
This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the information in books and make it universally accessible.

Google™ books

<https://books.google.com>



//

REPLY
TO
MR. WATSON'S REMARKS
ON THE
ETERNAL SONSHIP OF CHRIST;
AND THE
USE OF REASON IN MATTERS
OF
Revelation.
SUGGESTED BY SEVERAL PASSAGES
IN
DR. ADAM CLARKE'S COMMENTARY
ON THE
NEW TESTAMENT.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED REMARKS ON MR. BOYD'S LETTERS
ON THE SAME SUBJECT IN THE METHODIST MAGAZINE.

BY THOMAS EXLEY, A. M.

Let all those who value *Jesus*, and their *salvation*, abide by the Scriptures.

DR. A. CLARKE.

In doctrine *showing* uncorruptness, gravity, sincerity, sound speech that cannot
be condemned: that he that is of the contrary part may be ashamed.

ST. PAUL.

We were reconciled to God by the death of his Son.

ST. PAUL.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR J. BUTTERWORTH AND SON, 43, FLEET-STREET.

1818.



PRINTED BY J. AND T. CLARKE, 38, ST. JOHN'S SQUARE, LONDON.

REPLY, &c.

IN Mr. Watson's Pamphlet intituled "*Remarks on the Eternal Sonship of Christ, and the use of Reason in matters of Revelation, suggested by several passages in Dr. Adam Clarke's Commentary on the New Testament;*" the Doctor's Readers are surprised, as the remarks were "*suggested*" by a consideration of his "*views,*" to find an *incorrectness of statement* as to those "*views*" themselves, and that too in its very outset; for the Doctor has no where said that the appellations "Son," "Son of God," and others of similar import in the New Testament, are "*to be considered, in every instance, designations of our Lord's human nature;*" nor in any instance that I know of has he used them in this exclusive sense. On the contrary, he is of opinion that those appellations are intended to designate that Infinite Being, Jesus Christ, who is God and man in one Person; and it is in this sense, that he every where employs those appellations for the name of Him, who is God-man; thus comprehending the whole of His twofold nature, the nature of Him who is styled, "*The Lord Jesus Christ,*" "*Saviour,*" "*Son of man,*" "*only begotten Son,*" "*beloved Son,*" &c.

What the Doctor really has asserted is, "that Jesus Christ is not the Son of God in reference to His Divine nature; but that these terms, when used in Scripture, have always a relation, or reference, to the human nature of our Lord, and are employed, in consequence of that nature, as proper designations of Immanuel;—but that they have relation to that nature *merely* is a widely different case, and totally contrary to the Doctor's views. Mr. Watson

presumes, and I grant him his position, that if it can be proved from Scripture, that *Christ* is the *Son of God*, in reference to *His Divine nature exclusively*; that is, if “the doctrines of the eternal filiation of Christ, and the essential personal paternity of God the Father,” (in that relation) “are contained in Scripture,”—(page 5,) the matter is sufficiently determined. On the other hand, he will also surely grant, that if the doctrine (for the eternal filiation and the eternal paternity make but one doctrine) be not contained in Scripture, it is consequently not scriptural: and again, if it can be demonstrated that the appellation Son of God is given in reference to the *human nature* of the Second Person of the Holy Trinity, “then the matter” is also “sufficiently determined.”

There is, however, another proposition of Mr. Watson’s to which I am most willing to agree; for with him I admit that a doctrine is a scriptural doctrine, “when it is found in the literal sense of any of its passages; when there is nothing in any other part of the Revelation to oblige us to depart from that literal sense; when the meaning of other passages restrains us to this literal signification; and when no consistent sense can be made out, if the doctrine be not admitted:”—(page 6.) This mode of argumentation Mr. Watson proposes; and, of course, he allows it to be right. If then, by a rational procedure agreeing with these propositions, Mr. W. can substantiate what he has undertaken to prove, that the term “*Son of God*” is a designation of the *Divine nature* of our Lord *exclusively considered*; if I say he can prove this, in any rational manner, I will be one of the first to subscribe to his opinion: but if his premises be untenable, he must not be surprised if I still dissent from his principles.

That argumentation not only admits, but demands the utmost candour, and a vast latitude of dispassionate consideration, I was too fully aware, not to have examined *all* the passages produced by Mr. Watson, and his several observations on them. I find them, however, inconclusive: I find that he has *not* proved the doctrine, he espouses, to be a scriptural one, even judging of his arguments by his own rules; and, therefore,

without further preamble, I proceed to lay before my Readers my Reply to the "Remarks," containing the most essential particulars of the examination.

The first text Mr. W. urges upon our notice, is John i. 18, *No man hath seen God at any time ; THE ONLY BEGOTTEN SON, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him.*— The remark on this passage is intended to prove "that if the term *only begotten Son* be used, as Dr. Clarke's 'scheme' supposes, with reference to the human nature of Christ, (page 7,) the text contains a contradiction." But this argument is a glaring sophism ; for in the premises, instead of considering the name as "used," or rather, it should have been said, to speak quite agreeably to Dr. Clarke's views, as given, or applied to Him in "reference to His human nature ;" the name *only begotten Son* is made to designate "the man Jesus, separately and distinctly considered as a man," (page 8,) which is as perfectly opposed to Dr. Clarke's views, as darkness is to light : it is in fact wantonly, and I had almost said wickedly, attributing to him sentiments he does not hold ! But need I hesitate in this unqualified use of a term, which first presents itself to my mind. Dare I use it in reference to an act of a Christian brother, shrined in the sacred vestments of the priest's office ? dare I attribute to him any thing wantonly wicked, in respect to his treatment of the reputation and orthodoxy of a brother in the ministry ? Much sooner would I view it in the light of a mistake, or an oversight ; though, even then, I must consider it greatly reprehensible, when a very little attention paid to the subject itself, (especially by a person with such information as Mr. W. is known to possess,) would have set him right, and prevented any thing like injury to so great and so good a man. But I take it for granted, that Mr. W. will allow that the term *Jesus, or Christ*, is given to our Lord in reference to His human nature ; and yet, neither the one nor the other mean "the man Jesus separately and distinctly considered as a man." Undoubtedly not ; but to use Dr. Clarke's own words, in his note on John i. 1, "Therefore, Jesus, who was *before all things, and who made all things*, must necessarily be the *eternal God*." And here again, let me remind Mr. W. that Dr. Clarke

no where takes these and similar appellations to designate "the man Jesus *separately and distinctly* considered as man;" but always as appellations of the *God-man*, comprehending the whole of His twofold nature; and in this Dr. C. does but follow the Scriptures, for they too ascribe many things which can only belong to Him on account of His Divine nature; others which can alone have reference to His human nature; and abundantly more which strictly appertain to Him in His complex nature, and mediatorial office; and yet each, and all these, are found, whether He be called Jesus, Christ, Son of God, Saviour, Redeemer, Advocate, &c. all of which appellations, and numerous others, are given in reference to His human nature. But under each of them He receives honours which belong to God alone: and, therefore, none of these can be considered as designations of the Divine nature exclusively.

Were the reasoning of Mr. W. in this argument to be admitted, a thousand contradictions might be pointed out in the word of God! Labouring under a similar mistake, to say no more, he has often in his "Remarks" spoken extremely rashly indeed of the Doctor's expositions: but I forbear to dwell upon them; *they* are before his Readers; the motives for them are known only to his own heart, and his God!

But Mr. W. further proceeds, in his vindication of the *eternal filiation* of our Lord, to quote a "still stronger" passage than the preceding, by instancing the 14th verse of the same chapter: "*And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us; and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.*" That this "*glory*" was not a glory *merely* human, I doubt not, is readily granted; if not, says Mr. W., "the glory must have been that of a higher nature."—Granted also: "*which nature*" (continues he,) "is called, expressly called, the only begotten of the Father," (page 9.)—Neither the passage, nor the reasoning, gives countenance to such a conclusion. The most that can possibly be inferred is, that the disciples saw His glory, as the glory of a Being who *possessed* a higher nature—a glory of Divinity, and who is here called *the only begotten*.

The Person whom they beheld was Jesus Christ, the Son of God, He who in His own Person is God and man. Yes, it was the glory of this *Redeemer* which they saw, *as the glory of the only begotten of the Father!* And this very conclusion Mr. W. immediately after justly draws himself; for he adds, “and indeed as the context shews, was the glory of the *Word* made flesh,” (page 9.) This *Word made flesh* is called the *Son of God*; not this *Word* “*separately and distinctly considered.*” No, the *incarnation*, the human nature, is plainly expressed “in the literal sense of the passage.”

But where are the rules laid down by Mr. W. in the early stage of the discussion.—I must not lose sight of them; I am no where afraid of meeting them. Hitherto it has not been proved that the term *Son of God* is given to the Divine nature *exclusively*, according “to the literal sense of the passage;” nor that a consistent sense cannot be discovered without such a supposition: much less have either of Mr. W.’s other two rules been brought to bear upon this argument. But let me ask—Will not any man, desirous of knowing the literal sense of a given passage, begin where the subject begins? Undoubtedly he will; and in the present case, such is the sole method of rational procedure: and, having read the three first verses of the chapter under immediate consideration, he cannot but clearly discover that the *Divine nature, solely and exclusively*, in the three first verses is styled *The Word*. He continues to read—till at the 14th verse he finds “*that the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us;*”—can he otherwise understand this, than as expressing an *incarnation* of the *Divine Logos*? Undoubtedly, he cannot but consider this incarnate Deity as inconceivably, yea, infinitely glorious; and reading in the same verse that the disciples saw His glory, as of the only begotten of the Father, how can he else than conclude, that the literal sense declares this glorious Personage to be Him who is distinctly called the *only begotten of the Father*? And here again we see that the term *Son of God* has express reference to the human nature. The context, with the whole scope of the narration, likewise restrains us to this conclusion; and without it we have not a “consistent sense:” for if we suppose the *Evange*,

list to mean by "the *only begotten*" the Divine nature exclusively, or the Word simply, we have then no need for the change of the appellation; nor would that change have been made, unless we could wickedly suppose that the Holy Scriptures were intended to mislead, or introduce us to endless disputations: nor will what follows oblige us to depart from the view we have thus taken of it.

That the remarkable change already noticed in the appellative term was not accidental, but designed, is evident, from all the circumstances of the discourse; and, even setting aside the immediate inspiration of the apostle, his bare reason seems as if pointing out the impropriety of saying, *In the beginning was the Son*, &c. because that would certainly have involved a contradiction in terms; but he beholds, with the eye of contemplation, the incarnation of the *eternal Logos*; the mysterious junction, of the two natures, constituting, in the highest sense in which the words can be taken, the *Son of God*!

By the aid of the slightest attention to the change of the appellative just noticed, we shall immediately discover that it evidently points to some circumstance which has occurred in reference to the Being of whom the apostle has just been discoursing, and that this change of circumstance has rendered a change of terms absolutely necessary. The circumstance we discover to be the *incarnation* of the *eternal Logos*; and the change of the appellative in verse 14 having immediate relation, and following in consequence of this event, consequently has reference to the human nature of our blessed Lord!

Mr. Drew, in his sermon on the Divinity of Christ, after proving from this chapter that Jesus Christ is truly God, has the following observations:—"But although St. John evidently means Jesus Christ, he has, when asserting his Divinity, omitted to call Him the *Son of God*, for very obvious reasons. The term *Son* includes a relative idea, which implies priority of existence in the Father, and subsequence of existence in the Son. He who is a father, must as a father necessarily be older than his son. Nor will it obviate the difficulty to assert there

may be a pre-existence in the order of nature, while there is a co-existence in point of duration. For no being can be eternal who admits the pre-existence of another, either in the order of nature, or in point of duration. It, therefore, does not appear that any-being who is a son, can, as a son, be eternal. The term Son, as applied to Jesus Christ, comprehends His incarnation; but, according to our present conceptions, it cannot comprehend His Divinity. Nor do I recollect a single expression throughout any part of the Bible in which the term Son is applied to Jesus Christ, unless it has reference to His incarnate state. He who is God must be eternal; and He who is eternal can have nothing antecedent to him. The term Son, according to the relative ideas which we attach to it, seems therefore totally inapplicable to Christ, when we speak of His Divinity.

“To obviate objections which would naturally arise from the denomination of Son, St. John calls Him *The Word*. This is an appellation which has no relation either to priority or subsequence of existence; neither does it preclude co-existence, co-eternity, or co-essentiality. The prophet Isaiah has introduced his Divine character in language which also corresponds with it: he calls Him Immanuel, Wonderful, Counsellor, The Mighty God, The Everlasting Father, The Prince of Peace, Isaiah ix. 6. All these terms are perfectly coincident with His Divinity; and are wholly exempted from the objections to which those must necessarily be liable, which are merely relative.”

But Mr. W. remarks, that “there is a singular confusion in Dr. C.’s note on this passage” (page 9.) Let us look for this “confusion,” by a dispassionate consideration of the passage in question; and endeavour to find out in what it is alleged to consist. The words quoted from this Note of the Dr.’s are, “the human nature which He took of the Virgin was as the *shrine*, house, or temple, in which His immaculate Deity condescended to dwell:” the natural inference from which premises is, says Mr. W. “that as this shrine, house, or temple, had no glory, being in the ‘likeness of sinful flesh,’ the glory which the disciples saw, was the glory of that ‘immaculate Deity,’ which

condescended to dwell in it. No, we are told it was that glory which 'John saw, in company with Peter and James,' at the transfiguration." This, adds Mr. W., "is perfectly gratuitous; nothing is afforded in proof; and it is directly contradicted in the very next page, where the Dr. observes, that 'His glory was manifested in *His gracious words, and miraculous acts.*'" He might as well have said on the same page, and on the same verse, where he says of the disciples, "that while they had the fullest proof of His *Divinity*, by the miracles which he wrought, they had at the same time the clearest evidence of His *humanity*, in His tabernacling among them, in His eating, drinking, and conversing with them." But where is this "*direct contradiction*," this "*singular confusion*," Mr. W. speaks of? Not in Dr. C.: I have read over the passages in which it is pretended to exist; but I have not been able to discover the slightest contradiction. Was not the glory seen on the Mount the glory of a higher nature than that of mere humanity? And was not the transfiguration itself one of His miraculous acts? And though the Divinity beamed through *all* His gracious words, and miraculous acts; and the Evangelist might intend to include them all in the expression; yet, surely, it involves no contradiction to suppose he had a special reference to the glory manifested at the transfiguration. This supposed confusion then has disappeared upon a proper attention being paid to the Doctor's real meaning. But, adds Mr. W., "nothing is afforded in proof;" to which I reply, it required no proof, being a natural inference from several known circumstances. 1st, The glory displayed on the Mount was in itself the most peculiarly striking manifestation of His own glory, which the God-man ever gave to His disciples. 2dly, This very Evangelist was one of the favoured three who beheld this exceeding brightness of his Lord. 3dly, The voice from heaven proclaiming, *This is my beloved SON, hear him*; exactly corresponds with the appellative here employed, *ONLY BEGOTTEN OF THE FATHER*. And these were in themselves such self-evident proofs to the Dr., that to have dwelt longer upon it might perhaps have been deemed by him a multiplying of words without knowledge; and, consequently, a complete deviation from the plan he has adopted of writing a series of Notes, as brief as possible, upon the Sacred Volume. So much for

the "confusion," and the insignificant criticism to which it has given rise.

I cannot, however, pass by the inference "that this shrine, house, or temple," (the human nature of our Lord,) "HAD no glory, being in the *likeness of sinful flesh.*"

What! is Mr. W. daring enough to say, that this temple had no glory? That this shrine, in which "dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily," which knew no spot of sin,—that it had no glory? Strange and presumptuous declaration! Where did he meet with, and whence could he borrow, the idea?—What! has sinless human nature, which God declares to be *his own image, no glory?* From the first Adam it departed, because of his disobedience;—in the second Adam, who "kept the law of God, and made it honourable," with whom Deity was itself united, was there no glory? Assuredly there was: to this the disciples could bear ample testimony; *they* saw it in His words, and in His works; *we* see it in His history.—I speak not in reference to outward pomp, and glittering appearance; this was no worthy way for Deity to beam forth. But His disciples once beheld a faint ray of His Divine glory, in His transfiguration on the Mount; yet even then the dazzling light was softened by the shadings of His humanity; but notwithstanding this, and the well known tone of His voice,—still, I say, this streaming forth of His glory made them "*sore afraid!*" This, says Mr. W., was the glory of that immaculate Deity which condescended to dwell in it. The Dr. does not say so: no, he declares it to be the glory of that *incarnate* and immaculate Deity, the glory of the *Word made flesh.*

Mr. W. further observes, that if the term *Son of God* "be used to express the production of the body of our Lord, by the immediate power of God, it is a false term: the Son of Mary was not, in this sense, the '*only begotten of the Father;*' for Adam was also immediately formed by God, without human interposition!" But let Mr. W. observe, that He is *not* called the *only begotten* merely on that account: but were it even so, still I defy Mr. W. to prove it a "false term;" for Adam was formed

purely of the dust of the earth ; whereas Christ, in reference to His appearing among men, *was* of the seed of David, according to the flesh ; and, at the same time, He was produced by the immediate power of God—for he had no earthly father ; and this constitutes a peculiarity in Him, which did not appertain to Adam, nor to any other being, whether man or angel.

