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔργον οἰκίσει, ἀπαράτη, καὶ ἀτρέπτου δυνάμει πάντα ἐργαζομένη, &c. Clem. Strom. vii. sect. 2. p. 831.

Father, in the Christian sense, while disputing against those who would not yet own him a *Father* in that sense; for it would have been begging the question ε. You have therefore drawn strange consequences from an imagination of your own, which never entered into the head of Theophilus.

But you observe farther, that the Son (according to Theophilus) “assumed the Person (not of the Father “merely, but) of (τοῦ Θεοῦ,) God absolutely.” That is again not of the *Father*, but of the *Father*: for it is the *Father* he means, the Person of the Father, by τοῦ Θεοῦ, the same whom he had just before called the “Father “and God of the universe,” in compliance with the Pagan style. And what cuts off all your criticisms at once, Theophilus observes there, that the Son being *God*^h as God’s *Son*, appeared to Adam: as much as to say, that if the Son had not been *God*, he could not pretend to assert, that he was the Person styled in Genesis, Κύριος ὁ Θεός, the *Lord God*. But being really *God*, as God’s *Son*, there was nothing in that title but what very well suited his Person; and so it was right to interpret Gen. iii. 8. of him. This is evidently the train and course of Theophilus’s thoughts in that place; gradually to introduce Autolychus to admit *God’s Son*; and therewith the *Christian* religion. This may farther show, that when Theophilus speaks of the *Logos’s* assuming the “Person of God,” he means this, and only this; that he acted in the character and capacity of the *eternal God*: which he might very well do, being himself *very God*, as well as that other Person, his Father, called “God and Father of the universe:” and it was under this very character he appeared to Adam as his *Creator*, that is, as “God and Father of all things;” which is not a stronger expression than Κύριος ὁ Θεός, the *Lord God* applied to him by Theophilus. I shall only add,

ε See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 251.

h Θεὸς αὐτὸν ἂν ὁ Λόγος, καὶ ἐν Θεῷ σιθικῶς, ἐκείν’ ἂν βάλῃται ὁ πατὴρ τῶν ἔλων, πῆμπε αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν τῶν, &c. *Theoph.* p. 130.

that Theophilus certainly never intended to assert *two Lord Gods*, as your hypothesis requires, but one only, the Father with the *Logos*: and so all concludes in *one God supreme*ⁱ; agreeably to my principles.

A. D. 187. IRENÆUS.

My argument from Irenæus runs thus: "*Jehovah* that rained upon Sodom," (Gen. xix. 24.) *God* calling at the bush, and saying, "I am the God of Abraham, &c." (Exod. iii. 4, 6.) "The mighty God" spoken of, Ps. l. The *God* known in Judah, (Ps. lxxvi. 1.) ὁ Θεός absolutely; "God" (ὁ Θεός) standing in the congregation," (Ps. lxxxii. 1.) "The *Jehovah* reigning," Ps. xcix. 1. The *God* and *Jehovah* mentioned, Is. xii. 2. xxxv. 4. Joel iii. 16. Amos i. 2. *God*, who has none like him, Mich. vii. 18. "God (ὁ Θεός) that came from Teman," Hab. iii. 3. He that is all this, is the "one God supreme." But such is Christ, according to Irenæus: therefore, &c.

You have little here but repetition of the same threadbare things: that Christ "was not the one supreme God," that is, not the "one supreme Father," which you constantly confound with the other; that he *ministered*, which I do not dispute, for he *died* too; that "he fulfilled the Father's commands," which I never questioned; that the Son is "never called by Irenæus the one God," which I much question, and have proved to be false, though the point is not material; that the Son "received power to judge," that is, from whom he *received his essence*. What force is there in these trite things? You add, (p. 141.) that Exod. iii. 4, 8. is applied by Irenæus to the "Father only." I know not where; but

ⁱ Theophilus speaking of *woman* being made from the *rib* of the *man*, represents it as an emblem of the *divine Unity*, in these words.

Ὁ μὴ ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τούτου διὰ τὴν ἐν μυστηρίῳ τῆς μοναρχίας, τῆς παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ἅμα ἃ ἰσότητος ἰ Θεός τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ, καὶ Ἰσοῦται οἱ δύο σὺς εἶσα μίαν. *Theophil.* p. 145.

"To signify the mystery of the *Unity* (or *Monarchy*) of God, he made "for him a wife, (saying,) *And they two shall be one flesh*."

I am sure that he applies verse the 8th to the Son thrice^k. And if he has any where applied it to the Father also, the reason may be, that since both are the *same God*, the application may be proper to either; which may be likewise answer sufficient to what you observe of Exod. iii. 14, 15. As to what you have farther, p. 142, I refer to what hath been said under a former article, to prove that Father and Son are (according to Irenæus) both together *one God*.

A. D. 192. CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS:

My argument from Clemens is to this effect:

He who is "Jehovah," "Almighty God," (Gen. xvii. 1, 2.) "Lord God of Abraham," (Gen. xxviii. 13.) "God of Bethel," ὁ Θεός, (Gen. xxxi. 13.) and "Lord God," (Exod. xx. 2.) is the "one God supreme." But such is Christ, according to Clemens: therefore, &c.

Here you tell me (p. 144.) of the *Pædagogus* being a "juvenile" piece, (which is more than you know^l), or if it be, it is of never the less authority, if not contradicted by his riper thoughts, as it is not. You refer to what you had said above; and I refer to what I have said in answer above. But you farther take me to task for what I had said in my Defence, vol. i. p. 25. that Christ spoke the words, "I am the Lord thy God," Exod. xx. 2. in his *own Person*, according to Clemens^m. This observation, which, it seems, tenderly affects you, you call "absurd" and "perfectly ridiculous." It is easy to give hard names; let us hear your arguments. All you have to plead is this, that

^k Loquens Filio ad Moysem; *Descendi*, inquit, *eripere populum hunc*. Ipse enim est qui descendit, &c. *Iren.* p. 180.

Nescientes eum qui figura loquutus est humana ad Abraham, et iterum ad Moysem, dicentem, *Vident videri veritatem*, &c. Hæc enim Filius, qui est Verbum Dei, ab initio præstruebat, p. 236.

Ipse est qui dicit Moysei, *Vident videri*, &c. ab initio assumptus Verbum Dei ascendere et descendere, p. 241.

^l See Grabe's Instances of Defects, p. 10.

^m Πάλα δὲ θεὸς λέγει δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀπαύτου, ἡμεῖς ἰσχυροῦς πειλογοῦμεν Ἐγὼ λέγω ὁ Θεός σου, ὁ ἕλεσται σε ἐν γῆσι Διόσκου. *Clem.* p. 131.

“ Christ is there observed to speak in his *own Person*, not “ in opposition to his being the *representative* of the Person of the Father, but in opposition to his being elsewhere spoken of in the *third Person*.” Now, I grant it was not *intended* in opposition to an opinion which no body at that time was wild enough to hold : but while he is aiming at another thing, he might accidentally drop a sentence which quite overthrows that *opinion* ; which is the truth of the case. For what can be plainer than the words, *διὰ ἰδίου προσώπου*, *in his own Person*, and *ταυτὸν ὁμολογῆναι*, he professes *himself* to be *παιδαγωγὸν*, the *Leader forth*, because of his saying, “ I am the Lord thy God, “ who *led forth* thee out of the land of Egypt ?” I translate *leader forth*, to make the English answer, as the Greek *παιδαγωγὸν* and *ἔξαγαγὸν* do. Is there any sense in what Clemens says, if the Person there speaking was the Person of the *Father*, or any other Person but the *Son* ? But you was to say something to *amuse*, and was to fill up the rest with hard words. The *opposition* you have took notice of, does not at all alter the case. For whether the Scripture speaks of the Son in the *third*, or he of *himself* in the *first Person*, it is still the *Person of Christ*.

A. D. 206. TERTULLIAN.

My argument from Tertullian stands thus :

“ The Lord God” mentioned, Gen. iii. 8, 9. *Jehovah* appearing to Abraham, Gen. xviii. 1, 13. and xix. 24. The “ God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,” Exod. iii. 4, 6. The “ I AM,” Exod. iii. 14. The *God* spoken of, Is. xxxv. 4. “ The God, besides whom there is no God,” (Is. xlv. 14, 15.) he is the “ one true God supreme.” But this is *Christ*, according to Tertullian : therefore, &c.

You have here (p. 145.) two or three little cavils, which I have answered above. You next tell me that Tertullian always “ declares Christ to have appeared, not in his own “ name, *but* in the name of the one supreme God.” But where does Tertullian say that he appeared not, or conversed not in his *own name* ? He says indeed in the *Father’s*

name, but in his *own name* too, the *name and nature* of either being *common* to bothⁿ. He took no *name* but what he had a right to; nor said any thing of *himself* but what was true of *himself*. And therefore he never said *I am the Father*, though he often said *I am God*, or *Lord*, or *Almighty*: which deserves your special notice. I allow that he acted in the Father's name, coming with all the authority of the *Godhead*, common to *both*, unoriginately in the Father, derivatively in the Son. This is coming in the Father's name, and with his authority, to exhibit in and through himself all the *majesty and dignity* and *perfections* of the *Godhead*: being himself a full, perfect, and adequate transcript or image of all that the Father is.

You would have it thought that the Father was "absolutely invisible" (according to Tertullian) "on account of his supreme majesty, but the Son visible, as a comprehensible part;" and yet you very well know, that Tertullian did not allow even the Son to be *visible* in his *divine* nature^o, but only by *visible symbols* voluntarily chosen. And all the peculiar majesty of the Father lay only in this, that he was not to be *visible* in any way at all; because he was not to *minister* or to be *incarnate*. But will you persist in offering the most palpable abuses upon your readers?

A. D. 240. HIPPOLYTUS.

Hippolytus I had cited for one text only, his applying

ⁿ *Omnia, inquit, Patris mea sunt: cur non et nomina? Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. 17. See my Defence, vol. i. p. 31, &c.*

^o *Dicimus enim et Filium suo nomine eatenus invisibilem, qua Sermo et Spiritus Dei: ex substantiæ conditione, jam nunc, et qua Deus, et Sermo, et Spiritus. Visibilem autem fuisse ante carnem eo modo quo dicit, &c. Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. 14.*

"For we say that the Son also, in his own Person, was *invisible*, so far as he was *the Word*, and *Spirit of God*: and he is so also now, as *God*, and *the Word*, and *Spirit*: the *condition* (or quality) of his *substance* requiring *it*. But he was *visible* before his incarnation, in such a way as he says," &c.

Vid. Bull. D. F. p. 88. Nourrii App. vol. ii. p. 1310.

the words "that stretcheth out the heavens like a curtain" (Is. xl. 22.) to Christ. Whoever looks into that chapter, will see that the Person of whom those words were spoken is described all the way in characters peculiar to the *one true God*. That Person therefore being Christ, according to Hippolytus, the consequence is evident. You have little to say in answer, but what has been abundantly replied to or obviated before. So I pass on.

A. D. 237—244. ORIGEN.

I cited Origen but for two texts, Exod. iii. 4, 6. Psal. xxiv. 8, 10. According to him therefore Christ is "God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob;" "Jehovah," and "King of glory." "You see not," it seems, "how this proves that Origen thought Christ to be the one supreme God." It either proves that, or else that Origen thought there were *two Gods* of Abraham, *two Lords* of hosts: which yet Origen, as we have before seen, absolutely denies. So much for Origen.

A. D. 256. CYPRIAN.

My argument from Cyprian runs thus:

He that is "God of Bethel," Gen. xxxv. 1. "The Lord strong and mighty," "Lord of hosts," Psal. xxiv. 8, 10. He that said "I am God," (Psal. xlvi. 10.) and who is called "mighty God," and "our God," Psal. l. 1, 3. The *God* arising, Psal. lxxviii. 1. "God standing in the congregation," Psal. lxxxii. 1. "The God beside whom there is none else," Is. xlv. 14, 15. He that said, "I am God, and not man," Hos. xi. 9. The *Jehovah* spoken of, Zech. x. 12. "The God in comparison of whom none other shall be accounted of," Baruch iii. 35. He that is all this, is the "one true God supreme." But such is Christ, according to Cyprian: therefore, &c.

In answer hereto you tell me (p. 146.) that "Cyprian has not one word to my purpose." But let the reader judge as he finds, and not give too hasty credit to your blunt sayings. You tell me of Cyprian's styling the Fa-

ther "the one God, who is Lord of all, of unequalled "majesty and power:" but you have not shown that this was said in *opposition* to, or *exclusive* of, God the Son. Nay, it is certain it was not, because Cyprian, in his application of the texts above cited to Christ, has really said as high and as great things of him. What can run higher than that of Baruch? "This is our God, and there "shall none other be accounted of in comparison of him." You have nothing farther to say, but that "Christ" (*i. e.* during his humiliation here on earth) "called the Father "his Lord and God," by him "prayed to be glorified," and the like. Sure you do not expect an answer, as often as you bring up those poor things.

A. D. 270. ANTIOCHIAN Fathers.

The texts which these Fathers apply to Christ are Gen. xviii. 1, 13. Gen. xxxi. 13. Exod. iii. 4, 6. Isa. xxxv. 4. xlv. 14, 15. Hos. xi. 9.

The argument from them will be much the same as that of others before recited. You plead, that "these "Bishops are so far from declaring *the Son* to be the one "supreme God, that they expressly, on the contrary, say, "that he fulfilled the will of the Father in the creation of "all things." Wonderful! *So far* from declaring it, that they say nothing but what is very *consistent* with it, or what serves to confirm it. For what is there *contrary* in his "fulfilling the will of the Father in the creation?" Or what *creature* could ever be able to execute so high a charge? But here again you discover what it is you rely on; not *Scripture* or *Fathers*, but two or three *fancies* of your own, among which this is one: that the doctrine of the *Unity*, as held by the Church, is not consistent with a distinction of *Persons*, *order*, and *offices*. Might you not therefore better plainly own to the world that there lies all the difficulty, rather than amuse them with

* Labbè, tom. i. p. 845.

† See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 43, &c.

Scripture and Fathers, only to draw such premises as are readily granted; at least by me, who dispute only your conclusion? You repeat some things about the *absurdity* of the Father's appearing, the Son's being an *angel*, and the like; which have been before answered, and need not any farther notice.

A. D. 257. NOVATIAN.

This author, according to order of time, should have come in before: but I was willing to postpone him, as you had done; because I take him to be somewhat particular, and therefore of distinct consideration; as before hinted.

My argument from this writer will stand thus:

The *Jehovah* appearing to Abraham, (Gen. xviii.) and raining upon Sodom, (Gen. xix.) The *God* speaking to Abraham, (Gen. xxi.) "The God of Bethel," (Gen. xxxi.) "The God standing in the congregation," (Ps. lxxxii.) The *God* mentioned, Is. xxxv. 4. The *Jehovah* from Zion, (Joel iii. Am. i.) He is the "one true God." But such is Christ; according to Novatian: therefore, &c.

I have intimated my doubts of Novatian before, as to his way of solving the *Unity*: in which he appears to be various, and not very consistent with his own principles; though orthodox in the main, as to the Son's *essential* divinity. The Sabellian abuse of the phrase *one God*, I suppose, might make him the more scrupulous. I have sometimes wondered at it, considering the *known* principles of that age, appearing in the authors above mentioned. But he was none of the most *judicious*, nor without his *singularities*; as is plain from the *schism* begun by him. I shall now see what you have to say to this writer. You bring up (p. 148.) the whole pretence of God the Father being "immense," and "contained in no place," whereas the Son might be *contained*, &c. A general answer has been already given to this out of Bishop Bull; which answer is so full and certain, that you know not how to gainsay it. The meaning of the

Fathers was no more than this, that God the Father never appeared in a *place*, no, not by *visible symbols*, which yet the Son did: and it was by such *visible symbols* only, that the Son was contained in a *place*, and not in his *divine nature*. Novatian himself is a proof of this matter; for he expressly asserts the *omnipresence* or *immensity* of God the Son^r. Your other objection is, that Novatian speaks of the Son as being *subditus*, *subject* to the Father; which is meant only of the Son's *ministering* to the Father by voluntary condescension, according to the *economy* entered into from the creation: so that this is far from proving the *subjection* which you are aiming at, viz. a natural and necessary subjection of a *precarious being* to his God and Creator. Novatian would have abhorred the thought. He reserves to the Father solely and exclusively the title of the *one God*, on account of his *supremacy of order and office*, (which I think a false way of speaking,) at the same time allowing the Son to be of the *same nature and substance*; which is plainly making the Son *God supreme*, and God in the *strict* sense, according to just propriety of speech. In *words* then, he may seem in some measure to agree with you: but in *reality*, he agrees more with me; differing only *loquendi modo*, or *citra mysterii substantiam*, from the Catholic doctrine, as Petavius himself confesses of him. *Pref. in T. ii. c. 5.*

A. D. 318. LACTANTIUS.

There are only three texts cited from this author: Isa. xlv. 6. xlv. 14, 15. Baruch iii. 35. But they are wonderful strong and expressive, "I am the first, and I am the last; and besides me there is no God:" this he understands of the Father and Son together. "Surely

^r Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo adest ubique invocatus; cum hæc hominis natura non sit, sed Dei, ut adesse omni loco possit? *Novat. cap. 14.*

"If Christ be only a man, how comes he to be present as invoked every where; when it is not the nature of man, but of God, to be present to all places?"

“God is in thee; and there is not another God besides thee,” (so he expresses it in his Epitome:) this he understands of *Christ*; and the other text, out of Baruch, is as full and strong^s. One thing is evident, that Lactantius never dreamed of that strict force of *exclusive* terms, which you are used to insist upon. For if he had, he must have excluded the *Father* himself from being God, in virtue of the text of Baruch.

You have nothing of moment to say to Lactantius's citations, which are directly opposite to your principles: but with your usual air, when you are entirely at a loss, you would seem to condemn what you cannot answer. All you can pretend is, that Lactantius styles the Father *Deus summus*^t, *God supreme*: and yet it is certain that he supposes the Son to have the same *nature* and *substance* with the Father, and to be *one God* with him;

^s Unum esse Deum tam Patrem quam Filium, Esaias in illo exemplo quod superius posuimus, ostendit cum diceret: *Adorabunt te, et te deprecabuntur, quoniam in te Deus est, et non est alius præter te.* *Lact. Inst.* lib. iv. cap. 29. *Epitom.* cap. 44.

Sed et alio loco similiter ait. *Sic dicit Deus rex Israel, et qui eruit eum Deus æternus: Ego primus et ego novissimus, et præter me non est Deus.* Cum duas personas proposuisset Dei regis, id est Christi, et Dei Patris—ad utramque personam referens, intulit, et *præter me non est Deus*, cum posset dicere *præter nos*: sed fas non erat plurali numero separationem tantæ necessitudinis fieri. Lib. iv. cap. 29.

Item Jeremias. *Hic Deus noster est et non deputabitur alius absque illo, &c.* *Lactant. Epit.* cap. xlv. p. 116.

^t Unus est enim solus liber Deus, summus, carens origine; quia ipse est origo rerum, et in eo simul et Filius et omnia continentur. Quapropter cum mens et voluntas alterius in altero sit; vel potius in utroque *una*, merito *unus Deus* uterque appellatur: quia quicquid est in Patre ad Filium transfuit, et quicquid est in Filio a Patre descendit. *Lact. Inst.* lib. iv. cap. 29.

The words *et omnia* here seem to come in very strangely. Lactantius must think the *omnia* to be contained in the Father much otherwise than the Son is: else how should he prove the Son *one God* with the Father, without proving the same of every thing else, as well as of him, by the same argument? Qu. Whether *rerum* and *omnia* may not be understood of things *divine*? all that is *divine* or *adorable* in such a sense as Tertullian speaks:

Unus omnia, dum ex uno omnia, per substantiæ scilicet unitate

Here *omnia* stands only for the divine Persons. Arnobius se
omne quod colendum est colimus.

which is what I call making the Son *God supreme*: and the author cannot be more plainly opposite to my principles in the *former* part, than he is to *yours* in the *latter*. If the parts are not reconcilable, his evidence is *null*, and of no account on either side. But I conceive, the author may be reconciled by a candid construction of *Deus summus*; either considered as opposed only to Pagan deities, or as being an inaccurate expression for *summus Pater*, the *supreme Father*, by which the author himself interprets it, and meaning no more than that he is supreme in *order* or *office*; which I allow. See *Le Nourry, Apparat.* vol. ii. p. 353.

A. D. 335. EUSEBIUS.

What you were deficient with respect to Lactantius, you endeavour to make up in regard to Eusebius. Here you insult unmercifully: a plain sign that your forbearing to do the like upon other *writers*, is not owing to your civility or modesty, but to something else. The “learned world” must be called in, and stand “amazed” at my “presumption:” as if none of the learned world had ever taken Eusebius to have any thing *orthodox* upon the *Trinity*. I gave a caution in my Defence, vol. i. p. 23. note ^m, in regard to Eusebius: and it so stood in three editions before you published your piece. This was on purpose to intimate, that I did not pretend to claim Eusebius as entirely on my side; but only *so far*. And with the like moderation I have always spoke of Eusebius, in my Sermons, and elsewhere, because I would not deceive my reader, nor be confident where a point is disputable. Learned men know how both ancients and moderns have differed in their opinions of this man. Hilary, Jerome, Photius, two Nicephoruses, the second Council of Nice, Baronius, Perron, Petavius, Noris, Sandius, Le Clerc, and others, and at length Montfaucon, have charged him with *Arianism*: on the other hand, Socrates, Theodorit, Gelasius Cyzicenus, Camerarius, Chamier, Calovius, Peter du Moulin, Florentinus, Valesius, Bull,

Cave, Fabricius^u, defend, or at least excuse him. Athanasius^x seems to have thought that he was once an Arian, but at length came over to the Catholic side. Epiphanius says, he was *too much inclined* to the Arian way; and the learned Pagi (as an ingenious gentleman^y, from whom I have borrowed part of this account, has observed) *confesses he knows not what to make of him*. Now, in such cases, as these, however firmly persuaded a man may be, on this or that side; yet in pure modesty and deference to men of name and character in the learned world, one would speak with caution and reserve: and there cannot be a surer argument of a little mind, than to be insulting and confident on such occasions. After all, the main question is very little concerned in this other about Eusebius; who cannot justly be reckoned among the Ante-Nicene writers, (to whose *indifferent* judgment we appeal,) as living and writing after the time that Arius had broached his *heresy*, and raised a faction against the Church; to which Eusebius, by *affinity* and *party*, (and perhaps upon *principle* too,) appears to have leaned. He may however be a good evidence of what the Church taught, in those very points which he endeavoured, by a novel turn, or by some private constructions of his own, to warp from their ancient intendment and significancy. And though I cannot pretend to say that he comes entirely into that scheme which I defend, yet sure I am that he can never be reconciled, upon the whole, to yours.

It would be tedious to run through all you have cited from him: it might fill a volume to discuss this single question about Eusebius. I shall content myself therefore with a few strictures, just to abate your excessive confidence. I have admitted that Eusebius did (as some other very worthy men have also done) magnify the glory of *unoriginateness* rather too far; as if it were a distinct

^u Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. vol. vi. p. 32.

^x Vid. Athanas. Ep. ad Afros, p. 896.

^y Mr. Thirlby, Answer to Mr. Whiston, p. 79.

perfection, and not a relation only, or *mode of existence*, as the Catholics taught: yet you will not find that Eusebius denies the *necessary existence* or *eternity* of the Son; however not after the Nicene Council. If you have a mind to gain Eusebius to your side, do not endeavour it by *false reports* and manifest *untruths*; lest the reader suspect you even in what you may *justly* plead from him. You scruple not to say, (p. 150.) as from Eusebius, that the Son is “ styled God and Lord on account of his having received all power and authority from the Father, “ and ministering to all his commands:” which, in effect, is making a Photinian or Samosatene of him. He nowhere, that I know of, says any such thing: nor do the places you refer to prove any thing like it; unless saying that Christ is *God*, as being our *Creator*^z, be the same as saying he is *God* on account of *receiving authority*, &c. Eusebius’s constant way of accounting for the Son’s being *God*, is by resolving it into his being *God’s Son*^a, and his thereby copying out a *perfect* resemblance of the Father: and he makes him “ by nature great God^b” on that very account. In one place more besides that before mentioned, he calls him *God*, as being our *Creator*, or *Maker*^c: unless it be there meant of the *Father*; which if it be, it shows that Eusebius’s looking upon Christ as *God* because *Creator*, was no lessening consideration. The reader may well wonder, after this, what could move you to make so strange and false a representation of an author. I may farther hint, that, according to Eusebius, the Son could not be *God*, if he were produced *ἐξ ἑκ ὄντων*,

^a “Ὅτι δὲ γενητῶν ἀπάντων καθηγεῖται τῶν δι’ αὐτοῦ γενησμένων, ὡς ἂν ἀπάντων ὑπάρχων σωτῆρ, καὶ κτίσις καὶ δημιουργός—τηνικαῦτα, καὶ Θεός, καὶ δισπόστης, καὶ σωτῆρ, καὶ βασιλεὺς ἀναγορεύωτο ἂν. Euseb. Eccl. Theol. lib. ii. p. 111.

^a Euseb. Dem. Evang. p. 146, 213, 227.

Contra Marc. p. 7, 62, 68, 69, 72, 111, 123, 127.

Comm. in Psalm. p. 534, 634.

^b Φύσει μέγας ὡν Θεός, καὶ μέγας συχχάντι βασιλεὺς, ἅτι μοιγενῆς ὡν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος. Euseb. in Psalm. p. 629.

^c Κτίσις ἡμῶν ἴστιν ὡς δούλων, καὶ Θεός ὡς πλάστης. Euseb. Com. in Psalm. p. 645.

from nothing, or did not participate of the Father's divinity^d. How does this suit with your notion of his *Godship* being owing to his receiving of authority? You next produce a passage where Eusebius is arguing that the Father, or *God over all*, could not have appeared, because it is "impious to say God was changed:" and this you leave with your reader. You add another passage of like kind to it: "It can no way be said that the unbegotten and immutable essence of God supreme was changed into the form of a man." This also you leave for any simple reader to imagine, that Christ, who took upon him human form, is not, according to Eusebius, of *immutable* essence, but subject to *change*. Yet Eusebius certainly meant no more than that it was not so suitable to the majesty of the first Person, (whom he calls indeed *supreme God*, in contradistinction to the Son,) to submit to take upon him any *visible symbols*, or to be *incarnate*. As to the *nature and essence* of the Son, he believed it to be absolutely *immutable*^e, and liable to *no change*, as well as the Father's. Wherefore though Eusebius does insist on the *supremacy* of the Father, more than other writers before him, (which might bring him under the suspicion of *Arianizing*;) this is in a manner all he can be said to agree with you in, being directly opposite to you in the main points of your scheme. Such men as Dr. Cudworth, Bp. Fowler, and others amongst us, might perhaps have claimed Eusebius as their own: you and your friends are quite of another stamp; though you are willing to seek

^d Euseb. Eccl. Th. p. 69. See below, p. 149.

^e Μίσην αὐτὸς πάλιν ἄλλος εἶς ἐκ τούτου παρὰ τῷ πατρὶ ἦν ὅτι μεταβαλὼν τὴν οὐσίαν.—οὐδὲ τὴν οὐσίαν ἴσασχεν ἡ ἀπαθεία, &c. Euseb. Orat. Paneg. cap. xiv. p. 761.

Σχηματι εἰρηθίς ὡς ἀνθρώπος ἀλλοίωσεν ἡ τὴν τυχεύσαν ἰδοξίαν ὑπομίμνω, ἀναλλοίωτος ἦν καὶ ἀτριπτος ὡς Θεός. Euseb. in Psal. p. 185.

"He performed all things by the man he had assumed — Continuing immaterial in himself, such as he had been before this, with the Father, without any change of his substance. Nor did he suffer any thing in respect of his substance, being impassible.

"Being found in fashion as a man, he might seem to undergo no small change, though *unchangeable and unvariable as God.*"

some cover and countenance from the *few things* wherein they agreed with you. The next passage you cite (p. 152.) proves no more than that Eusebius strained the point of the Father's supremacy too high, in calling the Son a *second Lord*; which *second* however was, in his opinion, in a manner infinitely *higher* and more excellent than your scheme makes him, by depriving him of *necessary existence*, and reducing him thereby to a *creature*, which Eusebius declares against more than once. And though I will not undertake to clear Eusebius of *Tritheism*, or *Ditheism*; yet it appears plainly enough to me, that he was very far from *Arianism*; at least, after the Nicene Council.

As to the next text, about which I appeal, you pretend that Eusebius is expressly against me. Why? Because he says that the Son is not *ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων*, that is, he is not the *supreme Father*: which is all you could make of many the like places in Eusebius; were there not others still stronger elsewhere. I could show you where Eusebius styles the Son *Θεὸς τῶν ὅλων*^f, and *ὁ Θεὸς τῶν ὅλων*^g, and might translate *supreme God*, as you do *ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων*, were there nothing else to be considered in this matter. But I will not deceive my readers. Nor is there any such peculiar force in the words *ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός*, that Eusebius might not, as well as the Phrygian martyrs, apply them to the Son^h. But I attend to the sense, not to the phrase. To proceed:

You grow bolder in your next page, (154,) pretending to tell me, from a passage in Eusebius, that “the ancient Church worshipped Christ, not as being the one supreme God, but to the glory of the Father who dwelt in him, and from whom, says Eusebius, he received the honour of being worshipped as God.”

^f Euseb. contr. Marc. p. 67, 70.

^g Euseb. Dem. Evang. p. 11.

^h Τὸν ἐπὶ πάντων Σιὸν χριστὸν ἱσισοῦμεν. Euseb. Eccl. Hist. lib. viii. cap. 11.

ⁱ Ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων, ἔξ διὰ πάντων, ἔξ ἰσῶν ἰσοῦμεν οὐ ἔξ ἀφάντων, ἱσισοῦμεν τοῦ Σιῦ λόγος. Euseb. Orat. Panegyric. cap. i. p. 719.

The reader will easily see the drift and purport of these rash words; for which you have not one syllable of proof. Whatever may be thought of Eusebius, the *ancient Church* stands perfectly clear; as shall be shown in due time and place. As to your cavil upon the words of Eusebius, (*Eccl. Hist.* lib. i. cap. 3.) I refer to Valesius's Notes for an answer. Nothing more certain, than that Eusebius ordinarily founds the worship of the Son upon his being naturally *Son of God*, or *very God*ⁱ. If he contradicts this in his comment on Isa. xlv. 15. he is the less to be regarded, as being inconsistent: and it is one great prejudice against the notion, that among fifteen Christian writers who have considered and quoted that text^k, he is the only one that ever drew so wild a consequence from it. But the truth is, Eusebius never had a thought of what your words insinuate of him. Let him but explain himself, and all will be very right. It depends upon Eusebius's notion of the Father's *inhabitation*; which he fully lays open in another place^l: where he tells us, that the Father in the *generation* of the Son communicated of his fulness, the fulness of his *Godhead*, without division or separation; and it is in this respect that in him "dwell-eth all the fulness of the Godhead:" so that the worshipping of Christ as having the Father *dwelling* in him, comes to the same with worshipping him as being *God of God*, eternally begotten^m of the Father; which is Eu-

ⁱ Οὐκ ἐστὶν κατὰ δὲ θεοῦ παῖδα γίνεσθαι, ἀ ἀνθρώπων προσωκονίεσθαι. *Euseb. Eccl. Hist.* lib. x. p. 468.

Vid. *Eccl. Theolog.* p. 69, 111.

^k Hippolytus *contr. Noët.* cap. iv. p. 8. Cyprian. *adv. Jud.* lib. ii. cap. 6. Tertullian. *contr. Prax.* cap. 13. *Patres Antiocheni*, p. 845. Lactantius *Epit. et Institut.* Hilarius, p. 849. Cyrilli *Catech.* p. 156. Athanasius, p. 491, 686. Hieronymus in *loc. Epiphanius*, vol. i. p. 486. Ambros. *de Fid.* lib. i. cap. 2. Marius Victorin. lib. i. p. 261. Gregor. Nazianz. p. 733. Zeno Veronens. *de Nativ. Christi*, 1250.

^l Euseb. *contr. Marcell.* lib. i. cap. 2. p. 62.

^m Ἦν ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι. *Euseb. in Psal.* p. 15. Ἄθλιον γίνεσθαι. *Euseb. contr. Marc.* p. 73.

sebius's doctrine. And thus Eusebius agrees well with Hilaryⁿ, and other Catholic Fathers.

You go in triumph (p. 155.) in the most extraordinary manner, imputing to me whatever first comes into your head. All I was to prove from Eusebius was, that the texts there cited were applied to Christ; "determining "nothing of his other principles," as I expressly noted in p. 23, vol. i. Yet neither you, nor any man else, can ever clear Eusebius of the charge of *Polytheism* and *self-contradiction*, if, notwithstanding the applying these texts to Christ, he did not think him the *one true God*. And if he had learned of the Arians a *novel* way of eluding an argument which the Catholics before him knew nothing of, nor ever used; he is still a witness of the Church's *application* of those *texts*, (which is what I cited him for,) though it be against his own principles. But I am not yet satisfied that Eusebius differed in any main doctrine, except it were in the manner of expressing the *Unity*; still believing the essential *divinity* of God the Son. You cite Montfaucon as charging Eusebius with *Arianism*; at the same time telling us, that he erroneously calls it *Arianism*. But if that learned man did not know what *Arianism* is, he might more easily mistake in determining of Eusebius's doctrine; which is a much more intricate business. The truth is, that learned and judicious man understood very well what *Arianism* is, and is guilty of no error in that respect: but as to his judgment of Eusebius, it is not so entirely to be depended on. After he has given us a sketch of Eusebius's doctrine, as being *Arian*, he does not yet pretend to reconcile all Eusebius's doctrine to that scheme, to make him, in the whole, a *consistent* writer: but he still seems to suspect that he may be found various and repugnant; which at last is rather making him a *neutral*, than clear for any

ⁿ Deus enim in eo est: et in quo est Deus, Deus est. Non enim Deus in diversæ atque alienæ a se naturæ habitaculo est, sed in suo, atque ex se genito manet, Deus in Deo, quia ex Deo Deus est. *Hilar. de Trin. lib.v. cap. 40. p. 851.*

side°. Nor do I think it would be difficult to acquit Eusebius of the charge of *Arianism*, at least from the time of the Nicene Council.

It is plain enough that he does not *ordinarily* (for I must except a passage before cited) make Father and Son *one principle, or one God*; upon which chiefly Montfaucon founds his charge of *Arianism*. He did not consider that a man might assert the *eternity and necessary existence* of the Son, and yet throw the *supremacy and Unity of Godhead* upon the Father alone, as *self-existent* and God in a *higher sense*; which others have done besides Eusebius; though, I think, not very judiciously or consistently. Montfaucon takes too much advantage of Eusebius's *Demonstratio Evangelica*, or other pieces, wrote before the Council of Nice, and contradicted or corrected in several points afterwards by the same Eusebius. I will give two or three examples. In his *Demonstratio*, he makes the Son to be *δημιούργημα*^p. In his dispute with Marcellus he plainly retracts and contradicts it^q. In his *Demonstratio*^r, he pretends that nothing can be properly said to be *ἐξ ἑκ ὄντων*, without doubt to gratify the Arians, that they might in a certain sense deny the Son to be *ἐξ ἑκ ὄντων*. But in his piece against Marcellus, he asserts plainly that creatures are *ἐξ ἑκ ὄντων*^s, meaning that they come from *non-existence into existence*, (which is the true signification of the phrase,) at the same time denying that the Son is *ἐκ μὴ ὄντος*, in the same sense of the phrase^t. Wherefore the

* Quod si in his Eusebius secum pugnare deprehenditur; id sane proprium erroris est, ut consistere non valeat, sibi que ipsi adversetur. *Prælim. in Euseb. p. 28.*

^p Τίλειον τελίει δημιούργημα. *Demonstr. lib. iv. cap. 2.*

^q τῷ δὲ ἐξ αὐτοῦ φύστος οὐδ' οὐκ ἂν δημιουργὸς λεχθῆναι. *Euseb. contr. Marc. p. 68.*

^r Μηδὲσι εὐλόγως φάσαι διὸν ἐξ ἑκ ὄντων εἶναι τὸ τῶν ὄντων. *Euseb. Dem. lib. iv. cap. i. p. 145.*

^s Euseb. contr. Marcel. p. 68, 150, 152, 166.

^t Ibid. p. 67, 68, 69, 150.

I shall here cite one passage, being a pretty remarkable one.

Οἱ δὲ δύο δόντες ὑποστάσεις, τὴν μὴ ἀγίνησεν, τὴν δ' ἐξ ἑκ ὄντων περιθεῖσαν, ἵνα μὴν θεὸν ὑφίσταται. ἡ δὲ υἱὸς ἐκ ἐκ' αὐτῶν, ἐδὲ μοιγενῆς ἵσται, οὐδὲ μὴν κύριος, οὐδὲ

learned Mountfaucou does not do justice to Eusebius, when he imputes to him the opinion of the Arians, that the Son passed from *non-existence* to *existence*: for Eusebius plainly denies the Son to be *ἐκ τῆ μη ὄντος*, in the same sense that he affirms it of creatures; and therefore must deny his passing out of *non-existence* to *existence*, unless he were the greatest prevaricator and shuffler imaginable. If it be said that he intended that creatures were not made *out of any thing preexisting*, he must then affirm that the Son was *out of something preexisting*: and then let any man tell me what he could mean by it; except it were that he *existed before his generation*, having been eternally in and with the Father; of the same homogeneous divine substance that the Father is. But my persuasion is, that Eusebius believed *eternal generation*; and if so, it is plain enough what he meant by denying the Son to be *ἐκ μη ὄντος*. It does not appear to me that Eusebius denied the Son to be *ἀίδιος*, though I know Montfaucou charges him with it; and there are more passages than one ^u that say something very like it. Eusebius was very earnest in his charge against Marcellus, and was ready to put any the most invidious construction upon his words. As often therefore as Marcellus had made the Son *ἀίδιος*, Eusebius construes it *ἀγέννητος*, that he might reduce him to an absurdity; and believing perhaps that *ἀίδιος* and *ἀγέννητος*, upon Marcellus's hypothesis, went together and resolved into one. In this sense only I conceive Eusebius to have denied the Son to be *ἀίδιος*. And if any one narrowly examines the passages, he may find good reason to believe that this is real fact.

Σὺς, μηδὲ μὴν ἰσικαινονῶν τῆ τοῦ πατρὸς Διότῃσι, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς κρίμασι, καὶ ὁ ἴξ ἐκ ὄντων ὑπόσῃ, παραβαλλόμενος. *Eccl. Theol. lib. i. cap. 10.*

“ They that admit two *Hypostases*, one unbegotten and the other created “ from nothing, do indeed make *one God*; but in their scheme, the Son will “ be *no Son*, nor *only-begotten*, no, nor *Lord*, nor *God*; having no communion of the Father's Godhead, but being likened to the rest of the creatures, as having existed *from nothing*.”

^u Euseb. contr. Marcell. p. 35, 106, 119.

It may be questioned whether ever Marcellus asserted the Son to be ἀγέννητος. But Eusebius charged it upon him as a consequence of his *hypothesis*; and laid hold of ἀίδιος as implying it, and meaning as much with Marcellus, who denied any *antemundane* generation. But to return. To show me how low an opinion Eusebius had of God the Son, you quote part of his comment on Psalm cix. (which I cannot find there,) intimating that “by the laws of nature the father of every son is his lord;” and therefore God the *Father is Lord and God* of the Son. Admitting this rule, I suppose *by the same laws of nature, every Son is of the same nature with his Father, and as such equal*; and so let the similitude serve equally, if you please, for both. But since you produce one testimony, as you say, from *that book*, (from Eusebius on the Psalms,) give me leave, in my turn, to produce some few of a very contrary strain to what you would wish.

1. I shall first remind you of Eusebius’s accounting for Christ’s *praying*, praying as *man* for things which himself could bestow, or dispose of as *God*^x. This seems to run cross to *two* of your principles. One of which is, that Christ being a *subject* is to refer all *grants* entirely to his *Sovereign*: the other is, that the speaking of Christ in *two distinct* capacities, in the manner Eusebius does, you would call absurd, (as in p. 233.) as if *part* of Christ prayed, and another *part* did not pray; which is your profane way of ridiculing a distinction universally made use of by the primitive churches, and held sacred amongst them.

2. I must next observe to you, that, according to Eusebius, Christ is *Creator of all things*, (ὁ πάντων δημιουργός γ,) not only so, but ὁ ποιητής^z also, and he created all things

^x Αἰεὶ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἄνθρωπος, δίδωσι δὲ τῶν αἰτησῶν ὡς θεός· εἰδονῦντος ἡλπίσι ἢ συνηγῶντος τῷ αἰεὶ πατρὶ. Euseb. in Psal. p. 53. Vid. p. 142, 366, 698.

^y Ὁ πάντων δημιουργός ἐστὶν τῷ θεῷ υἱός. Euseb. in Psal. p. 89. Vid. p. 90, 125, 634.

^z Τὸ παρὶς καὶ συνῆρας ἡμῶν ἴδια ευχαρίστησεν· ἀδρός γὰρ ἦν ὁ ποιητής αὐτῶν. Euseb. in Psal. p. 630.

by his *own power*^a. This is a step beyond what Dr. Clarke is yet advanced to; who often talks of the Son's creating by the *power* of the Father, and interprets Heb.i.3. "the upholding all things by the Word of his power," of the Father's power; but is not yet come to say, that it is by the Son's *own power*. If he does not here contradict Eusebius, he is however vastly short of him; and has not yet discovered any such honourable thoughts of God the Son as Eusebius has done.

3. Eusebius does not scruple to give the Son the title of *only God*^b, believing it to have been him that so called himself, in opposition to *strange Gods*, and challenging the *Jewish* worship as his own due upon that very score. How does this suit with your doctrine about the *exclusive* terms, and the texts running *personally, I, thou, he*? By which doctrines, upon Eusebius's principles, you must exclude the *Father*. I do not therefore cite these and the like passages of Eusebius to prove that Father and Son are *one God*; but to show that there is no force (according to him) in your argument drawn from the *personal* and *exclusive* terms.

4. Eusebius, in this same book, fully and significantly expresses the immutable *eternity*^c of God the Son. For applying the words of the 92d (alias 93d) Psalm, "Thy throne is established of old, thou art from everlasting," to our Saviour Christ, he takes particular notice of the

^a Ὁ τὰδι ἔ τὰδι τῆ σωτῆ δυνάμι μεγαλυργήσας, &c. Euseb. in Psal. p. 318. Vid. p. 616.

^b Λίγω δὲ τὸ μὴ εἰδωλολατρεῖν ἱμὶ δὲ μόνον Θεὸν εἶδέναι παρεκλιυσάμην — οἷς ἐπιλέγει ἰγὼ γὰρ εἰμι κύριος ὁ Θεὸς σου, παριστὰς ἑαυτὸν ἔτι ἕτερον, ἔτι ἄλλοττον, ἔτι πρόσφατον ὄντα Θεόν ἢ γὰρ εἷς ἔ ὁ αὐτὸς ὁ τῷ Θεῷ λόγος, ἔ ὁ πάλαι διαφέρεις τοῖς παλαιῶς χρηματίζων, ὁ δὲ ἔ Θεὸς ἰσχυρῶς ἐπισημασμένος — διότι παρεκλιυσάμην λίγων Ἐγὼ γὰρ εἰμι κύριος ὁ Θεὸς σου, &c. Euseb. in Psal. p. 503, 504. Vid. p. 533.

^c Οὕτως γὰρ ἦν ἱταίμος ὁ Θρόνος σου, ἅφ' οὗ σὺν αὐτῷ καθίστασθαι ὁ γενήσας σε πατὴρ παρεκλιεύτο. Καὶ ἱταίμος ἦν ἀπὸ τότε, ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος, ἐπεὶ ἔ αὐτὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐν εἶ. ἀλλ' ἐκ ἧς, φησὶν, ἀλλ' εἶ. μόνον γὰρ αὐτῷ, ἐν εἶ, λίγισθαι ἀεμόσσει. διὸ ἔ ἰν ἱταίμοις εἰρηται: σὺ δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς εἶ, ἔ τὰ ἴσα σου ἔα ἐκλιύσσει — ἦν μὲν οὖν ἱταίμος ὁ Θρόνος σου ἀπὸ τότε, ἅφ' οὗ δηλαδὴ παρὰ τῷ πατρὶ ἧς, ἐπεὶ ἔ αὐτὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐν εἶ.

force of *thou art*, *ὄν εἶ*, as denoting *immutable existence*; agreeably to his explication of the same phrase elsewhere^d.

5. I have above took notice of Eusebius's styling God the Son, "great God by nature," which is a very high and strong expression. I shall here farther observe how he interprets the name of *Hand of God*, given to the Son. Not after a low disparaging manner, as you are used to interpret it, but as Christ is the *all-creative power of God*^e.

6. I may add a few more observations from Eusebius's Commentary on Isaiah. His comment on Isa. xlii. 8. is pretty remarkable^f; "I will not give my glory to another." Where he takes notice, that it is not said, that "I will give my glory to no one," (for the Son, says he, has the *Father's glory*,) but that it will not be given to *another*. Now, though Eusebius here comes not entirely into the common and Catholic way of construction, yet he differs very much from you in several particulars, as that the *Father's glory is also the Son's glory*, and that the *exclusive* terms do not affect God the Son. I may also take notice how magnificently Eusebius sets forth the Son's *omnipresence*, both here^g and in his Comment upon the Psalms^h, in words as expressive and full as any can be. Here also Eusebius keeps closer to the sense and language of the Church, in relation to the *one Godhead*, than he has at other times been observed to do; except in his Oration before Constantine, taken notice of above. His words areⁱ: "There being but *one Head*,

^d Vid. p. 584.

^e Χειρ γὰρ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἡ κτιστικὴ ἀπάντων δύναμις αὐτοῦ, οὐχ ἴσην ἕσα τοῦ δι' ἡ γίγνηται τὰ πάντα τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου. Euseb. in Psal. p. 701.

^f Ἐπισῆσαι ἄξιον ὡς οὐκ ἴσηται τὴν δόξαν μου οὐδὲν δόσω· δίδονται γὰρ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ πατρὸς ἴχων τὴν δόξαν &c. Euseb. Com. in Isa. p. 520.

^g Euseb. Com. in Isa. p. 428.

^h Euseb. Com. in Psal. p. 707, 708.

ⁱ Ἐγὼ ὁ Θεός, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι παρ' ἐμοῦ σῶζων. μίᾳ γὰρ ἔστι ἀρχῆς, μία εἶναι ἀπὸ Διότης ἢ συμπαραλαμβάνεται ἢ ἡ τοῦ μοτογινούσ αὐτοῦ Θεολογία. Euseb. in Isa. p. 524.

“ there will be no more than *one Godhead*, with which is “ taken in what concerns the divinity of his only-begotten.” It is much to the same purpose with what he elsewhere says^k, that the Son is *partaker* of the Father’s *Godhead*, and is, as it were, to be reckoned to him.

Upon the whole, you will find Eusebius much more favouring my principles than yours; though not fully coming in to either: and you ought hereafter either to reconcile such things as I have here cited out of him, besides many others, to your *hypothesis*, (which can never be done,) or to leave off boasting on that head. It should be considered that Eusebius lived and wrote at a time when the Arian pretences, being mostly *new* and *untried*, appeared therefore the more specious and plausible: and his familiar acquaintance and friendship with the heads of the party contributed to give them the greater force with him. They received an additional strength from the injudicious solutions which had been offered by Marcellus and other weak defenders of the *Homoousian* doctrine. Athanasius, Hilary, and other judicious advocates of the Catholic faith, had not then wrote their immortal pieces, to clear the doctrine from misrepresentation, to set it in a due light, and to unravel the main objections brought against it. No wonder if, in these circumstances, Eusebius might incline too much towards the *Arian* cause, and give too far into it. Yet, even under these disadvantages, he kept himself free from the grosser tenets of the Arians; and he retained so much of Catholic principles, that had he but attended to the true and certain consequences of many of his own positions in that behalf, he could not have failed of being entirely orthodox and Catholic. He had not so clear a judgment as Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, and other eminent defenders of the Nicene faith: nor did he live to see how easily the *Arian* sophistry was defeated and baffled after

^k Τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς Διότητος κωνορίας, &c. *Euseb. in Psal.* p. 534.

it had passed the scrutiny of such masterly hands. In the mean while he seems to have had no *consistent* set of principles, but a confused mixture of Catholic and Arian tenets¹, such as could not stand with each other in true and just reasoning.

You have certainly no right to claim him as yours.

If you would look among the *ancients* for your scheme, it must not be in Eusebius, nor in any Ante-Nicene Father, or Post-Nicene; but in such Fathers as Arius, Aetius, Eunomius, or Philostorgius: and yet you come short even of them in some points; particularly in the part you assign the Son in the creation of all things by the *Father's power*; (you do not yet say by his *own*, which several of the ancient Arians would never have scrupled;) and in the account you give of Christ's being appointed "God over all" after his resurrection; and your resolving his *worship* into the power then given him: doctrines proper only to a Samosateneian^m or Socinian.

Having shown, from Father to Father, down to the *Arian* times, that our Lord Jesus Christ was supposed by them to be the *Jehovah*, the *Almighty*, the *one true God*, God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, acknowledged as the *one true God*, and worshipped by the patriarchs as such: having proved this to have been the ancient Catholic doctrine of the Church, without any exception; unless of Novatian, who yet differs not from it in the main, but in expression rather; not in the doctrine of the Son's *real* and *essential* divinity: this foundation being laid, it remains now only to take off some pretences you have offered to invalidate the force of the evidence.

Your pretence is, that though God the Son was "God of Abraham, God of Israel, &c." yet he was such only in a "subordinate sense," because he was "representative" of God the Father, p. 159. To which I answer, that had the ancients supposed him to be styled *God* and *Lord*,

¹ See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 64.

^m See my Defence, vol. i. p. 195, &c.

purely in virtue of such *representation*, there would then be some force in your reasoning: but that they did not, will appear most evidently from the following considerations.

1. None of the Fathers ever put the *Godhead* of the Son upon that foot; they never say nor insinuate, that he is *God* on the account of any such *representation*.

2. They are so far from doing it, that their whole drift and method of arguing supposes and implies the utmost contradiction to it. For if the Son were supposed to be *God* on the score of the *representation*, then any *angel* might be *God* also on account of such *representation*; and then it could never be proved (in the way that the Fathers tookⁿ) that there was any *God the Son* at all; but the whole force of their reasoning would be vacated and null. On the contrary, they presumed that none could either *represent God*, or *personate God*, or use the *style of God*, that was not really *God*: and upon this presumption their whole reasoning turns. If therefore they are any where to be understood of a *representation*, they must mean a full and adequate representation, such as none could exhibit or sustain, who was not himself every thing that he *represents*. For as nothing but *man* can fully and adequately represent *man*; so nothing but *God* can perfectly and suitably represent *God*.

3. Add to this, the ancient Fathers always suppose the Son to be *God* antecedently to the supposed *representation*; which is decisive in the case. They suppose him *God* as being *God's Son*, of the same nature and substance with *God*. This is what all the Fathers *expressly*, or in words equivalent, resolve the Son's *divinity* into: which consideration cuts off all your pretences at once; as I before intimated^o, and you take no notice of it. The reason why you did not must be visible to the meanest reader.

ⁿ See my Defence, vol. i. p. 28, 29, 306.

^o Defence, vol. i. p. 34.

In proof of the fact, that the Fathers did so resolve the *divinity* of Christ, (though it be what no scholar can be ignorant of,) I shall, for the sake of common readers, here recite their testimonies.

Justin Martyr, in his first Apology, says of God the Son, "Who being the *Word*, God's *first-begotten*, is also "God^p." In his Dialogue he often repeats the same thing. He is "God, on account of his being his Son "begotten before all creatures^q." In another place, "Had you but understood what is said by the prophets, "you could not have denied him to be God, being the "Son of the only, the uncreated, the ineffable God^r."

To the same purpose he elsewhere styles him *God*; immediately adding, "as being Son of God^s." And Justin is known to represent the Son as begotten *from*, or *out* of God^t, (ἐκ Θεῦ and ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ,) without *abscision* or *division*^u, as one fire from another, and as being *strictly* and *properly*^x (ἰδίως and κυρίως) Son of God. All which together expresses the *consubstantiality*, sameness of *nature*, and most entire and perfect *Unity* imaginable. Such is Justin Martyr's account of Christ's *divinity*; never speaking of his being *appointed* God, or being God by I know not what *representation*; but of his being *God* by

^p Ὁς ἔ λόγος πρωτότοκος ἀν τῷ Θεῷ, ἔ Θεὸς ὑπάρχων. *Apol. i. p. 123. Ox.*

^q Θεοῦ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὐραίου τίκτονι πρωτότοκον τῶν ὄλων κτισμάτων. *Just. Dial. p. 364.*

^r Εἰ νοεῖσθε τὰ ἱερημίαι ὑπὸ τῶν προφητῶν, οὐκ ἂν ἐξηρησιόθε αὐτὸν εἶναι Θεόν, τοῦ μόνου, ἔ ἀγνήτου, ἔ ἀρρήτου Θεοῦ υἱόν. *Dial. p. 366.*

N. B. I read ἀγνήτου with single ν, for a reason which will appear more fully afterward: and I understand μόνου in opposition to creatures only, or false gods, not to the Son, who is always to be *tacitly* understood to belong to, and to be included in, the *alone God*. And I take this of Justin to be nearly equivalent to these other of Philo and Cyril of Alexandria.

^s Ὁς τοῦ ἀίδιου λόγος ὢν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ἀφθάρτος. *Phil. de Conf. Ling. p. 326.*

^t Ὅστις ἂν ἐξ ἀγνήτου ἔ ἀφθάρτου γιγίνηται, ταῦτο πάντως ἀφθάρτος καὶ ἀγνήτος. *Cyril. Thesaur. p. 34.*

^u Θεὸν ἕνα, υἱὸν αὐτοῦ. p. 170. Θεός, Θεοῦ υἱὸς ὑπάρχων. p. 171.

^v Just. Dial. p. 183. *Apol. p. 49.*

^w Just. Dial. p. 183, 373. *Paræn. p. 127.*

^x Just. *Apol. i. p. 45, 46. Apol. ii. p. 13.*

partaking of the one true Godhead, naturally Son of God.

The same account, but more briefly, we have from Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch, a little lower in the same century; who speaks of Christ *being God*, as *God's Son*^γ. The same we have also from Clemens of Alexandria, in a very remarkable passage above cited. The same also from Tertullian, who says, "that which is derived from "God is God, and Son of God, and both one *God*^z." Novatian speaks as plain, in these words; "As nature "itself has made it a rule that he must be accounted "man, who is of man: so the same rule of nature pre- "scribes, that he must be accounted God who is of "God^a."

I forbear to cite more. It is a ruled case in antiquity, that Christ is *God*, (not by appointment, deputation, representation, or any thing of like kind,) but by his *Sonship*; deriving the same divine nature from the Father, as is in the Father. Nor was the name of *God* ever thought by them to denote an *office*, or any *relative character*, but *nature* and *substance*, as the word *man*. It will now be easy to answer those little pleas and exceptions which you have remaining. You have, in the main, but one argument, which you repeat over and over: viz. that Christ cannot be *supreme God*, because he was an *angel*, or messenger of God: which is as much as to say that Peter, for instance, could not be *man*, if sent by *man*. The whole strength of your argument lies in the artificial confusion of *ideas*. Christ could not be *supreme* in office while executing an *inferior office*, that is very certain: but what has supremacy of office to do with the notion of *supreme God*? *God* is a word expressing *nature* and *sub-*

γ Θεὸς ὃν ἂν ἰ λόγος, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς, &c. *Theoph.* p. 130. Ox.

z Quod de Deo profectum est Deus est, et Dei Filius, et unus (*suppl. Deus*) ambo. *Tertull. Apol.* cap. 21.

a Ut enim præscripsit ipsa natura hominem credendum esse qui ex homine sit: ita eadem natura præscribit et Deum credendum esse qui ex Deo sit. *Novat.* cap. 11.

stance: he is *supreme God*, or God *supreme*, that has no God of a *superior nature* above him. Such is Christ, even while he submits and condescends to act *ministerially*: and thus all your speculations on this head, arising only from confusion of *ideas*, drop at once. I submit sometimes to your phraseology, of *supreme God*, though it be improper, and rather Pagan than Christian. *Supreme God* has generally a tacit reference to an *inferior God*; and so it was used in the Pagan theology. But Christians, who acknowledge but *one God*, should never talk of a *supreme God*; the more proper name being rather *the one God*, the *true God*, the *God of the universe*, *God supreme*, and the like. But you, to introduce your *Polytheism*, are perpetually telling us of the *supreme God*; and every time you meet with ἐν τῷ ᾧ Θεός, or ὁ Θεός τῶν ὄλων, you falsely and corruptly render it, the *supreme God*, (instead of the *God of the universe*,) to serve your *hypothesis*. I do not find that the Fathers were used to style God the Father *supreme God*; except when disputing with Pagans, or the like, they accommodated themselves in some measure, to their style, reserving to themselves the Christian sense. And it is but very rarely they use παῖτος Θεός, or *Deus Princeps*, for the *Father*; and when they do, it is, as I said, to express the *supreme Father* in a style not proper to Christian principles, only in condescension to the Pagans, to be the better understood.

To return. I perceive the *subordination* is what you lay the main stress upon, in order to overthrow the Church's doctrine of Christ's *real divinity*. You will now be reduced to this single maxim, (which you are sensible you can never *prove*, but every where *suppose*,) that the *unity* or *equality* which we teach, is not consistent with any distinction of *order* or *offices*. Whenever you are disposed to try the strength of your *metaphysics*, that point may be debated with you. At present you have thought it the wiser way only to speak your *wishes*, and to deliver out *dictates* instead of *proofs*: a method which may be thought rather too assuming in *private*,

and withal very *fallible* men; to expect that their bare *affirmations* should have any weight against the united verdict of all the Christian churches, ancient and modern.

I shall take but little notice of the "incidental errors" which you are pleased to charge me with, p. 160, &c. because the reader will have seen, before this time, that they are *imaginary* only, founded upon your own mistakes. I may just observe that, p. 164, you give a character, or description of *God the Father*, calling it, very absurdly, "the signification of the word *God*, when applied to the Father." You might as well have given a description, or character of Adam, calling it the signification of the word *man*, when applied to Adam. To say what the Father's *Person* is, is one thing: to say what is signified by the name *God*, is another. Your testimonies none of them come up to the point: which was to show, that *unbegotten*, or that particular *manner of existing*, is necessarily included in the signification of the word *God*. There is nothing more under this Query, but what I have before sufficiently answered or obviated. But since this Query has been drawn out into a very great length, so as almost to take in the whole of the controversy; it may be for the ease and conveniency of the reader, to subjoin a brief recapitulation, or summary of what has been done in it.

It has been shown, first, from *Scripture*, that God the Son is *not excluded* by such texts as speak of the Unity; not excluded from being *God*, and *one God* with the Father. The texts that prove this have been explained and vindicated; and the pretended contrary evidence from *Scripture* has been shown to be null, and of no account.

It has been farther proved, that the *ancients* in general teach the same thing, by understanding the *exclusive* texts to affect *idols* only, or *other Gods*; by declaring against admitting any *other God* besides God the Father, yet admitting God the Son; by their asserting Father and Son together to be *one God*, or the *one God*: and, lastly, by their believing God the Son to have been that very Per-

son, who declared *himself* God of Israel, God of Abraham, &c. besides whom the Jews were to have no God; declaring this of himself, in his *own proper Person*, (not excluding the Father or Holy Ghost, one with him,) as being really *God*, because *Son of God*, of the *same divine nature and substance* with God the Father. These things have been proved to have been unanimously taught by the ancients; saving only some little difference in Novatian, a schismatic at that time, and of no considerable authority, (though he also agrees in the main doctrine of the Son's *essential* divinity;) allowing also for some dissent in Eusebius, (a late writer, and a familiar acquaintance of the leading Arians,) in which he is not consistent with himself, or with the Creed which he subscribed, or with his public speeches and debates.

Upon the whole, one can scarce desire fuller or better evidence of what I advanced in this Query than has been produced for it. And, as I formerly told you, so I again repeat it, (though perhaps you may be the last to believe,) that "the Fathers stand pointed against you, and you are certain to expose your cause as often as you hope for any relief or succour from them." Which shall be yet more fully evidenced in the sequel.

QUERY III.

Whether the word (God) in Scripture can reasonably be supposed to carry an ambiguous meaning, or to be used in a different sense, when applied to the Father and Son, in the same Scripture, and even in the same verse? See John i. 1.

YOUR *new* answer to this Query is, that the word *God*, when applied to the Father, "denotes him who alone has all perfections, &c. in and of himself, original, underived, &c." but when applied to the Son, it denotes one who has not his perfections of himself, but derived, &c. and so the word *God* is used in *different* senses, *supreme* and *subordinate*. You might as well say that the word *man*, when applied to Adam, denotes the

person of Adam, who was *unbegotten*; but when applied to Seth, it denotes the person of Seth, who was *begotten*; and therefore the word *man* does not signify the same thing, or carry the same *idea* in both cases, but is used in different senses. What I assert is, that the word *God* signifies or denotes *absolute perfection*, whether applied to *Father* or *Son*; and is therefore applied in the same sense to both. He that is possessed of *all perfection* (whether *originally* or *derivatively*) is *God*; all that *God* is, *God* in the highest and fullest sense of the word *God*. You are to show that *unoriginateness*, or *paternity*, is contained in the *idea* or definition of *God*; or that the word *God* necessarily implies it. By your account, the word *God*, in one sense, signifies as much as *God and Father* together. You have no ground for this fancy, either in Scripture or antiquity. The truth is, *God* denotes *all perfection*, and *Father* denotes a *relation* of order, and a particular *manner* of *existing*: all which you confusedly blend together, as if signified by the one word *God*. Hitherto then you have brought no proof of two *different* senses of the word *God*, when applied to *Father* and *Son*.

I must observe, that here appears to be a very great change, a very material alteration in your scheme since your writing before. *God* was then a mere *relative*, a word of *office*, and *always* so, in *Scripture*: so the learned Doctor had told us^b, and that it was never intended to express *metaphysical attributes*. But now it is to signify *all perfections*, *original*, *underived*, (by which you mean *necessary existence*, as you elsewhere explain it.) So that you now come into my notion of the *true* and *proper* sense of the word *God*; excepting that you confound *unoriginateness* with *necessary existence*, which I keep *distinct*: and as I take the necessary existence into the definition of *God*, I as constantly throw out *unbegotten*, as having

^b See Clarke's Script. Doctrine, p. 296. edit. 1st. Reply, p. 119, 290.

nothing to do in it. What kind of a *divinity* you have left to God the Son, you may do well to consider; having excluded him from the one *necessarily existing* God-head, and from being *God* in the most usual and *scriptural* sense of the word; which you had some pretence to before, while you supposed the word *God* a mere *relative*, whether applied to *Father* or *Son*.

Our dispute about *dominion* is now at an end; though it before made a great part of this Query. I allow that the phrase, *our God*, expresses some *relation* of God to us, as well as what he is *absolutely* in *himself*. I admitted as much before^c; so that you need not now have mentioned it as any discovery.

You do not tell me in what sense you make Christ *God*, after you have struck him out of that sense which occurs ordinarily in Scripture, and which is indeed the only *true* and *proper* sense of the word; all the rest being *loose* and *figurative* only, as I showed at large^d. Instead of *answering* difficulties, which was the part you undertook, you turn *objector*; thereby to hide and cover, if possible, the many flaws in your scheme.

Why do you not tell me plainly in what sense the *Son* is *God*, that I may argue the point with you, and do justice to the common readers, who want to be satisfied in so important a question?

You *object* to me thus: "If none can properly be styled God, who has not all perfections, how come you to leave out the principal of the essential perfections of the first Cause and Author of all things?" p. 173.

To which I answer, that I leave out no *perfections* at all. I suppose the *Son*, with the *Father*, to be the *one Cause and Author of all creatures*; and there is no need of saying *first* where there is never a *second*. At the same time, I suppose the *Father* to be *Father* of his *Son*; which expresses a *relation* of *order*, and *mode* of existence; not any difference in any *essential perfection*. Neither

^c Defence, vol. i. p. 38.

^d Ibid. p. 36, &c.

is there any greater *perfection* in being a *Father*, in this case, than in being a *Son*; but both are equally *perfect*, equally *necessary* in respect of existence; all things common but the personal characters: and *self-existence*, as distinct from *necessary existence*, is expressive only of the *order* and *manner* in which the *perfections* are in the *Father*, not of any distinct *perfection*. With this answer the Catholic Fathers baffled the Arians and Eunomians, objecting in the same way you now do: and as you might have known this, it might have been more for your credit to have shown the *answer* to be insufficient, than barely to repeat a stale objection. You have little else but repetition in pages 174, 175. One argument, in a manner, is to serve quite through your book. The *Son* cannot be *supreme God*; no, he cannot, because he is a *Son*, because he is *subordinate*, because he has acted, or still acts *ministerially*. Repeat this ever so often, it proves nothing but a distinction of *Persons*, *order*, and *offices*; no difference of *nature*, or *perfections*, or *Godhead*. And what has the question about *supreme Godhead*, relating to *nature* and *substance*, (as *God* is a word denoting *substance*, and he is *God* supreme that knows no *nature* superior to his own,) to do with *order* or *offices*? The *Son* is *God* supreme for that very reason, because he is a *Son*, of the *same nature* and the same divine *perfections* with the *Father*. But you say, the word "*nature* is of very uncertain, various signification:" and you return me the same loose answer which Dr. Clarke gave to Mr. Nelson^e, which I sufficiently exposed in my *Defence*. The plain fact is, that you are pinched, and you see where, and have nothing to retreat to but insignificant words.

What is there in the words *equality* of *nature*, more than what every peasant or child may understand? *Man* is in *nature* equal to *man*; *angel* to *angel*; any *individual* to another of the *same* kind: a very little *metaphysics*

^e Clarke's Reply, p. 17.

^f Defence, vol. i. p. 212.

may suffice in so plain a thing. This then is what I assert, that a supremacy of *order* or of *office* is consistent with *equality* of *nature*; and if the Son be in *nature* equal to the Father, he is also equal in *Godhead*, which is a word expressing *nature*; and if equal in *Godhead*, equally *God supreme*. Q. E. D. This I took to be sound and true reasoning before: and you have been pleased to confirm it by your *tacit* confession: while you avoid replying to it.

To prove that Christ is *God* in the same sense as the Father is, I appealed to his name *Jehovah*; as I have also elsewhere, more at large. To this you have little to answer, besides what I have abundantly replied to above, about Christ's being a *messenger* and *representative*, &c.

As to what you add of *inferior* angels speaking in the style of their *principals*; you will consider, that it is a notion directly opposite to all the *ancients*; whose general argument for the *divinity* of God the Son, drawn from the appearances under the Old Testament, would be entirely eluded and frustrated by it: neither could they have proved, in that way, the existence of *God the Son*, but upon a supposition directly contrary to you. This therefore is one great prejudice against your notion, and such as ought to have weight with you, while you make your boasts of *antiquity*. Besides, I thought you had before allowed that God the Son was *Jehovah*, *God*, *Lord*, &c. in his own *Person*, though in a *subordinate* sense: and I think you then gave me a rebuke, p. 159. for supposing the contrary. Are you now altered of a sudden, and become *another* man? But be it so, this *new* answer will serve no better than the former: for as to any pretended instance you can bring from the Old Testament, it will be answered, that the *angel* was the *Logos*, for that very reason, because he used the *style* of *God*; as it was customary for him to do. And as to your instance from Rev. xi. 1, 3. I own it so runs in the English; but a

§ Sermons, vol. ii. p. 19, &c.

scholar should have looked into the Greek, where he will not find it. This you had notice of long ago^b.

Your example given of the Roman *fecialis* is as little to your purpose as the other. For in the words, *Ego populusque Romanus, I and the Roman people; I* does not denote the *senate*, as you imagine, but the *fecialis*, the *herald* himself coming in the name of the *Roman people*, considered in their large collective sense, comprehending all the Romans, senate and people. And so you find, in Rosinus, the herald saying, *Ego sum publicus nuncius populi Romani*: not, *Ego sum populus Romanus*, or, *Ego sum senatus*; as your supposition would require. However, I do not pretend that no instance can be given of such a thing as a *proxy*, in any case whatever. But that God should thus permit a *creature* to be his *proxy*, (as man may permit man,) appears by no means proper or congruous, because of the *infinite disparity*; and because of the inevitable danger it would bring men into, of mistaking the *creature* for the *Creator*, and misplacing their worship, which would be *idolatry*. You proceed (p. 178.) to weaken the force of what I had said in relation to the *name* or *appellation* of *Jehovah*.

Our dispute is in a great measure superseded, since you no longer insist upon the *relative* meaning of the word *God*; against which I was then arguing.

It is very indifferent to me whether *Jehovah* be ever an *appellative*, (as Bishopⁱ Pearson thinks,) or always a *proper name*, as others^k teach; provided only that it be looked upon as a name expressive of an *intrinsic perfection*, and not of an *outward relation*, like *king*, *governor*, &c.

And that it is expressive of *necessary existence*, the best critics, ancient and modern, agree. I had said (vol. i. p. 44. of my Defence) that its primary *signification* is *Being*; to which you answer very strangely, that “the name *Jeho-*

^b True Script. Doctr. continued, p. 194. See also Mr. Wade, p. 33.

ⁱ Pearson on the Creed, p. 150. ed. 10.

^k Brocklesby's Gospel Theism, p. 347.

“*vah* signifies neither primarily, nor at all, Substance, or “Being, but Person.” This is little more than equivocating upon the word *signify*; which is low employment. Let it *denote* a Person, which is what you mean by *signify*, (for I hope you do not intend to say that the word *Person* is the English for the Hebrew *Jehovah*,) still it signifies the *nature* of that Person to whom the *name* is given, to be *existing*, in the emphatical sense, or *necessarily existing*: and if it be applied to more Persons than one, it still signifies the same also. You are fallen into such a road of talking, without any distinct meaning, that I am sometimes at a loss to know what it is you would say. *Jehovah*, you observe, does not signify *substance*, but the “Person, whose the substance is.” I beseech you, what is *Person* but *substance*? Is it intelligent, agent *nothing*? *Person*, as I take it, is intelligent, acting *substance*; (though that is not a full definition;) and so the sense of what you have said amounts to this; that *Jehovah* does not signify *substance*, but the intelligent acting *substance*, whose that *substance* is. Readers will be much edified by these very curious and deep remarks. The truth may be said at once, in a very few words, that the name *Jehovah* denotes the *necessary existence* of as many Persons as it is applied to; and being applied to *Christ*, it is a proof that he is *necessarily existing* as well as the Father, and one *Jehovah* with him; since *Jehovah* is *one*¹. You say, Father and Son being *two agents* will be two *Jehovahs*: but that, you will remember, is begging the question. The *Father* is intelligent substance, and the *Son* intelligent substance; and both *one substance*, *one Jehovah*, *one God*. You add, (p. 180.) “being consubstantial with *Jehovah* will no more make another Person to be the same *Jehovah*, than being consubstantial with the *Father* will make “him the same *Father*.” For want of *arguments*, I am forced to take your *sayings*, where there is no argument. I never put the Unity upon *consubstantiality* alone^m: one

¹ See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 135. ^m See my Defence, vol. i. p. 326, 327.

man is *consubstantial* to another, and yet they are not *one man*, nor *one substance*. But if the Son be not *only consubstantial*, but also *one substance* with the Father, (styled *Jehovah*,) as proceeding from him, and inseparably contained in him; then he is also *one Jehovah* with him. You have a farther pretence, that if the Son be *Jehovah*, or $\delta \omega\nu$, he will be “unbegotten, unoriginate, &c.” But your reasoning is lame; because you have not proved that $\delta \omega\nu$ either signifies *unbegotten*, or ever necessarily implies it. The Father indeed is $\delta \omega\nu$, and is *unbegotten*; but not $\delta \omega\nu$, because *unbegotten*, but because *necessarily existing*.

Page 181, you come to inform the reader what it is I mean by the Son's being *supreme God*: it is, you say, *supreme* in the *strict sense*; God in the *same sense*, and in as *high a sense* as the *Father himself*; and yet, *strange contradiction!* “referring all to the Father as Father, “Head, Fountain, &c.” Now here is no *contradiction* at all, but what you have made to yourself, through your *confusion* of thought, and your want of *distinct* perception. For when I apply *supreme* to the word *God*, I mean as I ought to mean, that the Son is God *supreme*, (knowing no *superior God*, no *divine nature* greater, higher, or more excellent than his own,) not that he is the *supreme Father*: who, though superior in *order*, is not therefore of *superior Godhead*; for a supremacy of *order* is one thing, a supremacy of *nature* or *Godhead*, another. These are plain things to all that have ever dipped in this controversy.

But you come a little closer up to me in your following words, which will indeed deserve notice; because it is running your argument up as far as it can possibly be carried. You say, that upon my principles “there is no “impossibility but the Father (if the economy had been “so laid) might as well have exercised the authority of the “Son, executed his orders, &c.” nay, and “have been “begotten also of the Son, and from him have received “his being.” But do not blend things together which

ought to be kept *distinct*; and then we shall see clearly into this matter, so far as is needful.

If you ask, why that Person called the *Son* might not have been *Father*; I have nothing to say, but that in fact he is not: so it is *written*, and so we *believe*. The Father is *Father*, and the Son is *Son*; and because of this relation of *Father* and *Son*, there is a natural priority of *order*, (I say, *natural*, not *economical*;) by which the Son is referred up to the Father as his *Head*, and not *vice versa*.

As to the Son's acting a *ministerial* part, that indeed is purely *economical*; and there was no *impossibility*, in the nature of the thing, but the Father himself might have done the same: but it was more congruous that he who is *first* in *order* should be *first* in *office* too: and had it been otherwise, it would have been *inverting the order* of the Persons; which, I think, is reason sufficient against it. To which purpose Bp. Pearson very justly observes: "Upon this preeminence, (of the Father,) as I conceive, may safely be grounded the *congruity* of the divine *mission*. We often read that Christ was *sent*, from whence he bears the name of an *apostle* himself, as well as those whom he therefore named so; because as the *Father sent him*, so *sent he them*. The Holy Ghost is also said to be *sent*, sometimes by the Father, sometimes by the Son: but we never read that the *Father* was *sent* at all; there being an *authority* in that name which seems inconsistent with this *mission*." All this is very right in the Bishop's sense of *authority*; not in yours, as signifying *power* and *dominion* over a *subject*; which is neither *excellent* nor *true* divinity, but false and blasphemous.

You proceed to consider my argument for one and the same strict sense of the word *God*, drawn from John i. 1. which argument the reader may see briefly summed up in my first Sermon, vol. ii. p. 21.

^a Pearson on the Creed, p. 36.

I argued, as is usual^o, from the word *God* occurring twice in the *same verse*, without the least hint of any *different sense*. You pretend, on the contrary, that “for that very reason it must bear a different sense, because “it is used in the very same sentence by way of contradiction,” p. 183. By what kind of *logic* you draw this strange inference, I see not. Suppose it were said, Seth was with *the man*, (i. e. Adam,) and Seth was *man*; doth it follow that the word *man* carries two senses? Or God the Father was with *the Spirit*, (meaning the *Holy Ghost*,) and the Father was *Spirit*; does it follow that the word *Spirit* bears two senses? Would it not be rather manifest in both cases, that the words so repeated, and so near one another, are interpretative of each other? “The *Son*,” you say, “is styled *God the Word, or Messenger* ;” which is more than you know. See my Sermons as to the meaning of the name *Word*^p. But suppose him so styled by way of *prolepsis*, (being here considered antecedently to the creation,) as one that was to be sent to create the world, and to reveal the Father to mankind; how is this at all repugnant to the doctrine of his being the *one God supreme*? I have so often answered this pretence, that I am afraid of nauseating the reader with repetition. You say, “he is distinguished from him who “of his own original supreme authority sends the messenger.” Very true; he is distinguished from the *Person* of the *Father*, who has his authority *from none*: and yet the *Son* having the same *supreme authority* (if you mean power and dominion) *from the Father*, is *one God supreme*

* Si—evangelista Deum alium *majorem et supremum* hic indicat, alium vero *minorem et longe inaequalem*; incogitanter admodum Johannes, ut ait plerumque Athanasius, res adeo *disparatas*, sine ulla distinctione, *uno eodemque vocabulo* utramque copulans, significavit: et *Verbum*, ait, *erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum*. Nam quis non voci *Deus* conjunctim repetitæ eandem utrobique significationem statim aptaverit? Quis eandem vocem, bis eodem loco enuntiatam tam *disparata* significare putaverit? *Montfaucon, Prælim. Dissert. in Euseb. Comment. in Psalm. p. 21.*

^p Sermon i. vol. ii. p. 3, &c.

with him. He is distinguished, you say, from the "first Cause, of whom are all things," because "through him" are all things. He is distinguished in *Person*, and in the *manner*, or *order* of operating; but not as *one cause* from *another cause*: for as all things are *of one*, and *by the other*, both together are *one Cause* of all things⁹; their operations undivided, their nature, power, perfections, and glory one.

I had argued, that the Son was God *before the creation*. You say (p. 183.) this infers not *supremacy*. Yes it does: he was before *all creatures*, therefore *no creature*, therefore no *precarious* being, therefore *necessarily existing*, therefore *equal in nature and Godhead* with the Father; therefore *God supreme* as well as the Father. The link is never the worse for its length, if it be but well connected.

I had said, that the Son could not be called *God*, in the sense of *dominion*, John i. 1. because he is there considered antecedently to the *creation*, and before any *dominion* commenced. This, I think, is self-evident. But you have a mind to dispute the point. Your argument is, that God was *merciful, good, and just*, before the creation, therefore also he was *possessed* of dominion, p. 183, 184.

That is to say, he was *disposed* to acts of *goodness, mercy, and justice*, and likewise to *have dominion* in his own appointed time; therefore he had *dominion* before he had it. Does not every body know, that *dominus* and *servus*, *master* and *servant*, are *relatives*, as much as *father* and *son*, *husband* and *wife*, and always suppose and imply each other, commence and fall together? Tertullian therefore was very right and accurate in his distinction about *God* and *Lord*^r; that the Father was always *God*, God

⁹ See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 32, &c. 46, 62, 65.

^r *Dei nomen dicimus semper fuisse apud semetipsum et in semetipso, Dominum vero non semper. Diversa enim utriusque conditio. Deus substantiæ ipsius nomen, id est, divinitatis; Dominus vero non substantiæ, sed potestatis: substantiam semper fuisse cum suo nomine, quod est Deus; postea*

denoting *nature, substance, and perfections*; but became *Lord* in time, as soon as the creation commenced; *Lord* expressing his *relation* to his creatures. To proceed:

I had argued for Christ's *real* and supreme divinity, from his part in the *creation*, according to John i. Here you have only the same thing over again, about the distinction of *of whom* and *by whom*; which is nothing to the purpose.

I allow, that the Father is *primarily* Creator, and Son *secondarily*, or *subordinately*; and both *one Creator*. There is a difference of *order*, or *manner*, which yet makes no difference of *power* or *Godhead*: so that this is mere trifling, unless you could prove that the *Unity of Godhead* is not consistent with the distinction of *Persons, order, or offices*; which you have not done. I dispute not whether *διὰ* may express the *primary* efficient cause; it expresses as much *efficiency* as *ὑπὸ* or *ἐκ*, which is all I am concerned for: and as to the different *order* or *manner* of the two Persons concurring in the same thing, it neither makes them *two Causes*, nor *two Creators*, nor *two Gods*; nor is it any argument against the Son's being *Cause, Creator, or God*, in the same high and full sense of those words as the Father.

You have something to say to two instances given, (Rom. xi. 36. Heb. ii. 10.) where *διὰ* is applied to the Father. You interpret the texts of his *providential care*: not that things are *created*, but *preserved, through* him. Allowing you this construction, (which is perfectly precarious,) yet you have only *seemed* to say something, as usual, when, upon the matter, you have really said nothing. For if *διὰ* may be applied even to the Father, who, with you, is the *original efficient Cause* of the *preservation* of all things, and whose is the *original governing* Providence, (a work and business not less considerable than the work of *creation*;) what can you infer

Dominus, accedentis scilicet rei mentio. Nam ex quo esse cæperunt in quæ potestas Domini ageret, ex illo, per accessionem potestatis, et factus et dictus est Dominus. Tertull. contr. Hermog. cap. 3.

merely from *διὰ* being applied to God the Son? He might, notwithstanding what you have here said, be *efficient*, and even *originally* too, either in *creation* or *conservation*; for they are near akin to each other: and *conservation* has been sometimes styled *continued creation*, being a continuance of the same power. Might you not therefore have been content with my granting you more than you can fairly prove from the bare force of *διὰ*, instead of labouring a needless point; where, at last, you can make nothing out? I have allowed you (which I may now call a *courtesy*) a *priority of order*: make your advantage of it. You say it is in *words*; that is, because you make a difference in *order* to be *no difference in order*; and confound *coordination* with *coequality*. I desire no greater advantage over an adversary than to see him reduced to *self-contradiction* and plain defiance to *common sense*, only to keep up an *hypothesis*. I admit a difference of *order*, not of *nature*: but that word *nature* is so very obscure and *metaphysical*; I would say, that *distinction* is so plain and obvious, carrying in it so entire a confutation of all you have been saying, or doing, that you cannot endure the least mention of it. You have thought it material to observe, (p. 186.) that things are said to have been created for the *pleasure* of God the Father, (Rev. iv. 10, 11.) which is no where said of the Son. To which I answer, nor *twice* of the Father. However, nobody can doubt but the world was created for the *Son's pleasure* as well as the *Father's*; and to me it seems that the expression of St. Paul ("All things were created by him, and for "him") is as strong and significative as the other. I am the more confirmed in it, because I observe that you translate, or construe, *σις αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα* in Rom. xi. 36. (the very same phrase here used in Coloss. i. 15.) "To "his glory they all terminate," (p. 185.) which is as much as terminating in *his pleasure*.*

We are now to hold a debate about *ὁ Θεός*, which is

* See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 36.

very needless in the main, because I had really admitted (to shorten our dispute) more than you could prove, either from *Scripture* or *antiquity*. I had allowed $\delta\ \Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ to be the ordinary title of God the Father, and rightly reserved to him, in most cases, as his distinguishing personal character^t, in the sense of $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$. Yet I very well know that this is more than you can prove from the *Fathers*, except from Origen; and that not from his latest and best writings. Might you not then have thought it sufficient to build upon my *concessions*, rather than to make your cause appear the weaker, by endeavouring to give it more strength than belongs to it? It is demonstration, that the Fathers in general made no account of the distinction between $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ and $\delta\ \Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$, in our present case; because of their applying a multitude of texts to Christ, where there is $\delta\ \Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$, as before shown. Your pretence of his being considered as *representative* only, has been fully answered above: besides that you are fluctuating and inconsistent in your accounts of that matter; sometimes allowing Christ to be what he is there styled (*viz.* $\delta\ \Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$) in his own *Person*; and again retracting it, by supposing the title to belong only to the *other Person*, whom he *represented*. In short, you seem not to know what to determine, or where to fix; so various and unconstant a thing is error. It being certain that the Fathers, in general, so interpreted *Scripture* as to make no account of your distinction; it will be of less weight if they appear to make more of it in their own writings: for why should they fix a rule to themselves which *Scripture* (by their own account) had not observed, but the direct contrary? Indeed, you have two writers, before the Nicene Council, to produce for it, Clemens and Origen: as to Clemens, how little he made of the distinction, as to our present question, may be observed from his manner of styling the Father and Son together $\delta\ \Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$, as hath been noted above. Besides this, I took notice

^t See my Defence, vol. i. p. 50.

that he often gives the Son, *singly*, the title of δ Θεός : and I referred to the places^u : you have something to say to every one of them, to show how resolute you can be in defending any thing you have once pretended to lay a stress upon. To the first passage^x, you say it is only an allusion to Psal. xxxiv. 8. And what then? Is it ever the less true, that δ Θεός is there applied to Christ? To the second passage^y you say, the Λόγος is spoken of, as *personating the Father*. Not a word does Clemens say of *personating*, but of the Son's being the *face of the Father*^z : so that in seeing one, both were, in a manner, seen ; one being the perfect resemblance of the other, and *representing* him, (not in your low sense of *personating*,) but exhibiting him, as in a lively mirror, by exhibiting himself. Besides, that it is plain from Clemens, that the same Person who was to be man, was δ Θεός. Was this the *Father*, think you, or the Son? To the third passage^a, you say, that the δ Θεός “ is not the Λόγος, but a sanctified “ Christian.” But your better retreat is to the *various lection* ; not only because your construction is at least *dubious*, but because if it were *certain*, it were still an instance of δ Θεός, applied by Clemens contrary to your criticism. To the *fourth* and *fifth* passages^b, you reply, that “ τὸν Θεὸν and τῷ Θεῷ may be understood of the Fa- “ ther.” To which I need only say, they cannot without straining, and making the construction forced and unnatural. To the *sixth*^c, you say, “ the limitations added “ are strongly against me.” That is only a fancy of your own : but was not the question, whether δ Θεός was ap-

^u Clemens Alex. p. 72, 132, 251, 273, 436, 832.

