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
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DISQUISITIONS

RELATING TO

MATTER AND SPIRIT.

TO WHICH IS ADDED

The History of the Philosophical Doctrine concerning the Origin of the Soul, and the Nature of Matter; with its Influence on Christianity, especially with respect to the Doctrine of the Pre-existence of Christ.

By ^{cc} JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, LL.D. F.R.S.

V O L. I.

THE SECOND EDITION, IMPROVED AND ENLARGED.

Si quelqu'un démontreroit jamais, qu'*l'âme est matérielle*, loin de s'en alarmer, il faudroit admirer la puissance, qui auroit donné à la matière la capacité de penser.

BONNETT. *Palingenese*. Vol. I. p. 50.

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DISQUISITIONS

RELATING TO

MATTER AND SPIRIT.

T O T H E

Rev. WILLIAM GRAHAM.

DEAR SIR,

I TAKE the liberty to dedicate to you a work, written with greater freedom than any that I have hitherto offered to the Public. An enemy of bigotry, and a distinguished champion for freedom of thinking, in very trying situations, as you have long been, I am satisfied you will not be displeased with any effort of the spirit with which you have ever been animated, and which you have done so much to inspire.

Educated, as you know I was, in the very strictest principles of *reputed orthodoxy*, and zealous as I once was for every tenet of the system, it was, in a great measure, by your example and encouragement, at my entrance on theological inquiries, that I adventured to think for myself on subjects

VOL. I.

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of the greatest importance; and that I have been able, in the course of a slow and laborious investigation, to free myself from many vulgar prejudices, and to reject many gross corruptions, as I now deem them, of that religion which is the best gift of God to man, and to attain to the degree of conviction and satisfaction of mind which I now enjoy. Every obligation of this important kind I hope I shall always remember with peculiar pleasure and gratitude.

After a sufficiently tempestuous life, you are now enjoying yourself in a *tranquil retirement*, and seeing others contend with the storm, the fury of which you have borne, and which you have, in some measure, broken, and rendered less hazardous to those who come after you. My time of withdrawing from this busy scene is not yet come; but while I feel myself animated with your *love of truth*, I shall enjoy an enviable composure even in the midst of the tempest; and I shall endeavour to re-
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lieve the severity of these more serious pursuits, with those of *philosophy*, as you have done with those of *classical literature*.

Whatever you may think of some parts of my *reasoning* in the principal work, now presented to you, I am confident you will approve of the main *object* of it, and especially the *Sequel*. You have long been an assertor of the *proper unitarian doctrine*, and cannot be displeased with my endeavouring to trace to their source in heathen antiquity, those capital corruptions of christianity—the *Athanasian* and *Arian* opinions.

The proper *unity of God*, the maker and governor of the world, and the proper *humanity of Christ*, you justly consider as respectively essential to natural and revealed religion; and consequently entertain a reasonable suspicion and dread of any opinions that infringe upon them; and the more venerable those opinions have become on account of their *antiquity*, or the *numbers*, or worldly *power*, by which they are sup-
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ported,

ported, so much the more do they excite your indignation and zeal.

I rejoice with you, on account of such a prevalence of free inquiry, and good sense in matters of religion, in the present age, as cannot fail, in the end, to overturn the *antichristian systems* that have been permitted by divine providence to prevail so long in the christian world, and consequently (though probably in a remote period) the *antichristian tyrannies* that have supported them.

I am,

with the greatest esteem,

Dear Sir,

your affectionate friend,

and christian brother,

CALNE,
July, 1777.

J. PRIESTLEY.

T H E
P R E F A C E.

IT may appear something extraordinary, but it is strictly true, that but a very few years ago, I was so far from having any thoughts of writing on the subject of this publication, that I had not even adopted the opinion contended for in it. Like the generality of christians in the present age, I had always taken it for granted, that man had a soul distinct from his body, though with many modern divines, I supposed it to be incapable of exerting any of its faculties, independently of the body; and I believed this soul to be a substance so intirely distinct from matter, as to have no property in common with it. Of this several traces may be found in the first edition of my *Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion*, and probably in some of my other writings.

Not but that I very well remember many doubts occurred to me on the subject of the intimate union of two substances so intirely

heterogeneous as the soul and the body were represented to be. And even when I first entered upon metaphysical inquiries, I thought that either the *material*, or *immaterial* part of the universal system was superfluous. But not giving any very particular attention to a subject on which I could get no light, I relapsed into the general hypothesis of *two intirely distinct and independent principles in man*, connected in some unknown and incomprehensible manner; and I acquiesced in it as well as I could.

Father Boscovich and Mr. Michell's new theory concerning matter, of which I gave an account in my *History of Discoveries relating to Vision*, &c. was calculated, as will be seen, to throw the greatest light on the constituent principles of human nature; but it was a considerable time before I could bring myself really to receive a doctrine so new, though so strictly philosophical; and besides I had nothing of a metaphysical nature in contemplation at that time.

It was upon resuming some of my metaphysical speculations, to which (like most other persons of a studious turn) I had been exceedingly attached in the early period of my literary

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rary life (when I published my *Examination of the Principles of Common Sense*, as maintained by Dr. Beattie, &c. and when I republished Dr. Hartley's *Theory of the Human Mind*) that I first entertained a serious doubt of the truth of the vulgar hypothesis; and writing, as I always do, with great frankness, I freely expressed that doubt, exactly as it then stood in my mind; and I think it is hardly possible to express any thing with more hesitation and diffidence. The paragraph I allude to is the following:

“ I am rather inclined to think, though the
 “ subject is beyond our comprehension at pre-
 “ sent, that man does not consist of *two princi-*
 “ *ples* so essentially different from one another
 “ as *matter* and *spirit*, which are always de-
 “ scribed as having no one common property,
 “ by means of which they can affect, or act
 “ upon each other; the one occupying space,
 “ and the other not only not occupying the
 “ least imaginable portion of space, but in-
 “ capable of bearing any relation to it; inso-
 “ much that, properly speaking, my mind is
 “ no more in my body, than it is in the moon.
 “ I rather think that the whole man is of some
 “ *uniform composition*; and that the property of
 “ *perception*, as well as the other powers that
 “ are

“ are termed *mental*, is the result (whether
“ necessary, or not) of such an organical
“ structure as that of the brain: consequently,
“ that the whole man becomes extinct at
“ death, and that we have no hope of sur-
“ viving the grave, but what is derived from
“ the scheme of revelation.”

I little imagined that such a paragraph as this could have given the alarm that I presently found it had done. My *doubts* were instantly converted into a *full persuasion*, and the cry against me as an *unbeliever*, and a *favourer of atheism*, was exceedingly general and loud; and was echoed from quarters where more candour and better discernment might have been expected. With what *intention* this was done, is best known to the authors of such gross defamation. I shall proceed to relate the *consequences* of it, for which they are, in some measure, answerable.

This odium, which I had thus unexpectedly drawn upon myself, served to engage my more particular attention to the subject of it; and this at length terminated in a full conviction, that the doubt I had expressed was well founded. Continuing to reflect upon the subject, I became satisfied that, if we suffer our-
selves

selves to be guided in our inquiries by the universally acknowledged *rules of philosophizing*, we shall find ourselves intirely unauthorized to admit any thing in man besides that *body* which is the object of our senses; and my own observations, and my collection of opinions on the subject, presently swelled to the bulk that is now before the Public.

These observations I now lay before the reader (whatever be his disposition of mind with respect to myself, or my subject) with the same openness and simplicity with which I first proposed my simple doubt; and, judging from what has passed, I may imagine that, if the *simple doubt* occasioned so great an alarm and outcry, the unreserved avowal of my *intire conviction* on the subject will cause a much greater alarm. And yet in this apprehension I may possibly be mistaken; and as, on the former occasion, the offence was taken when I was least aware of it, the popular clamour may have spent itself, and may begin to subside, on the very occasion on which I imagined it would be inflamed to the utmost.

Men of reason and religion may attend to the arguments that I have produced, from *reason* and the *scriptures*, in support of my hypothesis,

thesis, and may be satisfied that my opinion is neither irrational in itself, nor destitute of countenance in the sacred writings, and therefore certainly not *dangerous*; and the favour of *the few* may silence the clamour of *the many*.

On the other hand, the tide of popular prejudice may rise still higher, and though I have spent the greatest part of my life in the study and defence of christianity, the suspicion of my being an unbeliever, and an underminer of all religion, may be confirmed; and, like Mr. Hobbes, I may for generations lie under the imputation of absolute atheism.

Be this as it may; I feel a great *present ease* in the idea of publishing my thoughts with the most unreserved freedom on this important subject; and I am not without hopes that, though many well meaning christians may, for some time, rank me with unbelievers, some unbelievers, of a philosophical turn of mind, may, on this very account, be prevailed upon to attend to the subject; and finding the true system of revelation to be quite another thing than they had imagined it to be, and infinitely more *consonant to the real appearances of nature*, may think it worth their while to consider it in various *other lights*, and attend to the
evidence

evidence that myself and others have produced in favour of it; and so, from being infidels (in consequence of not understanding what christianity really is, and not sufficiently examining the evidence of it, which is generally the case) they may become rational christians.

A very few converts of this kind would, in my estimation, compensate for a great deal of odium among professed christians. Their indignation will do neither themselves, nor me, much harm; whereas the conviction of the *reasonableness* and *truth* of christianity, in a few really thinking and intelligent unbelievers, might do the greatest good; and even contribute to put a stop, sooner than otherwise would be done, to the infidelity of the philosophical part of the world.

To effect this, in any tolerable degree, would be an object indeed; and the man who should in any measure succeed in it, could not be said to have lived, to have written, or to have been calumniated, in vain. I am fully satisfied that it will be to no purpose to expect the conversion of philosophical unbelievers to that system of opinions which now generally passes for christianity, and especially that which is *established* in the different countries of Europe under

der that name. Because conclusions contrary to all *natural appearances*, will never be admitted by them to be true.

So very free and undisguised an attack upon an opinion almost universally deemed to be of the utmost importance to all religion, natural or revealed, may be expected to rouse the zeal of many friends to the prevailing system, and produce *defences* of it. This is what I *expect*, and what I *wish*; and as I am prepared for it, I will take this opportunity of acquainting my readers with the rule I have laid down to myself on similar occasions, and to which I propose to adhere in this.

I by no means think it right to resolve, with Mr. Hume, to take no notice of any antagonist whatever. I might as well refuse to make any reply to a person who should address himself to me in conversation, after I had thought proper to direct my discourse to him: for in printed publications we, in fact, address all the world. A *pertinent*, and especially a *decent*, reply, requires, I think, a respectful notice, though a very *absurd* and *impertinent* one may justly, as in conversation, be treated with neglect. The Public, in whose presence every thing passes, will judge for

for themselves, whether a man refuses to make a reply because he is not able to make a good one, or because he has some sufficient reason for not doing it. It must, however, be acknowledged, that even the general and public opinion *may* be so unreasonable, that a writer may be justified in paying no attention to it, and in appealing to the more mature judgment of posterity.

It is, I presume, sufficiently evident from the strain of my publications, that *general applause* has not been my object. I know that they are rather calculated to narrow the circle of my friends, though I hope they will leave me enow for any valuable purpose in life. I shall not, therefore, feel myself disposed to take notice of *every* attack upon this treatise, and especially such as may be *anonymous*. But if the principles advanced in it be controverted by any person whose name, as a metaphysician, or divine, is *generally respected*, I do assure him that I will take more or less notice of him; either acknowledging any mistakes I may be convinced I have fallen into, or endeavouring to convince him of his. Even a very *able*, or *very plausible*, anonymous antagonist shall not be neglected. For,

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as in the controversy which I began with the Scotch writers, I really wish to have the subject freely and fully canvassed.

There are subjects on which, after a reasonable attention to them, a man may be authorized to *make up his mind*, so as to be justified in refusing even to lose his time in reading what may be addressed to him on it; because he may have sufficient ground to presume it cannot contain any thing materially new to him. This is what most protestants will avow with respect to the popish doctrine of *transubstantiation*, and I avow it with respect to the doctrine of the *trinity*, and various other articles of Calvinistic theology. I have at this time by me several tracts, particularly *Letters* addressed to me, on those subjects, and which have been much applauded, which I have not looked into, and which I profess I never intend to look into. But this is not the case with respect to the subject of this treatise. I will carefully read, for some time at least, whatever shall be addressed to me, or the Public, on the subject, provided the writers take care that their publications be transmitted, or properly announced, to me.

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I do not, as many persons would, except against all answers that may be written in a manner not perfectly consistent with the laws of *decorum*, or those in which I may think myself treated with too much *asperity*, or *ridicule*. I would have every man write as he actually *feels* at the time. There are few controversial writers, who, when the warmth of debate is over, may not see something of this kind to blame themselves for; but those who are acquainted with human nature, will make allowance for such *human imperfections*, and attend to the *merits of the case*; and it may be depended upon, that the real *weight of argument* is the thing that will decide in the end, when every thing of a *personal nature*, in the course of the controversy, will be forgotten.

If I were disposed, as I am not, to plead for *mercy*, I would alledge the extreme unpopularity of my side of the question; and say that, a man who writes with the full tide of popular opinion in his favour, has no occasion for any *indirect method* of bearing down his antagonist. It is the man whose opinions are unpopular that stands in the most need of the arts of address; and in him they would be most excusable. But, notwithstanding this,
I shall

I shall trust my very unpopular argument to its native strength, or weakness, without any artificial support whatever.

As I have extended this Preface thus far, I shall extend it a little farther, in order to answer an objection that may be made to religion, natural or revealed, from the very great *differences of opinion* among the professors of it, on such subjects as are here discussed, and from the *animosity* with which we may happen to debate about them. Now this does not at all arise from the *nature of the subject*, any farther than its greater importance necessarily, and justly, makes it more interesting, but from the *nature of man*, the same principles operating in a similar manner on similar occasions.

Men do not differ more, or dispute with more warmth, on subjects of *religion*, or *metaphysics*, than they do on those of *civil government*, *philology*, or even *philosophy*, which, one would imagine, *a priori*, must always be the calmest thing in the world, and could never occasion an angry debate. But by giving much *attention* to any thing, we may *interest* ourselves in any thing, and wherever that is the case, an intemperate warmth is the inevitable consequence. Besides, it is not in human

man nature not to feel one's self more or less interested in the support of an opinion which we have once advanced as *our own*. And whenever any thing *personal* mixes in a debate (and it is barely possible that it should not do so) it is, in fact, a regard for *our reputation* and *character* that is the *stimulus*, and nothing necessarily belonging to the *subject*.

But the circumstance that chiefly interests the passions, and inflames the animosity of those who dispute on the subject of religion, is the *worldly emolument* annexed to the profession of particular tenets, in the civil establishments of christianity. Did the civil magistrate shew no preference to one mode of religion more than to another, and was there no other motive concealed under the mask of *zeal for religion*, there would be no great reason to complain of its intemperance.

Few persons are, from their situation and experience, better qualified to speak on this subject than myself, few persons having been engaged in a greater variety of pursuits, or in a scene of more *various controversy*; and I see no reason whatever for accusing *religion*, more than any thing else, of exciting jealousy, ha-

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tred,

ted, or any other immediate cause of animosity and angry debate.

Many of my friends are frequently expressing their wishes, that I had nothing to do with *theology*, or *metaphysics*, flattering me with the prospect of a considerable degree of unenvied reputation as a *philosopher*. But the most rancorous opposition, and the most unprovoked abuse that I have met with, has been from persons who never knew any thing of me but in the character of a philosopher. And, though I will venture to say, that it is not possible to write with more frankness than I have always done; describing, in the most natural manner, the very progress of my thoughts with respect to every discovery of consequence, and, upon all occasions, giving rather too much, than too little, to any person who has favoured me with the least assistance, as all my philosophical writings evidence, I have been treated as a notorious *plagiary* *. There are even many persons, not destitute of name and character themselves, who cannot bear to hear me spoken of, as having any pretensions to philosophy, without a sneer; and who think

* See my Pamphlet intitled *Philosophical Empiricism*.

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my publications on the subject a disgrace to philosophy, and to my country.

Can I, then, have a more ungracious reception among *divines, metaphysicians, or philologists*? In short, having no better treatment to expect in any walk of literature; I shall, without distinction, apply myself to any pursuit to which my attention shall be more particularly drawn. I have friends, and I have enemies, in every class of men to whom I have been introduced. All the former I shall be happy to oblige in their turn, but I cannot be with any of them always. The latter I neither absolutely despise, nor greatly dread. Those of them who are disposed to be civil to me shall meet with civility from me in return, and as to those of them who are otherwise disposed, I shall behave to them as I may happen to be affected at the time.

But, mindful of the motto which I have chosen for my coat of arms, *Ars longa, vita brevis*, I shall devote as much of my time as possible to the *pursuit of truth*, and as little as I can help to the mere *defence of it*, or of *myself*. The former is a noble and sublime exercise of the mind, exalting the soul, and improving the temper; whereas in the latter,

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though conducted with the greatest caution, there is a risk of debasing the mind, hurting the temper, and sacrificing our peace. For, controversy is, at best, a state of war.

THE historical account of the system of heathenism concerning the pre-existence of souls in general, and of the pre-existence of the soul of Christ in particular, which was derived from it, I had once thought of reserving for my *Historical View of the Corruptions of Christianity*, which was originally intended to be the last part of my *Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion*. But as it was actually composed during my investigation of this subject, as it rose out of it, and is strictly connected with it, I have thought proper to subjoin it, by way of *Sequel*.

Both the parts of this work, taken together, will shew, in a striking light, the very extensive mischief that has been done to revealed religion by the introduction of this part of the system of heathenism, concerning the soul. And when the proper extent of this *foreign system* is seen, it may be hoped, that
many

many persons who have rejected a part of it, will see equal reason to reject the whole. And, for my own part, I am satisfied that it is only by purging away the whole of this *corrupt leaven*, that we can recover the pristine simplicity and purity of our most excellent and truly rational, though much abused, religion.

Athanasianism, I think, will sufficiently appear to have been merely Oriental philosophy in its origin, and afterwards to have become more absurd than the original tenets of that philosophy; and Arianism is only the same philosophy altered, free indeed from the palpable *contradictions* of Athanasianism, but it is, in other respects, no less remote from the proper scheme of christianity. I shall think myself happy if, by this or any other of my writings, I be able to throw the least new light upon a subject which has so near a relation to the fundamental principles of the christian system.

Explanation of the FRONTISPIECE.

THE idea is taken from 1 *Cor.* iii. 12. where different persons are represented as having built with different materials, on the solid foundation of christianity, as laid by Christ and the apostles; and that what was built with wood, and other base materials, would be consumed by fire, while the rest would stand. Our Saviour, who revealed the future state of his church to the apostle John, is represented as shewing him this circumstance relating to it. The application of this scene to the object of this work, is sufficiently obvious.

P R E F A C E
T O T H E
S E C O N D E D I T I O N .

IT is with much satisfaction that I publish a second edition of this work, having found the first to have been much better received than there seemed to be any reason to expect. It was, particularly, the means of discovering that many persons, the most serious christians, had either actually held the opinion I here contend for, or were well affected towards it, though they had not been disposed to write, or even to speak on the subject, on account of its extreme unpopularity. Hereafter, I hope that *materialism*, obnoxious as the term has hitherto been, will be so far from being peculiar to *unbelievers*, that it will be the favourite tenet of *rational christians*; being perfectly consonant to the appearances of nature, and giving a peculiar value to the scheme of revelation.

I have now, I think, done all the justice to the subject that I am capable of; having not only written thus largely upon it, but having also, as I professed myself ready to do, entered into the defence of it with persons the best qualified to controvert it. This, at least, must be allowed to be the case with respect to Dr. Price; who, at the same time, that he is one of the ablest writers of the age, is one of the most candid, and the best of men. The result of our friendly discussion of this subject is published in a volume by itself; but from that work I have now transferred into this the *Additional Illustrations*, which I took that opportunity of publishing, and have inserted them in the places to which they belong. When the *Discussion* is reprinted, they shall be left out of it.

I do not think it will be expected of me that I should take notice of every thing that has been written in answer to this work; but I must not pass by two sections in Mr. De Luc's, *Histoire de la Terre*, in which he professedly animadverts upon this publication of mine. Not that he has advanced any thing that is *new* on the subject (indeed he professes that his arguments are the same
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in substance with those of Dr. Price, and to them I have already replied in a manner with which I am sufficiently satisfied) but because his work is more likely to be read by foreigners. I have also a respect for the writer, as an excellent man, with whom I have the happiness of being acquainted, and whose intentions I am persuaded are the best that any man can have.

In the first place, I must observe that he charges me unjustly with considering only that kind of *immaterialism* which is most open to objection, and which he professedly disclaims, viz. that which makes spirit to have no common property with matter, and therefore to be incapable of any mutual action with it; whereas I have particularly considered that, and every other possible idea of spirit. But I have shewn that the progress from the original notion of it, which was that of *an attenuated kind of matter*, to that which made it to occupy no portion of space, and to bear no relation to it, was natural and necessary; and that, absurd as Mr. De Luc thinks this notion of spirit to be, it is, in fact, better covered from refutation than any other. The idea of spirits having extension, which
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is maintained by Mr. De Luc, I have considered at large in Section VIII. and I wish him to attend to what is there advanced.

He considers spirit as having *some* common property with matter; but let him consider what common property it *must* be, that can enable it to *act* upon matter. It cannot be mere *extension*, for then space and matter would be capable of a proper mutual action. And if, as he maintains, matter must have *solidity*, in order to its being possessed of the properties of attraction and repulsion, by which alone its action upon other matter is shewn, a spirit must have solidity also, in order to its being capable of the same kind of action.

To say, in general, that matter and spirit must have some common property, but that this common property is altogether *unknown* to us, cannot give any satisfaction. For till it be defined, I am at liberty to say that such unknown common property may be impossible in nature. Besides, those who, with Mr. De Luc, maintain the *impenetrability* of matter, always suppose that this is the foundation of all its other properties; for they say that, otherwise, they would be
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the properties of *nothing*. It must, therefore, be the foundation of this unknown property which it has in common with spirit. Consequently, they must, if they argue consistently, suppose this property of impenetrability to be the foundation of this same unknown property in spirit, which makes it capable of mutual action with matter.

Indeed, I can see no ground on which we can suppose that spirit is not impenetrable, but on the supposition that matter is destitute of it also, if these two substances be capable of mutual action. I wish Mr. De Luc, and others who think as he does, would attentively consider this obvious train of reasoning; and they will perceive that this new notion of spirit, viz. its having some property in common with matter, is absolutely untenable, as much so as that which supposes it to have no common property with it whatever, and to bear no relation to space. This they reject as chimerical, but they must take refuge in it, if they maintain *two principles* in man at all.

The only objection that Mr. De Luc, or any other person, can have to the hypothesis of man being wholly material, is that he
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can perceive no *connexion* between *matter* and *sensation* or thought; but neither can he perceive any connexion between *solidity*, or *impenetrability*, and the other known properties of matter, such as *cohesion*, *gravitation*, &c. Here is, in fact, precisely the same difficulty as in the connexion between matter and sensation, only it has not been so much attended to.

This truly valuable writer employs another whole section of his work, to convince me that I have done wrong in *publishing* my opinion on this subject; but I cannot say that his arguments have more weight with me in this case, than in the other. He urges very strongly that, when persons' minds are unhinged with respect to their opinions on subjects of importance, they are apt to give into universal scepticism. But this doctrine should have been preached to Luther, to Calvin, and the other reformers from popery. If their conduct be justifiable, I ask why may not we of this age humbly presume to be reformers from popery also? They are in fact the remains of the same fabric of corruptions that I would contribute to clear away. The building itself has happily been
thrown

thrown down; but I wish to dig up the very foundations, that they may never be built upon again.

He allows *, that with a certain persuasion of the truth and importance of our opinions, we are justifiable in publishing them. I will then tell him, and I wonder he did not perceive it before, that I *have* this full persuasion. It is, I believe, as clear and full as that which he has of the contrary; and therefore I am as justifiable in advancing my opinions, as he is in opposing them.

He says that I cannot plead in defence of my publication its importance to the defence of christianity, because he knows of no unbelievers who reject it on account of its being supposed to contain the doctrine of a soul; and that many unbelievers expect a future state upon that principle, which it is therefore an injury to deprive them of. I answer that this might have been urged some time ago; but at present I know of no unbelievers who have what can be truly called an *expectation* of a future life, on any principles. Nor can this be at all wonderful, after they have re-

* Vol. I. p. 371.

jected

jected revelation. Unbelievers abroad almost universally reject the opinion of a *soul* as absurd; and if Mr. De Luc only reads the *Système de la Nature*, he will see both this opinion, and also that of *philosophical liberty* (both of which the writer took for granted were essential to the system of revealed religion) reprobated with contempt. On the whole, the state of things is now such, that it appears to me to be absolutely necessary to abandon the notion of a *soul*, if we would retain christianity at all. And, happily, the principles of it are as repugnant to that notion, as those of any modern philosophy.

Lastly, Mr. De Luc seems willing to allow that I might be justified in publishing my opinions, provided I were *persecuted* for them, which he says I am not, except so far as I am excluded by them from all preferment in the church. And he takes this occasion of intimating, that I may not have sufficiently considered the necessity of some *establishment of religion*, in order to prevent controversy in the public exercises of it*. I answer, that I wish to have nothing to do with any establish-

* P. 355.

ment of religion by civil power. Our Saviour and the apostles certainly never looked to any such thing. They made no provision for it, and christianity did much better when, for three hundred years, it had no such support, than it has since done with it; notwithstanding there were sects enow among christians in those ages, and therefore the inconvenience which Mr. De Luc so much dreads, must have affected them, as well as it does us.

But, in fact, establishments have not removed this inconvenience, if it be any. Few sectaries differ more from one another than members of the church of England do contrive to differ among themselves. The same is the case in the church of Rome. The doctrines publicly preached in the pulpits of the church of England are just as different from one another as those in dissenting congregations. Mr. De Luc is a foreigner, and therefore may not be acquainted with the fact, but it is notorious. I think, therefore, he would be at some loss to shew what *good end* the establishment of religion in this country answers. I will undertake to point out to him many *bad* ones. On the other hand, let him look to America, and say

say what evils have arisen from a want of establishments.

The author of *Letters on Materialism* has written a very elaborate defence of his principles in a treatise intitled, *Immaterialism delineated*, giving his name (JOSEPH BERINGTON) to the Public, and avowing himself a priest of the Roman Catholic church. As to the argument between us, I am willing to let it remain as it is, not thinking my system invalidated by what he has alledged; and his system of immaterialism is so peculiar (though perhaps the same with that of Mr. De Luc, if he would distinctly unfold it) that I imagine few will avail themselves of it.

I shall, therefore, only take this opportunity of expressing my sincere esteem for Mr. Berington, as a man of a truly liberal turn of mind; and cultivated understanding, though warped, as I must think him to be, by his education. I wish all Catholics were such as he is, and then the horror with which we now, and too justly, regard his religion, would vanish, and our invectives against it might be spared. His defence of the Catholics, published soon after the late riots in London, was seasonable and excellent.

There

There has appeared an anonymous answer both to Dr. Price and myself, under the title of *An Essay on the Nature and Existence of a Material World*, the author himself asserting that no such thing exists. On this subject I have advanced what I deem sufficient in my *Examination of the writings of Dr. Reid, &c.* I shall therefore only observe in this place, that this ingenious writer seems to have mistaken my argument, and by that means to have made his reply very easy. I do not produce a world at so small an expence as he says*, and motion is not my sole material. I acknowledge with him, that power cannot mean any thing without a subject. But I do not therefore think that it follows, that the powers of attraction and repulsion must have a subject that has also the power or property of impenetrability. For then *spirit*, whose sole existence he contends for, and the divine being himself, could have no existence. But then, though we cannot speak of power but as existing in some *thing* or *substance*, it is equally true, that without those powers, that *something* is reduced to what, in our idea, is nothing at all.

* P. 81.

As to what I advanced in the speculation concerning points, or *centers of attraction and repulsion*, on which alone all this writers objections are founded, though I do not think it is at all invalidated by any thing that he has advanced, I professed never to lay any stress upon it, as not being necessary to my argument, and I shall not think it worth while to defend it.

He says *, that I seem to have fallen into a strange mistake, viz. that the form or shape of matter constitutes its essence; whereas I only observed that solid matter must necessarily have some form or shape, and this no person can deny.

There has not been much written on my side of the question; but I must not omit to mention the *Slight Sketch of the Controversy* between me and my opponents, the writer of which has well defended my hypothesis from the charge of infidelity. But I must more especially request the attention of my readers to the *Miscellaneous Observations on some points of Controversy between the Materialists and their Opponents*. This is the production of a masterly hand. It is only to be regretted

* P. 92.

that

that he has not entered more largely into the subject. He is a writer from whom I own I have considerable expectations.

I think I have now sufficiently fulfilled my promise to the Public, viz. to reply, more or less largely, to whatever can be deemed worthy of any answer with respect to these *Disquisitions*, as well as to the *Treatise on Philosophical Necessity*. I shall now probably dismiss any farther particular attention to these subjects, and apply to other studies, which I know will be no displeasing information to some of my partial friends.

. ON account of the references to the pages of the former edition of this work in the *Free Discussion*, and the various answers to it, and especially on account of the INDEX to both the volumes at the end of the *Discussion*, I have thought proper to print a *Table of the corresponding pages* in the two editions of both the volumes, and also of the *corresponding parts* of this new edition, and the *Additional Illustrations* inserted in the *Discussion*.

A
C A T A L O G U E

O F

Some of the B O O K S that are quoted in
this Treatise.

AS there are different editions of several of the books that I have quoted in this treatise, it will be proper to subjoin a list of the copies that I have made use of. It will also be proper to give more at length the titles of some books that I have frequently referred to very concisely, having sometimes mentioned nothing more than the name of the writer.

This has been more especially the case with Beaufobre and Dupin, to both of whom, and especially the former, I am much indebted for my historical account of the opinions of the ancients. And I would observe in this place, that when I might, with no great trouble, have given those opinions from the original authors themselves, I have often chosen to give them, as reported by such writers as these. Because as these things have been very differ-

c 3 rently

rently represented, I was confident that the opinion of these writers would be more respected than my own, their learning and exactness being universally acknowledged; and their views in writing having been different from mine, they cannot be suspected of partiality to my hypothesis.

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 Thirlbii. - - London 1722.
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4th edition.

1754.

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Baxter's

21 A C A T A L O G U E, &c.

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A L T E R A T I O N S.

The less metaphysical reader may, without any inconvenience, intirely omit the three first sections of this work, and begin with section IV. For whatever be the essential properties of matter, man, according to the doctrine contended for in this work, is wholly composed of it, and his hope of a future life is only derived from revelation.

DISQUISITIONS

RELATING TO

MATTER AND SPIRIT.

The INTRODUCTION.

LEST any person should hastily misapprehend the *nature*, or *importance*, of the questions discussed in this treatise, or the manner in which I have decided for myself with respect to them, I shall here state the several subjects of inquiry as concisely, and with as much distinctness, as I can, and also inform the reader what my opinions concerning them really are.

It has generally been supposed that there are *two distinct kinds of substance* in human nature, and they have been distinguished by the terms *matter* and *spirit*. The former of these has been said to be possessed of the property of *extension*, viz. of length, breadth, and thickness, and also of *solidity* or *impenetrability*, but it is said to be naturally destitute of all powers whatever. The latter has of late

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been

been defined to be a substance intirely *destitute of all extension, or relation to space*, so as to have no property in common with matter; and therefore to be properly *immaterial*, but to be possessed of the powers of *perception, intelligence, and self-motion*.

Matter is that kind of substance of which our *bodies* are composed, whereas the principle of perception and thought belonging to us is said to reside in a *spirit*, or immaterial principle, intimately united to the body; while the higher orders of intelligent beings, and especially the Divine Being, are said to be purely immaterial.