Again, He was formed to be this shrine, house, or temple, for the God to dwell in ; yea, so to inhabit that his Deity and human nature should, by this union, constitute *one Person* : and in this high and extraordinary sense *no being ever was the Son of God but He* ; and hence it follows that as to His *human nature*, He is *the only Son of God* ;—and Dr. C. thus considers Him, in a peculiar sense, “ *The SON of the most high God, because of the union of the Divine and human natures.*” Note on Luke i. 32.

There are only three other places in the New Testament where the epithet *only begotten* is applied to Christ ; and all these by this same apostle, twice in his gospel, chap. iii. verses 16 and 18, and once in 1 John iv. 9. Were there nothing else to fix the sense in these other passages, we should conclude they have the same meaning as in the places already examined. As “ an instance for the rest” of these three passages, Mr. W. fixes on John iii. 16, “ *God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son,*” &c. and at the same time proposes to put the former argument out of sight, (be it so, 'tis wisely done, for it is not worthy of the light,) and to examine the passage, on the supposition, “ that the whole compound nature of Christ is here spoken of, under the term *Son.*” But in the argument he shifts the hypothesis, by saying,—“ But the love of the Father ! is the emphasis (page 11,) of that in the least heightened by the gift of an ‘ *only begotten Son,*’ if that *Son,* as *Son,* were merely human ?”

How are we astonished at such reasoning from a man who possesses so accurate a knowledge of language, and of reason ! If we allow, I say, *only begotten Son* to designate the whole compound nature of Christ, which is agreeable to the hypothesis

of this argument ; and considering Mr. W. commences it with saying, " let us allow it," and seeing it is agreeable to Scripture language, and in unison with Dr. C.'s views, surely it will be allowed without question ; then nothing is lost ; not a single particle of this infinite emphasis, this world of meaning, centering in the particle *ourw*, *so* ; and Dr. C.'s interpretation is not " cold," but contains all the warmth and energy of the passage.

Mr. W. proceeds another step in this argument, and says, " If the *only begotten Son* be used as the designation of the human nature, where is the emphatic tenderness of the passage?" Here again he loses sight of his proposition to consider the term as relating to " the whole compound nature of Christ." Did he know that this would be to follow the sense of Dr. C. ? And Mr. W. not only departs from his own grant, but broadly insinuates that the worthy Dr. considers the term as a designation of the *human nature* of our Lord purely, and not in reference to its union with the *Divine* nature : this insinuation is contrary to fact ; and the instances we have already seen of it boldly stand up to confront it !

Where, then, is the lack of warmth and energy in the Dr.'s hypothesis, seeing the term Son embraces " the whole compound nature of Christ?" And so far from trembling, like Mr. W., at its " coldness," we feel, when considering what Dr. C. *has* said, not what he is *made* to say, the utmost glow of emphatic tenderness all our nature is capable of feeling—while, at the same time, we grant, there is an infinity of meaning and stress beyond it, " which ear hath not heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive !"

But let us follow Mr. W. further in the view he takes of this subject ; and we shall find him still reasoning from premises he had proposed to abandon.

" It would be nothing in reply to urge, that the Divine nature of Christ could not suffer pain."

From what has already been advanced, we have no need to

“urges” this: but yet respecting it I would ask, Does Mr. W. really think that the *Divine nature*, considered in contradistinction to the *human nature*, actually suffered? Does he imagine that, in reference to His Divinity, “*he emptied himself, made himself of no reputation, became obedient, and therefore truly a servant?*” What! Deity become of *no reputation*? Can then Divinity “*empty itself, and become obedient, and therefore truly a servant?*” which must be admitted on the hypothesis of Mr. W., if he considers the term *Son* to refer to His Godhead; and he quotes this passage to strengthen the supposition. Such language, thus antiscriturally applied, grates on common sense, contradicts reason, and approaches to a profanation of the God-head! I should have thought even the most indifferent Reader could not but perceive that the apostle St. Paul, in writing this passage, had immediate reference to the incarnation of Deity; and, consequently, to the fulfilment of the purpose of that incarnation. Or rather, that in condescending to assume our nature, Christ laid aside His majesty, and the splendor of His omnipotence; for the world could not behold it, and exist: all nature shall melt in its presence, at the second coming of the Lord most high.

But He divested Himself of that glory, not only because the world could not contain it; but He laid aside His grandeur, which was the proper right of His spotless human nature, as well as the glory appertaining to that nature, considered in its connection with the Divine nature. And does not the antithesis between what Christ divested Himself of, and what He submitted to, plainly shew the same thing? Undoubtedly, it does;—and can any man then imagine that these expressions of *suffering humiliation and servitude* are spoken of the *Divine nature exclusively*? It were almost impossible that he should; but if he can so imagine, I have no hesitation in saying, he has neither Scripture nor reason to sanction his sentiments.

But Mr. W.’s imagination has pointed out another argument in favour of the doctrine he undertakes to defend, in the form of baptism; “*Baptizing them in the name of the FATHER, and of the SON, and of the HOLY GHOST.*” But when this form was

instituted, allow me to ask, had not God already "bowed the heavens, and come down;" and, still holding the "theory" of Dr. C. respecting His twofold nature, was He not indeed the SON of GOD, and was not *God* indeed *His FATHER*?—Yes; and Dr. C. himself baptizes infants "in the name of the FATHER, and of the SON, and of the HOLY GHOST."

But again, I should apprehend no man, except he were under the influence of prejudice, would have found the doctrine of the Divine Sonship, where Mr. W. has discovered it:—but if, indeed, it be here, must it not also exist in "baptizing them in the name of *Jesus, or Christ*," Acts x. 48., xix. 5. Rom. vi. 3, and many other places besides?

The baptism in the name of Jesus was in the name of God, Jesus Christ being "God over all, and blessed for evermore!" and yet here the *humanity* is included, for the name Jesus is given in reference to that humanity: and most assuredly the same mode of interpretation will hold good in the use of the term *Son*, in the general form of baptizing, which holds good of the term Jesus, similarly used in the same ordinance. Again, according to Mr. W.'s own premises, since the terms used in the form of baptism "were to present the true God, in the exact views he was to form of Him, to every convert from the worship of false gods," (page 12.) it is evident the *human nature* of Christ must be in that form; and, consequently, comprised in the name: for every convert is to view *God in Christ Jesus*; to come to God through him. And, therefore, that the convert may entertain an "exact view" of God as He stands related to man, (and I suppose Mr. W. does not think we can have an "exact view" of His essence,) it becomes absolutely necessary, that the *incarnate nature* be introduced into our *creed, and baptismal engagements*.

And why, let me ask, do we believe that Jesus Christ, or the Son, is *perfect man*, as well as *perfect God*? Were we not baptized into this faith? And that it is included, may easily be proved from many Scriptures; but the Reader will be quite satisfied with consulting Acts. ii. 31—39. The apostle is there speaking

of Jesus, and has particularly in his view His human nature; and hence he speaks of "God's raising Him up, and exalting Him, and of Christ's receiving the Holy Ghost, the promise of the Father," &c. and then immediately adds, "*Repent, and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ.*"

Thus we see the humanity is included in baptism;—but where, if the term *Son* has not a reference to it in that general form? The inclusion of the *humanity* in the form of baptism is of vital importance; for God, out of Christ, is a consuming fire.

But Mr. W. asks "why the first Person in the Godhead is thus called the Father with relation to a *Son*, in a case where there is a *distinct consideration* of the Three," (page 12,) and "thinks no reason can be given, except that He is the 'Father' of the Divine nature of our Lord Jesus Christ." But upon the supposition that we could not give a reason, surely it does not necessarily follow that there is none; and I know no man more ready than Mr. W. to allow, in most cases, that the reasonableness of things may be hidden from us.

I am not a little surprised to find Mr. W. roundly asserting that "of the *human nature* of Jesus, the First Person" (in the Holy Trinity) "is not the Father; for the sacred temple of our Lord's body was produced by the Holy Ghost, the Third Person," (page 12.)

This precipitate and presumptuous declaration of Mr. W. is in opposition to the general tenor of Scripture; and is in direct opposition to "its literal sense," as in Rom. xv. 6. 2 Cor. i. 3., xi. 31. Eph. i. 3., and 1 Peter i. 3.; and, indeed, many other places, as well as in the text above quoted, Acts ii. 33. where the reference to the human nature of our Lord is as plain as it possibly can be: and Christ Himself addressing the First Person says, "A body hast Thou prepared me," Heb. x. 5.

We do, indeed, believe that the *only Son* of the *Father*

“ was conceived by the Holy Ghost, and born of the Virgin Mary :” but we imagine that this belief in no way annuls the idea that the First Person formed, produced, or created, the human body and mind of our blessed Lord ; even granting that He performed this through the co-operation of the Holy Spirit. In each several act of each Person in the Trinity is there not, in some sort, a co-operation of the other Persons ? and are we not warranted in this conclusion from the Holy Scriptures, which ascribe creation, and various other works, to the Godhead, and also to each Person in the Divine essence ? And is it not then quite arbitrary to say, that the first Person is “ not the Creator of the humanity of our Lord ;” and not only arbitrary, but contrary to the express declaration and tenor of Scripture ? And may there not, for ought any man knows to the contrary, be a thousand reasons why He is “ the Father of the Son, Christ,” without reckoning the eternal filiation as one of the number !—Unquestionably there may !

But Mr. W. concludes, “ that to deny the eternal filiation of the Second Person in the Trinity, is to deny the essential paternity of the First.” (page 13.) What is this essential paternity ? If Mr. W. would have us to understand that, from His nature, the First Person is the Father of all the human race, or the Father of our Lord *Jesus Christ*, it does not deny this “ essential paternity :” but if, on the contrary, he would wish us to understand from the term, that paternity itself necessarily arises from the nature of His essence, and that He could not exist without being a Father,—then we know how to reply ; and that reply is, we know of no such necessity,—we allow of no such necessity, for the Scripture makes no mention of it, and it is repugnant to the nature of God Himself, and carries with it a manifest contradiction.

We deny not that He is essentially a Father, for we acknowledge Him to be God ; but at the same time we say He is of His own will a Father, and not by the necessity of His nature ! But to say that the First Person is the everlasting Father, when by this term we mean that God was from eternity the Father of our Lord *Jesus Christ*, is as utterly repugnant to the

testimony of Scripture as the doctrine of the eternal filiation itself. In *this sense*, God is no more the everlasting Father, than Jesus Christ is the everlasting Son. To support this assertion, we need only refer to two passages in Scripture, one in 2 Sam. vii. 14., the other in 1 Chron. xxii. 10., where God, speaking to David of his son Solomon, says, "I will be his Father, and he shall be my Son." These scriptures we find the apostle of the Gentiles applying to Jesus Christ, the great Antitype: "For unto which of the angels said he at any time, I will be to him a Father, and He shall be to me a Son." Thus then the Reader, upon a careful consideration of the above texts, will perceive that at the time the words were spoken by God to David, *that* circumstance which constituted the relation of Father and Son, in the First and Second Persons of the adorable Trinity, had not taken place; for the words are, I WILL BE His Father,—He SHALL BE my Son; not I AM His Father, He IS my Son; though had this been said, it would not have militated against the doctrine here defended; for, in the PURPOSE of God, the relation of Father and Son subsisted from the foundation of the world, that the Divine mercy might be extended to *all* sinners, both under the Patriarohal and Mosaical dispensations, as well as to those living in gospel days. Therefore, to make out a consistent sense of 1 Chron. xxii. 10. in its application by the apostle to Christ, we must necessarily limit its meaning to that *then* future most gracious operation of Deity, the production of the first rudiments of our Lord's human nature in the womb of the Virgin. From a reference to the Second Book of Samuel, it will also be observed, that when God spoke the words in consideration, neither the birth nor conception of Solomon had taken place; and, consequently, that the words bore relation to a future event merely. Now, if Solomon be a type of Christ, (and St. Paul, by applying what was originally spoken in reference to the wise man, to our Lord, has indirectly asserted it,) then it consequently follows that the Antitype must be *also* in *futurity*;—or how otherwise can it constitute an antitype at all? Hence then it follows, that that which constituted the eternal Logos, "the Son of God," had not *then* taken place; and, consequently, the doctrine of the eternal filiation is false; which is, therefore, plainly proved from

the Sacred Writings. This point the apostle has himself cleared up in the next verse; for, speaking evidently of a time posterior to the reign of David, "And WHEN He bringeth in His first begotten into the world, He saith, And let all the angels of God worship Him." From this it follows that, AS *the Son*, He was not the object of angelic worship till He was manifested in the flesh, at which moment all the angels of God received the command to "worship Him:" but if, indeed, the doctrine in dispute be true, He was the object of angelic worship from the period in which these holy beings received through Him their existence.

After having taken this general view of the whole, it appears that the dedication of a person to God in Christian baptism has a direct reference to the Divine plan of admitting believers into the fellowship of the Father and of the Son, agreeably to the doctrines of Christ, in whose name alone we can be saved: it has, I say, a direct reference to, and view of our Lord's human nature; and in the administration of this holy rite we can conceive of no appellation, employed to designate our Lord, so suitable as that of *Son*, a term clearly and distinctly pointing out His incarnate nature! Had, however, this term *Son*, or some other term equally including His humanity, been omitted in the baptismal form, the human nature would have been left out; and, consequently, the whole scheme of the Christian religion would have been completely lost sight of in this essential ordinance.

Thus, then, we have surmounted this difficulty: but in the next paragraph Mr. W. exultingly points us to another, by saying much of passages of Scripture "which can be made to have no consistent meaning upon this scheme" of Dr. C.; (page 13.) I reply, Point them out to me, and I will acquiesce with you. But, alas! "the learned commentator" has got himself into a situation where his opposers have "an advantage" over him.—Make much of it then, for it is the first you have enjoyed; and I much question if, shortly, even this be not taken from you: but to the proof. Immediately, after having pointed out to Dr. C. the line of his duty, which is, that "he ought, in fairness, to ex-

mine every passage, in which the appellation Son of God occurs, and *prove*, that in no one of them is it given to the Divine nature of Christ, considered in contradistinction to His humanity ;” Mr. W. adds, “if those who take the other side of the question, can prove, that in only one passage, Christ is called ‘*The Son of God*,’ with express and distinguishing reference to His Divine nature, the point is gained,” (page 13.) This mode of reasoning is, I suppose, the “fairness” to which Mr. W. exhorts Dr. C.

But the Dr., I find, must also “allow that there is no passage which denies the doctrine of the eternal filiation.” What! must the Dr. submit to be dictated to in the first place, and have his hands tied in the second? Is this “fairness?” What! must he not enjoy the advantage of his opponents, and reason from the “sense of Scripture?” But I will not even beg this privilege, this common right for him; even though his opponents practically acknowledge it themselves.

But, perhaps, Mr. W. may consider that he has saved the Dr. a great deal of labour in having kindly “examined” for him “with some care, all the passages in the New Testament, where the term *Son of God* occurs, as applied to Christ,” (page 47.) Hence, if the texts produced by Mr. W. do not amount to a proof of the eternal filiation, we may conclude it is not a scriptural doctrine. We have seen that the texts already quoted do not only not favour the sense Mr. W. wishes to draw from them, but evidently oppose it; and that the plain and “literal sense” of the first chapter of St. John’s Gospel denies it in toto.

I proceed next to the other passages produced as proofs of the doctrine in the “Remarks.”