^x Ἰδοὺ ὅτι Χριστὸς ὁ Θεός. Clem. p. 72.

^y Ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ ἀνομιμαστος ἢ ὁ Θεὸς ὁ Κόσμος μηδὲν γινώσκων ἀνθρώπων. Clem. p. 132.

^z Πρόσωπον δὲ τῷ Θεῷ ὁ λόγος, ᾧ φωνίζονται ὁ Θεὸς, ἃ ἠμωρίζεται. τότε ἢ Ἰσραὴλ ἰστανόμεσται, ὅτι εἶδε τὸν Θεόν, τὸν κύριον ὑπὸς ἑἶναι ὁ Θεός, ὁ λόγος, &c. Clem. *Ibid.*

^a Clem. Alex. p. 251.

^b *Ibid.* p. 273, 436.

^c Ἄγνοια γὰρ ἔχεται πᾶσι τῷ Θεῷ, τῷ πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου συμβόλου γινώσκοντι τῷ πατρὶ. Clem. p. 832.

plied to Christ by Clemens? An ingenuous man would either have confessed plain fact, or have said nothing. None of the passages, you say, “give to the Son the title “(ὁ Θεός) in the *absolute* and *unlimited* construction.” And might you not have had this reserve, if I had produced a thousand passages with ὁ Θεός applied to Christ? I do not expect you should grant them to be understood in the *unlimited* construction: you have resolved against it: and if there were as many instances in *Scripture* as in the Fathers, you might still have some pretence against an *unlimited* construction. In the mean while, what becomes of your criticisms upon ὁ Θεός, if we are to judge from *other rules*, whether it is to be understood with *limitation*, or otherwise? Doth it not appear, even from yourself, that the insisting on the *article* is very trifling? I had likewise produced Clemens for styling the Son, ὁ παντοκράτωρ^d. Here you tell me it is not in an *absolute* construction. And what if it is not? The instance is sufficient to show that Christ is *true God*, upon Clemens’s principles, because he is ὁ παντοκράτωρ^e, for Clemens makes no distinction about *absolute* construction. But neither can you prove that Clemens does not use the words τὸν παντοκράτορα, in the passage cited, in an *absolute* construction, (if one can know what you mean by *absolute*,) nor if you could, would it at all change the sense of the word παντοκράτωρ, or make it signify any thing less than when applied ever so *absolutely*. Clemens reasons from it in the same manner as he would have done from the same word, or title, understood in the fullest and highest sense that παντοκράτωρ, or *Almighty*, can come up to. It is to little purpose for you to show that Clemens sometimes styles the Father μόνος ὁ παντοκράτωρ. It is not Clemens’s way to use the *exclusive* terms, in such instances, in any *opposition* to God the Son, but quite the contrary; as

^d Ἀντιθεὶς γὰρ ἰ τὸν παντοκράτορα θεὸν λόγον ἔχον, ἢ ἕτερον ἂν χεῖρ, ἀπεριῶσι. Clem. p. 277.

^e Οὐ γὰρ θεὸν ἀπλῶς προσεῖπεν, ἰ τῷ τῷ ἄρθῳ προτάξῃ τὸν παντοκράτορα δηλώσας. Clem. p. 548.

hath been observed above. As to Origen, you will be able to make no more of the place cited^f than this; that as the *Λόγος* excels all other his inferiors, so also the *Λόγος* is excelled by the Father; not in the same degree, but in a certain sense, as the Father is *αὐτόθεος*, God from none, the Son God by partaking of the Father's Godhead.

However, if Origen or his *interpolators* have any where in these *comments* dropped any unwary expressions; you will remember that they are of no moment any farther than they are consistent with Origen's certain, well-weighed doctrine, in his treatise against Celsus.

As to Eusebius, your last authority for the distinction between *Θεός* and *ὁ Θεός*, (whatever his principles were,) all the use he makes of the distinction is only to prove against Marcellus, that the *Son* was not the *Father*. For he perpetually charges Marcellus with *Sabellianism*; as making the *Son* to be the *Father*, and *vice versa*. His words, literally and justly rendered, (not as you render them,) ran thus: "The Evangelist could have said, the Word was *ὁ Θεός*, with the addition of the article, had he thought the Father and Son to be one and the same thing, and that the Word himself was the God over all." The sense of this passage will entirely depend upon a right consideration of what it was that Eusebius charged Marcellus with; or how he understood Marcellus to affirm the Father and Son to be the same thing, or same God.

Now this will easily appear from divers places in Eusebius's treatise against him. He charges Marcellus with making the Word a mere *notional* thing, fleeting and vanishing, like a *human* word, nothing *living* and *subsisting*^h. He charges him with taking it in a *Jewish* sense,

^f Διατίον γὰρ αὐταῖς οὗτοι τότε μὴ αὐτόθεος ὁ θεός ἴσιν—πάν δι τὸ παρὰ τὸ αὐτόθεος μισοχρῆσθαι τῆς λαϊνῆς διόσητος θεοποιούμενον, οὐκ ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ θεός κυριώτερον ἐν λόγῳ. *Orig. in Joh.* p. 46, 47. Vid. Huetii not. p. 93, 94.

^g ὁσπόμενος ἦν ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ὁ θεός ἦν ὁ λόγος, μισὰ τοῦ ἄρθου κρησθῆναι, εἴ γε ἐν καὶ ταυτὸν ἡγούμενος τὸν πατέρα ἴσαι καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτὸν τι ἴσαι τὸν λόγον τὸν ἐπὶ πάντων θεός. *Euseb. contr. Marc.* p. 127.

^h Euseb. p. 4, 19. p. 5.

and making no more than a *nominal* difference between the *Father* and his *Word*ⁱ: one *Essence* and one *Hypostasis* too, in the way of Sabellius. He charges him with taking away the very *existence* as well as *Hypostasis* of the Son; with making one *Hypostasis* with *three names*^k, having no more than a *nominal*, not a *real* distinction. Hence it is plain what Eusebius, in the passage above cited, meant by ἓν καὶ ταυτὸν, *one and the same thing*; as also by making the Λόγος to be τὸν ἐνὶ πάντων Θεὸν, *the God over all*. It was making Father and Son *one Person*, as we now term it; and so confounding both in one, as to take away all *real distinction*. You have therefore no reason to think I had *partially* represented Eusebius, when I said, (Defence, vol. i. p. 49.) that he made no farther use of the observation about the *article*, than to prove against Marcellus, that the Λόγος is a distinct *real Person*, and not the *Father* himself. It is you that have *partially* represented Eusebius, either to serve your *hypothesis*, or for want of considering the drift and scope of Eusebius's treatise, and in what sense he uses his terms.

What then is the result of your inquiries about the *distinction* between Θεὸς with the article and without it?

1. You have not been able to prove that the Ante-Nicene writers in *general* took any notice at all of it: *two* only are found, Clemens and Origen. The former never applies it at all to the text of St. John, nor makes any use of it to show the preeminence of the *Father* above the *Son*: so far from it, that he gives the title of ὁ Θεὸς indifferently to Father, or Son, or to both together, according as occasion offers. The latter has indeed, in an unaccurate work, or perhaps corrupted, mentioned the distinction, and applied it to prove some preeminence of the Father as being *God of himself*, or *unbegotten*. But in his later and more certainly genuine works, he has nothing of this kind, but resolves the *Unity* in a very different way from what he had done in his *Commentaries*; answering the objection of

ⁱ Euseb. p. 33, 35, 36.

^k Ibid. p. 167, 175.

Ditheism upon quite another foot. 2. You have not been able to show that the Fathers ever imagined the *Scripture style* to be at all conformable to that *distinction*: nay, the contrary is evident from their citing a multitude of texts of the Old Testament, and applying them to *Christ* as therein denoted by the title of δ Θεός. 3. You have not been able to show, that the Fathers ever invariably or carefully followed any such rule in their *own style*, (though you confidently affirm they did, p. 188.) For, besides what hath been shown from Clemens, examples may be given to the contrary out of the other ancient writers¹. 4. If it could have been proved that this *distinction* had been ever so constantly observed; yet no certain consequence in favour of your principles could be drawn from it: nothing but what (for the sake of shortening a dispute) I would have admitted, without your producing any ancient writer for it; namely this, that the Father is emphatically δ Θεός, as *first Person*, though the Son be Θεός in the same sense: almost in like manner as the Holy Ghost is emphatically τὸ πνεῦμα, though the Father or Son be πνεῦμα in as strict and proper a sense of πνεῦμα as the other.

You at length bring me a quotation from Theodorus Abucara, a very orthodox man of the ninth century, allowing that in *Scripture style* δ Θεός is a title *appropriate* to the Father. This is more than the *ancients* would have allowed; except the observation be confined to the New Testament. However, you may perceive that, in the judgment of very orthodox men, our cause is in no danger from this famed distinction^m: they knew the difference

¹ Irenæus, p. 211, 215, 271. ed. Bened. Hippolytus, vol. i. p. 267. ii. p. 15, 20. Melito, cit. a Grab. Not. in Bull. p. 86. Origenes contr. Cels. p. 85, 162.

^m Petavius, where he cites the passage you mention, cites also another of the same author; which deserved your notice.

Θεός δι' ἕξαιρέτως λέγεται, ἰσχυρὰ ἡ ἵκναι, ἧτοι ἀνάπτεις καὶ ἀνακεφαλαιώσις τῆς ἐριμίας ὁ Πατὴρ ἴσται, ὡς ἴσται ὁ Θεολόγος. *Petav. Trin. lib. iv. cap. 15. p. 262.*

“ He is emphatically styled *God*, because the Father is the *Union*, or

between allowing δ Θεός to be an *appropriate title*, and making the sense of Θεός depend upon an *article*.

As to John i. 1. where the want of the *article* before Θεός is made an objection against us, it should be considered that the expression, Θεός ἦν ὁ λόγος, is just what it should be on our principles. The want of the *article* determines Θεός to be the *predicate*, ascertains the construction against the Sabellians, and is the very expression which any accurate Greek writer would choose, rather than the other, to signify what we understand by it.

Having done with criticisms, you return to your *logical subtleties*. I had admitted a *priority of order*, yet denying the Son to be God in a *subordinate* sense: upon which you remark, "then he is God in a coordinate sense; and " what becomes of the priority of order?"

To which I answer, that though he be God in a *coordinate*, or rather the *same sense* of the word God, yet he is God in a *subordinate manner*, as being *God of God*: and now what becomes of the *subordinate sense* of the word God?

You pretend, that *subordinate* has necessarily a relation to *government*: which I deny. And if you could prove it, (as you cannot,) all that would follow is, that God the Son is not *subordinate*. And then, instead of saying that he is *subordinate*, we would only say that he is a *Son*, or that he is *of the Father*; changing the phrase, but still retaining the doctrine under other terms. But it is ridiculous to assert, that a difference of *order* does not make a *subordination*, or an equality of *order* a *coordination*. To my instance of Adam and Seth, you say, that "to Adam, considered as a governor, Seth was subordinate." Yes, and *subject* too. But to Adam, considered merely as a *Father*, he was only *subordinate*, and not *subject*.

You add, that "man being the abstract name of a species, all men are equally men." In like manner,

"folding up, or recapitulation of the Trinity; as (Gregory) the *divine* has "observed."

God being a name for as many Persons as have the *divine nature*, every Person having that *nature* is equally *God*. You go on: "Among men a son does not derive his being from his father—but God, when he is styled Father, must always be understood to be *αἴτιον*, a true and proper cause, really and efficiently giving life." This is the philosophy of Dr. Clarke^a: and it is to intimate, that though every son of man has the "nature of man," and is equal in *nature* to his Father; yet the "Son of God" must not have the "nature of God," nor be in nature equal to the Father. Excellent doctrine! And yet you are affronted to be called Arians. The answer is, that God the Father is not the *cause* of his Son, in Dr. Clarke's sense; who admits no *necessary* causes. Neither can the Doctor prove, either from *Scripture* or *Fathers*, that ever the Son was so *caused* by a voluntary act, or choice. In the old sense of *cause*, as the sun is the cause of light, the root of its branches, the fountain of streams, and the like, the Father was ever believed to be the *cause* of his Son, and no otherwise.

What you hint from Novatian about power, means only *paternal authority*, and *priority of order* on that account. You conclude with saying, that I might have argued that "the Son is included in the one unbegotten God." But I do not find *Scripture* speaking any thing of the one *unbegotten* God. It mentions the *one God*, and excludes all *other* Gods; wherefore the Son being included, is not *another God*, but the *same God*. And though I like not the expression of "the unbegotten God, and the begotten God," because it comes too near the language of *Ditheism*, (which you are every where inculcating,) yet I shall make no scruple of saying, that the Father, God *unbegotten*, and the Son, God *begotten*, are both *one God*.

^a Clarke's *Script. Doct.* p. 239, 273. ed. 2d.

• See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 218; &c.

QUERY IV.

Whether, supposing the Scripture notion of God to be no more than that of the Author and Governor of the universe, or whatever it be, the admitting of another to be Author and Governor of the universe, be not admitting another God; contrary to the texts before cited from Isaiah, and also to Isa. xlii. 8. xlviii. 11. where he declares he will not give his glory to another?

IN defence of this *Query*, I charged you with *Ditheism*, as professing one *Author* and *Governor* to be a *God*, and another *Author* and *Governor* to be a *God* likewise: not the *same God* with the other, but *another*, consequently *two Gods*; which is undeniably evident in your scheme.

You say, in answer, that my “defence of this and of the following *Query* is in reality (without intending it) an attempt to expose and render ridiculous the *express* doctrine of St. John and St. Paul, and to make it appear inconsistent with the Old Testament,” p. 195.

The reader, I doubt not, will be surprised at this high flight of extravagance. Hitherto I thought I had to do with a *sober man*, however mistaken in many things. But you are now giving yourself liberties of such a kind, as can scarce be thought consistent with that character. What I expected of you was, that you should clear your *hypothesis* of the charge of “two Gods;” every man taking it for granted, that neither St. John nor St. Paul, neither *Scripture* nor *antiquity*, ever taught *two Gods*. But the charge being so full and plain, that you can no way evade it, you are resolved, it seems, to carry it off with an air of assurance, and to charge even St. John and St. Paul with the same. You do well to put your authorities very high and strong; because, I remember, Justin Martyr and Irenæus have said, that they could not have believed even our *Lord* himself, had he preached up *another God* beside the Maker of all things. However, if you are able to make your point good from *Scripture*, I shall think it sufficient. And suffer me once more to dispute

it with you; not to *expose* or render ridiculous St. John or St. Paul, (God forbid!) but men of a much lower class; who, when their cause is most desperate, are used to put on the greatest confidence for a blind to the readers. Let us hear what you have to say: and do not tell me that I am "not arguing against Dr. Clarke and you, but "against plain Scripture;" as if Scripture were plain for *two Gods*.

You begin with your old pretence, that the texts of Isaiah are all "expressly personal." Be it so: so also are many expressions in *Scripture* and *antiquity*, indeed in all writers; where yet the *exclusive* terms exclude those persons only whom they were intended in *opposition* to. It is a rule of language common to all kinds of authors; whereas your rigorous interpretation of the *exclusive* terms has nothing in the nature of the thing, or in custom of speech, to support it. You can scarce dip into any writer, but you find exceptions against it.

You endeavour farther to shift off the charge of *Ditheism*, by retorting it upon me. But how wide a difference is there in the two cases! As I maintain that the Son is not *another God*, nor both *two Gods*, so I consistently teach that both are *one God*: you maintain, that God can be a name for no more than "one Person," that each of the Persons is "a God," and that they are not together "one God." What is this but saying directly that they are *two Gods*? I may mistake in my *hypothesis*, (which yet has not been shown,) but you are plainly *self-condemned*. You have recourse to St. Paul, (p. 197.) who favours your notions as little as I do. You ask, whether he "was a teacher of Polytheism?" I verily think not: and if your doctrine stands as clear as St. Paul's, all will be well with you. But do not father your conceits upon the blessed Apostle. He *directs* us, you say, "to the one true God, of whom are all things." Yes, he tells us that the "Father, of whom are all things," is the "one God," in opposition to false ones, to *nominal* gods and lords: and it is plain, that he meant it not in

opposition to God the Son, because he reckons him "God to us," (Rom. ix. 5.) which none of the *nominal* gods are. Now, since the same St. Paul says that "there is no other God but one," (1 Cor. viii. 4.) it is manifest that though the Father be *emphatically* styled *one God*, yet he and the Son together are not *two Gods*, but *one God*.

You ask, whether when St. Paul tells us that "God our Saviour—saved us—through Jesus Christ our Saviour," he does thereby preach *two Saviours*? (Tit. iii. 4, 6.) Yes certainly, unless both *be one Saviour*. Wherefore you by denying them to be *one*, make *two Saviours*, as you do also *two Gods*. To your other question, I answer, that *Jesus Christ* is the same *God* and the same *Saviour*, though not the *same Person* with him styled "God our Saviour," Tit. iv. You go on: "Did our Saviour himself introduce heathen Polytheism, when he said, (Mark xii. 29.) *The Lord our God is one Lord*, and yet immediately after mentions *another Lord*, ver. 36?" But who has taught you to call that *other, another Lord*? This did not our Saviour: you are the *Polytheist*, (and not he,) by your strained and false comments upon his words.

This is what you call producing *express Scripture*.

What you have farther, p. 198, about Bp. Pearson and Bp. Bull, (who are both directly against you,) is marvellous; as also your account of *antiquity*, which has been answered. Your pretence, that no ancient writer ever argued against *Polytheism*, by alleging that Christ is the "one supreme God," or individually the "same God," is a shameful misreport, a manifest untruth; unless you have some poor equivocation in the words. Tertullian, Origen, Hippolytus, Lactantius, &c. as many as resolve the Unity of *Godhead* into *Unity of substance*, (as the ancients in general do,) are so many evidences of your falsehood. For if Christ be *one substance* with the Fa-

P See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 31, &c.

ther, he is *one God supreme*, God being a name of substance.

Your telling me that I make "one substance," but never "one God," is just as if you had said, I make *one God*, but never make *one God*; or else it is a weak begging the question. You pretend, the Unity of God is secure by making one *original Cause*. Right; if you take in God the Father and God the Son into the *one Godhead*: otherwise, by excluding one of your *Gods*, you make a *supreme God* and an *inferior God*, after the way of *Pagan Polytheists*; and so *Ditheism* is unavoidable. I asked, where the sacred writers ever limited the sense of the texts relating to the *Unity* by the word *supreme*? Where do they say there is but one *supreme God*, instead of *one God*? You have not one text to produce out of the *laws against idolatry*: a plain sign that Scripture went upon quite other principles than yours. And the reason of it is evident, because the design was to intimate that no *other God* but the *God of Israel* was to be admitted.

To have made him *supreme God* only, would have left room for any *inferior deities* to be taken in with him. The place of the Psalms (Ps. xlvii. 2.) declaring God to be *ὑψιστος*, or *most high*, reacheth not the point; unless it had been said, *you shall have none other most high God but him*, to leave room for *lower deities*. There is a great deal of difference between saying, there is *one most high God*, and there is *one God who is most high*: as much as between saying, there is *one supreme King of Great Britain*, and there is *one King of Great Britain who is supreme*. Your instance is the more unfortunately chosen, because the very Person there styled *ὑψιστος*, *most high*, is by some of the ancients (Justin Martyr particularly) understood to be *God the Son*; which I infer from their interpreting verse the 5th, &c. of him. Your other instances are as little to your purpose: but it is pretty remarkable, that while you are confidently glorying of nothing less than *plain and express Scripture*, you are talking in a style

unknown to *Scripture*, but very well *known* to the Pagans, that there is one only *supreme* God; intimating that there are *inferior* Gods, or *one God* at least, besides him. As to your several *what-think-you's*, p. 200. I refer you to my Sermons⁹.

You tell me, that δ Θεός, in *Scripture*, &c. signifies the *supreme* God. Does it so? Then according to all *antiquity*, applying δ Θεός to Christ in their citations of the Old Testament, Christ is the *supreme* God. But I beg leave to say, that it signifies only *God*; and there is no need of saying *supreme* God, when there is no reference to an *inferior* God: and therefore *Scripture*, and generally *antiquity*, say nothing of a *supreme* God, because they acknowledged no *inferior* God; to which such expressions have a tacit reference. It was from the Pagans that such language was at first borrowed, and used at length by some Christian writers, (as Arnobius and Lactantius,) though by them very rarely; and with such cautions as might be sufficient to prevent misconstruction.

As St. Paul was willing to adopt the name of *unknown* God, in compliance with the Pagan *phrase*, to lead them into a belief of the God of the Christians: so some of the Fathers were inclinable to take the name of $\omega\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\varsigma$ Θεός, or *princeps Deus*, and to apply it, in a Christian sense, to draw the Pagans insensibly to the worship of the *true* God, under such a name as they had given to a *false* one. Otherwise this kind of phrases is not properly Christian, nor to be used by Christians.

It is one thing to say God is *supreme*, is $\omega\nu\nu\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\varsigma$, is *over all*, or the like; and quite another to say, there is one *supreme* God; which, in propriety of speech, implies that he has *another* God under him. We say of *the King*, that he is *supreme* in his dominions; but who ever talks of the *supreme King of Great Britain*, as if there were any *other* king of Great Britain? *Supreme moderator* and *governor*, we say, because there are subordinate *modera-*

⁹ Sermon vii. vol. ii. p. 168.

tors and governors. You do well to quote Nebuchadnezzar for the phrase of "God of Gods," Dan. ii. 47. It was a very proper expression for an idolatrous king to use; and was well suited to a Pagan *hypothesis*. And if the like phrase occurs elsewhere^r, in the sacred writers, the intent is not to signify that any *inferior* God was admitted under the *supreme*, but that the *God of Israel* was far superior to all the *reputed* gods of the nations.

Your comment upon Isa. xlii. 8. xlvi. 11. is very extraordinary, that God will not give the *glory* of being *underived* (that is all your comment amounts to) to any. Certainly he *will not* do what he *cannot*. But was it suitable to the divine Majesty to acquaint his people, that he will not (with reverence be it spoken) do the most staring contradiction and palpable absurdity? It is evident that his glory is his worship, all religious worship, (which might be taken from him, and placed upon false gods,) and he would not suffer it with impunity to be transferred from him to other objects. As to your pretended "mediate" worship, it shall be considered hereafter.

My saying that God has engrossed all divine honour to himself, you call "a most presumptuous contradiction to the whole New Testament." But as it is no great *presumption* to dispute with men fallible as myself, about the sense of the New Testament; so I hope the reader will not take you to be in earnest, but will rather kindly excuse a few passionate words, such as men are apt to throw out in great extremities.

You appeal to John v. 22. to prove that God has given honour and worship to Christ as "Son of man." This will be distinctly debated hereafter. At present, it is enough to say, that Christ, rather than the Father, is to execute judgment upon *man*, because he himself is *man*, (which the Father is not,) and that so high and great an *office* is an evident token of what he is, *very God*, as well

^r Esdras v. 8. Nehem. viii. 6. Vid. Cleric. in loc.

as very man; and therefore all men are to "honour him even as they honour the Father." You have taken a great deal of fruitless pains to show, that the particular glories belonging to the Son, on account of his *offices*, are distinct from the glories belonging to the Father. You might, in the same way, have shown, that the particular glories due to the Father under this or that consideration, are distinct from the glories of the Father considered under another capacity. For instance, the glory of the Father considered as *King*, is one glory; as *Judge*, another glory; as *God* of the *Jews* one thing, as *God* of *Christians* another, as *God* of *angels* another. And thus you may multiply the *worship* of the Father into a thousand several *worships*, by as many distinct considerations. But as all these several glories arise from the display of his *attributes* of wisdom, justice, goodness, &c. and all his attributes are founded in the excellency of his *nature*; so all the particular *worships* are reduced to *one*, as being an acknowledgment of that *one divine nature*, the root and source of all. The same I say of God the Son: all the particular glories belonging to him on account of his *offices*, relative to us, are but partial considerations of his *attributes*, of his *goodness*, *mercy*, *wisdom*, &c. which *attributes* have their root and foundation in the excellency of his *nature*, which *nature* is the same with the Father's; and thus all the particular *glories*, or *worships*, resolve into *one glory*, or *worship*, paid to that *nature* which is *common* to Father and Son. But of this I shall treat more distinctly in the sequel.

To conclude this article, you have not been able to clear yourself of the charge of believing and professing *two Gods*; but after a great many big words, and only words, about St. John, and St. Paul, and *plain Scripture*; you appear to have been doing nothing else but *perverting* Scripture, and *depraving* Christianity, and teaching us a *new language*, as well as a new faith, in asserting a *supreme* God and an *inferior* God, instead of *one God*.

QUERY V.

Whether Dr. Clarke's pretence, that the authority of Father and Son being one, though they are two distinct Beings, makes them not to be two Gods, as a king upon the throne, and his Son administering his Father's government, are not two kings, be not trifling and inconsistent? For if the King's son be not a king, he cannot truly be called king; if he is, then there are two kings. So, if the Son be not God, in the Scripture notion of God, he cannot truly be called God; and then how is the Doctor consistent with Scripture or with himself? But if the Son be truly God, there are two Gods upon the Doctor's hypothesis, as plainly as that one and one are two: and so all the texts of Isaiah cited above, besides others, stand full and clear against the Doctor's notion.

YOU go on here in the same confident way, (your confidence always rising as your arguments fall,) telling me that I "condemn Scripture for giving the Son the title of "God:" because, forsooth, I condemn you for giving him the title, and denying him the thing; while Scripture allows him both. You have nothing to reply, but that there is "one first Cause," &c. and therefore but "one "God." If a man were to admit this, you would still never be able to come at the conclusion you intend. For suppose the Father were allowed to be *one God*, as the *first Cause*, but God the Son *God* notwithstanding, as necessarily existing; this hypothesis is every whit as defensible as yours, or more so: only it is liable to the charge of *Ditheism*, as yours also is; and the like solutions would serve equally for either. This I hint, that you may not imagine yourself ever able to gain your point in that way of reasoning. But I proceed in my charge of *Ditheism* upon your scheme. You own the Son to be a *God*, though not included in the *one God*; therefore you make *two Gods*. You have no hopes of evading the charge yourself: but you think it may be some relief to bring me in to share with you in it; and so

you feebly endeavour to retort it. I will not transcribe all you have trifled on this head: your argument, or rather no argument, but *calumny*, is, that I make "two supreme Gods." Show me how. You tell me they are "two Gods," (in my *hypothesis*,) though "undivided in substance." But this is a miserable begging of the main question, that *two Persons* cannot be *one God*: whereas my charge of *Ditheism* upon you is founded upon this plain maxim, as plain as that two and two are four, that *one God* and *another God* are *two Gods*: or that two Persons, each of which is a God, and not together *one God*, are *two Gods*. Learn at length to submit to a self-evident maxim, and either confess *two Gods*, or throw out the Son from being *God* at all. You talk, in your usual deceitful way, of the ancient Christians making the "origination in the divine Paternity to be the assertion of the Unity:" which is a thing directly and fully to my purpose, and as directly contrary to yours. For the *ancients* from this principle concluded that all the three Persons are *one God*, (which Bishop Pearson observes;) and you, in contradiction to the *ancients*, infer from the same principle, that they are not "one God." Was there ever a more shameless abuse upon the ignorant readers? I have recited the passage of Bishop Pearson (which you refer to) once before, and shall now again (if it be possible to make any impressions upon your modesty) cite it to your shame, for thus imposing on your readers.

"This origination in the divine Paternity hath anciently been looked upon as the assertion of the Unity: and therefore the Son and Holy Ghost have been believed to be but *one God* with the Father, because both from the Father, who is one, and so the *Union* of them^s." This is a true account of the *ancients*, worthy of that great man; while yours is so entirely false, that were it not that you have the privilege of writing without a *name*,

• Pearson on the Creed, p. 40.

one might think, that pure regard to your *character* might deter you from these liberties.

How have you the *assurance* to represent my notion as different from Bishop Pearson's, when every body that has seen my books knows that Bishop Pearson's and mine are exactly the same? Do not I every where assert the *Paternity*, and resolve the Unity, as the Bishop with all the ancients does, into Unity of *substance* and *original*? All the three are *one God*, because two are referred up to one Father, to whom they adhere, and from whom they derive their substance, the same divine substance with his. I had reduced you to this dilemma, either to assert *two Gods*, or to make *no God* of the Son; which I called *ungodding* him. Instead of an answer, you give me a rebuke; as usual, when sore pressed. You pretend, that you declare the Son to be God as much as *Scripture* does: and so will any Socinian or Samosatene say, while he supposes him never to have existed before he was *man*. By the same or the like argument you may make a *God* of every *angel*, inasmuch as angels are called *Gods* in Scripture. But while, notwithstanding, you deny the *necessary existence* of an *angel*, and make his title *nominal*, who sees not that you deny him to be *God*? And thus do you with God the Son. The case is manifest: and an ingenuous man would rather give up so plain a point, than expose himself by inventing little quibbles to make things appear what they are not, and to keep up a show of believing what he believes not.

But I am next to be charged as "ungodding the Son." Let us hear how: you have been hitherto very unhappy in the way of retorting. I assert *him to be God in as high a sense as the Father*. Well, how is this *ungodding* him? Here you are silent. But I acknowledge him to be *derived*, *sent* to execute the Father's orders, &c. Show me then that either his being a *Son*, or being *sent*, is any way inconsistent with *equality of nature* or *Unity of Godhead*: here you are lost again. But you come *trembling* to tell me, "I ungod the Father." You ought to *tremble* at

such false and unrighteous accusations. Well, how do I do it? By *asserting another independent, another supreme Lord, &c.* Wonderful; when my business is to maintain, that he is not *another independent supreme Lord*, but the *same Lord*. "I deprive him," you say, "of his original *independent supremacy.*" What! of his *Paternity*? But I own him to be *Father*, and first considered in every thing common both to the Son and him. You have made nothing out in the way of retorting. Come we next to Tertullian and Athenagoras; to see whether they agree with you or me, in resolving the *Unity*. The criterion is this: if they take Father and Son both into the *one God*, they are *mine*; if they separate the Son from the Father, making *another God*, or *no God* of him, then they are *yours*. Tertullian, you say, founds the "Unity of God" upon the supremacy of the Father *alone*, in the government of the universe." That is false; for Tertullian makes all the three Persons of *one authority, one state, one substance*, because *one God*. They are his very words cited above^t. Neither are you able to prove any thing contrary to it, out of all his Works. I referred you to a passage of Tertullian, where he rejects the notion of an *inferior* God as a Pagan dream^u: and to show how consistent he is with himself, he makes the *Son* not an *inferior* God, but the *same God* with the Father; and he applies the general maxim to the particular case of *Father and Son*^x, as having the same *divinity, same power, &c.* Your pretence of Tertullian's making the

^t See above, p. 98.

^u Neque enim proximi erimus opinionibus nationum, quæ si quando coguntur Deum cõfiteri, tamen et alios infra illum volunt. Divinitas autem gradum non habet, utpote unica. *Contr. Hermog. cap. 7.* Deus non erit dicendus, quia nec credendus nisi summum magnum. Nega Deum quem dicis deteriorem. - *Contr. Marc. lib. i. cap. 6.*

^x Tres autem non statu sed gradu, nec substantia sed forma, nec potestate sed specie: *Unius autem substantia, et unius status, et unius potestatis, quia unus Deus.* *Contr. Prax. cap. 2.*

Trinitas unius divinitatis, Pater, Filius, et Spiritus sanctus. *De Pudic. cap. 21.*

Son *subordinate*, is meanly equivocating upon a word. He makes him subordinate, as I also do, in *order*, or *office*, not in *dominion*: and you are very sensible that while you are pleading Tertullian's expressions in favour of your notions, you make him all over *inconsistent*, and *contradictory* to his own plain and avowed principles. You might at this rate quote all the *Post-Nicene* Fathers, who allow of a *subordination* as much as Tertullian. You run out (p. 211.) upon the history of his dispute with Marcion, as if that were any secret. After a great many words, you have nothing to elude his testimony against an *inferior* God, but a *precarious* fiction, or conjecture, that he would not have owned the Son to be *summum Magnum*, the *supreme Being*; though he plainly does own it in making his *substance* the same with the *Father's*, and ascribing the same *divinity*, *power*, and *quality* (*unius status*) to him. Your cavils about *derivatio* and *portio* have been considered above, (p. 96.) But you lay great stress upon Tertullian's supposing the *summum Magnum*, the *supreme Being*, to be *unbegotten*, which you think must exclude the Son. But, under favour, it is never Tertullian's way to exclude the Son. Father and Son together, upon his principles, were the one *unbegotten eternal substance*, till the *generation* of the Son: and then the Son was *begotten*, the Father *unbegotten*, and both still the *same substance* as before, under a different *economy*. You would insinuate, as if the Son was (according to Tertullian) *begotten into a Person*, just before the creation, by the good pleasure of the Father. I refer the reader to Bp. Bull, for a confutation of this weak and groundless charge. I may however take notice of it, as a thing very particular, that, till you have made the *ancients* the most *stupid men* that ever lived, you presume not to claim them as advocates for your opinions. Is it a fair way of dealing with authors to strain and wrest their expressions to a sense directly repugnant to their known and standing principles? Could not you do the same by Athanasius

himself, if you were so disposed, and claim all the *Post-Nicene* Fathers, as well as *Ante-Nicene*, by the help of the like chicane? The question, you say, "is not whether Tertullian always speaks consistently:" and you "are not," you say, "vindicating Tertullian's reasoning," but such "plainly is his notion." In this way of talking, I know not why you should not put in your claim to all the *orthodox* men that ever wrote upon the Trinity. For, as you think them all *inconsistent*, it is only taking those principles which you may be able to strain to a sense agreeable to your notions, and then you may claim their countenance and authority; much in the same way as Dr. Clarke has shown you, in respect of our *Creeeds* and *Liturgy*. The reader, I hope, sees, by this time, what your boasts of *antiquity* amount to; little more than the same game over again with the *ancients*, which the Doctor had before practised with our Church's *forms*.

You are next finding fault with my account of Tertullian, vol. i. p. 57, 58. of my Defence. The objection, I said, as Tertullian resolved it, was, that the *authority would not be one*. I thought my putting in the parenthesis (as Tertullian resolves it) might have been hint sufficient to a man of ordinary acumen. I knew what the objectors meant by *monarchia*; and I knew also to what sense Tertullian turned it in his answer: which, it seems, you did not attend to. He tells you, from his knowledge of Greek and Latin, that *monarchia* ought to signify *singulare et unicum imperium, one singular government*, or authority; and under this view he proceeds to answer Praxeas's objection about *monarchia*. But you say this instance of Tertullian may serve to show that Father and Son are not "two Monarchs, but that the one Monarch " must be he only in whom the authority is original." But then you will consider that hereby you make the Son no *Monarch*: and so, instead of making the Father and the Son *one God*, (which this example was intended to illustrate,) you make the Son no *God* at all; or else

you make a *supreme God* and an *inferior God*, that is, *two Gods*, which you pretend to disown. Nor can you ever come off from so evident a *dilemma*.

I say then, that Tertullian's similitude, though it answered his purpose, does not at all serve yours. And therefore I observed to you, that Tertullian resolved the Unity of God, not into the Father's being sole Monarch, which would have been giving up the *divinity* of God the Son, but into Unity of *power, substance, Godhead*, common to both; taking both into the *one Godhead*, and *one God*. Had you done so too, you had done wisely; and might then have claimed some countenance from *antiquity*; which your *novel* scheme is directly opposite to.

"Unity of substance," you say, "can never make two equally supreme Monarchs *one God*." But it may make two Persons, considered as equally *supreme* over all, to be but *one Monarch*, and *one God*; and that is as well.

I had said of Athenagoras, that he resolves the Unity of Godhead into Unity of *substance* and original. "As if," say you, "Unity of substance and Unity of original were the same thing." I do not say they are precisely the *same*; for then I need not have mentioned both. But this I say, that no *Unity of substance*, unless the *original* was one, so as to make the substance, as it were, of the same stock, would be sufficient upon the principles of the ancients.

I very well knew what I was talking about. Two *unoriginate* divine Persons, however otherwise *inseparable*, would be *two Gods*, according to the ancients. But if one be not only *consubstantial*, but also of *the other*, and referred up to him as a head or fountain, two such Persons were believed to be *one God*. This was the Catholic method, not of making the Father *singly*, but Father and Son, *one God*; which was their pious care and truly Christian concern, and which they expressed on all occasions against Jews, Pagans, and heretics.

Your observations on Athenagoras are answered above.

You have in this page (p. 216.) and the following one, the shrewdest way of talking I have yet met with. You have discovered, it seems, that my principles and yours are the very same; and that we *need not dispute longer*. Indeed, I was wondering at your dulness in not making the discovery sooner. For I very well knew that you could never bring over the *ancients* to your principles, but you must at the same time take me also along with them: and the very same arguments which you make use of to draw them in as advocates to your cause, must of course draw me in too, being inviolably attached to them. You have therefore here done me justice, undesignedly. I am really on your side as much as ever the *ancients* were: and you are very consistent in taking me in with them. But the misfortune is, that the *pretty* way you have of fetching any thing, or any man you please, into a side, and forcing them into your service, is become greatly contemptible; especially after the attempts made upon such men as Bishop Pearson and Bishop Bull, and upon our *Creeds, Articles, and Liturgy*. You have carried the wile too far: and now every body sees through it.

But let us hear, at length, how it is that I am brought over to countenance your principles; and let the reader, from this instance, make a judgment of the rest. You proceed thus: "If the Unity of the Godhead is to be resolved into one *head, root, fountain, and Father of all*, the Son who is not the *head, root, fountain, &c.* cannot be himself *that* one supreme God which is the Father; *head, root, and fountain of all.*" Thus, after you have swelled yourself up with assurance, and your reader with expectation, you produce nothing but the silly sophism about *this* and *that*; which I before (p. 53.) promised to dismiss, wherever I should find it.

My "own hands," you tell me, "have entirely destroyed my own scheme." Happy for me, that I am here to answer for myself; when with Bishop Pearson,

Bishop Bull, and almost all the *ancients*, I am called in to countenance such notions as I had not only *detested*, but formally *confuted*. You tell me, “had I rested here,” (that is, in asserting the Father to be *head, root, &c.*) “the controversy had been at an end.” Now, if it may contribute any thing to end one of the idlest disputes, to say no worse, that ever was begun amongst us, I beg leave to assure you that I do *rest there*: and, by so doing, I have at once taken from you, as I humbly conceive, all your pretences both from *Scripture* and *antiquity*; leaving you nothing but your *metaphysics* to trust to; which, after repeated experiments, you have found very unserviceable, and *lighter than vanity itself*.

After you had taken notice of what I had granted, as to the Father’s being *root, head, fountain, &c.* you say, “if this be true, as I have fully proved, &c.” and you refer to what you had done above, adding some other authorities in the margin. The reader here cannot but observe how unaccountably you have spent your time and pains in an elaborate proof of what I had readily before granted. This is what commonly, and very justly, goes under the name of *impertinence*; and is a method almost peculiar to those who, having once espoused a *bad cause*, have an after-game to play for their own *reputation*, more than for the sake of the *cause* they are entered into, to carry on the *appearance* of a dispute after the dispute is really ended. What other account can be given of your filling so many tedious pages with quota-

‣ You scruple not, p. 218, to cite Athanasius, Hilary, and Gregory Nazianzen, as making the Father the *only God*; as if they also intended to exclude the Son from the *one Godhead*. Such as have ever looked into those writers themselves, instead of taking up scraps at second-hand, cannot want an answer to such weak pretences. I shall think it sufficient to refer you to a few places of these three writers, to give you a just notion of their principles upon this head: Athanasius, p. 536, 878. in Psal. p. 75. Hilarius, p. 836, 859. Gregor. Nazianz. Orat. xxxvi. p. 586. As to your pretence that you “cannot find that any even of the Post-Nicenes of the 4th century said that “the Son was equal in authority and in all perfections;” it is either a poor quibble upon the word *authority*, or else betrays your great want of reading.

tions from the *ancients*, really proving nothing but what I had ingenuously admitted before, leaving it to you to make all the advantage you possibly could of it?

The reader here may again plainly see, that your pretended arguments against me are not more against me than against the *ancients*, by whose principles mine must either stand or fall. And while you are charging me with *contradictions*, the charge falls equally upon them; whose faith I follow, and whose principles I here maintain. It may be seen, with half an eye, that you deal with the *ancients* just as you do with me. You pretend first to split their notion into *contradictory* principles; and then you take one part of the pretended contradiction and play it against the other part; crying out, the *ancients*, the *ancients*, all the way; with much the same justice as you can, when you have a mind to it, cry out, the *Creeeds*, the *Articles*, the *Liturgy*, and what not.

You tell me, (p. 217.) of my "perpetual self-contradiction." Now, if you are able to prove it, you will do something; if not, you only betray your own want of judgment or fairness, in making the charge. As to the *perfection* you imagine in the *Father* as such, more than in the *Son*, I deny any, except what is contained in a *mode of existing*, or *relation of order*. You go on cavilling, in a childish manner, against *Unity of substance*, *individual*, *numerical*, &c. which kind of *cavils* I abundantly answered again and again in my Defence, and shall not repeat. *Homogeneous substance* and *inseparability* amounts with you to *substances united*. You should have avoided this, because you hereby charge your friend the Doctor with making the *divine substance* a heap of *substances* united. If there cannot be substance and substance without *substances*, the Doctor and you are in a lamentable case, while you suppose the divine substance to be *extended*: for you thereby suppose him *compounded* of innumerable *substances*. Learn hereafter to have your thoughts more about you, when you are charging *contradictions*.

I had said in my Defence, vol. i. p. 59. that the Fathers believed *God* to be a word denoting *substance*^a, not *dominion* only. You are unwilling to let this pass, notwithstanding that you have changed your mind in this point of *God's* denoting *dominion* only, since your last time of writing. Now the word, you say, denotes the Person "whose the substance is:" that is, the substance whose the substance is; for *Person* denotes *substance*. As to *θεότης*, which before signified, with you, "divine dominion," it now signifies "divine dignity and authority." And it is pleasant to observe how you can change the sense of a word, and yet give the very same reason for the *new* sense, as before for the *old* one. We were before told, that "*θεότης*, like *άνθρωπότης*, and all other words of the like formation, *always* signifies *divine dominion*." Now "*θεότης*, like *άνθρωπότης*, and all other words of the like formation, *always* signifies *divine dignity and authority*." That is to say, once upon a time, it *always* signified an *outward relation*, expressed by the word *dominion*; but now it *always* signifies some *intrinsic perfection*, expressed by the word *dignity*. I hope, the next time you write, it will *always* signify *divine nature*, like *άνθρωπότης*, (which signifies the *human*,) and "all other words of like formation." I gave many plain examples of this signification, by references in the margin of my Defence^b. One would think that you, in your Reply, had a mind only to divert the reader. You tell me, in the passage of Melito, *θεότης* is expressly opposed to *άνθρωπότης*. I know it, and I chose it for that very reason; because, as *άνθρωπότης* there undoubtedly signifies *human nature*, *in concreto*, so it determines the

^a See Tertullian above, p. 172.

Κατὰ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας φύσις ἰδιωματικὸν ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς θεότητος ὄνομα. *Bas. Ep.* 80.

Ὁ ἄν, ἔ ἡ Θεὸς τῆς ἑστίας ὀνόματα. *Greg. Naz. Orat.* xxxvi. p. 586.

Οὐδὲ ἰστέα ἡ ἑστία παρὰ τὴν θεότητα, οὐδὲ ἰστέα ἡ θεότης παρὰ τὴν ἑστίαν. *Ephr.* vol. ii. p. 11.

See Dr. Clarke's Replies, p. 283.

Defence, vol. i. p. 60, 279.

signification of *θεότης* to the *divine nature*. Besides that your own notion of *dignity* (if you have any sense in it) falls in with mine of *substance*. For whatever expresses *intrinsic dignity* (and not mere outward *relation*) expresses the *nature* and *substance*, the seat and ground, of that *intrinsic* dignity.

You pass over a page or two of *my* Defence, till you find something to carp at: and it is my saying that the Sabellian singularity consisted in making the Godhead *μονοπρόσωπος*, one single *Hypostasis*. To which you reply, that the “contrary is notoriously true, that the Sabellians “supposed God to be *μία ὑπόστασις τριπρόσωπος*.” Now, of all things, there is nothing more contemptible among men of sense, than pedantry about words. Men of learning know that the word *πρόσωπον* has been sometimes used to signify only an appearance, or manifestation, or character: in this sense, the Sabellian tenet is, that the Godhead is *μία ὑπόστασις τριπρόσωπος*, one *Hypostasis* under three *Persons*, that is, *names, appearances, characters*; the same being either *Father, or Son, or Holy Ghost*, according to his several manifestations, or different appearances. But then the word *πρόσωπον* has been likewise used to signify the same with *Hypostasis*, a real Person^c: in this sense the Sabellian principle makes the Godhead *μονοπρόσωπος*, or *ἓν πρόσωπον*, one single Person^d. But I am weary of in-

^c It is thus used as early as Hippolytus, *contr. Noët.* cap. 7, 14. in which sense also Tertullian frequently uses the Latin word *Persona*. Gregory Nazianzen makes it indifferent whether to say *ὑπόστασις* or *πρόσωπον*, provided the meaning be secured. *Orat.* xxxix. p. 630. By degrees the words came to be indifferently used, one for the other, as Damascen has observed to have been common with the *Fathers*.

Χρῆ δὲ γινώσκω, ὡς οἱ ἅγιοι πατέρες ὑπόστασις καὶ πρόσωπον, καὶ ἄτομον τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάλεσαν. τὸ καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἰδιουσιότητος ἕξ ἑσίας ἔ συμβεβηκότων ὀφισάμωσι, ἔ ἀρεθμῶ διαφίρον, καὶ τὸν τῆνα θηλοῦν, οἷον Πίτρον, καὶ Παῦλον. *Damasc. Dialect.* p. 46.

^d Σοφίαν λίγοντις, ἰμοίαν εἶναι λίγονι, τῆ ἕξει τῆ ἐν ψυχῆ τῶν παιδαλιωμένων συνιστάμενη· καὶ διὰ τῆσο πρόσωπον ἐν πατρὶς καὶ υἱοῦ, &c. *Basil. Homil.* xxvii. p. 602.

Πρόσωπον is many times used in this Homily to signify the same with *ὑπόστασις*.

structing you in such *known* things as you ought to have been well versed in, before you engaged in this controversy. I excuse your telling me, that I “manifestly contradict all antiquity, by supposing *ἄρῶσωπον* and *Hy-“postasis”* (sometimes, for I never pretend they do *always*) “to mean the same thing.” I charitably believe you spoke it in your simplicity, not *designing* any misreport, but for want of knowing better.

Upon inquiry into this matter, the truth appears to me to lie thus. Upon the first broaching of the Praxean and Noëtian heresy, which charged the Catholic doctrine with *Tritheism*, the use of the terms *substance* and *persons* came in: the Catholics pleaded, that they did not assert *three Gods*, but *three Persons* only; meaning by *Persons*, *real Persons*, as is plain of Hippolytus and Tertullian. Such was the ancient Catholic sense of *ἄρῶσωπον* and *Persona*. Afterwards came Sabellius, who, reviving the Praxean and Noëtian doctrine, yet thought it prudent to adhere to the Catholic terms of *one substance*, or *one God*, and *three Persons*. But then he misinterpreted *Person*, understanding it of a *manifestation*, or *representation* only, and nothing *real*, or *substantial*.

Thus, after the manner of *heretics*, he kept to the Church’s language, but depraved and corrupted the Church’s sense. From this time *one God* and *three Persons* became an ambiguous phrase, capable either of a Catholic or Sabellian sense. As to the truth of the fact, I ground it chiefly upon what I have observed out of Hippolytus and Tertullian; and that it does not appear that either Praxeas or Noëtus ever talked of *three Persons*, as Sabellius did after. He was the first that introduced the theatrical sense of *person* into Christianity,

Οὐδὲ πάλιν υἱοῦ καὶ πνεύματος ἑνὸς πρόσωπόν ἐστιν. *Ibid.* p. 606.

Μίαν ὑπόστασιν ἴφθην εἶναι τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸν ἅγιον πνεῦμα, καὶ ἑνὸς κριόμενον πρόσωπον. *Theodor. de Sabellio. Hæret. Fab. lib. ii. cap. 9.*

Sabellius—cum veram Trinitatem intelligere non voleret, unam eandemque credidit sub triplici appellatione personam. *Leon. M. Serm. xxiii. p. 155. ed. Quenell.*

making the *τρία πρόσωπα* to be *ἀνυπόστατα*, while the Catholic notion was of *τρία πρόσωπα ὑπόστατα*. There was but a very small variation in the words, but a very great one in the sense and application. One thing however I may remark, that there is a slight difference between *ὑπόστασις* and *πρόσωπον*, that the former may be applied to *inanimate* or *irrational* things, the latter to *rational* only: when therefore I say that they are of the same import, I would be understood to mean only when applied to *rational* or *intelligent* things.

You proceed to mention an incidental thing, which, in common prudence, you might better have omitted. In order to vindicate your notion of there being but *one God*, while you suppose *another God* under him, you had asked me whether "Herod the Great was not King of Judæa, though the Jews had no king but Cæsar?" To which I civilly answered, that Herod the Great had been *dead above thirty years* before the time when it was said that the Jews had *no king but Cæsar*. You had here committed a *chronological slip*; such as ingenious men, through haste, may be sometimes apt to fall into. But you are pleased to quarrel with me for putting *when the Jews*, instead of *though the Jews*. I own the fact: for I supposed you to mean, being a man of sense, that the *two kings* were alive, when it was said the "Jews had no king but Cæsar." For otherwise you must be sensible of a great inadvertency in your argument; which was intended to prove that there may be *two kings* (as *two Gods*) at the *same time*; and yet the name of *king* (or *God*) devolved entirely upon the *superior*. Now whether you will submit to a slight slip in *chronology*, or to a gross *blunder* in the argument, is all one to me: but a prudent man would have passed a matter over quietly, which could not be called up again but to his own confusion. You tell me now, that Herod was king under Augustus. Very right: but how do you prove that, at *that time*, the "Jews had no king but Cæsar?" There lay the pinch of the difficulty; which it is a won-

der a man of your acumen should not be able to perceive.

We have nothing more, that is material, under this Query. The charge of professing *two Gods* remains still unanswered; and must remain, till you think proper to discard God the Son from all *religious worship*. Then indeed he will be no longer *God* to us, any more than *angels*, or *magistrates*, or other *nominal Gods*: and you may then rest consistently in *one God*, and no more; namely, in God the Father.

QUERY VI.

Whether the same characteristics, especially such eminent ones, can reasonably be understood of two distinct Beings; and of one infinite and independent, the other dependent and finite?

YOUR new answer to this Query is,

1. That the characters "can no more be understood of two distinct Persons, than of two distinct Beings."

To which I answer, that it may be proved from *Scripture* that the characters belong to *two Persons*: it cannot be proved that they belong to *two Beings*, much less that they belong to two such *disparate* and *unequal Beings* as you suppose Father and Son to be.

2. You answer, secondly, that "the characters are not the same, because powers derived and underived are not the same."

This answer is very contrary to the sentiments of wiser men, who have argued the other way, that if the powers had been equally *underived*, they had not been the *same* in the two Persons: but as one of the Persons is derived

* In *duobus ingenitis* diversa divinitas invenitur: in uno autem *genito* ex uno *ingenito*, naturalis unitas demonstratur. *Fulgent. contr. Arian.* p. 59.

Si ambo vocarentur *Patres*, essent profecto natura dissimiles. Unusquisque enim ex semetipso constaret, et communem substantiam cum altero non haberet; nec Deitas una esset, quibus una natura non esset. *Idem*, p. 52.

Si verus Deus est, et de Patre non est, duo sunt habentes singuli et volun-

from the other, "being Light of Light, God of God, "substance of substance," both together are "one God, "one substance, &c." And the same *powers* are *common* to both; as there is the *same life* in root and branches, the *same light* in the sun and its rays, the *same virtue* in the center and what proceeds from it. And though no comparisons are sufficient to illustrate infinity, and there must be a great deal more than we are able to conceive; yet there is no principle of reason to contradict this notion, that the same *powers, properties, perfections*, may be diversely considered in the fountain from whence they flow, and in the streams to which they descend.

You yourself can give no tolerable account how the same *powers, attributes, &c.* are equally diffused to infinitely distant parts of the *divine substance*, as you conceive it under *extension*: nor is our notion of the *same powers* being *common* to three Persons at all more unconceivable or inexplicable than yours is of the other^f. So that here let us be content to stop where it becomes us, and not pretend to measure *infinity*. You say, the "powers are no more the same than the Persons are:" nor, certainly, less the same than the *substance* is. All this will depend upon the settling the sense of *sameness*, and the several kinds of it.

When you are able to explain to me how the *wisdom* residing in *one part* of the divine substance (on your *hypothesis* of extension) is the *same*, and yet *not the same* with the *wisdom* residing in any other *part*; I may then be able to account for the degree of *sameness* in the *powers* belonging to the three Persons.

3. In the third place, you tell me of an "invidious insinuation," couched under the words *finite* and *infinite*. This you borrow, as you do many other things, from the author of Modest Plea, &c. Continued. I re-

tates proprias et imperia diversa. *Greg. Nazianz.* p. 729. Pseud. Ambros. p. 348. Confer Eugenii Confess. ap. Vict. Vit. p. 37. Chiff.

^f See my Defence, vol. i. p. 123.

turned a brief answer to it in the Preface to my Sermons. There is nothing *invidious* in the case. But you ought, if you have none but fair and honest designs, to come out of ambiguous terms, that we may fall directly upon the question. You are the less excusable for continuing your disguises, while you write under cover and conceal your name. It looks now as if you were afraid only of having your *cause* exposed, while there is no danger of your *persons*. Dr. Clarke, even in books which he has set his name to, is hardly more *reserved* than you are without a name. What is the meaning of this, but to protract a controversy, and to run from the question; being sensible that your cause is not really defensible?

But to proceed. You say, "you set no limitations to the perfections of the Son of God, *more* than the Scripture has done:" which is saying nothing; because you tell us not what "Scripture has done," according to your sense of it. But you add, "by declaring them to be derived:" which in my sense of *derived* is no *limitation* at all; you should tell me whether it be in *yours*. "Self-existence," you say, "is a perfection." Prove from *Scripture*, or any other way, if you can, that *self-existence*, as distinct from *necessary existence*, is any *perfection*: it is a relation of *order*, a *mode* of existing^b, and that is all.

Aye, but you say it denotes "positive greatness," (p. 226.) and you refer me to the Modest Pleader, who makes it the same with *necessary existence*ⁱ. If this be indeed your meaning, I own it, in that sense, to be as great a perfection as possible, and the sum total of all perfection: but then I assert it to be *common* to Father and Son, who are, in this sense, equally *self-existent*. Only, the Father particularly is *unbegotten* and *underived*; under which conception, *self-existence*, as peculiar to him,

^a Vol. II.

^b *Ἐκείναις ἑαυτῶν τὸ ἀγίνεσθαι, οὐκ ἑστὶν ἕνα.* Basil. contr. Eun. lib. iv. p. 763. Vid. Damascen. vol. i. p. 135, 140, 143, 210, 409. ii. p. 817. Pseudo Just. Exposit. Fid. Mich. Psell. apud Fabric. vol. v. p. 56.

ⁱ Modest Plea, p. 217.

is *negative* and *relative*. We had long been amused with Dr. Clarke's denying the *self-existence* of the Son and Holy Ghost; by which he was supposed to mean no more, than that they were *begotten* and *proceeding*, which every body allows: but now, it seems, he meant to deny their *necessary existence*; which is directly reducing them to *creatures*. You see now what you have to do: either prove that the mere character of *undervived* expresses any *positive* perfection; or that *necessary existence* belongs not equally to all the three Persons: and then you will show yourself an able disputant.

You need not now be scrupulous about "dependent" and "independent:" you have said enough. Whatever is not *necessarily existing* is *precarious* and *dependent*, as much as any *creature*, which is enough in all reason; we understand you. You say, that you suppose the Son "dependent in no other sense than is implied in the "notion of being begotten." It may be so, according to your notion of *begotten*, (I suppose, very little differing from *created*;) but you will have a hard task to show that either *Scripture* or *antiquity* favours any such notion of *begotten*, as to make the Son *precarious*, or not *necessarily existing*. The *voluntary generation* mentioned by the primitive writers will not serve you at all in this matter, as will be seen in the sequel: and as to *Scripture*, you have not a single text to help you, but what must first be racked and tortured with *metaphysical glosses*, to make it speak what it never meant. You have a surprising piece of subtilty (p. 224.) to bring yourself off from the just and well-grounded suspicion of making the Son a *precarious being*. It is a difficult matter to force *logic* against *common sense*; but you are resolute enough to try. Your words, speaking of the Son's existing by the Father's *free act* and *choice*, (which is Dr. Clarke's known sense of this matter,) are these: "Which yet no more implies the Son to be a *precarious* and *mutable being*, than those perfections of God, his power, justice, goodness, veracity, and the like, (the exercise

“whereof always implies the notion of *action*, and consequently depends wholly on the *will* of the *agent*,) “are therefore more *precarious* or *uncertain* in their “effects, than those other perfections, (which imply in “them *nothing of action*, and consequently have no dependence upon the *will* of the *agent*,) such as eternity, “omnipresence, omniscience, or the like.”

Here, if one may presume to understand such obscure reasoning, God the Son is proved to be *no precarious being*, because the acts of God’s *justice*, *goodness*, &c. are *certain* in their *effects*: which they undoubtedly are, whether God pleases to *annihilate* or to bring into existence. Therefore, most evidently, the Son is *no precarious being*: nor is any *creature* whatever at all *precarious* or *mutable*, by the same way of reasoning. A mighty honour done to God the Son, to make him no more *precarious* than the rest of the *creation*. Certain however it is, that, upon your principles, there is *no natural necessity* for his existing: he might either never have existed, or may even cease to exist, (as much as may be said of any *creature*,) if it should please God so to order it. This is the proper and full notion of a *precarious being*, a being having no *necessary* foundation of existence, but *depending* entirely upon the *free-will* and *choice* of another being. All the subtillies imaginable can never bring you off here, any more than they can bring together both ends of a contradiction.

Our readers may now see plainly what you have been doing. You set out with general and ambiguous words of the Father’s being *alone* supreme in “authority, do-“minion, &c.” But, at length, you can make nothing of it, without interpreting this *supremacy* by the perfection of *self-existence*, and *self-existence* by *necessary existence*; thereby depressing God the Son into *precarious* existence. Now indeed you have made the Father *sole* Governor very effectually: for who will ever be so mad as to dispute, whether a *precarious being*, a *creature*, be *subject* to his Creator? But let us return to the Query,


and consider whether those eminent characteristics, specified in the texts cited, are such as at all suit with a finite, dependent, precarious, created being.

You pretend (p. 225.) that “no distinguishing character of the one supreme God is ascribed to the Son in Scripture.” But let the reader see the texts which ascribe *omniscience*, knowledge of the *heart*, *eternity*, to the Son; *attributes* by Scripture *appropriated* to the one true God: besides some *titles*, appearing in these texts, applied to Christ, and appropriate likewise to the *one God*. As to two or three other characters, which you mention as appropriate to the *one God*, and which are not applied (as you pretend) to the Son; see my Sermons^k, and what I have said above: I do not love to fill my paper with repetition as often as you do yours. You come next to lessen the *characters* given to God the Son. He is “Searcher of the heart;” but as “received of the Father:” which the text says not one word of. Only, four verses lower, it is said, that he received “power over the nations,” of the Father; which is very wide of our present purpose. You have some pretences to elude the force of the title “First and Last;” which see answered in my Sermons^l. As to “mighty God,” you pretend the Father is so *absolutely*, the Son with limitation; and here you refer to the Son’s being (*μεγάλης βουλῆς ἄγγελος*) *angel of his great council*; which is not according to the Hebrew, and so is of no account while I am arguing from *Scripture*, not from the *Fathers*. The Father is “Lord of all,” you say, “absolutely:” and so is the Son, for any thing that appears; though the Father “put all things under him.” Let it be shown that the Father has any natural *subjects*, which are not equally *subjects* of the Son too. There is therefore no ground for your imaginary *limitations* in respect of the powers and perfections ascribed to the Son.

You add, (p. 228.) that nothing can be “communi-

^k S. p. 168.

^l Ibid. p. 139, 140.



“cated to the one supreme God.” The force of this lies only in the terms. The *first* Person may eternally communicate to the *second*, and both be *one God*. “He can have nothing,” you say, “of himself:” well; if he has it but *in himself*, and *of the Father*, it suffices. The question is not *whence* he has his perfections, but *what* he has. It is remarkable, you say, that the “throne, kingdom, &c. is never ascribed to Christ upon account of his part “in the work of creation,” p. 230. And what if it is not? The Father is recommended to us principally as *Creator*, the Son as *Redeemer*, to keep up a more distinct notion of their *Persons* and *offices*. What a stress do you lay upon common things taught in our *Catechism*! Besides, I had obviated this cavil in my Defence^m. It is remarkable again, you say, “that the descriptions of the “Word, in the Old Testament, always represent him as “the *Angel* or *Messenger*.” You should only have said *generally*: and there is good reason why; because by that *critterion* chiefly, we know that it was *God the Son*, not *God the Father*. He is at the same time represented also as *God*, and as *Lord*, *Jehovah*, &c. What use you can make of this *remarkable* thing has been shown. I pass over your speculations on Dan. vii. 13, 14. as carrying no argument in them. You go on in speaking of *Christ’s receiving* dominion; which relates only to the *economy* or *dispensation*: according to which God the Father will *receive* a kingdom at the last day, and enlarge his *dominion* over his subjects. As to Phil. ii. 6. I refer to my fifth Sermon; where I had obviated your pretences before you made them. You insist upon your construction of ἀλλὰ: which if admitted, yet you can never ascertain your whole construction, (as I showed in my Sermonⁿ,) but the words will still naturally bear a meaning opposite to yours. However, as to your criticisms about the use of ἀλλὰ in that place, they appear to me of no manner of force. The sense is exceeding clear and unbarressed,

^m Defence, vol. i. p. 194, 195.

ⁿ Sermon v. vol. ii. p. 99.

running thus : “ Who, being in the form of God, thought “ it not robbery to be equal with God :” (see how great, how divine a Person he was :) “ yet, notwithstanding, “ he humbled himself,° &c.” You pretend that the words, “ thought it not robbery,” would be the *example* proposed. No; but they are part of the *preface* to it, to make the example the more forcible and the more endearing: so that I may return you the compliment of *inattention*.

In my Sermons, you tell me, “ I most absurdly inter-pret God’s highly exalting Christ, in the same sense as “ men in their prayers highly exalt God.” No; but if you had not had a strong propensity to misrepresentation, you would have said in the same sense as men in *preaching*, or the like, exalt God by *proclaiming* and *publishing* his praises. And now where is there any the least appearance of absurdity, after taking out the idea of *praying*; which you improperly threw in, to abuse the reader, and to give some colour to your accusation? I always suspect a *magisterial* censure to have no weight at the bottom: it is to make up in the *manner* what it wants in the *substance*. Show me one instance in the Scripture and *Apocrypha* together, of your sense of *ὑπερυψώω*, and I will give you above thirty of mine. Indeed, I know but of a single place where it can bear such a sense as you are contending for; which is Psalm xxxvii. 35. And yet there it may as well bear mine. Please to tell me why *ὑπερυψώω* may not as well be so used as *δοξάζω*, and why one should be thought more *absurd* than the other, and I will stand corrected. I showed you that I was not singular in interpreting *ὑπερυψώω*, by *δοξάζω*, in that place. The context favoured it, the words would well bear it;

° Clemens understands it in the same way as I do. “Ὅς ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων, ἐχ’ ἀρεταγὰς ἠγάπησεν τὸ εἶναι Ἰσα Θεῷ· ἐκίνωσεν δὲ ἑαυτὸν ὁ φιλοκτερίμων Θεός, εἰς τὴν ἄδραν πον γλιχόμενος. *Clem. Alex.* p. 8. Ox.

That Clemens here interprets the place as I do, appears from his changing ἀλλὰ into δὲ, from his making a pause after Ἰσα Θεῷ, and from his choosing a new subject of his proposition, ὁ φιλοκτερίμων Θεός, instead of δὲ preceding.

and an ancient Greek writer, under the name of Dionysius, as well as a Latin writer, under the name of Ambrose, were beforehand with me in it. And what if your own favourite Eusebius^P should be found to chime in with both? I love not to be positive where I may be mistaken: but it appears to me extremely probable, from Eusebius's manner of speaking of it, that his sense of *ὑπερυψώω* was the same with mine: and the rather, because Origen (of whom Eusebius was a great admirer) would never have admitted *ὑπερυψώω* in your sense of the word, understanding it of Christ in his highest capacity; as Eusebius plainly does. Nor do I think that Eusebius ever had so low an opinion of *God the Son*, as to think him capable of being *exalted* in any other sense but that of being *glorified*, or having his glory manifested. It is observable, that Eusebius does not interpret the text of *constituting* our Saviour *Lord, King, and God*; but recognizing, or manifesting him as such: and it is certain that Eusebius resolves all the Son's real and essential greatness into his *Sonship*^Q, and not into any subsequent exaltation. It was as *Son of God* that he acknowledged him *Lord, and Saviour, and King, and God*: wherein Eusebius's theology, however you may boast of him, very far exceeds yours. You charge me with interpreting *ἐχαρίσατο* most absurdly. I suppose, if you had had any *reason* to assign, you would have obliged us with it. I see no *absurdity* in interpreting *giving a name* to be *giving a name*; which is all I have done. But it is very *absurd* of you to imagine that God may not *glorify* his Son, as well as his Son may *glorify* him; by spreading and extolling his name over the whole creation.

^P Ὁ δοξάζων αὐτὸν, ὁ ὑπερυψῶν, ὁ ἀναδίδους βασιλία τῶν ὅλων—ὃν ἔγω δοξάζοντα τὸν ἑαυτοῦ Πατέρα, ἀμοιβαίως ἀντιδοξάζων ὁ Πατήρ, ἔ Κύριον, ἔ Σωτῆρα, καὶ Θεὸν τῶν ὅλων, ἔ σύνδρονον τῆς ἑαυτοῦ βασιλείας ἀνιδίξῃ. *Euseb. contr. Marcell.* p. 70. Conf. Josh. iii. 7. ἄρχομαι ὑψῶσαι σὺ κατανώπιον πάντων.

^Q Καθὸ δὲ μόνος αὐτὸς, ὁ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεννηθεὶς τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐν μετῆϊ ὑπέσχετο τῷ Θεῷ τῷ ἀοράτῳ, ἔ πρωτότοκος ἀπάσης κτίσεως διὰ ἔ τιμῆν, ἔ σίβειν, ἔ προσκυτῆν μόνον αὐτὸν οἶα Κύριον, ἔ Σωτῆρα, ἔ Θεὸν ἑαυτοῦ μιμαθήκαμεν. *Euseb. contr. Marcell.* p. 69.

You go on to Heb. i. 2. "Whom he hath appointed heir of all things;" by which you intend, I suppose, to prove that he was not *Lord* before: though in the very same verse it is said, "by whom also he made the worlds." Might not this show you that the Apostle is only speaking of that peculiar and *special* right founded in the merits of Christ's *redemption*; by which he became, in a more *special* sense, *Lord* of all he had redeemed; just as God the Father became, in a more *special* sense than before, *Lord* of the Jews, upon his choosing them as his *peculium*, or upon his delivering them from Egyptian slavery. What you are here endeavouring, it is hard to devise; unless you are coming directly into the Socinian scheme; for which only, your present discourse is calculated. You observe, "Then it was that God said, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee." What then? Was he not the *begotten Son* long before? If he was, then you are proving nothing more than that the Son's glory was *manifested* in time; which is certainly true both of the *Father* and *Son*: if you mean otherwise, you run directly into *Socinianism*; as I before hinted. You add, "Then it was, that God commanded, Let all the angels of God worship him." And why did you not add, that *then it was*, that "he laid the foundation of the earth," and *then it was*, that the "heavens were the works of his hands?" Do you imagine that St. Paul, in that chapter, had no other design, but to describe the manifestations of Christ's glory subsequent to his incarnation? You find, that he was the *Lord*, who in the "beginning laid the foundations of the earth:" which is a stronger character than all the rest put together; and may convince you that he was *Lord* long before his incarnation, as John i. 1. declares him *God* before the *creation*. To your pretences about the Son's "receiving power, glory, &c." I had answered, with many of the Fathers, that he received in *capacity* of *man*, what in another *capacity* he had before ever enjoyed. This is not the *only* good answer to the difficulty pro-

posed: I have myself made use of another, which may as effectually serve to take off the imaginary force of your argument. But let us hear what you have to say to it. You “no where find this distinction in Scripture.” What! Do not you find that he was *God*, and that he was also *man*? When you have found this, you have found the *distinction*. But you “no where find in Scripture any “thing given to Christ, or any thing ascribed to him, “but what is applied to his whole Person.” We say, whatever is applied, is applied to his *whole Person*; but considered *secundum quid*, or in a certain *capacity*, not in every respect which goes in to make up the Person. And can you pretend to deny this? Let us see what you are like to make of it. Jesus *increased* in stature: Will you say, that the *Word* (for that you certainly allow to be constitutive of the *Person*) grew *taller* and *larger*, because this is applied to the *Person*? He *sweat*, as it were, *great drops of blood*: Was the *Δόγος* in a sweat? He *died*, and was *buried*, and he *lay in the ground*: according to you, the *whole Person*, the *Δόγος*, it seems, as well as the *body*, suffered all this; for you know of nothing that was ever applied to *part of the Person*, but to the *whole Person*. When you consider this matter again, learn to form your argument with a little more judgment: for you seem not, at present, to know how to oppose us in the best method, nor how to give your cause the advantage it is really capable of. You should not have found fault with us for applying any thing to a *compound person*, in such respect or capacity only as is suitable thereto; for this is the commonest thing imaginable, and is done every day, as often as we say Peter or John is fat, lean, low, tall, well, sick, or the like: but you should have laid your argument against our taking so much in as we do into the Person of Christ, (the *Δόγος*, the *soul* and the *body*,) and then you might have shown some degree of acuteness. But it is not my business to point out to you the properest way of defending your *heresy*,

which is every way indefensible : it may suffice, if I reply to such things as you have to produce.

You say, “ judgment *was not given* to part of him “ which is the Son of man ; but to him, because he is the “ Son of man.” There is nothing at all in your argument : for, suppose a *wound* or a *plaister* to be given to Peter, that is, to the *whole Person* ; yet, I suppose, it may be understood with respect to one *part* only of him, viz. his *body*. But I have allowed you that the authority of executing judgment was *economically* devolved upon Christ (considered in both capacities) as the properest Person for it ; being *equal* to the charge as *God*, and over and above peculiarly fitted for it as being also *man* ; and so a more suitable judge of *man*^r. The reason then why, out of three *divine Persons*, Christ is peculiarly appointed to the office of *judging* us, is because he had to his *divinity* superinduced the *humanity*, and thereby familiarized himself the more to us. You see then, that your ingenious argument about *parts*, however it might affect another *hypothesis*, (though it can really hurt none,) does not at all concern my account of that matter.

As to the place of *Hermas*, which I produced in my Defence, I refer the reader to Bishop Bull and Dr. Grabe. All you have to object, is the expression of *corpus*, by which you understand a *human body* ; I, the whole *human nature*, consisting of *body* and *soul*. Nothing more common in writers than to express the whole man by *flesh*, or *body*^s ; and by the latter especially, when considered as a *servant* : so that your construction is at least very *precarious* ; and is what neither the *expression* itself, nor what goes along with it, gives any reasonable ground for. But I leave that matter to be considered by the

^r Pater Verbum suum visibile effecit omni fieri carni, incarnatum et ipsum, ut in omnibus manifestus fieret rex eorum. Etenim ea quæ judicantur oportebat videre judicem, et scire hunc a quo judicantur. *Iren.* lib. iii. cap. 9. p. 184.

^s See Suicer's Thesaurus in *σάρξ* and *σῶμα*.

learned; there being some difficulties as to the text of *Hermas*, not yet fully adjusted by the manuscripts.

You are insinuating the same thing of Novatian which you had before of *Hermas*; as if he imagined the *Word* to have assumed *flesh* only, without a *soul*: which, if true, we would give you up Novatian for a very silly man, and withal a heretic. The point of Christ's having a *human soul* was a thing so settled in Novatian's time, and long before; so universally maintained from the very beginning of Christianity, by all the Fathers, without exception; that had Novatian taught otherwise, he could not have passed for a *schismatic* only. You may see what Socrates^t says to that point, who was himself of the Novatian sect, and his testimony therefore the more material; as disciples seldom vary in any thing very considerable from their leaders. He declares, that *all the ancients* (sure he did not exclude the head of his own party) believed that Christ had a *human soul*, and asserted it as a *doctrine universally received*. He mentions Irenæus, Clemens, Apollinaris of Hierapolis, Serapion Bishop of Antioch, the Synod that met about the case of Beryllus, Origen, Pamphilus and Eusebius: and it is evident still from their own works, of as many as have left us any. To those he has named, may be added Clemens Romanus^u, Justin Martyr^x, Melito^y, Hippolytus^z, Tertullian^a, and perhaps several more which may have escaped my notice. Now, what will Novatian's single testimony signify against such a cloud of witnesses? But the more *universal* the doctrine was, the less probable is it that Novatian should dissent from it. And indeed you have no foundation for any such suspicion of him, more than what lies in the use of the word *caro*, *flesh*; which is a

^t Socrates Eccl. H. lib. iii. cap. 7. p. 178.

^u Clem. Rom. Epist. cap. 49. p. 169. Cant.

^x Apol. ii. cap. 10. p. 26.

^y Melito apud Cav. Hist. Lit. tom. ii. p. 33.

^z Hippolytus contr. Noët. cap. 17. p. 18.

^a Tertullian contr. Prax. cap. 16, 30. de Carn. Christi, cap. 10.

very common expression for *man* (body and soul) in *Scripture* itself, as well as in ecclesiastical writers. Besides that Novatian interprets Christ's being *made flesh*, by his assuming of *man*, *hunc hominem*, ^b *this man*: which is a name he would scarce have given to mere *body* or *flesh*; well knowing that man is made up both of *body* and *soul*. Your pretence about *Son of God* and *Son of man* being *two Persons*, (upon my scheme,) hinted only, without any reason to support it, may be passed over. The clearing of that matter will require a large discussion of the true notion and definition of a *person*; which you have not attempted: I, perhaps, may, in a proper place. What you add farther is of more weight, that I seem to *suppose* that the "glory which Christ had before the world was, "is the very same with that authority and power of "judgment" (so you express it) "wherewith he was invested after his resurrection." But that *authority* and *power of judging*, as you call it, is what our *Lord* had before his *resurrection*, as himself declares, John v. 28, &c. And what I *suppose*, is this; that all the *powers*, *glories*, *honours*, given to the *Son*, were nothing but so many declarations, indications, or manifestations of the *dignity* and *divinity* of his *Person*: which *dignity* and *divinity* had been celebrated in *heaven* before, and were now to be *recognized* after his *incarnation* and *humiliation*: so that in the main, this was no more than receiving the same *honours* he before had, and returning, as it were, to the same *state of glory*; only now clothed with *humanity*, which before he was not.

You have something farther to observe of *Hermas*, in respect of *coheir*. How can *the divine nature*, say you, be *heir* of any thing? But I hope a *Son* may, without offence, be said to be *heir* to all his *Father's glories*, in allusion to what passes among men, though the similitude may not answer in every circumstance. It is a

^b Caro fit, et habitat in nobis, hoc est, assumit hunc hominem, &c. *Novat.* cap. 16.

lively and elegant way of conveying to us a notion of *divine* things; and is to be understood, like many passages of Scripture, θεοπροπῶς, though spoken ἀνθρωποπαθῶς,

You conclude with a passage of Irenæus, which I have cited in my Sermons^c; whither, to save myself trouble, I refer the reader; who may there also find a sufficient explication of it. What you infer from it is, that the “Word received an additional power and glory upon his “resurrection.” *Power* is an ambiguous word: but he received an *additional manifestation* of his glory; as God the Father also did at the very same time, as well as often before. And he became *Lord* and *Proprietor* of mankind, under a more peculiar title and stricter alliance: just as God the Father, when he had by his many deliverances, favours, and blessings, made the people of the Jews more peculiarly his *own*, became their *Lord* in a strict and special sense. Thus both Father and Son will (we hope) receive daily additions of external *honour*, and increase of *dominion*, by the coming in of Jews, Turks, Pagans, and Infidels. God’s full *kingdom* is not yet come; we pray for it: and if the Father himself be not yet completely *King*, in the fullest sense, what wonder is it, if we hear of our *Lord’s* receiving a *kingdom*, or *dominion*, in time. External *relations* may accrue to any of the divine Persons, such as *dominion*, &c. But your great misfortune is, that you can no where find *divinity* accruing to God the Son, (except it be by *eternal generation*;) you can no where find, that he was ever constituted *God*^d, (as

^c Sermons, vol. ii. p. 104, 105.

^d Novatian is the only ancient writer I have observed to say any thing like it; in the words

Universe creaturæ et Dominus et Deus constitutus esse reperitur. *Nov.* cap. 15.

Yet his constant way, at other times, is to resolve the Son’s divinity into his *Sonship*:

Deum credendum esse qui ex Deo sit. cap. 11. Deus quia Dei Filius comprobatur. cap. 16. Hoc ipsum tamen a Patre proprio consecutus, ut omnium et Deus esset, et Dominus esset, et Deus ad formam Dei Patris ex ipso ge-

he might be *Lord*;) or that he became, by any new accession, more truly or more fully *God* than he was ever before. This consideration at once shows the weakness of your *hypothesis*, (as I hinted above,) and is alone sufficient to unravel all your fallacies.

QUERY VII.

Texts applied

To the one God.

Thou, even thou only, knowest the hearts of all the children of men, 1 Kings viii. 39.

I the Lord search the hearts, I try the reins, Jer. xvii. 10.

I am the first, and I am the last; and beside me there is no God, Isa. xliv. 6.

I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, Rev. i. 8.

King of kings, and Lord of lords, 1 Tim. vi. 15.

The mighty God, Is. x. 21.

Lord over all, Rom. x. 12.

To the Son.

He knew all men, &c. John ii. 24. Thou knowest all things, John xvi. 30. Which knowest the hearts of all men, Acts i. 24.

I am he that searcheth the reins and the heart, Rev. ii. 3.

I am the first, and I am the last, Rev. i. 17.

I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, Rev. xxii. 13.

Lord of lords, and King of kings, Rev. xvii. 14. xix. 16.

The mighty God, Is. ix. 6.

He is Lord of all, Acts x. 36. Over all, God blessed, &c. Rom. ix. 5.*

nitus atque prolatus. cap. 17. Deus, sed qua Filius Dei natus ex Deo. cap. 18. Deus ergo processit ex Deo, dum qui processit Sermo, Deus est qui processit ex Deo. cap. 22. Unum potest dici, dum ex ipso est, et dum Filius ejus est, et dum ex ipso nascitur, dum ex ipso processisse reperitur, per quod et Deus est. cap. 23. Quoniam ex Deo est, merito Deus; quia Dei Filius dictus sit. cap. 26. Personæ Christi convenit ut et Deus sit, quia Dei Filius. cap. 26. Est ergo *Deus*, sed in hoc ipsum genitus ut esset Deus. cap. 31.

These passages considered, it is manifest that Novatian, in the former place cited, either used the word *constitutus* improperly, for *positus*, that is, *declaratus*: (see chap. xii.) or else, which appears to me most probable, that arguing there against the heretics, who would not allow Christ to be more than *man*, he was content at first to bring them so far, at least, as to admit Christ to be *God* in a higher sense than Moses, and go by *degrees*, to bring them up to Catholic principles.

* N. B. These texts should have been inserted in Query vi.

Whether the Father's omniscience and eternity are not one and the same with the Son's, being alike described, and in the same phrases?

HERE you answer, that *underived* and *derived* are not *the same*. To which I answer, that wisdom of wisdom is *one wisdom*, omniscience of omniscience *one omniscience*; just as substance of substance is *one substance*, Light of Light *one Light*, and God of God *one God*; because of the *inseparable* Unity of the Persons, and their mutually including and containing each other. As to the degree of *sameness*, I before intimated that it is inexplicable; and is no more to be accounted for than your supposing the *same wisdom*, &c. to reside in innumerable infinitely distant parts of the same substance. This controversy (whatever you imagine) is not to be decided by *metaphysics*, but by *Scripture* and *antiquity*; where we may find some footing, which we cannot in the other.

Your next answer therefore is more sober, could it but be proved to be just. You deny that the Son's *omniscience* and *eternity* are alike described, and in the same phrase. It lies then upon you to show the *difference*; as I have shown the *resemblance*. It is not necessary that every phrase which is used of the Father be also used of the Son. I singled out some of the strongest, fullest, and most expressive; showing that they are applied to both: and if they were not the *strongest*, yet if they are such as Scripture has declared *peculiar* to the *one God*, my argument is just, and it would have become you first to answer it, and then to call it a *quibble*.

You interpreted the texts which concern the Son's *omniscience* of a *relative omniscience*: upon which I blamed you for speaking of a *relative omniscience*, instead of saying plainly, that the Son was *not omniscient*; that so we might have come directly to the question. Here, by a peculiar kind of turn, proper to yourself, you tell me how ill I treat *Scripture*. Why so? Are you so perfectly

wrapped up in *Scripture*, that the justest rebuke imaginable cannot reach you, but through the sides of the *Scripture*? “Our Lord,” you say, “told his Apostles, that the “Holy Ghost should teach them all things, and guide “them into all truth: might he not better have said,” (so you go on,) “that he should not teach them all things, “and not guide them into all truth?” Now, at length, it is out: and thus I have mal-treated Scripture. Was there ever a wilder inference? You should have considered, that there was no question raised about the Apostles and their *omniscience*: if there had, I doubt not but our Lord would have readily said, what was true, that the Apostles were *not omniscient*. He would not have disguised his sentiments, nor have deceived his hearers with *ambiguous* terms, when they wanted to be resolved in an important matter, and honestly desired to have the truth fairly examined and scanned. And therefore your asking, “Had he not better have said,” and repeating it again and again, is mere trifling; unless you can show that our *Lord* or the *sacred writers* had been called upon (in such manner and in such circumstances as Dr. Clarke and you have been) to *declare* what they meant, and to let truth have a *fair trial*. But by this round about way you would insinuate, I presume, (for still you are shifting, and do not care to speak out,) that the texts speaking of the *Son’s omniscience* are of no force, because something of like kind has been said of the *Apostles*, whom all allow not to be *omniscient*. To this I answer, 1. That the expressions relating to our Saviour are much stronger than the other: such as *knowing all men*, *knowing the hearts of all men*, *searching the reins and the heart*: a kind of knowledge peculiar to God alone. 2. Considering that our Lord was *Son of God*, and likewise *God*, such expressions would very probably be taken in their most obvious and literal sense: and therefore they should not have been applied to him, (without guard and caution,) unless really so intended, as the words appear to declare. As to the Apostles being no

more than men, there could be no danger in a few general expressions of their *knowing all things*, being *taught all things*, or the like: since nobody could mistake the meaning of the words when so applied.

Your next attempt is to make some advantage of Matt. xxiv. 36. and Mark xiii. 32. relating to Christ's not knowing the day of judgment; of which I have fully and distinctly treated elsewhere^f: where I have also added other strong and clear proofs of Christ's *omniscience*; which you take no notice of, though you quote the Sermons. You like not my ascribing the *ignorance* to the *human nature*: you ask whether "any nature can with any sense be said to know or do any thing?" Yes, why not? You charge me (p. 238.) with *inconsistency*, for interpreting the text of the *human nature*, and yet saying that Irenæus, upon that text, is to be understood of the *Λόγος*. As if both might not be true, that Irenæus understood the text of the *Λόγος*, while I think it better to understand it of the *human nature*: I am weary of such trifling. You proceed to show that Irenæus, in his Comment on these texts, ascribed *ignorance* to God the Son. You take not the least notice of the several weighty and substantial reasons given by Bishop Bull^g, and referred to by *sæ*^h, against your opinion from other places of Irenæus's works. It is not your way to be at all solicitous about making any writer consistent with himself. If you can but meet with a passage seemingly favouring your opinion, it must be presently forced into your sense, however contradictory to the author's *known* principles elsewhere. I must desire the reader to consider well what I have said upon this passage in my Defence; and not to take it from your representation, which is extremely partial. And he may also compare M. Massuet's account of the same passage in his Previous Dissertationsⁱ to his

^f Sermon vii. vol. ii. p. 162, &c.

