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CAREFUL AND STRICT

ENQUIRY

INTO THE

MODERN PREVAILING NOTIONS

OF THAT

FREEDOM of WILL;

WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO BE ESSENTIAL

ΤÖ

MORAL AGENCY, VIRTUE AND VICE, REWARD AND PUNISHMENT, PRAISE AND BLAME.

By JONATHAN EDWARDS, A. M.

Rom. ix. 16. It is not of him that willeth-

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THE

P R E F A C E.

ANY find much fault with the cal-ling profeffing Chriftians, that differ one from another in some matters of opinion, by diffinct names; efpecially calling them by the names of particular men, who have diftinguished themselves as maintainers and promoters of those opinions; as the calling fome professing Christians Arminians, from Arminius; others Arians, from Arius; others Socinians, from Socinus, and the like. They think it unjust in itself; as it feems to suppose and fuggest, that the perfons marked out by thefe names, received thofe doctrines which they entertain, out of regard to, and reliance on those men after whom they are named; as though they made them their rule; in the fame manner, as the followers of CHRIST are called Christians; after his name, whom they regard and depend upon, as their great Head and Rule. Whereas, this is an unjust and groundlefs imputation on those that go under the fore-mentioned denominations. Thus (fay they) there is not the leaft ground A 2

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to fuppofe that the chief Divines, who embrace the fcheme of doctrine which is, by many, called Arminianifm, believe it the more, becaufe Arminius believed it: and that there is no reason to think any other, than that they fincerely and impar-tially fludy the holy Scriptures, and enquire after the mind of Christ, with as much judgment and fincerity, as any of those that call them by these names; that they feek after truth, and are not careful whether they think exactly as Arminius did; yea, that, in fome things, they actually differ from him. This practice is also effeemed actually injurious on this account, that it is supposed naturally to lead the multitude to imagine the difference between perfons thus named and others, to be greater than it is; yea, as tho' it were fo great, that they must be, as it were. another fpecies of beings. And they object against it as arising from an uncharitable, narrow, contracted fpirit; which, they fay, commonly inclines perfons to confine all that is good to themfelves, and their own party, and to make a wide diffinction between themfelves and others, and ftigmatize those that differ from them with odious names. They fay, moreover, that the keeping up fuch a diffinction of names has a direct tendency to uphold diftance and difaffection, and keep alive mutual hatred among Christians, who ought all to be united in friendship and charity, however they cannot, in all things, think alike.

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I confess, these things are very plausible. And I will not deny, that there are fome unhappy confequences of this diffinction of names, and that men's infirmities and evil dispositions often make an ill improvement of it. But yet, I humbly conceive, these objections are carried far beyond reason. The generality of mankind are disposed enough, and a great deal too much, to uncharitablenefs, and to be cenforious and bitter towards those that differ from them in religious opinions: which evil temper of mind will take occafion to exert itfelf from many things in themfelves innocent, useful and neceffary, But yet there is no necessity to suppose, that the thus diffinguishing perfons of different opinions by different names, arifes mainly from an uncharitable spirit. It may arife from the disposition there is in mankind (whom God has diffinguished with an ability and inclination for fpeech) to improve the benefit of language, in the proper use and delign of names, given to things which they have often occasion to speak of, or signify their minds about; which is to enable them to express their ideas with ease and expedition, without being encumbered with an obscure and difficult circumlocution. And the thus diftinguishing persons of different opinions in religious matters may not imply, nor infer, any more than that there is a difference, and that the difference is fuch as we find we have often occasion to take notice of, and make mention of. That which we

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have frequent occasion to speak of (whatever it be, that gives the occasion) this wants a name: and it is always a defect in language, in fuch cafes, to be obliged to make use of a description, instead of a name. Thus we have often occafion to fpeak of those who are the descendants of the ancient inhabitants of France, who were fubjects or heads of the government of that land, and spake the language peculiar to it; in diffinction from the descendants of the inhabitants of Spain, who belonged to that community, and fpake the language of that country. And therefore we find the great need of diftinct names to fignify these different forts of people, and the great convenience of those diftinguishing words, French and Spaniards; by which the fignification of our minds is quick and eafy, and our fpeech is delivered from the burden of a continual reiteration of diffuse descriptions, with which it must otherwife be embarrassed.

That the difference of the opinions of those, who in their general scheme of divinity agree with these two noted men, Calvin and Arminius, is a thing there is often occasion to speak of, is what the practice of the latter itself confess; who are often, in their discourses and writings, taking notice of the supposed absurd and pernicious opinions of the former fort. And therefore the making use of different names in this case cannot reasonably be objected against, or condemned, as a thing which must come

from fo bad a caufe as they affign. It is eafy to be accounted for, without fuppoling it to arife from any other fource, than the exigence and natural tendency of the flate of things; confidering the faculty and difpofition God has given to mankind, to express things which they have frequent occasion to mention, by certain distinguishing names. It is an effect that is fimilar to what we fee arife, in innumerable cases which are parallel, where the caufe is not at all blame-worthy.

Neverthelefs, at first, I had thoughts of carefully avoiding the use of the appellation, Arminian, in this treatife. But I foon found I fhould be put to great difficulty by it; and that my discourse would be so encumbered with an often repeated circumlocution, instead of a name, which would express the thing intended, as well and better, that I altered my purpose. And therefore I must ask the excute of fuch as are apt to be offended with things of this nature, that I have fo freely used the term Arminian in the following discourse. I profess it to be without any defign, to stigmatize perfons of any fort with a name of reproach, or at all to make them appear more odious. If, when I had occafion to fpeak of those divines who are commonly called by this name, I had, instead of ftyling them Arminians, called them thefe men, as Dr. Whitby does Calvinific Divines; it probably would not have been taken any better, or thought to shew a better temper, or more good manners. I have done as I

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would be done by, in this matter. However the term *Calvinific* is, in these days, among most, a term of greater reproach than the term *Arminian*; yet I should not take it at all amiss, to be called a *Calvinist*, for diffunction's fake: though I utterly disclaim a dependence on Calvin, or believing the doctrines which I hold, because he believed and taught them; and cannot justly be charged with believing in every thing just as he taught.

But, left I should really be an occasion of injury to fome perfons, I would here give notice, that though I generally speak of that doctrine, concerning Free-will and moral Agency, which I oppose, as an Arminian doctrine; yet I would not be understood, as afferting that every Divine or Author, whom I have occasion to mention as maintaining that doctrine, was properly an Arminian, or one of that fort which is commonly called by that name. Some of them went far beyond the Arminians: and I would by no means charge Arminians in general with all the corrupt doctrine, which these maintained. Thus, for instance, it would be very injurious, if I should rank Arminian Divines, in general, with fuch Authors as Mr. Chubb. I doubt not, many of them have fome of his doctrines in abhorrence; though he agrees, for the most part, with Arminians, in his notion of the Freedom of the Will, And, on the other hand, though I suppose this notion to be a leading article in the Arminian scheme, that

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which, if purfued in its confequences, will truly infer, or naturally lead to all the reft; yet I do not charge all that have held this doctrine, with being Arminians. For whatever may be the confequences of the doctrine really, yet fome that hold this doctrine, may not own nor fee these consequences; and it would be unjuft, in many inftances, to charge every Author with believing and maintaining all the real confequences of his avowed doctrines. And I defire it may be particularly noted, that though I have occasion, in the following Discourse, often to mention the Author of the book, entitled An Effay on the Freedom of the Will, in God and the Creature, as holding that notion of Freedom of Will, which I oppose; yet I do not mean to call him an Arminian: however, in that doctrine he agrees with Arminians, and departs from the current and general opinion of Calvinists. If the Author of that Effay be the fame as it is commonly afcribed to, he, doubtlefs, was not one that ought to bear that name. But however good a Divine he was in many refpects, yet that particular Arminian doctrine which he maintained, is never the better for being held by fuch an one; nor is there lefs need of opposing it on that account; but rather is there the more need of it; as it will be likely to have the more pernicious influence, for being taught by a Divine of his name and character; fuppofing the doctrine to be wrong, and in itfelf to be of an ill tendency.

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I have nothing further to fay by way of preface; but only to befpeak the Reader's candor, and calm attention to what I have written. The fubject is of fuch importance, as to demand attention, and the most thorough confideration. Of all kinds of knowledge that we can ever obtain, the knowledge of God, and the knowledge of ourselves, are the most important. As religion is the great bufinefs, for which we are created, and on which our happines depends; and as religion confifts in an intercourfe between ourfelves and our Maker: and fo has its foundation in God's nature and ours, and in the relation that God and we fland in to each other; therefore a true knowledge of both muft be needful, in order to true religion. But the knowledge of ourfelves confifts chiefly in right apprehentions concerning those two chief faculties of our nature, the understanding and will. Both are very important: yet the fcience of the latter must be confessed to be of greatest moment; inafmuch as all virtue and religion have their feat more immediately in the will, confifting more efpecially in right acts and habits of this faculty. And the grand question about the Freedom of the Will, is the main point that belongs to the fcience of the Will. Therefore, I fay, the importance of this fubject greatly demands the attention of Christians, and especially of Divines. But as to my manner of handling the fubject, I will be far from prefum-

THE PREFACE.

ing to fay, that it is fuch as demands the attention of the Reader to what I have written. I am ready to own, that in this matter I depend on the Reader's courtefy. But only thus far I may have fome colour for putting in a *claim*; that if the Reader be difposed to pass his censure on what I have written, I may be fully and patiently heard, and well attended to, before I am condemned. However, this is what I would humbly a/k of my Readers; together with the prayers of all fincere lovers of truth, that I may have much of that Spirit which Chrift promifed his disciples, which guides into all truth; and that the bleffed and powerful influences of this Spirit would make truth victorious in the world.

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PART I.

Wherein are explained and stated various *Terms* and *Things* belonging to the Subject of the ensuing Discourse.

Section L

Concerning the Nature of the WILL.

T may possibly be thought, that there is no great need of going about to define or describe the Will; this word being generally as well understood as any other words we can use to explain it: and so perhaps it would be, had not philosophers, metaphysicians and polemic divines brought the matter into obscurity by the things they have faid of it. But fince it is so, I think it may be of some use, and will tend to the greater clearness in the following discourse, to say a few things concerning it.

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The Nature of the Will. Part I.

And therefore I obferve, that the Will (without any metaphyfical refining) is plainly, That by which the mind chufes any thing. The faculty of the Will is that faculty or power or principle of mind by which it is capable of chufing: an act of the Will is the fame as an act of chufing or choice.

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If any think it is a more perfect definition of the Will, to fay, that it is that by which the foul either chuses or refuses; I am content with it: tho' I think that it is enough to fay, it is that by which the foul chufes: for in every act of Will whatfoever, the mind chufes one thing rather than another; it chufes fomething rather than the contrary, or rather than the want or non-existence of that thing. So in every act of refufal, the mind chufes the abfence of the thing refused; the positive and the negative are fet before the mind for its choice, and it chuses the negative; and the mind's making its choice in that cafe is properly the act of the Will: the Will's determining between the two is a voluntary determining; but that is the fame thing as making a choice. So that whatever names we call the act of the Will by chufing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, embracing, rejecting, determining, directing, commanding, forbidding, inclining or being averse, a being pleased or displeased with; all may be reduced to this of chusing. For the foul to act voluntarily, is evermore to act electively.

Mr. Locke*, fays, "The Will fignifies nothing "but a power or ability to *prefer* or *chufe*." And in the foregoing page fays, "The word *prefer*-"*ring* feems belt to exprefs the act of volition;"

* Human Understanding. Edit. 7. vol. i. p. 197.

Sect. I. The Nature of the Will.

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But adds, that " it does it not precifely; For (fays he) "tho' a man would prefer flying to walking, " yet who can fay he ever wills it?" But the inftance he mentions does not prove that there is any thing elfe in willing, but merely preferring: for it should be confidered what is the next and immediate object of the Will, with respect to a man's walking, or any other external action; which is not being removed from one place to another; on the earth, or thro' the air; thefe are remoter objects of preference; but fuch or fuch an immediate exertion of himfelf. The thing nextly chofen or preferred when a man wills to walk, is not his being removed to fuch a place where he would be, but fuch an exertion and motion of his legs and feet, &c. in order to it. And his willing fuch an alteration in his body in the prefent moment, is nothing elfe but his chufing or prefering fuch an alteration in his body at fuch a moment, or his liking it better than the forbearance of it. And God has fo made and established the human nature, the foul being united to a body in proper state, that the foul preferring or chusing fuch an immediate exertion or alteration of the body, fuch an alteration inftantaneoufly follows. There is nothing elfe in the actions of my mind, that I am confcious of while I walk, but only my preferring or chufing, through fucceffive moments, that there fhould be fuch alterations of my external fenfations and motions; together with a concurring habitual expectation that it will be fo; having ever found by experience, that on fuch an immediate preference, fuch fenfations and motions do actually inftantaneoufly, and conftantly arife. But it is not fo in the cafe of flying: tho' a man may be faid remotely to chufe or prefer flying; yet he does not chufe or prefer, incline to or defire, under circumstances in view, any

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The Nature of the Will.

immediate exertion of the members of his body in order to it; becaufe he has no expectation that he fhould obtain the defired end by any fuch exertion; and he does not prefer or incline to any bodily exertion or effort under this apprehended circumstance, of its being wholly in vain. So that if we carefully diftinguish the proper objects of the feveral acts of the Will, it will not appear by this, and fuch like inftances, that there is any difference between volition and preference; or that a man's chufing, liking beft, or being beft pleafed with a thing, are not the fame with his willing that thing; as they feem to be according to those general and more natural motions of men, according to which language is formed. Thus an act of the Will is commonly expressed by its pleasing a man to do thus or thus; and a man doing as he wills, and doing as he pleases, are the fame thing in common fpeech.

Mr. Locke* fays, "The Will is perfectly di-" ftinguished from Defire; which in the very fame " action may have a quite contrary tendency " from that which our Wills fet us upon. Α " man (fays he) whom I cannot deny, may oblige " me to use perfuasions to another, which, at the " fame time I am fpeaking, I may wifh may not " prevail on him. In this cafe it is plain the Will " and Defire run counter." I do not fuppofe, that Will and Defire are words of precifely the fame fignification: Will feems to be a word of a more general fignification, extending to things prefent and absent. Desire respects something absent. I may prefer my prefent fituation and posture. fuppofe fitting still, or having my eyes open, and fo may will it. But yet I cannot think they

* Hum. Und. vol. i. p. 203, 204.

Part I.

The Nature of the Will.

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Sect. I.

are fo entirely distinct, that they can ever be properly faid to run counter. A man never, in any instance, wills any thing contrary to his Defires, or defires any thing contrary to his Will. The forementioned instance, which Mr. Locke produces. does not prove that he ever does. He may, on fome confideration or other, will to utter fpeeches which have a tendency to perfuade another, and ftill may defire that they may not perfuade him: but yet his Will and Defire does not run counter at all: the thing which he wills, the very fame he defires; and he does not will a thing, and defire the contrary in any particular. In this inftance, it is not carefully observed, what is the thing willed, and what is the thing defired: if it were, it would be found that Will and Defire does not clash in the least. The thing willed on fome confideration, is to utter fuch words; and certainly, the fame confideration fo influences him, that he does not defire the contrary; all things confidered, he chufes to utter fuch words, and does not defire not to utter them. And fo as to the thing which Mr. Locke fpeaks of as defired, viz. That the words, tho' they tend to perfuade, fhould not be effectual to that end, his Will is not contrary to this; he does not will that they fhould be effectual, but rather wills that they fhould not, as he defires. In order to prove that the Will and Defire may run counter, it fhould be fhown that they may be contrary one to the other in the fame thing, or with respect to the very fame object of Will or Defire: but here the objects are two; and in each, taken by themfelves, the Will and Defire agree. And it is no wonder that they fhould not agree in different things, however little diftinguished they are in their nature. The Will may not agree with the Will, nor Defire agree with Defire, in different things. As in this very inftance which Mr. Locke

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Of the Determination of the Will. Part I.

mentions, a perfon may, on fome confideration, defire to use perfuasions, and at the fame time may defire they may not prevail; but yet nobody will fay, that *Defire* runs counter to *Defire*; or that this proves that *Defire* is perfectly a diffinct thing from *Defire*—The like might be observed of the other inftance Mr. Locke produces, of a man's defiring to be eafed of pain, &c.

But not to dwell any longer on this, whether Defire and Will, and whether Preference and Volition be precifely the fame things or no; yet, I trust it will be allowed by all, that in every act of Will there is an act of choice; that in every volition there is a preference, or a prevailing inclination of the foul, whereby the foul, at that inftant, is out of a state of perfect indifference, with respect to the direct object of the volition. So that in every act, or going forth of the Will, there is fome preponderation of the mind or inclination, one way rather than another; and the foul had rather have or do one thing than another, or than not to have or do that thing; and that there, where there is abfolutely no preferring or chufing, but a perfect continuing equilibrium, there is no volition.

SECTION II.

Concerning the Determination of the Will.

B Y determining the Will, if the phrafe be ufed with any meaning, must be intended, caufing that the act of the Will or Choice should be thus, and not otherwife: and the Will is faid to be determined, when, in confequence of some action, or influence, its choice is directed to, and fixed upon a particular object. As when we speak of the

Sect. II. What determines the Will.

Determination of motion, we mean caufing the motion of the body to be fuch a way, or in fuch a direction, rather than an other.

To talk of the Determination of the Will, fuppofes an effect, which must have a cause. If the Will be determined, there is a Determiner. This must be supposed to be intended even by them that fay, the Will determines itself. If it be so, the Will is both Determiner and determined; it is a cause that acts and produces effects upon itself, and is the object of its own influence and action.

With refpect to that grand enquiry, What determines the Will, it would be very tedious and unneceffary at prefent to enumerate and examine all the various opinions, which have been advanced concerning this matter; nor is it needful that I fhould enter into a particular difquifition of all points debated in difputes on that queftion, Whether the Will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. It is fufficient to my prefent purpofe to fay,—It is that motive, which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest that determines the Will—But it may be be neceffary that I should a little explain my meaning in this.

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By motive, I mean the whole of that which moves, excites or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing fingly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things may concur and unite their ftrength to induce the mind; and when it is fo, all together are as it were one complex motive. And when I fpeak of the *ftrongeft* motive, I have refpect to the ftrength of the whole that operates to induce to a particular act of volition, whether that be the ftrength of one thing alone, or of many together.

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Part I.

Whatever is a motive, in this fenfe, must be fomething that is extant in the view or apprehension of the understanding, or perceiving faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the mind to will or act any thing, any further than it is perceived, or is fome way or other in the mind's view; for what is wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of the mind's view, cannot affect the mind at all. It is most evident, that nothing is in the mind, or reaches it, or takes any hold of it, any otherwise than as it is perceived or thought of.

And I think it must also be allowed by all, that every thing that is properly called a motive, excitement or inducement to a perceiving willing agent, has fome fort and degree of tendency, or advantage to move or excite the Will, previous to the effect, or to the act of the Will excited. This previous tendency of the motive is what I call the strength of the motive. That motive which has a lefs degree of previous advantage or tendency to move the Will, or that appears lefs inviting, as it stands in the view of the mind, is what I call a weaker motive. On the contrary, that which appears most inviting, and has, by what appears concerning it to the understanding or apprehenfion, the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite and induce the choice, is what I call the strongest motive. And in this fense, I suppose the Will is always determined by the strongest motive.

Things that exift in the view of the mind have their ftrength, tendency or advantage to move or excite its Will, from many things appertaining to the nature and circumftances of the *thing viewed*, the nature and circumftances of the *mind that views*, and the degree and manner of its view;

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which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfect enumeration of. But fo much I think may be determined in general, without room for controverfy, that whatever is perceived or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary agent, which has the nature and influence of a motive to volition or choice, is confidered or viewed as good; nor has it any tendency to invite or engage the election of the foul in any further degree than it appears fuch. For to fay otherwife, would be to fay, that things that appear have a tendency by the appearance they make, to engage the mind to elect them, fome other way than by their appearing eligible to it; which is abfurd. And therefore it must be true, in fome fenfe, that the Will always is as the greatest apparent good is. But only, for the right understanding of this, two things must be well and diftinctly obferved.

1. It must be observed in what sense I use the term good; namely as of the fame import with agreeable. To appear good to the mind, as I use the phrafe, is the fame as to appear agreeable, or feem pleasing to the mind. Certainly, nothing appears inviting and eligible to the mind, or tending to engage its inclination and choice, confidered as evil or difagreeable; nor indeed, as indifferent, and neither agreeable nor difagreeable. But if it tends to draw the inclination, and move the Will, it must be under the notion of that which *fuits* the mind. And therefore that must have the greatest tendency to attract and engage it, which, as it stands in the mind's view, fuits it beft, and pleafes it most; and in that fenfe, is the greatest apparent good: to fay otherwife, is little, if any thing, fhort of a direct and plain contradiction.

The word good, in this fense, includes in its fignification, the removal or avoiding of evil, or

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of that which is difagreeable and uneafy. It is agreeable and pleafing, to avoid what is difagreeable and difpleafing, and to have uneafinefs removed. So that here is included what Mr. Locke fuppofes determines the Will. For when he fpeaks of uneafinefs as determining the Will, he must be underftood as fuppofing that the end or aim which governs in the volition or act of preference, is the avoiding or removal of that uneafinefs; and that is the fame thing as chufing and feeking what is more eafy and agreeable.

2. When I fay, the Will is as the greatest apparent good is, or (as I have explained it) that volition has always for its object the thing which appears most agreeable; it must be carefully obferved, to avoid confusion and needless objection, that I fpeak of the direct and immediate object of the act of volition; and not fome object that the act of Will has not an immediate, but only an indirect and remote refpect to. Many acts of volition have fome remote relation to an object, that is different from the thing most immediately willed and chofen. Thus, when a drunkard has his liquor before him, and he has to chufe whether to drink it, or no; the proper and immediate objects; about which his prefent volition is converfant, and between which his choice now decides, are his own acts, in drinking the liquor, or letting it alone; and this will certainly be done according to what, in the prefent view of his mind, taken in the whole of it, is most agreeable to him. If he chuses or wills to drink it, and not to let it alone; then this action, as it stands in the view of his mind, with all that belongs to its appearance there, is more agreeable and pleafing than letting it alone.

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But the objects to which this act of volition may relate more remotely, and between which his choice may determine more indirectly, are the prefent pleafure the man expects by drinking, and the future mifery which he judges will be the confequence of it: he may judge that this future misery, when it comes, will be more difagreeable and unpleafant, than refraining from drinking now would be. But these two things are not the proper objects that the act of volition fpoken of is nextly converfant about. For the act of Will fpoken of is concerning prefent drinking or forbearing to drink. If he wills to drink, then drinking is the proper object of the act of his Will; and drinking, on fome account or other, now appears most agreeable to him, and fuits him best. If he chuses to refrain, then refraining is the immediate object of his Will, and is most pleafing to him. If in the choice he makes in the cafe, he prefers a present pleasure to a future advantage, which he judges will be greater when it comes; then a leffer prefent pleafure appears more agreeable to him than a greater advantage at a diffance. If on the contrary a future advantage is preferred, then that appears most agreeable, and fuits him beft. And fo still the prefent volition is as the greatest apparent good at prefent is.

I have rather chosen to express myself thus, that the Will always is as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears most agreeable, is, than to fay that the Will is determined by the greatest apparent good, or by what feems most agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind, and the mind's preferring and chusing, feem hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct. If strict propriety of speech be infisted on, it may more pro-

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perly be faid, that the voluntary action which is the immediate confequence and fruit of the mind's volition or choice, is determined by that which appears most agreeable, than the preference or choice itfelf; but that the act of volition itfelf is always determined by that in or about the mind's view of the object, which caufes it to appear most agreeable. I fay, in or about the mind's view of the object. becaufe what has influence to render an object in view agreeable, is not only what appears in the object viewed, but also the manner of the view. and the state and circumstances of the mind that views .- Particularly to enumerate all things pertaining to the mind's view of the objects of volition, which have influence in their appearing agreeable to the mind, would be a matter of no fmall difficulty, and might require a treatife by itfelf, and is not neceffary to my prefent purpofe. I shall therefore only mention fome things in general.

I. One thing that makes an object proposed to choice agreeable, is the *apparent nature* and *circumftances of the object*. And there are various things of this fort, that have an hand in rendering the object more or lefs agreeable; as,

1. That which appears in the object, which renders it *beautiful* and pleafant, or *deformed* and irkfome to the mind; viewing it as it is *in itfelf*.

2. The apparent degree of pleafure or trouble attending the object, or the confequence of it. Such concomitants and confequents being viewed as circumftances of the objects, are to be confidered as belonging to it, and as it were parts of it; as it ftands in the mind's view, as a proposed object of choice.

3. The apparent state of the pleafure or trouble that appears, with respect to distance of time;

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being either nearer or farther off. It is a thing in itfelf agreeable to the mind, to have pleafure fpeedily; and difagreeable, to have it delayed; fo that if there be two equal degrees of pleafure fet in the mind's view, and all other things are equal, but only one is beheld as near, and the other far off; the nearer will appear most agreeable, and fo will be chosen. Because tho' the agreeableness of the objects be exactly equal, as viewed in themfelves, yet not as viewed in their circumstances; one of them having the additional agreeableness of the circumstance of nearness.

II. Another thing that contributes to the agreeablenefs of an object of choice, as it ftands in the mind's view, is the manner of the view. If the object be fomething which appears connected with future pleafure, not only will the degree of apparent pleafure have influence, but alfo the manner of the view, efpecially in two refpects.

1. With refpect to the degree of judgment, or firmnels of allent, with which the mind judges the pleafure to be future. Becaufe it is more agreeable to have a certain happinels, than an uncertain one; and a pleafure viewed as more probable, all other things being equal, is more agreeable to the mind, than that which is viewed as lefs probable.

2. With refpect to the degree of the *idea* of the future pleafure. With regard to things which are the fubject of our thoughts, either paft, prefent or future, we have much more of an idea or apprehension of fome things than others; that is, our idea is much more clear, lively and strong. Thus the ideas we have of fensible things by immediate fensation, are usually much more lively than those we have by mere imagination, or by contemplation of them when absent. My idea of the

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fun, when I look upon it, is more vivid, than when I only think of it. Our idea of the fweet relifh of a delicious fruit is ufually ftronger when we tafte it, than when we only imagine it. And fometimes, the idea we have of things by contemplation, are much stronger and clearer, than at other times. Thus, a man at one time has a much stronger idea of the pleafure which is to be enjoyed in eating fome fort of food that he loves, than at another. Now the degree, or ftrength of the idea or fenfe that men have of future good or evil, is one thing that has great influence on their minds to excite choice or volition. When of two kinds of future pleafure, which the mind confiders of, and are prefented for choice, both are fuppofed exactly equal by the judgment, and both equally certain, and all other things are equal but only one of them is what the mind has a far more lively fenfe of, than of the other; this has the greatest advantage by far to affect and attract the mind, and move the Will. It is now more agreeable to the mind, to take the pleafure it has a ftrong and lively fenfe of, than that which it has only a faint idea of. The view of the former is attended with the ftrongest appetite, and the greatest uneafines attends the want of it; and it is agreeable to the mind to have uneafinefs removed, and its appetite gratified. And if feveral future enjoyments are prefented together, as competitors for the choice of the mind, fome of them judged to be greater, and others lefs; the mind also having a greater fense and more lively idea of the good of some of them, and of others a lefs; and fome are viewed as of greater certainty or probability than others; and those enjoyments that appear most agreeable in one of these respects, appear least fo in others: in this cafe, all other things being equal, the agreeableness of a proposed object of

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choice will be in a degree fome way compounded of the degree of good fuppofed by the judgment, the degree of apparent probability or certainty of that good, and the degree of the view or fenfe, or livelinefs of the idea the mind has, of that good; becaufe all together concur to conflitute the degree in which the object appears at prefent agreeable; and accordingly volition will be determined.

I might further obferve, the flate of the mind that views a propofed object of choice, is another thing that contributes to the agreeablenefs or difagreeablenefs of that object; the particular temper which the mind has by nature, or that has been introduced and eftablished by education, example, cuftom, or fome other means; or the frame or ftate that the mind is in on a particular occasion. That object which appears agreeable to one, does not fo to another. And the fame object does not always appear alike agreeable to the fame perfon. at different times. It is most agreeable to fome men, to follow their reafon; and to others, to follow their appetites: to fome men, it is more agreeable to deny a vicious inclination, than to gratify it: others it fuits beft to gratify the vileft appetites. It is more difagreeable to fome men than others, to counter-act a former refolution. In thefe refpects, and many others which might be mentioned, different things will be most agreeable to different perfons; and not only fo, but to the fame perfons at different times.

But poffibly it is needlefs and improper, to mention the frame and flate of the mind, as a diffinct ground of the agreeablenefs of objects from the other two mentioned before; viz. The apparent nature and circumflances of the objects viewed, What determines the Will.

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and the manner of the view: perhaps if we ftrictly confider the matter, the different temper and ftate of the mind makes no alteration as to the agreeablenefs of objects, any other way, than as it makes the objects themfelves appear differently beautiful or deformed, having apparent pleafure or pain attending them: and as it occafions the manner of the view to be different, caufes the idea of beauty or deformity, pleafure or uneafinefs to be more or lefs lively.

However, I think fo much is certain, that volition, in no one inftance that can be mentioned, is otherwife than the greatest apparent good is, in the manner which has been explained. The choice of the mind never departs from that which, at that time, and with refpect to the direct and immediate objects of that decision of the mind, appears most agreeable and pleasing, all things confidered. If the immediate objects of the will are a man's own actions, then those actions which appear most agreeable to him he wills. If it be now most agreeable to him, all things confidered, to walk, then he now wills to walk. If it be now, upon the whole of what at prefent appears to him, most agreeable to speak, then he chuses to speak: if it fuits him best to keep filence, then he chuses to keep filence. There is fcarcely a plainer and more univerfal dictate of the fenfe and experience of mankind, than that, when men act voluntarily, and do what they pleafe, then they do what fuits them best, or what is most agreeable to them. To fay, that they do what they pleafe, or what pleafes them, but yet do not do what is agreeable to them, is the fame thing as to fay, they do what they please, but do not act their pleasure; and that is to fay, that they do what they please, and yet do not do what they pleafe.

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It appears from these things, that in some sense, the Will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. But then the understanding must be taken in a large fenfe, as including the whole faculty of perception or apprehension, and not merely what is called reafon or judgment. If by the dictate of the understanding is meant what reason declares to be best or most for the person's happines, taking in the whole of its duration, it is not true, that the Will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. Such a dictate of reason is quite a different matter from things appearing now most agreeable; all things being put together which pertain to the mind's prefent perceptions, apprehenfions or ideas, in any respect. Altho' that dictate of reason, when it takes place, is one thing that is put into the fcales, and is to be confidered as a thing that has concern in the compound influence which moves and induces the Will; and is one thing that is to be confidered in estimating the degree of that appearance of good which the Will always follows; either as having its influence added to other things, or fubducted from them. When it concurs with other things, then its weight is added to them, as put into the fame scale; but when it is against them, it is as a weight in the opposite scale, where it refists the influence of other things: yet its refistance is often overcome by their greater weight, and fo the act of the Will is determined in opposition to it.

The things which I have faid, may, I hope, lerve, in fome measure to illustrate and confirm the position I laid down in the beginning of this fection, viz. That the Will is always determined by the ftrongest motive, or by that view of the mind which has the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite volition. But whether I have been so

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happy as rightly to explain the thing wherein confifts the ftrength of motives, or not, yet my failing in this will not overthrow the polition itfelf; which carries much of its own evidence with it, and is the thing of chief importance to the purpole of the enfuing difcourfe: And the truth of it, I hope, will appear with great clearnels, before I have finished what I have to fay on the fubject of human liberty.

SECTION III.

Concerning the Meaning of the Terms Neceffity, Impoffibility, Inability, &c. and of Contingence.

THE words neceffary, impossible, &c. are abundantly used in controversies about Free-Will and moral agency; and therefore the fense in which they are used, should be clearly understood.

Here I might fay, that a thing is then faid to be *neceffary*, when it must be, and cannot be otherwife. But this would not properly be a definition of Necessity, or an explanation of the word, any more than if I explained the word *must*, by there being a Necessity. The words *must*, *can*, and *cannot*, need explication as much as the words *neceffary*, and *impoffible*; excepting that the former are words that children commonly use, and know something of the meaning of earlier than the latter.

The word *neceffary*, as used in common speech, is a relative term; and relates to some supposed opposition made to the existence of the thing spoken of, which is overcome, or proves in vain to hinder or alter it. That is necessary, in the original and proper sense of the word, which is, or will be, notwithstanding all supposable oppo-

fition. To fay, that a thing is neceffary, is the fame thing as to fay, that it is impoffible, it fhould not be: But the word *impoffible* is manifeftly a relative term, and has reference to fuppofed power exerted to bring a thing to pais, which is infufficient for the effect; as the word *unable* is relative, and has relation to ability or endeavour which is infufficient; and as the word *irrefiftible* is relative, and has always reference to refiftance which is made, or may be made to fome force or power tending to an effect, and is infufficient to withftand the power, or hinder the effect. The common notion of New ceffity and Impoffibility implies fomething that fruftrates endeavour or defire.

Here feveral things are to be noted.

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1. Things are faid to be neceffary in general, which are or will be notwithftanding any fuppofable opposition from us or others, or from whatever quarter. But things are faid to be neceffary to us, which are or will be notwithftanding all opposition fupposable in the case from us. The fame may be observed of the word impossible, and other such like terms.

2. These terms necessary, impossible, irrefistible, &c. do especially belong to controversy about liberty and moral agency, as used in the latter of the two senses now mentioned, viz. as necessary or impossible to us, and with relation to any supposable opposition or endeavour of ours.

3. As the word *Neceffity*, in its vulgar and common ufe, is relative, and has always reference to fome fuppofable infufficient oppofition; fo when we fpeak of any thing as neceffary to us, it is with relation to fome fuppofable oppofition of our Wills,

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or fome voluntary exertion or effort of ours to the contrary. For we do not properly make oppofition to an event, any otherwife than as we voluntarily oppofe it. Things are faid to be what muft be, or *neceffarily* are, as to us, when they are, or will be, though we defire or endeavour the contrary, or try to prevent or remove their existence: but fuch opposition of ours always either confists in, or implies opposition of our wills.

It is manifest that all fuch like words and phrafes, as vulgarly used, are used and accepted in this manner. A thing is faid to be *neceffary*, when we cannot help it, let us do what we will. So any thing is faid to be *impoffible* to us, when we would do it, or would have it brought to pass, and endeavour it; or at least may be supposed to defire and feek it; but all our defires and endeavours are, or would be vain. And that is faid to be *irrefifible*, which overcomes all our opposition, refistance, and endeavour to the contrary. And we are to be faid *unable* to do a thing, when our supposable defires and endeavours to do it are infufficient.

We are accultomed, in the common use of language, to apply and understand these phrases in this fense: we grow up with such a habit; which by the daily use of these terms, in such a fense, from our childhood, becomes fixed and fettled; fo that the idea of a relation to a supposed will, defire and endeavour of ours, is strongly connected with these terms, and naturally excited in our minds, whenever we hear the words used. Such ideas, and these words, are fo united and associated, that they unavoidably go together; one suggests the other, and carries the other with it, and never can be supposed as long as we

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live. And if we use the words, as terms of art, in another sense, yet, unless we are exceeding circumspect and wary, we shall infensibly slide into the vulgar use of them, and so apply the words in a very inconsistent manner: this habitual connection of ideas will deceive and confound us in our reasonings and discourses, wherein we pretend to use these terms in that manner, as terms of art.

4. It follows from what has been obferved, that when these terms necessary, impossible, irresistible, unable, &c. are used in cases wherein no opposition, or infufficient will or endeavour, is fuppofed, or can be fuppofed, but the very nature of the fupposed cafe itself excludes, and denies any fuch oppolition, will or endeavour, these terms are then not uled in their proper fignification, but quite befide their use in common speech. The reason is manifest; namely, that in fuch cafes we cannot use the words with reference to a fupposable opposition, will or endeavour. And therefore if any man uses these terms in fuch cafes, he either uses them nonfenfically, or in fome new fenfe, diverfe from their original and proper meaning. As for inftance; if a man should affirm after this manner, That it is neceffary for a man, and what must be, that a man fhould chufe virtue rather than vice, during the time that he prefers virtue to vice; and that it is a thing impossible and irrefistible, that it should be otherwife than that he should have this choice, fo long as this choice continues; fuch a man would ule the terms must, irrefiftible, &c. with perfect infignificance and nonfenfe; or in fome new fenfe, diverse from their common use; which is with reference, as has been observed, to supposable oppolition, unwillingness and resistance; whereas, here, the very fupposition excludes and denies any

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fuch thing: for the cafe fuppofed is that of being willing, and chufing.

5. It appears from what has been faid, that thefe terms necessary, impossible, &c. are often used by philosophers and metaphysicians in a fense quite diverse from their common use and original fignification: For they apply them to many cafes in which no opposition is supposed or supposable, Thus they use them with respect to God's existence before the creation of the world, when there was no other being but He: fo with regard to many of the difpolitions and acts of the divine Being. fuch as his loving himfelf, his loving righteoufnefs, hating fin, &c. So they apply these terms to many cafes of the inclinations and actions of created intelligent beings, angels and men; wherein all opposition of the Will is shut out and denied, in the very fuppolition of the cafe.

Metaphysical or Philosophical Neceffity is nothing different from their certainty. I fpeak not now of the certainty of knowledge, but the certainty that is in things themfelves, which is the foundation of the certainty of the knowledge of them; or that wherein lies the ground of the infallibility of the proposition which affirms them.

What is fometimes given as the definition of philofophical Neceffity, namely, That by which a thing cannot but be, or whereby it cannot be otherwife, fails of being a proper explanation of it, on two accounts: Fir/t, the words can, or cannot, need explanation as much as the word Neceffity; and the former may as well be explained by the latter, as the latter by the former. Thus, if any one afked us what we mean, when we fay, a thing cannot but be, we might explain ourfelves by fay. Sect. III. The Nature of Neceffity.

ing, we mean, it must neceffarily be fo; as well as explain Neceffity, by faying, it is that by which a thing cannot but be. And Secondly, this definition is liable to the fore-mentioned great inconvenience: the words cannot, or unable, are properly relative, and have relation to power exerted, or that may be exerted, in order to the thing fpoken of; to which, as I have now obferved, the word Neceffity, as ufed by philosophers has no reference.

Philosophical Necessity is really nothing elfe than the full and fixed connection between the things fignified by the fubject and predicate of a propofition, which affirms fomething to be true. When there is fuch a connection, then the thing affirmed in the proposition is necessary, in a philosophical fense; whether any opposition, or contrary effort be fuppofed, or fuppofable in the cafe, or no. When the fubject and predicate of the proposition, which affirms the existence of any thing, either fubstance, quality, act or circumstance, have a full and certain connection, then the existence or being of that thing is faid to be necessary in a metaphyfical fenfe. And in this fenfe I ufe the word Necessity, in the following difcourfe, when I endeavour to prove that Necessity is not inconfistent with liberty.

The fubject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms existence of fomething, may have a full, fixed, and certain connection feveral ways.

(1.) They may have a full and perfect connection in and of themfelves; becaufe it may imply a contradiction, or grofs abfurdity, to fuppofe them not connected. Thus many things are neceffary in their own nature. So the external existence of C 4

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being generally confidered, is neceffary in it/clf: becaufe it would be in itfelf the greatest absurdity, to deny the existence of being in general, or to fay there was abfolute and universal nothing; and is as it were the fum of all contradictions; as might be fhewn, if this were a proper place for it. So God's infinity, and other attributes are neceffary. So it is neceffary in its own nature, that two and two should be four; and it is necessary, that all right lines drawn from the center of a circle to the circumference should be equal. It is necessary, fit and fuitable, that men should do to others, as they would that they should do to them. So innumerable metaphyfical and mathematical truths are neceffary in themselves: the fubject and predicate of the proposition which affirms them, are perfectly connected of them felves.

(2.) The connection of the fubject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms the existence of fomething, may be fixed and made certain, becaufe the existence of that thing is already come to pafs; and either now is, or has been; and fo has as it were made fure of existence. And therefore, the proposition which affirms prefent and past existence of it, may by this means be made certain, and neceffarily and unalterably true; the past event has fixed and decided the matter, as to its existence; and has made it impossible but that existence should be truly predicated of it. Thus the existence of whatever is already come to pass, is now become neceffary; it is become impossible it fhould be otherwife than true, that fuch a thing has been.

(3.) The fubject and predicate of a propolition which affirms fomething to be, may have a real and certain connection *confequentially*; and

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fo the existence of the thing may be confequentially neceflary; as it may be furely and firmly connected with fomething elfe, that is neceffary in one of the former respects. As it is either fully and thoroughly connected with that which is absolutely neceffary in its own nature, or with fomething which has already received and made fure of existence. This Necessity lies *in*, or may be explained by the connection of two or more propositions one with another. Things which are perfectly connected with other things that are necessary, are necessary themfelves, by a Necessity of confequence,

And here it may be observed, that all things which are future, or which will hereafter begin to be, which can be faid to be neceffary, are neceffary only in this last way. Their existence is not necelfary in itfelf; for if fo, they always would have Nor is their existence become necessary exifted. by being made fure, by being already come to pais. Therefore, the only way that any thing that is to come to país hereafter, is or can be neceffary, is by a connection with fomething that is neceffary in its own nature, or fomething that already is, or has been; fo that the one being fuppofed, the other certainly follows. And this alfo is the only way that all things past, excepting those which were from eternity, could be neceffary before they came to pals, or could come to pals necessarily; and therefore the only way in which any effect or event. or any thing whatfoever that ever has had, or will have a beginning, has come into being neceffarily, or will hereafter neceffarily exist. And therefore this is the Neceffity which efpecially belongs to controverfies about the acts of the will.

It may be of fome use in these controversies, further to observe concerning metaphysical Necessity,

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that (agreeable to the diftinction before obferved of Neceflity, as vulgarly underflood) things that exift may be faid to be neceffary, either with a general or particular Neceflity. The exiftence of a thing may be faid to be neceffary with a general Neceffity, when all things whatfoever being confidered, there is a foundation for certainty of their exiftence; or when in the most general and univerfal view of things, the fubject and predicate of the proposition, which affirms its existence, would appear with an infallible connection,

An event, or the existence of a thing, may be faid to be neceffary with a particular Neceffity, or with regard to a particular perfon, thing or time, when nothing that can be taken into confideration, in or about that perfon, thing or time, alters the cafe at all, as to the certainty of that event, or the existence of that thing; or can be of any account at all, in determining the infallibility of the connection of the fubject and predicate in the proposition which affirms the existence of the thing; fo that it is all one, as to that perfon, or thing, at least, at that time, as if the existence were neceffary with a Neceffity that is most univerfal and absolute. Thus there are many things that happen to particular perfons, which they have no hand in, and in the existence of which no will of theirs has any concern, at least, at that time; which, whether they are necessary or not, with regard to things in general, yet are neceffary to them, and with regard to any volition of theirs at that time; as they prevent all acts of the will about the affair.---I fhall have occafion to apply this obfervation to particular inftances in the following difcourfe.—Whether the fame things that are neceffary with a particular Neceffity, be not alfo neceffary with a general Neceffity, may be a matter

Sect. III. The Nature of Neceffity.

of future confideration. Let that be as it will, it alters not the cafe, as to the use of this distinction of the kinds of Necessity.

These things may be sufficient for the explaining of the terms *neceffary* and *Neceffity*, as terms of art, and as often used by metaphysicians, and controversial writers in divinity, in a sense diverse from, and more extensive than their original meaning, in common language, which was before explained.

What has been faid to fhew the meaning of the terms neceffary and Neceffity, may be fufficient for the explaining of the opposite terms, impossible and impossible into the opposite terms, impossible and possible into the opposite terms, impossible and impossible into the opposite terms, impossible and possible into the opposite terms, impossible and possible and the opposite terms, impossible and possible and impossible and impossible and impossible and possible and the former possible and possible and the form

The fame may be obferved concerning the words *unable* and *Inability*. It has been obferved, that thefe terms, in their original and common ufe, have relation to will and endeavour, as fuppofable in the cafe, and as infufficient for the bringing to pafs the thing willed and endeavoured. But as thefe terms are often ufed by philofophers and divines, efpecially writers on controverfies about Free-Will, they are ufed in a quite different, and far more extensive fense, and are applied to many cafes wherein no will or endeavour for the bringing of the thing to pafs, is or can be fuppofed, but is actually denied and excluded in the nature of the cafe,

As the words necessary, impossible, unable, &c, are used by polemic writers, in a fense diverse

Of natural and moral Necessity. Part I.

from their common fignification, the like has happened to the term *contingent*. Any thing is faid to be contingent, or to come to pafs by chance or accident, in the original meaning of fuch words, when its connection with its caufes or antecedents, according to the effablifhed courfe of things, is not difcerned; and fo is what we have no means of the forefight of. And efpecially is any thing faid to be contingent or accidental with regard to us, when any thing comes to pafs that we are concerned in, as occasions or fubjects, without our foreknowledge, and befide our defign and fcope.

But the word *contingent* is abundantly ufed in a very different fenfe; not for that whofe connection with the feries of things we cannot difcern, fo as to forefee the event, but for fomething which has abfolutely no previous ground or reafon, with which its existence has any fixed and certain con_{π} nection.

SECTION IV.

Of the Distinction of natural and moral Necessity, and Inability.

THAT Neceffity which has been explained, confifting in an infallible connection of the things fignified by the fubject and predicate of a proposition, as intelligent beings are the fubjects of it, is diffinguished into *moral* and *natural* Neceffity.

I fhall not now ftand to enquire whether this diffunction be a proper and perfect diffunction; but fhall only explain how these two forts of Neceffity are understood, as the terms are fometimes

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Sect. IV. Of natural and moral Necessity. 29 used, and as they are used in the following difcourse.

The phrase, moral Necessity, is used variously: fometimes it is used for a Necessity of moral obli-So we fay, a man is under Necessity, gation. when he is under bonds of duty and confcience, which he cannot be discharged from. So the word Necessity is often used for great obligation in point of interest. Sometimes by moral Necessity is means that apparent connection of things, which is the ground of moral evidence; and fo is diftinguished from absolute Necessity, or that fure connection of things, that is a foundation for infallible certainty. In this fenfe, moral Neceffity fignifies much the fame as that high degree of probability, which is ordinarily sufficient to fatisfy, and be relied upon by mankind, in their conduct and behaviour in the world, as they would confult their own fafety and interest, and treat others properly as members of fociety. And fometimes by moral Neceflity is meant that Neceffity of connection and confequence, which arifes from fuch moral caufes, as the ftrength of inclination, or motives, and the connection which there is in many cafes between thefe, and fuch certain volitions and actions. And it is in this fenfe, that I use the phrase, moral Necessity, in the following difcourfe.

By natural Necessity, as applied to men, I mean fuch Necessity as men are under through the force of natural causes; as distinguished from what are called moral causes, fuch as habits and dispofitions of the heart, and moral motives and inducements. Thus men placed in certain circumstances, are the subjects of particular fensations by Necessity: they feel pain when their bodies are wounded; they see the objects prefented before 30 Of natural and moral Neceffity. Part I them in a clear light, when their eyes are opened: fo they affent to the truth of certain propositions, as foon as the terms are underftood; as that two and two make four, that black is not white, that two parallel lines can never crofs one another; fo by a natural Neceffity mens bodies move downwards, when there is nothing to fupport them.

But here feveral things may be noted concerning thefe two kinds of Necessity.

1. Moral Neceffity may be as abfolute, as natural Neceffity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral caufe, as a natural neceffary effect is with its natural caufe. Whether the Will in every cafe is neceffarily determined by the ftrongest motive, or whether the Will ever makes any refiftance to fuch a motive, or can ever oppose the strongest present inclination, or not; if that matter fhould be controverted, yet I fuppofe none will deny, but that, in some cases, a previous bias and inclination, or the motive prefented, may be fo powerful, that the act of the Will may be certainly and indiffolubly connected therewith. When motives or previous bias are very ftrong, all will allow that there is fome *difficulty* in going against them. And if they were yet stronger, the difficulty would be still greater. And therefore, if more were still added to their strength, to a certain degree, it would make the difficulty fo great, that it would be wholly impossible to furmount it; for this plain reason, because whatever power men may be supposed to have to surmount difficulties, yet that power is not infinite; and fo goes not beyond certain limits. If a man can furmount ten degrees of difficulty of this kind with twenty degrees of strength, becaufe the degrees of strength are beyond the degrees of difficulty; yet if the difficulty be increased to thirty, or an hundred, Sect. IV. Of natural and moral Neceffity. 3t or a thousand degrees, and his strength not also increased, his strength will be wholly insufficient to surmount the difficulty. As therefore it must be allowed, that there may be such a thing as a *sure* and *perfect* connection between moral causes and effects; so this only is what I call by the name of moral Necessity.

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> 2. When I use this distinction of moral and natural Neceffity, I would not be underftood to fuppole, that if any thing comes to pass by the former kind of Neceffity, the nature of things is not concerned in it, as well as in the latter. I do not mean to determine, that when a moral habit or motive is fo ftrong, that the act of the Will infallibly follows, this is not owing to the nature of things. But thefe are the names that thefe two kinds of Necessity have usually been called by: and they must be distinguished by fome names or other; for there is a diffinction or difference between them, that is very important in its confequences. Which difference does not lie fo much in the nature of the connection, as in the two terms connected. The caufe with which the effect is connected, is of a particular kind; viz. that which is of moral nature; either fome previous habitual disposition, or fome motive exhibited to the understanding. And the effect is also of a particular kind; being likewife of a moral nature: confifting in fome inclination or volition of the foul or voluntary action.

I suppose, that Necessity which is called *natural* in diffinction from *moral* necessity, is so called, because *mere nature*, as the word is vulgarly used, is concerned, without any thing of *choice*. The word *nature* is often used in opposition to *choice*; not because nature has indeed never any hand in

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our choice; but this probably comes to pais by means that we first get our notion of nature from that difcernible and obvious courfe of events, which we observe in many things that our choice has no concern in; and efpecially in the material world; which, in very many parts of it, we eafily perceive to be in a fettled courfe; the flated order and manner of fucceffion being very apparent. But where we do not readily differn the rule and connection, (though there be a connection, according to an eltablished law, truly taking place) we fignify the manner of event by fome other name. Even in many things which are feen in the max terial and inanimate world, which do not difcernibly and obvioufly come to pass according to any fettled courfe, men do not call the manner of the event by the name of nature, but by fuch names as accident, chance, contingent, &c. So men make a diffinction between nature and choice; as tho' they were compleatly and univerfally diffinct. Whereas, I suppose none will deny but that choice, in many cales, arifes from nature, as truly as other events. But the dependence and connection between acts of volition or choice, and their caufes, according to established laws, is not fo sensible and obvious. And we observe that choice is as it were a new principle of motion and action. different from that established law and order of things which is most obvious, that is feen especially in corporeal and fenfible things; and also the choice often interpofes, interrupts and alters the chain of events in these external objects, and causes them to proceed otherwife than they would do, if let alone, and left to go on according to the laws of motion among themfelves. Hence it is spoken of as if it were a principle of motion entirely diftinct from nature, and properly fet in opposition to it. Names being commonly given to

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things, according to what is most obvious, and is fuggested by what appears to the fenses without reflection and refearch.

3. It must be observed, that in what has been explained, as fignified by the name of moral Neceffity, the word Neceffity is not used according to the original defign and meaning of the word: for, as was observed before, fuch terms, necessary, impossible, irresistible, &c. in common speech, and their most proper sense, are always relative; having reference to fome fuppofable voluntary oppolition or endeavour, that is infufficient. But no fuch opposition, or contrary will and endeavour, is supposable in the case of moral Necessity; which is a certainty of the inclination and will itfelf: which does not admit of the fupposition of a will to oppose and refist it. For it is abfurd, to fuppose the fame individual will to oppose itself, in its prefent act; or the prefent choice to be opposite to, and refisting prefent choice: as abfurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions, in the fame moving body, at the fame time. And therefore the very cafe fuppofed never admits of any trial, whether an opposing or resulting will can overcome this Neceffity.

What has been faid of natural and moral Neceffity, may ferve to explain what is intended by natural and moral *Inability*. We are faid to be *naturally* unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it if we will, becaufe what is most commonly called *nature* does not allow of it, or becaufe of fome impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will; either in the faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects. *Moral* Inability confists not in any of these things; but either in the want of inclination; or the strength D

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of a contrary inclination; or the want of fufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of the will, or the ftrength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both thefe may be refolved into one; and it may be faid in one word, that moral Inability confifts in the oppofition or want of inclination. For when a perfon is unable to will or chufe fuch a thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives, it is the fame thing as his being unable through the want of an inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in fuch circumftances, and under the influence of fuch views.

To give fome inftances of this moral Inability .-A woman of great honour and chaftity may have a moral Inability to profittute herfelf to her flave. A child of great love and duty to his parents, may be unable to be willing to kill his father. A very lascivious man, in case of certain opportunities and temptations, and in the absence of fuch and fuch restraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying his A drunkard, under fuch and fuch circumluft. ftances, may be unable to forbear taking of ftrong drink. A very malicious man may be unable to exert benevolent acts to an enemy, or to defire his profperity; yea, fome may be fo under the power of a vile difposition, that they may be unable to love those who are most worthy of their esteem and affection. A ftrong habit of virtue, and great degree of holiness may cause a moral Inability to love wickedness in general, may render a man unable to take complacence in wicked perfons or things; or to chufe a wicked life, and prefer it to a virtuous life. And on the other hand, a great degree of habitual wickedness may lay a man under an Inability to love and chufe holinefs; and render him utterly unable to love an infinitely holy Being, or to chufe and cleave to him as his chief good.

Sect. IV. Of moral Inability.

Here it may be of use to observe this diffinction of moral Inability, viz. of that which is general and habitual, and that which is particular and occasional. By a general and habitual moral Inability, I mean an Inability in the heart to all exercifes or acts of will of that nature or kind, through a fixed and habitual inclination, or an habitual and stated defect, or want of a certain kind of inclination. Thus a very ill-natured man may be unable to exert fuch acts of benevolence, as another, who is full of good nature, commonly exerts; and a man, whofe heart is habitually void of gratitude, may be unable to exert fuch and fuch grateful acts, through that stated defect of a grateful inclination. By particular and occasional moral Inability, I mean an Inability of the will or heart to a particular act, through the strength or defect of present motives, or of inducements prefented to the view of the understanding, on this occasion-If it be fo, that the will is always determined by the ftrongeft motive, then it must always have an Inability, in this latter fense, to act otherwise than it does; it not being poffible, in any cafe, that the will should, at prefent, go against the motive which has now, all things confidered, the greatest strength and advantage to excite and induce it.----The former of these kinds of moral Inability, confifting in that which is ftated, habitual and general, is most commonly called by the name of Inability; because the word Inability, in its most proper and original fignification, has refpect to fome flated defect. And this effectially obtains the name of Inability also upon another account:---I before obferved, that the word Inability in its original and most common use, is a relative term; and has refpect to will and endeavour, as supposable in the case, and as insufficient to D 2

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bring to pass the thing defired and endeavoured. Now there may be more of an appearance and fhadow of this, with respect to the acts which arife from a fixed and strong habit, than others that arife only from transient occasions and caufes. Indeed will and endeavour against, or diverse from present acts of the will, are in no case suppofable, whether those acts be occasional or habitual; for that would be to fuppofe the will, at prefent, to be otherwife than, at prefent, it But yet there may be will and endeavour is. against future acts of the will, or volitions that are likely to take place, as viewed at a diftance. It is no contradiction, to fuppofe that the acts of the will at one time, may be against the acts of the will at another time; and there may be defires and endeavours to prevent or excite future acts of the will: but fuch defires and endeavours are, in many cafes, rendered infufficient and vain, through fixedness of habit: when the occafion returns, the strength of habit overcomes, and baffles all fuch opposition. In this respect, a man may be in miferable flavery and bondage to a ftrong habit. But it may be comparatively eafy to make an alteration with respect to such future acts, as are only occafional and transient; becaufe the occasion or transient caufe, if forefeen, may often eafily be prevented or avoided. On this account, the moral Inability that attends fixed habits, especially obtains the name of Inability. And then, as the will may remotely and indirectly refift itfelf, and do it in vain, in the cafe of ftrong habits; fo reafon may refift prefent acts of the will, and its refiftance be infufficient; and this is more commonly the cafe alfo, when the acts arife from ftrong habit.

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Of moral Inability.

But it must be observed concerning moral Inability, in each kind of it, that the word Inability is used in a sense very diverse from its original import. The word fignifies only a natural Inability, in the proper use of it; and is applied to fuch cafes only wherein a prefent will or inclination to the thing, with refpect to which a perfon is faid to be unable, is fuppofable. It cannot be truly faid, according to the ordinary use of language, that a malicious man, let him be never fo malicious, cannot hold his hand from ftriking, or that he is not able to fhew his neighbour kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be never fo ftrong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. In the strictest propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power, if he has it in his choice, or at his election: and a man cannot be truly faid to be unable to do a thing, when he can do it if he will. It is improperly faid, that a perfon cannot perform those external actions, which are dependent on the act of the will, and which would be eafily performed, if the act of the will were prefent. And if it be improperly faid, that he cannot perform those external voluntary actions, which depend on the will, it is in fome refpect more improperly faid, that he is unable to exert the acts of the will themfelves; becaufe it is more evidently falfe, with refpect to thefe, that he cannot if he will: for to fay fo, is a down-right contradiction: it is to fay, he cannot will, if he does will. And in this cafe, not only is it true, that it is easy for a man to do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing; when once he has willed, the thing is performed; and nothing elfe remains to be done. Therefore, in these things to afcribe a non-performance to the want of power or ability, is not just; because the thing wanting is not a being able but a being

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The Notion of Liberty,

willing. There are faculties of mind, and capacity of nature, and every thing elfe, fufficient, but a difpofition: nothing is wanting but a will.

SECTION V.

Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency,

THE plain and obvious meaning of the words Freedom and Liberty, in common fpeech, is power, opportunity or advantage, that any one has, to do as he pleafes. Or in other words, his being free from hinderance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting in any refpect, as he wills. * And the contrary to Liberty, whatever name we call that by, is a perfon's being hindered or unable to conduct as he will, or being neceffitated to do otherwife.

If this which I have mentioned be the meaning of the word Liberty, in the ordinary use of language; as I trust that none that has ever learned to talk, and is unprejudiced, will deny; then it will follow, that in propriety of speech, neither Liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be afcribed to any being or thing, but that which has such a faculty, power or property, as is called will. For that which is possible of no such thing as will, cannot have any power or opportunity of doing according to its will, nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will, nor be restrained from acting agreeably to it. And therefore to talk

* I fay not only *doing*, but *conduiting*; becaufe a voluntary forbearing to do, fitting fill, keeping filence, &c. are inftances of perfons *conduct*, about which Liberty is exercifed; though they are not fo properly called *doing*. Sect. V.

of Liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very will it/elf, is not to fpeak good fenfe; if we judge of fense, and nonfense, by the original and proper fignification of words. For the will itfelf is not an Agent that has a will: the power of chufing, itfelf, has not a power of chufing. That which has the power of volition or choice is the man or the foul, and not the power of volition itself. And he that has the Liberty of doing according to his will, is the Agent or doer who is poffeffed of the will; and not the will which he is posses of. We fay with propriety, that a bird let loofe has power and Liberty to fly; but not that the bird's power of flying has a power and Liberty of flying. To be free is the property of an Agent, who is possessed of powers and faculties, as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zealous. But these qualities are the properties of men or perfons; and not the properties of properties.

There are two things that are contrary to this which is called Liberty in common fpeech. One is conftraint; the fame is otherwife called force, compulsion, and coaction; which is a perfon's being neceflitated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is restraint; which is his being hindered, and not having power to do according to his will. But that which has no will, cannot be the fubject of these things.—I need fay the lefs on this head, Mr. Locke having fet the fame thing forth, with fo great clearnefs, in his Estar on the Human Understanding.

But one thing more I would obferve concerning what is vulgarly called *Liberty*; namely, that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice, is all that is meant by it; without taking into the meaning

of the word, any thing of the caufe or original of that choice; or at all confidering how the perfon came to have fuch a volition; whether it was caufed by fome external motive, or internal habitual bias; whether it was determined by fome internal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a caufe; whether it was neceffarily connected with fomething foregoing, or not connected. Let the perfon come by his volition or choice how he will; yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his purfuing and executing his will, the man is fully and perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom.

What has been faid may be fufficient to fhew what is meant by Liberty, according to the common notions of mankind, and in the ufual and primary acceptation of the word: but the word, as used by Arminians, Pelagians and others, who oppose the Calvinists, has an entirely different fignification .- These feveral things belong to their notion of Liberty. 1. That it confifts in a felfdetermining power in the will, or a certain fovereignty the will has over itfelf, and its own acts, whereby it determines its own volitions; fo as not to be dependent in its determinations, on any caufe without itfelf, nor determined by any thing prior to its own acts. 2. Indifference belongs to Liberty in their notion of it, or that the mind, previous to the act of volition be, in equilibrio. 3. Contingence is another thing that belongs and is effential to it; not in the common acceptation of the word, as that has been already explained, but as opposed to all necessity, or any fixed and certain connection with fome previous ground or reason of its existence. They fuppose the effence of Liberty fo much to confist in these things, that unless the will of man be

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and of moral Agency.

Sect V.

free in this fenfe, he has no real freedom, how much foever he may be at Liberty to act according to his will.

A moral Agent is a being that is capable of those \downarrow actions that have a moral quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral fence, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty. To moral Agency belongs a moral faculty, or fence of moral good and evil, or of fuch a thing as defert or worthinefs, of praife or blame, reward or punifhment; and a capacity which an Agent has of being influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of underftanding and reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to the moral faculty.

The fun is very excellent and beneficial in its action and influence on the earth, in warming it, and caufing it to bring forth its fruits; but it is not a moral Agent: its action, though good, is not virtuous or meritorious. Fire that breaks out in a city, and confumes great part of it, is very mischievous in its operation; but is not a moral Agent: what it does is not faulty or finful, or deferving of any punifhment. The brute creatures are not moral Agents: the actions of fome of them are very profitable and pleafant; others are very hurtful: yet, feeing they have no moral faculty, or fense of desert, and do not act from choice guided by understanding, or with a capacity of reasoning and reflecting, but only from instinct, and are not capable of being influenced by moral inducements, their actions are not properly finful or virtuous; nor are they properly the fubjects of any fuch moral treatment for what they do, as moral Agents are for their faults or good deeds. + incidence and at liser and

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Here it may be noted, that there is a circumstantial difference between the moral Agency of a ruler and a *fubject*. I call it *circum/tantial*, becaufe it lies only in the difference of moral inducements they are capable of being influenced by, arifing from the difference of circum/tances. A ruler acting in that capacity only, is not capable of being influenced by a moral law, and its fanctions of threatnings and promifes, rewards and punifhments, as the *fubject* is; though both may be influenced by a knowledge of moral good and evil. And therefore the moral agency of the Supreme Being, who acts only in the capacity of a ruler towards his creatures, and never as a *fubject*, differs in that respect from the moral Agency of created intelligent beings. God's actions, and particularly those which he exerts as a moral governor, have moral qualifications, are morally good in the highest degree. They are most perfectly holy and righteous; and we must conceive of Him as influenced in the higheft degree, by that which, above all others, is properly a moral inducement; viz. the moral good which He fees in fuch and fuch things: and therefore He is, in the most proper fense, a moral Agent, the fource of all moral ability and Agency, the fountain and rule of all virtue and moral good; though by reafon of his being fupreme over all, it is not poffible He should be under the influence of law or command, promifes or threatnings, rewards or punifhments, counfels or warnings. The effential qualities of a moral Agent are in God, in the greatest possible perfecttion; fuch as understanding, to perceive the difference between moral good and evil; a capacity of difcerning that moral worthinefs and demerit, by which fome things are praife-worthy, others deferving of blame and punifhment; and alfo a capacity of choice, and choice guided by understand-

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ing, and a power of acting according to his choice or pleafure, and being capable of doing those things which are in the highest fense praife-worthy. And herein does very much confist that image of God wherein he made man, (which we read of Gen. I. 26, 27. and Chap. IX. 6.) by which God distinguished man from the beasts, viz. in those faculties and principles of nature, whereby He is capable of moral Agency. Herein very much confists the natural image of God; as his fpiritual and moral image, wherein man was made at first, confisted in that moral excellency, that he was endowed with.

PART II.

Wherein it is confidered whether there is or can be any fuch Sort of FREEDOM OF WILL, as that wherein Arminians place the Effence of the Liberty of all moral Agents; and whether any fuch Thing ever was or can be conceived of.

SECTION I.

Shewing the manifest Inconfistence of the Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will, confisting in the Will's felf-determining Power.

AVING taken notice of those things which may be neceffary to be observed, concerning the meaning of the principal terms and phrases made use of in controversies concerning human Liberty, and particularly observed what *Liberty* is according to the common language and general apprehension of mankind, and what it is as understood and maintained by Arminians; I proceed to consider the Arminian notion of the Freedom of the Will, and the supposed necessity of it in order to moral agency, or in order to any

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one's being capable of virtue or vice, and properly the fubject of command or counfel, praife or blame, promifes or threatnings, rewards or punifhments; or whether that which has been defcribed, as the thing meant by Liberty in common fpeech, be not fufficient, and the only Liberty, which makes, or can make any one a moral agent, and fo properly the fubject of thefe things. In this Part, I fhall confider whether any fuch thing be poffible or conceivable, as that Freedom of Will which Arminians infift on; and fhall enquire, whether any fuch fort of Liberty be neceffary to moral agent, next Part.

And first of all, I shall confider the notion of *a felf-determining Power* in the will: wherein, according to the *Arminians*, does most effentially confist the Will's Freedom; and shall particularly enquire, whether it be not plainly absurd, and a manifest inconfistence, to suppose that the will itself determines all the free acts of the Will.

Here I fhall not infift on the great impropriety Vof fuch phrases, and ways of speaking, as the Will's determining itself; because actions are to be afcribed to agents, and not properly to the powers of agents; which improper way of fpeaking leads to many miltakes, and much confusion, as Mr. Locke observes. But I shall suppose that the Arminians, when they fpeak of the Will's determining itself, do by the Will mean the foul willing. I shall take it for granted, that when they fpeak of the Will, as the determiner, they mean the foul in the exercise of a power of willing, or acting voluntarily. I shall suppose this to be their meaning, because nothing elfe can be meant, without the groffest and plainest abfurdity. In all cafes when we fpeak of the powers or principles

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of acting, as doing fuch things, we mean that the agents which have these Powers of acting, do them, in the exercise of those Powers. .So when we fay, valour fights courageoufly, we mean, the man who is under the influence of valour fights courageoufly. When we fay, love feeks the object loved, we mean, the perfon loving feeks that object. When we fay, the understanding difcerns, we mean the foul in the exercise of that faculty. So when it is faid, the will decides or determines, the meaning must be, that the perfon in the exercife of a Power of willing and chufing, or the foul acting voluntarily, determine

Therefore, if the Will determines all its own free acts, the foul determines all the free acts of the will in the exercise of a Power of willing and chusing; or, which is the fame thing, it determines them of choice: it determines its own acts by chufing its own acts. If the will determines the Will, then choice orders and determines the choice: and acts of choice are fubject to the decifion, and follow the conduct of other acts of choice. And therefore if the Will determines all its own free acts, then every free act of choice is determined by a preceding act of choice, chuing that act. And if that preceding act of the Will or choice be alfo a free act, then by these principles, in this act too, the Will is felf-determined: that is, this, in like manner, is an act that the foul voluntarily chufes; or, which is the fame thing, it is an act determined still by a preceding act of the Will, chufing that. And the like may again be observed of the last mentioned act. Which brings us directly to a contradiction: for it supposes an act of the Will preceding the first act in the whole train, directing and determining the reft; or a

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free act of the Will, before the first free act of the Will. Or elfe we must come at last to an act of the Will, determining the confequent acts, wherein the Will is not felf-determined, and fo is not a free act, in this notion of freedom: but if the first act in the train, determining and fixing the rest, be not free, none of them all can be free; as is manifest at first view, but shall be demonstrated presently.

If the Will, which we find governs the members of the body and determines and commands their motions and actions, does also govern itfelf, and determine its own motions and actions, it doubtless determines them the fame way, even by antecedent volitions. The Will determines which way the hands and feet shall move, by an act of volition or choice: and there is no other way of the Will's determining, directing or commanding any thing at all. Whatfoever the Will commands, it commands by an act of the Will. And if it has itself under its command, and determines itfelf in its own actions, it doubtlefs does it the fame way that it determines other things which are under its command. So that if the freedom of the Will confifts in this, that it has itfelf and its own actions under its command and direction, and its own volitions are determined by itfelf, it will follow, that every free volition arifes from another antecedent volition, directing and commanding that: and if that directing volition be also free, in that also the Will is determined: that is to fay, that directing volition is determined by another going before that; and fo on, until we come to the first volition in the whole feries: and if that first volition be free, and the Will felf-determined in it, then that is determined by another volition preceding that. Which is a

contradiction; becaufe by the fuppolition, it can have none before it, to direct or determine it, being the first in the train. But if that first volition is not determined by any preceding act of the Will, then that act is not determined by the Will, and fo is not free in the Arminian notion of freedom, which confifts in the Will's felf-determination. And if that first act of the Will. which determines and fixes the fubfequent acts. be not free, none of the following acts, which are determined by it, can be free.-If we fuppofe there are five acts in the train, the fifth and laft determined by the fourth, and the fourth by the third, the third by the fecond, and the fecond by the first; if the first is not determined by the Will, and fo not free, then none of them are truly determined by the Will: that is, that each of them are as they are, and not otherwife, is not first owing to the Will, but to the determination of the first in the feries, which is not dependent on the Will, and is that which the Will has no hand in the determination of, And this being that which decides what the reft fhall be, and determines their existence; therefore the first determination of their existence is not from the Will. The cafe is just the fame, if instead of a chain of five acts of the Will, we should suppose a fucceffion of ten, or an hundred, or ten thousand. If the first act be not free, being determined by fomething out of the Will, and this determines the next to be agreeable to itfelf, and that the next, and fo on; they are none of them free, but all originally depend on, and are determined by fome caufe out of the Will: and fo all freedom in the cafe is excluded, and no act of the Will can be free, according to this notion of freedom. If we fhould fuppofe a long chain of ten thoufand links, fo connected, that if the first link

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moves, it will move the next, and that the next; and fo the whole chain must be determined to motion, and in the direction of its motion, by the motion of the first link; and that is moved by fomething elfe: in this cafe, though all the links, but one, are moved by other parts of the fame chain; yet it appears that the motion of no one, nor the direction of its motion, is from any felf-moving or felf-determining Power in the chain, any more than if every link were immediately moved by fomething that did not belong to the chain .--- If the will be not free in the first act, which caufes the next, then neither is it free in the next, which is caufed by that first act: for though indeed the will caufed it, yet it did not cause it freely; because the preceding act, by which it was caufed, was not free. And again, if the will be not free in the fecond act, fo neither can it be in the third, which is caufed by that; because in like manner, that third was determined by an act of the will that was not free. And fo we may go on to the next act, and from that to the next; and how long foever the fucceffion of acts is, it is all one; if the first on which the whole chain depends, and which determines all the reft, be not a free act, the will is not free in caufing or determining any one of those acts; because the act by which it determines them all. is not a free act; and therefore the will is no more free in determining them, than if it did not cause them at all.-Thus, this Arminian notion of Liberty of the Will, confifting in the Will's Selfdetermination, is repugnant to itself, and thuts itself wholly out of the world.

SECTION IL.

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Several fupposed Ways of evading the foregoing Reasoning confidered.

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F to evade the force of what has been observed. it should be faid, that when the Arminians fpeak of the will's determining its own acts, they do not mean that the will determines its acts by any preceding act, or that one act of the will determines another; but only that the faculty or power of will, or the foul in the use of that power, determines its own volitions; and that it does it without any act going before the act determined: fuch an evalion would be full of the most gross absurdity.----I confess, it is an Evafion of my own inventing; and I do not know but I fhould wrong the Arminians, in fuppofing that any of them would make use of it. But it being as good a one as I can invent, I would obferve upon it a few things.

First, If the faculty or power of the will determines an act of volition, or the foul in the use or exercise of that power, determines it, that is the fame thing as for the foul to determine volition by an act of will. For an exercise of the power of will, and an act of that power, are the fame thing. Therefore to fay, that the power of will, or the foul in the use or exercise of that power, determines volition, without an act of will preceding the volition determined, is a contradiction.

Secondly, If a power of will determines the act of the will, then a power of chufing determines

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it. For, as was before obferved, in every act of will, there is choice, and a power of willing is a power of chufing. But if a power of chufing determines the act of volition, it determines it by chufing it. For it is most abfurd to fay, that a power of chufing determines one thing rather than another, without chufing any thing. But if a power of chufing determines volition by chufing it, then here is the act of volition determined by an antecedent choice, chufing that volition.

Thirdly, To fay, the faculty, or the foul, determines its own volition, but not by any act, is a contradiction. Becaufe for the foul to direct, decide, or determine any thing, is to act; and this is fuppofed; for the foul is here fpoken of as being a caufe in this affair, bringing fomething to pafs, or doing fomething; or, which is the fame thing, exerting itfelf in order to an effect, which effect is the determination of volition, or the particular kind and manner of an act of will. But certainly, this exertion or action is not the fame with the effect, in order to the production of which it is exerted; but must be fomething prior to it.