As a text which is thought directly to decide the doctrine in question, Rom. i. 3 and 4. is produced :—“*Concerning his Son Jesus Christ our Lord, which was made of the seed of David according to the flesh; and declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead.*”

His first remark is intended to shew that the apostle "is not speaking of what Christ is officially ; but of what He is personally and essentially." (page 14.) Now Christ is personally and essentially "The Word made flesh," God and man ; take away either the one or the other nature, and He is no more Christ. If so, this remark declares, in effect, that, when speaking of one nature, the other nature is not excluded from the Person here called the *Son of God* ; and, though "He is considered by the apostle distinctly in His two natures," (page 14,) yet a name is not ascribed to one nature as contradistinguished from the other. In that respect the passage carries its own meaning plainly on the face of it ; "*concerning his Son Jesus Christ our Lord :*" here then most evidently "HIS SON" means "*Jesus Christ.*" And from this can Mr. W. separate the humanity ? No, he answers, it "is a designation of his humanity : " (page 89,)—and for what reason, and by what rule, should it be separated from the same term, in the same sentence ; the inspired writer giving no intimation of such a change in the sense ? It is true, the Jewish genealogies proved that Jesus Christ our Lord was of the seed of David ; and to shew that He was "the SON OF GOD, a proof of a higher kind was necessary ; and it was given in the resurrection from the dead." This "*declared him to be the SON OF GOD with power.*" Yes, "powerfully determined and marked Him out to be the Son of God ; a Divine person" (page 15,) "the true Messiah, God manifested in the flesh." There, indeed, is given us "the principal, the *all comprehending proof* of Christ's mission, and of His claims." (page 42.) Yes, the resurrection does prove that Christ, the Son of the Father, is *truly Divine* ; and, what is still more, it absolutely proves that the term "Son" is not taken, or applied here, in *contradistinction* to the human nature ; for, since it is the *resurrection* of the *Son* which is here spoken of, if that term be understood of the *Divine* nature, as put in opposition to the *human* nature, it would involve this absurdity—*that the Divine nature rose "from the dead."* In other places we also read that the "Son" was "*raised from the dead,*" Acts iii. 26. *God having raised up His SON Jesus :* and 1 Thess. i. 10, "*And to wait for His SON from heaven, whom He raised from the dead.*" But granting, what is not obvious, (if we

mean the Divine nature exclusively,) "that an opposition is expressed between what Christ was according to the flesh, and what He was according to a higher nature," (page 15,) and that this higher nature is the Divine nature of Christ; I say, even granting this, the conclusion in the "Remarks" is incorrect, which states, that of "the Divine nature of Christ the apostolic designation is the SON OF GOD." This by no means follows from the distinction of the two natures. On the contrary, the apostle states that the resurrection declared *Him* "*Jesus Christ our Lord*;" it is this Person he expressly calls the "*Son of God*;" and here the human nature is most evidently included in the apostolic designation "Son of God."

The assertion (page 15,) that, "according to Dr. C.'s view of the meaning of this term, the opposition would be lost, and the argument of the apostle destroyed," is absolutely without foundation; and argues a total want of a right apprehension on the part of Mr. W.: for on this very passage Dr. C. expressly says, that the resurrection was "*a manifest proof of our Lord's innocence, the truth of His doctrine, and the fulfilment of all that the prophets had spoken*;" and, consequently, concludes that the resurrection is "*the all comprehending proof of Christ's mission, and of His claims*," which amounts, in effect, to nothing short of this, that Christ is *God's OWN SON*, in a much higher sense than any *mere man*, or any *mere creature*, is His son; it proves the *Divinity* of Christ, which the Dr. every where strenuously and successfully defends. And, keeping in view this twofold nature of our Lord, Dr. C. in his Note on Luke i. 32, says, "*the human nature is called, in a peculiar sense, The SON of the most high God*;" (for it was conceived of the Holy Ghost, and born of the Virgin Mary,) "because," says he, "that human nature that should be born of the Virgin, was to be united with the Divine nature." But no where is this term "*Son of God*" applied *exclusively* to the *Divine nature* itself, any more than the term *Jesus*, or *Christ*, is appropriated exclusively to that nature. Thus we see how far Dr. C.'s "theory" is from annihilating the *Divinity* of our blessed Lord. On the contrary, his theory exhibits it in the strongest possible light, and infinitely above the most exalted conceptions of the mind.

of man! While, on the other hand, we behold the doctrine of the "eternal filiation" involving the grossest contradiction in terms, which can possibly be conceived, as has been so luminously stated at large by Mr. Drew in the extract we made in pages 6, 7, from his sermon upon this subject. So far removed, then, is the theory of the learned Dr. which opposes the eternal filiation from verging on Arianism, or Socinianism, as some have so disingenuously asserted that it does. On the contrary, he every where maintains with the Word of holy inspiration, that the *Divine nature* of the Son is co-equal, co-essential, and co-existent with the Father, and with the Spirit. He scripturally holds the personal distinctions of the Holy Trinity; but he will not be "wise above what is written," in determining in what that distinction consists, or to what degree it extends.

Added to all this, however, even were we to grant, in accommodation to Mr. W.'s opinion, (page 15,) that the phrase "according to the spirit of holiness" is equivalent to "according to His Divine nature;" still we shall find the text does not prove the term "Son of God" to designate the *Divine nature*, in *contradistinction* to the *human*. Contrarywise, it shews us, even admitting that very doubtful sense, that, "according to, in respect of, the flesh," Christ Jesus was the offspring of David: and not merely as a man, the son of David; but also, the Son of God in that high and distinguishing sense which gives Him the title of *only begotten*, according to, in respect of, or on account of, His Divine nature. He is, *κατα*, in respect of, or on account of, His Divine nature, supereminently, "The Son of God." Thus, so far from being restrained to that Divine nature, the appellation denotes the Person of Christ in His complex nature: and that He is the "Son of God" in this extraordinary manner, agreeably to this *mysterious union*, the resurrection fully proves; because it proves His "innocence, the truth of His doctrine, and the fulfilment of all that the prophets had spoken concerning Him." Before I dismiss this subject, I would further add, that the appellation "Son of God," as given to our Lord, leads us to a direct view of His Divinity. We are all the sons of God by *creation*; some of us more particularly so by *adoption*: but *Christ* is emphatically the "*Son of*

God," "His own Son," "His only begotten Son," because He was conceived by the Holy Ghost, and because the *Divine* nature was united with the *human* in the Person of Christ: but the manner *how* infinitely exceeds the utmost stretch of our intellectual powers! but that it is so the Holy Scriptures plainly declare, and the resurrection completely establishes.

From this conclusion then, drawn from Mr. W.'s own explanation of the text, we plainly see that it proves, that it says, that it means, nothing respecting the eternal filiation.

Nor does it appear that the apostle, in this passage, is speaking distinctly, or principally, of the Divine nature; or that he has it at all in his view; at least, no further than as it is contained in the name of *Christ*, as well as in that of *Son*. Mr. W. has also failed in proving that the "opposition is expressed between what Christ was according to His flesh," and what He was according to His "*higher nature*:" and, indeed, were this the opposition in the full sense Mr. W. imagines, it would contradict the miraculous conception, and disprove what the apostle intended it should illustrate. It would make His human nature to be entirely of David's seed in the natural way, begotten of the man, as well as coming of the woman, which is what he manifestly opposes: and, consequently, the "force in the apostle's observation," and "the opposition," also witness that, according to the flesh, he was, indeed, of the seed of David, because the Son of Mary; but the *Son of God*, because produced by the immediate influence of the Holy Ghost. Thus, then, He is, in a peculiar sense, the *Son of God*; the resurrection proves this, for it substantiates His claims; and this is one of them.—Nor does it argue against, but proves His Divinity; to this He also laid claim, and the resurrection is "the all comprehending proof."

In no sense then, in which this passage can be legitimately taken, can it be made to prove the *eternal Sonship*. On the contrary, in its most obvious and natural sense, it points out that Jesus Christ is called the "*Son of God*" in direct reference to the incarnation of His Deity!

And here I would observe, that the labour employed by Mr. W. in attempting to prove the difference of signification between the terms "Messiah," and "Son of God," he might well have spared himself; for we allow that each of these terms involves the idea of *Divinity*. But on what Mr. W. has advanced on that subject I would remark, that, although Nathanael be supposed to have used the terms "Son of God," and "King of Israel," as synonymous; yet, notwithstanding this, good reason might be assigned why "Rabbi" was not used "as synonymous with the other two," (page 17.)

Dr. C. does not, as is insinuated page 17, and in numerous other places, maintain "that the proof that Christ, as to His human nature, was miraculously produced by God, was the proof of His Messiahship." No, he insists that His *works*, His *doctrines*, His resurrection, &c. proved this, and all His other claims, among which we include His miraculous conception.

True, the Dr. says He is called the Son, because God produced Him in the womb of the Virgin by the energy of the Holy Ghost: but he has nowhere said that this was intended as a proof of His Messiahship, or of His Divinity; yet, at least to us, it has some weight as a proof, though not equal to those just noticed, and of which the resurrection is the confirmation. Again, we find the Dr., in his Note on Luke i. 32., saying that Christ is peculiarly styled the "Son of God," because of the *union* of the *Divine and human* natures. Nathanael was probably convinced, (though possibly unacquainted with the miraculous conception,) that Jesus possessed the *Divine nature*; and this was sufficient to produce the confession, "*Thou art the Son of God!*" and we are led to this supposition by this simple consideration,—that as Nathanael was then talking with the *man* Jesus, yet he perceived by His omniscience declared in the words "When thou wast under the fig-tree, I saw thee;" that, indeed, He must be God as well as man. Of the latter he had ocular demonstration; of the former full assurance from this display of His omniscience, "When thou wast under the fig-tree, I saw thee." Thus, then, Nathanael perceived that Jesus was God, as well as man. The above remark will, I presume, with certain limitations, serve as a reply to similar observations

made by Mr. W. respecting the sense in which the other disciples, and the Jews in general, understood this term. And, in short, whenever we find the term used, we perceive a manifest and direct reference to the man called the "*Son of God*;" and that he could justly have that title only in reference to a real and personal union with the Deity; but there is no intimation that the disciples imagined the Divine nature exclusively was "*the Son of God*."

In this stage of the discussion, we will allow to Mr. W. the utmost of what he contends for, that is, that the term "*Son of God*," as used in its highest signification, by the disciples and the Jews, was understood by them "so as to involve the idea of absolute Divinity," (page 21 and 23.) But though they considered it as involving that *idea*; yet this no way indicates that it is a designation of the Divinity itself, but of the Person who possessed that Divinity, the Person in whose nature that Divinity is mysteriously united.

That the Jews, and several Heathen nations, had some notion of an incarnation of Deity, cannot be doubted; and we admit that they considered Him to whose nature the Deity would be thus attached as the *Son of God*; and we are equally certain that the Heathens profanely applied this to their *false gods*. The manner in which the disciples and the Jews constantly used the term evidently shews that they understood it as referring to an *inferior* nature, mysteriously united to the Divine: hence we find some of the Jews bearing testimony "that Jesus is the *Son of God*;" *not* that the *Son of God* is *IN* Him. Thus the Jews and the High Priest asked him (Jesus,) *Art thou* the *Son of God*? and the words, and the sense, must be most wonderfully strained indeed, to make the term an appellation of the Divine nature exclusively; or in *contradistinction* to His humanity. It has not then been proved "that the personal term '*Son of God*' was understood, in the common language of the Jews," as "a designation of the Divine nature exclusively," (page 37.) Far from it, we see no such thing; and, consequently, the doctrine of the eternal filiation derives no advantage whatever, nor is it at all deducible, from the text in Romans, (page 37.)

But the Jews with whom Jesus conversed, as recorded in the tenth chapter of John's Gospel, appear to have attached so high and exclusive a sense to the term *Son of God*, as to charge our Lord with blasphemy in assuming it. This is done out of malice; and they strain the sense above its usual signification. The Redeemer corrects their invidious misconstruction, by a quotation from the Psalms, "Is it not written in your law, (or Scripture,) I said ye are gods. If He called them gods unto whom the word of God came, and the Scripture cannot be broken; say ye of Him whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest, because I said I am the Son of God." That is, if your Scriptures, which have been inspired by the Holy Ghost, have given the illustrious title of gods to your prophets, as in the case of Moses, (Exod. vii. 1.,) and others, "say ye of Him whom the Father hath sanctified, and sent into the world," who is a much more extraordinary Personage than any of the prophets that have preceded Him, and has done among you (Jews) works which none other man did, and, consequently, has a right, at least, to as high a titular distinction as the most exalted of your forefathers,—Say ye of *Him*, that He blasphemes because He styles Himself the Son of God, a title *far* beneath that which the Scriptures, which cannot be broken, have given to *mere* mortals? But though I have shewn you from the Sacred Oracles, that the title Son of God does not imply, that the Person rightly laying claim to it is the independent self-existent Jehovah, do not hence imagine I mean to tell you that the Person addressing you is not equal to the Father. "If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not." If the works which can be performed by God ALONE, are not NONE by my own power, and by my own authority, independently of any appeal to the Supreme Being, then believe me not, when I say, "I and my Father are one." Thus we find, from the testimony of Him who cannot lie, that the term *Son of God* could not be construed to mean Divinity; and, consequently, must have been given to the eternal Logos because of His assumption of human nature. This we have already shewn in various parts of this Pamphlet; and shall have occasion to notice frequently again, before the close of this discussion.

From this text we are conducted in pages 40 and 41, to

Acts xiii. 32, 33. *And we declare unto you glad tidings, how that the promise which was made unto the fathers, God hath fulfilled the same unto us their children, in that He hath raised up Jesus again : as it is also written in the second Psalm, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee :* and the term *Son* here is stated to have precisely the same meaning as that in Rom. i. 3, 4. Now Mr. W. himself tells us, (p. 41,) that “ the sense of the passage is obvious, *Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee*, raised thee up from the dead, in attestation of thy Sonship.” After this assertion, I would ask, what are we to understand by raising the Son from the dead, if the term ought to be restricted to the Divine nature *exclusively*, and in *contradistinction* to the human? Was the Divine nature then raised from the dead? What! the Divine nature, considered exclusively, and in opposition to the human nature of our Lord? Did it indeed become a companion of the tomb, a subject in the dominions of death! This sentiment Scripture will not warrant, and every thing bearing the stamp of orthodoxy lifts up its voice and its standard against it. But if, indeed, it be a sentiment interwoven in Mr. W.’s creed, we ought no longer to wonder at his endeavour, to set Scripture and reason at variance.

It is seen plainly, according to Mr. W.’s own explanation, that the Person called *the Son of God* in the most distinguishing sense of the expression, *Thou art my Son*, &c. it is seen, I say, that He was raised from the dead; and it is, therefore, plain that the propriety of the term arises from its reference to the *human nature* of our Lord; and, consequently, neither here, nor in Rom. i. 3, 4., nor, indeed, in any other place, has St. Paul “ contemplated the Supreme Divinity of His Lord under the title *Son of God*,” as a designation of that Divinity exclusively, (page 41.) That our Lord Jesus Christ is absolutely Divine, he every where keeps in mind, and not unfrequently contemplates the glorious fact with pleasing and awful astonishment: but while he says his Divine Lord is the Son of God, he never says, either directly, or in the real sense of his words, that the Divine nature is the Son of God. Mr. W. adds, that “ there is no authority at all for considering the great object of the resurrection to be to prove the miraculous conception, as the view which Dr. C. has adopted necessarily supposes,”

(page 42.) The assertion itself has already many times been made; and it has been refuted. It was shewn from the Dr.'s Note on Rom. i. 3, 4, that he considered the resurrection as the grand proof of all His claims, even of His *Divinity*, and the *truth* of His *doctrine*; and this is consistent with what he every where affirms. We find too, while the Dr. makes the resurrection "the all comprehending proof," and the seal of the truth; that he holds forth as the evidences of His Divinity, and His other claims, *His works*, *His doctrines*, and *His sufferings*, &c. Hence he remarks on John i. 14, "They had the fullest proof of His Divinity by the miracles which He wrought;" and again, "while Jesus dwelt among men, His glory was manifested in His gracious words, and miraculous acts:" and (John ii. 11.) Jesus, by the miracle at Cana, *manifested forth his glory*, which the Dr. explains, "of His supreme Divinity." Again he explains our Lord's words (John v. 32,) to the Jews thus:—"God the Father who, by His Spirit in your prophets, described my Person, office, and miracles;" and thus makes the fulfilment of the prophets an evidence of the truth of His claims; and on this subject he continually speaks in similar language.

Now, among our Lord's claims were these: that He is the Messiah, that He is the Son of God, that He is truly Divine, &c. These were established by His *gracious words*, His *miraculous acts*, the *fulfilment* of the prophecies, and the *resurrection*, added to other remarkable circumstances; and, in the establishment of these greater claims, all the minor ones are included; and hence the truth of His miraculous conception: and thus the Dr. does not bring the less to prove the greater, but the greater to prove the less; and the whole to give us a clear and blessed view of our Immanuel.