^g Bull. D. F. N. p. 82. Animadv. in G. Cler. p. 1056.

^h Defence, vol. i. p. 73.

ⁱ Massuet. Præv. Diss. in Iren. p. 133.

edition of Irenæus. I shall here content myself with transcribing so much of Irenæus as may be sufficient to clear his meaning, and to take off that confusion which you have been industriously throwing upon it, either in translating or commenting. The literal rendering is thus, much the same as I before gave in my Defence.

“ If one inquires into the reason why the Father, though communicating in *all things* to the Son, is yet set forth by our Lord as alone knowing that day and hour; he cannot, at present, find any fitter, or more decent, or indeed any other safe answer than this, (seeing our Lord is the only teacher of truth,) that we are to learn of him that the Father is *above all*; for the Father, saith he, is *greater than I*. And therefore the Father is declared by our Lord to have the preference in knowledge, to the end that we also, while we live in this world, may refer the perfection of knowledge, and such intricate questions to God ^k.”

Now, that Irenæus's design was not to represent the Son as *ignorant*, but quite the contrary, may appear from this very passage duly considered. For the question, with him, was not why the Father is more knowing, but why, since both are *equally knowing*, our Saviour made such a declaration as gave the preference to the Father as *alone* knowing. He puts the question, why the Father though communicating in *all things* (absolutely, not in all *other things*) is yet *set forth*, or *alone declared, to know*. So that the question is not about his *knowledge*, but about our Lord's *declaration*, why, or on what account, he made it, seemingly contrary to *truth*; since all things are

^k Si quis exquirat causam propter quam in omnibus Pater communicans Filio, solus scire et horam et diem a Domino manifestatus est, neque aptabilem magis, neque decentiorem, nec sine periculo alteram quam hanc inveniat in presenti; (quoniam enim solus verax Magister est Dominus) ut discamus per ipsum, super omnia esse Patrem. Etenim Pater ait, *major me est*. Et secundum agnitionem itaque præpositus esse Pater annuntiatus est a Domino nostro, ad hoc, ut et nos, in quantum in figura hujus mundi sumus, perfectam scientiam et tales quæstiones concedamus Deo. *Iren.* lib. ii. c. 28. p. 158, 159.

common to Father and Son. What then could be meant by such a *declaration*? It must be *true* some way or other, our Lord being a *teacher of truth*; what then is the case? Irenæus tells us, that it is *true* in respect of the Father's having the *preeminence* in every thing, and so *alone* knowing every thing in the *first place*, or *primarily*: and therefore it was upon this account that our Lord gave him the preference, and referred that knowledge to him *solely*, as the *sole* fountain of it; which it well became him to do, especially during the state of his humiliation, while *in figura mundi, conversing below*: though at the same time the Son also has the same knowledge, but *derived*, all things being *communicated* to the Son, as Irenæus had observed. Basil's and Nazianzen's accounts of this matter will clear it up farther, and will fix Irenæus's real meaning beyond all reasonable exception.

Basil, in answer to the doubt about our Lord's not knowing that day, says, he will give the solution which from a child had been taught him by the Fathers before him: and which he represents in these words: "As to what is said, *no one knows that day*, we understand it as ascribing to the Father the *primary* knowledge both of things present and things to come; and as signifying to us that he is in all things the *primary cause*¹. Nazianzen chooses rather to refer Christ's not knowing *that day* to his *humanity*; yet he mentions also this other construction of Christ's not *knowing* it *originally*, or in that high manner, as the Father may be said to know it. His words are to this effect. If the first construction be not sufficient, we may give this for a second: "As every thing else, so also the knowledge of the greatest things is to be referred up to the *cause* itself, for the honour of the *Father*^m."

¹ Τὸ, οὐδείς οἶδε, τὴν πρώτῃν εἶδῃσιν τῶν δι' ἑαυτῶν καὶ τῶν ἰσομήκων ἐπὶ τὸν Πατέρα ἀνάγοντος. Καὶ διὰ πάντων τὴν πρώτῃν αἰτίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὑποδικνύσας εἰρησθαι νομίζομεν. Basil. Ep. 391. p. 1168.

^m "Ὡσπερ τῶν ἄλλων ἰκαστον, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ γνώσις τῶν μεγίστων ἐπὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀναφερέσθω τιμῇ τοῦ γυνήτορος. Greg. Naz. Orat. 36. p. 588.

Every one may see that Irenæus's construction falls in with this of Nazianzen and Basil; who perhaps might both borrow it from him: nor is it possible from Irenæus's words to prove that he meant any thing more. Nay, the words themselves most easily and naturally resolve into this sense, as I had abundantly before proved from the *context*, and from Irenæus's main scope and design in the whole.

You call it *pleasant* for me to add, *consequently in all knowledge*, where Irenæus says, that the "Father communicates in all things to the Son." But is it not more *pleasant* of you to understand by *all things*, all *other* things, which Irenæus does not say, nor does his argument require it, but the contrary?

I took notice of Dr. Clarke's slipping over some words *through inadvertency*: which words he has since added in his *second edition*. And here, to show your inclination to find any little fault, you blame me for taking no notice of the *amendment*. Indeed the thing was very slight, scarce worth remembering. Yet in two later editions of my book, which you might have seen, I was so just to the Doctor as to leave my former words out. And now, I think, you ought to have inquired before you took this needless handle for complaint. As to *manifestatus*, which you construe *expressly declared*, I, *set forth, represented, or said*, (which you weakly call "deceiving the reader,") it is not very material which be taken, provided only the question were why, or in what sense, our Saviour *declared* it; not, why the *Father only knew the day*. Which question Irenæus resolves in saying, *Præpositus esse Pater annuntiatus est*. It was in this sense he declared him to be *alone knowing*, as declaring him *præpositum, set before, preferred* to the Son in knowledge, on account of his being *alone first* in every thing. So that the sum of all is, that Irenæus does not suppose the Father *more knowing*, but knowing every thing in the highest manner; as having it *primarily*, and *from none*; which was also the sense of Basil and Nazianzen. But enough of this. You go

on to Origen; whom I had cited, after Irenæus, Ignatius, and Clemens of Alexandria, to confute your round assertion, that *all* the Ante-Nicene writers believed the *Λόγος* to have been *ignorant*, &c. when you could not prove it of so much as *one*. Irenæus may now stand; as also Ignatius and Clemens. As to Origen, you have nothing to object against what I cited him for, namely, that the Son knows as much as the Father, or *all that the Father knows*; which is *omniscience* in the highest and fullest sense, not your *relative* omniscience, no where found among the ancients. But you oppose another passage of the same comment, saying, that the Father is *greater* than the *truth*, that is, than the *Son*: which nobody doubts: *greater* as Father, which is all that Origen means. And what is that to the purpose? Your other quotation out of Jerome (then a vehement Anti-Origenist, and straining every thing to the worst sense) is of very slight moment. Let the reader consult Bishop Bullⁿ in defence of Origen against Jerome's invectives; for I have no inclination to repeat: or let him turn to Origen's Treatise against Celsus, where Origen directly contradicts that very doctrine which you, upon Jerome's authority, endeavour to ascribe to him; he asserts, that the Son knows the Father *κατ' ἀξίαν*, *suitably to his dignity* °.

From the slender opposition which, after long deliberation, you have been able to make against the Son's *omniscience*, it ought now to pass as a thing concluded and determined, being fully supported by *Scripture* and by all *antiquity*. For besides the *particular* testimonies before mentioned, I gave you also a *general* argument, to prove that the Son's *omniscience* must have been a ruled case, a settled point with the Ante-Nicene Church: to which argument you make not a word of reply. Only you single out an expression of mine, relating to Sabellianism, which you think is not just, and which you call "abusing the reader;" though you have not yet been

ⁿ Ball. Def. F. Nic. p. 121.

° Origen. contr. Cels. p. 287.

able to produce any one instance where I have done it. I have discovered many in you, and shall many more as I pass on. What you blame me for, is, for supposing that the Greek word *hypostasis* signified *person*, during the time of the Sabellian controversy. I do assert that it did, and could very easily prove it: but Bishop Bull has already done it to my hands P. And it is something hard, that as often as you forget yourself, or happen to be *ignorant* of what every scholar should know, I must be charged with *abusing* my reader. As to the Sabellian notion of *μία ὑπόστασις τριπρόσωπος*, I have before shown how it is to be understood: and that Eusebius himself so understood it is plain to every man that can read him. But I suppose, the *secret* reason of all this was for the sake of a translation of yours, “one single individual substance under three personal distinctions:” which though *literal*, is a very *false* translation, as *substance* and *personal distinctions* are now understood: and therefore this was meanly applying to the *populace*. The true sense of the words, as we should now express it, is, *one person under three nominal distinctions*: which is manifestly what Eusebius meant by it; as may appear from the account I have given of him above (p. 177.) Your referring me to Dr. Cudworth is pretty extraordinary; when it is well known that that great man was mistaken, and that his account of that matter (espoused also by Curcellæus) has been at large confuted by Bishop Stillingfleet^q; not to mention what has been done also by Dr. Wall^r, and others, since that time.

The truth is, had Dr. Cudworth but distinguished between *substance of substance*, (which supposes no *division*, but *one substance*;) and saying *substances*, or *essences*, which implies *division*, his account had been, in the main, very just: for the Fathers knew nothing of a Trinity of

^p Bull. D. F. sect. ii. c. 9. p. 103, &c.

^q Stillingfleet on the Trinity, p. 76. to p. 100.

^r Wall's Hist. of Infant Baptism, p. 337. to p. 354. True Scripture Doctrine continued, p. 239. to 252.

modes, such as seems to have been taught by some of the later Schoolmen. But I pass on.

The *eternity* of God the Son comes next under consideration. You tell me, it "is not alike described" with the Father's, because the Father's is *unoriginate* and *underived*: but where do you find *unoriginate* or *underived* at all mentioned in the texts wherein the Father's eternity is described? You may collect it perhaps by inference: but still the Scripture phrases for the *eternity*, whether of Father or Son, are the same: neither does the distinction of *derived* and *underived* signify any thing as to the sense of *eternity*, which imports neither more nor less than *beginningless* and *endless* duration. You next endeavour to find some difference in the manner wherein the texts are applied to each Person. As to the phrase *first* and *last*, it has been vindicated already. As to Rev. i. 8. which you understand of the Father, it is to be interpreted (with all antiquity) of God the Son^s. I know how much it concerns you to contend for the application of this text to God the Father; and therefore it is that you plead so strenuously for it towards the latter end of Query xvii. It will be of some service to settle that text here; and therefore I shall stop awhile to consider the strength of your reinforcement. In my Sermons,

1. I pleaded from the context.
2. From antiquity.
3. I showed the weakness of the Doctor's reasons for applying the text to the Father.

As to the *context*, you make no reply at all; though it is certainly of very great moment, for the ascertaining the construction. As to *antiquity*, never were men more unanimous than the *ancients* were in this matter; there being no one exception, on record, against it. And though you may make slight of Post-Nicene writers, (Athanasius, Ruffinus, Gregory Nazianzen, Phœbadius, Ambrose, Epiphanius, Jerome, Austin, Andreas Cæsa-

* See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 136, &c. Defence, vol. i. p. 319, &c.

riensis,) yet their concurring voices in the case are really very considerable; and amount to a probable proof, at least, of the universal sense of the Ante-Nicene Church; especially where nothing can be brought to confront it. I observe, it is pretty frequent with you, upon the citing of Eusebius singly, immediately to cry out the *ancient Church*, even in points wherein Eusebius stands alone, or runs counter to the ancients. I have certainly a much better right to claim the verdict of the *ancient Church*, upon the strength of so many evidences, (and few of them either much later or less considerable than Eusebius,) in a matter which the ancients have no where contradicted. But I appealed also to two Ante-Nicene writers, (Hippolytus and Tertullian, to say nothing now of Origen,) and I observed farther, that their testimonies in the case were not to be looked upon merely as the private judgment of two writers, but as showing that the Praxeans and Noëtians had all along taken it for granted, that the Church applied Rev. i. 8. to God the Son; and that Hippolytus and Tertullian, however pressed in dispute, presumed not to question it. A proof of this kind amounts to more than many testimonies of *single Fathers*, in relation to their own interpretation of a text. As to Hippolytus, you call him (p. 509.) as usual, a “spurious” or interpolated” author; your pretences for which have been answered. But we have Epiphanius^t here stepping in to confirm the same thing, viz. that Noëtus urged that text, as applied to God the Son, against the Catholics: and he answers as Hippolytus had done, by admitting the text to be understood of Christ; borrowing his answer (as will be plain by comparing) from this very piece of Hippolytus, which you call *spurious* or *interpolated*. It is therefore manifest, that the part we are now concerned in is no *interpolation*.

As to Tertullian, you say, “He does not suppose this “text to be spoken of the Son,” (p. 508.) What, does he

^t Epiphan. vol. i. p. 488.

not? Surely you never looked carefully into Tertullian. He observes of the Praxeans^u, (just as Hippolytus does of Noëtus,) that they had cited and urged this text against the Catholics; applying it to God the Son: and Tertullian, in his answer, admits that application. Wherefore it is a clear case, that the Ante-Nicene Church universally understood this text of the *Son*, and not of the *Father*; which I am now proving. What you throw in to lessen the sense of *πατροπαράτρως*, when applied to the Son, I pass over here, as not affecting our present question. Origen I insist not upon, because of the doubtful credit of his translator. Yet, considering that the text was certainly so applied before Origen's time, and constantly after, it is more than probable that that part at least is Origen's own. However, I want not his testimony, having abundant proof of what I assert, without him.

Since therefore the *context*, and all *antiquity*, pleads on my side for understanding that text of God the Son, I must have strong reasons for the other *application*, before I admit it. Dr. Clarke's principal reason, drawn from verse the fourth of that chapter, I answered at large in my Sermons^x. It is no more than this; that the title, "which is, and which was, and which is to come," is given to the Father, ver. 4. therefore the same title, ver. 8. must belong to him also: as if the *same title* were not often in Scripture, and in the Apocalypse too, given to both. I instanced in the title of *Alpha* and *Omega*, &c. being applied by St. John, sometimes to the *Father*, and at other times to the Son. All you have to say by way of reply,

^u Interim, hic mihi promotum sit responsum adversus id quod et de Apocalypsi Joannis proferunt: *Ego Dominus qui est, et qui fuit, et venit omnipotens*; et sicubi alibi Dei omnipotentis appellationem non putant Filio convenire. Quasi qui venturus est, non sit omnipotens, cum et Filius omnipotentis tam omnipotens sit quam Deus Dei Filius. *Tertull. contr. Prax. c. 17.*

N. B. The Praxeans could not imagine that any such high title could belong to the *Son*, unless the Son was the very Father himself: which therefore they concluded him to be from this and the like texts.

^x Sermons, vol. ii. p. 137.

is, that the title of *Alpha* and *Omega* is indisputably given to the Son in other places; whereas this other is never given to the Son any where else but here; where it is *disputable* whether it be given him or no. To which I answer, that there is very little force in this argument, provided we have other good reasons for understanding the text of God the Son in this one place; as we certainly have both from the *context* and from *antiquity*: and there is still the less force, if *Scripture*, and even St. John himself, has elsewhere applied, if not this very title, yet *equivalent* titles to God the Son; which he undoubtedly has. For brevity sake, I refer only to St. John's application of Isa. ix. 6, 9. to God the Son[†], "Holy, holy, holy Lord *God of hosts*:" which St. John expresses (Rev. iv. 8.) by Κύριος ὁ Θεός, ὁ παντοκράτωρ, much the same with what we have Rev. i. 8.

There is therefore no force in your reasoning against the application of Rev. i. 8. to the Son.

The Doctor's other reason drawn from the *ancients*, as generally applying the title ὁ παντοκράτωρ to the Father, is ridiculous; when we have plain positive proof that they understand this very text of God the Son. Whatever use may be made of the general observation, (as there cannot much[‡]) it does not affect the question about the application of this text to the Son.

Having sufficiently vindicated our application of Rev. i. 8. I may proceed, and make my proper use of it, as occasion may require. I may now venture, by your allowance, to call God the Son *supreme over all*; which is your own rendering of ὁ παντοκράτωρ. And let us not presume to deal partially and unequally between the Father and the Son, in this important question. We may now return to the point of the Son's *eternity*.

I observed, in my Defence[‡], that by eluding the proof of the Son's eternity, you had scarce left yourself any for

[†] See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 18.

^{*} Ibid. p. 138.

[‡] Defence, vol. i. p. 81, &c.

the eternity of God the *Father*: or if you had, I desired you to show in what manner you could (consistent with your principles) prove the *eternity* of the Father. You make a doubt whether I intended it for *sober reasoning* or *banter*. You do well to put the matter off with as good a grace as you can: but I was very serious in it; that you had come very near defeating every proof that could be thought on in the case; if you had not entirely done so. And indeed, I am still of opinion, that, through your imprudent zeal against the divinity of God the Son, you have really betrayed the clearest and best cause in the world to the first bold Marcionite, or Manichee, that shall deny the *eternal Godhead* both of Father and Son, and assert some *unknown God* above them both. You will remember, the question was, whether that *particular Person*, called the Father, be the eternal God, or how you could prove it upon your principles. His being called *God* ever so often would amount to nothing; that being no more than a word of *office*. His being *Creator* was nothing, that you could *elude*. His being *Jehovah* was of no weight, meaning no more than a person true and faithful to his promises. As to his *eternity*, none of the texts were strong enough for it, but might bear a limited sense. I may now add, that the title of *παντοκράτωρ*, *Almighty*, or *God over all*, or the strongest words of like kind in the Old Testament, signify nothing; being capable of a *subordinate* sense. Well then; what have you at length reserved, to prove so momentous an article? Only this: that he is *the Father, or first Cause, of whom are all things*. But *first Cause* is no where said, that is your own. All that is said is, "To us there is one God " the Father, of whom are all things," 1 Cor. viii. 6. And you know how to elude the force of the word *all things*, when you are disputing against God the Son: so that creating *all things* may mean no more than creating *some things*; as Christ's knowing *all things*, according to you, means *some things* only. The utmost therefore of what you have proved is no more than that he is *Crea-*

tor; and being *Creator*, you had told me long ago, did not imply *eternity*, nor an *infinite* subject^b. You have not then been able to prove, that the particular Person, called the Father, is the *first Cause* of all things; or that there is not *another God* above him; who is really, and truly, and in the *metaphysical* sense, the *eternal God*. You may proceed as you think proper, to make up the apparent deficiency of your pretended demonstration. By loosening the proof of Christ's *divinity*, you have loosened every proof of the *divinity* of God the Father also; which perhaps you was not aware of. For my part, I shall always think, that his being so often called *God*, and *true God*, and his being *Creator*, and *Almighty*, and *Jehovah*, and *he that is, and was, and is to come*, are clear incontestable proofs that he is the one *necessarily existing* God, whose *existence* my reason assures me of: and when I am got thus far, I will prove, by the same topics, that God the Son is so likewise: and thus the same artillery shall serve both against Manichees and Arians; while you, by pleading the cause of one, have insensibly given up a greater cause to the other.

I must however do you the justice to observe, that since your first writing, you seem to be drawing off, with the Doctor, from some of your former principles. You do not now make the word *God* to be *always* a word of *office*: nay, you assert it to be very "improper to say, "that the supreme God has an office," (p. 220.) which makes a great alteration in your scheme, and is jumping from one *extreme* to another; overlooking, as usual, the truth, which lies in the midway. I do not know, whether you can yet prove that particular Person, called God the *Father*, to be the one eternal God. You suppose the word *God*, when applied to him, to denote his *Person*; and you suppose that *Person* to be the one eternal *God*. But *supposing* is one thing, and *proving* another: and I do not see how you have proved it, or ever can prove it;

^b See my Defence, vol. i. p. 83.

unless you allow the title of *God* to carry the notion of *necessary existence* in it, allowing the same also of *Jehovah*. Then indeed you may prove your point as to the *divinity* of God the Father: and as soon as you have done it, by the same arguments we will also prove the *divinity* of God the Son. So choose you whether to take in *both*, or give up *both*: for I see no remedy but that the *divinity* of *Father* and *Son* must stand or fall together.

To proceed: you pretend now, that “you was not arguing against the eternity of the Son, but showing the weakness of my arguments to prove his independent eternity.” You shall have the liberty of recanting and growing wiser, whenever you please. But the truth of the fact is, that you were then arguing against the *eternity* of the Son, in these words quoted in my Defence, vol. i. p. 84. “This office and character (of a Redeemer) relative to us, presupposes not, nor is at all more perfect for, the eternal past duration of his being.” It was the *eternity*, you see, not *independent* eternity, against which you were disputing. I asked, how you came to take for granted what you knew nothing of; viz. that any power less than *infinite* might be equal to the work of redemption. And what do you say to this? My argument is, if you cannot show that it did not require *infinite* power, you cannot show that it did not require an *eternal* agent. You say, that “an office commencing in time, does not require an eternal duration of him that executes.” Right: every *office* does not: but we are speaking of an *office* which may (for aught you know) require *infinite*, and therefore *eternal* powers, because nothing *infinite* can be *in time*. You say, “Infinity of powers is not a consequence of eternal duration.” Suppose it be not, (which you know nothing of again,) yet my argument is *vice versa*, that *eternal* duration is a consequence of *infinity of powers*; which you did not attend to. At length you are forced to give up the point; not being hardy enough to pronounce that the work of redemption did not require *infinite powers*.

But you attempt to prove it another way. A “me-

“diator,” you say, “cannot be himself the one supreme “God.” You should have said, (for it is all that you can prove,) that a *mediator* cannot be the same person whom he mediates to. And this is what Eusebius shows in the passage produced by you; which was very needlessly brought to prove what every man’s common sense teaches. The whole force of Eusebius’s reasoning lies only in this, that the two persons could not be *one person*: or if he meant any thing more, (which I am not sensible he did,) his arguing is low and trifling. I had pleaded, that by your reasoning, you had entirely frustrated the argument drawn from the acts of creation, to prove the *divinity* of God the Father: for the *office* of creating commenced *in time*. You are pleased to allow my consequence, (however scandalous it may appear upon you,) and to tell me, that the “perfections of God “the Father appear not barely and immediately from the “act of creating, *but* from the consideration of the nature “of a first Cause.” I am glad to find you begin to be reconciled to that *metaphysical* word, *nature*, which you will hardly allow us to use. But I must tell you farther, that by weakening and destroying so many clear and undeniable proofs of the Father’s *divinity*, you have not left yourself enough to prove him to be the *first Cause*. This perhaps you was not aware of, being entirely bent upon destroying the Son’s *divinity*; and taking it for granted, that the *Father’s* would be admitted without proof. It is a dark business: but disputants will sometimes overshoot. Dr. Clarke, I believe, began to be sensible of his error in this respect, as having undermined every *Scripture proof* of the *necessary existence* of God the Father. By an after-thought, in the *second* edition of *Scripture Doctrine*^c, he was pleased to allow, that the Father’s *self-existence* and *independent eternity* were taught in Rev. i. 8.

I am very glad he pitched upon that text, because we

^c Clarke’s *Script. Doctr.* p. 264. ed. 2d.

can easily vindicate it to *God the Son*: and so we shall have an *express* proof of the *necessary existence* of the *Son*; and leave you, with shame, to make out the *Father's*, by some other as express texts, or by *consequence* only. I have before hinted, that 1 Cor. viii. 6. will do you no service *directly*, or by itself; because *all things* may mean *some things*, and *God to us*, may not mean absolutely *the God of the universe*. But if the *Son's necessary existence* be once admitted, according to Rev. i. 8. the *consequence* will be clear and certain for the *necessary existence* of the *Father* also. Thus, as you had once lost the proof of the *Father's divinity*, by denying the *Son's*; so, by asserting the latter, you may again recover the former, and then all will be right.

QUERY VIII.

Whether eternity does not imply necessary existence of the Son; which is inconsistent with the Doctor's scheme? and whether the Doctor hath not made an elusive equivocating answer to the objection; since the Son may be a necessary emanation from the Father, by the will and power of the Father, without any contradiction? Will it be one thing, and arbitrary will another.

WE have many important matters to debate under this present Query, which will require the reader's most careful attention.

You begin with telling me, that *eternal generation* does not imply *necessary existence*, nay, that it is *contradictory* to it. Let us hear your reason. "Generation is an act, and all actions spring from the will only; and an act of the will (that is, free choice) cannot be necessary," p. 251. Your argument is undoubtedly just, according to your own *novel* sense of the word *act*. But it is ridiculous to imagine, that giving *new* names to *old* truths can ever alter their *nature*. Either argue against generation being an *act* in the *old* sense of *act*, or confess your trifling, in bringing the whole to a dispute about *words*

and *names* only. In the *old* sense of *act*, generation is an *act*; in your *novel* sense of *act* it is not: and where are you now, but where you at first set out?

You tell me, after the *Modest Pleader*, (to whom I briefly replied in a *Preface*,) “that I have not been able “to produce one single passage out of any one Ante-Nicene writer” (you should have added *Post-Nicene* too, it being equally true of all the *Fathers*) “wherein the Son “is affirmed to have *emanated*, or been *emitted*, from the “Father, *by necessity of nature*.”

Will you please to show me, where either *Scripture* or *Fathers* (*Post-Nicene* or *Ante-Nicene*) ever said, that God the Father existed by *necessity of nature*. They have never said it; though they have, in *other terms*, asserted the same thing, which we now mean by *necessity of nature*: and this may also be the case as to the *necessary* generation of the Son: and it certainly is so. To clear this momentous point I shall here show,

1. Why neither *Father* nor *Son* were ever said, by the ancients, to exist by *necessity of nature*, but the contrary.

2. I shall show that the *ancients*, notwithstanding, believed the very same thing which we now differently express; namely, the *necessary existence* of God the Son, as well as of God the Father.

3. I shall inquire in what sense, or by whom, *necessary generation* or *emanation* was held, and in what words they expressed it: where I shall also account for the Son's being said to be generated by the *will* of the Father.

1. I am to begin with observing, why neither Father nor Son were ever said, by the *ancients*, to exist by *necessity of nature*, but the contrary. None of the *ancients* durst have said, that God exists by *necessity*, because it would have been the same as to say, that he was compelled by a superior force, and against his will, (such was their sense of the word *necessity*,) to exist. The Greek ἀνάγκη had been much used among philosophers in this

hard sense. Some had made νοῦς and ἀνάγκη^d, *mind* and *necessity*, the two *causes*, or *sources* of all things. Some made *necessity* alone the first and highest *cause*^e. Plato meant the same as ὕλη, or first matter, by *necessity*^f, following therein Timæus Locrus. Some made *necessity* the *mother of the fates*, and the *first* among the deities^g. Many made their gods all subject to *necessity*; as is particularly true of the Stoics. I forbear to cite passages which might be given in great numbers. Such being the use of the word *necessity*, no wonder, if the *Fathers* forbore saying, that God existed by *necessity*, or if they even denied it.

Plotinus, a famous Platonist, of the third century, denies that God exists ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης^h, *by necessity*, being no other than what he would choose to be.

Lactantius hints at the same thoughtⁱ. And upon the same principles, the *Fathers* were always very careful to remove every thing of *necessity*^k from God; and would

^d Vid. Timæum Locrum de Anim. Mund. p. 543. Amst.

^e Vid. Phurnutum de Natura Deorum, p. 19. alias 155.

^f Vid. Platonis Timæum. Chalcid. in Timæum, p. 377. ed. Fabric.

^g Vid. Proclum. Theolog. Platon. p. 405, 406. Pausan. lib. ii. p. 93. Theophr. de Provid. Dei Serm. vi. p. 562, 563.

^h Μῆτι ἂν ἑαυτῇ τι μίμνησθαι ὡς ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης τοῦτο ἂν, ὃ ἴσται τοῦτο, τὸ αὐτὸς ἵπαι ἴσται αὐτὸς αἰὶ ἠδίλησι καὶ θίλι. Plotin. Enn. vi. p. 748.

ⁱ Ex seipso est, ut in primo diximus libro, et ideo talis est qualem se esse voluit. Lact. Inst. lib. ii. c. 8. p. 161.

^k Τίς ἔστιν ἀνάγκη ἐπιβαλὼν αὐτῇ; εἰ δὲ ἄσπονδον ἴσται λόγους ἐπὶ Θεοῦ ἀνάγκη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φύσει ἀγαθὸς ἴσται. Athanasius, 611.

Bonus Pater, non aut ex voluntate est, aut necessitate, sed super utrumque, hoc est, natura. Ambros. de Fid. lib. iv. c. 9. p. 540.

Non ex voluntate, nec ex necessitate, quia Deo nulla manet necessitas. Supra voluntatem et necessitatem est id quod est Deitas. Vigil. Taps. de Trin. lib. x. p. 273. Conf. Toletan. Concil. xi.

Φύσει γὰρ ἂν ἀγαθὸς ἔστις, καὶ φύσει δημιουργός, καὶ φύσει Θεός, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτά ἴσται· τίς γὰρ ἔστιν ἀνάγκη ἐπάγων. Damasc. de Fid. Orth. lib. iii. p. 228.

Εἰ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὴν τὸ φυσικὸν πάντως καὶ ἠναγκασμίνον· φύσει δὲ ὁ Θεός, Θεός, φύσει ἀγαθός, φύσει δημιουργός· ἀνάγκη ἴσται ὁ Θεός, Θεός, καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ δημιουργός· ἴσται καὶ ἰσοῖν, μῆτι γὰρ λόγους ἐσχάτης ἴσται βλασφημίας· Τίς γὰρ ἔστιν ἀνάγκη ἐπάγων; Maxim. Disp. cum Pyrrh. tom. ii. p. 163. Combesis.

Ὁ τῶν ὄλων Θεός οὐ κατὰ φύσιν ἅγιος, δικαίος, ἀγαθός, ζωὴ, φῶς, σοφία, καὶ δύ-

never say that he existed, or was God, by *necessity*. Damascen well expresses the thoughts of them all in these words.

“ God being by *nature* good, and by *nature* endued “ with creative powers, and by *nature* God, is not any of “ these by *necessity*: for, who has laid any *necessity* upon “ him?” I render δημιουργός, *endued with creative powers*, that being the sense of it; though otherwise, literally, it is *Creator*.

As low then as Damascen, who lived in the eighth century, we have no instance, that I know of, of the use of *necessary existence*, or of *necessity of nature* in the *modern* sense. They that would seek for it, must look among the later *Schoolmen*, and not among the *Fathers* of the Church. When it first came in is no great matter, nor worth my search: so I leave it to those who have leisure. But I must complain of it as a great instance of *unfairness*, after I had given you the hint of this in the *Preface* to my Sermons¹, (which you have read,) for you to bring up this pretence again, that the Ante-Nicene writers did not allow the Son to exist, or to be generated by *necessity of nature*. Which pretence amounts to no more than a poor quibble upon an expression: and you might have used the very same argument against the *necessary existence* even of God the Father. The ancient writers, I conceive, for eight centuries (I know not how much lower) would have denied, or did deny, that God was God by *necessity*: well therefore might they deny, or never assert, that the Son was generated by *necessity*. Yet they asserted the very same things which we do, in respect of *Father* or *Son*, under *other* terms; as I come next to show.

2. The ancients believed and taught the *necessary existence* of God the Son; expressing it in such manner and in such phrases as were suitable to their own times. The

ναμεις; ἀρ' οὐν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀβουλῆτος καὶ ὡς ἕξ ἀνάγκης ἰστίς, ἄ ἰστιν. *Cyrril. Alex. ad Anathem.* 3. *contr. Theodor.* p. 213.

¹ Vol. II.

most usual way of expressing what we call *necessary existence*, was by saying, that any thing was this or that, φύσει or κατὰ φύσιν, *by nature*: another pretty common way was by ὁ ὢν, τὸ ὄν, ὄντως ὢν, and the like, *existing emphatically*. Several other ways of expressing the same thing will occur as I go along, in tracing the sense of the Fathers upon this head, the *necessary existence* of God the Son.

A. D. 116. IGNATIUS.

I begin with Ignatius, one of St. John's disciples, whose words are these: "There is one physician, both fleshly and spiritual, *made and unmade*, though in flesh *God*, in death true life, both of *Mary* and of *God*; first *passible*, then *impassible*, Jesus Christ our Lord^m." The word which I here lay the stress on, in proof of the Son's *necessary existence*, is ἀγέννητος, *not made*: a word but seldom, if ever, used, in this manner, to signify any thing less. Thus Athanasiusⁿ, and Pope Gelasius^o, long ago, understood this place of Ignatius: you pretend (p. 295.) that the reading is ἀγέννητος, *unbegotten*, and that it is "plainly set in opposition only to human generation." But this which is so *plain* to you, is by no means plain to any man else: the contrary is rather so from many considerations. You must mean, I suppose, that he was *unbegotten*, as having no *human father*, born of a *virgin*. Against which construction there lie these several reasons. 1. That no other Catholic writer ever styled Christ ἀγέννητος on this account. 2. That Ignatius is plainly speaking of two several natures in the same person of Christ, as appears by the *antitheses* all along. Call it the *flesh* only, if you please, (though he meant by *flesh* human nature entire,) yet you see the opposition carried on quite

^m Εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἰστίῃ, σάρκιός τε καὶ πνευματικὸς, γεννῆτός τε καὶ ἀγέννητος, ἰν σαρκὶ γινόμενος Θεός, ἰν θανάτῳ ζῶν ἀληθινῶ, καὶ ἰν Μαρίας καὶ ἰν Θεοῦ, πρῶτον παθητός τε καὶ τότε ἀπαθῆς, Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ Κύριος ἡμῶν. *Ign. Ep. ad Ephes.* c. vii. p. 14. Ox.

ⁿ Athanas. de Synod. Arim. p. 761.

^o Gelasius de duabus Naturis, p. 690. Bas. ed.

through, *flesh and spirit, flesh and God, death and true life, one of Mary, the other of God, one passible, the other impassible*: so that the plain sense is, that one was *made*, the other *unmade*: unless you will say, that as the *flesh* was *begotten*, the *Λόγος*, the *God* was *unbegotten*: which can bear but two senses, one of which will not suit with your principles, nor the other with *Catholic* principles. You will not say, that the *Λόγος* was *unbegotten* of the Father, nor would Ignatius, that Christ, as *God*, was not *begotten of Mary*. It being a *Catholic* maxim, that *Mary* was *θεοτόκος*: that is, the doctrine was always held, though differently expressed; and it is the express doctrine of Ignatius^p himself. Since then Ignatius was undoubtedly speaking of what Christ was in two distinct *natures*; or *capacities*, to one of which *γενητός* is applied, and *ἀγέννητος* to the other; you may readily perceive, that your construction of him is entirely wide and foreign.

3. I shall add, thirdly, that I have some reason to doubt whether there was any such word as *ἀγέννητος* so early as the time of Ignatius. This will lead me into a long but useful inquiry; useful upon many other accounts besides the present. You are of opinion, that the ancient Christian writers, wherever they style God *ἀγέννητος*, meant the same as *ἀγέννητος, unbegotten*, p. 294. My opinion is, that it was late before they styled him *ἀγέννητος* at all^q; and that when they styled him *ἀγέννητος*, they never meant precisely *unbegotten*, but either *unmade*, or *underived* absolutely. We must trace this point up to the old philosophers. Thales is the first of them: and he uses the word *ἀγέννητος*^r, to signify either *unmade* or *eternal*.

^p Χριστοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, τοῦ γενομένου ἐν ὑστερῶ ἐν σπέρματι Δαβὶδ καὶ Ἀδελφῶν. *Ignat. ad Rom.* c. vii. p. 40.

^q Patri novum innascibilitatis nomen ecclesia imposuit. Cum enim Sabelliana hæresis *genitum* ex virgine Patrem voluisset asserere, *ingenitum* contra. Hanc confitendo ecclesia tradidit Patrem, et utique in divinis Scripturis *ingenitum* nunquam legimus Patrem. *Vigil. Taps. Disp. Not.* 21.

^r Πρωτότατος τῶν ὄντων Θεός ἀγέννητος γὰρ. *Diog. Laert.* lib. i. p. 21.

Τί τὸ θεῖον; τὸ μᾶτι ἀρχὴν ἔχει, μᾶτι τελειήν. *Thales apud Diog. Laert.* p. 22.

Parmenides^s, about a hundred years after, uses the word *ἀγένητον*, as is plain from the metre; and not in the sense of *unbegotten*, because he supposes the same thing to be *μονογενές*, *begotten*.

Clemens understands the passage of *God*: but Eusebius and Theodorit more rightly of the *world*: though perhaps both may be consistent, as some have imagined *God* and the *world* to be the same, and proceeding from a *chaos*. But I incline to understand it rather of the *world* distinct from *God*, as the *only begotten of God*; *μονογενής* being a title given to the *world* by Timæus Locrust^t, and Plato^u, who are imitated by Philo^x.

Here then *ἀγένητος* can only signify *unmade, eternal, or necessarily existing*.

Ocellus Lucanus^y uses it to express *beginningless* and *endless* existence: or what we should call *necessary existence*; always and unvariably the same.

Timæus Locrus applies it to *ideas* and to *duration*: where he seems to mean no more than *eternity* and *immutability*^z. I read the word with single *ν* in both places; there being no reason for making it double. There is a passage of Timæus^a, cited by Clemens, where the copies have *ἀγένητος*. Sylburgius had observed it should be *ἀγένητος* rather. But I believe the true reading is *ἀγέναιτος*, to answer the dialect. I suppose Timæus must

^s Πολλὰ μᾶλλον ὡς ἀγένητον ἰὸν καὶ ἀνώλιθρον ἴσται,

Οὐλον, μονογενὴς τε, καὶ ἀτρεμὶς, ἢ δ' ἀγένητον. *Apud Clem. Alex.* p. 716. Euseb. Præp. Ev. p. 43. Theod. tom. iv. p. 504, 528.

^t Timæus Locrus, p. 4. Gale. alias p. 545. *Amst.*

^u Plato Tim. c. 16, p. 239. Fabric. Vid. Orig. contr. Cels. p. 308.

^x Philo, p. 244, 298, 876.

^y Τὸ πᾶν ἀνώλιθρον καὶ ἀγένητον ἀεὶ τε γὰρ ἦν καὶ ἔσται. *Ocell. Lucan.* p. 8. Gale. al. 506.

^z Ἀγένητος καὶ ἀφθαρτος ὁ κόσμος ἄναρχος καὶ ἀτελιύτητος. *Id.* p. 16, 28.

^a De idea, τὸ μὴν ἀγέναιτόν τε καὶ ἀκίνατον, καὶ μῖνον τε. *Tim. Locr.* p. 2. ἀγινάτω χρόνῳ ἐν αἰῶνα ποταγορούμεν, p. 10.

^b Μία ἀρχὴ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀγένητος (leg. ἀγίνατος) εἰ γὰρ ἰγίνιστο, ἢ κ' ἀν-ἦν ἔτι ἀρχὴ, ἀλλ' ἰκίνα ἔξ ἧς ἡ ἀρχὴ ἰγίνιστο. *Clem. Alex.* p. 718. Plato in his Phædrus applies this reasoning to the soul. Phædr. p. 344. Vid. Cicer. Tusc. i. p. 45.

have meant *νοῦς*, by his *μία ἀρχή*, one of his two *principles*: *ἀνάγκη* was the other. And I must note, that *ἀγένετος* here seems to be used in the sense of *underived* absolutely.

We may now descend to Plato, about 360 years before Christ. It is frequent with him to use the word *ἀγένετος* to express *eternal, immutable* existence, that is, *necessary existence*. And though he derived his *νῆς* and *ψυχή*, *mind* and *soul*, from the *τὸ ἀγαθόν*, yet he supposed them *ἀγένετα*, *necessarily existing*; as Athanasius^b hath observed: and the like is observed of him by Eusebius^c. Dr. Clarke tells us, in his *Demonstration of the Being, &c.* that, according to many of Plato's followers, the world was supposed to be "an eternal voluntary emanation from the "all-wise and supreme Cause^d." But I know not whether the Doctor will be able to prove this of them, in his present sense of *voluntary*. Plotinus, who is one of his authorities, makes God's *will* to be the same with God's *essence*: and he derives the very being of God from his *will*, that is, from himself^e. You seem therefore to be under a great mistake when you tell me, (p. 254.) that the Platonists expressly affirmed the world to be *eternal*, and by the *will* of God, and *not by necessity*: as if *will* in their sense (because it is in *yours*) must needs be opposed to *necessity*, in your sense also of *necessity*; when neither their sense of *will* nor of *necessity* was the same with yours^f.

^b "Ὅτι λέγουσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νοῦν, καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ ψυχὴν, καί τινι γινώσκοντες τὸ ἐξ ἑν εἶναι, οὐκ ἐφοβήθησαν ἡμῶς καὶ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν ἀγένετα. Athanas. de Decret. S. N. p. 234.

^c Νουτὰς ἑσίας——ἀγένετος εἶναι φάσκον αὐτὰς ἄσπερ καὶ πάσαν ψυχὴν εἶματα ἐξ ἀπορροίας τῆς τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου ευσῆσαι λέγων. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος αὐτὰς γιγνόναι δίδοναι βάλισται. Euseb. Præp. Ev. l. 13. c. 15. p. 694.

^d Dr. Clarke's *Demonstration, &c.* p. 31. 4th ed.

^e See Cudworth, p. 405.

^f Basil gives a very different account of these philosophers and their sentiments, that they supposed the world *eternal*, and not by the *will* of God.

Καὶ παρὶτί πολλοὶ τῶν φασταθίντων συναρχῶν ἐξ αἰδίου εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, οὐχὶ γιγνῆσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ συνεχάρησαν· ἀλλ' εἰσὶ ἀποσκευασμα τῆς δυάμις αὐτοῦ αὐτομάτως παρεποσῆται. Καὶ αἴτιος μὲν αὐτοῦ ἡμελογοῦσι τὸν θεόν, αἴτιος δὲ

To Plato we may subjoin Aristotle, who is known to make the world *ἀγένητος*, *necessarily existent*; which you (because you affect *singularity*) will needs call *self-existent*. But as there is certainly a different *idea* from that of *self-existent* fixed to the word *ἀγένητος*, when applied to the thing *caused*, we will, with your good leave, give the different *ideas* different names. Simplicius, quoted by Dr. Cudworth^ε, observes of Aristotle, that while he makes God the *cause* of the world, he yet supposes the world to be *ἀγένητος*, *necessarily existing*. You say, Dr. Cudworth justly charges Aristotle with making the world *self-existent*. But Dr. Cudworth was a wiser man, than to charge Aristotle with it. He observes, that neither Aristotle, nor any of the Pagan theologers, from his time, ever supposed the *world* or the inferior Gods to be *self-existent*^h; but to proceed eternally from a *cause*. You allow the same thing, (p. 294.) of the Stoicks their *ἀγένητοι θεοί*, *eternal and necessarily existing* Gods, produced from the *substance* of God. So that now we have the sense of three famous sects of philosophers, (Platonists, Aristotelians, and Stoicks,) all distinguishing between *self-existence* and *necessary existence*; and all using the word *ἀγένητος* to express the latter singly, as often as they applied it to things *produced*.

From the whole we may make this observation, which will be useful to us in our reading the Fathers, that there is nothing strange or uncommon in giving the title of *ἀγένητος* to what is supposed to have been *produced*, or *begotten*. To the ancient instances already given from profane writers, I shall add a few more of something later

ἀπροαιρέτως, ὡς τῆς σκιᾶς τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τῆς λαμπρότης τὸ ἀπαυγάζον. Basil. in *Hexaem. Hom.* 1. p. 10.

So also St. Ambrose :

Quamvis causam ejus Deum esse fateantur, causam tamen volunt non ex voluntate, et dispositione sua, sed ita ut causa umbræ corpus est. Ambros. in *Hexaem.* 1. 1. c. 5.

^ε Τὰ αἴσιον τῷ οὐρανοῦ θεῶν λίγων, ἕμως ἀγένησιν αὐτὸν ἀποδείκνυσιν. Cudworth, p. 253.

^h Ibid.

date; one is from the Hermaick books, quoted in Cyrilⁱ, where the Λόγος is styled ἀγένητος, and yet γνήσιος υἱός. More may be cited from Plotinus^k, and other Platonists; who call things ἀγένητα, *eternal* and *necessarily existing*, though proceeding from another. All the while it is observable, that ἀγένητος was sometimes used in a higher sense, when applied to what those philosophers called the *first Cause*, or *supreme God*: for it might then signify both *necessary existence* and *self-existence*, that is, *underrived* absolutely: though it might often signify no more than *necessary existence*, abstracting from the consideration of *self-existence*: which may best be judged of by observing what the word is *opposed* to. I meet not however with the word ἀγένητος to denote particularly *self-existent*: nor does it seem to have been in use so high as Philo's time. For when Philo had a mind to express how the Λόγος was *necessarily existing*, but not *self-existent*, (so I understand him,) he had no way of doing it but by saying that he was not ἀγένητος in the highest sense as God is, nor γενητός in the low sense as creatures are, but between both^l. If he had had the two words ἀγένητος and ἀγένητος, he might much more easily have expressed the thought: as many of the Christian Fathers did after. I take the word ἀγένητος to have been first brought in by the Christians, to distinguish the *Father* from the *Son*; that is, *unbegotten* from *begotten*. But

ⁱ Ὁ κόσμος ἔχει ἀρχοντα ἐκικείμενον δημιουργόν, λόγον τοῦ πάντων δεσπότου, ὃς μισ' ἐκείνου πρώτη δύναμις, ἀγένητος, &c.—"Ἐσσι δὲ τοῦ παντελείου προγόνοι, καὶ τέλειος, καὶ γόνιμος γνήσιος υἱός. *Apud Cyril. Alex. contr. Jul.* lib. i. p. 33.

^k Γενητὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶ ἀρχῆν ἔχουσ' ἀγένητα δὲ ὅτι μὴ χροῖον τὴν ἀρχῆν ἔχουσ', ἀλλὰ αἰ παρ' ἄλλου ὄντα αἰσί. *Plotin. Enn.* ii. lib. 4. p. 161, 162.

Αἱ τῶν θεῶν οὐσίαι οὐδὲ γίνονται· τὰ γὰρ αἰ ὄντα οὐδίσποτε γίνονται.—οὐδὲ τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας, ἢ ἀλλήλων χωρίζονται ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ψυχῆς αἰ πισωτῆμαι. *Sallust. de Mund.* c. ii. p. 245.

Αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν κόσμον ἀφθαρτόν τε καὶ ἀγένητον εἶναι ἀνάγκη—εἰ γὰρ μὴ φθίσιται, οὐδὲ γίγνεται.—καὶ ὅτι ἀνάγκη διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀγαθότητα ὄντος τοῦ κόσμου αἰ τὴν θεὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, καὶ τὸν κόσμον ὑπάρχειν, ὥσπερ ἡλίω μὲν, καὶ πυρὶ συνοφίσταται φῶς, σώματι δὲ σκία. *Ibid.* c. vii. p. 256.

^l Ὅτι ἀγένητος ὡς θεὸς ἂν, οὔτε γενητός ὡς ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μίσις τῶν ἀκρω, ἀμφότεροις ὁμηρίων. *Philo*, p. 509.

when, or by what degrees it came into use, is not easy to determine. Hardly so early as Ignatius; or if it had, he would not have applied it to God the *Son* in any sense: wherefore it is highly improbable that ἀγέννητος should be the word in the place cited. But ἀγέννητος was a common word, and very applicable; and the more likely to be applied by him to God the *Son*, whom he also styles, as the *Word*, ἄιδιος^m, of like signification with ἀγέννητος, and frequently joined with it in ancient writersⁿ. I have nothing farther to add, but that the Arian interpolator well understood the force of ἀγέννητος in that place of Ignatius; and therefore craftily enough altered the passage, applying it to the *Father* only; suitably to Arian principles, which allow not either ἀγέννητος or ἀγέννητος to be applied to God the *Son*.

I should take notice, that Theodoret lays it to the charge of Saturnilus, that he asserted our Saviour to be not only ἀγέννητος, but also ἀγέννητος^o, therein contradicting himself, since he owns him to have a *Father*. But it is difficult to know whether Theodoret drew this from Saturnilus's own expressions, or only expressed what he took to be Saturnilus's sense in his own words. If the former were certain, we should have a proof of ἀγέννητος being used about Ignatius's time, though among heretics only: but that I leave to be considered. I incline to think, that even when the *Father* was spoken of, the word was still ἀγέννητος, but understood sometimes in the highest sense, signifying *self-existence*; as we see in the Sybilline verses P. Athanasius's observation may hold true, that the ἐν τῷ ἀγέννητον did not signify the *one unbegot-*

^m "Ὁς ἴσταν αὐτοῦ λόγος ἄιδιος, οὐκ ἀπὸ σιγῆς ἀποιδῶν. *Ignat. ad Magnes.* p. 23. *N. B.* Ἄιδιος here looks backwards, and is to be understood *a parte ante*, as the Schools speak. Compare what Irenæus says; *Ubi est sige non erit Logos; et ubi Logos non utique est sige.* *Iren.* l. ii. c. 12. p. 129.

ⁿ Τί οὖν ἴσταν τὸ ἄιδιον καὶ ἀγέννητον, καὶ ἀφθαρτον; ἢ χρόνος οὐδὲς μεταβολὴν ἰσάγει. *Plutarch. de ἰ in Delphis Script.*

^o Theod. Hæret. Fab. 194.

P Εἰς θεὸς θεὸς μόνος ἴσταν ὑπερμεγίστης ἀγέννητος. *Theoph. Antioch.* p. 181.

Ἀπόστολικῆς, ἀγέννητος, ἅπαντα κρεατῶν διαπαντός. *Ibid.*

ten, but the one *underived*⁹, when applied to the Father; carrying in it both *necessary existence* and *self-existence*: though it was often expressive of the former only, being understood in opposition to *precarious existence*, and nothing else: and so the Son might be included in the ἐν τῷ ἀγένητον. I have made no account of any Latin translations of the Greek ἀγένητος, because nothing is more uncertain. The translator of Irenæus is various, and often translates by *innatus* or *ingenitus*, where it is plain the word should be *infectus*. Tertullian sometimes translates the one word ἀγένητος, by two together, *innatus et infectus*; which confirms me that the word was ἀγένητος, and that, for want of a proper word for *underived*, he chose to express it by two. Yet Tertullian has also the word *innatus* for *unbegotten* alone; applying it to the Father in contradistinction to the Son. But I shall weary the reader. He that would see more of the use of ἀγένητος may consult the authors in the margin^r. The benefit of what hath been hinted will appear as I go on.

A. D. 145. JUSTIN MARTYR.

I am next to show, that Justin Martyr also taught the *necessary existence* of God the Son. His doctrine is, that the Son is ὁ ὦν, the *I AM*; a phrase expressing, according to Justin, and all other the best critics, proper *emphatical existence*; the same which we now call *necessary existence*. As to the proof of the fact, that Justin really styles God the Son ὁ ὦν, and in his own proper Person, I have given it in my Defence^s; and am now only to take off your exceptions to the evidence. You have very little of moment to reply; which is the reason, I suppose, that you appear so fretted all the way under this Query, and

⁹ Οὐκ ἀγνοοῦμεν δὲ ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἰερνοῦντες ἐν τῷ ἀγένητον τὸν πατέρα λίγοντες, οὐκ ὡς γινητοῦ καὶ ποιήματος ὄντος τοῦ λόγου οὕτως ἔγραψαν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μὴ ἔχου τὸν αἰτιον, καὶ μᾶλλον αὐτὸς πατὴρ μίς ἵσται τῆς σοφίας, &c. *Athanas.* vol. i. p. 761. Bened.

^r Suiceri Thesaur. Petavius de Trin. lib. v. c. 1, 2. Cudworth, p. 253, 254. Montfaucon, Admon. in Athanas. de Decr. S. N. p. 207.

^s Vol. i. p. 27, 108, 109.

betray a very indecent warmth in your expressions. You have only your old pretence, (which is worth nothing,) that, according to Justin, Christ was *Messenger*, or *Minister* to the Father: and so he was according to me too, in my Defence, and now; and yet he is $\delta \omega\nu$ together with the Father; and he will be, maugre all the endeavours of *passionate* men to the contrary.

I insisted farther in my Defence^t, that the very reason given why the Father is God, $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$, (not $\delta \Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$,) is because he is $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\tau\omicron\varsigma$, *necessarily existing*.

Now since Justin every where expressly styles the Son $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$, and says that he is $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$, *God*, he must of consequence believe the Son to be *necessarily existing*. Here you are in a passion; telling me, (p. 296.) that it “is exactly as ridiculous as if a man should argue that since, according to St. Paul, God’s being the *Father*, of whom *are all things*, is declared to be *the reason* of his being *the one God*; therefore if the Son be not the Father, he is not God at all.” But have a little patience, and you will see the clearer. Had St. Paul said, that the *reason* of the Father’s being *God*, is because he is the *Father of whom*, &c. it would be manifest, that, according to St. Paul, no one could be *God* that was not also the *Father of whom*, &c. But as St. Paul has said no such thing, the case is not parallel. Nor is the Father’s being the *Father of whom*, &c. the *reason* or *foundation* of his being *the one God*, but only a reason why he principally is styled the *one God*: so that you have yet said nothing to take off the force of my argument relating to Justin. You are extremely angry at my construing $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\tau\omicron\varsigma$ in Justin, *eternal, uncreated, immutable, not unbegotten, or self-existent*; and you say, (p. 292.) “that I have not the least ground *for it*, from any ancient writer whatsoever.” Who would not imagine you were perfectly acquainted with every *ancient writer*, to talk of

^t Vol. i. p. 109, 110.

them so familiarly? I have shown you from *many ancient writers*, that ἀγέννητος has been commonly applied to things *begotten* or *proceeding*; where it could not signify *unbegotten*. I would farther hint to you, which perhaps may surprise you, that you cannot prove that ever Justin Martyr used the word ἀγέννητος with double ν, or that he knew of any such word. That he uses ἀγέννητος is certain; sometimes meaning by it *undervived* absolutely^u; sometimes *necessarily existing*^x. One thing I will presume to *know*, and to be certain of, that in the place by me cited, he used it in the sense of *necessarily existing*, and no other; because it is opposed to *precarious, perishable being*; as I showed in my Defence: and this was the sense that the old philosophers most commonly used it in, whether speaking of the *supreme Cause*, or their *incorruptible* Deities, as opposed to the *corruptible* creation.

You think ἀγενήτω, (for so I read it,) in his second Apology^y, must signify *unbegotten*. Far from it: it signifies no more than *eternal*, or however *necessarily existing*, in my sense of the word. His argument requires no more than this, that God should have none older than himself to have given a *name* to him; and because he had not, he had *no name*: wherefore also the Son (as Justin observes) being *coexistent* with him (συνών) from the first, and afterwards *begotten*, had *no name*, having none older than himself. Thus the connection of Justin's sense is plain and clear; and his observation just and natural. O, but you say, "Justin, in this very sentence, styles the Son "γεννώμενος, in express opposition to ἀγέννητος." But that I deny; γεννώμενος is opposed only to συνών, his *temporal* generation to his *eternal* coexistence with the Father:

^u Pag. 387, 408, 410. ed. Thirlby.

I do not meet with more places where the word must necessarily signify more. In the rest, I conceive, it must, or may signify no more than *necessary existence*.

^x Pag. 20, 37, 72, 78, 114, 128, 148, 149, 150.

^y Just. Apol. ii. p. 13. Grab. p. 114. Thirlb.

for so I interpret that passage with the learned Dr. Grabe; so entirely void of all foundation is every one of your exceptions.

To those already given I shall add one proof more of Justin's professing the *necessary existence* of God the Son. It is from a fragment only^z; but there appears no reason to suspect its being genuine. What I build my argument upon, is Justin's styling the Λόγος, *life by nature*; by which I understand *necessarily existing* life, no phrase being more commonly used to signify *necessary existence* than φύσει, or κατὰ φύσιν, by the ancients. This very phrase of *life by nature*, is so used by Cyril of Alexandria, and others^a. But what most of all confirms this sense, is Justin himself, or a venerable person whom he produces in his Dialogue with approbation, arguing against the *necessary existence* of the soul, upon this topic, that she has not *life* in herself^b, but her life is precarious, depending on the *will* of another. Now, in this *fragment*, Justin asserts, that the Λόγος is *life by nature*, and enlivening whatever is joined thereto: the very description which the Platonists^c give of the τὸ θεῖον, the *divine Being*, which *emphatically* exists. I might add farther proofs, from Justin, of the Son's *necessary existence*; the same that Bishop Bull has produced out of him for the *consubstantiality*; for whatever proves one, proves both. But these are sufficient, and I may have occasion to hint more of this matter, when I come to answer the objection made from the *temporal* generation.

^z Ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ζωὴ προσιτάλη τῷ τὴν φθορὰν δεξαμένη. Justin. Frugm. p. 406. Jeb. Grabe Spicil. vol. ii. p. 172.

^a Κατὰ φύσιν ἰστί ζωὴ καὶ ζωοποιὸς ὁ παντὸς ἐπίκεινα νοῦ. Cyril. Alex. contr. Jul. lib. vii. p. 250.

Ζωὴ κατὰ φύσιν ὁ Θεὸς, ὡς Θεὸς ἐκ Θεοῦ, καὶ ζωὴ ἐκ ζωῆς. Cyril. in 1 Joh. p. 51.

^b Ὅς λόγος ὢν, καὶ ζωὴ, καὶ φῶς, καὶ ἀλήθεια, καὶ Θεὸς, καὶ σοφία, καὶ πάντα ἴσα κατὰ φύσιν ἰστί. Greg. Nyss. contr. Eun. Or. i. p. 1.

^c Οὐ γὰρ δι' αὐτῆς ἰστί τὸ ζῆν, ὡς τῷ Θεῷ. Just. Dial. p. 23. Jeb.

^d Οὐ γὰρ ὡς μιστοὶ τοῦ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὡς παρίκτιον τῆς θείας ζωῆς, τὸ θεῖον ἀθάνατόν ἰστί. Procl. Platon. Theol. p. 65.

A. D. 177. ATHENAGORAS.

Athenagoras, our next in order, will be a powerful advocate for the *necessary existence* of God the Son. He declares him to be οὐ γενόμενος^d, *not made*; the very same phrase whereby he expresses the *necessary existence* of God the Father^e; and which comes to the same as ὁ ὦν, φύσει ὦν, ἀεὶ ὦν, all words, or phrases, expressing in Athenagoras *necessary existence*.

It is ridiculous of you to plead, in opposition to me, (p. 296.) that Athenagoras calls the Son γέννημα in the very same sentence. It is the thing that we contend for, that he may be γέννημα, and yet *necessarily existing*; nay, that he is so, because he is γέννημα^f, properly so called; every *Son* being of the *same nature* with his *Father*. And why might not Athenagoras think the Son *necessarily existing*, and *begotten* also? No *philosopher* nor *Catholic Christian* ever imagined it at all inconsistent, for the same thing to be both γεννώμενον and ἀγέννητον, as may appear, in a good measure, from the testimonies I have given above.

I have something farther to plead from Athenagoras. He intimates, that God could never be without the Λόγος^g, any more than without *reason* or *wisdom*; which is declaring his existence as *necessary* as the *Father's* existence is. See this argument of the *ancients* explained and vindicated in my *Sermons*^h: besides that Bishop Bull has so fully defended Athenagoras in particular, from the senseless charge of his supposing the Son to be no more than an *attribute* before his generation, that an ingenuous man should be ashamed to revive it, till he can make some tolerable answer to what the Bishop has said. But I have mentioned this matter once before.

^d Οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον. *Athenag.* p. 38.

^e Αὐτὸν μὲν οὐ γενόμενον, ὅτι τὸ ὄν οὐ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν. P. 21.

Τὶ τὸ ὄν αἰεὶ, γίνεσθαι τε οὐκ ἔχων ἢ τὸ τὸ γενόμενον μὲν, ὄν δὲ εὐδίαστοι. P. 67.

Οὐ φύσει ὄντων, ἀλλὰ γενόμενων. P. 68.

^f Vid. Dionys. Rom. ap. Athan. p. 232.

^g Ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς, οὗς αἰδῖος ὦν, ἔχων αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν λόγον αἰδῖος λογικὸς ὦν. *Athen.* p. 38.

^h Vol. ii. p. 146, &c.

You object, that Athenagoras speaks emphatically of the *unoriginate underived eternity of the Father*, as the one *unbegotten* and *eternal God*, and again, that the *unbegotten God* is alone eternal. Had this been really said by him, yet nobody that knows Athenagoras could ever suspect that he had intended any *opposition* to the *eternity* of God the Son, included in him; and therefore it were of no great moment to dispute this point with you. But in regard to *truth*, I think myself obliged to observe, that no proof can be given of Athenagoras's ever using the word ἀγέννητος, but ἀγένητος. It is under the conception of *necessary existence*, not as *unbegotten*, that he proposes the Father as the *true God*, in opposition to all the *perishing* and *feeble* deities of the Pagans: and while he does this, he still bears in mind that this *Father* has a *Son* of the same nature with himself; and forgets not to mention him in his proper place: particularly in those very pages (37, 122.) from whence you quote the two passages of the *unbegotten Father*, (as you call him,) he takes care to bring in the mention of the *Son*, as included in him, and *one God* with him. It is very strange, that an ancient writer cannot be allowed to speak of the Father, in the first place, as the *one God*, (which all the churches in Christendom have ever done, and still do in their *creeds*,) but presently he must be charged with *excluding* God the Son: as if reserving him awhile in mind, and forbearing to make mention of him till it be a proper time and place, were the same thing with *excluding* him from the *one true Godhead*. Upon a view of the placesⁱ where Athenagoras uses the word ἀγένητος, it is plain to me, from what I find it *opposed* to, that he means no more than οὐ γενόμενος, or φύσει ὄν, *necessary existence* by it, in opposition to the Pagan perishing deities.

A. D. 187. IRENÆUS.

Irenæus will be found to teach the *necessary existence* of God the Son many ways, with great variety of ex-

ⁱ Athenag. p. 19, 27, 37, 53, 67, 122.

pression; sometimes declaring him to be *ipse Deus*^k, *God himself*; sometimes the *self*^l of the Father, *Creator*^m often; which, with Irenæus, is always a certain argument of *immutable* existenceⁿ, and a mark of distinction between what is *necessarily existing*, and what not: intimating also, that whatsoever is a *creature* could never create^o. I have shown also, above, that Irenæus asserts the Son not to be *another* God, but the *same God* with the Father; from whence it must follow, that he is also *necessarily existing* as well as the Father. He farther supposes him *God*, in respect of his *substance*^p, and co-existing^q always with the Father. By these and other the like characters, too long and too many to be here cited at length, does this very early and judicious Father proclaim the *necessary existence* of God the Son. I shall over and above produce two passages; one where Irenæus styles the Son *infectus*, and another where the *Father* and his *Word* are so described, as plainly to shew that they are one *necessary existing* Being. The first runs thus^r; “Thou art not, O man, *necessarily existing*, neither didst thou always *coexist* with God as his own *Word*.” I make no doubt of *infectus* being the rendering of ἀγέννητος, a word often used by Irenæus; but whether he ever has ἀγέννητος, *unbegotten*, I am not positive: it does not appear to me that he has^s. Now as to the sense of the place, it is certainly the most natural to refer each branch of the sentence to the same *Word* of

^k Iren. p. 132.

^l Ibid. p. 139, 163, 253.

^m Ibid. p. 44, 79, 190, 219, 307, 315.

ⁿ Ibid. p. 169, 183, 240.

^o Ibid. p. 288.

^p Generationem ejus quæ est ex Virgine, et *substantiam* quoniam Deus. Iren. p. 217.

^q Ibid. p. 153, 163, 209, 243.

^r Non enim infectus es, O homo, neque semper co-existebas Deo, sicut proprium ejus Verbum. Iren. p. 153.

^s The reader may turn to the pages here marked, if he is disposed to examine. N. B. I make no account of the present readings.

Iren. p. 2, 5, 11, 53, 54, 56, 67, 100, 101, 103, 153, 183, 284, 285, 348. Bened. ed.

God. That is to say, *Neither art thou unmade*, as the *Word* is, *nor didst thou always coexist with God*, as he, the same *Word*, has. But because it is barely possible for the words to admit of another construction, I shall not contend about it. One thing however is certain, that the *eternal coexistence* of God the *Word* is here plainly taught; which, among all sober reasoners, will imply his *necessary existence*, as well as *eternity*.

The other place of Irenæus runs thus.

“ But in him who is God over all, for as much as he is all *Mind* and all *Word*, (as we have said,) and having nothing sooner or later, or any thing of diversity in himself, but all equal and like, and ever continuing one; there can be no such order of emission,” (as the *Gnostics* pretend^t.)

To this may be added another such passage.

“ For the Father of all is not a kind of compound substance (animal) of any thing besides mind, as we have shown. But the Father is *Mind*, and *Mind* the Father. Wherefore it is necessary that the *Word*, which is of *him*, or rather the *Mind itself*, since it is *Word*, should be perfect and impassible, and the emissions therefrom being of the *same substance* with him, should be perfect and impassible, and always continue like to him that emitted them^u.”

^t In eo autem qui sit super omnes Deus, totus Nus et totus Logos cum sit, quemadmodum prædiximus, et nec aliud antiquius, nec posterius, aut aliud alterius habente in se, sed toto æquali et simili et uno perseverante; jam non talis hujus ordinationis sequitur emissio. *Iren.* p. 131, 132.

^u Non enim ut compositum animal quiddam est omnium Pater præter Nun, quemadmodum præ-ostendimus: sed Nus Pater, et Pater Nus. Necesse est itaque et eum qui ex eo est Logos, imo magis autem ipsum Nun, cum sit Logos, perfectum et impassibilem esse, et eas quæ ex eo sunt emissiones, ejusdem substantiæ cum sint, cujus et ipse, perfectas et impassibiles et semper similes cum eo perseverare qui eas emisit. *Ibid.* p. 139.

Compare

Qui generationem prolative hominum Verbi transferunt in Dei æternum Verbum, et prolationis initium dantes et genesim, quemadmodum et suo Verbo. Et in quo distabit Dei Verbum, imo magis ipse Deus, cum sit Verbum, a Verbo hominum, si eandem habuerit ordinationem et emissionem generationis? *Ibid.* p. 132.

These two passages will not be perfectly understood by any that are not in some measure acquainted with the Gnostick principles. Among other conceits of theirs, this was one, that the *Word* was remote from the Father in nature and perfections, and liable to ignorance and passion: which absurd tenet *Irenæus* here confutes, by teaching that the *Mind* is *Word*, and the *Word* *Mind*, both of the *same substance* and perfections. It is plain, that by *Word*, in those passages, is not meant any *attribute* of the Father, but the *Person* of the Son, by what follows in p. 132. where he speaks of the *eternal Word* under that notion, and still continues the same thought of *God himself* being *Word*, or *Logos*, as before. The *Word* therefore is *perfect*, is *impassible*, is *necessarily existing*, as the Father is, according to *Irenæus* ^x.

A. D. 192. CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS.

Clemens is another unexceptionable evidence for the same doctrine. He styles the Son ὄντως Θεός, *really God*: a phrase which he often applies with particular emphasis to God the Father ^z, as being the one true God, in opposition to pretended deities. I omit here, what I have before abundantly shown, that the Father and Son together are the *one God*, according to Clemens: I pass over also Clemens's doctrine of Christ being *Creator*, *Almighty*, *adorable*, &c. from whence, by certain consequence, it may be proved, that his substance is truly *divine* and *necessarily existing*. I shall here insist only on such passages, as more expressly and directly signify his *necessary existence*; among which this is one.

“ But this must of necessity be took notice of, that we ought not to think any thing wise *by nature*, but the τὸ Θεῖον, the *divine Being*; wherefore also it is *Wisdom*, God's *Power*, that teaches truth: and from thence the perfection of knowledge is received ^a.” Here *Wisdom* is

^x Vid. Massuet. Dissert. Præv. p. 128.

^y Clemens Alex. p. 86.

^z Ibid. p. 45, 55, 60, 61, 81, 92, 150.

^a Ἐκείνο δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης παρασημασιώσιον, ὡς μόνον τὸ Θεῖον σοφὸν εἶναι φέρει τὴν

plainly included in the τὸ Θεῖον, the *divine Being*, said to be wise *by nature*, that is, *necessarily* wise. All that know Clemens's style will allow, that by *Wisdom* is meant the *Son of God*, the teacher of *truth*, as Clemens himself explains it in the following page^b; and a few pages after, he gives him the titles of σοφία, *Wisdom*, and δύναμις Θεοῦ, *Power of God*^c, as here. Wherefore God the Son is φύσει σοφός, and also τὸ Θεῖον, which fully express *necessary existence*. Another passage of Clemens, proving the same thing, is as follows. "We are not as the Lord, and if we would, we cannot: for no disciple is above his Lord. It is enough, if we be made such as the Master; not in *essence*, for it is impossible for that which is by *adoption* (or *appointment*) to be equal in *essence* (or *existence*) to what is *by nature*: only we may be *made eternal*, and may be admitted to the contemplation of things that are, and may have the *title of sons*, and may see the Father in what belongs to him^d."

In these words it is clearly intimated, that our Lord is κατ' οὐσίαν, *essentially*, and φύσει, *by nature*, *eternal*, and *knowing*, and *Son of God*: which are the known ways by which the ancients express *necessary existence*. Φύσει as opposed to θείσει is a familiar and very common expression for what is *naturally* and *necessarily*, in opposition to *voluntary appointment* or *designation*^c.

σθαι χρεὶ διὸ καὶ ἡ σοφία δύναμις Θεοῦ, ἡ διδάσκατος τὴν ἀλήθειαν κἀνταῦθά σου ἔληπται ἡ τιλίωσις τῆς γνώσεως. Clem. p. 452.

^b Δι' οὗ καθορᾶται τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν καλὰ καὶ δίκαια. Ibid. p. 453.

^c Ὁ Κύριος ἀλήθεια, καὶ σοφία, καὶ δύναμις Θεοῦ. Ibid. p. 457.

^d Οὐκ ἴσμεν δὲ ὅς ὁ Κύριος, ἰσχυρὸν βουλόμεθα μὲν, οὐ δυνάμεθα δὲ. οὐδὲ γὰρ μαθητὴς ὑπὲρ τὸν διδάσκαλον· ἀρετὸν δὲ ἴαν γινώμεθα ὡς ὁ διδάσκαλος· οὐ κατ' οὐσίαν ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἴσθαι πρὸς τὴν ὑπαρξίν, τὸ θῆσαι τῷ φύσει τὸ δι' αἰδίου γεγονέναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων θεορίαν ἰγνωσκίαι, καὶ υἱὸς προσηγοριεύσθαι, καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἀπὸ τῶν οικίων καθορᾶν μόνον. Ibid. p. 469.

* Κάρεσι, καὶ οὐ φύσει τῆς υἰοθεσίας ἡξιώμενοις. Greg. Nyss. contr. Eun. lib. i. p. 17, 126.

Εἶπὸν πρῶτον τὸ οικίον, πρὸς τὸν πατέρα μου, ὅτι ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἴσ' ἰσχυρῶν καὶ πατέρα ἡμῶν, ὅτι ἦν κατὰ θῆσει. Cyril. Hierosol. p. 116. ed. Benedict. Vid. et p. 46, 114, 117, 138, 149, 151, 152, 153, 158.

Athan.

Clemens has another celebrated passage, worth the reciting.

“ The Son of God never comes down from his watch-tower, is never divided, never parted asunder, and never passes from place to place; but is always every where, and yet contained no where: all mind, all light, all the Father’s eye, sees all things, hears all things, and knows all things^f.”

Here we find the principal essential attributes of God (*immutability, immensity, omnipresence, and omniscience*) ascribed to God the Son. And what can all this mean less than *necessary existence*? Compare with it what I had just before cited from Irenæus; who in like manner describes God as being all *mind*, all *word*, &c. And it is observable, that this was a way of speaking never applied to any but the eternal and necessary existing God. It is so applied by Clemens himself in another place^g. The manner of speaking was indeed first borrowed from the philosophers^h, who applied it to none but the *divine nature* as such: and they are herein followed by manyⁱ of the Fathers, before or after Clemens.

I shall just point out one place more of Clemens, taken notice of by M. Lequien, the learned editor of Damascen^k. The words are, “ Let us hasten to salvation, to (baptis-

Athan. Orat. 2. p. 442, 527. Eustath. apud Theod. Dial. 1. The Arian doctrine was, Οὐ φύσει υἱὸς τίς ἐστιν τοῦ Θεοῦ. *Alexand. Epist. apud Theod. E. H. lib. i. c. 4.*

^f Οὐ γὰρ ἐξίσταται ποτε τῆς αὐτοῦ περιουσίας ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐ μερίζομενος, οὐκ ἀποτιμώμενος, οὐ μεταβαίνων ἐκ τόπου εἰς τόπον, πάντη δὲ ὦν πάντοτε, καὶ μηδαμῆ περιεχόμενος, ὅλος νοῦς, ὅλος φῶς, πατρῶος ὅλος ὀφθαλμὸς, πάντα ὁρῶν, πάντα ἀκούων, εἰδὼς πάντα, &c. *Clem. p. 831.*

^g Ὅλος ἀκοὴ καὶ ὅλος ὀφθαλμὸς, ἵνα τίς τούτοις χρίσθῃται ταῖς ἐνόμασι, ὁ Θεός. *Ibid. p. 853.*

^h Xenophanes, some hundred years before Christ, seems to have been the first that used it. *Vid. Diog. Laert. p. 559.*

Plinii Nat. Hist. lib. ii. c. 7. Sext. Empiric. contra Phys. i. sect. 144.

ⁱ Irenæus, p. 130, 131, 151, 240. Novatian c. 6. Lactantius de Opif. c. 2. Cyrill. Hieros. p. 91. ed. Bened. Zeno Veron. in Psal. p. 139. Hieronym. in Psal. 93. p. 371.

^k Damasc. Op. vol. i. p. 132.

“mal) regeneration, to be united together many of us, in
 “one love after (the example of) the unity of the one
 “*singular essence* ¹.”

The words are supposed to be an allusion to John xvii. 21, 22, 23. where Christian unity is described by our Lord, as resembling, in some measure, the union of father and son. This construction of that place in Clemens is extremely plausible: but that the words are strictly capable of no other, I will not pretend; let the reader make his judgment of it. Having traced the doctrine of the Son's *necessary existence* down to Clemens, I need not go lower, where the case is still plainer. As to Tertullian, you allow, that he supposes the *Son* to be a *self-existent part* of God's *substance*: which is throwing his sense into *invidious* terms to disparage it; but is, in the main, confessing the thing, that the Son is by him supposed *necessarily existing*, and but *one Person* of the Trinity; which Tertullian might not perhaps express in the best manner, though his meaning is right and good. I might produce vouchers for the same doctrine, as many Fathers ^m as have pleaded that God the Father could never have been without the *Word*, any more than without *thought, power, truth, life*, or the like: and those I have reckoned up in another place ⁿ, whither I refer the reader.

I shall content myself with particularly mentioning one more only, and that is

A. D. 249. ORIGEN.

I shall begin with the famous passage in his treatise against Celsus, where he expressly styles the Son ἀγέννη-

¹ Σπύσωμεν εἰς σωτηρίαν, ἐπὶ τὴν παλιγγύθειαν, εἰς μίαν ἀγάπην συναχθῆναι αἱ πολλοί, κατὰ τὴν τῆς μοναδικῆς οὐσίας ἕωσιν. *Clem. Alex.* p. 72. Compare y. 146.

^m Hippolytus contr. Noët. c. 10. Dionys. Roman. apud Athanas. 232. Dionys. Alex. apud Athan. 230, 253, 257. Alexand. apud Theod. lib. i. c. 4. Add to these Methodius (ap. Phot. p. 960.) and Theognostus, (ap. Athan. p. 230.) declaring the Son to be eternal and uncreated, that is, *necessarily existing*.

ⁿ Vol. ii. p. 146, 147.

τος, *unmade*, that is, as I understand, *necessarily existing*. The whole sentence runs thus °.

“ Our Saviour and Lord, the *Word* of God, setting forth “ how great a thing it is to know the Father, that he is “ comprehended and known principally, and, according to “ his *dignity*, by himself (*the Son*) alone, and in the se- “ cond place by those who have their minds enlightened “ by the very *Word* of God, says, ‘ No one knoweth the “ Son, but the Father, neither the Father but the Son, and “ he to whomsoever the Son shall reveal him.’ For no “ one can be able worthily to know him that was un- “ made, and begotten before all created nature, as the “ Father who begat him : neither can any one (know) “ the Father, as (he is known by) his living *Word*, his “ *Wisdom*, and *Truth*.” I need say nothing here in de- fence of my way of rendering πάσης γεννητῆς φύσεως πρωτό- τοκος, having sufficiently vindicated it in another place P. The stress of my argument for the Son’s *necessary existence* lies in the word ἀγένητον, which you are very sensible of, and therefore endeavour all possible ways, though in vain, to elude it.

You say, (p. 295.) that “ the place is evidently cor- rupt.” I suppose, because it is *evidently* against you. But where are your manuscripts? Or by what authority do you pretend to pronounce any place *corrupt*, without the least shadow of a reason? You plead the term πρωτό- τοκος. But that, if rightly understood, confirms the read- ing rather than otherwise: for if the Son was begotten before *all created nature*, he must be *uncreated* q. And I

° Οὗτοι γὰρ τὸν ἀγένητον, καὶ πάσης γεννητῆς φύσεως πρωτότοκος, κατ’ ἀξίαν εἰ- δῆσαι τις δύναται, ὡς ὁ γενήσας αὐτὸν πατήρ, οὗτοι τὸν πατέρα ὡς ὁ ἰμψυχος λόγος καὶ σοφία αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἀλήθεια. *Origen. contr. Cels. lib. vi. p. 287.*

P Vol. ii. p. 35. See also Le Moyne, Not. et Observ. p. 447. Wall’s Defence, p. 37.

q Dionysius, of the same age, thus reasons very remarkably upon the phrase πρωτότοκος, &c.

Ποῦμα ὁ πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως, ὁ ἐκ γαστρὸς πρὸ ἰωσφόρου γεννηθεὶς, ὁ εἰκὼν ὡς σοφία, πρὸ δὲ πάντων βουτῶν γενητῆς με; καὶ πολλαχοῦ δὲ τῶν θείων λογίων γενι- νῆσθαι, ἀλλ’ οὐ γιγνόμεναι τὸν υἱὸν λεγόμενον εὐρεῖ τις ἄν. *Dionys. Rom. apud Athanas. p. 232.*

doubt not but Origen chose πάσης γενητῆς φύσεως, instead of πάσης κτίσεως, on purpose to make it answer the better to ἀγένητος, going before, and to preserve the elegance of the sentence. You urge γέννησας αὐτὸν, as if the same thing could not be said to be ἀγένητος, and yet *begotten*: which all the *philosophers* had admitted, and nothing more frequent (as the testimonies produced above show) than the application of both to the same person or thing: not to mention, that if Christ was a *Son*, in the strict and *proper* sense, (as all the Fathers have taught,) he must have been *unmade*, or *necessarily existing*. Your last pretence is from Gelenius, the editor, rendering it *ab æterno genitus*: which is descending low indeed. You might have urged the authority of Dr. Clarke, if you had pleased, which would have signified to me as much as Gelenius's. To imagine that ἀγένητον stands for ἀγεννητον is making any thing stand for any thing: what man that knows Greek would use ἀγεννητος for ἀγενής, which is the proper word in such a case? To read γενητὸν, as you pretend, is still worse, being flat, and scarce sense: besides that Origen, intending here to say the highest things that could be said of the Son, would never use any such expression in this place.

Mr. Whiston^r, I think, has two or three little exceptions, more than you have mentioned. He appeals to Origen's known "doctrine and language elsewhere." But neither has this pretence any weight or force in it. Origen's doctrine can no way be better known than from this very treatise; which is every where conformable with what he has here said^s. And I have produced some evidence of it above. There is another place, in this very treatise, where Origen teaches the same doctrine implicitly, while he clearly distinguishes and exempts the Son ἀπὸ παντὸς γενητοῦ^t, *from all created being*: which comes to the same thing as the styling him ἀγένητος.

^r Whiston's Reply to Lord Nottingham, p. 15.

^s Bull. D. F. sect. ii. c. 9.

^t Ἀμικτον πρὸς ὁ, τιποτὸν γενητὸν—παντὸς μὲν ἀφιστάση γενητοῦ, πρῶτα.

Mr. Whiston has one plea more from the *silence* of Origen's Athanasian vindicators. But this is very slight, unless all that was ever anciently pleaded for Origen were still extant; whereas, we have very little, in comparison, remaining. But if Origen's friends were *silent* on this head, it may be, his adversaries may have supplied the defect. Among the heads of the accusation drawn up against him, this was one, *quod dixerit filium innatum*, that he asserted the Son to be *unbegotten*^u. It is no improbable conjecture of the learned Huetius^x, that they had respect to this very passage; maliciously and captiously construing ἀγένητον, *unbegotten*, instead of *unmade*. But enough of this matter. It appears from what hath been said, that there is no reason at all for imagining the place *corrupt*. You have no manuscript, no *various lection*, no plea from the *context*, none from Origen's doctrine in other places, (however not in this treatise,) no argument of any kind, but what is mere trifling: nor have you been able to invent any *correction* or *emendation*, but what either is not Greek, or makes the sentence flat, and even silly in comparison: so unfortunate and unadvised a thing is it, to play the *critic* in a wrong place.

Origen, as we have seen, has styled the Son ἀγένητος, *unmade*, or *uncreated*, (for that is his own interpretation^y of the word ἀγένητος;) and it is no objection to this, that other Fathers have been sparing of applying that title to Christ. The reason is, because the word ἀγένητος was ambiguous, and was not applicable to Christ in every sense of it. For the like reason it is, that γενητός is also very rarely applied to Christ: which though it might be applicable in one sense^z, yet being more generally used

γούση δι' δι' ἐμφύχου καὶ ζῶντος λόγου, ὃς ἴσται καὶ σοφία ζῶσα, καὶ υἱὸς Θεοῦ, ἐν ἑπὶ πᾶσι θεῶν. *Orig. contr. Cels. lib. iii. p. 160.*

^u Pamphili Apolog. p. 235. ed. Bened. inter op. Hieron.

^x Huetii Origeniana, p. 43.

^y Ἀγένητοι ὄνται, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ Θεοῦ κτισθεῖσαι. *Orig. contr. Cels. p. 187.*

^z Γενητός sometimes denotes only a thing's proceeding from another, whether eternally or temporally, whether by generation or creation.

in another, and too low a sense, was therefore avoided. It is once applied to Christ by the Antiochian Fathers directly, and again obliquely: though a doubt may be made whether it should be *γενητὸς* or *γεννητός*. And Origen (I do not remember any other of the Ante-Níccenes) is charged by Epiphanius^a with so applying it: which Epiphanius, as the humour then ran, very partially wrests to an ill sense, though he would have interpreted the same word more candidly in any one but Origen, as he there declares. So much had the Eustathian party prevailed in their unreasonable clamours against Origen, notwithstanding the endeavours of the wisest, and coolest, and best men of the Church, and even Jerome amongst them for a considerable time. However, though the phrase of *γενητὸς Θεὸς* might bear a good sense, (and I doubt not was so intended by Origen,) yet I commend not his discretion in the use of it; since it might also bear an *ill one*, and had been a phrase applied by the Platonists to their *inferior gods*, or to the *world*. It might be on account of some of these uncautious sallies of Origen, that he was forced to purge himself to Pope Fabian, in a letter to him: after which, as in his treatise particularly against Celsus, he was more cautious, and kept closer to the language of the Church. To proceed: I might produce other very clear proofs of Origen's faith in the *necessary existence* of God the Son, from the attributes of *immutability*^b, *omnipresence*^c, *impassibility*^d, &c. which he ascribes to him, as well as from other topics^e. But I

Γενητὸν λέγεσθαι τὸν κόσμον ὡς ἀπ' αἰτίας ἄλλης παραγόμενον, καὶ οὐκ ὄντα αἰετόγονον, οὐδὲ ἀδιυπόστατον. Crantor. apud Procl. in Tim. p. 85.