It is maintained in this treatise, that neither *matter* nor *spirit* (meaning by the latter the subject of sense and thought) correspond to the definitions above-mentioned. For that matter is not that *inert* substance that it has been supposed to be; that *powers of attraction or repulsion* are necessary to its very being, and that no part of it appears to be *impenetrable* to other parts. I therefore, define it to be a substance possessed of the property of *extension*, and of *powers of attraction or repulsion*. And since it has never yet been asserted, that the powers of *sensation and thought* are incompatible with these (*solidity, or impenetrability* only, having been thought to be repugnant to them) I therefore maintain, that we have no reason to suppose that there are in man two substances so distinct from each other, as have been represented.

It is likewise maintained in this treatise, that the notion of two substances that have no *common property*, and yet are capable of *intimate connection* and *mutual action*, is both absurd and *modern*; a substance without extension or relation to place being unknown both in the scriptures, and to all antiquity; the human mind for example, having till lately been thought to have a proper *presence in the body*, and a *proper motion* together with it; and the Divine Mind having always been represented as being, truly and properly *omnipresent*.

It is maintained, however, in the SEQUEL of this treatise, that such a distinction as the ancient philosophers *did* make between *matter* and *spirit*, though it was by no means such a distinction as was defined above (which does not admit of their having any common property) but a distinction which made the Supreme Mind the author of all good, and *matter* the source of all evil, that all inferior intelligences are *emanations from the Supreme Mind*, or made out of its substance, and that matter was reduced to its present form not by the Supreme Mind itself, but by *another intelligence*, a peculiar emanation from it, has been the real source of the greatest corruptions of true religion in all ages, many of which remain to this very day. It is here maintained, that this *system of philosophy*, and the *true system of revelation*, have always been diametrically opposite, and hostile to each other; and that the latter

can never be firmly established but upon the ruins of the former.

To promote this firm establishment of the system of *pure Revelation*, in opposition to that of a vain and absurd *philosophy*, here shewn to be so, is the true object of this work; in the perusal of which I beg the candour and patient attention of the judicious and philosophical reader.

It may not be unuseful to observe, that a distinction ought to be made with respect to the *relative importance* and *mutual subordination* of the different positions contended for in this treatise. The principal object is, to prove the uniform composition of man, or that what we call *mind*, or the principle of perception and thought, is not a substance distinct from the body, but the result of corporeal organization; and what I have advanced preliminary to this, concerning the *nature of matter*, though subservient to this argument, is by no means essential to it: for whatever matter be, I think I have sufficiently proved, that the human mind is nothing more than a modification of it.

Again, that man is wholly material is eminently subservient to the doctrine of the *proper, or mere humanity* of Christ. For, if no man has a soul distinct from his body, Christ, who, in all other respects, appeared as a man, could not have had a soul which had existed before his body; and the whole doc-

trine

THE INTRODUCTION. ▼

truth of the *pre-existence of souls* (of which the opinion of the pre-existence of Christ was a branch) will be effectually overturned. But I apprehend that, should I have failed in the proof of the materiality of man, arguments now remain, independent of this, to prove the non pre-existence of Christ, and of this doctrine having been introduced into christianity from the system of Oriental philosophy.

Lastly, the doctrine of *necessity*, maintained in the Appendix, is the immediate result of the doctrine of the materiality of man; for mechanism is the undoubted consequence of materialism. But whether man be wholly material or not, I apprehend that proof enough is advanced that every human volition is subject to certain fixed laws, and that the pretended *self-determining power* is altogether imaginary and impossible.

In short, it is my firm persuasion, that the three doctrines of *materialism*, of that which is commonly called *Socinianism*, and of philosophical *necessity*, are equally parts of *one system*, being equally founded on just observations of nature, and fair deductions from the scriptures; and that whoever shall duly consider their *connection*, and *dependence on one another*, will find no sufficient consistency in any general scheme of principles, that does not comprehend them all. At the same time, each of these doctrines stands on its own independent foundation, and is capable of such separate

demonstration, as subjects of a moral nature require, or admit.

I have advanced what has occurred to me in support of all the three parts of this system ; confident that, in due time, the truth will bear down before it every opposing prejudice, how inveterate soever, and gain a firm establishment in the minds of all men.

SECTION

SECTION I.

Of the Nature and essential Properties of
MATTER.

I AM sorry to have occasion to begin these disquisitions on the nature of *matter and spirit*, with desiring my reader to recur to the universally received *rules of philosophizing*, such as are laid down by Sir Isaac Newton at the beginning of his third book of *Principia*. But though we have followed these rules pretty closely in other philosophical researches, it appears to me that we have, without any reason in the world, intirely deserted them in this. We have suffered ourselves to be guided by them in our inquiries into the causes of *particular appearances* in nature, but have formed our notions, with respect to the most *general and comprehensive principles* of human knowledge, without the least regard, nay, in direct contradiction, to them. And I am willing to hope, that when this is plainly pointed out, the inconsistency of our conduct in these cases cannot fail to strike us, and be the means of inducing the philosophical part of the world to tread back their steps, and set out again on the same maxims which they

have actually followed in their progress. For my own part, I profess an uniform and rigorous adherence to them; but then I must require, that my own reasoning be tried by this, and by no other test.

The first of these rules, as laid down by Sir Isaac Newton, is that we are to *admit no more causes of things than are sufficient to explain appearances*; and the second is that, *to the same effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes*.

So long as we follow these maxims, we may be confident that we walk on sure ground; but the moment we depart from them, we wander in the regions of mere *fancy*, and are only entertaining ourselves and others with our own crude imaginations and conceits. By these plain rules, then, let us pursue our inquiries concerning the nature and connection of what have been called *material* and *thinking* substances; concerning both which very great misconceptions seem to have very generally prevailed. And in the first place, let us attend to what metaphysicians and philosophers have advanced concerning *matter*, with respect to which (I mean its *fundamental properties*, and what may be absolutely affirmed or denied concerning them) there are very few who have so much as expressed the least doubt or uncertainty.

It is asserted, and generally taken for granted, that matter is necessarily a *solid*, or *impenetrable* substance, and naturally, or of itself, destitute

destitute of all *powers* whatever, as those of *attraction* or *repulsion*, &c.

That the vulgar should have formed these opinions, and acquiesce in them, I do not wonder; because there are *common appearances* enow which must necessarily lead them to form such a judgment. I press my hand against the table on which I am writing, and finding that I cannot penetrate it, and that I cannot push my hand into the place which it occupies, without first pushing it out of its place, I conclude that this table, and by analogy, *all matter, is impenetrable to other matter*. These first appearances are sufficient for them to conclude, that matter is necessarily *solid*, and incapable of yielding to the impression of other solid matter.

Again, I see a billiard table; and though I observe the balls upon it ever so long, I do not find any of them ever to change their places till they are pushed against; but that when once they are put in motion, they continue in that *new state* till they are stopped, either by some obstacle, or their own friction, which is in fact the result of a series of obstacles. And therefore I conclude, that, had there been no obstacle of any kind in the way, a ball would have continued in that state of *motion* (as, without being impelled by a foreign force, it would have continued in its former state of *rest*) for ever; having no power *within itself* to make any change in either of those states. I therefore conclude
 universally,

universally, that all matter, as such, is entirely destitute of *power*, and whatever is true of larger bodies with respect to each other, must be equally true of the smallest component parts of the same body; and consequently that all *attraction* or *repulsion* must be the effect of some *foreign power*, disposing either larger bodies, or their small component parts, to certain motions and tendencies, which otherwise they would not have had.

Such appearances as these, I imagine, have led to the conclusions above-mentioned, concerning the fundamental properties of matter. But then they are no more than *superficial appearances*, and therefore have led to superficial and false judgments; judgments which the *real appearances* will not authorize. For, in fact, when the appearances above-mentioned are considered in the new and just lights which late observations have thrown upon this part of philosophy, they will oblige us, if we adhere to the rules of philosophizing laid down above, to conclude that *resistance*, on which alone our opinion concerning the solidity or impenetrability of matter is founded, is never occasioned by *solid matter*, but by something of a very different nature, viz. a *power of repulsion* always acting at a real, and in general, an assignable distance from what we call the body itself.

It will also appear, from the most obvious considerations, that without a power of attraction, a *power* which has always been considered

sidered as something quite distinct from matter itself, there cannot be any such thing as matter; consequently, that this *foreign property*, as it has been called, is in reality absolutely essential to its very *nature and being*. For when we suppose bodies to be divested of it, they come to be *nothing at all*.

These positions, though not absolutely new, will appear paradoxical to most persons, but I beg a candid hearing; and I appeal to the allowed rules of philosophizing above-mentioned, being confident that they will sufficiently support my conclusions.

It will readily be allowed, that every body, as *solid and impenetrable*, must necessarily have some particular *form or shape*; but it is no less obvious, that no such *figured thing* can exist, unless the parts of which it consists have a *mutual attraction*, so as either to keep contiguous to, or preserve a certain distance from each other. This power of attraction, therefore, must be essential to the *actual existence* of all matter; since no substance can retain any *form* without it.

This argument equally affects the smallest atoms, as the largest bodies that are composed of them. An atom, by which I mean an ultimate component part of any gross body, is necessarily supposed to be perfectly solid, wholly impervious to any other atom; and it must also be round, or square, or of some other *determinate form*. But the parts of such a body (as this solid atom must be *divisible*, and therefore

therefore have parts) must be infinitely hard, and therefore must have powers of mutual attraction infinitely strong, or it could not hold together, that is, it could not exist as a *solid atom*. Take away the *power* therefore, and the solidity of the atom intirely disappears. In short, it is then no longer *matter*; being destitute of the fundamental properties of such a substance.

The reason why *solid extent* has been thought to be a complete definition of matter, is because it was imagined that we could separate from our idea of it every thing else belonging to it, and leave these two properties independent of the rest, and subsisting by themselves. But it was not considered, that, in consequence of taking away *attraction*, which is a *power*, *solidity* itself vanishes.

It will perhaps be said, that the particles of which any solid atom consists, may be conceived to be placed close together, without any mutual attraction between them. But then this atom will be intirely destitute of *compactness*, and hardness, which is requisite to its being *impenetrable*. Or if its parts be held together by some *foreign power*, it will still be true that *power* is necessary to its *solidity* and *essence*; since without it every particle would fall from each other, and be dispersed. And this being true of the ultimate particles, as well as of gross bodies, the consequence must be, that the whole substance will absolutely vanish. For as the large
bodies

bodies would be dissolved without some principle of union, or some *power*, internal or external, so the parts of which they are composed would, in similar circumstances, be resolved into smaller parts, and consequently (the smallest parts being resolved in the same manner) the whole substance must absolutely disappear, nothing at all being left for the imagination to fix upon.

It will be observed, that, in this disquisition, I by no means suppose that these powers, which I make to be essential to the being of matter, and without which it cannot exist as a material substance at all, are *self-existent* in it. All that my argument amounts to, is, that from whatever source these powers are derived, or by whatever being they are communicated, matter cannot exist without them; and if that superior power, or being, withdraw its influence, the substance itself necessarily ceases to exist, or is annihilated. Whatever *solidity* any body has, it is possessed of it only in consequence of being endued with certain *powers*, and together with this *cause*, *solidity*, being no more than an *effect*, must cease, if there be any foundation for the plainest and best established rules of reasoning in philosophy.

Though Mr. Locke considered *solidity* as constituting the essence of matter (see *Essay*, &c. vol. ii. p. 141, where he says, "that substance that has the modification of *solidity* is matter") yet it is plain he had an
idea

idea of something else, being in fact necessary to its cohesion. "If God," says he*, "cannot join things together by connections inconceivable to us, we must deny the existence, and being, even of matter itself; since every particle of it having some bulk, has its parts connected by ways inconceivable by us."

Mr. Baxter, who, I believe, is considered as the ablest defender of the strict immaterial system, acknowledges that *powers of resistance and cohesion* are essential to matter, and absolutely make it a solid substance. But asserting, as he does, that these powers are the immediate agency of the Deity himself, it necessarily follows, that there is not in nature any such thing as *matter* distinct from *the Deity*, and *his operations*. An opinion in which Mr. Baxter's hypothesis necessarily terminates.

"Resistance," says Mr. Baxter†, "is fundamental in the nature of matter, and this itself is the power of the immaterial cause, indefinitely impressed upon, and exerted in, every possible part of matter. And since without this, these least parts could not cohere at all, or make a solid, making resistance, it appears that the power of this cause thus incessantly put forth, through all its possible parts, is that which constitutes the solidity and resistance

* Essay, vol. ii. p. 148. † Essay, vol. ii. p. 345.

“ of

“ of matter.—Without this *foreign influence*
“ to effect cohesion, and solidity in it, we
“ could not conceive it to be at all a sub-
“ stance.”

The opinion that all the powers of matter are nothing but the immediate agency of the Deity, is not peculiar to Mr. Baxter, though it is that which chiefly distinguishes his writings. It was held by the famous Jordano Bruno, as his sentiments are represented by the author of *Examen du Fatalisme*, “ All the
“ motions,” says he, “ which strike our
“ senses, the resistance which we find in mat-
“ ter are the effect of the immediate action of
“ God. The smallest parts of matter are
“ united by a force; and as there is no active
“ force in nature, but that of God; this being
“ is the infinite force which unites all the
“ parts of matter, an immense spring which
“ is in continual action*.” It is evident, however, that this philosopher considered the ultimate particles of matter as something different from any thing belonging to the Deity. But his principles, pursued to their proper extent, would have been the same with those of Mr. Baxter.

* Vol i. p. 277.

SECTION

SECTION II.

Of IMPENETRABILITY, as ascribed to
Matter.

AS philosophers have given *too little* to matter, in divesting it of all *powers*, without which I presume it has been proved that no such substance can exist, so it equally follows, from the plain rules of philosophizing above laid down, that they have ascribed *too much* to it, when they have advanced that *impenetrability* is one of its properties. Because, if there be any truth in late discoveries in philosophy, resistance is in most cases caused by something of a quite different nature from any thing *material*, or *solid*, viz. by a *power of repulsion* acting at a distance from the body to which it has been supposed to belong, and in no case whatever can it be proved that resistance is occasioned by any thing else.

Now if *resistance*, from which alone is derived the idea of impenetrability, is in most cases certainly, caused by *powers*, and in no case certainly by any thing else, the rules of philosophizing oblige us to suppose, that the cause of *all* resistance is *repulsive power*, and in no case whatever the thing that we have hitherto improperly termed *solid*, or *impenetrable matter*.

As

As all resistance can differ only in degree, this circumstance can only lead us to the supposition of a greater or less repulsive power, but never to the supposition of a cause of resistance intirely different from such a power. This would be exceedingly unphilosophical. To judge in this manner, is to judge altogether *without*, nay, really *contrary to evidence*. But I come to the *facts* themselves, which no philosopher will pretend to controvert.

When I press my hand against the table, as was mentioned above, I naturally imagine that the obstacle to its going through the table is the *solid matter* of which it consists; but a variety of philosophical considerations demonitrate, that it generally requires a much greater power of pressure than I can exert to bring my fingers into actual contact with the table. Philosophers know that, notwithstanding their seeming contact, they are actually kept at a real distance from each other, by *powers of repulsion* common to them both. Also, electrical appearances shew that a considerable weight is requisite to bring into contact, even links of a chain hanging freely in the air; they being kept asunder by a repulsive power belonging to a very small surface, so that they do not actually touch, though they are supported by each other.

I have myself, as will be seen in the account of my electrical experiments*, endeavoured to

* See History of Electricity, p. 702.

ascertain the weight requisite to bring a number of pieces of money, lying upon one another, into seeming contact, or so near to one another only as the particles that compose the same continued piece of metal, and I found it to be very considerable. These, however, are supposed by philosophers not to be in *actual contact*, but to be kept at certain distances from each other by powers of resistance within the substance itself.

Indeed, that the component particles of the hardest bodies do not actually touch one another, is demonstrable from their being brought nearer together by cold, and by their being removed farther from each other by heat. The power, sufficient to overcome these internal forces of repulsion, by which the ultimate particles of bodies are prevented from coming into actual contact, is what no person can pretend to compute. The power, requisite to break their cohesion, or to remove them from the sphere of each other's attractions, may, in some measure, be estimated; but this affords no *data* for ascertaining the force that would be necessary to bring them into actual contact, which may exceed the other almost infinitely.

Mr. Melville has shewn, from optical considerations *, that a drop of water rolls upon a cabbage leaf without ever coming into actual contact with it; and indeed all the phenomena of *light* are most remarkably un-

* See History of Discoveries relating to vision, &c. p. 454.
favourable

favourable to the hypothesis of the solidity or impenetrability of matter.

When light is reflected back from a body on which it seems to strike, it was natural to suppose that this was occasioned by its impinging against the *solid parts* of the body; but it has been demonstrated by Sir Isaac Newton, that the rays of light are always reflected by a *power of repulsion*, acting at some distance from the body. Again, when part of a beam of light has overcome this power of repulsion, and has entered any transparent substance, it goes on in a right line, provided the medium be of an uniform density, without the least interruption, and without a single particle being reflected, till it comes to the opposite side; having met with no solid particles in its way, not even in the densest transparent substances, as glass, crystal, or diamond; and when it is arrived at the opposite side, it is solely affected by the laws of attraction and repulsion. For with a certain angle of incidence, the greatest part, or the whole of it, will be drawn back into the solid body, without going on into the air, where it should seem that there would have been less obstruction to its passage.

Now these facts seem to prove, that such dense bodies as glass, crystal and diamonds, have no solid parts, or so very few, that the particles of light are never found to impinge upon them, or to be obstructed by them. And certainly till some portion of light can be

shewn to be reflected within the substance of a homogeneous transparent body, there can be no reason from *fact*, and *appearances*, to conclude that they have any such solid parts; but, on the contrary, there must be all the reason in the world to believe, that no such solid resisting particles exist. All the phenomena may be explained without them, and indeed cannot be explained with them.

Since then it is demonstrable that no common pressure is sufficient to bring bodies even into *seeming contact*, or that near approach which the component parts of the same body make to each other (though these are by no means in *absolute contact*, as the phenomena of heat and cold fully prove) but the resistance to a nearer approach is in all cases caused by *powers of repulsion*, there can be no sufficient reason to ascribe resistance *in any case* to any thing besides similar *powers*. Nay, the established rules of philosophizing above recited, absolutely require that we ascribe *all resistance* to such powers; and consequently the supposition of the *solidity* or *impenetrability* of matter, derived solely from the consideration of the resistance of the solid parts of bodies (which, exclusive of a *power* operating at a distance from them, cannot be proved to have any resistance) appears to be destitute of all support whatever. The hypothesis was suggested by a mere fallacy, and therefore ought to be discarded now that the fallacy is discovered,

It

It will be said, that if matter be not a solid, or impenetrable substance, *what is it?* I answer, with respect to this, as I should with respect to any other substance, that it is possessed of such properties, and such only, as the actual well-examined *appearances* prove it to be possessed of. That it is possessed of powers of attraction and repulsion, and of several spheres of them, one within another, I know; because appearances cannot be explained without supposing them; but that there is any thing in, or belonging to matter, capable of resistance, besides those powers of repulsion, does not appear from any phenomena that we are yet acquainted with; and, therefore, as a philosopher, I am not authorized to conclude that any such a thing exists. On the contrary, I am obliged to deny that matter has such a property.

If I be asked how, upon this hypothesis, *matter* differs from *spirit*, if there be nothing in matter that is properly solid or impenetrable; I answer, that it no way concerns me, or true philosophy, to maintain that there is any such difference between them as has hitherto been supposed. On the contrary, I consider the notion of the union and mutual influences of substances so essentially different from one another, as *material* and *immaterial* substances have been represented, as an opinion attended with difficulties infinitely embarrassing, and indeed actually insuperable,

as may appear in the course of these disquisitions.

The considerations suggested above, tend to remove the *odium* which has hitherto lain upon matter, from its supposed necessary property of *solidity*, *inertness*, or *sluggishness*; as from this circumstance only the *baseness* and *imperfection*, which have been ascribed to it are derived. Since, besides extension, matter has, in fact, no properties but those of *attraction* and *repulsion*, it ought to rise in our esteem, as making a nearer approach to the nature of spiritual and immaterial beings, as we have been taught to call those which are opposed to gross matter.

The principles of the Newtonian philosophy were no sooner known, than it was seen how few, in comparison, of the phenomena of nature, were owing to *solid matter*, and how much to *powers*, which were only supposed to accompany and surround the solid parts of matter. It has been asserted, and the assertion has never been disproved, that for any thing we know to the contrary, all the solid matter in the solar system might be contained within a nut-shell, there is so great a proportion of *void space* within the substance of the most solid bodies. Now, when solidity had apparently so very little to do in the system, it is really a wonder that it did not occur to philosophers sooner, that perhaps there might be nothing for it to do at all, and that there might be no such a thing in nature.

Since

Since the only reason why the principle of thought, or sensation, has been imagined to be incompatible with matter, goes upon the supposition of impenetrability being the essential property of it, and consequently that *solid extent* is the foundation of all the properties that it can possibly sustain, the whole argument for an immaterial thinking principle in man, on this new supposition, falls to the ground; matter, destitute of what has hitherto been called *solidity*, being no more incompatible with sensation and thought, than that substance, which, without knowing any thing farther about it, we have been used to call *immaterial*.

I will add in this place, though it will be considered more fully hereafter, that this supposition, of matter having (besides extension) no other properties but those of attraction and repulsion, greatly relieves the difficulty which attends the supposition of the *creation of it out of nothing*, and also the continual moving of it, by a being who has hitherto been supposed to have no common property with it. For, according to this hypothesis, both the creating mind, and the created substance, are equally destitute of *solidity* or *impenetrability*; so that there can be no difficulty whatever in supposing, that the latter may have been the offspring of the former.

This opinion, which I here maintain, of the *penetrability of matter*, is not my own, but what, from a conviction of its truth, I have

adopted from Father Boscovich, and Mr. Michell, to both of whom, independently of each other, this theory had occurred. Their ideas upon this subject, I have represented in my *History of Discoveries relating to Vision, Light, and Colours*; and as the doctrine is there placed in somewhat of a different light, and in language chiefly borrowed from my authors, I shall, in order to throw greater light on the subject, quote the whole passage relating to it in this place, and with it shall close this section.

“ The easiest method of solving all the difficulties attending the subject of the *subtlety of light*, and of answering Mr. Euler’s objections to its materiality, is to adopt the hypothesis of Mr. Boscovich, who supposes that matter is not *impenetrable*, as before him it had been universally taken for granted; but that it consists of *physical points* only, endued with powers of attraction and repulsion, taking place at different distances, that is, surrounded with various spheres of attraction and repulsion; in the same manner as solid matter is generally supposed to be. Provided, therefore, that any body move with a sufficient degree of velocity, or have sufficient momentum to overcome any powers of repulsion that it may meet with, it will find no difficulty in making its way through any body whatever. For nothing will interfere, or penetrate one another, but *powers*, such as we
 “ know

“ know do, in fact, exist in the same place,
“ and counterbalance or over-rule one an-
“ other; a circumstance which never had the
“ appearance of a contradiction, or even of a
“ difficulty.

“ If the momentum of such a body in mo-
“ tion be sufficiently great, Mr. Boscovich
“ demonstrates that the particles of any body,
“ through which it passes, will not even be
“ moved out of their place by it. With a
“ degree of velocity something less than this
“ they will be considerably agitated, and ig-
“ nition might perhaps be the consequence,
“ though the progress of the body in motion
“ would not be sensibly interrupted; and
“ with a still less momentum it might not
“ pass at all*.”

“ This theory Mr. Boscovich has taken
“ a great deal of pains to draw out at full
“ length and illustrate; shewing, that it is by
“ no means inconsistent with any thing that
“ we know concerning the laws of mecha-
“ nics, or our discoveries in natural philoso-
“ phy, and that a great variety of phenomena,
“ particularly those which relate to *light*,
“ admit of a much easier solution upon this
“ hypothesis than upon any other.

“ The most obvious difficulty, and indeed
“ the only one that attends this hypothesis,
“ as it supposes the *mutual penetrability of*
“ *matter*, arises from the difficulty we meet

* Theoria Philosophiæ Naturalis. p. 167.

“ with

“ with in attempting to force two bodies into
 “ the same place. But it is demonstrable, that
 “ the first obstruction arises from no actual
 “ contact of matter, but from mere powers of
 “ repulsion. This difficulty we can over-
 “ come; and having got within one sphere
 “ of repulsion, we fancy that we are now
 “ impeded by the solid matter itself. But the
 “ very same is the apprehension of the gene-
 “ rality of mankind with respect to the first
 “ obstruction. Why, therefore, may not the
 “ next resistance be only another sphere of
 “ repulsion, which may only require a greater
 “ force than we can apply to overcome it,
 “ without disordering the arrangement of the
 “ constituent particles; but which may be
 “ overcome by a body moving with the
 “ amazing velocity of light.

“ This scheme of the *mutual penetration of*
 “ *matter*, first occurred to Mr. Michell on
 “ reading *Baxter on the Immateriality of the*
 “ *Soul*. He found, that this author's idea of
 “ matter was, that it consisted, as it were,
 “ of bricks cemented together by an imma-
 “ terial mortar. These bricks, if he would
 “ be consistent in his own reasoning, were
 “ again composed of less bricks, cemented
 “ likewise by an immaterial mortar, and so
 “ on *ad infinitum*. This putting Mr. Michell
 “ upon the consideration of the appearances
 “ of nature, he began to perceive that the
 “ bricks were so covered with this immaterial
 “ mortar, that, if they had any existence at
 “ all,

“ all, it could not possibly be *perceived*, every
 “ *effect* being produced at least in nine in-
 “ stances in ten certainly, and probably in
 “ the tenth also, by this immaterial, spiritual,
 “ and penetrable mortar.

“ Instead, therefore, of placing the world
 “ upon the giant, the giant upon the tortoise,
 “ and the tortoise upon he could not tell
 “ what, he placed the world at once upon
 “ itself; and finding it still necessary, in
 “ order to solve the appearances of nature, to
 “ admit of extended and penetrable imma-
 “ terial substance, if he maintained the im-
 “ penetrability of matter; and observing far-
 “ ther, that all we perceive by contact, &c.
 “ is this penetrable immaterial substance, and
 “ not the impenetrable one; he began to
 “ think that he might as well admit of *pene-*
 “ *trable material*, as *penetrable immaterial*
 “ substance; especially, as we know nothing
 “ more of the nature of substance than that
 “ it is something which supports properties;
 “ which properties may be whatever we
 “ please, provided they be not inconsistent
 “ with each other, that is, do not imply the
 “ absence of each other.

“ This by no means seemed to be the case
 “ in supposing two substances to be in the
 “ same place, at the same time, without ex-
 “ cluding each other, the objection to which
 “ is only derived from the resistance we meet
 “ with to the touch, and is a prejudice that
 “ has taken its rise from that circumstance,
 “ and

“ and is not unlike the prejudice against the
“ antipodes, derived from the constant ex-
“ perience of bodies falling, as we account it,
“ downwards.

“ I hope I shall be excused dwelling so
“ long on this hypothesis, on account both
“ of the novelty and importance of it, espe-
“ cially with respect to the phenomena of
“ light. If I were to make any alteration in
“ it, it would be to suppose the force of the
“ sphere of repulsion next to any of the *in-*
“ *divisible points*, which constitute what we
“ call solid bodies, not to be absolutely *infi-*
“ *nite*, but such as may be overcome by the
“ momentum of light; which will obviate
“ the objection of Mr. Melville. If, how-
“ ever, we consider that Mr. Boscovich
“ makes this nearest power of repulsion not
“ to extend to any *real space*, but to be con-
“ fined to the indivisible point itself, it may
“ appear to be sufficient for the purpose;
“ since the chance of such points impinging
“ upon one another is so little, that it needs
“ not to be considered at all.”

SECTION

SECTION III.

Various OBJECTIONS to the preceding Doctrine concerning the Nature of Matter particularly considered.

I. Of Bodies acting where they are not.

IT is objected to the doctrine of these papers, which supposes that the repulsion, ascribed to bodies, takes place at some distance from their real surfaces; that bodies must then *act where they are not*, which is deemed to be an absurdity. I acknowledge that there is a considerable difficulty in this case; but it does not in the least affect the hypothesis that I have adopted concerning matter, any more than that which is commonly received. According to Sir Isaac Newton's Observations, rays of light begin to be reflected from all bodies at a certain distance from their surfaces; and yet he considers those rays as reflected by those bodies, that is, by powers inhering in and properly belonging to those bodies. So also the gravitation of the earth, and of the other planets to the sun, he considers as produced by a power of attraction properly belonging to the sun, which is at an immense distance from them.

If

If Sir Isaac Newton would say that the impulse, by which light is reflected from any body, and by which planets are driven towards the sun, is really occasioned by other *invisible matter* in actual contact with those bodies which are put in motion, I also am equally at liberty to relieve my hypothesis by the same means. But the existence of this invisible substance, to the agency of which that great philosopher ascribes so very much, and which he calls *ether*, has not yet been proved, and is therefore generally supposed not to exist. And, indeed, if it did exist, I do not see how it could produce the effects that are ascribed to it. For the particles of this very ether could not impel any substance, if they were not themselves impelled in the same direction; and must we provide a still more subtle ether for the purpose of impelling the particles of the grosser ether? If so, we must do the same for this other ether, and so on, *ad infinitum*, which is absurd.

Also, if the parts of solid bodies, as, for instance, of gold (which by its expansion when hot, and contraction when cold, appear not actually to touch one another) be kept asunder by a subtle matter, viz. the same ether above-mentioned, the parts of this ether must be kept asunder by a still more subtle ether, as before, and so on, till the whole space, occupied by the dimensions of the piece of gold, be absolutely solid, and have no pores or vacuum whatever,

ever, which would be contrary to appearances, and make it impossible to contract by cold, or by any other means. I do not say that there is no difficulty in this case, but it is not a difficulty that affects my system more than the common one; and therefore it is no particular business of mine to discuss it.

If it be supposed that no kind of matter is concerned in producing the above-mentioned effects at a distance from the surfaces of bodies, but that the Deity himself causes these motions, exerting his influence according to certain laws, am not I at liberty to avail myself of the same assistance? And surely I must have less objection to this resource than those who believe that God is not the only proper agent in the universe. As a necessarian, I, in fact, ascribe every thing to God, and, whether mediately or immediately, makes very little difference. But I believe that it is possible, though we cannot clearly answer every objection to it, that God may endue substances with powers; which, when communicated, produce effects in a manner different from his own immediate agency.

II. *Whether Matter be any thing, on this Hypothesis.*

It is said that, according to my definition of matter, it must be absolutely *nothing*; because,

cause; besides extension, it consists of nothing but the powers of attraction and repulsion, and because I have sometimes said that it consists of physical points only, possessed of those powers. In this I may have expressed myself rather incautiously; but the *idea* that I meant to convey was evidently this, that, whatever other powers matter may be possessed of, it has not the property that has been called *impenetrability* or *solidity*.

From the manner of expressing our ideas, we cannot speak of powers or properties, but as powers and properties of some *thing* or *substance*, though we know nothing at all of that thing or substance besides the powers that we ascribe to it; and, therefore, when the powers are supposed to be withdrawn, all idea of substance necessarily vanishes with them. I have, therefore, the same right to say that matter is a substance possessed of the properties of attraction and repulsion only, as another has to say, that it is a substance possessed of the property of impenetrability together with them, unless it can be proved that the property of attraction or repulsion necessarily implies, and cannot exist without, that of impenetrability. Whether it be possessed of *any* of these properties must be determined by experiment only. If, upon my idea of matter, every thing vanishes upon taking away the powers of attraction and repulsion, in like manner every idea vanishes from the mind; if, upon the common hypothesis, solidity or impen-

impénétrability be taken away. I own that I can see no difference in this case; *impenetrability* being as much a property as *penetrability*, and its actual existence equally to be ascertained by experiment, which, in my opinion, is decisive in favour of penetrability.