Again, The advocates for this notion of the freedom of the will, fpeak of a certain *fovereignty* in the will, whereby it has power to determine its own volitions. And therefore the determination of volition must itfelf be an act of the will; for otherwife it can be no exercise of that supposed power and fovereignty.

Again, If the will determines itfelf, then either the will is *active* in determining its volitions, or it is not. If it be active in it, then the determin-

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nation is an act of the will; and fo there is one act of the will determining another. But if the will is not active in the determination, then how does it exercife any liberty in it? These gentlemen fuppose that the thing wherein the will exercises liberty, is in its determining its own acts. But how can this be, if it be not active in determining? Certainly the will, or the foul, cannot exercife any liberty in that wherein it doth not act, or wherein it doth not exercife itfelf. So that if either part of this dilemma be taken, this fcheme of liberty, confifting in felf-determining power, is overthrown. If there be an act of the will in determining all its own free acts, then one free act of the will is determined by another; and fo we have the absurdity of every free act, even the very first, determined by a foregoing free act. But if there be no act or exercise of the will in determining its own acts, then no liberty is exercised in determining them. From whence it follows, that no liberty confifts in the will's power to determine its own acts: or, which is the fame thing, that there is no fuch thing as liberty confifting in a felf - determining power of the will.

If it fhould be faid, That although it be true, if the foul determines its own volitions, it muft be active in fo doing, and the determination itfelf muft be an act; yet there is no need of fuppofing this act to be prior to the volition determined; but the will or foul determines the act of the will *in willing*; it determines its own volition, *in* the very act of volition; it directs and limits the act of the will, caufing it to be fo and not otherwife, *in* exerting the act, without any preceding act to exert that. If any fhould fay after this manner, they muft mean one of thefe three things;

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Either, (1.) That the determining act, though it be before the act determined in the order of nature, yet is not before it in order of time. Or, (2.) That the determining act is not before the act determined, either in the order of time or nature, nor is truly diftinct from it; but that the foul's determining the act of volition is the fame thing with its exerting the act of volition: the mind's exerting fuch a particular act, is its caufing and determining the act. Or, (3.) That volition has no caufe and is no effect; but comes into exiftence, with fuch a particular determination, without any ground or reafon of its exiftence and determination.—I fhall confider thefe diftinctly.

(1.) If all that is meant, be, that the determining act is not before the act determined in order of time, it will not help the cafe at all, though it should be allowed. If it be before the determined act in the order of nature, being the caufe or ground of its existence, this as much proves it to be distinct from it, and independent on it, as if it were before in the order of time. As the caufe of the particular motion of a natural body in a certain direction, may have no distance as to time, yet cannot be the fame with the motion effected by it, but must be as distinct from it, as any other cause, that is before its effect in the order of time: as the archited is diftinct from the houfe which he builds, or the father diffinct from the fon which he begets. And if the act of the will determining be diftinct from the act determined, and before it in the order of nature, then we can go back from one to another. 'till we come to the first in the series, which has no act of the will before it in the order of na-

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Supposed Evalions confidered. Part II.

ture, determining it; and confequently is an act not determined by the will, and fo not a free act, in this notion of freedom. And this being the act which determines all the reft, none of them are free acts. As when there is a chain of many links, the first of which only is taken hold of and drawn by hand; all the reft may follow and be moved at the fame inftant, without any diftance of time; but yet the motion of one link is before that of another in the order of nature; the last is moved by the next, and that by the next, and fo till we come to the first; which not being moved by any other, but by fomething diftinct from the whole chain, this as much proves that no part is moved by any felf-moving power in the chain, as if the motion of one link followed that of another in the order of time.

(2.) If any fhould fay, that the determining act is not before the determined act, either in the order of time, or of nature, nor is diftinct from it; but that the exertion of the act is the determination of the act; that for the foul to ' exert a particular volition, is for it to cause and determine that act of volition: I would on this obferve, that the thing in question feems to be forgotten, or kept out of fight, in a darkness and unintelligibleness of speech; unless such an objector would mean to contradict himfelf .----The very act of volition itself is doubtless a determination of mind; i. e. it is the mind's drawing up a conclusion, or coming to a choice between two things, or more, proposed to it. But determining among external objects of choice, is not the fame with determining the act of choice itfelf, among various poffible acts of choice .----The question is, What influences, directs, or determines the mind or will to come to fuch a



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conclusion or choice as it does? Or what is the cause, ground or reason, why it concludes thus. and not otherwise? Now it must be answered, according to the *Arminian* notion of freedom, that the will influences, orders and determines itself thus to act. And if it does, I fay, it must be by some antecedent act. To fay, it is caused, influenced and determined by something, and yet not determined by any thing antecedent, either in order of time or nature, is a contradiction. For that is what is meant by a thing's being prior in the order of nature, that it is some way the cause or reason of the thing, with respect to which it is faid to be prior.

If the particular act or exertion of will, which comes into existence, be any thing properly determined at all, then it has fome caufe of its exifting, and of its exifting in fuch a particular determinate manner, and not another; fome caufe, whofe influence decides the matter: which caufe is diffinct from the effect, and prior to it. But to fay, that the will or mind orders, influences and determines itself to exert such an act as it does, by the very exertion itself, is to make the exertion both caufe and effect; or the exerting fuch an act, to be a caufe of the exertion of fuch an act. For the question is, What is the cause and reason of the foul's exerting fuch an act? To which the anfwer is, The foul exerts fuch an act, and that is the cause of it. And so, by this, the exertion must be prior in the order of nature to itself, and diftinct from itfelf.

(3.) If the meaning be, that the foul's exertion of fuch a particular act of will, is a thing that comes to pass of *it/elf*, without any cause; and that there is absolutely no ground or reason E_4

of the foul's being determined to exert fuch a volition, and make fuch a choice, rather than another, I fay, if this be the meaning of Armimians, when they contend to earneftly for the will's determining its own acts, and for liberty of will confifting in felf-determining power; they do nothing but confound themselves and others with words without a meaning. In the question, What determines the will? and in their answer, that the will determines itfelf, and in all the difpute about it, it feems to be taken for granted, that fomething determines the will; and the controverfy on this head is not, whether any thing at all determines it, or whether its determination has any caufe or foundation at all: but where the foundation of it is, whether in the will itfelf, or fomewhere elfe. But if the thing intended be what is above-mentioned, then all comes to this, that nothing at all determines the will; volition having absolutely no cause or foundation of its exiftence, either within, or without. There is a great noife made about felf-determining power, as the fource of all free acts of the will: but when the matter comes to be explained, the meaning is, that no power at all is the fource of these acts, neither felf-determining power, nor any other, but they arife from nothing; no caufe, no power, no influence, being at all concerned in the matter.

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However, this very thing, even that the free acts of the will are events which come to pafs without a caufe, is certainly implied in the Arminian notion of liberty of will; though it be very inconfistent with many other things in their fcheme, and repugnant to fome things implied in their notion of liberty. Their opinion implies, that the particular determination of voli-

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tion is without any caufe; becaufe they hold the free acts of the will to be *contingent* events; and contingence is effential to freedom in their notion of it. But certainly, those things which have a prior ground and reason of their particular existence, a cause which antecedently determines them to be, and determines them to be just as they are, do not happen contingently. If something foregoing, by a causal influence and connection, determines and fixes precisely their coming to pass, and the manner of it, then it does not remain a contingent thing whether they shall come to pass or no.

And becaufe it is a queftion, in many refpects, very important in this controverfy about the freedom of will, whether the free acts of the will are events which come to pafs without a caufe? I shall be particular in examining this point in the two following fections.

SECTION III.

Whether any Event what sever, and Volition in particular, can come to pass without a Cause of its existence.

BEFORE I enter on any argument on this fubject, I would explain how I would be underftood, when I use the word *Cause* in this discourse: fince, for want of a better word, I shall have occasion to use it in a fense which is more extensive, than that in which it is fometimes used. The word is often used in fo reftrained a fense as to fignify only that which has a *positive* efficiency or influence to produce a thing, or bring it to pass. But there are many things which have

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no fuch positive productive influence; which yet are Causes in that respect, that they have truly the nature of a ground or reason why some things are, rather than others; or why they are as they are, rather than otherwife. Thus the absence of the fun in the night, is not the Cause of the falling of the dew at that time, in the fame manner as its beams are the Caufe of the afcending of the vapours in the day-time; and its withdrawment in the winter, is not in the fame manner the Caufe of the freezing of the waters, as its approach in the fpring is the cause of their thawing. But yet the withdrawment or absence of the fun is an antecedent, with which these effects in the night and winter are connected, and on which they depend; and is one thing that belongs to the ground and reafon why they come to pass at that time, rather than at other times; though the absence of the fun is nothing positive, nor has any positive influence.

It may be further observed, that when I speak of connection of Causes and Effects, I have respect to moral Causes, as well as those that are called natural in diffinction from them. Moral Causes may be Causes in as proper a sense, as any causes whatsoever; may have as real an influence, and may as truly be the ground and reason of an Event's coming to pass.

Therefore I fometimes use the word *Cause*, in this enquiry, to fignify any *antecedent*, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an Event, either a thing, or the manner and circumstance of a thing, fo depends, that it is the ground and reason, either in whole, or in part, why it is, rather than not; or why it is as it is,

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rather than otherwife; or, in other words, any antecedent with which a confequent Event is fo connected, that it truly belongs to the reafon why the proposition which affirms that Event, is true; whether it has any positive influence, or not. And in an agreeableness to this, I fometimes use the word effect for the confequence of another thing, which is perhaps rather an occasion than a Caule, most properly speaking.

I am the more careful thus to explain my meaning, that I may cut off occasion, from any that might feek occasion to cavil and object against fome things which I may fay concerning the dependence of all things which come to pass, on fome cause, and their connection with their Cause.

Having thus explained what I mean by *Caufe*, I affert that nothing ever comes to pass without a Caufe. What is felf-existent must be from eternity, and must be unchangeable: but as to all things that *begin to be*, they are not felf-exissed iftent, and therefore must have fome foundation of their existence without themselves.——That whatfoever begins to be, which before was not, must have a Caufe why it then begins to exist, feems to be the first dictate of the common and natural fense which God hath implanted in the minds of all mankind, and the main foundation of all our reafonings about the existence of things, past, prefent, or to come.

And this dictate of common fenfe equally refpects fubftances and modes, or things and the manner and circumftances of things. Thus, if we fee a body which has hitherto been at reft, ftart out of a ftate of reft, and begin to move, we do as naturally and neceffarily fuppofe there is

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fome Caufe or reafon of this new mode of exiftence, as of the existence of a body itself which had hitherto not existed. And so if a body, which had hitherto moved in a certain direction, should fuddenly change the direction of its motion; or if it should put off its old figure, and take a new one; or change its colour: the beginning of these new modes is a new Event, and the mind of mankind neceffarily supposes that there is some Cause or reason of them.

If this grand principle of common fense be taken away, all arguing from effects to Caules ceafeth, and fo all knowledge of any existence, befides what we have by the most direct and immediate intuition. Particularly all our proof of the being of God ceafes: we argue His being from our own being, and the being of other things, which we are fenfible once were not, but have begun to be; and from the being of the world, with all its conftituent parts, and the manner of their existence; all which we see plainly are not neceffary in their own nature, and fo not felf-existent, and therefore must have a Cause. But if things, not in themfelves neceffary, may begin to be without a Caufe, all this arguing is vain.

Indeed, I will not affirm, that there is in the nature of things no foundation for the knowledge of the Being of God without any evidence of it from His works. I do fuppofe there is a great abfurdity, in the nature of things fimply confidered, in fuppofing that there fhould be no God, or in denying Being in general, and fuppofing an eternal, abfolute, univerfal nothing: and therefore that here would be foundation of intuitive evidence that it cannot be, and that

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eternal infinite most perfect Being must be; if we had strength and comprehension of mind sufficient, to have a clear idea of general and univerfal Being, or, which is the fame thing, of the infinite, eternal, most perfect Divine Nature and Effence. But then we should not properly come to the knowledge of the Being of God by arguing; but our evidence would be intuitive: we should fee it, as we fee other things that are neceffary in themfelves, the contraries of which are in their own nature absurd and contradictory; as we fee that twice two is four; and as we fee that a circle has no angles. If we had as clear an idea of univerfal infinite entity, as we have of these other things, I fuppose we should most intuitively see the abfurdity of fuppofing fuch Being not to be; fhould immediately fee there is no room for the question, whether it is possible that Being, in the most general abstracted notion of it, should not be. But we have not that ftrength and extent of mind, to know this certainly in this intuitive independent manner: but the way that mankind come to the knowledge of the Being of God, is that which the apostle speaks of, Rom. i. 20. The invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen; being understood by the things that are made ; even his eternal Power and Godhead. We first ascend, and prove a posteriori, or from effects, that there must be an eternal Caufe; and then fecondly, prove by argumentation, not intuition, that this Being must be necessarily existent; and then thirdly, from the proved necessity of his existence, we may descend, and prove many of his perfections a priori.

But if once this grand principle of common fense be given up, that what is not necessary in itfelf, must have a Cause; and we begin to maintain,

that things may come into existence, and begin to be, which heretofore have not been, of themfelves, without any caufe; all our means of afcending in our arguing from the creature to the Creator, and all our evidence of the Being of God, is cut off at one blow. In this cafe, we cannot prove that there is a God, either from the Being of the world, and the creatures in it, or from the manner of their being, their order, beauty and use. For if things may come into existence without any caufe at all, then they doubtlefs may without any Caufe answerable to the effect. Our minds do alike naturally fuppofe and determine both thefe things; namely, that what begins to be has a Caufe, and alfo that it has a Caufe proportionable and agreeable to the effect. The fame principle which leads us to determine, that there cannot be any thing coming to pass without a Caufe, leads us to determine that there cannot be more in the effect than in the Caufe.

Yea, if once it fhould be allowed, that things may come to pass without a Cause, we should not only have no proof of the Being of God, but we fhould be without evidence of the existence of any thing whatfoever, but our own immediately prefent ideas and confcioufnefs. For we have no way to prove any thing elfe, but by arguing from effects to Caufes: from the ideas now immediately in view: we argue other things not immediately in view: from fenfations now excited in us, we infer the existence of things without us, as the Caufes of these fensations: and from the existence of these things, we argue other things, which they depend on, as effects on Caufes. We infer the past existence of ourfelves, or any thing elfe, by memory; only as we argue, that the ideas, which are now in our

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minds, are the confequences of past ideas and fenfations. We immediately perceive nothing elfe but the ideas which are this moment extant in our minds. We perceive or know other things only by means of thefe, as neceffarily connected with others, and dependent on them. But if things may be without Caufes, all this neceffary connection and dependence is diffolved, and fo all means of our knowledge is gone. If there be no abfurdity or difficulty in fuppofing one thing to ftart out of non-existence, into being, of itself without a Caufe; then there is no abfurdity or difficulty in fuppofing the fame of millions of millions. For nothing, or no difficulty multiplied, ftill is nothing, or no difficulty: nothing multiplied by nothing, don't increase the fum.

And indeed, according to the hypothelis I am oppoling, of the acts of the will coming to pafs without a Caule, it is the cafe in fact, that millions of millions of Events are continually coming into existence *contingently*, without any Caule or reason why they do fo, all over the world, every day and hour, through all ages. So it is in a constant fuccession, in every moral agent. This contingency, this efficient nothing, this effectual No-Caule, is always ready at hand, to produce this fort of effects, as long as the agent exists, and as often as he has occasion.

If it were fo, that things only of one kind, wiz. acts of the will, feemed to come to pass of themfelves; but those of this fort in general came into being thus; and it were an event that was continual, and that happened in a course, wherever were capable subjects of such events; this very thing would demonstrate that there was fome Cause of them, which made such a difference

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between this Event and others, and that they did not really happen contingently. For contingence is blind, and does not pick and chufe for a particular fort of Events. Nothing has no choice. This No-Caufe, which caufes no exiftence, cannot caufe the exiftence which comes to pafs, to be of one particular fort only, diftinguished from all others. Thus, that only one fort of matter drops out of the heavens, even water, and that this comes fo often, fo conftantly and plentifully, all over the world, in all ages, shows that there is fome Caufe or Reason of the falling of water out of the heavens; and that fomething besides mere contingence has a hand in the matter.

If we fhould fuppofe Non-entity to be about to bring forth; and things were coming into existence, without any Caufe or Antecedent, on which the existence, or kind, or manner of existence depends; or which could at all determine whether the things should be; stones, or stars, or beasts, or angels, or human bodies, or fouls, or only fome new motion or figure in natural bodies, or fome new fenfations in animals, or new ideas in the human understanding, or new volitions in the will; or any thing elfe of all the infinite number of poffibles; then certainly it would not be expected, although many millions of millions of things are coming into existence in this manner, all over the face of the earth, that they fould all be only of one particular kind, and that it should be thus in all ages, and that this fort of existences , fhould never fail to come to pass where there is room for them, or a fubject capable of them, and that conftantly, whenever there is occasion for them.

Sect. III. No Event without a Caufe.

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If any fhould imagine, there is fomething in the fort of Event that renders it possible for it to come into existence without a Cause, and should fay, that the free acts of the will are existences of an exceeding different nature from other things; by reafon of which they may come into existence without any previous ground or realon of it, tho' other things cannot; if they make this objection in good earnest, it would be an evidence of their strangely forgetting themselves: for they would be giving an account of fome ground of the existence of a thing, when at the same time they would maintain there is no ground of its existence. Therefore I would observe, that the particular nature of existence, be it never fo diverse from others, can lay no foundation for that thing's coming into existence without a Caufe; becaufe to fuppofe this, would be to fuppose the particular nature of existence to be a thing prior to the existence; and fo a thing which makes way for existence, with such a circumstance, namely, without a caufe or reason of existence. But that which in any respect makes way for a thing's coming into being, or for any manner or circumstance of its first existence, must be prior to the existence. The distinguished nature of the effect, which is fomething belonging to the effect, cannot have influence backward, to act before it is. The peculiar nature of that thing called volition, can do nothing, can have no influence, while it is not. And afterwards it is too late for its influence: for then the thing has made fure of existence already, without its help.

So that it is indeed as repugnant to reafon, to fuppofe that an act of the will fhould come into existence without a cause, as to suppose the hu-

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Volition not without a Caufe. Part II. 66 man foul, or an angel, or the globe of the earth; or the whole universe, should come into existence without a cause. And if once we allow. that fuch a fort of effect as a Volition may come to pafs without a Caufe, how do we know but that many other forts of effects may do fo too? It is not the particular kind of effect that makes the abfurdity of fuppofing it has being without a Caufe, but fomething which is common to all things that ever begin to be, viz. That they are not felf-existent, or necessary in the nature of things.

SECTION IV.

Whather Volition can arife without a Caufe through the Activity of the Nature of the Soul.

THE author of the Effay on the Freedom of the Will in God and the Creatures, in answer to that objection against his doctrine of a felf-determining power in the will, (p. 68, 69.) That nothing is, or comes to pass, without a sufficient reason why it is, and why it is in this manner rather than. another, allows that it is thus in corporeal things, which are, properly and philosophically speaking, pasfive being; but denies that it is thus in fpirits, which are beings of an active nature, who have the fpring of action within themselves, and can determine themselves. By which it is plainly supposed, that fuch an event as an act of the will, may come to. pass in a spirit, without a sufficient reason why it comes to pass, or why it is after this manner, rather than another; by reafon of the activity of the nature of a fpirit.----But certainly this au-

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Sect. IV. Volition not without a Caufe.

thor, in this matter, must be very unwary and inadvertent. For,

t. The objection or difficulty proposed by this author, feems to be forgotten in his, anfwer or folution. The very difficulty, as he himfelf propofes it, is this; How an event can come to pass without a sufficient reason why it is, or why it is in this manner rather than another? Instead of folving this difficulty, or answering this question with regard to Volition, as he proposes, he forgets himfelf, and answers another question quite diverfe, and wholly inconfistent with this, viz. What is a fufficient reason why it is, and why it is in this manner rather than another? And he affigns the active being's own determination as the Caufe. and a Caufe fufficient for the effect; and leaves all the difficulty unrefolved, and the question unanswered, which yet returns, even, How the foul's own determination, which he fpeaks of, came to exist, and to be what it was without a Caufe? The activity of the foul may enable it to be the Caufe of effects; but it does not at all enable or help it to be the fubject of effects which have no Caufe; which is the thing this author fuppofes concerning acts of the will. Activity of nature will no more enable a being to produce effects, and determine the manner of their existence, within itself, without a Caufe, than out of itself, in fome other being. But if an active being fhould, through its activity, produce and determine an effect in fome external object, how absurd would it be to fay, that the effect was produced without a Caufe!

2. The question is not fo much, How a spirit endowed with activity comes to act, as why it exerts such an act, and not another; or why it

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acts with fuch a particular determination? If activity of nature be the Caufe why a fpirit (the foul of man for instance) acts, and does not lie still; vet that alone is not the Caufe why its action is thus and thus limited, directed and determined. Active nature is a general thing; it is an ability or tendency of nature to action, generally taken; which may be a Caufe why the foul acts as occafion or reason is given; but this alone cannot be a fufficient Caufe why the foul exerts fuch a particular act, at fuch a time, rather than others. In order to this, there must be fomething besides a general tendency to action; there mult also be a particular tendency to that individual action.-If it should be asked, why the soul of man uses its activity in fuch a manner as it does; and it should be answered, that the foul uses its activity thus, rather than otherwife, becaufe it has activity; would fuch an answer satisfy a rational man? Would it not rather be looked upon as a very impertinent one?

3. An active being can bring no effects to pass by his activity, but what are confequent upon his acting: he produces nothing by his activity, any other way than by the exercise of his activity, and so nothing but the fruits of its exercise: he brings nothing to pass by a dormant activity. But the exercise of his activity is action; and so his action, or exercise of his activity, must be prior to the effects of his activity. If an active being produces an effect in another being, about which his activity is conversant, the effect being the fruit of his activity, his activity must be first exercised or exerted, and the effect of it must follow. So it must be, with equal reason, if the active being is his own object, and his activity is conversant about himself, to produces

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and determine fome effect in himfelf; ftill the exercise of his activity must go before the effect, which he brings to pass and determines by it. And therefore his activity cannot be the Cause of the determination of the first action, or exercise of activity itself, whence the effects of activity arise; for that would imply a contradiction; it would be to fay, the first exercise of activity is before the first exercise of activity, and is the Cause of it.

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4. That the foul, though an active fubstance, cannot diversify its own acts, but by first acting; or be a determining Caufe of different acts, or any different effects, sometimes of one kind, and fometimes of another, any other way than in confequence of its own diverse acts, is manifest by this; that if fo, then the fame Caufe, the fame caufal Power, Force or Influence, without variation in any respect, would produce different effects at different times. For the fame fubstance of the foul before it acts, and the fame active nature of the foul before it is exerted (i. e. before in the order of nature) would be the Caufe of different effects, viz. Different Volitions at different times. But the fubftance of the foul before it acts, and its active nature before it is exerted, are the fame without variation. For it is fome act that makes the first variation in the Cause, as to any causal exertion, force or influence. But if it be fo, that the foul has no different caufality, or diverfe caufal force or influence, in producing thefe diverse effects; then it is evident, that the foul has no influence, no hand in the diverfity of the effect; and that the difference of the effect cannot be owing to any thing in the foul; or which is the fame thing, the foul does not determine the diversity of the effect; which is contrary to the

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Volition not without a Caufe. Part II.

fuppofition.—It is true, the fubftance of the foul before it acts, and before there is any difference in that refpect, may be in a different flate and circumftances: but those whom I oppose, will not allow the different circumftances of the foul to be the determining Causes of the acts of the will; as being contrary to their notion of felf-determination and felf-motion.

5. Let us fuppofe, as these divines do, that there are no acts of the foul, strictly speaking, but free Volitions; then it will follow, that the foul is an active being in nothing further than it is, a voluntary or elective being; and whenever it produces effects actively, it produces effects voluntarily and electively. But to produce effects thus, is the fame thing as to produce effects in confequence of and according to its own choice, And if fo, then furely the foul does not by its activity produce all its own acts of will or choice themfelves: for this, by the fupposition, is to produce all its free acts of choice voluntarily and electively, or in confequence of its own free acts of choice, which brings the matter directly to the fore-mentioned contradiction, of a free act of choice before the first free act of choice .-- According to thefe gentlemen's own notion of action, if there arifes in the mind a Volition without a free act of the will or choice to determine and produce it, the mind is not the active voluntary Caufe of that Volition; becaufe it does not arife from, nor is regulated by choice or defign. And therefore it cannot be, that the mind fhould be the active, voluntary, determining Caufe of the first and leading Volition that relates to the affair. -The mind's being a *defigning* Caufe, only enables it to produce effects in confequence of its defign; it will not enable it to be the defigning Caufe of



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all its own defigns. The mind's being an *elective* Caufe, will only enable it to produce effects in confequence of its *elections*, and according to them; but cannot enable it to be the elective Caufe of all its own elections; becaufe that fuppofes an election before the first election. So the mind's being an *active* Caufe enables it to produce effects in confequence of its own *acts*, but cannot enable it to be the determining Caufe of all its own *acts*; for that is still in the fame manner a contradiction; as it fuppofes a determining act converfant about the first act, and prior to it, having a caufal influence on its existence, and manner of existence.

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I can conceive of nothing elfe that can be meant by the foul's having power to caufe and determine its own Volitions, as a being to whom God has given a power of action, but this; that God has given power to the foul, fometimes at leaft, to excite Volitions at its pleafure, or according as it chufes. And this certainly fuppofes, in all fuch cafes, a choice preceding all Volitions which are thus caufed, even the first of them. Which runs into the fore-mentioned great abfurdity.

Therefore the activity of the nature of the foul affords no relief from the difficulties which the notion of a felf-determining power in the will is attended with, nor will it help, in the leaft, its abfurdities and inconfiftences.

SECTION V.

Shewing, that if the things afferted in these Evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and cannot help the cause of Arminian Liberty; and how (this being the state of the case) Arminian Writers are obliged to talk inconsuffective.

HAT was last observed in the preceding fection may fhew, not only that the active nature of the foul cannot be a reafon why an act of the will is, or why it is in this manner, rather than another; but also that if it could be fo, and it could be proved that volitions are contingent events, in that fenfe, that their being and manner of being is not fixed or determined by any caufe, or any thing antecedent; it would not at all ferve the purpole of Arminians, to establish the Freedom of the Will, according to their notion of its freedom, as confifting in the will's determination of it/elf; which supposes every free act of the will to be determined by fome act of the will going before to determine it; inafmuch as for the will to determine a thing, is the fame as for the foul to determine a thing by willing; and there is no way that the will can determine an act of the will, than by willing that act of the will, or, which is the fame thing, chusing it. So that here must be two acts of the will in the cafe, one going before another, one conversant about the other, and the latter the object of the former, and chosen by the former. If the will does not cause and determine the act by choice, it does not cause or determine it at all; for that which

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is not determined by choice, is not determined voluntarily or *willingly*: and to fay, that the will determines fomething which the foul does not determine willingly, is as much as to fay, that fomething is done by the will, which the foul doth not with its will.

So that if Arminian liberty of will, confifting in the will's determining its own acts, be maintained, the old abfurdity and contradiction muft be maintained, that every free act of will is caufed and determined by a foregoing free act of will. Which doth not confift with the free acts arifing without any caufe, and being fo contingent, as not to be fixed by any thing foregoing. So that this evalion muft be given up, as not at all relieving, and as that which, inflead of fupporting this fort of liberty, directly deftroys it.

And if it fhould be fuppofed, that the foul determines its own acts of will fome other way, than by a foregoing act of will; ftill it will not help the caufe of their liberty of will. If it determines them by an act of the understanding. or fome other power, then the will does not determine *itfelf*; and fo the *felf-determining* power of the will is given up. And what liberty is there exercifed according to their own opinion of liberty, by the foul's being determined by fomething befides its own choice? The acts of the will, it is true, may be directed, and effectually determined and fixed; but it is not done by the foul's own will and pleafure: there is no exercife at all of choice or will in producing the effect: and if will and choice are not exercised in it, how is the liberty of the will exercised in it?

These Evasions impertinent. Part II.

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So that let Arminians turn which way they pleafe with their notion of liberty, confifting in the will's determining its own acts, their notion destroys itself. If they hold every free act of will to be determined by the foul's own free choice, or foregoing free act of will; foregoing, either in the order of time, or nature; it implies that großs contradiction, that the first free act belonging to the affair, is determined by a free act which is before it. Or if they fay that the free acts of the will are determined by fome other act of the foul, and not an act of will or choice. This also destroys their notion of liberty confifting in the acts of the will being determined by the will it felf; or if they hold that the acts of the will are determined by nothing at all that is prior to them, but that they are contingent in that fenfe, that they are determined and fixed by no caufe at all; this alfo deftroys their notion of liberty, confifting in the will's determining its own acts.

This being the true flate of the Arminian notion of liberty, it hence comes to pafs, that the writers that defend it are forced into grofs inconfiftences, in what they fay upon this fubject. To inflance in Dr. Whitby; he in his difcourfe on the freedom of the will, * oppofes the opinion of the Calvinifts, who place man's liberty only in a power of doing what he will, as that wherein they plainly agree with Mr. Hobbes. And yet he himfelf mentions the very fame notion of liberty, as the dictate of the fenfe and common reason of mankind, and a rule laid down by the light of nature; viz. that liberty is a power of acting from our/elves, or DOING WHAT WE WILL. + This

* In his Book on the five Points, Second Edit. p. 350, 351, 352. † Ibid. p. 325, 326.

Sect. V. Arminians talk inconfiftently.

is indeed, as he fays, a thing agreeable to the fense and common reason of mankind; and therefore it is not fo much to be wondered at, that he unawares acknowledges it against himself: for if liberty does not confift in this, what elfe can be devifed that it should confist in? if it be faid, as Dr. Whitby elfewhere infifts, that it does not only confift in liberty of doing what we will, but alfo. a liberty of willing without necessity; still the question returns, what does that liberty of willing without neceffity confift in, but in a power of willing as we pleafe, without being impeded by a contrary necessity? or in other words, a liberty for the foul in its willing to act according to its own choice? Yea, this very thing the fame author feems to allow, and fuppofe again and again, in the use he makes of fayings of the Fathers, whom he quotes as his vouchers. Thus he cites the words of Origen, which he produces as a testimony on his fide; * The foul acts by HER OWN CHOICE, and it is free for her to incline to whatever part SHE WILL. And those words of Justin Martyr; + the doctrine of the Christians is this, that nothing is done or suffered according to fate, but that every man doth good or evil ACCORDING TO HIS OWN FREE CHOICE. And from Eufebius, thefe words; 1 If fate be established, philosophy and picty are overthrown.-All these things depending upon the necessity introduced by the stars, and not upon meditation and exercise PROČEEDING FRÔM OUR OWN FREE CHOICE. And again, the words of Maccarius: God, to preferve the liberty of man's will, suffered their bodies to die, that it might be IN THEIR CHOICE to turn to good or evil. They who are acted by the Holy Spirit, are not held under any ne-

Arminians talk inconfistently. Part II.

ceffity, but have liberty to turn themfelves, and DO WHAT THEY WILL in this life.

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Thus, the doctor in effect comes into that very notion of liberty, which the Calvinists have; which he at the fame time condemns, as agreeing with the opinion of Mr. Hobbes, namely, the foul's acting by its own choice, men's doing good or evil according to their own free choice, their being in that exercife which proceeds from their own free choice, having it in their choice to turn to good or evil, and doing what they will. So that if men exercife this liberty in the acts of the will themfelves, it must be in exerting acts of will as they will, or according to their own free choice; or exerting acts of will that proceed from their choice. And if it be fo, then let every one judge whether this does not suppose a free choice going before the free act of will, or whether an act of choice does not go before that act of the will which proceeds from it. And if it be thus with all free acts of the will, then let every one judge, whether it will not follow that there is a free choice or will going before the first free act of the will exerted in the cafe. And then let every one judge, whether this be not a contradiction. And finally, let every one judge whether in the scheme of these writers there be any poffibility of avoiding thefe abfurdities.

If liberty confifts, as Dr. Whitby himfelf fays in a man's doing what he will; and a man exercifes this liberty, not only in external actions, but in the acts of the will themfelves; then fo far as liberty is exercifed in the latter, it confifts in willing what he wills: and if any fay fo, one of thefe two things muft be meant, either, 1. That a man has power to will, as he does will; becaufe

Sect. V. Arminians talk inconfistently.

what he wills, he wills; and therefore has power to will what he has power to will. If this be their meaning, then all this mighty controverfy about freedom of the will and felf-determining power, comes wholly to nothing; all that is contended for being no more than this, that the mind of man does what is does, and is the fubject of what it is the fubject of, or that what is, is; wherein none has any controverfy with them. Or, 2. The meaning must be, that a man has power to will as he pleafes or chufes to will: that is, he has power by one act of choice, to chufe another; by an antecedent act of will to chufe a confequent act; and therein to execute his own choice. And if this be their meaning, it is nothing but fluffling with those they dispute with, and baffling their own reason. For still the question returns, wherein lies man's liberty in that antecedent act of will which chofe the confequent act. The anfwer according to the fame principles must be, that his liberty in this alfo lies in his willing as he would, or as he chose, or agreeable to another act of choice preceding that. And fo the question returns in infinitum and the like answer must be made in infinitum: in order to fupport their opinion, there must be no beginning, but free acts of will must have been chosen by foregoing free acts of will in the foul of every man, without beginning; and fo before he had a being, from all eternity.

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SECTION VI.

Concerning the Will's determining in Things which are perfectly indifferent, in the View of the Mind.

A Great argument for felf-determining power, is the fuppofed experience we univerfally have of an ability to determine our Wills, in cafes wherein no prevailing motive is prefented: the Will (as is fuppofed) has its choice to make between two or more things, that are perfectly equal in the view of the mind; and the Will is apparently altogether indifferent; and yet we find no difficulty in coming to a choice; the Will can inftantly determine itfelf to one, by a fovereign power which it has over itfelf, without being moved by any preponderating inducement.

Thus the fore-mentioned author of an Effay on the Freedom of the Will, &c. p. 25, 26, 27, fuppofes, "That there are many inftances, wherein " the Will is determined neither by prefent un-" eafinefs, nor by the greatest apparent good, nor " by the last dictate of the understanding, nor " by any thing elfe, but merely by itfelf as a "fovereign felf-determining power of the fouls " and that the foul does not will this or that " action, in fome cafes, by any other influence " but because it will. Thus (fays he) I can turn "my face to the South, or the North; I can " point with my finger upward, or downward.---"And thus, in fome cafes, the Will determines " itfelf in a very fovereign manner, becaufe it " will, without a reason borrowed from the un-" derstanding: and hereby it discovers its own " perfect power of choice, rifing from within it-

Sect. VI. Of chufing in Things indifferent.

"felf, and free from all influence or reftraint of "any kind." And in pages 66, 70, and 73, 74. this author very expressly supposes the Will in many cases to be determined by no motive at all, and acts altogether without motive, or ground of preference.—Here I would observe,

1. The very fupposition which is here made, directly contradicts and overthrows itfelf. For the thing fuppofed, wherein this grand argument confifts, is, that among feveral things the Will actually chuses one before another, at the fame time that it is perfectly indifferent; which is the very fame thing as to fay, the mind has a preference, at the fame time that it has no prefer-What is meant cannot be, that the mind ence. is indifferent before it comes to have a choice, or until it has a preference; or, which is the fame thing, that the mind is indifferent until it comes to be not indifferent. For certainly this author did not fuppofe he had a controverfy with any perfon in fuppofing this. And then it is nothing to his purpose, that the mind which chuses, was indifferent once; unlefs it chufes, remaining indifferent; for otherwife, it does not chuse at all in that cafe of indifference, concerning which is all the question. Besides, it appears in fact, that the thing which this author fuppofes, is not that the Will chufes one thing before another, concerning which it is indifferent before it chuses; but also is indifferent when it chuses; and that its being otherwife than indifferent is not until afterwards, in confequence of its choice; that the chofen thing's appearing preferable and more agreeable than another, arifes from its choice already made. His words are (p. 30.) "Where the objects "which are proposed, appear equally fit or good, " the Will is left without a guide or director;

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" and therefore must take its own choice, by its "own determination; it being properly a felf-" determining power. And in fuch cafes the " will does as it were make a good to itfelf by " its own choice, i. e. creates its own pleafure " or delight in this felf-chofen good. Even as "a man by feizing upon a fpot of unoccupied " land, in an uninhabited country, makes it his " own possession and property, and as fuch re-"ioices in it. Where things were indifferent " before, the will finds nothing to make them " more agreeable, confidered meerly in themfelves: " but the pleafure it feels ARISING FROM " ITS OWN CHOICE, and its perfeverance " therein. We love many things which we have " chofen, AND PURELY BECAUSE WE " CHOSE THEM."

This is as much as to fay, that we first begin to prefer many things, now ceasing any longer to be indifferent with respect to them, purely because we have preferred and chosen them before. —These things must needs be spoken inconfiderately by this author. Choice or preference cannot be before itself in the same instance, either in the order of time or nature: It cannot be the foundation of itself, or the fruit or consequence of itself. The very act of chusing one thing rather than another, is preferring that thing and that is setting a higher value on that thing. But that the mind set an higher value on one thing than another, is not, in the first place, the fruit of its fetting a higher value on that thing.

This author fays, p. 36. "The will may be "perfectly indifferent, and yet the will may de-"termine itfelf to chufe one or the other." And again in the fame page, "I am entirely inSect. VI. Of the Will's determining, &c.

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" different to either; and yet my Will may de-" termine itself to chuse." And again, " Which " I shall chuse must be determined by the mere " act of my Will." If the choice is determined by a mere act of Will, then the choice is determined by a mere act of choice. And concerning this matter, viz. That the act of the Will itfelf is determined by an act of choice, this writer is express, in page 72. Speaking of the cafe, where there is no fuperior fitnefs in objects prefented, he has these words: " There it must act " by its own CHOICE, and determine itfelf as " as it PLEASES." Where it is supposed that the very determination; which is the ground and fpring of the Will's act, is an act of choice and pleasure, wherein one act is more agreeable, and the mind better pleafed in it than another; and this preference, and superior pleasedness is the ground of all it does in the cafe. And if fo, the mind is not indifferent when it determines itself, but bad rather do one thing than another, had rather determine itself one way than another. And therefore the Will does not act at all in indifference; not fo much as in the first step it takes, or the first rife and beginning of its acting. If it be poffible for the understanding to act in indifference, yet to be fure the will never does; becaufe the Will's beginning to act is the very fame thing as its beginning to chule or prefer. And if in the very first act of the Will, the mind prefers something, then the idea of that thing preferred, does at that time preponderate, or prevail in the mind: or, which is the fame thing, the idea of is has a prevailing influence on the Will. Sơ that this wholly deftroys the thing supposed, viz. That the mind can by a fovereign power chufe one of two or more things, which in the view of the mind are, in every respect, perfectly

Of the Will's determining

equal, one of which does not at all preponderate, nor has any prevailing influence on the mind above another. άŸ

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So that this author, in his grand argument for the ability of the Will to chufe one of two, or more things, concerning which it is perfectly indifferent, does at the fame time, in effect, deny the thing he fuppofes, and allows and afferts the point he endeavours to overthrow; even that the Will, in chufing, is fubject to no prevailing influence of the idea, or view of the thing chosen. And indeed it is impossible to offer this argument without overthrowing it; the thing fuppofed in it being inconfistent with itself, and that which denies itself. To suppose the Will to act at all in a flate of perfect indifference, either to determine itfelf, or to do any thing elfe, is to affert that the mind chuses without chusing. To fav that when it is indifferent, it can do as it pleafes, is to fay that it can follow its pleafure, when it has no pleafure to follow. And therefore if there be any difficulty in the inftances of two cakes, or two eggs, &c. which are exactly alike, one as good as another; concerning which this author fupposes the mind in fact has a choice, and fo in effect supposes that it has a preference; it as much concerned himfelf to folve the difficulty, as it does those whom he opposes. For if these instances prove any thing to his purpose, they prove that a man chuses without choice.' And yet this is not to his purpose; because if this is what he afferts, his own words are as much against him, and do as much contradict him, as the words of those he disputes against can do.

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2: There is no great difficulty in shewing, in fuch instances as are alledged, not only that it must needs be fo, that the mind must be instuenced in its choice by fomething that has a prepondetating influence upon it, but also how it is fo. A little attention to our own experience, and a diflinct confideration of the acts of our own minds, in fuch cases, will be sufficient to clear up the matter.

Thus, fuppofing I have a chefs-board before me; and becaufe I am required by a fuperior, or defired by a friend, or to make fome experiment concerning my own ability and liberty, or on fome other confideration, I am determined to touch fome one of the fpots or fquares on the board with my finger; not being limited or directed in the first proposal, or my own first purpole, which is general, to any one in particular; and there being nothing in the fquares in themfelves confidered, that recommends any one of all the fixty-four, more than another: in this cafe, my mind determines to give itself up to what is vulgarly called *accident*^{*}; by determining to touch that fquare which happens to be most in view, which my eye is efpecially upon at that moment, or which happens to be then most in my mind, or which I shall be directed to by some other suchlike accident. Here are feveral steps of the mind's proceeding (though all may be done as it were in a moment) the first step is its general determination that it will touch one of the fquares.

* I have elfewhere observed what that is which is vulgarly called *accident*; that it is nothing akin to the *Arminian* metaphysical notion of *contingence*, fomething not connected with any thing foregoing; but that it is fomething that comes to pais in the course of things, in fome affair that men are concerned in, unforescen, and not owing to their design.

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The next step is another general determination to give itself up to accident, in some certain way; as to touch that which shall be most in the eve or mind at that time, or to fome other fuch-like accident. The third and last step is a particular determination to touch a certain individual spot. even that fquare, which, by that fort of accident the mind has pitched upon, has actually offered itself beyond others. Now it is apparent that in none of these feveral steps does the mind proceed in absolute indifference, but in each of them is influenced by a preponderating inducement. So it is in the first step; the mind's general determination to touch one of the fixty-four fpots: the mind is not abfolutely indifferent whether it does fo or no; it is induced to it, for the fake of making fome experiment, or by the defire of a friend, or some other motive that prevails. So it is in the *lecond* ftep, the mind's determining to give itfelf up to accident, by touching that which shall be most in the eye, or the idea of which shall be most prevalent in the mind, &c. The mind is not abfolutely indifferent whether it proceeds by this rule or no; but chufes it becaufe it appears at that time a convenient and requifite expedient in order to fulfil the general purpose aforesaid. And so it is in the third and last step, it is determining to touch that individual fpot which actually does prevail in the mind's view. The mind is not indifferent concerning this; but is influenced by a prevailing inducement and reason; which is, that this is a profecution of the preceding determination, which appeared requisite, and was fixed before in the fecond: ftep.

Accident will ever ferve a man, without hindering him a moment, in fuch a cafe. It will al-

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ways be to among a number of objects in view, one will prevail in the eye, or in idea beyond others. When we have our eyes open in the clear fun-shine, many objects strike the eye at once, and innumerable images may be at once painted in it by the rays of light; but the attention of the mind is not equal to feveral of them at once; or if it be, it does not continue fo for any time. And fo it is with respect to the ideas of the mind in general: feveral ideas are not in equal ftrength in the mind's view and notice at once; or at leaft, does not remain to for any fenfible continuance. There is nothing in the world more constantly varying, than the ideas of the mind: they do not remain precifely in the fame flate for the least perceivable fpace of time: as is evident by this, That all perceivable time is judged and perceived by the mind only by the fuccession or the fuccesfive changes of its own ideas: Therefore while the views or perceptions of the mind remain precifely in the fame state, there is no perceivable fpace or length of time, becaufe no fenfible fucceffion at all.

As the acts of the Will, in each ftep of the fore-mentioned procedure, does not come to pafs without a particular caufe, every act is owing to a prevailing inducement: fo the accident, as I have called it, or that which happens in the unfearchable courfe of things, to which the mind yields itfelf, and by which it is guided, is not any thing that comes to pafs without a caufe; and the mind in determining to be guided by it, is not determined by fomething that has no caufe; any more than if it determined to be guided by a lot, or the cafting of a die. For though the die's falling in fuch a manner be accidental to him that cafts it, yet none will fuppofe that there is no

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Of the Will's determining, &c. Part II. 86 caufe why it falls as it does. The involuntary changes in the fucceffion of our ideas, though the cause may not be observed, have as much a cause, as the changeable motions of the motes that float in the air, or the continual infinitely various, fucceffive changes of the uneveneffes on the furface of the water.

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There are two things especially, which are probably the occasions of confusion in the minds of them who infift upon it, that the will acts in a proper indifference, and without being moved by any inducement, in its determinations in fuch cafes as have been mentioned.

r. They feem to mistake the point in question, or at least not to keep it distinctly in view. The question they dispute about, is, Whether the mind be indifferent about the objects prefented, one of which is to be taken, touched, pointed to, &c. as two eggs, two cakes, which appear equally good. Whereas the question to be confidered, is, Whether the perfon be indifferent with respect to his own actions; whether he does not, on fome confideration or other, prefer one act with respect to these objects before another. The mind in its determination and choice, in these cases, is not most immediately and directly converfant about the objects presented; but the acts to be done concerning these objects. The objects may appear equal, and the mind may never properly make any choice between them: but the next act of the Will being about the external actions to be performed, taking, touching, &c. these may not appear equal, and one action may properly be chosen before another. In each step of the mind's progress, the determination is not about the objects, unlefs indirectly and improperly, but about the actions, which it chufes for

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There is no necessity of supposing, that the mind does ever at all properly chufe one of the objects before another; either before it has taken. or afterwards. Indeed the man chuses to take or touch one rather than another; but not because it chuses the thing taken, or touched; but from foreign confiderations. The cafe may be fo, that of two things offered, a man may, for certain reasons, chule and prefer the taking of that which he undervalues, and chufe to neglect to take that which his mind prefers. In fuch a cafe, chufing the thing taken, and chufing to take, are diverfe: and fo they are in a cafe where the things prefented are equal in the mind's efteem, and neither of them preferred. All that fact and experience makes evident, is, that the mind chufes one action rather than another. And therefore the arguments which they bring, in order to be to their purpole, ought to be to prove that the mind chuses the action in perfect indifference, with refpect to that action; and not to prove that the mind chuses the action in perfect indifference with refpect to the object; which is very poffible, and yet the will not act at all without prevalent inducement, and proper preponderation.

2. Another reason of confusion and difficulty in this matter, seems to be, not difficulty between a general indifference, or an indifference with respect to what is to be done in a more distant and general view of it, and a particular indifference, or an indifference with respect to the next immediate act, viewed with its particular and present circumstances. A man may be perfectly indifferent with respect to his own actions, G_{A}

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in the former respect; and yet not in the latter. Thus, in the foregoing inftance of touching one of the squares of a chess-board; when it is first proposed that I should touch one of them, I may be perfectly indifferent which I touch; because as yet I view the matter remotely and generally, being but in the first step of the mind's progress in the affair. But yet, when I am actually come to the last step, and the very next thing to be determined is which is to be touched, having already determined that I will touch that which happens to be most in my eye or mind, and my mind being now fixed on a particular one, the act of touching that, confidered thus immediately, and in these particular prefent circumstances, is not what my mind is abfolutely indifferent about.

SECTION VII.

Concerning the notion of Liberty of Will, confifting in Indifference.

W HAT has been faid in the foregoing fection, has a tendency in fome meafure to evince the abfurdity of the opinion of fuch as place Liberty in Indifference, or in that equilibrium whereby the Will is without all antecedent determination or bias, and left hitherto free from any prepoffelling inclination to one fide or the other; that the determination of the Will to either fide may be entirely from itfelf, and that it may be owing only to its own power, and that fovereignty which it has over itfelf, that it goes this way rather than that*.

* Dr. Whitby, and fome other Arminian, make a diffinction of different kinds of freedom; one of God, and perfect

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But in as much as this has been of fuch long ftanding, and has been fo generally received, and fo much infifted on by *Pelagians*, *Semi-Pelagians*, *Jefuits*, *Socinians*, *Arminians*, and others, it may deferve a more full confideration. And therefore I fhall now proceed to a more particular and thorough enquiry into this notion.

Now left fome fhould fuppofe that I do not underftand those that place Liberty in Indifference, or fhould charge me with misrepresenting their opinion, I would fignify, that I am fensible, there are fome, who when they talk of the Liberty of the Will as consisting in Indifference, express themselves as tho' they would not be understood of the Indifference of the inclination or tendency of the will, but of, I know not what, Indifference of the foul's power of willing; or that the Will, with respect to its power or ability to chuse, is indifferent, can go either way indifferently, either

fpirits above; another of perfons in a flate of trial. The former Dr. Whitby allows to confift with neceffity; the latter he holds to be without neceffity: and this latter he supposes to be requifite to our being the fubjects of praise or dispraise, rewards or punifhments, precepts and prohibitions, promifes and threats, exhortations and dehortations, and a covenant-treaty. And to this freedom he supposes Indifference to be requifite. In his Difcourfe on the five points, p. 299, 300, he fays; " It is a freedom (speaking of a freedom not only from " co-action, but from neceffity) requifite, as we conceive, " to render us capable of trial or probation, and to render our " actions worthy of praise or dispraise, and our persons of re-" wards or punishments." And in the next page, speaking of the fame matter, he fays, " Excellent to this purpole, are ** the words of Mr. Thorndike: We fay not, that Indifference " is requifite to all freedom, but to the freedom of man alone in " this flate of travail and proficience: the ground of which is " God's tender of a treaty, and conditions of peace and reconcile-** ment to fallen man, together with those precepts and prohibitions, ** those promises and threats, those exhortations and debortations, " it is enforced with."

to the right hand or left, either act or forbear to act, one as well as the other. Tho' this feems to be a refining only of fome particular writers, and newly invented, and which will by no means confift with the manner of expression used by the defenders of Liberty of Indifference in general. And I wish fuch refiners would thoroughly confider, whether they diffinctly know their own meaning, when they make a diffinction between Indifference of the foul as to its power or ability of willing or chufing, and the foul's Indifference as to the preference or choice itfelf; and whether they do not deceive themfelves in imagining that they have any diffinct meaning at all. The Indifference of the foul as to its ability or power to will, must be the fame thing as the Indifference of the ftate of the power or faculty of the Will, or the indifference of the state which the foul itself, which has that power or faculty, hitherto remains in, as to the exercise of that power. in the choice it shall by and by make.

But not to infift any longer on the obstrufeness and inexplicableness of this distinction; let what will be fuppofed concerning the meaning of them that make use of it, thus much must at least be intended by Arminians when they talk of Indifference as effential to Liberty of Will, if they intend any thing, in any respect to their purpose, viz. That it is fuch an Indifference as leaves the Will not determined already; but free from actual poffession, and vacant of predetermination, fo far, that there may be room for the exercise of the *felf-determining power* of the Will; and that the Will's freedom confifts in, or depends upon this vacancy and opportunity that is left for the Will itfelf to be the determiner of the act that is to be the free act.

And here I would observe in the first place, that to make out this scheme of Liberty, the Indiffe. rence must be perfect and absolute : there must be a perfect freedom from all antecedent preponderation or inclination. Becaufe if the Will be already inclined, before it exerts its own fovereign power on itself, then its inclination is not wholly owing to itself: if when two opposites are proposed to the foul for its choice, the proposal does not find the foul wholly in a state of Indifference, then it is not found in a flate of Liberty for mere felf-determination .- The least degree of an antecedent bias must be inconfistent with their notion of Liberty. For fo long as prior inclination poffeffes the Will, and is not removed, it binds the Will, fo that it is utterly impossible that the Will should act otherwife than agreeably to it. Surely the Will cannot act or chufe contrary to a remaining prevailing inclination of the Will. To fuppofe otherwife, would be the fame thing as to fuppofe, that the Will is inclined contrary to its prefent prevailing inclination, or contrary to what it is inclined to. That which the Will chuses and prefers, that, all things confidered, it preponderates and inclines to. It is equally impossible for the Will to chufe contrary to its own remaining and prefent preponderating inclination, as it is to prefer contrary to its own prefent preference, or chuse contrary to its own present choice. The Will, therefore, fo long as it is under the influence of an old preponderating inclination, is not at Liberty for a new free act, or any act that shall now be an act of felf-determination. The act which is a felf-determined free act, must be an act which the will determines in the possefior and use of fuch a Liberty, as confists in a freedom from every thing, which, if it were there, would make it impossible that the Will, at that

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time, fhould be otherwife than that way to which it tends.

If any one fhould fay, there is no need that the Indifference fhould be perfect; but although a former inclination and preference ftill remains, yet, if it be not very ftrong and violent, poffibly the ftrength of the Will may oppofe and overcome it: —This is grofsly abfurd; for the ftrength of the Will, let it be never fo great, does not at all enable it to act one way, and not the contrary way, both at the fame time. It gives it no fuch fovereignty and command, as to caufe itfelf to prefer and not to prefer at the fame time, or to chufe contrary to its own prefent choice.

Therefore, if there be the least degree of antecedent preponderation of the Will, it must be perfectly abolished, before the Will can be at liberty to determine itfelf the contrary way. And if the Will determines itself the fame way, it was not a free determination, because the Will is not wholly at Liberty in fo doing: its determination is not altogether from itfelf, but it was partly determined before, in its prior inclination: and all the Freedom the Will exercises in the cafe, is in an increase of inclination, which it gives itself, over and above what it had by foregoing bias; fo much is from itfelf, and fo much is from perfect Indifference. For though the Will had a previous tendency that way, yet as to that additional degree of inclination, it had no tendency. Therefore the previous tendency is of no confideration, with respect to the act wherein the Will is free. So that it comes to the fame thing which was faid at first, that as to the act of the Will, wherein the Will is free, there must be perfect Indifference, or equilibrium.

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To illustrate this; if we should suppose a fovereign felf-moving power in a natural body: but that the body is in motion already, by an antecedent bias; for inftance, gravitation towards the center of the earth; and has one degree of motion already, by virtue of that previous tendency; but by its felf-moving power it adds one degree more to its motion, and moves fo much more fwiftly towards the center of the earth than it would do by its gravity only: it is evident, that all that is owing to a felf-moving power in this cafe, is the additional degree of motion; and that the other degree of motion which it had from gravity, is of no confideration in the cafe, does not help the effect of the free felf-moving power in the least; the effect is just the fame, as if the body had received from itfelf one degree of motion from a state of perfect rest. So if we should fuppofe a felf-moving power given to the fcale of a balance, which has a weight of one degree beyond the opposite scale; and we ascribe to it an ability to add to itfelf another degree of force the fame way, by its felf-moving power; this is just the fame thing as to ascribe to it a power to give itfelf one degree of preponderation from a perfect equilibrium; and fo much power as the scale has to give itself an over-balance from a perfect equipoife, fo much felf-moving felf-preponderating power it has, and no more. So that its free power this way is always to be measured from perfed equilibrium.

I need fay no more to prove, that if Indifference be effential to Liberty, it must be perfect Indifference; and that fo far as the Will is deftitute of this, fo far it is deftitute of that freedom by which it is its own master, and in a capacity of being its own determiner, without being at

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all paffive, or fubject to the power and fway of fomething elfe, in its motions and determinations.

Having observed these things, let us now try whether this notion of the Liberty of Will confishing in Indifference and equilibrium, and the Will's felf-determination in such a state be not absurd and inconfistent.

And here I would lay down this as an axiom of undoubted truth; that every free act is done in a ftate of freedom, and not only after fuch a ftate. If an act of the Will be an act wherein the foul is free, it must be exerted in a ftate of freedom, and in the time of freedom. It will not fuffice, that the act immediately follows a ftate of Liberty; but Liberty must yet continue, and co-exist with the act; the foul remaining in possefilion of Liberty. Because that is the notion of a free act of the foul, even an act wherein the foul uses or exercises Liberty. But if the foul is not, in the very time of the act, in the possefilion of Liberty; it cannot at that time be in the use of it.

Now the queftion is, whether ever the foul of man puts forth an act of Will, while it yet remains in a ftate of Liberty, in that notion of a ftate of Liberty, viz. as implying a ftate of Indifference; or whether the foul ever exerts an act of choice or preference, while at that very time the Will is in a perfect equilibrium, not inclining one way more than another. The very putting of the queftion is fufficient to fhew the abfurdity of the affirmative anfwer: for how ridiculous would it be for any body to infift, that the foul chufes one thing before another, when at the very fame inftant it is perfectly indifferent with

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respect to each! This is the fame thing as to fay, the foul prefers one thing to another, at the very fame time that it has no preference .-Choice and preference can no more be in a state of Indifference, than motion can be in a state of reft, or than the preponderation of the scale of a balance can be in a state of equilibrium. Motionmay be the next moment after reft; but cannot co-exist with it, in any, even the least part of it. So choice may be immediately after a ftate of Indifference, but has no co-existence with it: even the very beginning of it is not in a ftate of Indifference. And therefore if this be Liberty, no act of the Will, in any degree, is ever performed in a flate of Liberty, or in the time of Liberty. Volition and Liberty are fo far from agreeing. together, and being effential one to another, that they are contrary one to another, and one excludes and destroys the other, as much as motion and reft, light and darkness, or life and death. So that the Will acts not at all, does not fo much as begin to act in the time of fuch Liberty: freedom is perfectly at an end, and has cealed to be, at the first moment of action; and therefore Liberty cannot reach the action, to affect, or qualify it, or give it a denomination, or any part of it, any more than if it had ceafed to be twenty years before the action began. The moment that Liberty ceafes to be, it ceafes to be a qualification of any thing. If light and darkness fucceed one another instantaneously, light qualifies nothing after it is gone out, to make any thing lightfome or bright, any more at the first moment of perfect darkness, than months or years after. Life denominates nothing vital at the first moment of perfect death. So freedom, if it confifts in, or implies Indifference, can denominate nothing free, at the first moment of

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preference or preponderation. Therefore it is manifest, that no Liberty which the foul is poffessed of, or ever uses, in any of its acts of voliztion, confists in Indifference; and that the opinion of such as suppose, that Indifference belongs to the very effence of Liberty, is to the highest degree absurd and contradictory.

If any one fhould imagine, that this manner of arguing is nothing but a trick and delution : and to evade the reafoning, should fay, that the thing wherein the Will exercises its Liberty, is not in the act of choice or preponderation itfelf, but in determining itself to a certain choice or preference; that the act of the Will wherein it is free, and uses its own fovereignty, confifts in its caufing or determining the change or transition from a state of Indifference to a certain preference, or determining to give a certain turn to the balance, which has hitherto been even; and that this act the Will exerts in a state of Liberty. or while the Will yet remains in equilibrium, and perfect master of itself .--- I fay, if any one chuses to express his notion of Liberty after this, or some fuch manner, let us fee if he can make out his matters any better than before.

What is afferted is, that the Will, while it yet remains in perfect equilibrium, without preference, determines to change itfelf from that flate; and excite in itfelf a certain choice or preference. Now let us fee whether this does not come to the fame abfurdity we had before. If it be fo, that the Will, while it yet remains perfectly indifferent, determines to put itfelf out of that flate, and give itfelf a certain preponderation; then I would enquire, whether the foul does not determine this of choice; or whether the Will's coming to a determination to do fo, be not the fame thing

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as the foul's coming to a choice to do fo. If the foul does not determine this of choice, or in the exercife of choice, then it does not determine it voluntarily. And if the foul does not determine it voluntarily, or of its own will, then in what fenfe does its will determine it? And if the will does not determine it, then how is the Liberty of the Will exercised in the determination? What fort of Liberty is exercifed by the foul in those determinations, wherein there is no exercise of choice, which are not voluntary, and wherein the will is not concerned?-But if it be allowed, that this determination is an act of choice, and it be infifted on, that the foul, while it yet remains in a state of perfect Indifference, chuses to put itself. out of that state, and to turn itself one way; then the foul is already come to a choice, and chufes that way. And fo we have the very fame absurdity which we had before. Here is the foul in a state of choice, and in a state of equilibrium, both at the fame time: the foul already chusing one way, while it remains in a state of perfect Indifference, and has no choice of one way more than the other.-And indeed this manner of talking, though it may a little hide the absurdity, in the obscurity of expression, is more nonfensical, and increases the inconsistence. To fay, the free act of the will, or the act which the will exerts in a state of freedom and Indifference, does not imply preference in it, but is what the will does in order to caufing or producing a preference, is as much as to fay, the foul chufes (for to will and to chuse are the fame thing) without choice, and prefers without preference, in order to caufe or produce the beginning of a preference, or the first choice. And that is, that the first choice is exerted without choice, in order to produce itself.

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If any, to evade thefe things, should own, that a state of Liberty, and a state of Indifference are not the fame, and that the former may be without the latter; but should fay, that Indifference is still effential to the freedom of an act of will, in fome fort, namely, as it is neceffary to go immediately before it; it being effential to the freedom of an act of will that it should directly and immediately arile out of a state of Indifference: still this will not help the caufe of Arminian Liberty, or make it confistent with itself. For if the act springs immediately out of a state of Indifference, then it does not arise from antecedent choice or preference. But if the act arifes directly out of a flate of Indifference, without any intervening choice to chufe and determine it, then the act not being determined by choice, is not determined by the will; the mind exercises no free choice in the affair, and free choice and free will have no hand in the determination of the act. Which is entirely inconfistent with their notion of the freedom of Volition.

If any fhould fuppofe, that thefe difficulties and abfurdities may be avoided, by faying, that the Liberty of the mind confifts in a power to *fufpend* the act of the will, and fo to keep it in a ftate of *Indifference*, until there has been opportunity for confideration; and fo fhall fay, that however Indifference is not effential to Liberty in fuch a manner, that the mind must make its: choice in a ftate of Indifference, which is an inconfiftency, or that the act of will must fpring immediately out of Indifference; yet indifference may be effential to the Liberty of acts of the wilk in this refpect; *viz*. That Liberty confifts in a Power of the mind to forbear or fufpend the act of Volition, and keep the mind in a ftate of In-

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difference for the prefent, until there has been opportunity for proper deliberation: I fay, if any one imagines that this helps the matter, it is a great miltake: it reconciles no inconfiltency, and relieves no difficulty which the affair is attended with.—For here the following things must be observed,

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1. That this *fufpending* of Volition, if there be properly any fuch thing, is itfelf an act of Volition. If the mind determines to fufpend its act, it determines it voluntarily; it chufes, on fome confideration, to fufpend it. And this choice or determination, is an act of the will: And indeed it is fuppofed to be fo in the very hypothefis; for it is fuppofed that the Liberty of the will confifts in its Power to do this, and that its doing it is the very thing wherein the will exercifes its Liberty: But how can the will exercife Liberty in it, if it be not an act of the will? The Liberty of the will is not exercifed in any thing but what the will does.

2. This determining to sufpend acting is not only an act of the will, but it is supposed to be the only free act of the will; because it is faid, that this is the thing wherein the Liberty of the will tonfifts.-Now if this be fo, then this is all the act of will that we have to confider in this controverly, about the Liberty of will, and in our enquiries, wherein the Liberty of man confifts. And now the forementioned difficulties remain: the former question returns upon us; viz. Wherein confifts the freedom of the will in those acts wherein it is free? And if this act of determining a fuspension be the only act in which the will is free, then wherein confifts the will's freedom with respect to this act of suspension? H 2

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And how is Indifference effential to this act? The answer must be, according to what is supposed in the evalion under confideration, that the Liberty of the will in this act of suspension, confists in a Power to fuspend even this act, until there has been opportunity for thorough deliberation. But this will be to plunge directly into the groffest nonfense: for it is the act of fuspension itself that we are speaking of; and there is no room for a space of deliberation and sufpension in order to determine whether we will fuspend or no. For that supposes, that even sufpension itself may be deferred: which is abfurd; for the very deferring the determination of fuspension, to confider whether we will fuspend or no, will be actually fufpending. For during the space of suspension. to confider whether to fuspend, the act is ipfo facto fuspended. There is no medium between fulpending to act, and immediately acting; and therefore no possibility of avoiding either the one or the other one moment.

And befides, this is attended with ridiculous abfurdity another way: for now it is come to that, that Liberty confifts wholly in the mind's having Power to suspend its determination whether to fuspend or no; that there may be time for confideration, whether it be best to fuspend. And if Liberty confifts in this only, then this is the Liberty under confideration: we have to enquire now, how Liberty with respect to this act of fulpending a determination of fulpenfion, confifts, in Indifference, or how Indifference is effential to it. The answer, according to the hypothesis we are upon, must be, that it confists in a Power of fuspending even this last-mentioned act, to have time to confider whether to fufpend that. And then the fame difficulties and enquiries re-

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turn over again with respect to that; and fo on for ever. Which, if it would fhew any thing, would fhew only that there is no fuch thing as a free act. It drives the exercise of freedom back in infinitum; and that is to drive it out of the world.

And befides all this, there is a Delufion, and a latent grofs contradiction in the affair another way; in as much as in explaining how, or in what respect the will is free with regard to a particular act of Volition, it is faid that its Liberty confifts in a Power to determine to fulpend that act, which places Liberty not in that act of Volition which the enquiry is about, but altogether in another antecedent act. Which contradicts the thing fuppofed in both the question and answer. The question is, wherein confists the mind's Liberty in any particular act of Voli-tion? And the answer, in pretending to shew wherein lies the mind's Liberty in that act, in effect fays, it does not lie in that act at all, but in another, viz. a Volition to fufpend that act. And therefore the answer is both contradictory, and altogether impertinent and befide the purpofe. For it does not fhew wherein the Liberty of the will confifts in the act in question; instead of that, it fuppofes it does not confift in that act at all, but in another diffinct from it, even a Volition to fufpend that act, and take time to confider of it. And no account is pretended to be given wherein the mind is free with respect to that act, wherein this answer supposes the Liberty of the mind indeed confifts, viz. the act of fuspension, or of determining the fufpenfion.

On the whole, it is exceeding manifest, that the Liberty of the mind does not confift in Indiffe-

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rence, and that Indifference is not effential or neceffary to it, or at all belonging to it, as the Arminians fuppole; that opinion being full of nothing but abfurdity and felf-contradiction.

SECTION VIII.

Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, as opposite to all Necessity,

I T is a thing chiefly infifted on by Arminians, in this controverfy, as a thing most important and effential in human Liberty, that volitions, or the acts of the will, are contingent events; understanding contingence as opposite, not only to constraint, but to all Necessity. Therefore I would particularly consider this matter, And

1. I would enquire, whether there is, or can be any fuch thing, as a volition which is contingent in fuch a fenfe, as not only to come to pafs without any Neceffity of constraint or co-action, but also without a Neceffity of consequence, or an infallible connection with any thing foregoing.

2. Whether, if it were fo, this would at all help the caufe of Liberty.

I. I would confider whether volition is a thing that ever does, or can come to pass, in this manner, contingently.

And here it must be remembered, that it has been already shewn, that nothing can ever come to pass without a cause, or reason why it exists in this manner rather than another; and the evidence of this has been particularly applied to the

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Sect. VIII. Of the fuppofed Liberty, &c. 103 acts of the will. Now if this be fo, it will demonftrably follow, that the acts of the will are never contingent, or without Neceffity in the fense fpoken of; in as much as those things which have a cause, or reason of their existence, must be connected with their cause. This appears by the following confiderations.

1. For an event to have a caufe and ground of its existence, and yet not to be connected with its cause, is an inconfistence. For if the event be not connected with the cause, it is not dependent on the cause; its existence is as it were bose from its influence, and may attend it, or may not; it being a mere contingence, whether it follows or attends the influence of the cause, or not: And that is the fame thing as not to be dependent on it. And to fay, the event is not dependent on its cause, is absurd: It is the fame thing as to fay, it is not its caufe, nor the event the effect of it: For dependence on the influence of a caufe is the very notion of an effect. If there be no fuch relation between one thing and another, confifting in the connection and dependence of one thing on the influence of another, then it is certain there is no fuch relation between them as is fignified by the terms caufe and effect. So far as an event is dependent on a caufe and connected with it, fo much caufality is there in the cafe, and no more. The caufe does, or brings to pass no more in any event, than is dependent on it. If we fay, the connection and dependence is not total, but partial, and that the effect, though it has fome connection and dependence, yet is not entirely dependent on it; that is the fame thing as to fay, that not all that is in the event is an effect of that cause, but that

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2. If there are fome events which are not neceffarily connected with their caufes, then it will follow, that there are fome things which come to pais without any caufe, contrary to the fuppolition. For if there be any event which was not neceffarily connected with the influence of the caufe under fuch circumstances, then it was contingent whether it would attend or follow the influence of the caufe, or no; it might have followed, and it might not, when the cause was the fame, its influence the fame, and under the fame circumitances. And if fo, why did it follow, rather than not follow? There is no caufe or reafon of this. Therefore here is fomething without any caufe or reafon why it is, viz. the following of the effect on the influence of the caufe, with which it was not neceffarily connected. If there be a neceffary connection of the effect on any thing antecedent, then we may suppose that fometimes the event will follow the caufe, and fometimes not, when the caufe is the fame, and in every respect in the same state and circumstances. And what can be the cause and reason of this strange phenomenon, even this diversity, that in one inftance, the effect fhould follow, in another not? It is evident by the supposition, that this is wholly without any caufe or ground. Here is fomething in the prefent manner of the existence of things, and state of the world, that is abfolutely without a caufe. Which is contrary to the fuppolition, and contrary to what has been before demonstrated.

3. To suppose there are some events which have a cause and ground of their existence, that vet are not necessarily connected with their cause, is to fuppofe that they have a caufe which is not their caule. Thus; if the effect be not necelfarily connected with the cause, with its influence, and influential circumstances; then, as I oblerved before, it is a thing possible and fuppolable, that the caufe may fometimes exert the fame influence, under the fame circumstances, and yet the effect not follow. And if this actually happens in any inftance, this inftance is a proof, in fact, that the influence of the caufe is not fufficient to produce the effect. For if it had been fufficient, it would have done it. And yet, by the fuppolition, in another inftance, the fame caufe, with perfectly the fame influence, and when all circumstances which have any influence, are the fame, it was followed with the effect. By which it is manifest, that the effect in this last instance was not owing to the influence of the cause, but must come to pass fome other way. For it was proved before, that the influence of the caufe was not fufficient to produce the effect. And if it was not fufficient to produce it, then the production of it could not be owing to that influence, but must be owing to fomething elfe, or owing to nothing. And if the effect be not owing to the influence of the caufe, then it is not the caufe. Which brings us to the contradiction, of a caufe, and no caufe, that which is the ground and reason of the existence of a thing, and at the fame time is not the ground and reason of its existence, nor is sufficient to be fo.

If the matter be not already fo plain as to render any further reasoning upon it impertinent, I would fay, that that which feems to be the caufe in the supposed case, can be no cause; its power Of the supposed Liberty, &c. Part II.

and influence having, on a full trial, proved infufficient to produce fuch an effect: and if it be not fufficient to produce it, then it does not produce it. To fay otherwife, is to fay, there is power to do that which there is not power to do. If there be in a caufe fufficient power exerted, and in circumstances sufficient to produce an effect, and fo the effect be actually produced at one time; these things all concurring, will produce the effect at all times. And fo we may turn it the other way; that which proves not fufficient at one time, cannot be fufficient at another, with precifely the fame influential circumstances. And therefore if the effect follows, it is not owing to that cause: unless the different time be a circumstance which has influence: but that is contrary to the fuppolition; for it is fuppoled that all circumstances that have influence, are the fame, And befides, this would be to fuppofe the time to be the caufe; which is contrary to the fupposition of the other thing's being the cause. But if merely diversity of time has no influence, then it is evident that it is as much of an abfurdity to fay, the caufe was fufficient to produce the effect at one time, and not at another; as to fay, that it is fufficient to produce the effect at a certain time, and yet not fufficient to produce the fame effect at the fame time.

On the whole, it is clearly manifelt, that every effect has a neceffary connection with its caufe, or with that which is the true ground and reafon of its existence. And therefore if there be no event without a caufe, as was proved before, then no event whatfoever is contingent in the manner, that Arminians fuppofe the free acts of the will to be contingent.

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SECTION IX.

Of the Connection of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Understanding.

T is manifest, that the acts of the Will are none of them contingent in fuch a fenfe as to be without all neceffity, or fo as not to be neceffary with a neceffity of confequence and Connection; becaufe every Act of the Will is fome way connected with the Understanding, and is as the greatest apparent good is, in the manner which has already been explained; namely, that the foul always wills or chufes that which, in the prefent view of the mind, confidered in the whole of that view, and all that belongs to it, appears most agreeable. Because, as was observed before, nothing is more evident than that, when men act voluntarily, and do what they pleafe, then they do what appears most agreeable to them; and to fay otherwise, would be as much as to affirm, that men do not chufe what appears to fuit them beft, or what feems most pleasing to them; or that they do not chuse what they prefer. Which brings the matter to a contradiction.

And it is very evident in itfelf, that the acts of the Will have fome Connection with the dictates or views of the Understanding, fo this is allowed by fome of the chief of the Arminian writers: particularly by Dr. Whitby and Dr. Samuel Clark. Dr. Turnbull, though a great enemy to the doctrine of neceffity, allows the fame thing. In his *Christian Philosophy*, (p. 196.) he with much appobation cites another philosopher, as of the fame ind, in these words: "No man, (fays an ex-

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" cellent philosopher) sets himself about any " thing, but upon fome view or other, which "ferves him for a reason for what he does; and " whatfoever faculties he employs, the Under-" ftanding, with fuch light as it has, well or ill "formed, constantly leads; and by that light, " true or false, all her operative powers are di-" rected. The Will itfelf, how absolute and in-" controllable foever it may be thought, never " fails in its obedience to the dictates of the "Understanding. Temples have their facred "images; and we fee what influence they have " always had over a great part of mankind; but " in truth, the ideas and images in mens' minds " are the invisible powers that constantly govern " them; and to these they all pay universally a " ready fubmiffion."