From what has been already considered, we have been obliged to mark the most gross system of misrepresentation, in the view Mr. W. has given of Dr. C.'s sentiments; and I would charitably hope that his misrepresentations have been undesigned, and have proceeded merely from a zeal for what he has considered the truth: but, alas, alas, the same reprehensible

conduct is so visible throughout the whole of his calumniating pamphlet, that it appears impossible for the utmost stretch of charity to exculpate its author!

That “associations of *Sonship* and *Divinity*,” (page 43,) are found in innumerable passages of Scripture, is an undeniable and glorious truth; and if such solid proof had not graciously been given us, we should have been obliged to renounce the *Divinity* of Christ: but, thank God, such “associations” are found; and it is this mysterious and glorious truth which animates our minds, and fills our souls with joy unspeakable, and full of glory! Therefore, we cordially admit “that we are to honour the *Son*, as we honour the *Father* ;” that the “*Holy Ghost* is sent as the *Spirit of the Son* ;” that all things “are created by the *Son*, and for Him ;” and that “He is appointed Heir of all things.” These truths we are forward to declare; for we find them agreeable to the tenor and the “literal sense of Scripture.” Yes, *there* we find God manifested in the flesh; *there* we discover this mysterious association of the Divine and human nature of our blessed Lord; and for this manifestation our hearts are ever ready to thank God, even the Father of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. All this, I say, we not only cordially admit, but gratefully acknowledge. But that God is the Father of the Second Person of the adorable Trinity, considered in reference to His *Divinity* exclusively, we boldly deny; it is no such thing—it can be no such thing—and the assertion which would oppose itself to this scriptural truth is a broad libel upon the essential *Divinity* of our Redeemer; for, if we assert that His *Divinity* is derived, we destroy His Godhead; for any thing derived from *God* cannot be imagined to be *equal* to *God*;—and to talk of His being begotten from eternity is to talk nonsense, for we cannot associate any notion of this kind either with Scripture, reason, or common sense.

Again, I agree with Mr. W. in saying “that the Second Divine hypostasis has the name of *Son*, when, through infinite condescension, He presents Himself to us in the *union* of the *two natures*. It appears strange, however, that Mr. W., among these associations, should present, as a confirmation of the

eternal Sonship, John v. 26, "To the SON *is given* to have life in Himself, even as the Father hath life in Himself," (page 43.)

Now if *Son* here be a designation of the Divine nature exclusively, the direct consequence is, that the Second Person has not life in Himself *necessarily*, since it was GIVEN Him to have it. Nor is this the only conclusion which must follow from these premises—for this also arises, that he must be dependent on the GIVER; with many other such *absurdities*. All this, if pushed to its consequences, would prove that the Second Person is not of the same essence with the First; for, taking *Son* to be a designation of the Divinity exclusively, we ascribe *essential* life to the Father, and only *communicated* life to the Son; therefore, the Father is God essentially, and the Son only God *derivatively*; which is the grossest possible absurdity and contradiction, for that which is derived cannot be God. See more on *derivation* below, in reply to the remarks on page 87.

Surely these necessary consequences of the sense just given do not rise higher than Arianism; and, therefore, it appears strange that this passage should be brought forward to favour the doctrine of the eternal Sonship; when, viewing it in this light, it opposes every thing Mr. W. himself allows to be strictly orthodox.

But taking the term *Son of God* in its proper scriptural sense, the force and beauty of the passage, and its accordance with the uniform language of Scripture, will be at once perceived.—The human nature has not essentially life *in itself*; but, from the incarnation, (the uniting of the Divine with the human nature) is *given* to the Son, (to our Lord Jesus Christ,) to have life *in Himself*.

Perhaps Mr. W. may say (with some others,*) that it was

* Here it may not be improper to introduce a quotation from Bishop Pearson on the Creed. This excellent prelate strenuously argued in favour of the eternal filiation; and his writings are referred to by most who espouse that doctrine. Who would suppose he is adverse to Arianism while he delivers the following sentiments: (page 34,) "That God is the

eternally given to the Son to have life in Himself. This, however, the Sacred Volume does not say either by plain declaration, or in the sense of any of its passages. But let us examine this text by Mr. W.'s own rules:—1st, In its “literal sense,”—when I read it was *given*, &c., I conclude, agreeably to this “literal sense,” that there was a period when this act of giving was performed, and that the act of giving necessarily preceded the possession of the gift; consequently, the Son, as Son, had not eternally life in Himself. When I consider again the gift itself, “the having of life *in Himself*,” I conclude that the “literal sense” demonstrates the *Divinity* of the Son; for no being but God can have life *in Himself* essentially. But it is given to the Son to have it as the Father hath it; therefore, the Divine nature was in that gift; and thus, by the incarnation, “*God is in Christ*,” and the *Son* is, therefore, on account of this gift, truly Divine, God as well as man, the Word made flesh; and hence, with equal propriety and truth, He says, “*My Father is GREATER than I*,” and, “*I and my Father are*

proper and eternal Father of his eternal Son ——— that in the very name of Father there is something of eminence which is not in that of Son: and some kind of priority we must ascribe to Him whom we call the First, in respect to Him whom we term the Second Person.” This priority, he says, “consisteth in this, that the Father hath the essence of Himself; the Son by communication from the Father. From whence He acknowledgeth that He is *from Him*, that He *liveth by Him*, that the *Father gave Him to have life in Himself* ——— His generation, by which He is understood to have *His being* from the Father, who only hath it of Himself, and is the original of all power and essence in the Son.” And again, “it is no diminution to the Son to say He is from another; for His very name imports as much; but it were a diminution of the Father to speak so of Him.” Again, says the good Bishop, under the influence of his misconceptions (page 133,) respecting Christ, “he must be understood to have the Godhead communicated to Him by the Father, who is not only eternally, but originally, God.” And again, (page 135,) “though Christ say, the *Father is in Me*, and *I in Him*; yet withal he saith, *I came out from the Father*; by the former shewing the Divinity of His essence, by the latter the origination of Himself.” Who does not see here the very sinews of Arianism, or else the plainest contradictions? His essence originated, communicated, having “His being” from another, and yet eternal! All this absurdity arises from applying exclusively to the Divine nature of Christ those passages which evidently refer to His complex Person as God-man, our great Immanuel.

ONE." 2dly, I can discover nothing in any other part of revelation to oblige me to depart from this "literal sense." 3dly, The meaning of several passages, which I have had occasion already to point out, and of others which I shall hereafter introduce before I dismiss this argument, restrains me to this "literal" signification. And, 4thly, I find that no consistent sense can possibly be made out, unless this literal sense be admitted. By this investigation, which is according to Mr. W.'s own principles, (though the practical part he has forgotten,) we plainly perceive that the text in question, while it fully establishes the Divinity of the Son, totally overthrows the doctrine of the eternal filiation: while it presents us with the doctrine of true Deity in the Person of Christ, and in this sense, of the Divine Sonship, it altogether rejects and tramples down the doctrine of the eternal filiation.

But we proceed; and find another of these soul-animating associations of Sonship and Divinity to have been discovered in Heb. i. "This Son," says Mr. W., "is the brightness (*αυραγμα*), the effulgence, the emitted splendour, of the Father's glory, certainly not as a human being; and the express, or exact image (*χαρακτηρ*) of his Person, (*της υποστασεως αυτου*) of His substance; another expression not in the least applicable to His human body, which had no visible glory; nor to His human spirit, which however heightened by its union with the Deity, could not be the exact image of His Person; for of His eternity, self-existence, omniscience, and omnipresence, it could not be even the faint image." (page 43.) A little reflection will, I think, teach us that this image and brightness are neither attributed to the Divine nor to the human nature alone; but to the human nature in its connection with the Divine.—Granting it, however, for the present, to mean the Divine nature; still we cannot infer that this nature alone is here called the Son who is *appointed* Heir of all things. Surely, it cannot, in any consistent sense of the passage, be made to express more than this: that He, who is denominated the Son, has in His own Person the Divine nature, which, on our present supposition, is this brightness and image.

I admit, with Mr. W., that the Son, in His complex nature, is called not only the exact image of God, but God over all blessed for ever; and it is likewise evident that Christ our Lord *may* be called "Son," on account of the human nature miraculously produced; and this "Son" *may* be called God, and the exact image of God, because of the Divine nature existing in His person. There is, therefore, nothing in this chapter, or passage, contradictory to the sense we have now taken of it: and, consequently, it is impossible that this chapter can prove that the term *Son* is a designation of the *Divine nature alone*. No, it does not in the least even indicate such a meaning: Christ the Son is God as well as man; and hence, in this complex nature, He is the brightness, (the image,) of God; for in this *Son* dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily; *He manifested his glory*, that is, "His supreme *Divinity*." God is *life, and light, and love*; and these perfections of the Divine nature exist equally in the Three Subsistences, or Persons, of the Holy Trinity. The *Word* is *life, and light, and love*; and the *Word was made flesh*; and, in consequence of this assumption of our nature, "*He is called, in a peculiar sense, the Son of the Most High God.*" This is simply what Dr. C. has stated; and not, as is insinuated (page 43,) that the title was "given Him *solely* because of His having been conceived by the Holy Ghost." And in this view of the subject, taken by Dr. C., can we alone see the power, the emphasis, the correctness, of "*and it was GIVEN him to have life in himself*;" "*he emptied himself, and became of no reputation.*" "*I and my Father are one,*" says He, speaking of His Divine nature; but, referring to His human nature; "*My Father is greater than I.*" In no other light than that in which the Dr. has viewed the subject can these (otherwise contradictory) passages be made to harmonize: but here we see that though He thought it not robbery to be equal with God: as to His *Divinity*; yet, to redeem a fallen world, He took upon Him our nature, became of no reputation; and, being found in the fashion of a man; He became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. But though this *brightness or image* may refer to the Divine nature, it affords no proof that the term *Son* is employed to designate that nature. By no

means: the "literal sense" of many passages opposes this interpretation; and I am truly astonished that a sensible man can resist the evidence that, one would think, even the conclusions of his own mind must irresistibly draw on this subject, if divested of prejudice!

But, agreeably to Mr. W.'s rules, let us examine the first chapter of Hebrews; and we shall find that "the literal sense" of the chapter shews, 1st, that Christ is called the Son on account of His human nature: 2dly, that He is called God on account of the union of the *Divine* with the human nature. And, first, that He is called Son on account of His human or created nature appears from this, that *God hath APPOINTED him* Heir of all things, ver. 2. He *was made better* than the angels, ver. 4. *THIS DAY* have I begotten thee; ver. 5. God, even thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows, ver. 9. And, again, I *WILL BE* to Him a *Father*, and He *SHALL BE* to me a *Son*, ver. 5. The marked phraseology of this last passage cannot be easily overlooked, in which the future tense is so very prominent; and, consequently, refers, as we have shewn in a previous part of this Pamphlet, to an act in futurity when the words were spoken: I *WILL BE* to Him a *Father*, He *SHALL BE* to me a Son. Therefore, to make out a consistent sense of the passage quoted above from the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, we are necessarily led to this conclusion, that Christ is the Son of God in reference to the union of His Divine and human natures; and that this *union* was effected that He might be the Redeemer of the world. But, secondly, the obvious sense of this chapter shews that the Divine and human natures constitute but one Person named in Scripture *our Lord Jesus Christ*. Hence, the Saviour of sinners upholdeth all things, ver. 3. He is God whose throne is for ever and ever, ver. 8. He laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the works of His hands, ver. 10. "The literal sense," therefore, shews us, that the Son is a Person comprehending *two* natures: that He is *APPOINTED Heir* refers to his human nature; that He *UPHOLDETH* all things has reference to His Divine nature. 2. This sense is not contradicted by any Scripture that I can find. 3. Other passages restrain us to this

sense; and those I have already quoted oppose the doctrine of the eternal Sonship. 4. In the sense in which my opponent has understood this chapter, no consistent sense can possibly be made of the whole; for if *Son* here mean the Divine nature "*distinctly and exclusively*," then we should read, God appointed the Divine nature *Heir*; that the *Divinity*, ("the eternal, independent, and self-existent Being,") was MADE better than the angels; that the *Divine* nature ("which is illimitable in its immensity, inconceivable in its mode of existence, and indescribable in its essence,") was ANOINTED with the oil of gladness above His *fellows*. What! above the Father and the Holy Spirit? Such are the gross absurdities which those have run into, who hold the doctrine of the eternal Sonship; and we find that the doctrine in dispute is wholly untenable upon a proper investigation of those very passages of Holy Writ which its advocates have deemed the most unanswerable.

But Mr. W. has not yet done with this chapter; and, consequently, I must not quit it: it is a favourite spot he has chosen; and I will tarry with him here a little longer. In page 44, we are directed to Heb. v. 8, "*Though he were a Son, yet learned he obedience by the things which he suffered*;" Mr. W. tells us that "the very stress of the apostle's argument compels us to conclude, that in the use of this term, in this passage, the apostle must refer *distinctly and exclusively* to the Divine nature of Christ." Notwithstanding what Mr. W. has said, I am altogether at a loss to find out this "*distinct and exclusive*" reference; especially, while I observe a direct allusion to His suffering death. What, then, did the Divine nature *learn obedience* by the things the Divine nature suffered? This would be strange indeed; and impossible to be reconciled with the ideas we usually attach to absolute Divinity. But to make it easier to be understood of the Divine nature *exclusively*, Mr. W. attempts to shew, that it could not be a subject for "so great an emphasis of holy wonder, that the *Son*, if His human nature alone were contemplated, should become obedient unto suffering," (page 44.) Even on this ground, I think it would be an object of holy wonder. But who says it is spoken of the human nature *exclusively*? Not Dr. C.; neither do his "views"

intimate such an exclusive sense: and, surely, because Mr. W. says it for him, this is no reason that the Dr. has said it for himself. The misrepresentation here, then, is evident; and the sophistry of the argument abundantly apparent:—it is not “spoken of the human nature *alone*,” therefore, it is spoken of the Divine nature “*exclusively*.” Alas! alas! What will not prejudice lead a man to say. Were this interpretation admitted, it would follow necessarily, that the Divine nature “*exclusively*” suffered death. But, since our very reason is so repugnant to this sense of the passage,—let us examine to what issue the “theory” of Dr. C. will lead us. We find that, while contemplating the union of the Divine and human natures of Christ, this death, and this suffering, demand a holy wonder; and excite the highest possible emotion of astonishment, love, and praise. Nature was astonished, and her rocks rent; the dead heard that it was “finished,” and rose with the influence of the power of the wonderful completion; the veil of the temple was rent in twain, when the God-man bowed His head, and gave up the ghost; and the sun was darkened in his going forth:—and yet is there no “emphasis of meaning” in the sufferings of the human nature of Christ, considering it in its connection with the Divine nature! Creation was astonished at it, —the emphasis was so great as to arrest the rays of light in their progress to the scene of those sufferings,—the rocks were rent, —and death himself became unmindful of the charge he held! And can Mr. W. then see no emphasis in the “sufferings” of *Christ*; in His death? Could His *Deity* suffer? No; His Divinity was incapable of suffering. Cannot Mr. W. think the circumstances we have just adverted to sufficiently wonderful that he must add, that the term *Son* here “must refer *distinctly and exclusively* to the Divine nature of Christ;” that “He put Himself under law; came to do the will of his God and Father, who had assigned Him the work of suffering and death,” (page 45.) The “will of his God?” What! the God of His Divine nature *exclusively*, “who had assigned Him the work of suffering and death?” “*Suffering and death*” to the “*Divine nature exclusively*!” Surely, Mr. W. is not aware of what he is saying. But he further adds, (page 45.) “Take the passage in

the sense of Dr. C.: 'Though He were, in His human nature, produced by the power of the Holy Ghost, in the womb of His virgin mother; yet learned He obedience by the things He suffered.'" I am tired with pointing out Mr. W.'s gross misrepresentations of Dr. C. To have given the Dr. his own meaning and sentiments, Mr. W. should have added after the word "*mother*," and *having in His own Person true Godhead*, or something to this effect; for this is necessary to make out Dr. C.'s real 'theory.' Mr. W. adds, "contrast this exposition, poor, spiritless, without point, or emphasis, with another passage," viz. Phil. ii. 6, 7, 8. Now taking the Dr.'s genuine sense, that the Divine nature is in the Person of the Son by the incarnation, then his 'exposition' has all the force of the passage to which we are referred. Hence the sharpened arrow directed with such precipitancy and impetuosity at the Dr. falls extremely wide of its intended mark; and only pierces a phantom of the warrior's brain! In the Note on page 46, it is asserted that Heb. vii. 28. is "utterly inexplicable on Dr. C.'s principle:" I confess I am unable to find a word in that text in the least repugnant to his principle; a principle which declares the Son to be God and man in one Person;* that He is immaculate; that He is made a Priest "by the word of the oath;" and that "He is consecrated for evermore." The text perfectly agrees, and is in unison, with the principle in question.