They who suppose spirit to have proper *extension*, and the Divine Being to have a proper *ubiquity*, must believe the mutual penetrability of real substance; and by whatever names they may choose to call the substances, is of no consequence. If they say that, on my hypothesis, there is no such thing as matter, and that every thing is spirit, I have no objection, provided they make as great a difference in *spirits*, as they have hitherto made in *substances*. The world has been too long amused with mere names.

III. *Of the Laws of Motion.*

It is said, that if there is not what has been termed a *vis inertiae* in matter, the foundation of the Newtonian Philosophy is overturned: for that the *three laws of motion*, laid down by Sir Isaac Newton, in the beginning of his *Principia*, have no meaning on any other supposition.

I answer, that these laws of motion are founded on certain *facts*, which result just as easily from my hypothesis concerning matter, as from the common one. It is an undoubt-

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ed fact, that every body perseveres in a state of rest or motion, till it be compelled to change that state by some external force, which is the first of the three laws, and the foundation of the other two. But this will follow just as well upon the supposition of that mutual action between two bodies taking place at any given distance from their surfaces. Newton himself shews, that rays of light are reflected by a power belonging to other bodies, without actually impinging upon them, and, consequently, by a power which takes place at a certain distance from their surfaces, without supposing that any of his laws of motion were violated.

IV. *Of Powers of Attraction, &c. belonging to physical Points.*

Several of my friends have proposed to me queries concerning the *physical indivisible points*, of which I have sometimes supposed matter to consist. But I beg it may be considered, that the only mention I have made of such *points* is in the extract from my *History of Vision*, &c. in which I gave an account of the hypothesis of Father Boscovich and Mr. Michell, adding only a single observation of my own; and that, in what properly belongs to these *Disquisitions*, I have not, as far as I can recollect, encumbered my doctrine with any of the difficulties attending the consideration of

of the *internal structure of matter*; concerning which we know, indeed, very little, having few *data* to argue from.

In this *metaphysical work*, I have confined myself to the exclusion of the property of *impenetrability*, which is generally considered as essential to all matter, and to the claim of the property of *attraction* or *repulsion*, as appearing to me not to be properly what is *imparted* to matter, but what really *makes it to be what it is*, in so much that, without it, it would be nothing at all; which is giving it the same rank and importance that has usually been assigned to the property of *solidity* or *impenetrability*. By this means it is, that I leave no room for the popular objection to the materiality of man, founded on the idea of matter, as *solid* and *inert*, being incapable of the powers of sensation and thought.

This, I say, is all that my purpose in these *Disquisitions* requires; and so far I see no difficulty, that appears to me to be of much moment, and the argument lies in a very small compass. I deny that matter is impenetrable to other matter, because I know no one *fact*, to the explanation of which that supposition is necessary; all those facts which led philosophers to this supposition, later, and more accurate observations, having shewn to be owing to, *something else* than solidity or impenetrability, viz. a *power of repulsion*, which, for that reason, I would substitute in its place. As other philosophers have said "Take
D 2 " away

“away solidity, and matter vanishes;” so, I say, “Take away attraction and repulsion, and matter vanishes.” Also, if any person asks *what it is* that attracts and repels, or what is left when the powers of attraction and repulsion are taken away, I, in my turn, ask, What is it that is solid, or what is left when the property of solidity is taken away. The immaterialist, whether his immaterial substance be extended, or not, cannot, with the least reason, ask such a question as this. If he do, he must be effectually silenced by being asked, what will be left of *spirit*, when the powers of sensation and thought are taken from it. If the immaterial substance he contends for be extended, it must, in that case, be reduced to *mere space*, and if it be not extended, it must be reduced to *nothing at all*. It is, moreover, not a little remarkable, that, according to the common hypothesis, spirit, though destitute of solidity, has the power of acting upon matter, or in other words, has the same property of attraction and repulsion with respect to matter, that I ascribe to unsolid matter; so that it is with a very ill grace indeed, that the abettors of that hypothesis can object to mine, that nothing will remain when the powers of attraction and repulsion are withdrawn.

Farther than this, which I think very clear ground, it does not appear to me that I have any proper call, or business, to proceed. In what *manner* matter, penetrable or impenetrable,

trable, is formed, with what interstices, &c. and how far the powers which we ascribe to it may be said to *inhere in*, or *belong to it*, or how far they are the effect of a *foreign power*, viz. that of the deity, concerns not my system in particular. And whatever difficulties may be started as resulting from these considerations, the very same, I think, or greater, may fairly be charged upon the opposite system. If I have advanced beyond these narrow bounds, it has been inadvertently, and for the sake of answering objections. The metaphysician has no business to speculate any farther, and the natural philosopher will find, I imagine, but few *data* for farther speculation.

In fact, what I have advanced above, is all that I have ascribed to that excellent and truly cautious philosopher Mr. Michell. I will venture, however, in order to give all the satisfaction I am able to the inquisitive natural philosopher, to go one step farther in this speculation, on the idea suggested at the conclusion of my account of that hypothesis. I am well aware, that the generality of my readers will revolt at the ideas I am about to present to them; but I beg their patient attention, and I may, perhaps, convince them, that the common hypothesis, when considered in connection with *facts*, is no less revolting.

Suppose then that the Divine Being, when he created *matter*, only fixed certain *centers of*

various attractions and repulsions, extending indefinitely in all directions, the whole effect of them to be upon each other; these centers approaching to, or receding from each other, and consequently carrying their peculiar spheres of attraction and repulsion along with them, according to certain definite circumstances. It cannot be denied that these spheres may be diversified infinitely, so as to correspond to all the kinds of bodies that we are acquainted with, or that are possible. For all effects in which bodies are concerned, and of which we can be sensible by our eyes, touch, &c. may be resolved into attraction or repulsion,

A compages of these centers, placed within the sphere of each others attraction, will constitute a body that we term *compact*; and two of these bodies will, on their approach, meet with a repulsion or resistance, sufficient to prevent one of them from occupying the place of the other, without a much greater force than we are capable of employing, so that to us they will appear perfectly hard.

As in the constitution of all actual bodies that we are acquainted with, these centers are placed so near to each other, that, in every division that we can make, we still leave parts which contain many of these centers, we, reasoning by analogy, suppose that every particle of matter is infinitely divisible; and the *space* it occupies is certainly so. But, strictly speaking, as these centers which constitute any

any body are not absolutely infinite, it must be naturally possible to come, by division, to one single center, which could not be said to be divisible, or even to occupy any portion of space; though its sphere of action should extend ever so far; and had only *one* such center of attraction, &c. existed, its existence could not have been known, because there would have been nothing on which its action could have been exerted; and there being no *effect*, there could not have been any ground for supposing a *cause*.

Father Boscovich supposes that no two of these centers can ever coincide, the resistance at the point itself being infinite. But admitting their coincidence, they would only from *another center*, with different powers, those belonging to one center modifying those belonging to the other. Had their powers been *the very same* before such coincidence, at the same distances, they would have been just doubled at those distances. Also, though united by one cause, they might possibly be separated by another.

To philosophical people, and I am not now writing for the use of any other, I do not need to explain myself any farther. They will easily see, or F. Boscovich, in his elaborate work will shew them, that this hypothesis will account for all the phenomena of nature.

The principal objection to this hypothesis is, that matter is, by this means, resolved into nothing but the *divine agency*, exerted ac-

ording to certain rules. But as, upon the common hypothesis, it has been again and again admitted, that, notwithstanding the existence of solid matter, every thing is really *done* by the divine power, what material objection can there be to every thing *being* the divine power. There is, at least, this advantage in the scheme, that it supposes *nothing to be made in vain*.

Admitting that bodies consist of solid atoms, there is no sort of connection between the idea of them, and that of *attraction*; so that it is impossible to conceive that any one atom should approach another without a *foreign power*, viz. that of the deity; and therefore bodies consisting of such atoms could not hold together, so as to constitute *compact substances*, without this constant agency.

There is, again, as little connection between the idea of these solid atoms, and that of *repulsion at the least distance from the point of contact*. So that, since the constituent particles of no substance actually touch one another, as is evident from the effects of cold (which brings them nearer together) their coherence cannot be accounted for without the constant agency of the same external power. And though mere *resistance* (not repulsion) *at the place of contact* might be explained on the principle of solidity, it is remarkable, that in no *known case* of resistance can it be proved, that real contact is concerned, and in most cases of resistance it is demon-

demonstrable that there is no real contact; and therefore there can be no *reason from fact* to believe that there is any such thing as real contact in nature; so that if there be such a thing as solid matter, it is altogether *superfluous*, being no way concerned in producing any effect whatever.

If I have bewildered myself, and my reader, with this speculation, I can only say that I have been drawn into it, when I would willingly acquiesce in what I have observed concerning the simple *penetrability of matter*; confessing myself unable to proceed any farther on tolerably sure ground, and my readiness to abandon all this hypothesis, whenever a better, that is, one more nearly corresponding to facts, shall be suggested to me: and I own, that I should much prefer an hypothesis which should make provision for the use of created matter without the necessity of such a *particular agency* as the preceding hypothesis requires; though, of the two, I shall certainly prefer one which admits nothing being made in vain.

Being, however, engaged thus far, I must be permitted to advance one step farther, for the sake of observing, that there is nothing more approaching to *impiety* in my scheme than in the common one. On this hypothesis every thing is the *divine power*; but still, strictly speaking, every thing is not *the Deity himself*. The centers of attraction, &c. are fixed by him, and all action is his action; but

but still these centers are no part of *himself*, any more than the solid matter supposed to be created by him. Nor, indeed, is making the deity to *be*, as well as to *do* every thing, *in this sense*, any thing like the opinion of Spinoza; because I suppose a source of infinite power, and superior intelligence, from which all inferior beings are derived; that every inferior intelligent being has a consciousness distinct from that of the supreme intelligence, that they will for ever continue distinct, and that their happiness or misery to endless ages, will depend upon their conduct in this state of probation and discipline.

On the other hand, the common hypothesis is much less favourable to piety, in that it supposes something to be *independent of the divine power*. Exclude the idea of deity on my hypothesis, and every thing except *space*, necessarily vanishes with it, so that the Divine Being, and his energy, are absolutely necessary to that of every other being. His power is the very *life and soul* of every thing that exists; and, strictly speaking, *without him, we ARE*, as well as, *can do nothing*. But exclude the idea of Deity on the common hypothesis, and the idea of *solid matter* is no more excluded, than that of *space*. It remains a problem, therefore, whether matter be at all dependent upon God, whether it be *in his power* either to *annihilate*, or to *create* it; a difficulty that has staggered many, and on which the doctrine of *two original independent prin-*

principles was built. My hypothesis, whatever other defects it may have, leaves no foundation for this *system of impiety*; and in this respect it has, I think, a great and desirable advantage.

I own that, for my part, I feel an inexpressible satisfaction in the idea of that most intimate connection which, on my hypothesis, myself, and every thing in which I am concerned, have with the deity. On his will I am intirely dependent for my *being*, and all my *faculties*. My sphere, and degree of influence on other beings, and other things, is *his* influence. I am but an instrument in his hands for effecting a certain part of the greatest and most glorious of purposes. I am happy in *seeing* a little of this purpose, happier in the *belief* that the operations in which I am concerned, are of infinitely greater moment than I am capable of comprehending, and in the persuasion that, in the continuance of my existence, I shall see more and more of this great purpose, and of the relation that myself and my sphere of influence bear to it. Let the abettors of the common hypothesis say more than this if they can, or any thing different from this, that shall give them more satisfaction.

SECTION

SECTION IV.

The proper and direct Proof, that the Seat of the Sentient Principle in Man, is the material Substance of the Brain.

IN the preceding sections I have endeavoured to rectify the notions which we have been taught to entertain concerning matter, as not being that *impenetrable, inert* substance that we had imagined it to be. This, being admitted, will greatly facilitate our farther progress in these disquisitions; as I hope we shall not consider matter with that contempt and disgust, with which it has generally been treated; there being nothing in its real nature that can justify such sentiments respecting it.

I now proceed to inquire whether, when the nature of matter is rightly understood, there be any reason to think, that there is in man any substance essentially different from it, that is, any thing possessed of other properties besides such as may be superadded to those of *attraction* and *repulsion*, which we have found to belong to matter, or that may be consistent with those properties. For if this be the case, true philosophy, which will not authorize us to *multiply causes*, or kinds of substance, *without necessity*, will forbid us to
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admit of any such substance. If *one kind of substance* be capable of supporting all the known *properties* of man; that is, if those properties have nothing in them that is absolutely incompatible with one another, we shall be obliged to conclude (unless we openly violate the rules of philosophizing) that no other kind of substance enters into his composition; the supposition being manifestly *unnecessary*, in order to account for any appearance whatever.

All the properties that have hitherto been attributed to matter, may be comprised under those of *attraction* and *repulsion* (all the effects of which have been shewn to be produced by *powers*, independent of all *solidity*) and of *extension*, by means of which matter occupies a certain portion of space. Besides these properties, man is possessed of the powers of *sensation* or *perception*, and *thought*. But if, without giving the reins to our imaginations, we suffer ourselves to be guided in our inquiries by the simple rules of philosophizing above-mentioned, we must necessarily conclude, as it appears to me, that these powers also may belong to the same substance, that has also the properties of attraction, repulsion, and extension, which I, as well as others, call by the name of *matter*; though I have been obliged to divest it of one property which has hitherto been thought essential to it, as well as to give it others, which have not been thought essential to it; and consequently
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my idea of this substance is not, in all respects, the same with that of other metaphysicians.

The reason of the conclusion above-mentioned, is simply this, that the powers of sensation or perception, and thought, as belonging to man, have never been found but in conjunction with a certain *organized system of matter*; and therefore, that those powers necessarily exist in, and depend upon, such a system. This, at least, must be our conclusion, till it can be shewn that these powers are incompatible with other known properties of the same substance; and for this I see no sort of pretence.

It is true, that we have a very imperfect idea of what the *power of perception* is, and it may be as naturally impossible that we should have a clear idea of it, as that the eye should see itself. But this very ignorance ought to make us cautious in asserting with what other properties it may, or may not, exist. Nothing but a precise and definite knowledge of the nature of perception and thought can authorize any person to affirm, whether they may not belong to an extended substance, which has also the properties of attraction and repulsion. Seeing, therefore, no sort of reason to imagine, that these different properties are really *inconsistent*, any more than the different properties of *resistance* and *extension*, I am, of course, under the necessity of being guided by the *phenomena* in my conclusions

sions concerning the proper seat of the powers of perception and thought. These phenomena I shall now briefly represent.

Had we formed a judgment concerning the necessary seat of thought, by the *circumstances that universally accompany it*, which is our rule in all other cases, we could not but have concluded, that in man it is a property of the *nervous system*, or rather of the *brain*. Because, as far as we can judge, the faculty of thinking, and a certain state of the brain, always accompany and correspond to one another; which is the very reason why we believe that any property is inherent in any substance whatever. There is no instance of any man retaining the faculty of thinking, when his brain was destroyed; and whenever that faculty is impeded, or injured, there is sufficient reason to believe that the brain is disordered in proportion; and therefore we are necessarily led to consider the latter as the seat of the former.

Moreover, as the faculty of thinking in general ripens, and comes to maturity with the body, it is also observed to decay with it; and if, in some cases, the mental faculties continue vigorous when the body in general is enfeebled, it is evidently because, in those particular cases, the *brain* is not much affected by the general cause of weakness. But, on the other hand, if the brain alone be affected, as by a blow on the head, by actual pressure within the skull, by sleep, or by inflammation,

tion, the mental faculties are universally affected in proportion.

Likewise, as the mind is affected in consequence of the affections of the body and brain, so the body is liable to be reciprocally affected by the affections of the mind, as is evident in the visible effects of all strong passions, hope or fear, love or anger, joy or sorrow, exultation or despair. These are certainly irrefragable arguments, that it is properly no other than *one and the same thing* that is subject to these affections, and that they are necessarily dependent upon one another. In fact, there is just the same reason to conclude, that the powers of sensation and thought are the necessary result of a particular organization, as that sound is the necessary result of a particular concussion of the air. For in both cases equally the one constantly accompanies the other, and there is not in nature a stronger argument for a necessary connection of any cause and any effect.

To adopt an opinion different from this, is to form an hypothesis without a single fact to support it. And to conclude, as some have done, that a material system is so far from being a necessary pre-requisite to the faculty of thinking, that it is an obstruction to it, is to adopt a method of argumentation the very reverse of every thing that has hitherto been followed in philosophy. It is to conclude, not only *without*, but directly *contrary* to all appearances whatsoever.

That

That the perfection of thinking should depend on the sound state of the body and brain *in this life*, insomuch that a man has no power of thinking without it, and yet that he should be capable of thinking better when the body and brain are destroyed, seems to be the most unphilosophical and absurd of all conclusions. If death be an advantage with respect to thinking, *disease* ought to be a proportional advantage likewise; and universally, the nearer the body approaches to a state of dissolution, the freer and less embarrassed might the faculties of the mind be expected to be found. But this is the very reverse of what really happens.

Part of this argument is so well represented, and so forcibly urged, by the excellent Mr. Hallet, that I shall quote the entire passage from the first volume of his *Discourses*, p. 213.

“ I see a man move, and hear him speak
 “ for some years. From his speech I cer-
 “ tainly infer that he *thinks*, as I do. I see
 “ then that man is a being who thinks and
 “ acts. After some time the man falls down
 “ in my sight, grows cold and stiff. He
 “ speaks and acts no more. Is it not then
 “ natural to conclude, that he *thinks* no more?
 “ As the only reason I had to believe that he
 “ did think, was his motion and speech, so
 “ now that this motion and speech cease, I
 “ have lost the only way of proving that he
 “ had a power of thought.

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“ Upon this sudden death, the one visible
 “ thing, the one man is greatly charged.
 “ Whence could I infer that the same *be*
 “ consists of two parts, and that the inward
 “ part continues to live and think, and flies
 “ away from the body, when the outward
 “ part ceases to live and move. It looks as if
 “ the *whole man* was gone, and that all his
 “ powers cease at the same time. His mo-
 “ tion and thought die together, as far as I
 “ can discern.

“ The powers of *thought, speech, and mo-*
 “ *tion* equally depend upon the body, and
 “ run the same fate in case of mens’ declining
 “ in old age. When a man dies through
 “ old age, I perceive his powers of speech,
 “ motion, and thought, decay and die to-
 “ gether, and by the same degrees. The
 “ moment he ceases to move, and breathe, he
 “ appears to cease to *think* too.

“ When I am left to mere reason, it seems
 “ to me that my power of *thought* as much
 “ depends upon my body, as my power of
 “ *sight or hearing*. I could not think in in-
 “ fancy. My powers of thought, of sight,
 “ and of feeling, are equally liable to be ob-
 “ structed by the body. A blow on the head
 “ has deprived a man of thought, who could
 “ yet see and feel and move; so that na-
 “ turally the power of thinking seems as
 “ much to belong to the body as any power
 “ of man whatsoever. Naturally there ap-
 “ pears no more reason to suppose that a

“ man

“ man can *think* out of the body, than he
 “ can *bear sounds*, or *feel cold*, out of the
 “ body.”

Notwithstanding, Mr. Hallet was satisfied, that there was no good argument from the light of *nature*, in favour either of the immateriality or immortality of the soul, he still retained the belief of it on the authority, as he imagined, of *revelation*. But it will be seen, in a subsequent section, that the scriptures afford no evidence whatever of a thing so contrary to the principles of reason; but that the sacred writers go upon quite different principles, always taking for granted the very thing I am here contending for, and that the notion of the soul being a substance distinct from the body, was originally a part of the system of *heathenism*, and was from thence introduced into christianity, which has derived the greatest part of its corruptions from this source.

It is still more unaccountable in Mr. Locke, to suppose, as he did, and as he largely contends, that, for any thing that we know to the contrary, the faculty of thinking may be a property of the body, and yet to think it more probable that this faculty inhered in a different substance, viz. an immaterial soul. A philosopher ought to have been apprized, that we are to suppose no more *causes* than are necessary to produce the *effects*; and therefore, that we ought to conclude, that the whole man is material, unless it should appear, that

he has some powers or properties that are absolutely incompatible with matter.

Since then, Mr. Locke did not apprehend, that there was any real inconsistency between the known properties of body, and those that have generally been referred to mind, he ought, as became a philosopher, to have concluded, that the *whole substance of man*, that which supports all his powers and properties, was one uniform substance, and by no means that he consisted of *two substances*, and those so very different from one another as *body* and *spirit* are usually represented to be; so much so, that they have been generally thought incapable of having any common property. Accordingly, the best writers upon this subject, always consider the union of these two very different substances as a most stupendous and wonderful thing. “*Le tout puissant,*” says the author of *La vraie Philosophie*, “*pou-*
“*voit seul etablir un accord si intime entre deux*
“*substances si discordantes par leur nature.*”

SECTION

SECTION V.

Additional Considerations in Favour of the Materiality of the Human Soul.

IN the preceding section, I have represented how unphilosophical it is to conclude, that all the powers of man do not belong to *the same substance*, when they are observed to have a constant and necessary dependance upon one another, and when there is not, as far as we know, the least inconsistency or incompatibility between them. If there be any foundation for the established rules of philosophizing, the argument ought to be conclusive with us, and every thing that can be added to it is really superfluous. However, for the greater satisfaction of some of my readers, I shall, in this section, subjoin some additional arguments, or considerations, or rather, in some cases, distinct illustrations of the preceding argument.

1. That the faculty of thinking necessarily depends, for its *exercise*, at least, upon a stock of ideas, about which it is always conversant, will hardly be questioned by any person. But there is not a single idea of which the mind is possessed, but what may be proved to have come to it from the bodily senses, or to have been consequent upon the perceptions of sense. Could we, for instance, have had any idea of

colour, as *red*, *blue*, &c. without the eyes, and optic nerves; of *sound*, without the ears, and auditory nerves; of *smell*, without the nostrils, and the olfactory nerves, &c. &c.? It is even impossible to conceive how the mind could have become possessed of any of its present stock of ideas, without just such a body as we have; and consequently, judging from present appearances (and we have no other means of forming any judgment at all) without a body, of some kind or other, we could have had no ideas at all, any more than a man without eyes could have any particular ideas belonging to colours. The notion, therefore, of the *possibility* of thinking in man, without an organized body, is not only destitute of all evidence from actual appearances, but is directly contrary to them; and yet these appearances ought alone to guide the judgment of philosophers.

Dr. Clark seems to have imagined, that he had fully answered the argument for the materiality of the human soul, from its having received all its ideas from the bodily senses, by asking whether there might not possibly have been *other inlets to ideas* besides our present senses. "If these," says he*, "be arbitrary, then the want of these does by no means infer a total want of perception, but the same soul may, in another state, have different ways of perception."

* Demonstration, &c. p. 89.

To this it is easy to reply, that mere *possibility* is no foundation for any conclusion in this case. We see, in fact, that all our sensations come to us by the way of the corporeal senses; and though our observing this will authorize us to say, that, if the Divine Being had so pleased, we might have had *more*, or *fewer*, or quite *different* senses, and, of course, should have had very different sets of sensations and ideas, it will by no means authorize us to say, that it was even *possible* for us to have had sensations and ideas *without any corporeal senses* at all. We have no *example* of any such thing, and therefore cannot say that it is even *possible*, much less that it is actually the case. Present appearances certainly lead us to think, that our mental powers *necessarily* depend upon our corporeal ones; and till some very different appearances present themselves, it must be exceedingly unphilosophical to imagine that the connection is not necessary.

2. The only reason why it has been so earnestly contended for, that there is some principle in man that is not material, is that it might subsist, and be capable of sensation and action, when the body was dead. But, if the mind was naturally so independent of the body, as to be capable of subsisting by itself, and even of appearing to more advantage after the death of the body, it might be expected to discover some signs of its independence before death, and especially when

the organs of the body were obstructed, so as to leave the soul more at liberty to exert itself, as in a state of *sleep*, or *fwooning*, which most resemble the state of death, in which it is pretended that the soul is most of all alive, most active, and vigorous.

But, judging by appearances, the reverse of all this is the case. That a man does not think during sleep, except in that imperfect manner which we call *dreaming*, and which is nothing more than an approach to a state of vigilance, I shall not here dispute, but take for granted; referring my readers to Mr. Locke, and other writers upon that subject; and that all power of thinking is suspended during a swoon, I conclude with certainty, because no appearance whatever can possibly lead us to suspect the contrary.

3. If the mental principle was, in its own nature, immaterial, and immortal, all its particular *faculties* would be so too; whereas, we see that every faculty of the mind, without exception, is liable to be impaired, and even to become wholly extinct before death. Since, therefore, all the faculties of the mind, separately taken, appear to be mortal, the substance, or principle, in which they exist, must be pronounced to be mortal too. Thus, we might conclude, that the *body* was mortal, from observing that all the separate *senses*, and *limbs*, were liable to decay and perish.

4. If the sentient principle in man be immaterial, it can have no *extension*, it can neither

ther have length, breadth, nor thickness, and consequently every thing within it, or properly belonging to it, must be *simple* and *indivisible*. Besides, it is universally acknowledged, that if the substance of the soul was not simple and indivisible, it would be liable to corruption, and death; and, therefore, that no advantage would be gained by supposing the power of thinking to belong to any substance distinct from the body. Let us now consider how this notion agrees with the phenomena of sensation and ideas, which are the proper subject of thought.

It will not be denied, but that sensations, or ideas, properly exist *in the soul*, because it could not otherwise retain them, so as to continue to perceive and think after its separation from the body. Now, whatever ideas are in themselves, they are evidently produced by external objects, and must therefore correspond to them; and since many of the objects, or archetypes of ideas are divisible, it necessarily follows, that the ideas themselves are divisible also. The idea of a *man*, for instance, could in no sense correspond to a man, which is the archetype of it, and therefore could not be the idea of a man, if it did not consist of the ideas of his *head, arms, trunk, legs, &c.* It, therefore, consists of *parts*, and consequently is *divisible*. And how is it possible that a thing (be the *nature* of it what it may) that is *divisible*, should be contained in a substance, be the nature

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ture of *it* likewise what it may, that is *indivisible*?

If the archetypes of ideas have extension, the ideas which are expressive of them, and are actually produced by them, according to certain mechanical laws, must have extension likewise; and therefore the mind in which they exist, whether it be material or immaterial, must have extension also. But how any thing can have extension, and yet be immaterial, without coinciding with our idea of mere empty *space*, I know not. I am therefore obliged to conclude, that the sentient principle in man, containing ideas which certainly have parts, and are divisible, and consequently must have extension, cannot be that simple, indivisible, and immaterial substance that some have imagined it to be; but something that has real *extension*, and therefore may have the other properties of matter.

To this argument for the extension and materiality of the human soul, the author of *La vraye Philosophie* replies; in a manner very singular, and to me not very intelligible. He says, p. 104, “ the impression of a circle, or
 “ any object that is divisible, strikes the or-
 “ gan of sense; this action is transmitted
 “ by some unknown law to the soul, which
 “ is thereby modified, and which refers its
 “ own modifications, indivisible as *itself* is,
 “ to external objects. Thus, the idea of a
 “ circle is not round, nor has any extension,
 “ though

“ though it answers perfectly to a circle that
 “ is divisible, and has extension.” This doc-
 trine he illustrates by what is observed of
 those who *dream*, and *walk in their sleep*, ima-
 gining they see what is not before them, and
 also by optical deceptions. “ This,” says he,
 “ is the case with all *colour*, which is falsely
 “ thought to be in bodies; but though the
 “ coloured body moves, its colour is as im-
 “ moveable as the soul that perceives it*.”
 What he farther adds upon this subject is
 still more unintelligible to me. “ The sen-
 “ sations, simple and indivisible as they are,
 “ contain, in an eminent manner, the quality
 “ of extension, and thereby prove, that the
 “ substance which they modify, viz. the soul,
 “ is of an order superior to matter †.”

5. All the defenders of the *simple, indivisible,*
 and *unalterable* nature of the soul, that I have
 met with, appear to me to have overlooked a
 great variety of mental *affections*, which ne-
 cessarily imply alteration, especially *meliora-
 tion* and *depravation*, which is something so
 similar to *corruption*, that it has universally
 obtained the same name, and which is cer-
 tainly incompatible with natural and perfect
simplicity. From Mr. Baxter’s own acknow-
 ledgment, expressed in words which it is im-
 possible to misconstrue, it necessarily follows,
 that, whatever may happen to the soul, during
 its temporary connection with the body, it

* P. 108. † P. 113.

must,

must, whenever it is set at liberty from it, immediately recover its pristine purity. But what then becomes of the christian doctrine, upon his own hypothesis, of vicious habits (which are the proper *disease* of the mind) inhering in the soul after death, and its being liable to punishment, in a separate unembodied state, on that account?

Mr. Baxter, however, says*, “ the soul
 “ cannot have a disorder lodged in itself, nor
 “ be subject to any disease. A man who
 “ considers the *simple nature* of it will never
 “ affirm this.—The soul can admit of no
 “ disease from matter, as having no *parts* to
 “ be disordered. It can suffer no alteration
 “ in its own substance, if that substance be
 “ not annihilated.—We would have the soul
 “ to grow up, to decay, to sleep, to be mad,
 “ to be drunk. Who does not see all these
 “ are ridiculous fancies, too gross to be en-
 “ tertained concerning a simple uncompound-
 “ ed substance? If the soul were mad, or had
 “ the disease lodged in itself, what could cure
 “ it?”

If this reasoning have any foundation, it will follow, that nothing is requisite to discharge all the vices of the soul, but to detach it from its fatal connection with the body, and leave it to itself. All vice and disorder, as it came with the body, and always inhered in it, must terminate and depart with it.

* Vol. ii. p. 161.

SECTION VI.

Advantages attending the System of MATERIALISM, especially with respect to the Doctrines of REVEALED RELIGION.

IT is a great advantage attending the system of materialism, that we hereby get rid of a great number of *difficulties*, which exceedingly clog and embarrass the opposite system; such, for instance, as these, *What becomes of the soul during sleep, in a swoon, when the body is seemingly dead (as by drowning, or other accidents) and especially after death; also, what was the condition of it before it became united to the body, and at what time did that union take place? &c. &c. &c.*

If the soul be immaterial, and the body material, neither the generation nor the destruction of the body can have any effect with respect to it. This *foreign principle* must have been united to it either at the time of conception, or at birth, and must either have been created at the time of such union, or have existed in a separate state prior to that period. Now all these suppositions are clogged with great difficulties, and indeed can hardly be considered at all, without being immediately rejected, as extremely improbable, if not absurd.

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Must the divine power be necessarily employed to produce a soul, whenever the human species copulate? Or must some of the pre-existent spirits be obliged, immediately upon that event, to descend from the superior regions, to inhabit the new-formed embryo? If this be the case (which was the original hypothesis of the separability of the soul from the body) by what *rule* must this descent be regulated? Must these unembodied spirits become embodied in *rotation* according to some rank, and *condition*, or must it be determined by *lot*, &c.?

If *man* be actuated by a principle distinct from his body, every *brute animal* must have an immaterial soul also; for they differ from us in *degree* only, and not at all in *kind*; having all the same mental, as well as corporeal powers and faculties that we have, though not in the same extent; and they are possessed of them in a greater degree than those of our race that are *ideots*, or that die *infants*.

Now the state of the souls of brutes is perhaps more embarrassing than that of human beings. Are *they* originally, and naturally, the same beings with the souls of men? Have they pre-existed, and are they to continue for ever? If so, *how* and *where* are they to be disposed of after death; and are they also to be re-united to their present bodies, as well as the souls of men? These are only a few of the

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the difficulties which must necessarily occur to any thinking person, who adopts the opinion of the essential difference between soul and body.