But whether this be in a just confistence with themfelves, and their own notions of liberty, I defire may now be impartially confidered.

Dr. Whitby plainly fupposes, that the Acts and Determinations of the Will always follow the Understanding's apprehension or view of the greatest good to be obtained, or evil to be avoided; or, in other words, that the Determinations of the Will conftantly and infallibly follow thefe two things in the Understanding: 1. The degree of good to be obtained, and evil to be avoided, proposed to the Understanding, and apprehended, viewed, and taken notice of by it. 2. The degree of the Understanding's view, notice or apprehenfion of that good or evil; which is increased by attention and confideration. That this is an opinion he is exceeding peremptory in (as he is in every opinion which he maintains in his controverly with the Calvinists) with difdain of the contrary opinion, as abfurd and felf-contradictory.

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will appear by the following words of his, in his Difcourfe on the Five Points*.

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"Now, it is certain, that what naturally makes "the Understanding to perceive, is evidence "proposed, and apprehended, confidered or ad-"verted to: for nothing elfe can be requilite to " make us come to the knowledge of the truth. "Again, what makes the Will chuse, is some-"thing approved by the Understanding; and " confequently appearing to the foul as good. "And whatfoever it refuseth, is fomething re-" prefented by the Understanding, and fo appear-"ing to the Will, as evil. Whence all that God " requires of us is and can be only this; to re-"fule the evil, and chuse the good. Where-" fore, to fay that evidence proposed, apprehend-"ed and confidered, is not fufficient to make the "Understanding approve; or that the greatest "good proposed, the greatest evil threatened, "when equally believed and reflected on, is "not fufficient to engage the Will to chufe the "good and refuse the evil, is in effect to fay, " that which alone doth move the Will to chufe or to " refuse, is not fufficient to engage it fo to do; "which being contradictory to itfelf, must of "necessity be false. Be it then so, that we na-"turally have an averfion to the truths pro-" posed to us in the Gospel; that only can make "us indifposed to attend to them, but cannot " hinder our conviction, when we do apprehend " them, and attend to them.-Be it, that there is " in us also a renitency to the good we are to "chuse; that only can indispose us to believe it " is, and to approve it as our chiefest good. Be "it, that we are prone to the evil that we should " decline; that only can render it the more diffi-

* Second Edit. p. 211, 212, 213.

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" cult for us to believe it is the worft of evils. " But yet, what we do really believe to be our chiefest " good, will still be chosen; and what we apprehend " to be the worft of evils, will, whilft we do continue " under that conviction, be refused by us. It there-" fore can be only requisite, in order to these ends, " that the Good Spirit should fo illuminate our " Understandings, that we attending to, and con-" fidering what lies before us, fhould apprehend. " and be convinced of our duty; and that the " bleffings of the Gofpel should be fo propounded " to us, as that we may difcern them to be our " chiefest good; and the miseries it threateneth, " fo as we may be convinced that they are the " worft of evils; that we may chufe the one, and " refuse the other."

Here let it be observed, how plainly and peremptorily it is afferted, that the greatest good proposed, and the greatest evil threatened, when equally believed and reflected on, is fufficient to engage the Will to chufe the good, and refuse the evil, and is that alone which doth move the Will to chufe or to refuse; and that it is contradictory to itfelf, to fuppofe otherwife; and therefore must of necessity be false; and then what we do really believe to be our chiefest good will still be chofen, and what we apprehend to be the worst of evils, will, whilf we continue under that conviction, be refused by us. Nothing could have been faid more to the purpose, fully to fignify and declare, that the determinations of the Will must evermore follow the illumination, conviction and notice of the Understanding, with regard to the greatest good and evil proposed, reckoning both the degree of good and evil understood, and the degree of Understanding, notice and conviction of that proposed good and evil; and that it is thus neceffarily, and can be otherwife in no inftance:

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because it is afferted, that it implies a contradiction, to suppose it ever to be otherwise.

I am fenfible, the Doctor's aim in these affertions is against the Calvini/ts; to shew, in oppofition to them, that there is no need of any phyfical operation of the Spirit of God on the Will, to change and determine that to a good choice, but that God's operation and affiftance is only moral, fuggesting ideas to the Understanding; which he fuppofes to be enough, if those ideas are attended to, infallibly to obtain the end. But whatever his defign was, nothing can more directly and fully prove, that every determination of the Will, in chufing and refufing, is neceffary; directly contrary to his own notion of the liberty of the Will. For if the determination of the Will, evermore, in this manner, follows the light, conviction and view of the Understanding, concerning the greatest good and evil, and this be that alone which moves the Will, and it be a contradiction to fuppofe otherwife; then it is necessarily fo, the Will neceffarily follows this light or view of the Understanding, not only in some of its acts, but in every act of chusing and refusing. So that the Will does not determine itfelf in any one of its own acts; but all its acts, every act of choice and refufal depends on, and is neceffarily connected with fome antecedent caufe; which cause is not the Will itself, nor any act of its own, nor any thing pertaining to that faculty, but fomething belonging to another faculty, whose acts go before the Will, in all its acts, and govern and determine them every one.

Here, if it fhould be replied, that although it be true, that according to the Doctor, the final determination of the Will always depends upon, and is infallibly connected with the Understand-

ing's conviction, and notice of the greateft good; yet the Acts of the Will are not neceffary; becaufe that conviction and notice of the Understanding is first dependent on a preceding Act of the Will, in determining to attend to, and take notice of the evidence exhibited; by which means the mind obtains that degree of conviction, which is fufficient and effectual to determine the confequent and ultimate choice of the Will; and that the Will with regard to that preceding act, whereby it determines whether to attend or no, is not neceffary; and that in this, the liberty of the Will confist, that when God holds forth fufficient objective light, the Will is at liberty whether to command the attention of the mind to it.

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Nothing can be more weak and inconfiderate than fuch a reply as this. For that preceding Act of the Will, in determining to attend and confider, still is an Act of the Will (it is fo to be fure, if the liberty of the Will confifts in it, as is fuppofed) and if it be an Act of the Will, it is an act of choice or refusal. And therefore, if what the Doctor afferts be true, it is determined by fome antecedent light in the Understanding concerning the greatest apparent good or evil. For he afferts, it is that light which alone doth move the Will to chufe or refuse. And therefore the Will must be moved by that in chusing to attend to the objective light offered, in order to another confequent act of choice: fo that this act is no lefs neceffary than the other. And if we suppose another Act of the Will, still preceding both these mentioned, to determine both, still that also mustbe an Act of the Will, and an act of choice; and fo must, by the fame principles, be infallibly determined by fome certain degree of light in the Understanding concerning the greatest good.

And let us fuppofe as many acts of the Will, one preceding another, as we pleafe, yet they are every one of them necessarily determined by a certain degree of light in the Understanding, concerning the greatest and most eligible good in that cafe; and fo, not one of them free according to Dr. Whitby's notion of freedom. And if it be faid, the reafon, why men do not attend to light held forth, is because of ill habits contracted by evil acts committed before, whereby their minds are indifposed to attend to, and confider of the truth held forth to them by God, the difficulty is not at all avoided: still the question returns. What determined the Will in those preceding evil acts? It must, by Dr. Whitby's principles, still be the view of the Understanding concerning the greatest good and evil. If this view of the understanding be that alone which doth move the Will to chule or refuse, as the Doctor afferts, then every act of choice or refusal, from a man's first existence, is moved and determined by this view; and this view of the Understanding exciting and governing the act, must be before the act: And therefore the Will is necessarily determined, in every one of its acts, from a man's first existence, by a cause beside the Will, and a caufe that does not proceed from, or depend on any act of the Will at all. Which at once utterly abolishes the Doctor's whole scheme of Liberty of Will; and he, at one stroke, has cut the finews of all his arguments from the goodnefs, tighteousness, faithfulness and sincerity of God, in his commands, promises, threatenings, calls, invitations, expostulations; which he makes use of, under the heads of reprobation, election, universal redemption, sufficient and effectual grace, and the freedom of the Will of man; and has enervated and made vain all those excla-

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mations against the doctrine of the Calvinifts, as charging God with manifest unrighteousness, unfaithfulness, hypocrify, fallaciousness, and cruelty; which he has over, and over, and over again, numberless times in his book.

Dr. Samuel Clark, in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, * to evade the argument to prove the necessity of volition, from its neceffary Connection with the last dictate of the Understanding, fuppofes the latter not to be diverse from the Act of the Will itself. But if it be fo, it will not alter the cafe as to the evidence of the necessity of the A& of the Will. If the dictate of the Understanding be the very fame with the determination of the Will or Choice, as Dr. Clark fuppofes, then this determination is no fruit or effect of choice: and if fo, no liberty of choice has any hand in it: as to volition or choice, it is neceffary; that is, choice cannot prevent it. If the last dictate of the Understanding be the fame with the determination of volition itself, then the existence of that determination must be neceffary as to volition; in as much as volition can have no opportunity to determine whether it shall exist or no, it having existence ` already before volition has opportunity to determine any thing. It is itself the very rife and existence of volition. But a thing, after it exist, has no opportunity to determine as to its own existence; it is too late for that.

If liberty confifts in that which Arminians fuppole, viz. in the Will's determining its own acts, having free opportunity, and being without all neceflity; this is the fame as to fay, that liber-

* Edit. VI. p. 93.

ty confifts in the foul's having power and opportunity to have what determinations of the Will it pleafes or chufes. And if the determinations of the Will, and the laft dictates of the Understanding be the fame thing, then Liberty confifts in the mind's having power to have, what dictates of the Understanding it pleafes, having opportunity to chufe its own dictates of Understanding. But this is abfurd; for it is to make the determination of choice prior to the dictate of Understanding, and the ground of it; which cannot confift with the dictate of Understanding's being the determination of choice itself.

Here is no way to do in this cafe, but only to recur to the old abfurdity of one determination before another, and the caufe of it; and another before that, determining that; and fo on in infinitum. If the last dictate of the Understanding be the determination of the Will itfelf, and the foul be free with regard to that dictate, in the Arminian notion of freedom; then the foul, before that dictate of its Understanding exists, voluntarily and according to its own choice determines, in every cafe, what that dictate of the Underftanding shall be; otherwife that dictate, as to the Will, is neceffary; and the acts determined by it must also be necessary. So that here is a determination of the mind prior to that dictate of the Understanding, an act of choice going before it, chufing and determining what that dictate of the Understanding shall be: and this preceding act of choice, being a free act of Will, must also be the fame with another last dictate of the Understanding: And if the mind also be free in that dictate of Understanding, that must be determined still by another; and fo on for ever.

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Befides, if the dictate of the Understanding, and determination of the Will be the fame, this confounds the Understanding and Will, and makes them the fame. Whether they be the fame or no, I will not now difpute; but only would obferve, that if it be fo, and the Arminian notion of liberty confifts in a felf-determining power in the Understanding, free of all necessity; being independent, undetermined by any thing prior to its own acts and determinations; and the more the Understanding is thus independent, and fovereign over its own determinations, the more free. By this therefore the freedom of the foul, as a moral agent, must confist in the independence of the Understanding on any evidence or appearance of things, or any thing whatfoever, that stands forth to the view of the mind, prior to the Understanding's determination. And what a fort of liberty is this! confifting in an ability, freedom and eafinefs of judging, either according to evidence, or against it; having a fovereign command over itself at all times, to judge, either agreeably or difagreeably to what is plainly exhibited to its own view. Certainly, it is no liberty that renders perfons the proper fubjects of persuafive reasoning, arguments, expostulations, and fuch like moral means and inducements. The use of which with mankind is a main argument of the Arminians, to defend their notion of liberty without all neceffity. For according to this, the more free men are, the lefs they are under the government of fuch means, lefs fubject to the power of evidence and reason, and more independent on their influence, in their determinations.

And whether the Understanding and Will are the fame or no, as Dr. Clark feems to fuppofe,

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vet in order to maintain the Arminian nction of liberty without neceffity, the free Will is not determined by the Understanding, nor necessarily connected with the Understanding; and the further from fuch Connection, the greater the freedom. And when the liberty is full and compleat, the determinations of the Will have no Connection at all with the dictates of the Understanding. And if so, in vain are all the applications to the Understanding, in order to induce to any free virtuous act; and fo in vain are all instructions, counsels, invitations, expostulations, and all arguments and perfuafives whatfoever: for these are but applications to the Understanding, and a clear and lively exhibition of the objects of choice to the mind's view. But if, after all, the Will must be felf-determined, and independent on the Understanding, to what purpose are things thus represented to the Understanding, in order to determine the choice?

SECTION X.

Volition neceffarily connected with the Influence of Motives; with particular Observations on the great Inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's Affertions and Reasonings, about the Freedom of the Will.

THAT every act of the will has fome caufe, and confequently (by what has been already proved) has a neceffary connection with its caufe, and fo is neceffary by a neceffity of connection and confequence, is evident by this, that every act of the will whatfoever is excited by fome motive: which is manifest, becaufe, if

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the will or mind, in willing and chuſing after the manner that it does, is excited fo to do by no motive or inducement, then it has no end which it propofés to itſelf, or purſues in ſo doing; it aims at nothing, and ſeeks nothing. And if it ſeeks nothing, then it does not go after any thing, or exert any inclination or preſerence towards any thing. Which brings the matter to a contradiction; becauſe for the mind to will ſomething, and for it to go after ſomething by an act of preſerence and inclination, are the ſame thing.

But if every act of the will is excited by a Motive, then that Motive is the caufe of the act of the will. If the acts of the will are excited by Motives, then Motives are the caufes of their being excited; or, which is the fame thing, the caufe of their being put forth into act and exiftence. And if fo, the existence of the acts of the will is properly the effect of their Motives. Motives do nothing as Motives or inducements, but by their influence; and fo much as is done by their influence is the effect of them. For that is the notion of an effect, fomething that is brought to pass by the influence of another thing.

And if volitions are properly the effects of their Motives, then they are neceffarily connected with their Motives. Every effect and event being, as was proved before, neceffarily connected with that, which is the proper ground and reafon of its existence. Thus it is manifest, that volition is neceffary, and is not from any felf-determining power in the will: the volition, which is caused by previous Motive and inducement, is not caused by the will exercising a fovereign power over itself, to determine, cause and excite

connected with Motives.

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volitions in itfelf. This is not confiftent with the will's acting in a flate of indifference and equilibrium, to determine itfelf to a preference; for the way in which Motives operate, is by biaffing the will, and giving it a certain inclination or preponderation one way.

Here it may be proper to obferve, that Mr. Chubb, in his Collection of Tracts on various Subjects, has advanced a fcheme of liberty, which is greatly divided against itself, and thoroughly fubversive of itself; and that many ways.

I. He is abundant in afferting, that the will, in all its acts, is influenced by Motive and excitement; and that this is the previous ground and reason of all its acts, and that it is never otherwife in any inftance. He fays, (p. 262.) No action can take place without fome Motive to excite it. And in p. 263. Volition cannot take place without fome PREVIOUS reafon or Motive to induce it. And in p. 310. Action would not take place without fome reason or Motive to induce it; it being absurd to suppose, that the active faculty would be exerted without fome PREVIOUS reafon to dispose the mind to action. So also p. 257. And he speaks of these things, as what we may be abfolutely certain of, and which are the foundation, the only foundation we have of a certainty of the moral perfections of God. p. 252, 253, 254, 255, 261, 262, 263, 264.

And yet at the fame time, by his fcheme, the influence of Motives upon us to excite to action, and to be actually a ground of volition, is *confequent* on the volition or choice of the mind. For he very greatly infifts upon it, that in all free actions, before the mind is the fubject of those vo-

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litions, which Motives excite, it chufes to be fo. It chufes, whether it will comply with the Motive, which prefents itfelf in view, or not; and when various Motives are prefented, it chufes, which it will yield to, and which it will reject. So p. 256. Every man has power to act, or to refrain from acting agreeably with, or contrary to, any Motive that prefents. P. 257. Every man is at liberty to act, or refrain from acting agreeably with, or contrary to. what each of these Motives, confidered fingly, would excite him to .- Man has power, and is as much at liberty to reject the Motive, that does prevail, as he has power, and is at liberty to reject those Motives that do not. And fo p. 310, 311. In order to constitute a moral agent, it is necessary, that he should have power to act, or to refrain from acting, upon fuch moral Motives as he pleases. And to the like purpofe in many other places. According to thefe things, the will acts first, and chuses or refuses to comply with the Motive, that is prefented, before it falls under its prevailing influence: and it is first determined by the mind's pleafure or choice, what Motives it will be induced by, before it is induced by them.

Now, how can thefe things hang together? How can the mind first act, and by its act of *volition* and *choice* determine, what Motives shall be the ground and reason of its *volition* and *choice*? For this supposes, the choice is already made, before the Motive has its effect; and that the volition is already exerted, before the Motive prevails, so as actually to be the ground of the volition; and makes the prevailing of the Motive, the confequence of the volition, which yet it is the ground of. If the mind has already chosen to comply with a Motive, and to yield to its excitement, it does not need to yield to it after Scheme of Liberty, &c.

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this: for the thing is effected already, that the Motive would excite to, and the will is beforehand with the excitement; and the excitement comes in too late, and is needlefs and in vain afterwards. If the mind has already chosen to yield to a Motive which invites to a thing, that implies and in fact is a chufing the thing invited to; and the very act of choice is before the influence of the Motive which induces, and is the ground of the choice; the fon is beforehand with the father that begets him: the choice is fuppofed to be the ground of that influence of the Motive, which very influence is fuppofed to be the ground of the choice. And fo vice verfa, the choice is supposed to be the confequence of the influence of the Motive, which influence of the Motive is the confequence of that very choice.

And befides, if the will acts first towards the Motive before it falls under its influence, and the prevailing of the Motive upon it to induce it to act and chufe, be the fruit and confequence of its act and choice, then how is the Motive *a PREVIOUS ground and reason of the act and choice*, fo that in the nature of the things, volition cannot take place without fome *PREVIOUS reason and Mo*tive to induce it; and that this act is confequent upon, and follows the Motive? Which things Mr. Chubb often afferts, as of certain and undoubted truth. So that the very fame Motive is both previous and confequent, both before and after, both the ground and fruit of the very fame thing!

II. Agreeable to the fore-mentioned inconfiftent notion of the will's first acting towards the Motive, chusing whether it will comply with it, in order to its becoming a ground of the will's

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acting, before any act of volition can take place, Mr. Chubb frequently calls Motives and excitements to the action of the will, the passive ground or reason of that action. Which is a remarkable phrafe; than which I prefume there is none more unintelligible, and void of diftinct and confiftent meaning, in all the writings of Duns Scotus, or Thomas Aquinas. When he reprefents the Motive to action or volition as passive, he must meanpassive in that affair, or passive with respect to that action, which he fpeaks of; otherwife it is nothing to his purpose, or relating to the defign of his argument: he must mean, (if that can be called a meaning) that the Motive to volition is first acted upon or towards by the volition, chufing to yield to it, making it a ground of action, or determining to fetch its influence from thence; and fo to make it a previous ground of its own excitation and existence. Which is the fame abfurdity, as if one should fay, that the foul of man, or any other thing fhould, previous to its exifting, chufe what caufe it would come into existence by, and should act upon its cause, to fetch influence from thence, to bring it into being; and fo its caufe should be a passive ground of its existence!

Mr. Chubb does very plainly fuppofe Motive or excitement to be the ground of the being of volition. He fpeaks of it as the ground or reafon of the E X E R TION of an act of the will, p. 391, and 392, and expressly fays, that volition cannot TAKE PLACE without fome previous ground or Motive to induce it, p. 363. And he speaks of the act as FROM the Motive, and FROM THE INFLUENCE of the Motive, p. 352. and from the influence that the Motive has on the man, for the PRODUCTION of an action, p. 317. Cer-

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tainly there is no need of multiplying words about this; it is eafily judged, whether Motive can be the ground of volition's being exerted and taking place, fo that the very production of it is from the influence of the Motive, and yet the Motive, before it becomes the ground of the volition, is paffive, or acted upon by the volition. But this I will fay, that a man, who infifts fo much on clearnels of meaning in others, and is fo much in blaming their confusion and inconfiftence, ought, if he was able, to have explained his meaning in this phrafe of *paffive ground of action*, fo as to so thew it not to be confused and inconfishent.

If any fhould fuppofe, that Mr. Chubb, when he speaks of Motive as a *paffive ground of action*, does not mean passive with regard to that volition which it is the ground of, but fome other antecedent volition (though his purpose and argument, and whole difcourfe, will by no means allow of fuch a fuppofition) yet it would not help the matter in the least. For, (1.) If we suppose there to be an act of volition or choice, by which the foul chufes to yield to the invitation of a Motive to another volition, by which the foul chufes fomething elfe; both these supposed volitions are in effect the very fame. A volition, or chufing to yield to the force of a Motive inviting to chufe fomething, comes to just the fame thing as chufing the thing, which the Motive invites to, as I observed before. So that here can be no room to help the matter, by a diffinction of two volitions. (2.) If the Motive be paffive with refpect, not to the fame volition, that the Motive excites to, but one truly diftinct and prior; yet, by Mr. Chubb, that prior volition cannot take place, without a Motive or excitement, as a previous ground

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of its existence. For he infifts, that it is abfurd to fuppofe any volition fhould take place without fome previous Motive to induce it. So that at last it comes to just the fame abfurdity: for if every volition must have a previous Motive, then the very first in the whole feries must be excited by a previous Motive; and yet the Motive to that first volition is passive; but cannot be passive with regard to another antecedent volition, because, by the supposition, it is the very first: therefore if it be passive with respect to any volition, it must be fo with regard to that very volition that it is the ground of, and that is excited by it.

III. Though Mr. Chubb afferts, as above, that every volition has fome Motive, and that in the nature of the thing, no volition can take place without some Motive to induce it; yet he afferts, that volition does dot always follow the strongest Motive; or, in other words, is not governed by any superiour strength of the Motive that is followed, beyond Motives to the contrary, previous to the volition itself. His own words, p. 258, are as follow: "Though with regard to phyfical caufes, " that which is strongest always prevails, yet it " is otherwife with regard to moral caufes. Of " thefe, fometimes the ftronger, fometimes the "weaker, prevails. And the ground of this " difference is evident, namely, that what we " call moral caufes, ftrictly speaking, are no " caufes at all, but barely paffive reafons of, or " excitements to the action, or to the refrain-" ing from acting: which excitements we have " power, or are at liberty to comply with or re-" ject, as I have fhewed above." And fo throughout the paragraph, he, in a variety of phrases, infifts, that the will is not always determined by the strongest Motive, unless by strongest we pre-

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pofteroufly mean actually prevailing in the event; which is not in the Motive, but in the will; but that the will is not always determined by the Motive, which is ftrongeft, by any ftrength previous to the volition itfelf. And he elfewhere does abundantly affert, that the will is determined by no fuperiour ftrength or advantage, that Motives have, from any conflitution or ftate of things, or any circumftances whatfoever, previous to the actual determination of the will. And indeed his whole difcourfe on human liberty implies it, his whole fcheme is founded upon it.

But these things cannot stand together .-There is fuch a thing as a diverfity of ftrength in Motives to choice, previous to the choice itself. Mr. Chubb himself supposes, that they do previoufly invite, induce, excite and dispose the mind to action. This implies, that they have fomething in themfelves that is inviting, fome tendency to induce and dispose to volition, previous to volition itfelf. And if they have in themselves this nature and tendency, doubtlefs they have it in certain limited degrees, which are capable of diverfity; and fome have it in greater degrees, others in less; and they that have most of this tendency, confidered with all their nature and circumftances, previous to volition, they are the ftrongest motives; and those that have least, are the weakeft Motives.

Now if volition fometimes does not follow the Motive which is ftrongeft, or has most previous tendency or advantage, all things confidered, to induce or excite it, but follows the weakeft, or that which as it ftands previously in the mind's view, has least tendency to induce it; herein the will apparently acts wholly without Motive, with-

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out any previous reafon to difpofe the mind to it, contrary to what the fame author fuppofes. The act, wherein the will must proceed without a previous motive to induce it, is the act of preferring the weakest motive. For how absurd is it to fay, the mind fees previous reason in the Motive, to prefer that Motive before the other; and at the fame time to suppose, that there is nothing in the Motive, in its nature, state or any circumstance of it whatfoever, as it stands in the previous view of the mind, that gives it any preference; but on the contrary, the other Motive that stands in competition with it, in all these respects, has most belonging to it, that is inviting and moving, and has most of a tendency to choice and preference. This is certainly as much as to fay, there is previous ground and reason in the Motive for the act of preference, and yet no previous reafon for it. By the fuppofition, as to all that is in the two rival Motives, which tends to preference, previous to the act of preference, it is not in that which is preferred, but wholly in the other: because appearing fuperiour strength, and all appearing preferableness is in that; and yet Mr. Chubb Juppofes, that the act of preference is from previous ground and reason in the Motive which is preferred. But are thefe things confiftent? Can there be previous ground in a thing for an event that takes place, and yet no previous tendency in it to that event? If one thing follows another, without any previous tendency to its following, then I should think it very plain, that it follows it without any manner of previous reason, why it should follow.

Yea, in this cafe, Mr. Chubb fuppofes, that the event follows an antecedent or a previous thing, as the ground of its existence, not only

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that has no tendency to it, but a contrary tendency. The event is the preference, which the mind gives to that Motive, which is weaker, as it stands in the previous view of the mind; the immediate antecedent is the view the mind has of the two rival Motives conjunctly; in which previous view of the mind, all the preferablenefs, or previous tendency to preference, is fuppofed to be on the other fide, or in the contrary Motive; and all the unworthinefs of preference, and fo previous tendency to comparative neglect, rejection or undervaluing, is on that fide which is preferred: and yet in this view of the mind is supposed to be the previous ground or reason of this act of preference, exciting it, and disposing the mind to it. Which, I leave the reader to judge, whether it be abfurd or not. If it be not, then it is not abfurd to fay, that the previous tendency of an antecedent to a confequent, is the ground and reason why that confequent does not follow; and the want of a previous tendency to an event, yea, a tendency to the contrary, is the true ground and reafon why that event does follow.

An act of choice or preference is a comparative act, wherein the mind acts with reference to two or more things that are compared, and fland in competition in the mind's view. If the mind, in this comparative act, prefers that which appears inferiour in the comparifon, then the mind herein acts abfolutely without Motive, or inducement, or any temptation whatfoever. Then, if a hungry man has the offer of two forts of food, both which he finds an appetite to, but has a ftronger appetite to one than the other; and there be no circumftances or excitements whatfoever in the cafe to induce him to

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take either the one or the other, but merely his appetite: if in the choice he makes between them, he chufes that, which he has least appetite to, and refuses that, to which he has the strongest appetite, this is a choice made abfolutely without previous Motive, Excitement, Reason, or Temptation, as much as if he were perfectly without all appetite to either: becaufe his volition in this cafe is a comparative act, attending and following a comparative view of the food, which he chufes, viewing it as related to, and compared with the other fort of food, in which view his preference has abfolutely no previous ground, yea, is against all previous ground and Motive. And if there be any principle in man, from whence an act of choice may arife after this manner, from the fame principle volition may arife wholly without Motive on either fide. Ĭf the mind in its volition can go beyond Motive, then it can go without Motive: for when it is beyond the Motive, it is out of the reach of the Motive, out of the limits of its influence, and fo without Motive. If volition goes beyond the ftrength and tendency of Motive, and especially if it goes against its tendency, this demonstrates the independence of volition or Motive. And if fo, no reafon can be given for what Mr. Chubb fo often afferts, even that in the nature of things volition cannot take place without a Motive to induce it.

If the Moft High fhould endow a balance with agency or activity of nature, in fuch a manner, that when unequal weights are put into the fcales, its agency could enable it to caufe that fcale to defcend, which has the leaft weight, and fo to raife the greater weight; this would clearly demonstrate, that the motion of the balance does Sect. X. Scheme of Liberty, &c.

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not depend on weights in the fcales, at leaft as much as if the balance fhould move itfelf, when there is no weight in either fcale. And the activity of the balance which is fufficient to move itfelf against the greater weight, must certainly be more than fufficient to move it when there is no weight at all.

Mr. Chubb fuppofes, that the will cannot ftir at all without fome motive; and alfo fuppofes, that if there be a Motive to one thing, and none to the contrary, volition will infallibly follow that Motive. This is is virtually to fuppofe an entire dependence of the will on Motives: if it were not wholly dependent on them, it could furely help itself a little without them, or help itself a little against a Motive, without help from the strength and weight of a contrary Motive. And yet his fuppofing that the will, when it has before it various opposite Motives, can use them as it pleafes, and chufe its own influence from them, and neglect the ftrongest, and follow the weakest, fuppofes it to be wholly independent on Motives.

It further appears, on Mr. Chubb's fuppofition, that volition muft be without any previous ground in any motive, thus: if it be, as he fuppofes, that the will is not determined by any previous fuperiour ftrength of the motive, but determines and chufes its own motive, then, when the rival motives are exactly equal in ftrength and tendency to induce, in all refpects, it may follow either; and may in fuch a cafe, fometimes follow one, fometimes the other. And if fo, this diverfity which appears between the acts of the will, is plainly without previous ground in either of the motives; for all that is previoufly in the motives, is fuppofed precifely and perfectly the fame, with-

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130 Inconfiftent with Mr. Chubb's Part II. out any diverfity whatfoever. Now perfect identity, as to all that is previous in the antecedent, cannot be the ground and reafon of diverfity in the confequent. Perfect identity in the ground cannot be a reafon why it is not followed with the fame confequence. And therefore the fource of this diverfity of confequence must be fought for elfewhere.

And laftly, it may be obferved, that however Mr. Chubb does much infift that no volition can take place without fome motive to induce it, which previoufly difpofes the mind to it; yet, as he alfo infifts that the mind, without reference to any fuperiour ftrength of motives, picks and chufes for its motive to follow; he himfelf herein plainly fuppofes, that with regard to the mind's preference of one motive before another, it is not the motive that difpofes the will, but the will difpofes itfelf to follow the motive.

IV. Mr. Chubb fuppofes neceffity to be utterly inconfiftent with *agency*; and that to fuppofe a being to be an agent in that which is neceffary, is a plain contradiction. P. 311. and throughout his difcourfes on the fubject of Liberty, he fuppofes, that neceffity cannot confift with agency or freedom; and that to fuppofe otherwife, is to make Liberty and Neceffity, Action and Paffion, the fame thing. And fo he feems to fuppofe, that there is no action, ftrictly fpeaking, but volition; and that as to the effects of volition in body or mind, in themfelves confidered, being neceffary, they are faid to be free, only as they are the effects of an act that is not neceffary.

And yet, according to him, volition itfelf is the effect of volition; yea, every act of free vo-

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lition: and therefore every act of free volition must, by what has now been observed from him, be neceffary. That every act of free volition is itself the effect of volition, is abundantly fupposed by him. In p. 341, he fays, "If a man " is fuch a creature as I have proved him to be, " that is, if he has in him a power or Liberty " of doing either good or evil, and either of " thefe is the fubject of his own free choice, fo " that he might, IF HE HAD PLEASED, " have CHOSEN and done the contrary."-Here he fuppofes, all that is good or evil in man is the effect of his choice; and fo that his good or evil choice itself, is the effect of his pleasure or choice, in these words, be might if he had PLEASED, have CHOSEN the contrary. So in p. 356, "Though it be highly reafonable, that a " man fhould always chufe the greater good,— " yet he may, if he PLEASE, CHUSE other-" wife." Which is the fame thing as if he had faid, he may, if he chufes, chufe otherwife. And then he goes on, "-that is, he may, if he pleafes, " chuse what is good for himself, &c." And again in the fame page, " The will is not con-"fined by the understanding, to any particular " fort of good, whether greater or lefs; but is at " liberty to chuse what kind of good it pleases." -If there be any meaning in the last words, the meaning must be this, that the will is at liberty to chuse what kind of good it chuses to chuse; supposing the act of choice itself determined by an antecedent choice. The Liberty Mr. Chubb speaks of, is not only a man's having power to move his body agreeably to an antecedent act of choice, but to use, or exert the faculties of his foul. Thus, in p. 379, fpeaking of the faculties of his mind, he fays, " Man has power, and " is at liberty to neglect these faculties, to use K 2

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" them aright, or to abufe them, as he pleafes." And that he supposes an act of choice, or exercife of pleafure, properly diffinct from, and antecedent to, those acts thus chosen, directing, commanding and producing the chofen acts, and even the acts of choice themfelves, is very plain in p. 283. "He can command his actions; and here-" in confifts his Liberty; he can give or deny " himfelf that pleafure, as he pleafes." And p. 377. " If the actions of men-are not the produce of a " free choice, or election, but fpring from a ne-" ceffity of nature, ---- he cannot in reason be " the object of reward or punishment on their " account. Whereas, if action in man, whether " good or evil, is the produce of will or free " choice; fo that a man in either cafe, had it in " his power, and was at liberty to have CHO-" SEN the contrary, he is the proper object of " reward or punishment, according as he CHU-" SES to behave himfelf." Here, in these last words, he fpeaks of Liberty of CHUSING, according as he CHUSES. So that the behaviour which he fpeaks of as fubject to his choice, is his chujing itself, as well as his external conduct confequent upon it. And therefore it is evident, he means not only external actions, but the acts of choice themfelves, when he fpeaks of all free actions, as the PRODUCE of free choice. And this is abundantly evident in what he fays in p. 372, 373.

Now these things imply a twofold great abfurdity and inconfistence.

1. To fuppofe, as Mr. Chubb plainly does, that every free act of choice is *commanded by*, and is the *produce of free choice*, is to fuppofe the first free act of choice belonging to the cafe, yea, the first free act of choice that ever man exerted, to be *the produce* of an antecedent act of choice. 7.

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But I hope I need not labour at all to convince my readers, that it is an abfurdity to fay, the very fr/t act is the produce of another act that went before it.

2. If it were both possible and real, as Mr. Chubb infifts, that every free act of choice were the produce or the effect of a free act of choice; yet even then, according to his principles, no one act of choice would be free, but every one neceffary; because, every act of choice being the effect of a foregoing act, every act would be neceffarily connected with that foregoing caufe. For Mr. Chubb himfelf fays, p. 389, "When the " felf moving power is exerted, it becomes the " neceffary caufe of its effects."----So that his notion of a free act, that is rewardable or punifhable, is a heap of contradictions. It is a free act, and yet, by his own notion of freedom, is neceffary; and therefore by him it is a contradiction, to suppose it to be free. According to him, every free act is the produce of a free act; fo that there must be an infinite number of free acts in fucceffion, without any beginning, in an agent that has a beginning. And therefore here is an infinite number of free acts, every one of them free; and yet not any one of them free, but every act in the whole infinite chain a neceffary effect. All the acts are rewardable or punishable, and yet the agent cannot, in reason, be the object of reward or punishment, on account of any one of these actions. He is active in them all, and paffive in none; yet active in none, but paffive in all, Gc.

V. Mr. Chubb does most strenuously deny, that motives are causes of the acts of the will; or that the moving principle in man is moved, or caused to be exerted by motives. His words, p. 388

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and 389, are, "If the moving principle in man "is MOVED, or CAUSED TO BE EXERT, "ED, by fomething external to man, which all "Motives are, then it would not be a felf-moving "principle, feeing it would be moved by a prin-"ciple external to itfelf. And to fay, that a "felf-moving principle is MOVED, or CAU-"SED TO BE EXERTED, by a caufe ex-"ternal to itfelf, is abfurd and a contradiction, "&c."—And in the next page, it is particularly and largely infifted, that motives are caufes in no cafe, that they are merely paffive in the production of action, and have no caufality in the production of it,—no caufality, to be the caufe of the exertion of the will.

Now I defire it may be confidered, how this can poffibly confift with what he fays in other places. Let it be noted here,

1. Mr. Chubb abundantly speaks of motives as excitements of the acts of the will; and fays, that Motives do excite volition, and induce it, and that they are neceffary to this end; that in the reason and nature of things, volition cannot take place. without Motives to excite it. But now, if motives excite the will, they move it; and yet he fays, it is abfurd to fay, the will is moved by motives. And again (if language is of any fignificancy at all) if motives excite volition, then they are the caufe of its being excited; and to caufe volition to be excited, is to caufe it to be put forth or exerted. Yea, Mr. Chubb fays himfelf, p. 317, motive is necessary to the exertion of the active faculty. To excite, is politively to do fomething; and certainly that which does fomething, is the cause of the thing done by it. To create, is to cause to be created; to make, is to cause to be Sect. X. Scheme of Liberty, &c.

made; to kill, is to caufe to be killed; to quicken, is to caufe to be quickened; and to excite, is to caufe to be excited. To excite, is to be a caufe, in the most proper fense, not merely a negative occasion, but a ground of existence by positive influence. The notion of exciting, is exerting influence to cause the effect to arise or come forth into existence.

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2. Mr. Chubb himfelf, p. 317, fpeaks of motives as the ground and reafon of action BV INFLUENCE, and BY PREVAILING IN-FLUENCE. Now, what can be meant by a caufe, but fomething that is the ground and reafon of a thing by its influence, an influence that is prevalent and fo effectual?

3. This author not only speaks of motives as the ground and reason of action, by prevailing influence; but expressly of their *influence as prevailing* FOR THE PRODUCTION of an action, in the same p. 317: which makes the inconsistency still more palpable and notorious. The production of an effect is certainly the *causing* of an effect; and *productive influence* is *causal influence*, if any thing is; and that which has this influence prevalently, so as thereby to become the ground of another thing, is a cause of that thing, if there be any such thing as a cause. This influence, Mr. Chubb says, motives have to produce an action; and yet, he says, it is absurd and a contradiction, to say they are causes.

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4. In the fame page, he once and again fpeaks of motives as *difpofing* the Agent to action, by *their influence*. His words are thefe: "As mo-" tive, which takes place in the understanding, " and is the product of intelligence, is NECES-

Inconfistence of Mr. Chubb's, &c. Part II. 136 " SARY to action, that is, to the EXERTION " of the active faculty, because that faculty " would not be exerted without fome PREVI. " OUS REASON to DISPOSE the mind to " action; fo from hence it plainly appears, that " when a man is faid to be disposed to one action " rather than another, this properly fignifies the " PREVAILING INFLUENCE that one mo-" tive has upon a man FOR THE PRODUC-" TION of an action, or for the being at reft, " before all other motives, for the production of " the contrary. For as motive is the ground " and reafon of any action, fo the motive that " prevails, DISPOSES the agent to the perform-" ance of that action."

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Now, if motives difpofe the mind to action, then they *caufe* the mind to be difpofed; and to caufe the mind to be difpofed is to caufe it to be willing; and to caufe it to be willing is to caufe it to will; and that is the fame thing as to be the caufe of an act of the will. And yet this fame Mr. Chubb holds it to be abfurd, to fuppofe motive to be a caufe of the act of the will.

And if we compare thefe things together, we have here again a whole heap of inconfiftences. Motives are the previous ground and reafon of the acts of the will; yea, the neceffary ground and reafon of their exertion, without which they will not be exerted, and cannot, in the nature of things, take place; and they do excite thefe acts of the will, and do this by a prevailing influence; yea, an influence which prevails for the production of the act of the will, and for the difpoing of the mind to it; and yet it is abfurd, to fuppofe Motive to be a caufe of an act of the will, or that a principle of will is moved or caufed to be exerted by it, or that it has

Sect. XI. GOD certainly foreknows, &c. 137 any caufality in the production of it, or any caufality to be the caufe of the exertion of the will.

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A due confideration of these things which Mr. Chubb has advanced, the strange inconfistences which the notion of Liberty, confifting in the will's power of felf-determination void of all necessity, united with that dictate of common fense, that there can be no volition without a motive, drove him into, may be fufficient to convince us, that it is utterly impoffible ever to make that notion of Liberty confiftent with the influence of motives in volition. And as it is in a manner felf-evident, that there can be no act of will, choice, or preference of the mind, without fome motive or inducement, fomething in the mind's view, which it aims at, feeks, inclines to, and goes after; fo it is most manifest, there is no fuch Liberty in the universe as Arminians infift on; nor any fuch thing poffible, or conceivable.

SECTION XI.

The Evidence of GOD's certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions of moral Agents.

THAT the acts of the wills of moral Agents are not contingent events, in that fenfe, as to be without all neceffity, appears by God's certain Foreknowledge of fuch events.

In handling this argument, I would in the first place prove, that God has a certain Foreknowledge of the voluntary acts of moral Agents; and *fecondly* fhew the confequence, or how it follows from hence, that the Volitions of moral Agents GOD certainly foreknows

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are not contingent, fo as to be without neceffity of connection and confequence.

FIRST, I am to prove, that God has an abfolute and certain Foreknowledge of the free actions of moral Agents.

One would think, it fhould be wholly needlefs to enter on fuch an argument with any that profefs themfelves Chriftians: but fo it is; God's certain Foreknowledge of the free acts of moral Agents, is denied by fome that pretend to believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God; and especially of late. I therefore shall consider the evidence of such a prescience in the Most High, as fully as the designed limits of this essay will admit of; supposing myself herein to have to do with such as own the truth of the Bible.

ARG. I. My *first* argument shall be taken from God's *prediction* of fuch events. Here I would, in the first place, lay down these two things as axioms.

(1.) If God does not foreknow, He cannot foretel fuch events; that is, He cannot peremptorily and certainly foretel them. If God has no more than an uncertain guess concerning events of this kind, then He can declare no more than an uncertain guess. Positively to foretel, is to profess to foreknow, or declare positive Foreknowledge.

(2.) If God does not certainly foreknow the future Volitions of moral Agents, then neither can He certainly foreknow those events which are confequent and dependent on these Volitions. The existence of the one depending on the existence of the other, the knowledge of the existence of the Sect XI. the Volitions of moral Agents.

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one depends on the knowledge of the existence of the other; and the one cannot be more certain than the other.

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Therefore, how many, how great, and how extensive solutions of the confequences of the Volitions of moral Agents may be; though they should extend to an alteration of the state of things thro' the universe, and should be continued in a feries of successive events to all eternity, and should in the progress of things branch forth into an infinite number of feries, each of them going on in an endles line or chain of events; God must be as ignorant of all these confequences, as He is of the Volition whence they first take their rife: all these events, and the whole state of things depending on them, how important, extensive and vast solution whence they first take their solution was the state of the state of things depending on them, how important, extensive and vast solution whence the solution whence the state solution whence the state of things depending on them, how important, extensive and vast solution whence the state solution whence solution whence the state solution whence solution whence the state solution whence the state solution whence the state solution whence solution

These positions being such as, I suppose, none will deny, I now proceed to observe the following things.

1. Men's moral conduct and qualities, their virtues and vices, their wickednefs and good practice, things rewardable and punifhable, have often been foretold by God.—Pharaoh's moral conduct, in refufing to obey God's command, in letting his people go, was foretold. God fays to Mofes, Exod. iii. 19. I am fure, that the King of Egypt will not let you go. Here God profeffes not only to guefs at, but to know Pharaoh's future difobedience. In chap. vii. 4. God fays, but Pharaoh fhall not bearken unto you; that I may lay mine hand upon Egypt, &c. And chap. ix. 30, Mofes fays to Pharaoh, as for thee, and thy fervants, I KNOW that ye will not fear the Lord. See alfo chap. xi. 9.—The moral conduct of Jofiah, by

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name, in his zealoufly exerting himfelf in oppofition to idolatry, in particular acts of his, was foretold above three hundred years before he was born, and the prophecy fealed by a miracle, and renewed and confirmed by the words of a fecond prophet, as what furely would not fail, I Kings xiii. 1,-----6, 32. This prophecy was also in effect a prediction of the moral conduct of the people, in upholding their fchifmatical and idolatrous worship until that time, and the idolatry of those priefts of the high places, which it is foretold Jofiah should offer upon that altar of Bethel.-Micaiah foretold the foolifh and finful conduct of Ahab, in refufing to hearken to the Word of the Lord by him, and chufing rather to hearken to the falle prophets, in going to Ramoth-Gilead to his ruin, 1 Kings xxi. 20,-22. The moral conduct of Hazael was foretold, in that cruelty he should be guilty of; on which Hazael fays, What, is thy fervant a dog, that he should do this thing! The prophet fpeaks of the event as what he knew, and not what he conjectured, 2 Kings viii. 12. I know the evil that thou wilt do unto the children of Ifrael: Thou wilt dash their children, and rip up their women with child. The moral conduct of Cyrus is foretold, long before he had a being, in his mercy to God's people, and regard to the true God, in turning the captivity of the Jews, and promoting the building of the Temple, Ifai. xliv. 28. and lxv. 13. Compare 2 Chron. xxxvi. 22. 23. and Ezra i. 1,-4. How many inftances of the moral conduct of the Kings of the North and South, particular inftances of the wicked behaviour of the Kings of Syria and Egypt, are foretold in the xith chapter of Daniel? Their corruption, violence, robbery, treachery, and lies. And particularly, how much is foretold of the horrid wickedness of Antiochus Epiphanes, called there

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a vile person, instead of Epiphanes, or illustrious. In that chapter, and also in chap. viii. verses 9, 14, 23, to the end, are foretold his flattery, deceit and lies, his having his heart fet to de mischief, and fet against the holy covenant, his destroying and treading under foot the holy people, in 2 marvellous manner, his having indignation against the boly covenant, fetting his heart against it, and conspiring against it, his polluting the sanctuary of strength, treading it under soot, taking away the daily facrifice, and placing the abomination that maketh desolate; his great pride, magnifying himself again/t God, and uttering marvellous bla/phemies again/f Him, until God in indignation should defroy bim. Withal, the moral conduct of the Jews, on occasion of his perfecution, is predicted. It is foretold, that he should corrupt many by flatteries, chap. xi. 32,-34. But that others fhould behave with a glorious constancy and fortitude in opposition to him, ver. 32. And that fome good men should fall and repent, ver. 35. Christ foretold Peter's fin, in denying his Lord, with its circumstances, in a peremptory manner. And fo, that great fin of Judas, in betraying his mafter, and its dreadful and eternal punishment in hell, was foretold in the like positive manner, Matt. xxvi. 21,-25. and parallel places in the other Evangelists.

• Many events have been foretold by God, which are confequent and dependent on the moral conduct of particular perfons, and were accomplifhed, either by their virtuous or vicious actions.—Thus, the children of Ifrael's going down into Egypt to dwell there, was foretold to Abraham, Gen. xv. which was brought about by the wickednefs of Jofeph's brethren in felling him, and the wickednefs of Jofeph's miftrefs, and his

own fignal virtue in refifting her temptation. The accomplishment of the thing prefigured in Joseph's dream, depended on the fame moral conduct. Iotham's parable and prophecy, Judges ix. 15,-20. was accomplished by the wicked conduct of Abimelech, and the men of Shechem. The prophecies against the house of Eli, 1 Sam. chap. ii. and iii. were accomplifhed by the wickedness of Doeg the Edomite, in accusing the priefts; and the great impiety, and extreme cruelty of Saul in destroying the priests at Nob. 1 Sam. xxii. -Nathan's prophecy against David, 2 Sam. xii. 11, 12. was fulfilled by the horrible, wickednefs of Abfalom, in rebelling against his father, feeking his life, and lying with his concubines in the fight of the fun. The prophecy against Solomon, 1 Kings xi. 11,-13. was fulfilled by Jeroboam's rebellion and usurpation, which are fpoken of as his wickedness, 2 Chron. xiii. 5, 6. compare ver. 18. The prophecy against Jeroboam's family, I Kings xiv. was fulfilled by the confpiracy, treafon, and cruel murders of Baasha, 2 Kings xv. 27, &c. The predictions of the

prophet Jehu against the house of Bashaa, 'I Kings xvi. at the beginning, were fulfilled by the treason and parricide of Zimri, I Kings xvi. 9, 13, 20.

3. How often has God foretold the future moral conduct of nations and people, of numbers, bodies, and fucceffions of men: with God's judicial proceedings, and many other events confequent and dependent on their virtues and vices; which could not be foreknown, if the Volitions of men, wherein they acted as *moral Agents*, had not been forefeen? The future cruelty of the Egyptians in oppreffing Ifrael, and God's judging and punifhing them for it, was foretold long be-

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fore it came to pass, Gen. xv. 13, 14. The continuance of the iniquity of the Amorites, and the increase of it until it should be full, and they ripe for destruction, was foretold above four hundred years before-hand, Gen. xv. 16. Acts vii. 6, 7. The prophecies of the destruction of Jerusalem, and the land of Judah, were abfolute; 2 Kings xx. 17,-19. chap. xxii. 15, to the end. It was foretold in Hezekiah's time, and was abundantly infifted on in the book of the prophet Ifaiah, who wrote nothing after Hezekiah's days. It was foretold in Jofiah's time, in the beginning of a great reformation, 2 Kings xxii. And it is manifest by innumerable things in the prediction of the prophets, relating to this event, its time, its circumstances, its continuance and end; the return from the captivity, the reftoration of the temple, city and land, and many circumstances, and confequences of that; I fay, these shew plainly, that the prophecies of this great event were absolute. And yet this event was connected with, and dependent on two things in men's moral conduct: first, the injurious rapine and violence of the king of Babylon and his people, as the efficient caufe; which God often speaks of as what he highly refented, and would feverely punish; and 2dly, the final obstinacy of the Jews. That great event is often spoken of as fuspended on this, Jer. iv. 1. and v. 1. vii. 1,-7. xi. 1,---6. xvii. 24, to the end. xxv. 1,---7. xxvi. 1,---8, 13. and xxxviii. 17, 18. Therefore this destruction and captivity could not be foreknown, unlefs fuch a moral conduct of the Chaldeans and Jews had been foreknown. And then it was foretold, that the people should be finally obstinate, to the destruction and utter desolation of the city and land, Ifa. vi. 9,---11. Jer. i. 18, 19. vii. 27,---29. Ezek iii. 7. and xxiv. 13, 14.

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The final obstinacy of those Jews who were left in the land of Ifrael, in their idolatry and rejection of the true God, was foretold by God, and the prediction confirmed with an oath, Jer. xliv. 26, 27. And God tells the people, Ifa. xlviii. 3. 4,--8. that he had predicted those things which should be confequent on their treachery and obstinacy, because he knew they would be obstinate; and that he had declared these things before-hand, for their conviction of his being the only true God, \mathfrak{Sc} .

The destruction of Babylon with many of the circumstances of it, was foretold, as the judgment of God for the exceeding pride and haughtinefs of the heads of that monarchy, Nebuchadnezzar, and his fucceffors, and their wickedly deftroying other nations, and particularly for their exalting themselves against the true God and his people, before any of these monarchs had a being; Ifa. chap. xiii, xiv, xlvii: compare Habbak. ii. 5. to the end, and Jer. chap. 1. and li. That Babylon's destruction was to be a recompence, according to the works of their own hands, appears by Jer. xxv. 14.---The immorality with which the people of Babylon, and particularly her princes and great men, were guilty of, that very night that the city was deftroyed, their revelling and drunkenness at Balshazzar's idolatrous feast, was foretold, Jer. li. 39, 57.

The return of the Jews from the Babylonish captivity is often very particularly foretold with many circumstances, and the promifes of it are very peremptory; Jer. xxxi. 35,---40. and xxxii. 6,---15, 41.---44. and xxxiii. 24,---26. And the very time of their return was prefixed; Jer.

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xxv. 11, 12. and xxix. 10, 11. 2 Chron. xxxvi. 21. Ezek. iv. 6. and Dan. ix. 2. And yet the prophecies reprefent their return as confequent on their repentance. And their repentance itfelf is very expressly and particularly foretold, Jer. xxix. 12, 13, 14. xxxi. 8, 9, 18,---31. xxxiii. 8. l. 4, 5. Ezek. vi. 8, 9, 10. vii. 16. xiv. 22, 23. and xx. 43, 44.

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It was foretold under the Old Testament, that the Meffiah fhould fuffer greatly through the malice and cruelty of men; as is largely and fully fet forth, Pfal. xxii. applied to Chrift in the New Testament, Matt. xxvii. 35, 43. Luke xxiii. 34. John xix. 24. Heb. ii. 12. And likewife in Pfal. lxix. which, it is alfo evident by the New Teftament, is spoken of Christ; John xv. 25. vii. 5, &c. and ii. 17. Rom. xv. 3. Matt. xxvii. 34, 48. Mark xv. 23. John xix. 29. The fame thing is alfo foretold, Ifa. liii. and I. 6. and Mic. v. 1. This cruelty of men was their fin, and what they acted as moral Agents. It was foretold, that there should be an union of Heathen and Jewish rulers against Christ, Pfal. ii. 1, 2. compared with Acts iv. 25,-28. It was foretold, that the Jews should generally reject and despise the Meffiah, Ifa. xlix. 5, 6, 7. and liii. 1,—3. Pfal. xxii. 6, 7. and lxix. 4, 8, 19, 20. And it was foretold, that the body of that nation should be rejected in the Meffiah's days, from being God's people, for their obstinacy in fin; Ifa. xlix. 4, -7. and viii. 14, 15, 16. compared with Rom. x. 19. and Ifa. lxv. at the beginning, compared with Rom. x. 20, 21. It was foretold, that Chrift fhould be rejected by the chief priefts and rulers among the Jews, Pfalm cxviii. 22. compared with Matt. xxi. 42. Acts iv. 11. 1 Pet. ii. 4, 7.

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Chrift himfelf foretold his being delivered into the hands of the elders, chief priests and scribes, and his being cruelly treated by them, and condemned to death; and that He by them should be delivered to the Gentiles: and that He should be mocked and scourged and crucified (Matt. xvi. 21. and xx. 17,---19. Luke ix. 22. John viii. 28.) and that the people fhould be concerned in and confenting to his death, (Luke xx. 13.---18.) especially the Inhabitants of Jerufalem; Luke xiii. 33, ---35. He foretold, that the difciples fhould all be offended becaufe of Him that night that he was betrayed, and fhould forfake him; Matt. xxvi. 31. John xvi. 32. He foretold, that he should be rejected of that generation, even the body of the people, and that they fhould continue obfinate, to their ruin; Matt. xii. 45. xxi. 33,-42. and xxii. 1,---7. Luke xiii. 16, 21, 24. xvii. 25. xix. 14, 27, 41,---44. xx. 13,---18. and xxiii. 34,--- 39.

As it was foretold in both Old Testament and New, that the Jews fhould reject the Meffiah, fo it was foretold that the Gentiles should receive Him, and fo be admitted to the privileges of God's people; in places too many to be now particularly mentioned. It was foretold in the Old Testament, that the Jews should envy the Gentiles on this account; Deut. xxxii. 21. compared with Rom. x. 19. Christ himself often foretold, that the Gentiles would embrace the true religion, and become his followers and people; Matt. viii. 10, 11, 12. xxi. 41,-43. and xxii. 8,---10. Luke xiii. 28. xiv. 16,---24. and xx. 16. John x. 16. He alfo foretold the Jews envy of the Gentiles on this occafion; Matt. xx. 12,---16. Luke xv. 26, to the end. He foretold, that they fhould continue in this opposition and envy, and should maniSect. XI. the Volitions of moral Agents.

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fest it in the cruel perfecutions of his followers, to their utter destruction; Matt. xxi. 33,-42. xxii. 6. and xxiii. 34,-39. Luke xi. 49,-51. The Jews obstinacy is also foretold, Acts xxii. 18. Chrift often foretold the great perfecutions his followers should meet with, both from Jews and Gentiles; Matt. x. 16,-18, 21, 22, 34,-36. and xxiv. 9. Mark xiii. 9. Luke x. 3. xii. 11, 49,-53. and xxi. 12, 16, 17. John xv. 18,-21. and xvi. 1,-4. 20,-22, 23. He foretold the martyrdom of particular perfons; Matt. xx. 23. John xiii. 36. and xxi. 18, 19, 22. He foretold the great fuccels of the Gofpel in the city of Samaria, as near approaching; which afterwards was fulfilled by the preaching of Philip, John iv. 35,-38. He foretold the rifing of many deceivers after his departure, Matt. xxiv. 4, 5, 11. and the apoftacy of many of his profeffed followers; Matt. xxiv. 10,-12.

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The perfecutions, which the apoftle Paul was to meet with in the world, were foretold; Acts ix. 16.—xx. 23, and xxi. 11. The apoftle fays to the Christian Ephefians, Acts xx. 29, 30. I know, that after my departure shall grievous wolves enter in among you, not sparing the flock; also of your own felves shall men arise, speaking perverse things, to draw away disciples after them. The apostle fays, He knew this: but he did not know it, if God did not know the future actions of moral Agents.

4. Unlefs God foreknows the future acts of moral Agents, all the prophecies we have in Scripture concerning the great Antichriftian apoflacy; the rife, reign, wicked qualities, and deeds of the man of fin, and his inftruments and adherents; the extent and long continuance of

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his dominion, his influence on the minds of princes and others, to corrupt them, and draw them away to idolatry, and other foul vices; his great and cruel perfecutions; the behaviour of the faints under thefe great temptations, &c. &c. I fay, unlefs the Volitions of moral Agents are forefeen, all thefe prophecies are uttered without knowing the things foretold.

The predictions relating to this great apoftacy are all of a moral nature, relating to men's virtues and vices, and their exercifes, fruits and confequences, and events depending on them; and are very particular; and most of them often repeated, with many precife characteristicks, defcriptions, and limitations of qualities, conduct, influence, effects, extent, duration, periods, circumstances, final iffue, &c. which it would be very long to mention particularly. And to suppose, all these are predicted by God without any certain knowledge of the future moral behaviour of free Agents, would be to the utmost degree absurd.

5. Unlefs God foreknows the future acts of men's wills, and their behaviour as moral Agents, all those great things which are foretold in both Old and New Testament concerning the erection, establishment, and universal extent of the Kingdom of the Messach, were predicted and promised while God was in ignorance whether any of these things would come to pass or no, and did but guess at them. For that kingdom is not of this world, it does not consist in things external, but is within men, and consists in the dominion of virtue in their hearts, in righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost; and in these things made manifest in practice, to

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the praife and glory of God. The Meffiah came to fave men from their fins, and deliver them from their fpiritual enemies; that they might ferve him in righteousness and boliness before bim: he gave bimfelf for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himfelf a peculiar people, zealous of good works. And therefore his fuccefs confifts in gaining men's hearts to virtue, in their being made God's willing people in the day of his power. His conquest of his enemies confists in his victory over men's corruptions and vices. And fuch fuccels, fuch victory, and fuch a reign and dominion is often expressly foretold: that his kingdom shall fill the earth; that all people, nations and languages should serve and obey him; and fo that all nations should go up to the mountain of the House of the Lord, that he might teach them his ways, and that they might walk in his paths: and that all men should be drawn to Christ, and the earth be full of the knowledge of the Lord (by which, in the style of Scripture, is meant true virtue and religion) as the waters cover the feas; that God's law should be put into men's inward parts, and written in their hearts; and that God's people should be all righteous, &c. &c.

A very great part of the prophecies of the Old Testament is taken up in fuch predictions as these.--And here I would observe, that the prophecies of the universal prevalence of the kingdom of the Messiah, and true religion of Jesus Christ, are delivered in the most peremptory manner, and confirmed by the oath of God, Isa. xlv. 22, to the end, Look to me, and be ye faved, all the ends of the earth; for I am God, and there is none else. I have SWORN by my Self, the word is gone out of my mouth in righteoussies, and shall not return, that unto Me every knee shall bow; and every L 3

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tongue shall fwear. SURELY, shall one fay, in the Lord have I righteoufness and strength: even to Him shall men come, &c. But here this peremptory declaration, and great oath of the Most High, are delivered with such mighty solemnity, to things which God did not know, if he did not certainly foresee the Volitions of moral Agents.

And all the predictions of Christ and his apoftles, to the like purpofe, must be without knowledge; as those of our Saviour comparing the kingdom of God to a grain of multard-feed, growing exceeding great, from a fmall begin-ning; and to leaven, hid in three measures of meal, until the whole was leavened, &c.-And the prophecies in the epiftles concerning the restoration of the nation of the Jews to the true church of God, and the bringing in the fulnefs of the Gentiles; and the prophecies in all the Revelation concerning the glorious change in the moral state of the world of mankind, attending the destruction of Antichrist, the kingdoms of the world becoming the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ; and its being granted to the church to be arrayed in that fine linen, white and clean, which is the righteousness of saints, &c.

Corol. 1. Hence that great promife and oath of God to Abraham, Ifaac and Jacob, fo much celebrated in Scripture, both in the Old Teftament and New, namely, *That in their feed all the nations and families of the earth fhould be bleffed*, muft be made on uncertainties, if God does not certainly foreknow the Volitions of moral Agents. For the fulfilment of this promife confifts in that fuccefs of Chrift in the work of redemption, and that fetting up of his fpiritual kingdom over the nations of the world, which has been fpoken of.

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Men are bleffed in Chrift no otherwife than as they are brought to acknowledge Him, truft in Him, kove and ferve Him, as is reprefented and predicted in Pfal. lxxii. 11. All kings *fhall fall down* before Him; all nations *fhall ferve Him*. With ver. 17. Men *fhall be bleffed in Him; all nations fhall call Him bleffed*. This oath to Jacob and Abraham is fulfilled in fubduing men's iniquities; as is implied in that of the prophet Micah, chap. vii. 19, 20.

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Corol. 2. Hence also it appears, that first gofpel-promife that ever was made to mankind, that great prediction of the falvation of the Messiah, and his victory over Satan, made to our first parents, Gen. iii. 15. if there be no certain prescience of the Volitions of moral Agents, must have no better foundation than conjecture. For Christ's victory over Satan confists in men's being faved from fin, and in the victory of virtue and holines, over that vice and wickedness, which Satan, by his temptation has introduced, and wherein his kingdom confists.

6. If it be fo, that God has not a prefcience of the future actions of moral Agents, it will follow, that the prophecies of Scripture in general are with out fore-knowledge. For Scripture-prophecies, almost all of them, if not universally without any exception, are either predictions of the actings and behaviours of moral Agents or of events depending on them, or fome way connected with them; judicial difpensations, judgments on men for their wickedness, or rewards of virtue and righteous for, remarkable manifestations of favour to the righteous or manifestations of fovereign mercy to finners, forgiving their iniquities, and magnifying the riches of di-

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vine Grace; or difpenfations of Providence, in fome refpect or other, relating to the conduct of the fubjects of God's moral government, wifely adapted thereto; either providing for what fhould be in a future ftate of things, through the Volitions and voluntary actions of moral Agents, or confequent upon them, and regulated and ordered according to them. So that all events that are foretold, are either moral events, or other events which are connected with, and accommodated to moral events.

That the predictions of Scripture in general must be without knowledge, if God does not forefee the Volitions of men, will further appear, if it be confidered, that almost all events belonging to the future state of the world of mankind, the changes and revolutions which come to pafs in empires, kingdoms, and nations, and all focieties, depend innumerable ways on the acts of men's wills; yea, on an innumerable multitude of millions of millions of Volitions of mankind. Such is the ftate and course of things in the world of mankind, that one fingle event, which appears in itself exceeding inconfiderable, may, in the progrefs and feries of things, occasion a fuccession of the greatest and most important and extensive events; caufing the state of mankind to be vastly different from what it would otherwife have been. for all fucceeding generations.

For inftance, the coming into existence of those particular men, who have been the great conquerors of the world, which, under God, have had the main hand in all the confequent state of the world, in all after-ages; such as Nebuchadnezgar, Cyrus, Alexander, Pompey, Julius Cæsar, &cc. undoubtedly depended on many millions of acts Sect. XI. the Volitions of moral Agents.

of the will, which followed, and were occasioned one by another, in their parents. And perhaps most of these Volitions depended on millions of Volitions of hundreds and thousands of others. their contemporaries of the fame generation; and most of these on millions of millions of Volitions of others in preceding generations .--- As we go back, still the number of Volitions, which were fome way the occasion of the event, multiply as the branches of a river, until they come at laft, as it were, to an infinite number. This will not feem strange, to any one who well confiders the matter; if we recollect what philosophers tell us of the innumerable multitudes of those things which are, as it were, the principia, or flamina vita, concerned in generation; the animalcula in femen masculo, and the ova in the womb of the female; the impregnation, or animating of one of these in distinction from all the rest, must depend on things infinitely minute, relating to the time and circumstances of the act of the parents, the state of their bodies, &c. which must depend on innumerable foregoing circumstances and occurrences; which must depend, infinite ways, on foregoing acts of their wills; which are occasioned by innumerable things that happen in the course of their lives, in which their own, and their neighbour's behaviour, must have a hand, an infinite number of ways. And as the Volitions of others must be fo many ways concerned in the conception and birth of fuch men; fo, no lefs, in their prefervation, and circumstances of life, their particular determinations and actions, on which the great revolutions they were the occasions of, depended. As, for instance, when the confpirators in Perfia, against the Magi, were confulting about a fucceffion to the empire, it came into the mind of one of them, to propole,

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that he whole horle neighed first, when they came together the next morning, fhould be king. Now fuch a thing's coming into his mind, might depend on innumerable incidents, wherein the Volitions of mankind had been concerned. But, in confequence of this accident, Darius, the fon of Histaspes, was king. And if this had not been, probably his fucceffor would not have been the fame, and all the circumstances of the Persian empire might have been far otherwife. And then perhaps Alexander might never have conquered that empire. And then probably the circumstances of the world in all fucceeding ages, might have been vaftly otherwife. I might further inftance in many other occurrences; fuch as those on which depended Alexander's prefervation, in the many critical junctures of his life, wherein a fmall trifle would have turned the fcale against him; and the prefervation and fuccefs of the Roman people, in the infancy of their kingdom and common-wealth, and afterwards; which all the fucceeding changes in their ftate, and the mighty revolutions that afterwards came to pass in the habitable world, depended upon. But these hints may be fufficient for every difcerning confiderate perfon, to convince him, that the whole state of the world of mankind, in all ages, and the very being of every perfon who has ever lived in it, in every age, fince the times of the ancient prophets, has depended on more Volitions, or acts of the wills of men, than there are fands on the feathore.

And therefore, unless God does most exactly and perfectly forefee the future acts of men's wills, all the predictions which he ever uttered concerning David, Hezekiah, Jofiah, Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander; concerning the four

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monarchies, and the revolutions in them; and concerning all the wars, commotions, victories, profperities and calamities, of any of the kingdoms, nations or communities of the world, have all been without knowledge.

So that, according to this notion of God's not forefeeing the Volitions and free actions of men, God could forefee nothing appertaining to the ftate of the world of mankind in future ages; not fo much as the being of one perfon that fhould live in it; and could foreknow no events, but only fuch as He would bring to pass himself by the extraordinary interpolition of his immediate power; or things which should come to pass in the natural material world, by the laws of motion, and course of nature, wherein that is independent on the actions or works of mankind: that is, as he might, like a very able mathematician and aftronomer, with great exactness calculate the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, and the greater wheels of the machine of the external creation.

And if we clofely confider the matter, there will appear reafon to convince us, that he could not, with any abfolute certainty forefee even thefe. As to the *fir/t*, namely, things done by the immediate and extraordinary interpofition of God's power, thefe cannot be forefeen, unlefs it can be forefeen when there fhall be occasion for fuch extraordinary interpofition. And that cannot be forefeen, unlefs the flate of the moral world can be forefeen. For whenever God thus interpofes, it is with regard to the flate of the moral world, requiring fuch divine interpofition. Thus God could not certainly forefee the univerfal deluge, the calling of Abrahm, the deftruction of Sodom

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and Gomorrah, the plagues on Egypt, and Ifrael's redemption out of it, the expelling the feven nations of Canaan, and the bringing Ifrael into that land; for thefe all are reprefented as connected with things belonging to the ftate of the moral world. Nor can God foreknow the moft proper and convenient time of the day of judgment and general conflagration; for that chiefly depends on the courfe and ftate of things in the moral world.

Nor, Secondly, can we on this fupposition reafonably think, that God can certainly forefee what things shall come to pass, in the course of things, in the natural and material world, even those which in an ordinary flate of things might be calculated by a good aftronomer. For the moral world is the end of the natural world; and the course of things in the former, is undoubtedly fubordinate to God's defigns with refpect to the latter. Therefore he has seen cause, from regard to the state of things in the moral world, extraordinarily to interpole, to interrupt and lay an arreft on the course of things in the natural world; and even in the greater wheels of its motion; even fo as to ftop the fun in its courfe. And unlefs he can forefee the Volitions of men, and fo know fomething of the future state of the moral world, He cannot know but that he may still have as great occasion to interpose in this manner, as ever he had; nor can He foresee how, or when, He shall have occasion thus to interpole.

Corol. 1. It appears from the things which have been observed, that unless God foresees the Volitions of moral Agents, that cannot be true which is observed by the apost James, Acts xv.

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ie At Corol. 2. It appears from what has been obferved, that unlefs God foreknows the Volitions of moral Agents, all the prophecies of Scripture have no better foundation than mere conjecture; and *That*, in most instances, a conjecture which must have the utmost uncertainty; depending on an innumerable, and, as it were, infinite multitude of Volitions, which are all, even to God, uncertain events: however, these prophecies are delivered as absolute predictions, and very many of them in the most positive manner, with affeverations; and fome of them with the most folemn oaths.

Corol. 3. It also follows, from what has been observed, that if this notion of God's ignorance of future Volitions be true, in vain did Christ fay (after uttering many great and important predictions, concerning God's moral kingdom, and things depending on men's moral actions) Matt. xxiv. 35. Heaven and earth shall pass away; but my words shall not pass away.

Corol. 4. From the fame notion of God's ignorance, it would follow, that in vain has God Himfelf often spoken of the predictions of his word, as evidences of foreknowledge; and se evidences of that which is his prerogative as GOD, and his peculiar glory, greatly distinguishing Him from all other beings; as in Ifa. xli. 22.--26. xhii. 9, 10. xliv. 8. xlv. 21. xlvi. 10. and xlviii. 14.

ARG. II. If God does not foreknow the Volitions of moral Agents, then he did not foreknow the *fall* of man, nor of angels, and fo could not

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foreknow the great things which are confequent on thefe events; fuch as his fending his Son into the world to die for finners, and all things pertaining to the great work of redemption; all the things which were done for four thousand years before Chrift came, to prepare the way for it; and the incarnation, life, death, refurrection and afcenfion of Chrift; and the fetting Him at the head of the universe, as King of heaven and earth, angels and men; and the fetting up His church and kingdom in this world, and appointing Him the Judge of the world; and all that Satan should do in the world in opposition to the kingdom of Christ: and the great transactions of the day of judgment, that men and devils shall be the fubjects of, and angels concerned in; they are all what God was ignorant of before the fall. And if fo, the following Scriptures, and others like them, must be without any meaning, or contrary to truth. Eph. i. 4. According as he hath chosen us in Him before the foundation of the world. I Pet. i. 20. Who verily was fore-ordained before the foundation of the world. 2 Tim. i. 9. Who hath faved us, and called us with an boly calling; not according to our works, but according to bis own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began. So, Eph. iii. 11. (fpeaking of the wildom of God in the work of redemption) according to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus. Tit. i. 2. In hope of eternal life, which God that cannot lie, promifed before the world began. Rom. viii. 29. Whom he did foreknow, them he alfo did predestinate, &c. 1 Pet. i. 2. Elect, according to the foreknowledge of God the Father.

If God did not foreknow the fall of man, nor the redemption by Jefus Chrift, nor the Volitions Sect. XI. the Volitions of moral Agents.

of man fince the fall; then he did not foreknow the faints in any fenfe; neither as particular perfons, nor as focieties or nations; either by election, or mere forefight of their virtue or good works; or any forefight of any thing about them relating to their falvation; or any benefit they have by Chrift, or any manner of concern of their's with a Redeemer.

ARG. III. On the fuppofition of God's ignorance of the future Volitions of free agents, it will follow, that God must in many cafes truly repent what He has done, fo as properly to wifh He had done otherwife: by reafon that the event of things, in those affairs which are most important, viz. the affairs of his moral kingdom, being uncertain and contingent, often happens quite otherwise than he was aware before-hand. And there would be reason to understand, that in the most literal sense, in Gen. vi. 6. It repented the . Lord, that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart. And that I Sam. xv. 11. contrary to that, Numb. xxiii. 19. God is not the Son of man, that He should repent. And I Sam. xv. 15, 29. Alfo the strength of Ifrael will not lie, nor repent; for He is not a man that He should repent. Yea, from this notion it would follow, that God is liable to repent and be grieved at His heart, in a literal fenfe, continually; and is always expofed to an infinite number of real difappointments in his governing the world; and to manifold, conftant, great perplexity and vexation: but this is not very confistent with his title of God over all, bleffed for ever more; which reprefents Him as poffeffed of perfect, conftant and uninterrupted tranquillity and felicity, as God over the univerfe, and in his management of the affairs of the world, as supreme and universal

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160 GOD certainly foreknows Part II. Ruler. See Rom. i. 25. ix. 5. 2 Cor. xi. 31. 1 Tim. vi. 15.