Γινητὸν, τὸ ἴσως οὖν ἀπ' αἰτίας ὑφιστάμενον. Vid. Cudw. p. 254.

^a Epiphanius. Hæres. Origenist. c. vii. viii. p. 531.

^b Origen. contr. Cels. p. 169, 170.

^c Ibid. p. 63, 164, 209, 325.

^d Ibid. p. 77, 170.

^e Viz. the many strong expressions of the Son's *real and natural*, or *essential divinity* occurring in that treatise of Origen. Τῆς θείας φύσεως ἀπαύγασμα—τοῦ Θεοῦ, p. 342. Τῆ φύσει κυρίου λόγου Θεοῦ, p. 392. Τῆς τοῦ

refer the reader to Bishop Bull's accurate account of him and his sentiments, and now hasten to what is most material, to take off your famous, and almost only objection drawn from what the Fathers have said about Christ's generation being by the *will* of the Father.

3. I am here to inquire, in what sense, and by whom, *necessary* generation or *emanation* was taught; and to account for the Son's being said to be generated by the *will* of the Father.

Here, in the first place, we are carefully to distinguish between those who asserted a *temporal generation* only, and those who asserted an *eternal generation*. As to the former, it may be allowed, that they supposed the generation to be by the *will* of the Father, even in your sense of *will*: and all you now have to do, is to prove, if you are able, that those writers believed no *real* or *substantial* existence of the Son, antecedent to that generation.

As to the latter, who held *eternal generation*, your business will be to show, that they believed it to be an *act* of the *will* in your sense of *will*, if possible to be done: or, without this, you do nothing. It were sufficient to men of sense, and to scholars, to have pointed out a way of solving all that you have, or ever can advance upon this head: but because some readers will want to see some things more particularly cleared, I shall be at the pains of tracing this matter down quite through the Fathers; showing you your mistakes all the way. You will not expect I should take any notice of the Apostolical Constitutions, so often and so unanswerably proved^f to be a patched, spurious, and interpolated work. Nor shall I have any thing to do with Ignatius's interpolated epistles, till you have confuted Bishop Pearson and Daillé. I refer you to a learned foreigner^g, in the margin, for the

θείου λόγου φύσις ὄντος Θεοῦ, p. 171. Ἀπαύγασμα φωτὸς αἰδίου, p. 387. τῆς ἀληθείας οὐσία, p. 386.

^f See Ittigius de Pseudepigraphis Apostolorum, p. 190. Mr. Turner on the Apost. Constitutions Dr. Smalbroke.

^g Quas solas genuinas esse, alteras vero illas quas sinceras esse dixi, ab Athanasio decurtatas, inauditum et incredibile Wilhelmi Whistoni, novi

sense of wise and judicious men in relation to Mr. Whiston's wild attempt to substitute the *larger* instead of the *smaller* epistles. I proceed then to the genuine Ignatius, in the smaller epistles. I allowed in my Defence^h, that Ignatius supposes the Son to be a Son by the *will* of the Father; and I showed in how many senses it might be taken, without at all favouring your principles. You imagine I was *greatly puzzled*; which I take to be an argument only of your small acquaintance with those matters. You pretend that three of the senses have *no distinct sense*. But are you to sit down in your study, and make reports of the *ancients* out of your own head, without looking into them, to see in what sense they used their phrases? I was not inquiring what you or I should now express by the word *will*, but what ideas the *ancients* had sometimes fixed to the word: for by that rule we must go in judging of the *ancients*. What think you of those that gave the name of *Will*, or the *Father's Will*, to the *Person* of the Sonⁱ? They had a meaning, though

Arianorum in Anglia Promachi, paradoxon est, singulari nuper scripto proditum magis quam demonstratum. *Fabricii Bibl. Gr.* lib. v. cap. 1. p. 40.

The same learned writer has also very lately given his judgment of Mr. Whiston's attempt about the Constitutions.

Quam parum feliciter hoc ei successerit, evidenter exposuerunt Rob. Turnerus, Richardus Smalbroke, Jo. Ernestus Grabe: consulendus etiam Simon Ockley. Licet vero Whistonus identidem tueri sententiam suam conatus est repetitis scriptis adversus Grabium, adversus Petrum Allixium, adversus Turnerum, vix quemquam tamen antiquitatis ecclesiasticæ peritum confido esse futurum, cui illius argumenta petita longius, et conjecturæ leves, rem tantam persuadere poterunt. *Fabr. Bibl. Gr.* vol. xi. p. 11.

^h Vol. i. p. 92.

ⁱ Ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἀγαθὸν βῦλημα. *Clem. Alex.* p. 309.

Θέλημα παντοκρατορικόν, *Sovereign Will*, p. 647.

Ipsæ erat Voluntas et Potestas Patris. *Tertull. de Orat.* cap. 4.

Θέλημα τοῦ πατρὸς ἴσιν Ἰησοῦς Χριστός. *Hippol. contr. Noët.* cap. xiii. p. 15. Charitatem ex charitate progenitam.

Voluntas ex mente procedens— *Orig. πρὶ ἀρχῶν. Pamph. Apol.* p. 235.

Τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς βῦλησιν. *Constant. apud Gelas.* part. 3.

Βουλὴ καὶ Θέλημα τοῦ πατρὸς. *Athanas.* p. 613.

Sicut Sapientia, et Verbum, et Virtus Dei, et Veritas, et Resurrectio, et Vis dicitur, ita etiam Voluntas. *Hieronym. Com. in Eph.* i. p. 323.

not such a meaning as you or I now understand the word *will* in. They must therefore be interpreted by the *ideas* which *they*, and not *we*, affixed to the phrase, or name. And what think you of others who used the phrases of *omnipotent*, or *all-containing Will*, (as we have seen above,) had not they some different idea of *will* from that which you have? And must not they be interpreted accordingly? You are very *angry* at those that have presumed (without your leave) to say the “Will of God is God himself,” (p. 259.) And yet, whether the saying be right or wrong, when you would interpret the doctrine of such as made that their maxim, you must take their words as they meant them, and according to *their* ideas, and not your *own*. For aught I see, they spake more properly than you do in so often mentioning *acts of the will*. Does any thing *act* but an *agent*; and is the *will* an *agent*? How absurdly do you speak! Not that I should blame you for using a common phrase: only do not be so very severe and smart upon others; who knew how to speak as properly, or perhaps more properly than you^k. It seems to be owing only to narrowness of mind, and want of larger views, that you would confine all writers to your particular modes of *speaking*. The word *will* has been used by some of the *ancients* to signify any *natural powers* of God^l. *Will*, in the sense of *approbation* or *acquiescence*, is very common with ancient writers: nor was it thought absurd to say, that God had *willed*

Quidam ne Filium consilii vel voluntatis Dei dicerent unigenitum Verbum, ipsum *Consilium*, seu *Voluntatem* Patris idem Verbum esse dixerunt. Sed melius, quantum existimo, dicitur *Consilium de Consilio*, et *Voluntas de Voluntate*; sicut substantia de substantia, Sapientia de Sapientia. *Augustin. Trin. lib. xv. cap. 38. p. 994.* Vid. Petav. Dogmat. vol. i. p. 229. Coteler. Not. in Recogn. p. 492.

^k See Petavius's Dogmata Theol. vol. i. lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 61, &c. lib. 5. cap. 4. p. 211. cap. 12. p. 239.

Where may be seen what Fathers said *the Will of God was God himself*, and what they meant by it.

^l Omnis Potentia naturalis (*Dei*) est Voluntas. *Mar. Victorin. adv. Arium*, lib. i. p. 199. Basil. ed. Vid. Petavii Dogm. vol. i. p. 229.

Ταυτὸν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι φρόνησιν καὶ βούλησιν εἶναι. *Athan. Orat. cap. lxxv. p. 613.*

thus or thus, from all *eternity*, and could not *will* otherwise. Whether there be any thing very edifying in these notions or not, is not the question. But when we are searching into the sentiments of the *ancients*, we must carefully observe in what sense they understood the *terms* they made use of: otherwise we shall be apt to make very gross mistakes in our reports of them. To return to Ignatius. To cut off dispute, I admitted that Ignatius might understand by *generation*, a *voluntary* antemundane generation, or *manifestation*, with several other Fathers. In answer to which, you tell me, that I should “ have proved that *he* had somewhere or other spoken of another higher generation, otherwise I have given up the “ question.” What question? the question of the *eternal* or *necessary* existence of the *Logos*? Nothing like it. I admitted that many of the Fathers speak of no *higher* a generation than that *antemundane* one: but still I insist upon it, that those very Fathers acknowledged the existence of a *real* and living *Word*, a *Word* of God, eternally *related* to the Father, whose *Word* he is: which *relation* to the Father as his *Head*, is all that any writers ever meant by *eternal filiation*. They therefore acknowledged the same thing, but under another *name*: there was no difference in *doctrine*, but in the *expression*, and the manner of *wording* it; as I observed in my Defence^m. Ignatius, of whom we are now speaking, owns an *eternal Logos*, and his *necessary existence*; as I have already proved: which is sufficient to my purpose, unless you can show that he meant an *attribute* only, by the *Logos*.

I go on to Justin Martyr; who, as I before allowed, speaks of no generation higher than that *voluntary* antemundane generation, otherwise called *manifestation*: and I showed both from Justin and Methodius, that a *manifestation* might be called a *generation*ⁿ. To the same

^m Vol. i. p. 113, &c.

ⁿ Τότε γίνεσθαι αὐτοῦ λόγον γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἕξουτος ἢ γῆσις αὐτοῦ ἱκελλε γίνεσθαι. *Just. Mart. Dial.* p. 270.

purpose I quoted Hippolytus^o; who plainly makes a *manifestation* to be the Son's *generation*; as do also several others^p. Now certainly there is nothing amiss in supposing God the Son to have been *manifested*, in the proper season, by the *will* of the Father. I allow then that the *Logos* became a *Son* (according to Justin) by *voluntary appointment*: but I do not allow that he became *God*. The latter is what you are endeavouring to prove out of Justin. The passage which you insist principally upon is this, which I have explained in my Defence^q, and elsewhere^r. "Who, according to his (the Father's) will, "is both God, being his Son, and an angel also, as ministering to his will^s." Upon which I observed that Christ is not here said to be God, by the *will of the Father*; though if it were, *it might bear a good sense*. For supposing that to be the case, Justin may mean no more than that the *Son* acted and appeared as *God*, with consent of the Father, who appointed him so to appear and act, being every way qualified for so doing, as being *Son* of God, and so really *God*. This sense the words may reasonably bear, were it certain that Justin applied the words *κατὰ βελήν* to the first part of the sentence *Θεὸν ὄντα*.

Προόντα ἤδη πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων ἐν ταῖς οὐρανοῖς, ἰεουλήθη καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ γεννηταί, ὃ δὴ ἐστὶ πρὸς θεὸν ἀγνοούμενον γνωρίσαι. *Method. apud Phot. Cod. 237. p. 960.*

^o "Οἱ λόγοι ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἀεράτον τι ὄντα, τῷ κτιστῷ κόσμῳ ἱερατὸν ποιοῦ, πρῶτον φωνὴν φθιγγόμενος, καὶ φῶς ἐκ φωτὸς γενῶν. *Hippol. contr. Noët. cap. 10.*

^p Cujus ex ore prodivit unigenitus Filius, cordis ejus nobilis inquilinus; exinde *visibilis* effectus quia humanum genus visitaturus erat. *Zen. Veronens.*

Creata est ergo Sapientia, imo *genita*; non sibi quæ semper erat, sed his quæ ab ea fieri oportebat. *Pseud-Ambros. de Fid. cap. 2. p. 349.*

Deus Filium non doloribus parturit sed virtutibus esse manifestat: nec propter se facit quod ex se est; sed generat, dum quod in se est aperit, et revelat. De Patre processit Filius, non recessit: nec successurus Patri prodivit ex Patre, sed prodivit mansurus semper in Patre. *Petr. Chrysol. Serm. lvii. p. 51.*

^q Vol. i. p. 93.

^r Vol. ii. p. 274.

^s Τὸν κατὰ βελὴν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἔθειν ὄντα, υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἄγγελος ἐκ τοῦ ὑπερητανῶν τῆ γνάμῃ αὐτοῦ. *Dial. p. 370.*

Or if this be not admitted, *κατὰ βελήν* may mean no more than that the Son is God, and in perfect *harmony* with the Father; not an *Anti-God*, not set up in opposition to him: according to what Justin says elsewhere; ἀριθμῶν ἕτερος, ἀλλὰ ἐ γνάμη†, adding, that he never did any thing but what was perfectly agreeable to the will of the Father. Neither of these senses is any thing so improbable as yours, that the Son “was God by voluntary appointment:” which none of the other Fathers ever said or thought; nor has Justin any thing elsewhere to countenance such a notion. But besides what I have here pleaded, I farther urged that the words did not necessarily require the application of *κατὰ βελήν* to both the parts of the sentence singly: but I understood them thus; that it was the Father’s good pleasure that he who before was *God*, as being his *Son*, should now be *God* and *Angel* both, by the addition of the *office*. That he was one, was *necessary*; but that he should be *both* in one, this was a matter of *voluntary* appointment. In like manner it may be said to be by the Father’s good pleasure, that he is Θεός and ἄνθρωπος together, or θεάνθρωπος. I do not yet see any thing, either in Justin’s words, or in your comments upon them, that should move me to recede from this construction: however, I leave it to the learned, to judge whether there be any thing harsh or unnatural in it.

You charge me, (p. 264.) with “self-contradiction,” for saying in a note^u, that though the Son was God as being a Son, and a Son *κατὰ βελήν*, yet he was not God *κατὰ βελήν*. You should have let the reader see what I had offered in the same place^u, to clear up, and take off the pretended contradiction. Let us consider whether a few words may not set all right: he *proceeded from* (was not *created by*) the Father; therefore he is *God*. The *procession* makes him a *Son*, and is *voluntary*; but at the

† Justin. Dial. p. 164.

▪ Vol. i. p. 93. See also vol. ii. p. 274, 275.

same time shows him to have been always *God*. For since he was not ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, was not *created*, but *proceeded* as a *Son* from the Father; therefore he is of the *same nature* with him, and God from all eternity. Wherefore though he is a Son κατὰ βελήν, and God because a *Son*, he is not God κατὰ βελήν, which I asserted. And now where is the *contradiction*? Your objecting (p. 265.) that the *supreme God* could not minister as an *angel*, has been often answered: so we may dismiss such quibbling for the future. As to Christ being κύριος δυνάμεων by the Father's appointment, I have allowed it above, in Justin's sense; which comes not up to the sense of the Hebrew. As to the Father's being *Lord* of the *Son*, Justin explains it by his being *Cause*, or *Fountain* of the *Son*: in which all Catholics are agreed^x. You object that the generation (compared with one fire lighted from another) was yet δυνάμει ἢ βελῆ αὐτῆ. I do not well apprehend what you have been doing for a page and a half. You seem to think that I have somewhere denied the *highest* generation, spoken of by Justin, to be *temporal*; whereas I have constantly allowed it: and so you do not dispute against me.

The Son proceeded φῶς ἐκ φωτός, in time, according to Justin, and according to many more besides him; particularly Hippolytus, and perhaps even the Nicene Fathers. Well, but then you will say, what becomes of what I call *eternal generation*? I answer, that before the *procession*, the Λόγος was ἐν γαστρὶ, as Justin would have expressed it; *in corde, pectore, utero*, as others^z. And this is the same thing which Post-Nicene Fathers called *eternal generation*; viz. that *eternal relation* and *reference* which he had to the Father; *in whom*, and *with whom*, and *of whom*,

^x Vid. Bull. D. F. sect. iv. cap. 2. p. 259.

^y Ἐκ γαστρὸς γιννομένης. *Just. Dial.* p. 85.

^z Ἐν καρδίᾳ Θεοῦ. *Theoph. Antioch.* p. 129.

^z Cordis ejus nobilis inquilinus. *Zen. Veron.*

Ex ore quamlibet Patris sis ortus, et verbo editus, tamen paterno in *pectore* sophia callebas prius. *Prudent. Hymn.* xi. p. 47.

he always was. So that there is still no more than a difference in *words* between Justin's doctrine of the generation and Athanasius's; for Athanasius owned the *pro-cession* which Justin speaks of, as much as he.

You had cited a second passage from Justin; which, by your leaving out a material part of the sentence, was made to run thus: "He hath all these titles, *viz.* Son, "Wisdom, Angel, God, Lord, and Word, from his being "begotten of the Father by his will." The thing that offended me here, was to find *angel* brought in among the other names, as given him on account of his being *begotten*. For if this were the case, he would be an angel by *nature*, and not by *office* only; which is directly making a *creature* of him, suitably to your sense of *begotten*: and you will remember that you had produced this citation among others, to prove that the Son was "brought "into existence;" it is your very expression^a. I had therefore just reason to complain of your leaving out the words, *from his ministering to his Father's will*, which showed the name *angel* to be a name of *office*, and gave a new turn to the whole sentence. The censure I passed upon your quoting so *carelessly* or *partially*, was only this: "The account you give is such as must make one "think either that you never saw the book you mention, "or else——" with a stroke: which you are pleased to call "wrathful" and "unchristian;" as it is natural for a man, when he is detected, to fly in the face of the calmest rebuke, and to give hard names. You now tell me, you had no design in the citation more than this; to show that the Son was "begotten by the will of the Fa- "ther." Had that been all, you should have had no contradiction from me: for I had again and again allowed it to be Justin's doctrine. But if you did not *design*, you had really *done* more, in that *partial* citation; which I saw, at least, if you did not: and could I imagine you so unthinking, as not to perceive how the *alteration* was

^a Collection of Queries, p. 51.

exactly fitted to your purpose? But as you best know what you intended, let it pass: only the more I allow to your *good meaning*, the less must be attributed to your *sagacity*. You proceed, in a very abusive manner, to misrepresent my words, and to throw dirt where you have very little occasion. You charge me with omitting a material word in a “marginal translation,” (which yet you know was *no translation*;) and you intimate I know not what artifice, in leaving out *ἑλήσει*, though it appears in the Greek; and I could not possibly have any ill design in the case, because I frankly admitted that the generation of the Son was *ἑλήσει*, by the *will* of the Father, and had no dispute with you on that head. But your warmth of temper here carried you too far: and you were resolved, it seems, not to be outdone in *wrathful* and *unchristian* expressions: at the same time not considering the difference between a *just censure* and an *injurious calumny*.

Tatian, who was Justin’s scholar, may come next. I allow him to speak only of a *temporal generation*, or procession; in like manner as Justin. If you can do any thing here, it must be to prove that the *Word* was no more than an *attribute*, before the *procession*. But Bishop Bull^b is beforehand with you; having demonstrated the contrary. You have but little to say, and that scarce worth notice. You observe that Tatian says of the *Word*, that he was *ἐν αὐτῷ*, (not *πρὸς αὐτὸν*,) “which shows, (as “St. Basil argues against the Sabellians,) that by the “Word is meant an internal power or property,” (p. 282.) But Basil was never so weak as to argue that *ἐν αὐτῷ* must necessarily denote an *attribute*; but only that *πρὸς αὐτὸν* is a stronger expression to signify *personality*; as I have also myself argued in another place^c: *ἐν αὐτῷ* may indifferently serve either for *person* or *attribute*: *πρὸς αὐτὸν* will not. When Christ says, “I am in the Father, and

^b Bull. D. F. N. sect. iii. cap. 6. p. 209.

^c Vol. ii. p. 7.

“the Father in me,” doth it follow that neither of them is a *Person*? There is therefore no force in your remark about ἐν αὐτῷ, more than this; that the Λόγος in Tatian might be an *attribute* agreeably enough to that expression, were there not other very convincing reasons to the contrary.

The words of Tatian (Δελήματι τῆς ἀπλότητος αὐτῆ προπηδᾶ ὁ Λόγος) you have rendered *two* several ways, and both of them wrong. The first you have, (p. 110.) “By the “simple efficiency of his will, this Reason, or Word, proceeded forth:” where I complain of your putting in “efficiency” to serve your *hypothesis*. The second is, (p. 270.) “The Word proceeded from the simple will of “the Father:” where I complain of the words “from “the simple will,” to intimate to the English reader, as if nothing but a *simple act* of the *will* was concerned in that matter. Let the words appear as they lie in the author, without the mean artifice of giving them a false turn. “By the will of his simplicity the Word proceeded “forth.”

I admit the same thing of Athenagoras as of Justin and Tatian, that he speaks of no higher generation than the *procession*: yet he believed the existence, the *eternal* and *necessary existence* of the Λόγος, as before proved. Here you can have no pretence, except it be to imagine that the Λόγος was an *attribute* only, before the procession; as to which, Bishop Bull^d has effectually prevented you: and as to what little observations you had to make, I have replied to them above.

Theophilus comes under the same predicament with the three writers before mentioned. You have something to except against Bishop Bull’s reasons^e for Theophilus’s believing the Son to be a *real Person* before the *procession*. His reasons were these:

1. That very *Logos* which had been from all eternity ἐνδιάθετος ἐν καρδίᾳ, becomes afterwards προφορικῶς^f. If

^d Bull, D. F. sect. iii. cap. 5. ^e Ibid. cap. 7. p. 215.

^f Τοῦτοι τὸν λόγον ἐγέννησι προφορικῶν. *Theoph.* p. 129.

therefore he was ever a *Person*, (as is not doubted,) he must have always been so.

2. The Λόγος who spake to the prophets, and was then undoubtedly a *Person*, was the same individual Λόγος which was always with the Father ὁ ἀεὶ συμπαγὼν αὐτῷ.ε.

3. He was the Father's *Counsellor*, σύμβουλος, before the procession; and therefore a *Person*.

4. He is said to have been *with him*, and to have *conversed with him*, which are *personal* characters.

5. Even after the procession, he is still supposed to be perpetually (διαπαντὸς) in the *heart* of the Father; not separate from him, but exerting himself, *ad extra*, in the work of the creation; which is the meaning of *procession*, and becoming *προφορικός*.

6. Theophilus goes upon the same principles with Athenagoras, Tatian, and others; whatever therefore could be pleaded for those writers, in the case, would be at the same time pleading for Theophilus.

You pass over all those reasons, except the *third* and *fourth*; though Bishop Bull^h principally insists upon the *first* and *second*. And what you have to say, (p. 116.) to the third and fourth, reaches only the *fourth*. For Bishop Bull had allowed, that sometimes, in *common speech*, (such as Tatian sometimes uses,) a person may be said to *be with himself*. But he allowed not that a person might be said to be *counsellor* to himself, in the manner Theophilus speaks: besides that though sometimes, and improperly, a person may be said to be *with himself*; yet more generally, *being with*, denotes two persons, as in John 1:1. It may therefore be used as an argument which in the main is right and good, though admitting of some few particular exceptions.

I had almost slipped over your 284th page, where you say, that "that generation, before which the person generated was every thing he could be after it, is no generation." But it is undoubtedly what those writers,

^ε Theoph. p. 81, 82.

^h Bull. D. E. p. 216, 217.

and many after them, call *generation*: and therefore this is disputing not against *me*, but *them*. However, though the *Logos* was the same *essentially* before and after the generation, he was not the same in respect of *operation*, or *manifestation*, and outward *economy*: which is what these Fathers meant.

Tertullian goes upon the same *hypothesis*, in the main, with those before mentioned; and so need not have any distinct consideration: he has been before vindicated at large.

Clemens of Alexandria, whom I should have mentioned before, may be likewise allowed to speak of the *procession*. And when he says the Word sprang, or arose, ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς βελλήσεως, *from the will of the Father*, it is plainly intended of his being sent out to mankind, as observed above, (p. 90.) Though I am of opinion that Clemens there means the same that other Fathers have expressed by ἐκ καρδίας, or ἐκ γαστρὸς, and might be rightly rendered in St. John's phrase, from the *bosom* of the Father, John i. 18.

Irenæus comes not under our inquiry, having said little either of *eternal* or *temporal* generation. Only from what hints we can gather, he seems to have asserted *eternal* generation^k. And you cannot show that he has said any thing of its being by the *will* of the Father.

Hippolytus was undoubtedly in the *hypothesis* of the *temporal generation*, or *procession*. And if you can show that the *Λόγος*, before that procession, was an *attribute* only, according to him, you will then take that writer from us. You do endeavour it, p. 119. Bishop Bull^l had observed, and ^mI after him, that Hippolytus supposes God, before the procession, to have been *one*; and *many*, because he had the *Son* and *Holy Spirit* in him and with himⁿ. You say, "that learned Prelate seems not to have

^l Clemens Alex. p. 86.

^k See my Defence, vol. i. p. 96.

^l Bull. D. F. sect. iii. cap. 8. p. 219.

^m Defence, vol. i. p. 105, &c.

ⁿ Ἄνθρωπος δὲ μόνος ἦν, πολλὸς ἦν, οὕτως γὰρ ἄλογος, οὕτως ἄσοφος, οὕτως ἀδύνατος, ὅτι ἀβούλευτος ἦν. Hipp. contr. Noët. p. 13.

“sufficiently considered,” that (by the same reasoning) the *power* also, and the *counsel* mentioned in the same sentence must have been *persons*. But that learned *Pre-late*, having a *judgment* equal to his *learning*, was used to *consider* things with great exactness; and was not so prone to mistake as those that too hastily pass their censure upon him. You have not considered (though I gave notice of it^o) that the words *ἄλογος, ἄσοφος, ἀδύνατος, ἀβούλευτος* correspond to *λόγος, σοφία, δύναμις, and βελή*, names of the *Son* and *Spirit*, and all so applied, except *βελή*, (for which *δέλημα* is used, cap. 23.) in that very treatise. And Hippolytus speaks there just in the same way as many other both Post-Nicene and Ante-Nicene Fathers do upon the same subject; several testimonies whereof may be seen in a note elsewhere^p; and their sense vindicated from such exceptions as you have made to it. You add farther, that the Bishop “did not observe that it is the “one *unbegotten* God, even the *Father*, who is here said “to be many.” I know not why you pretend the Bishop did not observe what nobody can doubt of: nor do I see of what service the observation can be to you or your cause. Allowing you that by *μόνος* is meant the *Father*, who was *many*, and the *τὸ πᾶν*: still it was the *Father* considered in the *comprehensive* way, as a *head* of a family containing all; in such a sense as I have explained above^q. It was not Hippolytus’s way to exclude or separate from the alone God and *Father*, what was *essential* to him, and contained in him; his *Logos*, or his *σοφία*, his *own mind*, (*νῦς*), which is the name he gives to the *Son*, thereby expressing his inseparable union and coexistence.

Origen, our next writer, I cited ^r for *eternal generation*: to which you have little to object, beyond what I have answered to above. If that passage is to be depended on

Compare this of Gregory Nazianzen.

Ὁ δὲ γὰρ ἦν ὅτι ἄλογος ἦν, οὐδὲ ἦν ὅτι οὐ πατήρ, οὐδὲ ἦν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὴς, ἢ ἄσοφος, ἢ ἀδύνατος, ἢ ζῶν ἰδιῶς, ἢ λαμπρότητος, ἢ ἀγαθότητος. *Orat. xxxv. p. 574.*

^o Defence, vol. i. p. 105.

^p Sermon vii. vol. ii. p. 146, &c.

^q P. 61, &c. 88, &c.

^r Defence, vol. i. p. 97.

which you cite (p. 272.) from Huetius's *Origeniana*; then Origen has asserted, besides the *eternal* generation, the *πρόλευσις* also.

Novatian I also considered at large^s, which you pass slightly over. Dionysius of Alexandria, and the other Dionysius of Rome, I also brought^t as evidences for *eternal generation*: whom you let pass without ever a word, of any weight or moment.

Methodius^u was another voucher for the same doctrine: which you do not, cannot gainsay. Only you endeavour to confront his known, certain, and genuine doctrine, with a *spurious* passage out of his Symposion: a piece very much corrupted and adulterated in the judgment of Photius, as Bishop Bull had observed^x, and you take no notice.

Pamphilus I also cited for the same doctrine; and also Alexander of Alexandria, to whom you have some little exceptions, which I have answered above, and which are perfectly foreign to the present question.

Eusebius I did not cite, because some just exceptions may be made to him; and there is no reconciling him perfectly with himself, at different times. This you must know; and yet, very deceitfully, you "conclude," as you say, (p. 273.) "the Ante-Nicene writers on this head, "with the judgment of the learned Eusebius, which may "justly be esteemed to be the true sense of the ancients "before him:" producing a passage from his *Demonstratio Evangelica*, wrote before the Council of Nice, and before he had well considered the subject, and corrected in some material points afterwards, as I have observed above, p. 149.

And now we are come down to the Arian times; in which Dr. Clarke and you think you have found something to your purpose; artificially tacking together testimonies of several kinds, some *Catholic*, some *Arian*, and

* Defence, vol. i. p. 97.

† Ibid. p. 101.

u Ibid. p. 102. See also my Reply to Dr. Whitty, vol. ii. p. 234, &c.

x Bull. Def. p. 166.

some *doubtful*: of which in their order, that I may fully clear the point I am now upon. But before I come to these testimonies, I must strike out a little into history, to give the reader a clearer notion of what we are about.

I have elsewhere^y given a brief account of an argument which the Arians made use of to prove the Son of God a *creature*. They argued that the Father must produce his Son either *volens, willingly*, (by which they understood *free choice*), or *nolens, against his will*, which in Greek they expressed by φυσική ἀνάγκη, meaning what we should now call *extrinsic necessity*. The argument is much the same with what Dr. Clarke urges in these words: “Whatever proceeds from any being otherwise than by the *will* of that being, doth not in truth proceed from that being, but from some other cause or *necessity, extrinsic* to, and independent of that being^z.” And in another place^a, “Whatever is caused by an intelligent being, is caused by the *will* of that being; otherwise it is not (in truth and reality) caused by that being at all, but by some superior cause, be it *necessity, or fate, or* whatever it be, &c.”

This was the old Arian argument, and that was their sense of *necessity*, or φυσική ἀνάγκη: which I shall prove by plain testimonies beyond contradiction. Athanasius may be first cited, who writes thus^b: “They have another way of saying the Son is a *creature*, by pretending *will*, and arguing thus: if he did not exist by *will*, then God had a Son by *necessity*, and *unwillingly*. But who is it, you miscreants, that imposes *necessity* upon him?”

Epiphanius represents it thus^c: “They object that he

^y Defence, vol. i. p. 89, 349.

^a Clarke's Reply, p. 227. ^z Ibid. p. 113.

^b Ἄλλως πάλιν πείσμα λέγουσι αὐτὸν εἶναι, βέλπον προκαλλόμενοι, ἢ λέγουσι, εἰ μὴ βελῶσι γίγνεται, ἀπὸ ἀνάγκης, καὶ μὴ θέλον ἔχειν ἰ Θεὸς οἶόν. Καὶ τίς ἰ ἐπὶ ἀνάγκης ἰσχυρὰν αὐτῷ, προσερίπτεται; &c. *Athanas.* p. 610.—ἀντίκειται τῇ βελῶσι τὸ πικρὰ γούρμου, p. 611. Ἐπειὸς ἴτε λέγουσι ἐπὶ Θεῷ ἀνάγκην.

^c Θέλον εὖν ἰσχυροῦσι ἢ μὴ θέλον; ἰὰς ἰσχυροῦσι μὴ θέλον ἀνάγκην προκαλλόμεν

“begat the Son *willingly* or *unwillingly*: and if we say “*unwillingly*, then the divine nature is forced by *necessity*, and not by freedom of will.” He concludes that the generation was neither *willingly* nor *unwillingly*, but *naturally*.

St. Ambrose^d, St. Austin^e, and others^f, represent the same cavil of the Arians much in the same way; which being once well understood, we may easily deal with your pretended authorities. The first is of the Council of Sirmium in the year 351, which condemned Photinus. It is to be noted, in the first place, that this Synod of Sirmium was made up mostly of men of suspected faith, Arians or Semi-Arians: and though they did well in condemning Photinus, and though Hilary laboured much in putting the best construction possible upon their *confession* and *anathemas*; yet Athanasius and others rank them in the class of Arians; and it is certain they stand not perfectly clear in their character against some very just and weighty objections. M. Tillemont says of them, that “they were the declared enemies of the Church, the “same Eusebians who had been condemned in the Council of Sardica^g :” and it seems that Hilary himself, who had once judged very kindly and candidly of them, saw reason afterwards to alter his sentiments^h. Having now

τὸ θεῖον—ἔκ τινος ἰσχυροῦ ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ἐγέννησεν ἄρα ἀνάγκη φύσει ἡμεῖς τὸ θεῖον, καὶ ἐκ ἐλευθεριότητος θελήματος. *Epiiph. Ancor. cap. li. p. 55.*

Ὅστι θεῶν τοῖνον ἐγέννησι, οὗτοι μὴ θεῶν, ἀλλ' ὑπερβολῇ φύσις: ὑπερβαίνου γὰρ ἢ θεῖα φύσις βουλὴν—οὗτοι ἀνάγκη ἄγονται. *Epiiph. ibid.*

^d Subtexunt aliam impietatem, proponentes utrum *volens*, an *invitus* generaverit Pater—Sed nihil in sempiterna generatione præcedit, nec *velle* nec *nolle*: ergo nec *invitum* dixerim nec *volentem*—non generat ex *voluntate*, aut *necessitate* Pater, sed super utrumque, hoc est *natura*. *Ambros. de Fid. lib. iv. cap. 9. p. 540.*

• Interrogant (Ariani) utrum Pater Filium *volens*, an *nolens* genuerit. *August. contr. Sermon. Arian. p. 626.*

^f Gregor. Nazianz. Orat. xxxv. p. 565, 566. Cyrill. Alex. Thesaur. p. 50, 52.

^g Tillemont, History of Arians, p. 144. a book which I would particularly commend to the perusal of the English readers, to give them a just notion both of ancient and modern *Arianism*.

^h See Tillemont, p. 145.

some notion of the men, let us next see what they say, in relation to our present point.

“ If any one say that the Son was begotten, and the Father not willing, let him be anathema. For the Father did not beget the Son, as being constrained, or impelled by a *physical necessity*, as not willing ; but he at once willed and produced him from himself, begetting him without time, and without *suffering* any thingⁱ.”

The expressions here are cautious and guarded : and though perhaps the men had something more in their hearts than they were willing to utter; yet as they have explained the Father's *willing* the generation in opposition only to his being *forced*, βίωθδώς, and (ἀχθδώς) *impelled*; their doctrine may pass. And so Hilary putting the mildest and most candid construction upon it, explained it to mean only that the generation was not *volente Patre, against the will of the Father*. And his comment upon ἡπὸ ἀνάγκης φυσικῆς ἀχθδώς, is *nec coacta imperio naturalis legis essentia est ; his essence was not compelled by the command of a natural law*.

You ask me, (p. 257.) “ whether the persons censured by the Council of Sirmium, or any others, ever were so stupidly senseless, as to think any thing that is *necessary*, to be therefore *against* the will of God, as well “ as *without* it ?” To which I answer, that the Arians (whether *stupidly* or *maliciously* I know not) so interpreted the *Catholic* sense of *natural* and *eternal* generation ; allowing no *medium* between *free choice* and such *compulsive necessity*^k. And there is one Dr. Clarke, who

ⁱ Εἴ τις μὴ θελήσαντος τῦ πατρὸς γεννηῖσθαι λέγοι τὸν υἱὸν, ἀνάθεμα ἔστω· οὐ γὰρ βίωθδώς ὁ πατήρ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης φυσικῆς ἀχθδώς, ὡς ἔν θελειν ἰγέννησεν τὸν υἱόν· ἀλλ' ἅμα τ' ἰβουλήθη καὶ ἀχρόνως καὶ ἀπαθώς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ αὐτὸν γενήσας ἀσπίδωσι. *Socrat. Hist. Eccl. lib. ii. cap. 30. p. 126. Athan. de Synod. p. 744.*

Si quis nolente Patre natum dicat Filium, anathema sit: non enim nolente Patre coactus Pater, vel naturali necessitate ductus, cum nollet, genuit Filium; sed mox voluit sine tempore, et impassibiliter ex se eum genitum demonstravit. *Hilar. p. 1184.*

^k To the testimonies before cited, I shall add one more, a very full and plain one, from the eighth anathema of an Arian council, in the year 344 or 345.

at this day (whether stupidly or otherwise I know not) charges the same doctrine with the same consequence, (as I have shown,) allowing no *medium* in this case, between what he calls *will*, and *extrinsic* necessity. You ask, “if God be omnipresent *by* outward *coaction*, or “against his will, *because not by it?*” I like your argument very well: please to apply it to what I have quoted above from Dr. Clarke: it may serve as an answer to him, in respect of *necessary* generation. You are here arguing for me, and happen not to know it. You ask again, “Is not he omnipresent by φυσικὴ ἀνάγκη, necessity “of nature?” He is omnipresent by *necessity of nature*, in the modern sense of the phrase: but φυσικὴ ἀνάγκη never stood for what we call, in this case, *necessity of nature*. I know not whether there be one instance of it in all antiquity: I have not yet met with any, no, nor of the word *necessity* so applied. Certain however it is, that in the places which we are now concerned with, φυσικὴ ἀνάγκη had no such meaning, but that only which I have given. You go on arguing and reasoning, what *necessity of nature* must signify: which is only talking without book, and guessing what words *anciently* meant, without consulting the *ancients* to know the fact. But at length you come to argue somewhat more like a scholar: you observe the *opposition* made by ἐβελήθη on the one side, and ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης φυσικῆς ἀχθῆς on the other. That is well urged: but observe also, βιασθῆς ὁ Πατήρ. Can any words be stronger? This determines φυσικὴ ἀνάγκη to the sense I am pleading for; and therefore ἐβελήθη is rather to be interpreted by its *opposition* to this. So Hilary interprets it, and construes ὡς οὐκ ἤθελεν, *cum nollet*. But I will frankly tell you what my opinion is, which I ground chiefly upon the consideration of the men concerned in that Council, that they really meant by ἐβελήθη what you

Τὰς ἐβελήσει ἔδι θελήσει γιγινῆσθαι τὸν υἱὸν ἰσηκότας ἀντιλαβῆς, ἀνάγκη δὲ δηλονότι ἐβελήθητι ἢ ἀπρωαίρετον περιτιμιχότας τῷ Θεῷ, ἵνα ἄπει γινῆσθαι τὸν υἱὸν, δυσσεβιστάτους καὶ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ζήτους ἰσχυρισκομεν. *Apud Athanas. tom. i. p. 740.*

say, and yet by φυσική ἀνάγκη what I say; admitting no *medium*, any more than Dr. Clarke has done in this case, between *necessity* in the *hard compulsive* sense, and *free choice*: and perhaps they intended, obliquely, to charge the Athanasian doctrine (as the Arians used to do) with that hard *necessity*, just as Dr. Clarke has been pleased to charge it as a *consequence* upon ours. Thus, I think, we may fairly compromise the dispute about the Sirmian Synod.

You next mention the Council of Sardica, meaning the false Sardican Council, or Synod of Philippopolis, in the year 347: which condemned Athanasius, Hosius, Julius; as they themselves had been condemned by the true Sardican Council.

Hilary¹ bestowed the same kind pains here that he used afterwards with the decrees of the Sirmian Synod, to interpret their confession to a *Catholic sense*. And coming to the words, *ex voluntate et consilio*, he understands them, not in the sense of *free choice*, but in opposition to *corporalis passio*, *corporal passion*, that is, *extrinsic necessity*. However, I am persuaded (knowing the men) that Hilary was too kind in his construction; though with a good design, hoping by condescending towards the weak, to reduce them, by degrees, and to gain them over to the true and sound faith. He was forced to apologize afterwards for his good-natured and well-meant endeavours; which had rendered him suspected with some that were zealous for the Catholic faith.

But let us now come to some better instances than such as you have brought me from suspected *synods*. Sure you do not expect I should take notice of the Arian Council of Antioch. What if they condemned some Arian tenets? Has it not been common for Arians, being ashamed of their leader, to condemn some of his tenets in words, at the same time professing the same things in other terms? Give me authorities from men of steady principles, known

¹ Hilarius de Synod. p. 1172.

Catholics, and not from known Ariàns. You do pretend to three such, Marius Victorinus, Basil, and Gregory Nyssen. Let us examine them.

Marius Victorinus says, that the generation “was not “by necessity of nature, but by the will of the Father’s “Majesty^m.” Such are his words: but when you inquire what he meant by *will*, and what by *necessity*, he is directly against you. *Will* is with that writer a name for any *natural power*, or for God himselfⁿ; so that generation by *will* comes to the same with generation by *nature*, which is what we now call *necessary generation*: and it is plain, that he understood by *necessity*, extrinsic necessity, as opposed to intrinsic nature. What is this to your purpose? Whoever will be at the pains to search into the sentiments of so obscure and perplexed a writer, (whom I am not very fond of quoting,) will perceive thus much at least, all the way through him, that he believed the substance of the Father and Son to be equally *necessarily existing*. I shall content myself with a few references^o.

Basil is also quoted by Dr. Clarke, as saying that the Father begat his Son, having his “power concurrent with “his will;” and that the Son springs from the Father’s *goodness*P. If the design be to deceive the populace with

^m Est autem lumini et spiritui imago, non a *necessitate nature*, sed voluntate magnitudinis Patris. Ipse enim seipsum circumterminavit, &c. Filius ergo in Patre imago, et forma, et λόγος, et voluntas Patris—Sic igitur voluntate Patris voluntas apparuit ipse λόγος, Filius. *Mar. Victor.* lib. i. *adv. Arium*, p. 188. Basil. ed.

ⁿ A se movens Pater, a sese generans Filius, sed potentia patris sese generans Filius; voluntas enim Filius, unde enim si ipsa voluntas non est a sese generans, nec voluntas est: sed quoniam Dei est voluntas, equidem ipsa, quæ sit generans, generatur in Deo. Et ideo Deus Pater, voluntas Filius, unum utrumque, &c. *Ibid.* p. 188.

^o Una eademque substantia, vi pari, eademque potentia, majestate, virtute: nullum alteri prius, nisi quod causa est alterum alterius, p. 224.

Una eademque substantia, et simul, et semper: hoc est enim ἰμοῦσιον, ἰμοῦσιον ἰχων, simul substantiam habens, *paremque existendi vim* atque virtutem, eandemque substantiæ naturam, &c. p. 225. Vid. p. 227, 234.

^p Ὁ Θεὸς σύνδρομος ἰχων τῇ βουλήσει τὴν δύναμιν, ἰγέννησεν ἄξιον ἑαυτοῦ ἰγέννησεν αἰς αὐτὸς εἶδεν. *Basil. Hom.* xxix. p. 624.

the sound of words, there may be some use in such quotations. But such things ought not to be offered either to scholars or by scholars. Who knows not that Basil is as express as possible for the *necessary existence* of God the Son; and directly denies and confutes the very thing for which you are pleading? “Will you not cease, you “impious wretch,” (says he to Eunomius, who was pleading the same cause that you now are,) “to speak of his “not existing, who exists necessarily, who is the Fountain “of Life; who gave being to all things that are?” I render τὸν ὄντως ὄντα, *necessarily existing*, because it always signifies the same with what we express by that word. Again, speaking of the Eunomians, he says, “They *blaspheme* in pretending to say, the Son of God ever was “not; as if he did not exist *by his own nature*, but was “brought into being by the *favour* of God^r.” What is this, but directly and flatly denying the very thing which you are contending for? Against which you set an obscure passage or two, which mean nothing of what you intend by them. As to Basil’s first expression, of the Father’s having his power *concurrent* with his *will*, it signifies only, that his *will* and his *nature* are the same, coeval with each other, and equally *necessary* in this case. Cyril of Alexandria thus expresses the same thought, something more distinctly than Basil.

“It were superfluous and silly to imagine the Father “to be a Father either *unwillingly* or *willingly*; but rather “*naturally* and *essentially*. For he is not *unwillingly* “whatever he is *naturally*: having the *will* to be what “he is, *concurring* with the nature^s.”

Φῶς εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν γεννητὸν, ἐκ τῷ ἀγενήτου φωτὸς ἀπολάμψαντα, ἢ αὐτοζῶν, ἢ αὐταγάμον ἐκ τῆς ζωοποιῦ πηγῆς, τῆς πατρικῆς ἀγαθότητος. *Contr. Eunom. lib. ii. p. 66.*

¹ Οὐ παύσῃ μὴ ὄντα προσαγορεύων, ᾧ ἄδει, τὸν ὄντως ὄντα, τὴν πηγὴν τῆς ζωῆς, τὸν παῖσι τοῖς οὖσι τῷ εἶναι πατριτικόν. *Basil. contr. Eun. ii. p. 56.*

² Μὴ εἶναι ποτε τὸν υἱὸν τῷ Θεῷ βλασφημῶντι, ὡς τῇ μὲν αὐτῷ φύσει μὴ ὄντα, χάριτι δὲ εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὑπὸ τῷ Θεῷ παραχθίντα. *Ibid. p. 57.*

³ Περιττὸν ἂν εἶη ἢ ἀμαθίς, τὸ γὰρ ἀνιδιλήτως, ἢ διλητῶς γεννητὸρα ὑπάρχων εἶσθαι τὸν πατέρα, φύσει δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ οὐσιασῶς: εἰς γὰρ ἕκ ἀνιδιλήτως ἄιστι

He means that the *will* and the *nature* are both together *coeval* and *coeternal*: in like manner as God always was what he would be, and always would be what he was. The like thought we have before seen in Lactantius. Here is nothing in this that at all favours your principles.

As to the second citation from Basil, the passage itself leads to the meaning. He there styles the Son *αὐτοάγαθον*, *essentially* good, as proceeding from the Fountain of essential Goodness, that is, from the Father himself: which is no more than saying, that he is *Goodness of Goodness*, in like manner as *God of God*.

Come we now to Gregory Nyssen, where the reader will admire at Dr. Clarke's pretences and yours upon this head; unless you take up passages at second-hand, without ever looking into the authors themselves. The words you have first pitched upon are these^u:

“ For neither doth that immediate connection between
 “ the Father and the Son exclude the *will* of the Father,
 “ as if he had the Son by some *necessity of nature*, with-

φουσιῶς, σύνημον ἔχων τῆ φύσει τὴν θείην τῷ ἴσῳ ἃ ἴσι. *Cyrill. Dial. ii. de Trin.* p. 456.

^u Ex seipso est, et ideo talis est qualem se esse voluit. *Lactant. Inst.* lib. ii. cap. 8. p. 161.

Plotinus, before any of them, speaking of God, says that his *will* was concurring with his existence: and he and his will are the same.

Σύνημονος αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ θείῳ αὐτὸς ἴσῳ, ἃ τῦτο ὡν ἕστι θείῳ, καὶ ἡ θείησις ἃ αὐτὸς ἴσῳ. *Plotin. Enn.* vi. lib. viii. cap. 13.

Τὸ ἴσῳ ἀγαθὸς εἶ καὶ ἰλιθίμων, ἔχῳ μὲν, οὐκ ἐκ βουλήσεως δι' οὗτι μὲν ἀβουλήσεως ταυτά ἴσῳ θείῳ γὰρ ἴσῳ τούτου ἕστι ἴσῳ, καὶ ἴσῳ αὐτῳ. *Cyril. Thes.* p. 56.

Οὐ μὲν ἀβουλήσεως καὶ ἀθειλήσεως ἴσῳ ἀγαθὸς· ὃ γὰρ ἴσῳ, τῦτο καὶ θειητός ἴσῳ αὐτῷ. *Athan. Orat.* iii. p. 615.

^u Οὗτι γὰρ ἡ ἄμιτος αὐτῆ συνάφῃ ἐκβάλλῳ τὴν βέλησι τῷ πατρὸς, ὡς κατὰ εἰνα φύσιως ἀνάγκη ἀπρωαίεως τὸν υἱὸν ἰσχηκέως· οὗτι ἡ βέλησι δῖσῃσι τῷ πατρὸς τὸν υἱὸν, ἃς εἰ δῖσῃσι μῖταξῳ παρεμπύσῃσι, ὡς μῖτε ἐκβάλλῳ τοῦ δόγματος τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ υἱῷ βέλησι τῷ γινησίσεως, εἰα εἰνοχωρεῖσῃσι ἐν τῇ συνάφῃσι τῆς τῷ υἱῷ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ἰνότητος, μῖτε μὴ τὴν ἀδῖσῃσι διελύσῃσι συνάφῃσι, ἕσαν ἰσῳεῖσῃσι τῇ γινησίσι βέλησι. *Greg. Nyss. Orat.* vii. *contr. Eunom.* p. 206.

“ out his will : neither does the will divide the Son from “ the Father, so as to make any distance betwixt them.”

Thus far Dr. Clarke quoted; shaping his translation, with little hints and parentheses, as near as he well could, to his *own* sense; however opposite to the author's. Let Gregory go on: “ Let us neither exclude from our notion the Father's *will* about the Son, as if it were straitened (or *burdened*) in the connection of the Son's unity with the Father; neither let us dissolve the immediate connection by considering the *will* in the generation.” Gregory proceeds to tell us, that to will what is good is essential to, and inseparable from the nature; as also to enjoy the thing willed, and that it cannot possibly be conceived without it. He farther illustrates his meaning by the instance of *fire*, and *light* streaming from it; that if the fire be imagined to have *reason* and *will*, it would choose or will to send forth its streams of light, according to its nature, with more to that purpose.

From hence it is manifest, that Gregory intended no more by *will* than we mean when we say God *wills* his own existence, or is what he would choose to be. Whether this be a proper sense of *will* is not the question: but it was Gregory's sense. And it is plain he does not mean by φυσική ἀνάγκη *necessity of nature* in the modern sense, but such a *necessity* as lays a *restraint* or *burden* upon the *will*^z, would be an imperfection, or a pain and uneasiness to the person. I might show this farther by many and express proofs of the *necessary existence* of God the Son,

^z In such a sense Gregory uses the phrase elsewhere.

Ὁ δὲ ἀνάγκη φύσις ὑπεξουμένης ἐνεργεῖ διὰ παντός, μᾶλλον δὲ κάσχει τὴν ὑπακοήν ἢ δι' εἰ μὴ βάλωτο τοῦτο ποιῆν συγχωρεῖσθαι τῆς φύσις. *Greg. Nyss. contr. Eun.* lib. i. p. 44. Paris. Vid. p. 49, 292.

Ἀνάγκη φυσική is constantly spoken of as an *imperfection*, or mark of subjection or servitude: for which reason it was not thought applicable to God.

Nature necessitas used in that low sense by Hilary, p. 976, 986, 1116, 1117.

occurring in this very treatise, too tedious to recite at length : I must refer to some in the margin.

Now for a word or two of St. Austin ; and then we may shut up our inquiries into the sense of the ancients on this head. You tell me of a *childish* quibble of St. Austin's, (p. 255.) I gave the reader, in the Appendix to my Defence, an account of what Dr. Clarke and you call a "childish quibble:" by which it may sufficiently appear that the *childishness* is none of St. Austin's. It is no commendation of your discretion to revive the memory of a thing which can serve to no purpose, except it be to expose your unacquaintedness with antiquity. You pretend to tell me, that I "repeat the same quibble in my "Appendix, without attempting to answer the Doctor's "reasoning." But the design of my Appendix was to show that the Doctor had committed an error, in supposing that St. Austin was making an answer to such testimonies as the Doctor had produced ; when he was answering nothing but a mean quibble of the Arians about *volens volens*. As the Doctor had there made a slip, for want of knowing or considering what St. Austin had been doing, and upon what occasion he had said what he did ; for the Doctor's credit, you should have let it drop, and have said no more of it. The colour you would now give to it is, that my answer to what was objected of the Son's being generated by *will*, was out of St. Austin : which is only heaping mistake upon mistake, and defending one error by another. Look again into my Defence, (vol. i. p. 89, &c.) and you will find I was showing how *necessary emanation* might be and had been understood, consistent with *will*. St. Austin came in by the bye indeed, but he was not cited as admitting either *volens* or *volens* in the case ; but as one who had contented himself with *retorting* the objection of the Arians upon themselves. I therefore passed on (p. 91.) to others,

γ Θεός—κατὰ φύσιν, p. 1. τοῦ θεοῦ θεός, understood of all the three Persons, p. 3. καὶ θεός ὡς ἐστίν, of the Son, p. 4. φύσει ὡς Θεός· ὁ ὢν, p. 9. θεός ἕνα, p. 205, 272.

who had allowed the generation to be *by will*, and I intimated in what sense they allowed it : not in any such sense as Dr. Clarke intended, though he cited those very men (Marius Victorinus, Basil, and Gregory Nyssen) as favouring his doctrine. He should not have opposed *will* to *necessary generation*, when citing men that asserted *both* ; and who understood by *will* a quite different thing from what he did. This was my answer with respect to citations of that kind. But as to other authorities from Justin Martyr, &c. I allowed *will* to be taken in the Doctor's sense : and my answer there was, that they intended it only of the *προέλευσις*, not of the *eternal generation*.

Upon my saying in my Defence, (vol. i. p. 89.) that you could not but have apprehended my meaning, about the difference between *will* and *arbitrary will*, had you retained in mind what you must have observed in the reading of the *ancients* ; I say, upon this your remark, that those *ancients* were really "moderns," (p. 259.) and that I often "express myself in this ambiguous and unfair manner." Yet you yourself take the liberty of calling the very same writers, and those of the same age, "ancient writers : " such as the Sirmian Council, Hilary, Basil, Marius Victorinus, and Gregory Nyssen ; to whom Dr. Clarke had appealed in his Scripture Doctrine^z. It was to obviate those testimonies that I referred you to the writers of that time, calling them *ancients* ; as you yourself have since done twice together, (p. 256, 257.) So easy is it to condemn another, and to do the same thing yourself. It seems they are *ancients* with you, while they furnish you with *objections* : but when the same writers, or their contemporaries, afford *solutions* also, then they become *moderns*. But to return.

The sum then of what hath been said is this : all the Fathers believed the *necessary existence* of God the Son : I have proved it of several, and might have done it of

* Part ii. sect. 17.

more, were it necessary. But the material thing was to take off the objection of the *voluntary generation*. I have done it, by distinguishing between those that asserted only a *temporal* generation, (where I allow *will* to be understood in the strict sense,) and those that asserted *eternal*. As to the latter, none of them ever allowed generation to be by *will*, in your sense of the word. They sometimes admit it in the sense of *approbation*, and they always reject *necessity of nature*; meaning by it extrinsic force, fate, or coercion, never what we now understand by it when applied to God.

Having thus cleared the main point, it remains only to take some notice of a few incidental objections you have made; which could not before be brought in, without breaking my method and disturbing the connection.

You object, (p. 253.) that if this be the case, that the Son *necessarily* exists; then he is *self-existent*: that “if the sun were self-existent, so also would be its rays; if a tree, so also its branches:—the same thing partially considered:—derivation, origination, causality, generation, in such a case are figurative, improper expressions.”

By this then I perceive I have been doing nothing in searching *antiquity*: you have some maxims to yourself that must overrule all *authorities*. I shall answer you what I think sufficient. 1. Allowing your plea, the consequence then is, that the Son is *self-existent* as well as the Father: we change the *name*, but retain the *thing*. And now we shall challenge you to prove either from *Scripture* or *antiquity*, that the Son is not *self-existent*; provided you keep steadily to what you have said, that whatever is *necessary* is also *self-existent*. If this maxim be certain, then the Son is *self-existent*, though referred up to another, and I have proved it in proving his *necessary existence*.

But, 2. I answer, you appear a little too late to be a corrector of the language of all the *ancients*, philosophers and divines. They have constantly distinguished the *ideas*;

and wherever there is a difference of *ideas*, there is a reason for assigning different names. Who does not see that the question *whence* a thing is, and the question *what* it is, are very different questions? Or that *immutably* existing, and existing under this or that *relation*, as a *father*, or as a *son*, are quite different things? And though we do not say that Father and Son are the same thing *partially* considered, where there are no *parts*: yet we admit them to be the *same substance* diversely considered, under distinct *relations* and personalities.

You refer me (p. 251.) to Modest Plea, p. 173. where I find it objected, that “if generation were necessary, “there would be no limitation to the number of Persons.” Yes, the number will be limited to so many as are *necessary*: and no more can be *necessary* than there are found, in fact, to *exist*.

It is farther objected, that “in Scripture, the begetting “of the Son is always mentioned as an act of the Father; “and an act cannot be necessary.” But show me that Scripture ever makes it an *act*, in your sense. I have heard of *begotten*, I never read that it was a *voluntary* act, a matter of *choice*; which is your sense of *act*. Scripture represents it by the relation of *thought* to *mind*^a, or by the *ἀπαύγασμα*, the shining forth of light^b from the luminous fountain: and so does all *antiquity*. This answers to the *old* sense of *begetting*^c and *acting*: but do not invent *novel* senses of them, and still pretend *Scripture* and *antiquity*. In your *new* sense of *begetting* and *acting*, there is no proof either in *Scripture* or *antiquity*, that the Father *begat* or *acted*: and now what have you done but altered

^a See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 3.

^b Ibid. p. 92.

^c Λόγον γινώμεν. *Just. M. Dial.* 183.

Nec dubitaverim *Filium* dicere et radicis fruticem, et fontis fluvium, et solis radium; quia *omnis origo parens est*, et omne quod ex origine profertur *progenies est*.

Γινῶ μὲν ἄν καὶ ὁ ἥλιος τὴν ἀύγην. *Euseb. Eccl. Theol.* lib. i. cap. 12.

Lux splendorem generat. *Ambros. de Fid.* p. 540.

* Ἀπαύγασμα γινώσται. *Basil. contr. Eun.* p. 89.

names, and left things as before? Was there ever truer pedantry about words? You may call *generation*, in our sense, *metaphorical*, if you please; though you have no reason to give, why it is not *proper*: but when you have done, show, if you can, that this *metaphorical* sense was not the true and only sense wherein it was understood both by *Scripture* and *antiquity*.

You object, that my “distinction between *will* and “*arbitrary will* is elusive and equivocating.” But I pray excuse it for the Doctor’s sake; who makes the same distinction^d, in other words, between will of *approbation* and will of *choice*; which is all that I mean.

You object, that the doctrine of “necessary emanations” was Gnostic and Valentinian:” which you can never prove. But I must remind you that Athanasius charged upon the Arians two things as Gnostic and Valentinian, which undoubtedly are so: one was their bringing in *θέλημα*^e, *will*, between the Father and his *Word*: another was their making a *creature Creator*^f. Philastrius^g farther charges them with borrowing another principle from the infamous Apelles, (of the Marcionite tribe,) which was the making a *second God*, a *creature* and a *subject* of the *first*. Not to mention that Bishop Bull had run up your doctrines to the old Gnostics^h long ago; and was never yet confuted, nor ever will be. It might therefore have been more prudent in you, to have been silent on this head.

Now we have mentioned the matter of *necessary emanations*, it may be proper to hint briefly what has been

^d Scripture Doctrine, p. 248. ed. 2.

* Πετολεμαίος γὰρ ὁ Οὐαλεντινίου ἴση δύο ζυγούς ἔχων τὸν ἀγίνησκον, Ἰησοῦν καὶ Θίλημα· καὶ πρῶτον ἰνιόνησιν, εἶτα ἠθέλησεν· ἔπειτα ἰνιόνει, οὐκ ἠδύνατο προσβάλλειν εἰ μὴ ὅτι καὶ ἡ τοῦ Θιλήματος δύναμις ἐκινήθητο· Ἰεθὸν Ἀρειανοὶ μαθεύοντες, Θίλημα ἔββλησκον προσηγύσθαι Θίλεως τοῦ λόγου. *Athanas.* p. 608.

^f Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἕδὴ ἀγγελοὶ δημιουργῶν δυνήσκονται, πείσματα ὄντες καὶ αὐτοὶ, καὶ Οὐαλεντινίος, καὶ Μαρκίων, καὶ Βασιλείδης τριαῦτα φρονῶσι, καὶ ὅμις ἐκείνων ζηλωταὶ συγχάρονται. *Athanas. Orat.* ii. p. 489.

^g Philastrius Hæres. cap. 47.

^h Bull. D. F. sect. iii. cap. 1.

the Church's constant doctrine in that article. It occurs not indeed any where under those terms: neither does the *necessary existence* of God the Father. The *ancients* expressed not either of the doctrines in those terms: so the question must be, not about the *name*, but the *thing*: and *emanation* must be distinguished according to its two senses; as either signifying the *Person* emaning, or the *emuning* itself. They that spake only of a temporal *procession*, or *emanation*, could not mean that such *procession* was *necessary*. Only, as they held the *necessary existence* of the Person, proceeding in time, but always existing in the Father to whom he belonged, and to whom he is referred; their doctrine, however expressed, comes to the very same that has been since called eternal *generation*, or *emanation*. They that held *eternal generation* were all in the principle of *necessary emanation*, directly and plainly. Only the word *emanation* (if it stands for ἀπορροια) was either approved, or otherwise, according as understood: and *generation* was the more common name for it. All is summed up in this, that the Son is *necessarily existing*, but still *of the Father*, and referred to him as his *head*.

You pretend, that the distinction of a *threefold generation* is groundless. If you mean that *single* writers do not speak of *three* generations, it may be true of most of them, not *all*: for an exception must be made for someⁱ, who plainly acknowledged *eternal generation*, *temporal procession*, and Christ's *incarnation*. But taking the Fathers *collectively*, there is demonstration for that *threefold* distinction I have mentioned. And even as to *single* Fathers, though they did not give the *name* to all the three, they acknowledged the things meant by that name; as I have fully shown. Which of the three is most *properly* called by the name of *generation*, is a very fruitless question: it is manifest that that name was given by *some* or *other* of the *ancients* to all the three.

ⁱ See Bull. D. F. p. 232. Animadv. in Gilb. Clerke, p. 1054. Fabricius Not. in Hippolyt. vol. i. p. 242.

You object, (p. 283.) that Irenæus argues against all *internal* generations. The reader may see that matter handsomely cleared up in Massuet's Previous Dissertations upon Irenæus^k.

You object, (p. 285.) that the notion of *consubstantiality* (I suppose you will say the same now of *necessary existence*) is far from inferring *equal supremacy*. But, having once sufficiently proved his *necessary existence*, and took off your pretences about *will*, (which you chiefly trusted to,) the rest will create no difficulty with considering men. As to your weak charge upon Tertullian, &c. about *angels* and *souls* being *consustantial* with God, it has been answered. You have a pleasant argument, (p. 271.) that "if the Son was generated, by the will and power of the Father, into a state of Sonship, either in time or from eternity, it is sufficient to distinguish him from the supreme, self-existent, *immutable* God; who is incapable of any *change*, even so much as in any *mode* of existence." Your argument here turns upon a fanciful supposition, that all generation, whether *temporal* or *eternal*, implies *mutability*, or *change*. But be pleased to make sense of what you have here said, on either supposition. Suppose the generation *eternal*, what sense is there in conceiving a *change* where there is nothing *new*, no state *antecedent*, no *prius* or *posterius*, which every *change* implies? Suppose it *temporal*; then as it means no more than a *manifestation*, *exertion*, or taking a new *office*, *relation*, &c. what *change* is there in all this, more than there is in God the Father, upon any new *act*, *manifestation*, *exertion* of power, &c.? There is no *change* at all in it, no, not so much as in any *mode* of existence.

I have now run through all that I find material under this Query. Upon the whole it appears, that the *ancients* firmly believed and professed the *necessary existence* of God the Son: as well those who maintained the generation to be *temporal*, as those that professed it *eter-*

^k Massuet. Præv. Dissert. p. 36, 128.

nal. And you have not been able to prove, either that the former thought the Son an *attribute* only before his generation, or that the latter ever made generation to be by *will*, in any sense but what is consistent with what we now call *necessary existence* and *necessary emanation*.

It may not be here improper to throw in a few words about the several *similitudes* and *illustrations* made use of by the ancients to help imagination, and to give men a more lively sense of divine truths. They are all of them *low*, and infinitely short of what they were intended to represent; some of them perhaps too coarse, and such as might better have been spared: but writers are not always upon their guard. They had a pious design in adapting their comparisons to the very meanest capacities. The *resemblances* were these; *mind* and *thought*, *light* and its *shining*, *sun* and its *rays*, *fountain* and *streams*, *root* and *branches*, *seed* and *plants*, *body* and its *effluvia*, *fire* and *fire*, *light* and *light*, *water* and *streams*.

These similitudes were intended to represent the *consubstantiality*, or *coeternity*, or *both*, according as they were most fitly adapted, respectively, or most proper to represent either, or both.

The comparisons of *fountain* and *stream*, *root* and *branch*, *body* and *effluvia*, *light* and *light*, *fire* and *fire*, and such like, served more peculiarly to signify the *consubstantiality*: but those of *mind* and *thought*, *light* and *splendor*, (*φῶς καὶ ἀκράγασμα*;) were more peculiarly calculated to denote *coeternity*; abstracting from the consideration of *consubstantiality*. For *thought* is not any thing *substantial*: and I know not whether *light*, *ἀκράγασμα*, was ever taken to be so by the ancient Fathers. It is certain that sometimes it was looked upon as a mere energy or quality¹. I say then, that *coeternity* was more fitly represented by those two similitudes, than *consubstantiality*.

¹ Justin. Martyr. Dial. p. 372. Euseb. Dem. Evang. lib. iv. c. 3. Damascen. vol. i. p. 135, 137. Theodorit. in Epist. ad Hebr. c. i. ver. 3. Hær. Fab. lib. v. c. 7. p. 256.

Indeed Eusebius would not allow that ^m *coeternity* was signified in the similitude of *light* and *splendor*; or, I may more properly say, *luminous body* and *light*, for that is the meaning. But in this that great man was very *singular*. And though Montfaucon's censure of him, as *commonly* wresting Scripture, and the Church's doctrine, to his own private fanciesⁿ, may seem rather too severe; yet it is certainly true of him in this instance: unless we could suppose that *parenthesis*, or digression, (for such it seems to be,) foisted into his work by some other hand. No Catholic, before or after him, ever talked in that way, but quite the contrary. Origen^o, Theognostus^p, Dionysius of Alexandria, and Alexander, (to say nothing of later writers^q,) give a very different account of that *similitude*: and they are more to be regarded than Eusebius, who stands alone in his account of it, directly thwarting the sense of all the Catholics his contemporaries, as well as of his predecessors that have used it. But to proceed.

It is observable that those who expressly maintained the *temporal* generation only, as Justin Martyr, Hippolytus, and several others, they also illustrate it by similitudes; not by *φῶς* and *ἀπαύγασμα*, so far as I have observed, but by *light of light*, one *fire* from another *fountain* and *streams*. They have sometimes also the *sun* and its *rays*, which seems to me to amount nearly to the same with *φῶς* and *ἀπαύγασμα*. Those writers considered the

^m Euseb. Demonstr. Evang. lib. iv. c. 3. p. 147.

ⁿ Nihil itaque insolens si Eusebium, qui plerumque Scripturarum et Ecclesie dogmata ex sensu et opinione sua testimare ausus est, in multis lapsus sit. *Montf. Prælim. in Euseb. &c.* p. 29.

^o Θεὸς γὰρ φῶς ἐστίν· ἀπαύγασμα οὐκ εἶχε τῆς ἰδίας δόξης, ἵνα τοιμήσας τις ἀρχὴν δῶν εἶναι υἱὸν πρότερον οὐκ ὄντος. *Orig. ap. Athanas.* p. 233.

^p Οὐκ ἔξωθεν τίς ἐστιν ἰφικριθῆσα ἢ τοῦ υἱοῦ οὐσία, οὐδὲ ἰκ μὴ ὄντων ἰκυσήχθῃ· ἀλλὰ ἰκ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας ἴφου, ὡς τοῦ φωτὸς τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, ὡς ὕδατος ἀστῆς. *Theogn. ap. Athanas.* p. 230.

^q Ἀπαύγασμα δὲ ὄν φωτὸς αἰδίου, πάντως καὶ αὐτὸς αἰδῖός ἐστι. *Dionys. Alex. apud Athan.* p. 253.

Τὸ γὰρ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης μὴ εἶναι λίγων, συναεῖν καὶ τὸ πρωτόγονον φῶς. *Alexandr. Alex. apud Theod.* lib. i. c. 4.

^q See some testimonies in my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 148.

light, not only as breaking forth, or streaming out from the Father *absolutely*, (as they considered it, who illustrated *eternal* generation thereby,) but also *relatively*, in respect of the *creatures*; upon whom it began to break forth and shine, when the *Son* exerted his power in the creation. Then was light sprung up *to them* from the Father, which light had been before eternally in and of the Father, not manifested *ad extra*, not sent abroad, as they would express it.

You give hints in your preface, (p. vii.) and book, p. 285, and elsewhere, that the notion of the ancients was no more than that the Son was from “an internal substantial power of the Father, by his will, *without any* division, “abscission, diminution, &c. as one fire is lighted from another:” but you represent their sense very partially, or at least very obscurely. Their plain meaning was, that the Son was *really*, and not *nominally* distinct from the Father; which they signified by *one fire* and *another*: and they meant farther to signify, that though the Son did in a certain sense come out from the Father, yet he was not *divided* from him, but remained still really in him and with him. I have set the principal passages in the margin; which may serve to explain each other, and

† Λόγον γινώμεν, οὐ κατὰ ἀποτομήν, ὡς ἱλαττωθῆναι τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν λόγον προβαλλόμενον (leg. προβαλλόμενον) καὶ ὅποιον ἐπὶ πυρὸς, ὁρῶμεν ἄλλο γινόμενον, οὐκ ἱλαττωμένου ἑαυτοῦ ἐξ οὗ ἢ ἀναψις γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μένοντος καὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀναφθῆναι καὶ τὸ ὄν φαίνεται οὐκ ἱλαττωσάν ἑαυτοῦ ἐξ οὗ ἀνήφθη. *Just. Dial.* p. 183.

Οὐ κατ’ ἀποτομήν ὡς ἀπομεριζομένης τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας, ἵσχυα τὰ ἄλλα πάντα μεριζόμενα καὶ τιμνόμενα, οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ἴσται ἃ καὶ σὺν τηρῆθῆναι. *Justin.* p. 373.

Γίγνεται δὲ κατὰ μερισμὸν, οὐ κατ’ ἀποτομήν τὸ γὰρ ἀποσμηθῆναι τοῦ πρώτου κηχῆριται τὸ δὲ μερισθῆναι οἰκονομίας τὴν αἵρεσιν προσλαβόν, οὐκ ἰδιῶ τὸν ἔθην εἰληπται πιστοίηκιν, ὡσαυτὲ γὰρ ἀπὸ μιᾶς δαδὸς διὰ τὴν ἕκαστην τῶν πολλῶν δαδῶν οὐκ ἱλαττωῦται τὸ φῶς· οὕτω καὶ ὁ λόγος προελθὼν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς δυνάμει οὐκ ἔλογον πιστοίηκιν τὸν γιγνησκῶτα. *Tatian.* p. 22.

Πρὸ γὰρ τὴν γίνεσθαι τοῦτον εἶχε σύμβουλον, ἑαυτοῦ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν ὄντα· ἐσῶσι δὲ ἡθίλησιν ὁ θεὸς ποιῆσαι ὅσα ἔβουλεύσατο, τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐγέννησε προφορικῶν, προτόκοιον πάσης κτίσεως, οὐ κινωθεὶς αὐτὸς τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ λόγον, γινῆσθαι καὶ τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ διαπαντὸς ἐμιλῶν. *Theoph. Antioch.* p. 129.

Nec separatur substantia, sed extenditur—a matrice non recessit, sed excessit. *Tert. Apol.* c. 21.

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fully to ascertain the meaning. It would be tedious here to enter into the particulars. Upon the whole, their meaning was, that the Son so came out from the Father, as still to remain in him: it was an *economical*, not a *real* separation. And so the Father did not leave himself *emptied*, as it were, of his Son, by his sending him out to create and to transact all matters between him and the creature.

This, I doubt not to say, is the *certain* and the *full* meaning of those Fathers: and had it not been for some persons coming to read them with the notion of *eternal* generation in their heads, they could never have mistaken so plain a matter as this is, of the Son's being sent out *economically* from the Father, first to *make*, and next to govern the *creatures*: which *mission, manifestation, or exertion*, is, with those writers, his *generation*: as it was also so reckoned even by many of the Post-Nicenes, who may be seen in the margin^s. It must be owned, that

Hæc erit *probola* veritatis, custos unitatis, qua prolatum dicimus Filium, et non separatum. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* c. 8.

Trinitas per consertos et connexos gradus a Patre decurrens, et monarchiæ nihil obstrepit, et *æconomiæ* statum protegit. *Tert. ibid.*

Habes Filium in terris; habes Patrem in cælis. Non est *separatio* ista, sed *dispositio* divina. *Tert. contr. Prax.* c. 23.

* Scirent Verbum in principio Deum, et hoc a principio apud Deum, et natum esse ex eo qui erat, et hoc in eo esse qui natus est, quod is ipse est penes quem erat antequam nasceretur; eandem scilicet æternitatem esse generationis et geniti. *Hilar. in Mat.* p. 742.

Procedit in nativitate, qui erat, ante quam nasceretur, in Patre, — cujus ex ore prodivit unigenitus Filius, cordis ejus nobilis inquilinus: exinde visibilis effectus, quia humanum genus visitaturus erat. *Zen. Veron. apud Bull.* p. 200.

Ortus habens initium in navitate, in statu non habens. *Phœbad.*

Hoc initium habeat Sapia Dei quod de Deo *processit* ad creanda omnia tam cælestia quam terrena; non quo cæperit esse in Deo. Creata est ergo sapientia, imo *genita*, non sibi, quæ semper erat, sed his quæ ab ea fieri oportebat. *Pseud. Ambros. de Fid.* c. ii. p. 349.

Ἐγενήθη, μᾶλλον δὲ προῆλθεν αὐτὸς, καὶ πάντως ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ὄν, ἐπὶ τὴν οὐν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γεννημένων διακείμενον. *Constantin. apud Gelas.* p. 58.

Ex ore quamlibet Patris sis ortus, et verbo editus;

Tamen paterno in pectore *Sophia* callebas prius. *Prudent. Hymn. xi.* p. 44.

Hilary seems to have changed his language and sentiments too afterwards: or else he held a *generation* prior to this, along with the *προέλευσις*. It must also be confessed, that the Catholics themselves were for some time pretty much divided about the question of *eternal generation*; though there was no question about the *eternal existence*. Whether the *Λόγος* might be rightly said to be *begotten* in respect of the state which was antecedent to the *προέλευσις*, was the point in question. Athanasius argued strenuously for it¹, upon this principle, that whatever is *of another*, and *referred* to that other as his *head*, (as the *Λόγος*, considered as such, plainly was,) may and ought to be styled *Son*, and *begotten*: besides, the Arians had objected, that there would be two *unbegotten* Persons, if the *Λόγος* ever existed, and was not in the capacity of *Son*; and the Church had never been used to the language of two *unbegottens*. These considerations, besides the testimonies of elder Fathers who had admitted *eternal generation*, weighed with the generality of the Catholics: and so *eternal generation* came to be the more prevailing language, and has prevailed ever since. There is nothing new in the doctrine more than this, the calling that *eternal generation* which others would have styled the *eternal existence* and *relation* of the *Λόγος* to the Father; which at length amounts only to a difference in *words* and *names*. This appears to me a fair and full account of that matter, after the most careful and impartial search I have been able to make into the ancients upon it; that I might not deceive either myself or my readers.

In conclusion, since you have been pleased to call upon me for *satisfaction*, (p. 297.) which I shall be always ready to pay for any injury I have really done to my readers; I now leave it to your “ingenuity to consider, what satis-

Verè enim et sine voce natum, et omnia potentialiter continens Verbum, tum Pater actualiter generavit, quando cælum et terram, quando lucem et cætera-fecit. *Rupert. Tuitiens.*

¹ Athanasius contr. Arianos, Orat. 4.

tisfaction you ought to make your readers," for the following particulars.

1. For carelessly passing over the many and plain testimonies I produced for *eternal generation*; from Irenæus, Origen, Novatian, Dionysius of Rome, Dionysius of Alexandria, Methodius, Pamphilus, and Alexander of Alexandria: as to which, you have not attempted to show that I have misconstrued the passages, nor have you endeavoured to *reconcile* them to your principles; contenting yourself with *objecting* only, instead of *answering*, as usual with you.

2. For imposing upon us the *spurious* or *interpolated* Constitutions: which, you know, are of no value in this controversy, with men of letters.

3. For representing the Councils of Sirmium, Sardica, Antioch, as undoubtedly *orthodox*; though never so accounted, or received as such, by the Catholics in general, but suspected as Arian by many, and that very justly.

4. For your several *unfair*, not to say manifestly *false* translations: of the words of the Sirmian Council, p. 258, 274. of Hilary, p. 259, 275. of Tatian, p. 270, 110. of Basil, p. 291.

5. For representing (p. 273, 287.) Eusebius as giving the sense of the ancients upon a point wherein all the Catholics before, and in, and after his times, are flatly against him, (as many as speak of it,) and not a man concurring with him.

6. For your very slight, superficial, and elusive answers to the many weighty reasons I before gave in my Defence, (vol. i. p. 105. to 111.) to prove that the *Logos* was a *real* and an *eternal* Person (according to the *ancients*) antecedently to his *procession*, otherwise called *generation*.

QUERY IX.

Whether the divine attributes, Omniscience, Ubiquity, &c. those individual attributes, can be communicated without the divine essence, from which they are inseparable?

TO this you say, "it is sufficient to answer, that individual attributes can neither be communicated with nor

“without the essence.” Your reason: “because communication of an individual, without the communicator’s parting with it, is supposing it to be not an individual, and is consequently a contradiction in terms,” p. 301. Thus far you: and you go on after this with so peculiar an air of self-complacency and satisfaction, that one would almost think you weak enough to imagine you had said something considerable. The great difficulty is still behind, to determine what makes an *individual*, or to fix a *certain principle of individuation*. I called upon you for it before; knowing that very wise men thought it as difficult a problem as to *square the circle*. But to a man of your abilities nothing is difficult; you can solve the doubt in three words.

You undertake it, (p. 307.) telling me, that the “principle of individuation is a self-evident thing.” To those only, I presume, who have not sagacity enough to see where the difficulty lies: to such all things are easy, as all colours are alike to men in the dark. Let us have this solution. “It is that by which any one thing, be it simple or complex, is that one thing which it is, and not another.” That is to say, it is that by which any thing is an individual. And pray what is that? Are we not just where we were? If any should ask you what is the *cause* of the *motion* of the heart, you would tell them, I suppose, it is *that by which the heart is made to beat*; or if you are asked the *cause* of the *tide*, it is *that by which the waters are made to ebb and flow*. Who would be the wiser for such discoveries? You have not told me what makes an *individual*; but you have signified, in other words, what is meant by the phrase, *principle of individuation*, which I knew very well before.

Having laid your foundation, such as it is, you proceed to build upon it. “Two beings,” you say, “may be one complex being, but they cannot either of them be that one being which this is. Two substances may be one complex substance, but they cannot either of them be that one substance which this is.” Wonderful edifying! But the great defect is, (and it is strange you should

not perceive it,) that we do not yet know what we are to call *one being* or *two beings*; *one substance* or *two substances*: if that were settled, any child could go on. We must therefore stop your course a little, and bring you back again to the place where you set out. To convince you of your being mightily out of the way, let me put a case to you. Upon Dr. Clarke's principles, of the *divine substance* being *extended*, I desire to know whether *this substance* which fills the earth, be *one* with *that substance* which fills heaven: this is bringing your doctrine of *individuals* to the test, in order to see of what service it may be to us. By your principles, so far as I yet perceive, *this substance* and *that substance* must be two *simple substances*, and one *complex substance*. I wondered indeed why you chose the word *complex*, rather than *compound*; which signifies the same. But now I recollect that Dr. Clarke had declared ^u against God's being a *compound substance*. He may be *complex*, however, upon your *hypothesis*: and so if we must have a *complex Deity*, it may as well be *with* a *Trinity* of divine Persons, as *without*. Clear your own schemes, and you clear ours at the same time.

Dr. Clarke's notion of *individual substance* appears plainly to be this; that if the substance be but *spiritual*, and there be no *disunion*, then the substance is *one*, one *simple substance*. I approve of his notion as very just: and since the three divine Persons are supposed by us to be all *spiritual*, and *united* as much as possible, more closely indeed (being equally *omnipresent*) than you suppose the *parts* of the divine substance to be; I say, since these things are so, the three Persons may be *oné indi-*

^u Dr. Clarke's Answer to the *sixth* Letter, p. 4. His words are; "The meaning of *parts* is separable, compounded, ununited parts, such as the *parts* of matter; which for that reason is always a *compound*, not a *simple substance*. No matter is *one substance*, but a *heap of substances*. And that I take to be the reason why it is a subject incapable of thought. Not because it is *extended*; but because its parts are distinct substances, ununited, and independent on each other: which, I suppose, is not the case of other substances."

vidual substance, upon the Doctor's principles, one *simple* and *uncompounded* substance; which is what we assert: and if the substance be *individual*, the *attributes*, we hope, may be so too: and then all is right. You are used to pay a deference to the learned Doctor's judgment in other matters; do so in this: or if you are resolved to debate the point, dispute it first with him: he may probably give you good satisfaction, and save me any farther trouble.

You are displeas'd with me (p. 309.) for mentioning *parts* of the *divine substance*. But let your displeasure fall where it ought, upon the learned Doctor; who having subjected the divine substance to *extension*, has necessarily introduced *parts*; there being no *extension* where there are not *parts*. Besides that the Doctor has expressly admitted *parts*, provided only they be not *separable*, *compounded parts*, which I charge you not with. You say, indeed, that instead of *parts*, I should have said "partial apprehensions of its omnipresence." But, I beseech you, put me not off with *words*, nor with such answers as you would not yourself admit in another case. I am talking of the divine substance, which is not made up of *apprehensions*, but of somewhat *real*; which (upon your and the Doctor's *hypothesis*) must be called *extended parts*. You would laugh at us, if we should tell you that the three Persons are three *partial apprehensions*, when you ask us what they are; whether *beings* or not *beings*. Do not therefore put us off with empty sounds, when we ask you the like questions about the *parts* of the divine substance; whether *Beings* or *one Being*; and if one Being, whether one *individual* Being; and if so, whether *simple* or *complex*. By that time you have furnished out proper answers to these questions, all that you have objected about *individual* will drop and dwindle into nothing. And it will be great satisfaction to us to observe, how handsomely you can plead on the *opposite* side, and how ingeniously you can unravel your own sophistry. You may at length, perhaps, be sensible, that all the difficulties you have rais'd about *individual*, *numerical*, *specific*,

&c. resolve only into this ; that we know not precisely, in all cases, what to call *individual*, or *numerical*, or *specific*. You have a very distinct notion (in your way of thinking) of any *two parts* of the divine substance : and yet you know not whether it be proper to say, that *this* part is *individually* and *numerically* the same substance with the *other* part. You would be as much puzzled about *specific* ; since you would hardly think it sufficient to say, that they are *specifically* one and the same substance. Learn therefore, from hence, to distinguish between difficulties relating to *things*, and difficulties about *names* only.

You attempt to answer what I had urged in my Defence, vol. i. p. 208. where I had argued against the same *wisdom*, *goodness*, or any other attributes, being supposed to reside in infinitely distant parts. I thought no maxim clearer than this, that attributes of any subject reach not beyond their subject : and therefore whatever attribute is in *this substance*, cannot be also in *that substance* ; unless *this* substance be *that* substance. I did not urge these things as being of any *real* weight in themselves ; but only as having the very same weight as your objections against the doctrine of the *blessed Trinity* have, or ought to have : and I was to convince you of the folly of wading beyond your depth. You have answers, such as they are, ready for every thing ; either to show that you know *more*, or else know *less* than wise men do : for, it is one degree of knowledge to be sensible of one's ignorance. You tell me that the "same individual moment of time is every where, and the same individual truth is every where." Admitting this, why then may not the *same individual wisdom*, *power*, &c. be in *three Persons* ? But if I should ask you to give me any distinct notion of the same *individual moment* or the same *individual truth* being every where, possibly you might be strangely confounded. Is this *moment* or this *truth* substance or attribute ? If *attribute*, what is the *subject* of it ? If the *divine substance* be the subject, how can these *truths* and these *moments* reside in an extended subject, without being *coextended* ?

And how can the attributes of one part be the attributes of another part, any more than the *extension* of one is the extension of another? However, since you have been pleased to admit that this individual *truth* and that individual *moment* are "entirely in the whole, and entirely in every part of the universe;" we shall want a good reason why the same *individual attributes* may not be *entirely in the whole Trinity, and entirely in every Person of it*. But you will say, that you suppose the attributes *common*, and not *communicated*: and so there will be a difference between your *hypothesis* and ours. But, as the main difficulty lies in conceiving the *same attributes* to be *entirely in the whole, and entire in every Person*; this being happily got over, the other will create no difficulty. It is as easy to conceive the same thing *common in this manner*, as common in *that manner*: for there is no other difference but in the *manner*, between *common* and *communicated*. Having thus dispatched the main point, relating to the *principle of individuation*, (which stands just where it did,) you will not expect any farther answer to such objections as turn only upon the uncertain meaning of *individual*.