Some hypothesis or other, every person, who maintains the immaterial system, and reflects upon it all, must necessarily have, in order to solve these questions, and many others of a similar nature. For every general system must be consistent, and also have all its parts properly filled up. The questions that I have mentioned must perpetually obtrude themselves upon those persons whose system admits of their being asked, as indeed is evident from the formal discussion of most of them by systematical writers; and whether any person be able to satisfy himself with respect to them or not, he cannot be without some hypothesis or other for that purpose. Now I will venture to pronounce, without discussing the questions above-mentioned particularly, that there is no method of solving them that can give any tolerable satisfaction to an ingenuous mind.

Metaphysicians, who have conceived high notions of the dignity of *immaterial substances*, and who have entertained a great contempt for every thing *material*, are much embarrassed when they consider the *use of the body*. The ancients, indeed, who imagined all souls to have pre-existed, and to have been sent into the bodies in which they are now confined as a *punishment*, for offences committed

mitted in their pre-existent state, found no difficulty in this case. The body is necessarily a *clog*, and an *impediment* to the soul, and it was provided for that very purpose. But the moderns, who have dropped the notion of pre-existence, and of offences committed prior to birth, and yet retain from that system the intire doctrine of the *contagion of matter*, which is a language that, among others, Mr. Baxter makes use of *, must necessarily be exceedingly embarrassed, when they connect with this mutilated *heathenish system* the peculiar doctrines of *christianity*.

Indeed, what is advanced by the most acute of these christian metaphysicians upon this subject is little short of a contradiction in terms. Mr. Baxter, for instance, says †, that “ nothing could be fitter than matter to initiate beings, whose first information of things is from sense, and to train them up in the elements of knowledge and admiration.” Let us now see what consistency there is between this notion of the use of matter, with what he had said before ‡, of the absolute *unfitness* of matter for this purpose of training up the soul in the elements of knowledge.

“ We know not,” says he, “ nor can we name a greater absurdity, than that union to a dead and torpid substance should give the soul life and power, or any degree of them; or that separation should again de-

* See *Matho*, vol. ii. p. 212. † *Matho*, vol. ii. p. 211.

‡ P. 173.

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“prive it of these. The soul, therefore, must be percipient and active in its own nature, independent of matter.” Again he says, “matter, when best disposed, must limit the power and activity of the soul, and when disordered and indisposed, may quite obstruct or impede its operations, but can in no manner aid or assist its powers and energy, otherwise than by confining and determining them to one manner of exertion. Hence the soul, when separate from matter, must be freed from indisposition, and the confinement be taken off from its natural activity.”

The manifest contradiction between these two accounts of matter, hardly needs to be pointed out. The immaterial principle, it seems, is to be *initiated in the elements of knowledge* by its union to a dead and torpid substance, which is so far from *giving it any life or power, or any degree of them*, that we cannot name a greater absurdity, than such a supposition; a substance which, *when best disposed*, must limit the powers and activity of the soul, and when *disordered and indisposed*, as it is evidently very liable to be, and indeed is hardly ever otherwise, may quite *obstruct and impede* all its operations; and can in no manner *aid or assist* its powers or energy.

If the soul, as this ingenious writer says, be *percipient and active in its own nature*, and when separate from the body must be freed from indisposition, and have a confinement

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taken

taken off from its natural activity, it would certainly have been very happy for it never to have been subject to such a *confinement*, and a great advantage never to have been affected by such a *contagion*.

The only shadow of consistency that is preserved in this account, is hinted at where he says, that “matter can no otherwise aid and assist the powers of the soul, than by confining and determining them to one manner of exertion.” This, however, is but a shadow of consistency, for, by the very same way of reasoning, it might be proved, that a man is a gainer by the loss of his eyes or ears, and indeed of all his senses except one; because his sentient powers being, by this means, *confined and determined to one manner of exertion*, he becomes more perfect in the exercise of it; whereas he is certainly a loser *upon the whole*, by having his senses and faculties thus curtailed. But allowing that some small advantage might possibly accrue to the soul from this great limitation of its percipient and active powers, what chance is there for its receiving any benefit upon the whole; when the thing that is employed to confine it is sure to become, if we judge from fact and experience, exceedingly disordered? so that, by this writer’s own confession, it must quite obstruct and impede all its operations; and when, by its union to this contagious principle, it is liable to be contaminated in such a manner as to be utterly ruined and lost to every

every valuable end of existence: Great, indeed, we see, is the risk that the immaterial soul runs by its union with this gross material body; and small, very small indeed, is the advantage that it may happen to derive from it.

It seems, however, that when the christian, after having long struggled, and maintained a very unequal combat in its present state of confinement, in which his soul can have little or no use of its native powers and faculties, has, by the benevolent constitution of nature, at length got rid of this *incumbrance of clay*, these *fetters of matter*, and this dreadful *contagion of flesh and blood*, and with all the privileges, and all the powers of action and enjoyment, naturally belonging to an *unembodied spirit*, has ranged the regions of empyreum for some thousands of years, these powers are to be again clogged and impeded by a *second union to matter*, though better tempered than before, and therefore a less, though a real and necessary incumbrance. And what is most extraordinary in the case is, that this *second degradation* takes place at a period which christianity points out to us as the great jubilee of the virtuous and the good; when (all mankind being judged according to their works) they shall receive the plaudit of their judge, and shall enter upon the *inheritance of a kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of the world*; at which time, and not before, they are to be admitted to be for ever with the Lord Jesus Christ.

Mr. Baxter, in his *Essay on the Soul**, says, that “ after the resurrection, the re-union
 “ of souls to their bodies may be no punish-
 “ ment, or diminution of the happiness de-
 “ signed them, if we conceive it to be within
 “ the reach of infinite power to bring this
 “ union to a state of *indolence*, or *inoffensiveness*
 “ on the part of matter. For to have no
 “ trouble or uneasiness at all from matter, is
 “ precisely the state of happiness with respect
 “ to it, that spirits have which are intirely
 “ free from it. But no attentive man,” he
 adds, “ ever thought that there consisted any
 “ real felicity in being united to material
 “ substance.”

That this account of the effects of the union of the mind with matter is inconsistent with the other quoted from his *Mattho*, needs no pointing out. In the one case, matter must *necessarily limit and fetter the soul*, whereas in the other, it is possible, though barely possible, that it may *not fetter* it. Upon the most favourable supposition, however, the christian resurrection is barely *no disadvantage*. But can this be that state towards which all christians are taught to look with the most eager expectation, when only their joy is to *commence*, and to *be full*. Looking, as the apostle Peter says, *for that blessed hope*. One would think that such writers as these had been but little conversant with the New Testament, to the

* P. 304.

uniform language of which their notions are totally repugnant.

Such have been the preposterous effects of mixing these *heathenish notions* with the principles of our holy religion, which disclaims all connection with them, and militates against them in every article,

On the other hand, the system of materialism, which revelation uniformly supposes, is clogged with none of these difficulties, or rather absurdities. Man, according to this system, is no more than what we now see of him. His being commences at the time of his conception, or perhaps at an earlier period. The corporeal and mental faculties, inhering in the same substance, grow, ripen, and decay together; and whenever the system is dissolved, it continues in a state of dissolution, till it shall please that Almighty Being who called it into existence to restore it to life again.

By the help of the system of materialism, also, the christian removes the very foundation of many doctrines, which have exceedingly debased and corrupted christianity; being in fact a heterogeneous mixture of *pagan notions*, diametrically opposite to those on which the whole *system of revelation* is built. The christian system provides no reward for the righteous till the general *resurrection of the just*, nor any punishment for the wicked, till the *end of the world*, at which

time, and not before, the angels will be commissioned to *gather out of the kingdom of Christ every thing that offends*. Then only will be the great *harvest*, when the *wheat* (to use the language of our Saviour) *will be gathered into the garner*, and the *chaff* will be burned with *unquenchable fire*.

The immaterial system, on the contrary, makes it necessary to provide some *receptacle for the souls of the dead*, which being in a state of consciousness, must necessarily be in a state of pleasure or pain, reward or punishment, even antecedent to the day of judgment. Now as there is no hint concerning the *nature*, or *use* of such an *intermediate state* in the scriptures, the vain imaginations of men have had most ample scope for displaying themselves; and among other gainful absurdities, the priests have taken this advantage to found upon it the doctrines of *purgatory*, and the *worship of the dead*.

The doctrine of *pre-existence*, or that of all human souls having been lapsed angels, which was the true source of *Gnosticism*, and most of the early corruptions of christianity, could have no other foundation than the notion of there being something in man quite different from his corporeal organized system; which, therefore, might have existed prior to that system, as well as continue after its dissolution. It was at this time, when *all* souls were supposed to have pre-existed, that the
soul

soul of Christ was not only supposed to have pre-existed, together with the souls of other persons, but, suitable to his rank here, had a proportional superior rank and office assigned to him before he came into the world. Upon this foundation he was first considered as the *δημιουργος* of the Oriental philosophy, or the immediate maker of the world under the supreme Being; then as a peculiar *emanation of the divine essence*; and lastly, as having been from eternity *equal to God himself*. From this it is evident, that the very seeds of this dreadful corruption of christianity, which has been the fruitful source of many others, could not have been sown, but in this immaterial, and as it may properly be termed, this heathenish system.

Had the minds of the primitive christians continued uncontaminated with *the wisdom of this world*, and considered Christ as his apostles, who lived and conversed with him, evidently appear to have considered him, viz. as a *mere man approved of God, by signs and wonders which God did by him*, they would have entertained for him all the sentiments of love and reverence that were due to the *captain of their salvation*, and the *first begotten from the dead*; who, as their *elder brother*, was *gone to prepare a place for them*, in the heavenly mansions, and who would return with a commission from God to raise the dead, and judge the world; but they could never have arrogated for him *divine honours*, and conse-

quently the worship that has been paid to the Virgin Mary, and other popish saints, would not have followed: and the influence of these leading opinions, upon the whole mass of corruptions that came in like a deluge afterwards, is easily traced.

SECTION VII.

Considerations more immediately relating to IM-MATERIAL SUBSTANCES, *and especially to* the CONNEXION OF THE SOUL AND BODY.

PART I.

Of the PRESENCE *of the Soul with the Body,*

THE idea of an *immaterial substance*, as it is defined by metaphysicians, is intirely a modern thing, and is still unknown to the vulgar. The original, and still prevailing idea concerning a *soul* or *spirit*, is that of a kind of attenuated aërial substance, of a more subtle nature than gross bodies, which have weight, and make a sensible resistance when they are pushed against, or struck at. The *form* of it may be variable, but it is capable, in certain circumstances, of becoming the object

ject of sight. Thus when our Lord appeared to his disciples walking on the sea, and also after his resurrection, they thought it had been a *spirit*; and, therefore, to convince them of their mistake on the latter of these occasions, he bade them handle him; for that a spirit had not flesh and bones, as they might be convinced that he had. He did not observe to them, that a spirit could not be the object of *sight*, any more than of *touch*. Also, whatever expressions might casually drop from any of the ancient philosophers, it is evident to all who consider the whole of their doctrine, that their idea of a spirit was widely different from that which is now contended for.

That a spirit is, strictly speaking, *indivisible*, which is essential to the modern idea of it, is absolutely incompatible with the notion that is known to have run through almost all the systems of the ancients, derived originally from the *East*, viz. that all human souls, and all finite intelligences, were originally *portions of the great soul of the universe*; and though detached from it for a time, are finally to be absorbed into it again; when the separate consciousness belonging at present to each of them will be for ever lost. How the idea of a spirit came to be refined into the very *attenuated state* in which we now find it, I shall endeavour to investigate in its proper place; and, in the mean time, shall bestow a few observations upon it, as it appears in the writings

ings of the latest, and most celebrated metaphysicians,

A spirit, then, or an *immaterial substance*, in the modern strict use of the term, signifies a substance that has no *extension* of any kind, nor any thing of the *vis inertiae* that belongs to matter. It has neither *length*, *breadth*, nor *thickness*; so that it occupies no portion of space; on which account, the most rigorous metaphysicians say, that it bears no sort of relation to space, any more than sound does to the eye, or light to the ear. In fact, therefore, *spirit* and *space* have nothing to do with one another, and it is even improper to say, that an immaterial being *exists in space*, or that it *resides* in one place more than in another; for, properly speaking, it is *no where*, but has a mode of existence that cannot be expressed by any phraseology appropriated to the modes in which matter exists. Even these spiritual and intellectual beings themselves have no idea of the manner in which they exist, at least while they are confined by gross matter:

It follows also from this view of the subject, that the *divine mind* can only be said to be *omnipresent* by way of figure; for, strictly speaking, this term implies *extension*, of which all immaterial substances are utterly incapable. By the omnipresence of the Deity, therefore, they mean his power of *acting every where*, though he *exists no where*. The

mind

mind of any particular person, also, they suppose not to be confined within the body of that person; but that though itself bears no relation whatever to space or place, its exertions and affections are, by the sovereign appointment of his Creator, confined to a particular system of organized matter, wherever that happens to be, and continues so limited in its operations as long as the organization subsists; but, that being dissolved, the immaterial principle has no more to do with the matter that had been thus organized, than with any other matter in the universe. It can neither affect it, nor be affected by it.

Others, however, I believe, considering that, though *mathematical points* occupy no real portion of space, they are yet capable of bearing some relation to it, by being fixed in this or that place, at certain distances from each other, are willing to allow that spirits also may be said to be in one place in preference to another; and consequently, that they are capable of changing place, and of moving hither and thither, together with the body to which they belong. But this is not the opinion that seems to prevail in general; since it supposes spirit to have, at least, one property in common with matter, whereas a being strictly *immaterial* (which, in terms, implies a negation of all the properties of matter) ought not to have any thing in common with it.

Besides

Besides, a mathematical point is, in fact, no *substance* at all, being the mere *limit*, or termination of a body, or the *place* in void space where a body is terminated, or may be supposed to be so. Mere *points*, mere *lines*, or mere *surfaces* are alike the mere *boundaries of material substances*, and may not improperly be called their *properties*, necessarily entering into the definition of particular bodies, and consequently bear no sort of relation to what is immaterial. And therefore, the *consistent immaterialist* has justly disclaimed this idea.

Indeed, it is evident, that if nothing but immaterial substances, or pure intelligences, had existed, the very idea of *place*, or *space*, could not have occurred to us. And an idea, that an immaterial being could never have acquired without having an idea of body, or matter, cannot belong to *itself*, but to matter only. Consequently, according to the strict and only consistent system of immateriality, a spirit is properly *no where*, and altogether incapable of *local motion*, though it has an arbitrary connection with a body, that is confined to a particular place, and is capable of moving from one place to another. This, therefore, being the only consistent notion of an immaterial substance, and every thing short of it being mere materialism, it is to the consideration of this idea, that I shall here confine myself.

Appearances cannot be said to favour the doctrine of these very abstract metaphysicians.

For,

For, certainly, judging by what appears to us, we should naturally say that the soul *accompanies the body*, and is contained in it, and therefore changes place together with the body. On this account, therefore, the most acute immaterialists have taken a good deal of pains to shew that, notwithstanding these appearances, which at first sight are acknowledged to be unfavourable to their system, there is not properly any motion, or change of place, in the soul, let the body to which it belongs rove about ever so much.

“ For my part,” says Father Gerdil, as he is quoted by the author of *La vraie Philosophie* *, “ if I had no other reason to satisfy me, I should content myself with saying, with the most celebrated philosophers, of ancient and modern schools, that one cannot doubt but that *thought* and *volition* are incapable of moving with the body, because they are evidently without extension. But the *soul*, of which they are modifications, is of the same nature with them. The *soul*, therefore, can no more move than the *thought* or the will.”

To illustrate this paradox, he says †, that the *void space*, in a carriage drawn by horses, does not move with the carriage, because it is *nothing*; and though the soul be a real substance, it bears no more relation to place, than if it had been nothing at all.” He adds ‡, in order to explain

* P. 271.

† P. 272.

‡ P. 273.

how

how the soul can have an idea of extension and of space, when itself bears no relation to either, that “ though the soul be
 “ incapable of motion, like the body, it
 “ doth not fail to contain eminently within
 “ itself that quality of matter, and therefore
 “ is capable of transferring it upon matter,
 “ and of supposing it to belong to mat-
 “ ter.”

Afterwards*, in explaining what is meant by the soul's willing and acting *in its own body*, he says, that “ these expressions, the
 “ *soul is in the body, thinks in the body, and*
 “ *goes out of the body*, signify nothing but
 “ that the soul is *united to the body*, that it
 “ thinks in a dependence upon that union,
 “ and that, after a certain time, the soul will
 “ be no longer united with that body; but
 “ that the soul is not placed in the body as
 “ the *brain* is in the *skull*, or that it is in the
 “ place where the body is.” How unintelligibly are persons reduced to talk, when they quit the road of common sense, forming their systems not from *facts* and *appearances*, but from *imagination*.

The author of *Letters on Materialism*, addressed to myself, seems to think that he has said something to the purpose, with respect to this difficulty, arising from *the place of spirits*, by considering *space* as nothing more than an *ideal phenomenon arising from the extensive order of co-existing bodies*. As this expression, I

* P. 275.

own, conveys no clear idea to me, I shall lay before my readers the whole paragraph, because, though I am not able to get any light from it, it is possible that another may.

“ To your second objection, that properly speaking, *your mind is no more in your body, than it is in the moon; because it is incapable of bearing the least relation to space?* I answer, *matter*, indeed, occupies *space*, to which *spirit* has no relation; that is, *matter*, as a compounded substance, bears, in its various parts, a relation to other bodies. *Space*, in itself, is nothing real, it is only an ideal phenomenon arising from the extensive order of co-existing bodies. Take from the creation every body, or, which amounts to the same, every being capable of viewing them, and *space* will no longer subsist.”

Now it appears to me, that it is impossible, even *in idea*, to suppose the annihilation of *space*. Let any person but for a moment suppose the annihilation of all *matter*, which is not difficult, and then consider whether the annihilation of *space* will necessarily follow. I do not mean *in imagination*, like the idea of things tending to fall downwards on the opposite side of the globe of the earth, but *in the nature of things*.

Afterwards this writer considers the presence of the mind with the body, as *attested* by its *action upon it*, so that still the spirit, properly speaking, is *no where*, and has *no motion*, notwithstanding—

withstanding its strict union with, and its constant action upon, a body which is necessarily confined to some particular place, and which it obliges to change its place at pleasure. How these notions strike others I cannot tell; to me nothing can appear more whimsical, or extravagant.

P A R T II.

Of the MUTUAL INFLUENCES of the Soul and the Body.

IT is contended for by all metaphysicians, who maintain the doctrine of any *proper immaterial principle*, that *spirit and body* can have no *common property*; and when it is asked, How, then, can they *act upon one another*, and how can they be so intimately connected as to be continually and necessarily subject to each other's influence? it is acknowledged to be a *difficulty*, and a *mystery* that we cannot comprehend. But had this question been considered with due attention, what has been called a *difficulty* would, I doubt not, have been deemed an *impossibility*; or such a mystery as that of the bread and wine in the Lord's supper, becoming the real body and blood of Christ, or that of each of the three persons in the Trinity being equally God, and yet there being no more Gods than one; which, in the
eye

eye of common sense, are not properly *difficulties*, or *mysteries*, but direct *contradictions*; such as that of a thing *being* and *not being* at the same time.

Let a man torture his imagination as much as he pleases, I will pronounce it to be impossible for him to conceive even the possibility of *mutual action* without some *common property*, by means of which the things that *act* and *re-act* upon each other, may have some *connexion*. A substance that is *hard* may act upon, and be acted upon by, another hard substance, or even one that is *soft*, which, in fact, is only relatively *less hard*: but it is certainly impossible that it should affect, or be affected by, a substance that can make *no resistance at all*, and especially a kind of substance that cannot, with any propriety of speech, be said to be even *in the same place* with it. If this be not an *impossibility*, I really do not know what is so.

But admitting that what appears to me to be an absolute impossibility, viz. that substances which have no common property can, nevertheless, affect, and be affected by each other, to be no more than a difficulty; it is however a difficulty of such magnitude, as far to exceed that of conceiving that the principle of sensation may possibly consist with matter; and, therefore, if, of two difficulties, it be most philosophical to take the *least*, we must, of course, abandon the hypothesis of two *heterogeneous and incompatible principles in*

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man,

man, which is clogged with the greater difficulty of conception, and admit that of the *uniformity of his nature*, which is only attended with a less difficulty.

The great difficulty that attends the supposition of the union of the soul and body, came in with the Cartesian hypothesis, which goes upon the idea that the essence of mind is *thought*, and the essence of body *extension*, exclusive of every property that had before been supposed to be common to them both, and by which they might influence one another. And it is very amusing to observe the different hypotheses that have been formed to account for the soul receiving ideas by the corporeal senses, and for the motion of the body in consequence of the volition of the soul.

That the body and mind have no physical influence upon one another, Descartes could not but allow. He therefore supposed that the impression of external objects, was only the *occasional*, and not the *efficient cause* of sensation in the mind; that volition also was only the occasional, and not the efficient cause of the motion of the muscles; and that in both these cases the real efficient cause was the immediate agency of the Deity, exerted according to certain rules which he invariably followed. Thus, whenever an object is presented, the divine Being impresses the mind, and whenever a volition takes place, he produces the corresponding motion in the muscular system.

Malebranche.

Malebranche refined upon this hypothesis, supposing that we perceive the ideas of things not only by the *divine agency*, but *in the divine mind itself*; all ideas being first in the divine mind, and there perceived by us. A general view of his system, with the reasons on which it is founded, is thus given by Lord Bolingbroke*.

“ We cannot perceive any thing that is
 “ not intimately united to the soul ; but there
 “ being no proportion between the soul and
 “ material things, these cannot be united to it,
 “ or perceived by it. Our souls are, indeed,
 “ united to our bodies, but there is a manner
 “ of union necessary to perception, and an-
 “ other that is not so. God, who is a sub-
 “ stance, and the only intelligible substance,
 “ is intimately united to our souls by his pre-
 “ sence. He is the *place of spirits*, as *space* is
 “ the *place of bodies* ; and as he must have in
 “ himself the ideas of all the beings that he
 “ has created, we may see those ideas in God,
 “ as he is pleased to shew them to us.”

The celebrated mathematician and metaphysician, Leibnitz, was as sensible of the impossibility of all proper connexion, or influence, between matter and spirit, as the Cartesians, but he explained the correspondence there is between them in quite another, though not a more satisfactory manner; forming a system, which has obtained the name of *the pre-established harmony*. For, admitting

* See his Works, vol. iii. p. 543.

the necessary and physical operation of all causes, mental and corporeal, he supposes that the whole train of volitions, from a man's birth to his death, would have taken place in the mind in the same order, if there had been no body connected with it; and, on the other hand, that all the motions and other affections of the body (being properly an automaton) would have been the same, if there had been no soul connected with it: but that it is pre-established by the divine Being, that the volitions of the one, and the motions of the other, should strictly correspond, just as they would have done, if they had really been *cause* and *effect* to each other.

Neither of these hypotheses having given lasting satisfaction, the defenders of the modern doctrine of immateriality have generally contented themselves with supposing, that there is some *unknown real influence* between the soul and the body, but that the connection is a *mystery* to us. And this is not the first absurdity, and impossibility, that has found a convenient shelter under that term.

The learned Beaufobre acknowledges this difficulty, even with respect to the Deity himself, but he gives us no assistance with respect to the solution of it. "If," says he*, "the substance of the first mover be absolutely immaterial, without extension, and without size (*grandeur*) one cannot conceive how it should give motion to mat-

* Vol. i. p. 483.

“ ter;

“ter; because such a substance can have no hold (*prise*) of them, any more than they have upon it. We must, therefore, have recourse to the christian system, according to which, God acts upon matter by an act of his will only.” But if the substance of a spirit cannot act upon matter, how can the *mere volition*, which is the mere act of a spirit, affect it?

Mr. Baxter, who ascribes so much to the agency of the Deity, and so little to matter, is, as might be expected, peculiarly embarrassed with this difficulty. According to him, all the properties of matter, as attraction, repulsion, and cohesion, are the immediate agency of the divine Being. Consequently, as we perceive material things by means of these their *powers*, it but too plainly follows, that, in fact, matter is wholly superfluous; for if it exists, all its operations and effects are resolvable into the pure unaided operation of the Deity. Such a philosopher cannot but be puzzled to answer Bishop Berkley, who supposed, that the divine Being himself presented the ideas of all things to our minds, and that nothing material exists. The following appears to me to be a very poor attempt to maintain the real use of matter to impress the mind.

“Those philosophers,” says he*, “who allow the objects of our ideas to exist, affirm, I think, without necessity, that

* Vol. ii. p. 333.

“ the sovereign mind produces the ideas of
 “ them in us, in so far, I mean, as the objects
 “ themselves may do this, or otherwise than
 “ by co-operation. Matter I know cannot
 “ act of itself, as it acts only by resistance.
 “ But if the resistance between the matter of
 “ our bodies, and other matter, be enough
 “ to excite the idea of their resistance in our
 “ minds, it would be unnecessary to suppose
 “ God to excite that idea, and the resistance
 “ itself to have no effect. And if we do not
 “ allow the matter of our bodies affects our
 “ minds directly, and by itself, the union be-
 “ tween them may seem to be, in a great
 “ measure, to no purpose.”

What does this amount to, but that, since matter *does* exist, it must be of some use, though Mr. Baxter's general hypothesis, agreeably to which he here asserts, that *matter cannot act of itself*, leaves so very little to it, that it might very well have been spared. Pity, that so mischievous a thing, as he every where represents matter to be, should have been introduced at all, when, without the aid of superior power, it could not do even that mischief.

Mr. Baxter seems to have thought, that the connexion between the soul and the body subsisted only during a state of *vigilance*; for that, though during sleep, the soul, as he says*, “ is *always active and percipient*, and is
 “ never without some real perception, it most

* Vol. ii. p. 11.

“ evidently

“ evidently ceases to act and perceive by the “ body.” It is, therefore, in fact, in an unembodied state. It is pity, that we have no evidence of what passes in that state; but that, in the moment of the re-union of the soul to the body, on awaking from sleep, all that passed in this intermediate state is forgotten.

Whatever passes in *dreams*, this philosopher supposes, not to be any thing that the soul is concerned in, but the work of other intellectual agents, which occupy the sensory the moment that the soul abandons it. If we ask, why the soul thus abandons the sensory, he says, it is on account of the “ *expence of animal spirits*, “ necessary to keep the former impressions “ patent, and to produce new ones, and that “ the fatigue of continuing to do this is intolerable.” But as it is not the *soul* that is fatigued, but the *body* only, is there not the same expence of animal spirits, whether the proper soul of the man, or some other spirit, be at work in the sensory? The same *quantity of thought* must be attended with the same expence of animal spirits.

The author of *La vraye Philosophie* has a very singular manner of helping this great difficulty concerning the soul acting upon the body. I shall only quote the passage without making any remark upon it. “ Without “ doubt,” says he*, “ it is not by *thought* “ that the soul moves the body, for as it is

* P. 277.

“ not by thought, that the soul enriches corporeal bodies with colours and extension, neither is it by thought that it acts upon matter, and puts it in motion. It does both these things, and many others of a similar nature, by its own *energy*. The supreme Being, in creating it, willed that it should have, in an eminent manner, the *properties* of matter, without having the *imperfections* of it.”

Others think to provide for the necessary mutual action and re-action between soul and body, by imagining, that there may be something like common properties between them, though by this means they evidently destroy the distinction between these two substances. This is remarkably the case with the author of *Letters on Materialism*.

“ You tell us,” says he*, “ that *matter and spirit are always described, as having not one common property, by means of which they can affect, or act upon each other.*—This may be true in the opinion of those philosophers, who consider all matter as *passive and inert*, void of every species of *force, action, or energy*. But probably, such *negative attributes* can scarcely constitute the nature of any being. In every sentiment, indeed, the properties of these two substances must, *in part*, at least, essentially differ, because their natures are ever said to

* P. 37.

“ be

“ be *dissimilar*; yet, it does not hence follow,
 “ that they may not be endowed with powers
 “ whereby mutually to affect and act upon
 “ each other. A being of a superior order
 “ may act on an inferior one, placed higher
 “ on the scale. It has acquired nobler pro-
 “ perties, but it is not therefore deprived of
 “ such *inferior qualities* as are not unalliable
 “ with the more exalted species. Particular-
 “ ly, this must be the case where the superior
 “ being constitutes a part of the same gene-
 “ ral system? Thus will the soul be able
 “ to act on matter, and consequently on its
 “ own body, which experience likewise seems
 “ to confirm.

“ Why may not matter also act upon spi-
 “ rit, at least, the most *exalted* and *refined part*
 “ of matter, in a manner, perhaps, inexpli-
 “ cable, but analogous to its inferior nature
 “ and powers? Thus reciprocally will the
 “ body act upon the soul. For this nothing
 “ seems more requisite than that matter, in
 “ its component elements, should be possessed
 “ of an *active force*, justly proportioned to
 “ their order, and rank of being. It must
 “ reside in the elements, and these must be
 “ *simple*, because no force could ever inhere
 “ in a substance ever divisible; and were not
 “ the *elements* active, their *compounds* never
 “ could be; no more than a percipient brain
 “ could arise from impercipient particles.
 “ The material elements then, I conceive to
 “ be *simple* and *active*, active in various de-
 “ grees,

“ grees, according to their scale of being, or
 “ the part they are by infinite wisdom destin-
 “ ed to fill. The human body, a compound
 “ of these elements, and the *brain* particular-
 “ ly, must be conceived as an instrument
 “ mounted in the most exact accord of parts
 “ to parts, and as endowed with the greatest
 “ *energetic powers* of which body is suscepti-
 “ ble. It is thus rendered a fit habitation for
 “ a substance simple and highly active, as is
 “ the soul.

“ The soul, as a superior being, must have,
 “ additionally, other superior attributes, some
 “ of which may be roused into action by the
 “ impulse of an inferior agent, the body,
 “ whilst the more eminent (though not, from
 “ the pre-established laws of union, independ-
 “ ent in their operations) are, however, out
 “ of the reach of any immediate and direct
 “ bodily action. Thus will the various men-
 “ tal powers be progressively brought into
 “ action, and man will feel, will perceive,
 “ will think, and will reason, just as the re-
 “ spective operative causes exert their influ-
 “ ence.

“ In the system of *occasional causes* (where-
 “ in all matter is supposed to be passive and
 “ lifeless, and wherein even the soul itself,
 “ though said to be active, never *acts*) the
 “ Deity is introduced as the only mover, and
 “ real agent, but is represented, as ever deter-
 “ mined to act by the view of the different
 “ states in which he himself has placed the
 “ external

“ external beings. The doctrine of *physical influence* is, in my opinion, the only philosophical notion. Here the two substances mutually *act* and *re-act* upon each other.”

I do not imagine that the more acute immaterialists will think themselves under any obligation to this defender of their principles, either for giving spirit *such inferior qualities as are not unalliable with the more exalted species of matter*, or for enduing matter with that *active power*, which is generally thought peculiar to *spirit*; because, in fact, this hypothesis entirely confounds the two substances, and lays a foundation for the grossest materialism. For the most *exalted and refined part of matter* cannot be deemed to differ essentially from the *grossest matter*. For, difference in *size* is all that the terms *exalted* and *refined* can possibly signify when applied to matter. An immaterial soul, therefore, must be wholly incapable of action and re-action with the most exalted and refined, as well as with the grossest corporeal system. A soul, capable of this mutual action with body, must have something gross in itself, and therefore must be degraded from holding that very high and distinguished rank in the scale of being, which has been assigned to it by those who consider it as *infinitely superior to matter*.