ARG. IV. It will also follow from this notion, that as God is liable to be continually repenting what He has done; fo He must be exposed to be conftantly changing his mind and intentions, as to his future conduct; altering his measures, relinquishing his old defigns, and forming new fchemes and projections. For his purpofes, even as to the main parts of his fcheme, namely, fuch as belong to the state of his moral kingdom, must be always liable to be broken, through want of forefight; and he must be continually putting his fystem to rights, as it gets out of order, through the contingence of the actions of moral Agents: He must be a Being, who in stead of being abfolutely immutable, must necessarily be the fubject of infinitely the most numerous acts. of repentance, and changes of intention, of any being whatfoever; for this plain reafon, that his vaftly extensive charge comprehends an infinitely greater number of those things which are to Him contingent and uncertain. In fuch a fituation, He must have little elfe to do, but to mend broken links as well as he can, and be rectifying his disjointed frame and difordered movements; in the best manner the case will allow. The Supreme Lord of all things must needs be under great and miferable difadvantages, in governing the world which he has made and has the care of, through his being utterly unable to find out things of chief importance, which hereafter shall befal his fystem; which if he did but know, He might make feafonable provision for. In many cafes, there may be very great necessity that He should make provision, in the manner of his ordering and disposing things, for some great e-

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vents which are to happen, of valt and extensive influence, and endless confequence to the universe; which He may see afterwards, when it is too late, and may with in vain that He had known before-hand, that He might have ordered his affairs accordingly. And it is in the power of man, on these principles, by his devices, purposes and actions, thus to disappoint God, break his measures, make Him continually to change his mind, subject Him to vexation, and bring Him into confusion.

But how do these things confist with reason, or with the Word of God? Which reprefents, that all God's works, all that He has ever to do, the whole scheme and series of his operations, are from the beginning perfectly in his view; and declares, that whatever devices and defigns are in the bearts of men, the counfel of the Lord is that which fhall fand, and the thoughts of his heart to all generations, Prov. xix. 21. Pfal. xxxiii. 10, 11. And that which the Lord of Hofts hath purposed, none *fhall difannul*, Ifa. xiv. 27. And that he cannot be frustrated in one defign or thought, Job xlii. 2. And that which God doth, it shall be forever, that nothing can be put to it, or taken from it, Eccl. iii. 14. The ftability and perpetuity of God's counfels are expressly spoken of as connected with the Foreknowledge of God, Ifaiah xlvi. 10. Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done ; faying, My counfel shall stand, and I will do all my pleafure .- And how are these things confiftent with what the Scripture fays of God's immutability, which represents Him as without variablenefs, or shadow of turning; and fpeaks of Him most particularly as unchangeable with regard to his purposes, Mal. iii. 6. I am the Lord; I change not; therefore ye fons of Jacob are M

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not confumed, Exod. iii. 14. I AM THAT I AM, Job xxiii. 13, 14. He is in one mind; and who can turn Him? And what his foul defireth, even that he doth: for he performeth the thing that is appointed for me.

ARG. V. If this notion of God's ignorance of future Volitions of moral Agents be thoroughly confidered in its confequences, it will appear to follow from it, that God, after he had made the world, was liable to be wholly frustrated of his end in the creation of it; and fo has been, in like manner, liable to be frustrated of his end in all the great works, He hath wrought. It is manifeft, the moral world is the end of the natural: the reft of the creation is but an house which God hath built, with furniture, for moral Agents: and the good or bad flate of the moral world depends on the improvement they make of their natural Agency, and fo depends on their Volitions. And therefore, if these cannot be foreseen by God, becaufe they are contingent, and fubject to no kind of necessity, then the affairs of the moral world are liable to go wrong, to any affignable degree; yea, liable to be utterly ruined. As on this scheme, it may well be supposed to be literally faid, when mankind, by the abufe of their moral Agency, became very corrupt before the flood, that the Lord repented that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved Him at his heart; fo, when He made the universe, He did not know but that he might be fo difappointed in it, that it might grieve Him at his heart that he had made it. It actually proved, that all mankind became finful, and a very great part of the angels apoftatifed: and how could God know before-hand. that all of them would not? And how could God know but that all mankind, notwithstanding

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means used to reclaim them, being still left to the freedom of their own will, would continue in their apostacy, and grow worse and worse, as they of the old world before the flood did?

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According to the fcheme I am endeavouring to confute, neither the fall of men nor angels, could be forefeen, and God must be greatly difappointed in these events; and fo the grand scheme and contrivance for our redemption, and destroying the works of the devil, by the Meffiah, and all the great things God has done in the profecution of these designs, must be only the fruits of his own difappointment, and contrivances of his to mend and patch up, as well as he could, his fyftem, which originally was all very good, and perfectly beautiful; but was marr'd, broken and confounded by the free will of angels and men. And still he must be liable to be totally difappointed a fecond time: He could not know, that He should have his defired fucces, in the incarnation, life, death, refurrection and exaltation of his only begotten Son, and other great works accomplifhed to reftore the ftate of things: he could not know, after all, whether there would actually be any tolerable measure of reftoration; for this depended on the free will of man. There has been a general great apoftacy of almost all the Christian World, 'to that which was worfe than Heathenifm; which continued for many ages. And how could God, without forefeeing men's Volitions, know whether ever Chriftendom would return from this apoftacy? And which way could He tell beforehand how foon it would begin? The apoftle fays. it began to work in his time; and how could it be known how far it would proceed in that age? Yea, how could it be known that the Gofpel M 2

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which was not effectual for the reformation of the Jews, would ever be effectual for the turning of the heathen nations from their heathen apoltacy, which they had been confirmed in for fo many ages?

It is represented often in Scripture, that God, who made the world for Himfelf, and created it for his pleafure, would infallibly obtain his end in the creation, and in all his works; that as all things are of Him, fo they would all be to Him; and that in the final iffue of things, it would appear that He is the first, and the last, Rev. xxi. 6. And he faid unto me, It is done. I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last. But these things are not confistent with God's being fo liable to be difappointed in all his works, nor indeed with his failing of his end in any thing that Hahas undertaken, or done.

SECTION XII.

GOD's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, inconfistent with such a Contingence of those volitions, as is without all Neceffity.

AVING proved, that GOD has a certain and infallible Prescience of the act of the will of moral agents, I come now, in the fecond place, to fhew the confequence; to fhew how it follows from hence, that these events are necessary, with a Necessity of connection or confequence.

The chief Arminian divines, fo far as I have had opportunity to obferve, deny this confequence; and affirm, that if fuch Foreknowledge

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be allowed, it is no evidence of any neceffity of the event foreknown. Now I defire, that this matter may be particularly and thoroughly enquired into. I cannot but think, that on particular and full confideration, it may be perfectly determined, whether it be indeed fo, or not.

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In order to a proper confideration of this matter, I would obferve the following things.

I. It is very evident, with regard to a thing whole existence is infallibly and indiffolubly connected with fomething which already hath, or has had existence, the existence of that thing is neceffary. Here may be noted,

1. I obferved before, in explaining the nature of Neceffity, that in things which are paft, their paft exiftence is now neceffary: having already made fure of exiftence, it is too late for any poffibility of alteration in that refpect: it is now impoffible that it fhould be otherwife than true, that that thing has exifted.

2. If there be any fuch thing as a divine Foreknowledge of the volitions of free agents, that Foreknowledge, by the fuppofition, is a thing which already *bas*, and long ago *bad* existence; and fo, now its existence is necessfary; it is now utterly impossible to be otherwise, than that this Foreknowledge should be, or should have been.

3. It is also very manifest, that those things which are indiffolubly connected with other things that are necessary, are themselves necessary. As that proposition whose truth is necessary connected with another proposition, which is necesfarily true, is itself necessary true. To fay

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otherwife, would be a contradiction: it would be in effect to fay, that the connection was indiffoluble, and yet was not fo, but might be broken. If That, whofe existence is indiffolubly connected with fomething, whose existence is now neceffary, is itself not neceffary, then it may *poffibly not exist*, notwithstanding that indiffoluble connection of its existence.—Whether the abfurdity be not glaring, let the reader judge.

4. It is no lefs evident, that if there be a full, certain and infallible Foreknowledge of the future existence of the volitions of moral agents, then there is a certain infallible and indiffoluble connection between those events and that Foreknowledge; and that therefore, by the preceding observations, those events are necessary events; being infallibly and indiffolubly connected with that, whose existence already is, and so is now necessary, and cannot but have been.

To fay, the Foreknowledge is certain and infallible, and yet the connection of the event with that Foreknowledge is not indiffoluble, but diffoluble and fallible, is very abfurd. To affirm it, would be the fame thing as to affirm, that there is no neceffary connection between a proposition's being infallibly known to be true, and its being true indeed. So that it is perfectly demonstrable, that if there be any infallible knowledge of future volitions, the event is neceffary; or, in other words, that it is impossible but the event should come to pass. For if it be not impossible but that it may be otherwife, then it is not impoffible, but that the proposition which affirms its future coming to pass, may not now be true. But how abfurd is that, on the fuppofition that there is now an infallible knowledge (i. e. know-

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ledge which it is impoffible fhould fail) that it is true. There is this abfurdity in it that it is not impoffible, but that there now fhould be no truth in that proposition, which is now infallibly known to be true.

II. That no future event can be certainly foreknown, whofe existence is contingent, and without all Necessity, may be proved thus; It is impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without evidence. To fuppose otherwise, implies a contradiction: because for a thing to be certainly known to any understanding, is for it to be evident to that understanding; and for a thing to be evident to any understanding is the fame thing, as for that understanding to fee evidence of it: but no understanding, created or increated, can see evidence where there is, none: for that is the fame thing, as to fee that to be, which is not. And therefore, if there be any truth which is abfolutely without evidence, that truth is abfolutely unknowable, infomuch that it implies a contradiction to fuppose that it is known.

But if there be any future event, whole exiftence is contingent, without all Neceflity, the future exiftence of the event is abfolutely without evidence. If there be any evidence of it, it muft be one of these two forts, either *felf-evidence*, or *proof*; for there can be no other fort of evidence, but one of these two; an evident thing muft be either evident in *itfelf*, or evident in *fomething elfe*; that is, evident by connection with fomething elfe. But a future thing, whole existence is without all Neceflity, can have neither of these forts of evidence. It cannot be *felf-evident*: for if it be, it may be now known, by what is now to be feen in the thing itself; either its present M 4

existence, or the Necessity of its nature: but both these are contrary to the supposition. It is fuppoled, both that the thing has no prefent exiftence to be feen; and also that it is not of fuch a nature as to be neceffarily existent for the future: fo that its future existence is not felf-evident. And, fecondly, neither is there any proof, or evidence in any thing elfe, or evidence of connection with fomething elfe that is evident; for this is also contrary to the fuppolition. It is fupposed, that there is now nothing existent with which the future existence of the contingent event is connected. For fuch a connection deftroys its Contingence, and supposes Necessity. Thus it is . demonstrated, that there is in the nature of things absolutely no evidence at all of the future existence of that event, which is contingent, without all Neceffity (if any fuch event there be) neither felf-evidence nor proof. And therefore the thing in reality is not evident; and fo cannot be feen to be evident, or, which is the fame thing, cannot be known.

Let us confider this in an example. Suppofe that five thousand feven hundred and fixty years ago, there was no other being but the Divine Being; and then this world, or fome particular body or spirit, all at once starts out of nothing into being, and takes on itself a particular nature and form; all in *abfolute Contingence*, without any concern of God, or any other cause, in the matter; without any manner of ground or reason of its existence; or any dependence upon, or connection at all with any thing foregoing: I fay, that if this be supposed, there was no evidence of that event before-hand. There was no evidence of it to be seen in the thing itself; for the thing itself as yet, was not. And there was no

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evidence of it to be feen in any thing elfe; for evidence in fomething elfe, is connection with fomething elfe: but fuch connection is contrary to the fuppofition. There was no evidence before, that this thing would happen; for by the fuppofition, there was no reason why it should happen, rather than fomething elfe, or rather than nothing. and if fo, then all things before were exactly equal, and the fame, with respect to that and other poffible things; there was no preponderation, no fuperior weight or value; and therefore, nothing that could be of any weight or value; to determine any understanding. The thing was abfolutely without evidence, and abfolutely unknow- Q_ able. An increase of understanding, or of the capacity of difcerning, has no tendency, and makes no advance, to a difcerning any figns or evidences of it, let it be increased never fo much; yea, if it be increased infinitely. The increase of the strength of fight may have a tendency to enable to difcern the evidence which is far off, and very much hid, and deeply involved in clouds and darkness; but it has no tendency to enable to difcern evidence where there is none. If the fight be infinitely ftrong, and the capacity of difcerning infinitely great, it will enable to fee all that there is, and to fee it perfectly, and with eafe; yet it has no tendency at all to enable a being to difcern that evidence which is not; but, on the contrary, it has a tendency to enable to difcern with great certainty that there is none.

III. To fuppofe the future volitions of moral agents not to be neceffary events; or, which is the fame thing, events which it is not impoffible but that they may not come to pafs; and yet to fuppofe that God certainly foreknows them, and knows all things; is to fuppofe God's knowledge

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to be inconfistent with itfelf. For to fay, that God certainly, and without all conjecture, knows that a thing will infallibly be, which at the fame time he knows to be fo contingent, that it may poflibly not be, is to fuppofe his Knowledge inconfiftent with itfelf; or that one thing, that he knows, is utterly inconfistent with another thing, that he knows. It is the fame thing as to fay, he now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible truth, which he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth. If a future volition is fo without all Neceffity, that there is nothing hinders but that it may not be, then the proposition, which afferts its future existence, is fo uncertain, that there is nothing hinders, but that the truth of it may entirely fail. And if God knows all things, he knows this proposition to be thus uncertain. And that is inconfistent with his knowing that it is infallibly true; and fo inconfistent with his infallibly knowing that it is true. If the thing be indeed contingent, God views it fo, and judges it to be contingent, if he views things as they are. If the event be not neceffary, then it is poffible it may never be: and if it be poffible it may never be, God knows it may possibly never be; and that is to know that the proposition, which affirms its existence, may possibly not be true; and that is to know that the truth of it is uncertain; which furely is inconfistent with his knowing it as a certain truth. If volitions are in themfelves contingent events, without all Necessity, then it is no argument of perfection of Knowledge in any being to determine peremptorily that they will be; but on the contrary, an argument of ignorance and mistake: because it would argue, that he fuppofes that proposition to be certain, which in its own nature, and all things confidered, is uncertain and contingent. To fay, in fuch a cafe,

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that God may have ways of knowing contingent events which we cannot conceive of, is ridiculous; as much fo, as to fay, that God may know contradictions to be true, for ought we know, or that he may know a thing to be certain, and at the fame time know it not to be certain, though we cannot conceive how; becaufe he has ways of knowing, which we cannot comprehend.

Corol. 1. From what has been observed it is evident, that the abfolute decrees of God are no more inconfistent with human liberty, on account of any Neceffity of the event, which follows from fuch decrees, than the abfolute Foreknowledge of God. Becaufe the connection between the event and certain Foreknowledge, is as infallible and indiffoluble, as between the event and That is, it is no more iman abfolute decree. poffible, that the event and decree fhould not agree together, than that the event and abfolute Knowledge fhould difagree. The connection between the event and Foreknowledge is abfolutely perfect, by the fuppofition: becaufe it is fupposed, that the certainty and infallibility of the Knowledge is abfolutely perfect. And it being fo, the certainty cannot be increased; and therefore the connection, between the Knowledge and thing known, cannot be increased; fo that if a decree be added to the Foreknowledge, it does not at all increase the connection, or make it more infallible and indiffoluble. If it were not fo, the certainty of Knowledge might be increased by the addition of •a decree; which is contrary to the fupposition, which is, that the Knowledge is abfolutely perfect, or perfect to the highest possible degree,

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There is as much of an impofibility but that the things which are infallibly foreknown, fhould be, or (which is the fame thing) as great a Neceffity of their future existence, as if the event were already written down, and was known and read by all mankind, through all preceding ages, and there was the most indiffoluble and perfect connection possible, between the writing, and the thing written. In fuch a cafe, it would be as impossible the event should fail of existence, as if it had existed already; and a decree cannot make an event furer or more necessary than this.

And therefore, if there be any fuch foreknowledge, as it has been proved there is, then Neceffity of connection and confequence, is not at all inconfistent with any liberty which man, or any other creature enjoys. And from hence it may be inferred, that absolute decrees of God, which down not at all increase the Necessity, are not at all inconfistent with the liberty which man enjoys, on any fuch account, as that they make the event decreed neceflary, and render it utterly impoffible but that it should come to pass. Therefore, if absolute decrees are inconfistent with man's liberty as a moral agent, or his liberty in a state of probation, or any liberty whatfoever that he enjoys, it is not on account of any necessity which abfolute decrees infer.

Dr. Whitby fuppofes, there is a great difference between God's Foreknowledge, and his decrees, with regard to Neceffity of future events. In his Difcourfe on the five Points, p. 474, &c. he fays, "God's Prefcience has no influence at all "on our actions:——fhould God (fays he), by "immediate Revelation, give me the knowledge "of the event of any man's flate or actions,

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" would my knowledge of them have any in-" fluence upon his actions? Surely none at all.-" Our knowledge doth not affect the things we " know, to make them more certain, or more " future, than they would be without it. Now, "Foreknowledge in God is Knowledge. As " therefore Knowledge has no influence on things " that are, fo neither has Foreknowledge on " things that shall be. And confequently, the "Foreknowledge of any action that would be "otherwife free, cannot alter or diminish that " freedom. Whereas God's decree of election " is powerful and active, and comprehends the " preparation and exhibition of fuch means, as " shall unfrustrably produce the end.—-Hence " God's Prescience renders no actions necessary." And to this purpose, p. 473. he cites Origen, where he fays, God's Prescience is not the cause of things future, but their being future is the caufe of God's Prescience that they will be: and Le Blanc, where he fays, This is the truest resolution of this difficulty, that Prescience is not the cause that things are future; but their being future is the caufe they are forescen. In like manner, Dr. Clark, in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, p. 95-99. And the Author of the Freedom of Will, in God and the Creature, fpeaking to the like purpose with Dr. Whitby, represents Foreknowledge as having no more influence on things known, to make them neceffary, than After-knowledge, or to that purpose.

To all which I would fay; that what is faid about Knowledge, its not having influence on the thing known to make it neceffary, is nothing to the purpofe, nor does it in the leaft affect the foregoing reafoning. Whether Prefcience be the thing that *makes* the event neceffary or no, it al-

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ters not the cafe. Infallible Foreknowledge may prove the Neceffity of the event foreknown, and yet not be the thing which *caufes* the Neceffity. If the Foreknowledge be abfolute, this *proves* the event known to be neceffary, or proves that it is impossible but that the event should be, by fome means or other, either by a decree, or fome other way, if there be any other way: becaufe, as was faid before, it is abfurd to fay, that a proposition is known to be certainly and infallibly true, which yet may possibly prove not true.

The whole of the feeming force of this evafion lies in this; that, in as much as certain Foreknowledge does not cau/e an event to be neceffary, as a decree does; therefore it does not prove it to be neceffary, as a decree does. But there is no force in this arguing: for it is built wholly on this fuppofition, that nothing can prove, or be an evidence of a thing's being neceffary, but that which has a caufal influence to make it fo. But this can never be maintained. If certain Foreknowledge of the future existing of an event, be not the thing, which first makes it impossible that it should fail of existence; yet it may, and certainly does demonstrate, that it is impossible it fhould fail of it, however that impoffibility comes. If Foreknowledge be not the caufe, but the effect of this impoffibility, it may prove that there is fuch an impoffibility, as much as if it were the caufe. It is as strong arguing from the effect to the caufe, as from the caufe to the effect. It is enough, that an existence, which is infallibly foreknown, cannot fail, whether that impofibility arifes from the Foreknowledge, or is prior to it. It is as evident, as it is possible any thing should be, that it is impoffible a thing, which is infallibly known to be true, fhould prove not to be true: therefore there is a Neceffity that it should be other-

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wife; whether the Knowledge be the caufe of this Necessity, or the Necessity the caufe of the Knowledge.

All certain Knowledge, whether it be Foreknowledge or After-knowledge, or concomitant Knowledge, proves the thing known now to be neceffary, by fome means or other; or proves that it is impoffible it fhould now be otherwife than true.---I freely allow, that Foreknowledge does not prove a thing to be neceffary any more than After-knowledge: but then After-knowledge, which is certain and infallible, proves that it is now become imposible but that the proposition known should be true. Certain After-knowledge, proves that it is now, in the time of the Knowledge, by fome means or other, become impossible but that the proposition, which predicates past existence on the event, should be true. And fo does certain Foreknowledge prove, that now, in the time of the Knowledge, it is by fome means or other, become imposible but that the proposition, which predicates future existence on the event, should be true. The Necessity of the truth of the propositions, confifting in the prefent impoffibility of the non-exiftence of the event affirmed, in both cafes, is the immediate ground of the certainty of the Knowledge; there can be no certainty of Knowledge without it.

There must be a certainty in things themselves, before they are certainly known, or (which is the fame thing) known to be certain. For certainty of Knowledge is nothing elfe but knowing or difcerning the certainty there is in the things themfelves, which are known. Therefore there must be a certainty in things to be a ground of certainty of Knowledge, and to render things capable of being known to be certain. And this is nothing but the neceffity of the truth known, or its be-

176 Foreknowledge infers Neceffity, Part II. ing impossible but that it should be true; or, in other words, the firm and infallible connection between the fubject and predicate of the propofition that contains that truth. All certainty of Knowledge confifts in the view of the firmnefs of that connection. So God's certain Foreknowledge of the future existence of any event, is his view of the firm and indiffoluble connection of the fubject and predicate of the proposition that affirms its future existence. The subject is that poffible event; the predicate is its future existing: but if future existence be firmly and indiffolubly connected with that event, then the future existence of that event is necessary. If God certainly knows the future existence of an event which is wholly contingent, and may poffibly never be, then He sees a firm connection between a fubject and predicate that are not firmly connected; which is a contradiction.

I allow what Dr. Whitby fays to be true, That mere Knowledge does not affect the thing known, to make it more certain or more future. But yet, I fay, it fuppofes and proves the thing to be already, both future, and certain; i. e. neceffarily future. Knowledge of futurity, fuppofes futurity; and a certain Knowledge of futurity, fuppofes certain futurity, antecedent to that certain Knowledge. But there is no other certain futurity of a thing, antecedent to certainty of Knowledge, than a prior impoffibility but that the thing fhould prove true; or (which is the fame thing) the Neceffity of the event.

I would observe one thing further concerning this Matter, it is this; that if it be as those forementioned writers suppose, that God's Foreknowledge is not the cause, but the effect of the

existence of the event foreknown; this is fo far from shewing that this Foreknowledge doth not infer the Necessity of the existence of that event, that it rather flews the contrary the more plainly. Because it shews the existence of the event to be fo fettled and firm, that it is as if it had already been; in as much as in effect it actually exists already; its future existence has already had actual influence and efficiency, and has produced an effect, viz. Prescience: the effect exists already; and as the effect fuppoles, the caule is connected with the caufe, and depends entirely upon it, therefore it is as if the future event, which is the cause, had existed already. The effect is firm as possible, it having already the possession of existence, and has made fure of it. But the effect cannot be more firm and stable than its cause, ground and reason. The building cannot be firmer than the foundation.

To illustrate this matter, let us suppose the appearances and images of things in a glafs; for instance, a reflecting telescope to be the real effects of heavenly bodies (at a distance, and out of fight) which they refemble: if it be fo, then, as these images in the telescope have had a past actual existence, and it is become utterly impossible now that it should be otherwise than that they have existed; fo they being the true effects of the heavenly bodies they refemble, this proves the exifting of those heavenly bodies to be as real, infallible, firm and neceffary, as the existing of these effects; the one being connected with, and wholly depending on the other .--- Now let us fuppose future existences some way or other to have influence back, to produce effects before-hand, and cause exact and perfect images of themselves in a glass, a thousand years before they exist,

yea, in all preceding ages; but yet that thefe images are real effects of these future existences, perfectly dependent on, and connected with their cause: these effects and images, having already had actual existence, rendering that matter of their existing perfectly firm and stable, and utterly impossible to be otherwife; this proves in like manner, as in the other instance, that the existence of the things, which are their caufes, is also equally fure, firm and neceffary; and that it is alike impossible but that they should be, as if they had been already, as their effects have. And if instead of images in a glass, we suppose the antecedent effects to be perfect ideas of them in the Divine Mind, which have exifted there from all eternity, which are as properly effects, as truly and properly connected with their caufe, the cafe is not altered.

Another thing which has been faid by fome Arminians, to take off the force of what is urged from God's Prefcience, againft the Contingence of the volitions of moral agents, is to this purpofe; "That when we talk of Foreknowledge in "God, there is no ftrict propriety in our fo "fpeaking; and that although it be true, that "there is in God the most perfect Knowledge of all "events from eternity to eternity, yet there is no "fuch thing as *befare* and *after* in God, but He "fees all things by one perfect unchangeable view, "without any fucceffion."—To this I anfwer,

1. It has been already fhewn, that all certain Knowledge proves the Neceffity of the truth known; whether it be *before*, *after*, or *at the fame time*.---Though it be true, that there is no fucceffion in God's Knowledge, and the manner of his Knowledge is to us inconceivable, yet thus much

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we know concerning it, that there is no event, past, present, or to come, that God is ever uncertain of; He never is, never was, and never will be without infallible Knowledge of it; He always fees the existence of it to be certain and infallible. And as he always fees things just as they are in truth; hence there never is in reality any thing contingent in fuch a fense, as that possibly it may happen never to exist. If, strictly speak. ing, there is no Foreknowledge in God, it is because those things, which are future to us, are as preferat to God, as if they already had existence: and that is as much as to fay, that future events are al-rays in God's view as evident, clear, fure and neceffary, as if they already were. If there never is a time wherein the existence of the event is not prefent with God, then there never is a time wherein it is not as much impossible for it to fail of existence, as if its existence were present, and were already come to pafs.

God's viewing things fo perfectly and unchangeably as that there is no fucceffion in his ideas or judgment, do not hinder but that there is properly now, in the mind of God, a certain and perfect Knowledge of moral actions of men, which to us are an hundred years hence: yea the objection fuppofes this; and therefore it certainly does not hinder but that, by the foregoing arguments, it is now impofible thefe moral actions fhould not come to pafs.

We know, that God knows the future voluntary actions of men in fuch a fenfe before-hand, as that he is able particularly to declare, and foretell them, and write them, or cause them to be written down in a book, as He often has done; and that therefore the necessfary connection which

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there is between God's Knowledge and the event known, does as much prove the event to be neceffary before-hand, as if the Divine Knowledge were in the fame fenfe before the event, as the prediction or writing is. If the Knowledge be infallible, then the expression of it in the written prediction is infallible; that is, there is an infallible connection between that written prediction and the event. And if fo, then it is impossible it should ever be otherwife, than that that prediction and the event fhould agree: and this is the fame thing as to fay, it is impossible but that the event fhould come to pass: and this is the fame as to fay that its coming to pass is necessary.-So that it is manifest, that there being no proper fucceffion in God's mind, makes no alteration as to the Necessity of the existence of the events which God knows. Yea.

2. This is fo far from weakening the proof, which has been given of the impossibility of the not coming to pass of future events known, as that it establishes that, wherein the strength of the foregoing arguments consists, and shews the clearness of the evidence. For,

(1.) The very reason, why God's Knowledge is without fucceffion, is, because it is absolutely perfect, to the highest possible degree of clearness and certainty: all things, whether pass, prefent, or to come, being viewed with equal evidence and fulness; future things being seen with as much clearness, as if they were prefent; the view is always in absolute perfection; and absolute constant perfection admits of no alteration, and so no fuccession; the actual existence of the thing known, does not at all increase, or add to the clearness or certainty of the thing known: God calls

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the things that are not, as though they were; they are all one to him as if they had already exifted. But herein confifts the strength of the demonstration before given, of the impossibility of the not existing of those things, whose existence God knows; that it is as impossible they should fail of existence, as if they existed already. This objection, instead of weakening this argument, fets it in the clearest and strongest light; for it fuppofes it to be fo indeed, that the existence of future events is in God's view fo much as if it already had been, that when they come actually to exift, it makes not the least alteration or variation in his view or Knowledge of them.

(2.) The objection is founded on the immutability of God's Knowledge: for it is the immutability of Knowledge makes his Knowledge to be without fucceffion. But this most directly and plainly demonstrates the thing I infift on, viz. that it is utterly impossible the known events should fail of existence. For if that were possible, then it would be poffible for there to be a change in God's Knowledge and view of things. For if the known event should fail of existence, and not come into being, as God expected, then God would fee it, and fo would change his mind, and fee his former mistake; and thus there would be change and fucceffion in his Knowledge. But as God is immutable, and fo it is utterly infinitely impossible that his view should be changed; fo it is, for the fame reason, just fo impossible that the fore-known event fhould not exist; and that is to be impossible in the highest degree: and therefore the contrary is neceffary. Nothing is more impossible than that the immutable God fhould be changed, by the fucceffion of time; who comprehends all things, from eternity to N 3

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182 Foreknowledge proves Neceffity. Part II. eternity, in one, most perfect, and unalterable view; fo that his whole eternal duration is vitæ interminabilis, tota, fimul, & perfecta possific/fio.

On the whole, I need not fear to fay, that there is no geometrical theorem or proposition whatfoever, more capable of strict demonstration, than that God's certain Prescience of the volitions of moral agents is inconfistent with such a Contingence of these events, as is without all Necessity; and so is inconfistent with the Arminian notion of liberty.

Corol. 2. Hence the doctrine of the Calvinifts, concerning the abfolute decrees of God, does not at all infer any more fatality in things, than will demonstrably follow from the doctrine of most Arminian divines, who acknowledge God's omnifcience, and univerfal Preficience. Therefore all objections they make against the doctrine of the Calvinifts, as implying Hobbe's doctrine of Neceffity, or the *foical* doctrine of fate, lie no more against the doctrine of Calvinifts, than their own doctrine: and therefore it doth not become those divines, to raife such an out-cry against the Calvinifts, on this account.

Corol. 3. Hence all arguing from Neceffity, against the doctrine of the inability of unregenerate men to perform the conditions of falvation, and the commands of God requiring fpiritual duties, and against the *Calvinific* doctrine of efficacious grace; I fay, all arguings of *Arminians* (fuch of them as own God's omnifcience) against these things, on this ground, that these doctrines, though they do not suppose men to be under any constraint or coaction, yet suppose them under Neceffity, with respect to their moral ac-

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tions, and those things which are required of them in order to their acceptance with God; and their arguing against the Necessity of men's volitions, taken from the reasonableness of God's commands, promises, and threatenings, and the fincerity of his counsels and invitations; and all objections against any doctrines of the *Calvinists* as being inconfistent with human liberty, because they infer Necessity; I fay, all these arguments and objections must fall to the ground; and be justly esteemed vain and frivolous, as coming from them; being maintained in an inconfistence with themselves, and in like manner levelled against their own doctrine, as against the doctrine of the *Calvinists*.

SECTION XIII.

Whether we fuppose the volitions of moral agents to be connected with any thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian Liberty.

E VERY act of the will has a caufe, or it has not. If it has a caufe, then, according to what has already been demonstrated, it is not contingent, but neceflary; the effect being neceffarily dependent and confequent on its caufe; and that, let the caufe be what it will. If the caufe is the will itself, by antecedent acts chufing and determining; still the *determined* and *caufed* act must be a neceflary effect. The act; that is the determined effect of the foregoing act which is its caufe; but mult be wholly subject to its determination and command, as much as

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the motions of the hands and feet. The conlequent commanded acts of the will are as paffive and as neceffary, with respect to the antecedent determining acts, as the parts of the body are to the volitions which determine and command them. And therefore, if all the free acts of the will are thus, if they are all determined effects, determined by the will itfelf, that is, determined by antecedent choice, then they are all neceffary; they are all subject to, and decisively fixed by the foregoing act, which is their caufe: yea, even the determining act itself; for that must be determined and fixed by another act, preceding that, if it be a free and voluntary act; and fo must be necessary. So that by this all the free acts of the will are neceffary, and cannot be free unless they are neceffary: because they cannot be free, according to the Arminian notion of freedom, unlefs they are determined by the will; which is to be determined by antecedent choice; which being their caufe, proves them neceffary, And yet they fay, Neceffity is utterly inconfistent with Liberty. So that, by their scheme, the acts of the will cannot be free, unlefs they are neceffary, and yet cannot be free if they be not neceffary!

But if the other part of the dilemma be taken, and it be affirmed that the free acts of the will have no caufe, and are connected with nothing whatfoever that goes before them and determines them, in order to maintain their proper and abfolute Contingence, and this fhould be allowed to be poffible; Itill it will not ferve their turn. For if the volition come to pafs by perfect Contingence, and without any caufe at all, then it is certain, no act of the will, no prior act of the foul was the caufe, no determination or choice of the foul, had any hand in it. The will, or

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the foul, was indeed the fubject of what happened to it accidentally, but was not the caufe. The will is not active, in caufing or determining, but purely the paffive fubject; at leaft, according to their notion of action and paffion. In this cafe, Contingence does as much prevent the determination of the will, as a proper caufe; and as to the will, it was neceffary, and could be no otherwife. For to fuppofe that it could have been otherwife, if the will or foul had pleafed, is to suppose that the act is dependent on some prior act of choice or pleafure; contrary to what now is supposed: it is to suppose that it might have been otherwise, if its cause had made it or ordered it otherwife. But this does not agree to its having no caufe or orderer at all. That muft be necessary as to the foul: which is dependent on no free act of the foul: but that which is without a cause, is dependent on no free act of the foul: because, by the supposition, it is dependent on nothing, and is connected with nothing. In fuch a cafe, the foul is neceffarily fubjected to what accident brings to pass, from time to time, as much as the earth, that is inactive, is neceffarily fubjected to what falls upon it. But this does not confift with the Arminian notion of liberty, which is the will's power of determining itself in its own acts, and being wholly active in it, without paffiveness, and without being fubject to Neceffity.----Thus, Contingence belongs to the Arminian notion of Liberty, and yet is inconliftent with it,

• would here observe, that the author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will, in God and the Creature, page 76, 77, fays as follows: "The word "Chance always means something done without "defign. Chance and defign stand in direct

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" opposition to each other: and Chance can ne-" ver be properly applied to acts of the will, " which is the fpring of all defign, and which " defigns to chufe whatfoever it doth chufe, whe-" ther there be any fuperior fitness in the thing " which it chuses, or no; and it defigns to de-" termine itself to one thing, where two things, " perfectly equal, are proposed, merely because " it will." But herein it appears a very great inadvertence in this author. For if the will be the foring of all design, as he fays, then certainly it is not always the effect of defign; and the acts of the will themfelves must fometimes come to pafs, when they do not fpring from defign; and confequently come to pais by Chance, according to his own definition of Chance. And if the will defigns to chufe what soever it does chufe, and designs to determine it/elf, as he fays, then it defigns to determine all its defigns. Which carries us back from one defign to a foregoing defign determining that, and to another determining that; and fo on in infinitum. The very first defign must be the effect of foregoing defign, or elfe it must be by Chance, in his notion of it.

Here another alternative may be propoled, relating to the connection of the acts of the will with fomething foregoing that is their caule, not much unlike to the other; which is this: either human liberty is fuch, that it may well stand withvolitions being necessarily connected with the views of the understanding, and fo is confistent with Necessity; or it is inconfistent with, and contrary to fuch a connection and Necessity. The former is directly fubversive of the Arminian notion of liberty, confisting in freedom from all Necessity. And if the latter be chosen, and it be faid, that liberty is inconfistent with any fuch

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's f neceffary connection of volition with foregoing views of the understanding, it confisting in freedom from any fuch Neceffity of the will as that would imply; then the liberty of the foul confifts (in part at least) in the freedom from restraint, limitation and government, in its actings, by the understanding, and in liberty and liableness to act contrary, to the understanding's views and dictates: and confequently the more the foul has of this difengagedness, in its acting, the more liberty. Now let it be confidered what this brings the noble principle of human liberty to, particularly, when it is poffeffed and enjoyed in its perfection, viz. a full and perfect freedom and liableness to act altogether at random, without the least connection with, or reftraint or government by, any dictate of reafon, or any thing whatfoever apprehended, confidered or viewed by the understanding; as being inconfistent with the full and perfect fovereignty of the will over its own determinations.—The notion mankind have conceived of liberty, is fome dignity or privilege, fomething worth claiming. But what dignity or privilege is there, in being given up to fuch a wild Contingence as this, to be perfectly and constantly liable to act unintelligently and unreafonably, and as much without the guidance of understanding, as if we had none, or were as destitute of perception, as the smoke that is driven by the wind!

PART III.

Wherein is enquired, whether any fuch liberty of will as Arminians hold, he neceffary to MORAL AGENCY, VIRTUE and VICE, PRAISE and DISPRAISE, Sc.

SECTION I.

GOD's moral Excellency neceffary, yet virtuous and praife-worthy.

AVING confidered the *first* thing that was proposed to be enquired into, relating to that freedom of will which *Arminians* maintain; namely, Whether any fuch thing does, ever did, or ever can exist, or be conceived of; I come now to the *fecond* thing proposed to be the subject of enquiry, viz. Whether any such kind of liberty be requisite to moral agency, virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment, &c.

Sect. I. God's moral Excellency, &c.

I shall begin with some consideration of the virtue and agency of the supreme moral Agent, and Fountain of all Agency and virtue.

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Dr. Whitby, in his difcourse on the five Points, P. 14, fays, " If all human actions are necessary, " virtue and vice must be empty names; we " being capable of nothing that is blame-wor-" thy, or deferveth praise; for who can blame " a perfon for doing only what he could not help, " or judge that he deferveth praife only for what "he could not avoid?" To the like purpose he fpeaks in places innumerable; efpecially in his Discourse on the Freedom of the Will; constantly maintaining, that a Freedom not only from coaction, but necessity, is absolutely requisite, in order to actions being either worthy of blame, or deferving of praise. And to this agrees, as is well known, the current doctrine of Arminian writers, who, in general, hold, that there is no virtue or vice, reward or punishment, nothing to be commended or blamed, without this freedom. And yet Dr. Whitby, p. 300, allows, that God is without this freedom; and Arminians, fo far as I have had opportunity to observe, generally acknowledge that God is necessarily holy, and his will neceffarily determined to that which is good.

So that, putting these things together, the infinitely holy God, who always used to be esteemed by God's people not only virtuous but a Being in whom is all possible virtue, and every virtue in the most absolute purity and perfection, and in infinitely greater brightness and amiableness than in any creature; the most perfect pattern of virtue, and the fountain from whom all others virtue is but as beams from the fun; and who has been supposed to be, on the account of his vir-

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tue and holinefs, infinitely more worthy to be esteemed, loved, honoured, admired, commended, extolled and praifed, than any creature: and He, who is thus every where represented in Scripture: I fay, this Being, according to this notion of Dr. Whitby, and other Arminians, has no virtue at all: virtue, when ascribed to him, is but an empty name; and he is deferving of no commendation or praise: because he is under necessity, He cannot avoid being holy and good as he is; therefore no thanks to him for it. It feems, the holinefs, justice, faithfulnefs, &c. of the Most High, must not be accounted to be of the nature of that which is virtuous and praise-worthy. They will not deny, that these things in God are good; but then we must understand them, that they are no more virtuous, or of the nature of any thing commendable, than the good that is in any other being that is not a moral agent; as the brightness of the fun, and the fertility of the earth, are good, but not virtuous, because these properties are neceffary to these bodies, and not the fruit of felf-determining power.

There needs no other confutation of this notion of God's not being virtuous or praife worthy, to Christians acquainted with the Bible, but only stating and particularly representing of it. To bring texts of Scripture, wherein God is represented as in every respect, in the highest manner virtuous, and supremely praise-worthy, would be endless, and is altogether needless to such as have been brought up in the light of the Gospel.

It were to be wifhed, that Dr. Whitby, and other divines of the fame fort, had explained themfelves, when they have afferted, that *that* which

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is neceffary, is not deferving of praife; at the fame time that they have owned God's perfection to be neceffary, and fo in effect reprefenting God as not deferving praife. Certainly, if their words have any meaning at all, by praife, they must mean the exercise or testimony of some forts of esteem, respect or honourable regard. And will they then fay, that men are worthy of that esteem, respect and honour for their virtue, fmall and imperfect as it is, which yet God is not worthy of, for his infinite righteousnes, holinefs and goodnefs? If fo, it must be, becaule of fome fort of peculiar Excellency in the virtuous man, which is his prerogative, wherein he really has the preference; fome dignity, that is entirely diftinguished from any Excellency, amiableness or honourableness in God: not in imperfection and dependence, but in pre-eminence: which therefore he does not receive from God, nor is God the fountain or pattern of it; nor can God, in that respect, stand in competition with him, as the object of honour and regard; but man may claim a peculiar esteem, commendation and glory, that God can have no pretension to. Yea, God has no right, by virtue of his necessary holines, to entermeddle with that grateful refpect and praife, due to the virtuous man, who chufes virtue, in the exercife of a freedom ad utrumque; any more than a precious stone, which cannot avoid being hard and beautiful.

And if it be fo, let it be explained what that peculiar refpect is, that is due to the virtuous man, which differs in nature and kind, in fome way of pre-eminence, from all that is due to God. What is the name or defcription of that peculiar affection? Is it efteem, love, admiration, honour,

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· praife or gratitude? The Scripture every where represents God as the highest object of all these: there we read of the foul's magnifying the Lord, of loving Him with all the heart, with all the foul, with all the mind, and with all the ftrength; admiring him, and his righteous acts, or greatly regarding them, as marvellous and wonderful; honouring, glorifying, exalting, extolling, bleffing, thanking and praifing Him; giving unto Him all the elory of the good which is done or received, rather than unto men; that no flesh should glory in his presence; but that He should be regarded as , the Being to whom all glory is due. What then is that respect? What passion, affection, or exercife is it, that Arminians call praife, diverse from all thefe things, which men are worthy of for their virtue, and which God is not worthy of, in any degree?

If that necessity which attends God's moral perfections and actions, be as inconfistent with a Being worthy of praife, as a necessity of coaction; as is plainly implied in, or inferred from Dr. Whitby's difcourfe; then why fhould we thank God for his goodness, any more than if He were forced to be good, or any more than we should thank one of our fellow-creatures who did us good, not freely, and of good will, or from any kindness of heart, but from mere compulsion, or extrinsical Necessity? Arminians suppose, that God is neceffarily a good and gracious Being: for this they make the ground of some of their main arguments against many doctrines maintained by Calvinists; they fay, these are certainly falfe, and it is impossible they should be true, becaufe they are not confiftent with the goodness of God. This fuppofes, that it is impossible but that God should be good: for if it be possible that

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, Ø He should be otherwise, then that impossibility of the truth of these doctrines ceases, according to their own argument.

That virtue in God is not, in the most proper sense, rewardable, is not for want of merit in his moral perfections and actions, fufficient to deferve rewards from his creatures; but becaufe He is infinitely above all capacity of receiving any reward or benefit from the creature: He is already infinitely and unchangeably happy, and we cannot be profitable unto Him. But still he is worthy of our fupreme benevolence for his virtue; and would be worthy of our beneficence, which is the fruit and expression of benevolence, if our goodnefs could extend to Him. If God deferves to be thanked and praifed for his goodnels, He would, for the fame reason, deferve that we should also requite his kindness, if that were poffible. What shall I render to the Lord for all his benefits? is the natural language of thankfulnefs: and fo far as in us lies, it is our duty to recompenfe God's goodnefs, and render again according to benefits received. And that we might have opportunity for fo natural an expression of our gratitude to God, as beneficence, notwithstanding his being infinitely above our reach; He has appointed others to be his receivers, and to stand in his ftead, as the objects of our beneficence; fuch are especially our indigent brethren.

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SECTION II.

The Acts of the Will of the human foul of JESUS CHRIST neceffarily holy, yet truly virtuous, praise-worthy, rewardable, &c.

I HAVE already confidered how Dr. Whitby infifts upon it, that a freedom, not only from coaction, but neceffity, is requisite either to virtue vice, praise or dispraise, reward or punishment. He also infifts on the fame freedom as absolutely requisite to a perfon's being the subject of a law, of precepts or prohibitions; in the book beforementioned, (p. 301, 314, 328, 339, 340, 341, 342, 347, 361, 373, 410.) And of promises and threatenings, (p. 298, 301, 305, 311, 339, 340, 363.) And as requisite to a state of trial, (p. 297, &c.

Now therefore, with an eye to these things, I would enquire into the moral conduct and practices of our Lord Jesus Christ, which he exhibited in his human nature here, in his state of humiliation. And first, I would shew, that his holy behaviour was necessary; or that it was impossible it should be otherwise, than that He should behave himself holily, and that he should be perfectly holy in each individual act of his life. And fecondly, that his holy behaviour was properly the nature of virtue and was worthy of praise; and that he was the subject of law, precepts or commands, promises and rewards; and that he was in a state of trial.

I. It was *impoffible*, that the acts of the Will of the human foul of Christ should, in any in-

neceffarily holy. stance, degree or circumstance, be otherwise than holy, and agreeable to God's nature and will. The following things make this evident.

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1. God had promifed fo effectually to preferve and uphold Him by his Spirit, under all his temptations, that he could not fail of reaching the end for which He came into the world;--which he would have failed of, had he fallen into fin. We have fuch a promife, Ifai. xliii. 1, 2, 3, 4. Behold my Servant, whom I uphold; mine Elect, in whom my foul delighteth: I have put my Spirit upon him: He shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles: He shall not cry, nor lift up, nor cause his voice to be heard in the street.-He shall bring forth judgment unto truth. He shall not fail nor be discouraged, till He have fet judgment in the earth; and the ifles shall wait his law. This promife of Christ's having God's Spirit put upon Him, and his not crying and lifting up his voice, &c. relates to the time of Christ's appearance on earth; as is manifelt from the nature of the promife, and also the application of it in the New Teftament, Matthew xii. 18. And the words imply a promife of his being fo upheld by God's Spirit, that he should be preferved from fin; particularly from pride and vain-glory, and from being overcome by any of the temptations, he fhould be under to effect the glory of this world, the pomp of an earthly prince, or the applaufe and praife of men: and that he fhould be fo upheld, that he fhould by no means fail of obtaining the end of his coming into the world, of bringing forth judgment unto victory, and eftablifting his kingdom of grace in the earth.-And in the following verfes, this promife is confirmed, with the greatest imaginable folemnity. Thus faith, the LORD, HE that created the heavens, 02

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and ftretched them out; he that fpread forth the earth, and that which cometh out of it; He that giveth breath unto the people upon it, and fpirit to them that walk therein: I the Lord have called Thee in righteousness, and will hold thine hand; and will keep thee, and give thee for a covenant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles, to open the blind eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the prison, and them that sit in darkness out of the prison-bousse. I am JEHOVAH, that is my name, &c.

Very parallel with these promises is that, Ifai. xlix. 7, 8, 9. which also has an apparent respect to the time of Christ's humiliation on earth.— Thus faith the Lord, the Redeemer of Israel, and his Holy One, to him whom man despiseth, to him whom the nation abhorreth, to a Servant of the rulers; kings shall see and arise, princes also shall worship; because of the Lord that is faithful, and the Holy One of Israel, and he shall choose Thee. Thus faith the Lord, In an acceptable time have I heard Thee; in a day of falvation have I helped Thee; and I will preferve Thee, and give Thee for a covenant of the people, to establish the earth, &c.

And in Ifai. 1. 5-6. we have the Meffiah expreffing his affurance, that God would help Him, by fo opening his ear, or inclining his heart to God's commandments that He fhould not be rebellious, but fhould perfevere, and not apoftatize, or turn his back; that through God's help, He fhould be immoveable, in a way of obedience, under the great trials of reproach and fuffering he fhould meet with; fetting his face like a flint: fo that He knew, He fhould not be afhamed, or fruftrated in his defign, and finally fhould be approved and juftified, as having done his work faithfully. The Lord hath opened mine ear;

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fo that I was not rebellious, neither turned away my back: Igave my back to the fmiters, and my cheeks to them that plucked off the hair; I hid not my face from shame and spitting. For the Lord God will help me; therefore shall I not be confounded; therefore have I fet my face as a flint, and I know that I [hall not be ashamed. He is near that justifieth me: who will contend with me? Let us fland together. Who is mine adversary? Let him come near to me; Behold the Lord God will help me: who is he that shall condemn me? Lo, they shall all wax old as a garment, the moth shall eat them up.

2. The fame thing is evident from all the promifes which God made to the Messiah, of his future glory, kingdom and fuccefs, in his office and character of a Mediator: which glory could not have been obtained, if his holinefs had failed, and he had been guilty of fin. God's abfolute promife of any things makes the things promiled neceffary, and their failing to take place absolutely impossible: and, in like manner, it makes those things neceffary, on which the thing promifed depends, and without which it cannot take effect. Therefore it appears, that it was utterly impossible that Christ's holiness should fail, from fuch absolute promises as those, Pfal. cx. 4. The Lord hath fworn, and will not repent, Thou art a Priest forever, after the order of Melchizedeck. And from every other promife in that plalm, contained in each verse of it. And Psal. ii. 6, 7. I will declare the decree: The Lord hath faid unto me, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten Thee: Alk of me, and I will give Thee the Heathen for thine inheritance, &c. Pfal. xlv. 3, 4, &c. Gird thy fword on thy thigh, O most Mighty, with thy Glory and thy Majesty; and in thy Majesty ride prosperously. And fo every thing that is faid from thence to 03

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the end of the Pfalm. And those promises, Ifai. iii, 13, 14, 15. and liii. 10, 11, 12. And all those promises which God makes to the Messiah, of fuccess, dominion and glory in the character of a Redeemer, in Ifai. chap. xlix.

3. It was often promifed to the Church of God of old, for their comfort, that God would give them a righteous, finless Saviour. Jer. xxiii. 5, 6. Behold, the days come, faith the Lord, that I will raise up unto David a righteous Branch; and a King shall reign and prosper, and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth. In his days shall Judah be faved, and Ifrael shall dwell safely. And this is the name whereby He shall be called, The Lord our Righteousness. So, Jer. xxxiii. 15.-I will cause the Branch of Righteou/nefs to grow up unto David; and he shall execute judgment and righteousness in the land. Isai. ix. 6, 7. For unto us a Child is born :upon the throne of David and of his kingdom, to order it, and to establish it with judgment and justice, from henceforth, even for ever: the Zeal of the Lord of Hofts will do this. Chap. xi. at the beginning. There shall come forth a Rod out of the Stem of Jeffe, and a Branch shall grow out of his Roots; and the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him,-the Spirit of Knowledge, and the Fear of the Lord :- with righteousness shall He judge the poor, and reprove with equity:-Righteoufnels shall be the girdle of his loins, and faithfulness the girdle of his reins. Chap. lii. 13. My Servant shall deal prudently. Chap. liii. 9. Because He had done no violence, neither was guile found in his mouth. If it be impossible that these promises should fail, and it be easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than for one jot or title of these promises of God to pass away, then it was impossible that God should commit any fin. Chrift himfelf fignified, that it was impoffible but that the things which were fpoken

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concerning Him, fhould be fulfilled. Luke xxiv. 44.—That all things muft be fulfilled, which were written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the Psalms concerning Me. Matt. xxvi. 53, 54. But how then shall the Scripture be fulfilled, that thus it must be? Mark xiv. 49. But the Scriptures must be fulfilled. And so the apostle, Acts i. 16, 17. —This Scripture must needs have been fulfilled.

4. All the promifes, which were made to the Church of old, of the Meffiah as a future Saviour, from that made to our first parents in Paradife, to that which was delivered by the prophet Malachi, fhew it to be impoffible that Chrift should not have perfevered in perfect holinefs. The antient predictions given to God's Church, of the Meffiah as a Saviour, were of the nature of promifes; as is evident by the predictions themfelves, and the manner of delivering them. But they are exprefsly, and very often called promises in the New Testament; as in Luke i. 54, 55, 72, 73. Acts xiii. 32, 33. Rom. i. 1, 2, 3. and chap. xv. 8. Heb. vi. 13, &c. These promises were often made with great folemnity, and confirmed with an oath; as in Gen. xxii. 16, 17. By myself have I fworn, faith the Lord, that in bleffing, I will blefs thee, and in multiplying, I will multiply thy feed, as the stars of heaven, and as the fand which is upon the feashore; ——And in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be bleffed. Compare Luke i. 72, 73. and Gal. iii. 8, 15, 16. The Apostle in Heb. vi. 17, 18. fpeaking of this promife to Abraham, fays, Wherein God willing more abundantly to shew to the heirs of promife the immutability of his counfel, confirmed it by an oath; that by two IMMUTABLE things, in which it was IMPOSSIBLE for God to lie, he might bave strong confolation .- In which words, the neceffity of the accomplishment, or (which is the fame thing) the impossibility of the contrary, is Оı

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fully declared. So God confirmed the promife of the great falvation of the Mefliah, made to David, by an oath; Pfal. lxxxix. 3, 4. I have made a covenant with my chosen, I have sworn unto David my fervant; thy feed will I establish forever, and build up thy throne to all generations. There is nothing that is fo abundantly fet forth in Scripture, as fure and irrefragable, as this promife and oath to David. See Pfalm lxxxix. 34, 35, 36, 2 Sam. xxiii. 5. Ifai. lv. 4. Acts ii. 29, 30. and xiii. 34. The Scripture expressly speaks of it as utterly impossible that this promife and oath to David, concerning the everlasting dominion of the Messiah of his seed, should fail. Jer. xxxiii, 15, &c. In those days, and at that time, I will cause the Branch of Righteousness to grow up unto David.-For thus faith the Lord, David shall never want a Man to fit upon the throne of the House of Ifrael.-ver. 20, 21. If you can break my covenant of the day, and my covenant of the night, and that there should not be day and night in their season; then may also my covenant be broken with David my serwant, that He should not have a son to reign upon bis throne. So in ver. 25, 26.-Thus abundant is the Scripture in reprefenting how imposfible it was, that the promifes made of old concerning the great falvation and kingdom of the Meffiah fhould fail; which implies, that it was impofiible that this Meffiah, the fecond Adam, the promifed feed of Abraham, and of David, fhould fall from his integrity, as the first Adam did.

5. All the promifes that were made to the Church of God under the Old Testament, of the great enlargement of the Church, and advancement of her glory, in the days of the gospel, after the coming of the Messiah; the increase of her light, liberty, holines, joy, triumph

over her enemies, &c. of which to great a part of the Old Testament confist; which are repeated fo often, are fo varioufly exhibited, fo frequently introduced with great pomp and folemnity, and are fo abundantly fealed with typical and fymbolical reprefentations; I fay, all these promifes imply, that the Mefliah should perfect the work of redemption; and this implies, that he fhould perfevere in the work, which the Father had appointed Him, being in all things con-formed to his Will. These promises were often confirmed by an oath. (See Ifai. liv. 9. with the context; chap. lxii. 18.) And it is represented as utterly impossible that these promises should fail. (Ifa. xlix. 15. with the context, chap. liv. 10. with the context; chap. li. 4-8. chap. xl. 8. with the context.) And therefore it was impossible that the Meffiah should fail, or commit fin.

6. It was imposfible that the Meffiah should fail of perfevering in integrity and holinefs, as the first Adam did, because this would have been inconfistent with the promises, which God made to the bleffed Virgin, his mother, and to her hufband; implying, that He should save his people from their fins, that God would give Him the throne of his Father David, that He should reign over the house of Jacob for ever; and that of his kingdom there shall be no end. These promises were fure, and it was impossible they fhould fail. And therefore the Virgin Mary, in trufting fully to them, acted reafonably, having an immoveable foundation of her faith; as Elizabeth observes, ver. 45. And bleffed is she that believeth; for there shall be a performance of those things, which were told her from the Lord.

7. That it should have been possible that Christ should fin, and so fail in the work of our re-

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demption, does not confift with the eternal purpofe and decree of God, revealed in the Scriptures. that He would provide falvation for fallen man in and by Jefus Chrift, and that falvation fhould be offered to finners through the preaching of the Such an absolute decree as this Armi-Gofpel. nians do not deny. Thus much at least (out of all controverfy) is implied in fuch Scriptures, as 1 Cor. ii. 7. Eph. i. 4, 5. and chap. iii. 9, 10, 11. I Pet. i. 19, 20. Such an absolute decree as this, Arminians allow to be fignified in these texts. And the Arminians election of nations and focieties. and general election of the Christian Church, and conditional election of particular perfons, imply God could not decree before the foundathis. tion of the world, to fave all that should believe in, and obey Chrift, unlefs he had abfolutely decreed, that falvation should be provided, and effectually wrought out by Chrift. And fince (as the Arminians themfelves strenuously maintain) a decree of God infers neceffity; hence it became necoffary, that Chrift fhould perfevere, and actually work out falvation for us, and that he should not fail by the commission of fin.

8. That it fould have been poffible for Chrift's holinefs to fail, is not confiftent with what God promifed to his Son, before all ages. For, that falvation should be offered to men, through Christ, and bestowed on all his faithful followers, is what is at least implied in that certain and infallible promise spoken of by the Apostle, Tit. i. 2. In hope of eternal life; which God, that cannot lie, promised before the world began. This does not feem to be controverted by Arminians.*

* See Dr. Whitby on the five Points, p. 48, 49, 50.

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9. That it should be possible for Christ to fail of doing his Father's Will, is inconfiftent with the promife made to the Father by the Son, by the Logos that was with the Father from the beginning, before he took the human nature: as may be feen in Pfal. xl. 6, 7, 8. (compared with the Apostle's interpretation, Heb. x. 5-9.) Sacrifice and offering thou did/t not desire: mine ears haft thou opened, (or bored;) burnt-offering and finoffering Thou hast not required. Then said I, Lo, I come: in the volume of the book it is written of me, I delight to do thy Will, O my God, and thy law is within my heart. Where is a manifest allusion to the covenant, which the willing fervant, who loved his master's fervice, made with his master, to be his fervant for ever, on the day wherein he had his ear bored; which covenant was probably inferted in the public records, called the Volume of the Book, by the judges, who were called to take cognizance of the transaction; Exod. xxi. If the Logos, who was with the Father, before the world, and who made the world, thus engaged in covenant to do the Will of the Father in the human nature, and the promife, was as it were recorded, that it might be made fure, doubtlefs it was impossible that it fhould fail; and fo it was impossible that Christ should fail of doing the Will of the Father in the human nature.

10. If it was possible for Christ to have failed of doing the Will of his Father, and fo to have failed of effectually working out redemption for finners, then the falvation of all the faints, who were faved from the beginning of the world, to the death of Christ, was not built in a firm foundation. The Messiah, and the redemption, which He was to work out by his obedience unto death, was the foundation of the falva.

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204 The Acts of the Will of Chrift, Part III. tion of all the posterity of fallen man, that ever were faved. Therefore, if when the Old Teftament faints had the pardon of their fins, and the favour of God promifed them, and falvation bestowed upon them, still it was possible that the Messiah, when he came, might commit fin, then all this was on a foundation that was not firm and stable, but liable to fail; fomething which it was possible might never be. God did as it were trust to what his Son had engaged and promifed to do in future time; and depended fo much upon it, that He proceeded actually to fave men on the account of it, as though it had been already done. But this trust and dependence of God, on the fupposition of Christ's being liable to fail of doing his Will, was leaning on a staff that was weak, and might possibly break. The faints of old trusted on the promises of a future redemption to be wrought out and compleated by the Meffiah, and built their comfort upon it; Abraham faw Chrift's day, and rejoiced; and he and the other Patriarchs died in the faith of the promife of it. (Heb. xi. 13.) But on this fupposition, their faith and their comfort, and their falvation, was built on a moveable fallible foundation; Chrift was not to them a tried stone, a fure foundation: as in Ifai. xxviii. 16. David entirely rested on the covenant of God with him, concerning the future glorious dominion and falvation of the Meffiah, of his feed; fays it was all his falvation, and all his defire: and comforts himself that this covenant was an everlasting covenant, ordered in all things and fure, 2 Sam. xxiii. 5. But if Christ's virtue might fail, he was mistaken: his great comfort was not built fo fure, as he thought it was, being founded entirely on the determinations of the Free-Will of Chrift's human Soul; which was fubject to no necessity, and might be deter-

mined either one way or the other. Alfo the dependence of those, who looked for redemption in Jerufalem, and waited for the confolation of Ifrael, (Luke ii. 25, and 38.) and the confidence of the disciples of Jesus, who forsook all and sollowed Him, that they might enjoy the benefits of his future kingdom, was built on a fandy foundation.

II. The man Chrift Jefus, before he had finished his course of obedience, and while in the midft of temptations and trials, was abundant in politively predicting his own future glory in his kingdom, and the enlargement of his church, the falvation of the Gentiles through Him, &c. and in promifes of bleffings he would beftow on his true disciples in his future kingdom; on which promifes he required the full dependence of his disciples. (John xiv.) But the disciples would have no ground for fuch dependence, if Chrift had been liable to fail in his work: and Chrift Himfelf would have been guilty of prefumption, in fo abounding in peremptory promifes of great things, which depended on a mere contingence; viz. the determinations of his Free-Will, confifting in a freedom ad utrumque, to either fin or holinefs, standing in indifference, and incident, in thousands of future instances, to go either one way or the other.

Thus it is evident, that it was *impoffible* that the Acts of the Will of the human foul of Chrift fhould be otherwife than holy, and conformed to the Will of the Father; or, in other words, they were necessfarily fo conformed.

I have been the longer in the proof of this matter, it being a thing denied by fome of the

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greatest Arminians, by Episcopius in particular; and because I look upon it as a point clearly and absolutely determining the controversy between Calvinists and Arminians, concerning the necessity of such a freedom of will as is infisted on by the latter, in order to moral agency, virtue, command or prohibition, promise or threatening, reward or punishment, praise or dispraise, merit or demerit. I now therefore proceed, <u>9</u>1,

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Part III.

II. To confider whether CHRIST, in his holy behaviour on earth, was not thus a moral agent, fubject to commands, promises, &c.

Dr. Whitby very often speaks of what he calls a freedom ad utrumlibet, without necessity, as requisite to law and commands; and speaks of necessity as entirely inconfistent with injunctions and probibitions. But yet we read of Christ's being the subject of the commands of his Father, Job x. 18. and xv. 10. And Christ tells us, that every thing that He faid, or did, was in compliance with commandments he had received of the Father; John xii. 49, 50. and xiv. 31. And we often read of Christ's obedience to his Father's commands, Rom. v. 19. Phil. ii. 18. Heb. v. 8.

The forementioned writer reprefents promifes offered as motives to perfons to do their duty, or a being moved and induced by promifes, as utterly inconfiltent with a flate wherein perfons have not a liberty ad utrumlibet, but are neceffarily determined to one. (See particularly, p. 298, 311.) But the thing which this writer afferts, is demonstrably false, if the Christian religion be true. If there be any truth in Christianity or the holy Scriptures, the man Christ Jefus had his Will infallibly, unalterably and unfrustrably determined Sect. II. Praise-worthy, rewardable, &c.

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to good, and that alone; but yet he had promiles of glorious rewards made to Him, on condition of his perfevering in, and perfecting the work which God had appointed Him; Ifa. liii. 10, 11, 12. Pfal. ii. and cx. Ifai. xlix. 7, 8, 9.-In-Luke xxii. 28, 29. Chrift fays to his difciples, Ye are they which have continued with me in my temptations; and I appoint unto you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed unto me. The word most properly fignifies to appoint by covenant, or promife. The plain meaning of Christ's words is this; " As you have partook of my temptations and "trials, and have been stedfast, and have over-" come, I promife to make you partakers of " my reward, and to give you a kingdom; as the "Father has promifed me a kingdom for conti-" nuing ftedfaft, and overcoming in those trials." And the words are well explained by those in Rev. iii. 21. To him that overcometh, will I grant to fit with me on my throne; even as I also overcame, and am fet down with my Father in his throne. And Chrift had not only promifes of glorious fuccefs and rewards made to his obedience and fufferings, but the Scriptures plainly reprefents Him as using these promises for motives and inducements to obey and fuffer; and particularly that promife of a kingdom which the Father had appointed Him, or fitting with the Father on his throne; as in Heb. xii. 1, 2. Let us lay aside every weight, and the fin which doth eafily befet us, and let us run with patience the race that is set before us, looking unto Jefus the Author and Finisher of our faith ; who for the joy that was set before Him, endured the cross, despising the shame, and is set down on the right hand of the throne of God.

And how ftrange would it be to hear any Chriftian affert, that the holy and excellent temper

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and behaviour of Jefus Chrift, and that obedience, which he performed under fuch great trials. was not virtuous or praise-worthy; because his Will was not free ad utrumque, to either holinefs or fin, but was unalterably determined to one: that upon this account, there is no virtue at all, in all Christ's humility, meekness, patience, charity, forgiveness of enemies, contempt of the world, heavenly mindedness, submission to the will of God, perfect obedience to his commands, (though He was obedient unto death. even the death of the crofs) his great compassion to the afflicted, his unparalleled love to mankind. his faithfulnefs to God and man, under fuch great trials; his praying for his enemies, even when nailing him to the crofs; that virtue, when applied to thefe things, is but an empty name; that there was no merit in any of these things; that is, that Chrift was worthy of nothing at all on the account of them, worthy of no reward, no praife, no honour or respect from God or Man; becaufe his will was not indifferent, and free either to thefe things, or the contrary; but under fuch a ftrong inclination or bias to the things that were excellent, as made it impoffible that he fhould chufe the contrary; that upon this account (to ufe Dr. Whitby's language) it would be fenfibly unreasonable that the human nature should be rewarded for any of these things.

According to this doctrine, that creature who is evidently fet forth in fcripture as the first-born of every creature, as having in all things the preeminence, and as the highest of all creatures in virtue, honour, and worthiness of esteem, praise and glory, on the account of his virtue, is lefs worthy of reward or praife, than the very leaft of faints; yea, no more worthy than a clock or

Sect. II. Praife-worthy, rewardable, &c. 209 mere machine, that is purely paffive, and moved by natural neceffity.

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If we judge by fcriptural reprefentations of things, we have reason to suppose, that Christ took on him our nature, and dwelt with us in this world, in a fuffering state, not only to fatisfy for out fins, but that He, being in our nature and circumstances, and under our trials, might be our most fit and proper example, leader and captain, in the exercise of glorious and victorious virtue, and might be a visible instance of the glorious end and reward of it; that we might fee in Him the beauty, amiablenefs, and true honour and glory, and exceeding benefit, of that virtue, which it is proper for us human beings to practife; and might thereby learn, and be animated, to feek the like glory and honour, and to obtain the like glorious reward. See Heb. ii. 9,-14, with v. 8, 9. and xii. 1, 2, 3. John xv. 10. Rom. viii. 17. 2 Tim. ii. 11, 12. 1 Pet. ii. 19, 20. and iv. 13. But if there was nothing of any virtue or merit, or worthiness of any reward, glory, praife or commendation at all, in all that He did, becaufe it was all neceffary, and He could not help it; then how is here any thing fo proper to animate and incite us, free creatures, by patient continuance in well-doing, to feek for honour, glory, and virtue?

God fpeaks of Himfelf as peculiarly well-pleafed with the righteoufnefs of this fervant of his. Ifai. xlii. 21. the Lord is well-pleafed for his righteoufnefs fake. The facrifices of old are fpoken of as a fweet favour to God, but the obedience of Christ as far more acceptable than they. Pfal. xl. 6, 7. Sacrifice and offering Thou did/t not defire:----Mine ear haft Thou opened [as thy fervant per-P

CHRIST'S Righteouinels

forming willing obedience;] burnt-offering and fin-offering haft thou not required : then faid I, Lo, I come [as a fervant that chearfully anfwers the calls of his mafter:] I delight to do thy will, O my God, and thy law is within mine heart. Matthew xvii. 5. This is my beloved Son, in whom I am wellpleafed. And Chrift tells us expressly, that the Father loves Him for that wonderful inftance of his obedience, his voluntary yielding himfelf to death, in compliance with the Father's command, John x. 17, 18. Therefore doth my Father love me, becaufe I lay down my life:—No man taketh it from me; but I lay it down of myfelf—This commandment received I of my Father.

And if there was no merit in Christ's obedience unto death, if it was not worthy of praife, and of the most glorious rewards, the heavenly hosts were exceedingly miltaken, by the account that is given of them, in Rev. v. 8,-12.--The four beasts and the four and twenty elders fell down before the Lamb, having every one of them harps, and golden vials full of odours ;--- and they fung a new fong, Saying, Thou art WORTHY to take the book, and to open the seals thereof; for Thou wast stain .--- And I beheld, and I heard the voice of many angels round about the Throne, and the beafts, and the elders, and the number of them was ten thousand times ten thoufand, and thousands of thousands, faying with a loud voice, WORTHY is the Lamb that was flain, to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and bleffing.

Chrift fpeaks of the eternal life which He was to receive, as the reward of his obedience to the Father's commandments. John xii. 49, 50. I have not fpoken of myfelf; but the Father which fent me, He gave me a commandment what I should fay,

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Sect. III. Praise-worthy and rewardable, &c. 211

and what I should speak: and I know that his commandment is life everlasting: whatsoever I speak therefore, even as the Father faid unto me, fo I speak. ---God promifes to divide him a portion with the great, &c. for his being his righteous Servant, for his glorious virtue under fuch great trials and afflictions, Ifai. liii. 11, 12. He shall see the travel of his foul and be fatisfied: by his knowledge shall my righteous Servant justify may; for be shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong, because he hath poured out his soul unto death.-The Scriptures represent God as rewarding Him far above all his other fervants, Phil. ii. 7, 8, 9. He took on him the form of a fervant, and was made in the likeness of men: and being found in fashion as a man, He humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the crofs: wherefore GOD alfo hath highly exalted Him, and given Him a Name above every Name. Pfal. xlv. Thou lovest righteousness, and hatest wickedness; 7. therefore God, thy God, hath anointed Thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows.

There is no room to pretend, that the glorious benefits beftowed in confequence of Chrift's obedience, are not properly of the nature of a reward. What is a reward, in the moft proper fenfe, but a benefit beftowed in confequence of fomething morally excellent in quality or behaviour, in teftimony of well-pleafednefs in that moral excellency, and refpect and favour on that account? If we confider the nature of a reward moft ftrictly, and make the utmost of it, and add to the things contained in this defcription, proper merit or worthinefs, and the beftowment of the benefit in confequence of a promife; ftill it will be found, there is nothing be-

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CHRIST'S Righteousnels, &c. Part III. 212 longing to it, but that the Scriptue is most exprefs as to its belonging to the glory bestowed on Chrift, after his fufferings; as appears from what has been already observed: there was a glorious benefit bestowed in confequence of fomething morally excellent, being called Righteou/ne/s and Obedience; there was great favour, love and well-pleafednefs, for this righteoufnefs and obedience, in the bestower; there was proper merit, or worthinefs of the benefit, in the obedience: it was bestowed in fulfilment of promises, made to that obedience; and was bestowed therefore, or becaule he had performed that obedience.

I may add to all these things, that Jesus Christ, while here in the flesh, was manifestly in a state of trial. The last Adam, as Christ is called, 1 Cor. xv. 45. Rom. v. 14. taking on Him the human nature, and fo the form of a fervant, and being under the law, to ftand and act for us, was put into a state of trial, as the first Adam was.-Dr. Whitby mentions thefe three things as evidences of perfons being in a state of trial (on the five Points p. 298, 299.) namely, their afflictions being fpoken of as their trials or temptations, their being the fubjects of promifes, and their being exposed to Satan's temptations. But Chrift was apparently the fubject of each of thefe. Concerning promifes made to Him, I have fpoken already. The difficulties and affictions, He met with in the courfe of his obedience, are called his temptations or trials, Luke xxii. 28. Ye are they which have continued with me in my temptations, or trials. Heb. ii. 18. For in that he Himself hath suffered, being tempted [or tried] He is able to succour them that are tempted. And chap. iv. 15. We have not an high-prieft, which

Sect. III. Of the Inabilty and fin, &c. 213 cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without fin. And as to his being tempted by Satan it is what none will difpute.

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SECTION III.

The Cafe of fuch as are given up of God to Sin, and of fallen Man in general, proves moral Neceffity and Inability to be confiftent with blameworthinefs.

R. Whitby afferts freedom, not only from J co-action, but Neceffity, to be effential to any thing deferving the name of fin, and to an action's being culpable: in these words (Discourse on the five Points, edit. 3. p. 348.) " If they be "thus neceffitated, then neither their Sins of "omiffion or commiffion could deferve that " name; it being effential to the nature of Sin, " according to St. Auftin's definition, that it be " an action a quo liberum est abstinere. Three "things feem plainly neceflary to make an ac-"tion or omiffion culpable; i. That it be in "our power to perform or forbear it: for, as " Origen, and all the Fathers fay, no man is blame-" worthy for not doing what he could not do." And elfewhere the Doctor infifts, that " when any " do evil of Neceffity, what they do is no vice, " that they are guilty of no fault, * are worthy " of no blame, dispraise, + or dishonour, 1 but " are unblameable." §

* Difcourfe on five Points, p. 347, 360, 361, 377, ‡ 303. 326, 329, and many other places. † 371. § 304, 361.

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If these things are true, in Dr. Whitby's sense of Neceffity, they will prove all fuch to be blamelefs, who are given up of God to Sin, in what they commit after they are thus given up.-That there is fuch a thing as men's being judicially given up to Sin, is certain, if the Scripture rightly informs us; fuch a thing being often there fpoken of; as in Pfal. 1xxxi. 12. So I gave them up to their own hearts lufts, and they walked in their own counsels. Acts vii. 42. Then God turned, and gave them up to wor/hip the host of heaven. Rom. i. 24. Wherefore, God alfo gave them up to uncleanefs, through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between themselves. Ver. 26. For this cause God gave them up to vile affections. Ver. 28. And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things that are not convenient.

It is needlefs to ftand particularly to enquire, what God's giving men up to their own hearts lusts fignifies: it is fufficient to observe, that hereby is certainly meant God's fo ordering or difpofing things, in fome refpect or other, either by doing or forbearing to do, as that the confequence should be men's continuing in their Sins. So much as men are given up to, fo much is the confequence of their being given up, whether that be lefs or more. If God does not order things fo, by action or permiffion, that Sin will be the confequence, then the event proves that they are not given up to that confequence. If good be the confequence, in stead of evil, then God's mercy is to be acknowledged in that good; which mer-, cy must be contrary to God's judgment in giving up to evil. If the event must prove, that they are given up to evil as the confequence, then the perfons, who are the fubjects of this judgment,

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Statistics.