Mr. W. informs us, (page 47,) that he "has examined with some care all the passages in the New Testament where the term Son of God occurs, as applied to Christ." Of these he has selected several in order to prove the eternal filiation: these, with the remarks on them, have now been considered; and it has, I think, been found that all of them declare against the eternal filiation, and some of them most strongly oppose it; and that too, agreeably to Mr. W.'s own principles and rule, in their "literal sense;" and accord exactly with the Dr.'s

* Dr. C., in his Note on John v. 23, says, "If then the Son is to be honoured, EVEN AS the Father is honoured; then the Son must be God, as receiving that worship which belongs to God alone."

views. Of course, then, the Dr. is exempted from the labour of bringing forward all the other passages relating to this subject. But we find that Mr. W. is "not prepared to allow, that even Christ is called the Son of God, in Luke i. 35. with sole reference to the human nature." If he mean with *sole* reference, so as to exclude the union of the Divine nature, we readily agree with him; for we have never contended for a *sole* reference, and never wished it. But if Mr. W. means, as indeed his views require, that the term "Son" is not given to the complex nature of Christ, who, as to His human nature, was born of the Virgin; then when he says, (page 47,) "The holy thing *born* of Mary was called the Son of God," he admits that the Divine nature could be born of Mary; in which, I think, he will find few followers. The human nature could alone be *born* of Mary; though, at the same time, the Divine nature was personally united, we know not how, with the Son conceived and born; so that the two natures constitute one Person; and that Person is our Lord Jesus Christ!

Having now taken a pretty enlarged view of Mr. W.'s attack upon Dr. C. in reference to the Dr.'s ideas on the subject of the *eternal Sonship*, we proceed to consider the next ground of complaint which Mr. W. has preferred against the worthy and learned Dr. This, we find, relates to the principles of scriptural explanation; and Mr. W. has summed up the charge by saying, "Dr. C. has, in the conclusion of his commentary, contended for a right to make use of human reason in matters of Revelation;" and then Mr. W. immediately hastens to draw his conclusions; "which, to me, appears highly dangerous and unwarranted," (page 50.) Before, however, we give in our verdict, let us allow the Dr. to speak for himself. We find him saying, "In every question which involves the eternal interests of man, the *Holy Scriptures* must be appealed to, in union with *reason*, their *great commentator*. He who forms his *creed*, or *confession of faith* without these, may believe any thing or nothing, as the cunning of others, or his own caprices, may dictate."—This is what Dr. C. has maintained; and what most of us consider as our unalienable right. But, says Mr. W., "All the doctrines which churches have crowded into their

creeds" are "to be brought, not, as one might have expected to hear from such a Divine as is Dr. C., to the test of Scripture alone, but *reasons* also, the great 'commentator' on Scripture itself;" (page 55.) and such use of reason is "destroying the unity of truth, and leaving us without any standard of opinion, except the ever varying one of human reason," (page 51.)

Thus, then, we find where the Dr. and Mr. W. are at issue:—the former says, We have no true standard, if we do *not* appeal to Scripture in union with reason: the latter that we have no true standard, if we *make* this appeal in union with reason. Before we proceed further in the consideration of this subject, let us examine the ground Mr. W. so strenuously disputes with the Dr. What is reason? It is, says Mr. Locke, "sometimes taken for true and clear principles; sometimes for clear and fair deductions from those principles; sometimes for the cause, and particularly the final cause; and sometimes for a faculty of the human mind." Not unfrequently we find it used to designate a strong motive, leading to the performance of a certain action; and sometimes we use the term to denote the act of reasoning, or the operation of the reasoning faculty in man, which distinguishes him above the beasts which perish.—It is that power of the mind by which we are enabled to discover truth from error; to draw from each their conclusions; and build upon them their consequences and results. It is the power God has given us to distinguish and ennoble us above all His other creatures;—and are we, then, to shrink from the use of it? Surely not, even in matters which "involve the eternal interests of man;"—or what mean the commands, "Be able to give a reason for the hope that is in you;" "Try all things; Hold fast that which is good?" And by what better rule, I would ask, can we "*try all things*" than by Scripture? Or by what power of our minds can we try them, better than by that one which we denominate reason; and which is still further to be exercised, in accounting for the "hope that is in us," of possessing even life eternal?

Let us listen, however, for a moment to the opinion which our reverend fathers in God, Mr. Wesley and Mr. Fletcher, enter-

tained of reason, of its office, and its nature. The former of these holy men says, in his sermon on 1 Cor. xiv. 20., "It is a true remark of an eminent man, that if reason be against a man, a man will be against reason;" and adds, "This has been confirmed by the experience of all ages." And in the same sermon, speaking of what reason can, and what it cannot do; "in matters of religion," says he, "it can do exceeding much, both with regard to the foundation of it, and the superstructure. Is it not reason (assisted by the Holy Ghost) which enables us to understand what the Holy Scriptures declare concerning the being and attributes of God?—concerning His eternity, and immensity; His power, wisdom, and holiness? It is by reason that God enables us, in some measure, to comprehend His method of dealing with the children of men," &c. "and it is only by acting up to the dictates of it, that we can have a conscience void of offence towards God and man." In this exalted strain speaks Mr. Wesley of reason. Nor shall we find Mr. Fletcher, of whose character, self-abasement and piety form the leading features, much lower in his praise of it; for, in the second volume of his Works, page 8, I find this testimony of its glory:—"right reason, which is that which I appeal to, is a ray of the light that enlightens every man who comes into the world, and a beam of the eternal *Logos*." And it is presumed, no one will imagine Dr. C. refers to any other kind of reason than what Mr. Fletcher here terms *right reason*, any more than Mr. Wesley meant any other. Evidently their meaning is alike, as well as it appears their estimation of it is. Thus, then, we see Dr. C. does not stand alone in the high conceptions he has entertained of the reasoning faculty in man. Time would fail me to enumerate the names and opinions of great men in all ages on this subject: nor are we left without even greater authority than these; for the word of God is not silent here; and, as Mr. Fletcher says, "God, far from blaming a proper use of the noble faculty, by which we are chiefly distinguished from brutes, graciously invites us to the exercise of it; 'Come now,' says He, 'and let us *reason* together.' Jesus commends the unjust steward, for *reasoning* better upon his wrong, than the children of light, upon their right principles. Samuel desires the Israelites to stand still, that he may *reason* with them before

the Lord. St. Paul, who *reasoned* so conclusively himself, intimates, that wicked men are *unreasonable*; and declares that a total dedication of ourselves to God is our *reasonable* service: and while he challenges the vain disputers of this world, who would make jests pass for proofs, invectives for arguments, and sophistry for reason; he charges Titus to use, not merely sound speech, but (as the original also means) *sound reason*, that he who is of the contrary part may be ashamed. Let us then, following his advice and example, pay a due regard both to *reason* and *Revelation*: so shall we, according to his candid direction, break the shackles of prejudice; prove all things; and, by Divine grace, hold fast that which is good." Works, Vol. II. p. 8.

Were it necessary, abundance of other Scriptures might be adduced, to prove that God requires of us the fullest exercise of that reason he has given us: it is a talent we must not only improve, but we must gain by it others also; for, by and by we shall have to give an account; and woe, woe unto us, if we have either hid our light under a bushel, or digged a hole, and buried it in the earth! Let us, however, take a closer view of the term thus under our immediate consideration; and we shall find that the most general and primary acceptations of it are, 1st, It is used to denote true and clear principles, as when we say this or that is agreeable to reason. Some Authors have called this *common sense*:—and why? because these true and clear principles are admitted by all men of *sound mind* in all ages, and countries; and are planted by the Great Creator in the constitution of His common family. 2dly, It is used to designate that faculty of the soul by which we apprehend, comprehend, judge, and discourse; passing successively from evidence to evidence, and forming a correct judgment upon the whole.

Now one of these two senses necessarily involves the other; for if these common principles be planted in our nature, it consequently supposes that we have the faculty of using them; and, if so, that we likewise possess the principles necessary to its proper exercise.

Hence *human reason* generally means that faculty of the mind, which reasons, with the common principles planted in our nature as the foundation of all just reasoning: but when the term is used in reference to any particular man, it signifies his reasoning faculty as exercised by him, with the principles he has particularly selected and employed; and when applied to the all-wise Bestower of it, Divine or eternal reason refers to His infinite intelligence fully comprehending all things, and all the relations of things. Thus, then, we are led to three distinct senses in which this term reason is and may be used. 1. Eternal reason. 2. Human reason, or the reason of man. And, 3. His or their reason, or what appears reasonable to one, or more men: and we should do well to keep these absolute *distinctions* constantly in sight.

Eternal reason is infinitely above human reason; human reason admits certain knowledge, and rightly uses it; and his or their reason indicates supposed certain knowledge, and an apparent right use of it. Dean Swift, in his excellent sermon on the Trinity, makes this admirable remark and distinction: "*Reason itself* is true and just: but the *reason* of every particular man is weak and wavering, perpetually swayed and turned by his interests, his passions, and his vices."

Let us now see in what sense Dr. C. has used the term reason. In his excellent Commentary we find him saying, "The SACRED WRITINGS are a system of pure unsophisticated *reason*, proceeding from the immaculate mind of God: in many places, it is true, vastly elevated beyond what the reason of man could have devised or found out; but in no case *contrary* to human reason." And "the doctrines of this Book are doctrines of *eternal reason*; and they are *revealed*, because they are such. *Human reason could not have found them out.*" Concluding page of the Dr.'s Commentary.

Out of his own mouth, then, will we judge him. Is it not evident to every candid mind that by *eternal reason* the Dr. means the infinite understanding of Jehovah, from which Revelation has proceeded? That by *human reason* he contemplates

that faculty of reasoning which is founded in true principles; the candle of the Lord lighted up in the mind of man? Is not the distinction clear, and the infinite difference between eternal and human reason sufficiently made manifest in the Dr.'s argument? Nor does he ever confound *my reason* or *his reason* with either of the former. No, his own words shew he has constantly preserved the three perfectly distinct.

On the contrary, we find Mr. W. using the term in several senses, which he generally confounds. On page 49, he terms it a faculty, as "our reason, that is, our understanding:" but on the same page we learn that this very "understanding" is a very fickle faculty; for he adds, speaking of a man's former opinions, "the same reason which now impugns and rejects them, formerly regarded them as very undeniable conclusions." This surely, then, cannot be *right reason* assisted by the Holy Spirit—"that ray of light which illumines every man coming into the world—that beam of the eternal Logos." No, we recognize in it the "*pretender* to reason," which Mr. Fletcher speaks about—as "the poor thing which, in spiritual matters, the world calls reason," which St. Paul guards us against by telling us to "*try* all things," to "*prove* all things." And in following his injunctions we can alone arrive at "*undeniable conclusions.*"

We turn over the next page of Mr. W.'s "*Remarks,*" and find he uses the term to denote *opinion*; for he says, "My reason cannot be true, if it contradict Scripture." This reason not being true cannot refer to right reason: on page 51, he denotes it to be "our own views of what is reasonable;" and a little lower we find that it is always in a state of alteration, "without any standard of opinion, except the *ever varying* one of human reason." Thus is the "radiation of eternal reason" vilified indeed! But at page 73, we find the term (chameleon like) has changed once more its appearance: for it is "our reason; or, what is the same thing, our present knowledge;" or, as he terms it in another place, "supposed certain information!" Notwithstanding all these metamorphoses, however, Mr. W. still grants human reason may be right; for he says, (page 53,) "It may be a faint radiation of eternal reason:" though, alas! once more

it has changed its aspect ; for we are told, "it may be the reverse of eternal reason."

Having thus considered the term reason, and the way in which it is used by Dr. C. and his opponent, I think it is clearly evident, that the Dr. means by the term, *right reason*, or *human reason*: and that Mr. W. uses it indiscriminately, to mean only what *appears* reason, or *seems* reasonable to him.— Hence, then, it follows, that Mr. W.'s unjustifiable and illiberal attack upon "such a Divine as IS Dr. C.," is sapped in its very foundation. But before it crumbles into dust I would just notice a few of his principal remarks upon the subject. In page 48, Mr. W. asserts that Dr. C. denies the doctrine of the eternal Sonship by his "principle that it *cannot* be true ; and is not the sense of Scripture, because it is contrary to reason." Here, however, Mr. W. has not candidly stated the Dr.'s views ; for he does not say merely "because it is contrary to reason," but *because* he cannot find it in Scripture, and *besides* it is contrary to reason. Surely Mr. W. will never affirm that Scripture and *right* reason can contradict each other : if so, indeed, no man should ever reason with him ; nor will he, I presume, dare to affirm, that Dr. C. can be understood to mean any other than that called by Mr. Fletcher *right reason*. This admitted, it follows undeniably, that if it be demonstrated that any sense given to a passage in Scripture be certainly contrary to right reason, then that sense cannot be the true one. But, asks Mr. W., "how do I know that *my* reason in this particular is right reason ?" This is another question ; and in pages 49 and 80, he answers it for himself by saying, the sense of Scripture is ascertained by reason. So then he must know his reason is right, before he can pronounce that his sense of Scripture determined by it is the right sense. Dr. C. no where opposes any principle of reason against a scriptural declaration ; any more than he opposes Scripture to Scripture ; he merely maintains their agreement, and concord : and in this Mr. W. follows his example ; for he says, we are to use our reason "in interpreting the sense of the Divine Volume, and in ascertaining its sense," (page 49 and 80.) I shall spend no time in refuting Mr. W.'s representation of Dr. C.'s wish to make the *Holy Writings* bend to his "notions assumed as infallible."

No one who reads his comment on them will, can, be so blind as to give a moment's credence to this insinuation. And, consequently, I shall pass it by.

In page 50, Mr. W. tells us that the only question on the sense of Scripture ought to be: "not what we must make it, to make it reasonable; but what it appears when read solely by its own light." Now it is not the aim of the Dr. to make it reasonable; he finds it so already: and to discover its genuine sense he takes reason with him to enable him to perceive "what that sense really is." Mr. W. says that we are to learn what this sense "appears, when read solely by its own light." I would, however, ask, "appears" to what? To the eye of my mind I suppose, to my understanding. Dr. C. has not gone so far as to say Scripture must be read "solely by its own light." No, he admits that human reason is, though true, too weak to be trusted alone; and, consequently, he insists we must have, and he looks for the assistance and illumination of the Holy Spirit, who gave that *word*, and without which it is as a sealed book. The sentiments of Dr. C., which have given Mr. W. the most pain and offence, are found in the concluding page of his Commentary, and quoted in page 50, of the Remarks. *The doctrine which cannot stand the test of rational investigation cannot be true. We have gone too far when we have said, such and such doctrines should not be subjected to rational investigation, being doctrines of pure Revelation. I know of no such doctrine in the Bible. The doctrines of this Book are doctrines of eternal reason; and they are revealed because they are such. Human reason could not have found them out; but, when revealed, reason can both apprehend and comprehend them. No man either can or should believe a doctrine that contradicts reason: but he may safely credit (in any thing that concerns the nature of God) what is above his reason.*

To most of this Mr. W. objects, but most particularly to the "rational investigation" the Dr. speaks of. This, he says, "is a process by which we inquire the truth and falsehood of any thing by comparing it with what we already know, and what we have already determined to be true." (page 55.)

The knowledge employed must be "previous knowledge, or the investigation is not *rational*." (page 55.) This self-evident position we most cheerfully grant;—for how else can we conclude but that all the knowledge we have, before we commence an investigation, must be "previous knowledge?" But "if it be conducted on principles which we have received on the authority of Scripture, then it is a scriptural investigation."

Again, on page 57, "If reason is to proceed only by the light of revelation, then any investigation so conducted is not, as I have already observed, a rational, but a scriptural investigation." Just as well might a man say he is not an animal, he is a man;—I did not examine that object with my eyes, because I used a microscope, or a telescope. Exactly the same is it to say, I did not examine that difficult passage with my reason, because I employed plainer passages to illustrate it. But, says Mr. W., "For this inquiry to be strictly and severely rational, all the knowledge of God which has been obtained by tradition, or previous revelation, must be put out of the case."