This writer also says, that the *active force* which he ascribes to matter, must reside in the simple *elements* of it, because, as he says, “ no force could ever inhere in a substance ever
“ divisible,

“divisible, and were not the elements active
 “their compounds never could be so.” But
 did not this writer know, that it is even
 demonstrable that *matter is infinitely divisible*,
 and that, therefore, according to his own con-
 cession, no active force *can* ever inhere in it ?
 This writer, therefore, acknowledging, as he
 does, the necessity of a *physical influence* be-
 tween the body and the mind, must necessa-
 rily abandon the notion of *two distinct princi-
 ples*, and adopt that of the *uniform composition*
of the whole man.

The vulgar, who consider *spirit* as a *thin
 aërial substance*, would be exceedingly puzzled
 if they were to endeavour to realize the mo-
 dern idea of a proper *immaterial being*; since, to
 them, it would seem to have nothing *positive*
 in its nature, but to be only a *negation of pro-
 perties*, though disguised under the positive
 appellation of *spirit*. To them it must appear
 to be the idea of *nothing at all*, and to be in-
 capable of supporting any properties.

Metaphysicians, however, affirm, that we
 have as clear an idea of *spirit*, as we have of
 matter, each being equally the unknown sup-
 port of known properties, *matter* of exten-
 sion and solidity, and *spirit* of sensation and
 thought. But still, since the *substance* is con-
 fessedly *unknown* to us, it must also be un-
 known to us what *properties* it is capable of
 supporting; and, therefore, unless there be a
 real inconsistency in the properties themselves,
 those which have hitherto been ascribed to
 both

both substances may belong to either of them.

For this reason, Mr. Locke, who maintains the immateriality of the soul, and yet asserts that, for any thing we know to the contrary, matter may have the property of thought superadded to it, ought to have concluded, that this is really the case; since, according to the rules of philosophizing, we ought not to multiply causes without necessity, which in this case he does not pretend to.

I shall conclude this section with a quotation from the author of *Reflections on the Existence of the soul, and of the Existence of God*, as represented in the *Examen du Fatalisme* *, “ If,” says he, “ the operations ascribed “ to the mind may result from the powers “ of matter, why should we suppose a being “ that is useless, and which solves no difficulty? It is easy to see that the properties of matter do not exclude those of intelligence, but it cannot be imagined how “ a being, which has no property besides “ intelligence, can make use of matter. In “ reality, how can this substance, which “ bears no relation to matter, be sensible of “ it, or perceive it? In order to see things, “ it is necessary that they make an impression upon us, that there be some relation “ between us and them, but what can be this “ relation?” I shall only observe upon this passage, that we can never leave the road of

* Vol. i. p. 390.

found

found philosophy, without giving advantage to atheists and unbelievers.

S E C T I O N VIII.

Of Spirits having Extension.

SEVERAL of the moderns finding themselves embarrassed with the idea of a soul, as being without any extension or relation to space, have admitted these properties to belong to spirits. But they do not seem to have considered how inconsistent it is with their general doctrine, and the arguments by which it is supported, to admit thus much, or the peculiar difficulties with which this scheme is clogged. These, therefore, I shall proceed to represent.

1. The chief reason why the principle of thought has been supposed to be incompatible with matter, is, that there is no *conceivable connexion* between *thought* and *solidity*, that the two ideas are altogether different and *dissimilar*. But is there any more conceivable connexion between thought and mere *extension*? Are ideas, according to the opinion of the persons who hold this doctrine, extended things? Is the *judgment* extended, is the *will* extended, or have the *passions* extension? How, then, do they require an extended substance in which to inhere? If there be some un-
known

known reason why they *do* require an extended *substratum*, may not this substance have *solidity* added to its extension; the idea of solidity not being more foreign to the idea of thought, than that of extension, nor more dissimilar to it.

2. The essence of the soul, it is said, cannot be matter, because it would then be *divisible*; but is not every thing that is extended divisible? It is not the solidity of bodies that makes them capable of division so properly as their extension. It is this property that makes division possible; and then all that is necessary to actual division is *discerptibility*, or the possible separation of one part of its substance from another. For wherever there is extension, there must be conceivable parts, viz. a half, a third, a fourth, &c. But till the substance of which the soul (exclusive of its power of thinking) consists, be more known to us, so that we can subject it to a rigorous examination, it is impossible to say whether it be more or less discerptible than any species of matter; for all that we know of it is, that it is *extended*, and that it *thinks*. The firmness of its texture, is a thing of which we have no knowledge at all; and if it be any thing more than *mere space*, it must have that which may be called *texture*, or *consistence*, solid or fluid, elastic or non-elastic, &c. &c. Consequently, it may, for any thing we know, be as corruptible, and perishable, as the body. The boasted *unity of consciousness*, and *simpli-*
city

city of perception and thought, can be no security against division and dissolution, unless they inhere in a substance naturally incapable of division, and consequently of dissolution.

3. As divisibility may always be predicated of any substance that is extended, and not infinite, I wish the advocates of this doctrine of extended spirit, would consider a little what would be the probable consequence of an actual division of it. Supposing the substance of a human soul to be divided into two equal parts (which to divine power must, at least, be possible) would the power of thinking be necessarily destroyed, or would the result be *two spirits*, of inferior powers, as well as of smaller size? If so, would each of them retain the consciousness of the whole undivided soul, or would the stock of ideas be equally divided between them?

4. As every created being must *exist* before it can *act*, I wish the advocates of this doctrine would consider what idea they can form of the extended substance of a spirit before it has acquired any ideas at all, and consequently before it has begun to think. In what will it differ from mere space? Whatever this state be, in what does it differ from the state of the soul whenever it ceases to think, as in a deep sleep, a swoon, or the state between death and the resurrection!

5. I would also submit it to the consideration of the partisans of *extended spiritualism*, what *size* or *shape* they would give to the human

human soul (for if it be extended, size and shape it must have) and whether some inconvenience may not arise to their system in the discussion of the question. If nothing can act but where it is, I should think that the soul must have the size and form of the brain, if not of the whole nervous system. For there is no region within the brain of less extent than the medullary part of it, that can be imagined to be the *sensorium*, or the immediate seat of sensation; and as the nerves consist of the same substance with the medullary part of the brain, and are properly a production, or part of it, I do not see why the soul should be confined to the size of the brain only, exclusive of the nerves; and then, as the nerves are in every part of the body, the soul would, in fact, be of the same form and size with the body to which it belongs, though with more interstices.

6. It is also a matter of some curiosity to the speculatist, to consider whether the size and form of these extended souls be invariable, or whether, as we suppose the body to undergo some change at the resurrection, in order to adapt it to its new mode of existence, the soul may not undergo a proportionable change, and be transformed together with it.

7. We are apt to impose upon ourselves, and to confound our understandings, by the use of *general terms*. To gain clear perceptions of things we must inspect them more closely, in order to discover what particular

and more *definite ideas* are necessarily comprized in the more general ones. Thus, while we content ourselves with saying, that man is a compound being, consisting of two substances, the one *corporeal*, and the other *spiritual*, the one both extended and solid, and the other extended indeed, but destitute of solidity; and that an intimate union subsists between them, so that they always *accompany* and *affect* one another (an impression upon the body causing a sensation in the mind, and a volition of the mind causing a motion of the body) we are satisfied. The hypothesis seems to correspond to the *first view* of the phenomena; and though we cannot help being staggered, when we consider this intimate union of two such *heterogeneous substances*, we still acquiesce in it, as an union effected by almighty power; and we are likewise repelled from a rigorous examination of it by the idea, however ill-founded, that our prospects of a future life are materially affected by it.

But a future life being secured to us by the promises of the gospel, upon *other and better principles*, we need not be afraid to consider what this supposed union of body and soul really implies, and it appears to me to imply that the soul, having *locality*, and *extension*, must have *solidity* also.

That the mind should move the body, and, at the same time, *move itself* along with the body, we may think a tolerably easy supposition; but what shall we say to the case of the
body

body being moved during sleep, or a swoon, to which removal the mind does not at all contribute. It will hardly be said that, in this case, the soul is first of all left behind, in the place from which the body was taken, and that it afterwards *voluntarily* joins its former companion. And, if not, the motion of the mind must, in all cases, *necessarily* accompany the motion of the living body, or, in other words, the mind must be *involuntarily dragged* along with it. But can this motion be communicated from *body* to *mind* without real *impulse*, implying a *vis inertiae*, and *solidity*, without which, it should seem, that the one cannot lay hold of the other?

8. It will also, I think, be difficult to account for the separation of the soul from the body after death, unless the spiritual substance be supposed to be a proper constituent part of the *solid mass*, which, like fixed air in bodies, is set loose when the rest of the mass is dissolved by putrefaction, or otherwise. If putrefaction, or total dissolution, be the physical cause of this separation, is there not a good foundation for the practice of the Egyptians, who preserved the bodies of their friends as long as they possibly could, probably with a view of retaining their souls in them, or near them?

If the soul be really inseparable from the body, which is probably the opinion of those who maintain that, during the death of the body, the soul is in a state of insensibility

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until

until the resurrection, what part of the body does it accompany? If it be indiscerptible, it must be wholly in some one place; and as all the constituent parts of every member of the body are completely dissolved and dispersed, it must, in fact, accompany some one of the *ultimate particles*; and which of them can that be?

If the extended spirit does *not* accompany any particle of the dissolved body, and all souls be preserved, during their dormant state, in some *general repository* (whether in the sun, the earth, or some part of the intermediate space) in what manner will the re-union of the souls, and their respective bodies, be effected at the resurrection? Will it be by any thing like what is called *elective attraction* between them, or will it be effected by a new and express *fiat* of the deity?

These objections do not much, if at all, affect the doctrine of *spirit bearing no relation to space*, or any speculation concerning the divine essence, which fills all space.

9. Many other queries will necessarily obtrude themselves on any person who shall begin to speculate on the nature of extended spiritual substances, which it will be impossible to dismiss without some degree of attention; and it appears to me that, let the advocates for this doctrine answer them in whatever manner they please, they must occasion some degree of embarrassment, so as to leave a suspicion of the doctrine from which they

they arise, as wanting a sufficient foundation in probability and truth; such as, What is the origin, or commencement, of the extended spirit? Is every soul a separate creation, or, are souls propagated from each other like bodies? Does it grow in size with the growth of the body and brain? Are these extended spirits mutually penetrable to each other? There can be no doubt but that they must occupy a portion of the same universal space that is already occupied by the divine essence. Is the essence of these extended spirits similar to that of the deity, and will no impediment arise from this necessary mutual penetration?

Many more observations might be made on this notion of extended spirit, which appears to me not to have been sufficiently considered by those who hold it. They have concluded, or rather, have taken it for granted, that there is in man a soul distinct from his body, but they revolt at the idea of this soul having no extension, or relation to space, and therefore admit that it has these properties; but, being driven by mere necessity to admit thus much, they are unwilling to consider the subject any farther, and shut their eyes on all the concomitants and consequences of their concessions; though, if they would attend to them, they would find them such as would probably make them revolt at the whole system. Their arguments for a separate soul from the topics of thought being dissimilar to matter, from the unity of consciousness, indiscerptibility,

&c. properly belong to the advocates for refined spiritualism, and are impertinently and ineffectually alledged by those, who, admitting a real extension, and consequently real size and form in the soul, in vain imagine, that they are advocates for the doctrine of proper immateriality. In fact, they are themselves *semi-materialists*.

How easy is it to get rid of all the embarrassment attending the doctrine of a soul, in every view of it, by admitting, agreeably to all the phenomena, that the power of thinking belongs to the *brain* of a man, as that of walking to his feet, or that of speaking to his tongue; that, therefore, man, who is *one being*, is composed of *one kind of substance*, made of *the dust of the earth*; that when he dies, he, of course, ceases to think; but when his *sleeping dust* shall be re-animated at the resurrection, his power of thinking, and his consciousness, will be restored to him?

This system gives a real value to the doctrine of *a resurrection from the dead*, which is peculiar to revelation, on which alone the sacred writers build all our hope of a future life, and it explains the uniform language of the scriptures, which speak of one day of judgment for all mankind, and represent all the rewards of virtue, and all the punishments of vice, as taking place at that awful day, and not before. This doctrine of a resurrection was laughed at by the conceited Athenians, and will always be the subject of ridicule to persons

persons of a similar turn of mind; but it is abundantly confirmed to us by the well attested resurrection of Jesus Christ, and the promises of the gospel, established on all the miraculous events by which the promulgation of christianity was attended.

S E C T I O N IX.

Of the VEHICLE of the Soul.

MANY modern metaphysicians, finding some difficulty in uniting together things so discrepant in their nature, as a *pure immaterial substance*, and such *gross matter*, as that of which the human body and brain are composed, have imagined, that this connexion may be better cemented by means of some *intermediate* material substance, of a more refined and subtle nature than that which is the object of the senses of sight or touch. Upon the dissolution of the body by death, they suppose that this subtle *vehicle* of the soul is set loose from its connexion with it, and flies off, unperceived by any of the senses, together with the immaterial soul, from which it is inseparable, into the intermediate state.

This, in fact, is nothing more than taking the *εἶδμαλον* of the ancients, or the popular

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ghost

ghost of all countries, which was all the thinking principle that they had any idea of, and making it a kind of *body* to something of which the ancients and the vulgar had no idea. But this modern vehicle of the soul is altogether a creature of imagination and hypothesis, and in reality without explaining any one phenomenon, or removing one real difficulty. For so long as the matter of which this vehicle consists, has what are supposed to be the essential properties of all matter, viz. *solid extent*, its union with a truly immaterial substance must be just as difficult to conceive, as if it had been the subject of all our corporeal senses. To the vulgar, indeed, the *attenuation* of matter may make it seem to approach to the nature of *spirit*; but the philosopher knows that, in fact, no attenuation of matter brings it at all nearer to the nature of a substance that has no common property with matter.

Mr. Wollaston, however, who is certainly a very respectable writer, and treats pretty largely of this subject, of a vehicle for the soul, not attending to these obvious considerations, seems to consider the immaterial soul as a substance capable of the most intimate union with this subtle material vehicle. I shall present my reader with this writer's ideas on the subject, and subjoin some remarks upon it. I might quote what many others have advanced, but there is no end of pursuing such mere creatures of imagination, and the farther

ther discussion of the subject would be inexcusable trifling.

“ The human soul,” says Mr. Wollaston*, “ is a cogitative substance, clothed in a material vehicle, or rather united to it, and as it were inseparably mixed (I had almost said incorporated) with it. These act in conjunction, that which affects the one, affecting the other.—The soul is detained in the body (the head or brain) by some sympathy, or attraction between this material vehicle and it, till the habitation is spoiled, and this mutual tendency interrupted (and perhaps turned into an aversion) by some hurt or disease, or by the decays and ruins of old age, or the like, happening to the body; and in the *interim*, by means of this vehicle, motions and impressions are communicated to and fro.”

Again, he says†, “ If we suppose the soul to be a being by nature made to inform some body, and that it cannot exist and act in a state of total separation from all body—that body which is so necessary to it, may be some fine vehicle, that dwells with it in the brain, and goes off with it at death—When it shall, in its proper vehicle, be let go, and take its flight into the open fields of heaven, it will then be bare to the immediate impression of objects. And why should not those impressions

* P. 364.

† P. 370

“ which

“ which affected the nerves that moved, and
 “ affected the vehicle, and the soul in it,
 “ affect the vehicle immediately, when they
 “ are immediately made upon it, without the
 “ interposition of the nerves. The hand
 “ which feels an object at the end of a staff,
 “ may certainly be allowed to feel the same
 “ much better by immediate contact, without
 “ the staff.”

On this I would observe, that by what-
 ever considerations it appears that a vehicle is
 necessary to the soul, the body must at least
 be equally necessary to the vehicle. For it
 by no means follows, that because external
 objects can affect the vehicle *through the body*,
 that therefore they would affect it at all, and
 much less better, without its assistance. It
 would then follow, that because the auditory
 nerves are affected with sounds, by means of
 the external and internal ear, that therefore
 sounds would be heard better without the ear,
 the vibrations of the air acting immediately
 upon the nerves themselves; and that be-
 cause the brain is affected with the several
 sensations, by means of the nerves, that it
 would perceive every thing to much more
 advantage, if it were exposed to the influ-
 ence of all those things to which the nerves
 are exposed. Whereas these are all contrary
 to fact.

On the contrary, there is the greatest rea-
 son to believe, that nothing is provided for
 us as a *means*, or *instrument* of sensation, but
 what

what was naturally proper, and even necessary for the purpose; and consequently that, if these means were withheld, the *end* could not be attained. Whereas, therefore, the only means by which we receive our sensations are the organs of sense, the nerves, and the brain, we ought to conclude, that without bodily organs, nerves, and brain, we could have no sensations or ideas.

There is something curious in Mr. Wollaston's notion concerning the *place of the soul*, as determined by the specific gravity of the gross body, or of the vehicle to which it is connected; copied, as it should seem, from Plato or Cicero, who give a similar account of the height to which the soul ascends after death, according as it is more or less weighed down by its vicious tendency to earthly things.

“That general law,” says Wollaston*, “to which bodies are subject, makes it sink in this fluid of air, so much lighter than itself, keeps it down, and so determines the seat of it, and of the soul in it, to be upon the surface of this earth, where, or in whose neighbourhood, it was first produced. . . But then, when the soul shall be disengaged from the gross matter which now encloses and encumbers it, and either becomes naked spirit, or be only veiled in its own fine and obsequious vehicle, it must

* P. 401.

“ at

“ at the same time be either freed from the
 “ laws of bodies, and fall under some other,
 “ which will carry it to some proper mansion
 “ or state ; or at least, by the old ones,
 “ be capable of mounting upwards, in pro-
 “ portion to the volatility of its vehicle, and
 “ of emerging out of these regions, into some
 “ medium more suitable, and (if the philo-
 “ sopher may say so) more equilibrious.”

This has the appearance of being written in ridicule of the *vehicular system*, but it was meant to be a just exposition and defence of it. I would observe also, that this writer, taking it for granted, that all these vehicles are specifically lighter than the atmosphere that surrounds the earth, and therefore must ascend in it, makes no provision for the *descent* of any unembodied spirit into any of the *lower regions*, where most of the moderns dispose of the souls of the wicked, and where all the ancients placed the receptacle of all souls without distinction.

Even Dr. Hartley, who ascribes so much to matter, and so little to any thing immaterial in man (nothing but the faculty of simple *perception*) yet supposes, that there is something *intermediate* between the soul and the gross body, which he distinguishes by the name of *the infinitesimal elementary body*. But, great as is my admiration of Dr. Hartley, it is very far from carrying me to adopt every thing in him. His language, in this instance, conveys no clear ideas to my mind, and I consider both

his

his *intermediate body*, and *immaterial soul*, as an encumbrance upon his system, which, in every other respect, is most admirably simple.

I do not find, that any thing has been said of the state of the vehicle of the soul during sleep. Does the vehicle require rest as well as the body and brain; and if the soul think during sleep, where is the repository of the ideas on which it is employed? Are they contained in the vehicle, or the soul itself.

Indeed, every thing relating to sleep, is a very puzzling phenomenon, on the supposition of the distinction between the soul and the body, especially the little evidence that can be pretended of the soul being employed at all in a state of really sound sleep, exclusive of dreaming. And surely, if there be a soul distinct from the body, and it be sensible of all the changes that take place in the corporeal system to which it is attached, why does it not perceive that state of the body which is termed *sleep*; and why does it not *contemplate* the state of the body and brain during sleep, which might afford matter enough for reasoning and reflection? If no *new ideas* could be transmitted to it at that time, it might employ itself upon the stock which it had acquired before, if they really had inhered in it; and belonged to it; taking the opportunity of ruminating upon its *old* ideas, when it was so circumstanced, that it could acquire no *new* ones.

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All this we should naturally expect if the soul was a substance really distinct from the body, and if the ideas properly *belonged* to this substance, so that it was capable of carrying them all away with it, when the body was reduced to dust. The soul, during the sleep of the body, might be expected to approach to the state in which it would be when the body was dead, *death* being often compared to a more sound *sleep*. For if it be capable of thinking, and feeling, when the powers of the body shall entirely *cease*, it *might* be capable of the same kind of sensation and action when those powers are only *suspended*.

S E C T I O N X.

OBJECTIONS *to the System of Materialism* considered.

MOST of the objections that have been made to the possibility of the powers of sensation and thought belonging to matter, are entirely founded on a mistaken notion of matter, as being necessarily *inert* and *impenetrable*, and not a thing possessed of no other powers than those of *attraction* and *repulsion*, and such as may be consistent with them. With such objections as these I have properly

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no concern, because they do not affect my peculiar system. Some objections, however, which are founded on the *popular notion of matter*, it may be worth while to consider; because, while they remain unnoticed, they may impede the reception of any system that bears the name of *materialism*, how different soever it may be from any thing that has hitherto been so denominated. I shall, therefore, briefly reply to every objection that can be thought *considerable*, either in itself, or on account of the person who has proposed it.

OBJECTION I. *From the difficulty of conceiving how Thought can arise from Matter.*

IT is said, we can have no conception how sensation, or thought, can arise from matter, they being things so very different from it, and bearing no sort of resemblance to any thing like *figure* or *motion*; which is all that can result from any modification of matter, or any operation upon it.

But this is an argument which derives all its force from our *ignorance*. *Different* as are the properties of sensation and thought, from such as are usually ascribed to matter, they may, nevertheless, inhere in the same substance, unless we can shew them to be absolutely *incompatible* with one another. There is no apparent resemblance between the ideas of *sight*, and those of *bearing*, or *smelling*, &c.
and

and yet they all exist in the same mind, which is possessed of the very different senses and faculties appropriated to each of them. Besides, this argument, from our not being able to *conceive* how a thing can be, equally affects the immaterial system: for we have no more conception how the powers of sensation and thought can inhere in an *immaterial*, than in a *material* substance. For, in fact, we have no distinct idea either of the *properties*, or of the *substance* of mind or spirit. Of the latter, we profess to know nothing, but that it is not matter; and even of the property of *perception*, it seems to be as impossible that we should fully comprehend the nature of it, as that the eye should see itself.

Besides, they who maintain the intimate union of substances so discrepant in their natures as *matter* and *immaterial spirit*, of which they certainly cannot pretend to have any conception, do, with a very ill grace, urge any objection against the system of materialism, derived from our ignorance of the *manner* in which a principle of thought may be superadded to matter.

I would observe, that by the *principle of thought*, I mean nothing more than the power of *simple perception*, or our consciousness of the presence and effect of sensations and ideas. For I shall, in these Disquisitions, take it for granted, that this one property of the mind being admitted, all the particular phenomena of sensation and ideas, respecting their *retention*,

tion, association, &c. and the various faculties of the mind, to which those affections of our sensations and ideas give rise, as *memory, judgment, volition, the passions, &c.* will admit of a satisfactory illustration on the principles of *vibration*, which is an affection of a material substance. I, therefore, admit of no argument for the *spirituality* of the soul, from the consideration of the *exquisiteness, subtlety, or complexness* of the mental powers, on which much stress has been laid by some; there being in matter a capacity for affections as subtle and complex as any thing that we can affirm concerning those that have hitherto been called *mental affections*. I consider *Hartley's Theory of the Mind*, as a *practical answer* to all objections of this kind.

OBJECTION II. *From abstract Ideas.*

“Matter,” says Mr. Wollaston*, “can never, by itself, entertain abstracted, or general ideas, such as many in our minds are. For could it reflect upon what passes within itself, it could possibly find there nothing but material and particular impressions. Abstract and metaphysical ideas could not be found upon it.”

But Mr. Locke, and others, have observed, that all actual ideas are, in fact, *particular*, and that abstraction is nothing more than

* P. 357.

leaving out of a number of resembling ideas, what is peculiar to each, and considering only what is common to them all.

OBJECTION III. *From the Influence of Reasons.*

Mr. Wollaston argues, that the mind cannot be material, because it is influenced by *reasons*. “When I begin to move myself,” says he *, “I do it for some reason, and with respect to some end.—But who can imagine matter to be moved by arguments, or ever ranked syllogisms and demonstrations among levers and pullies?—Do we not see, in conversation, how a pleasant thing will make people break out into laughter, a rude thing into a passion, and so on. These affections cannot be the physical effects of the words spoken, because then they would have the same effect, whether they were understood or not. It is, therefore, the *sense* of the words, which is an immaterial thing, that by passing through the understanding, and causing that which is the subject of the intellectual faculties to influence the body, produces those motions in the spirits, blood, and muscles.”

I answer, that, since it is a fact, that *reasons*, whatever they be, do ultimately move matter, there is certainly much less difficulty

* P. 355.

in conceiving that they may do this, in consequence of their being the affection of some material substance, than upon the hypothesis of their belonging to a substance that has no common property with matter. It is acknowledged, that syllogisms and demonstrations are not levers and pullies, but neither are the effects of gun-powder, in removing the heaviest bodies, produced by levers and pullies, and yet they are produced by a material cause. To say that *reasons* and *ideas* are not things material, or the affections of a material substance, is to take for granted the very thing to be proved.

OBJECTION IV. *From the Unity of Consciousness.*

It is asserted, that the soul of man cannot be material and divisible, because the *principle of consciousness*, which comprehends the whole of the thinking power, is necessarily simple, and indivisible. But before this can be admitted as any argument, it should be strictly defined what *unity of consciousness* means. I profess, that those who have hitherto written about it, have given me no clear ideas upon the subject. The only meaning that I can annex to the words *unity of consciousness*, is a feeling or perception of the *unity of my nature, or being*; but all that can be inferred from this is, that I am only *one person, one sentient*

tient and thinking being ; and not two persons, or two sentient or thinking beings ; which is no more an argument that this one sentient being cannot be divided, than that a *sphere*, being one thing, is a proof that it likewise consists of indivisible materials. It is true, that it is impossible to divide a sphere so as to make it two spheres ; but still the *matter* of which it consists is, strictly speaking, divisible, and the matter of it may be so divided, that it shall intirely cease to be a sphere. So, though that *system of intelligence*, which we call the *soul of a man*, cannot be divided into two systems of intelligence, it may be so divided, or dissolved, as to become no system of intelligence at all. If any person can define *unity of consciousness* in a manner more favourable to the proof of the immateriality of the soul, I shall be glad to hear it, and to attend to it.

OBJECTION V. *From a separate Consciousness not belonging to every Particle of the Brain.*

It is said to be a decisive argument against materialism, that the *consciousness of existence* cannot be annexed to the whole *brain*, as a *system*, while the individual *particles* of which it consists are separately unconscious ; since the whole brain, being a collection of parts, cannot

not possess any thing but what is derived from them*.

But surely there may be a separate *unity of the whole nervous system*, as well as of *one atom*; and if the perception that we call *consciousness*, or that of any other *complex idea*, necessarily consists in, or depends upon, a *very complex vibration*, it cannot possibly belong to a *single atom*, but must belong to a *vibrating system*, of some extent.

A certain *quantity of nervous system* is necessary to such complex ideas and affections as belong to the human mind; and the idea of *self*, or the feeling that corresponds to the pronoun *I* (which is what some may mean by *consciousness*) is not essentially different from other *complex ideas*, that of our *country*, for instance: This is a term by which we denote a part of the world subject to that form of government, by the laws of which we ourselves are bound, as distinguished from other countries, subject to other political systems of government; and the term *self* denotes that substance, which is the seat of that particular set of sensations and ideas, of which those that are then recollected make a part, as distinguished from other substances, which are the seat of similar sets of sensations and ideas. But it may be necessary to consider this objection, with respect to the faculty of simple *perception*, exclusive of the general feeling of *consciousness*.

* See Letters on Materialism, p. 67.

For the same reason that “*activity*, and *perceptivity* cannot arise from joining together “dead and inert parts,” which is the language of Mr. Baxter, no *powers* whatever could be affirmed of any mass of matter, because matter being infinitely divisible, it is impossible that the *ultimate parts* of it can be possessed of any powers. And there is no more reason in nature, why perception may not belong to a *system of matter*, as such, and not to the *component parts of it*, than that *life* should be the property of an intire animal system, and not of the separate parts of it. It might also be said, that no *harmony* could result from a harpsichord, because the single notes, separately taken, can make no harmony. Mr. Baxter, however, says*, that “if an active and perceptible substance have parts, these parts must of necessity be active and perceptible.”

This argument has been much hackneyed, and much confided in by metaphysicians; but, for my part, I cannot perceive the least force in it. Unless we had a clearer idea, than it appears to me, that any person can pretend to have, of the nature of *perception*, it must be impossible to say, *a priori*, whether a single particle, or a system of matter, be the proper seat of it. But judging from *appearances*, which alone ought to determine the judgment of philosophers, an *organized system*, which requires a considerable *mass of matter*, is requisite for this purpose. Also, judging

* Essay on the Soul, p. 236.

by

by observation, a mass of matter, duly organized, and endued with *life*, which depends upon the due circulation of the fluids, and a proper tone of the solid parts, must necessarily have *sensation* and *perception*. To judge of the *perceptive power*, without any regard to *facts*, and appearances, is merely giving scope to our imaginations, without laying them under any restraint; and the consequence of building systems in this manner is but too obvious. It is high time to abandon these random hypotheses, and to form our conclusions with respect to the faculties of the *mind*, as well as the properties and powers of *matter*, by an attentive observation of *facts*, and cautious inferences from them.

OBJECTION VI. *From the Comparison of Ideas, &c.*

It is said, there can be no *comparison of ideas*, and consequently no *judgment*, or *perception of harmony* or *proportion*, which depends upon comparison, on the system of materialism; for that, if the ideas to be compared be VIBRATIONS in the brain, they must be perceived by a different substance, inspecting, as it were, and considering that state of the brain*.

But if the brain itself be the percipient power, as well as the subject of these vibra-

* See Letters on Materialism, p. 63.

tions, it must both feel the effect of every particular impression that is made upon it, and also all that can result from the combination of ever so many impressions at the same time; and as things that *agree*, and things that *disagree*, cannot impress the brain in the same manner, there is certainly as much foundation for a perception of the difference between *truth* and *falsehood*, as upon the hypothesis, of a superintending mind. For the mind, it is evident, has no ideas but what result from the state of the brain, as the author quoted above very expressly allows. Consequently, if there be no impression upon the brain, there can be no perception in the mind; so that, upon any hypothesis that is consistent with known facts, there can be no state of mind to which there is not a correspondent state of the brain; and, therefore, if the brain itself *can* be the seat of feeling, or of consciousness, its feeling or consciousness may be just as *various* and *extensive* as that of the independent mind itself could be. It is impossible there should be any difference in this case, unless the mind could have sensations and ideas independent of the state of the brain, which every observation proves to be impossible.

It is a very gross mistake of the system of materialism to suppose, with the author of the *Letters on Materialism*, that the vibrations of the brain are themselves the perceptions. For it is easy to form an idea of there being vibrations, without any perceptions accompanying

panying them. But it is supposed that the brain, besides its *vibrating power*, has super-added to it a *percipient* or *sentient power*, likewise; there being no reason that we know why this power may not belong to it. And this, once admitted, all that we know concerning the human mind will be found in the material nervous system; and this percipient power may as well belong to one *system* as to one *atom*.

OBJECTION VII. *From the Nature of Attention.*

It has been said, that *attention* is a state of mind that cannot be the effect of vibration*. But as *simple attention* to any idea is nothing more than the simple *perception* of it, so a *continued attention* to it is nothing more than a *continued perception* of it; which is the necessary consequence either of the constant presence of the object which excites it, or of the presence of other associated ideas, in circumstances in which it must necessarily make the greatest figure, and strike the mind the most.

I shall here introduce some more of Mr. Wollaston's arguments to prove, that the body and the mind must be different substances, though I think them unworthy of him. My replies will be very short, and sometimes *ad hominem*.

* See Letters on Materialism, p. 147.

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OBJECTION VIII. *From the Difference between the Ideas and the Mind employed about them.*

“ That which peruses the impressions and
 “ traces of things in the fantasy and me-
 “ mory, must be something distinct from the
 “ brain, or that upon which those impres-
 “ sions are made. Otherwise it would con-
 “ template itself, and be both *reader* and *book* *.”