Sect. III. as are given up to Sin. 215 must be the subjects of such an event, and so the event is necessary.

If not only co-action, but all Neceffity, will prove men blamelefs, then Judas was blamelefs, after Chrift had given him over, and had already declared his certain damnation, and that he fhould verily betray Him. He was guilty of no Sin in betraying his Mafter, on this fuppolition; though his fo doing is fpoken of by Chrift as the moft aggravated Sin, more heinous than the Sin of Pilate in crucifying Him. And the Jews in Egypt, in Jeremiah's time, were guilty of no fin, in their not worfhipping the true God, after God had fworn by bis great Name, that his Name fbould be no more named in the mouth of any man of Judab, in all the land of Egypt. Jer. xliv. 26.

Dr. Whitby (Difc. on five Points, p. 302, 303.) denies, that men, in this world, are ever fo given up by God to fin, that their wills fhould be neceffarily determined to evil; though He owns, that hereby it may become exceeding difficult for men to do good, having a ftrong bent, and powerful inclination, to what is evil.-But if we should allow the cafe to be just as he represents, the judgment of giving up to fin will no better agree with his notions of that liberty, which is effential to praife or blame, than if we fhould fuppose it to render the avoiding of. fin impossible. For if an impoffibility of avoiding fin wholly excufes a man; then, for the fame reafon, its being difficult to avoid it, excuses him in part; and this just in proportion to the degree of difficulty. -If the influence of moral impoffibility or Inability be the fame, to excufe perfons in not doing, or not avoiding any thing, as that of natural Inability, (which is fuppofed) then undoubt-

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edly, in like manner, moral difficulty has the fame influence to excufe with natural difficulty. But all allow, that natural impoffibility wholly excufes, and also that natural difficulty excuses in part, and makes the act or omiffion less blameable in proportion to the difficulty. All natural difficulty, according to the plainest dictates of the light of nature, excufes in fome degree, fo that the neglect is not fo blameable, as if there had been no difficulty in the cafe: and fo the greater the difficulty is, still the more excuseable, in proportion to the increase of the difficulty. And as natural impoffibility wholly excufes and excludes all blame, fo the nearer the difficulty approaches to impoffibility, still the nearer a perfon is to blameleffnels in proportion to that approach. And if the cafe of moral impoffibility or Necessity, be just the fame with natural Necessity or co-action, as to influence to excuse a neglect, then also, for the fame reason, the case of natural difficulty, does not differ in influence, to excufe a neglect, from moral difficulty, arifing from a ftrong bias or bent to evil, fuch as Dr. Whitby owns in the cafe of those that are given up to their own hearts So that the fault of fuch perfons must be lufts. leftened, in proportion to the difficulty, and approach to impoffibility. If ten degrees of moral difficulty make the action quite impoffible, and fo wholly excufe, then if there be nine degrees of difficulty the perfon is in great part excufed, and is nine degrees in ten, lefs blame-worthy, than if there had been no difficulty at all; and he has but one degree of blame-worthinefs. The reafon is plain, on Arminian principles; viz. becaufe as difficulty, by antecedent bent and bias on the will, is increafed, liberty of indifference, and telf-determination in the will, is diminished; fo much hindrance and impediment is there, in

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the way of the will's acting freely, by mere felf-determination. And if ten degrees of fuch hindrance take away all fuch liberty, then nine degrees take away nine parts in ten, and leave but one degree of liberty. And therefore there is but one degree of blameablenefs, *cateris paribus*, in the neglect; the man being no further blameable in what he does, or neglects, than he has liberty in that affair: for blame or praife (fay they) arifes wholly from a good use or abuse of liberty.

From all which it follows, that a ftrong bent and bias one way, and difficulty of going the contrary, never caufes a perfon to be at all more exposed to Sin, or any thing blameable: becaufe, as the difficulty is increased, fo much the lefs is required and expected. Though in one respect, exposedness to Sin or fault is increased, viz. by an increase of exposedness to the evil action or omiffion; yet it is diminished in another respect, to balance it; namely, as the finfulness or blameableness of the action or omiffion is diminished in the fame proportion. So that, on the whole, the affair, as to exposedness to guilt or blame, is left just as it was.

To illustrate this, let us fuppose a scale of a balance to be intelligent, and a free agent, and indued with a self-moving power, by virtue of which it could act and produce effects to a certain degree, ex. gr. to move itself up or down with a force equal to a weight of ten pounds; and that it might therefore be required of it, in ordinary circumstances, to move itself down with that force; for which it has power and full liberty, and therefore would be blame-worthy if it failed of it. But then let us suppose a weight of

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ten pounds to be put in the oppofite scale, which in force entirely counter-balances its felf-moving power, and fo renders it impossible for it to move down at all; and therefore wholly excufes it from any fuch motion. But if we fuppole there to be only nine pounds in the opposite scale, this renders its motion not impossible, but yet more difficult; fo that it can now only move down with the force of one pound: but however, this is all that is required of it under these circumstances; it is wholly excufed from nine parts of its motion: and if the scale, under these circumstances, neglects to move, and remains at rest, all that it will be blamed for, will be its neglect of that one tenth part of its motion; which it had as much liberty and advantage for, as in ufual circumstances, it has for the greater motion, which in fuch a cafe would be required. So that this new difficulty, does not at all increase its exposedness to any thing blame-worthy.

And thus the very fupposition of difficulty in the way of a man's duty, or proclivity to Sin, through a being given up to hardness of heart, or indeed by any other means whatfoever, is an inconfistence, according to Dr. Whitby's notions of liberty, virtue and vice, blame and praise. The avoiding Sin and blame, and the doing what is virtuous and praise-worthy, must be always equally eafy.

Dr. Whitby's notions of liberty, obligation, virtue, Sin, &c. led him into another great inconfistence. He abundantly infists, that necelfity is inconfistent with the nature of Sin or fault. He fays, in the forementioned treatife, p. 14. Who can blame a perfon for doing what he could not help ? and p. 15. It being fenfibly unjuft,

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Sect. III.

to punifh any man for doing that which was never in his power to avoid. And in p. 341, to confirm his opinion, he quotes one of the Fathers, faying, Why doth God command, if man hath not freewill and power to obey? And again in the fame and the next page, Who will not cry out, that it is folly to command him, that hath not liberty to do what is commanded; and that it is unjust to condemn him, that has it not in his power to do what is required? And in p. 373, he cites another faying, A law is given to him that can turn to both parts; i. e. obey or transfers it: but no law can be against him who is bound by nature.

And vet the fame Dr. Whitby afferts, that fallen Man is not able to perform perfect obedience. in p. 165, he has these words: " The nature of " Adam had power to continue innocent, and " without Sin; whereas, it is certain our nature " never had fo." But if we have not power to continue innocent and without Sin, then Sin is inconfistent with Neceffity, and we may be finful in that which we have not power to avoid; and those things cannot be true which he afferts elfewhere, namely, " That if we be neceffitated, " neither Sins of omifion nor commifion, " would deferve that name," (p. 348.) If we have it not in our power to be innocent, then we have it not in our power to be blamelefs: and if fo, we are under a Necessity of being blame-worthy. And how does this confift with what he fo often afferts, that Necessity is inconfistent with blame or praise? If we have it not in our power to perform perfect obedience to all the commands of God, then we are under a Necessity of breaking fome commands, in fome degree; having no power to perform fo much as is commanded. And if fo, why does he cry out of the unreason-

220 Of the Inability of fallen Man. Part III. ablenefs and folly of commanding beyond what men have power to do?

And Arminians in general are very inconfistent with themfelves in what they fay of the Inability of fallen Man in this respect. They strenuously maintain, that it would be unjust in God, to require any thing of us beyond our prefent power and ability to perform; and also hold, that we are now unable to perform perfect obedience, and that Christ died to fatisfy for the imperfections of bur obedience, and has made way, that our imperfect obedience might be accepted instead of perfect: wherein they feem infenfibly to run themfelves into the groffest inconfistence. For, (as I have observed elsewhere) " they hold, that God, " in mercy to mankind, has abolished that rigor-" ous constitution or law, that they were under " originally; and in stead of it, has introduced a "more mild constitution, and put us under a " new law, which requires no more than imper-" fect fincere obedience, in compliance with our " poor infirm impotent circumftances fince the " fall."

Now, how can thefe things be made confiftent? I would afk, what law thefe imperfections of our obedience are a breach of? If they are a breach of no law, that we were ever under, then they are not Sins. And if they be not Sins, what need of Chrift's dying to fatisfy for them? But if they are Sins, and the breach of fome law, what law is it? they cannot be a breach of their new law; for that requires no other than imperfect obedience, or obedience with imperfections: and therefore to have obedience attended with imperfections, is no breach of it; for it is as much as it requires. And they cannot be a

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breach of their old law; for that, they fay, is entirely abolished; and we never were under it .---They fay, it would not be just in God to require of us perfect obedience, because it would not be just to require more than we can perform, or to punish us for failing of it. And therefore, by their own scheme, the imperfections of our obedience do not deferve to be punished. What need therefore of Christ's dying, to fatisfy for them? What need of his *fuffering*, to fatisfy for that which is no fault, and in its own nature deferves no *fuffering*? What need of Chrift's dying, to purchase, that our imperfect obedience should be accepted, when, according to their fcheme, it would be unjust in itself, that any other obedience, than imperfect should be required? What need of Christ's dying to make way for God's accepting fuch an obedience, as it would be unjust in Him not to accept? Is there any need of Christ's dying, to prevail with God not to do unrighteously ?---If it be faid, that Christ died to fatisfy that old law for us, that fo we might not be under it, but that there might be room for our being under a more mild law; ftill I would inquire, what need of Chrift's dying, that we might not be under a law, which (by their principles) it would be in itfelf unjust that we should be under, whether Chrift had died or no, becaufe, in our prefent flate, we are not able to keep it?

So the Arminians are inconfiftent with themfelves, not only in what they fay of the need of Chrift's fatisfaction to atone for those imperfections, which we cannot avoid, but also in what they fay of the grace of God, granted to enable men to perform the fincere obedience of the new

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Of Inability, and Obligation. Part III. 222

" I grant (fays Dr. Stebbing*) indeed, that law. " by reafon of original Sin, we are utterly dif-" abled for the performance of the condition, " without new grace from God. But I fay then, "that he gives fuch a grace to all of us, by "which the performance of the condition is " truly poffible: and upon this ground he may, " and doth most righteously require it." If Dr. Stebbing intends to fpeak properly, by grace he must mean, that affistance which is of grace, or of free favour and kindnefs. But yet in the fame place he fpeaks of it as very unreasonable, unjust and cruel, for God to require that, as the condition of pardon, that is become impossible by original Sin.' If it be fo, what grace is there in giving affiftance and ability to perform the condition of pardon? Or why is that called by the name of grace, that is an absolute debt, which God is bound to beftow, and which it would be unjust and cruel in Him to with hold, feeing he requires that, as the condition of pardon, which he cannot perform without it?

IV. SECTION

Command and Obligation to Obedience, confistent with moral Inability to obey.

T being fo much infifted on by Arminian wri-ters, that neceffity is inconfiftent with Law or Command, and particularly, that it is abfurd to fuppofe God by his Command fhould require that of men which they are unable to do; not allowing in this cafe for any difference that there is

* Treatife of the Operations of the Spirit. 2 edit. -P. 112, 113.

Sect. IV. Commands confiftent, &c. between natural and moral Inability; I would therefore now particularly confider this matter.

• And, for the greater clearnefs, I would difinctly lay down the following things.

I. The will itfelf, and not only those actions which are the effects of the will, is the proper object of Precept or Command. This is, fuch or fuch a state or acts of men's wills, is in many cafes, properly required of them by Commands; and not only those alterations in the state of their bodies or minds that are the confequences of volition. This is most manifest; for it is the foul only that is properly and directly the fubject of Precepts or Commands; that only being capable of receiving or perceiving Commands. The motions or state of the body are matter of Command, only as they are fubject to the foul, and connected with its acts. But now the foul has no other faculty whereby it can, in the most direct and proper fense, confent, yield to, or comply with any Command, but the faculty of the will; and it is by this faculty only, that the foul can directly difobey, or refuse compliance: for the very notions of confenting, yielding, accepting, complying, refusing, rejecting, &c. are, according to the meaning of the terms, nothing but certain acts of the will. Obedience, in the primary nature of it, is the fubmitting and yielding of the will of one to the will of another. Difobedience is the not confenting, not complying of the will of the commanded to the manifested will of the commander. Other acts that are not the acts of the will, as certain motions of the body and alterations in the foul, are Obedience or Difobedience only indirectly, as they are connected with the state or actions of the will,

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according to an eftablished law of nature. So that it is manifest, the will itself may be required: 'and the being of a good will is the most proper, direct and immediate subject of command; and if this cannot be prescribed or required by Command or Precept, nothing can; for other things can be required no otherwise than as they depend upon, and are the fruits of a good will.

Corol. 1. If there be feveral acts of the will, or a feries of acts, one following another, and one the effect of another, the fir/t and determining act is properly the fubject of command, and not only the confequent acts, which are dependent upon it. Yea, it is this more efpecially, which is that, which Command or precept has a proper refpect to; becaufe it is this act that determines the whole affair: in this act the Obedience or Difobedience lies, in a peculiar manner; the confequent acts being all fubject to it, and governed and determined by it. This determining governing act muft be the proper object of Precept, or none.

Corol. 2. It also follows, from what has been observed, that if there be any fort of act, or exertion of the foul, prior to all free acts of the will or acts of choice in the cafe, directing and determining, what the acts of the will shall be; that act or exertion of the foul cannot properly be subject to any Command or Precept, in any respect whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely. Such acts cannot be subject to Commands *directly*, because they are no acts of the will; being by the supposition prior to all acts of the will, determining and giving rise to all its acts: they not being acts of the

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will, there can be in them no confent to, or compliance with any command. Neither, can they be fubject to Command or Precept *indirectly* or *remotely*; for they are not to much as the *effects* or *confequences* of the will, being prior to all its acts. So that if there be any Obedience in that original act of the foul, determining all volitions, it is an act of Obedience wherein the will has no concern at all; it preceding every act of will. And therefore, if the foul either obeys or difobeys in this act, it is wholly involuntarily; there is no willing Obedience or rebellion, no compliance or opposition of the will in the affair: and what fort of Obedience or rebellion is this?

And thus the Arminian notion of the freedom of the will confifting in the foul's determining its own acts of will, instead of being essential to moral agency, and to men's being the fubjects of moral government, is utterly inconfiftent with it. For if the foul determines all its acts of will, it is therein fubject to no Command or moral government, as has been now observed; because its original determining act is no act of will or choice, it being prior, by the supposition, to every act of will. And the foul cannot be the fubject of Command in the act of the will itfelf, which depends on the foregoing determining act, and is determined by it; in as much as this is necessary, being the necessary confequence and effect of that prior determining act, which is not voluntary. Nor can the man be the fubject of Command or government in his external actions; becaufe thefe are all neceffary, being the neceffary effects of the acts of the will themfelves. So that mankind, according to this scheme, are subjects of Command or

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moral government in nothing at all; and all their moral agency is entirely excluded, and no room for virtue or vice in the world.

So that it is the Arminian fcheme, and not the fcheme of the Calvinists, that is utterly inconfistent with moral government, and with all use of laws, precepts, prohibitions, promifes or threatenings. Neither is there any way whatfoever to make their principles confift with these things. For if it be faid, that there is no prior determining act of the foul, preceding the acts of the will, but that volitions are events that come to pafs by pure accident, without any determining caufe, this is most palpably inconfistent with all ufe of laws and precepts; for nothing is more plain than that laws can be of no use to direct and regulate perfect accident: which, by the fuppolition of its being pure accident, is in no cale regulated by any thing preceding; but happens, this way or that, perfectly by chance, without any caufe or rule. The perfect ufeleffnefs of laws and precepts also follows from the Arminian notion of indifference, as effential to that liberty, which is requisite to virtue or vice. For the end of laws is to bind to one fide; and the end of Commands is to turn the will one way: and therefore they are of no use, unless they turn or bias the will that way. But if liberty confifts in indifference, then their biaffing the will one way only, deftroys liberty; as it puts the will out of equilibrium. So that the will, having a bias, through the influence of binding law, laid upon it, is not wholly left to itfelf, to determine itfelf which way it will, without influence from. without.

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II. Having shewn that the will itself, especially in those acts, which are original, leading and determining in any cafe, is the proper fubject of Precept and Command, and not only those alterations in the body, &c. which are the effects of the will; I now proceed, in the fecond place, to observe that the very opposition or defect of the will itfelf, in that act, which is its original and determining act in the cafe; I fay, the will's opposition in this act to a thing proposed or commanded, or its failing of compliance, implies a moral Inability to that thing: or, in other words, whenever a Command requires a certain state or act of the will, and the perfon commanded, notwithstanding the Command and the circumstances under which it is exhibited, still finds his will oppofite or wanting, in that, belonging to its state or acts, which is original and determining in the affair, that man is morally unable to obey that Command.

This is manifest from what was observed in the first part, concerning the nature of moral lnability, as diftinguished from natural: where it was observed, that a man may then be faid to be morally unable to do a thing, when he is under the influence or prevalence of a contrary inclination, or has a want of inclination, under fuch circumstances and views. It is also evident, from what has been before proved, that the will is always, and in every individual act, neceffarily determined by the strongest motive; and so is always unable to go against the motive, which, all things confidered, has now the greatest strength and advantage to move the will .--- But not further to infift on these things, the truth of the position now laid down, viz. that when the will is opposite to, or failing of a compliance with a

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thing in its original determining inclination or act, it is not able to comply, appears by the confideration of these two things.

The will in the time of that diverfe or oppofite leading act or inclination, and when actually under the influence of it, is not able to exert itself to the contrary, to make an alteration, in order to a compliance. The inclination is unable to change itfelf; and that for this plain reason, that it is unable to incline to change it-Prefent choice cannot at prefent chufe to be felf. otherwife: for that would be at present to chuse fomething diverse from what is at present chosen. If the will, all things now confidered, inclines or chufes to go that way, then it cannot chufe, all things now confidered, to go the other way, and fo cannot chuse to be made to go the other To fuppose that the mind is now finway. cerely inclined to change itself to a different inclination, is to suppose the mind is now truly inclined otherwife than it is now inclined. The will may oppose fome future remote act that it is exposed to, but not its own prefent act.

2. As it is impossible that the will should comply with the thing commanded, with respect to its *leading act*, by any act of its own, in the time of that diverse or opposite *leading and original act*, or after it has actually come under the influence of that *determining choice or inclination*; fo it is impossible it should be determined to a compliance by any foregoing act; for, by the very supposition, there is no foregoing act; the opposite or non-complying act being that act which is *original* and *determining* in the case. Therefore it must be fo, that if this *first determining act* be

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found non-complying, on the propofal of the Command, the mind is morally unable to obey. For to fuppofe it to be able to obey, is to fuppofe it to be able to determine and caule its first determining act to be otherwife, and that it has power better to govern and regulate its first governing and regulating act, which is abfurd; for it is to fuppole a prior act of the will, determining its first determining act; that is, an act prior to the first, and leading and governing the original and governing act of all; which is a contradiction.

Here if it should be faid, that although the mind has not any ability to will contrary to what it does will, in the original and leading act of the will, because there is supposed to be no prior act to determine and order it otherwife, and the will cannot immediately change itfelf, becaufe it cannot at prefent incline to a change; yet the mind has an ability for the prefent to forbear to proceed to action, and taking time for deliberation; which may be an occasion of the change of the inclination.

I answer, (1.) In this objection that feems to be forgotten which was observed before, viz. that the determining to take the matter into confideration, is itself an act of the will; and if this be all the act wherein the mind exercises ability and freedom, then this, by the fuppofition, must be all that can be commanded or required by Precept. And if this act be the commanding act, then all that has been observed concerning the commanding act of the will remains true, that the very want of it is a moral Inability to exert it, &c. (2.) We are speaking concerning the first and leading act of the will in the cale, or about the affair; and if a determining Q 3

to deliberate, or, on the contrary, to proceed immediately without deliberating, be the first and leading act; or whether it be or no, if there be another act before it, which determines that; or whatever be the original and leading act; still the foregoing proof stands good, that the noncompliance of the leading act implies moral Inability to comply.

If it fhould be objected, that these things make all moral Inability equal, and suppose men morally unable to will otherwise than they actually do will, in all cases, and equally so in every Instance.

In answer to this objection, I defire two things may be observed. First, That if by being equally unable be meant as really unable; then, fo far as the Inability is merely moral, it is true, the will, in every instance, acts by moral necessity, and is morally unable to act otherwife, as truly and properly in one cafe as another; as I humbly conceive has been perfectly and abundantly demonstrated by what has been faid in the preceding part of this Effay. But yet, in fome refpect, the Inability may be faid to be greater in fome inftances than others: though the man may be truly unable, (if moral Inability can truly be called Inability,) yet he may be further from being able to do fome things than others. As it is in things, which men are naturally unable to do. A perfon, whole strength is no more than fufficient to lift the weight of one hundred pounds, is as truly and really unable to lift one hundred and one pounds, as ten thousand pounds; but vet he is further from being able to lift the latter weight than the former; and fo, according to common use of speech, has a greater Inability

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for it. So it is in moral Inability. A man is truly morally unable to chufe contrary to a prefent inclination, which in the least degree prevails; or, contrary to that motive, which, all things confidered, has strength and advantage now to move the will, in the least degree, fuperior to all other motives in view: but yet he is further from ability to refift a very ftrong habit, and a violent and deeply rooted inclination, or a motive vality exceeding all others in ftrength. And again, the Inability may, in fome refpects, be called greater in fome inftances than others, as it may be more general and extensive to all acts of that kind. So men may be faid to be unable in a different fense, and to be further from moral ability, who have that moral Inability which is general and habitual, than they who have only that Inability which is occasional and particular*. Thus in cafes of natural Inability; he that is born blind may be faid to be unable to fee, in a different manner, and is, in fome respects, further from being able to fee, than he whofe fight is hindred by a transient cloud or mist.

And befides, that which was obferved in the first part of this difcourse, concerning the Inability which attends a *strong and settled babit*, should be here remembered; viz. that fixed habit is attended with this peculiar moral Inability, by which it is diftinguished from *occasional volition*, namely, that endeavours to avoid future volitions of that kind, which are agreeable to such a habit, much more frequently and commonly prove vain and infufficient. For tho' it is impossible there should be any true fincere defires and endeavours a-Q 4

* See this diffinction of moral Inability explained in PART I. Sed. IV.

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against a present volition or choice, yet there may be against volitions of that kind, when viewed at a distance. A person may defire and use means to prevent future exercises of a certain inclination; and, in order to it, may wish the habit might be removed; but his defires and endeavours may be ineffectual. The man may be faid in fome fense to be unable; yea, even as the word *unable* is a *relative term*, and has relation to ineffectual endeavours; yet not with regard to present, but remote endeavours.

Secondly, It must be borne in mind, according to what was observed before, that indeed no inability whatfoever, which is merely moral, is properly called by the name of Inability; and that in the strictest propriety of speech, a man may be faid to have a thing in his power, if he has it at his election; and he cannot be faid to be unable to do a thing, when he can, if he now pleafes, or whenever he has a proper, direct and immediate defire for it. As to those defires and endeavours, that may be against the exercises of a ftrong habit, with regard to which men may be faid to be unable to avoid those exercises, they are remote defires and endeavours in two respects. First, as to time; they are never against present volitions, but only against volitions of fuch a kind, when viewed at a diftance. Secondly, as to their nature; these opposite defires are not directly and properly against the habit and inclination itself, or the volitions in which it is exercifed; for thefe, in themfelves confidered, are agreeable; but against fomething elfe, that attends them, or is their confequence; the opposition of the mind is levelled entirely against this; the inclination or volitions themfelves are not at all opposed directly, and for their own fake; but only

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indirectly and remotely on the account of fomething alien and foreign.

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III. Though the opposition of the will itfelf, or the very want of will to a thing commanded, implies a moral Inability to that thing; yet, if it be, as has been already shewn, that the being of a good state or act of will, is a thing most properly required by Command; then, in some cases, such a state or act of will may properly be required, which at prefent is not, and which may also be wanting after it is commanded. And therefore those things may properly be commanded, which men have a moral Inability for.

Such a flate, or act of the will, may be required by Command, as does not already exift. For if that volition only may be commanded to be which already is, there could be no use of Precept; Commands in all cafes would be perfectly vain and impertinent. And not only may fuch a will be required, as is wanting before the Command is given, but also fuch as may possibly be wanting afterwards; fuch as the exhibition of the Command may not be effectual to produce or excite. Otherwife, no fuch thing as difobedience to a proper and rightful Command is poffible in any cafe; and there is no cafe fuppofable or poffible, wherein there can be an inexcufable or faul. ty difobedience. Which Arminians cannot affirm confiftently with their principles: for this makes Obedience to just and proper Commands always neceffary, and difobedience impossible. And fo the Arminian would overthrow himfelf, yielding the very point we are upon, which he fo ftrenuoufly denies, viz. that Law and Command are confiftent with necessity.

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If merely that Inability will excufe difobedience, which is implied in the opposition or defect of inclination, remaining after the Command is exhibited, then wickedness always carries that in it which excufes it. It is evermore fo, that by how much the more wickedness there is in a man's heart, by fo much is his inclination to evil the stronger, and by fo much the more, therefore, has he of moral Inability to the good required. His moral Inability, confifting in the strength of his evil inclination, is the very thing wherein his wickednefs confifts; and yet, according to Arminian principles, it must be a thing inconfistent with wickednefs; and by how much the more he has of it, by fo much is he the further from wickednefs.

Therefore, on the whole, it is manifelt, that moral Inability alone (which confifts in difinclination) never renders any thing improperly the fubject matter of Precept or Command, and never can excufe any perfon in difobedience, or want of conformity to a command.

Natural Inability, arifing from the want of natural capacity, or external hindrance (which alone is properly called Inability) without doubt wholly excufes, or makes a thing improperly the matter of Command. If men are excufed from doing or acting any good thing, fuppofed to be commanded, it must be through fome defect or obftacle that is not in the will itfelf, but intrinfic to it; either in the capacity of understanding, or body, or outward circumstances.

Here two or three things may be observed,

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1. As to fpiritual duties or acts, or any good thing in the state or imminent acts of the will itfelf, or of the affections (which are only certain modes of the exercise of the will) if perfons are justly excused, it must be through want of capacity in the natural faculty of understanding. Thus the fame fpiritual duties, or holy affections and exercises of heart, cannot be required of men, as may be of angels; the capacity of understanding being fo much inferior. So men cannot be required to love those amiable perfons, whom they have had no opportunity to fee, or hear of, or come to the knowledge of, in any way agreeable to the natural state and capacity of the human understanding. But the infufficiency of motives will not excuse; unless their being infufficient ariles not from the moral state of the will or inclination itself, but from the state of the natural understanding. The great kindness and generofity of another may be a motive infufficient to excite gratitude in the perfon, that receives the kindnefs. through his vile and ungrateful temper: in this cafe, the infufficiency of the motive arifes from the ftate of the will or inclination of heart, and does not at all excuse. But if this generofity is not fufficient to excite gratitude, being unknown, there being no means of information adequate to the state and measure of the person's faculties, this infufficiency is attended with a natural Inability which entirely excufes,

2. As to fuch motions of body, or exercises and alterations of mind, which does not confist in the imminent acts or state of the will itself, but are supposed to be required as effects of the will; I fay, in such supposed effects of the will, in cases wherein there is no want of a capacity of understanding; that Inability, and that only ex-

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3. Both these kinds of natural Inability that have been mentioned, and fo all Inability that excuses, may be resolved into one thing; namely, want of natural capacity or strength; either capacity of understanding, or external strength. For when there are external defects and obstacles, they would be no obstacles, were it not for the imperfection and limitations of understanding and strength.

Corol. If things for which men have a moral Inability, may properly be the matter of Precept or Command, then they may alfo of invitation and counfel. Commands and invitations come very much to the fame thing; the difference is only circumftantial: Commands are as much a manifeftation of the will of him that fpeaks, as invitations, and as much testimonies of expectation of compliance. The difference between them lies in nothing that touches the affair in hand. The main difference between Command and invitation confists in the enforcement of the will of him who commands or invites. In the latter it is his kindnefs, the goodnefs which his will arifes from: Sect. V. confistent with moral Inability.

in the former it is his authority. But whatever be the ground of the will of him that fpeaks, or the enforcement of what he fays, yet feeing neither his will nor expectation is any more teffified in the one cafe than the other; therefore a perforto being directed by invitation, is no more an evidence of infincerity in him that directs in manifefting either a will, or expectation which he has not, than his being known to be morally unable to do what he is directed to by command...... So that all this grand objection of Arminians against the Inability of fallen men to exert faith in Chrift, or to perform other fpiritual gospelduties, from the fincerity of God's counfels and invitations, must be without force.

SECTION V.

That Sincerity of defires and Endeavours, which is *fuppofed* to excuse in the Non-performance of Things in themfelves good, particularly confidered.

T is what is much infifted on by many, that fome men, though they are not able to perform fpiritual duties, fuch as repentance of fin, love to God, a cordial acceptance of Chrift as exhibited and offered in the gofpel, &c. yet they may fincerely defire and endeavour these things; and therefore must be excused; it being unreasonable to blame them for the omission of those things, which they fincerely defire and endeavour to do, but cannot do.

Concerning this matter, the following things may be observed.

1. What is here fuppofed, is a great mistake. and grofs abfurdity; even that men may fincerely chufe and defire those spiritual duties of love. acceptance, choice, rejection, &c. confifting in the exercise of the will itself, or in the disposition and inclination of the heart; and yet not be able to perform or exert them. This is abfurd. becaufe it is abfurd to fuppofe that a man should directly, properly and fincerely incline to have an inclination, which at the fame time is contrary to his inclination: for that is to fuppole him not to be inclined to that, which he is inclined to. If a man, in the ftate and acts of his will and inclination, does properly and directly fall in with those duties, he therein performs them: for the duties themfelves confift in that very thing; they confift in the state and acts of the will being fo formed and directed. If the foul properly and fincerely falls in with a certain proposed act of will or choice, the foul therein makes that choice its own. Even as when a moving body falls in with a proposed direction of its motion, that is the fame thing as to move in that direction.

2. That which is called a *defire* and *willingnefs* for those inward duties, in fuch as do not perform, has respect to these duties only indirectly and remotely, and is improperly represented as a willingness for them; not only because (as was observed before) it respects those good volitions only in a distant view, and with respect to future time; but also because evermore, not these things themselves, but fomething else, that is alien and foreign, is the object that terminates these volitions and defires.

A drunkard, who continues in his drunkennefs, being under the power of a love, and vio-

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lent appetite to ftrong drink, and without any love to virtue; but being alfo extremely covetous and clofe, and very much exercifed and grieved at the diminution of his eftate, and profpect of poverty, may in a fort defire the virtue of temperance; and though his prefent will is to gratify his extravagant appetite, yet he may wifh, he had a heart to forbear future acts of intemperance, and forfake his exceffes, through an unwillingness to part with his money: but still he goes on with his drunkennefs; his wifhes and endeavours are infufficient and ineffectual: fuch a man has no proper, direct, fincere willingness to forfake this vice, and the vicious deeds which belong to it: for he acts voluntarily in continuing to drink to excess: his defire is very improperly called a willingness to be temperate; it is no true defire of that virtue; for it is not that virtue, that terminates his wifnes; nor have they any direct respect at all to it. It is only the faving his money, and avoiding poverty, that terminates, and exhausts the whole strength of his defire. The virtue of temperance is regarded only very indirectly and improperly, even as a neceffary means of gratifying the vice of covetoufnefs.

So, a man of an exceeding corrupt and wicked heart, who has no love to God and Jefus Chrift, but, on the contrary, being very profanely and carnally inclined, has the greatest distaste of the things of religion, and enmity against them; yet being of a family, that from one generation to another, have most of them died, in youth, of an hereditary confumption; and so having little hope of living long; and having been instructed in the necessful of a supreme love to Christ, and gratitude for his death and sufferings, in order

to his falvation from eternal mifery; if under these circumstances he should, through fear of eternal torments, with he had fuch a difposition: but his profane and carnal heart remaining, he continues still in his habitual distaste of, and en. mity to God and religion, and wholly without any exercife of that love and gratitude, (as doubtlefs the very devils themfelves, notwithstanding all the devilishness of their temper, would with for a holy heart, if by that means they could get out of hell:) in this cafe, there is no fincere Willingness to love Christ and chuse him as his chief good: these holy dispositions and exercifes are not at all the direct object of the will: they truly share no part of the inclination or defire of the foul; but all is terminated on deliverance from torment: and these graces and pious volitions, notwithstanding this forced confent, are looked upon undefirable; as when a fick man defires a dofe he greatly abhors, to fave his life.—From thefe things it appears,

3. That this indirect Willingness which has been spoken of, is not that exercise of the will which the command requires; but is entirely a different one; being a volition of a different nature, and terminated altogether on different objects; wholly falling short of that virtue of will, which the command has respect to.

4. This other volition, which has only fome indirect concern with the duty required, cannot excufe for the want of that good will itfelf, which is commanded; being not the thing which anfwers and fulfils the command, and being wholly defititute of the virtue which the command feeks.

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Further to illustrate this matter.-If a child has a most excellent father, that has ever treated him with fatherly kindness and tenderness, and has every way, in the highest degree, merited his love and dutiful regard, being with all very wealthy; but the fon is of fo vile a difposition, that he inveterately hates his father; and yet, apprehending that his hatred of him is like to prove his ruin, by bringing him finally to poverty and abject circumstances, through his father's difinheriting him, or otherwife; which is exceeding crofs to his avarice and ambition; he, therefore, wifhes it were otherwife: but yet remaining under the invincible power of his vile and malignant difposition, he continues still in his settled hatred of his father. Now, if fuch a fon's indirect willingness to have love and honour towards his father, at all acquits or excufes before God, for his failing of actually exercifing these dispositions towards him, which God requires, it must be on one of these accounts. (1.) Either that it answers and fulfils the command. But this it does not by the fuppolition; becaule the thing commanded is love and honour to his worthy parent. If the command be proper and just as is supposed, then it obliges to the thing commanded; and fo nothing elfe but that can anfwer the obligation. Or, (2.) It must be at least, because there is that virtue or goodness in his indirect willingness, that is equivalent to the virtue required; and fo balances or countervails it, and makes up for the want of it. But that also is contrary to the supposition. The willingnefs the fon has merely from a regard to money and honour, has no goodness in it, to countervail the want of the pious filial respect required.

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Sincerity and reality, in that indirect willingnefs, which has been spoken of, does not make it the better. That which is real and hearty is often called fincere; whether it be in virtue or vice. Some perfons are fincerely bad; others are fincerely good; and others may be fincere and hearty in things, which are in their own nature *indifferent*; as a man may be fincerely defirous of eating when he is hungry. But a being fincere, hearty and in good earnest, is no virtue, unless it be in a thing that is virtuous. A man may be fincere and hearty in joining a crew of pirates, or a gang of robbers. When the devils cried out, and befought Christ not to torment them, it was no mere pretence; they were very hearty in their defires not to be tormented: but this did not make their will or defires virtuous. And if men have fincere defires, which are in their kind and nature no better, it can be no excuse for the want of any required virtue.

And as a man's being fincere in fuch an indirect defire or willingnefs to do his duty, as has been mentioned, cannot excuse for the want of performance; fo it is with Endeavours arising from fuch a willingness. The Endeavours can have no more goodnefs in them, than the will which they are the effect and expression of. And, therefore, however fincere and real, and however great a perfon's Endeavours are; yea though they fhould be to the utmost of his ability; unless the will which they proceed from be truly good and virtuous, they can be of no avail, influence or weight to any purpofe whatfoever, in a moral fense or respect. That which is not truly virtuous, in God's fight, is looked upon, by Him, as good for nothing: and fo can be of no value, weight or influence in his account, to recom-.

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mend, fatisfy excufe or make up for any moral defect. For nothing can acounter-balance evil, but good. If evil be in one fcale, and we put a great deal into the other, fincere and earneft Defires, and many and great Endeavours; yet, if there be no real goodnefs in all, there is no weight in it; and fo it does nothing towards balancing the real weight, which is in the oppofite fcale. It is only like the fubftracting a thoufand noughts from before a real number, which leaves the fum juft as it was.

Indeed fuch Endeavours may have a negatively good influence. Those things, which have no positive virtue have no positive moral influence; yet they may be an occafion of perfons avoiding fome positive evils. As if a man were in the water with a neighbour, that he had ill-will to. who could not fwim, holding him by his hand; which neighbour was much in debt to him; and should be tempted to let him fink and drown; but fhould refuse to comply with the temptation; not from love to his neighbour. but from the love of money, and because by his drowning he fhould lofe his debt; that which he does in preferving his neighbour from drowning, is nothing good in the fight of God: yet hereby he avoids the greater guilt that would have been contracted, if he had defignedly let his neighbour fink and perish. But when Arminians, in their difputes with Calvinifts, infift fo much on fincere Defires and Endeavours, as what must excuse men. must be accepted of God, &c. it is manifest they have refpect to fome positive moral weight or influence of those Desires and Endeavours. Accepting, justifying or excusing on the account of fincere honeft Endeavours (as they are called) and men's doing what they can, &c. has relation

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to fome moral value, fomething that is accepted as good, and as fuch, countervailing fome defect.

But there is a great and unknown deceit arifing from the ambiguity of the phrafe, *fincere Endeavours.* Indeed there is a vaft indiffinctnefs and unfixednefs in moft, or at leaft very many of the terms ufed to express things pertaining to moral and fpiritual matters. Whence arife innumerable mistakes, ftrong prejudices, inextricable confusion, and endlefs controverfy.

The word fincere is most commonly used to fignify fomething that is good: men are habituated to understand by it the fame as honest and upright; which terms excite an idea of fomething good in the ftricteft and higheft fense; good in the fight of Him, who fees not only the outward appearance, but the heart. And, therefore, men think that if a perfon be fincere, he will certainly be accepted. If it be faid that any one is fincere in his Endeavours, this fuggefts to men's minds as much, as that his heart and will is good, that there is no defect of duty, as to virtuous inclination; he honeftly and uprightly defires and endea-- vours to do as he is required; and this leads them to fuppofe, that it would be very hard and unreafonable to punish him, only because he is unfuccessful in his Endeavours, the thing endeavoured being beyond his power.---Whereas it ought to be observed, that the word *incere* has these different fignifications.

1. Sincerity, as the word is fometimes ufed, fignifies no more than reality of Will and Endeavour, with respect to any thing that is professed or pretended; without any confideration of the

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nature of the principle or aim, whence this real Will and true Endeavour arifes. If a man has fome real defire to obtain a thing, either direct or indirect, or does really endeavour after a thing, he is faid fincerely to defire or endeavour it; without any confideration of the goodness or virtuousness of the principle he acts from, or any excellency or worthiness of the end he acts for. Thus a man, who is kind to his neighbour's wife, who is fick and languishing, and very helpful in her cafe, makes a flew of defiring and endeavouring her reftoration to health and vigour; and not only makes fuch a fhew, but there is a reality in his pretence, he does heartily and earneitly defire to have her health reftored, and ufes his true and utmost Endeavours for it; he is faid fincerely to defire and endeavour it, becaufe he does fo truly or really; though perhaps the principle he acts from, is no other than a vile and fcandalous paffion; having lived in adultery with her, he earnestly defires to have her health and vigour reftored, that he may return to his criminal pleafures with her. Or.

2. By fincerity is meant, not merely a reality of Will and Endeavour of fome fort or other, and from fome confideration or other, but a virtuous fincerity. That is, that in the performance of those particular acts, that are the matter of virtue or duty, there be not only the matter, but the form and effence of virtue, confisting in the aim that governs the act, and the principle exercifed in it. There is not only the reality of the act, that is as it were the body of the duty; but alfo the foul, which should properly belong to fuch a body. In this fense, a man is faid to be fincere, when he acts with a pure intention; not from finister views, or bye-ends: he not only

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In reality defires and feeks the thing to be done, or qualification to be obtained, for fome end or other; but he wills the thing directly and properly, as neither forced nor bribed; the virtue of the thing is properly the object of the will.

In the former fenfe, a man is faid to be fincere, in oppofition to a mere pretence, and *fbew of the particular thing to be done or exhibited*, without any real defire or Endeavour at all. In the latter fenfe, a man is faid to be fincere, in oppofition to that *fbew of wirtue there is in merely doing the matter of duty*, without the reality of the virtue itfelf in the foul, and the effence of it, which there is a fhew of. A man may be fincere in the former fenfe, and yet in the latter be in the fight of God, who fearches the heart, a vile hypocrite.

In the latter kind of fincerity, only, is there any thing truly valuable or acceptable in the fight of God. And this is the thing, which in Scripture is called fincerity. uprightnefs, integrity, truth in the inward parts, and a being of a perfect beart. And if there be fuch a fincerity, and fuch a degree of it as there ought to be. and there be any thing further that the man is not able to perform, or which does not prove to be connected with his fincere Defires and Endeavours, the man is wholly excufed and acquitted in the fight of God; his will shall furely be accepted for his deed: and fuch a fincere Will and Endeavour is all that in strictness is required of him, by any command of God. But as to the other kind of fincerity of Defires and Endeavours, it having no virtue in it, (as was observed before) can be of no avail before God, in any cafe, to recommend,

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fatisfy, or excuse, and has no positive moral weight or influence whatsoever.

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Corol. 1. Hence it may be inferred, that nothing in the reafon and nature of things appears, from the confideration of any moral weight of that former kind of fincerity, which has been fpoken of, at all obliging us to believe, or leading us to fuppofe, that God has made any pofitive Promifes of falvation, or grace, or any faving affiftance, or any fpiritual benefit whatfoever, to any Defires, Prayers, Endeavours, Striving, or Obedience of thofe, who hitherto have no true virtue or holinefs in their hearts; though we fhould fuppofe all the Sincerity, and the utmost degree of Endeavour, that is possible to be in a perfon without holinefs.

Some object against God's requiring, as the condition of falvation, those holy exercises, which are the refult of a fupernatural renovation: fuch as a fupreme refpect to Christ, love to God, loving holiness for its own fake, &c. that these inward dispositions and exercises are above men's power, as they are by nature; and therefore that we may conclude, that when men are brought to be fincere in their Endeavours, and do as well as they can, they are accepted; and that this must be all that God requires, in order to men's being received as the objects of his favour, and mult be what God has appointed as the condition of falvation. Concerning which, I would observe, that in such a manner of speaking of men's being accepted, because they are sincere, and do as well as they can, there is evidently a fuppolition of fome virtue, fome degree of that which is truly good; though it does not go fo far as were to be wished. For if

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men do what they can, unless their fo doing be from fome good principle, disposition, or exercife of heart, fome virtuous inclination or act of the will; their fo doing what they can, is in fome respects not a whit better than if they did nothing at all. In fuch a cafe, there is no more positive moral goodness in a man's doing what he can, than in a wind-mill's doing what it can; because the action does no more proceed from virtue; and there is nothing in fuch fincerity of Endeavour, or doing what we can, that should tender it any more a proper or fit recommendation to positive favour and acceptance, or the condition of any reward or actual benefit, than doing nothing; for both the one and the other are alike nothing, as to any true moral weight or value.

Corol. 2. Hence also it follows, there is nothing that appears in the reafon and nature of things which can justly lead us to determine, that God will certainly give the neceffary means of falvation, or fome way or other beflow true holinefs and eternal life on those *Heathen*, who are fincere, (in the fense above explained) in their Endeavours to find, out the will of the Deity, and to please him, according to their light, that they may escape his future displeasure and wrath, and obtain happiness in the future state, through his favour.

SECTION VI.

Liberty of Indifference, not only not neceffary to Virtue, but utterly inconfistent with it; and all, either virtuous or vicious Habits or Inclinations, inconfistent with Arminian Notions of Liberty and moral Agency.

TO fuppofe fuch a freedom of will, as Arminians talk of, to be requisite to Virtue and Vice, is many ways contrary to common fense.

If Indifference belongs to Liberty of Will, as Arminians suppose, and it be effential to a virtuous action, that it be performed in a flate of Liberty, as they also fuppose; it will follow, that it is effential to a virtuous action, that it be performed in a state of Indifference: and if it be performed in a state of Indifference. then doubtlefs it must be performed in the time of Indifference. And fo it will follow, that in order to the virtuoufness of an act, the heart must be indifferent in the time of the performance of that act, and the more indifferent and cold the heart is with relation to the act, which is performed, fo much the better; becaufe the act is performed with fo much the greater Liberty. But is this agreeable to the light of nature? Is it agreeable to the notions, which mankind, in all ages, have of Virtue, that it lies in that, which is contrary to Indifference, even in the Tendency and Inclination of the heart to virtuous action; and that the stronger the Inclination, and fo the further from Indifference, the more virtuous the heart, and fo

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much the more praife-worthy the act which proceeds from it?

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If we should suppose (contrary to what has been before demonstrated) that there may be an act of will in a state of Indifference; for instance, this act, viz. The will's determining to put itself out of a state of Indifference, and give itself a preponderation one way, then it would follow, on Arminian principles, that this act or determination of the will is that alone wherein Virtue confifts, becaufe this only is performed, while the mind remains in a state of Indifference, and so in a state of Liberty: for when once the mind is put out of its equilibrium, it is no longer in fuch a state; and therefore all the acts, which follow afterwards, proceeding from bias, can have the nature neither of Virtue nor Vice. Or if the thing, which the will can do, while yet in a ftate of Indifference, and fo of Liberty, be only to fufpend acting, and determine to take the matter into confideration, then this determination is that alone wherein Virtue confifts, and not proceeding to action after the scale is turned by confideration. So that it will follow, from these principles, all that is done after the mind, by any means, is once out of its equilibrium and already poffeffed by an Inclination, and arifing from that Inclination, has nothing of the nature of Virtue or Vice, and is worthy of neither blame nor praife. But how plainly contrary is this to the universal sense of mankind, and to the notion they have of fincerely virtuous actions? Which is. that they are actions, which proceed from a heart well disposed and inclined; and the stronger, and the more fixed and determined the good difpofion of the heart, the greater the fincerity of Virtue, and fo the more of the truth and reality

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of it. But if there be any acts, which are done in a ftate of equilibrium, or fpring immediately from perfect Indifference and coldnefs of heart, they cannot arife from any good principle or difpolition in the heart; and, confequently, according to common fenfe, have no fincere goodnefs in them, having no virtue of heart in them. To have a virtuous heart, is to have a heart that favours Virtue, and is friendly to it, and not one perfectly cold and indifferent about it.

And befides, the actions that are done in a state of Indifference, or that arife immediately out of fuch a state, cannot be virtuous, because, by the fuppofition, they are not determined by any preceding choice. For if there be preceding choice, then choice intervenes between the act and the state of Indifference; which is contrary to the fuppofition of the act's arifing immediately out of Indifference. But those acts, which are not determined by preceding choice, cannot be virtuous or vicious by Arminian principles, becaufe they are not determined by the will. So that neither one way, nor the other, can any actions be virtuous or vicious, according to Arminian principles. If the action be determined by a preceding act of choice, it cannot be virtuous; becaufe the action is not done in a state of Indifference, nor does immediately arife from fuch a state; and fo is not done in a state of Liberty. If the action be not determined by a preceding act of choice, then it cannot be virtuous; becaufe then the will is not felf-determined in it. So that it is made certain, that neither Virtue nor Vice can ever find any place in the univerfe,

Moreover, that it is necessary to a virtuous action that it be performed in a state of Indif.

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ference, under a notion of that being a flate of Liberty, is contrary to common fenfe; as it is a dictate of common fenfe, that Indifference itfelf, in many cafes, is vicious, and fo to a high degree. As if when I fee my neighbour or near friend, and one who has in the higheft degree merited of me, in extreme diftrefs, and ready to perifh, I find an Indifference in my heart with respect to any thing proposed to be done, which I can eafily do, for his relief. So if it should be proposed to me to blass other things, which might be mentioned: the being indifferent, for a moment, would be highly vicious and vile.

And it may be further observed, that to suppofe this Liberty of Indifference is effential to Virtue and Vice, destroys the great difference of degrees of the guilt of different crimes, and takes away the heinousness of the most flagitious horrid iniquities; fuch as adultery, bestiality, murder, perjury, blasphemy, &c. For, according to these principles, there is no harm at all in having the mind in a state of perfect Indifference with respect to these crimes: nay, it is abfolutely necessary in order to any Virtue in avoid, ing them, or Vice in doing them. But for the mind to be in a ftate of Indifference with respect to them, is to be next door to doing them: it is then infinitely near to chufing, and fo committing the fact: for equilibrium is the next step to a degree of preponderation; and one, even the least degree of preponderation (all things confidered) is choice. And not only fo, but for the will to be in a ftate of perfect equilibrium with respect to fuch crimes, is for the mind to be in fuch a state, as to be full as likely to chufe them as to refuse them, to do them as to omit them, And

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if our minds must be in such a state, wherein it is as near to chuing as refufing, and wherein it must of necessity, according to the nature of things, be as likely to commit them, as to refrain from them; where is the exceeding heinoufnefs of chusing and committing them? If there be no harm in often being in fuch a ftate, wherein the probability of doing and forbearing are exactly equal, there being an equilibrium, and no more tendency to one than the other; then, according to the nature and laws of fuch a contingence, it may be expected, as an inevitable confequence of fuch a disposition of things, that we should chuse them as often as reject them: that it should generally to fall out is necessary, as equality in the effect is the natural confequence of the equal tendency of the caufe, or of the antecedent state of things from which the effect arifes. Why then fhould we be fo exceedingly to blame, if it does fo fall out?

It is many ways apparent, that the Arminian fcheme of Liberty is utterly inconfiftent with the being of any fuch things as either virtuous or vicious Habits or Difpolitions. If Liberty of *Indifference* be effential to moral agency, then there can be no Virtue in any habitual Inclinations of the heart; which are contrary to Indifference, and imply in their nature the very deftruction and exclusion of it. They fuppofe nothing can be virtuous, in which no Liberty is exercifed; but how abfurd is it to talk of exercifing Indifference under bias and preponderation!

And if *felf-determining power* in the will be neceffary to moral agency, praife, blame, &c. then nothing done by the will can be any further praife or blame-worthy, than to far as the

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will is moved, fwayed and determined by itfelf, and the fcales turned by the fovereign power the will has over itfelf. And therefore the will muft not be put out of its balance already, the preponderation muft not be determined and effected before-hand; and fo the felf-determining act anticipated. Thus it appears another way, that habitual bias is inconfiftent with that Liberty. which Arminians fuppofe to be neceffary to Virtue or Vice; and fo it follows, that habitual bias itfelf cannot be either virtuous or vicious.

The fame thing follows from their doctrine concerning the Inconfistence of Necessity with Liberty, Praise, Dispraise, &c. None will deny, that Bias and Inclination may be fo ftrong as to be invincible, and leave no poffibility of the will's determining contrary to it; and fo be attended with Neceffity. This Dr. Whitby allows concerning the will of God, Angels, and glorified Saints, with respect to good; and the will of Devils, with refpect to evil. Therefore, if Neceffity be inconfistent with Liberty; then, when fixed Inclination is to fuch a degree of ftrength, it utterly excludes all Virtue, Vice, Praife of And, if fo, then the nearer Habits are Blame. to this strength, the more do they impede Liberty, and fo diminish Praise and Blame. If very strong Habits destroy Liberty, the leffer ones proportionably hinder it, according to their degree of strength. And therefore it will follow. that then is the act most virtuous or vicious. when performed without any Inclination or habitual Bias at all; because it is then performed with most Liberty.

Every prepoffeffing fixed Bias on the mind brings a degree of moral Inability for the con-

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trary; becaufe fo far as the mind is biaffed and prepoffeffed. fo much *binderance* is there of the contrary. And therefore if moral Inability be inconfiftent with moral agency, or the nature of Virtue and Vice, then, fo far as there is any fuch thing as evil difpofition of heart, or habitual depravity of Inclination; whether covetoufnefs, pride, malice, cruelty, or whatever elfe; fo much the more excufeable perfons are; fo much the lefs have their evil acts of this kind the nature of Vice. And, on the contrary, whatever excellent difpofitions and Inclinations they have, fo much are they the lefs virtuous.

It is evident, that no habitual disposition of heart, whether it be to a greater or lefs degree, can be in any degree virtuous or vicious; or the actions which proceed from them at all praife or blame-worthy. Becaufe, though we fhould fuppole the Habit not to be of fuch strength, as wholly to take away all moral ability and felfdetermining power; or hinder but that, although the act be partly from Bias, yet it may be in part from felf-determination; yet in this cafe, all that is from antecedent Bias must be set aside, as of no confideration; and in estimating the degree of Virtue or Vice, no more must be confidered than what arifes from felf-determining power, without any influence of that Bias, becaufe Liberty is exercifed in no more: fo that all that is the exercise of habitual Inclination, is thrown away, as not belonging to the morality of the action. By which it appears, that no exercife of thefe Habits, let them be ftronger or weaker, can ever have any thing of the nature of either Virtue or Vice.

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Here if any one fhould fay, that notwithstanding all these things, there may be the nature of Virtue and Vice in the habits of the mind; because these Habits may be the effects of those acts, wherein the mind exercised Liberty; that however the forementioned reasons will prove that no Habits, which are natural, or that are born or created with us, can be either virtuous or vicious; yet they will not prove this of Habits, which have been acquired and established by repeated free acts.

To fuch an objector I would fay, that this evafion will not at all help the matter. For if freedom of will be offential to the very nature of Virtue and Vice, then there is no Virtue or Vice but only in that very thing, wherein this Liberty is exercifed. If a man in one or more things, that he does, exercifes Liberty, and then by those acts is brought into fuch circumstances, that his Liberty ceafes, and there follows a long feries of acts or events that come to pass necessarily; those confequent acts are not virtuous or vicious, rewardable or punishable; but only the free acts that established this necessity; for in them alone was the man free. The following effects, that are neceffary, have no more of the nature of Virtue or Vice, than health or fickness of body have properly the nature of Virtue or Vice, being the effects of a course of free acts of temperance or intemperance; or than the good qualities of a clock are of the nature of Virtue, which are the effects of free acts of the artificer; or the goodness and sweetness of the fruits of a garden are moral Virtues being the effects of the free and faithful acts of the gardener. If Liberty be abfolutely requifite to the morality of actions, and neceffity wholly inconfistent with it, and vicious Habits.

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as Arminians greatly infift; then no neceffary effects whatfoever, let the caufe be never fo good or bad, can be virtuous or vicious; but the virtue or vice muft be only in the free caufe. Agreeably to this, Dr. Whitby fuppofes, the neceffity that attends the good and evil Habits of the faints in heaven, and damned in hell, which are the confequence of their free acts in their ftate of probation, are not rewardable or punifhable.

On the whole, it appears, that if the notions of Arminians concerning liberty and moral agency be true, it will follow, that there is no virtue in any fuch Habits or qualities as humility. meeknefs, patience, mercy, gratitude, generofity, heavenly-mindedness; nothing at all praifeworthy in loving Chrift above father and mother. wife and children, or our own lives; or in delight in holinefs, hungering and thirsting after righteoufnefs, love to enemies, univerfal benevolence to mankind: and, on the other hand, there is nothing at all vicious, or worthy of difpraise, in the most fordid, beastly, malignant, devilish dispositions; in being ungrateful, profane, habitually hating God, and things facred and holy; or in being most treacherous, envious, and cruel towards men. For all thefe things are Dispositions and Inclinations of the heart. And in fhort, there is no fuch thing as any virtuous or vicious quality of mind; no fuch thing as inhetent virtue and holinefs, or vice and fin: and the stronger those Habits or Dispositions are, which used to be called virtuous and vicious, the further they are from being fo indeed; the more violent men's lusts are, the more fixed their pride, envy, ingratitude and malicioufnefs, still the further are they from being blame-worthy. If there be a man that by his own repeated acts, or

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by any other means, is come to be of the most hellish Disposition, desperately inclined to treat his neighbours with injuriousness, contempt and malignity; the further they should be from any Difposition to be angry with him, or in the least to blame him. So, on the other hand, if there be a perfon, who is of a most excellent fpirit. ftrongly inclining him to the most amiable actions, admirably meek, benevolent, &c. fo much is he further from any thing rewardable or commendable. On which principles, the man Jefus Chrift was very far from being praife-worthy for those acts of holiness and kindness, which He performed, these propensities being strong in his heart. And above all, the infinitely holy and gracious God is infinitely remote from any thing commendable, his good Inclinations being infinitely strong, and He, therefore, at the utmost poffible diftance from being at liberty. And in all cafes, the stronger the Inclinations of any are to virtue, and the more they love it, the lefs virtuous they are; and the more they love wickednefs, the lefs vicious.----Whether thefe things are agreeable to Scripture, let every Christian, and every man who has read the Bible, judge: and whether they are agreeable to common fenfe, let every one judge, that has human understanding in exercife.

And, if we purfue these principles, we shall find that virtue and vice are wholly excluded out of the world; and that there never was, nor ever can be any such thing as one or the other; either in God, angels or men. No propensity, Difposition or Habit can be virtuous or vicious, as has been shewn; because they, so far as they take place, destroy the freedom of the will, the foundation of all moral agency, and exclude all

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capacity of either Virtue or Vice .- And if Habits and Difpositions themselves be not virtuous nor vicious, neither can the exercise of these Difpofitions be fo: for the exercise of Bias is not the exercise of free felf-determining will, and fo there is no exercise of liberty in it. Confequently, no man is virtuous or vicious, either in being well or ill-difposed, nor in acting from a good or bad Difpolition. And whether this Bias or Difpolition, be habitual or not, if it exifts but a moment before the act of will, which is the effect of it, it alters not the cafe, as to the neceffity of the effect. Or if there be no previous Difposition at all, either habitual or occasional, that determines the act, then it is not choice that determines it: it is therefore a contingence, that happens to the man, arifing from nothing in him; and is neceffary, as to any Inclination or Choice of his; and, therefore, cannot make him either the better or worfe, any more than a tree is better than other trees, because it oftener happens to be lit upon by a fwan or nightingale: or a rock more vicious than other rocks, becaufe rattle-fnakes have happened oftener to crawl over it. So that there is no Virtue nor Vice in good or bad Difpofitions, either fixed or transient; nor any Virtue or Vice in acting from any good or bad previous Inclination; nor yet any virtue or vice, in acting wholly without any previous Inclination. Where then shall we find room for Virtue or Vice?

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SECTION VII.

Arminian Notions of moral Agency inconfistent with all influence of Motive and Inducement, in either virtuous or vicious Actions.

A S Arminian notions of that liberty, which is effential to virtue or vice, are inconfiftent with common fenfe, in their being inconfiftent with all virtuous or vicious habits and difpofitions; fo they are no lefs fo in their inconfiftency with all influence of Motives in moral actions.

It is equally againft those notions of liberty of will, whether there be, previous to the act of choice, a preponderancy of the inclination, or a preponderancy of those circumstances, which have a tendency to move the inclination. And, indeed, it comes to just the fame thing; to fay, the circumstances of the mind are such as tend to fway and turn its inclination one way, is the fame thing as to fay, the inclination of the mind, as under such circumstances, tends that way.

Or if any think it most proper to fay, that Motives do alter the inclination, and give a new bias to the mind, it will not alter the cafe, as to the prefent argument. For if Motives operate by giving the mind an inclination, then they operate by destroying the mind's indifference, and laying it under a bias. But to do this, is to destroy the Arminian freedom: it is not to leave the will to its own felf-determination, but to bring it into fubjection to the power of fomething ex-

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trinfic, which operates upon it, fways and determines it, previous to its own determination. So that what is done from Motive, cannot be either virtuous or vicious.—And befides, if the acts of the will are excited by Motives, those Motives are the causes of those acts of the will; which makes the acts of the will neceffary; as effects neceffarily follow the efficiency of the cause. And if the influence and power of the Motive causes the volition, then the influence of the Motive determines volition, and volition does not determine itself; and so is not free, in the fense of Arminians (as has been largely shewn already) and consequently can be neither virtuous nor vicious.

The fuppofition, which has already been taken notice of as an infufficient evaluon in other cafes, would be, in like manner, impertimently alledged in this cafe; namely, the fuppofition that liberty confifts in a power of fufpending action for the prefent, in order to deliberation. If it fhould be faid, Though it be true, that the will is under a neceflity of finally following the ftrongest Motive; yet it may, for the prefent, forbear to act upon the Motive prefented, till there has been opportunity thoroughly to confider it, and compare its real weight with the merit of other Motives. I anfwer as follows;

Here again, it must be remembered, that if determining thus to fuspend and confider, be that act of the will, wherein alone liberty is exercifed, then in this all virtue and vice must confist; and the acts that follow this confideration, and are the effects of it, being neceffary, are no more virtuous or vicious than fome good or bad events, which happen when they are fast asleep,

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262 Motive and Inducement inconfistent Part III. and are the confequences of what they did when they were awake. Therefore, I would here obferve two things:

1. To fuppole, that all virtue and vice, in every cafe, confifts in determining, whether to take time for confideration or not, is not agreeable to common fense. For, according to fuch a fupposition, the most horrid crimes, adultery, murder, fodomy, blasphemy, &c. do not at all confift in the horrid nature of the things themfelves, but only in the neglect of thorough confideration before they were perpetrated, which brings their viciousness to a small matter, and makes all crimes equal. If it be faid, that neglect of confideration, when fuch heinous evils are proposed to choice, is worfe than in other cafes: I anfwer, this is inconfiftent, as it fuppofes the very thing to be, which, at the fame time, is fuppofed not to be; it supposes all moral evil, all viciousness and heinoufnefs, does not confift merely in the want of confideration. It fuppofes fome crimes in themselves, in their own nature, to be more heinous than others, antecedent to confideration or inconfideration, which lays the perfon under a previous obligation to confider in fome cafes more than others.

2. If it were fo, that all virtue and vice, in every cafe, confifted only in the act of the will, whereby it determines whether to confider or no, it would not alter the cafe in the leaft, as to the prefent argument. For fill in this act of the will on this determination, it is induced by fome Motive, and neceffarily follows the ftrongeft Mo. tive; and fo is neceffarily, even in that act where, in alone it is either virtuous or vicious.

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One thing more I would observe, concerning the inconfistence of Arminian notions of moral agency with the influence of Motives.---I fuppofe none will deny, that it is poffible for Motives to be fet before the mind fo powerful, and exhibited in fo ftrong a light, and under fo advantageous circumstances, as to be invincible; and fuch as the mind cannot but yield to. In this cafe, Arminians will doubtlefs fay, liberty is destroyed. And if fo, then if Motives are exhibited with half fo much power, they hinder liberty in proportion to their strength, and go half-way towards deftroying it. If a thousand degrees of Motive abolish all liberty, then five hundred take it half away. If one degree of the influence of Motive does not at all infringe or diminish liberty then no more do two degrees; for nothing doubled, is still nothing. And if two degrees do not diminish the will's liberty, no more do four, eight, fixteen, or fix thoufand. For nothing multiplied never fo much comes to but nothing. If there be nothing in the nature of motive or moral fuafion, that is at all oppofite to liberty, then the greatest degree of it cannot hurt liberty. But if there be any thing in the nature of the thing, that is against liberty, then the least degree of it hurts it in some degree; and confequently hurts and diminishes virtue. If invincible motives, to that action which is good, take away all the freedom of the act, and fo all the virtue of it; then the more forceable the Motives are, fo much the worfe, fo much the lefs virtue; and the weaker the motives are, the better for the caule of virtue; and none is beft of all.

Now let it be confidered, whether these things are agreeable to common sense. If it should be

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264 Armin. Argument from the Sincerity Part III. allowed, that there are fome inftances wherein the foul chufes without any motive, what virtue can there be in fuch a choice? I am fure, there is no prudence or wifdom in it. Such a choice is made for no good end; for it is for no end at all. If it were for any end, the view of the end would be the motive exciting to the act; and if the act be for no good end, and fo from no good aim, then there is no good intention in it; and, therefore, according to all our natural notions of virtue, no more virtue in it than in the motion of the imoke, which is driven to and fro by the wind, without any aim or end in the thing moved, and which knows not whither, nor why and wherefore, it is moved.

Corol. 1. By thefe things it appears, that the argument against the Calvinists, taken from the use of counsels, exhortations, invitations, expostulations, &c. fo much infisted on by Arminians, is truly against themselves. For these things can operate no other way to any good effect, than as in them is exhibited Motive and Inducement, tending to excite and determine the acts of the will. But it follows, on their principles, that the acts of will excited by fuch causes, cannot be virtuous; becaufe, fo far as they are from thefe, they are not from the will's felf-determining power. Hence it will follow, that it is not worth the while to offer any arguments to perfuade men to any virtuous volition or voluntary action; it is in vain to fet before them the wildom and amiablenefs of ways of virtue, or the odioufnels and folly of ways of vice. This notion of liberty and moral agency frustrates all endeavours to draw men to virtue by instruction or perfuafion, precept or example: for though these things may induce men to what is

S. VII. of Invitations, & c. again/t themfelves. 265 materially virtuous, yet at the fame time they take away the form of Virtue, because they destroy Liberty; as they, by their own power, put the will out of its equilibrium, determine and turn the scale, and take the work of self-determining power out of its hands. And the clearer the instructions that are given, the more powerful the arguments that are used, and the more moving the persuasions or examples, the more likely they are to frustrate their own design; because they have so much the greater tendency to put the will out of its balance, to hinder its freedom of self-determination; and so to exclude the very form of virtue, and the effence of whatsoever is praise-worthy.

So it clearly follows, from these principles, that God has no hand in any man's virtue, nor does at all promote it, either by a phyfical or moral influence; that none of the moral methods, He uses with men to promote virtue in the world, have tendency to the attainment of that end; that all the inftructions, which He has given to men, from the beginning of the world to this day, by Prophets or Apostles, or by His Son Jefus Christ; that all his counfels, invitations, promifes, threatenings, warnings and expostulations; that all means, He has used with men, in ordinances, or providences; yea, all influences of his Spirit, ordinary and extraordinary, have had no tendency at all to excite any one virtuous act of the mind, or to promote any thing morally good and commendable, in any respect.-For there is no way that these or any other means can promote virtue, but one of these Either (1.) By a physical operation on three. the heart. But all effects that are wrought in men in this way, have no virtue in them, by

266 Arminianism excludes all Virtue, Part III. the concurring voice of all Arminians. Or, (2.) Morally, by exhibiting Motives to the underftanding, to excite good acts in the will. But it has been demonstrated, that volitions, which are excited by Motives, are neceffary, and not excited by a felf-moving power; and therefore, by their principles, there is no virtue in them. Or, (3.) By merely giving the will an opportunity to determine itself concerning the objects proposed, either to chuse or reject, by its own uncaufed, unmoved, uninfluenced felf-determination. And if this be all, then all those means do no more to promote virtue than vice: for they do nothing but give the will opportunity to determine itself either way, either to good or bad, without laying it under any bias to either: and fo there is really as much of an opportunity given to determine in favour of evil, as of good.

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Thus that horrid blafphemous confequence will certainly follow from the Arminian doctrine, which they charge on others; namely, that God acts an inconfistent part in using fo many counfels, warnings, invitations, intreaties, &c. with finners, to induce them to forfake fin, and turn to the ways of virtue; and that all are infincere and fallacious. It will follow, from their doctrine, that God does these things when he knows, at the fame time, that they have no manner of tendency to promote the effect, He feems to aim at; yea, knows that if they have any influence, this very influence will be inconfistent with fuch an effect, and will prevent it. But what an imputation of infincerity would this fix on Him, who is infinitely holy and true!-So that their's is the doctrine which, if purfued in its confequences, does horribly reflect on the most High,

Sect. VII. and Vice out of the World.

and fix on Him the charge of hypocrify; and not the doctrine of the *Calvinift*; according to their frequent, and vehement exclamations and invectives.

Corol. 2. From what has been observed in this fection, it again appears, that Arminian principles and notions, when fairly examined and purfued in their demonstrable confequences, do evidently fhut all virtue out of the world, and make it impossible that there should ever be any such thing, in any cafe; or that any fuch thing fhould ever be conceived of. For, by these principles, the very notion of virtue or vice implies abfurdity and contradiction. For it is abfurd in itfelf, and contrary to common fenfe, to fuppose a virtuous act of mind without any good intention or aim; and, by their principles, it is abfurd to fuppofe a virtuous act with a good intention or aim; for to act for an end, is to act from a Motive. So that if we rely on these principles, there can be no virtuous act with a good defign and end; and it is felf-evident, there can be none without: confequently there can be no virtuous act at all.

Corol. 3. It is manifelt, that Arminian notions of moral agency, and the being of a faculty of will, cannot confift together; and that if there be any fuch thing as either a virtuous or vicious act, it cannot be an act of the will; no will can be at all concerned in it. For that act which is performed without inclination, without Motive, without end, must be performed without any concern of the will. To fuppole an act of the will without these, implies a contradiction. If the foul in its act has no motive or end; then, in that act (as was observed before) it feeks no-

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268 Armin. excludes all Virtue, Scc. Part III.

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thing, goes after nothing, exerts no inclination to any thing; and this implies, that in that act it defires nothing, and chufes nothing; fo that there is no act of choice in the cafe: and that is as much as to fay, there is no act of will in the cafe. Which very effectually fhuts all vicious and virtuous acts out of the univerfe; in as much as, according to this, there can be no vicious or virtuous act wherein the will is concerned; and according to the plaineft dictates of reafon, and the light of nature, and alfo the principles of Arminians themfelves, there can be no virtuous or vicious act wherein the will is not concerned. And therefore there is no room for any virtuous or vicious acts at all.

Corol. 4. If none of the moral actions of intelligent beings are influenced by either previous Inclination or Motive, another ftrange thing will follow; and this is, that God not only cannot fore-know any of the future moral actions of his creatures, but he can make no conjecture, can give no probable guess concerning them. For, all conjecture in things of this nature, must depend on fome difcerning or apprehension of these two things, previous Disposition and Motive, which, as has been observed, Arminian notions of moral agency, in their real consequence, altogether exclude.

PART IV.

Wherein the chief grounds of the reafonings of Arminians, in fupport and defence of the forementioned notions of Liberty, moral Agency, &c. and against the opposite doctrine, are confidered.

SECTION I.

The Effence of the Virtue and Vice of Dispositions of the Heart, and Acts of the Will, lies not in their Caule, but their Nature.

ONE main foundation of the reafons, which are brought to establish the forementioned notions of liberty, virtue, vice, \mathfrak{Sc} . is a supposition, that the virtuous of the dispositions, or acts of the will, consists not in the nature of these dispositions or acts, but wholly in the Origin or Cause of them: so that if the disposition of the mind, or acts of the will, be never so good, yet if the Cause of the disposition or act be not our vir-

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tue, there is nothing virtuous or praife-worthy in it; and, on the contrary, if the will, in its inclination or acts, be never fo bad. yet, unlefs it arifes from fomething that is our vice or fault, there is nothing vicious or blame-worthy in it. Hence their grand objection and pretended demonstration, or felf evidence, against any virtue and commendableness, or vice and blame-worthiness, of those habits or acts of the will, which are not from fome virtuous or vicious determination of the will itself.

Now, if this matter be well confidered, it will appear to be altogether a miftake, yea, a grofs abfurdity; and that it is most certain, that if there be any fuch things, as a virtuous or vicious disposition, or volition of mind, the virtuous of or vicious of them confists not in the Origin or cause of these things, but in the nature of them.

If the Effence of virtuousness or commendablenefs, and of viciousnefs or fault, does not lie in the nature of the dispositions or acts of mind. which are faid to be our virtue or our fault, but in their Caufe, then it is certain it lies no where Thus, for instance, if the vice of a vicious at all. act of will, lies not in the Nature of the act, but the Caufe; fo that its being of a bad Nature will not make it at all our fault, unless it arifes from fome faulty determination of our's, as its Caufe, or fomething in us that is our fault; then, for the fame reafon, neither can the viciousness of that Caufe lie in the nature of the thing itfelf, but in its Caufe: that evil determination of our's is not our fault, merely because it is of a bad Nature, unlefs it arifes from fome Caufe in us that is our fault. And when we are come to

Sect. I. The Effence of Virtue and Vice.

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this higher Caufe, still the reason of the thing holds good; though this Caufe be of a bad Nature, yet we are not at all to blame on that account. unless it arifes from fomething faulty in us. Nor yet can blame-worthinefs lie in the Nature of this Caule, but in the Caule of that. And thus we must drive faultiness back from step to step, from a lower Caufe to a higher, in infinitum: and that is, thoroughly to banish it from the world, and to allow it no poffibility of existence any where in the univerfality of things. On these principles, vice, or moral evil, cannot confift in any thing that is an effect; because fault does not confist in the Nature of things, but in their Caufe; as well as becaufe effects are neceffary, being unavoidably connected with their Caufe: therefore the Caufe only is to blame. And fo it follows, that faultinefs can lie only in that Caufe, which is a Caufe only, and no effect of any thing. Nor yet can it lie in this; for then it must lie in the Nature of the thing itself; not in its being from any determination of our's, nor any thing faulty in us which is the Caufe, nor indeed from any Caufe at all; for, by the fuppofition, it is no effect, and has no Caule. And thus, he that will maintain, it is not the Nature of habits or acts of will that makes them virtuous or faulty, but the Caufe, must immediately run himfelf out of his own affertion; and in maintaining it, will infenfibly contradict and deny it.