I freely own my ignorance, that I am not yet got beyond the common School definition: *Individua sunt quæ dividi non possunt in plura ejusdem nominis, et naturæ singularis*. Individual is something *undivided*, in such respect as it is conceived to be *one*: and *one* is something *single*, and not *multiplex*, in that respect wherein it is conceived to be *one*. I pretend not to make any man wiser by such an account as this: but it is proper to confess our *ignorance* where we know nothing. This, however, I pretend to be certain of, that every *individual* is, upon your principles, made up of *parts*; and that all *oneness*, or *sameness*, is by *union* of parts: otherwise there is nothing in the world that you can call *one substance*, or *same substance*, at all. Now, if *union* makes *oneness*, or *sameness*, you will be extremely puzzled to find out any *union* closer, or stronger, or higher, than that *union* which we conceive

to be among the three Persons. Why then may they not be one *individual* Substance, Being, God? Or the *same* individual Substance, Being, God? I like what St. Bernard^x has said of this matter; and leave you to confute it when you are able.

I may here take some notice of the author of the Appeal to a Turk, &c. who thinks it strange we should pretend to know that three Persons are *one Being*, when, by our own confession, *we know not precisely what makes one Being*, nor can fix upon any *certain principle of individuation*, p. 54. Now, as to the fact, that three Persons are *one God*, or *one Being*, we pretend to know it from Scripture: but as to the *manner* how they are *united*, we know it not at all. I suppose, we may know that soul and body are so united as to make *one man*; though we understand not the nature of the *union*: or that the parts of matter *cohere*, though we understand not the *manner* or *cause* of their *cohesion*. And if we are puzzled in accounting for the *union* of things so familiar to us, and suited to our capacities, what wonder is it, if our thoughts are lost in accounting for the *divine union* of the tremendous Deity? It is one thing to know that three Persons are *one God*, another to know *what makes* them *one*. If the author's objection lies only against calling the Persons *one Being*, as not being *scriptural*; we shall be content if he admits them to be *one God*, or *one Jehovah*, which is evidently *Scripture doctrine*. His reasoning, p. 56. is of the same size for acuteness and penetration with what he has, p. 54. If we have no *idea* of the manner *how* two may be *one*, he will infer, that "we have no idea either of two Persons "or of one God." That is to say, if we have no *idea* of the manner *how* soul and body make *one man*, we have no idea of *soul*, or *body*, or of *one man*. Now the case is this; we have an idea of the *Persons* united, and we un-

^x Inter omnia quæ recte unum dicuntur, arcem tenet Unitas Trinitatis; qua Personæ tres una substantia sunt: secundo loco, illa præcellit, qua, e converso, tres substantiæ una in Christo persona sunt. *Bernard. de Conf.* lib. v. c. 8.

derstand that they are *one*, having a confuse general idea of *unity*: but as to the internal *cause*, or particular *manner* of the union, we have no *idea* of it. What is there strange or surprising in this, unless it be strange for *ignorant* creatures to know only *in part*, and to be able to understand something without knowing every thing? But to return to you.

I shall now look back, to see if there be any incidental passages under this Query deserving notice. Page 303, I find you endeavouring to prop up the Doctor's aphorism, that "necessary agents are no agents, and necessary causes "no causes." This is also strife about *words*; in which the cause is nothing concerned. For admitting all you would have, it comes to this only; that the ancients have *improperly* called the Father an *Agent*, or *Cause*, in respect of the *generation*: the doctrine will stand exactly as before, only in other *terms*. And you must not pretend to *change* the sense of the *ancients* in respect of the words *act* or *cause*; and still appeal to their expressions as countenancing your *novel* notions: that will be affronting the readers indeed. But let us inquire a little into this *new* philosophy. I asked, whether an infinitely *active* Being can ever *cease* to act? To which you answer not a word. I asked, whether God's *loving himself* (which is loving every thing that is good, and which general love, or *natural propensity*, seems to be the *prime mover* in all the divine acts) be not *acting*? To which you reply nothing. I believe we are almost out of our depth here, and might more modestly leave the *divine acts* to that divine Being who alone understands the nature of them. But since you pretend to be wise in such high things, I may put a few questions to you concerning them. You say, "the essence of action is exerting of power, and the will is "the original of all exerting of power." Well, let *action* be exerting of power: Does God never *naturally* or *necessarily* exert any power? Who can be wise enough to know these things? But, the "will is the original:" and is not the *will* itself determined by essential wisdom,

goodness, and truth? And why is not that as much the *original* which determines, as that which is determined? How is it that God cannot but *will* good, cannot but *will* happiness: as, on the other hand, he cannot but *will* evil, cannot but *will* unhappiness? Are *approving* and *disapproving* the same with *knowing* good and evil? Or does he not rather *approve* and *disapprove*, because he *knows* why? How hard a thing then is it to distinguish between what shall be called *acts*, or *actions*, and what not? You have discarded all that in common speech passes under the name of *action*. Walking, riding, running, are no *acts*: they are *bodily motions*, following the impulses of something else that moves and actuates. Human *acts* must be confined to what is *invisible*, to what passes in the dark recesses of our minds. And here our *ideas* are very defective and obscure; and our language almost all *improper* and *metaphorical*; taken from bodily motions, which are no acts. . We may divide the powers or faculties of the mind into *perceptive* and *active*: and we may call the latter by the name of *will*. But still what is that perpetual *activity* of the mind, that general pursuit of happiness, and avoidance of misery, which is not merely *perceptive*, and yet is *necessary* and *unavoidable*? It will be said, perhaps, that it is *natural*, resulting from our *nature*; that is, from God, who gave us our nature: and so herein we *act* not, but are *acted* upon. Be it so; let us next go higher, to the first cause of all things: are there no *natural* and *necessary* propensities there, no *natural* or *necessary* aversions; in a word, no *willings* and *nillings*, which are as *necessary* as it is to exist? Yet they are *acts*, *internal* acts; and the ground of all *external*: or else we know not what *acts* are. But enough of this matter; which, as I before observed, is entirely foreign to the cause.

You object, that the Father is not *αἰῖος*, (as Basil styles him,) if the Son *necessarily* coexists with him. But he is *αἰῖος*, notwithstanding, in Basil's sense of *αἰῖος*, in the ancient sense of *αἰῖος*, when *necessary causes* were styled

causes: and can any thing be more ridiculous than to plead *ancient* phrases, and not to take them in their *ancient* sense? Could not I, in this way, quote Dr. Clarke, Mr. Whiston, Mr. Emlyn, (and indeed whom not?) as being perfectly in my sentiments; let me but put a sense upon their words as I please, however contrary to the known, certain sense of the author's? Was there ever a wilder method of supporting an hypothesis?

You have something, p. 305, which is reasonably put, and deserves consideration. I had pressed you with insuperable difficulties relating to the *omnipresence*, and other undoubted truths. To which you reply, that the "omnipresence is a truth demonstrated by reason, and "affirmed in Scripture;" which our doctrine is not, at least not so certainly: that therefore though the *difficulties* be equal, here and there, yet the *positive* evidence is not. You will forgive me for putting your argument somewhat clearer and stronger than you had done. Now to this I answer, that our *positive* evidence from Scripture is very great and full; as hath been often shown. I will here mention but one argument of it, viz. that you have not been able to *elude* our proof of the *Son's* divinity, without eluding, at the same time, every proof of the *Father's* divinity also; as I have shown above[†]. Is not this a very sensible and a very affecting demonstration of the strength of our *Scripture proofs*? You add farther, that our doctrine is "impossible to be understood." A groundless calumny, which I confuted at large[‡]. Is *omnipresence* impossible to be understood, which you say can be *demonstrated*? or is our doctrine more hard to be conceived than that is? But you pretend an *insuperable* difficulty in our scheme, that it makes more *supreme Gods* than one: which is another calumny as groundless as the former. You ask, are not two supreme Gods, though undivided, two supreme Gods? Yes, certainly;

[†] Page 230, &c.

[‡] Defence, vol. i. p. 218, &c.

but two *supreme Persons*, that is, two equally supreme in *nature*, (though not in *order*,) and *undivided* in substance, are not *two Gods*, but *one God*. You add, that making "one substance" is not the same thing with making "one God." To which it is sufficient to say, How do you know? or how came you to be wiser, in this particular, than all the Christian churches early and late? The *heathens*, you tell me, did not pretend that their subordinate deities, though *consubstantial*, were equally *supreme*. They were therefore the more silly in supposing them *consubstantial*, and not *supreme*; that is, of the *same nature*, and yet of a *different nature*. But the heathens were farther wrong in making more *deities* than *one*, supreme and inferior: wherein you copy after them, adopting their *Polytheism*, and *paganizing* Christianity, as Dr. Cudworth expresses it.

You accuse me, (p. 311.) as "presumptuously" calling my doctrine "the doctrine of the blessed Trinity," in opposition to yours. But why will you give yourself these affected airs? Great *presumption*, indeed, to believe that the Catholic Church has kept the true faith, while Eunomians and Arians made shipwreck of it. But it is high *presumption* in a few private men to revive old *heresies*, and to talk as confidently of them, as if they had never been confuted. A modest man would be apt to distrust his own judgment, when it runs counter to so many eminent lights of the Christian Church, and has been so often condemned by the wiser and better part of the Christian world. A becoming deference would appear well in a case of this nature: nor do I know any thing short of *infallibility* that can either warrant or excuse this big way of talking which you affect to appear in.

You intimate, (p. 311.) that it is not *reason*, but *Scripture* you appeal to; and that you will here *join issue with me*, apart from *metaphysical hypotheses*. Agreed: discharge then your *metaphysics* for the future; let us hear no more of *self-existence*, to *divide* the Father from the Son, when *Scripture* tells us they are *one*. Let us no

more be told, that *begetting* is an *act*, and every *act* is of the *will*: this is all *metaphysical*. Wave all farther discourse about *specific*, and *individual*, and *intelligent agent*, and the like, to hinder plain Christians from seeing that Scripture makes no more Gods but *one*; never supposes the Son *another* God, nor admits Father and Son to be *two Gods*. Drop your pretences about subordination of *offices*, as implying distinct *authorities*, *unequal* power, *independence* on one hand, *subjection* on the other: such reasonings are *metaphysical*. Let us hear no more that three *divine* Persons must be three *personal Gods*, three *Beings*, three *Substances*; and that there can be no Unity of Godhead, but *identical* personal Unity, confined to one Person solely: these are *metaphysics*; deep, profound *metaphysics*. Tell us no more that *derived* and *underived* powers cannot be the *same* powers, nor any *equality* stand with the distinct *relations* or *offices* of a *father* and a *son*. Give up your famed *dilemma* against the Unity, that each Person must be either the *same*, *whole*, *identical* substance, or else an *homogeneous undivided part* of that substance: and your other *dilemma*, that the Persons must either have the same *identical life*, or distinct *identical lives*; neither of which (you imagine) can stand with our principles. These are abstract *metaphysical* speculations, such as never disturbed the churches of Christ, until many years after they had professed their *faith* in, and paid their *worship* to, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as the one true God. Wave these things for the future, and we shall readily join issue with you upon *Scripture* alone; and shall then believe that you mean what you say, when you hereafter plead for the laying aside of *metaphysics*. We desire no metaphysics but in our own necessary self-defence: if you begin in that way, we must also enter the lists in the same way, and oppose *false* metaphysics with *true*; to show the world your wanderings and your inconsistencies, even in what you most rely upon, and (though you will not own it) almost solely trust to.

QUERY X.

Whether, if they (the attributes belonging to the Son) be not individually the same, they can be any thing more than faint resemblances of them, differing from them as finite from infinite; and then in what sense, or with what truth can the Doctor pretend that all divine powers, except absolute supremacy and independency, are communicated to the Son? And whether every being, besides the one Supreme Being, must not necessarily be a creature and finite; and whether all divine powers can be communicated to a creature, infinite perfection to a finite being?

I FIND nothing in your farther reply (which is no reply) to this Query, but what I have fully obviated in my Defence, and now in my answer to the other Queries above. All that the reader can learn from what you have here said, is, that if the question be, what it is not, viz. *Whether the Son be the Father*; you have something to plead for the negative: but if it be, as it really is, *Whether the Son be a creature and finite*; you have nothing to say to it. The evidence is so full and strong against you, that you dare not submit it to a fair hearing. Allow you but to wrap yourself up in *ambiguous terms, supremacy, self-existence, individual, &c.* and you are willing to hold on a frivolous and tedious dispute, of no benefit to the readers: but bring you down to plain sense and fixed terms, then you draw off, and take your leave. A conduct suitable to such a cause, but very unworthy of the hands engaged in it.

QUERY XI.

Whether if the Doctor means by divine powers, powers given by God, (in the same sense as angelical powers are divine powers,) only in a higher degree than are given to other beings; it be not equivocating, and saying nothing: no-

thing that can come up to the sense of those texts before cited, or to these following?

Applied to the one God.

Thou, even thou, art Lord alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their hosts, the earth, and all things that are therein, &c. Neh. ix. 6.

In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth, Gen. i. 1.

To God the Son.

All things were made by him, John i. 3. By him were all things created; he is before all things, and by him all things consist. Coloss. i. 16, 17.

Thou, Lord, in the beginning, hast laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the works of thy hands. Heb. i. 10.

THE questions here were, what Dr. Clarke meant by *divine* powers, and whether his meaning comes up to the texts here cited. I am now told, that the "divine powers of the Son are not only in a higher degree than angelical powers, but totally of a different kind: for" (let us observe the reason) "to the Son is committed all judgment," p. 316. Well then, the Son's *divine powers* are at last dwindled into his *offices* given him by God; therefore *divine* most certainly. This is the *divinity* of God the Son, which you stand up so zealously for in your preface; and for the sake of which you are so highly affronted to be thought opposers of Christ's *divinity*. But let us go on. I insist upon the Son's having *creative powers*, according to the texts cited, and as I have proved more at large in my Sermons. You have little to reply, but that *derived* and *underived* are not the same: whereas they are the same, because they descend from one to the other: were they both *underived*, they could not (at least according to the *ancients*) have been the same. *Derived* and *underived* may be the *same substance*, as well as *greater* and *less*, *containing* and *contained*, may be the *same substance*: which you are forced to allow in your *hypothesis* of the extended parts of the same substance. And why must you be perpetually quibbling upon the different senses, or kinds of *sameness*, and using arguments against

us, which inevitably recoil upon yourselves? Do but keep to that strict sense of *sameness* which you are using against us, in the argument about *derived* and *underived*; and I will demonstrate to you, upon your own principles, as before hinted, that there is no such thing as *one* and the *same* substance in the world.

In answer to hard arguments, in this Query, you return me *hard* names. “Heaps of contradictions, not treating “the argument seriously;” in short, any thing that first came into your head, being at a loss for an *answer*, and resolved not to be entirely silent. You are cavilling at the account I gave of the *ancients*, as assigning to three Persons their several parts and provinces in the work of creation. I observed what meaning they had in it^a, and that their words are not to be strictly and rigorously interpreted. Have you a syllable to object to the truth of this report? Not a word: the thing is too plain and evident to be gainsaid. The truth is, if the *ancients* are to be interpreted rigorously, the Father is not *properly* Creator at all, but the Son only; for he is represented as *doing* and *executing*, the Father as issuing out *orders* only. But who can entertain so absurd a thought, as that the Father did not *work* in the creation as much as the Son? Again, the Father is represented as standing in *need*^b of the assistance of the Son and Holy Ghost. How will this suit with that *supreme* dignity, that *alone* self-sufficiency, which you are contending for? If you interpret this rigorously, it must be as great a lessening to the Father as you pretend the *executing* of another’s *orders* is to the Son. It is

^a Defence, vol. i. p. 131.

^b Ως βοηθίας χεζζων ὁ Θεὸς ἐπίσταται λόγων ποιήσωμεν ἀνθρώπων κατ’ εἰκόνα καὶ κατ’ ὁμοίωσιν. οὐκ ἄλλα δὲ ἐνι εἴρησι ποιήσωμεν, ἀλλ’ ἢ ἐν ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ, καὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῦ σοφίᾳ. *Theoph. Antioch.* p. 114.

Nec enim indigebat horum Deus ad faciendum quæ ipse apud se prædefini-
erit fieri, quasi ipse suas non haberet manus. *Iren.* p. 253.

Si necessaria est Deo materia ad opera mundi ut Hermogenes existimavit;
habuit Deus materiam longe digniorem—Sophiam suam scilicet—ma-
teriam materiarum—quali Deus potuit *eguisse*, sui magis quam alieni
egenus. *Tertul. contr. Hermog.* cap. 18.

plain therefore, that these sayings of the *ancients* were intended only to preserve a more lively sense of the *distinction* of Persons; while they considered them altogether as equally concerned in the creation, and equally working in it. You object that no ancient writer ever said that the three Persons “created in concert,” p. 299. But what did the *ancients*^c mean then, by understanding the text of Genesis, “Let us make man,” of all the three Persons? And what did they mean by giving the Son the title of *σύμβουλος*^d, *Counsellor* to the Father, in that work? How much does this come short of what I said? Nor can you make any thing more of *αὐθεντία*, (a word which rarely occurs,) or of *auctoritas*^e, (which is used oftener,) than the preeminence of the Father as *Father*, his priority of *order*. When you wrote before, you were confident that the Son was not styled *ποιητὴς τῶν ὄλων*: and this you noted, to confirm your fiction, that the Father only was *efficient* cause, the Son *instrumental*. You have been since convinced of your error by plain testimonies given you in great numbers^f. But still you go on in your pretence about *efficient* and *instrumental*, notwithstanding *ποιητὴς*, which you had before allowed to be expressive of the *efficient* cause. Now the defect is, that the Son is not *ὁ ποιητὴς*: and neither is that true, for I cited Eusebius for *ὁ ποιητὴς* applied to God the Son. I have spoke of *διὰ* before, and so here pass it over. You are persuading me that even Cyril of Jerusalem, whom I quoted in my Defence, (vol. i. p. 130.) is expressly against me. Ridiculous to any that know Cyril: you can mean this only for such as do not read. If there is any thing to be suspected of Cyril, it is rather his excluding the Father from being

^c Barn. Ep. cap. 5, 6. Herm. Past. Sim. 5. Justin. Mart. Dial. p. 185. Irenæus, p. 220, 295. Theoph. Antioch. 114. Origen. contr. Cels. p. 63, 257. Synod. Antioch. Labbé, tom. i. p. 845.—See Dr. Knight's first Sermon.

^d Iren. p. 292. Clem. Alex. p. 769, 832. Tertullian. contr. Hermog. p. 18. Theoph. Antioch. p. 129. Hippolyt. vol. ii. p. 13.

^e *Insinuat nobis in Patre auctoritas, in Filio natiuitas, in Spiritu Sancto Patris Filique communitas, in tribus æqualitas.* August. Serm. 11.

^f Defence, vol. i. p. 134, 135.

Creator, than the Son from being *efficient*. But the late learned Benedictine editor has sufficiently cleared up Cyril's orthodoxy on that head. I charged^h you with opposing *efficient* to *ministering* cause; either very unskilfully or very unfairly. Now you would seem to come off by making the Father *efficient*, *by way of eminence*. Why then did you not allow both to be *efficient*, and leave the *eminence* only to the Father, that the readers might understand you, and that I might save myself the trouble of disputing that point? Let but both be equally *efficient*, and as to the *eminence of order* in the *efficiency*, (which is all you can make of it,) I readily assent to it.

You tell me of Origen's making the Father *πρῶτος δημιουργός*, the *first and principal* Creator: as if Origen admitted two *Creators*. But if you mean not to deceive your readers, you should tell them, that Origen never uses the phrase of *πρῶτος δημιουργός*, but where he is retorting upon his adversary Pagan testimonies in the Pagan styleⁱ; as was proper to do. But when Origen speaks in the Christian style, and is delivering his own sense; it is then *πρώτως δημιουργός*, *primarily* Creator^k. You have something more to urge from Origen, that the Son was *αὐτουργός*, *immediate worker* in the creation. Well then, I hope the Son was *efficient*; and, by your representation, more properly so than the Father, who only gave out *commands*. Are you sensible of what you are doing? Or have you a mind, at length, through your great zeal in attributing to the Father the *commanding part* only, to make him properly *no Creator* at all? If you strain the expressions of the *ancients* to the utmost rigour, that must be the consequence. Be content therefore to allow a proper latitude of construction, and a significant *mystery* in these things. But I have obviated all you have said upon this topic, about the Father's *commanding*, else-

^g Dissert. iii. p. 139, &c.

^h Defence, vol. i. p. 130.

ⁱ Origen. contr. Cels. p. 308. ^k Ibid. p. 317.

where¹. You quote Eusebius again, his *Demonstratio Evangelica*, which is of no consideration with me at all. What if he styles the Son ὄργανον, does he not style him δημοῦργημα too, in the same piece, though he contradicted it again afterwards? Why must Eusebius be thought to speak the sense of the *ancients*, especially in things where he manifestly ran counter to the ancient doctrine? You may see this very notion of the Son's being ὄργανον condemned by the famous Synod of Antioch^m long before Eusebius wrote. I value Eusebius in many things; but not where he attempted to deprave and corrupt the doctrine of his Catholic predecessors; perhaps to gratify some novelists, before he had well considered what he was doing. However, if any one has a mind to see what mild construction may be put upon that expression of Eusebius, he may consult Bishop Bull and Dr. Caveⁿ. For my own part, I think the best defence to be made for him is, that he seems to have grown wiser afterwards. You charge Basil with weakness for making Aëtius the inventor^o of the distinction between ὑπὸ and διὰ. But where was Basil's mistake? You say, Origen, Eusebius, and Philo insist upon it. But Philo's is only general, without application to this case: and Origen's and Eusebius's amount to no more than a *preeminence* of the *Father* as such. They do not carry it to a difference of *nature*, as Aëtius did^p; and you also do: you do it indeed under other terms, but as plainly, while you deny the *necessary existence* of the Son. You will find none

¹ Sermons, vol. ii. p. 42.

^m Οὕτω δὲ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντος ἔκτελεγοντες, ὡς Λόγου ἅμα καὶ Θεοῦ, δι' ἃ ἡ Πατὴρ πάντα πεποίηκε, οὐχ ὡς δι' ὄργανου, οὐδὲ ὡς δι' ἐπιπέρας ἀνοπιστάτου γινώσκοντες μὴ τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ὡς ζῶσαν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ὑπόστατον, ἐκτελοῦντα τὰ πάντα ἰσῶσιν.

ⁿ Bull. D. F. p. 256. Cav. Diss. iii. p. 66.

^o Basil. de Sp. Sancto, p. 145, &c.

^p The Synodicon Vetus agrees with Basil's account of Aëtius.

Ὁ γὰρ μακαρίτης Εὐστάθιος Ἀντιοχείας, ἐν τῷ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐπιπέρας ἀποπέρας, ἀείβει ὅτι, ἀόριστοι λέγοντες τὸ ἐξ ἃ, τῷ δι' ἃ, τὸν ἄριστον Εὐσέβιον διήλεγχε καὶ Ἄϊτιον. *Synod. Vetus. ap. Fabric. B. Gr. vol. xi. p. 211.*

higher than Aëtius, or Eusebius of Nicomedia, to countenance you in it. There is nothing more that is material under this Query.

You have not been able to take off the force of what is urged from *Scripture* and *antiquity* for the Son's *creative powers*: and that *creative powers* are *divine powers*, in quite another sense than the Doctor and you use the phrase, in the equivocating way, will be seen as we pass on.

QUERY XII.

Whether the Creator of all things was not himself uncreated; and therefore could not be ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, made out of nothing?

AS to your complaint of my wording this Query, and my styling Christ the *Creator of all things*; I refer to my Sermons^q, where I have proved the thing, and to my Defence^r, where I have shown that it is the language of all *antiquity* to style him *Creator*, and not barely in your deceitful way, him, “by whom God created all things,” while you inform us not what you mean by it. You say, you “affirm not (nay, you blame those that presume to affirm) that the Son of God was created, or that he was ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing.” With what sincerity you say this, let the reader judge from the *nine arguments* I produced in my Supplement, to show that you make the Son a *creature*^s. How you may *equivocate*, I know not: but I am sure you dare not tell us distinctly what you mean by saying, you blame those that affirm that the Son is “out of nothing:” it is either a mean quibble, or something worse that you are ashamed to own. You are pleased to give up some criticisms of Dr. Clarke's in relation to a passage of Origen which I had took notice of in my Defence^t; so that we have done with. Still you

^q Vol. ii. Serm. 2 and 3.

^r Vol. ii. p. 354, &c.

^s Vol. i. p. 133, &c.

^t Vol. i. p. 140, &c.

talk of "ten thousand passages" in Origen, as opposite to my sentiments. When you were in the way of *romancing*, (which has no certain rule,) you did well to take a large number. I challenge you to produce a *single* passage from any piece of his, that is to be depended on, which either directly or indirectly makes the Son a *creature*. That, you know, was the point here in question.

The remainder of this Query is filled with all the worthless trifles you could rake up from Sandius, or others, to represent the *ancients* as making the Son a *creature*. At the same time, because you know they have been answered, and that you cannot stand by them, (yet having a strong propensity to make use of them, for the deception of ignorant readers,) you produce them with this faint and disingenuous censure upon them. "I think that the writers I have here cited were mistaken in their judging about consequences, when they thus charged with *Arianism* the most learned and most eminent men the Christian Church ever had." Permit me here, for a while, to choose myself a new *adversary*; one that *honestly* professes his belief of the Son's being a *creature*, and has produced those very passages, most of them, as favouring those sentiments; which he is not *afraid* nor *ashamed* (while maintaining, as he believes, the honour of the *great God*) to call his *own*. After long and deliberate considering the question of the Son's being a *creature* or no *creature*, the argument he mainly depends on^u, with respect to the sentiments of the *ancients*, is this: the universal application of the words in Prov. viii. 22. "The Lord created me the beginning of his ways, &c." by the ancient Christians, to the *creation* of Christ by God the Father. And indeed, hardly any thing can be brought out of the *ancients*, at all looking like it, but what is either the application of, or allusion to this text. The argument then is this: the text in the Proverbs has ἐκτίσας, according to the *Seventy*: the Fa-

^u See Mr. Whiston's Reply to Lord Nottingham, p. 28.

thers, knowing little or no Hebrew, followed that rendering: *ἐκτίσθαι* signifies *created*: therefore the Fathers, in general, believed and taught that the Son is a *creature*. The argument would be irrefragable, if the word *ἐκτίσθαι*, as it might signify what is pretended, could be shown to have been so understood by the Fathers. But if *created* may signify *appointed*, or *constituted*, (as in good Latin authors, *consuls*, *captains*, *magistrates*, are said to be *created*, and we sometimes use the word in English, of *creating* a peer, or *creating* any officer,) and it may be certainly shown that some Fathers so understood it, and no proof can be given that any of them understood it otherwise; then there will appear such a flaw in the argument, as the wit of man will not be able to make up. We have it upon record, that this very point came to be considered about the middle of the third century, by Dionysius of Rome*, (with his clergy;) who fearing, upon the rise of *Sabellianism*, lest some should run into the opposite extreme of making the Son a *creature*, first condemns all such doctrine, as highest *blasphemy*, and next answers what had been urged by some from this text, expressing himself as follows: “ And what need I
 “ say more of these things to you, men full of the Holy
 “ Ghost, and well knowing what absurdities follow upon
 “ the supposition of the Son’s being a *creature*? To which
 “ the leaders in that opinion seem to me not to have well
 “ attended, and so they have very much erred from the
 “ truth; interpreting that place, ‘ The Lord created me
 “ the beginning of his ways,’ not according to the mean-
 “ ing of the divine and sacred writ. For, as you know,
 “ *ἐκτίσθαι* is a word of more senses than one, *ἐκτίσθαι*, *created*,
 “ here stands for *ἐπέστησεν*, appointed, over the works (God)
 “ had made by the Son himself. The word *ἐκτίσθαι* is not
 “ here to be understood to be the same as *ἐποίησεν*: for
 “ *ποιῆσαι* and *κτίσαι* are very different.” Here we find

* Apud Athanas. p. 232.

how that text was understood by the most considerable men of the Church about the year 259.

And let it not here be objected, that the piece is of doubtful credit, because extant only in Athanasius : for nobody that knows any thing of Athanasius, and is not strangely bigotted to an *hypothesis*, can suspect any foul play in this matter. It is the less to be suspected here, because, as I shall show presently, Athanasius did not entirely approve of this construction of Dionysius, and would certainly never have forged an interpretation different from his *own*. Besides, it is observable that Eusebius, in his famous piece against Marcellus, interprets that text in the very same manner as Dionysius had done, defending it at large by several parallel places of Scripture. He interprets *ἔκτισε* by *κατέταξε* and *κατίστησεν*, *appointed*, or *constituted*. So that we have very great reason to believe that this was the prevailing and current construction of Prov. viii. 22. in the Ante-Nicene church. What confirms it is, that they all understood *ἀρχὴν* in the *active* sense, for *Head* or *Principle*, just as Dionysius and Eusebius do : and so the sense is, that *the Father appointed the Son Head over all his works*.

That this was the sense of *ἀρχὴ* all along, may be proved ^z from Justin, Theophilus, Tatian, Clemens, Origen, and Methodius, to name no more : which consideration is alone sufficient in the case, when there is no positive proof on the other side. Only I must add further, that clear and strong passages may be brought, from the Fathers in general, to prove that they believed the Son to be *un-created*. Seeing then that this text may bear such a sense as has been mentioned ; seeing it was certainly so interpreted by some, and no reason appears for Mr. Whiston's interpretation at all ; but the sense of *ἀρχὴ*, as understood by the ancients, is entirely against him, as also many clear

^r Euseb. contr. Marcell. p. 150, 151.

^z See Bull. D. F. p. 210.

testimonies of the Son's being uncreated: these considerations put together are enough to show that there is no force in the argument drawn from the Fathers following the LXX, and reading *ἔκτισε* in that text.

But I farther promised to give some account of Athanasius, in relation to this text; because Mr. Whiston^a has been pleased to say some very hard, and indeed unjust things of him, in relation hereto. Athanasius could not be at a loss to know the meaning of *ἔκτισε*, which had been so well explained both by Dionysius and Eusebius. He therefore closed in with the common interpretation, as signifying *appointed*, or *constituted*^b. But then he understood the *appointing* to be to the work of *redemption* only, not the work of *creation*: at least he makes no mention of the latter. He seems to have been apprehensive that the notion of *appointing* to the work of *creation* might sound too low: and indeed many of the Arians scrupled not to say as much, at least, in words. Athanasius thought the way of speaking not so proper, his notion being that the Father could no more create without the Son^c, than exist without him, both being alike necessary; and therefore *appointing* was not so proper a word for it. This principle he lays down in the very same Oration, where he at large comments upon Prov. viii. 22. Nevertheless it may be said, that this great man might perhaps be too scrupulous in this matter. Cyril^d of Je-

^a Reply to Lord Nottingham, p. 29.

^b Athanas. Orat. ii. p. 513.

^c Οὐκ ἠδύνατο μὴ δι' αὐτοῦ γινώσκειν τὰ δημιουργήματα. καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ φῶς τῆ ἀπαυγάσματος τὰ πάντα φωτίζει καὶ ἄνω τοῦ ἀπαυγάσματος οὐκ ἂν τι φωτισθῆναι αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ πατὴρ ὡς διὰ χειρὸς, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ εἰργάσατο τὰ πάντα, καὶ χειρὸς αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν οὐκ. Athan. Orat. ii. p. 498, 499.

^d Cyril. Hieros. Catech. xi. p. 160.

Πατὴρ βουληθὴντος τὰ πάντα κατασκευᾶσθαι, τῷ τῷ πατρὸς νόμῳ ὁ υἱὸς τὰ πάντα ἰδημοῦργησεν. ἵνα τηρῆ τῷ πατρὶ τὴν ἀδιδντικὴν ἕξουσιαν, καὶ ὁ υἱὸς δὲ πάλιν ἔχη ἕξουσιαν τῶν ἰδίων δημιουργημάτων, &c.

Theodorit's account of this matter appears to be as just and accurate as any.

Ὅστις ὁ πατὴρ βουληθείας διόμενος κτίσει διὰ υἱοῦ, οὗτοι ὁ υἱὸς βουληθείας χρῆζων, κτίσει

rusalem (whose orthodoxy is unquestionable) scruples not to assign a reason why the Son was appointed to create: and it has been usual with all the Christian writers to represent all *offices* as descending from the Father to the Son. Athanasius himself allows that God the Son wrought in the creation, upon the Father's issuing out his *fiat*, or *command* for it: as also do several other Post-Nicene writers^e. This in reality comes to the same thing with what others intended by *appointing*, or *constituting* to the work of creation.

But here indeed Athanasius guards against the notion of the Son's being *ὑπουργός*, an *underworker*, in the low Arian sense: for otherwise he admits that the Father wrought *by* and *in* the Son. And I doubt not but it was his apprehension of the Arians misconstruing the *appointing*, which made him so scrupulous in relation to Prov. viii. The expression however, when it is not abused, is very innocent; and some zealous Athanasians^f were not afraid to understand Prov. viii. 22. of God the Son's being *appointed* and *constituted* Creator, and Head over all the works of God. Faustinus, that severe and rigid Homousian, of the Eustathian party, and Luciferian sect, understands that text of Christ, as being appointed by the Father, the *Head* and *Conductor* of all his works, as well of *creation* as redemption^g. Let this suffice to have shown the sense of antiquity upon that text.

διὰ τῆ πνεύματος, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων διχθῆ πατρὸς, καὶ υἱοῦ, καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἡ σωτηρία. *Dial. iv. adv. Macedon.* p. 367.

^e Athanas. p. 216, 499. Hilarius, p. 325, 837, 840. Basil. de Sp. S. c. 16. Greg. Nyss. tom. i. p. 993. tom. ii. p. 454.

^f Hoc initium habeat Sapientia Dei, quod de Deo processit ad creanda omnia tam caelestia quam terrestria, non quo cæperit esse in Deo. *Creata* est ergo Sapientia, imo genita; non sibi quæ semper erat, sed his quæ ab ea fieri oportebat. *Hilar. Diacon. apud Ambros.* p. 349.

^g Quod *creata* est Sapientia, ad mysterium vel *rerum creandarum*, vel *humana dispensationis* intellige: quam cum Dei Sapientia dignanter adsumit, *creata* dicitur. *Faustin. contr. Arian.* c. vi. p. 153.

Sapientia cum *creata* dicitur, non substantia ejus quasi quæ non erat, facta est: sed ipsa existens *creata est initium viarum in opera ejus.* *Ibid.*

Now I return to you, who are entertaining your reader with a collection of *scandal*, and which you *know* to be such, for the greatest part of it. The *scandal* is produced at length; and what should have been, and has been pleaded to remove and confute it, is disingenuously kept out of sight: only it is said by you, "sufficient apologies have been made" for this or that Father, to show that he was not indeed of Arius's notions. But what then? You pretend that your notions were not Arius's: so you would still have your reader apprehend that those Fathers might have been in *your* notions; whereas Bp. Bull, in his confutation of those *scandals*, (most of them *misreports*, and some of them malicious tales and lies,) has effectually prevented their being really serviceable either to Arius's cause or yours; which in reality (however you disguise the matter) are the very same. The conclusion you draw from this heap of stuff is pretty remarkable: "It evidently shows, that those ancient Fathers had not entertained such a confused notion as you are labouring to introduce of the Creator of all things:" whereas it is evident, to a demonstration, that my *confused notion* (as you unrighteously call it) was the very notion which all those Fathers had: or, if you think otherwise, why did you not distinctly show where they contradict it, instead of producing a deal of idle tales, which (though you would have your reader lay some stress on) you yourself dare not undertake to defend?

Where is the consequence to be drawn from such premises? As let us see. The Apostolical Constitutions, which are *spurious* and *interpolated* by some Arian, have said something; therefore &c. Melito is said to have wrote *περὶ κρίσεως Χριστοῦ*, which learned men doubt of; and neither Ruffinus nor Jerome would allow; therefore &c. Clemens has been charged with some things of which he was very *innocent*; therefore &c. Dionysius had enemies that told *lies* of him, abused him, and misrepresented his words; and some honest men were deceived thereby; therefore &c. Gregory likewise met with some that per-

verted his words, (as many have perverted our *Articles* or *Liturgy*;) therefore &c. In short, several other very *orthodox* men have been either falsely charged, or wrongfully suspected: therefore undoubtedly Dr. Waterland is mistaken in supposing them to have been *orthodox*. I refer the reader to Bp. Bull, who has abundantly answered what relates to these trifling accusations. Only, because you seem to insult and triumph the most in respect of Origen, I shall be at the trouble of giving the reader some account of that great man and his writings, and their hard fate in the world.

Origen was one that wrote much, and sometimes in haste: and it might be no great wonder if some uncautious things might sometimes drop from him; or if his writings, passing through ignorant or malicious hands, might be otherwise represented than he intended or wrote. He complained of such misrepresentations in his life-time; and made an apology for things of that kind in a letter to Pope Fabian, about the year 248. The doctrine of a co-eternal and consubstantial Trinity could be no new thing at that time. It appears by the famous case of Dionysius, but about ten years after, that it was the settled faith of the Church; and that the generality, at least, were extremely jealous of the appearance of any thing that seemed to break in upon it. Origen's works however were still in great esteem; and it does not appear that, for many years after his death, they were ever charged with heterodoxy in that article. Gregory Thaumaturgus, and Dionysius of Alexandria, whose orthodoxy in that doctrine has been abundantly vindicated by Bp. Bull, were great admirers of the man, and of his writings. Methodius, about the year 290, (a man of orthodox principles,) began to impugn some of Origen's doctrines: but laid nothing to his charge in relation to the Trinity. About the year 308, he first began to have articles drawn up against him; and among the several charges, there were some upon that head. Pamphilus and Eusebius then undertook to apologize for him; not by justifying any thing that seemed to lessen

the divinity of the Son or Holy Ghost, but by showing from Origen's own writings, that his doctrine was on the side of Christ's divinity, and against the Holy Ghost's being a *creature*. This appears from the remains we have of that *Apology*, according to Ruffin's translation; who professes solemnly that he did not add a syllable, but made a just and literal translation. So that though Ruffin's other versions, where he professes to have taken a liberty, are the less to be depended on, this is of another kind, and may more securely be confided in: from whence I would take notice by the way, that even Eusebius at this time, before the rise of the Arian controversy, appears to have been very orthodox. I know there is an objection to be made out of Jerome: which the reader may see answered in Bp. Bull^h.

After Pamphilus, we find mention made of another *apologist*ⁱ, a very orthodox man himself, in respect of the Trinity, even in the judgment of Photius; who was used to judge too severely sometimes of the ancients, comparing their expressions too rigidly with those in use in his own times. That *apologist* acquits Origen as to any erroneous doctrine in the article of the *Trinity*: only he allows that Origen's zeal against *Sabellianism* might sometimes draw him into expressions that *seemed* to go too far the other way. Let us now come down to the Arian times. About the year 330, or later, the Arians endeavour to gain some countenance from Origen's writings: and some of the more zealous Catholics of the Eustathian party, who were for professing one *hypostasis*, had no opinion of Origen. The reason, I presume, was, because Origen every where insists upon the *distinction* of persons very much, and seemed not very reconcileable to the Eustathian way of professing one *hypostasis*. Origen therefore was much out of favour with that more rigid part of the Catholics; who differed from the rest in *expression*

^h Bull. Def. F. p. 125.

ⁱ Photius, Cod. cxvii. p. 293.

rather than real meaning, as appeared fully afterwards^k. Athanasius all the while stood up for Origen, and vindicated his own doctrine from Origen's writings^l. Gregory Nazianzen and Basil were both of them friends of Origen; defending his orthodoxy against the Arians^m. This was about the year 360. And though Basil thought Origen's notion of the Holy Ghost not to have been *altogether sound*, yet he objects nothing against him in respect of God the *Son*: and as to the *Holy Ghost*, he yet quotes passages from him where Origen spoke conformably to the doctrine and tradition of the Churchⁿ. And possibly the other suspected passages might not be Origen's own.

Titus of Bostra, another orthodox man of that time, was an advocate of Origen.

About 370, flourished Didymus, who is known to have been very zealous for the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, and zealous also for Origen; looking upon those as weak men, and of small sagacity, that suspected Origen on that head^o. Hitherto we have found no considerable men that condemned Origen as *heterodox* in the doctrine of the Trinity. The Catholics of greatest name and reputation asserted the contrary.

Let us come a little lower, to the year 380, and we shall now perceive a storm gathering; chiefly, I presume, by the means and the interest of the Eustatbians, who had disliked Origen from the first. Epiphanius, about this time, was drawn in to be a party in the quarrel against the Origenists; and laid severe charges against Origen, even with respect to the doctrine of the Trinity. Ruffinus, at the same time, was a zealous advocate for Origen's orthodoxy; himself, as is well known, a strict Athanasian.

^k Vid. Athanasium ad Antiochenos, p. 773. Gregor. Nazianz. Orat. xxx. p. 396. Or. xxxii. p. 521.

^l Athanas. de Decret. Syn. N. p. 232.

^m Vid. Socrat. Eccl. H. lib. iv. c. 26. p. 246.

ⁿ Basil. de Sp. Sanct. c. xxix. p. 219.

^o Vid. Hieronym. tom. iv. p. 347, 355, 409.

Jerome being now about fifty years old, was also a great admirer of Origen. Nay, in the years 388 and 391, when past sixty, he still retained the same kind of opinion of Origen and his writings: as appears by his calling him the “master of the churches, second to none but the “Apostles themselves^p.” He declares that those who had in Origen’s life-time censured him, did it not for any novel doctrine, or *heresy*, but for *envy*; because they could not bear the reputation he had raised^q. Now could Jerome, so orthodox a man himself, and who had translated Didymus in defence of the *divinity* of the *Holy Ghost*; could he ever have thus commended Origen, had he, at that time, believed him heterodox in the doctrine of the Trinity? Impossible. He gives no better a name than that of *barking dogs* to those that then charged Origen with *heresy*: though at the same time Arians, or Macedonians, and all impugnors of the *divinity* of *Christ* or the *Holy Ghost*, were *heretics* in Jerome’s account. To do Jerome justice, he stood up for Origen with resolution and courage some time; till finding the stream run strong, he thought it convenient to tack about: and then (as is the nature of *new converts* in any case) he grew zealous and vehement on the opposite side. Then he set himself, meanly, to run down the man whom before he had so much commended. He fell to criticising his works, sometimes manifestly perverting his sense, sometimes representing it by halves; always putting the worst constructions he possibly could upon his writings: as did also Epiphanius and Theophilus, who were afterwards joined with Anastasius Bishop of Rome, and many other Bishops of the west. Still Origen was not entirely destitute of some good and great defenders; as Gregory Nys-

^p Origenem, quem post Apostolos, ecclesiarum magistrum nemo nisi imperitus negabit. *Hieron. Pref. in Nom. Hebræ.*

^q Non propter dogmatum *novitatem*, non propter *hæresim*, ut nunc adversus eum rabidi canes insimulant; sed quia gloriam eloquentiæ ejus et scientiæ ferre non poterant; et illo dicente omnes muti putabantur. *Hieron. tom. iv. p. 67.*

sen, the great Chrysostom, (bred up under Meletius, and never of the Eustathian party,) Theotimus, and John of Jerusalem. Severus Sulpitius, of that time, is a kind of neuter, passing a doubtful and moderate censure. St. Austin^r appears doubtful; but, taking his accounts from Epiphanius, or other adversaries, leans to the severer side. Vincentius Lirinensis^s inclines to think that the plea about Origen's writings being *adulterated*^t might be very just. Socrates and Sozomen, of the fifth century, defend Origen's orthodoxy, and think he had been greatly misrepresented. Theodorit, of the same age, has been justly looked upon as a favourer of Origen; because he reckons not the Origenists in his list of *heretics*: as neither did Philastrius, who wrote sixty years before him. What followed in the *sixth century*, under Justinian, is rather too late to come into account.

From what hath been said, it appears, that though antiquity were much divided in their sentiments of Origen's orthodoxy, in respect of the Trinity; yet the most early and the most valuable men down to the times of Jerome, (and for a long while Jerome himself,) had acquitted him on that head. This account is a sufficient answer to what you have raked together in pages 327, 328, 329, 330. And I must observe, that were it really fact that Origen had taught what you pretend in respect to the article of the *Trinity*, it would by no means follow that he was

^r Origeniani—mortuorum resurrectionem negant, Christum autem et Spiritum Sanctum *creaturam* dicunt—Hæc quidem de Origene, Epiphanius refert. Sed defensores ejus dicunt Origenem Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum *unius ejusdemque substantiæ* docuisse; neque resurrectionem repulisse mortuorum. Sed qui ejus plura legerunt, contradicunt—

Dicit præterea ipse Origenes quod Filius Dei sanctis hominibus comparatus veritas sit, Patri collatus mendacium; et quantum distant Apostoli Christo, tantum Filius Patri. Unde nec orandus est Filius, &c. *Augustin. Hæres. 43.*

^s Sed dicat aliquis, *corruptos esse Origenis libros*. Non resisto, quin potius malo: nam id a quibusdam et traditum et scriptum est; non Catholicis tantum, sed etiam Hæreticis. *Vincent. Lirin. c. xxiii.*

^t See Rufinus's plea about the *adulteration* of Origen's books, handsomely defended against St. Jerome, by the learned Huetius. *Origeniana*, p. 187, 188.

therein a true interpreter of the *Church's doctrine* in that instance, any more than in the *other articles* laid to his charge by his accusers: many of which are known to have been directly contrary to the standing doctrines of the Church, as well *before* as *after* his time. Such was the denial of the *resurrection of the dead*, imputed to him, among other errors, by his adversaries; as St. Austin observes: who, in the same place, mentions some other erroneous and uncatholic tenets of Origen. At last, the question of Origen's faith in the Trinity may be certainly determined out of his treatise against Celsus, (still remaining, and free from corruption.) And it is from thence chiefly, that Bishop Bull has demonstrated that Origen's doctrine on that head was sound and just, directly opposite to the principles which you are now espousing.

I may take notice of your citing (p. 335.) a second-hand passage of Eusebius; as if he had made the Son *created* in the vulgar sense of *created* in this question, directly contrary to what Eusebius has argued at large in his piece against Marcellus. I hope you did it *ignorantly*. However, to prevent the like for the future, I shall here give you Eusebius's own words. Commenting on Prov. viii. 22. he says thus: "Though he says *created*, he does not say it, as if he came from *non-existence* into *existence*; nor as if he also, like as the rest of the creatures, were from *non-entity*, (as some have erroneously imagined;) but he was living and subsisting, prior and pre-existing to the creation of the universe: and being *appointed* of the Lord his Father to bear rule over the universe; *created* here stands for *appointed*, or *constituted*." He goes on to several texts of Scripture, 1 Pet.

^a Εἰ δὲ λίγοι ἐκτίσθαι αὐτὸν, ἕχ ὡς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρελθόν, τοῦτ' ἂν εἶποι, οὐδ' ὡς ἰσμίως τοῖς λοιποῖς κτίσμασι, ἃ αὐτὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γενεαῖος, ἢ τινος ἢ ἀφ' οὗτος ὑπεκλήφασιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὑφιστάς μὲν καὶ ζῶν, προῖον τι καὶ προῦσάρχων τῆς τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου συστάσεως· ἄρχων δὲ τῶν ἄλων ὑπὸ κυρίου τοῦ αὐτοῦ πατρὸς καταταγμένος, τοῦ ἰκτισθαι ἂντι τοῦ κτιστάζειν, ἢ κατίσθην εἰσημίσει. Euseb. *Eccl. Theol.* p. 150, 151.

ii. 13. Amos iv. 13. Psalm ci. 19. to show that $\kappa\rho\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$, or $\kappa\rho\iota\zeta\omega$, may admit that sense of *appointing*, or *ordaining*, rather than *creating*. And upon the words of the Psalm, "Create in me a clean heart, O God," he observes, that this is not said as if the Psalmist's heart was then to begin to exist, but what was before should be *cleansed*. You will please to remember how highly you resented my quoting Socrates for Eusebius's opinion, seemingly contradictory to Eusebius's other tenets. You have here quoted a short sentence out of an *index* of a book, not published to speak for itself; and have given it a construction flatly contrary to what Eusebius undoubtedly taught in his piece against Marcellus; namely, that Prov. viii. 22. was not to be understood of *creating*, in the sense you pretend. As to what you cite from him in respect of the *Holy Ghost*, I know not whether it may admit of a candid \times construction. He was certainly mistaken, if he took that doctrine, such as you understand it, to be the doctrine of the Church. But it is out of my compass to treat of the *divinity* of the Holy Ghost. To conclude; I referred γ you to Ignatius, Athenagoras, Irenæus, Origen, Dionysius of Rome, Dionysius of Alexandria, Theognostus, and Methodius; as *express* authorities against the doctrine of the Son's being a *creature*. As to *consequential* and *indirect* testimonies against it, they are numberless; and have been produced by Bishop Bull, Le Moyne, Nourry, and many others, in this controversy. To this you have *opposed* such evidence as Bishop Bull has already answered, and you will not stand by, or engage to defend; but have rather owned to be indefensible. Only you think some advantage you should make of it; which *some advantage* is yet very *unfair*, and not regularly or *distinctly* laid down by any certain consequence, but is merely a confused and *precarious* conclusion. Upon the whole, every *honest* reader will easily perceive on what side he ought here to determine.

\times See the Bishop of London's Letter Defended, p. 56, &c.

γ Defence, vol. i. p. 140.

QUERY XIII.

Whether there can be any middle between being made out of nothing, and out of something; that is, between being out of nothing, and out of the Father's substance; between being essentially God, and being a creature; whether, consequently, the Son must not be either essentially God, or else a creature?

IF any man wanted an instance of the power of affections or prejudice in holding out against *conviction*; or if there were not too many lamentable examples of it in history, *sacred* and *profane*; I would recommend to him the perusal of what you have under this Query, to give him a very lively example and idea of it. You begin with telling me, "there are many *dilemmas* in *metaphysics*, *physics*, and *theology*, wherein it may be very pre-
sumptuous to determine absolutely which part of the "*dilemma* is the truth." Had you rested *neuter* in this controversy, your plea would have appeared the better: but as you have determined on one side, and in virtue of such *dilemmas* as are neither half so *clear* nor half so *certain* as this is, you have no pretence left of that kind.

You should therefore tell me what *medium* there is between being *essentially God*, and being a *creature*; or else own the Son a *creature*. We do not thus shift and shuffle with you, when you press us with *dilemmas*. *Derived* or *underived*; we say *derived*: *being* or *not being*; we say *being*: *necessary* or *not necessary* in existence; we say *necessary*: *self-existent* or *not self-existent*; we say *not self-existent*: *Supreme God* or *not supreme God*; we say *supreme God*. And whatever *invidious* terms, or however liable to be misunderstood, you put the question in, still we answer frankly, and discover our minds. And what can be the reason of the difference between your conduct and ours, but that we desire to be open and plain, and you love disguises? We have a cause which we know we can defend: you are conscious that you have not.

We are justly sensible what advantage you every where make by putting the question, "Whether God the Son "be the *supreme God*, or *that supreme God*?"

1. The expression is apt to insinuate to the reader a notion of *two Gods*, supreme and inferior: on which supposition the Son certainly could not be the *supreme*.

2. It is farther apt to confound the reader, as insinuating, either that we suppose the Son to be the *supreme Father* himself, or else that the *supremacy* of order, or office, belonged equally to both. Yet we bear with your thus unequally and partially wording the question; being content to admit it with proper distinctions, and to assert that God the Son is *the supreme God*, or even *that supreme God*, as you are pleased to word it for us.

And why should not you as plainly own, that you make the Son a *creature*; there being no imaginable medium between *uncreated* and *created*, between *God* and *creature*? Yet you pretend to be arguing only against the Son's being essentially God, or *supreme God*, and not to be arguing for his being a *creature*; though they come to the same thing differently expressed. You say, p. 338. there lies a fallacy in my words, *essentially God*. As how? Show where the fallacy is. You say, the words ought to mean *self-existent* in such a sense as the Father *alone* is. Well then; if you take *self-existence* and *necessary existence* to signify the same thing, you of consequence allow no *medium*, but that the Son must either be the *Father* himself, or else a *creature*. Why do you not therefore say plainly he is a *creature*? You will ask then, whether I would prove that the Son is the *Father himself*, in proving him to be *no creature*? No. But when I have proved that point, (as is easily done, and has been done a thousand times,) it will then be apparent how absurd and wild your notion is, that there is no *medium* between God the Father and a *creature*. I say then, that there neither is nor can be any *medium* between being *necessarily existing* and being a *creature*: and therefore since you allow nothing to be *necessary* but the Father,

you plainly make a *creature* of the Son. Instead of answering this plain argument, you do nothing but evade, and shift in such a manner, as shows only that you are afraid of coming to the point, and of putting the controversy on a fair issue: which is highly disingenuous. Were I to abuse my readers at this rate, how would you insult, and look upon it as no better than giving up the cause. I told you before², and now tell you again, that you assert evidently, and by immediate necessary consequence, “that the Maker, and Redeemer, and Judge of
“the whole world is a *creature*, is mutable and corrupt-
“ible, depending entirely on the good pleasure of God,
“has a precarious existence and dependent powers, finite
“and limited; and is neither so perfect in his nature, nor
“so exalted in privileges, but that the Father may, when
“he pleases, create another, equal, or even superior to
“him.”

This is no *unrighteous representation*, nor appealing to the *prejudices of the ignorant vulgar*: you know it is not: but it is laying down the plain naked truth. And it ought to be sounded in the ears and rivetted in the thoughts of all that come to read you; that they may be deeply sensible what you are doing, and whither it is that you are leading them.

¹ These are not things shocking to the *vulgar* only, nor so much to the *vulgar* as to the wisest and most considerate, and most religious men. In short, they are such a weight upon your *hypothesis*, as have ever sunk and bore it down among the sober part of mankind: and they will ever do so, as long as true piety and sobriety of thought have any footing in the world. This you are sensible of; and are therefore forced to wink hard.

You are next endeavouring to *retort*; which is your constant method when you are non-plused, and have no direct answer to give. I “assert,” you say, “many su-
“preme Gods in one undivided substance.” Ridiculous:

² Defence, vol. i. p. 146.

they are not *many Gods*, for that very reason, because their substance is *undivided*. Is there no difference between charging *false* consequences and *true* ones? Make you out the consequence which you pretend, at your leisure: mine is self-evident, and makes itself.

You run off (p. 341.) to some foreign things, which have been answered in their place. You talk of *authority* and *dignity*; not telling us what you mean by them, whether of *order* and *office*, or of *nature*; though it is about the last only, that we are inquiring. I suppose, if there be ever so many testimonies in antiquity for the Son's *uncreatedness*, *consubstantiality*, *eternity*, *necessary existence*, *omnipresence*, *omnipotence*, and other divine attributes; all must yield to a few equivocations and quibbles about *authority* and *dignity*: which if you had once defined and fixed to a determinate meaning, (as every ingenious man would have done,) it would have been presently seen whether any testimony you produce were *pertinent* or no; or rather, that *none of them* are pertinent. As to Basil, whom you pretend to cite, it is certain he did not mean by ἀξιώματι what you mean; for he absolutely denies that the Father is *greater* in respect of *dignity*^a, meaning *essential* dignity: and he particularly excepts against your notion of making the Son *subject*; and censures Eunomius smartly, for taking from him the dignity of dominion, τῆς δεσποτίας τὸ ἀξίωμα. In another place, he spends a whole chapter in confutation of that very notion you are contending for; proving that God the Son is united in *nature*, in *glory*, in *dignity*^b with the Father, of *equal* honour and authority^c. I had told you, that "an eternal substance, not divine, and a Son made " out of it, was what you must mean, or mean nothing^d."

^a Ἀλλὰ μεγάλου μὲν ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐκ ἀν' ἑαυτοῦ μίζων, ἀσώματος γὰρ— ἄλλ' ἔδὲ ἀξιώματι, ἃ γὰρ ἰγίνετο ὁ οὐκ ἦν πῶσι. Basil. contr. Eun. lib. iv. et lib. i. p. 236. ed. Bened.

^b Τῶ ἀξιώματι συνημμένον.

^c Σύμβροτον ἢ ὁμότιμον—τὸ τῆς ἀξίας ὁμότιμον. Basil. de Sp. Sancto. cap. 6.

^d Defence, vol. i. p. 150.

This you confute by calling it a "calumny, ridiculous, " and unjust;" which is a very easy way of confutation. Let the reader see the reason why you had nothing to offer but *hard words*. You deny the Son's being of the *same divine substance* that the Father is; you allow him not to be *necessarily existing*; you deny his being *out of nothing*. Let any Œdipus make other sense of this put together, than what I made of it^c.

QUERY XIV.

Whether Dr. Clarke, who every where denies the consubstantiality of the Son as absurd and contradictory, does not of consequence affirm the Son to be a creature, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, and so fall under his own censure, and is self-condemned?

HERE, being conscious that this charge is just, you can give no direct answer; but, as usual, must retreat to little shifts and poor evasions. I sufficiently explained the *true* sense, and *my* sense of *consubstantiality* in my Defence, vol. i. p. 326, 327. Yet now you pretend to complain, you understand not what I mean by *consubstantiality*: whereas the truth is, you understand it so well as to know that this Query is unanswerable. But let us hear how you can *cavil* where you cannot *reply*. "Sometimes," you tell me, I "seem to mean that the "Father and Son are individually the same single, identical, whole substance." But where do you ever find me talking so weakly and crudely? This you gather only from the word *individual*; which is capable of a larger and stricter sense, as I have often intimated. When you

^c Qui Filium de Patris substantia natum denegant, debent utique dicere unde arbitrentur Dei Filium exstitisse: ntrum *de nihilo*, an *ex aliquo*? Si *de nihilo* exstitit, Creatura dicendus est, non Creator. Si *autem de aliquo* dicatur, sic etiam id ipsum Deus fecit, unde Filium genuit. An forte *coeternum* dicitur aliquid habuisse unde posset Filium generare? Si *coeternum* aliquid aestimatur, unde genitus Filius creditur, Manichæorum error hac adsertione firmatur. *Fulgent. Resp. contr. Arian. object. iv. p. 58.*

suppose that part of God's substance which fills the *sun*, to be *individually* the same with what fills the *moon*; do you mean that both *are individually the same single, identical, whole substance*? How often must you be reminded of your unequal dealing in this controversy, that arguments must hold against the *Trinity*, which, in other cases, have no force with you at all? I may speak of *whole* and *parts*, while I am arguing against a man that brings every thing under *extension*: but as to the Catholic doctrine of the Church, which I here defend, the words are not proper; only this is certain, that *one Person* of the Trinity is not *all the Persons* of the Trinity. Yet because the Persons are *undivided*, they are one *individual* substance; which is as far from *Sabellianism* as from *Tritheism*, and can justly be charged with neither. You pretend that Dr. Clarke does not deny such *consubstantiality* as was taught by the Nicene Fathers. If this be true, then he admits, or does not deny, that the substance of the Son is of the *same kind* with that of the Father, as truly as *light* answers to *light*, *very God* to *very God*, *uncreated* to *uncreated*, and so on^f: that is, he admits all that I do, and there is no longer any dispute between us. For I will easily prove to him, after he is advanced thus far, that whatever is thus *equal* in *nature* to the Father, cannot be *unequal* in any essential *powers* or *perfections*: and so all that you have been doing drops at once. If these be the Doctor's present sentiments, I am very glad of it: they were not always so. You say, indeed, "what-
 " ever the Son's metaphysical nature, essence, or sub-
 " stance be, all the Doctor's propositions (so far as you
 " perceive) hold nevertheless equally true." Are you then so very *unperceiving* in a plain and clear case? Turn to five of the Doctor's *propositions*, (5th, 12th, 14th, 19th, 23d,) where he denies the Substance, or Person, of the *Son*, or *Holy Ghost*, to be *self-existent*: and compare your own construction of *self-existent*, by *necessarily ex*

^f See my Defence, vol. i. p. 327.

isting, with them; and then tell me, whether the Doctor has determined nothing about the *substance* of the Son. Doth he not make the substance of the Father *necessary*, the other *precarious*; the one *self-sufficient*, the other *depending*; the one *immutable*, the other *mutable* at pleasure; in a word, the one *infinitely perfect*, the other *infinitely* short of it? All this follows by self-evident connection from the Doctor's denying the Son's *necessary existence*. Now certainly he has hereby determined their substances to be entirely different in *kind*; or else I should despair of showing, that a *man* and a *horse*, a *tree* and a *stone*, are not *ὁμοούσια*, are not of the same kind. For what is it we denote and distinguish *different kinds* of substances by, but by their different essential properties? Do not therefore now bring me the lame pretence, about the Doctor's *propositions* being the same on *either* supposition. I bore with it in the Modest Pleader^s, (though sensible how little *sincerity* was in it,) because I was then doubtful whether the Doctor should be charged with denying the *necessary existence*. You have eased me of that doubt: and now the plea is ridiculous, and will serve no longer. The mystery is at length come out; and *self-existence*, wherewith we have been so long amused, wants no unriddling.

QUERY XV.

Whether he also must not, of consequence, affirm of the Son, that there was a time when he was not, since God must exist before the creature; and therefore is again self-condemned. (See Prop. 16. Script. Doctr.) And whether he does not equivocate in saying, elsewhere, that the second Person has been always with the first; and that there has been no time when he was not so: and lastly, whether it be not a vain and weak attempt to

† See the Preface to my Sermons, vol. ii.

pretend to any middle way between the orthodox and the Arians; or to carry the Son's divinity the least higher than they did, without taking in the consubstantiality?

IT has been shown that the Son is, upon the Doctor's principles, a *precarious being*, which is nothing but another name for *creature*: and now the question is only whether a *creature* can be *eternal*. And this is of no great moment to the *cause* itself, but only to show the Doctor's *self-condemnation*, in blaming such as have said, *there was a time when the Son was not*. If, for the sake hereof, you will maintain that a *creature is eternal*, you shall dispute by yourself, or else against Mr. Whiston^h; who justly calls it a *despised* and *absurd* tenet: only he happened to have his thoughts a little wandering, when he called it an Athanasian mystery, instead of calling it an Arian one. For I never heard of any one Athanasian but what despised and rejected it. There were some Arians who formed a new sect about the year 394, under the name of Psathyrians, who have been charged with that principle by Theodoritⁱ; though I think Socrates's and Sozomen's account^k of them rather acquits them of it. Now if you are inclined to maintain such wild doctrine, say so plainly: if not, let us know the meaning of the Doctor's censuring those that should presume to say of the Son, that *there was a time when he was not*^l; and of his saying that the second Person has been *always* with the first. I am sensible there is something very

^h Nor do I quite despair of seeing such shrewd and cunning Athanasians as Dr. W. driven to this *last evasion*, and of hearing them broach this other great Athanasian mystery, how despised and absurd an one soever, that any *creature* whatsoever may be strictly speaking, in point of *duration*, coeternal with its Creator. *Whiston, Reply to Lord Nottingham*, p. 30.

ⁱ Theod. Hæret. Fab. lib. 4. Compare the supposititious *Disputatio contra Arium*, p. 211. ed. Bened.

^k Socrat. Eccl. Hist. lib. v. cap. 23. p. 300. Sozom. Eccl. Hist. lib. vii. cap. 17. p. 303.

^l Clarke's Script. Doctr. prop. 16.

mean and *disparaging* in the way of *equivocating* upon so serious a subject. A man may well be ashamed to own it: so I press it no farther.

You were to find a *middle way* between the *orthodox* and the *Arians*: which I called a *vain* and *weak* attempt, and proved it to be so. You do not care to own your mistake here: but you say, "it is not material to deter-
"mine." That is, you find it has been evidently *deter-
mined* against you; though you are very unwilling to confess it. Next you come to your usual method of misrepresenting my notion, and charging *three supreme Gods*: which trifling has been answered oftener than it deserved. What follows, p. 348, 349. is so exceeding low, that in pure commiseration one would pass it over. Page 350, you come to dispute the point, whether the Doctor's scheme was condemned near 1400 years ago by the Council of Nice. You pretend that none of his Propositions were condemned. But I insist upon it, that the Doctor, in denying the Son's *necessary existence*, evidently makes him a *creature*: and therefore all that is *material* in the Doctor's Propositions, all that we find fault with, in respect of his doctrine of God the Son, stands fully condemned by the Nicene Council. And do not imagine that the point of difference betwixt us lies only in *autho-
rity*, or *office*, and not in *nature*: you make the *nature* of the Son wholly of a *different kind* from the Father, as hath been shown. I told you of our doctrine, that it has "prevailed for 1400 years:" upon which you remind me of my saying of the Arians, that the "world was once, "in a manner, their own." In a manner, that is, when they had got the *emperors* of the world, in a *manner*, on their side. You return to your quibble about *individual essence*. Please to observe, *essentia de essentia, sub-
stantia de substantia*, was Catholic doctrine all along: and this is the full meaning of *individual essence*. Not *essences*, nor *substances*, nor *beings*: any more than you will say *substances*, while yet you admit *substance* and

substance; or *beings*, where yet you are forced to allow *being* and *being*^m.

You tell me, I acknowledge *person* and *intelligent agent* to be the *same*. I never acknowledged any such thing; but always denied their being *reciprocal*. But because this word *person* is a matter of much dispute, I shall here endeavour, having nothing farther worth notice under this Query, to give the best account I am able of the true notion of *person*. I shall not here search into the books of *philosophers*, but into the common apprehensions of mankind, learned and unlearned; which appears to be the true method of knowing what ideas are affixed to the word *person*.

Our *ideas* are at first all of them *particular*, and borrowed from what we daily converse with, from what we *see* and *feel*. Our first notion of *person* is the notion we have of a *man*, a *woman*, a *child*. By degrees we learn to *abstract* from the differences of *age*, *sex*, *stature*, &c. and so we form a more general idea of an *human person*, meaning one of our own species: and this *idea*, perhaps, a rude countryman would express, improperly, by the word *Christian*, in opposition to *brutes*, or *inanimate* things. From the idea of *human persons* thus formed, we proceed to make a more *general* idea, by leaving out what is peculiar to our *species*, and keeping in what we conceive *common* to us with *angels*, suppose, or any intelligent being. And now we take in *rationality* only, or *intelligence*: and a person is *something intelligent* in opposition to the *brutal* creation. Indeed there is something analogous to *person* even in brutes: and so it is common to say *he* or *she* of them, in like manner as we speak of *persons*. But still the common notion of *person* includes *intelligence*: and I think Damascenⁿ is very singular in bringing in τὸν τὸν ἴππον under ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον,

^m See my Defence, vol. i. p. 119, 120, 211. and Reply to Dr. Whitty, vol. ii. p. 219.

ⁿ Damascen. Dialect. c. xliii. p. 46.

signifying *person*. But perhaps he meant it of *ὁμότασις* only, and did not nicely distinguish. Thus far we are advanced, that *person* is something which is the *subject* of *intelligence*. But still we are not come far enough to fix the idea of a *single person*: for an army, a council, a senate, is something which is the *subject* of *intelligence*, something that *understands* and *acts*. We must therefore be more particular: and at length we may bring it to this: a single person is *an intelligent agent, having the distinctive characters of I, thou, he; and not divided nor distinguished into more intelligent agents capable of the same characters*. This definition or description will, I think, take in all the *ideas* that mankind have generally affixed to the word *person*, when understood of a *single person*. I will show this first *negatively*, and then *positively*.

1. *Negatively*. An *army*, a *senate*, &c. is not a *single person*, because *divided* into more. The *Trinity*, upon the Catholic *hypothesis*, is not a *single person*, because *distinguished* into more intelligent agents than one.

2. *Positively*. A *man* is a *single person* by the definition.

An *angel* is a *single person* by the same.

Father, *Son*, or *Holy Ghost*, a *single person* by the same.

Any *separate soul*, a *single person* also.

The *θεάνθρωπος*, or *God-man*, a *single person*: because not divided nor distinguished into more intelligent agents than one, having each of them the *distinctive* characters.

To clear this matter a little farther, we must next distinguish persons into several kinds: as 1. *divided* and *undivided*; 2. *simple* and *compound*: which, when explained, will, I hope, set this whole affair in a true and full light.

1. As to the distinction of *divided* and *undivided*; all persons, but the *three divine Persons*, are divided and separate from each other in nature, substance, and existence. They do not mutually include and imply each other: therefore they are not only distinct *subjects*, *agents*, or *supposita*, but distinct *substances* also. But the *divine*

Persons, being *undivided*, and not having any *separate* existence independent on each other; they cannot be looked upon as *substances*, but as one *substance* distinguished into several *supposita*, or intelligent agents.

2. As to the other distinction of *simple* and *compound*, it will appear what reason there is for it. An *angel*, or a *soul*, (whether supposed first *preexisting*, or afterwards *separated*;) is a *simple* person, and so is God the *Father*, or God the *Holy Ghost*, upon the *Catholic* scheme. But *man* is a *compound* person of *soul* and *body*. It is plain, that according to the common idea of *person*, (which must here be our rule,) the *body* goes to make up the *person*: otherwise we could not say James or John is *fat* or *lean*, *low* or *tall*, *healthful* or *sickly*, or the like; such things belonging to the *body* only, and yet belonging to the *person*. If we suppose John's soul to have *preexisted*, it would be a *person* in that *preexistent* state as much as after, having all that belongs to the *definition* of a *person*: and by taking a *body* afterward, the *soul* does not become *magis persona*, but *major persona*: that is, the *person* is enlarged by the addition of a *body*, but still altogether is considered but as one subject with intelligence in it; and all is but one *Peter*, one *John*, one *I*, *he*, or *thou*, which completes the notion of a *single person*. Let John die, the *body* is no longer part of the *person*, but the *person* goes where the *intelligence* rests; the *soul* in this case becomes, not *minus persona*, by the separation, but *minor*.

Our next example of a *compound person* is the *Σεῦ-σπρωπος*; consisting of the *Logos*, the *soul*, and the *body*. The *Logos* was a *Person* before the incarnation, as much as after. But by taking in a *soul* and *body*, the *whole Person* then is made up of all *three*. And thus *Christ* is always represented in Scripture in the same manner as any *single person* is represented; one *I*, one *he*, one *thou*, whether he is spoken of with respect to what he is as the *Logos*, or as having a *soul* or a *body*. The same *Christ* made the *world*, increased in *wisdom*, was *pierced* with a spear: in which three examples, it appears that the *Logos*, the *soul*,

and the *body*, all go to make up the one Person, the one *compound* Person of Christ. And hence it is, that the churches of God, following the common idea of a single person, which they found to suit with the Scripture representation of Christ, have rightly and justly included all the three constituents in the *one Person*°.

These are my present thoughts of the word *person*, and the *ideas* contained in it. If any man has any thing to object to it, I shall be willing either more fully to explain, or else to alter the notion, as I see reason for it. You will perceive that *intelligent acting substance* is implied in every *person*; and more persons are more intelligent *substances*, whenever their substance is *divided*, but not otherwise: and two intelligent substances are two persons, where *both* have existed *separately*, or have been severally capable of the *distinctive* characters, but not otherwise. You will also perceive, that *intelligent acting substance* (that is, *intelligent agent*, as you call it) is not equivalent to *person*, neither are the phrases reciprocal. But to *intelligent agent* add, its *not being divided*, nor *distinguished* into more intelligent agents having the same distinctive characters; and then, as I conceive, you complete the notion of *person*, according as it has commonly passed with mankind. I suppose not any of the divine Persons a person in a *sense different* from the common meaning of the word *person*: they are *Persons* in the same common sense of *person*; but Persons of a *different kind*, and differently circumstantiated from what *human*, or *angelical*, or any other kinds of *persons* are. Thus *person*, like triangle, appears to be the name for an *abstract idea*: and the *name* is equally applicable to *every kind* of person, as the name of *triangle* is to every kind of triangle.

• Videmus duplicem statum, non confusum, sed conjunctum in una Persona, Deum et hominem Jesum. Tertull. contr. Prax. c. 27. Τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγον ἰνῶσαι, τῇ κατ' ἐπίστασιν φωνῇ, ἰνωδίστεος τῆ σαρκί, &c. Irenæi Fragm. p. 347. Bened.

QUERY XVI.

Whether by these (of the first column) and the like texts, adoration and worship be not so appropriated to the one God, as to belong to him only?

Divine worship due.

To the one God.

Thou shalt have no other gods before me, Exod. xx. 3.

Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve, Matt. iv. 10.

To Christ.

They worshipped him, Luke xxiv. 52. Let all the angels of God worship him, Heb. i. 6.

That all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father, John v. 23.

UNDER this Query I fully proved, in my Defence, that, according to *Scripture* and *antiquity*, adoration is due to *God alone*, in opposition to all *creature-worship* whatever. You enter very little, if at all, into the particulars of the evidence which I produced: but you form two objections against the thing in general, leaving me the part of a *respondent*, instead of undertaking it yourself, as was proper in answer to *queries*. Your two objections are these: 1. That if my arguments prove any thing, they prove too much, *viz.* that Christ is the very Father himself. 2. That they again prove too much in disallowing all *mediatorial worship*; which, you think, is plainly warranted by *Scripture* and *antiquity*.

1. As to your first pretence, it is founded only on the *personal* characters, *I, thou, he*; seemingly excluding all persons but one. To which it is answered, that there is no necessity arising from any pretended force of the *exclusive* terms, for excluding all other persons^p: but there is a necessity, from the very *end* and *design* of the Law, for excluding all *other gods*; and from the whole tenor of *Scripture*, for excluding all *creatures*: so that my argument proves what I intended to prove, and no more. And

^p See my fourth Sermon, vol. ii.

why have you not answered, after you have been so often called upon, the reasons I had offered in my Defence, and Preface to my Sermons, against the receiving *inferior gods* to any degree of *religious* worship? Surely it should be your business to *respond* sometimes, especially in reply to *queries*, and not merely to *oppose*.

2. As to your second pretence about *mediatorial worship*, first borrowed from Pagans, handed on by Arians, and brought to our own times by Papists; I shall give it a large and distinct answer presently. You have for some time (I mean you and your friends) amused unthinking persons with a phrase, never yet distinctly explained by you, but serving to delude such as can be content with *sounds* instead of *sense*. I shall endeavour to search this matter to the bottom, once for all; and then show how easy it is to unravel your speculations on this head.

By *mediatorial worship* you intend some kind of worship to be paid to Christ; such as you have been pleased to invent for him, rather than none. I do not find that you have secured any worship at all to the *Holy Ghost*, (who is no *mediator*,) though all antiquity has paid him worship. But you are so confused and undeterminate in your account of *mediatorial worship*, that it is not easy to discover what you precisely mean by it; or perhaps you yourself do not yet know what you intend. There are but two general senses, so far as I conceive, to be put upon it; though these again are divided into many *particular* ones. The two I speak of, are either, 1. the making Christ the *medium* of worship; or, 2. the worshipping him under the character of a *Mediator*. We must examine both these.

1. A *medium of worship* is a phrase of some latitude and ambiguity. It must be explained by instances and examples; that considering all cases which can well be thought of, we may at last hit upon what you mean by *mediatorial* worship. An *image* has been sometimes thought a *medium* of worship, when God is supposed to be worshipped by and *through* an image: as in the in-

stance of the *molten calf*, and in the golden calves of Dan and Bethel. Such mediatorial worship as this leaves very little honour to the *medium*: all is supposed to pass through, to the ultimate object. Thus the Egyptians, in worshipping the sacred animals, supposed the worship to pass to the *prototype*, to the Deity whereunto the animals belonged. This, I presume, is not your notion of *mediatorial* worship: if it be, it is low indeed.

There may be a *second* sense of making a *medium* of worship: as, if we were to pray to Christ, to pray for us. This is near akin to the Romish doctrine of praying to *saints* and *angels*. If this be what you mean by *mediatorial* worship, your opinion of Christ may still be very low, as of one that gives us nothing himself, but only asks another to give us. But, besides that there is no warrant for praying to any thing less than *God*, and so such a practice must be wholly unjustifiable; I conceive that this is not what you mean by *mediatorial* worship, it being so extremely low and dishonourable to suppose that he can himself do nothing for us, especially having declared the contrary, John xiv. 13, 14.

There is a *third* sense of a *medium* of worship: as if we ask the Father any thing by and through the *merits* of *Jesus Christ*. If this be what you mean by *mediatorial* worship, I am afraid it will amount to no worship at all upon your principles. You will not say that the *same* worship is therein paid to both: and unless you say that, you leave no worship at all for God the Son in such addresses or applications.

There may be a *fourth* consideration of a *medium* of worship, supposing Christ to be directly worshipped, but "to the glory of the Father:" the Father being imagined to be glorified through Christ as through a *medium*. Now here I must ask, Whether the worship supposed to be paid to Christ be *supreme* or *inferior*? You will not say *supreme*: and if it be *inferior*, it cannot be presumed to pass on to the *supreme* object, who would not be honoured but affronted with *inferior* worship. It

must therefore rest in the inferior object, and so cannot be called *mediate*, but *ultimate* worship. I must add, that no worship of a *creature* can terminate in the *Creator*, or be for his *glory*, because he has absolutely forbidden all *creature-worship*: and therefore, again, such worship as we are now supposing cannot be *mediate*, but *ultimate*, terminating where it is offered.

Indeed, the Scripture never makes any difference between *directing* and *terminating* worship; but supposes it always to terminate in the object to which it is directed, or offered. God interprets all *image-worship*, or *creature-worship*, as terminating in the *image*, or *creature*, to which it is offered. When the Israelites worshipped the calf, they “offered sacrifice to an idol,” not to God; and they “worshipped the molten image,” not God, in doing it; however they might *intend* and mean it (as they certainly did) for the *Jehovah*. They are said to have “got God their Saviour,” (Psal. cvi. 21.) notwithstanding their *intention* to remember him in it; because it was not remembering him in a manner suitable to his commandment, which was to *offer* worship to *God* only. So also Jeroboam is said to have made *other gods*, and to have cast “God behind his back,” (1 Kings xiv. 9. 2 Chr. xiii. 11.) notwithstanding his intention to *terminate* all the worship in the true *Jehovah*. I may add, that when St. John was preparing to offer worship to an angel, (whether out of a sudden transport, or not then knowing that it was a mere angel,) no doubt but he designed the *glory* of God, and to terminate all worship there: and yet it is observable, that the angel, notwithstanding, bade him “worship God;” intimating, that it is not worshipping of *God*, unless the worship be directly offered to *God*. Dr. Clarke^q has a fancy, that the *idolatry* of such as worshipped the *true God* through *mediums* of their own inventing, lay only in their making *idol-mediators*, such as God had not allowed them to have. But this notion is

^q Clarke's Script. Doct. p. 344. ed. 2d.

very peculiar, and has no foundation in *Scripture* or *anti-quity*. To pay *religious* worship to any thing is, in *Scripture* style, making a *God* of it. This is true, even of what is called *mediate* or *relative* worship; as I have before instanced in the case of the *golden calf*, and the calves of Dan and Bethel. And Laban's *teraphims*, or images, which were supposed to be no more than *symbols* or *mediums* of the worship of the *Jehovah*, (for Laban worshipped, as some believe, the true *God*;) are called *gods*^s; because worship was offered directly to them, instead of being offered immediately to *God*. To make any medium of worship was setting up *other gods*, not *other mediators*; *strange gods*, not *strange mediators*; it was robbing *God*, not any *mediator*, of his honour; and making an *idol-god*, not an *idol-mediator*. The idolaters are never charged with mistaking the *medium*, but mistaking the *object*; not with having false mediators, but *false gods*; not for worshipping those that were not *mediators* by *office*, but those that *by nature* were *no gods*; for worshipping the *creature*, not instead of the *Mediator*, but instead of the "Creator, who is blessed for ever." Such is the constant language both of the Old and New Testament, which never fix the charge upon the setting up *false mediators* or *mediums* of worship; nor ever insert any caution against it: so weak and groundless is the Doctor's notion of *idol-mediators*. What then is the result, you will ask, of this reasoning? Does not the worship of *Christ* terminate in the glory of *God the Father*? Admit that it does so; then certainly the worship of *Christ* is not *creature-worship*. For since all worship terminates in the object to which it is directed or offered, if the same act of worship, offered to *Christ*, terminates in *God the Father*; then the case is plain that it terminates in *both*, and both are one undivided object. Having considered the several senses of a *medium* of worship, and shown that none of them will answer your purpose, I come now,

^r Gen. xxxi. 49, 53.

^s Gen. xxxi. 30. Josh. xxiv. 2.

2. To consider the worship of Christ under the character of a *Mediator*, and to see what sense we can make of *mediatorial worship* under that view. A *Mediator* may be considered two ways, according to the ancients; a *Mediator by nature*, and *Mediator by office*. The first and principal sense of a *Mediator* (μεσίτης) between God and man, is a Person partaking of the *nature* of both, perfect *God* and perfect *man*. In this sense, *principally*, the ancient Christians constantly understood Christ to be a *Mediator*. So Irenæus, Melito, Clemens, Hippolytus, Tertullian, Cyprian, Novatian, and others of the Ante-Nicenes; whose testimonies I have placed in the margin^t. As to Post-Nicenes, since no doubt can be made of them, I content myself with referring to Petavius, who has collected their testimonies^u.

^t Εἰ μὴ συνήθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ Θεῷ οὐκ ἂν ἠδυνήθη μετασχὼν τῆς ἀφθαρσίας. ἴδιον γὰρ μίσην Θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, διὰ τῆς ἰδίας πρὸς ἑκατέρους οἰκίωστος εἰς φιλίαν καὶ ἰσόμεναν τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους συναγαγεῖν. *Iren.* p. 211. ed. Bened.

Θεὸς γὰρ ὢν, ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἄνθρωπος τίλιος, ὁ αὐτὸς τὰς δύο αὐτοῦ οὐσίας ἐπιστάτωτο ἡμῖν. *Melito, Cav. H. L.* vol. ii. p. 33.

Θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος Θεός. καὶ τὸ δῆλημα τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ μίσητος ἐκτιλιῖ. μίσητος γὰρ ὁ λόγος ὁ κοινὸς ἀμφὸν Θεῷ μὲν υἱὸς, σωτὴρ δὲ ἀνθρώπων. *Clem. Alex.* p. 251.

Ἴνα δὲ διχῶν τὸ συναμφοτέρον ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὴν τε τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὡς καὶ ὁ ἀπόστολος λέγει, μίσητη Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἄνθρωπος Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς. ὁ δὲ μίσητος ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου οὐ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ δύο. ἴδιον οὖν τὸν Χριστὸν Θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπων, μίσητη γινόμενον παρ' ἀμφοτέρων ἀρραβῶνά τινα εἰληφέναι, ἵνα φανῇ δύο προσώπων μίσητης. *Hippol.* vol. ii. p. 45.

Hic sequester Dei atque hominum appellatus; ex utriusque partis deposito commisso sibi. In another place, *utriusque substantia*. *Tertull de Resur. Car.* c. 51. *contr. Prax.* c. 28.

Deus cum homine miscetur. Hic Deus, hic Christus est, qui Mediator duorum, hominem induit quem perducatur ad Patrem. *Cypr. de Idol. Van.* p. 15.

Quoniam si ad hominem veniebat; ut Mediator Dei et hominum esse deberet, oportuit illum cum eo esse, et Verbum carnem fieri; ut in semetipso concordiam confibulareret terrenorum pariter atque cælestium: dum utriusque partis in se connectens pignora, et Deum homini et hominem Deo copularet. *Novat.* c. 18.

Mediam inter Deum et hominem substantiam gerens—Deum fuisse et hominem, ex utroque genere permistum. *Lactant.* l. iv. c. 13.

^u Dogm. Th. tom. v. part. 2.

Now, if you would but please to understand *mediatorial worship* conformably to this true and ancient sense of *Mediator*, we might not perhaps despair of coming to some terms of agrément. For *mediatorial* worship, thus understood, would nearly coincide with what we call *divine*. It would be worshipping Christ because, with the human nature, he is possessed also of the *divine*, and is therefore strictly and properly *adorable*, as well as the Father.