But what is the distinction between the reader and the book, in an unembodied spirit, which certainly must have a repository for its ideas, as well as be provided with a principle of intelligence to make use of them? Will not this argument affect the simplicity and indivisibility of such a spirit, to say nothing of superior intelligences, and of the divine Mind?

OBJECTION IX. *From the Expression, MY BODY, &c.*

“ As a man considers his own body, does
 “ it not appear to be something different
 “ from the *considerer*, and when he uses this
 “ expression, *my body*, or *the body of me*, may
 “ it not properly be demanded, who is meant
 “ by *me*, or what *my* relates to?——Man
 “ being supposed a person consisting of two

* Wollaston, p. 358.

“ parts,

“ parts, soul and body, the whole person
 “ may say of this, or that part of him, *the*
 “ *soul of me*, or *the body of me*. But if
 “ he were either all soul, or all body, and
 “ nothing else, he could not speak in this
 “ manner*.”

According to this merely *verbal argument*, there ought to be something in man besides *all the parts* of which he consists. When a man says, *I devote my soul and body*, what is it that makes the devotement? It cannot be the things devoted. Besides, in Mr. Wollaston's own phrase, it ought, in strictness, to be the *body* only that says *my soul*. Nothing surely can be inferred from such phraseology as this, which, after all, is only derived from vulgar apprehensions.

OBJECTION X. *From the different Interests in Man.*

“ It is plain there are two different *interests*
 “ in man, on one side reason, on the other
 “ passion, which, being many times directly
 “ opposite, must belong to different subjects.
 “ There are upon many occasions contests,
 “ and, as it were, wars between the mind
 “ and the body, so far are they from being
 “ the same thing †.”

I answer, the passions themselves are more evidently at variance than passion and reason, and, therefore, by the same argument,

* Wollaston, p. 350

† Wollaston, p. 350.

ought

ought to be referred to different substances in the human constitution. If Mr. Wollaston meant to refer the *passions* to the body, there will be some danger lest *desire, will,* and other faculties, always acknowledged to be *mental*, should go with them; and so, before he is aware of it, the whole man will be material, there being nothing left to belong to, or constitute the immaterial soul.

OBJECTION XI. *From the Mind supporting the Body.*

“ We may perceive something within us
 “ which *supports* the body (*keeps it up*) di-
 “ rects its motions for the better preservation
 “ of it; when any hurts or evils befall it,
 “ finds out the means of its cure, and the like,
 “ without which it would fall to the ground,
 “ and undergo the fate of common matter.
 “ The body, therefore, must be considered
 “ as being under the direction and tuition of
 “ some other thing, which is (or should be)
 “ the governor of it, and consequently, upon
 “ this account, must be concluded to be dif-
 “ ferent from it*.”

I answer, we also say, that *reason* controuls and directs the *passions*, influences the *will*, and makes use of the *memory*, that those and all the other faculties of the mind are subservient to reason, &c. But does it therefore

* Wollaston, p. 350.

follow,

follow, that they belong to a different substance?

OBJECTION XII. *From the Self-moving Power of the Soul.*

The soul is represented by Mr. Baxter, and others, as *essentially active*, and possessed of a *self-moving power*, in opposition to *matter*, which is necessarily *inert* and *passive*.

But if we ask on what authority these positions are advanced, it is impossible they should produce a single *appearance* in favour of them. The soul, in its present state, and we have nothing else by which to judge of its powers, has not a single idea but what it receives by means of the organs of sense; and till it has got *ideas*, it is impossible that any of its *powers*, active, or passive, could have the least employment; so that they could not appear even to *exist*. Sensations and ideas comprehend all the objects of thought, and all the exertions, or emotions of the soul, as far as we can observe, always succeed sensations or ideas; and, to all appearance, are as much *occasioned* and *produced* by them, as any effect in nature can be said to be produced by its proper cause; the one invariably following the other, according to a certain established law.

In fact, a *ball*, acted upon by a foreign mechanical impulse, may just as well be said to have

have a self-moving power as the soul of man; sensations and ideas being as properly an *impelling force* respecting the mind (since they always precede, and regulate both the judgment and the will) as the stroke of a rod, &c. is an impelling force with respect to the ball. Nothing can prove a self-moving power in the soul, but a clear case of the decision of the judgment, a determination of the will, or some other exertion of the mental faculties, *without any preceding sensations or ideas*; or, at least, without such as usually precede such judgments, determinations, or exertions. But while those sensations and ideas, which cannot be denied to have a real *influence* upon the mind, always precede mental determinations, &c. it is impossible not to conclude, according to the established rules of philosophizing, that those sensations and ideas are the proper *moving powers* of the soul; and that without them it would have been incapable of any motion or determination whatever. And this, if we judge at all from *observation* and *experience*, we must conclude to be actually the case.

OBJECTION XIII. *From the unwearied Nature of the thinking Principle.*

Mr. Baxter likewise says*, That "the consideration of the indefeasibleness, or un-

* Essay on the Human Soul, p. 433.

"weariedness

“ weariedness of the principle of thought in
“ us, should perfectly satisfy us of the imma-
“ teriality of our thinking part. We feel
“ our bodies every now and then sinking down
“ under their own infirmities ; but the thing
“ that thinks in us would never give over, if
“ the body could keep up with it. It is busy
“ all the day with the body, and all the night
“ without the body, and all the day with the
“ body again; and thus in a constant circle,
“ without respite or intermission, that we can
“ perceive by our strictest inquiry. For the
“ body no sooner sinks down in weariness and
“ slumber, than this thing within us enters
“ upon other scenes of action, and hears and
“ sees things worth inquiring into, and this
“ without a subserviency of its organs, which
“ are then disabled from their function.”

This is altogether a misrepresentation of the fact. The *brain*, indeed, is a thing so far distinct from the rest of the system, as that it may be but little affected by several disorders, under which the rest of the system may labour; as the *legs* may be sound while the *arms* are diseased, or rather as the *bones* may continue sound, while the *muscular flesh* is disordered, &c. In a case of this kind, where the brain is not itself immediately affected, as the thinking faculty depends upon the brain, it may be vigorous, when the rest of the body is very languid. But that the soul enters upon new scenes of action, without the help of the body in sleep, is destitute of any one fact

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or observation to support it. We are, according to all appearance, just as much fatigued with *thinking* as with *walking*; and to say, that it is the *body* only that is fatigued, in this case, and not the *mind itself*, is absolutely *gratis dictum*. There is just the same reason to conclude, that the *thinking powers* are exhausted, in the one case, as that the *walking powers* are exhausted in the other. That we think at all, in perfectly sound sleep, is by no means probable. On the contrary, according to appearances, the thinking powers are refreshed by rest in sleep, exactly as the muscular strength is recruited by the same means.

OBJECTION XIV. *From Absence of Mind.*

It is said by Mr. Baxter*, That “it is altogether inconsistent with the materiality of the thing that thinks in us, that we are sometimes so wholly occupied in the contemplation of some absent objects, or some purely ideal thing, that we are quite imperipient of objects round us, and which at present act upon our senses.” Among other instances, he afterwards †, mentions the constant *pressure of our own bodies*, occasioned by gravitation, whether we walk, sit, or lie.

But nothing is requisite to solve the difficulty in these cases, but the supposition, that whatever be the effect of any sensation or

* Essay on the Soul, p. 428.

† P. 430.

idea

idea upon the brain, the impression may be so strong as to overpower all other impressions. This we know is actually the case with the eye. Let a man look attentively upon any very bright object, and immediately afterwards turn his eyes upon whatever other objects he pleases, and he either will not see them at all, or they will all appear to be of the same colour; so that, in this violent affection of the eye, fainter impressions are not sensibly perceived, though they cannot but be made upon the eye in those circumstances, as well as others. Now the *brain* is of the very same substance with the *retina*, and *optic nerves*; and therefore must be subject to a similar affection.

This writer explains these cases by supposing, that the mind “*voluntarily* employs “*itself*, while it is thus inattentive to things “*present*, in the earnest consideration of some “*things that are absent.*” But *volition* is not at all concerned in the case; for nothing can be more evident, than that this *absence of mind* is altogether an involuntary thing. It is not *choice* that either leads to it, or prolongs it; for this would imply, that the mind had been *aware* of other objects having solicited its attention, and that it had peremptorily refused to give any attention to them. Whereas, at the close of a reverie of this kind, the mind is always unconscious of any foreign objects having obtruded themselves upon it at all, just as in the case of sound sleep.

OBJECTION XV. *From the corruptibility of Matter.*

The greatest cause of that aversion which we feel to the supposition of the soul being material, is our apprehension, that it will then be liable to *corruption*, which we imagine it cannot be if it be immaterial. But, for any thing that we know, neither of these inferences are just, and, therefore, no advantage whatever is, in fact, gained by the modern hypothesis. All things material are not liable to corruption, if by corruption be meant *dissolution*, except in circumstances to which they are not naturally exposed. It is only very *compound bodies* that are properly liable to corruption, and only *vegetable* and *animal substances* ever become properly *putrid* and *offensive*, which is the real source of the objection.

It is possible, however, that even a human body may be wholly exempt from corruption, though those we have at present are not, as is evident from the account that the apostle Paul gives of the bodies with which we shall rise from the dead; when from *earthly*, they will become *spiritual*; from *corruptible*, *incorruptible*; and from *mortal*, *immortal*.

Besides, how does it follow, that an immaterial substance cannot be liable to decay or dissolution, as well as a material one? In fact, all the reason that any person could ever have

have for imagining this, must have been that an immaterial substance, being, in all respects, the reverse of a material one, must be *incorruptible*, because the former is *corruptible*. But till we know something *positive* concerning this supposed immaterial substance, and not merely its *not being matter*, it is impossible to pronounce whether it may not be liable to change, and be dissolved, as well as a material substance. Necessary *immortality*, is an attribute that cannot be demonstrated except of God only; and he who made all things, material or immaterial, may have subjected them to whatever laws he pleases, and may have made the one as much subject to change and decay as the other, for any thing that we know to the contrary: so that all our flattering notions of the *simplicity* and *incorruptibility* of immaterial substances are mere fancy and chimera, unsupported by any *evidence* whatever. The soul has been supposed to be necessarily incorruptible, because it is *indivisible*, but that argument I presume was sufficiently answered, when it was shewn that ideas which have *parts*, as most of our ideas manifestly have, cannot exist in a soul that has *no parts*; so that the subject of thought in man cannot be that simple and indivisible, and consequently not that *indiscernible* thing that it has been imagined to be.

SECTION XI.

The Objection from CONSCIOUSNESS more particularly considered.

SINCE, in all metaphysical subjects, there is a perpetual appeal made to *consciousness*, or *internal feeling*; that is, to what we certainly and intuitively know by reflecting on what passes within our own minds, and I have hitherto contented myself with noticing the particular instances in which I apprehended some mistake has been made with respect to it, as they occurred in the course of my argument; I shall here give a more general view of the subject, in order to acquaint my reader what things they are that, I apprehend, we *can* be conscious of, and especially to caution him against confounding them with those things of which we are not properly conscious, but which we only *infer* from them.

When we shut our eyes on the external world, and contemplate what we find within ourselves, we first perceive the images, or the ideas of the objects by which our senses have been impressed. Of these we are properly conscious. They are what we immediately *observe*, and are not *deductions* from any prior observations.

In the next place, we know by intuition, or are conscious, that these ideas appear, and re-appear,

appear, and that they are variously connected with each other, which is the foundation of *memory* or *recollection*. We also see, that our ideas are variously *combined* and *divided*, and can perceive the other relations that they bear to each other, which is the foundation of *judgment*, and consequently of *reasoning*. And lastly, we perceive, that various bodily motions depend upon ideas, and trains of ideas, from which arises, what is called a *voluntary power* over our actions.

These particulars, I apprehend, comprize all that we are properly conscious of; and with respect to these, it is hardly possible we can be mistaken. But every thing that we pretend to know, that is really more than these, must be by way of *inference* from them; and in drawing these inferences or conclusions, we are liable to mistakes, as well as in other inferences. In fact, there is, perhaps, no subject whatever with respect to which we have more need of caution, from the danger we are in of imagining, that our knowledge of things relating to ourselves is *in the first instance*, when, in reality, it is in the *second*, or perhaps the *third* or *fourth*.

If then, as I have observed, all that we are really conscious of be our *ideas*, and the various *affections of our ideas*, which, when reduced to general heads, we call the *powers of thought*, as *memory*, *judgment*, and *will*, all our knowledge of the *subject of thought* within us, or what we call *ourselves*, must be by way

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of *inference*. What we *feel*, and what we *do*, we may be said to know by intuition; but what we *are*, we know only by deduction, or inference from intuitive observations. If, therefore, it be asserted, that the subject of thought is something that is *simple, indivisible, immaterial, or naturally immortal*, it can only be by way of conclusion from given premises. Consequently, it is a decision for which no man's word is to be taken. We may *fancy* that it is something that we feel, or are conscious of, but, from the nature of the thing, it can only be that a man *reasons* himself into that belief, and therefore he may, without having been aware of it, have imposed upon himself by some fallacy in the argument.

Feeling and thinking are allowed to be *properties*; and though all that we can know of any thing are its properties, we agree to say, that all properties inhere in, or belong to, some *subject or substance*; but what this substance *is*, farther than its being possessed of those very properties by which it is known to us, it is impossible for us to say, except we can prove, that those known properties necessarily imply others. If, therefore, any person say he is conscious that his mind (by which we mean the subject of thought) is *simple, or indivisible*, and if he speak properly, he can only mean, that he is *one thinking person, or being*, and not *several*, which will be universally acknowledged. But if he means any thing more than this, as that the substance

to

to which the property of thinking belongs is incapable of division, either having no extension, or parts, or that those parts cannot be removed from each other, I do not admit his assertion, without hearing what *reasons* he has to advance for it; being sensible, that in this he goes beyond a proper consciousness. I may think it more probable, that every thing that exists must have extension, and that (except space, and the divine essence, which fills all space) whatever is extended may be divided, though that division might be attended with the loss of properties peculiar to the undivided substance.

Much farther must a man go beyond the bounds of proper *consciousness*, into those of *reasoning*, to say that the subject of his thinking powers is *immaterial*, or something different from the matter of which his body, and especially his brain, consists. (For admitting all that he can know by *experience*, or *intuition*, I may think it more probable, that all the powers or properties of man inhere in *one kind* of substance; and since we are agreed, that man consists, in part at least, of matter, I may conclude, that he is wholly material, and may refuse to give up this opinion, till I be shown, that the properties necessarily belonging to matter, and those of feeling and thinking, are incompatible. And before this can be determined, the *reasons for and against* it must be attended to. It is a question that cannot be decided by *simple feeling*.

Less still can it be determined by consciousness, that the subject of thought is *naturally immortal*, so that a man will continue to think and act after he has ceased to breathe and move. We are certainly conscious of the same things with respect to ourselves, but what one man may think to be very clear on this subject, another may think to be very doubtful, or exceedingly improbable; drawing different *conclusions* from the same premises.

Again, that man is an *agent*, meaning by it, that he has a power of *beginning motion*, independently of any mechanical laws to which the author of his nature has subjected him, is a thing that is so far from being evident from consciousness, that, if we attend properly to what we really do feel, we shall, as I conceive, be satisfied that we have no such power. What we really do feel, or may be sensible of, if we attend to our feelings, is, that we never come to any resolution, form any deliberate purpose, or determine upon any thing whatever, without some *motive*, arising from the state of our minds, and the ideas present to them; and, therefore, we ought to conclude that we have no power of resolving, or determining upon any thing, without some motive. Consequently, in the proper philosophical language, motives ought to be denominated the *causes* of all our *determinations*, and therefore of all our *actions*.

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All that men generally mean by a *consciousness of freedom*, is a consciousness of their having a power to do what they previously will, or please. This is allowed, and that it is a thing of which we are properly conscious. But to will without a motive, or contrary to the influence of all motives presented to the mind, is a thing of which no man *can* be conscious. Nay, every just observation concerning ourselves, or others, appears to me very clearly to lead to the opposite conclusion, viz. that our *wills*, as well as our *judgments*, are determined by the *appearances of things* presented to us; and, therefore, that the determinations of both are equally guided by certain invariable *laws*; and, consequently, that every determination of the will, or judgment, is just what the being who made us subject to those laws, and who always had, and still has, the absolute disposal of us, must have intended that they should be. If, however, this conclusion be denied, it must be controverted by *argument*, and the question must not be decided by *consciousness*, or any pretended *feeling* of the contrary.

SECTION

SECTION XII.

Of the Objection to the System of Materialism derived from the Consideration of the DIVINE ESSENCE.

IT will be said, that if the principle of thought in *man* may be a property of a material substance, the *divine Being* himself may be material also; whereas, it is now almost universally believed to be the doctrine of revelation, that the Deity is, in the strictest sense of the word, an *immaterial substance*, incapable of local presence; though it will be shewn in its proper place, that the sacred writers say nothing about such a substance.

Considering how much this subject is above all human comprehension, it is no wonder that the most opposite opinions should have been maintained with respect to it. But this consideration, at the same time that it ought to check our boldness, ought, likewise, to have taught us mutual candour and indulgence.

I am fully aware how difficult it is to express myself with clearness on a subject so extremely obscure, and how hazardous it is to advance the very little that any man can say concerning it. But I shall not, on this account, decline speaking freely and fully to every difficulty that either has been urged
against

against the system of the materiality of man, or that has occurred to myself with respect to it; and the objections which arise from the consideration of the divine essence, are of such particular consequence, that I shall treat of them in this separate section. I only beg those who are friends to freedom of thought, and inquiry, to attend to the few considerations that I shall offer on this very difficult subject.

In the first place, it must be confessed, with awful reverence, that we know but little of *ourselves*, and therefore much less of our *Maker*, even with respect to his *attributes*. We know but little of the *works* of God, and therefore certainly much less of his *essence*.

In fact, we have no proper idea of any *essence* whatever. Our ascribing impenetrability to matter might make us imagine, that we had some kind of idea of *its* substance, though this was fallacious; but now that, by a rigid attention to the phenomena, and a strict adherence to the laws of philosophizing, we have been obliged to deny that matter has any such property, but besides extension, merely *powers* of attraction and repulsion, it will hardly be pretended, that we have any proper idea of the substance even of matter, considered as divested of all its properties. The term substance, or essence, therefore, is, in fact, nothing more than a help to *expression*, as we may say, but not at all to *conception*.

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We cannot speak of attraction or repulsion, for example, but as powers belonging to, and residing in some *thing*, *substance*, or *essence*, but our ideas do not go beyond these powers; and when we attempt to form any thing of an idea of the substance of matter, exclusive of the *powers* which it *has*, and exclusive of the *impenetrability* which it *has not*, all ideas vanish from the mind, and nothing, absolutely nothing, is left for an object of contemplation. If it be still called a *substance*, it is, however, as immaterial a one as any person can wish for. In reality, the term *immateriality* never did, or could suggest any idea whatever. That the term substance and essence are of no use but as modes of expression, is evident from our speaking of the *substance* or *essence of things*, as if they themselves were only properties.

If then our ideas concerning matter do not go beyond the powers of which it is possessed, much less can our ideas go beyond powers, properties, or attributes, with respect to the divine Being; and if we confine our definition of God to these, it is not possible that we can make any mistake, or suffer by our misconceptions. Now the powers and properties of the Divine mind, as clearly deduced from the works of God, are not only so infinitely superior to those of the human mind, when there is some analogy between them, but so essentially different from them in other respects, that whatever term we make use of to denote

denote the one, it must be improperly applied to the other.

In two circumstances that we do know, and probably in many others of which we have no knowledge at all, the human and divine nature, finite and infinite intelligence, most essentially differ. The first is, that our attention is necessarily confined to one thing, whereas he who made, and continually supports all things, must equally attend to all things at the same time; which is a most astonishing, but necessary attribute of the one supreme God, of which we can form no conception; and, consequently, in this respect, no finite mind, or nature, can be compared with the Divine.

Again, the Deity not only attends to every thing, but must be capable of either *producing*, or *annihilating* any thing. For since all that we know of bodies, are their powers, and the divine Being changes those powers at pleasure, it is evident, that he can take them all away, and consequently annihilate the very substance; for without powers, substance is nothing. And since he can communicate powers, it is evident, that he can produce substance. So that, in this respect also, as the Divine *powers*, so the Divine *nature* must be essentially different from ours; and, consequently, no common term, except such comprehensive terms as *being*, *nature*, &c. can be properly used to express them both.

Again,

Again, as the Divine nature has properties incompatible with all created and finite natures, so, though there must be some common property in all beings that have any action or influence upon one another, there is no evidence of the Divine nature being possessed of the properties of other substances, in such a manner as to be intitled to the same appellation. For example, the Divine essence cannot be the object of any of our senses, as every thing that we call *matter* is. For though the divine Being, in order to his *acting* every where, must *be* every where, we are not sensible of his presence by our sight, hearing, or feeling, &c.

There is, therefore, upon the whole, manifold reason to conclude, that the Divine nature, or essence, besides being simply unknown to us, as every nature or essence is, has properties most essentially different from every thing else; and, therefore, we shall certainly deceive ourselves, if we call things so different from one another by any common name.

Upon the whole, it is plain, that no proof of the materiality of man can be extended, by any just analogy, to a proof or evidence of a similar materiality of the Divine nature; for the properties or powers being different, the substance or essence (if it be any convenience to us to use such terms at all) must be different also.

If

If by the term *immaterial*, we simply mean to denote a substance, that has properties and powers essentially different from those of created matter, it is plain, that I have no objection to the term; and, in this sense, I do believe it is, in fact, used by the generality of mankind. But if, with modern metaphysicians, we intend to denote by it a substance, that has no property whatever in common with matter, and that even bears no relation to space, I must deny that any such substance exists; because, according to such a definition, the divine Being is necessarily cut off from all communication with, and all action or influence upon, his own creation.

But let us make use of what terms we please to express the Divine nature, or his mode of existence, we are not able to come any nearer to an adequate conception concerning them. God is, and ever must remain, the *incomprehensible*, the object of our most profound reverence, and awful adoration. Compared with him, all other beings are as *nothing*, and *less than nothing*. *He filleth all in all, and he is all in all.*

I would observe, however, and I think it but justice to those who may happen to see this subject in a different light from that in which I have here represented it, that should any person, on account of the very few circumstances in which the Divine nature resembles other natures, think proper to apply the

the term material to both, the hypothesis advanced in this treatise concerning the nature of matter which excludes impenetrability, or solidity from being a property of it (by which, as we may say, the *reproach of matter* is wiped off) makes this to be a very different kind of materialism from that grosser sort, which, however, has been maintained by many pious christians, and was certainly the real belief of most of the early Fathers.

It is only on account of the notion that matter is necessarily *inert*, and absolutely incapable of intelligence, thought, or action; that it has been deemed dangerous to ascribe it either to a finite, or to the infinite mind; but when this reproach is wiped away, the danger vanishes of course. It is the powers of supreme intelligence, omnipotence, unbounded goodness, and universal providence, that we reverence in the Deity; and whatever be the essence to which we believe these powers belong, it must appear equally respectable to us, whether we call it material or immaterial; because it is not the *substance*, of which we have no idea at all, but the *properties* that are the object of our contemplation and regard.

All that we can pretend to know of God, is his infinite wisdom, power, and goodness. We see, and feel the effects and influence of these every moment of our lives; but it is impossible we should see or feel the *substance* to which these powers belong; and, there-

therefore, all that we can conceive, or pronounce concerning it, must be merely hypothetical ; and provided, that every person is fully satisfied that his own ideas of the Divine essence are consistent with the *known attributes of divinity*, they must necessarily be equally safe, and equally innocent. We are all agreed with respect to every thing that *concerns us*, viz. the *divine works*, and the *divine attributes* ; and we differ only with respect to an opinion which, circumstanced as this is, cannot possibly affect us.

It is said, that matter can only *be acted upon*, and is necessarily incapable of *acting*, or *beginning action*. This conclusion we have been led to form, by observing, that every motion in matter, with which we are acquainted, was preceded by some other motion ; which we therefore consider, and properly enough, as the *cause* of the subsequent motion. But, for the very same reason, we might conclude, that what we call *spirit*, or *mind*, is equally incapable of beginning action or motion ; because every idea, every thought, and every determination of the mind of man, is preceded, and, strictly speaking, *caused* by some other idea of the mind, or sensation of the body ; and, therefore, judging by what we know of ourselves, *mind* ought to be concluded to be as incapable of beginning motion as the *body* itself. As far as we know from experience, both are equally passive, the one being absolutely governed by intellectual laws,

and influences, and the other by corporeal ones.

Of the *beginning of motion, or action*, we must sit down with acknowledging, that we have, in reality, no conception at all, and the difficulty is by no means removed, or in the smallest degree lessened, by shifting it from *matter to mind*. Mr. Locke very justly observes *, that "it is as hard to conceive self-motion in a created immaterial, as in a created material being, consider it how we will." And certainly the difficulty of our conception is not lessened by transferring it from a created to an uncreated being.

We know there must be a *first cause* of all things, because things do actually exist, and could never have existed without a cause, and all *secondary causes* necessarily lead us to a *primary one*. But of the nature of the *existence* of this primary cause, concerning which we know nothing but by its *effects*, we cannot have any conception. We are absolutely confounded, bewildered, and lost, when we attempt to speculate concerning it, and it is no wonder that this should be the case. We have no *data* to go upon, and no force of mind to support us in it. All we can say is, that this speculation, attended as it is, with insuperable difficulties, is attended with just the same, and no greater difficulty, on the *idea* of the mind being material or immaterial. And the system of materialism has unquestion-

* Essay, vol. ii. p. 147.

ably

ably this advantage, that it is entirely free from another difficulty, viz. *how an immaterial substance can act upon matter*; a difficulty which, in my idea, amounts to an absolute *impossibility*, as those substances have hitherto been defined.

As to the difficulty arising from the divine material essence penetrating other matter, it has no place at all in the hypothesis advanced from Mr. Boscovich and Mr. Michell; and certainly this idea is much more consonant to the idea which the sacred writers give us of the omnipresence of the divine Being, and of his *filling all in all*, than that of a being who bears no relation to space, and therefore cannot properly be said to *exist any where*; which is the doctrine of the rigid immaterialists.

In the scriptures, the divine Being is said to be a *spirit*; but all that is there meant by spirit, is an *invisible power*. The divine works are visible and astonishing, but *himself no man has seen, or can see*.

That such an idea as many have, or affect to have, of the strict immateriality of the divine nature, as not existing in space, is not an idea of much importance, at least, may with certainty be concluded, from its not being suggested to us in the scriptures, and especially in the Old Testament. All that we are there taught concerning the nature of God, is, that he made all things, that he sees and knows all things, that he is present in all places, and that he superintends and governs

all things ; also, that he had no beginning, that he can have no end, and that he is incapable of any change. Farther than this we are not taught.

On the contrary, it appears to me, as will be seen in its proper place, that the idea which the scriptures give us of the divine nature, is that of a Being, properly speaking, *every where present*, constantly supporting, and, at pleasure, controlling the laws of nature, but not the object of any of our senses ; and that, out of condescension, as it were, to the weakness of human apprehension, he chose, in the early ages of the world, to signify his peculiar presence by some *visible symbol*, as that of a supernatural bright cloud, or some other appearance, which could not but impress their minds with the idea of a real local presence. He is also generally represented as residing in the heavens, and from thence inspecting and governing the world, and especially the affairs of men. This, indeed, is not a philosophically *just*, but it is an *easy*, and a very *innocent* manner of conceiving concerning God.

It has been said, that, notwithstanding I decline the term, I virtually make the Deity to be a material being. But it will be found, by the candid and attentive, that I have not, in reality, any idea of the divine essence that is at all different from that of those philosophers and divines, who maintain the *proper omnipresence*, or *ubiquity* of the Divine Being, which

which necessarily implies a real extension, and that he has a power of acting upon matter.

I will take this opportunity of saying farther, that, upon no system whatever, is the great Author of Nature more distinct from his productions, or his presence with them, and agency upon them, more necessary. In fact, the system now held forth to the public, taken in its full extent, makes the Divine Being to be of as much importance in the system, as the apostle makes him, when he says, *In him we live, and move, and have our being.* The contemplation of it impresses the mind with sentiments of the deepest reverence and humility, and it inculcates a degree of devotedness to God, both active and passive, that no other philosophical system can inspire. Consequently, the obligation to all those virtues, that are more immediately derived from that great vital spring and principle of all virtue, *devotion*, those which give a superiority to the world, a fearless integrity, and a noble independence of mind in the practice of our duty, is more strongly felt, and therefore may be supposed to take a deeper root in the mind, than upon any other system whatever. In short, it is that philosophy which alone suits the doctrine of the *scriptures*, though the writers of them were not philosophers, but had an instruction infinitely superior to that of any philosophical school. Every other system of philosophy is discordant with the

scriptures, and, as far as it lays any hold upon the mind, tends to counteract their influence.

S E C T I O N XIII.

Of the Connexion between Sensation and Organization.

I HAVE been asked, whether I consider the powers of sensation and thought as *necessarily resulting* from the organization of the brain, or as something independent of organization, but *superadded* and *communicated* to the system afterwards; having expressed myself doubtfully, and perhaps variously on the subject*.

I answer, that my idea *now* is, that sensation and thought do necessarily result from the organization of the brain, when the powers of mere *life* are given to the system. For I can easily conceive a perfect man to be formed without life, that is, without respiration, or the circulation of the blood, or whatever else it be in which life more properly

* In the *Essay* prefixed to my edition of Hartley, I expressed myself with absolute uncertainty in this respect. "I rather think, that the whole man is of some uniform composition, and that the property of perception, as well as the other powers that are termed mental, is the result (whether necessary, or not) of such an organical structure as that of the brain."

consists,

consists, and consequently without every thing necessarily depending upon life; but I cannot imagine that a human body, completely organized, and having life, would want sensation and thought. This I suppose to follow *of course*, as much as the circulation of the blood follows respiration.

As to the *manner* in which the power of perception results from organization and life, I own I have no idea at all; but the *fact* of this connexion does not appear to me to be, on that account, the less certain. Sensation and thought do always accompany such an organization; and having never known them to be separated, we have no reason to suppose that they *can* be separated. When, therefore, God had made man of the *dust of the earth*; nothing was wanting to make him all that he is, viz. a *living soul*, but simply the *breath of life*.

In all other cases we deem it sufficient to say, that certain circumstances are the causes, and the *necessary causes*, of certain appearances, if the appearances always accompany the circumstances. We are not, for example, in the least able to conceive how it is that a magnet attracts iron; but having observed, that it never fails to do it, we conclude that, though we do not see the *proximate cause*, or *how* the attraction is effected; the magnet nevertheless *has* that power, and must cease to be a magnet before it can lose it; so that our reasoning with respect to the result of sensation from

organization is exactly similar to our reasoning concerning the attraction of iron by magnetism.

Also, for the very same reason, that it is said, that it is not the organized body that feels and thinks, but an *immaterial substance* residing in the body, and that will remain when the body is destroyed, we might say, that it is not the material magnet that attracts, but a peculiar immaterial substance within it, that produces the effect, and that will remain when the material magnet is destroyed. And, for the same reason, we may imagine *distinct immaterial substances* for every operation in nature, the proximate cause of which we are not able to perceive.

The manner in which the association of ideas is formed, or in which motives influence the mind, was equally unknown; but the association of ideas was, nevertheless, known to be a *fact*, and the influence of motives was not, on that account, denied. But now, that Dr. Hartley has shewn us what ideas probably are, we see much farther into the *mechanism of the mind*. We see *how* one idea is connected with another, and *the manner* in which motives (which are only trains of ideas) produce their effect. Now, we are not more (or not much more) ignorant how sensation results from organization, than we were how the motion of the hand results from a volition, or how a volition is produced by a motive, which are now no longer such very difficult

difficult problems. It is not impossible, but, that in time we may see *how* it is that sensation results from organization.