This is certain, that if effects are vicious and faulty, not from their Nature, or from any thing inherent in them, but becaufe they are from a bad Caufe, it must be on account of the *badnefs* of the Caufe: a bad effect in the will must be bad, becaufe the Caufe is *bad*, or *of an evil Nature*, or *bas badnefs* as a quality inherent in it: and a good

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effect in the will must be good, by reason of the goodness of the Cause, or its being of a good Kind and Nature. And if this be what is meant, the very fuppolition of fault and praise lying not in the Nature of the thing, but the Caule, contradicts itfelf, and does at least refolve the Effence of virtue and vice unto the Nature of things, and fuppofes it originally to confift in that.---And if a caviller has a mind to run from the abfurdity, by faying, "No, " the fault of the thing, which is the Caufe, lies " not in this, that the Caufe itfelf is of an evil Na-" ture, but that the Caufe is evil in that fenfe. " that it is from another bad Caufe." Still the abfurdity will follow him; for, if fo then the Caufe before charged is at once acquitted, and all the blame must be laid to the higher Cause, and must confist in that's being evil or of an evil Nature. So now, we are come again to lay the blame of the thing blame-worthy, to the Nature of the thing. and not to the Caufe. And if any is fo foolifh as to go higher still, and ascend from step to step. till he is come to that. which is the first Cause concerned in the whole affair, and will fay, all the blame lies in that; then, at last, he must be forced to own, that the faultiness of the thing, which he fuppofes alone blame-worthy, lies wholly in the Nature of the thing and not in the Original or Caufe of it; for the fuppolition is, that it has no Original, it is determined by no act of our's, is caufed by nothing faulty in us, being abfolutely without any Caufe. And fo the race is at an end, but the evader is taken in his flight.

It is agreeable to the natural notions of mankind, that moral evil, with its defert of diflike and abhorrence, and all its other ill-defervings, confifts in a certain *deformity* in the *Nature* of certain difpositions of the heart, and acts of the

Sect. I. in the Nature of Volition, &c.

will; and not in the deformity of *fomething elfe*, diverfe from the very thing itfelf, which deferves abhorrence, fuppofed to be the Caufe of it. Which would be abfurd, becaufe that would be to fuppofe a thing, that is innocent and not evil, is truly evil and faulty, becaufe another thing is evil. It implies a contradiction; for it would be to fuppofe, the very thing, which is morally evil and blame-worthy, is innocent and not blameworthy; but that fomething elfe, which is its Caufe, is only to blame. To fay, that vice does not confift in the thing which is vicious, but in its Caufe, is the fame as to fay, that vice does not confift in vice, but in that which produces it.

It is true, a Caufe may be to blame, for being the Caufe of vice: it may be wickednefs in the Caufe, that it produces wickednefs. But it would imply a contradiction, to fuppofe that thefe two are the fame individual wickednefs. The wicked act of the Caufe in producing wickednefs, is one wickednefs; and the wickednefs produced, if there be any produced, is another. And therefore, the wickednefs of the latter does not lie in the former, but is diffinct from it; and the wickednefs of both lies in the *evil Nature* of the things, which are wicked.

The thing, which makes fin hateful, is that by which it deferves punifhment; which is but the expression of hatred. And that, which renders virtue lovely, is the fame with that, on the account of which, it is fit to receive praife and reward; which are but the expressions of esteem and love. But that which makes vice hateful, is its hateful Nature; and that which renders virtue lovely, is its amiable Nature. It is a certain beauty or deformity that are *inherent* in that

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The Effence of Virtue and Vice, Part IV. 274 good or evil will, which is the foul of virtue and vice (and not in the occasion of it) which is their worthiness of esteem or difesteem, praise or difpraife, according to the common fense of mankind. If the Caufe or occasion of the rife of an hateful difposition or act of will be also hateful; fuppofe another antecedent evil will; that is entirely another fin, and deferves punifhment by itfelf, under a diffinct confideration. There is worthinefs of difpraife in the Nature of an evil volition, and not wholly in fome foregoing act, which is its Caufe; otherwife the evil volition, which is the effect, is no moral evil, any more than ficknefs, or fome other natural calamity, which arifes from a Caufe morally evil.

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Thus, for inftance, ingratitude is hateful and worthy of difpraife, according to common fenfe; not becaufe fomething as bad, or worfe than ingratitude, was the Caufe that produced it; but becaufe it is hateful in itfelf, by its own inherent deformity. So the love of virtue is amiable, and worthy of praife, not merely becaufe fomething elfe went before this love of virtue in our minds, which caufed it to take place there; for inftance, our own choice; we chofe to love virtue, and, by fome method or other, wrought ourfelves into the love of it; but becaufe of the amiablenefs and condefcendency of fuch a difpofition and inclination of heart. If that was the cafe, that we did chufe to love virtue, and fo produced that love in ourfelves, this choice itfelf could be no otherwife amiable or praife-worthy, than as love to virtue, or fome other amiable inclination, was exercised and implied in it. If that choice was amiable at all, it must be fo on account of fome amiable quality in the nature of the choice. If we chose to love virtue,

Sect. I. in the Nat. of Volit. not in the Caufe. 275 not in love to virtue, or any thing that was good, and exercifed no fort of good difpofition in the choice, the choice itfelf was not virtuous, nor worthy of any praife, according to common fenfe, becaufe the choice was not of a good Nature.

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It may not be improper here to take notice of fomething faid by an author, that has lately made a mighty noife in America. "A neceffary holi-"nefs (fays he *) is no holinefs.-Adam could "not be originally created in righteoufnefs and "true holinefs, becaufe he must chufe to be "righteous, before he could be righteous. And "therefore he must exist, he must be created, "yea, he must exercise thought and reflection, "before he was righteous." There is much more to the fame effect in that place, and also in p. 437, 438, 439, 440. If these things are so. it will certainly follow, that the first chusing to be righteous is no righteous choice; there is no righteousness or holiness in it; because no chusing to be righteous goes before it. For he plainly speaks of chusing to be rightcous, as what must go before rightcoufnefs : and that which follows the choice, being the effect of the choice, cannot be righteoufnefs or holinefs: for an effect is a thing neceffary, and cannot prevent the influence or efficacy of its caufe; and therefore is unavoidably dependent upon the Caufe: and he fays, a neceffary holinefs is no holinefs. So that neither can a choice of righteousnets be righteoufnefs or holinefs, nor can any thing that is confequent on that choice, and the effect of it, be righteoufnefs or holinefs; nor can any thing that is without choice, be righteoufnefs or holi-

> Scrip. Doc. of Original Sin, p. 180. 3d Edit. T 2



276 The Effence of Virtue and Vice, Part IV. nefs. So that by his fcheme, all righteoufnefs and holinefs is at once fhut out of the world, and no door left open, by which it can ever poffibly enter into the world.

I suppose, the way that men came to entertain this absurd inconfistent notion, with respect to internal inclinations and volitions themfelves, (or notions that imply it,) viz. that the Effence of their moral good or evil lies not in their Nature. but their Caufe; was, that it is indeed a very plain dictate of common fense, that it is fo with respect to all outward actions, and fenfible motions of the body; that the moral good or evil of them does not lie at all in the motions themfelves; which, taken by themfelves, are nothing of a moral nature; and the Effence of all the moral good or evil that concerns them, lies in those internal difpolitions and volitions, which are the caufe of them. Now, being always used to determine this, without hefitation or dispute, concerning external Actions; which are the things, that in the common use of language are fignified by fuch phrases, as men's actions, or their doings; hence, when they came to fpeak of volitions, and internal exercises of their inclinations, under the fame denomination of their actions, or what they do, they unwarily determined the cafe must also be the fame with these, as with external actions; not confidering the vaft difference in the Nature of the cafe.

If any shall still object and fay, why is it not necessfary that the Cause should be considered, in order to determine whether any thing be worthy of blame or praise? Is it agreeable to reason and common fense, that a man is to be praised or

Sect. I. in the Nat. of Volition not in the Cause. 277 blamed for that, which he is not the Cause or author of, and has no hand in?

I anfwer, fuch phrases as being the Cause, being the author, having a hand, and the like are am-biguous. They are most vulgarly understood for being the defigning voluntary Caufe, or Caufe by antecedent choice: and it is most certain, that men are not, in this fense, the Causes or authors of the first act of their wills, in any case; as certain as any thing is, or ever can be; for nothing can be more certain, than that a thing is not before it is, nor a thing of the fame kind before the first thing of that kind; and fo no choice before the first choice .- As the phrase, being the author, may be understood, not of being the producer by an antecedent act of will; but as a perfon may be faid to be the author of the act of will itself, by his being the immediate agent, or the being that is acting, or in exercife in that act; if the phrase of being the author, is used to fignify this, then doubtless common fense requires men's being the authors of their own acts of will, in order to their being esteemed worthy of praise or dispraise, on account of them. And common fenfe teaches, that they must be the authors of external actions, in the former fense, namely, their being the Causes of them by an act of will or choice, in order to their being justly blamed or praifed: but it teaches no fuch thing with respect to the acts of the will themfelves.---But this may appear more manifest by the things, which will be obferved in the following fection.

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SECTION II.

The. Falfeness and Inconfistence of that metaphylical Notion of Action, and Agency, which feems to be generally entertained by the Defenders of the Arminian Doctrine concerning Liberty, moral Agency, &c.

NE thing, that is made very much a ground of argument and supposed demonstration by Arminians, in defence of the forementioned principles, concerning moral Agency, virtue, vice, &c. is their metaphyfical notion of Agency and They fay, unlefs the foul has a felf-de-Action. termining power, it has no power of Action; if its volitions be not caufed by itfelf, but are excited and determined by fome extrinsic cause, they cannot be the foul's own acts; and that the foul cannot be active. but must be wholly paffive, in those effects which it is the fubject of neceffarily, and not from its own free determination.

Mr. Chubb lays the foundation of his fcheme of liberty, and of his arguments to fupport it, very much in this polition, that man is an Agent, and capable of Action. Which doubtlefs is true: but *felf-determination* belongs to his notion of Action, and is the very effence of it. Whence he infers, that it is impossible for a man to act and be acted upon, in the fame thing, at the fame time; and that nothing, that is an Action, can be the effect of the Action of another: and he infifts, that a neceffary Agent, or an Agent that is neceffarily determined to act, is a plain contradiction,

false and inconsistent.

But those are a precarious fort of demonstrations, which men build on the meaning that they arbitrarily affix to a word; especially when that meaning is abstrufe, inconsistent, and entirely diverse from the original sense of the word in common speech.

That the meaning of the word Action, as Mr. Chubb and many others use it, is utterly unintelligible and inconfistent, is manifest, becaufe it belongs to their notion of an Action, that it is fomething wherein is no paffion or passivenes; that is (according to their fense of passiveness) it is under the power, influence or action of no caufe. And this implies, that Action has no caufe, and is no effect; for to be an effect implies pallivenels, or the being fubject to the power and Action of its caufe. And yet they hold, that the mind's Action is the effect of its own determination, yea, the mind's free and voluntary determination; which is the fame with free choice. So that Action is the effect of fomething preceding, even a preceding act of choice: and confequently, in this effect the mind is paffive, fubject to the power and Action of the preceding caufe, which is the foregoing choice, and therefore cannot be active. So that here we have this contradiction, that Action is always the effect of foregoing choice; and therefore cannot be Action; because it is passive to the power of that preceding caufal choice; and the mind cannot be active and passive in the fame thing, at the fame Again, they fay, neceffity is utterly incontime. fiftent with Action, and a neceffary Action is a contradiction; and fo their notion of Action implies contingence, and excludes all neceffity. And therefore, their notion of Action implies, that it has no neceffary dependence or connection with

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any thing foregoing; for fuch a dependence or connection excludes contingence, and implies And yet their notion of Action imneceffity. plies necessity, and supposes that it is necessary, and cannot be contingent. For they suppose, that whatever is properly called Action, must be determined by the will and free choice; and this is as much as to fay, that it must be necessary, being dependent upon, and determined by fomething foregoing; namely, a foregoing act of choice. Again, it belongs to their notion of Action, of that which is a proper and mere act, that it is the beginning of motion, or of exertion of power; but yet it is implied in their notion of Action, that it is not the beginning of motion or exertion of power, but is confequent and dependent on a preceding exertion of power, viz. the power of will and choice: for they fay there is no proper Action but what is freely chosen; or, which is the fame thing, determined by a foregoing act of free choice. But if any of them shall fee cause to deny this, and fay they hold no fuch thing as that every Action is chosen or determined by a foregoing choice; but that the very first exertion of will only, undetermined by any preceding act, is properly called Action; then I fay, fuch a man's notion of Action implies neceffity; for what the mind is the fubject of, without the determination of its own previous choice, it is the fubject of neceffarily, as to any hand, that free choice has in the affair, and, without any ability, the mind has to prevent it, by any will or election of its own; because by the fuppolition it precludes all previous acts of the will or choice in the cafe, which might prevent it. So that it is again, in this other way, implied in their notion of act, that it is both necessary and not necessary. Again, it belongs to

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their notion of an *act*, that it is no effect of a pre-determining bias or preponderation, but fprings immediately out of indifference; and this implies, that it cannot be from foregoing choice, which is foregoing preponderation: if it be not habitual, but occafional, yet if it caufes the act, it is truly previous, efficacious and determining. And yet, at the fame time, it is effential to their notion of the act, that it is what the Agent is the Author of freely and voluntarily, and that is, by previous choice and defign.

So that, according to their notion of the act, confidered with regard to its confequences, thefe following things are all effential to it; viz. That it should be necessary, and not necessary; that it should be from a cause, and no cause; that it should be the fruit of choice and defign, and not the fruit of choice and defign; that it fhould be the beginning of motion or exertion, and yet confequent on previous exertion; that it should be before it is; that it fhould fpring immediately out of indifference and equilibrium, and yet be the effect of preponderation; that it should be felf-originated, and also have its original from fomething elfe; that it is what the mind caufes itfelf, of its own will, and can produce or prevent, according to its choice or pleafure, and yet what the mind has no power to prevent, precluding all previous choice in the affair.

So that an act, according to their metaphysical notion of it, is fomething of which there is no idea: it is nothing but a confusion of the mind, excited by words without any distinct meaning, and is an absolute non-entity; and that in two respects: (1.) There is nothing in the world that ever was, is, or can be, to answer the things

282 The Arminian notion of Action, Part IV. which must belong to its description, according to what they fuppofe to be effential to it. And (2.) There neither is, nor ever was, nor can be, any notion or idea to anfwer the word, as they ufe and explain it. For if we fhould fuppofe any fuch notion, it would many ways deftroy itfelf. But it is impossible any idea or notion should fubfift in the mind, whole very nature and effence, which conflitutes it, deftroys it.-If fome learned philosopher, who had been abroad, in giving an account of the curious observations he had made in his travels, should fay, " He had " been in Terra del Fuego, and there had feen an "animal, which he calls by a certain name, " that begat and brought forth itfelf, and yet " had a fire and dam diftinct from itfelf; that " it had an appetite, and was hungry before it " had a being; that his master, who led him, " and governed him at his pleafure was always " governed by him, and driven by him where he " pleafed; that when he moved, he always took " a step before the first step; that he went with " his head first, and yet always went tail fore-"most; and this, though he had neither head " nor tail:" it would be no impudence at all, to tell fuch a traveller, though a learned man, that he himfelf had no notion or idea of fuch an animal, as he gave an account of, and never had, nor ever would have.

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As the forementioned notion of Action is very inconfishent, fo it is wholly diverse from the original meaning of the word. The more usual fignification of it, in vulgar speech, feems to be fome *motion* or *exertion of power*, that is voluntary, or that is *the effect of the will*; and is used in the same sense as *doing*: and most commonly it is used to fignify *outward Actions*. So thinking is

Sect. II. falfe and inconfiftent. 283 often diftinguished from acting; and defiring and willing, from doing.

Besides this more usual and proper fignification of the word Action, there are other ways in which the word is used, that are less proper, which yet have place in common fpeech. Oftentimes it is ufed to fignify fome motion or alteration in inanimate things, with relation to fome object and effect. So the fpring of a watch is faid to act upon the chain and wheels; the fun beams, to act upon plants and trees; and the fire, to act. upon wood. Sometimes, the word is used to fignify motions, alterations, and exertion of power, which are feen in corporeal things, confidered abfolutely; especially when these motions feem to arife from fome internal caufe which is bidden; fo that they have a greater refemblance of those motions of our bodies, which are the effects of natural volition, or invisible exertions of will. So the fermentation of liquor, the operations of the loadstone, and of electrical bodies, are called the Action of these things. And sometimes, the word Action is used to fignify the exercife of thought, or of will and inclination: fo meditating, loving, hating, inclining, difinclining, chufing and refufing, may be fometimes called acting; though more rarely (unlefs it be by philosophers and metaphysicians) than in any of the other fenfes.

But the word is never used in vulgar fpeech in that fense, which *Arminian* divines use it in, namely, for the felf-determinate exercise of the will, or an exertion of the soul that arises without any necessary connection, with any thing foregoing. If a man does fomething voluntarily, or as the effect of his choice, then in the most pro-

284 The Arminian Notion of Action, Part IV. per fenfe, and as the word is most originally and commonly used, he is faid to act: but whether that choice or volition be felf-determined, or no, whether it be connected with foregoing habitual bias, whether it be the certain effect of the strongest motive, or some intrinsic cause, never comes into confideration in the meaning of the word.

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And if the word Action is arbitrarily used by fome men otherwife, to fuit fome scheme of metaphyfic or morality, no argument can reasonably be founded on fuch a use of this term, to prove any thing but their own pleafure. For divines and philosophers strenuously to urge such arguments, as though they were fufficient to fupport and demonstrate a whole scheme of moral philosophy and divinity, is certainly to erect a mighty edifice on the fand, or rather on a fhadow. And though it may now perhaps, through cuftom, have become natural for them to use the word in this fense (if that may be called a fense or meaning, which is inconfiltent with itfelf) yet this does not prove, that it is agreeable to the natural notions, men have of things, or that there can be any thing in the creation that should answer such a meaning. And though they appeal to experience, yet the truth is, that men are fo far from experiencing any fuch thing, that it is impossible for them to have any conception of it.

If it should be objected, that Action and Paffion are doubtless words of a contrary fignification; but to suppose that the Agent, in its Action, is under the power and influence of something intrinsfic, is to confound Action and Passion, and make them the same thing.

I answer, that Action and Passion are doubtlefs, as they are fometimes used, words of oppolite fignification; but not as fignifying oppolite existences, but only opposite relations. The words tause and effect are terms of opposite fignification; but, nevertheles, if I affert, that the fame thing may, at the fame time, in different refpects and relations, be both caufe and effect, this will not prove that I confound the terms. The foul may be both active and paffive in the fame thing in different respects; active with relation to one thing, and paffive with relation to another. The word passion, when fet in oppofition to Action, or rather Activeness, is merely a relative: it fignifies no effect or caufe, nor any proper existence; but is the fame with paffivenefs, or a being paffive, or a being acted upon by fome thing. Which is a mere relation of a thing to fome power or force exerted by fome caufe, producing fome effect in it, or upon it. And Action. when fet properly in opposition to Paffion, or Paffiveness, is no real existence; it is not the same with AN Action, but it is a mere relation: it is the Activenels of fomething on another thing, being the opposite relation to the other, viz. a relation ` of power, or force, exerted by fome caufe, towards another thing, which is the fubject of the effect of that power. Indeed, the word Action is frequently used to fignify fomething not merely relative, but more absolute, and a real existence; as when we fay an Action; when the word is not used transitively, but absolutely, for some motion or exercise of body or mind, without any relation to any object or effect: and as used thus, it is not properly the opposite of Paffion; which ordinarily fignifies nothing abfolute, but merely the relation of being acted upon. And therefore if the word Action be used in the like relative sense.

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then Action and Paffion are only two contrary relations. And it is no abfurdity to fuppofe, that contrary relations may belong to the fame thing, at the fame time, with respect to different things. So to fuppole, that there are acts of the foul by which a man voluntarily moves, and acts upon objects, and produces effects, which yet themfelves are effects of fomething elfe, and wherein the foul itfelf is the object of fomething acting upon, and influencing that, do not at all confound Action and Paffion. The words may neverthelefs be properly of oppofite fignification: there may be as true and real a difference between ading and being caufed to act, though we fhould fuppose the foul to be both in the fame volition, as there is between living and being quickened, or made to live. It is no more a contradiction, to fuppofe that Action may be the effect of fome other caufe, befides the Agent, or Being that acts, than to fuppofe, that life may be the effect of fome other caufe, befides the Liver, or the Being that lives, in whom life is caufed to be.

The thing which has led men into this inconfiftent notion of Action, when applied to volition, as though it were effential to this internal Action, that the Agent fhould be felf-determined in it, and that the will fhould be the caufe of it, was probably this; that according to the fenfe of mankind, and the common ufe of language, it is fo with refpect to men's external Actions; which are what originally, and according to the vulgar ufe and most proper fenfe of the word, are called *Actions*. Men in these are felf-directed, felf-determined, and their wills are the caufe of the motions of their bodies, and the external things that are done; fo that unless men do them voluntarily, and of choice, and the Action be

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determined by their antecedent volition, it is no Action or Doing of theirs. Hence fome metaphyficians have been led unwarily, but exceeding abfurdly, to fuppofe the fame concerning volition itfelf, that *that* alfo muft be determined by the will; which is to be determined by antecedent volition, as the motion of the body is; not confidering the contradiction it implies.

But it is very evident, that in the metaphyfical diffinction between Action and Paffion (though long fince become common and the general vogue) due care has not been taken to conform language to the nature of things, or to any diflinct clear ideas. As it is in innumerable other philofophical, metaphyfical terms, ufed in thefe difputes; which has occafioned inexpreffible difficulty, contention, error and confution.

And thus probably it came to be thought, that neceflity was inconfiftent with Action, as thefe terms are applied to volition. First, these terms Action and Neceffity are changed from their original meaning, as fignifying external voluntary Action and Conftraint, (in which meaning they are evidently inconfistent) to fignify quite other things, viz. volition itfelf, and certainty of exiftence. And when the change of fignification is made, care is not taken to make proper allowances and abatements for the difference of fenfe; but still the fame things are unwarily attributed to Action and Neceffity, in the new meaning of the words, which plainly belonged to them in their first fense; and on this ground, maxims are establifhed without any real foundation, as though they were the most certain truths, and the most evident dictates of reason.

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But however ftrenuoufly it is maintained, that what is neceffary cannot be properly called Action, and that a neceffary Action is a contradiction, yet it is probable there are few Arminian divines, who, if thoroughly tried, would ftand to thefe principles. They will allow, that God is, in the higheft fenfe. an active Being, and the higheft Fountain of Life and Action; and they would not probably deny, that thofe, that are called God's acts of righteoufnefs, holinefs and faithfulnefs, are truly and properly God's acts, and God is really a holy Agent in them; and yet, I truft, they will not deny, that God neceffarily acts juftly and faithfully, and that it is impoffible for Him to act unrighteoufly and unholily.

SECTION III.

The Reafons why fome think it contrary to common Senfe, to fuppose those Things which are necessary, to be worthy of either Praise or Blame.

T is abundantly affirmed and urged by Arminian writers, that it is contrary to common Senfe, and the natural notions and apprehenfions of mankind, to fuppole otherwife than that neceffity (making no diffinction between natural and moral neceffity) is inconfistent with Virtue and Vice, Praife and Blame, Reward and Punifhment. And their arguments from hence have been greatly triumphed in; and have been not a little perplexing to many, who have been friendly to the truth, as clearly revealed in the holy Scriptures: it has feemed to them indeed difficult, to reconcile *Calviniftic* doctrines with the notions, men commonly have of juffice and equity. And

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Sect. III. contrary to common Senfe. 289 the true reasons of it seem to be these that follow.

I. It is indeed a very plain dictate of common Senfe, that natural neceffity is wholly inconfistent with just Praise or Blame. If men do things which in themfelves are very good, fit to be brought to pais, and very happy effects, properly against their wills, and cannot help it; or do them from a necessity that is without their wills, or with which their wills have no concern or connection; then it is a plain dictate of common Sense, that it is none of their virtue, nor any moral good in them; and that they are not worthy to be rewarded or praifed; or at all efteemed, honoured or loved on that account. And, on the other hand, that if, from like necessity, they do those things which in themselves are very unhappy and pernicious, and do them, becaufe they cannot help it; the necessity is fuch, that it is all one whether they will them, or no; and the reafon whey they are done, is from necessity only, and not from their wills; it is a very plain dictate of common Senfe, that they are not at all to blame; there is no vice, fault, or moral evil at all in the effect done; nor are they, who are thus neceffitated, in any wife worthy to be punished, hated, or in the least difrespected, on that account.

In like manner, if things, in themfelves good and defirable, are abfolutely impossible, with a natural impossibility, the universal reason of mankind teaches, that this *wholly and perfectly* excuses perfons in their not doing them.

And it is also a plain dictate of common Sense, that if the doing things, in themselves good, or U

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avoiding things in themfelves evil, is not abfolutely impossible, with fuch a natural impossibility, but very difficult, with a natural difficulty; that is, a difficulty prior to, and not at all confifting in will and inclination itfelf, and which would remain the fame, let the inclination be what it will; then a perfon's neglect or omiffion is excufed in fome measure, though not wholly; his fin is lefs aggravated, than if the thing to be done were eafy. And if instead of difficulty and hindrance, there be a contrary natural propenfity in the ftate of things, to the thing to be done, or effect to be brought to pass, abstracted from any confideration of the inclination of the heart; though the propenfity be not fo great as to amount to a natural neceffity; yet being fome approach to it, fo that the doing the good thing be very much from this natural tendency in the state of things, and but little from a good inclination; then it is a dictate of common Senfe, that there is fo much the lefs virtue in what is done; and fo it is lefs praife-worthy and rewardable. The reafon is eafy, viz. because fuch a natural propensity or tendency is an approach to natural neceffity; and the greater the propenfit,, ftill fo much the nearer is the approach to necessity. And, therefore, as natural neceffity takes away or fhuts out all virtue, fo this propenfity approaches to an abolition of virtue; that is, it diminishes it. And, on the other hand, natural difficulty, in the flate of things, is an approach to natural impoffibility. And as the latter, when it is complete and abfolute, wholly takes away Blame; fo fuch difficulty takes away fome Blame, or diminishes Blame; and makes the thing done to be lefs worthy of punishment.

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II. Men, in their first use of fuch phrases as thefe, must, can't, can't help it, can't avoid it, neceffary, unable, impo/fible, unavoidable, irresistable. &c. use them to fignify a necessity of constraint or reftraint, a natural neceffity or impoffibility; or fome necessity that the will has nothing to do in; which may be, whether men will or no; and which may be fuppoled to be just the fame, let men's inclinations and defires be what they will. Such kind of terms in their original ufe, I fuppofe, among all nations, are relative; carrying in their fignification (as was before observed) a reference or respect to some contrary will, defire or endeavour, which, it is fuppofed, is, or may be, in the cafe. All men find, and begin to find in early childhood, that there are innumerable things that cannot be done, which they defire to do; and innumerable things which they are averfe to, that must be, they cannot avoid them, they will be, whether they chufe them or no. It is to express this necessity, which men fo foon and fo often find, and which fo greatly and early affects them in innumerable cafes, that fuch terms and phrafes are first formed; and it is to fignify fuch a neceffity, that they are first used, and that they are most constantly used, in the common affairs of life; and not to fignify any fuch metaphyfical, speculative and abstract notion, as that connection in the nature or course of things, which is between the fubject and predicate of a proposition, and which is the foundation of the certain truth of that proposition; to fignify which, they who employ themfelves in philosophical inquiries into the first origin and metaphysical relations and dependencies of things, have borrowed thefe terms, for want of others. But we grow up from our cradles in a use of such terms and phrases entirely different from this,

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and carrying a fense exceeding diverse from that, in which they are commonly used in the controversy between Arminians and Calvinists. And it being, as was faid before, a dictate of the univerfal fense of mankind, evident to us as soon as we begin to think, that the necessfity fignified by these terms, in the fense in which we first learn them, does excuse persons and free them from all Fault or Blame; hence our ideas of excusableness or faulteleness is tied to these terms and phrases by a strong habit, which is begun in childhood, as soon as we begin to speak, and grows up with us, and is strengthened by constant use and custom, the connection growing stronger and stronger.

The habitual connection, which is in men's minds between Blamelefnefs and those forementioned terms, mu/t, cannot, unable, neceffary, impossible, unavoidable, &c. becomes very strong; because, as soon as ever men begin to use reason, and fpeech, they have occafion to excufe themfelves, from the natural neceffity fignified by thefe. terms, in numerous inftances.—I can't do it—I could not help it .- And all mankind have constant and daily occafion to use fuch phrases in this sense, to excuse themselves and others, in almost all the concerns of life, with refpect to difappointments, and things that happen, which concern and affect ourfelves and others, that are hurtful, or difagreeable to us or them, or things defirable, that we or others fail of.

That a being accustomed to an union of different ideas, from early childhood, makes the habitual connection exceeding strong, as though such connection were owing to *nature*, is manifest in innumerable instances. It is altogether by such an habitual connection of ideas, that men judge

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of the bignels or diftance of the objects of fight, from their appearance. Thus it is owing to fuch a connection early established, and growing up with a perfon, that he judges a mountain, which he fees at ten miles distance, to be bigger than his nofe, or further off than the end of it. Having been used for long to join a confiderable distance and magnitude with fuch an appearance, men imagine it is by a distate of natural fense: whereas, it would be quite otherwise with one that had his eyes newly opened, who had been born blind: he would have the fame visible appearance, but natural fense would distate no fuch thing, concerning the magnitude or distance of what appeared.

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III. When men, after they had been fo habituated to connect ideas of Innocency or Blamelefnefs with fuch terms, that the union feems to be the effect of mere nature, come to hear the fame terms used, and learn to use them themselves in the forementioned new and metaphyfical fenfe, to fignify quite another fort of necessity, which has no fuch kind of relation to a contrary fuppofable will and endeavour; the notion of plain and manifest Blamelesness, by this means, is, by a strong prejudice, infenfibly and unwarily transferred to a cafe to which it by no means belongs: the change of the use of the terms, to a fignification which is very diverse, not being taken notice of, or adverted to. And there are feveral reafons, why it is not.

1. The terms, as used by philosophers, are not very distinct and clear in their meaning: few use them in a fixed determined fense. On the contrary, their meaning is very vague and confused. Which is what commonly happens to the

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words used to fignify things intellectual and moral, and to express what Mr. Locke calls *mixt modes*. If men had a clear and diffinct underftanding of what is intended by these metaphyfical terms, they would be able more easily to compare them with their original and common Sense; and so would not be so easily led into delusion by no fort of terms in the world, as by words of this fort.

2. The change of the fignification of the terms is the more infenfible, becaufe the things fignified, though indeed very different, yet do in fome generals agree. In neceffity, that which is vulgarly fo called, there is a ftrong connection between the thing faid to be neceffary, and fomething antecedent to it, in the order of nature; fo there is alfo in philosophical necessity. And though in both kinds of necessity, the connection cannot be called by that name, with relation to an oppofite will or endeavour, to which it is *fuperior*; which is the cafe in vulgar neceffity; yet in both, the connection is prior to will and endeavour, and fo, in some respect, superior. In both kinds of neceffity, there is a foundation for fome certainty of the proposition, that affirms the event .- The terms used being the fame, and the things fignified agreeing in thefe and fome other general circumstances, and the expressions as used by philosophers being not well defined, and fo of obfcure and loofe fignification; hence perfons are not aware of the great difference; had the notions of innocence or faultinefs, which were fo ftrongly affociated with them, and were ftrictly united in their minds, ever fince they can remember, remain united with them still, as if the union were altogether natural and neceffary; and they

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that go about to make a feparation, feem to them to do great violence even to nature itfelf.

IV. Another reafon why it appears difficult to reconcile it with reason, that men should be blamed for that which is necessary with a moral neceflity (which, as was observed before, is a species of philosophical necessity) is, that for want of due confideration, men inwardly entertain that apprehension, that this necessity may be against men's wills and fincere endeavours. They go away with that notion, that men may truly will, and wish and strive that it may be otherwise, but that invincible necessity stands in the way. And many think thus concerning themfelves: fome, that are wicked men, think they wish, that they were good, that they loved God and holinefs; but yet do not find that their wilhes produce the effect.—The reasons why men think, are as follow; (1.) They find what may be called an *indirect wil*lingnefs to have a better will, in the manner before observed. For it is impossible, and a contradiction to fuppofe the will to be directly and properly against itself. And they do not confider, that this indirect willingness is entirely a different thing from properly willing the thing that is the duty and virtue required; and that there is no virtue in that fort of willingness which they have. They do not confider, that the volitions, which a wicked man may have that he loved God, are no acts of the will at all against the moral evil of not loving God; but only fome difagreeable confequences. But the making the requisite diffinction requires more care of reflection and thought, than most men are used to. And men, through a prejudice in their own favour, are disposed to think well of their own defires and dispositions, and to account them good and virtuous, though their refpect to vir-U 4

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tue be only indirect and remote, and it is nothing at all that is virtuous that truly excites or terminates their inclinations. (2.) Another thing, that infenfibly leads and beguiles men into a fuppolition that this moral necessity or impossibility is, or may be, against men's wills and true endeavours, is the derivation and formation of the terms themfelves, that are often used to express it, which is fuch as feems directly to point to, and holds this forth. Such words, for instance, as unable, unavoidable, impoffible, irresiftible; which carry a plain reference to a fupposable power exerted, endeavours used, refistance made, in oppolition to the neceflity: and the perfons that hear them, not confidering nor fufpecting but that they are used in their proper sense: that sense being therefore underftood, there does naturally, and as it were neceffarily arife in their minds a supposition, that it may be fo indeed, that true defires and endeavours may take place, but that invincible neceffity stands in the way, and renders them vain and to no effect.

V. Another thing, which makes perfons more ready to fuppofe it to be contrary to reafon, that men fhould be exposed to the punishments threatened to fin, for doing those things which are morally neceffary, or not doing those things morally impossible, is, that imagination strengthens the argument, and adds greatly to the power and influence of the feeming reasons against it, from the greatness of that punishment. To allow that they may be justly exposed to a small punishment, would not be so difficult. Whereas, if there were any good reason in the case, if it were truly a dictate of reason, that such necessity was inconsistent with faultiness, or just punishment, the demonstration would be equally certain with re-

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fpect to a fmall punifhment, or any punifhment at all, as a very great one: but it is not equally eafy to the imagination. They that argue againft the juffice of damning men for those things that are thus neceffary, seem to make their argument the ftronger, by setting forth the greatness of the punifhment in strong expressions:—That a man should be cast into eternal burnings, that he should be made to fry in hell to all eternity for those things which be had no power to avoid, and was under a fatal, unfrustrable, invincible necession.

SECTION IV.

It is agreeable to common Senfe, and the natural Notions of Mankind, to *suppose moral Necessity* to be confistent with Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment.

HETHER the reasons, that have been given, why it appears difficult to fome perfons, to reconcile with common Senfe the praifing or blaming, rewarding or punishing those things which are morally necessary, are thought fatisfactory or not; yet it most evidently appears, by the following things, that if this matter be rightly understood, fetting aside all delusion arifing from the impropriety and ambiguity of terms, this is not at all inconfistent with the natural apprehensions of mankind, and that fense of things which is found every where in the common people; who are furthest from having their thoughts perverted from their natural channel, by metaphyfical and philosophical subtilities; but, on the contrary, altogether agreeable to, and the 298 Neceffary Virtue, &c. Part IV. very voice and dictate of this natural and vulgar Senfe.

I. This will appear, if we confider what the vulgar Notion of blame-worthine/s is. The idea, which the common people, through all ages and nations, have of faultinefs, I fuppofe to be plainly this; a perfon's being or doing wrong, with bis own will and pleafure; containing these two things; I. His doing wrong, when he does as he pleafes. 2. His pleafures being wrong. Or, in other words, perhaps more intelligibly expressing their Notion; a perfon's having bis heart wrong, and doing wrong from his heart. And this is the fum total of the matter.

The common people do not afcend up in their reflections and abstractions to the metaphysical fources, relations and dependencies of things, in order to form their Notion of faultinefs or blame-worthinefs. They do not wait till they have decided by their refinings, what first determines the will; whether it be determined by fomething extrinsic, or intrinsic; whether volition determines volition, or whether the understanding determines the will; whether there be any fuch thing as metaphyficians mean by contingence (if they have any meaning;) whether there be a fort of a strange unaccountable sovereignty in the will, in the exercise of which, by its own fovereign acts, it brings to pafs all its own fovereign acts. They do not take any part of their Notion of fault or blame from the refolution of any fuch questions. If this were the case, there are multitudes, yea the far greater part of mankind, nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thoufand, would live and die, without having any fuch Notion, as that of fault, ever entering into their

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heads, or without fo much as one having any con-· ception that any body was to be either blamed or commended for any thing. To be fure, it would be a long time before men came to have fuch Notions. Whereas it is manifelt, they are fome of the first Notions that appear in children; who difcover, as foon as they can think, or fpeak, or act at all as rational creatures, a fense of defert. And, certainly, in forming their Notion of it, they make no use of metaphysics. All the ground they go upon, confifts in thefe two things; experience, and a natural fenfation of a certain fit-nels or agreeablenels, which there is in uniting fuch moral evil as is above defcribed, viz. a being or doing wrong with the will, and refentment in others, and pain inflicted on the perfon in whom this moral evil is. Which natural Sense is what we call by the name of confcience.

It is true, the common people and children, in their Notion of any faulty act or deed, of any perfon, do fuppose that it is the perfon's own act and deed. But this is all that belongs, to what they understand by a thing's being a perfon's own deed or action; even that it is fomething done by him of choice. That fome exercise or motion should begin of itself, does not belong to their Notion of an action, or doing. If fo, it would belong to their Notion of it, that it is fomething, which is the caufe of its own beginning: and that is as much as to fay, that it is before it begins to be. Nor is their Notion of an action fome motion or exercife, that begins accidentally, without any caufe or reason; for that is contrary to one of the prime dictates of common Senfe, namely, that every thing that begins to be, has fome caufe or reafon why it is.

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The common people, in their Notion of a faulty or praise-worthy deed or work done by any one, do fuppofe, that the man does it in the exercise of liberty. But then their Notion of liberty is only a perfon's having opportunity of doing as he pleafes. They have no Notion of liberty confifting in the will's first acting, and fo caufing its own acts; and determining, and fo caufing its own determinations; or chufing, and fo caufing its own choice. Such a Notion of liberty is what none have, but those that have darkened their own minds with confused metaphyfical fpeculation, and abstrufe and ambiguous terms. If a man is not restrained from acting as his will determines, or constrained to act otherwife; then he has liberty, according to common Notions of liberty, without taking into the idea that grand contradiction of all, the determinations of a man's free will being the effects of the determinations of his free will .-Nor have men commonly any Notion of freedom confifting in indifference. For if fo, then it would be agreeable to their Notion, that the greater indifference men act with, the more freedom they act with; whereas, the reverse is true. He that in acting, proceeds with the fullest inclination, does what he does with the greatest freedom, according to common Senfe. And fo far is it from being agreeable to common Senfe, that fuch liberty as confifts in indifference is requisite to praife or blame, that on the contrary, the dictate of every man's natural fenfe through the world is, that the further he is from being indifferent in his acting good or evil, and the more he does either with full and ftrong inclination, the more is he efteemed or abhorred, commended or condemned.

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II. If it were inconfistent with the common Senfe of mankind, that men fhould be either to be blamed or commended in any volitions, they have, or fail of, in cafe of moral neceffity or impoffibility; then it would furely alfo be agreeable to the fame Senfe and reafon of Mankind, that the nearer the cafe approaches to fuch a moral neceffity or impoffibility. either through a ftrong antecedent moral propenfity, on the one hand,* or a great antecedent opposition and difficulty, on the other, the nearer does it approach to a being neither blameable nor commendable; fo that acts exerted with fuch preceding propenfity, would be worthy of proportionably lefs praife; and when omitted, the act being attended with fuch difficulty, the omiffion would be worthy of the lefs It is fo, as was observed before, with blame. natural necessity and impoffibility, propenfity and difficulty: as it is a plain dictate of the fenfe of all Mankind, that natural necessity and impossibility take away all blame and praife; and therefore, that the nearer the approach is to thefe, through previous propenfity or difficulty, fo praise and blame are proportionably diminisched. And if it were as much a dictate of common Senfe, that moral neceffity of doing, or impoffibility of avoiding, takes away all praise and blame, as that natural neceffity or impoffibility does this; then, by a perfect parity of reason, it would be as much the dictate of common Senfe, that an approach to moral necessity of doing, or impoffibility of avoiding, diminifies praife and blame, as that an approach to natural neceffity and impoffibility does fo. It is equally the voice of common Senfe, that perfons are excufable

* It is here argued, on fuppofition that not all propenlity implies moral neceffity, but only fome very high degree; which none will deny.

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in part, in neglecting things difficult against their wills, as that they are *excufable wholly* in neglecting things impossible against their wills. And if it made no difference, whether the impossibihity were natural and against the will, or moral, lying in the will, with regard to excufableness; fo neither would it make any difference, whether the difficulty, or approach to necessfity be natural against the will, or moral, lying in the propensity of the will.

But it is apparent, that the reverse of these things is true. If there be an approach to a moral necessity in a man's exertion of good acts of will, they being the exercise of a ftrong propenfity to good, and a very powerful love to virtue; it is fo far from being the dictate of common Senfe, that he is lefs virtuous, and the lefs to be efteemed, loved and praifed; that it is agreeable to the natural Notions of all mankind, that he is fo much the better man, worthy of greater respect, and higher commendation. And the ftronger the inclination is, and the nearer it approaches to neceffity in that refpect; or to impoffibility of neglecting the virtuous act, or of doing a vicious one; still the more virtuous, and worthy of higher commendation. And, on the other hand, if a man exerts evil acts of mind; as, for inftance, acts of pride or malice from a rooted and ftrong habit or principle of haughtinefs and malicioufnefs, and a violent propenfity of heart to fuch acts; according to the natural Senfe of men, he is fo far from being the lefs hateful and blameable on that account, that he is fo much the more worthy to be detefted and condemned, by all that observe him.

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Moreover, it is manifest that it is no part of * the Notion, which mankind commonly have of a blameable or praise-worthy act of the will, that it is an act which is not determined by an antecedent bias or motive, but by the fovereign power of the will itself; because, if fo, the greater hand fuch caufes have in determining any acts of the will, fo much the lefs virtuous or vicious would they be accounted; and the lefs hand, the more virtuous or vicious. Whereas, the reverse is true: men do not think a good act to be the less praise-worthy, for the agent's being much determined in it by a good inclination or a good motive, but the more. And if good inclination or motive, has but little influence in determining the agent, they do not think his act fo much the more virtuous, but the lefs. And fo concerning evil acts, which are determined by evil motives or inclinations.

Yea, if it be fuppofed, that good or evil difpofitions are implanted in the hearts of men, by nature itself (which, it is certain, is vulgarly fuppofed in innumerable cafes) yet it is not commonly fuppofed, that men are worthy of no praife or dispraise for such dispositions; although what is natural, is undoubtedly neceffary, nature being prior to all acts of the will whatfoever. Thus, for instance, if a man appears to be of a very haughty or malicious disposition, and is suppofed to be fo by his natural temper, it is no vulgar Notion, no dictate of the common Senfe and apprehension of men, that fuch dispositions are no vices or moral evils, or that fuch perfons are not worthy of difesteem, or odium and difhonour; or that the proud or malicious acts which flow from fuch natural dispositions, are worthy of no refentment. Yea, fuch vile natural dispositions,

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and the ftrength of them, will commonly be mentioned rather as an aggravation of the wicked acts, that come from fuch a fountain, than an extenuation of them. Its being natural for men to act thus, is often obferved by men in the height of their indignation: they will fay, " It " is his very nature: he is of a vile natural tem-" per; it is as natural to him to act fo, as it is " to breathe; he cannot help ferving the devil, " &c." But it is not thus with regard to hurtful mifchievous things, that any are the fubjects or occasions of, by natural necessity, against their inclinations. In fuch a cafe, the necessity, by the common voice of mankind, will be spoken of as a full excufe. ---- Thus it is very plain, that common Sense makes a vast difference between these two kinds of necessity, as to the judgment it makes of their influence on the moral quality and defert of men's actions.

And these dictates of men's minds are so natural and neceffary, that it may be very much doubted whether the Arminians themfelves have ever got rid of them; yea, their greatest doctors, that have gone furthest in defence of their metaphyfical Notions of liberty, and have brought their arguments to their greatest strength, and, as they suppose, to a demonstration, against the confistence of virtue and vice with any necessity: it is to be questioned, whether there is fo much as one of them, but that, if he fuffered very much from the injurious acts of a man, under the power of an invincible haughtinefs and malignancy of temper, would not, from the forementioned natural fense of mind, refent it far otherwife, than if as great fufferings came upon him from the wind that blows, and fire that burns by natural neceffity; and otherwife than he

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Some feem to difdain the diffinction that we make between natural and moral necessity, as though it were altogether impertinent in this controverfy! " that which is neceffary (fay they) is neceffary; "it is that which must be, and cannot be pre-"vented. And that which is impoffible, is im-"poffible, and cannot be done: and, therefore, " none can be to blame for not doing it." And fuch comparisons are made use of, as the commanding of a man to walk, who has loft his legs. and condemning and punishing him for not obeying; inviting and calling upon a man, who is fhut up in a strong prison, to come forth, &c. But, in thefe things, Arminians are very unreasonable. Let common Senfe determine whether there be not a great difference between those two cafes a the one, that of a man who has offended his Prince, and is caft into prifon; and after he has lain there a while, the King comes to him, calls him to come forth to him; and tells him, that if he will do fo, and will fall down before him and humbly beg his pardon, he shall be forgiven, and fet at liberty, and also be greatly enriched, and advanced to honour: the prifoner heartily repents of the folly and wickedness of his offence against his Prince, is thoroughly disposed to abase himfelf, and accept of the King's offer; but is confined by ftrong walls, with gates of brafs, and bars of iron. The other cafe is, that of a man who is of a very unreasonable spirit, of a haughty, ungrateful, wilful disposition; and, moreover, has been brought up in traiterous principles; and has his heart poffeffed with an ex-Х

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306 . treme and inveterate enmity to his lawful fovereign; and for his rebellion is caft into prifon, and lies long there, loaden with heavy chains, and in miferable circumstances. At length the compassionate Prince comes to the prison, orders his chains to be knocked off, and his prifondoors to be fet wide open; calls to him, and tells him, if he would .come forth to him, and fall down before him, acknowledge that he has treated him unworthily, and ask his forgiveness; he shall be forgiven, fet at liberty, and fet in a place of great dignity and profit in his court. But he is ftout and ftomachful, and full of haughty malignity, that he cannot be willing to accept the offer: his rooted strong pride and malice have perfect power over him, and as it were bind him, by binding his heart: the oppofition of his heart has the mastery over him, having an influence on his mind far fuperior to the King's grace and condefcenfion, and to all

his kind offers and promifes. Now, is it agreeable to common Senfe, to affert and fland to it. that there is no difference between these two cafes, as to any worthinefs of blame in the prifoners; becaufe, forfooth, there is a neceflity in both, and the required act in each cafe is impoffible? It is true, a man's evil difpositions may be as ftrong and immoveable as the bars of a caftle. But who cannot fee, that when a man, in the latter cafe, is faid to be unable to obey the command, the expression is used improperly, and not in the fenfe it has originally and in common fpeech? and that it may properly be faid to be in the rebel's power to come out of prifon, feeing he can eafily do it if he pleafes; though by reason of his vile temper of heart, which is fixed and rooted, it is impossible that it should please him?

Upon the whole, I prefume there is no perfon of good understanding, who impartially confiders the things which have been observed, but will allow, that it is not evident, from the dictates of the common Sense, or natural Notions of mankind, that moral necessity is inconfissent with Praise and Blame. And, therefore, if the Arminians would prove any such inconfistency, it must be by fome philosophical and metaphysical arguments, and not common Sense.

There is a grand illufion in the pretended demonstration of Arminians from common Sense. The main strength of all these demonstrations lies in that prejudice, that arifes through the infenfible change of the use and meaning of fuch terms as liberty, able, unable, necessary, impossible, unavoidable, invincible, action, &c. from their original and vulgar Senfe, to a metaphyfical Senfe, entirely diverfe; and the ftrong connection of the ideas of Blamelefnefs, &c. with fome of thefe terms, by an habit contracted and established, while these terms were used in their first meaning. This prejudice and delufion, is the foundation of all those positions, they lay down as maxims, by which most of the Scriptures, which they alledge in this controverfy, are interpreted, and on which all their pompous demonstrations from Scripture and reafon depend. From this fecret delution and prejudice they have almost all their advantages: it is the strength of their bulwarks, and the edge of their weapons. And this is the main ground of all the right they have to treat their neighbours in fo affuming a manner, and to infult others, perhaps as wife and good as themfelves, as weak bigots, men that dwell in the dark caves of superstition, perversely set, obstinately fhutting their eyes against the noon-day light, ene-

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mies to common Senfe, maintaining the first-born of abfurdities, &c. &c. But perhaps an impartial confideration of the things, which have been obferved in the preceding parts of this enquiry, may enable the lovers of truth better to judge, whose doctrine is indeed abfurd, abstrusse, felf-contradictory, and inconfistent with common Senfe, and many ways repugnant to the universal dictates of the reason of mankind.

Corol. From things which have been obferved, it will follow, that it is agreeable to common Senfe to fuppofe, that the glorified faints have not their freedom at all diminifhed, in any refpect; and that God Himfelf has the higheft poffible freedom, according to the true and proper meaning of the term; and that he is, in the higheft poffible refpect, an agent, and active in the exercife of his infinite holinefs; though he acts therein, in the higheft degree, neceffarily: and his actions of this kind are in the higheft, most abfolutely perfect manner virtuous and praife-worthy; and are fo, for that very reafon, because they are most perfectly neceffary.

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SECTION V.

Concerning those Objections, that this Scheme of Neceffity renders all Means and Endeavours for the avoiding of Sin, or the obtaining Virtue and Holines, vain, and to no purpose; and that it makes Men no more than mere Machines in Affairs of Morality and Religion.

A RMINIANS fay, if it be fo, that fin and virtue come to pass by a neceffity confishing in a fure connection of causes and effects, antecedents and confequents, it can never be worth the while to use any Means or Endeavours to obtain the one, and avoid the other; seeing no endeavours can alter the futurity of the event, which is become necessary by a connection already established.

But I defire, that this matter may be fully confidered; and that it may be examined with a thorough ftrictnefs, whether it will follow that Endeavours and Means, in order to avoid or obtain any future thing, must be more in vain, on the fuppofition of fuch a connection of antecedents and confequents, than if the contrary be fuppofed.

For Endeavours to be in vain, is for them not to be fuccefsful; that is to fay, for them not eventually to be the Means of the thing aimed at, which cannot be, but in one of these two ways; either first, that although the Means are used, yet the event aimed at does not follow: or, se

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condly, If the event does follow, it is not becaufe of the Means, or from any connection or dependence of the event on the Means, the event would have come to pafs, as well without the Means as with them. If either of these two things are the cafe, then the Means are not properly fuccefsful, and are truly in vain. The fuccefsfulnefs or unfuccessfulness of Means, in order to an effect. or their being in vain or not in vain, confifts in those Means being connected, or not connected. with the effect, in fuch a manner as this, viz. That the effect is with the Means, and not without them; or, that the being of the effect is, on the one hand, connected with means, and the want of the effect, on the other hand, is connected with the want of the Means. If there be : fuch a connection as this between Means and end, the Means are not in vain: the more there is of fuch a connection, the further they are from being in vain; and the lefs of fuch a connection, the more they are in vain.

Now, therefore, the queftion to be answered, (in order to determine, whether it follows from this doctrine of the necessary connection between foregoing things, and confequent ones, that Means uled in order to any effect, are more in vain than they would be otherwife) is, whether it follows from it, that there is lefs of the forementioned connection between Means and effect; that is, whether, on the fuppofition of there being a real and true connection between antecedent things and confequent ones, there must be lefs of a connection between Means and effect, than on the fuppolition of there being no fixed connection, between antecedent things and confequent ones: and the very stating of this question is fufficient to answer it. It must appear to every

one that will open his eyes, that this question cannot be affirmed, without the groffeft abfurdity and inconfistence. Means are foregoing things, and effects are following things: And if there were no connection between foregoing things and following ones, there could be no connection between Means and end; and fo all means would be wholly vain and fruitlefs. For it is by virtue of fome connection only, that they become fuccessful: It is fome connection observed, or revealed, or otherwife known, between antecedent things and following ones, that is what directs in the choice of Means. And if there were no fuch thing as an established connection, there could be no choice, as to Means; one thing would have no more tendency to an effect, than another; there would be no fuch thing as tendency in the cafe. All those things, which are successful means of other things, do therein prove connected antecedents of them: and therefore to affert, that a fixed connection between antecedents and confequents makes Means vain and useless, or stands in the way to hinder the connection between Means and end, is just fo ridiculous, as to fay, that a connection between antecedents and confequents stands in the way to hinder a connection between antecedents and confequents,

Nor can any fuppofed connection of the fucceffion or train of antecedents and confequents, from the very beginning of all things, the connection being made already fure and neceffary, either by established laws of nature, or by these together with a degree of fovereign immediate interpositions of divine power, on such and such occasions, or any other way (if any other there be;) I fay, no such neceffary connection of a se-X A

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ries of antecedents and confequents can in the least tend to hinder, but that the means we use may belong to the feries; and fo may be fome of those antecedents which are connected with the confequents we aim at, in the established course of things. Endeavours which we use, are things that exist; and, therefore, they belong to the general chain of events; all the parts of which chain are fuppofed to be connected; and fo Endeavours are fuppofed to be connected with fome effects, or fome confequent things or other. And certainly this does not hinder but that the events they are connected with, may be those which we aim at, and which we chufe, becaufe we judge them most likely to have a connection with those events, from the established order and course of things which we observe, or from something in divine Revelation.

Let us suppose a real and fure connection between a man's having his eyes open in the clear day-light, with good organs of fight, and feeing; fo that feeing is connected with his opening his eyes, and not feeing with his not opening his eyes; and also the like connection between fuch a man's attempting to open his eyes, and his actually doing it: the supposed established connection between these antecedents and confequents, let the connection be never fo fure and neceffary, certainly does not prove that it is in vain, for a man in fuch circumstances, to attempt to open his eyes, in order to feeing: his aiming at that event, and the use of the Means, being the effect of his will, does not break the connection, or hinder the fuccefs.

So that the objection we are upon does not lie against the doctrine of the necessity of events by a certainty of connection and confequence: Sect. V. by the Arminian Scheme.

On the contrary, it is truly forcible against the Arminian doctrine of contingence and self-determination; which is inconfistent with fuch a connection. If there be no connection between those events, wherein virtue and vice confist, and any thing antecedent; then there is no connection between these events and any Means or Endeavours used in order to them: and if so, then those means must be in vain. The less there is of connection between foregoing things and following ones, fo much the less there is between Means and end, Endeavours and fucces; and in the fame proportion are Means and Endeavours ineffectual and in vain.

It will follow from Arminian principles, that there is no degree of connection between virtue or vice, and any foregoing event or thing: or, in other words, that the determination of the existence of virtue or vice do not in the least depend on the influence of any thing that comes to pass antecedently, from which the determination of its existence is, as its cause, Means, or ground; becaufe, fo far as it is fo, it is not from felf-determination: and, therefore, fo far there is nothing of the nature of virtue or vice. And fo it follows, that virtue and vice are not at all, in any degree, dependent upon, or connected with, any foregoing event or existence, as its cause, ground, or Means. And if fo, then all foregoing Means must be totally in vain.

Hence it follows, that there cannot, in any confistence with the *Arminian* fcheme, be any reafonable ground of fo much as a conjecture concerning the confequence of any Means and Endeavours, in order to escaping vice or obtaining virtue, or any choice or preference of Means,

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as having a greater probability of fuccefs by fome than others; either from any natural connection or dependence of the end on the means, or through any divine conftitution, or revealed way of God's bestowing or bringing to pass thefe things, in confequence of any Means, Endeavours, Prayers or Deeds. Conjectures, in this latter cafe, depend on a fupposition, that God himfelf is the Giver, or determining Caufe of the events fought: but if they depend on felf-determination, then God is not the determining or difpofing Author of them: and if these things are not of his disposal, then no conjecture can be made, from any revelation he has given, concerning any way or method of his disposal of them.

Yea, on these principles, it will not only follow, that men cannot have any reasonable ground of judgment or conjecture, that their Means and Endeavours to obtain virtue or avoid vice, will be fuccefsful, but they may be fure, they will not; they may be certain, that they will be in vain; and that if ever the thing, which they feek, comes to pass it will not be at all owing to the Means they use. For Means and Endeavours can have no effect at all, in order to obtain the end, but in one of these two ways: either, (1.) Through a natural tendency and influence, to prepare and difpose the mind more to virtuous acts, either by caufing the difpolition of the heart to be more in favour of fuch acts, or by bringing the mind more into the view of powerful motives and inducements: or, (2.) By putting perfons more in the way of God's bestowment of the benefit. But neither of these can be the case. Not the latter; for, as has been just now observed, it does not confift with the Arminian notion of felf-deter-

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mination, which they fuppofe effential to virtue, that God fhould be the Beftower, or (which is the fame thing) the determining, difpofing Author of Virtue. Not the former, for natural influence and tendency fuppofes caufality and connection; and fuppofes neceffity of event, which is inconfistent with Arminian liberty. A tendency of Means, by biaffing the heart in favour of virtue, or by bringing the will under the influence and power of motives in its determinations, are both inconfistent with Arminian liberty of will, confisting in indifference, and fovereign felf-determination, as has been largely demonstrated.

But for the more full removal of this prejudice against the doctrine of necessity, which has been maintained, as though it tended to encourage a total neglect of all Endeavours as vain; the following things may be confidered.

The question is not, Whether men may not thus improve this doctrine: we know that many true and wholefome doctrines are abused: but. whether the doctrine gives any just occasion for fuch an improvement; or whether, on the fuppolition of the truth of the doctrine, fuch a use of it would not be unreafonable? If any fhall affirm, that it would not, but that the very nature of the doctrine is fuch as gives just occasion for it, it must be on this supposition; namely, that fuch an invariable neceffity of all things already fettled, must render the interposition of all Means, Endeavours, Conclusions or Actions of ours, in order to the obtaining any future end whatfoever, perfectly infignificant; becaufe they cannot in the least alter or vary the course and feries of things, in any event or circumstance:

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all being already fixed unalterably by neceffity: and that therefore it is folly, for men to use any Means for any end; but their wifdom, to fave themselves the trouble of Endeavours, and take their eafe. No perfon can draw fuch an inference from this doctrine, and come to fuch a conclufion, without contradicting himfelf, and going counter to the very principles he pretends to act upon: for he comes to a conclusion, and takes a course, in order to an end, even his ease, or the faving himfelf from trouble; he feeks fomething future, and uses Means in order to a future thing, even in his drawing up that conclusion, that he will feek nothing, and ufe no Means in order to any thing in future; he feeks his future eafe, and the benefit and comfort of indolence. If prior neceffity, that determines all things, makes vain all actions or conclusions of ours, in order to any thing future; then it makes vain all conclusions and conduct of ours, in order to our future eafe. The measure of our ease, with the time, manner and every circumstance of it, is already fixed, by all-determining neceffity, as much as any thing elfe. If he fays within himfelf, "What " future happiness or misery I shall have, is al-" ready, in effect, determined by the neceffary " courfe and connection of things; therefore, I " will fave myfelf the trouble of labour and " diligence, which cannot add to my determined " degree of happines, or diminish my misery; " but will take my eafe, and will enjoy the com-" fort of floth and negligence." Such a man contradicts himself: he fays, the measure of his future happiness and misery is already fixed, and he will not try to diminish the one, nor add to the other: but yet, in his very conclusion, he contradicts this; for, he takes up this conclusion, to add to bis future happines, by the ease and com-

Sect. V. Calvinifm *does not make Men* Machines. 317 fort of his negligence; and to diminifh his future trouble and mifery, by faving himfelf the trouble of using Means and taking Pains.

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Therefore perfons cannot reafonably make this improvement of the doctrine of necessity, that they will go into a voluntary negligence of Means for their own happines. For the principles they must go upon, in order to this, are inconfistent with their making any improvement at all of the doctrine: for to make fome improvement of it, is to be influenced by it, to come to fome voluntary conclusion, in regard to their own conduct, with fome view or aim: but this, as has been fhown, is inconfistent with the principles they pretend to act upon. In fhort, the principles are fuch as cannot be acted upon at all, or, in any respect, confistently. And, therefore, in every pretence of acting upon them, or making any improvement at all of them, there is a felf-contradiction.

As to that Objection against the doctrine, which I have endeavoured to prove, that it makes men no more than mere Machines; I would fay, that notwithstanding this doctrine, Man is entirely, perfectly and unspeakably different from a mere Machine, in that he has reafon and understanding, and has a faculty of will, and is fo capable of volition and choice; and in that, his will is guided by the dictates or views of his understanding; and in that his external actions and behaviour, and, in many refpects, alfo his thoughts, and the exercises of his mind, are subject to his will; fo that he has liberty to act according to his choice, and do what he pleafes; and by Means of these things, is capable of moral habits and moral acts, fuch inclinations and actions as, ac-

318 Calvinifm does not make Men Machines. P. IV. cording to the common fenfe of mankind, are worthy of praife, efteem, love and reward; or, on the contrary, of difefteem, deteftation, indignation and punifhment.

In these things is all the difference from mere Machines, as to liberty and agency, that would be any perfection, dignity or privilege, in any respect: all the difference that can be defired, and all that can be conceived of; and indeed all that the pretensions of the Arminians themselves come to, as they are forced often to explain themfelves. (Though their explications overthrow and abolish the things afferted, and pretended to be explained) For they are forced to explain a felf-determining power of will, by a power in the foul, to determine as it chufes or wills; which comes to no more than this, that a man has a power of chusing, and, in many inftances, can Which is quite a different thing do as he chufes. from that contradiction, his having power of chufing his first act of choice in the cafe.

Or, if their fcheme makes any other difference than this, between Men and Machines, it is for the worfe: it is fo far from fuppoling Men to have a dignity and privilege above Machines, that it makes the manner of their being determined ftill more unhappy. Whereas, Machines, are guided by an understanding caufe, by the fkilful hand of the workman or owner; the will of Man is left to the guidance of nothing, but abfolute blind contingence.

SECTION VI.

Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine which has been maintained, that it agrees with the Stoical Doctrine of Fate, and the Opinions of Mr. Hobbes.

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WHEN Calvinifts oppose the Arminian notion of the freedom of will, and contingence of volition, and infift that there are no acts of the will, nor any other events whatfoever, but what are attended with fome kind of neceflity; their opposers cry out of them, as agreeing with the antient Stoicks in their doctrine of Fate, and with Mr. Hobbes in his opinion of neceffity.

It would not be worth while to take notice of fo impertinent an Objection, had it not been urged by fome of the chief Arminian writers.—There were many important truths maintained by the antient Greek and Roman philosophers, and especially the Stoicks, that are never the worfe for being held by them. The Stoick philosophers, by the general agreement of Christian divines, and even Arminian divines, were the greatest, wifest, and most virtuous of all the heathen philosophers; and, in their doctrine and practice, came the nearest to Christianity of any of their fects. How frequently are the fayings of these philosophers, in many of the writings and fermons, even of Arminian divines, produced, not as arguments of the falseness of the doctrines which they delivered, but as a confirmation of fome of the greatest truths of the Christian Religion, relating to the Unity and Per-

Of the Stoical Fate.

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Part IV.

fections of the Godhead, a future flate, the duty and happinels of mankind, &c. as observing how the light of nature and reason, in the wiseft and best of the Heathen, harmonized with, and confirms the Gospel of Jefus Christ.

And it is very remarkable, concerning Dr. Whitby, that although he alledges the agreement of the Stoicks with us, wherein he fuppofes they maintained the like doctrine with us, as an argument against the truth of our doctrine; yet, this very Dr. Whitby alledges the agreement of the Stoicks with the Arminians, wherein he supposes they taught the fame doctrine with them, as an argument for the truth of their doctrine.* So that, when the Stoicks agree with them, this (it feems) is a confirmation of their doctrine, and a confutation of ours, as shewing that our opinions are contrary to the natural fenfe and common reafon of mankind: neverthelefs, when the Stoicks agree with us, it argues no fuch thing in our favour; but, on the contrary, is a great argument against us, and shews our doctrine to be heathenish.

It is obferved by fome *Calviniftic* writers, that the *Arminians* fymbolize with the *Stoicks*, in fome of those doctrines wherein they are opposed by the *Calvinifts*; particularly in their denying an original, innate, total corruption and depravity of heart; and in what they held of man's ability to make himself truly virtuous and conformed to God;—and in fome other doctrines.

It may be further observed, it is certainly no better Objection against our doctrine, that it agrees, in some respects, with the doctrine of the

* Whithy on the five points, Edit. 3. p. 325, 326, 327.

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Sect IV.

Of the Stoickal Fate

antient Stoick philosophers, than it is against theirs, wherein they differ from us, that it agrees, in some respects, with the opinion of the very worst of the heathen philosophers, the followers of Epicurus, that father of atheism and licentiouss, and with the doctrine of the Sadducees and Jesuits.

I am not much concerned to know precifely, what the antient Stoick philosophers held concerning Fate, in order to determine what is truth; as though it were a fure way to be in the right, to take good heed to differ from them. It feems, that they differed among themfelves; and probably the doctrine of Fate as maintained by most of them, was, in fome refpects, erroneous. But whatever their doctrine was, if any of them held fuch a Fate, as is repugnant to any liberty, confifting in our doing as we pleafe, I utterly deny fuch a Fate. If they held any fuch Fate, as is not confiftent with the common and universal notions that mankind have of liberty, activity, moral agency, virtue and vice; I difclaim any fuch thing, and think I have demonstrated that the scheme I maintain is no fuch fcheme. If the Stoicks, by Fate, meant any thing of fuch a nature, as can be fuppofed to ftand in the way of the advantage and benefit of the use of means and endeavours, or make it lefs worth the while for men to defire, and feek after any thing wherein their virtue and happiness confist; I hold no doctrine that is clogged with any fuch inconvenience, any more than any other fcheme whatfoever; and by no means fo much as the Arminian scheme of contingence; as has been fhewn. If they held any fuch doctrine of universal fatality, as is inconfistent with any kind of liberty, that is or can be any perfection, dignity, privilege or benefit, or any thing defirable, in any respect, for

Part IV.

any intelligent creature, or indeed with any liberty that is poffible or conceivable; I embrace no fuch doctrine. If they held any fuch doctrine of Fate, as is inconfistent with the world's being in all things fubject to the disposal of an intelligent wife agent, that prefides, not as the *foul* of the world, but as the Sovereign *Lord* of the Universe, governing all things by proper will, choice and defign, in the exercise of the most perfect liberty conceivable, without subjection to any constraint, or being properly under the power or influence of any thing before, above or without himfelf; I wholly renounce any fuch doctrine.

As to Mr. Hobbes's maintaining the fame doctrine concerning neceffity;-I confess, it happens I never read Mr. Hobbes. Let his opinion be what it will, we need not reject all truth which is demonftrated by clear evidence, merely becaufe it was once held by fome bad man. This great truth, that Jefus is the Son of God, was not spoiled because it was once and again proclaimed with a loud voice by the devil. If truth is fo defiled, becaufe it is fpoken by the mouth, or written by the pen of fome ill-minded mischievous man, that it must never be received, we shall never know, when we hold any of the most precious and evident truths by a fure And if Mr. Hobbes has made a bad ufe tenure. of this truth, that is to be lamented; but the truth is not to be thought worthy of rejection on that account. It is common for the corruptions of the hearts of evil men to abufe the best things to vile purpofes.

I might also take notice of its having been obferved, that the Arminians agree with Mr. Hobbes in many more things than the Calvini/ts.* As,

* Dr. Gill, in his Anfwer to Dr. Whitby. Vol. III. p. 183, &c.

Sect. VII. Concerning the Necessity, &c. 323 in what he is faid to hold concerning original fin, in denying the neceffity of fupernatural illumination, in denying infuled grace, in denying the doctrine of justification by faith alone; and other things.

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VII. Section

Concerning the Neceffity of the Divine Will.

C OME may poffibly object against what has D been fuppofed of the abfurdity and inconfistence of a self-determining power in the will, and the impoffibility of its being otherwife, than that the will should be determined in every cafe by fome motive, and by a motive which (as it ftands in the view of the understanding) is of fuperior ftrength to any appearing on the other fide; that if these things are true, it will follow, that not only the will of created minds, but the will of God Himfelf is neceffary in all its determinations. Concerning which, fays the Author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will in God and in the Creature (pag. 85, 86.) "What strange doctrine is " this, contrary to all our ideas of the dominion " of God? does it not deftroy the glory of his "liberty of choice, and take away from the "Creator and Governor and Benefactor of the " world, that most free and Sovereign Agent, all "the glory of this fort of freedom? Does it " not feem to make him a kind of mechanical "medium of fate, and introduce Mr. Hobbes's "doctrine of fatality and Neceffity, into all " things that God hath to do with? Does it not " feem to reprefent the bleffed God, as a Being " of vaft understanding, as well as power and " efficiency, but still to leave him without a Y 2

324 Concerning the Neceffity Part IV. "will to chufe among all the objects within his "view? In fhort, it feems to make the bleffed "God a fort of Almighty Minister of Fate, un-"der its universal and supreme influence; as it "was the professed fentiment of some of the "antients, that Fate was above the gods."

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This is declaiming, rather than arguing; and an application to men's imaginations and prejudices, rather than to mere reafon .- But I would calmly endeavour to confider, whether there be any reason in this frightful representation .-- But before I enter upon a particular confideration of the matter, I would observe this: that it is reafonable to fuppofe, it fhould be much more difficult to express or conceive things according to exact metaphyfical truth, relating to the nature and manner of the existence of things in the Divine Understanding and Will, and the operation of these faculties (if I may fo call them) of the Divine Mind, than in the human mind; which is infinitely more within our view, and nearer to a proportion to the measure of our comprehension, and more commenfurate to the use and import of human speech. Language is indeed very deficient, in regard of terms to express precise truth concerning our own minds, and their faculties and operations. Words were first formed to express external things; and those that are applied to express things internal and spiritual, are almost all borrowed, and used in a fort of figurative Whence they are, most of them, attended fenfe. with a great deal of ambiguity and unfixedness in their fignification, occasioning innumerable doubts, difficulties and confusions, in enquiries and controversies, about things of this nature. But language is much lefs adapted to express

Sect. VII. of the Divine Volition.

things in the mind of the incomprehensible Deity, precisely as they are.

We find a great deal of difficulty in conceiving exactly of the nature of our own fouls. And notwithstanding all the progress, which has been made, in past and present ages, in this kind of knowledge, whereby our metaphyfics, as it relates to these things, is brought to greater perfection than once it was; yet, here is still work enough left for future enquiries and refearches, and room for progress still to be made, for many ages and generations. But we had need to be infinitely able metaphyficians, to conceive with clearness, according to strict, proper and perfect truth, concerning the nature of the Divine Effence, and the modes of the action and operation of the powers of the Divine Mind.

And it may be noted particularly, that though we are obliged to conceive of fome things in God as confequent and dependent on others, and of fome things pertaining to the Divine Nature and Will as the foundation of others, and fo before others in the order of nature: as, we must conceive of the knowledge and holinefs of God as prior, in the order of nature, to his happines; the perfection of his understanding, as the foundation of his wife purpofes and decrees; the holinefs of his nature, as the caufe and reafon of his holy determinations. And yet, when we fpeak of caule and effect, antecedent and confequent, fundamental and dependent, determining and determined, in the first Being, who is felf-existent, independent, of perfect and abfolute fimplicity and immutability, and the first cause of all things; doubtless there must be less propriety in fuch reprefentations, that when we speak of derived de-

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326 Neceffity of acting most wifely, Part IV. pendent beings, who are compounded, and liable to perpetual mutation and fucceffion.

Having premifed this, I proceed to obferve concerning the forementioned Author's exclamation, about the neceffary Determination of God's Will, in all things, by what he fees to be fitteft and beft,

That all the feeming force of fuch objections and exclamations must arise from an imagination, that there is fome fort of privilege or dignity in being without fuch a moral Necessity, as will make it impossible to do any other, than always chufe what is wifest and best; as though there were fome difadyantage, meannefs and fubjection, in fuch a Neceffity; a thing by which the will was confined, kept under, and held in fervitude by fomething, which, as it were, maintained a ftrong and invincible power and dominion over it, by bonds that held him fast, and that he could, by no means, deliver himfelf from. Whereas, this must be all mere imagination and delusion. It is no difadvantage or difhonour to a being, neceffarily to act in the most excellent and happy manner, from the necessary perfection of his own nature. This argues no imperfection, inferiority or dependence, nor any want of dignity, privilege or ascendency.* It is not inconfistent with the

* "It might have been objected, with more plaufible-"nefs, that the Supreme Caufe cannot be free, becaufe he mult "needs do always what is beft in the whole. But this would "not at all ferve Spinoza's purpole; for this is a Neceffity, "not of nature and of fate, but of fitnefs and wifdom; a Ne-"ceffity confiftent with the greateft freedom, and moft per-"fect choice. For the only foundation of this Neceffity is "fuch an unalterable rectitude of will, and perfection of "wifdom, as makes it impoffible for a wife being to act fool-"ifhly." Clark's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God. Edit. 6. p. 64.