Why so? Is not all the knowledge we possess, derived from God? I confess I am not able to see why we cannot rationally apply Scripture knowledge in an investigation, or why it should be deemed irrational to use this advantage. True, while we walk by Scripture light, we walk not "by our own torch:" but neither is reason "our own torch;" it is "a beam of the eternal Logos." We walk by our own torch when we reject Scripture or reason; therefore, let no man separate what God hath joined together. "Such a Divine as *is* Dr. C." durst not separate them; for he practically maintains that the "Holy Scriptures must be appealed to in *union* with reason."

He has opposed no principle to Scripture;—and how then can Mr. W. unblushingly put such a false construction on his language; and say, "I have not mistaken his views, in the application of reason to matters of revelation:" (page 52,) merely because he had recourse to reason in refuting a doctrine concerning which Scripture appears to give no intimation.

Surely no man of sound sense, and with a mind divested of prejudice, could thus wrest the Dr.'s words; and force upon him a meaning in which the Holy Scriptures are not held to have the pre-eminence.

The grounds on which Mr. W. pretends to object to the Dr.'s sentiments above quoted he thus states on page 51: "To most of these positions I object, generally, because they implicate the pernicious principle, that the meaning of Scripture is to be determined by our own views of what is reasonable; that human reason is to be made not only the *instrument* of investigating the meaning of the revelation, but the *judge* of the doctrine; a principle which makes it a canon of interpretation, that where the letter of Scripture indicates a doctrine which appears unreasonable to us, it must be taken in a sense which does appear reasonable;" and adds, "This, I conceive, would authorize the most unnatural interpretations of even Socinian writers." Where did Mr. W. meet with this sentiment? Not in the writings of the learned Dr. And to put this construction on his words and meaning, I hesitate not to say, is an instance of the most palpable misrepresentation; and an inexcusable disregard to truth. Does not the Dr., I would ask, appeal to the Scriptures *alone* "rationally understood, and rationally investigated?" Does he not ever make Scripture "the judge," in *union* with reason, in order to ascertain its right sense? And, because he would not have the Sacred Records examined by the caprices of men, he contends for their being examined by sound divinely illuminated reason:—not "that the meaning of Scripture is to be determined by *our own views* of what is reasonable." Why this false view of the Dr.'s sentiments, and why this bitterness of spirit cherished against him? Every unjaundiced eye must see that the test of a rational investigation brings every doctrine to the tribunal and absolute decision of the Holy Scriptures; that it makes these, *alone*, the *judge*! I am tired with viewing this chain of misrepresentations forged by Mr. W. for the Dr.; holding him up as "attempting to coerce Scripture meaning by the rod and rule of our assumed first and infallible principles," (page 52.) Or if, says Mr. W., "he meant to rest

the proof on Scripture, why did he resort to the *argumentum ex absurdo*? If he did not mean to make our reason the judge of the case, why did he not merely adduce passages of Holy Writ used in support of the commonly received opinion; and shew that the doctrine is not contained in them? His practice, in this instance, shews that I have not mistaken his views in the application of reason to matters of revelation." This miserable, but best apology Mr. W. can offer for his conduct, may simply be thus answered: 1st, When the Dr. said he could not find the doctrine in Scripture, there could be no impropriety in using the *argumentum ex absurdo*. 2dly, He was writing a commentary on the Holy Scriptures, and not an essay on that particular subject; therefore, to have brought these passages together, and explained them all there, would have argued that he knew not the nature of the work in which he had engaged. No, we find them, where we ought to find them, all explained in their proper and several places; and if other testimonies to the doctrine he espouses be found in other parts of the labour he has yet before him, I would refer Mr. W. to them also, for they will be noticed, in their proper order; nor do I doubt but *they* will also be examined "in union with reason," "that beam of the eternal *Logos*."

But Mr. W. brings another charge against Dr. C.; and I must own it is one of the strangest I have yet met with. "With him human reason, and eternal reason, are assumed to be the same: in other words, that human reason is Divine reason;" calling it "a fallacy which vitiates his whole argument," (page 53.) Here not even the widest embrace of charity will screen this wilful and wanton charge: the Dr.'s words and meaning are too clearly expressed to allow the least shadow for such an interpretation. So completely has he distinguished human reason and eternal reason, that even a wayfaring man, though a fool, could not err therein. Though he run, he might read "that the Sacred Writings are a system of pure unsophisticated *reason*, proceeding from the immaculate mind of God: in many places vastly elevated beyond what the *reason of man could have discovered, or found out!*" This he says of what has proceeded from eternal reason. Let then Mr. W. be ashamed of his as-

sertions, thus opposed to the light of truth. Is not human reason "a radiation of eternal reason?" This Mr. W. himself grants:— and for what purpose then was this "beam of the eternal *Logos*" given us? Was it not bestowed that we might humbly, and according to our measure, look into the deep things of God? Was it not to enable us to mark, learn, and inwardly digest, the great truths of revelation, the works of His hand, the impress of His foot in creation; to mark the dealings of His providence towards the children of men? And to what *nobler* purposes than these, I would ask, could we appropriate it? Or for what *less* ends is it better calculated?

Mr. W. proceeds to prove what, indeed, nobody denies, that "A revelation from God cannot contain all the truths apprehended by eternal reason." And he states, "All beyond what can be made known in any mode to the mind, is not capable of revelation; all that is revealed as truth, but of which the reasons, the processes of proof are not given, is apprehended but not comprehended by the mind," (page 53.) How can all this be? Mr. W. speaks of some things "revealed as truth," which are "not comprehended by the mind." Now it is evident that if they cannot be comprehended, they cannot be known; and, therefore, agreeably with the first part of the argument, they are "not capable of revelation."

That there are truths "which cannot possibly be the subjects of human reason," I readily grant: but Mr. W. must allow they cannot be known to man; for, if known, they may be subjects of his reason; therefore, he adds, they are "not capable of revelation." But I find he "will go farther and say, that there must of necessity be such truths in a revelation," (page 53.) Indeed! Truths "which cannot possibly be the subjects of human reasoning;" and, therefore, which cannot be known, and consequently "not capable of revelation;" and yet "must of necessity" be revealed. How is this? He replies, "If it be a revelation of God, His mode of existence and His counsels, which from their nature can only be fully known to God Himself." But even these, *so far as they cannot be known*, they cannot be revealed by Mr. W.'s own position. I allow

God has not revealed His mode of existence, and His counsels ; and as they are not revealed, they are not, agreeably to Dr. C.'s theory, the subjects of human reason.

But, says Mr. W., " the principle of subjecting doctrines of revelation to rational investigation gains so little" by admitting that reason could not have discovered the doctrines of revelation, but when revealed can comprehend and apprehend them ; " that the sentiments are fatal to each other : " and adds, by way of proof and inference, " If reason is to proceed only by the light of revelation, then any investigation so conducted is not, as I have already observed, a rational, but a scriptural investigation ; and Dr. C. has in vain attempted to correct the notions of those who exclude reason as the judge of the doctrines of an acknowledged revelation. If the investigation is to be conducted by an appeal to principles which reason did not furnish, but which have been communicated to the mind by revelation, Dr. C. agrees with his opponents, while he strongly condemns them ; for then are the obvious *data* of that revelation made the test of those parts of it which are more recondite, and human reason is no judge in the case at all. So contradictory is Dr. C. to himself." (pages 57 and 58.)

I reply, first, that the principle of subjecting doctrines of revelation to rational investigation does by no means exclude the use of knowledge derived from revelation, even by Mr. W.'s own view of it ; and, agreeably to his quotation from Cicero, (page 55,) " we are led by reason from things apprehended and understood, to things not apprehended." Now respecting these things apprehended and understood, so far is their evidence from being weakened by their being the sense of plain Scripture, that on that very ground their value is, if possible, augmented. But, again, if the principle could admit of a sense excluding the light of revelation, which it does not, such a sense could not be intended by Dr. C. ; as Mr. W. must be well aware, and as the other quoted sentiment proves. What, then, means this vilifying attack upon the Dr. ? If his sense had been dubious, which it assuredly is not when viewed with the least discerning eye ; even then he treats the Dr. basely, as well as contrary to every

established rule of sound criticism, which, he ought to have known, requires that the more obscure passages of an author are to be interpreted by his clear and general sense; instead of which Mr. W. has so far departed from all rule, as to set the passage in opposition in order to make the Dr. at variance with himself, and to make him deliver two opposite "sentiments fatal to each other" in the same passage. It is well all do not, in this case, "walk by the same rule, and mind the same thing;" or, by such a procedure, we might find a world of contradiction, even in the oracles of truth themselves! Again, Dr. C. no where opposes, and no where "condemns," those who exclude reason as the judge of the doctrines of revelation. He does not make "human reason any judge in the case at all," but he leads us to Scripture: for while he says "human reason could not have found them out," surely he could not mean that reason was to be the judge whether they are right or wrong: he maintains, on the contrary, that they *are* right; and that we are to take with us this "beam of the eternal Logos" that we may be enabled rightly to understand them. The Dr. has not then contradicted himself, any more than he has given up the comprehending power of reason.

But one more remark before I dismiss this long quotation. "If," says Mr. W., "the investigation is to be conducted by an appeal to principles which reason did not furnish." The man who pretends to this critical accuracy of the term *rational*, ought to have known that reason furnishes no principles; but is capable of perceiving and knowing them. There are certain principles common to all men in all countries and ages: these constitute what is sometimes termed *common sense*; but reason is furnished with them by the Creator, and has only the power of recognizing them whenever they appear, and employing them in the search of other truths which, when found, are also recognized in like manner by reason. But reason no more furnishes them, than the telescope furnishes the stars, which are only discovered to us by its assistance.

That "God is love," that a "stone is heavy," are principles, or things certainly true: but reason furnishes neither of them.

If Mr. W. affirms that reason furnishes the latter, then, I say, it may furnish the former also: for, though these true principles be presented to the eye of the mind through somewhat different *media*, yet they are presented by the same Being, and we receive the one on the same authority that we receive the other, as truths, that is, as principles; whatever difference there may exist in the method of communication, or in their relative importance.

In page 58, we are informed that "Dr. C. may be understood to mean, that reason when aided by a revelation, is raised into so perfect a condition, that what *appears* incongruous to it, must of necessity be concluded to be contrary to the revelation itself:" and then he informs us whence this proceeds. To this charge I answer, the Dr. cannot be so understood by any unprejudiced or sound mind. For does he not speak of what IS, and not of what APPEARS, agreeable to reason? Hence, then, he has nothing to do with what it proceeds from; whether from confounding Divine and human reason, or from supposing reason can, when in possession of the doctrine, "complete the process:" he has not done the former, not supposed the latter. He does not even talk of the *strength* or *perfection* of human reason, but of its truth: and that cannot be denied, if it even be but a "faint radiation of eternal reason." And right reason, of which the Dr. speaks, must, in the very nature of things, and in their fitness also, be as certain as the truth of Scripture itself; for if the reason which admits revelation, and "ascertains its sense," cannot be depended upon, then we have no certainty respecting the truth of what it receives!

But if, contrary indeed to all that is learned, not to say Christian, violence be put on Dr. C.'s writings; and he be *forced* to mean that Scripture cannot be contrary to what *appears* human reason, or "the reason of any particular man;" then, indeed, Mr. W. may have full scope for his pen, and for his feelings; but still it will remain for men of understanding to judge for themselves, and that too without disguise.

On page 59, we find that the divines, "to whom our faith is

most indebted," seem to have used the utmost powers of their reason, to have dealt deeply in "rational investigation." To shew, however, the insignificance of reason, we are asked, "on the high and solemn mysteries of our religion, the rational evidence of which has been withheld in the revelation, what light has been shed by the most powerful ratiocinations? Do they, like philosophical truths, gain ground by reasonings abstract or analogic?" Now neither the one truth nor the other, being *certainly* known, can gain any farther ground by reasonings of any kind: but, where they are not certainly known, the rational use of such knowledge, as we are in possession of, may place the subject in a clearer and a more satisfactory light.

Respecting the revelations of God Mr. W. says, "they are objects of faith, not of enquiry; and therefore not of reason," (p. 62.) This is strange kind of arguing and determining. They are the "objects of faith;" but it is utterly false to add, "not of enquiry;" for, more than any others, they ought to be the subjects of enquiry and reason too. They should be the first objects, and should employ the noblest energies of the mind; or we might as well be Mohammedans or Pagans, as Christian Protestants; for their systems are not only contrary to Scripture, but also to reason and common sense. The quotations from Locke, pages 62, 63, and 64, contain nothing in them contrary to Dr. C.'s principle: he does not at all consult reason to know "how far God is to be believed;" for his right reason assures him that God's word is true; and holding this candle of the Lord, and being divinely assisted by the Holy Spirit, he opens the Sacred Oracles to see and hear what God has "*really*" said; and thus cordially, rationally, and affectionately, to embrace it.

But, says Mr. W., Dr. C. "lays it down as a general principle, that when a revelation is made, the reason of man is not only able to *apprehend*, but to *comprehend*, its doctrines," (p. 64.) What follows, then, from this principle "*stated so broadly?*" "Henceforward, then, we are no more to speak of the incomprehensible God, or the great mystery of godliness, or of any other mystery." Dr. C. does not refer to a comprehending of God, or any mystery; he only speaks of comprehending what is *re-*

vealed concerning them, as far as that revelation goes. They must wilfully misunderstand him, who suppose that he means a full comprehension of the thing as it respects its totality, including all its modes and relations, known and unknown. "I cannot comprehend the Divine nature:" but still I may comprehend what is revealed concerning it. Or why, let me ask, is any part of it revealed? Were we to employ the term "to comprehend" only in the sense to which Mr. W. has restricted it; then, assuredly, there is nothing which we can comprehend: not even a blade of grass; not even a small particle of the dust of the earth. We know nothing certain of all their "modes and relations;" yet with many facts concerning them we are perfectly well acquainted. On this subject Mr. Wesley, in his excellent sermon on the Trinity, speaks with his usual perspicuity. "As strange as it may seem in requiring you to believe, 'that there are Three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost; and these Three are one;' you are not required to believe any mystery. Nay, that great and good man, Dr. Peter Browne, sometime bishop of Cork, has proved at large, that the Bible does not require you to believe any mystery at all. The Bible barely requires you to believe such *facts*, not the manner of them. Now the mystery does not lie in the *fact*, but altogether in the *manner*. For instance, God said, Let there be light; and there was light! I believe it; I believe the plain *fact*: there is no mystery at all in this. The mystery lies in the *manner* of it: but of this I believe nothing at all; nor does God require it of me!" Mr. W. himself grants that we may *know* what is revealed. "All beyond what can be made known in any mode to the mind, is not capable of revelation," (page 53.) Hence, then, the doctrines revealed may be known; and, therefore, understood and received, as far as revealed. But what is thus known, understood, and received, may be comprehended to the same extent: and to put any other meaning than this on what Dr. C. has said; or to enlarge his sense as Mr. W. has done; is to wrest the meaning, to say nothing worse of it: and hence it follows that Dr. C. does not "contradict himself," when he says, "I cannot comprehend the Divine nature." Again, Dr. C. knows full well, that "there are many things which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered

into the heart of man to conceive." Part of them, however, "God hath revealed to us by His Spirit:" that is, He hath *unveiled; uncovered* them; and that part we are bound to believe. And that Dr. C. plainly refers to that which is "revealed," not to the *manner* in which is contained the incomprehensible part, we have only need to refer to himself; and we hear that "human reason could not have found them out; but, *when revealed*, reason can both apprehend and comprehend them:" that he does not speak of comprehending the hidden part, or mystery, or of knowing their agreement with unrevealed processes, reasons, or proofs, we have only need to look at what he further adds on this subject. "It sees their perfect harmony among themselves; their agreement with the perfection of the Divine nature; and their sovereign suitableness to the nature and state of man: thus reason approves and applauds." Is it not evident, then, that, agreeably to the Dr.'s "literal sense," no man can construe his words to mean, a comprehension beyond the limits of the fact revealed; that he pretends that reason sees their agreement with hidden processes, modes, or relations; but that it only has to do with those things which are revealed, with what we know of God, and their relation to what we know of ourselves, and our condition.

Dr. C. is again attacked, (page 65,) on the ground of his saying, "No man either can, or should, believe a doctrine which *contradicts* reason."