But *Mediator* may be considered also in respect of *office*, without considering the *nature* at all: and this, I presume, is the sense you contend for. Accordingly, for the most part, by *mediatorial worship*, you seem to intend some *inferior* kind of worship payable to our *Lord* considered as *mediating*, or as executing the *office* of a *Mediator* between God and man. Now we must confess that Christ is really *Mediator* by *office*, as well as by *nature*: but how this can ever justify you in making a *new* and an *inferior* worship, and calling it *mediatorial*, we understand not. Fanciful men will have their peculiarities: and it is a wonder to me, you have not yet invented twenty several kinds of worship, *superior* and *inferior*, for God the *Father*. For the purpose; you may consider him as *King*, and so you may present him with *regal* worship; or as *King of kings*, and then it will be *super-regal*. You may consider him as *Judge*, your particular *Judge*, and so present him with *judicial* worship: but if you consider him farther as *Judge of all men*, nay, and as *judge of angels*, or of the whole system of creatures, the worship will be then most highly and superlatively *judicial*. You may next consider him as *Creator*, *ποιητής*, without an *article*, and then you are to present him (pardon the novelty of the phrase) with *creatorial* worship: but if you consider him farther as *the Creator*, *ὁ ποιητής*, with an *article*, the worship then becomes eminently *creatorial*. You may next consider him as *Protector*, as *Deliverer*, or *Defender*, and each of these in a higher or a lower sense: and hence may arise as many *several worships*. Nay,

when your hand is in, every *attribute* you consider him under will be a distinct foundation of a *particular worship*: and so you will have *worships* innumerable, to pay to one and the same Person. But you will say, that these *many worships* are all but one worship of the one *divine* Father under variety of conceptions. Right: and so, though the Son be considered as *Mediator*, as *Judge*, as *Creator*, as *King*, &c. in our worship of him, these are all but one worship of the one *divine* Son, under variety of conceptions. The worship then both of Father and Son centering in this, that they are both *divine*, this makes it *divine* worship: and divine worship being one with itself, it is very manifest that the worship of both is *one*.

Aye but, says the learned Doctor ^x, "There is an adoration due to Christ as *Mediator*, which cannot possibly be paid to the one supreme God;" supreme Father he means. And what is there in this, more than an affected manner of expressing what every body allows, that Father and Son have distinct personal *characters* and *offices*? He need not have gone thus round about: the shorter way would have been to divide adoration into two sorts, *paternal* and *filial*; and to plead that one of these *worships* can never be paid to the *Son*, any more than the other to the *Father*, because the Son must never be considered as *Father*, nor the Father as *Son*. But had the Doctor remembered that *both* may be considered as *divine*, and that *divine* worship is but one, he might have perceived that there is no foundation for the *two worships* which he is introducing: unless he has a mind to bring in a hundred worships as well as two; which may be easily done in the way he has taken. The truth of the case is this; worship has an immediate respect to the *divinity* of the Person to be worshipped. That must be presupposed in all *religious* worship: otherwise such wor-

^x See Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 343 2d. ed. Modest Plea, &c. Continued, p. 33.

ship is *idolatry*; as hath been proved. This foundation being laid, whatever *personal* characters or offices we consider the Person worshipped under; *divine* goes along with all: it is a *divine* Mediator, a *divine* Priest, a *divine* Prophet, a *divine* King: and so our worship of him never wants its proper object, never moves from its proper foundation, but remains constantly the same. Our considering the Son under the character or office of *Mediator* does not hinder us from considering him as *God* at the same time, (indeed *Mediator*, in strictness, implies it,) any more than our considering the Father as *King*, *Judge*, *Preserver*, or *Rewarder*, hinders us from considering him also as *divine*.

All the acts and offices of Christ, relative to us, are only so many manifestations of his goodness, power, wisdom, and other *attributes*, which attributes are founded in his *divine* nature, which nature is *common* to the Father and him: thus all our acknowledgments center and terminate in one and the same *divine* nature; and all the particular *worships* amount to no more than *one worship*, one *divine* worship belonging equally to both.

Having thus far cleared my way, I may now proceed to examine what you have done under this Query. But I should first observe to the reader what you have *not done*, that he may be the more fully apprised of your manner of disputation: which is to answer difficulties, by slipping them over without notice.

I urged the great design of the *Law* and of the *Gospel* to exclude *inferior*, as well as other *supreme* deities: you take no notice. I urged, that even *miracles* could not suffice for the introducing *another God*: you are profoundly silent. I pleaded, that the *reasons* of worship which God insists upon are such as exclude all *creatures*: not a word do you give in answer. I showed, (vol. i. p. 168.) that any man, with your distinction of *sovereign* and *inferior* worship, might have eluded every law about *sacrificing* to the true God only: you have nothing to say to

it. I pleaded the impropriety of *absolute* and *relative* sacrifice, vows, oaths, &c. not a syllable do you reply. I pleaded several texts of Scripture, and several examples against *creature-worship*, and against your distinction made from the *intention* of the worshipper: all is passed over. I farther pressed you with the practice and principles of the primitive *martyrs*; of which you take no notice. You have indeed something to *oppose* in favour of the other side of the question: but is it *my* business only to answer objections? I thought you had undertook to answer *queries*; to *clear* something, and not to be always in the way of *puzzling*. But let us see however what you have in the way of *objection*. I have answered your two principal pleas already: I am now to seek for some of the slighter pretences. You find fault with me (p. 357.) for making the *nature* of God, not the *Person*, the object of worship. But what if I make *three Persons* the object (which is the truth of the case) on account of their *divine nature*? Is there any thing more absurd in this, than in your making *one Person*, on account of his perfections, that is, of his *nature*? And where is the difference between you and me, but that you worship *individual living substance*, which you confine to *one Person*; and I, *individual living substance*, which I suppose *common* to more Persons? You the τὸ Θεῖον in one Person; I the τὸ Θεῖον in more than one.

You say, “the texts of the Old Testament relate not “to an *indefinite* Person, but *definitely* to the Person of “the Father.” Yet many of them (in the judgment of all antiquity) relate to the person of the Son, as we have seen before: and that none of them are ever meant *inde-*

† *Sacrifice*, without distinction of absolute and relative, supreme and inferior, the outward act of sacrificing, was always looked upon as *appropriate* to God. Now *prayers* were of the same import with sacrifice, in the primitive Church, and esteemed by them as the purest and best sacrifices.

See Just. Mart. Dial. p. 340. Jeb. Irenæus, l. iv. c. 17. p. 249. Clem. Alex. p. 848. Tertull. ad Scap. c. 2.

finitely is what you can never prove ^z. However, if you could, you would still be far from proving your point. For, supposing *God*, or *Jehovah*, to be always taken *personally*, sometimes denoting the *Person* of the *Son*, abstracting from the consideration of the *Father*, and sometimes denoting the *Person* of the *Father*, abstracting from the consideration of the *Son*; it might still be nevertheless true, that *Jehovah* is one, both *Father* and *Son*.

You attempt, (p. 360.) to prove that the worship of the *Son* is "subordinate, mediate, relative." You quote Heb. i. 6. and infer that the angels are to worship him, "not as supreme, but by the command of the *Father*." Wonderful! that if the *Father* has ever *commanded* any one to worship himself, (as he often has,) his worship therefore is not *supreme*. Has not our Saviour *commanded* us to worship the *Father*; is his worship therefore not *supreme*? Sure, arguments must run very low with you, or you would not trifle at this rate. As to Heb. i. 9. I have answered it above: and as to John v. 23. Christ is not worshipped because God *committed* judgment to him: but God *committed* it to him for this end and purpose, that men might be sensible of the dignity and *divinity* of his *Person*, and thereupon worship him. The prophecy of Daniel (chap. vii. 13.) speaks of a *kingdom*, and a *dominion*, in a particular sense; as 1 Cor. xv. speaks of a kingdom to be *received* by the *Father*: this is all *economical*, and makes nothing for your purpose. But your argument is calculated for the Socinian hypothesis, rather than the Arian. The ancient Arians would have condemned such men as you, for their low thoughts of our Saviour. They did not worship him merely as having a *judgment* or a *kingdom* committed to him, but as being *Creator*^a. You throw together (p. 361, 362.) a multitude of texts, proving only that Christ is *Mediator*. Does

^z See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 85, &c.

^a Christum colimus ut Creatorem. *Serm. Arian. ap. Augustin.* p. 623. Maximin. ap. August. p. 663.

any Christian doubt of it? There is not a syllable about *absolute* and *relative*, *sovereign* and *inferior* prayer: which is what you were to show. A Mediator may be a *divine* Mediator notwithstanding: and so all your pretences vanish into air. And what if it be said, (Rev. v. 9, 12.) "Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory:" and if it be said, "Unto him that loved us, and washed us, &c. be glory and dominion," Rev. i. 5, 6. what are we to learn from thence? Here is nothing said of the *foundation* of worship: but the Person is described under his proper and peculiar characters, and such as may recommend him to our *affections*. Not a word is there of *mediatorial* worship, or of any thing like it. And if his being *God*, or *God supreme*, be not assigned as the reason for worshipping him, doth it therefore follow that he is not to be worshipped as *God supreme*? By the same argument, you might as well prove, that neither is the Father to be worshipped as *supreme God*. We find it said, (Eph. iii. 20, 21.) "Unto him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us; unto him be glory in the Church by *Christ Jesus*," &c. The reason here assigned for worshipping the Father, is not his being *supreme God*, but only his being "able to do more than we can ask or think." So again in the Book of Revelations, (ch. xix. 1, 2.) "Salvation, and glory, and honour; and power unto the Lord our God; for true and righteous are his judgments," &c. Here the reason assigned is not his being *supreme God*, but his being *true* and *righteous*. Again, in chapter iv. ver. 11. "Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power: for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created." Here the reason assigned for worshipping the Father, is not that he is *supreme God*, but that he "created all things for his pleasure:" which reason, though not expressly applied in this manner to God the Son, is yet equally applicable in virtue of

Heb. i. 10. and Col. i. 16. I own that *supreme God* is implied in this last title of *Creator*: which however is equally true, either of Father or Son. I observed in my Sermons^b, how frequent it is for the Father himself to insist upon what he had done for men; claiming their worship upon those moving reasons, or *motives*: and what wonder is it, if some much greater and more endearing works of God the Son be mentioned as *motives* to our worship of him? the *foundation* still of worship stands as before; which is wholly to be resolved into the infinite excellency and *divinity* of his Person^c. You pretend to say, that “the worship of the Father is founded “principally in his supreme, independent, underived power,” &c. If you mean any thing contrary to me, you mean, on his *self-existence*, or being *unbegotten*, as distinct from *necessary existence*. Show me one text of Scripture for it, at your leisure. You do not pretend any: but you speak of *all antiquity*; not knowing what you say, nor whereof you affirm. You should have shown me who, and what *ancients* ever founded his worship in his being *Father*, or *unbegotten*; and not in his being *God*.

After abundance of trifling, you come at length to make some reply to what I had urged from *antiquity*^d: only you first take notice of my charging you^e with *slipping over a difficulty*, by putting *honour*, an ambiguous word, instead of *worship* and *adoration*. The reason I had for it is, that *worship* and *adoration* stand for *exterior acts*; whereas *honour* may stand for either *interior* or *exterior*, and is therefore more ambiguous. *Exterior acts* have their signification fixed and determined by circumstances, and do not depend upon the *intention* of the mind to make their signification *higher* and *lower*; as *mental honour* does. This therefore was the reason of my blaming you for changing *worship* into *honour*. The difference

^b Vol. ii. p. 105, 106.

^d Defence, vol. i. p. 175, &c.

^c See the Preface to my Sermons, vol. ii.

^e Defence, vol. i. p. 167, 179.

of these two is easily seen in this instance: *equality* and *inequality* of honour are proper expressions: but equality or inequality of *sacrifice* (an outward act) is very improper. Now our dispute was about *outward acts*. The foundation I went upon was this; that in order to have God's authority and superlative excellency owned, there should be some *outward visible acts*, which we call *worship*, appropriated to God, to put a *visible* difference between *God* and the *creature*. For herein lies the *manifestation* of that inward sense we have of his superlative excellencies and perfections: and the confounding this difference, by applying these peculiar and *appropriated* acts to any *creature*, is the great sin of *idolatry*. The inward *intention* is of no moment in this case: for if the *outward acts* be the same, how then shall God be *outwardly* distinguished (as he ought to be) in the honours paid to him, above the creatures? This consideration is alone sufficient to cut off every plea and pretence for offering *religious worship* to any but God. You have first a distinction of *supreme* and *inferior*, of *ultimate* and *mediate worship*: but that is utterly unserviceable, because it would not so much as exclude the worship even of Pagan *deities* (if considered as *inferior*) along with the true God. You may next say, that worship should not be paid to any inferior gods, that stand in *opposition* to the true and supreme God: and yet neither will this restriction sufficiently answer the purpose; since it does not exclude the worship of *saints* or *angels*, friends of God, and not *opposite* to him. You may retreat to a farther restriction, that even *inferior* religious worship must be paid to none but such as God has *nominated*, and allowed to be worshipped: which, you may think, will effectually exclude all but *Christ*. But after you have thus far followed your own inventions, in your several restrictions, and qualifying of an *absolute* command; there is still this invincible reason against them all, that whereas there ought to be some peculiar *outward acts* (as *sacrifice* was formerly) *appropriated* to *God*, as *exterior* acknowledg-

ments of his infinite excellencies and perfections above his *creatures*; by these restrictions and limitations, all such *peculiarity* of exterior acknowledgments is taken away, and it is made impossible even for God himself to prescribe any. Now you see why I found fault; and that I had some reason for it. But you ask me, why then did I “found Christ’s worship upon John v. 23.” which speaks only of *honour*? The reason is plain: if I am to *honour the Son, even as I honour the Father*; I must signify it by the same *outward* expressions, that is, by *worship*. The text then is very much to my purpose; though *honour* and *worship* are not the same thing, but differing as the *internal thought* and the *outward manifestation*. Now let us come to the *ancients*, upon this head of *worship*.

I showed by plain testimonies what their doctrine was; viz. to worship *God alone*, the *Creator*, in opposition to the *creature*. You take no notice of the last particular; because it was very *material*, and pressed hard upon your scheme. But you observe, by the “alone God” is evidently meant “the God and Father of all.” I am persuaded you, in the main, are right in your observation: and now the question will be, whether when they proposed the Father as the *only God*, they intended it in opposition only to *false gods* and *creature-gods*, admitting a latitude in the *exclusive* terms; or whether they intended any distinction of *worship*, making it *supreme* and *inferior*, *absolute* and *relative*, *ultimate* and *mediate*. This is a question which will admit of an easy and a certain decision, upon a due consideration of circumstances. There are but two ways of making this matter out; either by admitting some latitude in the *exclusive terms*, so that the Father shall be understood to be the *only God* in *opposition* to *creatures* and *false gods*; or by admitting some distinction and degrees of worship, that *supreme* worship may be due to the Father as the highest God, and *inferior* to the Son as an *inferior Deity*. Now this, I say, will be easily decided. If, when the *ancients* speak of

worshipping *one God*, the Father, they either say, that he alone is to be *sovereignly*, or *absolutely* worshipped; or if they found his title to worship upon his being *Father*, or *unbegotten*, rather than upon his being *God*; or if they admit any *inferior God*, or any *other God* besides the Father; then you will have something to plead from the *ancients* for your opinion. But, on the other hand, if they never mention *two worships* or *two Gods*; if they mean, when they speak of worship as due to *God alone*, not *sovereign* worship only, but all *religious* worship; if they suppose the Son not to be *another God*, but *one God* with the Father; and if they intimate their intention to be to exclude *creatures*, or *false gods*, not *God the Son*; then the case will be manifest, that they used the *exclusive terms*, not with utmost strictness, but with a proper latitude; and this will be the true way of interpreting the *ancients*. That this latter is really the case, is evident to every man that is at all conversant with the ancients: and he that thinks otherwise must either never have read them, or have read them with very little judgment. Their way was to speak of the *one God* in opposition to all false deities; and by the *one God* they meant principally the *Father*, as *first* in conception, and *first* in order; but always with a reserve for the *Son* and *Holy Ghost*, reckoned to him, and included in him: so that the *Father*, considered with what *naturally* belonged to him, was the *one God* of the Christians in opposition to all *other* deities. This is so clearly and so evidently the current and prevailing notion of the ancients, that I scruple not to say, that they who see not this, see nothing. I shall briefly consider the testimonies I before gave, and then conclude this article.

Justin Martyr says, "God alone is to be worshipped^f." He does not say *sovereignly*, or *absolutely*, but barely *worshipped*: neither does he say, *Worship him alone*

^f Θεὸς μόνος προσκυνῆται. *Apol.* i. cap. 23. Τὸν Θεὸν μόνον δι' προσκυνῶν. cap. 21.

as *supreme* God, to insinuate any *inferior* God: and therefore it is evident that Justin was not in your scheme of *two Gods* and *two worships*, but in mine of *one God* and *one worship*; considering the Father *primarily* as the *one God*, not exclusive of the Son.

Athenagoras^ε lays the stress upon worshipping the *Creator*, in opposition to *creatures*: so that it is plain he was in my principles, not yours: besides that he says nothing of *sovereign* and *inferior* worship.

Theophilus^h speaks of *worship* simply, not *sovereign* worship as due to *God* alone: and the reason he gives why the king is not to be worshipped, is not because he is not *underived*, or *unbegotten*, but because he is not *God*.

Tatianⁱ denies *worship* (not *sovereign* worship only) to the creatures.

Tertullian^k is express against any *inferior* worship, any *worship* at all but to the *one God*; in which *one God*, as every body knows, he includes all the three Persons.

Clemens Alexandrinus^l has not a word that looks favourable to the distinction of *suprema*, and *inferior* worship; but he confines all worship to the *Creator*, excluding all *creatures* from it, making no *medium* between *Creator* and *creature*.

Irenæus^m speaks of *adoring* or *worshipping*; but not a

^ε Οὐ τῶτον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τιχίστην αὐτῷ προσκυνήσαν. *Athen.* p. 55. Οὐ τὰς δυνάμεις προσκύνοντες διτταίσομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ποιητὴν αὐτῶν καὶ διακόνην. p. 56.

^h Διὰ τί ἐ προσκυνεῖς τὸν βασιλῆα; ἵτι ἐκ εἰς τὸ προσκυνῆσθαι γίγνεται—Θεὸς γὰρ ἐκ Ἰσιν, ἀλλὰ ἄνθρωπος, &c. *Theoph.* p. 30. οὐκ ἄλλη ἰξὸν ἰσι προσκυνῆσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ μόνον Θεῷ. *Theoph.* p. 33.

ⁱ Δημιουργίαν τὴν ὑπ' αὐτῷ γεγονημένην χάριν ἡμῶν προσκυνεῖν ἐ βίλω. *Tatian.* p. 18. Σίβειν δὲ τῶν τοιχείων τὴν ὑπόστασιν αὐτῶν ἐπιπαιδείης, &c. p. 79.

^k Quod colimus Deus unus est. *Tertul. Apol.* cap. 17. Præscribitur mihi ne quem *aliūm* Deum dicam, ne quem *aliūm* adorem, aut *quoquo modo* venerer, præter unicum illūm qui ita mandat. *Scorpiace*, cap. 4. *Conf. Prax.* cap. 31. *Orat.* cap. 2. cum notis *Albaspinæi*.

^l See the passages in my Defence, vol. i. p. 176. *Comp.* p. 182.

^m Dominum Deum tuum adorare oportet et ipsi soli servire, et non credere ei qui falso promisit ea quæ non sunt sua; *Hæc omnia tibi dabo, si proci dens adoraveris me.* Neque enim conditio sub ejus potestate est, quandoquidem et ipse unus de *creaturis* est. *Iren.* p. 320.

word of *sovereign*, or *absolute* adoration : and it is reason sufficient with him against the worship of any thing, that it is a *creature* : which you take no notice of.

Origenⁿ also is express against the worship of any *creature* ; which you observe not, though before hinted. Neither does he speak of *supreme* worship, but *all* worship, when he confines it to the *Creator*, to the *divine nature*, τὸ Θεῖον, to the eternal and *uncreated nature* of God. You pretend, that τὸ Θεῖον is a figurative way of speaking for ὁ Θεός, like the *King's Majesty* for the *King*, p. 356. But I affirm, on the contrary, (which is sufficient against your bare affirmation,) that it generally, if not always, signifies the *divine nature*, or *substance*^o, considered as the *subject* of divine perfections.

As to Origen in particular, in his piece against Celsus, I know not that he any where uses the phrase of τὸ Θεῖον, but where it either must or may bear the sense I contend for. See p. 158, 159, 226, 321, 374, 375, 376, 377, 392. And, I think, if what Origen has in p. 342, be well considered, it may suffice to determine the dispute about the sense of τὸ Θεῖον in him. For there he plainly uses τὸ Θεῖον to denote that which is *divine* in our Lord, (as distinguished from his *human nature*,) viz. The *only-begotten of God* ; intimating that his *substance* is very different in that respect : Ἄλλος ὁ περὶ τούτου, καὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ, Λόγος ἔστι, παρὰ τὸν περὶ τοῦ νοημένου κατὰ τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἀνθρώπου. And he afterwards gives the name of τῷ Θεῷ, to that very *divinity*, or divine nature, which he supposes in our Lord together with the *manhood*^p.

The like may be said of Clemens's use of the phrase,

ⁿ See the passages collected in my Defence, vol. i. p. 177, 178.

^o The reader may see several plain examples in Gregory Nyss. contr. Eunom. It is not worth the while to search or cite many authorities for a known thing, which nobody conversant in the Greek Fathers can doubt of.

Greg. Nyss. p. 89, 92, 145, 147, 161, 162, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 180, 181, 191, 203, 264, 281, 291, 294, 301, 302, 303, 319, 327, 329, 412, 427. —448, 451, 453, 457, 471.

^p Τὰ περὶ τὸν Ἰησοῦν τοῖνον καθὼ μὴ νοήνται διόσται ἐν αὐτῷ πρᾶχθίνα, ἰστί ὄσια, ἃ ἔ μαχόμενα τῷ περὶ τοῦ Θεῷ ἰνοίσι. Orig. p. 343.

who likewise includes the Son in the τὸ Θεῖον⁹, as observed above^r: other places ^s of Clemens, where the phrase is also used, may be compared at leisure. Τὸ Θεῖον and ὁ Θεός may sometimes indifferently stand for each other: but a judicious reader may often observe τὸ Θεῖον to be used where ὁ Θεός would be very improper, and so *vice versa*. God considered *substantially*, as *res divina*, is the proper notion of τὸ Θεῖον, [θεῖον γένος, or θεῖον πρᾶγμα,] and not considered according to *personal* characters, acts, or offices. It would be improper to say, for instance, that the τὸ Θεῖον *begat*, or *sent* his Son, or did acts of *mercy*, or the like. I need not give more instances: an intelligent reader will easily perceive, from the circumstances, where τὸ Θεῖον is the more proper phrase, and where ὁ Θεός. To return to Origen.

You translate ἀγένητον φύσιν in Origen^t, *unoriginate nature*, instead of *uncreated nature*: which is the constant sense of ἀγένητον in that treatise of Origen, opposed to γενητὸν, a name for *created, mutable, and perishing things*. You have no instance in all Catholic antiquity where worship is put upon the *underivedness* of the Father, any farther than as it implies *necessary existence*: nor a single example to prove a distinction of *two worships, one supreme and the other inferior*. Some pretences of yours relating hereto will be examined in the next Query.

QUERY XVII.

Whether, notwithstanding, worship and adoration be not equally due to Christ; and consequently, whether it must not follow that he is the one God, and not (as the Arians suppose) a distinct inferior Being?

YOU here begin with repeating your argument from the *personal characters, I, thou, he*: which has been often

⁹ Clem. Alex. p. 452.

^r Query VIII.

^s Clem. Alex. p. 50, 53, 58, 113, 704, 776, 829, 836, 841, 845, 848.

^t Orig. contr. Cels. p. 189.

answered. You go on, (p. 368.) to argue for *mediate* worship, because the worship of the Son is to the *glory of the Father*. I might here insist upon it (as an ingenious gentleman^u hath lately done) that the words, Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ Πατρὸς, may be justly rendered, *The Lord Jesus Christ is (or Jesus Christ is Lord) in the glory of God the Father*: which rendering, agreeable to the Italic, and some other versions, would entirely defeat your argument. But allowing the common construction, and that the worship of God the Son *terminates* in God the Father; still it is manifest, for that very reason, that it is not an *inferior* worship, because then it could not terminate in the Father, being unworthy of him. Nor indeed can any act of worship extend to *both*, unless both be *one object*, as before shown. As to the same act of worship being considered as ultimately resting in the Father, it is because the *divine nature* to which the worship is paid is considered *primarily* in the Father, though belonging equally to *both*. You object that, by this account, no worship is paid to the *Father*, but to the *substance* or *essence* of the Father. Ridiculous; as if worshipping the divine substance as *personalized* in the Father, were not the same thing with worshipping the Father's *Person*. Pray, what is the *Person* of the Father but living, acting, intelligent *substance*? Do you mean, by *intelligent agent*, intelligent and acting *nothing*? "All worship," you say, "is personal:" and I say every person is *substance*: therefore worship may as well be called *substantial*, as *personal*, amounting, in this case, to the same thing. And if worship be paid to *three Persons*, is it not truly *personal*, as well as when paid to one? Your quotation from Bishop Pearson is nothing to the point in hand, but wide and foreign as possible. I had observed, in my Defence, that

^u Mr. Wade's short Inquiry into the Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 55.

N. B. Cyprian, Novatian, Hilary, and other Latins, so read and understand Phil. ii. 11.

Ὁ οὐκ ἀλλότριος Θεὸς ἓν, ἀλλὰ εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ πατρὸς. Epiphani. p. 972. Conf. 880.

you had many things to say, *in hopes* to lessen the honour attributed to the Son in Scripture. Upon this, you go solemnly to prayers: "I pray God forgive you the injury you here do me." I thank you for your charitable prayer, if really such. But had you put it up from your *closet*, instead of sending it from the *press*; there would have been less suspicion either of *affectation* or *malice* in it. As keen a *satire* and as *bitter* a revenge may appear in the shape of a *prayer*, as in any other form. The great *injury*, it seems, lies only in the word *hopes*; an expression perhaps not so exactly proper or accurate: a *candid* construction of it would have been a much surer token of a *forgiving* and *charitable* temper, than this unusual sally of *devotion* thrown out upon so slight an occasion. But let us pass on.

You tell me, (p. 371.) of "building my notion of religious worship upon metaphysical speculations:" which is doing me a great injury, and laying your own faults to my charge. I build my notion upon *plain Scriptures*, the universal suffrage of antiquity, (till the time that praying to *saints* and *angels* came in,) and upon the principles and practices of the Jews before Christ; who always looked upon *creature-worship* as *idolatry*. You build your *dissent* to such a cloud of witnesses upon nothing, that I can yet perceive, but some *metaphysical* speculations about *self-existence*, generation being an *act*, acts being all acts of the *will*, necessary generation being *co-action*, and the like. And when, in the strength of these speculations, you have discarded God the Son from the *one Godhead*; then you have recourse to such principles as Pagans first, and Papists since, have made use of in favour of *idolatry*, to bring in the *worship* of the Son at a back-door; instead of fixing it where *Scripture*, and *antiquity*, and all sober Christians have ever fixed it. You ask me, if I "really think that the worship of the Father does as much terminate finally in the Son, as the worship of the Son terminates finally in the Father?" But let me ask you, do you really think that any *creature-*

worship, any *inferior* worship terminates in the Father? I have shown you that it does not, and cannot. Your own argument therefore turns upon yourself. Either the supposed *inferior* worship terminates in the Son, and then it is *ultimate*; or it terminates in the Father, and then it is *supreme*: choose which you please. I say, what I take to be sense and truth, that it terminates in the *divine nature*, considered *primarily* in the Father, and *derivatively* in the Son: and now all is right. You ask, if the Son's "glorifying the Father" means the very same thing with the "Father's glorifying the Son?" Yes, the very same thing: how can you doubt of it, when you read John xvii. 1? And as to Phil. ii. 9. I question not its meaning being the very same.

I allowed, that prayers are *generally* to be offered rather *through*, than *to* the Son, because of his *being Mediator*. You ask, how this is consistent with the allowing no distinction of *mediate* and *ultimate* worship? You should have shown how it is *inconsistent*: but you choose rather to amuse your reader with *words*, where you give him no distinct *ideas*. Either the Son is not worshipped in this case, or he is worshipped: if he is not, there is no *mediate* worship; if he is, then in worshipping the Father *through him*, his *divinity*, and *essential union* with the Father, (which alone can render our services accepted, and unite us to God,) are at the same time acknowledged. And so the worship of both is *one*, being an acknowledgment of the same *divine* excellencies under a distinction of *Persons* and *offices*. Where do you find two *different* worships, more than two *different natures* in these cases? Only the *worship*, as the *nature*, being *one*, is considered *primarily* in the Father, and *secondarily* in the Son: this is all you can make of it. You will never prove any thing of *inferior* worship, unless you can first prove the nature of the Son to be *inferior* to the Father. Why then do you not come to the pinch of the question, instead of amusing us with little cavils wide of the point? You fall to your usual quibbling with *abstract*

essence, which has been often answered. You proceed to repeat your pretence about *derived* and *underived*; which indeed makes, in a manner, the sum total of your Reply; having little else to retreat to when pressed. Yet you love not *metaphysical* speculations. Let us see, however, what these curious things are: "that is, either derived and underived are the same, and the Son has the underived perfections of the Father derivatively: or else self-existence and underived self-sufficiency are no perfection at all." Here is nothing in this matter but quibbling upon the word *same*; which must admit of a closer and larger sense: or else there is no such thing as *same substance* or *same perfection* in the world: I am sure in your way of considering every thing as *extended*, there is not. To answer them more directly; the perfections of the Father and of the Son are *equal*, and the same in *kind*, though differing in the *manner* of existing, *underderivatively*, and *derivatively*: and they are also the same in *number*, by reason of their inseparable unity and coexistence. That *union* is sufficient to make *sameness*, numerical sameness, you must allow, as I have often hinted: otherwise how do you suppose innumerable extended parts of substance to make one *numerical* substance? Or will you venture to say, that they are the same *specifically*, and no otherwise, making *many* substances in *number*, though the same in *kind*? These *metaphysical* subtilities therefore ought to be dismissed, as being of no use in our present question. The same *substance* or the same *perfections* may be both *derived* and *underived*; allowing such a sense of *same* as you admit yourself in other cases.

I charged you with begging the question all the way, as confounding a *distinction* of *Persons* with difference of *nature*. You have nothing to say to *nature*. But what is the meaning of this shifting, but shutting your eyes against a necessary *distinction*, which at once discovers the fallacy of your reasonings, and leaves you utterly destitute of any farther reply? It is not that you understand not *nature*: but you understand it too well to be

ever capable of getting over so clear and plain a distinction. You have nothing further worth notice, till you come to consider *antiquity*, p. 375.

I began with Justin Martyr, showing that he maintains the *worship* of the Son; and upon *my* principles, not *yours*. You cite some passages out of him to prove the contrary. I stand amazed at your note, p. 375. wherein you insinuate, as if Justin were for the worship of *angels*; nay, and had set them before the Holy Ghost. I little thought you would fall in with Bellarmine and other Roman Catholics, in an interpretation which has been so often confuted by learned Protestants. I will not do over again what has been done to my hands. Let the reader consult the authors in the margin^x upon that passage of Justin. Justin speaks of honouring the Son in the *second place*: he does not say with *inferior* worship: he says expressly second in *order*. He says also, that the *Word*, who is of the *uncreated*, or *necessary existing* God^y, (intimating thereby, as I conceive, the necessary existence also of the *Λόγος* himself,) *we worship, and we love next after God*. Next in *order* again, he does not say with *inferior* worship, or *inferior* love. He adds the reason why we are to *love* him, namely, on account of his merits in our redemption.

Your next quotation from Justin proves only that God has *commanded* his Son to be *worshipped*: and so has Christ commanded us to worship his Father. What is this to the point of *inferior* worship?

Your last proves, that we worship the Father *through Christ*; which I readily admit.

What you say to Athenagoras and Theophilus requires

^x Le Moyne Var. Sacr. Not. p. 180. Bull. D. F. p. 72. Op. Posth. p. 962, 1037. Clerici Histor. Eccles. p. 616. Nourr. Appar. ad Bibl. Max. p. 414.

^y As to *angels* being taught by God the Son, see Clem. Alex. p. 769. Iren. p. 163. Cyril. Hierosol. p. 90. ed. Bened.

^z Τὸν γὰρ ἀπὸ ἀγγελίου (leg. ἀγγέλου) ἔφησεν Θεῷ Λόγον μετὰ τὸν Θεὸν προσκυνῶμεν, καὶ ἀγαπῶμεν, ἰσοῦδι ἔ δι' ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γίγνεται, ὅπως ἔ τῶν πατρῶν τῶν ἁριστέων συμμέτοχος γινώσκων, ἔ ἴδωσιν ποιήσεται. Apol. ii. p. 35.

no farther answer than what I have given more than once. As to Tertullian, I have shown before, that he is directly against inferior worship. You have nothing from Clemens, but that God is worshipped *through Christ*; which is wide of the purpose. As to the place cited by you out of his *Protrepticum*, it has been considered above^z.

Irenæus is plainly on my side of the question, as never making any distinction of *supreme* and *inferior* worship, never allowing worship to any *creature*, asserting Father and Son together to be *one God*, and testifying that the same acts of adoration^a under the Old Testament were applied to both. You have two objections to make against it: one, that Irenæus makes a prayer to God *through Jesus Christ*; which has no difficulty: the other is, that every knee, according to the *good pleasure* of the Father, is to *bow to Christ*; which scarce carries the face of an objection. For why may not the Father, who, according to his *good pleasure*, makes known *himself*, and demands worship to *himself*, do the like for his Son?

Hitherto the point in dispute is clearly determined on my side, by antiquity. Origen's principles appear more disputable: but when he is rightly understood, he will be also an advocate on the same side. I shall first lay down the arguments on my side, and vindicate the same from your exceptions: and then shall consider what counter-evidence you have pretended out of him.

1. In the first place, Origen declares fully against the worship of all *creatures*^b whatever; clearly distinguishing the Son from the *creatures*.

This you say nothing to.

2. The *reasons* which Origen founds worship on are applicable to the Son, as well as to the Father. The *un-created nature*, ἀγέννητος φύσις, is adorable as such: but

^z Page 92.

^a Qui igitur a prophetis adorabatur Deus vivus; hic est vivorum Deus et Verbum ejus, qui et loquutus est Moysi, &c.—Ipse igitur Christus cum Patre vivorum est Deus qui loquutus est Moysi, &c. p. 232.

^b See my Defence, vol. i. p. 177, 183.

such is the nature of God the Son: I have proved above, that he makes the Son ἀγένητος. The δημιουργός τοῦ παντός, *Creator of the universe*, is adorable as such: but such also is the Son. To this you object, (p. 380.) that the Father is *primarily* Creator, (so you ought to have rendered πρώτως δημιουργόν, and not *primarily Maker*,) the Son only *immediate* Maker, at the Father's command. But a difference in *order* or *manner* makes no difference in the thing itself: or if there be any, the Son is more properly *Creator* than the Father, according to the strictness of the expression in Origen.

Origen's doctrine is, that he who *made all things* is *adorable*, as such: and he asserts expressly, that the Son *made all things*, the very words^c. To which you again object, that he made them at the *command of the Father*: which I allow in such sense as the ancients meant it, explained above. But the point of *worship* is not put upon the *primary* manner of making, nor upon the *commanding* to make, by Origen, but upon the *making*: so that in this respect there is no difference.

3. I farther pleaded Origen's supposing the Son to be *worshipped*, because *God*^d. And I have above proved^e, that he is to be worshipped as *one God* with the Father: therefore their worship is *one*, not *two worships*, supreme and inferior.

4. I pleaded, lastly, that the worship of Father and Son is *inseparably* and *undividedly* one, according to Origen. His words are: "Now he has ascended to the God of the universe, who *undividedly, inseparably, unpartedly* worships him through the Son, the *Word* and *Wisdom* of God, seen in *Jesus*, who alone brings those to him that^f," &c.

^c See my Defence, vol. i. p. 183.

^d Origen. contr. Cels. p. 46.

^e Page 69, 106.

^f Ἀναβίβηκε δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἐνὶ πᾶσι Θεὸν, ὁ ἀρχίστως καὶ ἀδιαίρετως καὶ ἀμειρίστως πᾶσιν εἶβαν διὰ τοῦ μένου προσάγοντος ἐκείνου υἱοῦ, τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου καὶ σοφίας ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ Θεωρουμένῳ, &c. *Orig. contr. Cels. p. 382.*

You were sensible how strong this passage was against your principles; and therefore endeavoured to pervert the sense, by foisting in a word into your translation. You say, "with an undivided, undistracted, unparted affection." Where do you meet with *affection*? Or how came it in here, where the author is not talking of the *undistractedness of our affections*, but the *undivided worship* of Father and Son? He is commenting on 1 Cor. viii. 6. where it is said, "one God, of whom are all things," and also "one Lord, by, or through, whom are all things:" and this made him bring in the discourse of worshipping one by the other *inseparably*. What follows in that sentence farther shows, that this must be his meaning; where he observes, that it is the Son only, who is the very *Word* and *Wisdom* of God (well therefore may he be *undivided* from God) that brings men to God. This then may show you what worshipping the Father *through* the Son means in Origen: it is directing the worship to the Father; but so as to look upon the Son as *inseparably* worshipped in the same act. I illustrated the thought by a parallel place of the elder Cyril's, which you take no notice of.

Having now seen what Origen's real and certain doctrine was upon this head, it will be the easier to take off the force of your pretended counter-evidence from the same Origen.

There is but one passage, in his whole treatise, that looks at all favourable to your principles; and that being obscure, and of doubtful meaning, ought never to be set

§ Νῆστι διὰ τὸ τιμᾶν τὸν πατέρα νομίζων, ἢ ἐν τῶν δημοσεγγιμάτων τὸν υἱὸν ἐκπύσωμεν, ἀλλ' εἰς πατρὸς δι' υἱὸς υἱὸς προσκυνῶμεν, ἔ μὴ μισίζωμεν ἢ προσκύνουσι. *Cyrrill. Catech.* xi. p. 143. Ox.

Μία γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ θείασις, καὶ διὰ τούτου μία τιμὴ ἔ μὴ ἑστὶ προσκύνουσις, ἢ ἐν υἱῷ ἔ δι' αὐτοῦ γινομένη τῇ πατρὶ: ἔ ὁ οὕτω προσκυνῶν, ἵνα Θεὸν προσκυνῷ. *Athan. Orat.* p. 3, 555.

Dum ad solius Patris personam honoris Sermo dirigitur, bene credentis fide, tota Trinitas honoratur. Et cum ad Patrem, litantis destinatur intentio, sacrificii munus omni Trinitati uno eodemque offertur litantis officio. *Fulgent. ad Monim.* lib. ii. c. 5. p. 31.

against *many* and *plain* ones, but rather to be interpreted by them. I gave a sufficient answer to it before, producing the passage in the margin. You tell me that, “for a very good reason I thought not fit to translate it.” I must own, I do not love to abound in translations, only to swell pages; while I suppose myself writing more for the use of *scholars*, than for the *populace*, who are scarce competent judges of our disputes about *antiquity*. I perceive, you are very full of *translations*, out of Eusebius especially; as if you intended *show* more than any thing else: for they are of no more real weight, than if I were to translate as much out of Alexander, Athanasius, or Cyril the elder, and throw it before the readers. But this by the way. I return to Origen. The passage, justly and literally rendered, runs thus: “All *supplication*, and *prayer*, and *intercession*, and *thanksgiving*, are to be sent up to the God over all, by the High Priest, who is above all angels, being the *living Word*, and *God*. And we may also offer supplication to the *Word* himself, and intercession, and thanksgiving, and prayer; if we can but understand how prayer is taken in *propriety of speech*, or in an *improper sense*.”

What I gather from this passage is, that *prayer* in the most *proper* sense is to be understood of prayer directed immediately to the Father. This has been the most usual and common method of *praying*: wherefore this kind of *praying* has obtained generally the name of *prayer*, and is what the word *prayer* has been ordinarily used to mean. Origen does not say, that the *prayers*, *supplications*, *intercessions*, and *thankgivings*, offered to God the Son, are none of them properly so called; but he makes his remark

Ἡ πᾶσαν μὲν δίδου γὰρ καὶ προσευχὴν, καὶ ἑνότητι, καὶ εὐχαριστίας ἀναπαύσειν τῆς ἐπὶ πάνσι Θεῷ, διὰ τοῦ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀγγέλων ἀρχιερέως, ἐμφύχου Λόγου καὶ Θεοῦ διηγήμεθα δὲ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Λόγου, καὶ ἑνεχόμεθα αὐτῷ καὶ εὐχαριστήσομεν, καὶ προσευξόμεθα δὲ, ἂν δυνάμεθα κατακούειν τῆς πρὸς προσευχῆς κυριολίχειας, καὶ κατασχέσειας. Orig. contr. Cels. lib. v. p. 233.

Vid. Bull. D. F. sect. ii. c. 9. p. 121. Bingham. Origin. Ecol. lib. xiii. c. 2. p. 45, &c. Origen. πρὸς εὐχ. p. 78. in notis.

upon *prayer* only : and he does not say, that even *prayer*, when directed to God the Son, is not proper *divine worship*, or that it is *another* worship, or an *inferior* worship : nor can any such consequences be justly drawn from his words. All that we are obliged to grant, in virtue of this passage, is, that one part of *divine* worship called *prayer*, is most properly and emphatically *prayer*, when directed to the *first Person* of the Godhead ; inasmuch as that method of *praying* has been most customary and prevailing, and has thereby, in a manner, engrossed the name of *prayer* to itself : just as *addresses*, by being most commonly offered to a prince, come at length, by use, to mean *addresses* of that kind only ; and then *addresses* to *others* are not so properly *addresses*. *Prayer* then, properly, or emphatically speaking, is praying to the Father, to whom all prayer *primarily* belongs. Allowing this to be Origen's meaning, (and it is the very utmost that can be made of it,) how will you prove *supreme* and *inferior* worship from it ?

I have before observed, that the worship of the Son, according to Origen, is properly *divine* ; being offered to him as *Creator*, and as *necessarily existing*, and as *God* : and I observed also, that Father and Son together are worshipped as *one God*. I observed farther, that even in prayers directed to the Father *through the Son*, the Son is supposed, by Origen, to be worshipped *undividedly* in the *same act*. How then do you make out your *two worships* ? Suppose the prayer to pass *through* or *by* the Son to the Father ; still it is *one prayer*, *one worship*, considered as belonging to both in a different manner. For as the *one work* of creating descends, as it were, *from the Father by the Son* ; who are therefore *one Creator* : so the *one worship* ascends, as it were, *by the Son to the Father* ; who are therefore *one object* of worship. You should have proved two *unequal* worships : but you have proved no more than this, that *one* and the *same worship*, diversely considered, is paid to both, in the very same act : to the Father directly, as being *primarily* and *eminently* Creator,

God, &c. and *supreme* in order and office; to the Son obliquely, or interpretatively, as being *equally* God, Creator, &c. but God of God, and *mediating* between God and man. There is therefore no difference in the worship itself, no *superiority* or *inferiority*, no acknowledgment of *higher* and *lower* perfections: but the same worship, the same acknowledgments of the same infinite perfections, admit of a different manner of application, to keep up a sense of the distinction of Persons, order, and offices.

You represent Bishop Bull (p. 383.) as making a distinction of *one worship* paid to the Son as God absolutely, and *another* worship paid to him as God of Godⁱ. This is not a just representation of Bishop Bull, as if he admitted *one* and *another* worship, *two worships*, to God the Son; when he makes but *one worship* of all, due to Father and Son. This, I suppose, was to give some colour to your own *hypothesis*. Bishop Bull's meaning is plainly this; that the Son is considered as *divine* whenever we worship him; and that that alone is the *foundation* of his worship^k. But we may consider him barely as *divine*, abstracting from all relations of *order* and *office*; or *divine* in such an *order*, or together with the *office* of *Mediator*. The *divine worship* is the same, under these *three conceptions*, because *divine* enters them all: but the additional consideration of *order* and *office*, in the two last, makes a difference, not in the *worship itself*, but in the *order* and manner of *applying* it.

You proceed to cite another passage of Origen^l, where arguing *ad hominem*, (as the Schools call it,) he pleads a *command* for the worship of Christ, against Celsus; who could plead no command for the worship of the Pagan

ⁱ Vid. Bull. D. F. sect. ii. c. 9. s. xv. p. 120.

^k Vid. Bull. Prim. Trad. p. 36.

N. B. The design of this piece of Bishop Bull, is to prove that the worship paid to Christ is properly *divine*, and not merely *mediatorial*. From whence let the reader judge with what *truth* or *fairness* you represent Bishop Bull as differing from me, in the allowing *mediatorial worship*, p. 120.

^l Orig. contr. Cels. p. 384.

deities. This was indeed showing a very great difference in the two cases, such as was worth insisting upon: but it does not from hence follow, (the contrary is very evident,) that Origen ever *founded* the worship of Christ upon mere *command*, without reference to the dignity and real *divinity* of his Person. What you farther cite from the piece *περὶ εὐχῆς*, whether Origen's own, or foisted in by some other hand, is of no moment in the case, being clearly contradicted in his treatise against Celsus, which is certainly *genuine*, and contains Origen's last and maturest thoughts upon the subject. Do you ever find Origen placing the Son among the *γενῆα* in his book against Celsus? Doth he not constantly distinguish him from them, and set him above them, making him *ἀγέννητος*, as I have proved? Or does he ever deny that Christ is to be prayed to at all; as this author of the piece *περὶ εὐχῆς* does? No, but he frequently, plainly, and fully asserts the contrary.

What you add (p. 386.) about *doxologies* is low and trifling; especially after that matter has been so carefully and accurately discussed by learned hands. And your quoting the lying Philostorgius in a matter of fact of Flavian's introducing a new kind of doxology, which he reports against the faith of all history^m, is a great affront upon your readers.

I might quote you a better authority than Philostorgius, namely, Theodoritⁿ, to prove that Arius introduced a change of the ancient *doxologies*. But learned men know that neither of those accounts is true: but that *doxologies* of both sorts were in use long before either Flavian on one side or Arius on the other.

You go on to other writers, endeavouring to prove, as you say, *mediate* and *ultimate* worship: that is your phrase now, instead of *inferior* and *supreme*; because you imagine the reader may more easily be *deceived* under those terms, than under these. For if the Father be but

^m Vid. Bull. D. F. sect. ii. c. 3. p. 51.

ⁿ Theod. Hæret. Fab. lib. iv. c. 1.

worshipped *through* Christ; presently you cry out *mediate* worship; though it be all one *divine* worship, not *two*: and either the Son is not worshipped at all, in such a case; or, if he is, the *same* worship is then offered to *both*. The nature of the worship is not altered by the manner of *conveyance*; any more than a present of *gold*, made to two persons, becomes *brass* to one and *gold* to the other, only by being conveyed through one to the other. You will never be able to prove any difference in the nature or kind of the worship, merely from the *economical* manner of applying it. You begin with the Apostolical Constitutions; which you know are of no authority: and so I shall not trouble myself to show that the passages, were they really genuine, are nothing to your purpose. You go on to Polycarp; who glorifies God *through* Christ. Cyprian says, that the Father *commanded his Son to be worshipped*: therefore his worship is *mediate*. Wonderful! Novatian says, if Christ be a *man* only, why is he *invoked* as *Mediator*? therefore again his worship is *mediate*. You did not consider Novatian's notion of a *Mediator*, that he must be both *God* and *man*: and so you lost the whole force of his argument; which was to prove the Son to be *God* from the *invocation*, and not *man* only, as some heretics pretended.

What you cite from Lactantius, I have answered above: or if I had not, you must be sensible that very little stress ought to be laid upon a few uncautious expressions of a catechumen, not yet perfectly instructed in the doctrines of the Church, which was the case of Lactantius. He had, however, learned so much of the Church's doctrine, as to determine directly against you in the present question; where he says, *one honour* belongs to both as to *one God*, and that their worship is *inseparable*°.

° *Unus est honos utrique tribuendus tanquam uni Deo: et ita dividendus est per duos, cultus, ut divisio ipsa compage inseparabili vinciat. Neutrum sibi relinquet, qui aut Patrem a Filio, aut Fillum a Patre secernit. Lact. Epit. c. xlix. p. 141. ed. Cant.*

As to Eusebius, your last evidence, though I build little upon so late and so suspected an authority, (which, as I have often hinted, you ought no more to urge against me, than I to urge Alexander, Cyril, Athanasius, or Hilary, against you,) yet neither had he any such mean thoughts of God the Son, as you have: nor did he found his *worship* upon any such low principles; which I have shown above. He is, however, the first you could find, among such as have been ever called Catholics, who pretended to say, that Father and Son are not *ισοτριμοι*, the first that durst ever flatly contradict St. John, (or rather our Saviour himself by St. John,) where he says, "that all men should "honour the Son, even as they honour the Father," John v. 23. I conclude with the same declaration I formerly made, that "I desire only to have things *fairly* represented, as they *really* are; no evidence smothered or "stifled on either side. Let every reader see plainly what "may be *justly* pleaded here or there, and no more." Had you attended to these good rules, which you are pleased to remind me of, and to favour with your approbation, you might have brought your book into a less compass; and perhaps have done as much *real* service to your cause, and less hurt to your character.

QUERY XVIII.

Whether worship and adoration, both from men and angels, was not due to him, long before the commencing of his mediatorial kingdom, as he was their Creator and Preserver, (see Col. i. 16, 17.) and whether that be not the same title to adoration which God the Father hath, as Author and Governor of the universe, upon the Doctor's own principles?

IT is proper the reader should be let into the full design and purport of this Query, that he may be able to pass a more certain judgment of the pertinence or impertinence of your answer. The question is, whether the worship of Christ be founded upon any thing *antecedent*

to his incarnation and exaltation, or only upon the *powers* then supposed to be given him. If it was founded on any thing *antecedent*, then the Doctor and you have very impertinently cited Matt. xxviii. 18. John v. 22, 23. Phil. ii. 10, 11. and the like texts, as carrying in them the sole *foundation* of his worship, after the manner of the Socinians: if it was not founded on any thing *antecedent*, what account can you give of Christ's being *Creator*, of his being *God* before the creation, John i. 1. of his having "glory before the world was," and the like? In short, the Doctor is here confounded between two schemes, Socinian and Arian, and very unskilfully endeavours to tack both together; which is utterly impracticable. Either let him found the worship of the Son upon what was *antecedent* to the incarnation, and then he may tolerably go on upon the Arian scheme: or if he chooses to found it entirely upon the *subsequent powers*, he is all over Socinian, and does not know it.

My design is not to suffer you to take the advantage of *both* the schemes, which are utterly inconsistent with each other. You must either drop your Arian principles, and so settle in Socinianism: or if you resolve to retain your Arian tenets, you must drop your Socinian pleas, to be all of a piece. This is what you may easily be driven to; and that was the design of this Query. If the reader takes this along with him, he will readily perceive how hard you are here pressed; and how elusive and insufficient all your answers are.

You say, whenever the *mediatorial kingdom* began, the *worship* however of Christ was by the *command* of the Father. That I allow: and so was also the worship of the Father first introduced by the *command* of the Father. Hitherto you are only shifting; and come not to the pinch of the *question*; namely, *when* the worship began, or *whereon* it was founded. What follows, (p. 392.) is still evading, and running from the point in question. What comes nearest to it is your saying, that *he by whom God created all things* has not the same title to *adoration* with

him *who created all things by him*. Well: but has he any title at all upon the foot of his being *Creator*? Or do you make him a mere *nominal* Creator? If, according to Heb. i. 10. "he laid the foundation of the earth," and if "the heavens were the works of his hands;" and if he was *God* before the creation, (according to John i. 1.) then show me, that the *power of judging*, or any thing of like nature subsequent, ever could be a *higher* or an *equal* foundation of worship with what has been mentioned. You cannot show, that he was made a *God* after his resurrection: but it is plain, and you cannot gainsay it, that he was *God* before the creation. Wherefore I insist upon it, that he had as clear and full a title to worship before his incarnation, as any you can show after: and therefore it is strangely inconsistent of you to *found* his worship upon the *power of judging*, &c. No one ever would do this that believed the Son to be *God* and *Creator* (though in a lower sense than the Father) before the world. The Socinians were shrewd men, and showed some parts and sagacity in the working up their scheme. They founded the worship of Christ upon the *power of judging*, and his *exaltation*: but then they were never so silly as to suppose him *God* and *Creator* before. The Arians founded the worship of Christ upon his being *Creator* and *God* before the world: but then they were not so weak as to found it upon the *power of judging*, &c. Whereas you, to give a specimen of your great dexterity in forming a scheme, have marvellously tacked two parts together, one of which will suit only with the Socinian scheme, the other only with the Arian or Catholic; thereby betraying great unskilfulness and want of thought. Which of these parts you will at length give up, I know not: but all men of sense and common discernment will laugh at you for holding *both*.

When I wrote my Defence, the Doctor had not determined that God the Father is ever called *God*, in Scripture, in the *metaphysical* sense. Worship even of *him* was to be founded only upon his *office* (God was then a

name of *office*) *relative* to us. I was therefore of opinion, that if the Son was *Creator*, as great an *office* as any, and as highly meriting of us, he must then, upon the Doctor's own principles, have the same title to adoration as the *Father* himself had: nor do I see, that you have yet been able to baffle this reasoning. You have been forced to allow, (obliged thereto by the unanimous current of antiquity, Eusebius not excepted,) that the Son is *immediate Artificer*, or *Creator*, of the universe. This is meriting as highly of us as is possible; more, one would imagine, than merely giving out *commands*; which is an honour you reserve peculiar to the *Father*. If therefore worship be founded, not upon any *dignity* and *excellency* of *nature*, but upon *relative offices*; it seems to me, that the Son's title to our worship is as clear and full as possible, upon your *own* principles; such, I mean, as they were at that time. My argument therefore was good when I made it; however you may have varied your notions since. I add further, that my argument, from the hand the Son had in *creating*, will remain impregnable for an *equality* of worship, whatever principles you take up in hopes to elude it: though that particular was not the special purport of this Query.

You had argued against *creating* being a just *foundation* of worship, because *no act of dominion*: to which I replied, that the same argument would hold with respect to the *Father* also; and so his *creating* the world would be no foundation for worshipping him, being no more an *act of dominion* than the *Son's* creating is. To which you now reply, that the world was made by the *Father's* "original absolute authority and power." This is not defending your *first* answer, but retreating to *another*. However, this will not do, any more than the *first*. For you will never be able to prove, that the *Son* is not as completely and fully *Creator* as the *Father*: and Scripture never founds worship upon the *original unde-rived* manner of creating, which you speak of, but upon

the *creating* itself. What you object from Rev. iv. 10, 11. "created for his pleasure," has been answered above⁹. You go on upon this argument of the Son's having the *same title* that the Father has, though but a by-part of the Query. Not a word do you say to clear yourself of *Socinianism*; not a syllable to vindicate your inconsistency in *founding* the Son's *worship* upon his *mediatorial powers* given after his resurrection; at the same time admitting that he was *God* before the world, and *created* the world. This perhaps was too tender a point to be touched.

To pursue you in your own way. I pleaded John xvii. 5. "Glorify me with the glory," &c. not to prove that the Son had the *same title to worship* which the Father has; but to show that the *glory* he had after his incarnation was *not greater* than he had before: and therefore it was a weak thing of you to overlook his *former glories*, equal to any, and to found his *worship* upon what came after. To this you reply, (p. 394.) "His being restored "to the glory he had before, does not prove that the "power of judgment, &c. was not an additional exaltation." Yes, but it proves something more; that even after *all judgment was committed to him*, he was yet not invested with *that glory*, not with so *great glory*, (for why should he ask for less, if he had greater,) as he *had before the world was*. But you add, that "if the Son "had the same right to *glory* that the Father had, it "could be no more proper for the Son to pray to the Father, to *glorify him*, than for the Father to pray to the "Son." But the case is different, because the Son was *incarnate*, and not the Father: therefore it became the Son to *pray*, but not the Father. Aye but, say you, could not the Son himself have given it by his own authority? Yes; but as the Father did not disdain to receive *glory* from the Son, why should the Son refuse to

⁹ See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 54, 55.

⁹ Page 173.

receive *glory* from the Father? As to Irenæus's testimony, that the Son was of old worshipped together with the Father, it is a very plain one; and I have given it above^r. The Father and Son together are there expressly styled the "God of the living:" and it was the "God of "the living" that the Patriarchs *adored*.

You have a pleasant remark (p. 142.) on that passage of Irenæus: you say, I take no notice of the *emphatical* words, *resurrectio autem ipse Dominus est*. Behold, now I have taken notice of them: of what use are they, I beseech you, in our present debate? How do they at all lessen the force of my argument? Would you have it, that Christ was adored by the Patriarchs of old, as *God*, because he was to be exalted to be *God* 2000 years after? You should speak out plainly, that a reader may understand you: unless your design be to give a hint as if you had something material to say, when you have really nothing. It puts me in mind of the Modest Pleader, who once thinking himself obliged to quote, at full length, a noted passage of Bishop Pearson^s, which had been usually cut into halves, (the latter half begins with, "and "therefore,") he claps this note upon it: "What that "learned writer meant by the word *therefore*, I submit to "the judicious reader." No doubt but he would have the *judicious reader* imagine there is something weighty in the remark; though he can neither show *what* nor *why*. But to proceed.

I had referred to Eusebius and Athanasius, as both agreeing that God the Son was worshipped by Abraham, Moses, and the Jewish Church: it was therefore the sense of the ancients in general, (as we may safely conclude from these two writers, and their agreement; were there no other proofs,) that God the Son had distinct worship paid him long before his incarnation: and therefore his *worship* (whatever it were) could not be founded

^r Page 366.

^s See it above, p. 190.

^t Modest Plea, p. 212.

on the commission to *judge*, or the like, as you have founded it. After your many boasts of the *ancients*, groundless and shameless as I ever met with, here in a very important point, the point of *worship*, wherein our practice is nearly concerned; here, I say, you run counter to all the Catholics of the primitive Church; nay, to all the sober Arians, who will hereafter rise up in judgment and condemn you, for founding Christ's worship so *meanly*, upon I know not what *powers* given after his resurrection. They founded it upon reasons *antecedent* to his incarnation, upon his being *God* before the world, and *Creator* of the world by his *own* power^u.

You endeavour to show that Eusebius's doctrine about the worship of Christ runs not so high as mine. Perhaps it does not: I did not cite Eusebius for that purpose. But I cited him as an evidence, to prove that all antiquity is directly and fully against your way of founding Christ's worship in the *power of judging*, &c. You have none of the ancients, except such as Photinus, or Paul of Samosata, to countenance you in it: the Arians, at least the generality of them, would have been ashamed of it. This is what I before pressed you with; and you, in your reply, dissemble and totally conceal it, leading your reader off to quite other things.

What you have from Philo is still diverting, and running off from the main point: nor are Philo's notions, in this case, of any moment in the controversy; unless the Apostles and primitive Christians had no better guide than Philo. Philo might hit upon some truths, but shaded with errors, and not breaking out with full lustre and brightness. A clearer and fuller discovery was a privilege reserved for the Christian Church. Your remark (p. 397.) about the *angel* which appeared to Manoah is

^u Christum colimus ut *Creatorem*. *Serm. Arian. ap. August. p. 663.*

Antequam faceret universa, omnium futurorum Deus et Dominus, Rex et Creator erat constitutus. Voluntate et præcepto (*Patris*) cælestia et terrestria, visibilia et invisibilia, corpora et spiritus, *ex nullis exstantibus*, ut essent, *sua virtute* fecit. *Serm. Arianor. p. 622.*

just: and had you looked into the last edition of my Defence, you would have found that part corrected. For it is not my way, after I perceive any mistake, to persist in it.

To conclude. The reader is desired to observe, that you had been charged with taking in two inconsistent schemes (Arian and Socinian) into one, and tacking them very absurdly together; that you have been called upon to declare which of the disjointed parts you will give up, or else to show how it is possible to make them stand together; that after mature deliberation, you have made no answer to the charge, but have passed it over in profound silence. These are the *facts*; let every honest reader judge what to *infer* from them.

QUERY XIX.

Whether the Doctor hath not given a very partial account of John v. 23. founding the honour due to the Son on this only, that the Father hath committed all judgment to the Son; when the true reason assigned by our Saviour, and illustrated by several instances, is, that the Son doth the same things that the Father doth, hath the same power and authority of doing what he will; and therefore has a title to as great honour, reverence, and regard, as the Father himself hath? and it is no objection to this, that the Son is there said to do nothing of himself, or to have all given him by the Father; since it is owned that the Father is the fountain of all, from whom the Son derives, in an ineffable manner, his essence and powers, so as to be one with him?

THOUGH you have nothing under this Query but what I have before fully answered or obviated; yet because you are pleased to repeat, I shall repeat also. Dr. Clarke's pretence is, that Christ's honour is *founded* upon the *power* of judgment committed to him: I say, his honour is *founded* on the *intrinsic* excellency and *antece-*

dent dignity of his Person; whereof the power of judgment committed is only a farther attestation, and a provisional security for the payment of his due honour. It did not *make* him *worthy*, but *found* him so: and it was added, that such his high worth and dignity might *appear* to men, and be acknowledged by them—"The Father hath committed all judgment unto the Son, that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father." This is not giving us the *formal reason*, or *foundation* of his *honour*, but the *final reason*, or *moving cause*, why the Son is to execute judgment rather than the Father himself. It is because men would hereby be apprised of his *antecedent* worth and dignity, and at the same time be incited to pay him suitable honour, in external acts of *worship* and *adoration*, as to the Father himself. This is the obvious, natural construction of the place in St. John; as I before intimated. And I confirmed it by the accounts which St. John has given us of his *antecedent* dignity, his being *God* before the creation, and his *creating* the world: which makes it plain, that the *committing of judgment* was no addition of *new* dignity, but rather declarative of the *old*; that it might *appear* the more fully, and be the more secure of the *effect* upon mankind. This reasoning appearing to me very clear and just, demanded as clear an answer. But you have little to say, except in the way of *objection* and *repetition*, about *derived* and *underived*: which is not arguing from *Scripture*, but from *metaphysical* notions you have taken up about *sameness*, and such as you allow not in any case but this; contradicting that strict notion of *sameness*, as often as you make an infinite number of extended parts to be the *same* substance.

To what you repeat from the Modest Pleader about the Father's being *Fountain*, I returned a sufficient answer in a note to a Sermon*. You ask, "Can one person commit powers to another who had already in himself

* Sermon II. vol. ii. p. 33, 34.

“the same powers?” Yes, by voluntary *economy*, the exercise of powers *common* to many may devolve upon one chiefly; and may run in his name. I gave you a proper rebuke in my Defence, vol. i. p. 199. for your expressing great *amazement* at my *prejudice* and *blindness* in maintaining only what had been held by all the Christian churches. I reminded you of the many *wise, great, and good* men, whom you charged through my sides. “This,” you say, “is not a right way of dealing with Scripture.” That was not the point: but it might be a right way of dealing with a gentleman who was gone beyond *decorum*, and appeared too full of *himself*; forgetting that a *modest* deference is due to *wise, great, and good* men, even where we *dissent* from them. But to pass on.

I charged your interpretation of John v. 19. as *unnatural* and *forced*, making the context *incoherent*. “The Son can do nothing but by commission: for” (observe the reason) “he can do every thing the Father does.” But if the sense runs thus, *The Son being one with the Father can do nothing separately*, then the context is coherent; “for whatsoever the Father doth, the Son does also, or likewise.” You say, “The word *for*, in the latter part of the 19th verse, is not the reason given of what went before, but that the latter part is a parenthesis.” But who will give you the liberty of making a *parenthesis* where there is no occasion, only to serve a *hypothesis*? I showed, that you cannot make your sense out of the passage, but by supplying the deficiency of the text with what the text has not said. Which observation of mine you call *retracting* the charge before made, when it is really *enforcing* it: and I preferred the Catholic interpretation as more *natural*, and as arguing no *deficiency* in the text. Besides that, admitting the sentence to be elliptical, in order to make the sense *coherent* in your way of construction; yet I took notice farther, how very harsh and strange it must sound for a *creature* to be *commissioned to do all that the Creator does*. To which you have nothing to reply, but that

your interpretation does not suppose the Son *created*. Say then, that he is *uncreated*, and let us end the dispute; provided only, you will please to *mean*, as well as *say*. I accept, however, of your tacit acknowledgment, that my argument against the Son's being a *creature* is unanswerable. How far you are concerned in it, the readers will judge. You go on; "it must be odd, and "strange, that the supreme God should be commissioned." Nothing strange at all, that one who is *supreme* in order and *office*, should give commission to another *not supreme* in order or *office*; though both be equally *supreme in nature*; which is the true notion of *supreme God*.

I showed you what answers had been formerly given to your objections by Hilary, Chrysostom, Cyril, and Austin: in reply to which, you tell me, that Novatian and Eusebius were more *ancient* Fathers. But did I put it upon the *authority* of the Fathers which I cited? I insisted upon the *reasons* they gave, against those very pretences which you revive. And why did you not answer them? Their *reasons* were drawn from *Scripture*, and founded on the *text* itself; against which neither Novatian nor Eusebius is of any the least weight. But thus you love to disguise the true matter in question, and to lead your reader off to something wide and foreign. However, Novatian has not a word to your purpose; unless *copying out* the Father's works (*imitator operum Paternorum*) proves the Son to be of a *different* nature from the Father. Tertullian, ancients than either Novatian or Eusebius, understands the Son's doing *nothing of himself*, of the intimate conjunction of the Father and Son, the Son being *in the Father*, and seeing all that he does, or rather all that he *designs* or *conceives*. He goes upon

γ Filius nihil a semetipso potest facere, nisi viderit Patrem facientem. Pater enim sensu agit; Filius vero qui in Patris sensu est, videns perficit; sic omnia per Filium facta sunt, et sine illo factum est nihil. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* c. 15.

Τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων τοὺς τύπους ἰσχυμαίνεσθαι μὴ ὁ πατήρ, ἰσχυμαίνῃ δὲ ὁ υἱός,

the old notion, that the *designing* or *conceiving* part belongs peculiarly to the *Father*, the *executive* and *finishing* part to the *Son*: and thus *Father* and *Son* were jointly concerned in every operation. As to *Eusebius's* authority, where he has not *reasons*, nor elder *Fathers* to support him, it is worth nothing. *Athanasius* has writings extant older, probably, than any we have of *Eusebius's*; except his oration before *Paulinus* of *Tyre*, or what may be had in *Pamphilus's* *Apology*. And as to *Hilary*, there is about twenty years difference between his age and *Eusebius's*: a mighty thing for you to boast of.

I excuse your citing (p. 404.) a sentence of the *Semi-Arians* in *Epiphanius*; mistaking it for *Epiphanius's* own: I suppose you did it ignorantly. And it is the more pardonable, because *learned* men had formerly made the same blunder: though, I believe, never since the time that *Petavius's* sagacity set that matter right in his notes to his edition, the same that you made use of.

To your argument drawn from the *Father's* *loving* the *Son*, I replied, that he *loves* also himself; which is no matter of *choice*. You pretend, however, that "showing the *Son* all things, is free:" which you have no ground for saying, but it is purely fiction to serve an *hypothesis*. Your adding, his "giving authority to do likewise," is corrupting the text, which says nothing of *authority*; though if it had, it might be understood of such authority, power, and perfections, as descend with his nature from the *Father* to the *Son*.

You quote *John* xv. 10. of *Christ's* "abiding in his love." If you see any consequence favourable to your principles in that text, you should have shown it: I can

εὐ δουλικῶς, οὐτ' ἀμαθῶς, ἀλλ' ἐπιστημονικῶς, καὶ οἰκονόμικον εἰσὶν, πατριῶς.
Greg. Naz. Orat. xxxvi. p. 584.

Eusebius has the like thought, which he expresses however in terms somewhat harsh.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν πατρὶς διέτισσε, καὶ ἡτοίμαζε διανοούμενος, &c.—; δι τῶν τοῦ πατρὸς λογισμῶν ἐκαστίζων, καὶ μόνος ἐπιστημῶν τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ βάλων, δι' ἕργων ἐχάσει, τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκαστηγούμενος νόμοισι. *Euseb. Eccl. Theol.* lib. iii. c. 3. p. 164.

see none. You tell me of bringing Hilary in again: and you entirely slip over the reasons I produced from him, without any answer. Is this dealing fairly with the reader?

I had challenged you to show, that one person may not be *delegate* to another, without being unequal in *nature*. But you are frightened, as usual, with the distinction of *order* and *nature*; and run off in the utmost confusion. A “delegated power,” you say, “cannot be equally supreme and independent.” Come out of the clouds, and tell me what you mean by *supreme* and *independent*. If you mean as *great* a power, and as *necessarily existing*, I shall tell you, there is no difference between the *Father's* and the *Son's*: if you mean, that the *Son's* is *of the Father*, the *Father's* from none, I allow a supremacy of *order*, and a different *manner* of existing; and the question is not *whence* the Son has his powers, but *what* they are. As to supremacy of *order* being only in placing of *words*, I have showed your inconsistency on that head above. Your blaming me for citing Ruffin's translation, in a case where it is all one whether the words were Ruffin's or Origen's, is low carping. You did not perceive that the passage was brought in among several others of Post-Nicene writers; and intended only for illustration. But you are still more offended at my styling my doctrine *the doctrine of the Trinity*; as if others had not as good a right to style theirs so. Supposing you have, (which I deny,) yet sure I may style my own according to what I take to be right and true. But your Trinity of a *great God*, a *little God*, and *no God*, must have some strong figure to help it, to make it a *Trinity*; which is a word that has long stood for a quite different thing^z.

^z Τριὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἢ τριῶν ἀδελφοί. τριῶν δὲ οὐ πραγμάτων ἁγίων ἀπαριθμησὶ — ἀλλὰ ἴσων καὶ ὁμοτιμῶν σύλληψις. Greg. Nazian. Orat. xiii. p. 211.

Εἰ δὲ τριῶν ἴσων, ὅσπερ οὖν καὶ ἴσται, δίδωσται δὲ ἀδικίαιτες οὐσα καὶ οὐκ ἀνόμοιοι. ἀνάγκη μίαν σκῆπτει εἶναι τὴν ἀγένητα, καὶ μίαν ταύτης τὴν ἀϊδιόγητα, καὶ τὴν τῆς ἀτρεψίως φύσιν. Athanas. Ep. i. ad Scrap. p. 678.

I had retorted upon you your own arguments against the received doctrine of the Trinity; to show the world how *unequal* and *partial* you have been in the handling this controversy. You had several maxims about *individual*, about *sameness*, about *substance*, about *being*, which were to be urged as of great force against the doctrine of the *Trinity*; though of no force in another subject, upon your own principles. You could allow being and being, where you could not say *beings*; substance and substance, where you could not say *substances*; *individual* substance, where yet you could distinguish between *this* and *that*; and *samo*-substance, where it is not the *same* in such a sense of *same*, as you urge against us. *Sameness* by *union* you can allow, where you have a mind: only in our present dispute, no such thing was to be admitted. This unreasonable, and indeed shameful conduct, in so momentous an affair, I endeavoured to expose as it deserved. The reader may please to look into my Defence, vol. i. p. 207, &c. to see what I had to say on that head: I have no mind to repeat. Pressed with the difficulties of the *omnipresence* retorted upon you, you now tell me, that my foundation was wrong, in supposing *the substance of God to be God*. This I am a little startled at: let us hear what your philosophy can produce in defence of so wild a paradox, that *the substance of God is not God*. I will give the reader your words at length, that he may marvel. "God is neither the substance of God, nor the attributes of God, but he is that intelligent Agent whose both the substance and attributes are. And as infinity, for instance, so every other attribute, power, or perfection, of the omnipresent Being, is the individual attribute, power, or perfection, of that one individual intelligent Agent, whose the omnipresent substance is," p. 407. The philosopher that fixed the *earth* upon an *elephant*, and the *elephant* upon a *tortoise*, and knew not where to go next, could not be more confounded than you appear to be here. The *substance*, it seems, is to be fixed upon the *Person*; (which is neither *substance* nor at-

tribute; but something between both,) and thus all difficulties are wiped off at once, by making *person* stand for nobody knows what; an *idea*, I suppose, or nothing. I have often suspected your notion of *intelligent agent* to be very confused; but never thought it so wild and unaccountable as this comes to. Do you consider that *intelligent* and *agent* are two *adjectives*, which suppose a *substantive*, two attributes that require *substance* for their support? Say that *person* is the subject: but then what is *person*, but either *substance*, or *attribute*, or *nothing*? Resolve it into its several *ideas*, and you will find that *person* always implies *intelligent* and *acting substance*; not *intelligent acting nothing*. Now *intelligence*, and *activeness*, are *attributes* only of *God*, that is, of the *divine substance*; which is *God*, and what we mean by *God*, as often as we speak of him, considered as the *subject* of his own attributes.

I know not whether you might not be led into the mistake through the *vulgar* way of speaking about the *substance* of *God*, or *substance* of the *Father*; as if the *substance* were not *God* himself, or not the *Father* himself, but something *belonging* to him. The same way of speaking might be as good an argument to prove, that the *Person* of the *Father* is not the *Father*, but something *belonging* to the *Father*. Such a mode of speech is very common in other cases; as when we say the *body of the moon* for the *moon*, or the *matter of the world* for the *world*. Which kind of language has its reason and foundation in our way of forming and ranging our *ideas* for our more *distinct* perception. For, not content with a *general* confuse *idea* of any thing, we take it, as it were, into pieces, or parcels, for a more *distinct* and *particular* view of it. The *idea*, suppose, of *God the Father*, we divide into two *ideas*, *substance* and *attribute*; and *attribute* again into many *ideas* still more *distinct* and *particular*. And now *Father* stands for the *general* confuse *idea*, while *substance* and *attribute* are considered as parts of it, and *belonging* to it. This I take to be the true account

of that way of speaking; as well in this, as in the other cases above mentioned. So, though *the Person of the Father* be really nothing else but the *Father*; yet it is considered as something *distinct*, after we have once parcelled out the *general confuse idea* into several particular *ideas*; as into *person, power, goodness, &c.* for the greater *distinction*. Then even *Person* is considered as but part of that *confuse idea*, for which the word *Father* stands; and it is conceived to belong to it, as a *part* to the *whole*. Hence, as I apprehend, arises the way of speaking before mentioned; which is right and just in respect of our *ideas*, but very inaccurate in regard to the *things* themselves, for which the *ideas* stand: because indeed our *ideas* are not *adequate*; being formed in a way suited to our own *infirmity*, rather than to the *truth* and *strictness* of *things*.

QUERY XX.

Whether the Doctor needed have cited 300 texts, wide of the purpose, to prove what nobody denies, namely, a subordination, in some sense, of the Son to the Father; could he have found but one plain text against his eternity or consubstantiality, the points in question?

YOU have little under this Query but *repetition* and *reference*: which requires no farther notice. As to the *Form of Baptism*, which you mention in the close, I have considered it in a distinct Discourse^a, which you had seen before you came to this Query. You have nothing to object but a passage from the spurious Constitutions, of no value; and another from Eusebius, of very little. I content myself therefore with referring to my Defence and Sermons.

QUERY XXI.

Whether he be not forced to supply his want of Scripture-proof by very strained and remote inferences, and very

^a See my eighth Sermon, vol. ii.

uncertain reasonings from the nature of a thing confessedly obscure and above comprehension; and yet not more so than God's eternity, ubiquity, prescience, or other attributes, which we are obliged to acknowledge for certain truths?

YOU tell me, in the entrance, that "none of Dr. Clarke's propositions, on which he lays any stress, are drawn by mere reasonings from the incomprehensible nature of God." But what think you of five of his propositions, where he denies the necessary existence (for so you now understand *self-existence*) of the Son and Holy Ghost? Has the Doctor so much as one text in the Scripture for any of them? Not a syllable, either in Old or New Testament, but what he pretends to infer from very obscure and uncertain reasonings about *derived* and *underived*, about *acts* and no *acts*, about *necessary* agency being *no agency*, about *will*, *coaction*, &c. profoundly *metaphysical* and *fanciful*, with nothing solid or certain in them. The like may be said of the doctrine contained in his 17th proposition; which has no text of Scripture to stand upon, though he lays great stress upon it. In short, I observed in my Defence, and here repeat, that "the main strength of the Doctor's cause lies first in his giving either a *Sabellian* or *Tritheistic* turn (admitting no *medium*) to the Catholic doctrine; and then charging it with *confusion* of *Persons*, *Polytheism*, *nonsense*, *contradiction*. Take away that; (to which his constant resort is, whenever he comes to the pinch of the question,) and there will be little left considerable." For the truth and justice of this report, or censure, I appealed ^b to the Doctor's own books, which is a fair procedure: and if you have any thing to say in vindication of the Doctor, show that the fact is otherwise than I represented. Not being able to do any thing of this kind, you endeavour, as usual, to turn it off by *retorting*; and to put me upon the *defensive*,

^b See my Defence, vol. i. p. 215, 231.

having nothing to plead in defence of the Doctor or yourself. This may serve to *blind* a reader, and to conceal your *shame*: but it is not answering Queries. You fall again upon 1 Cor. viii. 6. which has been answered over and over. What is that to the point now in hand, the Doctor's making *strained inferences*, except it be giving one example more, by his wresting of that text?

As to God's "eternity, ubiquity, prescience," you say, "they themselves are the subject of our belief, not particular men's philosophical explications of the *manner* of them." Well then, let it be the subject of our belief, that the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God; and that they are the *one God* of the Christians. But as to the *manner* how they are *three*, or *one*, let nobody concern himself about it. If any one, under pretence of explaining the *manner*, changes the *sense* of the word *God*, making the Son a *nominal* God only, and the Holy Ghost scarce so much; what is this but doing the same, as if under pretence of explaining the *manner* of *eternity*, *ubiquity*, or *prescience*, he should introduce the doctrine of a *nominal*, not *real* eternity; a *nominal* ubiquity, a *nominal* prescience; undermining the doctrines themselves? Our dispute is about the *sense* in which any of the Persons is *God*: let this be determined by Scripture and antiquity, and proper rules of *criticism*. Make no objections from the *manner* how the thing should be: for all such objections are as improper, as it would be in the question of *prescience*^c, *eternity*, or *ubiquity*; to leave

^c A late author, in his Appeal to a Turk or Indian, being pressed with the instance about *prescience* and *free agency*, has no way of coming off, but by denying that there is so much as a *seeming repugnancy* between the two ideas, p. 5. He is the first man of *parts* who, after considering the subject, ever thought so. I could name him many of the clearest heads and finest wits among *ancients* and *moderns*, (such as Dr. Burnet of the Charter House, Mr. Locke, &c.) who have been so sensible of the *seeming repugnancy*, as to despair of ever clearing it, or reconciling the *ideas*. Is there no *seeming repugnancy* in maintaining that the *same act* is *certain*, as being foreknown, *uncertain*, as depending on the *will* of a free agent? I should be glad to see the *seeming repugnancy* answered, or took off any other way than by an

Scripture, and such approved rules as serve to determine the sense of it, and to retreat to philosophical reasonings about the *manner* how these things are. This is the very fault which you have perpetually run into. And while we are bringing you plain *Scripture* proofs for Christ's *divinity*, as plain as can be brought for the *divinity* of the *Father*; you are filling people's heads with *Tritheism* and *Sabellianism*, with *specific* and *individual*, with *identical wholes* and undivided *parts*, with *acts* and *no acts*, with *causes* and *no causes*, with *derived* and *underived*, with *coordinations*, three *supreme Gods*, three *substances*, and I know not what; all cavils taken from the *manner* of the thing, and intended to undermine the *doctrine* itself, which is and ought to be the *subject of belief*. You will say, perhaps, that we have not so full proof of this doctrine, as we have of *eternity*, *prescience*, or *ubiquity*. Admit we have not: yet let that point, as to the truth of the doctrine, be decided by *proper* evidence; discarding all vain pretences about the *manner*; and then we may bring it to a short issue.

“The directions,” you say, “given in Scripture concerning the worship of God and Christ (and not philo-

humble acknowledgment of our *ignorance* in the *high* things of God. And I would remind this author, that this very instance about *prescience* and *free will*, carries much greater difficulty in it than the doctrine of *three* and *one*. For there is no argument, I know of, against the *latter*, but what is capable of a just solution: that is, it may be shown where the argument has a *flaw*, and where the *chain* breaks. But in the other case, I think, the utmost we can do is only to *prove* that the argument must have a flaw *somewhere*, though we see *not where*; being content to resolve all into the inscrutable perfection of the divine *Prescience*, which infinitely transcends our finite capacities. With this author's good leave, then, *there is a difference between these two cases*: but the advantage lies wholly on the side of the doctrine of the *Trinity*, as being more easily *defended* than the other. And if he pleases but to point his *logic*, contained in page 6. against *free will*, or *prescience*, with the same *vigour* as he intends it against the *Trinity*, I dare promise him an absolute victory *there*, though not *here*. But this, perhaps, the author was not aware of; any more than of the *difference* between saying, that few understand the *doctrine* of the *Trinity*, and few understand the *controversy* about the *Trinity*; committing the same blunder twice, p. 12, 153. See my Supplement, vol. ii. p. 401.

“sophical conjectures concerning substances and essences) ought to be the guide of our practice.” Let us then follow the directions given in *Scripture*: not *philosophical* conjectures about *self-existence*; nor Pagan distinctions about *absolute* and *relative, ultimate* and *mediate* worship; nor *precarious* suppositions of one that had been *God* and *Creator* before, becoming *greater* by being appointed *Judge*. Let worship, all religious worship, be paid, as *Scripture* every where directs, to *God* alone, and to no *creature*. Let none have worship that *cannot* be proved to be *God*, nor any want it that *can*: and then there will soon be an end of all disputes; and *worship* will stand upon its old foundations, as it had ever stood, before *Pagans, Arians, and Papists* perverted and corrupted the true notions of it.

You state the main question between us in these terms, (p. 413.) “*Scripture*,” you say, “tells us there is but “one God, even the Father.” Yes: *Scripture* styles the Father the “one or only God:” that is all you should pretend. The same *Scripture* styles the Son *God*, ascribing also *divine* titles, attributes, glory, to him. Now let your question be put: “In what sense these two propositions are, according to reason and the use of language, “best understood to be consistent.” I have at large considered this very question, so stated, in a distinct *Discourse*^d; which was published before this part of your *Reply* was put to the press: as appears by your quoting my *Sermons* in the former part. I have therefore just reason to complain of your *complaint*, which you have borrowed from the *Modest Pleader*; and which, whatever was then, you have now no pretence for. I have shown abundantly that your argument from the *exclusive terms* is not, either *according to reason* or *use of language*, of any weight, in comparison to the proofs we bring of *Christ’s* being *God* in the *same sense* as the Father is, and *one God* with him. The 1 *Cor.* viii. 6. which you urge

^d Sermon IV. vol. ii.

in such a manner as if the whole Scripture was to yield to *one text*, and that misinterpreted, has been often answered. You blame me for not expressing my faith in any *Scripture positions*: as if every thing I assert as matter of faith, were not as much *Scripture position*, according to my way of understanding Scripture, as yours is to your *Scripture position* according to your way: only the difference is, that mine is the Catholic, approved way; yours is partly Arian, and partly Socinian.

Under this Query, I entered into a discourse about the meaning of believing *mysteries*, in answer to the objection, that our doctrine is *not intelligible*. I showed both of the doctrine in *general*, and of the *particulars* most usually excepted against, that they are *intelligible*; as intelligible, at least, as *omnipresence, eternity, prescience, God's simplicity, self-existence, &c.* To the main of the discourse you have nothing to reply: but here and there you throw in some short strictures upon such parts as you think proper.