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absolute and most perfect fovereignty of God. The fovereignty of God is his ability and authority to do whatever pleafes him; whereby He doth according to his will in the armies of heaven, and among A the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, or fay unto him, what dost thou?-The following things belong to the fovereignty of God; viz. (1.) Supreme, Universal, and Infinite Power; whereby he is able to do what he pleafes, without control, without any confinement of that power, without any fubjection, in the least measure, to any other power; and fo without any hinderance or reftraint, that it should be either imposfible, or at all difficult, for him to accomplifh his Will; and without any dependence of his power on any other power, from whence it fhould be derived, or which it should stand in any need of: fo far from this, that all other power is derived from him, and is abfolutely dependent on him. (2.) That He has fupreme authority;

"Though God is a most perfect free Agent, yet he cannot " but do always what is best and wifest in the whole. The " reason is evident; because perfect wildom and goodnels " are as fleady and certain principles of action, as Neceffity " itfelf; and an infinitely wife and good Being, indued " with the most perfect liberty, can no more chuse to act in " contradiction to wifdom and goodnefs, than a neceffary agent " can act contrary to the Necessity by which it is acted; it " being as great an abfurdity and impoffibility in choice, for " Infinite Wildom to chule to act unwifely, or Infinite Good-" nefs to chufe what is not good, as it would be in nature, " for abfolute Neceffity to fail of producing its neceffary " effect. There was, indeed, no Neceffity in nature, that God " should at first create such beings as he has created, or indeed " any being at all; because he is, in Himself, infinitely happy " and all-fufficient. There was, alfo, no Neceffity in nature, " that he should preferve and continue things in being, after " they were created; becaufe he would be felf-fufficient with-4 out their continuance, as he was before their creation. " But it was fit and wife and good, that Infinite Wifdom should

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Neceffity of acting most wifely, Part IV. 228 absolute and most perfect right to do what he wills, without fubjection to any fuperior authority, or any derivation of authority from any other, or limitation by any distinct independent authority, either fuperior, equal, or inferior; he being the head of all dominion, and fountain of all authority; and alfo without restraint by any obligation, implying either fubjection, derivation, or dependence, or proper limitation. (3.) That his Will is fupreme, underived, and independent on any thing without Himfelf; being in every thing determined by his own counfel, having no other rule but his own wisdom; his will not being fubject to, or reftrained by the will of any other, and other wills being perfectly fubject to his. (4.) That his Wildom, which determines his will, is supreme, perfect, underived, felf-fufficient and independent; fo that it may be faid, as in Ifa. xl. 14. With whom took He counfel? And who instructed Him and taught Him in

"manifeft, and Infinite Goodnefs communicate itfelf; and "therefore it was neceffary, in the fenfe of Neceffity I am "now fpeaking of, that things fhould be made at *fuch a time*, " and continued *fo long*, and indeed with various perfectiona " in fuch degrees, as Infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs faw it " wifeft and beft that they fhould." *Ibid.* p. 112, 113.

"'Tis not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to de-"fire, will and act, according to the last refult of a fair ex-"amination.—This is fo far from being a reftraint or di-"minution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and "benefit of it: 'tis not an abridgment, 'tis the end and "ufe of our liberty; and the further we are removed from "fuch a determination, the nearer we are to mifery and fla-"very. A perfect indifference in the mind, not determinable by its last judgment, of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would be fo far from being an advanter tage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want of indiffeter rency to act, or not to act, till determined by the will, would be an imperfection on the other fide.—'Tis as

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the path of judgment, and taught Him knowledge, and shewed him the way of understanding?—There is no other Divine Sovereignty but this: and this is properly absolute sovereignty: no other is defirable; nor would any other be honourable, or happy: and indeed, there is no other conceivable or possible. It is the glory and greatness of the Divine Sovereign, that God's Will is determined by his own infinite all-fufficient wisdom in every thing; and in nothing at all is either directed by any inferior wisdom, or by no wisdom; whereby it would become fenseless arbitrarines, determining and acting without reason, defign or end.

If God's Will is fleadily and furely determined in every thing by *fupreme* wifdom, then it is in every thing neceffarily determined to that which is *mo/t* wife. And, certainly, it would be a difadvantage and indignity, to be otherwife. For if

" much a perfection, that defire or the power of preferring " fhould be determined by good, as that the power of acting " should be determined by the will: and the certainer such " determination is, the greater the perfection. Nay, were 16 we determined by any thing but the laft refult of our own " minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were " not free. This very end of our freedom being, that we " might attain the good we chufe; and, therefore, every man " is brought under a Neceffity by his conflitution, as an in-" telligent being, to be determined in willing by his own " thought and judgment, what is best for him to do; elfe " he would be under the determination of fome other than " himfelf, which is want of liberty. And to deny that a " man's will, in every determination, follows his own judg-" ment, is to fay, that a man wills and acts for an end that " he would not have, at the fame time that he wills and acts " for it. For if he prefers it in his prefent thoughts, be-1º fore any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and so would have it before any other; unless he can have, and # not have it; will, and not will it, at the fame time; a

Necessity of acting most wifely, Part IV. 330 the Divine Will was not neceffarily determined to that, which in every cafe is wifeft and beft, it must be subject to some degree of undefigning contingence; and fo in the fame degree liable to evil. To suppose the Divine Will liable to be carried hither and thither at random, by the uncertain wind of blind contingence, which is guided by no wifdom, no motive, no intelligent dictate whatfoever, (if any fuch thing were poffible) would certainly argue a great degree of imperfection and meannels, infinitely unworthy of the Deity .- If it be a difadvantage, for the Divine Will to be attended with this moral Necessity, then the more free from it, and the

" contradiction too manifest to be admitted-If we look up-4 on those superior beings above us, who enjoy perfect hap-" pinefs, we shall have reason to judge, that they are more " fteadily determined in their choice of good than we; and " yet we have no reason to think they are less happy, or less " free, than we are. And if it were fit for fuch poor finite " creatures as we are, to pronounce what Infinite Wifdom " and Goodnefs could do, I think we might fay, that God " himself cannot chuse what is not good. The freedom of the " Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is beft.-" But to give a right view of this miftaken part of liberty, " let me ask, Would any one be a changeling, because he is " lefs determined by wife determination, than a wife man? " Is it worth the name of freedom, to be at liberty to play " the fool, and draw fhame and mifery upon a man's felf? " If to break loofe from the conduct of reafon, and to want " that reftraint of examination and judgment, that keeps us " from doing or chuing the worfe, be liberty, true liberty, " mad-men and fools are the only free men. Yet, I think, " no body would chufe to be mad, for the fake of fuch li-" berty, but he that is mad already. Locke, Hum. Und.

" Vol. I. Edit. 7. p. 215, 216. "This Being, having all things always neceffarily in view, "must always, and eternally will, according to his infinite comprehension of things; that is, must will all things that are wifest and best to be done. There is not getting free of this confequence. If it can will at all, it must will this way. To be capable of knowing, and not capable of

Sect. VII. no Meannels or Difadvantage.

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more left at random, the greater dignity and advantage. And, confequently, to be perfectly free from the direction of understanding, and univerfally and entirely left to fenfeles unmeaning contingence, to act absolutely at random, would be the fupreme glory.

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It no more argues any dependence of God's Will, that his fupremely wife volition is neceffary, than it argues a dependence of his being, that his existence is neceffary. If it be fomething too low, for the Supreme Being to have his Will determined by moral Neceffity, fo as neceffarily, in every cafe, to will in the higheft degree holily and happily; then why is it not alfo fomething too low, for him to have his existence, and the in-

"willing, is not to be underftood. And 'to be capable of " willing otherwife than what is wifeft and beft, contradicts " that knowledge which is infinite. Infinite Knowledge muft "direct the will without error. Here then, is the origin of " moral Necessity; and that is really, of freedom-Perhaps it " may be faid, when the Divine Will is determined, from the " confideration of the eternal aptitudes of things, it is as " neceffarily determined, as if it were phyfically impelled, if " that were poffible. But it is unskilfulness, to suppose this "an objection. The great principle is once established, viz. "That the Divine Will is determined by the eternal reafon " and aptitudes of things, inftead of being phyfically im-" pelled; and after that, the more ftrong and neceffary this "determination is, the more perfect the Deity must be al-"lowed to be: it is this that makes him an amiable and " adorable Being, whofe Will and Power are conftantly, im-" mutably determined, by the confideration of what is wifeft " and beft; inftead of a furd Being, with power, but without " difcerning and reason. It is the beauty of this Necessity, " that it is ftrong as fate itfelf, with all the advantage of reason " and goodne/s.-It is ftrange, to fee men contend, that the " Deity is not free, becaufe he is neceffarily rational, im-"mutably good and wife; when a man is allowed ftill the " perfecter being, the more fixedly and conftantly his will is " determined by reason and truth." Enquiry into the Nature of the Hum. Soul. Edit. 3. Vol. II. p. 403, 404.

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Necessity of acting most wifely, Part IV. 332 finite perfection of his nature, and his infinite happinels determined by Neceffity? It is no more to God's difhonour, to be necessarily wife, than to be neceffarily holy. And, if neither of them be to his diffionour, then it is not to his diffionour neceffarily to act holily and wifely. And it be not diffionourable to be neceffarily holy and wife, in the highest possible degree, no more is it mean and diffionourable, neceffarily to act holily and wifely in the highest possible degree; or, which is the fame thing, to do that, in every cafe, which, above all other things, is wifest and beft.

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The reason, why it is not dishonourable, to be necessarily most holy, is, because holines in itfelf is an excellent and honourable thing. For the fame reason, it is no dishonour to be necelfarily most wife, and, in every cafe, to act most wifely, or do the thing which is the wifelt of all: for wildom is also in itself excellent and honourable.

The forementioned Author of the Effay on the Freedom of Will, &c. as has been observed, reprefents that doctrine of the Divine Will's being in every thing neceffarily determined by fuperior fitness, as making the bleffed God a kind of Almighty Minister and mechanical medium of fate: and he infifts, p. 93, 94. that this moral Neceffity and impossibility is, in effect, the fame thing with phyfical and natural Neceffity and impoffibility: and in p. 54, 55. he fays, "The " fcheme which determines the will always and " certainly by the understanding, and the un-" derstanding by the appearance of things, "feems to take away the true nature of vice " and virtue. For the fubliment of virtues, and

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"the vileft of vices, feem rather to be matters of fate and Neceflity, flowing naturally and "neceflarily from the existence, the circum-"flances, and prefent fituation of perfons and "things: for this existence and fituation ne-"ceflarily makes fuch an appearance to the "mind; from this appearance flows a neceffary "perception and judgment, concerning these "things; this judgment, neceffarily determines "the will: and thus, by this chain of neceffary causes, virtue and vice would lose their "nature, and become natural ideas, and necef-"fary things, instead of moral and free ac-"tions."

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And yet this fame author allows, p. 30, 31. That a perfectly wife being will conftantly and certainly chufe what is most fit; and fays, p. 102, 103. " I grant, and always have granted, that "wherefoever there is fuch antecedent fuperior "fitnefs of things, God acts according to it, " fo as never to contradict it; and, particularly, " in all his judicial proceedings as a Governor, " and Diftributer of rewards and punifhments." Yea, he fays expressly, p. 42. " That it is not " possible for God to act otherwise, than accord-" ing to this fitnefs and goodnefs in things."

So that according to this Author, putting thele feveral paffages of this Effay together, there is no virtue, nor any thing of a moral nature, in the most fublime and glorious acts and exercises of God's holinefs, justice, and faithfulnefs; and he never does any thing which is in itfelf fupremely worthy, and, above all other things, fit and excellent, but only as a kind of mechanical medium of fate; and in what he does as the Judge, and moral Governor of the world, he exercises no

334 Necessity of God's acting wifely, &c. P. IV.

moral excellency; exercifing no freedom in thefe things, because he acts by moral Necessity. which is, in effect, the fame with phyfical or natural Neceffity; and, therefore, he only acts by an Hobi/tical fatality; as a Being indeed of valt understanding, as well as power and efficiency (as he faid before) but without a will to chuse. being a kind of Almighty Minister of fate, acting under its supreme influence. For he allows, that in all these things, God's Will is determined conftantly and certainly by a fuperior fitness, and that it is not possible for him to act otherwife. And if these things are fo, what glory or praife belongs to God for doing holily and justly, or taking the most fit, holy, wife and excellent courfe, in any one instance? Whereas, according to the Scriptures, and also the common Senfe of mankind, it does not, in the leaft, derogate from the honour of any being, that through the moral perfection of his nature, he neceffarily acts with fupreme wifdom and holinefs: but, on the contrary, his praife is the greater; herein confifts the height of his glory.

The fame author, p. 56. fuppofes, that herein appears the excellent character of a wife and good man, that though he can chufe contrary to the fitnefs of things, yet he does not; but fuffers himfelf to be directed by fitnefs; and that, in this conduct, he imitates the bleffed God. And yet, he fuppofes it is contrariwife with the bleffed God; not that he fuffers himfelf to be directed by fitnefs, when he can chufe, contrary to the fitnefs of things, but that he cannot chufe contrary to the fitnefs of things; as he fays, p. 42.—That it is not poffible for God to act otherwife than according to this fitnefs, where there is any fitnefs or goodnefs in things: Yea, he fuppofes, p. 31. That if a man were perfectly wife

Sect. VIII. Of God's creating the World &c. 335 and good, he could not do otherwife than be constantly and certainly determined by the fitnefs of things.

One thing more I would observe, before I conclude this fection; and that is, that if it derogates nothing from the glory of God, to be neceffarily determined by fuperior fitness in fome things, then neither does it to be thus determined in all things; from any thing in the nature of fuch Necessity, as at all detracting from God's freedom, independence, abfolute fupremacy, or any dignity or glory of his nature, state or manner of acting; or as implying any infirmity, reftraint, or fubjection. And if the thing be fuch as well confifts with God's glory, and has nothing tending at all to detract from it; then we need not be afraid of afcribing it to God in too many things, left thereby we should detract from God's glory too much.

SECTION VIII.

Some further Objections against the moral Necessity of GoD's Volitions confidered.

THE Author last cited, as has been obferved, owns that God, being perfectly wife, will constantly and certainly chufe what appears most fit, where there is a superior fitnels and goodnels in things; and that it is not possible for him to do otherwise. So that it is in effect confessed, that in those things where there is any real preferablenels, it is no discover, nothing in any respect unworthy of God, for him to act from Necessity; notwithstanding all that can be objected from the agreement of such a Necessity,

Of God's creating the World. Part IV. 130 with the fate of the Stoicks, and the Neceffity maintained by Mr. Hobbes. From which it will follow, that if it were fo, that in all the different things, among which God chufes, there were evermore a fuperior fitness, or preferableness on one fide, then it would be no diffeonour, or any thing, in any refpect, unworthy, or unbecoming of God, for his will to be neceffarily determined in every thing. And if this be allowed, it is a giving up entirely the argument, from the unfuitablenels of fuch a Necessity to the liberty. fupremacy, independence and glory of the Divine Being; and a refting the whole weight of the affair on the decifion of another point wholly, diverse; viz. Whether it be fo indeed, that in all the various possible things, which are in God's view, and may be confidered as capable objects of his choice, there is not evermore a preferablenefs in one thing above another. This is denied by this Author; who fuppofes, that in many inftances, between two or more poffible things, which come within the view of the Divine Mind, there is a perfect indifference and equality, as to fitnefs or tendency, to attain any good end which God can have in view, or to answer any of his designs. Now, therefore, I would confider whether this be evident.

The arguments brought to prove this, are of two kinds. (1.) It is urged, that, in many inftances, we mult fuppofe there is abfolutely no difference between various possible objects of choice, which God has in view: and (2.) that the difference between many things is fo inconfiderable, or of fuch a nature, that it would be unreasonable to suppose it to be of any confequence; or to suppose that any of God's wife de-

Sect. VIII. at fuch a Time and Place. 337 figns would not be answered in one way as well as the other.

Therefore,

I. The first thing to be confidered is, whether there are any instances wherein there is a perfect likeness, and absolutely no difference, between different objects of choice, that are proposed to the Divine Understanding?

And here, in the fir/t place, it may be worthy to be confidered, whether the contradiction there is in the terms of the question proposed, does not give reason to suspect, that there is an inconfiftence in the thing fuppofed. It is enquired, whether different objects of choice may not be absolutely without difference? If they are absolutely without difference, then how are they different objects of choice? If there be abfolutely no difference, in any refpect, then there is no variety or distinction: for distinction is only by some difference. And if there be no variety among propofed objects of choice, then there is no opportunity for variety of choice, or difference of determination. For that determination of a thing, which is not different in any respect, is not a different determination, but the fame. That this is no quibble, may appear more fully anon.

The arguments, to prove that the Most High, in fome instances, chuses to do one thing rather than another, where the things themselves are perfectly without difference, are two.

1. That the various parts of infinite time and fpace, abfolutely confidered, are perfectly alike, and do not differ at all one from another: and that therefore, when God determined to create Z

338 Of God's creating the world, &c. Part IV. the world in fuch a part of infinite duration and fpace, rather than others, he determined and preferred, among various objects, between which there was no preferableness, and absolutely no difference.

Anfw. This objection fuppofes an infinite length of time before the world was created, diftinguifhed by fucceffive parts, properly and truly fo; or a fucceffion of limited and unmeafurable periods of time, following one another, in an infinitely long feries: which muft needs be a groundlefs imagination. The eternal duration which was before the world, being only the eternity of God's existence; which is nothing elfe but his immediate, perfect and invariable possifiefion of the whole of his unlimited life, together and at once; Vitæ interminabilis, tota, fimul & perfecta possifience. Which is fo generally allowed, that I need not ftand to demonstrate it.*

* . If all created beings were taken away, all poffibility · of any mutation or fucceffion, of one thing to another, ' would appear to be also removed. Abstract fuccession in eternity is fcarce to be underftood. What is it that fuc-· ceeds? One minute to another, perhaps, velut unda fuper-" venit undam. But when we imagine this, we fancy that • the minutes are things feparately exifting. This is the ' common notion; and yet it is a manifest prejudice. Time ' is nothing but the existence of created fucceffive beings, • and eternity the necessary existence of the Deity. Therefore, · if this neceffary being hath no change or fucceffion in his · nature, his existence must of course be unsuccessive. We feem to commit a double overfight in this cafe; first, we find fucceffion in the neceffary nature and existence of the · Deity himself: which is wrong, if the reasoning above be · conclusive. And then we afcribe this fuccession to eternity, · confidered abstractedly from the Eternal Being; and sup-· pole it, one knows not what, a thing fublifting by itlelf, • and flowing, one minute after another. This is the work · of pure imagination, and contrary to the reality of things.

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So this objection fuppofes an extent of fpace beyond the limits of the creation, of an infinite length, breadth and depth, truly and properly diffinguished into different measurable parts, limited at certain stages, one beyond another, in an infinite feries. Which notion of absolute and infinite fpace is doubtlefs as unreafonable, as that now mentioned, of abfolute and infinite duration. It is as improper, to imagine that the immenfity and omniprefence of God is diftinguished by a feries of miles and leagues, one beyond another; as that the infinite duration of God is diffinguifhed by months and years, one after another. A diversity and order of diffinct parts, limited by certain periods, is as conceivable, and does as naturally obtrude itself on our imagination, in one cafe as the other; and there is equal reafon in each cafe, to suppose that our imagination deceives us. It is equally improper, to talk of months and years of the Divine Existence, and milefquares of Deity: and we equally deceive our-

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* Hence the common metaphorical expressions; Time runs " a-pace, let us lay hold on the prefent minute, and the like. The · philosophers themselves millead us by their illustration. * They compare eternity to the motion of a point running * on for ever, and making a traceles infinite line. Here the · point is fuppofed a thing actually fubfilting, reprefenting * the prefent minute; and then they afcribe motion or fuc-' ceffion to it: that is, they afcribe motion to a mere non-' entity, to illustrate to us a fueceflive eternity, made up of s finite fucceflive parts .---- If once we allow an all-perfect * mind, which hath an eternal, immutable and infinite com-• prehension of all things, always (and allow it we must) • the diffinction of past and future vanishes with respect to fuch a mind.-In a word, if we proceed ftep by ftep, as • above, the eternity or existence of the Deity will appear • to be Vita interminabilis, tota, fimul & perfetta poffeffio; " how much foever this may have been a paradox hitherto." Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul. Vol. II. 409, 410, 411. Edit. 3.

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340 Of GoD's placing differently Part IV. felves, when we talk of the world's being differently fix'd, with respect to either of these forts of measures. I think, we know not what we mean, if we fay, the world might have been differently placed from what it is, in the broad expanse of infinity: or, that it might have been differently fixed in the long line of eternity: and all arguments and objections, which are built on the imaginations we are apt to have of infinite extenfion or duration, are buildings founded on shadows, or caftles in the air.

2. The fecond argument, to prove that the Most High wills one thing rather than another, without any fuperior fitness or preferableness in the thing preferred, is God's actually placing in different parts of the world, particles, or atoms of matter, that are perfectly equal and alike. The forementioned Author fays, p. 78, &c. " If one " would descend to the minute specific particles, " of which different bodies are composed, we " fhould fee abundant reafon to believe, that there " are thousands of fuch little particles, or atoms " of matter, which are perfectly equal and alike, " and could give no diffinct determination to the "Will of God, where to place them." He there inftances in particles of water, of which there are fuch immenfe numbers, which compose the rivers and oceans of this world; and the infinite myriads of the luminous and fiery particles, which compose the body of the Sun; fo many, that it would be very unreasonable to suppose no. two of them should be exactly equal and alike.

Anfw. (1.) To this I answer: that as we must fuppose matter to be infinitely divisible, it is very unlikely, that any two, of all these particles, are exactly equal and alike; fo unlikely, that it is a

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thousand to one, yea, an infinite number to one, but it is otherwife: and that although we fhould allow a great fimilarity between the different particles of water and fire, as to their general nature and figure; and however fmall we fuppofe those particles to be, it is infinitely unlikely, that any two of them should be exactly equal in dimenfions and quantity of matter.-If we should fuppose a great many globes of the fame nature with the globe of the earth, it would be very strange, if there were any two of them that had exactly the fame number of particles of dust and water in them. But infinitely lefs strange, than that two particles of light fhould have just the fame quantity of matter. For a particle of light, according to the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter, is composed of infinitely more affignable parts, than there are particles of duft and water in the globe of the earth. And as it is infinitely unlikely, that any two of these particles fhould be equal; fo it is, that they fhould be alike in other respects: to instance in the configuration of their furfaces. If there were very many globes, of the nature of the earth, it would be very unlikely that any two fhould have exactly the fame number of particles of dust, water and stone, in their furfaces, and all posited exactly alike, one with respect to another, without any difference, in any part difcernible either by the naked eye or microfcope; but infinitely lefs strange, than that two particles of light should be perfectly of the fame figure. For there are infinitely more affignable real parts on the furface of a particle of light, than there are particles of dust, water and stone, on the surface of the terreftrial Globe.

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Anfw. (2.) But then, fuppoing that there are two particles, or atoms of matter, perfectly equal and alike, which God has placed in different parts of the creation; as I will not deny it to be poffible for God to make two bodies perfectly alike, and put them in different places; yet it will not follow, that two different or diffinct acts or effects of the Divine Power have exactly the fame fitnels for the fame ends. For these two different bodies are not different or diftinct, in any other respects than those wherein they differ: they are two in no other respects than those wherein there is a difference. If they are perfectly equal and alike in themfelves, then they can be diftinguished, or be distinct, only in those things which are called *circumstances*; as place, time, reft, motion, or fome other prefent or past circumstances or relations. For it is difference only that conftitutes diffinction. If God makes two bodies, in themselves every way equal and alike, and agreeing perfectly in all other circumstances and relations, but only their place; then in this only is there any diffinction or duplicity. The figure is the fame, the meafure is the fame, the folidity and refistance are the fame, and every thing the fame, but only the place. Therefore what the Will of God determines, is this, namely, that there fhould be the fame figure, the fame extension, the fame refistance, Ec. in two different places. And for this determination he has fome reafon. There is fome end, for which fuch a determination and act has a peculiar fitnefs, above all other acts. Here is no one thing determined without an end, and no one thing without a fitnefs for that end, fuperior to any thing elfe. If it be the pleafure of God to cause the fame refistance, and the fame figure, to be in two different places and fitua-

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tions, we can no more justly argue from it, that here must be some determination or act of God's will, that is wholly without motive or end, then we can argue, that whenever, in any cafe it is a man's will to fpeak the fame words, or make the fame founds at two different times; there must be some determination or act of his will. without any motive or end. The difference of place, in the former cafe, proves no more than the difference of time does in the other. If any one should fay, with regard to the former cafe, that there must be fomething determined without an end; viz. that of those two fimilar bodies. this in particular fhould be made in this place, and the other in the other, and should enquire, why the Creator did not make them in a tranfpolition, when both are alike, and each would equally have fuited either place? The enquiry fuppoles fomething that is not true; namely, that the two bodies differ and are diffinct in other refpects befides their place. So that with this diftinction, inherent in them, they might, in their first creation, have been transposed, and each might have begun its existence in the place of the other.

Let us, for clearnefs fake, fuppofe, that God had, at the beginning, made two globes, each of an inch diameter, both perfect fpheres, and perfectly folid, without pores, and perfectly alike in every refpect, and placed them near one to another, one towards the right hand, and the other towards the left, without any difference as to time, motion or reft, past or prefent, or any circumstance, but only their place; and the queftion should be asked, why God in their creation placed them fo? Why that which is made on the right hand, was not made on the left, and vice versa? Let it be well confidered, whether there ΖA

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344 Of God's chusing among like Things, P. IV. be any fense in such a question; and whether the enquiry does not suppose something false and abfurd. Let it be confidered, what the Creator must have done otherwife than he did, what different act of will or power he must have exerted, in order to the thing propofed. All that could have been done, would have been to have made two fpheres, perfectly alike, in the fame places where he has made them, without any difference of the things made, either in themfelves or in any circumstance; fo that the whole effect would have been without any difference, and, therefore, just the By the fuppofition, the two fpheres are fame. different in no other respect but their place: and therefore in other respects they are the fame. Each has the fame roundnefs; it is not a diftinct rotundity, in any other respect but its situation, There are, alfo, the fame dimensions, differing in nothing but their place. And fo of their refistance, and every thing elfe that belongs to them,

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Here, if any chufes to fay, " that there is a difference in another refpect, viz. that they are not NUMERICALLY the fame: that it is thus with all the qualities that belong to them: that it is confessed, they are, in some respects, the same; that is, they are both exactly alike; but yet numerically they differ. Thus the roundness of one is not the fame numerical individual roundnefs with that of the other." Let this be fuppofed; then the question about the determination of the Divine Will in the affair, is, why did God will, that this individual roundness should be at the right hand, and the other individual roundness at the left? why did not he make them in a contrary polition? Let any rational perfon confider, whether fuch questions be not words without a meaning; as much as if God should fee fit for

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fome ends, to caufe the fame founds to be repeated, or made at two different times; the founds being perfectly the fame in every other refpect, but only one was a minute after the other; and it should be afked, upon it, why God caufed these founds, numerically different, to fucceed one the other in fuch a manner? Why he did not make that individual found, which was in the first minute, to be in the fecond? And the individual found of the last minute to be in the first; which enquiries would be even ridiculous; as, I think, every perfon must fee, at once, in the case proposed of two founds, being only the fame repeated, abfolutely without any difference, but that one circumstance of time. If the Most High sees it will answer some good end, that the same sound should be made by lightening at two diffinct times. and therefore wills that it fhould be fo, must it needs therefore be, that herein there is fome act of God's will without any motive or end? God faw fit often, at diffinct times, and on different occafions, to fay the very fame words to Mofes; namely, those, I am Jehovah. And would it not be unreasonable to infer, as a certain consequence, from this, that here must be some act or acts of the Divine Will, in determining and difpofing thefe words exactly alike, at different times wholly without aim or inducement? But it would be no more unreasonable than to fay, that there must be an act of God's without any inducement, if he fees it best, and, for fome reasons, determines that there shall be the fame refistance, the fame dimensions, and the fame figure, in feveral diflinct places.

If, in the inftance of the two fpheres, perfectly alike, it be fuppofed possible that God might have made them in a contrary position; that which is

a46 Of God's chusing among like Things, Part IV made at the right hand, being made at the left; then I ask, Whether it is not evidently equally possible, if God had made but one of them, and that in the place of the right-hand globe, that he might have made that numerically different from what it is, and numerically different from what he did make it; though perfectly alike, and in the fame place: and at the fame time, and in every refpect, in the fame circumstances and relations? Namely, Whether he might not have made it. numerically the fame with that which he has now made at the left hand; and fo have left that which is now created at the right hand, in a ftate of non-existence? And, if so, whether it would not have been poffible to have made one in that place, perfectly like thefe, and yet numerically differing from both? And let it be confidered. whether, from this notion of a numerical difference in bodies, perfectly equal and alike, which numerical difference is fomething inherent in the bodies themfelves, and diverse from the difference of place or time, or any circumstance whatfoever; it will not follow, that there is an infinite number of numerically different possible bodies, perfectly alike, among which God chufes, by a felf-determining power, when he goes about to create bodies.

Therefore let us put the cafe thus: fuppoing that God, in the beginning, had created but one perfectly folid fphere, in a certain place; and it fhould be enquired, Why God created that individual fphere, in that place, at that time? And why he did not create another fphere perfectly like it, but numerically different, in the fame place, at the fame time? Or why he choice to bring into being there, that very body, rather than any of the infinite number of other bodies,

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Sect. VIII. and Things of trivial Difference. 347 perfectly like it; either of which he could have made there as well, and would have answered his end as well? Why he caufed to exift, at that place and time, that individual roundness, rather than any other of the infinite number of individual rotundities, just like it? Why that individual refistance, rather than any other of the infinite number of poffible reliftances just like it? And it might as reasonably be asked, Why, when God first caused it to thunder, he caused that individual found then to be made, and not another just like it? Why did he make choice of this very found, and reject all the infinite number of other possible founds just like it, but numerically differing from it, and all differing one from another? I think, every body must be fenfible of the alurdity and nonfense of what is fuppofed in fuch enquiries. And, if we calmly attend to the matter, we shall be convinced, that all fuch kind of objections as I am answering, are founded on nothing but the imperfection of our manner of conceiving things, and the obfcureness of language, and great want of clearness and precifion in the fignification of terms.

If any shall find fault with this reasoning, that it is going a great length into metaphysical niceties and subtilities; I answer, the objection which they are in reply to, is a metaphysical subtility, and must be treated according to the nature of it.**

, II. Another thing alledged is, that innumerable things which are determined by the Divine

* ".For men to have recourfe to fubtilities, in raifing dif-"ficulties, and then complain, that they fhould be taken off "by minutely examining these fubtilities, is a ftrange kind "of procedure." * Nature of the Human Soul, vol. 2, p. 331.

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will, and chofen and done by God rather than others, differ from those that are not chosen in so inconfiderable a manner, that it would be unreasonable to suppose the difference to be of any confequence, or that there is any superior fitness or goodness, that God can have respect to in the determination.

To which I answer; it is impossible for us to determine, with any certainty or evidence, that because the difference is very small, and appears to us of no confideration, therefore there is abfolutely no fuperior goodnefs, and no valuable end, which can be proposed by the Creator and Governor of the world, in ordering fuch a difference. The forementioned author mentions many inftances. One is, there being one atom in the whole universe more, or lefs. But, I think, it would be unreafonable to fuppofe, that God made one atom in vain, or without any end or motive. He made not one atom, but what was a work of his Almighty Power, as much as the whole globe of the earth, and requires as much of a constant exertion of Almighty Power to uphold it; and was made and is upheld understandingly, and on defign, as much as if no other had been made but that. And it would be as unreasonable to suppose, that he made it without any thing really aimed at in fo doing, as much as to fuppofe, that he made the planet Jupiter without aim or defign.

It is poffible, that the most minute effects of the Creator's power, the fmallest affignable difference between the things which God has made, may be attended, in the whole feries of events, and the whole compass and extent of their influence, with very great and important confe-

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quences. If the laws of motion and gravitation, laid down by Sir Ifaac Newton, hold univerfally, there is not one atom, nor the leaft affignable part of an atom, but what has influence, every moment, throughout the whole material univerfe, to caufe every part to be otherwife than it would be, if it were not for that particular corporeal existence. And however the effect is infensible for the prefent, yet it may, in length of time, become great and important.

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To illustrate this, let us suppose two bodies moving the fame way, in straight lines, perfectly parallel one to another; but to be diverted from this parallel courfe, and drawn one from another. as much as might be by the attraction of an atom, at the diftance of one of the furthest of the fixed ftars from the earth; these bodies being turned out of the lines of their parallel motion, will, by degrees, get further and further diftant, one from the other; and though the diftance may be imperceptible for a long time, yet at length it may become very great. So the revolution of a planet round the fun being retarded or accelerated, and the orbit of its revolution made greater or lefs, and more or lefs elliptical, and fo its periodical time longer or fhorter, no more than may be by the influence of the leaft atom, might, in length of time, perform a whole revolution fooner or later than otherwife it would have done: which might make a vaft alteration with regard to millions of important events. So the influence of the least particle may, for ought we know, have fuch effect on fomething in the conftitution of fome human body, as to caufe another thought to arife in the mind at a certain time. than otherwife would have been; which, in length of time, (yea, and that not very great) might oc350 Neceffity confiftent with free Grace. Part IV. cafion a vaft alteration through the whole world of mankind. And fo innumerable other ways might be mentioned, wherein the leaft affignable alteration may poffibly be attended with great confequences.

Another argument, which the fore-mentioned author brings against a necessary determination of the Divine Will, by a superior structure of God's grace and goodness, in chusing the objects of his favour and bounty, and from the obligation upon men to thankfulness for special benefits. P. 89, &c.

In answer to this objection, I would observe,

1. That it derogates no more from the goodnefs of God, to fuppofe the exercife of the benevolence of his nature to be determined by wifdom, than to fuppofe it determined by chance, and that his favours are beftowed altogether at random, his will being determined by nothing but perfect accident, without any end or defign whatfoever; which must be the cafe, as has been demonstrated, if Volition be not determined by a prevailing motive. That which is owing to perfect contingence, wherein neither previous inducement, nor antecedent choice has any hand, is not owing more to goodnefs or benevolence, than that which is owing to the influence of a wife end.

2. It is acknowledged, that if the motive that determines the Will of God, in the choice of the objects of his favours. be any moral quality in the object, recommending that object to his benevolence above others, his chufing that object is not fo great a manifestation of the freenels and fovereignty of his grace, as if it were otherwise.

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But there is no Neceffity of fuppoing this, in order to our fuppoing that he has fome wife end in view, in determining to beflow his favours on one perfon rather than another. We are to diffinguifh between the merit of the object of God's Favour, or a moral qualification of the object attracting that favour and recommending to it, and the natural fitnefs of fuch a determination of the act of God's goodnefs, to answer fome wife defign of his own, fome end in the view of God's Omnifcience.—It is God's own act, that is the proper and immediate object of his Volition.

3. I fuppose that none will deny, but that, in fome instances, God acts from wife defign in determining the particular fubjects of his favours: none will fay, I prefume, that when God diftinguishes, by his bounty, particular focieties, or perfons, He never, in any inftance, exercifes any wifdom in fo doing, aiming at fome happy confequence. And, if it be not denied to be fo in fome instances, then I would enquire, whether, in these instances, God's goodness is less manifested, than in those wherein God has no aim or end at all? And whether the fubjects have lefs caufe of thankfulnefs? And if fo, who shall be thankful for the bestowment of distinguishing mercy, with that enhancing circumstance of the distinction's being made without an end? How shall it be known when God is influenced by fome wife aim, and when not? It is very manifest, with respect to the apostle Paul, that God had wife ends in chuing him to be a Christian and an apostle, who had been a perfecutor, &c. The apoftle himfelf mentions one end. 1 Tim. i. 15, 16. Christ Yesus came into the world to save sinners, of whom I am chief. Howbeit, for this caufe I obtained mercy, that in me first, Jesus Christ might shew forth

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all long-fuffering, for a pattern to them who should hereafter believe on Him to life everlasting. But yet the apostle never looked on it as a diminution of the freedom and riches of Divine Grace in his election, which he fo often and fo greatly magnifies. This brings me to observe,

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4. Our fuppofing fuch a moral Neceffity in the acts of God's will, as has been spoken of, is so far from neceffarily derogating from the riches of God's grace to fuch as are the chofen objects of his favour, that, in many instances, this moral Neceflity may arife from goodnefs, and from the great degree of it. God may chufe this object rather than another, as having a fuperior fitnels to answer the ends, defigns and inclinations of his goodness; being more finful, and fo more miserable and necessitous than others; the inclinations of Infinite Mercy and Benevolence may be more gratified, and the gracious defign of God's fending his Son into the world, may be more abundantly answered, in the exercises of mercy towards fuch an object, rather than another.

One thing more I would obferve, before I finifh what I have to fay on the head of the Neceffity of the acts of God's will; and that is, that fomething much more like a fervile fubjection of the Divine Being to fatal Neceffity, will follow from Arminian principles, than from the doctrines which they oppofe. For they (at least most of them) fuppofe, with respect to all events that happen in the moral world, depending on the Volitions of moral agents, which are the most important events of the universe, to which all others are fubordinate; I fay, they fuppose, with respect to these, that God has a certain foreknowledge of them, antecedent to any purposes or decrees of his about them. And if so, they have a

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fixed certain futurity, prior to any defigns or volitions of his, and independent on them, and to which his volitions must be fubject, as he would wifely accommodate his affairs to this fixed futurity of the state of things in the moral So that here, instead of a moral necesworld. fity of God's Will, arifing from, or confifting in, the infinite perfection and bleffedness of the Divine Being, we have a fixed unalterable state of things, properly diffinct from the perfect nature of the Divine Mind, and the state of the Divine Will and Defign, and entirely independent on thefe things, and which they have no hand in, because they are prior to them; and which God's Will is truly fubject to, being obliged to conform or accommodate himfelf to it, in all his purpofes and decrees, and in every thing ne does in his disposals and government of the world; the moral world being the end of the natural; fo that all is in vain, that is not accommodated to that state of the moral world, which confists in, or depends upon, the acts and state of the wills of moral agents, which had a fixed futurition from eternity. Such a fubjection to neceffity as this, would truly argue an inferiority and fervitude, that would be unworthy of the Supreme Being; and is much more agreeable to the notion which many of the heathen had of Fate, as above the gods, than that moral necessity of fitnels and wifdom which has been fpoken of; and is truly repugnant to the absolute fovereignty of God, and inconfistent with the fupremacy of his will; and really fubjects the will of the Most High, to the will of his creatures, and brings him into dependence upon them.

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Of the Objection about

SECTION IX.

Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine which bas been maintained, that it makes GOD the Author of Sin.

T is urged by *Arminians*, that the doctrine of the necessity of men's volitions, or their neceffary connection with antecedent events and circumstances, makes the first cause, and supreme orderer of all things, the Author of Sin; in that he has fo conflituted the state and course of things, that finful volitions become neceffary, in consequence of his disposal. Dr. Whitby, in his Discourse on the Freedom of the Will, + cites one of the antients, as on his fide, declaring that this opinion of the necessity of the will "ab-" folves Sinners, as doing nothing of their own " accord which was evil, and would caft all the " blame of all the wickedness committed in the " world, upon God, and upon his Providence, " if that were admitted by the affertors of this " fate; whether he himself did necessitate them " to do thefe things, or ordered matters fo, that " they should be constrained to do them by some " other cause." And the doctor fays, in another place, § " In the nature of the thing, and in " the opinion of philosophers, causa deficiens, in " rebus necessariis, ad causam per se efficientem re-" ducenda eft. In things neceffary, the deficient " cause must be reduced to the efficient. And " in this cafe the reafon is evident; becaufe the " not doing what is required, or not avoiding " what is forbidden, being a defect, must follow

† On the five Points, p. 361. § Ibid. p. 486.



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Concerning this, I would observe the following things.

I. If there be any difficulty in this matter, it is nothing peculiar to this fcheme; it is no difficulty or difadvantage, wherein it is diffinguished from the fcheme of *Arminians*; and, therefore, not reafonably objected by them.

Dr. Whitby fuppofes, that if Sin neceffarily follows from God's withholding affiftance, or if that affiftance be not given, which is abfolutely neceffary to the avoiding of Evil; then, in the nature of the thing, God must be as properly the Author of that Evil, as if he were the efficient caufe of it. From whence, according to what he himfelf fays of the devils and damned fpirits, God must be the proper Author of their perfect unrestrained wickedness: he must be the efficient caufe of the great pride of the devils, and of their perfect malignity against God, Christ, his faints, and all that is good, and of the infatiable cruelty of their difpolition. For he allows, that God has fo forfaken them, and does fo withhold his affiftance from them, that they are incapacitated from doing good, and determined only to evil. * Our doctrine, in its confequence, makes God the Author of men's Sin in this world, no more, and in no other fense, than his doctrine, in its confequence, makes God the Author of the hellish pride and malice of the devils. And doubtlefs the latter is as odious an effect as the former.

Again, if it will follow at all, that God is the Author of Sin, from what has been fuppofed * On the five Points, p. 302, 305.

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of a fure and infallible connection between antecedents and confequents, it will follow becaufe of this, viz. that for God to be the Author or Orderer of those things which, he knows before hand, will infallibly be attended with fuch a confequence, is the fame thing, in effect, as for him to be the Author of that confequence. But, if this be fo, this is a difficulty which equally attends the doctrine of Arminians themselves; at least, of those of them who allow God's certain fore-knowledge of all events. For, on the supposition of fuch a fore-knowledge, this is the cafe with respect to every Sin that is committed: God knew, that if he ordered and brought to pass fuch and fuch events, fuch Sins would infallibly follow. for inftance, God certainly foreknew, long before Judas was born, that if he ordered things fo, that there should be such a man born, at such a time, and at fuch a place, and that his life fhould be preferved, and that he should, in Divine Providence, be led into acquaintance with Jefus; and that his heart should be fo influenced by God's Spirit or Providence, as to be inclined to be a follower of Christ; and that he should be one of those twelve, which should be chosen constantly to attend him as his family; and that his health should be preferved, fo that he should go up to Jerufalem, at the last Passover in Christ's life; and it should be so ordered, that Judas should fee Christ's kind treatment of the woman which anointed him at Bethany, and have that reproof from Christ, which he had at that time, and see and hear other things, which excited his enmity against his Master, and other circumstances should be ordered, as they 'were ordered; it would be what would most certainly and infallibly follow, that Judas would betray his Lord, and would foon

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357 after hang himfelf, and die impenitent, and be fent to hell, for his horrid wickedness.

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Therefore, this fuppofed difficulty ought not to be brought as an objection against the scheme which has been maintained, as difagreeing with the Arminian scheme, seeing it is no difficulty owing to fuch a difagreement; but a difficulty wherein the Arminians share with us. That must be unreafonably made an objection against our differing from them, which we should not escape or avoid at all by agreeing with them.

And therefore I would observe,

II. They who object, that this doctrine makes God the Author of Sin, ought diffinctly to explain what they mean by that phrafe, The Author of Sin. I know the phrase, as it is commonly used, fignifies fomething very ill. If by the Author of Sin, be meant the Sinner, the Agent, or Actor of Sin, or the Doer of a wicked thing; fo it would be a reproach and blafphemy, to fuppofe God to be the Author of Sin. In this fenfe, I utterly deny God to be the Author of Sin; rejecting fuch an imputation on the Most High, as what is infinitely to be abhorred; and deny any fuch thing to be the confequence of what I have laid down. But if, by the Author of Sin, is meant the permitter, or not a hinderer of Sin; and, at the fame time, a disposer of the state of events, in fuch a manner, for wife, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that Sin, if it be permitted or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow: I fay, if this be all that is meant, by being the Author of Sin, I do not deny that God is the Author of Sin, (though I diflike and reject the phrase, as that which by use and cuftom is apt to carry another fense) it is no reproach

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for the Moft High to be thus the Author of Sin. This is not to be the *Actor of Sin*, but, on the contrary, of holinefs. What God doth herein, is holy; and a glorious exercife of the infinite excellency of his nature. And, I do not deny, that God's being thus the Author of Sin, follows from what I have laid down; and, I affert, that it equally follows from the doctrine which is maintained by moft of the Arminian divines.

That it is most certainly fo, that God is in fuch a manner the Difpofer and Orderer of Sin, is evident, if any credit is to be given to the Scripture; as well as becaufe it is impossible, in the nature of things, to be otherwife. In fuch a manner God ordered the obfinacy of Pharaoh, in his refufing to obey God's Commands, to let the people go. Exod. iv. 21. I will harden bis heart, and he shall not let the people go. Chap. vii. 2-5. Aaron thy brother (hall fpcak unto Pharaoh, that he fend the children of Israel out of his land. And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, and multiply my figns and my wonders in the land of Egypt. But Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you; that I may lay mine hand upon Egypt, by great judgments, &c. Chap. ix. 12. And the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkened not unto them, as the Lord had spoken unta Mofes. Chap. x. 1, 2. And the Lord faid unto Moses, Go in unto Pharaoh; for I have hardened his heart and the heart of his fervants, that I might shew these my signs before him, and that thou mays? tell it in the ears of thy fon, and thy fon's fon, what things I have wrought in Egypt, and my figns which I have done amongst them, that ye may know that I Chap. xiv. 4. And I will harden am the Lord. Pharaoh's heart, that he shall follow after them: and I will be honoured upon Pharaoh, and upon all his Holt. Ver. 8. And the Lord hardened the heart of

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Pharaoh King of Egypt, and he purfued after the Children of Ifrael. And it is certain, that in fuch a manner God, for wife and good ends, ordered that event, Joseph's being fold into Egypt, by his brethren. Gen. xlv. 5. Now, therefore, be not grieved, nor angry with your felves, that ye fold me hither; for God did fend me before you to preferve life. Ver. 7, 8. God did fend me before you to preserve a posterity in the earth, and to save your lives by a great deliverance: so that now it was not you, that sent me bither, but God. Pfal. cvii. 17. He sent a man before them, even Joseph, who was sold for a servant. It is certain, that thus God ordered the Sin and Folly of Sihon King of the Amorites, in refufing to let the people of Ifrael pass by him peaceably. Deut. ii. 30. But Sihon King of Helhbon would not let us pass by him; for the Lord thy God hardened his (pirit, and made his heart obstinate, that he might deliver him into thine hand. It is certain, that God thus ordered the Sin and Folly of the Kings of Canaan, that they attempted not to make peace with Ifrael, but, with a ftupid boldnefs and obftinacy, fet themfelves violently to oppofe them and their God. Josh. xi. 20. For it was of the Lord, to harden their hearts, that they should come against Ifrael in battle, that he might destroy them utterly. and that they might have no favour; but that he might destroy them, as the Lord commanded Moses. It is evident, that thus God ordered the treacherous rebellion of Zedekiah against the King of Babylon. Jer. lii. 3. For through the anger of the Lord it came to pafs in Jerufalem, and Judah, until he had cast them out from his presence, that Zedekiah rebelled against the King of Babylon. So 2 Kings xxiv. 20. And it is exceeding manifest, that God thus ordered the rapine and unrighteous ravages of Nebuchadnezzar, in spoiling and ruining the nations round about. Jer. xxv. 9. Behold, I will A a 4

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fend and take all the families of the north, faith the Lord, and Nebuchadnezzar my fervant, and will bring them against this land, and against all the nations round about; and will utterly destroy them. and make them an aftoni/hment, and an hiffing, and perpetual desolations. Chap. xlin. 10, 11. I will fond and take Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babylon, my fervant: and I will fet his throne upon these stones that I have hid, and he shall spread his royal pavilion over them. And when he cometh, he fall fmite the land of Egypt, and deliver fuch as are for death to death, and fuch as are for captivity to captivity, and fuch as are for the fword to the fword. Thus God reprefents himfelf as fending for Nebuchadnezzar, and taking of him and his armies, and bringing him against the nations, which were to be deftroyed by him, to that very end, that he might utterly destroy them, and make them defolate; and as appointing the work that he should do. fo particularly, that the very perfons were defigned. that he should kill with the fword; and those that should be killed with famine and pestilence, and those that should be carried into captivity; and that in doing all these things, he should act as his fervant; by which, lefs cannot be intended, than that he should ferve his purposes and defigns. And in Jer. xxvii. 4, 5, 6. God declares, how he would caufe him thus to ferve his defigns, viz. by bringing this to pass in his fovereign disposals, as the great Poffessor and Governor of the Universe, that disposes all things just as pleases him. Thus faith the Lord of Hofts, the God of I/rael; I have made the earth, the man and the beast, that are upon the ground, by my great power, and my stretched out arm, and have given it unto whom it seemed meet unto me: and now I have given all these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezzar MY SERVANT, and the beasts of the

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field have I given alfo to ferve him. And Nebuchadnezzar is spoken of as doing these things, by having his arms strengthened by God, and having God's sword put into his hands, for this end. Ezek. xxx. 24, 25, 26. Yea, God speaks of his terribly ravaging and wasting the nations, and cruelly deftroying all forts, without diffinction of fex or age, as the weapon in God's hand, and the inftrument of his indignation, which God makes ufe of to fulfil his own purposes, and execute his own vengeance. Jer. li. 20. &c. Thou art my battle-axe, and weapons of war: For with thee will I break in pieces the nations, and with thee will I destroy kingdoms, and with thee will I break in pieces the horfe and his rider, and with thee will I break in pieces the chariot and his rider; with thee alfo will I break in pieces man and woman; and with thee will I break in pieces old and young; and with thee will I break in pieces the young man and the maid, &c. It is reprefented, that the defigns of Nebuchadnezzar, and those that destroyed Jetufalem, never could have been accomplifhed, had not God determined them, as well as they; Lam. iii. 37. Who is he that faith, and it cometh to pass, and the Lord commandeth it not? And yet the King of Babylon's thus deftroying the nations, and especially the Jews, is spoken of as his great wickedness, for which God finally destroyed him. Ifa. xiv. 4, 5, 6, 12. Hab. ii. 5,-12. and Jer. chap. l. and li. It is most manifest, that God, to ferve his own defigns, providentially ordered Shimei's curfing David. 2 Sam. xvi. 10, 11. The Lord hath faid unto him, curfe David.-Let him curfe, for the Lord hath bidden him.

It is certain, that God thus, for excellent, holy, gracious and glorious ends, ordered the fact which they committed, who were concerned in

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Christ's death; and that therein they did but fulfil God's defigns. As, I trust, no Christian will deny it was the defign of God, that Christ should be crucified, and that for this end, he came into the world. It is very manifest, by many Scriptures, that the whole affair of Christ's crucifixion, with its circumstances, and the treachery of Judas, that made way for it, was ordered in God's Providence, in pursuance of his purpose; notwithstanding the violence that is used with those plain Scriptures, to obscure and pervert the sense of them. Acts ii. 23. Him being delivered, by the determinate counfel and foreknowledge of God, * ye have taken, and with wicked hands, have crucified and flain. Luke xxii. 21, 22. † But behold the

have taken, and with wicked hands, have crucified and flain. Luke xxii. 21, 22. + But behold the hand of him that betrayeth me, is with me on the table: and truly the Son of Man goeth, as it was determined. Acts iv. 27, 28. For of a truth, against the holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate. with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done. Acts iii. 17, 18. And now, brethren, I wot that through ignorance ye did it, as did

* "Grotius, as well as Beza, obferves, *προγονοι*; muft "here fignify decree; and Elfner has fhewn that it has that "fignification, in approved Greek writers. And it is cer-"tain *uxδorog* fignifies one given up into the hands of an "enemy." Doddridge in Loc.

+ "As this paffage is not liable to the ambiguities, which "fome have apprehended in Acts ii. 23. and iv. 28. (which "yet feem on the whole to be parallel to it, in their moft "natural conftruction) I look upon it as an evident proof, "that these things are, in the language of Scripture, faid "to be determined or decreed (or exactly bounded and "marked out by God, as the word ωριζω most naturally fig-"nifies) which he sees in fact will happen, in confequence "of his volitions, without any neceffitating agency; as well "as those events, of which he is properly the Author." Dodd. in Loc.

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also your rulers: but these things, which God before had shewed by the mouth of all his prophets, that Christ should suffer, he hath so fulfilled. So that what these murderers of Christ did, is spoken of as what God brought to pass or ordered, and that by which he fulfilled his own word.

In Rev. xvii. 17. The agreeing of the Kings of the earth to give their kingdom to the beaft, though it was a very wicked thing in them, is fpoken of as a fulfilling God's Will, and what God had put into their hearts to do. It is manifeft, that God fometimes permits Sin to be committed, and at the fame time orders things fo, that if he permits the fact, it will come to pafs, becaufe, on fome accounts, he fees it needful and of importance, that it fhould come to pafs. Matt. xviii. 7. It muft needs be, that offences come; but wo to that man by whom the offence cometh. With I Cor. xi. 19. For there muft alfo be herefies among you, that they which are approved may be made manifeft among you.

Thus it is certain and demonstrable, from the holy Scriptures, as well as the nature of things, and the principles of *Arminians*, that God permits Sin; and at the fame time, fo orders things, in his Providence, that it certainly and infallibly will come to pass, in confequence of his permission.

I proceed to obferve in the next place,

III. That there is a great difference between God's being concerned thus, by his permiffion, in an event and act, which, in the inherent fubject and agent of it, is Sin, (though the event will certainly follow on his permiffion) and his being concerned in it by producing it and exerting the act of Sin; or between his being the Orderer of its certain existence, by not bindering it, under

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certain circumstances, and his being the proper Actor or Author of it, by a positive Agency or Efficiency. And this, notwithstanding what Dr. Whitby offers about a faying of philosophers, that caufa deficiens, in rebus necessariis, ad causam per se efficientem reducenda est. As there is a vast difference between the fun's being the caufe of the lightfomnels and warmth of the atmosphere, and brightness of gold and diamonds, by its prefence and positive influence; and its being the occasion of darkness and frost, in the night, by its motion, whereby it defcends below the horizon. The motion of the fun is the occafion of the latter kind of events; but it is not the proper caufe, efficient or producer of them; though they are neceffarily confequent on that motion, under such circumstances: no more is any action of the Divine Being the Caufe of the Evil of men's wills. If the fun were the proper caule of cold and darkness, it would be the fountain of these things, as it is the fountain of light and heat: and then fomething might be argued from the nature of cold and darkness, to a likenefs of nature in the fun; and it might be justly inferred, that the fun itself is dark and cold, and that his beams are black and frofty. But from its being the caufe no otherwife than by its departure, no fuch thing can be inferred, but the contrary; it may justly be argued, that the fun is a bright and hot body, if cold and darknefs are found to be the confequence of its withdrawment; and the more constantly and neceffarily these effects are connected with, and confined to its absence, the more strongly does it argue the fun to be the fountain of light and heat. So, inafmuch as Sin, is not the Fruit of any pofitive Agency or influence of the Most High, but, on the contrary, arifes from the withholding of his

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action and energy, and, under certain circumstances, necessarily follows on the want of his influence; this is no argument that he is finful, or his operation evil, or has any thing of the nature of Evil; but, on the contrary, that He, and his Agency, are altogether good and holy, and that He is the fountain of all Holinefs. It would be strange arguing, indeed, because men never commit Sin, but only when God leaves them to themfelves, and neceffarily fin, when he does fo, and therefore their Sin is not from themfelves but from God; and fo, that God must be a sinful Being; as strange as it would be to argue, because it is always dark when the fun is gone, and never dark when the fun is prefent, that therefore all darkness is from the fun, and that his disk and beams must needs be black.

IV. It properly belongs to the Supreme and Abfolute Governor of the univerfe, to order all important events within his dominion, by his wifdom: but the events in the moral world are of the most important kind, such as the moral actions of intelligent creatures, and their confequences.

These events will be ordered by fomething. They will either be disposed by wisdom, or they will be disposed by chance; that is, they will be disposed by blind and undesigning causes, if that were possible, and could be called a disposal. Is it not better, that the good and evil which happens in God's world, should be ordered, regulated, bounded and determined by the good pleafure of an infinitely wise Being, who perfectly comprehends within his understanding and conftant view, the universality of things, in all their extent and duration, and fees all the influ-

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ence of every event, with respect to every individual thing and circumstance, throughout the grand fystem, and the whole of the eternal series of confequences; than to leave these things to fall out by chance, and to be determined by those caufes which have no understanding or aim? Doubtless, in these important events, there is a better and a worfe, as to the time, fubject, place, manner and circumstances of their coming to pass, with regard to their influence on the state and course of things. And if there be, it is certainly best that they should be determined to that time, place, &c. which is best. And therefore it is in its own nature fit, that wifdom, and not chance, should order these things. So that it belongs to the Being, who is the poffeffor of infinite Wildom, and is the Creator and Owner of the whole fystem of created existences, and has the care of all; I fay, it belongs to him, to take care of this matter; and he would not do what is proper for him, if he fhould neglect it. And it is fo far from being unholy in him, to undertake this affair, that it would rather have been unholy to neglect it; as it would have been a neglecting what fitly appertains to him; and fo it would have been a very unfit and unfuitable

Therefore the fovereignty of God doubtlefs extends to this matter: especially confidering, that if it should be supposed to be otherwise, and God should leave men's volitions, and all moral events, to the determination and disposition of blind unmeaning causes, or they should be left to happen perfectly without a cause; this would be no more consistent with liberty, in any notion of it, and particularly not in the Arminian notion of it, than if these events were supposed to

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neglect.

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the difpofal of Divine Providence, and the will of man were determined by circumftances which are ordered and difpofed by Divine wildom; as appears by what has been already obferved. But it is evident, that fuch a providential difpofing and determining men's moral actions, though it infers a moral neceffity of those actions, yet it does not in the least infringe the real liberty of mankind; the only liberty that common fense teaches to be neceffary to moral agency, which, as has been demonstrated, is not inconfistent with fuch neceffity.

On the whole, it is manifest, that God may be, in the manner which has been defcribed, the Orderer and Difpofer of that event, which, in the inherent fubject and agent, is moral Evil; and yet His fo doing may be no moral Evil. He may will the difpofal of fuch an event, and its coming to pass for good ends, and his will not be an immoral or finful will, but a perfect holy will. and he may actually, in his Providence, fo difpofe and permit things, that the event may be certainly and infallibly connected with fuch disposal and permission, and his act therein not be an immoral or unholy, but a perfectly holy act. Sin may be an evil thing, and yet that there fhould be fuch a difpofal and permiffion, as that it fhould come to pass, may be a good thing. This is no contradiction, or inconfiftence. Joseph's brethren's felling him into Egypt, confider it only as it was acted by them, and with respect to their views and aims which were evil, was a very bad thing; but it was a good thing, as it was an event of God's ordering, and confidered with refpect to his views and aims which were good. Gen. l. 20. As for you, ye thought Evil against me; but God meant it unto Good. So the crucifixion of

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Chrift, if we confider only those things which belong to the event as it proceeded from his murderers, and are comprehended within the compass of the affair confidered as their act, their principles, dispositions, views and aims; fo it was one of the most heinous things that ever was done; in many respects the most horrid of all acts: but confider it, as it was willed and ordered of God, in the extent of his defigns and views, it was the most admirable and glorious of all events; and God's willing the event was the most holy volition of God, that ever was made known to men; and God's act in ordering it, was a divine act, which, above all others, manifests the moral excellency of the Divine Being.

The confideration of these things may help us to a fufficient answer to the cavils of Arminians, concerning what has been fuppofed by many Calvinists, of a distinction between a secret and revealed Will of God, and their diversity one from the other; fupposing that the Calvini/ts herein afcribe inconfistent Wills to the Most High: which is without any foundation. God's fecret and revealed Will, or, in other words, his difpofing and perceptive Will may be diverse, and exercised in diffimilar acts, the one in disapproving and oppofing, the other in willing and determining, without any inconfistence. Because, although these diffimilar exercifes of the Divine Will may, in fome refpects, relate to the fame things, yet, in strictness, they have different and contrary objects, the one evil and the other good. Thus, for inftance, the crucifixion of Chrift was a thing contrary to the revealed or perceptive Will of God; becaufe, as it was viewed and done by his malignant murderers, it was a thing infinitely contrary to the holy Nature of God, and fo neceffarily contrary to the

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holy inclination of his heart revealed in his law: Yet this does not at all hinder but that the crucifixion of Chrift, confidered with all those glorious tonfequences, which were within the view of the Divine Omniscience, might be indeed, and therefore might appear to God to be, a glorious event; and confequently be agreeable to his will, though this Will may be fecret, i. e. not revealed in God's law. And thus confidered, the crucifixion of Christ was not evil but good. If the fecret exercifes of God's Will were of a kind that is diffimilar and contrary to his revealed Will, refpect-, ing the fame, or like objects; if the objects of both were good, or both evil; then, indeed, to ascribe contrary kinds of volition or inclination to God, refpecting these objects, would be to afcribe an inconfistent Will to God: but to ascribe to him different and oppofite exercises of heart. respecting different objects, and objects contrary one to another, is fo far from fuppofing God's Will to be inconfistent with itfelf, that it cannot be fuppofed confistent with itfelf any other way. For any Being to have a Will of choice refpecting good, and, at the fame time, a Will of rejection and refusal respecting evil, is to be very confistent: but the contrary, viz. to have the fame Will towards these contrary objects, and to chuse and love both good and evil, at the fame time, is to be very inconfiftent.

There is no inconfiftence in fuppoling, that God may hate a thing as it is in itlelf, and confidered fimply as evil, and yet that it may be his Will it fhould come to pafs, confidering all confequences. I believe, there is no perfon of good understanding, who will venture to fay, he is certain that it is impossible it fhould be best, taking in the whole compass and extent of existence.

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and all confequences in the endless feries of events, that there fhould be fuch a thing as moral evil in the world. 1 And, if fo, it will certainly

[†] Here are worthy to be obferved fome paffages of a late noted writer, of our nation, that no body who is acquainted with him, will fufpect to be very favourable to *Calvinifm*. ⁶ It is difficult (fays he) to handle the *neceffity of evil* in fuch ⁶ a manner, as not to flumble fuch as are not above being ⁶ alarmed at propositions which have an uncommon found. ⁶ But if philosophers will but reflect calmly ou the matter, ⁶ they will find, that confistently with the unlimited power ⁶ of the Supreme Caide, it may be faid, that in the beft or-⁶ dered fyftem, *evil*: mult have place.²—Turnbull's PRIN-CIPLES of moral Philosophy p. 327, 328. He is there fpeaking of moral evils, as may be feen.

Again the fame Author, in his fecond Vol. entitled Chrifian Philosophy, p. 35. has these words: 'If the Author and 'Governor of all things be infinitely perfect, then whatever 'is, is right; of all possible systems he hath chosen the best: 'and, consequently, there is no absolute evil in the universe..... 'This being the case, all the seeming impersections or evils in it are such only in a partial view; and, with respect to the whole 'fystem, they are goods.'

Ibid. p. 37. 'Whence then comes evil, is the queffion that ' hath, in all ages, been reckoned the Gordian knot in philo-· fophy. And, indeed, if we own the existence of evil in the " world in an abfolute fense, we diametrically contradict what • hath been just now proved of God. For if there be any · evil in the fystem, that is not good with respect to the whole, . then is the whole not good, but evil: or, at best, very im-• perfect: and an Author must be as his workmanship is; as • is the effect, fuch is the caufe. But the folution of this · difficulty is at hand; That there is no evil in the univerfe-"What! Are there no pains, no imperfections? Is there no ' mifery, no vice in the world? or are not these evils? Evils · indeed they are; that is, those of one fort are hurtful, and • those of the other fort are equally hurtful, and abominable: • but they are not evil or mischievous with respect to the < whole.'

Ibid. p. 42. But He is, at the fame time, faid to create evil, darknefs, confufion; and yet to do no evil, but to be the Author of good only. He is called the Father of Lights, the Author of every perfett and good gift, with whom there is no variablenefs nor fbadow of turning, who tempteth per

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follow, that an infinitely wife Being, who always chufes what is best, must chufe that there should be fuch a thing. And, if fo, then fuch a choice is not an evil, but a wife and holy choice. And if fo, then that Providence which is agreeable to fuch a choice, is a wife and holy Providence. Men do will fin as fin, and fo are the authors and actors of it: they love it as fin, and for evil ends and purpofes. God does not will fin as fin, or for the fake of any thing evil; though it be his pleasure fo to order things, that, He permitting, fin will come to pass; for the fake of the great good that by his difpofal shall be the confequence. His willing to order things fo that evil should come to pass, for the fake of the contrary good, is no argument that He does not hate evil, as evil: and if fo, then it is no reafon why he may not reafonably forbid evil as evil, and punish it as such.

The Arminians themfelves must be obliged, whether they will or no, to allow a diffinction of God's Will, amounting to just the fame thing that Calvinifts intend by their diffinction of a fecret and revealed Will. They must allow a diffinction of those things which God thinks best should be, confidering all circumstances and confequences, and sate agreeable to his disposing Will, and those things which he loves, and are agreeable to his

• man, but giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not. And • yet, by the prophet Ifaias, He is introduced faying of • Himfelf, I form light, and create darknefs; I make peace, and • create evil: I the Lord, do all thefe things. What is the • meaning, the plain language of all this, but that the Lord • delighteth in goodnefs, and (as the Scripture fpeaks) evil • is his ftrange work? He intends and purfues the univerfal • good of his creation: and the evil which happens, is not • permitted for its own fake, or through any pleafure in evil, • but becaufe it is requisite to the greater good purfued. nature, in themfelves confidered. Who is there that will dare to fay, that the hellifh pride, malice and cruelty of devils, are agreeable to God, and what He likes and approves? And yet, I truft, there is no Chriftian divine but what will allow, that it is agreeable to God's Will fo to order and difpofe things concerning them, fo to leave them to themfelves, and give them up to their own wickednefs, that this perfect wickednefs fhould be a neceffary confequence. Befure Dr. Whitby's words do plainly fuppofe and allow it. §

These following things may be laid down as maxims of plain truth, and indisputable evidence.

1. That God is a *perfectly happy* Being, in the most absolute and highest fense possible.

2. That it will follow from hence, that God is free from every thing that is contrary to happines; and fo, that in strict propriety of speech, there is no such thing as any pain, grief, or trouble, in God.

3. When any intelligent being is really croffed and difappointed, and things are contrary to what he truly defires, he is the *lefs*, *pleafed* or has *lefs pleafure*, his *pleafure* and *happinefs* is *diminifhed*, and he fuffers what is difagreeable to him, or is the fubject of fomething that is of a nature contrary to joy and happinefs, even pain and grief. †

6 Whitby on the five Points, Edit. 2. 300, 305, 309.

+ Certainfy it is not lefs abfurd and unreafonable, to talk of God's Will and Defires being truly and properly croffed, without his fuffering any uneafinefs, or any thing grievous or difagreeable, than it is to talk of fomething that may be called a revealed Will, which may, in fome refpect, be different from a *fecret* purpofe; which purpofe may be fulfilled, when the other is oppofed.

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From this laft axiom, it follows, that if no diffinction is to be admitted between God's hatred of fin, and his Will with respect to the event. and the existence of fin, as the all-wife Determiner of all events, under the view of all confequences through the whole compass and feries of things; I fay, then it certainly follows, that the coming to pass of every individual act of fin is truly, all things confidered, contrary to his Will, and that his Will is really croffed in it; and this in proportion as He hates it. And as God's hatred of fin is infinite, by reason of the infinite contrariety of his Holy Nature to fin; fo his Will is infinitely croffed, in every act of fin that happens. Which is as much as to fay, He endures that which is infinitely difagreeable to Him, by means of every act of fin that He fees committed. And, therefore, as appears by the preceding politions, He endures truly and really, infinite grief or pain from every fin. And fo He must be infinitely croffed, and fuffer infinite pain, every day, in millions of millions of instances: He must continually be the fubject of an immense number of real, and truly infinitely great croffes and vexations. Which would be to make him infinitely the most miserable of all Beings,

If any objector fhould fay; all that thefe things amount to, is, that God may do evil that good may come; which is juftly effected immoral and finful in men; and therefore may be juftly effected inconfiftent with the moral perfections of God. I anfwer, that for God to difpofe and permit evil, in the manner that has been fpoken of, is not to do evil that good may come; for it is not to do evil at all.—In order to a thing's being morally evil, there muft be one of thefe things belonging to it: either it muft be a thing B b 3

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unfit and unsuitable in its own nature; or it must have a bad tendency; or it must proceed from an evil disposition, and be done for an evil end. But neither of these things can be attributed to God's ordering and permitting fuch events, as the immoral acts of creatures, for good ends. (1.) It is not unfit in its own nature, that He should do fo. For it is in its own nature fit, that infinite wildom. and not blind chance, fhould difpofe moral good and evil in the world. And it is fit, that the Being who has infinite wildom, and is the Maker, Owner, and Supreme Governor of the World, fhould take care of that matter. And, therefore, there is no unfitnefs, or unfuitablenefs in his doing it. It may be unfit, and fo immoral, for any other beings to go about to order this affair; becaule they are not possessed of a wildom, that in any manner fits them for it; and, in other refpects, they are not fit to be trufted with this affair; nor does it belong to them, they not being the owners and lords of the universe.

We need not be afraid to affirm, that if a wife and good man knew with abfolute certainty, it would be beft, all things confidered, that there fhould be fuch a thing as moral evil in the world, it would not be contrary to his wifdom and goodnefs, for him to chufe that it fhould be It is no evil defire, to defire good, and to fo. defire that which, all things confidered, is beft. And it is no unwife choice, to chufe that that fhould be, which it is best should be; and to chuse the existence of that thing concerning which this is known, viz. that it is best it should be, and so is known in the whole to be most worthy to be On the contrary, it would be a plain chofen. defect in wifdom and goodnefs, for him not to chufe it. And the reason why he might not erSect. IX.

der it, if he were able, would not be becaufe he might not defire it, but only the ordering of that matter does not belong to him. But it is no harm for Him who is, by right, and in the greatest propriety, the Supreme Orderer of all things, to order every thing in fuch a manner, as it would , be a point of wildom in Him to chule that they fhould be ordered. If it would be a plain defect of wifdom and goodnefs in a Being, not to chufe that that should be, which He certainly knows it would, all things confidered, be best should be (as was but now observed) then it must be impoffible for a Being who has no defect of wifdom and goodnefs, to do otherwife than chufe it should be; and that, for this very reason, because He is perfectly wife and good. And if it be agreeable to perfect wildom and goodness for him to chuse that it should be, and the ordering of all things fupremely and perfectly belongs to him, it must be agreeable to infinite wifdom and goodnefs, to order that it should be. If the choice is good, the ordering and disposing things according to that choice must also be good. It can be no harm in one to whom it belongs to do his Will in the armies of heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the earth, to execute a good volition. If this Will be good, and the object of his Will be, all things confidered, good and beft, then the chufing or willing it is not willing evil that good may come. And if fo, then his ordering, according to that Will, is not doing evil, that good may come.

2. It is not of a *bad tendency*, for the Supreme Being thus to order and permit that moral evil to be, which it is beft fhould come to pafs. For that it is of good tendency, is the very thing fuppofed in the point now in queftion.—Chrift's crucifixion, though a most horrid fact in them that $\mathbf{B} \cdot \mathbf{b} \ \mathbf{4}$

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3. Nor is there any need of fuppoing, it proceeds from any evil difposition or aim: for by the fupposition, what is aimed at is good, and good is the actual iffue, in the final refult of things.

SECTION X.

Concerning Sin's first Entrance into the World.

THE things, which have already been offered, may ferve to obviate or clear many of the objections which might be raifed concerning Sin's first coming into the world; as though it would follow from the doctrine maintained. that God must be the Author of the first Sin, through his fo disposing things, that it should neceffarily follow from his permission, that the finful act should be committed, &c. I need not, therefore, shand to repeat what has been faid already, about such a neceffity's not proving God to be the Author of Sin, in any ill fense, or in any such fense as to infringe any liberty of man, concerned in his moral agency, or capacity of blame, guilt and punishment.

But, if it should nevertheless be faid, supposing the case so, that God, when he had made man, might so order his circumstances, that from these circumstances, together with his withholding further affistance and Divine Influence, his Sin would infallibly follow, why might not God as well have first made man with a fixed prevailing principle of Sin in his heart?

I answer, 1. It was meet, if Sin did come into existence, and appear in the world, it should arise from the imperfection which properly belongs to a creature, as fuch, and fhould appear fo to do, that it might appear not to be from God as the efficient or fountain. But this could not have been, if man had been made at first with Sin in his heart; nor unlefs the abiding principle and habit of Sin were first introduced by an evil act of the creature. If Sin had not arole from the imperfection of the creature, it would not have . been fo visible, that it did not arise from God, as the politive caule, and real fource of it.-But it would require room that cannot be here allowed. fully to confider all the difficulties which have been started, concerning the first Entrance of Sin into the world.