We have shewn, what indeed was hardly necessary to the most superficial reader, that by human reason Dr. C. means right reason, or what Mr. W. terms "a radiation of eternal reason." And is it not manifest that what God has revealed cannot be in *opposition* to this "beam of the eternal *Logos*?" Hence it also follows that it is not a "natural," and I am surprised Mr. W. should think it "a necessary inference, that whatever doctrine of Scripture contradicts the reason of *him who reads it*, is not true, and must be rejected:" (p. 65, 66.) for, "*the reason of him who reads it*," or his view or opinion, may itself be contrary to all right reason! In regard to the "Theist," revelation may "*contradict his reason*:" it may contradict "the old

and modern Socinians, their *own tenets* dictated by their *own reason*," (page 66.) All this, and more, I allow. But let Mr. W. prove that *their reason* is right reason, and not thus confound terms Dr. C. has kept distinct; using *his reason* for *human reason*. The remark on page 66, has been refuted again and again: Dr. C. has not assumed "that human reason is eternal reason" any more than he has used the terms *my reason* and *human reason* as signifying the same thing.

We are now brought to another world of enquiries concerning Dr. C.'s meaning in making reason judge, and its qualifications for that office. It is extremely easy to make enquiries; and to annex to them certain importance: but *the fact* is, Dr. C. has no where made reason a judge at all in the case; not even right reason; and hence there is no occasion to enquire whether or not it is "qualified for such an arbitration," (page 67.) But of many "doctrines of Scripture," admitted as such by Dr. C., Mr. W. says, "It is the highest reason to believe them." And here I was about to hail the dawning of his better mind; when, alas! he adds, "But they are believed on authority; not on their *own evidence*, and the authority of their reasonableness," (page 68.) How can they, I would ask, be believed on the highest reason, but not on the authority of their reasonableness? Mr. W., doubtless, means, they are believed on the authority that God has spoken them. But let him remember that authority is their *own evidence*: they have that, they need no higher, for that is a sufficient authority for their reasonableness, on the simple authority that God has declared them; and this is their strong *own evidence*. But, says Mr. W., "I have no hesitation in saying, that the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity; of the union of two natures in one personal Christ; of the resurrection of the same body; not only *transcend*, but *contradict*, human reason," (page 68.) But surely Mr. W. ought to have "*hesitated*" before he made this *bold assertion*. If, indeed, he had said, these doctrines contradicted *his* reason; most certainly I would not have done him the injustice to discredit his assertion: but when he says that they "*contradict human reason*," I deny his proposition in toto. They no more contradict human reason, than the union of soul and body in one

person, man, contradicts it. But if they do "contradict human reason," how can Mr. W. "have the highest reason to believe them?" The concluding remark is founded on the false supposition already exposed, that we cannot use Bible knowledge in a rational investigation: the Bible is a system of reason itself; for it was given by the unerring mind of God: by that eternal reason of which human reason is, I grant, but "a faint radiation;" though still it is a beam of the eternal Logos. And is it, then, incapable of assisting us in the clearer discovery of our great Source; incapable of illuminating all the other powers of the mind in their search after its All-wise Author, its first Great Cause? Assuredly it is not: if, indeed, it be "a faint radiation of eternal reason;" then, in the very nature of things, it must, if rightly understood, be most congenially employed in rising to its source, in dwelling on themes so suited to the nature of its origin. Then, indeed, right reason is rightly directed; and He, who has shed this light over our wilfully darkened mental horizon, will smile upon our utmost endeavours to improve this talent He has entrusted us with; that, aided by this Holy Spirit, we may learn His will concerning us; that we may discover what is our "*reasonable service*," which is to *know Him, the only true God*, and to serve Him with all our powers! It is, in short, the noblest faculty of our soul;—and shall we not employ it on the noblest purposes, and to the noblest ends?

But while we allow reason to be so glorious, and unquestionably true; we still grant, that it is first in childhood; then in manhood; first weaker, then stronger; and, while we remain on earth, it will be marching on through progressive improvement, till the full blaze of uncreated truth be *himself* revealed! The weaker, however, it is, the more likely am I to mistake the shadow for the substance: but as it thus advances in its strength, still receiving the gracious influences of The Holy Spirit, it works gloriously! Mr. W. thinks "the modest will spend life at school, and never presume to judge; the bold will break away from it, before their education is completed, and dogmatize in premature luxuriance," (page 71.) Mr. W., I fear, has left school too soon; or, surely, he would have been able to discern the wide space that lies between human reason, and the reason

presented to us in his "Remarks!" The wide world is before me; the volume of nature and Providence in my hand; the beam of the eternal Logos is human reason: and I shall not leave school, neither shall I close my books, or forget the great commentator I have upon them, till I leave the world!

On page 71, we are conducted to a very wordy discussion on transubstantiation: But first it is found "necessary," (and I allow the correctness of the supposition,) "to give the term reason still greater *precision* of meaning." "It does not mean," says Mr. W., "as used by the Dr., the faculty, or operation, of judging or arguing." This is a point blank denial of what Mr. W. has before asserted of the worthy Dr.: but then it suited the point in hand; and is only now, as then, a faithful servant to its master. On this ground, I suppose, we must overlook the two varied assertions of Mr. W.; but not pass them by without saying, they are both *utterly false!* The first assertion was, "that the Dr. made reason the judge of Scripture doctrine." The second that he does not even make "reason the faculty, or operation, of judging or arguing." What the Dr. means for himself is, that the faculty of reasoning with its true principles, can perceive, apprehend, comprehend, and judge of the connection and agreement of our ideas; and be able to argue from our best judgments; this is too clear ever to be unavoidably mistaken. But before Mr. W. attempted to inform us what "is essential to good reasoning," he should have *reasoned* better himself; and not chosen, as an illustration of what "is essential," two such opposite and false premises. He may believe, if he will and can, that a blind person "had acquired so delicate a sense of touch, as, by that sense to distinguish colours with great accuracy," (page 72:) but it is surely no case in point; and let him believe the story who can. But, says Mr. W., "in comparing what we know little of, with what we know, so as to affirm or deny any thing concerning them, our reason, or, what is the same thing, our present knowledge, may be contradicted," (page 73). If *our* reason, here called our "*present knowledge*," (which Mr. W. makes a term of various signification,) be certain knowledge, as that derived from plain Scripture, or from the law of our nature implanted by the hand of God, or

from any sure source ; I say, if it be any certain knowledge ; it cannot be contradicted by any truth ; for then would truth be contradictory to truth, which is absurd : but if by *our reason* Mr. W. merely means our *supposed knowledge* ; then *our reason* may perchance be contrary to *human reason*, and may probably contradict truth.

And here I would observe that the quotation from an eminent author, cited in page 73, is not in opposition to Dr. C.'s views respecting reason ; however they may be to the perverted sense taken of them by Mr. W. : Dr. C. does not imagine that the reason of man can "wade through the vast abyss to unknown regions ;" but he takes reason with him to the Holy Scriptures, to understand what is there "really" revealed. In the very next page, however, Mr. W. admits the certainty of "human knowledge" in some cases ; and certainly in other things of importance to be known, especially spiritual things, if we already possess not certain knowledge, we ought to seek diligently till we find it.

What Mr. W. further adds on the subject of transubstantiation are, like all his other reasonings, founded either upon his want of distinguishing properly between the terms *right* reason, and *his* or *their* reason ; or a wilful misrepresentation of the worthy and learned Dr.'s sentiments and opinions. This part of the subject, then, we leave ; for there is more work yet before every friend of the Dr., every just dealer with *his* "theory" and "views." On page 76, Mr. W. states that Dr. C.'s "*great error*" is, "the assuming that human reason and eternal reason are the same ;" and truly adds, "this has been sufficiently exposed." Yes, quite "sufficiently exposed," to evince the unfair conduct of his remarker. But we have seen the Dr. never made the assertion ; never was guilty of this strange confounding of terms ; and, consequently, not of the "great error," or its sad consequences !

But the friends of reason may begin to take courage, since even its great enemy Mr. W. tells us, "it cannot be doubted that *human reason*, when illuminated by revelation, is raised

into a very interesting correspondence with eternal reason," (pages 76 and 77.)

What! "a very interesting correspondence," and still contrary to the dictates of eternal reason? And still contrary to the revelation by which it is illuminated? And still cannot we use that revelation in a "rational investigation?" What is this Proteus, this "ever varying human reason?" If Mr. W. can make it correspond with revelation, and yet contradict that revelation; then, indeed, he is fully qualified to take up both, or either, of the questions.

But Mr. W. is not "for placing the reason of man unnecessarily in opposition to the decisions of his Maker," (page 77.) When, then, is it in opposition? "Truth, in the revelation of Scripture, is not always stated on mere authority." In this we differ: but, if it be not; yet, in cases where it is so stated, are we always to consider the reason of man to be in opposition to its decisions?

Several Scriptures, Mr. W. grants, are accompanied with "some rays of rational evidence." "There is more *virtue* in faith; but more *pleasure* in knowledge:"—and is knowledge, then, less certain, or less pleasurable, because coming directly from God? But let not the friends of Dr. C. be too sanguine; for Mr. W. will not allow that even these admissions afford "the slightest support" to "the principles laid down by Dr. C.;" but, on the contrary, it is thought probable that they "may have led to the erroneous idea, that reason itself is an adequate judge of such doctrines," (page 78.) To this charge let those reply who have admitted the idea: but as Dr. C. has it not in his writings; consequently, he cannot need the "slightest support" from such admissions. However, we find Mr. W., in the view he has given "of the office of reason in religion," speaking thus: "The office of reason is to judge of the evidences of the record professing to be a revelation from God: when we are satisfied of the Divine authority of Scripture, our understanding is to be employed humbly, and with dependance upon God, in ascertaining its sense; and whatever doctrine is there stated, or

necessarily implied by the harmony of its different parts, is to be admitted, believed, and held fast, whether it corroborate, or contradict, the notions which our previous or collateral reasonings have led us to adopt," (page 80.) What had Dr. C. ascribed to reason more than this? Has he not said, "The Holy Scriptures must be appealed to in union with reason?" Yet, Mr. W. says, we must approach the Word with reason to "judge of the evidence of the record;" to use it "in ascertaining the sense;" and to see "what doctrine is there stated, or necessarily implied by the harmony of its different parts:" and this being done, we are to embrace the doctrine, however contrary to our former notions; and we are previously told that, in respect of Scripture truths, reason is the "receptive" faculty. What, then, has Mr. W. waded through so much censure of Dr. C. to embrace at last the very principles and views the Dr. has taken; and even to outdo him in the value he has set upon reason? Mr. W. has made reason work from beginning to end: whereas the Dr. has only used it in conjunction. Mr. W. would have reason used to find out whether it be a Divine revelation, to discover its sense, to find whether it contain the doctrine; and, lastly, when thus satisfied, to receive the truth so determined. Is this a rational investigation? If not, why does Mr. W. propose it? If it be, why should he have spent so much time in condemning Dr. C. for employing it? He has more highly spoken of reason than the Dr.; and yet I not only subscribe to all he has said in that paragraph, but unhesitatingly pronounce it the best in his whole Pamphlet!

We have now proceeded to nearly the close of Mr. W.'s "Remarks:" but it appears that he is aware of not having given a correct view of the principles of the learned Dr. which he professedly undertook to consider; for we hear him say, "I have drawn them out to a length to which he probably did not mean them to extend." I ask, then, *Why has he called them Dr. C.'s principles?* And hear his apology, "My business is with what he has said, and not what he might intend." This is Mr. W.'s best reason for this very *unjustifiable drawing out*, his only apology: it may be sufficient for *his* conscience; but I must own *mine* is more exorbitant in its demands. But, adds

Mr. W., "The principles have been taken in their true logical sense," (page 81.) How far this also is correct, the preceding observations will best determine. In my opinion, the "Remarks" evince him to be neither a good logician, nor a sound critic: but if he see *he* has misrepresented the Dr.'s views, much more will the unprejudiced see it; while every man with common sense, and with principles of common justice, will shun doing such violence to both, as to put upon the Dr.'s theory the constructions Mr. W. has unblushingly affixed to it; and which the great Methodist press has sanctioned and advertised; while they have absolutely refused admission to every paper in their magazine which could develop this fine spun chain of false premises, false reasonings, and false conclusions: and not only refused to admit them into their magazine, but even the shield, meant merely to ward off a *personal* attack upon a character they have handled as they thought fit, through that very channel.* And is this all? No, they have hitherto absolutely refused to sell a pamphlet in their book-room which would clear the principles of one whom every heart will join me in saying is, from his piety, his long labours, and his learning; an honour, and an ornament, to the body he is connected with. Yet, to remove the obloquy they have endeavoured to throw upon him, they not only refuse to come forward themselves; but will not permit those who are willing, to come and roll away the stone, they have set upon the mouth of the sepulchre, in which they intended to entomb him!

What shall I say to these things? An honest heart is too full for utterance; it dare hardly trust itself! But I leave such conduct to be pondered in their own hearts, to be judged of by their God: thus far have I gone—the justice due to my friend demanded that I thus shew to the world the wrong which has been done him by Mr. W.: and if the dart of calumny, not being able to penetrate the principles it was intended to wound, should recoil into his own breast, I need not wait to barb

* Having understood that the letter to which this alludes was objected to on account of its length; another somewhat more than two-thirds of the first was sent, and inserted.

it farther; it will sink deeply, and wound bitterly enough, charged with this double infliction; while this last sadly offending page of the learned Dr.'s Commentary shall live respected and admired; while there remains a man of sense to read, or a "a radiation of eternal reason" to assist in its being rightly understood!

We have thus far traced Mr. W. in his endeavour to depreciate the value of reason; and in his denial of some of its most sacred offices: I will not detain my Readers long with any of my reflections upon so strange an endeavour; but simply content myself with saying, if he have failed to prove that the "principles" of Dr. C., "followed out as they stand in the Commentary, would inevitably lead to the greatest errors;" if, I say, he have failed to prove this, he has undeniably been more successful in evincing, to every unprejudiced mind, the falseness of the views he has taken of the Dr.'s meaning. And well, indeed, may he be "not unaware that the learned commentator, on whom he has so freely remarked, will, at least partially, demur to the view he has given of the principles he (Dr. C.) has laid down in the conclusion of his valuable work," (page 81.) Why, then, I demand in justice, is that view given? Dr. C., I maintain, would not be able to recognize his own principles as they appear in the view Mr. W. has taken of them. But Mr. W. says, "Dr. C. *will*, at least partially, demur to the view" thus given. I answer, No; he will not, "at least *partially*, demur;" for he wisely altogether refuses even to look at this medley, prepared for him by Mr. W.: which is intended to lower him in the scale of mental existence; and to take away from him the blessing of orthodoxy, which, alas for Mr. W.! is, by this fruitless endeavour of his, only proved to be like a tree when shaken at its trunk, scattering its fruit around it, and evincing to all who behold, how firmly it is seated, how deeply it is rooted!

Nor is this all that Mr. W. has proved on this part of the subject. No, he has proved to demonstration that a book may be written against reason! And, having established this fact, he has surely proved what few, indeed, of us ever contemplated the accomplishment of, even in our modest speculations! In

passing on, however, to page 83, we find Mr. W. has commenced reasoner himself; and actually endeavours to prove that the "objections" Dr. C. has raised to the doctrine of the eternal Sonship are "by no means inexpugnable," even on this very ground; and this he shews to his own satisfaction by a quotation from a note by the editor of Dr. Doddridge's Lectures. Let us, however, for a moment examine this "ample answer:" and we find that "the terms *generation* and *begetting* do not include any *voluntary* act *ad extra*,—but denote a *necessary* act *ad intra*," (page 84.) To this I reply, we cannot suppose that any terms, when used in reference to the Creator, can have literally the same ideas as when applied to a finite being: but still there exist certain analogous ideas, which can never be separated from the terms, and hence *generation* and *begetting* cannot but include within themselves those of *derivation*, or *production*; and whether they denote an act *ad extra*, or *ad intra*, still, in either case, it *must* be an act; and, consequently, must have had a beginning, must have known an end, or must still continue to be an act: neither of which ideas can ever possibly comport with *Divinity*! "*A necessary act*," agreeably to its meaning in this paragraph, is mere jargon: every act of Deity is infinitely free. And if we conceive the Second Person of the Holy Trinity, in reference to His Divine nature, as being derived from the First Person; we take away from Him that which alone can constitute Divinity. An existence uncreated, and as uncreated eternal, and as eternal infinite: this is essential to Divinity; and it is constituted of nothing less; and in taking away one jot or tittle from it, its very vitality expires. The underived Divinity of our blessed Lord cannot, then, be successfully denied: it is founded in fact, strong as the pillars of eternity; and "I and my Father are one," in point of existence and duration, is as co-eval with eternity as it shall be co-eternal.