I had said, "the learned are hardly agreed, whether *self-existence* be a negative or positive idea." Upon which you remark, "how absurd this is I have already *shown*." What is absurd? The *report* I had made of learned men, and their differing on that head? No; the fact is undoubtedly true. But it is absurd for any one to make the idea *negative*: that, I presume, is your meaning. And yet you here entirely mistake what I was talking about; and have certainly determined on the wrong side of the question. For the question upon which the learned have differed is this; whether when we say any thing exists *of itself*, or is *self-existing*, the words *a se*, or of *self*, have any *positive* meaning, or mean only that it does *not exist of another*. Some have carried the notion of its being *positive* so far, as to say God is the *cause of himself*, or even *made himself*, as Lactantius expresseth it:

* The expressions of *αὐτογενής* and *αὐτοφύων*, if strictly taken, lead to such a meaning. As also *ex se ortus, ex se scripto*, and the like. Petavius cites several testimonies of this kind. *De Tris.* lib. v. cap. 5. p. 294.

which is supposing the *idea positive* indeed, and is manifestly absurd. Dr. Clarke, one of the latest writers, and from whom one might have expected something accurate, yet appears to be all over confused upon this very head in his famous *Demonstration of the Existence*. His professed design there is to prove the existence of a *first cause a priori*: which has no sense without the supposition of a cause *prior* to the *first*: which yet is *nonsense*. The Doctor was too wise a man to say that God is the *cause of himself*: and yet he says what amounts to it unawares. He speaks of “necessity of existence,” as being “antedecently, in order of nature, the cause or ground of that existence^f :” which is, in short, making a *property* or *attribute* antecedent, in order of nature, to its *subject*, and the *cause* and *ground* of the subject. And he talks in his Letters, of this necessity *absolute* and *antedecent* (in order of nature) to the existence of the first Cause, *operating* every where alike^g. As if a *property* operated in *causing* the substance, or making it to be what it is. All this confusion seems to have been owing to the Doctor’s not distinguishing between *modal* and *causal* necessity; and his not considering that *self-existence*, or *aseity*^h, as the Schools speak, is *negative*; and does not mean that the *first Cause* is either caused by any thing *ad extra*, or

Ἦν ἰαυρῶ. *Synes.*

Solus Deus est, itaque principium; qui ex seipso dedit sibi ipse principium. *Zen. Veron.*

Deus—ipse sui origo est, sūeque causa substantiæ. *Hieron. in Ephes. 3.*
 Id quod est, ex se, atque in se continens. *Hilar.*

Ex se principium cui contigit. *Hilar. alter.*

* Ἐξυ ἰῆ ἰαυρῶ τὸ ἴνα ἴ ἴσιν. *Zuch. Mitylen.*

Sui namque principium.

Ex seipso procreatus—ipse se fecit. *Lactant.*

^f See *Demonstration*, &c. p. 9, 10, 16. *Letters*, p. 35, 36, 16.

* *Letters*, p. 20, 37.

^h Hanc Dei proprietatem quidam ex recentioribus philosophis *aseitatem* vocarunt, quia Deus, eo quod principio caret, est *a se*, non ab alio; contenduntque eam esse *positivum* attributum; quod eodem quidem redit ac id quod diximus, sed vocabus novis sine causa expressum est. *Clerici Pneumatol. cap. 3. p. 150.*

by *itself*, (much less by any *property* of itself,) but has no cause, is absolutely *uncaused*. I was not therefore considering, whether any, or what *positive* perfections are implied in *self-existence*, or in any being that is self-existent, as you hastily apprehended, but whether *self-existence* (having plainly a reference to the question *whence* the thing is) is to be considered *positively* or *negatively* in regard to the *cause* of that existence. I have now determined, I think upon plain reasons, that it is *negative* only; and that we are not to suppose any cause, *external* or *internal*, but absolutely *no cause*; because there is no cause *prior* to the *first*. The true way of ending the dispute about the attribute of *self-existence* being *positive* or *negative*, is by showing what *ideas* are supposed to be contained in it. No doubt but *existence* is a positive idea: and the question only is, whether the manner of existing expressed by *self* denotes any thing *positive*. It is plain it doth not, since it means existing from *no cause*, which is *negative*; though such *existence* implies all positive perfections. Bishop Stillingfleet on the Trinity (p. 278.) says, “To be from *himself*, in the sense generally understood, is a mere *negative* expression:—and in this sense “only, learned men have told us, that it is to be understood by those ancient and modern writers, who have “used that expression, as when St. Jerome saith, that “God is *self-originated*, and St. Austin, &c.—All these “and such like expressions are only to be *negatively* “understood.”ⁱ To return.

You proceed to make two or three little exceptions (scarce worth notice) to what you met with in my Defence. You declare that your argument against the Son's being God, in the *strict sense*, is not founded upon what *can* or *cannot* be, (which I am glad to hear,) but upon 1 Cor. viii. 6. which I have often answered. You acquaint me farther, (p. 416.) that “two supreme Gods” cannot be “one supreme God;” which I readily agree

ⁱ See Pearson on the Creed, Art. i. p. 39.

to: as neither can two Gods, supreme and inferior, be one God, or ever stand with the Scripture doctrine of *one God*. But two Persons in *nature* equal, and so equally supreme, may be one *supreme God*.

You assure me, that you did set out “upon the foot of Scripture, and do continue upon that foot still.” I heartily wish you could *mean*, as well as *say*, and not revoke all again presently, by denying the Son and Holy Ghost to be *necessarily existing*: which you have not the least syllable of *Scripture* to countenance you in. And I wish you would not every where represent a distinction of *order* or *office* to be inconsistent with the *divine Unity*; which again you have no *Scripture* for, but mere fanciful speculations. You have the less reason to blame me for mentioning *office* in respect of God: because, you know, there was a time, when the word *God* was thought to be always a relative word of *office*.

As to Lucian’s *Philopatris*, I have given my thoughts of it above, (p. 72.) Your hints about a passage of Irenæus, which I had sufficiently explained^k by another of Novatian, and a third of Tertullian, are very trifling. Those heretics thought it mean and degrading for *God* to become *man*: which made some of them deny Christ’s *divinity*, and others his *humanity*; all, the union of *both natures* in *one Person*. Whether you or I give the most countenance to those *heretical* tenets, I leave the reader to judge.

QUERY XXII.

Whether his (the Doctor’s) whole performance, whenever he differs from us, be any thing more than a repetition of this assertion, that being and person are the same, or that there is no medium between Tritheism and Sabellianism? Which is removing the cause from Scripture to natural reason, not very consistently with the title of his book.

YOU begin with telling me, that “if two or more intelligent agents can be the same being, or subsist in

^k Defence, vol. 4. p. 230.

“ the same individual substance, (provided the agents be “ not all of them self-existent,) this will no way affect the “ truth of Dr. Clarke’s propositions.” The reader is to know that by the *same being*, or *substance*, in this case, is understood the same *necessarily existing* substance: for *necessary* and *precarious*, that is, *uncreated* and *created*, cannot be called the *same individual substance*. By *self-existent*, as you have now explained yourself, you mean *necessarily existing*. The sum then of what you have here said amounts to this wise sentence; “ If two or “ more intelligent agents can be the same *necessarily existing being*, or subsist in the same *necessarily existing substance*, (provided the agents be not all of them “ *necessarily existing*,) this will no way affect the truth “ of Dr. Clarke’s propositions.” What is this to the purpose? Do not you here plainly deny that two persons can be one *necessary being*, or *substance*? And this is what Dr. Clarke has often denied¹; and could never give a sufficient reason for doing it. Indeed the Doctor (or you for him) seems at length to have given up his general principle, which he first insisted upon, *viz.* that “ two persons cannot be one being;” which he chiefly grounded upon the consideration of the imaginary *composition* implied in it. I say, he appears to have given this up; being at length sensible that he has allowed, in another case, *substance* and *substance*, *being* and *being*, to make *one substance* and *one being*, without any *composition*. But what the Doctor (or you) insists upon now,

¹ Three intelligent agents in one individual, identical substance, is so self-evident a contradiction, that I think no reasoning can make it plainer than intuition. *Dr. Clarke’s Three Letters*, p. 31.

Two persons to be *one being*, I think a manifest contradiction in terms. *Clarke’s Reply*, p. 157.

Two persons in one and the same individual *uncompounded being*, is an express contradiction. *Ibid.* p. 169.

Two individuals cannot, without an express contradiction, have an identity of nature. *Ibid.* p. 184.

The reason why our Saviour could not affirm that *he and his Father were one Being*, is because he would thereby have affirmed that they were *one Person*. *Ibid.* p. 291.

is, that two *such* Persons cannot be one *necessary* Being or substance; or that *derived* and *underived* cannot be both included in one *necessary substance*. Which though it be putting the objection upon a different foot, yet wants to be proved as much as did the other: and is equally liable to the charge I brought against the Doctor in this Query, his removing the cause from *Scripture* to *natural reason*; to a philosophical question, whether the ideas of *self-existence* and *necessary existence* be the *same* or *different*, or whether *underived* expresses an essential perfection, all that *necessary existence* does, or only a *relation* of order, and mode of existence. After all your pretences to *Scripture*, you really resolve the dispute into this *metaphysical* question: and you cannot advance your cause at all by *Scripture*, but by the help of your *metaphysics*. You take your rise from 1 Cor. viii. 6. to come at *unoriginate*: thus far is commenting upon *Scripture*. The rest is *philosophy*, false philosophy, drawing inferences from *unoriginate* to *self-existence*, from *self-existence* to *necessary existence*, from thence to the Father's being *alone* necessarily existing, from thence to the *exclusion* of the Son from being *necessarily existing*, from thence to the making him a *precarious* being, (though in words you deny it,) and from thence to his being a *creature*: this is the course of your reasoning. Your *ἁπάρων ψεύδος*, or fundamental error, lies in your *philosophy*, confounding *unoriginate* (as did the ancient Eunomians) with *necessary existence*; which you have no foundation for: or if you be allowed to make *necessary existence* the same with *self-existence*; you will then never be able to prove that the Father *alone* is self-existent; or that the *self-existence* of three Persons (so understood) is at all inconsistent with a *real* distinction of *order* and *office*. It will be changing the *names* of things, and nothing more. It is manifest, from what I have observed, that *Scripture* is not the thing you trust to, but *philosophy*; because when we have granted you all you pretend to have proved from *Scripture*, *viz.* that the Father is the *first* Person, derived *from none*, you

are still but where you were, till you call in *philosophy* and *metaphysics* to make out the rest, and to determine the main question. You are now pleased to put the matter upon this, whether two supreme Persons can be one supreme God. You say, (p. 420.) “two equally “supreme Persons united may be in the complex sense, “*one Being, one substance*; but they will not consequently “be one supreme Governor, one Lord, one God.” Now here, in the first place, I very much blame your not attending to the distinction of supreme *in nature*, and supreme *in order*. It is in the first sense only that we assert two or three *supreme Persons*; supreme in every perfection, having no *higher* or *lower*, no *better* or *worse*, no degrees of essential *power, wisdom*, or any other attribute. At the same time, those Persons, thus *equally* supreme in *nature*, are not equally supreme in *order*, but two of them are *subordinate* to one, the *Head and Center* of Unity. And because they are in nature *undivided*, and in *order* referred up to that one *Head and Fountain* of all; they are therefore, with him, *one Governor, one Lord, and one God*. And though the authority, the dominion, the power be considered always *primarily* in the Father, yet is it *common* to all; only with this *order*, that the Father has it *from none*, they *from the Father*: so that all that remains peculiar to the Father is a *præminence*, or priority of *order*. This is the Catholic doctrine which you are endeavouring to confute: but, instead of arguments, you generally give us only ambiguous words and names, to confound and perplex what ought to be kept clear and distinct.

You tell me of running counter to *Scripture* and *antiquity*, in making more than one “absolutely supreme “over all.” Here you are only doubling upon, or trifling with, the word *supreme*. I make three *supreme* in *nature*; I suppose one only *supreme* in *order* or *office*: show me either *one* text of *Scripture* or one *single* testimony of Catholic antiquity, (I allow not Eusebius for such,) that plainly contradicts *either* of these *positions*. They appear to me, both of them, true and just positions; founded in

Scripture, and confirmed by the universal suffrage of the *ancients*. If they appear not consistent in your *philosophy*, own it frankly and ingenuously, as an honest man would: but do not misreport *Scripture* and *antiquity*.

What follows in p. 421. is only repeating your own *fictions* both of me and of the *ancients*.

I had appealed to the Prophet Isaiah, as interpreted by St. John, making Father and Son “one Lord of hosts.” You tell me bluntly, “there is no such thing in the texts;” referring me to Dr. Clarke’s *Scripture Doctrine*. I say, there is in those texts all that I before asserted: and why do you now refer me to Dr. Clarke, whose pretences I had before^m considered, and, I think, confuted?

You tell me that neither the ancient writers nor Bishop Bull are at all of my opinion in the point of “equal su-
“premacv of dominion.” But so far as I apprehend of the *ancients* and of Bishop Bull, they were exactly of my opinion, as they are directly opposite to yours: and I wonder at your presumption in claiming any acquaintance with them, or interest in them.

You have a pretty argument (p. 425.) to prove St. Paul a Pagan and an idolater, upon my principles; that is, upon the principles of the Catholic Church in all ages: for mine are no other. But how is this wonderful consequence to be raised? It is first by supposing, that St. Paul excluded the Son from the *one Godhead*; an imaginary consequence drawn from 1 Cor. viii. 6. And next by supposing, that St. Paul allowed *mediate* and *inferior* worship; another *imaginary* inference drawn from 1 Tim. ii. 5. Phil. ii. 11. After sporting yourself awhile in so ridiculous an argument, you come to invent something for me to say: you suppose I shall say, that our Lord is *that one God* mentioned 1 Cor. viii. 6. which you think highly absurd. But what if I should plead, that *that one God* is a silly expression, where there are not *two one-Gods*; and therefore should rather say, that our Lord is not *that Person* there

^m Sermons, vol. ii. p. 18.

styled *one God* by way of eminence, but another Person, who is yet *one God* with him. Your interpretation of the *gods many* and *lords many*, as alluding to the *superior* and *inferior deities* of the Pagans, stands upon the authority of Mr. Mede; who, like a modest and learned man, proposed it only as a plausible *conjecture*, not with the confidence you speak of it. An ingenious gentleman^a has very lately suggested several things on that head well deserving consideration; and such as appear sufficient to make Mr. Mede's construction pass for *precarious* at least, if not certainly *false*. There is one obvious objection to be farther used against it; that to make the *gods many* answer in the comparison, (in your way,) they should be understood to be many *supreme* Gods; which yet the heathens never asserted, but the contrary; as Dr. Cudworth and other learned men have abundantly shown. To me it appears, that the *many gods* and *many lords* mean the same thing, under different names; and that St. Paul, in opposition to having *many*, asserts that *all things* were of the one God, and *by* the one Lord, intimating their perfect *unity* of power, perfection, and operation, so as to be both but *one God* and *one Lord*; the one Lord being *one* with the one God, and *vice versa*. To proceed: how well you have been able to answer the charge of *Polytheism* has been seen before: and particularly as to Origen, it has been shown that his answer to the charge in his piece against Celsus was nothing like yours, but directly contrary; affirming Father and Son to be *one God*.

I pass over your *repetitions* in p. 426, 427. which have been abundantly answered. Two Gods, one *supreme* and another *inferior*, is so manifestly your doctrine, that you do but expose yourself to ridicule by struggling to evade it. The Socinians, in this, were plainer men, and did not scruple to confess a clear thing.

You pretended, before, to bring Ante-Nicene and Post-Nicene writers against me, as to the point of charging you

^a Mr. Wade's Short Inquiry into the Doctrine of the Trinity, &c. p. 39, &c.

with *Polytheism*. I knew you had none, but that you had unhappily deceived yourself with a few second-hand scraps of Athanasius, Hilary, and Basil, which you understood not. I answered your pretences, and produced full and plain testimonies^o against you, both from Ante-Nicene and Post-Nicene antiquity. One was out of a fragment of Dionysius Romanus, preserved by Athanasius; a very valuable one, and such as *no critic* will ever doubt of, as to its being genuine: your exceptions therefore against it, as of doubtful authority, are not worth the notice; beside that I have answered them above^p. Another testimony I produced from Athanasius himself, (or perhaps Basil,) who makes it *Ditheism* either to suppose *two principles*, or to admit *one God underived* and *another God derived*. Your remark upon him for it is so very shrewd and sagacious, that it is pity the reader should lose it: he shall have it in your own words. “You cite a passage of Athanasius, that he who introduces a God underived, and another who is a God derived, makes two Gods: which is not very consistent with his own foregoing words, that *he who introduces two original principles, preaches two Gods: for, that in this unoriginate principality over all, consists the unity of God, was the express doctrine of all the Ante-Nicene writers.*” Now are you really so blind as not to have perceived, that that *origination* (according to the ancients) was not supposed to make the Father *one God* exclusive of the other Persons? But because two of the Persons were referred to one as their *Head*, undivided from him; therefore *all three* together were the *one God*. This was the use they made of the *origination*: not to throw out the *Son* and *Holy Ghost*, as you do, but to take them both in. Yet you are constantly representing that *origination* in a quite different light, and to a quite different purpose; meanly quoting Bp. Pearson for it: who contradicts you in the very same sentence, and represents the

^o Defence, vol. i. p. 239.

^p Page 318.

case as it really stood among the *ancients*, being a *learned* and a *judicious* man.

Upon this occasion, I shall here translate that passage of Athanasius, that the common reader may see what the ancients thought of *Tritheism*, in a very few words.

“ He that introduces *two principles* (or *heads*) preaches up *two Gods*: such was the impious doctrine of Marcion. Again, he that asserts an *uncreated* God, and another *God created*, does also make *two Gods*; because of the difference of nature (*essence*) which he blasphemously introduces. But where there is one Head, (or *Father*), and one offspring from him, there is but *one God*; the Godhead being perfect in the Father, and the perfect Godhead of the Father being also in the Son.” I refer the reader to my Defence, (vol. i. p. 239.) for the *original*; where he will also find other passages to the same purpose.

What you produce next from Justin, Novatian, Hilary, and Bishop Pearson, the reader may judge of by the last of them; whom you quote as saying, “ This origination in the divine Paternity has anciently been looked upon as the assertion of the unity.” Here you stop, as usual. The very next words of Bishop Pearson are; “ and therefore the Son and Holy Ghost have been believed to be but one God with the Father, because both from the Father, who is one, and so the union of them^a:” directly contrary to what you cited him for. Such are your representations of authors; such your manner of using the common reader.

QUERY XXIII.

Whether the Doctor's notion of the Trinity be more clear and intelligible than the other ?

The difficulty in the conception of the Trinity is, how three Persons can be one God ?

^a Pearson on the Creed, p. 40.

Does the Doctor deny that every one of the Persons, singly, is God? No: Does he deny that God is one? No: How then are three one?

Does one and the same authority, exercised by all, make them one, numerically or individually one and the same God? That is hard to conceive how three distinct Beings, according to the Doctor's scheme, can be individually one God, that is, three Persons one Person.

If therefore one God necessarily signifies but one Person, the consequence is irresistible; either that the Father is that one Person, and none else, which is downright Sabellianism; or that the three Persons are three Gods.

Thus the Doctor's scheme is liable to the same difficulties with the other.

There is indeed one easy way of coming off, and that is, by saying that the Son and Holy Spirit are neither of them God, in the Scripture-sense of the word. But this is cutting the knot, instead of untying it; and is in effect to say, they are not set forth as divine Persons in Scripture.

Does the communication of divine powers and attributes from Father to Son and Holy Spirit, make them one God, the divinity of the two latter being the Father's divinity? Yet the same difficulty recurs; for either the Son and Holy Ghost have distinct attributes, and a distinct divinity of their own, or they have not: if they have, they are (upon the Doctor's principles) distinct Gods from the Father, and as much as finite from infinite, creature from Creator; and then how are they one? If they have not, then, since they have no other divinity, but that individual divinity, and those attributes which are inseparable from the Father's essence, they can have no distinct essence from the Father's; and so (according to the Doctor) will be one and the same Person, that is, will be names only.

Q. *Whether this be not as unintelligible as the orthodox notion of the Trinity, and liable to the like difficulties: a communication of divine powers and attributes, without*

the substance, being as hard to conceive, nay, much harder, than a communication of both together ?

YOU begin thus: "The difficulty in the conception of the Trinity, is not how *three Persons can be one God*. "For the Scripture no where expresses the doctrine in those words: and the difficulty of understanding a Scripture doctrine ought not surely to lie wholly upon words not found in Scripture." The reader is to know that this is a *new turn*, intended to bring you off from the first state of the question, where you happened to lose yourself in your first answer. However, though it may pass for an ingenious shift in distress, there is very little in it more than in your *first* answer. Only it is hard upon me to have *new* answers now formed to *old* Queries, and to be put upon changing my method of *defence*, as often as you are pleased to vary your responses. Whoever taught you this *new turn*, was a man of no great prudence or foresight: he did not consider how it inevitably recoils upon Dr. Clarke. For the Scripture no where expresses in words or in sense his *main doctrine*, that the Father *alone* is *necessarily existing*, that neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost is *necessarily existing*; (so you now confessedly understand *self-existence*;) these are tenets not found in Scripture expressly, nor so much as deducible by any consequence, or shadow of a consequence. Why then did you not consider better, before you drew up a charge upon others, which at length falls only on your own friends? You go on: "It is very strange that a man of your abilities should write a large book without so much as knowing, or ever once being able to express, what the true question is." And it is very strange that a man of your abilities should perceive nothing of my *mistaking the question*, when you first answered the Queries; but should be forced to learn this, at length, of the Modest Pleader, from whom you have been content to echo it. Though my *abilities* are very slender, yet this mean suggestion will hardly find credit, even among the

lowest readers that can at all distinguish between a *probable* untruth, and one that is plainly *romantic*. When you are again disposed to abuse an *adversary*, do it a little more artfully; if without any *truth*, yet with a little *discretion*. But I excuse you for being misled by a third person, who was too wise to set his *name*. As to the *question*, I have not mistook it, but have kept close to it; while the Doctor and you have been either industriously disguising it, or unfairly running from it. You might think it sufficient, if your shifting and shuffling in so momentous a controversy (which plain and honest men, on either side, can but hardly excuse) be passed over as *tolerable*; or may but admit of any *candid* and *plausible* colour, from the circumstances you are under. It becomes you not, in the mean time, so magisterially to correct others for stating the question *right*, and as it ought to be stated. Had you but had the courage and spirit of your friend Mr. Whiston, I doubt not but you yourself would have stated the question as he, and I, and all men of sense and undisguised ingenuity have ever done. But enough of this.

You were here to clear Dr. Clarke's doctrine of the charge of *three Gods*. You first observe, that the word *God* no where in Scripture denotes the *Holy Ghost*. Well then, you will throw him out from being *God*, and reduce the number to *two*: though, when I wrote before, I imagined Dr. Clarke and you had admitted the *Holy Ghost* to be *God*; and the rather, because I never heard that you had retracted your *subscription*, or would scruple to *repeat* it. But not to press you farther on so tender a point; how get you off from asserting *two Gods*, the Father and the Son? You have nothing to say, but repeating and trifling: let us go to another point.

You are next to retort the charge of *Tritheism* upon me: which I have answered more than once, and need not do it again. Dr. Clarke's scheme, you say, is easily expressed in the very words of Scripture. But had the Doctor gone no farther than *Scripture*, his scheme

could never have been expressed at all. Only, since he has told you where, and how, to understand *self-existent*, and where to exclude it; now you pretend his scheme may be expressed in *Scripture* words. Do you imagine that I cannot as easily, or more easily, find *Scripture words* for mine? But this is trifling. Why have you not laid down your doctrine in *Scripture* words, that I might compare it with the Doctor's propositions, to see how far they exceed or come short? I may here dismiss the Modest Pleader, who is set in the front, and is not answering my Defence, but my Queries: which you had done before, and, I think, more to the purpose; I am sure more *ingenuously* and *frankly*, and more like a lover of truth. I have reason to complain of your not digesting your book better, and not throwing your disjointed materials into a more neat and regular order, after you had so long time for the compiling. For when sometimes I thought a point had been discussed, and we were to have no more of it, in that Query at least; as I go on some pages forwards, there, I observe, I am to discuss the same things again; which gives me some trouble, and must create confusion in the reader.

The Modest Pleader, I perceive, draws off in p. 436. and now I am to engage a *new* man, whom I will suppose to be the man I am writing to. You need say no more about the charge of *three Gods*, or *two Gods*: I understand you very fully, that the Father is *one God*, as being *necessarily existing*; the Son *another God* infinitely inferior, of the Father's *appointing*. Strain no more for apologies: the thing is out, though long a bringing forth; and now our dispute will run clear. Here is very little of moment occurring but what has been answered. You have a few quibbles in p. 438. which are all abundantly answered in my Defence^r. You object Bishop Pearson to me against my saying, that the word *God* is sometimes taken *personally* and sometimes *essentially*. And what says Bishop

^r Vol. i. p. 246, 247.

Pearson? I have a great respect for his memory. He says, the word *God* in the Apostles' Creed is not taken *essentially*: so say I too. Nor is it taken *essentially*, but *personally*, in the Nicene Creed. Therefore what? therefore it is *never* taken otherwise: that is your consequence, when you can make any *consequence* of it. It is the old Valentinian distinction, you observe. I am glad it is so old however: those *heretics* sometimes borrowed good things from the Church; though they happened to spoil them in the use. But, if you look again into Tertullian, you will find that Valentinian distinction to be nothing akin to ours, except it be in the *name*.

In page 439, you are finding I know not what perplexities in a very easy thing; which I have accounted for twice already in print^s. *Intelligent agent*, being only two adjectives, is to be understood according to the *subject* to which the attributes are applied. Put the words to *substance*, and then we have *intelligent agent substance*, whether in *person* or *persons*. If the substance be thus or thus circumstantiated, (as explained above,) *intelligent agent substance* may be a *single* person; if otherwise, it may be *more persons*: so that *intelligent agent* is different in sense and meaning, according as it may be differently applied. What you repeat about a *principle of individuation*, and your farther speculations thereupon, have been sufficiently obviated; or have nothing contradictory to any thing I assert. I allow that *three* stands for *three*, and *three substances* for three substances, and *three Gods* for three Gods. What is all this to me? I do not assert that *three* stands for more or less than three; nor that three substances, but that three Persons (who are not three substances) are one substance; nor that three Gods, but three Persons (who are not three Gods) are *one God*. What you say of Sabellius (p. 442.) has been answered above. And what you say of the Church's holding "one and the same indi-

^s Preface to Sermons, vol. ii. Supplement to the Case of Arian Subscription, vol. ii. p. 364.

“vidual identical whole substance,” affects not me, who never express my notion in such uncouth terms. The *same undivided substance* is what I hold and maintain in opposition both to *substances* and to the Sabellian notion of one *Hypostasis, nominally*, and not *really* distinguished.

Origen’s account of the Sabellian notion is very distinct and accurate, as I before observed, *viz.* that the Father and Son were *one, not in essence only*, (or substance,) *but in subject*, (or *suppositum*,) *being called Father and Son under different considerations*, not really or *personally* distinguished^t. This is a just account of Origen’s sense in that passage. And it is observable, that the Noëtians of that time would not have been blamed for supposing the Father and Son to be *ἐν οὐσίᾳ, one in essence*, (or what we call *one in substance*,) had they not carried the *union* so high as to make one *suppositum*, or what we now call *one Person*,^l of both, without any *real* distinction. Your account of it is very little different from mine: only you are fond of the phrase, *single existent substance*, which serves you to play with, and you know not what you mean by it. Do but define what a *single existent substance is*, and I will soon tell you whether the *name* belongs to every *single person*, or to all together.

Undivided substance, in three Persons, you say, makes *three substances*. How do you prove it? I have often told you that Dr. Clarke and you will not admit this kind of reasoning in another case, for fear of dividing the divine substance into numberless substances. If you can admit *substance* and *substance*, nay, *this substance* and *that substance*, where there are no *substances*; why do you deal thus unequally with others? You must allow that *union* is enough to constitute *sameness*, without making either *complex* or *compound* substance: otherwise you make a *complex* or *compound* substance of God. Since therefore the same, or equal difficulties bear upon both, be so fair

^t Μὴ διαφέρειν τῇ ἀριθμῇ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀλλ’ ἐν οὐ μόνον οὐσίᾳ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁμοκειμένῳ τυγχάνοντας ἀμφοτέρους, κατὰ τινος ἰσότητος, οὐ κατ’ ὑπόστασιν, λίγισθαι πατέρα καὶ υἱόν. *Orig. Com. in Joh.* p. 186.

and so candid, as to condemn or to acquit both. As to the sense of *Hypostasis*, I have delivered my mind above.

You bring in a long detail of the sense of *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, in which I am very little concerned; having never pretended that *Hypostasis*, or *Person*, does not imply *substance*, or signify *substance*. Only, in *Divinis*, a person is not *separate substance*, nor, consequently, more *persons* more *substances*: so that what you have to say in the following pages is mostly wide and foreign. I may just throw a few strictures upon your account, as I pass along. *Ἰσόστασις*, you say, signifies *singular identical substance*. Now, because you often speak of *singular identical substance*, as if you really understood what you are talking about; let us stop awhile, and examine what you mean by it. I conceive, you mean just *as much substance* as you take into your thoughts at once, considering it as *one*. You have brought the *divine substance* under *extension*; and so give me leave to question you a little upon that head, in a style proper to your notion. You can conceive, in your thoughts, as much of that substance as is commensurate, suppose, to the *sun*: pray, tell me, if this be not a *singular identical substance*, in your own way of reasoning. Consider only *half* of that; and then there is another *singular identical substance*. Divide into *quarters*; and then you have four *singular identical substances*. And as every thing extended is (as our *mathematicians* tell us) *infinitely* divisible; there will be as many *singular identical substances* as you are pleased to conceive divisible parts. Do I misrepresent you? Or are none of those parts *singular identical substances*, but all one *singular identical substance*? What is the reason of it? Is it not that *union* makes *sameness*, all real *sameness*? You must say so: otherwise, upon your principles, I will demonstrate that there is not a *singular identical substance* in the world; the least imaginable *same* being still farther *divisible*, in conception, infinitely. What use you will now make of *singular identical substances*, I know not: but this I know, that you can never oblige me to admit two *undivided*

inseparable persons to be two *singular identical substances*, till you divide the divine substance (as you conceive it) into as many *singular identical substances* as there are conceivable parts. Having given this hint of the fruitlessness of the pains you are taking about *Hypostasis*, I may now ask, is this the doctrine Christ came to teach, that *three divine Persons must be three singular identical substances*? But to proceed. I forgot to ask you, whether any two parts of the divine substance, in your way of thinking, are *ἁμοούσια*, or *ταυτοούσια*, or *μονοούσια*? I know they must be *una substantia*, though either of them is *singular identical substance*, distinct by itself, and *this* is not *that*. I believe you would be more puzzled about the use of *terms*, in that case, than ever were the Fathers in respect of the *Trinity*.

What I intend by all I have here said, is to make you at length sensible of two things, about which you have been hitherto very slow and unperceiving.

1. That a man may have a very clear and full notion of an *union* and a *distinction*, and yet be very much puzzled about the *names* whereby they should be called.

2. That the *metaphysical* objections wherewith you have been endeavouring to clog the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity, (about *specific, numerical, individual, identical*, and the like,) are not so much owing to any difficulty there is in the conception of the *doctrine*, (which was a *plain thing* long before ever those words came in, and still is so,) but to the difficulty of fixing, defining, settling, in all cases, what those several *words, names, or phrases*, shall import. But I proceed.

Instead of amusing your reader with a long detail of the use of *ούσια* and *ὑπόστασις*, such as the learned will despise, and the unlearned will not edify by; it were better to have endeavoured to give him a distinct idea of what the ancients meant by *one Hypostasis*, or *three Hypostases*. That I may say something which may be useful to common readers, the case lies thus: The faith of the Church all along was in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,

one God, into which they were baptized. The Father was not the Son, nor the Son the Father, nor the Holy Ghost either of the other. This was the common faith of the Church before either *person* or *substance* was talked of.

In Justin Martyr's time, we find, that nothing was to be worshipped but *God*; that these three, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, were all *worshipped*, yet not as *three Gods*; that they were believed to be *really* distinct, and not *nominally* only: but the *distinction* was not expressed by *persons*, nor the *union* by *substance*; nor does it appear that the word *Trinity* was yet applied to this case.

In Athenagoras, we find plain mention made of the *union* and *distinction* of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; but still nothing of *persons* and *substance*.

Theophilus, of the same age, about the year 180, is the first writer extant that expressly gives them the name of *Trinity*. But still *persons* and *substance* were not mentioned.

But upon the disputes raised by Praxeas, Noëtus, and Sabellius^u, (one after another,) it by degrees grew into common use to express the distinction by *persons*, and the *unity* by *one substance*. I know not whether Clemens of Alexandria may be reckoned the first writer extant that expressly has the name of *one substance* (*μοναδικὴ οὐσία*) applied in this case. It is certain Tertullian has it, and *persons* too. And this became the usual way of express-

^u Facundus Hermianensis is a little mistaken, when he confines it to the times of Sabellius: but if we understand him of Sabellius, and his predecessors, Noëtus and Praxeas, his observation is just. His words are:

Nam sic Ecclesia Christi, etiam cum necdum ad distinctionem Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, uteretur nomine *Personæ*. Tres credit, et prædicavit, Patrem, et Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum,—*Personarum* autem nomen non nisi cum Sabellius impugnaret Ecclesiam, necessario in usum prædicationis assumptum est; ut qui semper tres crediti sunt, et vocati, Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus, uno quoque simul et communi *Personarum* nomine vocarentur. Deinde etiam et *subsistentiæ* dictæ sunt, quoniam Ecclesie placuit, ad significandam Trinitatem, et hoc nomen distinctioni personali tribuere. *Facun. Herm.* lib. i. p. 8.

See what I have said above, p. 201.

ing what had been all along believed and professed, though under other terms. The Sabellians (by which I mean all of Sabellian principles) charged the Catholics with *three Gods*, and thereby first gave occasion to the Church to make use of the word *Person*: for their answer was, that they did not profess *two Gods*, or *three Gods*, but *one God* and *two Persons*, or *three Persons*^x.

There being in the *Trinity* a *distinction* and an *union*, there would naturally arise some difference about the use of several *terms*, to be either *plurally* or *singularly* predicated, according as the intent might be to speak of the *Persons* as *distinguished* into *three*, or as united in *one God*. The same names either *plurally* or *singularly* predicated sometimes served to express both the *distinction* and *union*. Gregory Nazianzen calls them *Lights* and *Light*, that is, *three Lights*, and yet but *one Light*; and so *three Lives*, and yet but *one Life*; *three Goods*, and yet but *one Good*; *three Glories*, and yet but *one Glory*; the mind conceiving the three as *distinct*, though in themselves united and inseparable^y. All the care to be taken in these cases was, not to make the *distinction* too wide by the *plural* expressions, nor the *unity* too close by the *singular*: and the disputes that arose in this case were from men's different apprehensions about this or that *phrase*, or *expression*, as being liable to abuse one way or other. *Three Spirits* was a phrase generally thought to carry the distinction too far: and therefore *one Spirit* became the more common language; though even Jerome himself has been thought to have used the phrase of *three Spirits*^z.

But the greatest debate of all was about three *Hyposta-*

^x See Hippolytus contr. Noët. and Tertull. adv. Prax.

^y Ζωὴς καὶ ζωὴν, φῶς καὶ φῶς, ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀγαθὸν, δόξαι καὶ δόξα—Θεὸς ἕκαστος ἂν διαφέροι μόνον, τοῦ νοῦ χωρίζοντος τὰ ἀχώριστα. *Orat.* xiii. p. 211.

^z Tres *Spiritus* nominatos breviter ostendam.—*Principalem Spiritum Patrem* appellat: quia Filius ex Patre, et non Pater ex Filio. *Spiritum autem rectum*, veritatis atque justitiæ, Christum Dominum significat.—Porro *Spiritum Sanctum* aperto nomine vocat. *Hieron. in Galat.* tom. iv. cap. 14. p. 168.

ses, begun at Antioch. The Arians had used the phrase to signify *three substances*, understanding them to be *different in kind*, (as *gold, silver, brass,*) and *separate* from each other. Again, the Sabellians had made use of *one Hypostasis*, to signify *one substance* in such a sense as left no *real* distinction, but *nominal* only. Here was therefore danger on either side; either of *dividing* the *substance* by making *three Hypostases*, or of *confounding* the *Persons* by making *one*. This difference was at length compromised, (A. D. 362.) in a synod at Alexandria, where Athanasius presided: either manner of expression was left indifferent, so long as they agreed in one *common* faith, meaning both the *same thing*, under different terms. So that *μία ὑπόστασις* or *τρῆς ὑποστάσεις* might be asserted, in like manner as *ὅως* or *ὅῶτα*, the same word *plurally* predicated to express the *distinction*, and also *singularly* to express the *union*; the *plural* being equivalent to three *Persons*, the *singular* to *one God*: for that was all the ancients intended, never to make the *Persons one*, nor the *Godhead many*.

The Latins^a could hardly bear the phrase of *tres substantiæ*: it seemed to carry more in it than the Greeks' three *Hypostases*. It was understood to mean either *three substances*, (that is, a *division* of *substance*,) or three *different kinds* of *substance*; neither of which could be

^a Et quisquam, rogo, Ore sacrilego *tres substantias* prædicabit? Hieron. *Ep. ad Damas.* tom. iv. p. 20.

Sub nomine Catholicæ fidei, impia verba defendunt; dicentes, *tres esse substantias*, cum semper Catholica fides *unam substantiam* Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti confessa sit. *Faustin. Fid. Theodos. Missa.*

Quia nostra loquendi consuetudo jam obtinuit, ut hoc intelligatur cum dicimus *essentiam* quod intelligitur cum dicimus *substantiam*; non audemus dicere *unam essentiam, tres substantias*, sed *unam essentiam, vel substantiam, tres autem Personas*. *August. Trin.* lib. v. c. 9. p. 838.

Sunt *tria quædam* coeterna, consubstantialia, coessentialia. Sed cum quæreretur a patribus, ut diceretur, *Quid tria*; nec *essentias, nec substantias, nec naturas* dicere ausi sunt; ne aliqua forte *diversitas* crederetur essentialium, aut naturarum, aut substantiarum: sed dixerunt *tres Personas, unam essentiam*; ut una essentia declararet *Deum unum, tres autem Personæ Sanctam Trinitatem* ostenderent. *Fulgent. de Trin.* cap. iii. p. 330.

borne: and therefore *una substantia* became the common language; but so that the *real* distinction between Father, Son, and Holy Ghost was kept up, to guard against *Sabellianism*. Indeed Hilary uses *tres substantiæ*^b: and so, no doubt, did some other Latins who were zealous Catholics: but then they intended no difference in the *kind of substance*, nor any *division* in the *same kind*: which secured the true Catholic notion; and the offence lay only in the *expression*. In short, the main thing they intended in all was, that the three Persons were *really*, and more than *nominally* distinct, and all but *one God*. And they admitted several ways of expressing the *distinction*, or *union*, in such modes of speech as were thought most proper to it. Provided both a *real* distinction, a *real Trinity* were kept up, and at the same time an *unity of Godhead*; the rest amounted only to a *verbal* dispute, or strife about *words*.

I may here remark, that Basil, Nazianzen, Austin, and others, blame the scantiness of the Latin tongue, as being the sole reason of the perplexity of the Latins, in relation to the phrase of *tres substantiæ*. Yet we find, that for a long season the phrase of *τρῆς ὑποστάσεις* was almost as much a bone of contention among the Greeks, as *tres substantiæ* among the Latins; and that it was with great difficulty that it at length prevailed, and became the common language^c: as it was also with some difficulty that the other way of speaking, viz. *una substantia*, obtained among the Latins. The true ground of all was this, that both Greeks and Latins wanted a phrase to express substance considered as *united*, but *distinguished* at the same time. *Three substances* (whether *ὑποστάσεις* or *substantiæ*)

^b Idcirco *tres substantias* esse dixerunt, subsistentium *Personas* per *substantias* edocentes, non *substantiam* Patris et Filii diversitate dissimilis essentiae separantes. *Hilar. de Synod.* p. 1170.

^c Quamobrem gratis Basilius Romanis objiciebat, quod cum nomen Græcorum vim ignorarent, illarum duarum vocum significationem confunderent; quandoquidem alii e Græcis nativæ patriæque linguæ non ignari prorsus, earum discrimen non satis intelligebant. *Le Quien Panopl.* p. 28.

expressed, ordinarily, three *divided* substances; and the latter, three of different *kinds*: what therefore could they invent to express *three things* (*tres res*, or *tria*) real and substantial, but *undivided*? Here lay the pinch of the difficulty. *Substantia de substantia* expressed it tolerably well; like as *Lumen de lumine*, and *Deus de Deo*: but still what were they to put to the word *three*, in the plural way of predication? *Persons*? But Sabellius had wrested and depraved the sense of the word *person* to an ambiguous or sinister meaning. *Substances*? But that was also liable to misconstruction, and to be perverted to another extreme. However, the Greek ὑποστάσεις, by degrees, obtained to signify the same as πρόσωπα ἐνυπόστατα. And so long as no *division* be understood, the phrase may serve very well: and so perhaps might the Latin *substantiæ*, had not custom carried it the other way. The Latins have since invented *tres subsistentiæ*, *tria supposita*, instead of *tres substantiæ*; though the very Schoolmen have not scrupled *tres substantiæ*, with the addition of *incommunicabiles*, or *relative*^d, to intimate that the Persons are not *divided substances*, but that they are *united*, and depending on each other, *relative* as to existence, so that one cannot be without the other, or *separate* from the other: under which cautions they can admit *tres substantiæ*, and yet *una substantia* in all; like as *tres res*, though all together *una summa res*. The truth is, every *Person* is *substance*, (but not properly a *substance*,) *substance* in *union* with *substance*, and not *divided*: a thing easy to be understood, but not easy to be expressed. You would find

^d Est æquivocum *substantiæ* nomen, et sæpe significat *essentiam*—Potest etiam significare *suppositum*; et maxime si addatur *prima* substantia, quia *suppositum* maxime per se subsistit. Unde in hac significatione admitti possunt *tres substantiæ* in Deo, non vero in priori. Et propter hanc equivocationem vitandam, multi ex antiquis patribus negarunt hanc locutionem, ne viderentur cum Ario sentire, qui *essentias* in Trinitate multiplicabat—et ita D. Thomas dicit juxta consuetudinem Ecclesiæ non esse absolute dicendas *tres substantias*; addendo vero aliquid, quod determinet significationem, dici posse—ut *tres substantiæ* *incommunicabiles*, seu *relative*. Suarez. *Metaph. Disp. xxxiv. sec. 1. n. 6. p. 177.*

the like difficulty in expressing the *parts* of the *divine substance*, in your hypothesis of extension. You cannot but admit that every part is *substance*, (substance it must be, or nothing,) and yet because of their inseparable union, and their making *one substance* in the whole; you would not dare to call one part a *substance*, or *several* parts several *substances*. This I again intimate, that you may not be too severe upon others, merely about a *mode of expression*, (which is all the case,) when, in a parallel instance, the objection may be as strongly retorted upon yourselves. You admit *substance* and *substance*, where you think it not proper to say *substances*: and if you had not, yet you could never be able to show that *substance* and *substance*, considered in *union*, must always make *substances*. Yet a great part of what you have been endeavouring under this Query, as well as what Dr. Whiston has urged in the Second Part of his Reply, is founded chiefly upon a precarious, nay false supposition, that, if every person be *substance*, three persons must be *three substances*, and cannot be *one substance*. Now to return.

I must here take notice of a passage of Gregory Nazianzen, produced first by Mr. Whiston^e with great pomp, as making some notable discovery; and now by you, I suppose, for the like purpose. What Mr. Whiston professedly (and you covertly) intends from that passage is, that Athanasius was the first inventor or teacher of the *divinity*, *consubstantiality*, *coequality*, and *coeternity* of the Holy Spirit. This would be a great discovery indeed, had Gregory Nazianzen really said it.

But before we come to the remarkable passage, it will be proper to inform the reader what Gregory had been saying before, and how this sentence, which I shall presently produce at length, came in. The oration is a panegyric upon Athanasius; wherein he runs through the most remarkable incidents of his life: his *sufferings* and his *services*, his great prudence, fervent zèal, and un-

^e Whiston's Reply to Lord Nottingham, Add. p. 92.

daunted courage in the cause of Christ. He observes how Athanasius ^f, even in his younger years, before the Nicene Council, had very just and accurate notions of the doctrine of the Trinity; keeping a mean between the *extreme* of Sabellius (who had too much contracted the Godhead by confounding the distinction) and the other extreme of Arius, who had divided the Godhead into separate Deities. He describes afterwards the many difficulties Athanasius met with, raised by the hatred and enmity of the Arians: particularly in the year 356, in the reign of Constantius, when Gregory the Arian was put into the see of Alexandria, and Athanasius forced to flee for his life. Then were the churches put into the hands of the Arians: who having the *secular* power on their side, spared no severities; but raged against the Catholics with all imaginable cruelties. Then it was, especially about the year 359, that the *ancient and pious doctrine of the Trinity* (as Nazianzen ^g says) was dissolved and destroyed: and *Arianism, unscriptural Arianism*, brought in, in its room. Many who were in their hearts true friends to the *ancient* doctrine, yet complied too far with the Arian confessions ^h; which, Nazianzen says, he had often lamented with tears. And such was the violence of the *persecution*, that, excepting some *few* men that stood out, and others whose station was so low as to make them be overlooked, all yielded to the times; induced thereto either by fear or by interest, or else ignorantly circumvented by fraud. During these storms, and in the midst of so general an apostasy, Athanasius stood firm and unmoved; the main support of the true ancient faith. In 361, Constantius, who had been the strength of the Arians, dies: and a worse than he, Julian the apostate emperor, succeeds. Here was some peace to the Church, but it was yet miserably distracted with heresies, with variety of sects and parties, tearing one another. In 363,

^f Greg. Naz. Orat. xxi. p. 380, 381.

Greg. Naz. p. 386.

^h Ibid. p. 387.

Julian being slain, Jovian succeeded: still things were in confusion as to the state of the Church. The Arians, in some places, were many and powerful, and had been endeavouring, very early, to stir up the Emperor Jovian against Athanasius and all his adherents. At this critical time, in the midst of danger, that great and good man was not afraid to preach the truth boldly, and to propose it open and undisguised to the Emperor himself in *writing*: of which noble instance, both of his courage and constancy, Nazianzen thus speaks.

“ And here particularly appeared the integrity of the man (Athanasius) and the firmness of his faith in Christ. For when, of all the other Christians, divided into three parts, *many* were unsound in their faith concerning the *Son*, and *more* concerning the Holy Ghost, (where to be only *less impious* was esteemed *piety*), and but a *few* were sound in both articles; he was the *first* and *only* man (or however with a very few) that had the courage to profess the truth, in writing, plainly and in express words, the one Godhead and essence of *three*. And what many of the Fathers before had been divinely moved to confess in relation to the *Son*, he was afterwards *inspired* to confess concerning the Holy Ghost; bringing a gift truly royal and magnificent to the Majesty Royal, a written faith in opposition to unwritten novelty ⁱ.”

Now what is there in this passage of Nazianzen more than this: that at a time when many had abandoned the faith, and more had been sneakers and time-servers, Athanasius, with a few adherents, had the courage to speak out the truth, boldly, without mincing it: and that this

ⁱ Τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ἀπάντων, ὅσοι τοῦ καὶ ἡμᾶς λόγου, φριχτῆ νιμημίονος καὶ πολλῶν μὲν ὄντων τῶν περὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἀβυσσοπύοντων, κλιόνων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ἴσθαι καὶ τὸ ἥττον ἀσθεῖν, Εὐσέβειοι ἐνομιέσθη· ὀλίγου δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀμφότερα ὑγιαίνοντος· πρώτος καὶ μόνος, ἢ κομιδῆ σὺν ὀλίγοις, ἀποτολμᾷ τὴν ἀλήθειαν σαφῶς οὕτως καὶ διαβήθη, τῶν τριῶν μίαν θεότητα καὶ οὐσίαν ἐγγράφως ἠμολογήσας· καὶ ὁ τῶν πολλῶν τῶν πατέρων ἀριθμῶν περὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἐχαρίσθη πρότερον, τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος αὐτὸς ἠμπνευσθεὶς ἕσπερος, &c. *Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xi. p. 394.*

brave resolution of his was owing to the *Spirit* of God, *moving* and *inciting* him to make that glorious confession in the face of the world? I have translated ἐχάρισθη, according to what appears to me to be the true and full meaning of Nazianzen: who in this very oration speaks of the Nicene Council, as called together by the *Holy Ghost*^k, that is, moved and incited by the *Holy Spirit* to the resolutions they made against Arius, and his *heresy*. In like manner, he supposes Athanasius to have been stirred up, by the *same Spirit*, to make that noble confession of the *divinity* of the Holy Ghost, and in the like *expressive* words. All this well agrees with what Nazianzen had said but a few pages before, that, notwithstanding the violence of the persecution, there were some that had courage to resist, and stand firm; whom God preserved, that there might be still remaining some seed and root for Israel to reflowerish, and take new life by the *influxes* of the *Holy Spirit*^l.

That this was all his meaning may appear farther, from his representing the doctrine of a *coessential* Trinity, every where, as *ancient* doctrine; and his branding the contrary doctrine as *novelty*, in that very passage. Nor could a man of Nazianzen's good sense and piety be so ridiculous and silly as to build his *own faith* (which this was) upon any supposed *private inspiration* in the fourth century, or any century after the Apostles, or indeed upon any thing but the *sacred* writings. It is certain, he looked upon the doctrine of the *Godhead* of the *Holy Ghost*, as one of those *truths*, into the knowledge whereof the *Apostles* were led immediately after Christ's ascension^m. All that was done after, was the fixing it by *terms* that could not be *eluded*.

I must observe, that where Gregory Nazianzen speaks of the smallness of the number joining with Athanasius, and adhering to the Nicene faith; some allowance must

^k Greg. Naz. Orat. xxi. p. 381.

^l Ibid. p. 387.

^m Τούτων ἵς ἀναί νομίζω, ἡ αὐτὴν εὐ ἀνούματος τὴν Σιδόντα, &c. Greg. Naz. Orat. xxxvii. p. 609.

be made for his oratorical manner of setting forth Athanasius's singular courage and constancy: or else he must be understood only of the Christians of Alexandria or Constantinople; who had been, for the generality, perverted by the Arians. For, as to other places, it is certain, that the Nicene faith was, at that very time, professed by almost all the churches, all the world over. For no sooner did the Catholics recover a little respite from persecution, about the year 362, but they condemned all that had been done by the Arians in the Council of Ariminumⁿ; and professed their steady attachment to the Nicene faith. Athanasius assures the Emperor Jovian, in that very year 363, that the Nicene faith was universally received by all the churches of Spain, England, and Gaul; by all Italy, Dalmatia, Dacia, Mysia, and Macedonia; by all Greece and Africa, by the islands of Sardinia, Cyprus, and Candia, by Pamphylia, Lycia, Isauria, Egypt, Libya, Pontus, Cappadocia, and the East; that is, by all the earth, excepting a small number of Arians. He declares, that he was assured of the faith of all those churches; and had their letters by him to produce^o, in testimony of it.

From hence I infer, that Nazianzen is to be understood only of some *particular* place at that time overrun with Arianism; most probably Constantinople, where Eusebius of Nicomedia, Macedonius, and Eudoxius, had successively held the see for above twenty years; and must of course have corrupted great numbers: and it is certain, that by the succession of Demophilus, (another ringleader of the Arians,) the Catholic interest in that city was in a manner oppressed and stifled, before Nazianzen came thither, about the year 378.

To return. I have nothing more to say to your long account of *Hypostasis*, which does not at all affect me: when you are once able to fix and settle the precise mean-

ⁿ See Tillemont's History of the Arians, sect. 83. p. 279, &c.

^o Athanas. Epist. ad Jovian. p. 787.

ing of *individual, identical substance*, you may then know how to oppose me. That person is *substance*, I have always allowed: that *substance and substance* always makes *substances*, you cannot prove: or if you could, you know very well, that the consequence bears as hard upon the Doctor and you, as it can upon me; since it makes the *divine Being*, upon your own principles, a *compound* of innumerable substances: so that you cannot condemn my way of thinking and speaking, but with the shame of self-contradiction, and condemning your ownelves.

I had told you in my Defence, vol. i. p. 249. that to say the one God is *one Person* only, and the *Father* that Person, is the essence of *Sabellianism*, and the doctrine of Paul of Samosata^P. This you call *romantic history*; which I am willing to excuse, charitably believing you really think so: though had any man well versed in antiquity told me as much, I must have had a hard opinion of his *sincerity*. You pretend, that the professed doctrine of those that opposed Paul of Samosata, was, that the “one God was the Father, by way of eminence.” That is, the Father was *eminently* styled one God: not that the Father *alone* was the one God, *exclusive* of a *real* Son; as Sabellius and Paul of Samosata taught. I have shown you above, that the Church’s doctrine was to make both *one God*: and this was done by the defenders of the Catholic faith, even against the Praxeans, Noëtians, and Sabellians. You add, that Paul of Samosata, and the Sabellians, taught that the “one God was not the Father only, “but Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.” Here you are playing with *terms* (whether ignorantly or designedly, I know not) to deceive the reader, in a very plain case. Pray, what did the Sabellians mean, or Paul of Samosata, by making *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost* one *God*? Just

† Καὶ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δύο φημὲν εἶναι θεοὺς ἢ διότις, ἀλλὰ μίαν θεότητα—οὗτοι δὲ ἐλίγου μόνον θεὸν διὰ τὸ πηγῆν εἶναι τὸν πατέρα, ἀλλὰ μόνον θεὸν ἀναρῶν, ὅσοι τὸ κατ’ αὐτὸν, τὴν τῷ υἱῷ θεότητα καὶ ὑπόστασιν, καὶ τῷ ἁγίου πνεύματος—πρόσωπον ἰσὺν τὸν θεὸν ἅμα τῷ λόγῳ φασίν, ὡς ἀνθρώπου ἵνα καὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον. Eriphan. de Paul. Samosat. Hær. lxx. p. 609.

the same as if you should style the Father *Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier*, and then say, that the Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier are *one God*. To the *Person* of the Father, the *alone God*, (according to them,) they were pleased to apply two *names* more, that of *Son* and *Holy Ghost*: and so the same *one real Person*, the *Person* of the *Father*, was alone, with them, the *one God*⁹. I showed you this by plain testimonies: and now, where is the difference between them and you; except that they made the *Person* of the Father the *alone God*, under *three names*; you make the same *one Person* the *alone God*, under the one name of the *self-existent God*^r? This I demonstrated very distinctly to you in my Defence; and you take not the least notice of it. The reader will suspect you had a reason for slipping over so material a point.

I retorted upon you your plea from 1 Cor. viii. 6. asking, how you can make *two Gods*, in contradiction to

⁹ Φάσκει δὲ (Παῦλος ὁ Σαμοσατινός) Θεὸν πατέρα, & υἱόν, καὶ ἅγιον πνεῦμα ἰσὺς Θεόν.—μὴ εἶναι δὲ τὸν υἱὸν τῷ Θεῷ ἰσοπόσητον, ἀλλὰ ἰσὺς αὐτοῦ Θεῷ, ὡσαύτῃ ἀμίμῳ & ὁ Σαβίλλιος, &c. *Epiiph. Hæc.* lxx. p. 698.

Παῦλος ὁ Σαμοσατινός Θεὸν ἐκ τῆς παρθεῖν ὁμολογῶν, Θεὸν ἐκ Ναζαρεθ ἐφθίνα —τῷ μὴν προσηγομῶν πρὸς αἰώνων ὄντα, τῇ δὲ ὑπάρξει ἐκ Ναζαρεθ ἀναδυχθίνα: ἰσὺς αὐτῷ, φησὶν, ὁ ἐστὶ πάντα Θεός, ὁ πατήρ. *Athanas. contr. Apollinar.* p. 642.

^r Ὅν γὰρ Σαβίλλιος λίγου τριώνυμοι, τῶντων Εὐνόμιος ἰσομάζει ἀγίνησεν. *Greg. Nyss. contra Eunom.* p. 676. alias 248.

Uterque hæreticorum istorum *singularem* in Deo *personam* asseruit; quod de Sabellio nemo prorsus ignorat: de Paulo Samosateno testantem Epiphanius audivimus. *Petav. Dogm.* vol. v. p. 6.

^r See my Defence, vol. i. p. 251, &c. Gregory Nyssen's observation is worth the reciting: he says thus:

“To charge our doctrine with *Sabellianism*, or *Montanism*, is much the same as to impute to us the blasphemy of Eunomius. For if any one carefully examines into the common mistake of those heresies, he will find that it has a near affinity to that of Eunomius. Both judaize in the same doctrine; as not admitting the *only-begotten* to be God, nor receiving the *Holy Ghost* into the communion of the Godhead of him whom they call the *great* and the *first* God. For, whom Sabellius calls the *trinominal* God, the same does Eunomius name *self-existent*: and neither of them looks upon the *Godhead* as common to a *Trinity* of Persons. Let the reader then judge who it is that comes nearest to Sabellius.” *Græg. Nyss. Orat.* ix. p. 676. alias 248.

St. Paul, who says there is *but one*? You distinguish between a *supreme God* and an *inferior God*; which St. Paul does not: we distinguish upon the *strict* or *large* intent of the *exclusive* terms: and I told you, that our distinction was much older, and better warranted than yours. I therefore desired you no more to charge us with contradicting St. Paul; but either to condemn yourselves for doing it, or at least to acquit both. To this you reply, that to say “the Son is (*an inferior*) God, is no way “contrary to this text.” But it is contrary to the whole tenor of Scripture, and to the fourth verse of that very chapter; which says absolutely, that “there is none other “God but one.” St. Paul does not say, no *supreme God* only, but absolutely, *none*. In strictness therefore you contradict St. Paul, as directly as possible: and you have no other way of coming off, but by a *novel distinction*. Now, since it is easy for us to come off from the charge you make, by the help of a *distinction*, and one much better warranted than yours; why are we blamed, and you freed? I have before shown what we mean by saying that the Son is tacitly included, though the Father be *eminently* styled the *one God*: not that the word *God*, or the word *Father*, in such cases, includes Father and Son; but it is predicated of one only, at the same time that it is tacitly understood that it may be equally predicated of either or both; since no opposition is intended against either, but against *creatures* and *false gods*. You have here passed over fifteen pages of mine, which contained things of great moment: I may pass over two of yours, which contain nothing but words.

QUERY XXIV.

Whether Gal. iv. 8. may not be enough to determine the dispute betwixt us; since it obliged the Doctor to confess, that Christ is by nature truly God, as truly as man is by nature truly man.

He equivocates there, indeed, as usual. For, he will have it to signify that Christ is God by nature, only as having,

by that nature which he derives from the Father, true divine power and dominion: that is, he is truly God by nature, as having a nature distinct from, and inferior to, God's, wanting the most essential character of God, self-existence. What is this but trifling with words, and playing fast and loose?

THE Modest Pleader here stands in the front; and, after his solemn way, gives me *rebukes*, when he is at a loss for *answers*. He tells me of an *express Scripture-distinction* that I am *ridiculing*: as if ridiculing what is really *ridiculous*, and what is very *profanely* called *express Scripture*, (*viz.* the distinction of *two adorable Gods, supreme and inferior,*) were ridiculing Scripture. However, I was *ridiculing* nothing in this Query; but only laying before the reader two or three instances of Dr. Clarke's *equivocating* and *trifling*: which, it seems, is resented as a high affront, and is to be turned upon the *Scripture* itself. And the reader is to be gravely called to judge, whether it were a "zeal according to knowledge, &c." All this, because one *fallible* man, who has been charging whole churches and whole ages with *contradiction* and *nonsense*, has been charged with trifling and contradicting himself; and that in a case too, which is self-evident and undeniable.

The argument on which the charge rests is this:

"He that has not the nature of the *true and only God*,
"or is not *naturally* and *necessarily* God, is not *by nature*
"truly God, as truly as *man* is by nature *truly* man.

"Our Lord (according to the Doctor) has not the *na-*
"ture of the true and only God, nor is he *naturally* and
"necessarily God: therefore he is not *by nature* truly
"God, as truly as *man* is *by nature* truly man."

Let the reader now judge whether the Doctor, in saying that Christ is "by nature truly God," &c. has not either *grossly* contradicted himself, or *meanly* equivocated. It might have become this Modest Pleader either to have confessed the charge, or to have shown how to get clear

of it. All he can say is, that "the Son has, by that nature which he derives from the Father, true dominion:" and so has every *lawful* magistrate *true dominion*, in as just a sense as is here understood of Christ, a dominion derived from God. Is this what according to use of language, and custom of speech, has been understood by the phrase *God by nature*? And how has Christ, *by nature*, true dominion, when his nature is supposed to have existed before any dominion commenced, and is supposed also to continue after the *dominion* shall cease? Not to mention that the *dominion* is also presumed to proceed from *free grant*, and to be *given* or taken away at pleasure. Is this to be as truly *God by nature*, as man is *by nature* truly man? If this be not burlesquing Scripture, *ridiculing* every thing serious, and making a jest of all language, I know not what is. To divert the reader from dwelling upon the Doctor's mismanagement, you charge me next with a "heap of absurdities," (p. 465.) as it is a very easy matter for a man, when his head is clouded, or his passions are up, to make *blunders* for others, and then comment upon them. Let us hear.

1. The first pretence is, that I contradict myself in making *self-existence* no *essential* character, and yet approving the putting it in a *definition* of the supreme Being, as an *essential* character. That is to say, because *self-existence* often has, and still may be used in *different* senses, therefore the allowing in one sense what I disallow in another, is *contradicting* myself.

2. The second pretence is, that to call *self-existent* an *ambiguous* term, and an *equivocal* word, is *ridiculous*. To which it is sufficient to say, that to deny it is much more so.

3. The third pretence is, that to call *self-existence* a character *merely negative*, is absurd. That is according as it is understood: for to make it *positive*, in some cases, is infinitely absurd; as hath been shown above.

4. A fourth cavil is, that the distinction of *essential* and *personal* has no place here, because both the *Person* and

the *essence* are self-existent. But this is begging the question. The *essence* belongs to three Persons; *self-existence*, or *underivedness*, to one only: therefore though *necessary existence* be an *essential* character common to all, *self-existence* is not.

5. A fifth cavil is against my including *supreme* in the definition of the divine nature, abstracting from the consideration of person. "As if," say you, "supremacy" was a character, not of a living agent, but of an abstract "essence." Ridiculous enough: as if the living substance, *common* to three persons, were not as truly *living*, and *agent*, as when considered in one^a. Let the reader now judge to whom the "heap of absurdities" justly belongs. You have invented some *imaginary* ones for me, and betrayed *real* ones of your own; having a happier talent at writing *nonsense* for others, than *sense* for yourself.

Your argument to prove that a person may be *God* on account of *dominion* before any dominion commenced, has been already answered. As to the sense of Gal. iv. 8. I referred to what had been said by a learned gentleman^b upon it. You, on the other hand, refer to Dr. Clarke's pieces, and to Modest Plea, &c. The dispute is about the meaning of the phrase τοῖς μὴ φύσει οὐσι θεοῖς, or shorter, about φύσει Θεός, *God by nature*, what it should signify; whether *substantially* and *essentially* God, or *really* God, as *having true dominion*. The reasons for the former interpretation are such as follow:

1. The common use of the term φύσις, for *essence*, or *substance*.
2. The use of φύσις Θεός in that sense among Greek writers^c: as particularly by Irenæus and Athanasius; and by Gregory Nyssen in relation to this very text.

^a See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 135.

^b The Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity, &c. p. 19, &c. True Scripture Doctrine Continued, p. 73, &c. Edwards's Critical Remarks, p. 18.

^c *Naturaliter Deus*, in opposition to one that only bears dominion, who

3. Worship is required to be given to God principally on account of his being *ὁ ὄν*, or *Jehovah*; that is, on account of his being *essentially*, or *substantially* God. Nor is it of any moment what the Modest Plea urges, that then Father and Son will be *two Jehovahs*, if each of them is to be worshipped as being *ὁ ὄν*, or *Jehovah*: for that is supposing the name *Jehovah* to be proper to *one Person* only, and not common to more; which is begging the question.

4. Scripture is used to argue against the gods of the heathen, as being *no Gods*; not as wanting divine *dominion* only, but as having no divine nature or substance.

5. The true notion of *idolatry* is paying *religious* honour to any thing that has not the *divine perfections*; that is, divine substance, the only ground of divine perfections. To which may be added,

6. That St. Paul (Rom. i. 20.) condemns the worship of the *creature*, confines all worship to the *Creator*: which is explicatory of Gal. iv. 8. Now the Creator is God *essentially*, the creature not essentially God: wherefore, as all things are really excluded by St. Paul from worship that are not *essentially divine*; that must be the meaning of Gal. iv. 8. These are the reasons on our side. Dr. Clarke, on the other hand, pleads,

1. The different use of the word *φύσις* in *Scripture*, to signify *state, condition, capacity, &c.* and even *customs* only. But if the places be well considered where the expression *φύσις*, *by nature*, occurs; we shall find that it is put in opposition to something *accessional, superinduced, accidental*, or the like: from whence one may plainly perceive that it relates to something inherent, innate, permanent, fixed and implanted in any thing from the first.

is God *verbo tenus*. Irenæus allows the distinction, but rejects the application. *Iren.* lib. iv. cap. 1.

Θεὸς ἴσραηλ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν, ὅτις ὁ πατήρ. Athan. vol. ii. p. 43.

φύσις Θεός. Athan. in Psal. p. 83. *Greg. Nyss. contr. Eun.* p. 9. See above, p. 237. *Eustathius, Fabric.* vol. viii. p. 174, 185. *Vid. Cleric. de Art. crit.* p. 103.

The uncircumcision by nature (Rom. ii. 27.) is opposed to circumcision superinduced *by law*. The wildness *by nature* (Rom. xi. 24.) is opposed to what is superinduced *by grace*. The Jews are said to be such *by nature*, as being such from their birth, in opposition to being *made* or *adopted*. The Gentiles do *by nature* the things contained in the law, (Rom. ii. 14.) in opposition to the doing the same by a superinduced *law*. We are *by nature* children of wrath, born such in opposition to the superinduced new-birth *by grace*: that is, by our *depraved nature*, our *conditio nascendi*, since the fall, we are under the sentence of the divine displeasure^x. Even in that famous place, (1 Cor. xi. 14.) “Doth not even nature itself teach “you, &c.” the word *nature* does not signify *custom*, but the *masculine* nature, in opposition to the *feminine*. Subjection is *natural* to the woman, in token whereof she is to wear her *veil*; and her *hair*, as another kind of veil: while the *man*, in token of his being *naturally* superior to the woman, goes with his head uncovered, and with short hair. Nature, in the formation of the two sexes, has made the distinction of *superiority* and *inferiority*; and they are born to this or that, by the condition of their sex. This appears to be the most obvious and easy sense of that text. Such being the usual sense of *nature*, or of the phrase *by nature*; we may infer thus much from Gal. iv. 8. That nothing is to be *worshipped* that has not a *divine nature*. Whatever is *God by nature*, as Christ is now supposed to be, must have *that which makes God to be God*, (in like manner as man by nature must have *that which makes man to be man*; or a Jew by nature must have *that which makes a Jew to be a Jew*, and the like :) and what can that be, but his having the *divine perfections*, and consequently, the *divine substance*, coeval with the Father; that is, from all eternity?

^x Naturam aliter dicimus cum proprie loquimur naturam hominis, in qua primum in suo genere inculpabilis factus est: aliter istam in qua, ex illius damnati poena, et mortales et ignari, et carni subditi nascimur. *August. de lib. Arbitr.* lib. iii. cap. 19.

I may add, that whatever passages may be brought of the use of φύσει, yet they come not fully up to the case; unless φύσει Θεός could be shown to bear such a sense as you would put upon it. Many examples may be brought of ours: few, or perhaps none, of yours. The Modest Pleader (p. 247.) thinks that the passage cited out of Eusebius^γ, where Æmilian the Roman præfect makes mention of the Pagan deities, as being *gods by nature*, is directly contrary to our notion; because the Romans did not look upon their gods to be *self-existent* and *supreme*. This observation is to the purpose, and is not without its weight. But as the Pagans had several schemes of *theology*, and several hypotheses in respect of their gods, and it cannot be certainly known what hypothesis Æmilian went upon; we cannot be certain in what sense he used the phrase. And though the Pagans did not believe more than one *supreme God*, yet their *inferior* gods were generally supposed *ἀγένητοι*, *eternal*, and *necessarily existing*; which answers to θεοὶ κατὰ φύσιν, *gods by nature*^z. Besides that, as many Pagans as supposed the inferior gods to be nothing but the *polyonymy* of their one supreme God, must have thought them all to be θεοὶ κατὰ φύσιν, *gods by nature*.

I may add, that it seems highly probable that Æmilian designed what he said, in answer to what Dionysius or other Christians had pleaded; *viz.* that they worshipped one that was God *by nature*, in opposition to the *Pagan deities*, which were none of them such. I say, in answer hereto, he pleads that *their* deities were gods *by nature* also: and why then might not Christians worship both

γ Τίς γὰρ ὁμᾶς κωλύει ἢ τῦτον, ἵππερ ἰσὶ Θεοὶ, μὲνὰ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν Διῶν προσκυνῶν; Euseb. lib. vii. cap. 11. p. 335.

z The primary and archical beings, according to Proclus, were the Pagan deities.

“Απαντες οὖν ὅσοι πάποτε Διολογίας εἰσὶν ἡμῖνοι, τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν Θεοὶ ἐπωνομάζοντες περὶ ταῦτα τὴν Διολογικὴν ἐπιπέμπων πραγμασιεύεσθαι φασί. Procl. Plat. Theol. lib. i. cap. 3. p. 5. Vid. Plotin. Ennead. 2. lib. ix. cap. 1.

Αἱ τῶν Διῶν ἑσῖαι ἐδὲ γίνονται. Τὰ γὰρ αἱ ὄντα εὐδέποτε γίνονται. Sallust. de Mund. cap. ii. p. 244.

the *Pagan* gods, and their *own*? The heathens had before this time learned to refine their *theology*, and to pretend as much in honour of the *Pagan divinity*, as the Christians pleaded for *theirs*: and the dispute now was, which of them could most clearly make good their plea ^u.

But I proceed to a second argument for your sense of the text.

2. The Modest Pleader argues, that if St. Paul had gone upon our scheme, he would not have said τοῖς μὴ φύσει οὐσι θεοῖς, but τοῖς μὴ φύσει οὐσι θεῶ; not them which by nature are not *gods*, but them which by nature are not *God*: because to say, they are not *gods*, as not being of the same divine substance, seems to intimate that they would be *gods* if they were of the *same substance*, and not *one God* as upon our principles. But St. Paul's expression is very right. The fault of the *Pagans* was not in worshipping *gods*; had there really been *many gods*, many *gods by nature*: their fault was in worshipping *gods* that were not *really* and *essentially* such. Nor would it be any fault in Christians to worship *many gods*, were there really many *gods by nature*: but the fault is in worshipping any that are not *gods by nature*, or more *gods* than there *really* are; which fault is committed by worshipping more *gods* than *one*, because there is but *one God by nature*. Whether more persons than one would be *more gods*, or otherwise, by partaking of the same substance; is neither affirmed nor denied in this place of St. Paul: only the *Pagans* are condemned for worshipping those as *gods*, which had not the *nature of gods*, or what was necessary to make them really *gods*.

3. It is farther pleaded by Dr. Clarke, that the true notion of *idolatry* is the ascribing to any being such worship and honour as does not belong to it.

To this pretence see a sufficient answer in True Scrip-

^u Cum de re loquimur *divina* vobiscum, hoc ut ostendatis exposcimus, *esse Deos alios natura*, vi, nomine: non in simulachris propositos quos videmus, sed in *ea substantia* in qua conveniat estimari tanti esse nominis oportere virtutem. *Arnob. contr. Gent.* lib. iii. p. 101.

ture Doctrine Continued^b, of which the Modest Plea has taken no notice.

To conclude this article; you have not been able to acquit the Doctor of the charge of *equivocating*, or *contradicting* himself; nor to take off the force of our argument built upon Gal. iv. 8. for the *essential* divinity of God the Son: who, because he is *adorable*, is therefore *God by nature* in virtue of that text. Your trifling about the definition I gave from Melancthon, as if it could not be *scriptural* because it is taken from Melancthon, who took it from Scripture, is beneath my notice.

QUERY XXV.

Whether it be not clear from all the genuine remains of antiquity, that the Catholic Church before the Council of Nice, and even from the beginning, did believe the eternity and consubstantiality of the Son; if either the oldest creeds, as interpreted by those that recite them; or the testimonies of the earliest writers, or the public censures passed upon the heretics, or particular passages of the ancientest Fathers, can amount to a proof of a thing of this nature?

I AM here to dispute first with the Modest Pleader, who may be known by his *positive* style, and *magisterial* air, to make good the *title* of his treatise. I am rebuked for my *presumption*, in this Query: and why? Because I have presumed to tell the world what has been proved an hundred times over: and yet not positively affirming it, but putting it by way of Query, to be fairly debated. This solemn gentleman, I suppose, will call it *presumption*, in a while, for any man to undertake to defend the faith of all the Christian churches. To such a height may men be carried by a strong conceit of their own novel *hypotheses*.

I had modestly appealed to the *oldest creeds*, not di-

^b True Script. Doctr. p. 76, 78, &c.

rectly, but as *interpreted by those that recite them*. And where was the *presumption* of doing it? His cavil, upon this occasion, I answered in a note to my eighth Sermon^c. I appealed also to *censures* passed upon *heretics*. In reply to this I am told,

1. That the most remarkable censures were passed upon the Ebionites; who taught that Christ was a *mere man*, in whom the supreme God dwelt. But if their great guilt, and the heinousness of it, lay in the *consequence* of their principles, in their denying Christ's *divinity*; then it will appear that the modern impugnors of Christ's *divinity* are nearly concerned in the censures passed upon the Ebionites. For indeed the great danger and impiety of their heresy was not merely in making a *creature* some years, or ages, *younger* than he really was; but in *denying* their *God*, in refusing to acknowledge him as really and truly *God*. Irenæus^d, the oldest Father that mentions the Ebionites, represents the case thus: "The Ebionites God will judge: How can they be saved, if he was not *God* who upon earth wrought salvation? Or how shall man come to God, if God (ὁ Θεός) had not come to man?" In another place, he says, "Vain are the Ebionites, not admitting the union of *God* and *man*, by *faith*, into their souls." He proceeds to observe, that the *Holy Spirit* (by which he understands the *Logos*, as do many other Fathers^e) came upon the Virgin: and a little lower, blames the Ebionites again, as "not receiving God" along with the man. Now it is well known in how strict a sense Irenæus understood the word *God*, and that he applied it in the same strict sense to God the Son; as I

^c Vol. ii. p. 199.

^d Ἀνακρινὶ δὲ τῶν Ἐβιωνῶν πῶς δύναται σωθῆναι εἰ μὴ ὁ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ τὸν σωτηρίαν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἐργασάμενος; ἢ πῶς ἄνθρωπος χωρῆσαι εἰς Θεὸν, εἰ μὴ ὁ Θεὸς ἐχωρήσῃ εἰς ἄνθρωπον; *Iren. lib. iv. cap. 30. p. 271.*

Vani autem et Ebionæi, unionem *Dei* et hominis, per fidem, non recipientes. *Iren. lib. v. cap. 1. p. 293.*

Non recipientes *Deum* ad commixtionem suam.

^e Irenæus, p. 216. Just. Mart. *Apol. i. cap. 43. p. 69.* Clem. Alex. p. 654. Tertull. *contr. Prax. cap. 26, 27.* Novat. *cap. 19.*

have proved above. As many therefore as deny the Son to be *God* in that sense, were condemned in the Ebionites long ago; as is plainly proved from this Father. To the same purpose speak other writers^f of the Ebionites (and of such others as the Ebionites) both before and after the Nicene Council. The great *impiety* of such men was in their being ἀρνησίδεοι, *deniers* of Christ's *divinity*, blasphemers against his *Godhead*. How you can yet clear yourselves of the same charge, I see not. It was not without reason that Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, charged the Arians, upon their first appearance, with reviving the impiety of Ebion, Artemas, and Paul of Samosata. *Theod. E. H.* lib. i. cap. 4.

2. The Modest Pleader goes on to tell us that Cerinthus was censured; who taught that the Son of God was not himself made man, but only united to a man. He thinks he has here said something smart: but, because every body will not understand the *innuendo*, and he durst not speak plainer for fear of discovering his whole heart, we may pass it over. He takes no notice of Cerinthus's being condemned, as well as Ebion, for denying our Lord's *divinity*, and the *eternity* of the *Word*. He proceeds to observe, that the Valentinians and Cataphrygians were censured; from whom arose the doctrine of *necessary emanations*: to which weak piece of calumny I have an-

^f Καὶ γὰρ κἀκεῖνοι ἦσαν φίλων ἀνθρώπων ὁμολογοῦσι πιφυκίαι πρὸς Χριστὸν εἰς τὸν βίον, Διότι οὗτοι αὐτοῦ τὸ σάλυντον ἀρνοῦμιναι. *Hippol. Fragm.* vol. i. p. 281.

Accedit his Theodotus, hæreticus Byzantius, qui—doctrinam introduxit quæ Christum hominem tantummodo diceret, Deum autem illum negaret. *Auctor. Append. ad Tertull. de Præscript.* cap. 68.

^g Ἀρνησίδεο ἀποστασίας. *Euseb.* lib. v. cap. 28.

Paul of Somosata, his crime was denying his God.

Τοῦ καὶ τὸν Θεὸν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κύριον ἀρνοῦμιναι. *Epist. Syn. Antioch. apud Euseb.* lib. vii. cap. 30.

Hebion discipulus Cerinthi, in multis ei similiter errans, Salvatorem nostrum hominem de Joseph natum, carnaliter æstimabat, nihilque in eo *divinitatis* fuisse docebat; sed sicut omnes prophetæ, sic et eum gratiam Dei habuisse adserebat, non tamen *Dominum Majestatis*, et *Dei Patris Filium* cum Patre sempiternam credebat. *Philastr. Hæ.* cap. 37.

^h See Bishop Bull, D. F. p. 178. *Jud. Eccl.* cap. 2.

swered above. He takes no notice of the Valentinians denying the *eternity* of the *Logos*, nor of their making *creature-creators*, nor of several of their other principles, whereby they led the way to *Arianism*, as Athanasius hath shown^h.

3. Sabellius, it seems, was censured for teaching *individual consubstantiality*: that is, for *nonsense*. For *consubstantiality* and *individual* (in the Sabellian sense of *individual*) are repugnant, and contradictory as possible. Nor did Sabellius ever teach *consubstantiality* at allⁱ. Whether the Modest Pleader has here shown *a zeal according to knowledge*, let any man judge that *knows* antiquity. He takes no notice of Sabellius's being condemned for confining the *Godhead* to one *real* Person, (instead of extending it to three,) upon the very same principles on which Arius afterwards founded a different *heresy*^k; *viz.* the apprehension of their being no *medium*^l between making the Son to be the *self-existent* Father himself, and *excluding* him from the *one Godhead*.

After a lame, partial, and false account of the ancient heresies condemned by the Church, the Modest Pleader goes on to give as partial and false accounts of the doctrine of the Fathers. But having obviated all his frivolous pretences on that head before, I may now dismiss him, and return to you.

You are pleased to say, that my "Defence of this Query is nothing but a confused heap of words relating to metaphysical subtilities," &c. The reader, I suppose,

^h See Montfaucon's preface to the first volume of Athanasius, p. 24.

ⁱ "Ὅστις γὰρ μισὶ ἰδίῃς τὴν ὁρμὴν τῆς ἀσφάλτου—αὐτῶς καὶ Ἄρειος καὶ Σαβέλλιος μισὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἐν ἀληθείᾳ ὁμολογίας τοῦ ἰμοῦσιω. *Επιρρῆ. Her.* lxi. n. 70. p. 797.

^k See my Defence, vol. i. p. 237, 251.

^l Σαβέλλιος δὲ τοῦ Σαρμοσενίως Παύλου, καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν ἐπιδιδόμενοι τὴν γνώμην διδοικὸς γὰρ τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου διαίρεσιν, εἰ ἀνεκρίτου κατὰπίστεως πλάσ. *Ἀθανασ. contr. Apoll.* lib. ii. p. 942.

^h Ἄρειος μὲν πρὸς τὸν Σαβέλλιον τοῦ λίβου δέξεν ἀπαντᾶσαι μὴ δυνατῶς, τῆς ἐξ ἑδῆς ἰδίῃσι πίστισι, πρόσθετον Θεὸν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ δογματίζων. *Socr. E. H.* lib. iv. cap. 33. p. 256.

understands by this time what these and the like complaints from you mean. I no sooner find you expatiating this way, but I conclude you had met with something you could not answer; it being your constant method thus to proclaim your defeat.

You durst not enter upon the main question debated under this Query. It was whether the Ante-Nicene writers, in general, taught a *proper* consubstantiality. You were before of opinion that it was a *figurative* or *oratorical* consubstantiality. I suffered not the reader to go away with any such weak pretence, instead of a just answer. I laid before you several reasons to the contrary, such as, I thought, might be depended on: and I perceive now, by your manner of replying, (which is no *replying*,) that you think so too. I shall repeat the reasons once more: and where you have scattered any loose hints that any way relate to them, I shall consider them in their proper places.

1. I thought it strange and unaccountable that so *many* Fathers should *rhetoricat*e in a matter of *faith*, and of the greatest *importance*: and that *none* should be met with wise enough, or good enough to throw off the varnish, and to tell us the naked truth.

2. I thought it still stranger that they should do it, not in *popular harangues*, but even in *dry debates*; where it particularly concerned them to speak accurately and properly, out of figure and flourish.

Hitherto you are pleased to be silent; not a syllable of reply. Let me go on.

3. I observed, that one principal and standing objection of heretics against the Catholic doctrine was, that it inferred a *division* of the Father's substance. I thought there must have been at least some *colour* for the objection; as indeed there was, if the Catholics professed a *proper* consubstantiality: otherwise there was none at all^m. For who could be silly enough to imagine that

^m See my Defence, vol. i. p. 272.

angels or archangels, or any creature whatever, might not be *created* without a *division* or *abscission* of the divine substance?

You endeavour at something (p. 472.) by way of reply; telling me that the ancients, “by denying all division, abscission, or diminution, did not mean to affirm that the Son was the individual identical substance of the Father.” I would be glad to know what this phrase, *individual identical*, &c. means with you. I think it plain, that the *objectors*, in inferring a *division* of substance, thought of the *same substance*; and the Catholics by denying *division*, asserted the *same undivided substance*. Whether this amounts to your *individual identical*, &c. is no great matter; since you do not care to say, or rather do not yet know, what you mean by it. You pretend that the ancients intended only, to “assert the absolute immutability of the Father;” and that “he generated the Son, as one fire lights another, without any diminution of himself.” But what pretence or colour could there be for the Father’s *diminishing* himself, unless a proper *consubstantiality* was intended? And if one fire be consubstantial to another, as I think the Fathers believed; that very instance proves the thing I am speaking of. I have however explained above what they meant by *diminution*, and what by denying it in this case.

4. A fourth argument I drew from another noted *objection* made to the Catholic doctrine, *viz. Tritheism*: and I observed both from the sense of the *objectors*, and from the method taken in the answers, what kind of *Tritheism* was intended; such as was founded on the supposition of a *proper consubstantiality*. This argument you have taken no notice of, but have left it in *the heap*, undisturbed.

5. I added a fifth reason from the particular state of the Sabellian controversy, and the arguments made use of in it; quite different from what would have been, and must have been, had the Fathers been of the *same* or *like* principles with you and Dr. Clarke. To which you say nothing.

6. In the sixth place, I threw in a *heap of reasons*; *reasons*, I think, and not *words* only: to one of which, relating to *worship*, you vouchsafe me a brief answer, but such as I have answered in another place. Upon the whole, you appear to have been much distressed in this Query: for otherwise, who would believe that a man of your abilities, after so long considering, would leave any thing unanswered?

Aye, but after all, you say, Dr. Clarke's propositions will remain *true* and *untouched*, which way soever any of these points be determined, (p. 471.) Indeed, they are wonderful *propositions*: they seem to be much of the Stoic make and constitution; that if they be ever so distressed or crushed, or even ground to pieces, yet they cannot be *hurt*. To be serious; if the Doctor's *propositions* have really nothing contrary to the Son's *eternity*, or *consubstantiality*, or *necessary existence*, (which comes to the same;) if they leave to God the Son that *honour* and that *worship* which those *divine* perfections demand; if they do not make him *precarious* in existence, or *dependent* on the *good pleasure* of another; in short, if they leave to the Son the one *true Godhead*, or *divine substance*, then let the propositions pass as very harmless, innocent, *trifling* propositions, containing nothing but *old* truths under a novel and conceited way of expression. But if the propositions really run counter to the *necessary existence*, the *immutable* perfections, the *divine worship*, &c. of God the Son, (as I conceive they do) then the *propositions* appear to be very nearly concerned in what I have been proving.