And therefore,

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2. I would observe, that objections against the doctrine that has been laid down, in opposition to the Arminian notion of liberty, from thefe difficulties, are altogether impertinent; because no additional difficulty is incurred, by adhering to a scheme in this manner differing from theirs, and none would be removed or avoided, by agree, ing with, and maintaining theirs. Nothing that the Arminians fay, about the contingence, or felfdetermining power of man's will, can ferve to explain, with lefs difficulty, how the first finful volition of mankind could take place, and man be justly charged with the blame of it. To fay, the will was felf-determined, or determined by free choice, in that finful volition; which is to fay, that the first finful volition was determined by a foregoing finful volition; is no folution of the difficulty. It is an odd way of folving difficulties, to advance greater, in order to it. To fay, two and

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two makes nine; or, that a child begat his father, folves no difficulty: no more does it, to fay, the first finful act of choice was before the first finful act of choice, and chofe and determined it, and brought it to pass. Nor is it any better folution, to fay, the first finful volition chofe, determined and produced itfelf; which is to fay, it was before it was. Nor will it go any further towards helping us over the difficulty, to fay, the first finful volition arole accidentally, without any caufe at all; any more than it will folve that difficult question, How the world could be made out of nothing? to fay, it came into being out of nothing, without any caufe; as has been already observed. And if we should allow that that could be, that the first evil volition should arife by perfect accident, without any caufe; it would relieve no difficulty, about God's laying the blame of it to man. For how was man to blame for perfect accident, which had no caufe, and which, therefore, he (to be fure) was not the caufe of, any more than if it came by fome external cause?-Such kind of solutions are no better, than if fome perfon, going about to folve fome of the strange mathematical paradoxes, about infinitely great and fmall quantities; as, that fome infinitely great quantities are infinitely greater than fome other infinitely great quantities; and alfo that fome infinitely fmall quantities, are infinitely lefs than others, which yet are infinitely little; in order to a folution, fhould fay, that mankind have been under a mistake, in fuppofing a greater quantity to exceed a fmaller; and that a hundred, multiplied by ten, makes but a fingle unit.

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SECTION XI.

Of a fuppofed Inconfiftence of thefe Principles with GOD's moral Character.

THE things which have been already obferved, may be fufficient to answer most of the objections, and filence the great exclamations of Arminians against the Calvinists, from the supposed inconfistence of Calvinistic principles with the moral perfections of God, as exercifed in his government of mankind. The confiftence of fuch a doctrine of neceffity as has been maintained, with the fitnels and reafonablenels of God's commands, promifes and threatenings, rewards and punifhments, has been particularly confidered: the cavils of our opponents, as though our doctrine of necessity made God the author of fin, have been answered; and also their objection against these principles, as inconfistent with God's fincerity, in his counfels, invitations and perfuafions, has been already obviated, in what has been observed, respecting the confistence of what Calvinists suppose, concerning the fecret and revealed will of God; by that it appears, there is no repugnance in fuppofing it may be the fecret will of God, that his ordination and permifion of events fhould be fuch, that it shall be a certain confequence, that a thing never will come to pass; which yet it is man's duty to do, and fo God's perceptive will, that he should do; and this is the fame thing as to fay, God may fincerely command and require him to do it. And if he may be fincere in commanding him, he may, for the fame reafon, be fincere in counfelling, inviting and using perfuasions with him to do it. Counfels

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and invitations are manifestations of God's perceptive will, or of what God loves and what is in itself, and as man's act, agreeable to his heart; and not of his disposing will, and what he chuses as a part of his own infinite scheme of things. It has been particularly shewn, Part III. Sect. IV. that such a necessity as has been maintained, is not inconsistent with the propriety and fitness of divine commands; and for the same reason, not inconfistent with the fineerity and invitations and counfels, in the Corollary at the end of that Section. Yea, it hath been shewn, Part III. Sect. VII. Corol. 1. that this objection of Arminians, concerning the fincerity and use of divine exhortations, invitations and counfels, is demonstrably against themselves.

Notwithstanding, I would further observe, that the difficulty of reconciling the fincerity of counfels, invitations and perfuafions with fuch an antecedent known fixedness of all events, as has been supposed, is not peculiar to this scheme, as distinguished from that of the generality of Arminians, which acknowledge the abfolute foreknowledge of God: and therefore, it would be unreasonably brought as an objection against my differing from them. The main feeming difficulty in the cafe is this: that God, in counfelling, inviting and perfuading, makes a fhew of aiming at, feeking and using endeavours for the thing exhorted and perfuaded to; whereas, it is impoffible for any intelligent being truly to feek, or use endeavours for a thing, which he at the fame time knows, most perfectly, will not come to pafs; and that it is abfurd to fuppofe, he makes the obtaining of a thing his end, in his calls and counfels, which he, at the fame time, infallibly knows will not be obtained by these means,

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Now. if God knows this, in the utmost certainty and perfection, the way by which he comes by this knowledge makes no difference. If he knows it is by the necessity which he fees in things, or by fome other means; it alters not the cafe. But it is in effect allowed by Arminians themfelves, that God's inviting and perfuading men to do things, which he, at the fame time, certainly knows will not be done, is no evidence of infincerity; becaufe they allow, that God has a certain foreknowledge of all men's finfut actions and omiffions. And as this is thus implicity allowed by most Arminians, fo all that pretend to own the Scriptures to be the word of God, muft be conftrained to allow it .--- God commanded and counfelled Pharaoh to let his people go, and ufed arguments and perfuasions to induce him to it; he laid before him arguments taken from his infinite Greatness and almighty Power, (Exod vii. 16.) and forewarned him of the fatal confequentces of his refufal, from time to time; (chap. viii. 1, 2, 20, 21. chap. ix. 1,-5. 13,-17. and x. 3, 6,) He commanded Mofes, and the elders of Ifrael, to go and befeech Pharaoh to let the people go; and at the fame time told them, he knew furely that he would not comply to it. Exod. iii. 18, 19. And thou shalt come, thou and the elders of Ifrael, unto the king of Egypt, and you fall fay unto him; the Lord God of the Hebrews hath met with us; and now let us go, we befeech thee, three days journey into the wilderness, that we may facrifice unto the Lord our God: and, I am fure, that the king of Egypt will not let you go. So our Bleffed. Saviour, the evening wherein he was betrayed, knew that Peter would fhamefully deny him, before the morning; for he declares it to him with affeverations, to fhew the certainty of it; and tells the disciples, that all of them should be of-

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Part IV.

fended because of him that night; Matthew xxvi. 31,-35. John xiii. 38. Luke xxii. 31,-34. John xvi. 32. And yet it was their duty to avoid these things: they were very finful things, which God had forbidden, and which it was their duty to watch and pray against; and they were obliged to do fo from the counfels and perfuasions Christ used with them, at that very time, fo to do; Matthew xxvi. 41. Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation. So that whatever difficulty there can be in this matter, it can be no objection against any principles which have been maintained in opposition to the principles of Arminians; nor does it any more concern me to remove the difficulty, than it does them, or indeed all, that call themfelves Christians, and acknowledge the divine authority of the Scriptures .--- Ne-verthelefs, this matter may poffibly (God allowing) be more particularly and largely confidered, in some future discourse, on the doctrine of predestination.

But I would here observe, that however the defenders of that notion of liberty of will, which I have opposed, exclaim against the doctrine of Calvinifts, as tending to bring men into doubts concerning the moral perfections of God; it is their scheme, and not the scheme of Calvinists, that indeed is justly chargeable with this. For it is one of the most fundamental points of their scheme of things, that a freedom of will, confifting in felf-determination, without all neceffity, is effential to moral agency. This is the fame thing as to fay, that fuch a determination of the will, without all neceffity, must be in all intelligent beings, in those things, wherein they are moral agents, or in their moral acts: and from this it will follow, that God's will is not necef-

Sect. XI. from God's moral Character.

farily determined, in any thing he does, as a moral agent, or in any of his acts that are of a moral nature: So that in all things, wherein he acts bolily, justly, and truly, he does not act necessarily; or his will is not neceffarily determined, to act holily and justly; becaufe, if it were neceffarily determined, he would not be a moral agent in thus acting: his will would be attended with neceffity; which, they fay, is inconfistent with moral agency: "He can act no otherwife; He is at no liberty " in the affair; He is determined by unavoid-" able invincible neceffity: therefore fuch agen-"cy is no moral agency; yea, no agency at " all, properly speaking: A necessary agent is " no agent: He being passive, and subject to " neceffity, what he does is no act of his, but " an effect of a neceffity prior to any act of " his." This is agreeable to their manner of arguing. Now then, what is become of all our proof of the moral perfections of God? How can we prove, that God certainly will, in any one instance, do that which is just and holy; feeing his will is determined in the matter by no neceffity? We have no other way of proving that any thing certainly will be, but only by the neceffity of the event. Where we can fee no neceffity but that the thing may be, or may not be, there we are unavoidably left at a lofs. We have no other way properly and truly to demonstrate the moral perfections of God, but the way that Mr. Chubb proves them, in p. 252, 261, 252, 263. of his Tracts, viz. that God must necessarily perfectly know, what is most worthy and valuable in . itfelf, which, in the nature of things, is best and fittest to be done. And, as this is most eligible in itfelf, He, being omniscient, must see it to be for and being both omniscient and felf-fufficient, cannot have any temptation to reject it; and fo must

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384 Of Arminian Arguments, &c. Part IV. neceffarily will that which is best. And thus, by this neceffity of the determination of God's will to what is good and best, we demonstrably establish God's moral character.

Corol. From things which have been observed. it appears, that most of the arguments from Scripture, which Arminians make use of to fupport their scheme, are no other than begging the que/tion. For in these their arguments, they determine in the first place, that without fuch a freedom of will as they hold, men cannot be proper moral agents, nor the fubjects of command; counfel, perfuation, invitation, promifes, threatenings, expostulations, rewards and punishments; and that without fuch freedom it is to no purpose for men to take any care, or use any diligence, endeavours or means, in order to their avoiding fin, or becoming holy, escaping punishment or obtaining happines: and having supposed these things, which are grand things in question in the debate, then they heap up Scriptures, containing commands, counfels, calls, warnings, perfuasions, expoltulations, promifes, and threatenings; (as doubtless they may find enough fuch; the Bible is confeffedly full of them, from the beginning to the end) and then they glory, how full the Scripture is on their fide, how many more texts there are that evidently favour their fcheme, than fuch as feem to favour the contrary. But let them first make manifest the things in question, which they suppose and take for granted, and shew them to be confiftent with themfelves; and produce clear evidence of their truth; and they have gained their point, as all will confess, without bringing one Scripture. For none denies, that there are commands, counfels, promises, threatenings, &c. in the Bible. But unless they do these things.

Sect. XII. Whether thefe Principles, &c. 385 their multiplying fuch texts of Scripture is infignificant and vain.

It may further be observed, that such Scriptures, as they bring, are really against them, and not for them. As it has been demonstrated, that it is their scheme, and not ours, that is inconsistent with the use of motives and persuasives, or any moral means whatsoever, to induce men to the practice of virtue, or abstaining from wickedness: their principles, and not ours, are repugnant to moral agency, and inconsistent with moral government, with law or precept, with the nature of virtue or vice, reward or punishment, and with every thing whatsoever of a moral nature, either on the part of the moral governor, or in the state, actions or conduct of the subject.

SECTION XII.

Of a fuppofed Tendency of these Principles to Atheifm and Licentioulness.

IF any object againft what has been maintained, that it tends to Atheifm; I know not on what grounds fuch an objection can be raifed, unlefs it be, that fome Atheifts have held a doctrine of neceffity which they fuppofe to be like this. But if it be fo, I am perfuaded the Arminians would not look upon it juft, that their notion of freedom and contingence fhould be charged with a tendency to all the errors that ever any embraced, who have held fuch opinions. The Stoick philofophers, whom the Calvinifts are charged with agreeing with, were no Atheifts, but the greateft Theifts and neareft a-kin to Chriftians in their

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Whether thefe Principles Part IV.

opinions concerning the unity and the perfections of the Godhead, of all the heathen philosophers. And Epicurus, that chief father of Atheism, maintained no such doctrine of necessity, but was the greatest maintainer of contingence.

The doctrine of neceffity, which fuppoles a neceffary connection of all events, on fome antecedent ground and reafon of their existence, is the only medium we have to prove the being of God. And the contrary doctrine of contingence, even as maintained by Arminians (which certainly implies or infers, that events may come into existence, or begin to be, without dependence on any thing foregoing, as their caufe, ground or reason) takes away all proof of the being of God; which proof is fummarily expressed by the apostle, in Rom. i. 20. And this is a tendency to Atheifm with a witnefs. So that, indeed, it is the doctrine of Arminians, and not of the Calvinist, that is justly charged with a tendency to Atheifm; it being built on a foundation that is the utter fubversion of every demonstrative argument for the proof of a Deity; as has been shown. Part II. Sect. III.

And whereas it has often been faid, that the *Calviniftic* doctrine of neceffity faps the foundations of all religion and virtue, and tends to the greateft Licentiousness of practice: this objection is built on the pretence, that our doctrine renders vain all means and endeavours, in order to be virtuous and religious. Which pretence has been already particularly confidered in the 5th *Section* of this *Part*; where it has been demonftrated, that this doctrine has no fuch tendency; but that fuch a tendency is truly to be charged on the contrary doctrine: inafmuch as the no-

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Sect. XII.

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tion of contingence, which their doctrine implies, in its certain confequences, overthrows all connection in every degree, between endeavour and event, means and end.

And befides, if many other things, which have been observed to belong to the Arminian doctrine, or to be plain confequences of it, be confidered, there will appear just reason to suppose that, it is that which must rather tend to Licentiousnels. Their doctrine excufes all evil inclinations, which men find to be natural; becaufe in fuch inclinations, they are not felf-determined, as fuch inclinations are not owing to any choice or determination of their own wills. Which leads men wholly to justify themselves in all their wicked actions, fo far as natural inclination has had a hand in determining their wills, to the commiffion of them. Yea, thefe notions, which fuppofe moral neceffity and inability to be inconfiftent with blame or moral obligation, will directly lead men to justify the vilest acts and practices, from the ftrength of their wicked inclinations of all forts; ftrong inclinations inducing a moral neceffity; yea, to excufe every degree of evil inclination, fo far as this has evidently prevailed, and been the thing which has determined their wills: becaufe, fo far as antecedent inclination determined the will, fo far the will was without liberty of indifference and felf-determination. Which, at laft, will come to this, that men will justify themselves in all the wickedness they commit. It has been observed already, that this fcheme of things does exceedingly diminish the guilt of fin, and the difference between the greateft and fmalleft offences; * and if it be purfued in its real confequences, it leaves room * Part III. Sect. VI.

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for no fuch thing, as either virtue or vice, blame or praife in the world. + And then again, how naturally does this notion of the fovereign felfdetermining power of the will, in all things, virtuous or vicious, and whatfoever deferves, either reward or punifhment, tend to encourage men to put off the work of religion and virtue, and turning from fin to God; it being that which they have a fovereign power to determine themfelves to, juft when they pleafe; or if not, they are wholly excufable in going on in fin, becaufe of their inability to do any other.

If it fhould be faid, that the tendency of this doctrine of neceffity, to Licentiousness, appears by the improvement many at this day actually make of it, to justify themselves in their diffolute courfes; I will not deny that fome men do unreasonably abuse this doctrine, as they do many other things, which are true and excellent in their own nature: but I deny that this proves, the doctrine itself has any tendency to Licentiouf-I think, the tendency of doctrines, by nefs. what now appears in the world, and in our nation in particular, may much more justly be argued, from the general effect which has been feen, to attend the prevailing of the principles of Arminians, and the contrary principles; as both have had their turn of general prevalence in our nation. If it be indeed, as is pretended, that Calvinistic doctrines undermine the very foundation of all religion and morality, and enervate and difannul all rational motives to holy and virtuous practice; and that the contrary doctrines give the inducements to virtue and goodnefs

† Part III. Sect. VI. Ibid. Sect. VII. Part IV. Sect. I. Part III. Sect. III. Corol. 1. after the first Head.

Sect. XII. tend to Licentioufnefs.

their proper force, and exhibit religion in a rational light, tending to recommend it to the reafon of mankind, and enforce it in a manner that is agreeable to their natural notions of things: I fay, if it be thus, it is remarkable, that virtue and religious practice should prevail most, when the former doctrines, fo inconfistent with it, prevailed almost universally: and that ever fince the latter doctrines, fo happily agreeing with it, and of fo proper and excellent a tendency to promote it, have been gradually prevailing, vice, prophanenels, luxury and wickednels of all forts, and contempt of all religion, and of every kind of feriousness and strictness of conversation, should proportionably prevail; and that thefe things fhould thus accompany one another, and rife and prevail one with another, now for a whole age together. It is remarkable, that this happy remedy (difcovered by the free enquiries, and fuperior fenfe and wildom of this age) against the pernicious effects of Calvini/m, fo inconfistent with religion, and tending fo much to banish all virtue from the earth, fhould, on fo long a trial, be attended with no good effect; but that the confequence should be the reverse of amendment; that in proportion as the remedy takes place, and is thoroughly applied, fo the difease should prevail; and the very fame difmal effect take place, to the highest degree, which Calvini/tic doctrines are fupposed to have fo great a tendency to; even the banishing of religion and virtue, and the prevailing of unbounded Licentiousness of manners. If thefe things are truly fo, they are very remarkable, and matter of very curious speculation.

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Of Metaphysical

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SECTION XIII.

Concerning that Objection against the reasoning, by which the Calvinistic doctrine is supported, that it is metaphysical and abstruse.

T has often been objected against the defenders of *Calviniftic* principles, that in their reasonings, they run into nice scholastic distinctions, and abstrufe metaphysical subtilities, and set these in opposition to common sense. And it is possible, that, after the former manner, it may be alledged against the reasoning by which I have endeavoured to confute the *Arminian* scheme of liberty and moral agency, that it is very abstracted and metaphysical.—Concerning this, I would observe the following things.

I. If that be made an objection against the foregoing Reafoning, that it is metaphyfical, or may properly be reduced to the fcience of metaphyficks, it is a very impertinent objection; whether it be fo or no, is not worthy of any dispute or controverfy. If the Reafoning be good, it is as frivolous to enquire what fcience it is properly reduced to, as what language it is delivered in: and for a man to go about to confute the arguments of his opponent, by telling him, his arguments are metaphysical, would be as weak as to tell him, his arguments could not be fubstantial, because they were written in French or Latin. The question is not, whether what is faid be metaphyficks, phyficks, logick, or mathematicks, Latin, French, Englifh, or Mohawk? But whether the Reafoning be good, and the arguments truly conclusive? The foregoing arguments are

Sect. XIII. and abstruse Reasoning.

no more metaphysical, than those which we use against the Papists, to disprove their doctrine of transubstantiation; alledging, it is inconfistent with the notion of corporeal identity, that it should be in ten thousand places at the fame time. is by metaphyfical arguments only we are able to prove, that the rational foul is not corporeal; that lead or fand cannot think; that thoughts are not fquare or round, or do not weigh a pound. The arguments by which we prove the being of God, if handled clofely and distinctly, fo as to shew their clear and demonstrative evidence, must be metaphysically treated. It is by metaphyficks only, that we can demonstrate, that God is not limited to a place, or is not mutable: that he is not ignorant, or forgetful; that it is impossible for him to lie, or be unjust; and that there is one God only, and not hundreds or And, indeed, we have no ftrict dethousands. monstration of any thing, excepting mathematical truths, but by metaphyficks. We can have no proof, that is properly demonstrative, of any one proposition, relating to the being and nature of God, his creation of the world, the dependence of all things on him, the nature of bodies or fpirits, the nature of our own fouls, or any of the great truths of morality and natural religion, but what is metaphyfical. I am willing, my arguments should be brought to the test of the strictest and justest Reason, and that a clear, distinct and determinate meaning of the terms I use, fhould be infifted on; but let not the whole be rejected, as if all were confuted, by fixing on it the epithet, metaphy fical.

II. If the reafoning, which has been made ufe of, be in fome fenfe metaphyfical, it will not fol-C c 4

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low, that therefore it must needs be abstrufe, unintelligible, and a-kin to the jargon of the fchools. I humbly conceive, the foregoing reafoning, at least to those things which are most material belonging to it, depends on no abstruse definitions or diffinctions, or terms without a meaning, or of very ambiguous and undetermined fignification, or any points of fuch abstraction and fubtilty, as tends to involve the attentive underftanding in clouds and darknefs. There is no high degree of refinement and abstrufe fpeculation, in determining, that a thing is not before it is, and fo cannot be the caufe of itfelf; or that the first act of free choice, has not another act of free choice going before that, to excite or direct it; or in determining, that no choice is made, while the mind remains in a state of absolute indifference; that preference and equilibrium never co-exist; and that therefore no choice is made in a state of liberty, confisting in indifference: and that fo far as the will is determined by motives. exhibited and operating previous to the act of the will, fo far it is not determined by the act of the will itfelf; that nothing can begin to be, which before was not, without a cause, or fome antecedent ground or reafon, why it then begins to be; that effects depend on their caufes, and are connected with them; that virtue is not the worfe, nor fin the better, for the strength of inclination with which it is practifed, and the difficulty which thence arifes of doing otherwife; that when it is already infallibly known, that the thing will be, it is not a thing contingent whether it will ever be or no; or that it can be truly faid, notwithstanding, that it is not necessary it fhould be, but it either may be, or may not be. And the like might be observed of many other

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If any shall still stand to it, that the foregoing Reasoning is nothing but metaphysical sophistry; and that it must be fo, that the seeming force of the arguments all depends on fome fallacy and wile that is hid in the obfcurity, which always attends a great degree of metaphyfical abstraction and refinement; and shall be ready to fay, " Here is indeed fomething that tends to con-" " found the mind, but not to fatisfy it: for who " can ever be truly fatisfied in it, that men are " fitly blamed or commended, punished or re-" warded for those volitions which are not from " themfelves, and of whofe existence they are " not the causes. Men may refine, as much as " they pleafe, and advance their abstract no-" tions, and make out a thousand seeming con-" tradictions, to puzzle our understandings; yet " there can be no fatisfaction in fuch doctrine as " this: the natural fense of the mind of man " will always refift it."" I humbly conceive, that fuch an objector, if he has capacity and hu-

* A certain noted Author of the prefent age fays, the arguments for neceffity are nothing but quibbling, or logomacby, using words without a meaning, or begging the question.—I do not know what kind of neceffity any authors, he may have reference to, are advocates for; or whether they have managed their arguments well, or ill. As to the arguments I have made use of, if they are quibbles they may be shewn fo: such knots are capable of being untied, and the trick and cheat may be detected and plainly laid open. If this be fairly done, with respect to the grounds and reasons I have relied upon, I shall have just occasion, for the future, to be filent, if not to be assumed of my argumentations. I am willing my proofs should be thoroughly examined; and if there be nothing but begging the question, or mere logomacby, or dispute of words, let it be made manifest, and shewn how the feeming fitrength

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mility and calmnefs of fpirit, fufficient impartially and thoroughly to examine himfelf, will find that he knows not really what he would be at; and indeed, his difficulty is nothing but a mere prejudice, from an inadvertent cultomary use of words, in a meaning that is not clearly understant the state of the sta

of the argument depends on my using words without a meaning, or arifes from the ambiguity of terms, or my making use of words in an indeterminate and unsteady manner; and that the weight of my reasons reft mainly on such a foundation: and then, I shall either be ready to retract what I have urged, and thank the man that has done the kind part, or shall be justly exposed for my obstinacy.

The fame Author is abundant in appealing, in this affair, from what he calls logomachy and fophiftry, to experience .--A perfon can experience only what paffes in his own mind. But yet, as we may well fuppofe, that all men have the fame human faculties; fo a man may well argue from his own experience to that of others, in things that flew the nature of those faculties, and the manner of their operation. But then one has as good right to alledge his experience, as another. As to my own experience, I find, that in innumerable things I can do as I will; that the motions of my body, in many refpects, inftantaneoufly follow the acts of my will concerning those motions; and that my will has fome command of my thoughts; and that the acts of my will are my own, i. e. that they are acts of my will, the volitions of my own mind; or, in other words, that what I will, I will. Which, I prefume, is the fum of what others experience in this affair. But as to finding by experience, that my will is originally determined by itfelf; or that, my will first chusing what volition there shall be, the chosen volition accordingly follows: and that this is the first rife of the determination of my will in any affair; or that any volition rifes in my mind contingently; I declare, I know nothing in myfelf, by experience, of this nature; and nothing that ever I experienced, carries the leaft appearance or fhadow of any fuch thing, or gives me any more reason to suppose or suspect any fuch thing, than to suppose that my volitions existed twenty years before they existed. It is true, I find myself possessed of my volitions, before I can fee the effectual power of any caufe to produce them (for the power and efficacy of the caule is not feen but

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objector reflect again, if he has candor and patience enough, and does not fcorn to be at the trouble of close attention in the affair.-He would have a man's volition be from himself. Let it be from bimfelf, most primarily and originally of any way conceivable; that is, from his own choice: how will that help the matter, as to his being justly blamed or praised, unless that choice itself be blame or praife-worthy? And how is the choice itself (an ill choice, for instance) blame-worthy, according to these principles, unless that be from himself too, in the same manner; that is, from his own choice? But the original and first-determining choice in the affair is not from his choice: his choice is not the caufe of it. ——And if it be from himfelf fome other way, and not from his choice, furely that will not help the matter: If it be not from himfelf of choice, then it is not from himfelf voluntarily; and if fo, he is furely no more to blame, than if it were not from himfelf at all. It is a vanity, to pretend it is a fufficient answer to this, to fay, that it is nothing but metaphyfical refinement and fubtility, and fo attended with obscurity and uncertainty.

If it be the natural fense of our minds, that what is blame-worthy in a man must be from himself, then it doubtles is also, that it must be from something *bad* in himself, a *bad choice*, or *bad disposition*. But then our natural fense is, that this bad choice or disposition is evil *in itfelf*, and

but by the effect) and this, for ought I know, may make fome imagine, that volition has no caule, or that it produces itfelf. But I have no more reafon from hence to determine any fuch thing, than I have to determine that I gave myfelf my own being, or that I came into being accidentally without a caule, becaule 1 first found myfelf poffessed of being, before I had knowledge of a caule of my being.

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the man blame-worthy for it, on its own account, without taking into our notion of its blameworthinefs, another bad choice, or disposition going before this, from whence this arifes: for that is a ridiculous abfurdity, running us into an immediate contradiction, which our natural fenfe of blame-worthinefs has nothing to do with, and never comes into the mind, nor is fuppofed in the judgment we naturally make of the affair. As was demonstrated before, natural fense does not place the moral evil of volitions and dispositions in the caufe of them, but the nature of them. An evil thing's being FROM a man, or from fomething antecedent in him, is not effential to the original notion we have of blame-worthines: but it is its being the choice of the heart; as appears by this, that if a thing be from us, and not from our choice, it has not the nature of blame-worthinefs or ill-defert, according to our natural fenfe. When a thing is from a man, in that fense, that it is from his will or choice, he is to blame for it, becaufe his will is IN IT: fo far as the will is in it, blame is in it, and no further. Neither do we go any further in our notion of blame, to enquire whether the bad will be FROM a bad will: there is no confideration of the original of that bad will; because, according to our natural apprehension, blame originally confists in it. Therefore a thing's being from a man, is a fecondary confideration, in the notion of blame or ill-defert. Becaufe those things, in our external actions, are most properly faid to be from us, which are from our choice; and no other external actions, but those that are from us in this fense, have the nature of blame; and they indeed, not fo properly becaufe they are from us, as becaufe we are in them, i. e. our wills are in them; not fo much because they are from

Sect. XIII. A Fault of Arminian Writers. 397 fome property of ours, as because they are our properties.

However, all these external actions being truly from us, as their cause; and we being so used, in ordinary speech, and in the common affairs of life, to speak of men's actions and conduct that we see, and that affect human society, as deferving ill or well, as worthy of blame or praise; hence it is come to pass, that philosophers have incautiously taken all their measures of good and evil, praise and blame, from the dictates of common sense, about these overt acts of men; to the running of every thing into the most lamentable and dreadful confusion. And, therefore, I observe,

III. It is fo far from being true (whatever may be pretended) that the proof of the doctrine which has been maintained, depends on certain abstruse, unintelligible, metaphysical terms and notions; and that the Arminian fcheme, without needing fuch clouds and darknefs for its defence, is supported by the plain dictates of common fense; that the very reverse is most certainly true, and that to a great degree. It is fact, that they, and not we, have confounded things with metaphyfical, unintelligible notions and phrases, and have drawn them from the light of plain truth, into the grofs darknefs of abstrufe metaphysical propositions, and words without a meaning. Their pretended demonstrations depend very much on fuch unintelligible, metaphyfical phrases, as felf-determination, and sovereignty of the will; and the metaphysical fense they put on fuch terms, as necessity, contingency, action, agency, &c. quite diverse from their mean. ing as used in common speech; and which, as

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they use them, are without any confistent meaning, or any manner of diffinct confistent ideas; as far from it as any of the abstrufe terms and perplexed phrafes of the peripatetick philofophers, or the most unintelligible jargon of the schools, or the cant of the wildest fanaticks. Yea, we may be bold to fay, these metaphysical terms, on which they build fo much, are what they use without knowing what they mean themfelves; they are pure metaphyfical founds, without any ideas whatfoever in their minds to anfwer them; inafmuch as it has been demonstrated, that there cannot be any notion in the mind confistent with these expressions, as they pretend to explain them; becaufe their explanations deftroy themfelves. No fuch notions as imply felfcontradiction, and felf-abolition, and this a great many ways, can fubfift in the mind; as there. can be no idea of a whole which is lefs than any of its parts, or of folid extension without dimensions, or of an effect which is before its caufe.————Arminians improve thefe terms, as terms of art, and in their metaphyfical meaning, to advance and establish those things which are contrary to common fenfe, in a high degree. Thus, instead of the plain vulgar notion of liberty, which all mankind, in every part of the face of the earth, and in all ages, have; confifting in opportunity to do as one pleafes; they have introduced a new strange liberty, confifting in indifference. contingence, and felf-determination; by which they involve themfelves and others in great obscurity, and manifold gross inconfistence. So, instead of placing virtue and vice, as common fenfe places them very much, in fixed bias and inclination, and greater virtue and vice in stronger and more established inclination; thefe, through their refinings and abstrufe

Sect. XIII. Arminians too Metaphyfical. 399 notions, fuppofe a liberty confifting in indifference, to be effential to all virtue and vice. So they have reafoned themfelves, not by metaphyfical diftinctions, but metaphyfical confusion, into many principles about moral agency, blame, praife, reward and punifhment, which are, as has been fhewn, exceeding contrary to the common fenfe of mankind; and perhaps to their own fenfe, which governs them in common life.

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CONCLUSION.

HETHER the things which have been alledged, are liable to any tolerable anfwer in the ways of calm, intelligible and strict reafoning, I must leave others to judge: but I am fensible they are liable to one fort of answer. It is not unlikely, that fome, who value themfelves on the fuppofed rational and generous principles of the modern fashionable divinity, will have their indignation and difdain raifed at the fight of this discourse, and on perceiving what things are pretended to be proved in it. And if they think it worthy of being read, or of fo much notice as to fay much about it, they may probably renew the ufual exclamations, with additional vehemence and contempt, about the fate of the heathen, Hobbes's Necessity, and making men mere machines; accumulating the terrible epithets of fatal, unfrustrable, inevitable, irresistible, &c. and it may be, with the addition of *horrid* and *bla*[phemous; and perhaps much skill may be used to fet forth things, which have been faid, in colours which shall be shocking to the imaginations, and moving to the paffions of those, who have either too little capacity, or too much confidence of the



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opinions they have imbibed, and contempt of the contrary, to try the matter by any ferious and circumfpect examination. * Or difficulties may be ftarted and infifted on, which do not belong to the controverfy; becaufe, let them be more or lefs real, and hard to be refolved, they are not what are owing to any thing diffinguishing of this fcheme from that of the Arminians, and would not be removed nor diminished by renouncing the former, and adhering to the latter. Or fome particular things may be picked out, which they may think will found harshest in the ears of the generality; and these may be gloffed and defcanted on, with tart and contemptuous words; and from thence, the whole treated with triumph and infult.

It is eafy to fee, how the decision of most of the points in controversy, between *Calvinis* and *Ar*minians, depends on the determination of this grand article concerning the Freedom of the Will requisite to moral agency; and that by clearing and esta-

* A writer, of the prefent age, whom I have feveral times had occafion to mention, fpeaks once and again of those who hold the doctrine of Necessity, as scarcely worthy of the name of philosophers.----I do not know, whether he has refpect to any particular notion of neceffity, that fome may have maintained; and, if fo, what doctrine of necessity it is that he means.-----Whether I am worthy of the name of a philosopher, or not, would be a queftion little to the prefent purpofe. If any, and ever fo many, should deny it, I should not think it worth the while to enter into a difpute on that queftion: though at the fame time I might expect, fome better answer should be given to the arguments brought for the truth of the doctrine I maintain; and I might further reafonably defire, that it might be confidered, whether it does not become those, who are truly worthy of the name of philofophers, to be fenfible, that there is a difference between argument and contempt; yea, and a difference between the contemptibleneis of the perfon that argues, and the inconclutivenels of the arguments he offers.

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blifting the Calvinistic doctrine in this point, the chief arguments are obviated, by which Arminian doctrines in general are fupported, and the contrary doctrines demonstratively confirmed. Hereby it becomes manifest, that God's moral government over mankind, his treating them as moral agents, making them the objects of his commands, counfels, calls, warnings, expostulations, promifes, threatenings, rewards and punifhments, is not inconfistent with a determining disposal of all events, of every kind, throughout the univerfe, in his Providence; either by positive efficiency, or permiffion. Indeed, fuch an universal determining Providence, infers fome kind of neceffity of all events, fuch a neceffity as implies an infallible previous fixedness of the futurity of the event: but no other necessity of moral events, or volitions of intelligent agents, is needful in order to this, than moral neceffity; which does as much afcertain the futurity of the event, as any other neceffity. But, as has been demonftrated, fuch a neceffity is not at all repugnant to moral agency, and a reafonable use of commands, calls, rewards, punifhments, &c. Yea. not only are objections of this kind against the doctrine of an universal determining Providence, removed by what has been faid; but the truth of fuch a doctrine is demonstrated. As it has been demonstrated, that the futurity of all future events is established by previous necessity, either natural or moral; fo it is manifest, that the fovereign Creator and Difpofer of the world has ordered this neceffity, by ordering his own conduct, either in defignedly acting, or forbearing to act. For, as the being of the world is from God, fo the circumstances in which it had its being at first, both negative and positive, must be ordered by him, in one of these ways; and all the neces-

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fary confequences of these circumstances, must be ordered by him. And God's active and pofitive interpolitions, after the world was created. and the confequences of these interpolitions; also every inftance of his forbearing to interpole, and the fure confequences of this forbearance, must all be determined according to his pleafure. And therefore every event, which is the confequence of any thing whatfoever, or that is connected with any foregoing thing or circumstance, either positive or negative, as the ground or reason of its existence, must be ordered of God; either by a defigning efficiency and interpolition, or a defigned forbearing to operate or interpole. But as has been proved, all events whatfoever are neceffarily connected with fomething foregoing, either positive or negative, which is the ground of its existence. It follows, therefore, that the whole feries of events is thus connected with fomething in the ftate of things, either positive or negative, which is original in the feries; i. e. fomething which is connected with nothing preceding that, but God's own immediate conduct, either his acting or forbearing to act. From whence it follows, that as God defignedly orders his own conduct, and its connected confequences, it must necessarily be, that he defignedly orders all things.

The things, which have been faid, obviate fome of the chief objections of Arminians against the Galviniftic doctrine of the total depravity and corruption of man's nature, whereby his heart is wholly under the power of fin, and he is utterly unable, without the interposition of fovereign grace, favingly to love God, believe in Christ, or do any thing that is truly good and acceptable in God's fight. For the main objection against this doctrine is, that it is inconfishent with the D d 2 freedom of man's will, confifting in indifference and felf-determining power; becaufe it fuppofes man to be under a neceffity of finning, and that God requires things of him, in order to his avoiding eternal damnation, which he is unable to do; and that this doctrine is wholly inconfistent with the fincerity of counfels, invitations, &c. Now, this doctrine fuppofes no other necessity of finning, than a moral neceffity; which, as has been shewn, does not at all excufe fin; and fuppofes no other inability to obey any command, or perform any duty, even the most spiritual and exalted, but a moral inability, which, as has been proved, does not excuse perfons in the non-performance of any good thing, or make them not to be the proper objects of commands, counfels and invitations. And, moreover, it has been shewn, that there is not, and never can be, either in existence, or so much as in idea, any fuch freedom of will, confifting in indifference and felf-determination, for the fake of which, this doctrine of original fin is caft out; and that no fuch freedom is neceffary, in order to the nature of fin, and a just defert of punishment.

The things, which have been obferved, do also take off the main objections of Arminians against the doctrine of efficacious grace; and, at the fame time, prove the grace of God in a finner's conversion (if there be any grace or divine influence in the affair) to be efficacious, yea, and irrefiftible too, if by irrefistible is meant, that which is attended with a moral neceflity, which it is impoffible should ever be violated by any refistance. The main objection of Arminians against this doctrine is, that it is inconfistent with their felf-determining freedom of will; and that it is repugnant to the nature of virtue, that it should be

wrought in the heart by the determining efficacy and power of another, inftead of its being owing to a felf-moving power; that, in that cafe, the good which is wrought, would not be our virtue, but rather God's virtue; becaufe it is not the perfon in whom it is wrought, that is the determining.author of it, but God that wrought it in him. But the things, which are the foundation of thefe objections, have been confidered; and it has been demonstrated, that the liberty of moral agents does not confift in felf-determining power; and that there is no need of any fuch liberty, in order to the nature of virtue; nor does it at all hinder, but that the flate or act of the will may be the virtue of the fubject, though it be not from felfdetermination, but the determination of an intrinfic caufe; even fo as to caufe the event to be morally neceffary to the fubject of it. And as it has been proved, that nothing in the state or acts of the will of man is contingent; but that, on the contrary, every event of this kind is neceffary, by a moral neceffity; and has alfo been now demonstrated, that the doctrine of an univerfal determining Providence, follows from that doctrine of neceffity, which was proved before: and fo, that God does decifively, in his Providence, order all the volitions of moral agents, either by positive influence or permission: and it being allowed, on all hands, that what God does in the affair of man's virtuous volitions, whether it be more or lefs, is by fome positive influence, and not by mere permiffion, as in the affair of a finful volition; if we put these things together, it will follow, that God's affiftance or influence, must be determining and decifive, or must be attended with a moral necessity of the event; and fo, that God gives virtue, holinefs and conversion to finners, by an influence which Dd3

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The things, which have been faid, do likewife answer the chief objections against the doctrine of God's universal and absolute decree, and afford infallible proof of this doctrine; and of the doctrine of absolute, eternal, personal election in particular. The main objections against these doctrines are, that they infer a necessity of the volitions of moral agents, and of the future moral state and acts of men; and fo are not confistent with those eternal rewards and punishments, which are connected with conversion and impenitence; nor can be made to agree with the reafonablenefs and fincerity of the precepts, calls, counfels, warnings and expostulations of the Word of God; or with the various methods and means of grace, which God uses with finners, to bring them to repentance; and the whole of that moral government, which God exercises towards mankind: and that they infer an inconfistence between the fecret and revealed Will of God; and make God the author of fin. But all thefe things have been obviated in the preceding difcourfe, And the certain truth of these doctrines, concerning God's eternal purposes, will follow from what was just now observed concerning God's univerfal Providence; how it infallibly follows from what has been proved, that God orders all events; and the volitions of moral agents amongst others, by fuch a decifive difpofal, that the events are infallibly connected with his difpofal. For if God disposes all events, fo that the infallible existence of the events is decided by his Providence, then he, doubtlefs, thus orders and decides things know-

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ingly, and on defign. God does not do what he does, nor order what he orders accidentally and unawares; either without, or beside his intention. And if there be a foregoing *defign* of doing and ordering as he does, this is the fame with a purpose or decree. And as it has been fhewn, that nothing is new to God, in any respect, but all things are perfectly and equally in his view from eternity; hence it will follow, that his defigns or purposes are not things formed anew, founded on any new views or appearances, but are all eternal purpofes. And as it has been now fhewn, how the doctrine of determining efficacious grace certainly follows from things proved in the foregoing difcourfe; hence will neceffarily follow the doctrine of particular, eternal, absolute election, For if men are made true faints, no otherwife than as God makes them fo, and diffinguishes them from others, by an efficacious power and influence of his, that decides and fixes the event: and God thus makes fome faints, and not others, on defign or purpofe, and (as has been now obferved) no defigns of God are new; it follows, that God thus diffinguished from others, all that ever become true faints, by his eternal defign or decree. I might also shew, how God's certain foreknowledge must suppose an absolute decree, and how fuch a decree can be proved to a demonstration from it: but that this difcourfe may not be lengthened out too much, that must be omitted for the prefent.

From thefe things it will inevitably follow, that however Chrift in fome fenfe may be faid to *die for all*, and to redeem all vifible Chriftians, yea, the whole world by his death; yet there must be fomething *particular* in the defign of his death, with refpect to fuch as he intended fhould actu-D d A

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ally be faved thereby. As appears by what has been now shewn, God has the actual falvation or redemption of a certain number in his proper abfolute defign, and of a certain number only; and therefore fuch a defign only can be profecuted in any thing God does, in order to the falvation of men. God purfues a proper defign of the falvation of the elect in giving Chrift to die, and profecutes fuch a defign with refpect to no other, most strictly speaking; for it is impossible, that God fhould profecute any other defign than only fuch as he has: he certainly does not, in the highest propriety and strictness of speech, pursue a defign that he has not.-And, indeed, fuch a particularity and limitation of redemption will as infallibly follow, from the doctrine of God's foreknowledge, as from that of the decree. For it is as impossible, in strictness of speech, that God should profecute a defign, or aim at a thing, which He at the fame time most perfectly knows will not be accomplifhed, as that he fhould use endeavours for that which is befide his decree.

By the things which have been proved, are obviated fome of the main objections against the doctrine of the infallible and neceffary *perfeverance* of faints, and fome of the main foundations of this doctrine are established. The main prejudices of Arminians against this doctrine feem to be thefe; they suppose such a neceffary, infallible perfeverance to be repugnant to the freedom of the will; that it muss be owing to man's own felf-determining power, that he *first becomes* virtuous and holy; and fo, in like manner, it muss be left a thing contingent, to be determined by the fame freedom of will, whether he will *perfevere* in virtue and holines; and that otherwise his continuing stedfass in faith and obedience would

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not be his virtue, or at all praise-worthy and rewardable; nor could his perfeverance be properly the matter of divine commands, counfels and promifes, nor his apoftacy be properly threatened, and men warned against it. Whereas, we find all these things in Scripture: there we find stedfastnefs and perfeverance in true Christianity, reprefented as the virtue of the faints, fpoken of as praife-worthy in them, and glorious rewards promifed to it; and alfo find, that God makes it the fubject of his commands, counfels and promifes; and the contrary, of threatenings and warnings. But the foundation of these objections has been removed, in its being fhewn that moral neceffity and infallible certainty of events is not inconfiftent with these things; and that, as to freedom of will lying in the power of the will to determine itfelf, there neither is any fuch thing, nor need of any of it, in order to virtue, reward, commands, counfels, &c.

And as the doctrines of efficacious grace and absolute election do certainly follow from things, which have been proved in the preceding difcourfe; fo fome of the main foundations of the doctrine of perfeverance, are thereby established. If the beginning of true faith and holinefs, and a man's becoming a true faint at first, does not depend on the felf-determining power of the will, but on the determining efficacious grace of God; it may well be argued, that it is also with respect to men's being continued faints, or perfevering in faith and holinefs. The conversion of a finner being not owing to a man's felf-determination, but to God's determination, and eternal election, which is abfolute, and depending on the fovereign will of God; and not on the free will of man; as is evident from what has been faid: and it being very evident from the Scrip-

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tures, that the eternal election which there is of faints to faith and holinefs, is alfo an election of them to eternal falvation: hence their appointment to falvation must alfo be abfolute, and not depending on their contingent, felf-determining will. From all which it follows, that it is abfolutely fixed in God's decree, that all true faints fhall perfevere to actual eternal falvation.

But I must leave all these things to the confideration of the fair and impartial reader; and when he has maturely weighed them, I would propofe it to his confideration, whether many of the first reformers, and others that fucceeded them, whom God in their day made the chief pillars of his church, and greatest instruments of their deliverance from error and darknefs, and of the fupport of the caufe of piety among them, have not been injured, in the contempt with which they have been treated by many late writers, for their teaching and maintaining fuch doctrines as are commonly called Calviniftic. Indeed, fome of thefe new writers, at the fame time that they have reprefented the doctrines of these antient and eminent divines, as in the highest degree ridiculous, and contrary to common fenfe, in an oftentation of a very generous charity, have allowed that they were honeft well-meaning men: yea, it may be fome of them, as though it were in great condefcention and compation to them, have allowed, that they did pretty well for the day which they lived in, and confidering the great difadvantages they laboured under: when, at the fame time, their manner of fpeaking has naturally and plainly fuggested to the minds of their readers, that they were perfons, who through the lownefs of their genius, and greatnefs of the bigotry, with which their minds were shackled,

and thoughts confined, living in the gloomy caves of fuperstition, fondly embraced, and demurely and zealoufly taught the most abfurd, filly and monstrous opinions, worthy of the greatest contempt of gentlemen possessed of that noble and generous freedom of thought, which happily prevails in this age of light and enquiry. When, indeed, fuch is the cafe, that we might, if fo difposed, speak as big words as they, and on far better grounds. And really all the Arminians on earth might be challenged without arrogance or vanity, to make these principles of theirs, wherein they mainly differ from their fathers, whom they fo much despife, confistent with common fense; yea, and perhaps to produce any doctrine ever embraced by the blindeft bigot of the Church of Rome, or the most ignorant Musfulman, or extravagant enthusiast, that might be reduced to more demonstrable inconfistencies, and repugnancies to common fense, and to themselves; though their inconfistencies indeed may not lie fo deep, or be fo artfully vailed by a deceitful ambiguity of words, and an indeterminate fignification of phrases.---I will not deny, that these gentlemen, many of them, are men of great abilities, and have been helped to higher attainments in philosophy, than those antient divines, and have done great fervice to the Church of God in fome refpects: but I humbly conceive, that their differing from their fathers, with fuch magisterial affurance, in these points in divinity, must be owing to fome other caufe than fuperior wifdom.

It may also be worthy of confideration, whether the great alteration, which has been made in the flate of things in our nation, and fome other parts of the Protestant world, in this and the past age, by the exploding fo generally *Cal*-

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vini/tic doctrines, that is fo often fpoken of as worthy to be greatly rejoiced in by the friends of truth, learning and virtue, as an inftance of the great increafe of light in the Christian Church; I fay, it may be worthy to be confidered, whether this be indeed a happy change, owing to any fuch cause as an increase of true knowledge and understanding in things of religion; or whether there is not reason to fear, that it may be owing to fome worfe cause.

And I defire it may be confidered, whether the boldness of some writers may not be worthy to be reflected on, who have not fcrupled to fay, that if these and those things are true (which yet appear to be the demonstrable dictates of reason, as well as the certain dictates of the mouth of the Most High) then God is unjust and cruel, and guilty of manifest deceit and double dealing, and the like. Yea, fome have gone fo far, as confidently to affert, that if any book which pretends to be Scripture, teaches f ch doctrines, that alone is fufficient warrant for mankind to reject it, as what cannot be the Word of God. Some, who have not gone fo far, have faid, that if the Scripture feems to teach any fuch doctrines, fo contrary to reafon, we are obliged to find out fome other interpretation of those texts, where fuch doctrines feem to be exhibited. Others express themfelves yet more modeftly: they express a tenderness and religious fear, left they should receive and teach any thing that fhould feem to reflect on God's moral character, or be a difparagement to his methods of administration, in his moral government; and therefore express themfelves as not daring to embrace fome doctrines, though they feem to be delivered in Scripture, according to the more obvious and natural

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conftruction of the words. But indeed it would fhew a truer modefty and humility, if they would more entirely rely on God's wifdom and difcerning, who knows infinitely better than we, what is agreeable to his own perfections, and never intended to leave thefe matters to the decifion of the wifdom and decerning of men; but by his own unerring infruction, to determine for us what the truth is; knowing how little our judgment is to be depended on, and how extremely proné, vain and blind men are, to err in fuch matters.

The truth of the cafe is, that if the Scripture plainly taught the oppofite doctrines, to those that are fo much stumbled at, viz. the Arminian doctrine of free-will, and others depending thereon, it would be the greatest of all difficulties that attend the Scriptures, incomparably greater than its containing any, even the most mysterious of those doctrines of the first reformers, which our late free-thinkers have fo fupercilioufly exploded.-Indeed, it is a glorious argument of the divinity of the holy Scriptures, that they teach fuch doctrines, which in one age and another, through the blindness of men's minds, and strong prejudices of their hearts, are rejected, as most abfurd and unreasonable, by the wife and great men of the world; which yet, when they are most carefully and strictly examined, appear to be exactly agreeable to the most demonstrable, certain, and natural dictates of reafon. By fuch things it appears, that the foolishness of God is wifer than men, and God does as is faid in 1 Cor. i. 19, 20. For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wife; I will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent. Where is the wife! Where is the scribe! Where is the disputer of this world! Hath not God made foolifh the wildom of this world? And as it

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used to be in time pash, so it is probable it will be in time to come, as it is there written, in ver. 27, 28, 29. But God bath chosen the foolish things of the world, to confound the wise: and God bath chosen the weak things of the world, to confound the things that are mighty: and base things of the world, and things which are despised, bath God chosen: yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that are; that no flesh should glory in his presence. Amen. ТНЕ

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REMARKS

ON THE

ESSAYS on the PRINCIPLES of MORALITY and NATURAL RELIGION,

In a LETTER to a Minister of the Church of Scotland:

By the Rev. Mr. JONATHAN EDWARDS, Prefident of the College of New JERSEY, and Author of the late ENQUIRY into the MODERN NOTIONS of the FREEDOM of WILL.

Rev. SIR,

THE intimations you have given me of the ufe which has, by fome, been made of what I have written on the Freedom of the Will, &c. to vindicate what is faid on the fubject of liberty and neceffity, by the Author of the Effays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, has occafioned my reading this Author's Effay on that fubject, with particular care and attention. And I think it must be evident to every one, that has read both his Effay and my Inquiry, that our fchemes are exceeding reverfe from each other. The wide difference appears particularly in the following things.

This author supposes, that fuch a necessity takes place with respect to all men's actions, as is inconfissent with liberty*, and plainly denies that men have any liberty in acting. Thus in p. 168. after he had been speaking of the necessity of our deter-

* P. 160, 161, 164, 165, and many other places.

minations, as connected with motives, he concludes with faying, "In fhort, if motives are not under our power or direction, which is confeffedly the fact, we can at bottom have——NO LIBERTY." Whereas, I have abundantly expressed it as my mind, that man, in his moral actions, has true liberty; and that the moral necessity, which univerfally takes place, is not in the least inconfistent with any thing that is properly called liberty, and with the utmost liberty that can be defired, or that can possibly exist or be conceived of 1.

I find that fome are apt to think, that in that kind of moral neceffity of men's volitions, which I fuppofe to be universal, at least fome degree of liberty is denied; that though it be true I allow a fort of liberty, yet those who maintain a felf-determining power in the will, and a liberty of contingence and indifference, hold an higher fort of freedom than I do: but I think this is certainly a great mistake.

Liberty, as I have explained it, in p. 38. and other places, is the power, opportunity, or advantage that any one has to do as he pleafes, or conducting, IN ANY RESPECT, according to his pleasure; without confidering how his pleafure comes to be as it is. It is demonstrable, and, I think, has been demonstrated, that no neceffity of men's volitions that I maintain, is inconfistent with this liberty: and I think it is impossible for any one to rife higher in his conceptions of liberty than this: If any imagine they defire higher, and that they conceive of a higher and greater liberty than this, they are deceived, and delude themfelves with confused ambiguous words, instead of ideas. If any one should here fay, "Yes, I conceive of a freedom above and beyond the liberty a man has of conducting in

‡ Inquiry, P. 38-43, 186, 187, 278-288, 300, 307, 326-335.

any refpect as he pleafes, viz. a liberty of chufing as he pleafes. "Such an one, if he reflected, would either blush or laugh at his own instance. For, is not chufing as he pleafes, conducting, IN SOME RESPECT, according to his pleafure, and ftill without determining how he came by that pleafure? If he fays, "Yes, I came by that pleafure by my own choice." If he be a man of common fense, by this time he will fee his own abfurdity: for he must needs fee that his notion or conception, even of this liberty, does not contain any judgment or conception how he comes by that choice, which first determines his pleasure, or which originally fixed his own will refpecting the affair. Or if any shall fay, " That a man exercises liberty in this, even in determining his own choice, but not as he pleafes, or not in confequence of any choice, preference, or inclination of his own, but by a determination arifing contingently out of a state of absolute indifference;" this is not rifing higher in his conception of liberty: as fuch a determination of the will would not be a voluntary determination of it. Surely he that places liberty in a power of doing fomething not according to his own choice, or from his choice, has not a higher notion of it, than he that places it in doing as he pleafes, or acting from his own election. If there were a power in the mind to determine itfelf, but not by its choice or according to its pleafure, what advantage would it give? and what liberty, worth contending for, would be exercifed in it? Therefore no Arminian, Pelagian, or Epicurean, can rife higher in his conceptions of liberty, than the notion of it which I have explained: which notion is apparently, perfectly confiftent with the whole of that neceffity of men's actions, which I fuppose takes place. And I foruple not to fay, it is beyond all their wits to invent a higher notion, or

form a higher imagination of liberty; let them talk of fovereignty of the will, felf-determining power, felf-motion, felf-direction, arbitrary decifion, liberty ad utrumvis, power of chufing differently in given cafes, &c. &c. as long as they will. It is apparent that thefe men, in their ftrenuous affirmation, and difpute about thefe things, aim at they know not what, fighting for fomething they have no conception of, fubflituting a number of confufed unmeaning words, inftead of things, and inftead of thoughts. They may be challenged clearly to explain what they would have: they never can anfwer the challenge.

The Author of the Effays, through his whole Effay on Liberty and Neceffity, goes on that fupposition, that, in order to the being of real liberty, a man must have a freedom that is opposed to moral neceffity: and yet he fuppofes, p. 175, that fuch a liberty must signify a power in the mind of acting without and against motives, a power of acting without any view, purpose, or design, and even of acting in contradiction to our own defires and averfions, and to all our principles of action; and is an abfurdity altogether inconfistent with a rational na-Now, who ever imagined fuch a liberty as ture. this, a higher fort or degree of freedom, than a liberty of following one's own views and purpofes, and acting agreeable to his own inclinations and paffions? Who will ever reafonably fuppofe that liberty, which is an abfurdity altogether inconfiftent with a rational nature, to be a kind of liberty above that which is confiftent with the nature of a rational, intelligent, defigning agent.

The Author of the *Effays* feems to fuppofe fuch a neceffity to take place, as is inconfiftent with fome fuppofable POWER OF ARBITRARY CHOICE*; or that there is fome liberty conceivable, whereby * P. 169.

men's own actions might be more PROPERLY IN THEIR POWER +, and by which events might be more dependent on ourselves ;; contrary to what I suppose to be evident in my Inquiry |. What way can be imagined, of our actions being more in our power, from ourselves, or dependent on our/elves, than their being from our power to fulfil our own choice, to act from our own inclination, purfue our own views, and execute our own defigns? Certainly, to be able to act thus, is as properly having our actions in our power, and dependent on ourfelves, as a being liable to be the fubjects of acts and events, contingently and fortuitoufly, without defire, view, purpose or design, or any principle of action within ourfelves; as we must be, according to this Author's own declared fenfe, if our actions are performed with that liberty that is oppofed to moral neceffity.

This Author feems every where to fuppofe, that neceffity, most properly fo called, attends all men's actions; and that the terms neceffary, unavoidable. impossible, &c. are equally applicable to the cafe of moral and natural necessity. In p. 173, he fays, The idea of neceffary and unavoidable equally agrees, both to moral and physical necessity. And in p. 184, All things that fall out in the natural and moral world are alike neceffary. P. 174, This inclination and choice is unavoidably caufed or occasioned by the prevailing motive. In this lies the necessity of our actions, that, in fuch circumstances, it was impossible we could act otherwife. He often expresses him. felf in like manner elfewhere, fpeaking in ftrong terms of men's actions as unavoidable, what they cannot forbear, having no power over their own actions, the order of them being unalterably fixed, and inseparably linked together, &c. §

On the contrary, I have largely declared, that the connection between antecedent things and confequent ones, which takes place with regard to the acts of men's wills, which is called moral neceffity, is called by the name of necessity improperly; and that all fuch terms as must, cannot, impossible, unable, irresistible, unavoidable, invincible, &c. when applied here, are not applied in their proper fignification, and are either used nonfenfically, and with perfect infignificance, or in a fense quite diverse from their original and proper meaning, and their ufe in common fpeech +: and, that fuch a neceffity as attends the acts of men's wills, is more properly called certainty, than necessity; it being no other than the certain connection between the fubject and predicate of the proposition which affirms their existence t.

Agreeable to what is observed in my Inquiry \P , I think it is evidently owing to a strong prejudice in perfons minds, arifing from an infenfible habitual perversion and misapplication of fuch-like terms, as necessary, impossible, unable, unavoidable, invincible, &c. that they are ready to think, that to fuppose a certain connection of men's volitions, without any foregoing motives or inclinations, or any preceding moral influence whatfoever, is truly and properly to suppose such a strong irrefragable chain of caufes and effects, as stands in the way of, and makes utterly vain, opposite defires and endeavours, like immovable and impenetrable mountains of brass; and impedes our liberty like walls of adamant, gates of brass, and bars of iron: whereas, all fuch reprefentations fuggest ideas as far from the truth, as the East is from the Welt.

+ Inquiry, P. 18-28, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 232, 289-293, 296, 304-308, 397, 398. ‡ Inquiry, P. 22-24. P. 289,-293. ľ

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Nothing that I maintain, fuppofes that men are at all hindered by any fatal necessity, from doing, and even willing and chufing as they pleafe, with full freedom; yea with the highest degree of liberty that ever was thought of, or that ever could poffibly enter into the heart of any man to conceive. I know it is in vain to endeavour to make fome perfons believe this, or at least fully and steadily to believe it: for if it be demonstrated to them, ftill the old prejudice remains, which has been long fixed by the use of the terms necessary, must, cannot, impossible, &c. the affociation with thefe terms of certain ideas, inconfiftent with liberty, is not broken; and the judgment is powerfully warped by it; as a thing that has been long bent and grown stiff, if it be straitened, will return to its former curvity again and again.

The Author of the Effays most manifestly suppofes that if men had the truth concerning the real neceffity of all their actions clearly in view, they would not appear to themfelves, or one another, as at all praife-worthy or culpable, or under any moral obligation, or accountable for their actions+: which supposes, that men are not to be blamed or. praifed for any of their actions, and are not under any obligations, nor are truly accountable for any thing they do, by reafon of this necessity; which is very contrary to what I have endeavoured to prove, throughout the third part of my Inquiry. I humbly conceive it is there fhewn, that this is fo far from the truth, that the moral neceffity of men's actions, which truly take place, is requisite to the being of virtue and vice, or any thing praife-worthy or culpable: that the liberty of indifference and contingence, which is advanced in opposition to that neceffity, is inconfistent with the being of

+ P. 207, 209, and other places

thefe; as it would fuppofe that men are not determined in what they do, by any virtuous or vicious principles, nor act from any motives, intentions or aims whatfoever; or have any end, either good or bad, in acting. And is it not remarkable, that this Author fhould fuppofe, that, in order to men's actions truly having any defert, they must be performed without any view, purpofe, defign, or defire, or any principle of action, or any thing agreeable to a rational nature? As it will appear that he does, if we compare, p. 206, 207, with p. 175.

The Author of the Effays fuppofes, that God has deeply implanted in man's nature, a ftrong and invincible apprehension, or feeling, as he calls it, of a liberty, and contingence, of his own actions, opposite to that necessity which truly attends them; and which in truth does not agree with real fact a_1 , is not agreeable to ftrict philosophic truth b, is contradictory to the truth of things c, and which truth contradicts d, not tallying with the real plan e: and that therefore fuch feelings are deceitful f_{i} are in reality of the declusive kind g. He speaks of them as a wife delufion b, as nice artificial feelings, merely that conficience may have a commanding power i: meaning plainly, that thefe feelings are a cunning artifice of the Author of Nature, to make men believe they are free, when they are not k. He fuppofes that, by these feelings, the moral world has a difguifed appearance l. And other things of this kind he fays. He fuppofes that all felf-approbation, and all remorfe of confcience, all commendation or condemnation of ourfelves or others, all fenfe of defert, and all that is connected with this way of thinking, all the ideas, which at prefent are fuggested by the words

a P. 200, bP. 152. c P. 183. d P. 186. c P. 205. fP. 203, 204, 211. g P. 183. bP. 209. i P. 211. i P. 153. / P. 214.

sught, fhould, arife from this delution and would entirely vanish without it a.

All which is very contrary to what I have abundantly infifted on and endeavoured to demonstrate in my *Inquiry*; where I have largely shewn, that it is agreeable to the natural sense of mankind, that the moral necessity or certainty that attends men's actions, is consistent with praife and blame, reward and punishment b; and that it is agreeable to our natural notions, that moral evil, with its defert of diflike and abhorrence, and all its other illdefervings, consists in a certain deformity in the nature of the dispositions and acts of the heart, and not in the evil of fomething elfe, diverse from these, supposed to be their cause or occasion c.

I might well ask here, whether any one is to be found in the world of mankind, who is confcious to a fenfe or feeling, naturally and deeply rooted in his mind, that, in order to a man's performing any action that is praise or blame-worthy, he must exercife a liberty that implies and fignifies a power of acting without any motive, view, defign, defire, or principle of action? For fuch a liberty, this Author supposes, that must be which is opposed to moral neceffity, as I have already observed once and again. Supposing a man should actually do good, independent of desire, aim, inducement, principle or end, is it a dictate of invincible natural fenfe, that his act is more meritorious or praifeworthy, than if he had performed it for fome good end, and had been governed in it by good principles and motives? and fo I might ask, on the contrary, with respect to evil actions d.

a P 160, 194, 199, 205, 206 207, 209. I Inquiry Part IV. Sect. 4. throughout. c Idem, Part IV. Sect. 1. throughout, and P. 395-397. d See this Matter illustrated in my Inquiry, Part IV. Sect. 4. efpecially, P. 302-304.

The Author of the Estays fuppofes that the liberty without neceffity, which we have a natural feeling of, implies contingence: and, fpeaking of this contingence, he fometimes calls it by the name of chance. And it is evident, that his notion of it, or rather what he fays about it, implies things hapening loofely, fortuitoufly, by accident, and without a cause t. Now I conceive the flightest reflection may be sufficient to fatisfy any one, that fuch a contingence of men's actions, according to our natural fense, is so far from being effential to the morality or merit of those actions, that it would destroy it; and that, on the contrary, the dependence of our actions on fuch caufes, as inward inclinations, incitements and ends, is effential to the being of it. Natural fense teaches men, when they fee any thing done by others of a good or evil tendency, to inquire what their intention was; what principles and views they were moved by, in order to judge how far they are to be justified or condemned; and not to determine, that, in order to their being approved or blamed at all, the action must be altogether fortuitoufly, preceding performed from nothing, arifing from no caufe. Concerning this matter, I have fully expressed my mind in the Inquiry +.

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If the liberty, which we have a natural fenfe of as neceffary to defert, confifts in the mind's felfdetermination, without being determined by previous inclination or motive, then indifference is effential to it, yea abfolute indifference; as is obferved in my *Inquiry* §. But men naturally have no notion of any fuch liberty as this, as effential to the morality or demerit of their actions; but, on the contrary, fuch a liberty, if it were poffible, would be

† P. 156, 157, 158, 159, 177, 178, 181, 183, 184, 185. † P. 258-261, 267, 302, 303, and other places. § P. 89-91. inconfistent with our natural notions of defert, as is largely flown in the *Inquiry*. * If it be agreeable to natural fense, that men must be indifferent in determining their own actions; then, according to the fame, the more they are determined by inclination, either good or bad, the less they have of defert: the more good actions are performed from good disposition, the less praise-worthy; and the more evil deeds are from evil dispositions. the less culpable; and, in general, the more men's actions are from their hearts, the less they are to be commended or condemned: which all must know is very contrary to natural fense.

Moral neceffity is owing to the power and government of the inclination of the heart, either habitual or occafional, excited by motive: but, according to natural and common fenfe, the more a man does any thing with full inclination of heart, the more is it to be charged to his account for his condemnation, if it be an ill action, and the more to be afcribed to him for his praife, if it be good.

If the mind were determined to evil actions by contingence, from a ftate of indifference, then either there would be no fault in them, or elfe the fault would be in being fo perfectly indifferent, that the mind was equally liable to a bad or good determination. And, if this indifference be liberty, then the very effence of the blame or fault would lie in the liberty itfelf, or the wickednefs would, primarily and fummarily, lie in being a free agent. If there were no fault in being indifferent, then there would be no fault in the determination's being agreeable to fuch a ftate of indifference: that is, there could no

> • Especially in Part III. Sect. 6, and 7. F f

fault be reasonably found with this, viz. that opposite determinations actually happen to take place *indifferently*, fometimes good and fometimes bad, as contingence governs and decides. And if it be a fault to be indifferent to good and evil, then fuch indifference is no indifference to good and evil, but is a determination to evil, or to a fault; and fuch an indifferent disposition, tendency or determination of mind. So inconfistent are these notions of liberty, as effential to praise or blame.

The Author of the Effays fuppofes men's natural delusive sense of a liberty of contingence, to be, in truth, the foundation of all the labour, care and industry of mankind; + and that if men's practical ideas had been formed on the plan of universal necessity, the ignava ratio, the inactive doctrine of the Stoicks, would have followed ; and that there would have been no ROOM for forethought about futurity, or any fort of industry and care: † plainly implying, that, in this cafe, men would fee and know that all their industry and care fignified nothing, was in vain, and to no purpose, or of no benefit; events being fixed in an irrefragable chain, and not at all DEPENDING on their care and endeavour; as he explains himfelf, particularly, in the inftance of men's use of means to prolong life: § not only very contrary to what I largely maintain in my Inquiry, || but alfo very inconfiftently with his own fcheme, in what he supposes of the ends for which God has fo deeply implanted this deceitful feeling in man's nature; in which he manifestly supposes men's,

+ P. 184. ‡ P. 189. § P. 184, 185. ∥ Especially Part IV. Sect. 5.

care and industry not to be in vain and of no benefit, but of great use, yea of absolute necessity, in order to the obtaining the most important ends and neceffary purpofes of human life, and to fulfil the ends of action to the BEST ADVAN-TAGE; as he largely declares. + Now, how fhall these things be reconciled? That, if men had a clear view of real truth, they would fee that there was no ROOM for their care and industry, because they would see it to be in vain, and of no benefit; and yet that God, by having a clear view of real truth, fees that their being excited to care and industry, will be of excellent use to mankind, and greatly for the benefit of the world, yea abfolutely neceffary in order to it: and that therefore the great wildom and goodnefs of God to men appears, in artfully contriving to put them on care and industry for their good, which good could not be obtained without them; and yet both these things are maintained at once, and in the fame fentences and words by this Author. The very reason he gives, why God has put this deceitful feeling into men, contradicts and destroys itself; that God in his great goodness to men gave them fuch a deceitful feeling, becaufe it was very ufeful and neceffary for them, and greatly for their benefit, or excites them to care and industry for their own good, which care and industry is useful and necessary to that end: and yet the very thing that this great benefit of care and industry is given as a reason for, is God's deceiving men in this very point, in making them think their care and industry to be of great benefit to them, when indeed it is of none at all; and if they faw the real truth, they would fee all their

+ P. 188-192. and in many other places. F f. 2

endeavours to be wholly useles, that there was NO ROOM for them, and that the event does not at all DEPEND upon them a.

And befides, what this Author fays, plainly implies (as appears by what has been already obferved), that it is neceffary men should be deceived, by being made to believe that future events are contingent, and their own future actions free, with fuch a freedom, as fignifies that their actions are not the fruit of their own defires, or defigns, but altogether contingent, fortuitous and without a cause. But how should a notion of liberty, confifting in accident or loofe chance, encourage care and industry? I should think it would rather entirely difcourage every thing of this nature. For furely, if our actions do not depend on our defires and defigns, then they do not depend on our endeavours, flowing from our defires and defigns. This Author himfelf feems to fuppofe, that if men had, indeed, fuch a liberty of contingence, it would render all endeavours to determine or move men's future volitions, in vain: he fays, that, in this cafe, to exhort, to instruct, to promise, or to threaten, would be to no purpose b. Why? Because (as he himself gives the reason), then our will would be capricious and arbitrary, and we should be thrown loose altogether, and our arbitrary power could do us good or ill only by accident. But if fuch a loofe fortuitous state would render vain others endeavours upon us, for the fame reafon would it make ufelefs our endeavours on ourfelves: for events that are truly contingent and accidental, and altogether loofe from, and independent of, all foregoing caufes, are

a P 188, 189, &c.

bP. 178, 213, 214.

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independent on every foregoing cause within ourfelves, as well as in others.

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I suppose that it is so far from being true, that our minds are naturally poffeffed with a notion of fuch liberty as this, fo ftrongly, that it is impoffible to root it out, that indeed men have no fuch notion of liberty at all, and that it is utterly impoffible, by any means whatfoever to implant or introduce fuch a notion into the mind. As no fuch notions as imply felf-contradiction and felf-abolition can fubfift in the mind, as I have shewn in my Inquiry +; I think a mature fenfible confideration of the matter, fufficient to fatisfy any one, that even the greatest and most learned advocates themfelves for liberty of indifference and felf-determination, have no fuch notion; and that indeed they mean fomething wholly inconfiftent with, and directly fubverfive of, what they ftrenuoufly affirm, and earneftly contend for. By a man's having a power of determining his own will, they plainly mean a power of determining his will, as he pleafes, or as he chufes: which fuppofes that the mind has a choice, prior to its going about to confirm any action or determina-And if they mean that they determine tion to it. even the original or prime choice, by their own pleafure or choice, as the thing that caufes and directs it; I fcruple not most boldly to affirm, that they fpeak they know not what, and that of which they have no manner of idea; becaufe no fuch contradictory notion can come into, or have a moment's fubfistence in, the mind of any man living, as an original or first choice being caused, or brought into being, by choice. After all, they fay,

+ P. 257, 258. See alfo P. 49, 56, 57, 73, 74, 79, 183-187, 281, 282, 298-301.

they have no higher or other conception of liberty, than that vulgar notion of it, which I contend for, viz. a man's having power or opportunity to do as he chufes: or if they had a notion that every act of choice was determined by choice, yet it would deftroy their notion of the contingence of choice; for then no one act of choice would arife contingently, or from a ftate of indifference, but every individual act, in all the feries, would arife from foregoing bias or preference, and from a caufe predetermining and fixing its existence, which introduces at once fuch a chain of caufes and effects, each preceding link decifively fixing the following, as they would by all means avoid.

And fuch kind of delufion and felf-contradiction as this, does not arife in men's minds by nature: it is not owing to any natural feeling which God has ftrongly fixed in the mind and nature of man; but to falle philosophy, and strong prejudice, from a deceitful abufe of words. It is artificial; not in the fenfe of the Author of the Effays, supposing it to be a deceitful artifice of God; but artificial as opposed to natural, and as owing to an artificial deceitful management of terms, to darken and confound the mind. Men have no fuch thing when they first begin to exercise reason; but mult have a great deal of time to blind themfelves, with metaphysical confusion, before they can embrace, and reft in fuch definitions of liberty as are given, and imagine they understand them.

On the whole, I humbly conceive, that wholoever will give himfelf the trouble of weighing, what I have offered to confideration in my *Inquiry*, muft be fenfible, that fuch a moral neceffity of men's actions as I maintain, is not at all inconfiftent with any liberty that any creature has, or can have, as

a free, accountable, moral agent, and fubject of moral government; and that this moral necessity. is to far from being inconfiltent with praise and blame, and the benefit and use of men's own care and labour, that, on the contrary, it implies the very ground and reafon, why men's actions are to be ascribed to them as their own, in that manner as to infer defert, praise and blame, appro-bation and remorie of confcience, reward and punifament; and that it establishes the moral fyftem of the universe, and God's moral government, in every respect, with the proper use of motives, exhortations, commands, counfels, promifes, and threatenings; and the use and benefit of endeavours, care and industry: and that therefore there is no need that the strict philosophic truth should be at all concealed from men; no danger in contemplation and profound discovery in these things. So far from this, that the truth in this matter is of valt importance, and extremely needful to be known; and that the more clearly and perfectly, the real fact is known, and the more constantly it is in view, the better; and particularly, that the clear and full knowledge of that, which is the true fystem of the universe, in these respects, would greatly establish the doctrines which teach the true Christian scheme of Divine Administration in the city of God, and the Gospel of Jesus Christ, in its most important articles; and that these things never can be well established, and the opposite errors, fo fubverfive of the whole Gofpel, which at this day fo greatly and generally prevail, be well confuted, or the arguments by which they are maintained, anfwered, till these points are settled: while this is not done, it is, to me, beyond doubt, that the friends of those great Gospel Truths, will but poorly maintain their controverfy with the adverfaries of those truths: they will be obliged often to dodge, fhuffle, hide, and turn their backs; and the latter will have a ftrong fort, from whence they never can be driven, and weapons to use, which those whom they oppose will find no shield to fcreen themselves from; and they will always puzzle, confound, and keep under the friends of found doctrine; and glory, and vaunt themselves in their advantage over them; and carry their affairs with an high hand, as they have done already for a long time past.

I conclude, Sir, with afking your pardon for troubling you with fo much faid in vindication of myfelf from the imputation of advancing a fcheme of neceffity, of a like nature with that of the Author of the *Effays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion.* Confidering that what I have faid is not only in vindication of myfelf, but, as I think, of the most important articles of moral philosophy and religion; I trust in what I know of your candour, that you will excuse,

Your obliged friend and brother,

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STOCKBRIDGE, July 25, 1757.

J. EDWARDS.

FINIS.

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
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