SECTION XIV.

Of the Principles of HUMAN NATURE according to the Scriptures.

HAD man consisted of *two parts*, so essentially different from each other as *matter* and *spirit* are now represented to be, and had the immaterial been the principal part, and the material system only subservient to it, it might have been expected that there would have been some express mention of it, or declaration concerning it (this being a thing of so much consequence to us) in the *scriptures*, which contain the history of the creation, mortality, and resurrection of man. And yet there is not only a most remarkable silence on the subject of the immateriality of the human soul in these sacred books, even where we should most naturally have expected some account of it, but many things are there advanced, which unavoidably lead us to form a different conclusion; and nothing can be found in those books to countenance the vulgar opinion, except a few passages ill translated, or ill understood, standing in manifest contradiction to the uniform tenor of the rest.

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The history of the creation of man is succinctly delivered in Gen. ii. 7. *And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul.* We see here, that the *whole man* (for nothing is said of his *body* in particular) was made of the dust of the ground. No part of him is said to have had a higher or different original; and surely so very important a circumstance as that of an *immaterial principle*, which could not be from the *dust*, would not have been omitted, if there had been any such thing in the composition.

When the whole man was completely formed, and not before, we are next informed, that God made this man, who was *lifeless* at first, to *breathe* and *live*. For it evidently follows from the text, that nothing but the circumstance of *breathing*, made the difference between the *unanimated earth*, and the *living soul*. It is not said that when one constituent part of the man was made, another necessary constituent part, of a very different nature, was superadded to it; and that these two, united, constituted the man; but only that that substance which was formed of *the dust of the earth* became a *living soul*, that is, became *alive*, by being made to *breathe*.

That no stress is to be laid upon the word נשמה, which we translate *soul* (though it would be most of all absurd to suppose, as we must have done, from a fair construction of this passage,

passage, that the *dust of the earth* could be converted into an *immaterial soul*) is evident from the use of the same term in other places, in which it is used as synonymous to *man*, the *whole man*, and in some manifestly signifies nothing more than the *corporeal*, or *mortal part of man*.

Gen. xlvi. 26. *All the souls that came with Jacob into Egypt, which came out of his loins.* The immaterial principle certainly could not come from his loins.

Exod. xviii. 4. *The soul that sinneth it shall die.* Ez. xiii. 19. *To slay the souls that should not die, and to save the souls that should not live.* Ps. vii. 1, 2. *Save me, lest he tear my soul, rending it in pieces.* In all these passages, it is most evident, that the word *soul* is synonymous to *man*, and that it refers more immediately to his *body*; so that by *man becoming a living soul*, nothing can be understood besides his being *made alive*; and the passage suggests no hint of any thing but the property of *life* being superadded to that corporeal system which was intirely formed of the dust of the earth, in order to make a complete living man.

Sometimes the word that is here rendered *soul*, is used to express the *dead body* itself, and is so translated by us; as Lev. xxi. 1. 11. *There shall none be defiled for the dead among his people, neither shall he go in to any dead body, nor defile himself for father or mother.* Ib. xix. 28. *Ye shall not make any cuttings in*
your

your flesh for the dead. Numb. xix. 13. *Whoever touches the dead body of any man that is dead.* In this passage the periphrasis is very remarkable; and if, in this passage, the word *שׂוֹרֵף* should be rendered *soul*, it must be translated thus, *Whosoever touches the dead soul of a man who shall die.* See also Hagg. ii. 13.

In other passages, where the same word is by us rendered *soul*, there would have been much more propriety in translating it *life*, which does not denote a *substance*, but a *property*.

Pf. lxxxix. 48. *Who can deliver his soul [life] from the hand of the grave.* Job xxxiii. 30. *To bring back his soul [life] from the pit.* Gen. xxxv. 18. *And it came to pass as her soul, [her life] was departing, for she died.* 1 Kings xvii. 22. *And the soul [the life] of the child came to him again.*

The same observation may be made with respect to the corresponding word in the Greek, *ψυχή*, in the New Testament; as in Luke xii. 20. *Thou fool, this night shall thy soul [thy life] be required of thee; that is, this night thou shalt die.*

Besides, whatever principles we may be led to ascribe to *man* from this account of his formation in Gen. ii. 7. the very same we ought to ascribe to the *brutes*; because the very same words are used in the account of them by the same writer, both in the Hebrew and in the Septuagint, though they are differently rendered in our translation. For Gen. i. 24, we read,

read, *And God said, let the earth bring forth the living creature* [נפש חיה] [*living soul*] and again, Gen. ii. 19. *And whatsoever Adam called every living creature* [living soul] *that was the name thereof.* For this observation I am indebted to an ingenious and worthy friend, and I think it valuable and decisive in the case.

Let us now proceed to the account which the scriptures give us of the *mortality of man*, to see whether we can find in any passage relating to this subject some trace of an immortal soul.

Death is first threatened to man in these terms, Gen. ii. 17. *Of the tree of knowledge, of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest of it thou shalt surely die.* Here is no exception made of any part of the man that was not to die. The natural construction of the sentence imports, that whenever the decree should take place, whatever was alive belonging to man would wholly cease to live, and become *lifeless earth*, as it had been originally.

The same inference may be made from the account of the actual *sentence of death* passed upon Adam, after his transgression. Gen. iii. 19. *In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken. For dust thou* [not thy body only] *art, and unto dust shalt thou return.* If, in this, there be any allusion to an immaterial and immortal part in man, it is wonderfully concealed; for nothing appears, upon
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the face of the passage, but that, as the *whole man* had been *lifeless earth*, he would become lifeless earth again. Every other construction is an express contradiction both to the words, and the spirit of the sentence. For what would have signified the death of the *body*, to Adam, if there still remained an *inextinguishable principle of life*? and especially if, as the immaterialists in general suppose, he would afterwards have enjoyed a *better life* than he could have had in conjunction with the body; which could only be a clog to it, and obstruct its exercise and enjoyment.

Besides, according to the common hypothesis; all the punishment that is mentioned in this sentence, is inflicted upon the mere *passive instrument* of the soul, whilst the *real criminal* was suffered to escape.

In general, to interpret what the scriptures say of the *mortality of man*, which is the uniform language, both of the Old and New Testament on this subject, of the *mortality of the body only*, which is a part of the man that is of the least value, and wholly insignificant, when compared with the other part of his constitution, *the mind*, is exactly of a piece with the Trinitarian interpretation of those passages in the gospels, which represent Christ as *inferior to his Father*, of his *human nature only*; supposing the evangelists to have neglected the consideration of his *superior divine nature*; though, if there had been any such thing, it was more especially requisite, that
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it should have been particularly attended to in those very passages.

When the wickedness of men was so great, that God was resolved to destroy them from the face of the earth by a flood, he says, Gen. vi. 3. *My spirit shall not always strive with man, for that he also is flesh* (בשר). Here is no mention of any other superior principle.

When this flood took place, and almost the whole race of mankind was destroyed by it, there is still no mention made of their immaterial souls, or what became of them. We only read, Gen. vii. 22. *All in whose nostrils was the breath of life, of all that was on the dry land died. And every living substance was destroyed which was upon the face of the ground, both man and cattle, and the creeping things, and the fowls of heaven; and they were destroyed from the earth.*

Another occasion on which we might naturally expect some account of the immaterial principle in man, if there had been any such thing, is where an account is given of the deaths of remarkable persons. And yet, though we have, in the scriptures, very circumstantial accounts of the deaths of several eminent persons, with respect to none of them is there the least hint dropped, that the *body only* was dead, but, that the *immaterial soul* was altogether unaffected by what had happened to its gross companion. This sentiment, which is capable of a vast variety of expression, never fails

fails to occur upon similar occasions with us; and, for the same reasons, could not have failed to occur to the sacred writers, if they had had any idea of such a thing.

Particular mention is made of the deaths of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Aaron, Moses, David, and many others; but all that is said upon any of these occasions, is either that the dying person was *gathered to his people*, or that he *slept with his fathers*. Now, certainly *sleep* does not give us the idea of a person's being *alive*, and *active*, and especially of his entering upon a *new mode of being*, in which he should be more alive, more active, and more vigorous, than he had ever been before.

In the account of the death of Joseph, it is said, Gen. l. 26. *They embalmed him, and he was put into a coffin in Egypt*. It is not said, that there was any part of him that was *not embalmed*, and that could not be put into a coffin. Our different notions dictate a very different language. Upon our grave-stones we never see inscribed, *Here lies such a person*, but always, *here lies the body*, or *the remains*, or *what was mortal* of such a person. Such an influence have *ideas* upon *language* and *customs*; and the same would they have had upon the language and customs of those ancient times, if the ideas and notions had then existed.

We have accounts in the scriptures of several persons having been recalled from death, and having come to life again; as of the
dead

dead man, who was raised to life by the touch of the prophet's bones, of two children by Elijah and Elisha; of Jairus's daughter, the young man at Nain, and of Lazarus by our Saviour; of other persons by the apostles, and more especially of the death and resurrection of our Lord himself. Yet, upon none of these occasions, is there the least mention made of the *immaterial soul*, which, upon the common hypothesis, must have been in a state of happiness, or misery, and have been recalled from thence to its old habitation. This looks as if, in the apprehension of the sacred writers, there was no such a thing as a separate soul to be recalled; but that on the contrary, the case was simply this, viz. that the *life*, which is no more than a *property*, had been lost, and was restored again. This too would be considered as an *advantage*; whereas it has the appearance of cruelty and injustice, in the case of a good man, as of Lazarus, who had been dead four days, to recall him from a state of unmixed happiness, to the troubles and miseries of this life, and subject him, once more, to the pains of death.

If there be an immaterial soul in man, and especially if the body be a clog to its operations and enjoyments, it was no favour to Enoch or Elijah to remove them to another life, with such an incumbrance; and the general resurrection, as I have observed before, which we are taught to regard as *the great*

object of christian hope, is not merely *superfluous*, but even *undesirable*; since virtue would naturally have had a much more complete reward without the body.

It is so evidently the doctrine of the scriptures, that the state of retribution does not take place till after the general resurrection, that it is now adopted by great numbers, who, nevertheless, cannot be brought to give up the notion of an immaterial soul. But I wish they would consider, what notion they really have of an immaterial soul passing thousands of years without a single idea or sensation. In my opinion, it approaches very nearly to its being *no substance at all*; just as matter must intirely vanish, when we take away its property of *extension*.

If, together with the opinion of the intire cessation of thought, they will maintain the real *existence* of the soul, it must be for the sake of the *hypothesis* only, and for no real *use* whatever. They who maintain that, without a resurrection, there is a sufficient reward for virtue, and a state of punishment for vice, taking place immediately after death, have a *solid reason* for contending for an immaterial principle, unaffected by the catastrophe to which the body is subject. But I can see no reason in the world why any *christian*, who, as such, necessarily believes the doctrine of a resurrection (this being the proper fundamental article of his faith) should be so zealous for it; and, indeed, why he should

should not be rather *jealous* of such a notion, as interfering with his *proper system*, superseding it, and making it *superfluous*, and really *undesirable*. The doctrine of a separate soul most evidently embarrasses the true christian system, which takes no sort of notice of it, and is uniform and consistent without it. In the scriptures, the heathens are represented to be *without hope*, and all mankind as *perishing* at death, if there be no *resurrection of the dead*.

Persons who attend to the scriptures cannot avoid concluding, that the *operations* of the soul depend upon the body; and that between death and the resurrection there will be a *suspension* of all its powers. And it is obvious to remark, that if this be the fact, there must be a sufficient *natural reason* why it should be so; and, therefore, there is fair ground to presume, that the soul cannot be that *independent being* that has been imagined.

According to the christian system, the body is necessary to all the *perceptions* and *exertions* of the mind: and if this be the case, what *evidence* can there be, that the mind is not dependent upon the body for its *existence* also? that is, what evidence can there be, that the faculty of thinking does not inhere in the body itself, and that there is no such thing as a *soul* separate from it? A philosopher, on seeing these appearances, would more naturally conclude, that the body appeared to have greater powers than he imagined it could

have had, than that an immaterial spirit could be so necessarily dependant upon a gross body, as not to be able to perceive or think without it. This appears to me, on the first face of things, to be by much the more natural conclusion, exclusive of the obligation that all philosophers are under, not to admit more *causes* than are absolutely *necessary*.

But the most extraordinary assertion, that I have yet met with, relating to the subject, is, that the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul is necessary to be established, before any regard can be paid to the scripture doctrine of a resurrection. For it is said, “ that “ if the soul be not naturally capable of sur- “ viving the body, or if death is unavoid- “ ably its *destruction*, then the resurrection “ must be the resurrection of what was *not “ in being*, the resurrection of *nothing*.” It is true, that a *property*, such as I consider the *power of thinking* to be, cannot exist without its *substance*, which is an organized system. But if this property of thinking necessarily attends the property of *life*, nothing can be requisite to the restoration of all the powers of the man, but the restoration of the body, (no particle of which can be lost) to a state of life.

If we search the scriptures for passages more particularly expressive of the *state of man at death*, we find in them not only no trace of *sense, thought, or enjoyment*, but, on the contrary, such declarations as expressly exclude

exclude it; as Ps. vi. 5. *In death there is no remembrance of thee. In the grave who shall give thee thanks?* spoken by David when he was praying for recovery from sickness. Ps. cxv. 47. *The dead praise not the Lord, neither they that go down into silence;* and Ps. cxvi. 4. *His breath goeth forth, he returneth to the earth, in that very day his thoughts perish.*

Job, speaking of man as utterly insensible in death, expresses himself so very fully and distinctly, that it is not possible to mistake his meaning. Job, xiv. 7. *There is hope of a tree if it be cut down, that it will sprout again, and that the tender branch thereof will not cease. Though the root thereof wax old in the earth, and the stock thereof die in the ground, yet through the scent of water it will bud, and bring forth boughs like a plant. But man dieth, and wasteth away, yea man giveth up the ghost, and where is he? As the waters fail from the sea, and the flood decays and dries up, so man lieth down, and riseth not till the heavens be no more. They shall not awake, nor be raised out of their sleep.*

Nothing can be more evident, than that Job considered man as altogether insensible in death, and that he had no notion of his *body* being one thing, and *himself*, the *sentient principle*, another. But I cannot help concluding, that in the verses immediately following those quoted above, he expresses his belief of a re-

surrection to a future life. V. 13. *O that thou wouldst hide me in the grave, that thou wouldst keep me secret until thy wrath be past; that thou wouldst appoint me a set time, and remember me. If a man dies, shall he live again? All the days of my appointed time will I wait [in the grave, as it seems to me] till my change come. Thou shalt call, and I will answer thee: thou wilt have a desire to the work of thy hands.*

It is still more evident, from that celebrated passage in the 19th chapter of this book, that all the hope that Job had of a future life, was founded on his belief of a *resurrection*, and not on a state of *separation from the body*, of which he does not appear to have had any idea.

Job xix. 25. *I know that my redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth. And though, after my skin, worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God; whom I shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold, and not another, though my reins be consumed within me.*

Solomon evidently considers the whole of man as equally mortal with brutes. After having said, Ecc. iii. 17. *God shall judge the righteous and the wicked, for there is a time there for every purpose, and for every work;* he adds, v. 18. *I said in my heart concerning the estate of the sons of men, that God might manifest them, and that they might see that they themselves are beasts. For that which befalleth*
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the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them. As the one dieth, so dieth the other. Yea they have all one breath. So that a man has no pre-eminence over a beast; for all is vanity. All go to one place. All are of the dust, and all return to dust again.

Some consider this passage as put into the mouth of a person who objects against religion, or as an objection which had occurred to the writer himself; but I see no appearance of any such thing; and the doctrine is perfectly agreeable to the uniform tenor of the scriptures. After the passage quoted above, he adds, *Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?* But if this passage be interpreted in a sense consistent with what goes before, it can only mean that, notwithstanding the difference in the *form* and *posture* of a man and a beast; in consequence of which the *breath* of man goes *upwards*, and that of a beast goes *downwards*, there is no difference between them when they die. Accordingly, in the very next verse, he says, of man, *Who shall bring him to see what shall be after him?* evidently considering him as in a state of insensibility and perfect ignorance. Besides, *upwards* and *downwards* in this place, may not relate to the *breath*, or any thing represented by the breath, but to the *posture* of the body in walking, man walking with his head upwards, and the beast with his head looking downwards.

This writer, indeed, speaking of death, uses this expression, Ecc. xii. 7. *Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it.* But, as it is contrary to the whole tenor of the scriptures, to suppose that the souls of departed men are in heaven, *with God, and Christ*, where they are said not to be till after the resurrection, the meaning of this passage can only be, that God, who gave *life*, will take it away; the word *spirit* denoting nothing more than *breath*, or *life*. By the same kind of figure, *our lives* are said, Coll. iii. 3. after death, to be *hid with Christ in God*, and that *when Christ, who is our life, shall appear, we also shall appear with him in glory.* From which it is evident, that, notwithstanding the *lives* of good men are, figuratively speaking, said to be *with God*, they are not to *appear*, or be manifested, till the appearance, or second coming of Christ; so that the *spirit*, or *life*, going to God, and remaining with him, does not imply any state of perception, or enjoyment.

Our Saviour, indeed, seems to use the term *soul* as expressive of something distinct from the body, but, if he did (which, however, is not certain) he might do it in compliance with the prevailing opinion of the times; in the same manner as he applies the term *possessed of dæmons*, to madmen, and even speaks to madmen, as if they were actuated by evil spirits, though he certainly did not believe the

the existence of such dæmons. He says, however, Matt. x. 28. *Fear not them who kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him, who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.*

But when we consider that, according to the uniform tenor of the scriptures, and especially our Saviour's own discourses and parables, there is no punishment in hell till after the resurrection, it will be evident, that his meaning could only be, that men have power over us only in *this life*, but God in *the life to come*; meaning by the *soul*, the *life*, and in this place, the *future and better life* of man in opposition to the *present*. Also, when the apostle Paul, 1 Thess. v. 23. says, *I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved blameless until the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ*, he only uses these terms as denoting, in the philosophy of his time (which had spread even among the Jews) all that constituted a *complete man*, without hinting at the possibility of any *separation* of the several parts.

Had the sacred writers really believed the existence of the soul, as a principle in the human constitution, naturally distinct from, and independent of the body, it cannot but be supposed, that they would have made some *use* of it in their arguments for a future life. But it is remarkable, that we find no such argument in all the New Testament.

St. Paul, though he writes largely upon the subject, and to Greeks, by whom the doctrines
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of Plato were respected, lays the whole stress of his argument upon *the promise of God by Jesus Christ*, confirmed to us by his resurrection from the dead. According to him, who must certainly be allowed to have understood christianity, and who would not slightly undervalue any *proper* support of its doctrines, *if Christ be not raised, our faith is vain, and they who are asleep in Christ, that is, they who have died in the profession of christianity, are perished.* But how could they have been said to have *perished*, or how could he conclude, as he does, that upon the supposition of there being no resurrection of the dead, we may safely neglect all the duties of morality, adopting the Epicurean maxim, *Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die*, if the soul survive the body, enjoying all its thinking faculties, and consequently be the proper subject of moral retribution? Indeed, what occasion could there be for a resurrection, or general judgment, upon that hypothesis?

Two passages in the book of Revelation may also be interpreted in a manner equally favourable to this doctrine. We read, Rev. vi. 9, &c. *I saw the souls of them that were slain for the word of God, &c.* But it is not uncommon for the sacred writers to personify things without life. We also read, chap. xx. 4. *I saw the souls of them that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus, and for the word of God, &c. and they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years. But the rest of the dead lived not*

not again till the thousand years were ended. It is plain, therefore, that he saw them not as *unembodied souls*, but as *living men*; after a real resurrection, and, therefore, he did not see the rest of the dead souls at all; for being *dead*, they had no *souls* or *lives*.

I shall conclude this section with some observations of Mr. Hallet; “Hence we see why the scriptures never speak of the *immortality of the soul*, as many divines have done. Tillotson takes notice of the fact, and wonders at it. The reason that he assigns for the silence of the scriptures on this head is, that the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul is taught so plainly by the light of nature, that every man’s reason can easily discover it, and so a revelation needs not mention, but might take it for granted. Whereas, it now appears, that the true reason why the scriptures do not teach it, is because it is not true*.”

With respect to the importance of the opinion, he says, “It is of no consequence in the world to any purpose of religion, whether the soul of man be material or immaterial. All that religion is concerned to do, is to prove that that which now thinks in us shall continue to think, and to be capable of happiness or misery for ever. This religion proves from the express promises and threatenings of the gospel. But religion

* Discourses, vol. i. p. 277.

“ is

“ is not concerned to determine of what *na-*
 “ *ture* this thinking immortal substance is.
 “ For my part, I judge it to be immaterial ;
 “ but if a man should think that the soul is
 “ mere matter, endowed with the power of
 “ thought, he would not overturn any article
 “ in religion, that is of the least consequence
 “ to promote the *ends* of religion. For while
 “ a man thinks that his soul is matter, he ne-
 “ cessarily thinks that God, who made mat-
 “ ter capable of thinking, and endowed the
 “ matter of his soul in particular with the
 “ power of thought, is capable, by the same
 “ almighty power, of preserving the matter
 “ of his soul capable of thinking for ever.
 “ And when he shall have proved, that it is
 “ the *will of God*, that that thing which now
 “ thinks in him shall continue to think for
 “ ever, he has proved the immortality of the
 “ soul, even upon his supposition of its being
 “ material, in the only way in which we who
 “ apprehend it to be immaterial are capable
 “ of proving its *aetual immortality*. For this
 “ can only be proved by shewing, that it is
 “ the will of God that it shall be immortal *.”

To what is advanced in this section, I beg
 my reader to add what is observed in the third
 volume of my *Institutes of Natural and Reveal-*
ed Religion, concerning the doctrine of an
intermediate state; every argument against this
 doctrine tending to prove that there is no *sepu-*
rate soul in man, but that his percipient and

* Hallet's Discourses, p. 214.

thinking

thinking powers are nothing more than the necessary result of the *life* of the body

SECTION XV.

Of the DIVINE ESSENCE, according to the Scriptures.

HAD the Deity been an immaterial substance, in the modern strict metaphysical sense of the word (for in the common sense of it, as signifying a being that has properties and powers, not only infinitely *superior* to, but most essentially *different* from, every thing that we call *matter*, it has been seen that I do not object to it) and had this idea of God been of real consequence, either to his own honour, or to the virtue and happiness of mankind, it might have been expected that it would have been strongly and frequently inculcated in the scriptures, as we find the doctrine of the *unity of his nature*, of his almighty *power*, his perfect *knowledge*, and his unbounded *goodness* to be. But if we look into the scriptures, we find a very striking difference in this case.

The scriptures abound with the strongest assertions, and the most solemn declarations concerning the unity of God, and concerning his power, wisdom, and goodness; but though we find in them that his attributes are displayed every where, and that nothing can confine their opera-

operations, we meet with nothing at all determinate with respect to the *divine essence*. Nay, till we come to the times of David, and the later prophets, the Divine Being is represented in such a manner, that we can hardly help imagining, that the patriarchs must have conceived of him as a being of some unknown form, though surrounded by an insupportable splendour, so as to be invisible to mortal eyes.

Now, had even this opinion been a *dangerous one* (though it is not philosophically just) there would certainly have been something said to guard us against it, and prevent our entertaining a notion so dishonourable to God, and so injurious to ourselves. But it is remarkable, that nothing of this kind does occur.

We often find the *presence of the Lord* mentioned, as if there was upon earth some place where he particularly *resided*, or which he *frequented*. One instance of this we have in the Antediluvian history. Cain says, Gen. iv. 14. *Behold thou hast driven me out this day from the face of the earth, and from thy face shall I be hid*. Again, v. 16. *And Cain went out from the presence of the Lord*.

At the building of the tower of Babel, we read, Gen. xi. 5. *And God came down to see the city, and the tower which the children of men builded*. This is an expression which I can hardly think would have been used by David or Isaiah, who represent the Divine Being with much more dignity, as *sitting on the*

the circle of the heavens, and from thence beholding all the inhabitants of the earth. But the other representation is more adapted, as we may say, to the infantile state of the world.

To Moses God seems to have appeared in the symbol of a *dense bright cloud*; but his first appearance to him in the bush, was in a *flame of fire*. It is said, Exod. iii. 4. *that the angel of the Lord appeared to him in a flame of fire, out of the midst of the bush*. But it appears from the conversation afterwards, that it was no angel, but *God himself*, who spake to him; the *fire* being, perhaps, called the *angel of God*, because it was the emblem of his presence, or was that by which he chose to manifest himself. For it is said, v. 4. *And when the Lord saw that he turned aside to see, God called to him out of the midst of the bush, and said, I am the God of thy fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, &c.* When Moses asked his name, he says, **I AM THAT I AM**, a name peculiarly characteristic of the true God, denoting, as is generally thought, his *necessary existence*.

The visible appearance which represented the divine presence to the Israelites, in the wilderness, was a *cloud* by day, and *fire* by night, Ex. xiii. 21. *And the Lord went before them by day in a pillar of a cloud, to lead them the way; and by night in a pillar of fire, to give them light.* Through this pillar it is said,

v. 24.

v. 24. that *the Lord looked upon the host of the Egyptians, and troubled them.*

But, in general, the Divine Being appeared unto Moses in a *dense bright cloud*, Ex. xix. 9. *And the Lord said unto Moses, Lo I come unto thee in a thick cloud, that the people may hear when I speak with thee, and may believe thee for ever.*

After the history of the golden calf, there is another account of an appearance of God to Moses, and many others with him, which has something in it very peculiar. Ex. xxiv. 9. *Then went up Moses and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel, and they saw the God of Israel. And there was under his feet, as it were, a paved work of sapphire stone, and as it were the body of heaven in its clearness; and upon the nobles of the children of Israel he laid not his hand; and they saw God, and did eat and drink.* Whether this was only the same appearance of a bright cloud, or of fire, from which the Divine Being had before spoken to Moses, or something farther, does not distinctly appear. In the Septuagint it is only said, and *they saw the place where the God of Israel stood*; and it appears from Maimonides*, that the more intelligent Jews did not consider this, or any other similar passage, as importing that God had any *form*, or was really the *object of sight*; but only some symbol of the more immediate presence of God.

* See his More Nevochim

It should seem that Moses imagined there was some other more *proper form of God* concealed within the cloud, from which he had usually spoken to him: for he expresses an earnest wish to have a nearer view of the majesty of God. Immediately after it is said, Exod. xxxiii. 11. that *the Lord spake unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh to his friend*; we are informed, v. 18: that he desired that God would *shew him his glory*. In answer to which, it is said, v. 20. *Thou canst not see my face; for there shall no man see me and live. And the Lord said, Behold there is a place by me, and thou shalt stand upon a rock, and it shall come to pass while my glory passeth by, that I will put thee in a cleft of the rock, and will cover thee with my hand while I pass by; and I will take away mine hand, and thou shalt see my back parts, but my face shall not be seen.*

If our modern metaphysicians would attend a little to such passages of scripture as these, and consider what must have been the sentiments of the writers, and of those who were present at the scenes described in them (though I readily acknowledge that such representations as these were used by way of accommodation to the low and imperfect conceptions of the Jews, or the passages may admit an interpretation different from the literal sense of them) they would not be so much alarmed as they now are, or affect to be, at every thing like *materiality* ascribed even to the Di-

vine Being ; and much less to human minds. It is the *attributes*, the *powers*, and the *character* of the Deity that alone concerns us, and not his *essence*, or *substance*.

The circumstances which attended the giving of the law, which were very awful, and calculated to impress the mind in the strongest manner, could not leave upon it the idea of an *immaterial being*, but of a being capable of local presence, though of no known form. Exod. xix. 16. *And it came to pass on the third day, in the morning, that there were thunders and lightnings, and a thick cloud upon the mount, and the voice of the trumpet exceeding loud, so that all the people that were in the camp trembled. And Moses brought forth the people out of the camp to meet with God, and they stood at the nether part of the mount. And mount Sinai was altogether on a smoke, because the Lord descended upon it in fire, and the smoke thereof descended as the smoke of a furnace, and the whole mount quaked greatly. And when the voice of the trumpet sounded long, and waxed louder and louder, Moses spake, and God answered him by a voice. And the Lord came down upon mount Sinai, on the top of the mount, and the Lord called Moses up to the top of the mount, and Moses went up.*

Again, it is not said that an *angel*, but that *God himself* spake all the words of the ten commandments. Exod. xx. 1. *And God spake all these words, saying ; I am the Lord thy God, who have brought thee out of the land of Egypt,*
out

out of the house of bondage, &c. The two tables of stone, containing the same commandments, are also said to have been *written with the finger of God*. Exod. xxxi. 18.

An *audible voice* is certainly calculated to give us the idea of a locally present being, and this is frequently represented as proceeding immediately from God, when he reveals his will to the prophets. It was not only to Moses that he thus spake *face to face*, but to Samuel when he was a child. 1 Sam. iii. 4. *And the Lord called Samuel, and he answered, Here am I.*

In the New Testament, also, an audible voice proceeded three several times from the Divine Majesty, to bear testimony to the mission of Christ. The first time at his baptism, Matt. iii. 17. *And lo, a voice from heaven, saying, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.* Again, on the mount of transfiguration, Matt. xvii. 5. *Behold a white cloud overshadowed them; and behold a voice from the cloud, which said, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased; Hear ye him.* And lastly, in the temple, in the week of crucifixion. John xii. 28. *Jesus says, Father, glorify thy name. Then came there a voice from heaven, saying, I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again.*

The Israelites justly considered the true God as standing in a peculiar relation to themselves, and as the Divine Being had promised to *dwell among them*, it was natural for them to take it

in too literal a sense. *Exod. xxix. 45. And I will dwell among the children of Israel, and will be their God, and they shall know that I am the Lord their God, that brought them forth out of the land of Egypt, that I may dwell among them. I am the Lord their God.* On this account, . Jonah might imagine, that he could flee from the presence of God by leaving the land of Canaan, in which he dwelt. *Jonah i. 3. And Jonah rose up to flee unto Tarshish, from the presence of the Lord.* But the subsequent events in the history of that prophet convinced him, that God was equally present in all places.

Seeing God, in vision, is by no means uncommon with the ancient prophets. Is. vi. 1. In the year that king Uzziah died, I saw also the Lord [אֲרוֹנִי] sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple, &c. Then said I, Woe is me, for I am undone, because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips; for mine eyes have seen the king, the Lord of Hosts. Then flew one of the seraphims unto me—and said unto me, Lo, thine iniquity is taken away, and thy sin purged. And I heard the voice of the Lord, saying, Whom shall I send, and who will go for us. Then said I, Here am I, send me.

Micaiah says, 1 Kings xxii. 19. I saw the Lord [יְהוָה] sitting on his throne, and all the host of heaven standing by him, on his right hand and on his left. And the Lord said, Who shall persuade Ahab, &c.

Dan.

Dan. vii. 9. *I beheld till the thrones were cast down, and the ancient of days did sit, whose garment was as white as snow, and the hair of his head like pure wool. His throne was like a fiery flame, and his wheels as burning fire. A fiery stream issued out, and came forth from before him. Thousand thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousands stood before him—I saw in the night visions, and behold, one like the son of man came with the clouds of Heaven, and came to the ancient of days, and they brought him near before him, &c.*

Amos ix. 1. *I saw the Lord [יְהוָה] standing upon the altar, and he said; &c..*

Heb. iii. 2. *O Lord, I have heard thy speech, and was afraid—God came from Teman, and the holy one from mount Paran. His glory covered the Heavens, and the earth was full of his praise, and his brightness was as the light. He had horns (or bright beams, as it is rendered in the margin) coming out of his hands—He stood and measured the earth.*

This language is not unknown to the New Testament. Rev. iv. 2. *Immediately I was in the spirit; and behold, a throne was set in Heaven, and one sat on the throne; and he that sat was, to look upon, like a jasper, and a sardine stone; and there was a rainbow round about the throne, in sight like unto an emerald—And the four living creatures rest not day or night, saying, Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty, who was, and is, and is to come. And when those living creatures give glory, and honour*

and thanks, to him that sat on the throne, who liveth for ever and ever, the four and twenty elders fall down before him that sat on the throne, and worship him that liveth for ever and ever, and cast their crowns before the throne; saying, thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they were and are created.