But you say, the true and only material question is, "Who is the alone first Cause, the alone supreme Governor?" &c. Now as to this matter, I will be very frank and plain with you. Do but sincerely and plainly acknowledge that God the Son is *coeternal* and *consubstantial* with the Father, of the same *divine substance*, *necessarily existing*, having the *divine perfections*, Creator by his *own* power, worthy of *equal* honour, and of the same kind of *worship*: do but admit these things, and you

shall have the liberty of talking as you please about the *alone first Cause*, and the *alone supreme Governor*; that is, *first in order and office*. But if you deny the Son's *necessary existence*, if you deny his *divine perfections* strictly so called, if you scruple to admit him as *Creator* by his *own power*, (which many Arians allowed,) and to worship him as *Creator*; nay, to call him *Creator*, which the very Eunomians never scrupled: if you betray your dissent from us in so many and so *material* points as these are, do not then pretend that the *supremacy* is the *main* point of difference, or the *only material question*: because it is pretending something directly *false*, and what you *know* to be false; and therefore what ought not to be pretended by any honest or good man. It is possible you may understand *supreme Governor* in such a sense, that all the other questions may be reduced to that one: and so may they also to this *one question*; whether God the Son be a *creature* or no. If this be your meaning, then there is no difference betwixt your state of the question and mine, except this; that what you have put into ambiguous, equivocal, deceitful words, to *confound* the readers, I have put into plain, clear, and distinct terms, to instruct and inform them. And now the main question will not be about the *supremacy*, whether to be asserted or denied; but about the sense and meaning of *supremacy*: whether supremacy is to be asserted in such a *sense* as to make the Son a *creature*, or in such a *sense* only as is consistent with his being *essentially* God, and *one* God with the Father. For you may please to take notice that many other questions must come in, in order to give light into the question about *supremacy*: or if you pretend to take the *supremacy* in a sense peculiar to yourself, and then to argue from it; this is only begging the *main question*, and pursuing your own inventions, in opposition both to *Scripture* and *antiquity*.

You have an odd remark in the close: you say, "to preserve the priority of the Father, and without the divinity, the *essential* divinity, of the Son, is no difficulty."

This is *news* from you: I hope you are *sincere*, and have no *double* meaning. For if these two things, the *essential* divinity of the Son, and the *priority* of the Father, be admitted as consistent, the dispute is at an end. But you add, that I pretend something more, *viz.* "to preserve the "priority of the Father, and withal, the equal supremacy "of the Son in point of authority and dominion." Yes; I do pretend to hold the *priority* of the Father in *order* (which is *natural*) and in *office* (which is *economical*) as consistent with the Son's *essential* and equal divinity: in a word, I hold any *supremacy* consistent with the Son's *essential* divinity. If you carry the *supremacy* farther, you either *contradict* yourself, or *equivocate* in a childish manner in the word *essential*. Choose you either part of the *dilemma*: it is all one to the argument whether the fault lies in your *heart* or your *head*.

QUERY XXVI.

Whether the Doctor did not equivocate or prevaricate strangely, in saying, "The generality of writers before the "Council of Nice were, in the whole, clearly on his "side:" when it is manifest, they were, in general, no farther on his side, than the allowing a subordination amounts to; no farther than our Church is on his side, while in the main points of difference, the eternity and consubstantiality, they are clearly against him? that is, they were on his side, so far as we acknowledge him to be right, but no farther.

HERE I am told by the Modest Pleader, (who was to rectify your unwary answers to my Queries, after he had seen my Defence,) that Dr. Clarke did not *equivocate*, or *prevaricate*; because the Ante-Nicene writers agree with him in all the points laid down in his propositions. This is a shameful *untruth*, as hath been often proved: and since you have now owned that *self-existent* is necessarily *existent*, I shall point out to you what *propositions* of the Doctor's are flatly contrary to the Ante-Nicene writers in

general. His 4th is one : for the *ancients* always thought that the *nature, essence, or substance* of the Persons was sufficiently declared in Scripture. His 5th proposition is another: for the *ancients* never taught that the Father *alone is necessarily existing*, but the contrary. His 7th is ambiguous. His 8th is contrary to all *antiquity*. So are the 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th. So is the 14th, in part, if by *self-existent* he meant *necessarily existing*. His 17th is directly contrary to the *ancients*, in *sense*, though not in *words*. The 19th has no manner of foundation in antiquity. The 25th has no foundation in antiquity: the *ancients* are contrary. The 33d is not agreeable to the primitive doctrine. The 38th is oddly expressed: the covert meaning directly contrary to the Ante-Nicene faith. The 39th is contrary to the *ancients*.

As to proposition 43, the *ancients* knew nothing of *supreme* and *inferior* worship. The 48th is contrary to all the *ancients*. So is the 50th in part: and the 51st in the whole. The 54th may admit of some dispute; but, in the main, the *ancients* are against it.

About one third of the Doctor's *propositions* are either directly contrary to *antiquity*, or have no countenance from it. I shall not here stay to prove the particulars: it has been done before, under the proper heads, in my Defence, and in this vindication of it. But, supposing I had charged the Doctor with something not to be found in his *propositions*, but in his *replies*, or other *pieces*; is the Doctor ever the less guilty of *equivocating* or *prevaricating*? Are we not to take his sentiments from any other part of his writings, as well as from his *propositions*? But to proceed.

What you add about *supremacy* and *subordination* has been abundantly answered. You surprise me a little by one sentence, p. 477. "The question," you say, "is not whether the Son be generated consubstantially, but whether he be generated at all." I understand you. The question is, whether God could have a *Son* of the same nature, power, and perfections with himself: or,

more briefly, whether such *divinity* as the Church maintains, is consistent with *Sonship*. You have hit the matter right: but why have you pretended all the while to lay no stress on *metaphysics*, when you here rest the main debate upon *metaphysics*, and that only? For you will not be weak enough to maintain that *Scripture* any where says that the *only-begotten* Son of God is *another* God, or not *one* God with the Father, or that he is of a *different nature*, or not *necessarily existing* as the Father. *Metaphysics* must do this for you, or nothing. You must call in all your *vain* philosophy, about *individual*, about *necessity*, about *intelligent agent*, about *coaction*, about *substance* and *substances*, *causes*, *acts*, *will*, and I know not what else: and at length you will go off without a proof, just as you came on.

You return to your quibble about the *supremacy* and *monarchy* of the Father. That is, all *dominion* over the *creatures* (I know of no dominion, properly so called, over any thing else) is *primarily* in the Father, *secondarily* in the other two Persons, and *common* to all three. The *dominion* is not in the Father *alone*: only he *alone* has it from none, they from him; this is the whole truth. Dr. Clarke having made some pretence to *antiquity*, I thought it proper to hint, in *eleven* particulars, his disagreement with itⁿ. I must here be forced to repeat them, because you have something to say to every one of them.

1. The first was, in the point of *consubstantiality*: in denying of which he runs counter to all the ancients. In reply, you say, you “do not presume to say that the Son “is not consubstantial;” but only that “the Father *alone* “has supreme authority and dominion.” Which is either saying the same thing in other words, or saying nothing. But as you presume to say that the Son is not *necessarily existing*, I suppose all men of sense will see that that is denying the *consubstantiality*; or I know not what is so.

2. The second charge was, that you do by necessary

ⁿ See my Defence, vol. i. p. 278, &c.

consequence deny the Son's *coeternity*. Here again you *presume not to say the Son is not eternal*, but the Father is *supreme*, &c. I did not ask about the *Father*: however, what you intend, is, to deny the *eternity*, not directly, but implicitly, by asserting the Father *alone* to be *necessarily existing*. Now it is all one to us, whether you do it *directly* or by *consequence*: undermining the faith in a serpentine way, is as pernicious as a more open attacking it. If you do not deny the *eternity*, it is plain however that you do not assert it; and therefore you come very short of the *ancients*.

3. Another article was, the Doctor's asserting *Œd̄s, God*, to be a relative word. This I showed to be contrary to all antiquity, a few instances excepted: your reply to this article hath been obviated above, p. 199.

4. You differ from all the *ancients*, in pretending that the Father *only* was God of Abraham, &c. You plead, in answer hereto, that it is a *Scripture proposition*: which is false, as hath been shown. However, the *ancients* (about whom our present question is) never thought it to be a *Scripture position*, but quite the contrary.

5. You differ from all antiquity, in pretending that the titles of *one, only*, &c. are exclusive of God the Son. This you ridiculously call an express *Scripture proposition*. I have answered your cavils on that head: in the mean while it is evident, and you do not gainsay it, that the *ancients* never thought as you do.

6. You again differ from all *antiquity*, in pretending that the "Son had not distinct worship paid him till after his resurrection." You here make references only, which I may answer by references °.

7. You run counter to all *antiquity*, in pretending that *two Persons* may not be, or are not, *one God*. To this you reply, that the *one God*, you think, always, in the Ante-Nicene writers, signifies the Father. I have demonstrated the contrary. However, if both together be ever called

° Defence, vol. i. p. 192, &c. See above on Query xviii.

God, or included in that singular title, it comes to the same thing, though the word *one* be away.

8. You contradict all the *ancients*, in saying, that “the title of *God*, in Scripture, in an absolute construction, always signifies the Father.” The quotations of the *ancients* from the Old Testament have been abundantly vindicated above. See Query II.

9. You run counter to all *antiquity*, in admitting an *inferior God* besides the *supreme*; and allowing *religious worship to both*. You appeal to St. Paul, which I have often shown to be a weak plea; and it is here foreign. The *ancients* never understood St. Paul in any such sense, but the contrary. You have therefore no plea from the Ante-Nicene Fathers, which was the point in hand.

10. You contradict all *antiquity*, in denying the Son to be “efficient Cause of the universe.” You now say, you “do not deny it;” which I am very glad of: there is one point gained. You did before, in opposing *efficient* to *instrumental*, and reserving the first to the Father only. You now say, the Son is not the “original efficient Cause.” This is ill expressed, and worse meant: but do you ever find the *ancients* making *two causes*?

11. You run counter to all *antiquity*, in supposing (not saying) the Son to be a *creature*. That you suppose it, and really mean it, under other terms, hath been shown P.

12. You contradict all *antiquity* in resolving the *foundation* of the Son’s *personal Godhead* into the power and dominion which you suppose him advanced to after his resurrection. It is your express doctrine. Collect. of Queries, p. 75.

13. You run counter to all the *ancients* in supposing the *Logos* to have supplied the place of a *human soul*; and making the *Logos*, as such, *passible*. As to the former part of this charge, you have given broad hints, up and down, in this *reply*: as to the latter part, it is, or was, your express doctrine. Collect. of Queries, p. 143.

P See my Supplement, vol. ii. p. 354, &c.

Let the reader now judge of your repeated boasts of *antiquity*: such as none could ever have made, but the same that could espy *Arianism* in our *Liturgy* and our *Articles*, and bring the *Creeeds* of the Church to speak the language of *heresy*.

QUERY XXVII.

Whether the learned Doctor may not reasonably be supposed to say, the Fathers are on his side, with the same meaning and reserve as he pretends our Church forms to favour him; that is, provided he may interpret as he pleases, and make them speak his sense, however contradictory to their own; and whether the true reason why he does not care to admit the testimonies of the Fathers as proofs, may not be, because they are against him?

YOU ask me whether I admit *the testimonies of the Fathers as proofs*, since I disapprove of the Doctor's making them *illustrations* only.

You think, it *had been just in me to declare* upon this head. Verily, I thought I had *declared*^P plainly, that I admit their testimonies as *proofs*, two ways: *certain* proofs, in many cases, of the Church's doctrine in that age; *probable* proofs of what the doctrine was from the *beginning*. In respect of the latter, they are *inferior* additional *proofs*, when compared with plain *Scripture-proof*: of no moment if *Scripture* is plainly contrary; but of great moment where *Scripture* looks the same way, because they help to fix the *true interpretation* in any disputed texts. I build no article of faith upon the *Fathers*, but upon *Scripture* alone. If the sense of *Scripture* be disputed, the concurring sentiments of the *Fathers* in any doctrine will be, generally, the best and safest comments upon *Scripture*, so far as concerns that doctrine: just as the practice of *courts*, and the decisions of eminent law-

^P Defence, vol. i. 321.

yers, are the best comments upon an *act of Parliament* made in or near their own times: though it be nevertheless true, that the obedience of the *subject* rests *solely* upon the *laws* of the *land*, as its rule and measure.

You proceed to vindicate some *translations* of the Doctor's, which I had found fault with. But you are first wrapped up in admiration of the Doctor's performance; that so "acute a man, &c. could not find above twenty passages to cavil at, in a book of near five hundred pages full of quotations." Whether it was *cavilling* shall be seen presently. But you will remember, that, besides a *general* charge of want of *pertinence* in many, and of great *unfairness*^q in the whole course of them; I had over and above taken notice of particular faults, very great ones, in the Doctor's *versions*. And surely twenty faults of this kind were enough for one man to commit within the compass of about three hundred pages: for I examined no farther^r, having found and noted a sufficient number for my purpose; which was to awaken the reader's caution, and to prevent his relying too implicitly upon the Doctor's representations. And you will consider, that it was not merely for *inaccuracy* in his translations, that I blamed him, (such as a man may innocently commit, or sometimes choose, to save time or pains, when the cause is not concerned in it, or when it is not material whether a scrupulous exactness be observed or no,) but it was for his mistranslating such parts of what he cited, as were of *greatest moment* to the question in hand, and his industriously warping them to his own *hypothesis*. You do well to labour this point: for indeed the Doctor's *integrity*, or *fidelity*, to say no more, is pretty deeply concerned in it; though my design was, not to expose his *character*, but to prevent the *deception* of the reader. They who desire to reexamine this matter, may please to

^q See my Defence, vol. i. p. 314, &c.

^r The learned reader will observe more instances of like kind, in Script. Doctr. p. 295, 296, 297, 304, 312, 314, 322. 2d edit. The most shameful of them is a version, in p. 312, of a passage cited at the bottom of p. 311.

look into my Defence, that I may not be at the trouble of repeating.

1. In the first passage, I complained of two false renderings; one of the words, *οὐκ εἰς ἀναίρεσιν*, another of the word *ἀπαύρασμα*, in both which the Doctor served his *hypothesis*, obliquely, *against* the sense of the *author*. You cannot, you do not pretend that his version was *just*: I cited as far as was necessary to show that it was not. What then? You pretend I leave out the *only words* for the sake of which the Doctor cited it. I left out no words that were at all necessary to show the *sense* of the author, or to judge of the Doctor's *version*. It was undoubtedly the Doctor's business either not to cite or translate the author at all, or to render his words faithfully, so far as he did pretend to translate from him. And though the Doctor's *particular design*, in that passage, might be to show that Athanasius allowed the Father to be styled the *only God*, (Mark xii. 32.) yet he had a more *general design* running through his performance, which was to keep the reader in the dark as to the ancient way of understanding it, in opposition to *false gods*, or *idols* only: to serve which *general design*, he perverted the sense of that passage in his *translation* of it.

2. The second passage^s which the Doctor had mis-translated, you are willing to correct, in some measure, by leaving out the word *most*. But you will still have it *absolutely and strictly God*, instead of *really God*: which might not be much amiss, had not the Doctor made such frequent ill use of *absolutely*, in respect of the Father; intending therein an opposition to God the *Son's* being *absolutely* God. This was not the meaning of Athanasius, who meant no *opposition* but to *idols*^t. I observed, that Athanasius would have said, or had said, in other

^s Τὸν ἀληθινὸν καὶ ἕνα ὄντα Θεὸν, τὸν τοῦ Χριστοῦ πατέρα. *Athan. contr. Gent.* p. 9.

^t See my Defence, vol. i. p. 303.

words, as much of the *Son*, as he has there said of the *Father*. To which you reply, that you “will not under-
 “take to answer what Athanasius would have said, were
 “I to indite for him: but you deny that he has said it.”
 I showed before what Athanasius had said, in that very
 treatise^u, namely, that the Son is the *ὦν*, signifying *em-
 phatical existence*; which amounts to the same thing he
 had before said of the Father. And to show farther,
 what Athanasius *would have said*, I have quoted in the
 margin what he really *has said*, in a treatise^x annexed to
 the other, written at the same time, and being a second
 part to it, so that they may be justly esteemed one treatise.
 He there teaches us to *worship the Son only*, and
 he styles him *true God*. These things put together
 amount to full as much as was said of the Father^y in the
 passage cited by the Doctor; namely, τὸν ἀληθινὸν καὶ ὄν-
 τως ὄντα Θεὸν, signifying that he is the *true God*, and that
 he exists *emphatically*: and it is manifest, that Athana-
 sius intended no *opposition* to the Son, in what he said of
 the Father, but to *idols* only.

3. As to the third place which I found fault with, you
 would persuade us that the Doctor was very favourable
 in his *translation*, and took the least advantage possible.
 I blamed him for his rendering “far above all derivative
 “being,” intending thereby to include the Son; as if
 Athanasius meant that the Father was *far above the Son*:
 whereas if it be rendered, as it ought to be, *far above all
 created being*; it would then be plain that this passage
 relates not to the Son at all, but to *creatures* only. But
 the Doctor, you now say, might have translated it “far

^u Ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ὢν ἴσται καὶ οὐ σύνθετος, διὰ καὶ ὁ τούτου Λόγος ὢν ἴσται καὶ οὐ σύνθε-
 τος, ἀλλὰ εἰς καὶ μονογενῆς Θεὸς—ὡς ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἑαυτοῦ Λόγῳ καὶ αὐτῷ ἵναι Θεῷ
 τὴν σὺμψασαν διακυβερνᾷ καὶ καθίστησιν. Athan. contr. Gent. p. 40.

^x Πανταχοῦ τῆν τοῦ Λόγου διύλητα βλίσσαι, ἐκ ἴτι μὴ ἀπαυᾶται περι Θεοῦ,
 μένον δὲ τούτου προσηκονί, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ καλῶς τὸν πατέρα γινώσκει. Ibid. p. 87.

^y Ἐγνωρίσθη Θεὸς ἀληθινὸς, Θεοῦ Θεὸς Λόγος. P. 88.

^z Ἐπιεικείμια πάσης γνητῆς οὐσίας ὁ τοῦ Χριστοῦ πατήρ. Athanas. contr.
 Gent. p. 39.

“above all begotten being.” He might, indeed, have done so, and have thereby shown himself as ill a *critic*, as before a *partial* writer. For what if some copies read *γεννητῆς*, with double *ν*, instead of single; is any thing more common than mistakes of that kind? A little lower, in the same page, the editions had *γεννητῶν* instead of *γεννητῶν*². The sense must determine us in such cases, and a critical judgment of the principles laid down in the same treatise. One thing is certain, that however *γεννητῆς* be rendered, the Doctor is entirely false in ranking the Son under *γεννητῆς οὐσίας*, because Athanasius, in the very page, clearly exempts him from the *τὰ γενητὰ*, from *created beings*. You may, if you please, say, from the *begotten beings*, and justify it in the same way as you pretend to justify the other. The late learned editor of Athanasius easily perceived that the word should be *γεννητῆς* in one place, and *γεννητῶν* in the other: and so it stands corrected in his edition.

4. I found fault with the Doctor's translation of a place in Eusebius³, wherein he was doubly blameable: first, for tripping in his *logic*, by opposing *efficient* to *ministerial* cause, when the same may be both *efficient* and *ministerial*; and secondly, for faulting in a momentous article of *faith*, excluding God the Son from being *efficient Cause* of all things. Upon this you are in a vehement passion: it is “a cavil, most ridiculous, as well as unjust.” I am not displeased to hear you say so; because now I

² “Ἄλλος μὲν ἴσσι τῶν γενητῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς κτίσεως, ἴδιος δὲ καὶ μόνος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ὑπέρχη λόγος, &c. p. 39. ed. Bened. Comp. Orat. i. c. 56. p. 460, &c. which, if there be any doubt, will determine the meaning of the phrase ἄλλος τῶν γενητῶν, &c.

³ Οὐχ ὅτ' αὐτοῦ, ἴφη, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτῶν ἴν' ἡμᾶς ἀναπίμψῃ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἑλκων ποιητικὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀδιδουσίαν. Euseb. Eccl. Theol. lib. i. c. 20.

The Doctor's translation, or *paraphrase*.

“Whereas he might have expressed it thus, All things were made by him, as the *efficient Cause*; he does not so express it, but thus; All things were made by him as the *ministering Cause*; that so he might refer us to the *supreme power* and efficiency of the Father, as the *Maker* of all things.” *Script. Doct.* p. 89. alias 79.

may be confident that what I said was very right, just, and unanswerable. It is an observation the reader may have made, which will not be found to fail in any one instance, that whenever you throw out this kind of language, it is a certain mark of your distress, and of your not being able to make any solid reply. Let us see whether it does not hold true here, as well as in former instances. The Doctor's *translation*, you say, "does not exclude the Son from any proper efficiency, but from supreme self-authoritative efficiency." You may be a better judge than I, of what the Doctor believes, or maintains upon *second* thoughts: but I may presume to judge of a written translation. And, I say, it is plain from his opposing *efficient* (not *supreme* efficient) to *ministerial*, that, unless his wits were absent, he intended as much to say that the Son was not *efficient* Cause, as that the Father was not *ministerial*. He continues the same thought all along, concluding the Father to be the *Maker* (not *supreme* Maker only) *of all things*; therein showing his *supreme power and efficiency*. This is the obvious sense of the Doctor's version. But I am not sorry to find, that either the Doctor or you are coming off from it, and approaching nearer to Catholic principles: though it still looks a little suspicious, that you are every where scrupulous of styling the Son *Creator*, or *Maker*, and will never say that he created by his *own* power, but by the power of the Father.

5. I found fault with the Doctor's partial rendering a place of St. Chrysostom^b, and cutting the quotation short. You repeat (p. 462.) the same thing that the Doctor had pleaded for himself; and which I showed to be insufficient, in my Appendix. As to Basil, the Doctor had dealt as partially by him^c. Basil makes the Son's inherent power *equal* to the Father's; and in that sense says, that *as to power*, he is *equal* and *the same*. The Doctor means no more than that the Son's power

^b Defence, p. 261, 304, 347.

^c Page 304.

(however *unequal*) is derived from the Father, and in that sense they are *one in power*. Now, I say, Basil's idea and the Doctor's are very different: and the Doctor was sensible of it; dropping the word *equal* in his version of Basil. Basil should not have been quoted, as agreeing in the *thing*, when he agrees only in the *name*. You say, Basil could not mean that the Son's power is *coordinate*. But he certainly meant, and said, that the *Son's power is equal*: let the Doctor say this, and our dispute is ended. It is plain, that Basil's reason for the Father and Son being *one* is quite another than what the Doctor's is; and that the Doctor's notion of *one in power* is not Basil's notion^d. Why then was he quoted, and *mistranslated*, to confirm an interpretation entirely different from, nay, contrary to his own?

6. I found fault with the Doctor's *partial* rendering a noble passage of Irenæus^e. That Irenæus was not speaking of the Son, considered in a *representative capacity*, (which the Doctor, without any warrant^f, would express by ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ,) is manifest from Irenæus's referring to John i. 1. which describes the Son as *God*, before that fictitious representation the Doctor speaks of. Therefore the τὸ θεῖκόν καὶ ἐνδοξόν, in that place of Irenæus, is to be understood of the *antecedent* character which belonged to God the Son, before the world was; and not of any subsequent *representation*.

7. I took notice^g of a passage in Justin cited by the Doctor, and truly rendered, but set in a *false light* to deceive the reader; as if God the Son were not himself *Creator*, and *God* of Abraham, but one *personating* the Creator, and God of Abraham.

^d The Doctor, by *power*, seems to mean *moral* power; such as *moralists* define to be that by which a person is enabled to do a thing *lawfully* and with *moral* effect: but Basil means *natural* power. The Doctor interprets the text of Christ's *assuming to himself the power and authority of God*. *Reply*, p. 147. See also p. 136, 254.

^e See my *Defence*, vol. i. p. 305, 348.

^f See my *Sermons*, vol. ii. p. 94.

^g *Defence*, vol. i. p. 305.

I observed, that the Doctor could not have confuted the Jew, as Justin did, while he goes upon the supposition of the Son's *personating* the Father: a plain and evident token of the Doctor's misunderstanding and misrepresenting his author, when he makes a great part of the Dialogue nonsense, to bring it to his *hypothesis*. For how should Justin ever prove that there was a *divine Person*, distinct from *angels*, one that was really *God*, *God* of Abraham, &c. if the person pretended to be such, was only *personating* the God of Abraham, and was not himself God? Might not the Jew insist upon it, that it was an angel only, *personating* God? Why must it be another, who was really *God* of Abraham as well as the Father^b? The whole drift of Justin's argument is entirely defeated by such a fiction of *personating*: which makes it evident that Justin had no such notion, but the quite contrary. You do not pretend to say that the Doctor, upon his principles, could have confuted the Jew in the same way with Justin: only you say, "He never thought of confuting him upon mine." But it is manifest that he did confute him upon this principle, that there was a Person, besides the *Father*, *God* of Abraham, really so, in his own *Person*, because so described in Scripture: and therefore there exists a *divine Person*, besides the Father, *Son* of that Father; which was to be proved. Your weak pretences about the Son's *ministering*, and his not being *supreme God* because of that, have been often answered.

8. I took notice of some things of a slighter kind; but such as betrayed too much leaning to an *hypothesis*, and tended to convey false *ideas* to the common readerⁱ. And

^b For if he always spake in the name, &c. of the Father, no texts could be brought to prove him *Lord God*, because *Lord God* would express the *Person* and *authority* of the Father: but it is evident, that Justin, Irenæus, and others, do professedly cite passages of Scripture to prove the Son to be *Lord God*: that title or name then, no less expresses the Person and authority of the *Son*, than of the *Father*. *True Script. Doctr. Continued*, p. 146.

ⁱ Defence, vol. i. p. 306.

though the alteration in such cases may appear slight, like the change of a figure or a cypher in an account; yet is it very mischievous, and, if designedly donè, very dishonest.

9. I blamed the Doctor ^k for skipping over some very material words of Novatian. Do you deny the fact? No: but you insist upon it, that Novatian has a great deal which may look for your purpose. I allowed as much before: only, as the words were capable of a Catholic meaning, and must be determined to that meaning if some parts of the sentence are incapable of any other; I desired that the words *per substantiæ communionem*, by *communion of substance*, (which the Doctor had unfairly omitted,) might be brought in, to end the dispute.

As to Novatian's real principles, I have given you my thoughts above. He takes a particular way in the resolving the *unity*, very like to yours: yet he maintains the *eternity*¹ and *consubstantiality* of God the Son; wherein he differs as much from you, as he agrees with me. The *subordination* he expresses in very strong words, but yet such as do not amount to an *inferiority of nature*.

You intimate, that the author intended an inequality of *perfections*, and not merely an inequality in respect of *original*: which is more than Novatian's words prove; or, at least, than they appear to me to prove. I shall give

^k Defence, vol. i. p. 306.

¹ As to Novatian's supposing the Father *prior* to the Son, I accounted for it in my Defence, vol. i. p. 99, 100. I shall here add a few parallel expressions from other Catholic writers, who undoubtedly believed the *coeternity*.

Ex quo ostenditur semper fuisse vaporem istum virtutis Dei, nullum habentem initium nisi ipsam Deum: neque enim decebat aliud ei esse initium nisi ipsum unde est et nascitur. *Pamphil. Apolog.* p. 230.

Primitivus est dictus quia *præter Patrem*, cui etiam *coæternus* est divinitate, cum Spiritu Sancto, *ante ipsum* nullus est primus. *Zen. Veronens. Serm. in Exod. ix.*

Πῶς ὁὖν οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς;—ὁ μὲν δὲν ἔχων προαιτιοῦμενον ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ μὴ τὸν ἐξ ὧ ἔχου τὸ εἶναι αὐ διαστέμματος ὑπερέχοντα, ἀλλὰ τῇ αἰτίᾳ προαιτιοῦμενον. *Basil. contr. Eunom. lib. ii. p. 735.*

the passage in the margin ^m, which must decide this matter. Novatian there many ways expresses the same thing, that had the Father and Son been equal in respect of *original*, had they both been *underived* or *unbegotten*, there might then have been just pretence for making them *two Gods*. He adds, that had they been both *invisible* and *incomprehensible*, they had then been *two Gods*. To understand which, we are to remember that it was the general doctrine of the Fathers, that God the *Son* might be *visible* and appear in a *place*, *per assumptas species*, by *visible symbols*; but that God the Father might not, it being unsuitable to the character of the *first Person* to be *sent*, and consequently to appear in that manner. Upon this *hypothesis*, had the Son been *invisible* and *incomprehensible*, in such a sense as the Father was conceived to be, it would have been the same thing as if he had been *another Father*, or another *first Person*; and that would infer *two Gods*. He is not therefore speaking of any difference as to *essential perfections*, but only of the difference between a *first* and *second Person*; that one could not be *sent*, or become *visible* and confined to a *place* in any sense: the other might in such a sense as hath been mentioned, *viz.* by *symbols* of his presence. Otherwise Novatian admits the Son in his own nature to be *omnipresent*, as well as the Father, as is plain from his

^m Si enim natus non fuisset, innatus comparatus cum eo qui esset innatus, æquatione in utroque ostensa, duos faceret innatos, et ideo duos faceret Deos. Si non genitus esset, collatus cum eo (qui) genitus non esset, et æquales inventi, duos Deos merito reddidissent non geniti; atque ideo duos Christus reddidisset Deos. Si sine origine esset, ut Pater, inventus, et ipse principium omnium, ut Pater, duo faciens principia, duos ostendisset nobis consequenter et Deos. Aut si et ipse Filius non esset, sed Pater generans de se alterum Filium, merito collatus cum Patre, et tantus denotatus, duos Patres effecisset, et ideo duos approbasset etiam Deos. Si invisibilis fuisset cum invisibili collatus, par expressus, duos invisibiles ostendisset, et ideo duos comprobasset et Deos. Si incomprehensibilis, si et cætera quæcunque sunt Patris; merito dicimus, duorum Deorum quam isti confingunt controversiam suscitasset. Nunc autem quicquid est, non ex se est, quia nec innatus est. Novat. c. 31.

wordsⁿ. See this point more fully cleared in Bishop Bull^o. The whole course and tenor of Novatian's discourse tends only to this, that there is but one *Head*, viz. the *Father*, to whom the Son himself, his *substance*, his *power*, and perfections are referred, and in whom they centre; that there is a difference of *order* because of that headship; and that, conformably thereto, the Son in all things acts *subordinately*, ministers to the Father, and executes inferior offices under him, as a son to a father, not as a *servant* to his *lord*. This is all that Novatian's words strictly amount to: and though he speaks of the *subjection* of the Son, it does not necessarily mean any thing more than that voluntary *economy* which God the Son underwent, and which would not have been proper for the Father himself to have submitted to, because not suitable to the *order* of the Persons.

One passage I must here give, because we differ chiefly about what that passage contains. The literal version runs thus^p:

“ Whose Godhead is so delivered, as not to appear to
 “ make two Gods, either by a *disagreement* or *inequality*
 “ of Godhead. For all things being by the Father made

ⁿ Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo adest ubique invocatus? Cum hæc hominis natura non sit sed Dei, ut adesse omni loco possit. *Novat.* cap. 15. See True Script. Doctr. Continued, p. 170.

^o Bull. D. F. sect. iv. cap. 3.

^p Cujus sic divinitas traditur, ut non aut *dissonantia*, aut *inequalitate* divinitatis, duos Deos reddidisse videatur. Subjectis enim ei, quasi Filio, omnibus rebus a Patre, dum ipse cum his quæ illi subjecta sunt, Patri suo subjicitur, Patris quidem sui Filius probatur, cæterorum autem et Dominus et Deus esse reperitur. Ex quo dum huic qui est Deus, omnia substracta (*leg. substracta*) traduntur, et cuncta sibi subjecta Filius accepta refert Patri, totam divinitatis auctoritatem rursus Patri remittit; unus Deus ostenditur verus et æternus Pater, a quo solo hæc *vis divinitatis emissa*, etiam in Filium tradita et directa, rursum *per substantiæ communionem* ad Patrem revolvitur. Deus quidem ostenditur Filius cui divinitas tradita et porrecta conspicitur; et tamen nihilominus unus Deus Pater probatur; dum *gradatim* reciproco meatu illa majestas atque divinitas ad Patrem, qui dederat eam, rursum ab illo ipso Filio missa révertitur, et retorquetur. *Novat.* cap. 31.

“ subject to him, as to a Son, while he himself, with
 “ those things which are made subject to him, is subject
 “ to his Father: he is shown indeed to be the Son of his
 “ Father; but is found to be Lord and God of all things
 “ else. And since all things are thus subjected to him
 “ (*the Son*) who is God, and since he owes their being
 “ made subject under him to the Father, he again refers
 “ back to the Father all the authority of the Godhead:
 “ and so the Father is shown to be the one true and
 “ eternal God, from whom alone this efflux of the God-
 “ head being sent out and communicated to the Son, re-
 “ volves again to the Father by *communion of substance*.
 “ The Son is indeed shown to be God, as the Godhead is
 “ communicated and delivered to him: but at the same
 “ time the Father is nevertheless *the one God*, while that
 “ very Majesty and Godhead is, by a reciprocal course,
 “ returned, and referred up again from the Son, to the
 “ Father that gave it.”

This is, I think, a fair and true rendering of Novatian: only I am now to justify such parts of it as you will be apt to except against. Instead of *inequality*, you choose the reverse, viz. *equality*; upon some slender suspicions of your own against the faith of the copies. *Conjectural* emendations ought never to be admitted, but upon the greatest necessity. For it often happens that men please themselves awhile with reasons that look plausible; but when the thing comes to be well considered, reasons as plausible, or more so, may appear on the other side. It has been urged, in this very case, by a learned gentleman, that what you would make a reason for *non æqualitate*, is sufficiently answered by the words, *non dissonantia divinitatis*. For had the Father and Son been *equally unoriginate*, there would have been *dissonantia*, according to Novatian^r; a disagreement of two independent Deities,

[¶] True Scripture Doctrine Continued, p. 172.

^r Dum non aliunde est quam ex Patre, Patri suo originem suam debens, *discordiam divinitatis* de numero duorum Deorum facere non potuit. *Novat.* cap. 31.

without any *Sonship*, which makes the *union*^s. Hence then Novatian excludes *equality* of original, by the words *non dissonantia*; but at the same time teaches an *equality* of nature, or *Godhead*, that he might avoid the opposite extreme. And this is but suitable to the very tenor of his discourse, there and elsewhere. For how can there be a *communication* of substance and Godhead, without the supposition of *equality* of nature and Godhead? A little before, he had said, the *Word* was *divine substance*^t: and he here speaks of the Godhead being communicated, or imparted to the Son, and revolving again to the Father as the Head or Fountain. Besides that, Novatian is known to make the Son as truly of the *same nature* with the Father, as any *man* is of the same *human* nature with his Father^u. What is this but, in other words, declaring equality of *nature* or *Godhead*? There is therefore no reason for altering Novatian's text^x: however positively you may express yourself on that head.

^s Si ambo vocarentur *Patres*, essent profecto *natura dissimiles*: unusquisque enim ex semetipso constaret, et communem substantiam cum altero non haberet; nec *Deitas una* esset, quibus *una natura* non esset. *Fulgent. Resp. contr. Arian.* p. 52.

Duos autem Deos dicere non possumus, nec debemus: non quod Filius Dei Deus non sit, imo verus Deus de Deo vero; sed quia *non aliunde* quam de ipso uno Patre Dei Filium novimus, proinde unum Deum dicimus.—Si verus Deus est, et de Patre non est, duo sunt, habentes singuli et voluntates proprias, et imperia diversa. *Greg. Nazianz. Op.* vol. i. p. 728. *Ambros. Op.* vol. ii. p. 347.

Quicquid *extra* eum est, cum contumelia ei honoratæ virtutis *æquabitur*. Si enim aliquid quod *non ex ipso est*, reperiri potest *simile* ei, et *virtutis ejusdem*; amisit *privilegium Dei* sub consortio *coæqualis*: jamque non erit *Deus unus* a quo indifferens sit *Deus alius*. At vero non habet contumeliam *proprietas* æqualitas, quia *suum* est quod sui simile est; et *ex se* est quod sibi ad similitudinem comparatur; nec *extra se* est, quod quæ sua sunt potest: et profectus *dignitatis* est genuisse potestatem, nec alienasse naturam. *Hilary. de Trin.* p. 934.

^t *Substantia* scilicet illa *divina*, cujus nomen est *Verbum*. *Novat.* c. 31.

^u Ut enim præscripsit ipsa natura hominem credendum qui ex homine sit: ita eadem natura præscribit et Deum credendum esse qui ex Deo sit. *Novat.* cap. 11.

^x I may here cite a passage of Hilary, which may serve as a just comment

As to the words *accepta refert Patri*, they really mean no more than that he received them from the Father, or acknowledged them to be received : which comes not up to the Doctor's expression, (which I found fault with,) "in acknowledgment returned : " besides that the Doctor was not there translating *accepta refert*, but *reciproco meatu revertitur*, &c.

The words *vis divinitatis*, I render *efflux of the Godhead*; which you render *divine power*. I could not think of a better expression than what I made use of. That I have not missed the sense I persuade myself, because Novatian is speaking of *communion of substance* in the same sentence, and had styled the Word *divine substance* a little before : and he is here plainly speaking of the divine substance being *porrecta* and *tradita*, communicated from Father to Son, and recurring to the Father as Head. If *vis* answers to the Greek *δύναμις*, as I conceive it here does, it means the same as the *living* and *substantial* power of God, the same that we express by *efflux*, or *emanation*. The thought of Novatian seems to be the same with that of Tertullian^y, whom he loved to imitate in many things. To make it still plainer that I interpret him rightly, please to observe the words, *Deus quidem ostenditur Filius, cui divinitas tradita et porrecta conspicitur*. Here he gives the reason why the Son is *God* : it is because the Godhead extends to him, or is communicated to him. Compare this with what the author says in another place^z;

upon this of Novatian ; being extremely like it, and carrying the same thought, probably, in it.

Insunt sibi invicem, dum non est nisi ex Patre nativitas, dum in Deum alterum naturæ vel exterioris, vel dissimilis non subsistit, dum Deus ex Deo manens non est aliunde quod Deus est. Hilari. p. 937.

Here are the same reasons given why Father and Son are not *two Gods* : and Hilary's expression of *non naturæ exterioris*, answers to Novatian's of *non dissonantia* ; as also his *non dissimilis* to the other's *non inæqualitate*.

^y *Cum radius ex sole porrigitur, portio ex summa ; sed sol erit in radio, quia solis est radius, nec separatur substantia, sed extenditur. Tertul. Apol. cap. 21.*

Prolatum Filium a Patre, sed non separatam. Contr. Prax. cap. 8.

^z *Qui idcirco unum potest dici, dum ex ipso est, et dum Filius ejus est, et*

and you will see how consistent and uniform this writer is in his doctrine, that it is the Son's *proceeding* from the Father, or his partaking of the *divine substance*, that makes him *God*. So little reason have you to imagine that the words, *per substantiæ communionem*, crept into the text out of the margin. Whether the Doctor or I have pursued a wrong scent in explaining Novatian, I now leave to the reader to judge.

10. I had remarked ^a upon the Doctor's rendering a passage of Athanasius^b, more to serve his *hypothesis*, than pursuant to the sense of the author. The reader must be left to judge for himself, after comparing what hath or may be said on both sides. The author, as I take it, is there blaming the Sabellians for imagining the Son to be the *only God*, in such a sense as to make *one Person only* (under *three names*, of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost) in the Godhead, instead of three real Persons. Accordingly, the same author censures them (p. 39^c) for making the Son *μόνος*, or the *alone* divine Person, in contradiction to John viii. 16. "I am not alone, because the Father is "with me." Which text he produces to prove, that Father and Son were *two Persons*, and that the Son was not *μόνος* in such a sense, as to infer a *confusion* of Persons. This therefore being all that the author intended against the Sabellians, it seems to me plain, that the construction I before gave of *ὡς ἑκεῖνοι φαῖεν*, was right, and the Doctor's wrong. That the author could not deny the Son to be the *only God* in any other sense, is plain from

dum ex ipso nascitur, et dum ex ipso processisse reperitur, per quod et Deus est. *Novat. cap. 23.*

Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo dicit, *Ego ex Deo prodii et veni!* cum constet hominem a Deo factum esse, non ex Deo processisse—Deus ergo processit ex Deo, dum qui processit sermo, *Deus est qui processit ex Deo. Novat. cap. 23.*

^a Defence, vol. i. p. 308.

^b Ὁ σαρκωδὴς Κύριος καὶ Θεὸς ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ πατὴρ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ὡς ἑκείνου φαῖεν, ὁ μόνος Θεός. *Athan. contr. Greg. Sabell. p. 47.*

^c Πῶς οὐκ ἀποσασία σαφῆς ἀρτιῶσαι τὰ τρία, καὶ μόνον εἶναι λίγην τὸν φάσκοντα οὐκ εἶμι μόνος, ὅτι ὁ πῶμψος με πατὴρ μετ' ἐμῷ ἐστίν.—Ἰδὲ γὰρ δύο πρόσωπα. *Athan. tom. ii. p. 39.*

his making Father and Son *one perfect substance*^d: and his asserting *one Godhead* of both^e. In another place^f, he censures the Sabellians for making the Son the *one and only God*: but how? So as to deny the *distinct Personality*, and no otherwise. And in the very place we are now upon, all that the writer insists upon is, that the Father and Son are distinct Persons, not one Person: in which sense the author does not admit the Son to be *ὁ μόνος Θεός*. But that it is always *Sabellian* to apply the phrase to the Son singly, or to both together, is not said, neither can you prove it. The force of your argument lies only in the article *ὁ*: for as to *μόνος Θεός*, *only God*, that it is often applied to the Son, cannot be denied^g: and this consideration might be sufficient to make the author put in the restriction of *ὡς ἐκεῖνοι φαῖεν*, to the latter branch of the sentence, which he did not to the former, where it is *ὁ Πατήρ*. For there is a sense wherein the Son is *ὁ μόνος Θεός*, but he is not *ὁ Πατήρ* in any sense: which shows the reason why the author expressed himself as he did.

II. I took notice^h of another passage directly contrary to the Doctor's purpose, though cited by him. For the Doctor's design was to make the Father the *only God* exclusive of the Son: while that passage makes him the only God *including* the Son; directly the reverse. Had

^d Μία δι ὅσα οὐσία τριμία. p. 41.

^e Μία Διότης πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ. p. 42.

^f Οἱ τῆν τριάδα μονάδα ποιούντες νοθεύειν καὶ τὴν ἀποστολὴν, ὡσαύτῃ τὴν γέννησιν, ἐπιχειροῦσιν εἶπω γὰρ ὅσα φασὶ τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν υἱόν, ἁγιασμὸν ἀνθρώπου ἐργάζεσθαι, πατήρ, αὐτὸν τὸν ἴσα καὶ μόνον Θεόν, οὕτως ἀποτάλλει τὸν ἁδερματιν, οὐ Θεὸν παρὰ Θεοῦ. p. 47.

^g Μόνον τῶν πάντων ἀνθρώπων Θεῶν. Clem. Alexand. p. 84.

Τῶν συμπάντων Θεῶν ἴσα μόνον—υἱὸν ἐν πατρὶ. p. 142.

Christus Jesus solus esset Deus. Aristid. apud Petav. Præf. ad 2 tom.

Theol.

Τῷ Θεῷ λόγος μόνος Θεὸς ἀληθής—μόνος Θεὸς ὡς ὁ πατήρ. Athan. in Psal. p. 83. nov. collect.

Τὸν μόνον εἰρηθεῖν Θεόν, &c. Greg. Naz. Orat. xxxvi. p. 586.

Ἐμὶ δὲ μόνον Θεὸν εἰδέναι, &c. Euseb. in Psal. p. 503.

^h Defence, vol. i. p. 308.

the Doctor's intention been. only to prove that the Father is styled the *only God*, the method had been fair: but as his professed design was to *exclude* the Son from the *one Godhead*; his manner of citing authors for it, who in these very passages were directly against it, is an intolerable abuse upon the readers.

12. The like may be said of another passage taken notice of in my Defenceⁱ. You seem to forget the Doctor's note on prop. 9. where he precautions his reader to understand it in such a sense as to exclude the Son from *necessary existence*, (so you interpret *self-existent*.) Now can any thing be more unfair, or fraudulent, than to cite authors as styling the Father the *only God*, to countenance a proposition in such a sense as those authors detested and abhorred? All the apologies you can possibly invent can never make such a practice righteous, or honest.

13. I remarked^k upon a passage cited out of Nazianzen; where the Doctor, by a note, had most shamefully stifled and perverted the author's meaning. You say not one word of the Doctor's note, the only thing I found fault with: and which indeed can admit of no colourable excuse, except it were done through carelessness, taking a passage at *second hand*, and commenting upon it, without ever looking into the author to see what went before or after.

14. As to the passage of Justin Martyr, enough hath been said above.

15. I remarked^l upon another note of the Doctor's, on a passage in Irenæus, and gave several reasons to show the unfairness and falseness of it. You have here nothing to say in his defence: so I pass on.

16. I remarked upon another passage^m, where the

ⁱ Vol. i. p. 308.

^k Defence, vol. i. p. 309.

^l Ibid. p. 310.

^m Ὁ γινητός καὶ ἀπελάσμιμος ἄσθρωνος κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ ἀγνήτου γίνονται Θεῶ τῷ μὴ πατρὸς εὐδοκῶντες, καὶ κελιόντες, τῷ δὲ οἰοῦ πρῶσσιτος καὶ

Doctor had read the text of Irenæus wrong; which you civilly acknowledge, and thank me for the notice. But there are still two questions betwixt us relating to that place. First, whether it should be ἀγέννητος or ἀγένητος, and next, whether the Son be included by Irenæus, in that place, in the ἀγένητος Θεός, supposing that to be the reading. It was needless for you to heap passages upon me to prove, that none but the *Father* should be styled ἀγέννητος, *unbegotten*, or *unoriginate*; which I readily allow. All the question is about ἀγένητος, *uncreated, unmade, eternal, or necessarily existing*. The reasons why I think ἀγένητε to be the reading in Irenæus are these:

I. The translator's rendering it by *infecti*: which however I acknowledge to be of less weight, because he is sometimes mistaken in such cases; putting *ingenitus* for *infectus*, and perhaps *infectus* for *ingenitus*, or *innatus*.

II. A much stronger reason is, that through that whole chapter ἀγένητος is opposed to things *made*, things of transient and *precarious* existence. The opposition runs between the things *made*, and the *Maker* of themⁿ:

III. Another very weighty reason is drawn from the opposition between γενητός ἄνθρωπος, and ἀγενήτου Θεοῦ: that the reading is γενητός, not with double ν, is evident from the whole chapter; where the opposition runs between man *made*^o, and God his *Maker*. And there is not the least hint of man considered as *begotten*, or as *Son of God*; as you would understand it, referring to Luke iii. 38. These reasons convince me, that the true reading of the words is ὁ γενητός ἄνθρωπος, and τοῦ ἀγενήτε Θεοῦ.

δημιουργήτος, τῷ δὲ πνεύματος τρίτοντος καὶ αὔξαντος. *Iren. lib. iv. cap. 38. p. 285.*

ⁿ Τῷ μὲν Θεῷ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντι, καὶ ἀγενήτη ὑπάρχοντι—τὰ δὲ γενοῦσα καὶ δι' αὐτὰ γενέσθαι ἀρχὴν ἰδίαν ἴσχυι, κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ ὑπεριστάσαι δι' αὐτὰ τῷ πεποιητότος, ἢ γὰρ ἠδύνατο ἀγένητα εἶναι τὰ πρὸς γεννημένα. *Iren. p. 283.*

Volunt similes esse factori Deo, et nullam esse differentiam infecti Dei et nunc facti hominis. p. 285.

^o Ἐκείνος ἄρτι γενοῦς—πρὸς γενοῦσα ἄνθρωπον, ὅτι μὴ ἀγενήτος ἦν. p. 284.

ⁿ Ἐδὴ δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον πρῶτον γενέσθαι, καὶ γενόμενον αὔξῃσαι, &c. p. 285.

The next question is, whether the Son be here included under ἀγενήτου Θεοῦ. I gave several reasons why all the three Persons are included; which reasons may be seen in my Defence. I shall add two more: one, that as the opposition runs between the thing *made* and the *maker*; so it is observable that God the Son frequently is *factor*, ποιητής, *Maker*, according to Irenæus; which shows, that he is included in the ἀγένητος Θεός. And again, it is Irenæus's doctrine, that man's being made after the *image of God* is to be understood of his being made in the image of God the *Word*: which still farther confirms my construction of that passage; and I now submit it to the judgment of the learned reader. As to my translating εὐδοκοῦντος by *designing*, I have accounted for it above.

17. As to the passage in Basil, which the Doctor had not done justice to, I desire the reader to see my Defence⁹. That Basil allows the Father to be a natural *cause* of the Son is very true; not a *cause* in the Doctor's sense: nor do Basil's words convey any such notion to the reader, as the Doctor's word, *effects*, does. And therefore the Doctor cannot be acquitted of a misrepresentation. I leave it to any reader, who will compare my account of Basil with the Doctor's version, to judge whether the *ideas* here and there be not very widely different. And what occasion was there for the Doctor's saying *effects*, instead of *things issuing from them*, but to favour an *hypothesis*, and to hold out a false light to the readers? As to what you say of ἀξίωμα, *dignity*, I have answered it above. Your reason for προτερύχθαι signifying more than *priority of order*, is very peculiar, *viz.* because

Ρ Ὁ Λόγος, οὐ κατ' εἰκόνα δ' ἀνθρώπου ἐγενόμην.

Ἵ Ὁ Λόγος—τὴν εἰκόνα ἰδιῶς ἀληθῶς, αὐτὸς τῦτο γινόμενος ἦν εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ.
Iren. lib. v. cap. 16. p. 313.

Quia jam adhærebat illi Filius, *secunda* persona, sermo ipsius, et *tertia*, Spiritus in sermone, ideo pluraliter pronuntiavit, *faciamus*, et *nostram*. Tertull. adv. Prax. cap. 12.

Unum enim sunt, quorum imaginis et similitudinis unum est homo factus exemplum. Hilar. de Trin. lib. v. cap. 8.

⁹ Vol. i. p. 312.

Basil in another place has both *τάξει* and *ἀξιώματι* : therefore when he makes mention of *order* only, (as in the word *προτετάχθαι*,) he meant more than *order*. You might perceive, by the reason given in both places, that *προτετάχθαι* applied to the Father, and *τάξει δεύτερος* applied to the Son, answer exactly to each other, and literally signify *order*, and nothing else^r. And had you attended to Basil's reasoning, where he allows *ἀξιώματι* as well as *τάξει*, you would have perceived that it was rather *ad hominem*, or for argument sake, than any thing else. For admitting that the Son or Holy Ghost were *ἀξιώματι*, as well as *τάξει*, *second* and *third*, (as Eunomius pretended,) yet he shows that no certain consequence can be drawn from thence to *inferiority* of *nature*. Or however, at the most, all you can make of it is, that the Father being *supreme* in *office*, as well as in *order*, was on that account *ἀξιώματι* *πρώτος*, first in dignity : as one angel (which is Basil's illustration) is superior to another in *rank*, or *office*, though in *nature* equal. *Basil.* lib. iii. p. 79.

19. The last passage I found fault with, you are content to throw off under the name of a *quibble*; because you could not account for the Doctor's foul play in mistranslating it, and warping it to his own *hypothesis*. Why was not the word *δημιουργήματα* rendered *creatures*, as it ought to have been? And why did the Doctor put *all things*, when speaking of things produced by the Father, and *things* only in respect of the Son's producing, when he had no ground for the distinction in Basil?

But enough of this. The Doctor's partiality in many of his quotations has been sufficiently manifested. And though you are pleased to pass the matter off with as good a face as you can, (and it is your wisest way so to do,) yet you will hardly find many readers of opinion with you, that these kind of slips, in a man of character, are of slight moment. Had Bishop Bull been ever guilty of things of this kind, I well know what use would have

^r See another passage of Basil above, p. 454.

been made of it. Mr. Whiston^a charged him with once *unfairly* translating a passage of Origen; where yet the Bishop was right, and Mr. Whiston certainly wrong, as I have proved in my Defence^t: and this one pretended instance of *unfairness* is brought up again, and aggravated, by another gentleman^u, with some kind of insult. A few slips of this nature, where a charge is really just, are not easily pardoned in any writers of the higher class: betraying either want of *learning*, or want of *care*, or, what is worst of all, want of *honesty*.

You endeavour to throw off the force of the next five or six pages of my Defence, (which you can never fairly answer,) by charging something *disingenuous*, as you pretend, upon me: "as if all the Doctor's citations from the "Fathers in general were *concessions only from writers, who were adversaries in the whole.*" But I made a distinction^x, as the Doctor himself had done^y, between Ante-Nicene and Post-Nicene writers. As to the latter, he laid claim to nothing but *concessions*: and as to the former, he did indeed claim more in respect of *some of them*, though I think without reason. You are still sanguine enough to say, that "much the greater part of the authors "he cites, all," you think, "of the three first centuries, "agree with him in the full sense of all his propositions." How wild, and indeed romantic, this imagination of yours is, hath been sufficiently shown all the way; first, in my Defence, and again in these papers: particularly in the *eleven* instances above mentioned, wherein the Doctor runs counter to all antiquity. As to *supreme dominion*, which you lay so much stress on; it is demonstration that the Fathers held no *supremacy* but what was thought consistent with *equality of nature*, and with the unity of the same *Godhead* common to Father and Son. If this

^a Primitive Christianity Revived, vol. iv. p. 154.

^t Vol. i. p. 141, &c.

^u Primitive Christianity Revived. Append. ii. p. 44.

^x Defence, vol. i. p. 301.

^y Preface to Script. Doctr. p. 16. 1st ed. Reply, p. 5, 6.

be your *supremacy*, all is right and well. But it is ridiculous in you to quote *ancients* for the supremacy, and at the same time to throw out all the considerations which should come in to qualify, fix, and determine the notion of *supremacy* among the ancients. Are not all the other tenets, wherein the *ancients* evidently contradict the Doctor's whole scheme, so many *demonstrations* that they never understood *supremacy* in any such sense as he does? What is the Doctor or you doing, but playing *one* or *two* principles of the *ancients*, of uncertain meaning in themselves, against twenty *clear, plain, undoubted* principles? which if you were able to do with success, it would not be proving that the *Fathers* were on your side, but that they were fools and mad, and are of no account on either side of the controversy. But I hope the reader will easily see through the mystery of the whole deceit which you are putting upon him, (and perhaps upon yourselves at the same time,) which is only this: the straining and perverting the true and Catholic notion of *supremacy* (held in all ages of the Church, before and after the Nicene Council) to an *Arian* and *heretical* sense; that so you may *obliquely* (what you care not to do *directly*) reduce the Son and Holy Ghost to the rank of *creatures*. Your constant plea is, the *supremacy*, the *supremacy*: the *ancients*, it seems, were for supremacy, *amidst all their variety of metaphysical speculations*: so that every other tenet, whereby the *ancients* plainly overturn your whole scheme, must be thrown off as a *metaphysical speculation*; and nothing but *supremacy* must be sounded in our ears. Yet, after all, you can make nothing of this pretended *supremacy* till you turn it into a *metaphysical speculation* upon *self-existence*, and that again into *necessary existence*; then adding sundry other *metaphysical speculations*, to degrade and sink God the Son into *precarious* existence. This was not the way of the *ancients*; nor was this the use they ever made, or intended to make of the *supremacy*: if they had, you would have allowed them, I suppose, in this single instance, to run into *metaphysical*

speculations. One thing is evident, *amidst all their variety of metaphysical speculations*, in which you think they abounded more than you, that what *metaphysics* they had in their *great abundance*, they employed them all in *defence* of our Lord's *divinity*; while you, on the contrary, employ the *little* you have, in *direct opposition* to it. Certainly, the *ancients*, being so much given to *metaphysics*, could have been *metaphysical* on your side of the question, as well as you are now: but either they were wise enough to distinguish *false* metaphysics from *true*; or, they had *not so learned Christ*. But to return.

I intimated^z how a Romanist might, in Dr. Clarke's way, fill pages with quotations wide of the purpose, and call them *concessions*, and thereby deceive weak readers. Here you have nothing to reply, but that I do the Doctor wrong in applying this to *all his citations*. I applied it not to *all*; but to as many (be they *more or fewer*) as have been thus deceitfully made use of by the Doctor. By his own account it must be understood of as many Post-Nicene Catholics, as he quotes in that manner: and how many Ante-Nicenes it ought to be understood of, may appear from what I have shown of their being in very opposite sentiments to his, in the most material points of our dispute. But allowing your plea, is it any justification of the Doctor's method of quoting? I charge him with *deceit*: and you, in his *defence*, represent him as practising it not so *much*, or so *often*, as I might imagine. But why did he practise it at all?

You next endeavour to retort something upon me like to the Romanists, though entirely wide and foreign, and brought in most strangely. They have recourse, you say, to *tradition*: you should have said to *oral* tradition, which is quite another thing from *written* tradition. And what harm is there in having recourse to the *written* tradition of Fathers for the sense of Scripture, more than in having recourse to a Dictionary for the sense of words; or to the

^z Defence, vol. i. p. 316, 317.

practice of *courts*, resolutions of Judges, or books of Reports, for the sense of *laws*? All helps, for the understanding of Scripture, ought to be made use of: and recourse to the *Fathers* is one, and a very considerable one. The Romanists, you add, call their own doctrine Catholic: yes, and without reason. The Fathers, long before *Popery*, called their doctrine Catholic, and with good reason. What then? The Romanists also call that *heresy*, which is really none: may we not therefore call that *heresy*, which really is such, and which has been ever so accounted in all ages of the Church? What you have farther is repetition: except your speculations on Rev. i. 8. which have been mostly considered above^a. There remain only a few incidental matters to be here taken notice of, very briefly. I had referred to four places^b in Clemens, where he either directly or indirectly makes the Son παντοκράτωρ, *Almighty*. Of *three* of them no reasonable doubt can be made: and *three* are sufficient. The *fourth* only says, that the nature of the Son is προσεχιστάτη, most intimately united to the *alone Almighty*; which, according to Clemens's notion of their *union*, is supposing both *Almighty*. But this I need not insist upon, having *three* plain testimonies besides; two of which have been vindicated above. You cite another passage^c of Clemens, and you translate it most shamefully, to serve your *hypothesis*, in these words; "He is irresistible as being Lord of all; most certainly irresistible, because ministering to the will of the good and supreme Father over all." You have here exceeded Mr. Whiston by far; whose translation is very modest and reasonable in comparison. The literal and just rendering is thus. "Neither could he be obstructed by any other, being *Lord of all*, and chiefly (or *most*

^a Page 227.

^b Τοῦ παντοκράτορος καὶ πατρικοῦ Λόγου. p. 148. Τὸν παντοκράτορα Θεὸν Λόγον, p. 277. Δύναμις παγκρατοῦς—Σίλημα παντοκρατορικόν. p. 646. Ἡ οὐδὲ φύσις ἢ τῆ μόνῃ παντοκράτορι προσεχιστάτη. p. 831.

^c Οὐδ' ἂν ἰστέον κολυδίη σοῦ ἂν ὁ πάντων κύριος, καὶ μάλιστα ἕνεσθητῶι τῆ σοῦ ἁγαθοῦ καὶ παντοκράτορος θελήματι πατρὸς. p. 832.

“*perfectly*) ministering to the will of the good and Almighty Father.” Clemens’s thought is this; that as to *creatures*, they cannot obstruct him, since he is *Lord over them*: and as to the *Father*, he will not, inasmuch as all that the Son does is *perfectly agreeable* to his will^d. I need not say any thing here farther in relation to Justin or Eusebius; having given my thoughts of both in the preceding sheets.

QUERY XXVIII.

Whether it be at all probable, that the primitive Church should mistake in so material a point as this is; or that the whole stream of Christian writers should mistake in telling us what the sense of the Church was: and whether such a cloud of witnesses can be set aside without weakening the only proof we have of the Canon of the Scripture, and the integrity of the sacred text?

THE Modest Pleader thinks it not material to inquire, “whether the ancient writers of the Church were better skilled in *metaphysical* speculations, than we at this day?” This kind of talk is what he affects, and pleases himself in; though he has nothing but *metaphysics* to depend on, as I have often observed: and I will venture to assure him, that the old and well tried *metaphysics* of the ancients are such as he will find much superior to his own. *Metaphysics* were indeed first brought in by *heretics*, and were much encouraged by Arius, Eunomius, and the whole sect of Arians: but the Fathers of the Church, having better sense than they, were able to baffle them at their own weapons. The Modest Pleader, I think, (if there be not an interpolation by another hand,) still goes on, and tells me “how unanimously, how uniformly the ancients asserted a real supremacy of the Father’s dominion.” And yet the certain truth is, that he has no

^d See Bull. D. F. sect. ii. cap. 6. Nourrii Apparatus. vol. i. p. 954. Lord Nottingham’s Answer to Whiston, p. 5.

Ante-Nicene or Post-Nicene Catholic writer that ever came up to his notion of it. Where does he find them saying, that the Father *alone* is supreme in dominion? He may find many expressly contradicting it; as many as make Father and Son *one God*, or proclaim them *undivided* in dominion, or say that they are *unius Potestatis, unius Divinitatis, of one Power and Godhead*, and the like: many testimonies whereof have been given in the course of these papers. All he can prove is a *supremacy* of the Father, a *supremacy* in respect of *order* or *office*, nothing more. But his way is to take *old* expressions, and to affix *new* ideas to them, under pretence that those old writers knew not how to speak accurately. What they called *cause*, is with him no *cause*; what they called *acts*, are no *acts*; what they called *generation*, is no *generation*; and their *subordination* (like mine) is a *coordination*: and so, I presume, their *supremacy* is no *supremacy*, but must be stretched farther upon the foot of the *new metaphysics*. This is the whole of the case; new *ideas* to old terms, that a man may seem to concur with the *ancients*, while he is *really* contradicting them in the grossest manner, and introducing a *novel* faith. I know not how far such a method may serve with the populace: wise men will see through it, and give it its due name; viz. either great *ignorance* of antiquity, or great *partiality*.

But he goes on: "whole streams of writers in matters of controversy, representing other men's opinions otherwise than in the words of the persons themselves, are no manner of evidence." One would wonder what this wise paragraph meant, or what it was to the purpose. Have we not the sense of the Church from Churchmen themselves? But he wanted to introduce an ill-natured gird upon some body. He is terribly afraid lest any man should judge of Dr. Clarke's writings from his *adversary's* accounts. I hope the reader will bear this caution in mind, as often as he reads Dr. Clarke's account of the Ante-Nicene or Post-Nicene writers, to whom he is an utter *adversary*; though a *professed* one to the latter only. As

to what he says about *weakening the Canon of Scripture*, I refer to my Defence^e; where that matter is fairly and fully stated.

I now come to you. You repeat the pretence of *supremacy*: which requires no farther answer but this; that you mistake the *alone unoriginateness* for *alone dominion*. The Father is not the *alone Governor*: but he *alone* hath his authority and dominion *from none*.

QUERY XXIX.

Whether private reasoning, in a matter above our comprehension, be a safer rule to go by, than the general sense and judgment of the primitive Church in the first 300 years: or, supposing it doubtful what the sense of the Church was within that time, whether what was determined by a Council of 300 Bishops soon after, with the greatest care and deliberation, and has satisfied men of the greatest sense, piety, and learning, all over the Christian world, for 1400 years since, may not satisfy wise and good men now?

I HERE meet with nothing but what has been abundantly answered or obviated. Your former pretences were;

1. That the Nicene Council knew nothing of *individual consubstantiality*.
2. That they understood *consubstantial* in a *figurative* sense.
3. That if they intended any *real* consubstantiality, it was *specific* only.
4. That several Councils, more *numerous* than that of Nice, determined against the *ὁμοούσιον*.

All these *pleas* were particularly *examined* and *confuted* in my Defence: and you have been content to drop them, as *indefensible*, without any reinforcement.

You have nothing farther but a few trifling quibbles

^e Vol. i. p. 324, &c.

about *individual*, and *identical*, and *supreme* authority: which may now pass with the readers for words of course; such as you have accustomed yourself to repeat, when you have no mind to be silent. I must desire the reader to turn to my Defence of this Query, and to compare it with your Reply; if he finds any thing in what you have said, that seems to require any consideration.

QUERY XXX.

Whether, supposing the case doubtful, it be not a wise man's part to take the safer side; rather to think too highly, than too meanly of our blessed Saviour; rather to pay a modest deference to the judgment of the ancient and modern Church, than to lean to one's own understanding?

I MUST take notice of what the Modest Pleader here pretends, that "this Query may be retorted with "irresistible strength." After he has thus prepared his reader, let us hear what his words come to. It is thus, "whether it be not a wise man's part, rather to think too highly, than too meanly of God the Father; and to be tender of his *incommunicable* honour." To which I answer, that God the Father has determined this question already, by his *commands* laid upon us to *honour* his Son even as *himself*; and by his giving no particular cautions against honouring him *too much*. If we err on this part, in honouring the Son *too highly*, (without the least thought of dishonouring the Father,) we err on the *right side*, as erring on the side of the *precept*; whereas the other is erring against the *precept*. This I urged before; and neither the Modest Pleader nor yourself take the least notice of it. However, I rested my argument upon this farther consideration, that the *modest* side is the *safest* to err in: and I thought a debt of *modesty* very proper to be paid to the *ancient Church*, and to all the *modern Churches*; unless you had plain *demonstration* for your dissent.

But the Modest Pleader says, a "modest deference should be paid to the express declarations and com-

“mands of Scripture, rather than to the additions of any “human and fallible judgment.” But where is his *modesty* to call his *unscriptural* inventions by the venerable name of *Scripture*? The question is not, whether *express Scripture* ought to be obeyed: but whether, what a few confident men call *express Scripture*, and all the Churches of Christendom, early and late, take to be directly *contrary* to *express Scripture*, is to be admitted as an article of faith.

It is very strange that you should so often speak of *human* and *fallible* judgment, and never consider that the judgment you make is *human* and *fallible*, as well as the rest. Are you, in particular, privileged from *errors*, or blessed with the gift of *infallibility*? Since we are comparing *human* with *human*, and *fallible* with *fallible* judgment; think it possible that *many*, and *great*, and *wise* men may have judged *right*, and that a *few* may have judged *wrong*. There is a presumption, a strong probability, to say no more, against you: nor will any thing less than *demonstration* be sufficient to support your pretences, in opposition to the current judgment of the Christian world. In modesty, the *novelists* ought to pay a deference to wiser men than themselves; and not presume that they have *Scripture* on their side, till they are able to *prove* it. But of this I said enough in my Defence^f; and you make no answer. You have nothing more, under this Query, but repetition of your preface; which I have answered in its place. Only I must take notice of one very peculiar piece of grave banter; your accusing me as appealing to the *passions of the readers*, only for retorting upon you your own declamation, in somewhat stronger words; as I had a better cause to support them. Who was it that first called upon us to “consider, what to answer at “the great day, &c.?” So solemn an appeal, upon such *trifling* pretences as you had, obliged me to remind you of the infinitely greater risk you run, in unaccountably de-

^f Vol. i. p. 324, 325.

nying your *Lord and God*. You tell us also of names of *reproach*; at the same time reproaching the Church of God, and the most eminent lights of it in all ages, as *Tritheists*, or *Sabellians*, or *Scholastics*, or as *contentious* men, that built their faith on *metaphysical speculations*. It seems, you can feel any thing that looks like a *reproach* upon yourselves; at the same time causelessly dealing about hard names, and most injurious reflections upon all around you. Learn to be *modest*, or at least commonly *civil* to others, and you may meet with suitable returns. We shall not suffer you to run on with your charge of *Sabellianism*, *Tritheism*, *scholastic jargon*, &c. which you cannot make good against us; without letting the world know something of a charge of *Arianism*, which we can make good against you, having often done it with the force and evidence of demonstration. As to the charge I made (p. 435.) relating to your resting your cause, in the last result, solely upon *metaphysics*, though you are pleased to call it *calumny*, there is not a syllable of it but what is strictly true, and may be undeniably proved from Dr. Clarke's own pieces, and yours. I except one or two particulars, which I remember to have met with only in Mr. Emlyn's Tracts^s. I hope you will not think him an *ignorant writer*, nor one that is used to *allege such reasons only* as his adversaries should *desire* or wish for. He has long studied this controversy, and, as I conceive, understands it better than some who have succeeded him in it, and who have been content sometimes to borrow from him. But that by the way: I still continue to affirm, having proved it more than once, that in the *last result* your doctrine stands upon *metaphysics* only, and such pretences as I mentioned in the place above cited. They are what you constantly *retreat* to, when pressed: and *without them* you cannot advance one considerable step towards what you aim at, with all your pretended proofs from *Scripture* or *antiquity*.

^s Emlyn's Tracts, p. 165.

QUERY XXXI.

Whether any thing less than clear and evident demonstration, on the side of Arianism, ought to move a wise and good man, against so great appearances of truth on the side of orthodoxy, from Scripture, reason, and antiquity; and whether we may not wait long before we find such demonstration?

WHAT the Modest Pleader here pretends against the charge of *Arianism* has been abundantly answered more than once^h. And as to his cavil against charging *consequences* in this case, I have distinctly considered it elsewhereⁱ.

Among all the charges I made, you will hardly meet with any such *general* charge as is here brought against me, of “subverting all science, and all religion,” without showing *how* or *why*. When I make a charge, I signify upon what I found it, and give you the liberty of defending yourselves if you can. This other method of *general scandal*, thrown out in such a way as to bar a man the privilege of *self-defence*, is of all the most ungenerous, mean, and detestable. All I shall say to it is this; that I have demonstration before me, that if the man had had any thing he could have mentioned without exposing himself, he would certainly have produced it at full length: and therefore, I presume, his *general* charge about nobody knows what, may reasonably pass for a bounce extraordinary, words and no more.

After a deal of trifling repetition, you are at length pleased to ease your reader and me; leaving me some words of my own, which stand better in their place. You do well to return me back the good advice I gave you, which you had made no use of. As to the honest reader, I desire him to take notice, that every thing material in

^h In my Defence, and in this Second Defence, and particularly in my Supplement to the Case of Arian Subscription, vol. ii. p. 354, 355, 393, 394.

ⁱ Supplement, vol. ii. p. 355, &c.

this Query is entirely dropped : no *demonstration* given of the *new scheme*, nor so much as pretended ; no answer to *five* particulars which required satisfaction. As you begin, so you end, with evasions and subterfuges, shiftings and disguises ; perpetually running off from the true point in question, and wrapping yourself up in clouds and darkness ; studying and contriving all possible ways to perplex rather than instruct, and fearing nothing so much as to have the issue of the cause put upon a clear foot, or left to a fair hearing. It might reasonably have been expected, while you write under cover, that you would have taken quite another method : and give me leave to judge so *justly*, or at least so *kindly* of you, as to believe you would have done it, had you been left entirely to your own counsels. I am not such a *stranger* to you, or so unacquainted with your *style*, your *manner*, your *diction*, (in many *private* papers, as you well know, besides what you have *published*,) as not to perceive, that many things, which I have here answered as yours, yet never came from your pen. I cannot indeed critically distinguish in all cases, where you begin to speak, or where you end : but, in the general, where there is any thing that looks of a more *ingenuous* strain, and is most like what one would expect from a *plain, honest man* ; that I conceive certainly to be all your *own*. Indeed, you have interpretatively made the whole *yours*, by lending your *name*, I should rather say your *person*, to it : for you are *personated* all the way through. You will therefore the more easily excuse me for directing myself generally to you, even in those parts where I am sensible I have had to do with another man.

One thing I complain of, and that is of the disingenuous use every where made of writing under concealment, and without a *name*. I should have had a great deal less trouble in examining the Reply, had it been to be *owned* by any man of character, and his *name* set to it. He would have written, very probably, with more *care*, had his *reputation* been staked upon it ; he would have cut off many impertinences, would not have attempted to put so

many gross and palpable abuses upon the readers, nor have undertaken to defend what was at first sight plainly indefensible. He would have selected such things, and such only, as might bear some *colour* at least, and appear of *real weight*: such, in a word, as might become a *scholar*, a man of *sense*, and a man of *probity*, to urge, and nothing more. And then I am sure, that both the Reply itself, and my labour in examining it, would have been very much shortened: and our readers would have been more agreeably and more usefully entertained.

I shall conclude with observing, how easy a thing it may be to reduce this controversy into a small compass; if men would but come sincerely to it, and keep close to the principal points in question. The most convenient method, and most natural order of inquiry, would, I conceive, be this following one.

- I. *What* the doctrine to be examined is.
- II. Whether it be *possible*?
- III. Whether it be *true*?

I.

The first question is, *what the doctrine is*; which lies in these particulars.

1. That the Father is *God*, (in the strict sense of *necessarily existing*, as opposed to *precarious* existence,) and the Son *God*, and the Holy Ghost *God*, in the *same* sense of the word *God*.

2. That the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father, nor the Holy Ghost either Father or Son: they are *distinct*, so that one is not the *other*; that is, as we now term it, they are three distinct *Persons*, and two of them *eternally* referred up to *one*.

3. These three, however *distinct* enough to be *three* Persons, are yet *united* enough to be *one God*.

II.

The second question is, *whether the doctrine be possible*?

All that relates to this question is resolvable into three other questions.

1. Whether there can be three Persons *necessarily existing*?

2. Whether three such Persons can be *one God*, in the nature of the thing itself, or upon the foot of mere *natural* reason?

3. Whether they can be *one God*, consistently with any *data* in Scripture, any thing plainly laid down in sacred writ; as, suppose, *subordination, mission, generation*?

If any one of these questions can be determined in the *negative* with sufficient *certainty*, then the doctrine, as here stated, is not *possible*: but if none of these questions can be with any *certainty* determined in the *negative*, the doctrine then must be allowed to be *possible*.

1. The *first question* cannot be determined in the *negative*; for, after frequent trials so to determine it, no one has been yet found able to do it: all the pretended proofs of it are *sophistical*; they may be, they have been, shown to be so.

2. As to the *second question*, no one has hitherto been able to determine it in the *negative*; though often attempted. And there is this reason to be given why it never can be done; that no certain *principle of individuation* ever has or can be fixed: upon which alone the resolution of that question, on the foot of mere *natural* reason, entirely depends.

3. As to the *third question*, there is no determining it in the *negative*; because it is certain that *subordination* or *mission* may be consistent with *equality* of nature; as is seen even in *men*. And if it be pleaded, that such *subordination* is not consistent with the *unity*, (though it might with the *equality*), our ideas of the *unity* are too imperfect to reason solidly upon: nor can any man prove that every kind of unity must be either *too close* to admit of any *subordination*, or else *too loose* to make the Persons *one God*. How shall it be shown, that the *distinction* may

not be great enough to answer the *subordination*, &c. and yet the *union* close enough to make the Persons *one God*? Our faculties are not sufficient for these things. If *eternal generation* be objected to as a thing *impossible*, the objectors should show that there cannot be any *eternal reference* or *relation* of one to the other, as *head, fountain, or center*: which is the sum of what *eternal generation* amounts to; and which (though often attempted) could never yet be proved to carry any thing *contradictory* in it. Not to mention that could it be really proved to be absurd or contradictory, yet the *main doctrine* might possibly stand independent of it; among such at least as scruple not to throw off the *ancients*, and confine the dispute to *Scripture* alone: which is not so clear or full for the *eternal generation*, as it is for the *eternal existence* of the Son. Upon the whole, since the doctrine can never be proved to be *impossible*; it must be allowed to be *possible*: and now,

III.

The third and last question is, whether the doctrine be *true*? For the resolving of which, we must have recourse to *Scripture* and *antiquity*. Whoever undertakes to debate this question should forbear every topic drawn from the *nature of the thing*; because such arguments belong only to the other question, *whether the doctrine be possible*: and, in all reason, the *possibility* should be *presupposed* in all our disputes from *Scripture* or *Fathers*.

By what I have here observed, it appears that the controversy of the Trinity may be easily brought to a short issue, and be comprised in two sheets of paper. The strength of the adversaries most certainly lies in the question of the *possibility*: and if they have any thing considerable to urge, it may be dispatched in a very few words; one *demonstration* (if any one can be found) being as good as a hundred.

If none can be found, I doubt not but all reasonable men will immediately give up the point in respect of

Scripture and *antiquity*; which have been so often and so unanswerably proved to be on our side.

My hearty concern for *truth*, on whatever side it may be conceived to lie, and my desire to submit every doctrine (not excepting even those which we call *fundamental*) to a free and fair trial, makes me willing to offer those hints; which may be useful to our adversaries, if there be any *real* strength in the cause they have undertaken. I am not afraid of pointing out to them the shortest and readiest way of confuting us, if there be any way of doing it. Let them try the strength of their *philosophy*, or *metaphysics*, when they please: I desire only to have the cause put upon *clear* and *solid* reasoning, upon firm principles pursued by regular and just inferences or deductions. And let the world see whether any modern improvements in philosophy, logic, or metaphysics, can raise *Arianism* up, in these latter days, which never could be supported, formerly, by all that human wit and learning could invent or contrive for it.

ANSWER

TO

THE POSTSCRIPT.

YOU conclude with a Postscript relating to Dr. Calamy : whom you first reproach very roundly, as one that has been *throughout misled, by trusting to my citations and comments*. You ought to beg his pardon for this *unrighteous* report ; which was not made in the *fear of God*, nor under a sense of the common obligations of *humanity* or *justice* towards man. If I should report that you had been *frequently* (I do not say *throughout*) misled by Dr. Clarke's citations and comments, I should say no more than I have given abundant proof of: but what proof have you given that Dr. Calamy has been *throughout* misled by *mine*? I know not whether you will be able to give a single example of it. However it had been but just, rather to have said that he had been misled by trusting to his *own judgment*, concurring with mine. For it is plain enough that the Doctor has examined for himself: and if he has fallen, in a great measure, into the same way of thinking with me, it is not as *trusting to my citations or comments*, but as approving the grounds upon which they stand. You had the less reason to reproach him as having been *throughout misled* by me, when the main design of your Postscript is to intimate to the world that he differs from me in one part of his scheme, which you think very considerable: an argument, sure, that he did not take things upon *trust* from others; but considered and examined carefully, before he gave into them.

The *second* citation which you produce from him, to intimate to me (as you pretend) the *consequence* of my *notion*, relates not to *my notion*; nor was it written with any such *view*, but with regard to quite *another notion*^a. The unaccountable part you have here acted, in citing it and tacking it most unrighteously to the former, must make your very friends blush for you, or stand astonished at you. Whether it was done with *design*, or was purely *blunder*, the author of the Postscript (for I would gladly hope it was not you) best knows. Suppose it owing to *haste* and *carelessness*; yet even *want of care*, in charges of this kind, will be apt to cast some blemish upon a writer's *honesty* or *probity*.

I lay hold on this opportunity of thanking Dr. Calamy for his learned and useful labours in defence of our *common* faith: and it is with pleasure I take notice of the reasonable stand which he and many others (the most eminent and most considerable men of the *Dissenting way*) have made, in opposition to the threatening *defection*, and to preserve their flocks in time of danger. If he has any where differed from me, in less material points, holding the *foundation sure*, the doctrine of a *real* and *coequal* Trinity; he is at liberty to follow his own judgment, and to defend the *main articles* in such a way as appears to him most reasonable, and freest from embarrassments. I will first suppose that he really differs from me in the point of *subordination*, (though, I conceive, he does not,) yet what advantage do you propose to reap from it, that you should now so plume yourself upon it? Do not deceive yourself in this matter: if Dr. Calamy has made any *concession* of this kind, beyond what I have thought proper to do, he will still be able to maintain his ground against Dr. Clarke and his adherents, both from *Scripture* and *antiquity*. As to *Scripture*, allowing any *natural* subordination of Christ, as *God*, to be inconsistent with his *essential* Divinity; the question then will be, whether your proofs of any such

^a See Dr. Calamy's Sermons, p. 345.

natural subordination (distinguished from *economical*) are plainer, stronger, or fuller than the proofs of the *essential* Divinity. Here, I conceive, he will have the advantage very evidently, both in the *number* and the *strength* of his proofs. Your pretended *voluntary generation* he will reject as an *unscriptural* dream of human invention: your Scripture proofs of the *necessary existence* of the Father will stand upon no better a foot than his Scripture proofs of the *necessary existence* of the Son. Your pretences from the prepositions *of, by, through, or in,* he will resolve into *economical* order: and you will not be able to prove from 1 Cor. viii. 6. that God the Son is included in the *all things* which are *of* the Father. *Metaphysics* you will be ashamed to offer, having so often pretended to condemn them in us. All your little quibbles about *derived* and *underived,* about *cause* and *effect,* about *acts* of the *will,* about *identical* substance, *identical* lives, and the like, will drop at once. In short, when *antiquity* is set aside, you will find it extremely difficult to make it appear that the Scripture account of *subordination* necessarily infers any *natural* subordination, or may not possibly be understood of *economical* only; as some writers of note seem to have understood, as high as the sixth century^b, if not higher.

As to *antiquity,* you will be able to prove a *natural subordination,* very plainly, from the earliest Fathers: but not more plainly than Dr. Calamy will be able to prove the *consubstantiality, coeternity, omnipresence, omniscience,* and other *Divine* attributes of God the Son: not more plainly than he will prove from the *ancients,* that the Father and Son are *one God,* (one God *most high,*) that *creature worship* is *idolatry,* that no *inferior* God must be admitted, and the like. The question then will be, (since the *ancients,* upon the present *hypothesis,* must be said to have contradicted themselves and each other,) I say, the question will be, whether you have *more* and

^b See Jobius apud Photium Cod. ccxxii. p. 624, 625.

stronger testimonies for one part of the *contradiction*, than the Doctor will have for the other part. Here again he will manifestly have the advantage over you, in the *number* and *strength* of his testimonies: and he may justly plead, either to have the evidence of antiquity set aside as *null*; or that the *many* tenets, wherein the *Fathers* agree with his scheme, be admitted as more considerable than the *few* tenets wherein they agree with you. Thus, so far as I apprehend, you and your friends will be really no gainers by Dr. Calamy's concessions; or by throwing off the *subordination*, as *impossible* and *contradictory* on both sides.

Nevertheless, I am fully and unalterably persuaded, that the true and right way is, to admit the *subordination*, and to assert the *essential* Divinity of all the three Persons together with it. Both parts appear to be *founded* in *Scripture*, and were undoubtedly believed by the *ancients* in general: and there is no *repugnancy* between them, more than what lies in mistaken fancy or imagination. I know not whether Dr. Calamy might not pay too great a regard to Dr. Clarke's partial representation of this matter; and so take Bp. Pearson's and Bp. Bull's sentiments something otherwise than they intended them. I observe, that he admits *eternal generation*, *necessary emanation*, and *natural order*; which is, in other words, admitting all that is intended by priority of *order* or *subordination*. The Son proceeds *from the Father*; the Father *from none*: this is the difference of *natural order* which the *ancients*, and after them those two excellent *moderns*, speak of; *viz.* that the Son is referred up to the Father as to a Head or Fountain, and not *vice versa*. This reference or relation of the Son to the Father, we call *subordination*: and this is all that is *natural*, the rest is *economical*. If Dr. Clarke has represented *subordination* otherwise, pretending Bp. Pearson's or Bp. Bull's authority for it, he has done unfairly: and perhaps Dr. Calamy intended no more than to

^c Sermons, p. 20, 49, 263.

condemn the notion so represented^d. Which is not condemning either Bp. Pearson's, or Bp. Bull's, or my doctrine; but something else which others have invented for us.

I know not indeed whether you will allow me to put myself in; because I am represented as teaching a real *coordination*, and a *verbal* subordination only. But I am very certain that the same objection, or rather cavil, lies equally against Bp. Pearson or Bp. Bull; and you are very sensible of it: only you are disposed to serve a turn by making some use of those *great names*. They both asserted a *coequality*, in as full and strong terms as I any where do: which *coequality* you are pleased to miscall, in me, *coordination*; assuming a strange liberty of altering the sense of words, and affecting to speak a *new language*, to make way for a *new faith*.

To conclude; if Dr. Calamy and I really differ, (as I think we do not,) we *agree* however in the *main* points, and much better than our late revivers of *Arianism* agree among themselves. And I doubt not but that by the united labours of the true friends of our *common faith*, (with God's blessing upon them,) the vain attempts of our new Arians and Eunomians will be defeated and baffled, (as were formerly those of their predecessors,) and that the Catholic doctrine of the ever blessed Trinity, that sacred *depositum* of the Church of Christ, will be preserved whole and entire, and handed down, as to us, so to our latest posterity, through all generations.

^d " Whosoever will be at the pains to compare the several passages cited
 " by Dr. Clarke, as they stand in the places whence they are taken, with
 " other clear and express passages of our learned author, (Bishop Bull,) and
 " with the whole scope and purport of his reasonings for the truth of the Ni-
 " cene doctrine, must evidently perceive that these are all placed in quite an-
 " other light than in the book referred to: that some are *directly contrary*
 " to the author's true meaning, and to his design in writing; and most of
 " the rest *inconsistent*, at least, with the same, as the Doctor very well
 " knew." *Nelson's Life of Bull*, p. 326, 327.

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