We pursue this chain of argumentation farther; and find much said, and much thought, of "the strict *co-existence of Persons*:" and that, "even among men, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to form an idea of Fatherhood and Sonship, but as *correlative*, and *co-existent*. One may, indeed, exist as a

man before his *son*; but not *as the father!*" Now what is gained by this very hopeful argument? Just what I wish to be re-established, that the *Son* necessarily involves the prior existence of the Source whence he sprung. This is clear. It also follows, that the Being from whom that Son proceeded claims, consequently, priority of existence, and superiority as the source of that existence; and I presume it will not be denied, that the Son is absolutely posterior to his Father, even as the "Father of such a Son;" for the Son could not have existed as His Son, without the prior existence of the Father as the "Father of such a Son."

But this argument is vainly endeavoured to be put aside by, "In this doctrine *no personal* subsistence is to be conceived prior to *Fatherhood* and *Sonship*." This is begging the question, indeed; but as it involves total absurdity, and direct contradiction, it is, consequently, not to be granted either by common sense, or as long as *words* are used as signs of *ideas*. An eternal Father, and an eternal Son, we cannot conceive of; nor even admit that one of the Divine "Personalities" produced another. For in whatever manner this be urged, the difficulties are equally insurmountable! Again, we find (page 85,) "the infinite Mind, as to essence, to be necessarily active, or *life* itself;" and that it is reasonable to conceive "a *terminus a quo*, and a *terminus ad quem*, relative to this essential energy, and life antecedent to will;" "that these *termini*" may "contribute relative properties, which may not improperly be called Subsistences, or Persons," &c. This fine spun metaphysical speculation may serve to darken counsel by words without knowledge; yet, like the foregoing arguments, it too only arrives at the same conclusion with them, for we learn that these *termini* contribute relative properties, and these properties constitute Father and Son. Here we are presented with precisely the same data, only a little varied in their mode of expression: for if one of these properties, contributed by the *termini*, be produced by another; still that which contributes must be antecedent to that contributed. Hence the argument is only perplexed, not illustrated, by the multiplicity of its forms. But we are further conducted through this enquiry into "the *dis-*

linguishing cause of these relative properties," and the "essential distinctive characters" of "these Divine Persons." Such searching to find out the Almighty to me appears idle, and vain. These distinctive characters and modes exist, as God Himself exists, without any cause at all; and to say that they "correspond with the terms *begetting, begotten, and proceeding,*" is to speak at random, and without proof.

It is not necessary for man to explain these distinctions: if he scripturally admit them, it is enough for him to do; it is unquestionably as far as he ought to go!

And these metaphysical cobwebs, then, Mr. W. thinks "an ample answer" to Dr. C.'s plain substantial argument, which cannot be shaken by any subtilty in the world. In vain has Mr. W. placed them in opposition to the Dr.: and the argument that "no father, as father, is prior to his son," is a poor subtilty, which I am astonished to find has a place in the mind of a wise man.

But Mr. W. adds, "If the correlatives, Father and Son, are used to express essential, necessarily existent, and, consequently, eternal relations: in this there is nothing contradictory," (page 87.) I will admit it too, if an entirely new meaning be given to the terms; but then again any other terms would be equally suitable: but while these terms include the idea of derivation, cause and effect, they, thus applied, contain in themselves a contradiction; for a Son begotten, generated, produced, and yet *eternal*, and consequently *not* generated, produced, or begotten, is an absolute contradiction in terms, to common sense, and to all received ideas and notions. Mr. W. further says, "derivation may be an essential attribute, and is often so in fact." However this may be, the thing derived is never an essential property of that from which it is derived. Shew me an instance to the contrary in all the compass of nature, and I will readily yield the point. In proof of this position Mr. W. affirms, "It is an essential property of the sun to give light; and the beaming of the light is therefore co-existent with the sun." Now, admitting that this be true, then the "beaming of the light" in the sun, is not derived from the sun, since it is essential, co-existent, and contained in the very nature of the sun; yet the light *actually*

derived from the sun must, *as such*, be posterior to the sun himself, because the act by which it is derived was first performed: and it makes no difference whatever in the argument, whether the act were performed a million of years before, or only the millionth part of a second; still it is anterior.

Further the light *actually* derived from the sun cannot be essential to it; for if so, then the sun could not exist without it, which is contrary to fact, and the nature of the case. And to suppose that the Divine nature of Christ is a derived nature is, in reality, to deny Him to be necessarily existent, self-existent, or eternal; which idea necessarily involves and embodies the very essence of Arianism. After Mr. W. has asserted, without proof, that derivation may be an essential attribute, he applies it to Divinity, and says, "Christ is therefore called, in the Nicene creed, "*light of light*, in perfect accordance with inspired Scripture, where His designation is 'the streaming forth, the refulgence of His Father's glory,'" (page 87). In reference to the Scripture alluded to, we have seen that it bears no reference whatever to the Divine or human natures of our Lord considered *exclusively*, but to the complex Person of Christ; and if this portion of the Nicene creed be viewed in the same light, which it may without being forced, then it also is perfectly correct. But we find Mr. W. applies these terms to the Divine nature exclusively, and as denoting derivation. Surely he is not aware that these views, taken in their true import, and closely followed up, amount to Arianism; however they may conceal themselves in the terms *eternal, co-existent, co-eval, &c.* which are most incongruously applied to a derived, or an originated, nature.

We have now nearly followed Mr. W. to the close of his Remarks: but even here we find him charging the worthy and highly injured Dr. falsely, by accusing him of confounding the terms of Father and Son, as applied to God, and as applied to man. The contrary has, however, been sufficiently proved; and I now leave my Readers to judge whether or not in the view we have taken of this important subject, they do not find that reason is full and strong on that side of the question taken by Dr. C.; and whether Scripture and reason do not go along with him; and if even those very passages of Holy Writ, which

have been produced in favour of the eternal filiation, are not found to oppose and contradict that very doctrine, and prove it an invention of the mind of man; and that it really has no sanctuary in the word, the holy oracles of God.

The misrepresentation which this pamphlet of Mr. W. gives of the theory of Dr. C. will too plainly unfold itself to require, that I endeavour to develop it more fully: the reasons for the act, and the act itself, I now leave. They are known to Mr. W.'s own mind—they are partially visible to the world;—but to Him who knows the thoughts and intents of the heart of man will I leave the high prerogative of judgment.

In closing my observations on the foregoing "Remarks of Mr. W.," I have to request the further indulgence of my Readers while I notice the criticisms in the Letters of Mr. H. S. Boyd, contained in the Methodist Magazine for March 1818, and in some subsequent numbers of the same publication.

I ought not to enter upon this subject without first begging pardon of my Readers for detaining their attention on such insignificant criticisms; which borrow their importance, and claim notice, from their connection with a work generally tending to the promotion of the vital interests of religion; sanctioned, as those letters are, by the conductors of that work; and coming, as they do, from a press which is regarded as solely Methodistical. On these accounts I claim my Readers' patient indulgence; and on these accounts I excuse myself also for the notice I here take of them. I will not dwell upon the arrogance, bombast, self-praise, and degrading ridicule, which Mr. Boyd (considered as a scholar, and a gentleman,) has condescended to use. These I see but to pass by; and hasten to his criticism on the Greek term *καί*, *and*, or *also*. This term is generally used merely as a connective word; and sometimes in union with another particle, for the sake of greater force and elegance; and very frequently (especially in Attic writers) it is even redundant, and is employed either to soften the period, or as an accommodation to general usage. Is it not, then, surprising to hear Mr. B. assert, "It is the most important word in the whole; and upon it the sense principally depends?" And, again, we are equally

astonished to hear that "he who possesses a *critical* knowledge of the Greek language will perceive, that in the original the word *also* cannot be united to *therefore*, or *wherefore*; it must be joined to the words which immediately follow," (Magazine for March). It is true that *καί* is a copulative conjunction, and, as well as others, generally connects the following word or sentence: but this is not always the case; for in James ii. 11, and other places, this particle is merely an expletive, added to strengthen the passage. Neither does it connect them in Mr. B.'s sense so as always to allude to another person, when a term denoting a person follows. See the Greek writers *passim*.

But I am more astonished that a scholar, such as Mr. B., should so far endanger his credit as to say, that in the original the conjunction "*καί, also*, cannot be united to *διό, therefore*." The famous Dr. Busby would himself have been surprised at such an assertion; for this learned author has, in his excellent grammar, given us the very same two particles placed exactly in the same order, *διό καί*, forming together a causal conjunction. And, even in our grammars and lexicons we see that two or more particles, of which *καί* stands last, are often translated by a single word: thus *καί μὲν καί* is *quinetiam, moreover*; *εἰ καί, etsi, although, &c.*: and from other authors, innumerable instances might be quoted. But it will be sufficient to refer to Job xxxi., where we find a frequent recurrence of the Hebrew term *אִם, if*, which, seven times in that chapter, the Septuagint render *εἰ δὲ καί*. Also in 2 Cor. vii. 8. *εἰ καί* occurs three times, and once in ver. 12.; and in each place it is translated "*though*," and no doubt can possibly be entertained of the justness of the translation.

From all these instances, then, we are sure that *also* may be joined with the preceding particle; and that it is so joined in the disputed passage, is evident from the other places in the New Testament where the same terms occur in the same manner: *viz.* Acts x. 29. xiii. 35. xxiv. 26. Rom. iv. 22. xv. 22. 2 Cor. v. 9. Phil. ii. 9. Heb. xi. 12. xiii. 12. 1 Peter ii. 6.

Our authorised Version has given for these particles *διό καί*, in Acts x, 29, the simple term "*therefore*;" Acts xxiv. 26, and 2 Cor. v. 9, "*wherefore*;" Rom. iv. 22, "*and therefore*;" an

the other places will admit a like translation. Hence in Luke i. 35., the words may be truly rendered by the single term *therefore*, or by *and therefore*. The sole importance which can, with propriety, be attached to the word *καί* is, that it more forcibly connects the words following with the preceding member of the sentence, than the particle *διό* would, if used alone. But were Mr. B.'s explanation admitted, it would necessarily follow from Phil. ii. 9. that some other being, besides God, exalted Jesus Christ; and from Acts xxiv. 26., that another, besides Felix, sent to Paul in hopes of gaining money: and many other absurdities would likewise arise from this conclusion.

Of the passages above quoted *καί* is wanting in a few manuscripts in Rom. iv. 22.: also in 1 Peter ii. 6. many manuscripts read *διότι*. On the other hand *διό καί* is found Acts xx. 26., and Rom. i. 24., in some copies; while in others *διό* alone appears in the text. Now from these various readings we may collect this circumstance, that the term in question is not of such importance, and does not affect the sense of a passage as represented in Mr. B.'s critical observations.

Again, the insufficient answer Mr. B. has given to the objections, he has himself raised in the Magazine for May, evinces the futility of his own criticism. He acknowledges that in the only two instances he can find to favour his views, Matt. xxvi. 69, 71., the reference indicated by the term *also* was well known to the parties speaking, and spoken to; and that, therefore, they had before been mentioned: consequently, by his own confession he has failed in his "attempt." Indeed, we have noticed above that the term *καί* does not always refer to persons, even when a word denoting persons follows it; when there is such reference, which from the nature of the case commonly happens, it is known by the sense, and not by the force of that particle. It is absurd of Mr. B. to say, it is of no importance whether Mary understood the words of Gabriel, spoken in answer to her question in order to remove her perplexity: which end his reply effectually accomplished.

But that Mr. B. may "make assurance doubly sure," he seeks help from the Vulgate version, which, he says, gives the

same translation he himself has insisted on ; and that, therefore, "the author of the Vulgate viewed the passage in the same light." The correctness of this conclusion I much doubt : the author of that version has, it is true, in Luke i. 35. rendered *διο και*, *ideoque* : but it should be recollected that the particle *διο* itself alone is also in that version translated by this compound, Rom. xiii. 12.; and in Heb. xii. 1. *τοιγαρουν και* is rendered *ideoque et*. Also in Acts x. 29., the Vulgate translates *διο και* *propter quod*, and in other places *propter quod et*. I could also point out a multitude of places in that version where the term *και* is translated in the most perfect unison with the foregoing word. Thus *δε και* is rendered *enim*, Matt. iii. 10., Luke iii. 9.; and *αυτην*, Luke v. 10., and xii. 54. ; *οτι και*, *quia*, Matt. viii. 27.; *ει και*, *etsi*, Luke xi. 8.; *ωτω και*, *sicut*, 1 Cor. xv. 45, &c. Hence the author of the Vulgate version had a very different view of the force and use of the Greek term before us, than that one suggested by Mr. B.: and I am truly astonished that with so much knowledge of the Greek language, as Mr. B. really possesses, he should allow himself to put his Readers in mind of a drowning man, grasping at a floating feather in order to preserve his life.

Had, however, his criticisms (as we all expected) been correct ; still he would have had to prove that the Second Person in the Holy Trinity has been called, as to His Divine nature, the Son of God ; which task he cannot possibly perform !

Again, if any opposition be contained in the words, it is proper to seek it in the paragraph in which these words form a part, and not in the regions of fancy and flighty imagination. It appears from verse 32, &c. that Mary thought His kingly office, title of Son of God, and greatness foretold by the angel, might all comport with one born in the ordinary way : but in verse 35, Gabriel informs her that, on account of the production of His human nature by the immediate power of God, He should be called, in the most eminent sense in which the words can be understood, the "Son of God." Hence, throughout the whole, Mr. B. has failed in his endeavour to support his arguments on "critical grounds."

I cannot dismiss this subject without just glancing at the con-

fused ideas Mr. B. entertains upon the doctrine in dispute. It appears that he is fully aware that the idea of *production*, or *derivation*, cannot be separated from the term *Son*; for he says, "It is self-evident, that if Christ was from eternity the wisdom or reason of God, He must, in a certain sense, be *produced*, or *derived*." Now, so far from being self-evident, we maintain (and every unprejudiced Reader must feel the force of this statement) that the idea of being produced, or derived, is not *necessarily* implied in the terms *wisdom* and *reason*; but it is evidently implied in the appellation *Son*. Hence there can be no incongruity in the expression *eternal wisdom*, or *eternal reason*: but in speaking of an *ETERNAL Son*, we speak no better sense than when we speak of an *ETERNAL production*, which is in itself the most gross contradiction in terms.

Agreeably to Mr. B., then, Christ the Son, or the Word, as to His Divine nature, exclusively is, "in a certain sense, produced or derived:" and that such are his views is confirmed by many other expressions in his letters, and especially marked by his quotations from Gregory Nazianzen. "It behoves us to acknowledge one God the Father, *unoriginated*, and *unbegotten*; one Son, *begotten* by the Father; and one Spirit, *deriving* His subsistence from God." Now it is impossible that such language as the above, when duly considered, can lead to any other conclusion than this: that both the Second and Third Persons of the ever-blessed Trinity are originated; and if originated, consequently, they are not independent and self-existent!!! Such is the repugnant and blasphemous conclusion to which the words of Gregory Nazianzen (reputed one of the most orthodox in the primitive Christian church) necessarily conduct the sincere inquirer after truth; and the argument of Mr. B., the great admirer of this father, when weighed in the impartial scales of just criticism, is found to be lighter than vanity.

That every man is at liberty to think for himself I readily grant. I am not finding fault with Mr. B. merely because he differs in sentiments from myself: but I am astonished that a Methodist press should have been *permitted* to issue such sentiments, and sanction such a belief. Surely, they could not have been aware of the essential absurdity of the doctrine they have

done all in their power to promulgate. This my charity hopes; for I am certain, they would not knowingly have ministered to their flock poison for food, error for truth, darkness for light! But the conductors of the work, we have just adverted to, should sufficiently consider the awful responsibility of their situation; for they are entrusted to feed the church of Christ, to build it up in its most holy faith. It is impossible, therefore, that they can be too guarded in the food they minister; or too watchful, lest with the wheat they also mix the tares!

I now quit this field of controversy. How far I have come off victorious I leave my Readers to determine: with my motive I am thoroughly satisfied; for I have been actuated by a love to truth, an aversion from error, a reverence for justice, an abhorrence of calumny and misrepresentation. And if I were, with these motives and incitements, to number that of a personal respect and love for the character, learning, and piety, of Dr. C.;—who, but that man who cannot behold *learning* without envy; virtue and benevolence without suspicion; zeal for the honour and cause of God without emotion; and who can mark calumny and misrepresentation lay her finger upon, and endeavour to blot such fair characters out of the respect of all good and great men without indignation;—who, but such a being, will feel disposed to blame this endeavour to render such measures abortive? Will not all impartial Readers rather feel disposed to forward my success; and to judge, by the uprightness and integrity of their own minds and feelings, this result of those wishes and endeavours, which I now leave to their kind consideration; and I trust to the blessing of that God who trieth the heart, and the reins of the children of men; and to whom the darkness is as the light.

FINIS.