Many passages in the books of scripture, and especially in the Psalms, give us the most exalted ideas of the *universal power and presence* of God. But still this is so far from suggesting the idea of proper *immateriality*, which bears no relation to space, that they naturally give us the idea of a Being that is locally present every where, but invisible, and penetrating all things.

Solomon says, in his prayer at the dedication of the temple, 1 Kings viii. 27. *But will God indeed dwell on earth? Behold Heaven, and the Heaven of Heavens, cannot contain thee, how much less this house that I have built. Is. lxvi. 1. Thus saith the Lord, The Heaven is my throne, and the earth is my foot-stool. Where is the house that ye build unto me, and where is the place of my rest? Jer. xxiii. 23. Am I a God at hand, says the Lord, and not a God afar off? Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him? Do I not fill Heaven and earth, says the Lord? To the same purpose is that sublime passage in Psalm cxxxix. 7. Whither shall I go from thy spirit, or whither*

ther shall I flee from thy presence. If I ascend up into heaven thou art there. If I make my bed in the grave, behold thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall thine hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me.

Job says, ch. xxiii. 3. *Oh that I knew where I might find him, that I might come even to his seat. Behold I go forward, but he is not there, and backward, but I cannot perceive him; on the left hand, where he doth work, but I cannot behold him. He hideth himself on the right hand, that I cannot see him.*

When the Divine Being is expressly said to be *invisible*, no words are ever added to suggest to us, that it is because he is *immaterial*; but we are rather given to understand, that we cannot see God on account of the *splendour* that surrounds him. This will be seen in some of the passages quoted above; and the idea suits very well with the following passage of St. Paul, 1 Tim. vi. 15. *The King of Kings, and Lord of Lords, who only hath immortality, dwelling in light which no man can approach unto, whom no man hath seen, nor can see; to whom be honour and power everlasting, Amen.* The apostle John also says, John i. 18. *No man hath seen God at any time; but he says nothing of the reason of it.*

When our Saviour says, John iv. 24. *God is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth; there is no*

reference whatever to the *immateriality* of the divine nature, but only to his *intelligence*, and *moral perfections*; and, therefore, requiring *truth in the inward part*, or a spiritual, as opposed to a corporeal homage; and this very passage is alledged, by some of the Fathers, as an argument for the corporeity of the divine nature.

When the Divine Being compares himself with *idols*, which is frequent in Isaiah, Jeremiah, and other prophets, on which occasion they are said to be *wood and stone*, incapable of *motion, knowledge, or sense*, it is never said, by way of contrast, as might naturally be expected in this connexion, that the true God is altogether *immaterial*, and incapable of local presence. On the contrary, we find nothing on these occasions but declarations concerning the divine *power and knowledge*, especially with respect to *future events*, on which subject the true God more especially challenges the false ones.

I think I may conclude this section with observing, that our modern metaphysical notions, concerning the strict immateriality of the Divine Being, were certainly not drawn from the scriptures. In those sacred books we read of nothing but the infinite *power, wisdom, and goodness* of God; and to impress our minds with the more awful ideas of him, he is generally represented as residing in heaven, and surrounded with a splendor, through which no mortal eye can pierce. But he is
so

so far from being said to be what we now call immaterial, that every description of him, even in the New Testament, gives us an idea of something *filling*, and *penetrating all things*, and therefore of no form, or known mode of existence..

For my part, I do not see how this notion of immateriality, in the strict metaphysical sense of the word, is at all calculated to heighten our veneration for the Divine Being. And though, as is no wonder, we are utterly confounded when we attempt to form any conception of a being properly *pervading*, and *supporting all things*, we are still more confounded when we endeavour to conceive of a being that has *no extension*, *no common property with matter*, and *no relation to space*. Also, by the help of these principles, which I have been endeavouring to establish, we get rid of two difficulties, which appear to me to be absolutely insuperable upon the common hypothesis, viz. how an immaterial being, not existing in space, can *create*, or act upon, matter; when, according to the definition of the terms, they are absolutely incapable of bearing any relation to each other.

SECTION

SECTION XVI.

Of the Arguments for the BEING and PERFECTIONS of GOD, on the System of Materialism.

NOTWITHSTANDING the opinion of the *materiality of man* has, in reality, nothing at all to do with the doctrine concerning *God*, yet as it has often been charged with *leading to Atheism*, I shall shew, in this section, that our practical knowledge of *God* stands independent of any conception whatever concerning even the *divine essence*; from whence it will clearly follow, *a fortiori*, that it must certainly be altogether independent of any opinion concerning *human nature*.

The arguments for the being and attributes of a *God* stand precisely upon the same footing on the system of materiality or immateriality. Considering, however, the prejudices that may arise on this subject, it may not be amiss to review some of the arguments, as laid down in my *Institutes of Natural Religion*, where I made such a distribution of the subject, as I hope will make the discussion of it more easy than it had been before.

By a *God*, I mean an *intelligent first cause*. This being proved, I consider what other properties

erties or attributes are necessarily connected with the idea of a first cause, and afterwards those which the examination of the works of God leads us to ascribe to him. Lastly, the divine goodness being the only *moral quality* that we directly discover, I consider how it is necessarily branched out into the different modifications of *justice, mercy, veracity, &c.*

In the proof of an intelligent cause of all things, it is impossible, that the consideration of the *divine essence* can be at all concerned. For the same reason that the *table* on which I write, or the *watch* that lies before me, must have had a maker, *myself*, and the *world* I live in must have had a maker too: and a *design, a fitness of parts to each other*, and to an end, are no less obvious in the one case than in the other. I have, therefore, the very same reason to conclude, that an intelligent mind produced the one, as the other (meaning by the word *mind* the subject of intelligence) and my idea of the *degree* of intelligence requisite for each of these productions, rises in proportion to the number of particulars necessary to be attended to in each, and the completeness with which they are adapted to the ends which they manifestly subserve. Judging by this obvious rule, I necessarily conclude, that the intelligence of the being that made myself and the world, must infinitely exceed that of the person who made the table or the watch.

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This simple argument for the being of a God, or an intelligent maker of all things, notwithstanding Dr. Oswald, out of his great zeal for religion, has mustered up all his logic to invalidate it, I consider as *irrefragable*, whether we be able to proceed any farther in the inquiry or not.

Again, for the same reason that the *maker* of the *table*, or of the *watch*, must be different from the table, or the watch, it is equally manifest that the maker of *myself*, of the *world*, and of the *universe*, (meaning by it all the worlds that we suppose to exist) must be a being different from myself, the world, or the universe; which is a sufficient answer to the reasoning of Spinoza, who, making the *universe itself* to be God, did, in fact, deny that there was any God. I am not acquainted with any arguments more conclusive than these; that is, supposing a God to exist, it is not in nature possible, that there could have been more, or stronger evidence of it than we find. This argument is, in fact, the foundation of all our practical and useful knowledge concerning God, and in this, the consideration of materiality or immateriality has certainly no concern.

The argument also against an *eternal succession of finite beings*, of men, for instance, none of which had any more knowledge or ability than another, is the very same on both the hypotheses, here being an effect without any

any adequate cause; since this *succession of men* must have required, at least, as much intelligence and power as the production of a *single man*, that is, an intelligence and power infinitely exceeding that of any man, and consequently that of any one in this supposed succession of men.

Also the conception of a being who had *no cause* is attended with just the same, and no greater difficulty on the supposition of this primary cause of all things being *material*, or *immaterial*. The *beginning of motion in matter*, or the *beginning of thought in mind*, is, in this view, the very same thing; because, judging by ourselves (from whence we get all the *data* that we have for forming any judgment in the case at all) every thought is as much caused by something in the body, or the mind preceding it, and influencing the mind, by certain invariable laws, as every motion of the body. We have no experience of any thing that can help us to form any judgment at all concerning the *original beginning of motion*, or *primary activity*, in any respect. To say that an immaterial being is capable of this, but that a material one is incapable of it, is merely deceiving ourselves, and concealing our ignorance, and total want of conception, in *words* only, without any ideas adequate to the subject.

A first cause, therefore, being proved in a manner quite independent of any consideration of materiality or immateriality, it follows

follows that the *eternity* and *unchangeableness* of the first cause stands upon the very same grounds upon either hypothesis, being derived simply from the consideration of an uncaused being.

If, from the consideration of these necessary attributes of a *first cause*, we proceed to the consideration of *the works of God*, we find innumerable things exactly similar to such as would unavoidably lead us to the ideas of *power*, *wisdom*, and *goodness* in man; and therefore we are necessarily led to ascribe wisdom, power and goodness to this first cause. But to what kind of *essence* these attributes belong, material or immaterial, the effects themselves give us no information.

Lastly, the philosopher admits the belief of *one God*, in opposition to a multiplicity of Gods, on account of the *unity of design* apparent in the universe; and because it is contrary to the rules of philosophizing to suppose more causes than are necessary to explain effects. In this great argument, therefore, materiality or immateriality are equally unconcerned.

And in the same manner it might be shewn, that the argument for a *Divine Providence* suffers no injury whatever by this hypothesis. If nothing was *made*, it is equally certain that nothing can *happen*, or *come to pass*, without a design; and there can be no reason whatever why this should not extend to the smallest things, and the most seemingly inconsiderable events,

events, as well as to things of greater magnitude, and events of greater apparent moment. Besides, the smallest things, and the most trifling circumstances, may have the most important influences; and therefore they could not be neglected in the comprehensive plan of Divine Providence, without an inattention to things of the greatest consequence that might depend upon them. So that, in a truly philosophical view, there is nothing exaggerated in our Saviour's saying, that *Even a sparrow falls not to the ground without the will, the knowledge, and design of our heavenly Father, and that the very hairs of our heads are numbered.*

If, after this candid, explicit, and I hope clear and satisfactory view of the subject, any person will tax my opinions, according to which the divine essence is nothing that was ever called matter, but something essentially different from it (though I have shewn that the belief of all his attributes and providence is compatible with *any* opinion concerning his essence) with *atheism*, I shall tax him with great *stupidity*, or *malignity*. In my own idea, I have all the foundation that the nature of things admits of for a firm belief in a first, eternal, unchangeable, and intelligent cause of all things; and I have all the proof that can be given of his almighty power, infinite goodness, and constant providence. And this system of *natural religion* affords all the foundation

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tion that can be had in support of *revealed religion*, the history of which is contained in the books of scripture, which I most cordially and thankfully receive; and the truth of which I have endeavoured in the best manner I have been able, to prove, in the second volume of my *Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion*.

That the hypothesis even of the *materiality of the divine nature* is not a dangerous one, is even demonstrable from this single consideration, that it is, in fact, the idea that all the vulgar actually do form of God, whenever they think of him at all. For a substance, properly *immaterial*, cannot give us any *proper idea* whatever, and some idea or other we cannot avoid having whenever we think of a being possessed of the attributes that we ascribe to God. It is necessarily either the idea of a being of some particular, though perhaps variable, form, or else infinitely diffused, and not the object of our senses. If, therefore, this idea could do harm, almost all mankind must have received that harm; and, notwithstanding all our laboured refinements, the evil is, with respect to the bulk of mankind at least, naturally irremediable. But no harm whatever has come from it, nor is any to be apprehended.

To shew that I am not singular in my idea of the perfect innocence of any method of expressing the divine essence, I shall close this section

section with the testimony of some of the most pious and respectable writers of the last and present age, and who cannot be suspected of any undue prejudice, because they did not embrace the system they plead in favour of. The writers I shall produce are Ramsay; Cudworth and Beaufobre.

“ True atheism consists in denying, that there is a supreme intelligence which has produced the world by his power, and governs it by his wisdom *.”

“ All corporealists must not be condemned for atheists, but only those of them who assert that there is no conscious intellectual nature presiding over the whole universe †.”

“ I am well persuaded, that God is a *pure intelligence*; but the more I reflect on the subject, the more disposed I find myself to treat the contrary opinion with indulgence. The ablest Cartesians acknowledge, that we have no idea of a spiritual substance. We only know by experience that it thinks, but we do not know what is the *nature* of the being, whose modifications are thoughts. We do not know what is the *foundation*, the *subject*, in which the thoughts inhere.

“ Secondly, whatever be the error of believing God to be corporeal, religion suffers nothing by it. Adoration, the love of God, and obedience to his sovereign will, remain intire. He is not the less the *most*

* Ramsay, p. 274.

† Cudworth, p. 156.

“ *holy, the most high, the almighty, and the*
 “ *immortal---* Were Tertullian, Melito, &c.
 “ who believed God to be corporeal; on that
 “ account, the less good Christians? Lastly,
 “ what ought at least to moderate the rage
 “ of those who are always ready to dart their
 “ anathemas, is, that the wisest of the Fathers
 “ acknowledge not only that the divine na-
 “ ture is inexplicable, but that we cannot
 “ speak of it without making use of expres-
 “ sions which agree to corporeal substances
 “ only *.”

SECTION XVII.

*Observations on PERSONAL IDENTITY with
respect to the future State of Man.*

THE opinion of the mortality of the
 thinking part of man is thought by some
 to be unfavourable to morality and religion,
 but without the least reason, as they who
 urge this objection at present, must be unac-
 quainted with the sentiments of christian di-
 vines upon the subject in ancient and present
 times. The excellent bishop of Carlisle has
 sufficiently proved the insensibility of the soul
 from death to the resurrection (which has the
 same practical consequences) to be the doc-
 trine of the scriptures, and the learned arch-
 deacon Blackburne has traced the corruption
 of it from the earliest ages.

* Beaufobre, vol. i. p. 485.

In fact, the common opinion of the soul of man surviving the body was (as will be shewn) introduced into christianity from the Oriental and Greek philosophy, which in many respects exceedingly altered and debased the true christian system. This notion is one of the main bulwarks of popery; it was discarded by Luther, and many other reformers in England and abroad; and it was wisely left out in the last correction of the articles of the church of England, though incautiously retained in the burial service. Now, can it be supposed, that the apostles, the primitive Fathers, and modern reformers, should all adopt an opinion unfavourable to morality?

It was objected to the primitive christians, as it may be at present, that if all our hopes of a future life rest upon the doctrine of a *resurrection*, we place it upon a foundation that is very precarious. It is even said, that a proper resurrection is not only, in the highest degree, improbable, but even actually impossible; since, after death, the body putrefies, and the parts that composed it are dispersed, and form other bodies, which have an equal claim to the same resurrection. And where, they say, can be the propriety of rewards and punishments, if the man that rises again be not identically *the same* with the man that acted and died?

Now, though it is my own opinion, that we shall be *identically the same beings* after the resurrection that we are at present, I shall, for

the sake of those who may entertain a different opinion, speculate a little upon their hypothesis; to shew that it is not inconsistent with a state of future rewards and punishments, and that it supplies motives sufficient for the regulation of our conduct here, with a view to it. And, metaphysical as the subject necessarily is, I do not despair of satisfying those who will give a due attention to it, that the propriety of rewards and punishments, with our hopes and fears derived from them, do not at all depend upon such a kind of identity as the objection that I have stated supposes.

If I may be allowed, for the sake of distinction, to introduce a new term, I would say, that *the identity of the man*, is different from *the identity of the person*; and it is the latter, and not the former, that we ought to consider in a disquisition of this kind. The distinction I have mentioned may appear a paradox, but, in fact, similar distinctions are not uncommon, and they may illustrate one another.

Ask any person to shew you the *river Thames*, and he will point to water flowing in a certain channel, and you will find that he does not consider the *banks*, or the *bed* of the river, to be any part of it. And yet, though the water be continually and visibly changing so as not to be the same any one day with the preceding, the use of language proves, that there is a sense in which it may be called, to every real purpose, the *same river* that it was a
thousand

thousand years ago. So also the *Nile*, the *Euphrates*, and the *Tiber*, have an identity *as rivers* independently of the *water*, of which alone they consist. In the same manner *forests*, which consist of *trees* growing in certain places, preserve their identity, though all the trees of which they consist decay, and others grow up in their places.

In like manner, though every person should be satisfied of what I believe is not true, that in the course of nutrition, digestion and egestion, every particle of the body, and even of the brain (and it should be taken for granted, that the whole man consisted of nothing else) was entirely changed, and that this change, though gradual and insensible, could be demonstrated to take place completely in the course of a year, we should, I doubt not, still retain the idea of a real *identity*, and such a one as would be the proper foundation for approbation, or self reproach, with respect to the past, and for hope and fear with respect to the future. A man would claim his wife, and a woman her husband, after more than a year's absence, debts of a year's standing would not be considered as cancelled, and the villain who had absconded for a year would not escape punishment.

In fact, the universal and firm belief of this hypothesis, would make no change whatever in our present conduct, or in our sense of *obligation*, respecting the duties of life, and the propriety of rewards and punishments; and

consequently all hopes and fears, and expectations of every kind, would operate exactly as before. For, notwithstanding the complete change of the *man*, there would be no change of what I should call the *person*.

Now, if the water of a river, the trees of a forest, or the particles that constitute the man, should change *every moment*, and we were all acquainted with it, it would make no more difference in our conduct, than if the same change had been considered as taking place more slowly. Supposing that this change should constantly take place during sleep, our behaviour to each other in the morning would still be regulated by a regard to the transactions of the preceding day. In this case, were any person fully persuaded, that every particle of which he consisted should be changed, he would, nevertheless, consider himself as being the *same person* to-morrow, that he was yesterday, and the same twenty years hence, that he was twenty years ago; and, I doubt not, he would feel himself concerned as for a *future self*, and regulate his conduct accordingly.

As far as the idea of identity is requisite, as a foundation for rewards and punishments, the *sameness and continuity of consciousness* seems to be the only circumstance attended to by us. If we knew that a person had by disease, or old age, lost all remembrance of his past actions, we should, in most cases, immediately see that there would be an impropriety in
punishing

punishing him for his previous offences, as it would answer no *end* of punishment, to himself or others. In the case, however, of *notorious criminality*, the association of a man's crime, with every thing belonging to him, is so strong, and so extensive, that we wreak our vengeance upon the dead body, the children, the habitation, and every thing that had been connected with the criminal; and likewise in the case of *distinguished merit*, we extend our gratitude and benevolence to all the remains and connexions of the hero and the friend. But as men habituate themselves to reflection, they lay aside this *indiscriminate vengeance*, and confine it to the person of the criminal, and to the state in which he retains the remembrance of his crimes. Every thing farther is deemed barbarous and useless.

Admitting, therefore, that the man consists wholly of *matter*, as much as the *river* does of *water*, or the *forest* of *trees*, and that this matter should be wholly changed in the interval between death and the resurrection; yet, if, after this state, we shall all know one another again, and converse together as before, we shall be, to all intents and purposes, the *same persons*. Our *personal identity* will be sufficiently preserved, and the expectation of it at present will have a proper influence on our conduct.

To consider the matter philosophically, what peculiar excellence is there in those particles of matter which compose my body, more than

those which compose the table on which I write; and consequently, what *rational motive* can I have for preferring, or attaching myself to the one more than to the other. If I knew that they were instantly, and without any painful sensation to myself, to change places, I do not think that it would give me any concern. As to those who are incapable of reflecting in this manner, as they cannot understand the *objection*, there is no occasion to make them understand the *answer*.

However, notwithstanding I give this solution of the difficulty, for the satisfaction of sceptical and metaphysical persons, I myself believe the doctrine of the *resurrection of the dead* in another, and more literal sense. Death, with its concomitant putrefaction, and dispersion of parts, is only a *decomposition*; and whatever is *decomposed* may be *recomposed* by the being who first composed it; and I doubt not but that, in the proper sense of the word, *the same body* that dies shall rise again, not with every thing that is *adventitious* and *extraneous* (as all that we receive by nutrition) but with the same *flamina*, or those particles that really belonged to the *germ* of the organical body. And there can be no proof that these particles are ever properly destroyed, or interchanged. This opinion was advanced by Dr. Watts, and no man can say that it is unphilosophical.

That excellent philosopher, Mr. Bonnet, supposes (and advances a variety of arguments from

from new and curious experiments on the reproduction of the parts of animals to prove) that all the *germs* of future plants, organical bodies of all kinds, and the reproducible parts of them, were really contained in the first germ; and though the consideration confounds us when we contemplate it, we are not more confounded than in the contemplation of other views of the system of which we make a part; and the thing is no more incompatible with our idea of the omnipotence of its author. Those who laugh at the mere mention of such a thing, have certainly a small share of *natural science*, which indeed generally accompanies conceit and dogmatism.

This idea of the doctrine of the resurrection is perfectly agreeable to the light in which St. Paul represents it (though I should not condemn his comparison, if it should be found not to be so complete) when he compares it to the revival of a *seed* that has been sown in the earth, and become seemingly *dead*. For the *germ* does not die, and in our future transformation we may be as different from what we are in our present state, as the *plant* is from the *seed*, or the *butterfly* from the *egg*, and yet be essentially the same.

Dr. Hartley also, and others, suppose that, strictly speaking, there will be nothing more *miraculous* in our resurrection to a future life, than there was in our *birth*, to the present; for that, in the circumstances in which the world will be at the general consummation of all things,

things, these *germs*, as we may call them, may naturally and necessarily revive, according to some fixed, but to us, unknown laws of nature.

There have even been unbelievers in revelation, who have seen nothing to object to in this supposition.

“ Let us not,” says the author of *Man a Machine**, “ pretend to say, that every machine, or animal, is intirely annihilated after death, nor that they put on another form, since we are quite in the dark as to this point. To affirm an immortal machine to be a chimera, a fiction of our brain, appears to be as absurd as it would seem in caterpillars, when they see the dead bodies of their kind, bitterly to lament the fate of their species, which would seem to them to be utterly destroyed. The soul of these insects is too narrow and confined to be able to comprehend the transformation of their nature. Never did any one of the acutest amongst them entertain the least notion that he would become a butterfly. It is the very same case with us. What do we know of our future destiny more than we do of our original?”

I shall close this section with some observations respecting a *term* I made use of when I gave to the public the first hint of the sentiment maintained in this treatise, which was in my edition of *Dr. Hartley's Theory*. It

* P. 81.

was

was that, according to appearances, *the whole man becomes extinct at death*. This was thought to be rather incautious by some of my friends, and my enemies eagerly caught at it, as thinking I had given them a great advantage over me; and yet I still think the term very proper, and that to object to this application, betrays an ignorance even of the real meaning of that English word.

Some of them seem to have supposed, that by *the extinction of the whole man*, I mean the absolute *annihilation* of him, so that when a man dies, whatever it was that constituted him, *ceases to exist*. But then I must have supposed, that the moment a man is dead, he absolutely *vanishes away*, so that his friends can find nothing of him left to carry to the grave. Mr. Hallet, treating of this subject, uses an expression much more nearly approaching to the idea of *annihilation*, when he says*, “It looks as if the whole man was *gone*,” and I do not know that the expression was ever objected to.

Nor does the word *extinction*, as it is generally understood, imply any such thing as *annihilation*. When we say, that a *candle is extinguished*, which is using the word in its primary, and most proper sense, we surely do not mean that it is annihilated, and therefore, that there is nothing left to light again. Even the *particles of light* which it has emitted we only suppose to be *dispersed*, and there-

* See page 30 of this treatise.

fore

fore to be capable of being *collected* again. As, therefore, a candle, though extinguished, is capable of being lighted again, so, though a man may be said, figuratively speaking, *to become extinct at death*, and his capacity for thinking cease, it may only be for a time: for no particle of that which ever constituted the man is lost. And, as I observed before, whatever is *decomposed* may certainly be *recomposed*, by the same almighty power that first composed it, with whatever change in its constitution, advantageous or disadvantageous, he shall think proper; and then the powers of thinking, and whatever depended upon them, will return of course, and the man will be, in the most proper sense, *the same being that he was before*.

This is precisely the apostle Paul's idea of *the resurrection of the dead*, as the only foundation for a future life; and it is to this to which I mean to adhere, exclusive of all the additional vain supports which either the *Oriental*, or *Platonic* philosophy has been thought to afford to this great doctrine of *pure revelation*. I have, however, been represented as having, by this view of the subject, furnished a stronger argument against revelation than any that infidelity has hitherto discovered, and the atheists of the age have been described as *triumphing* in my concessions; when, whatever triumph atheists may derive from *my* concessions, and my writings, the very

very same they may derive from the writings of *St. Paul* himself, which is certainly much more to their purpose.

Farther, though I have been charged with being an abetter of *atheism*, it has been, by persons who have urged against my opinion, the hackneyed objection, that all unbelievers of ancient and modern times have made against the doctrine of *any resurrection*, viz. from the consideration of the matter that once composed the human body entering, afterwards, into the composition of plants, animals, &c. not considering that this objection equally affects the doctrine of *St. Paul*, and that of all christians, who maintain what may, by any possible construction of the words, be called *a resurrection of the dead*; which certainly requires that it is something that dies, and is put into the grave (and an *immaterial soul* is never supposed to die at all) that must *revive*, and *rise again* out of it.

SECTION

SECTION XVIII.

Of the Origin of the popular Opinions concerning the Soul.

THOUGH *truth* be a thing altogether independent of the *opinions of men*, yet when any erroneous doctrine has prevailed long in the world, and has had a very general spread, we are apt to suspect that it must have come from some sufficient authority, unless we be able to trace the rise and progress of it, and can assign some plausible reason for its general reception. On this account, I shall enter into a pretty large historical detail concerning the system that I have, in this treatise, called in question; and I hope to be able to shew, that it can by no means boast so respectable an origin as many are willing to ascribe to it. On the contrary, I hope to make it appear, that it has arisen from nothing but mere superstition, and the vain imaginations of men, flattering themselves with a higher origin than they had any proper claim to, though the precise date of the system may be of too remote antiquity to be ascertained with absolute certainty at this day.

The notion of the soul of man being a substance distinct from the body, has been shown, and I hope to satisfaction, not to have been
known

known to the writers of the scriptures, and especially those of the Old Testament. According to the uniform system of revelation, all our hopes of a future life are built upon another, and I may say an opposite foundation, viz. that of the *resurrection* of something belonging to us that *dies*, and is buried, that is, the *body*, which is always considered as *the man*. This doctrine is manifestly superfluous on the idea of the soul being a substance so distinct from the body as to be unaffected by its death, and able to subsist, and even to be more free and happy, without the body. This opinion, therefore, not having been known to the *Jews*, and being repugnant to the scheme of *revelation*, must have had its source in *heathenism*; but with respect to the *date* of its appearance, and the *manner of its introduction*, there is room for conjecture and speculation.

As far as we are able to collect any thing concerning the history of this opinion, it is evidently not the growth of Greece or Rome, but was received by the philosophers of those countries either from Egypt, or the countries more to the East. The Greeks in general refer it to the Egyptians, but Pausanias gives it to the Chaldeans, or the Indians. I own, however (though every thing relating to so very obscure a subject must be in a great measure conjectural) that I am inclined to ascribe it to the Egyptians; thinking, with Mr. Toland, that it might possibly have been suggested

gested by some of their known customs respecting the dead, whom they preserved with great care, and disposed of with a solemnity unknown to other nations; though it might have arisen among them from other causes without the help of those peculiar customs.

The authority of Herodotus, the oldest Greek historian, and who had himself travelled into Egypt, is very express to this purpose. He says*, that "the Egyptians were
 " the first who maintained that the soul of
 " man is immortal, that when the body
 " dies it enters into that of some other
 " animal, and when it has transmigrated
 " through all terrestrial, marine, and flying
 " animals, it returns to the body of a man
 " again. This revolution is completed in
 " three thousand years." He adds, that "several
 " Greeks, whose names he would not
 " mention, had published that doctrine as
 " their own."

Mr. Toland's hypothesis is as follows, and I think I should do wrong to omit the mention of it. My reader may judge of the probability of it for himself. "The funeral rites
 " of the Egyptians," he says †, "and their
 " historical method of preserving the memo-
 " ry of deserving persons, seems to have been
 " the occasion of this belief. Their way of
 " burying was by embalming the dead bodies,
 " which they deposited in a subterranean

* Ed. Steph. p. 137. † Letters to Serena, p. 45.

"grotto,

“ grotto, where they continued intire for
 “ thousands of years; so that before any notion
 “ of separate or immortal souls, the common
 “ language was, that *such a one was under*
 “ *ground, that he was carried over the river*
 “ *Acherusia by Charon* (the title of the public
 “ ferryman for that purpose) and *laid happily*
 “ *to rest in the Elysian fields, which was the*
 “ common burying place near Memphis.”

This hypothesis is rendered more probable by an observation of Cicero's. He says †, “ the
 “ bodies falling to the ground, and being
 “ buried there, it was imagined that the de-
 “ ceased passed the rest of their life under
 “ ground.” Among other absurdities flow-
 ing from this notion, he says that, though the
 bodies were buried, they still imagined them
 to be *apud inferos*; and whereas they could not
 conceive the mind to exist of itself, they gave
 it a form or figure.

I think, however, that the notion of there
 being something in man distinct from his bo-
 dy, and the cause of his feeling, thinking,
 willing, and his other mental operations and
 affections, might very well occur in those
 rude ages without such a step as this; though
 no doubt the custom above-mentioned would
 much contribute to it. Nothing is more com-
 mon than to observe how very ready all illi-
 terate persons are to ascribe the cause of any
 difficult appearance to an *invisible agent*, dis-

† Tusculan Questions, Ed. Glas. p. 37.

tinct from the subject on which the operation is exerted. This led the Jews (after the heathens) to the idea of madmen being possessed of dæmons, and it is peculiarly remarkable, how very ready mankind have always been to ascribe the unknown cause of extraordinary appearances to something to which they can give the name *spirit*, after this term had been once applied in a similar manner. Thus, that which struck an animal dead over fermenting liquor, was first called the *gas*, or *spirit of the liquor*, while the fermented liquor itself also, being possessed of very active powers, was thought to contain *another kind of spirit*; and many times do we hear ignorant persons, on seeing a remarkable experiment in philosophy, especially if *air*, or any *invisible fluid*, be concerned in it, perfectly satisfied with saying, that is the *spirit of it*. Now, though the idea of a spirit, as a distinct substance from the body, did not perhaps immediately occur in all these cases, their conceptions might afford a foundation for such an hypothesis.

It would be most natural, however, at first, to ascribe the cause of thought to something that made a *visible* difference between a living and a dead man; and *breathing* being the most obvious difference of this kind, those powers would be ascribed to his *breath*: and accordingly we find, that in the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin languages, the name of the *soul* is the same with that of *breath*. From whence

we

we may safely infer, that originally it was considered as nothing else, and hence the custom of receiving the *parting breath* of dying persons, as if to catch their departing souls. And though, to appearance, the breath of a man mixes with the rest of the air, yet, the nature of air being very little known, it was not at all extraordinary, that it should have been considered as not *really* mixing with the atmosphere, but as ascending by its levity to the higher regions above the clouds. And men having got this idea, the notion of its having *come down from above the clouds*, where God was supposed to reside, would naturally enough follow.

But living bodies differ from dead ones by their *warmth*, as well as by the circumstance of breathing. Hence might come the idea of the principle of life and thought being a kind of *vital fire*; and, as flame always ascends, men would, of course, imagine that the soul of man, when set loose from the body, would ascend to the *region of fire*, which was supposed to be above the atmosphere. From these leading ideas, it could not be difficult for the imagination of speculative men to make out a complete system of *pre-existence* and *transmigration*; and there being so much of *fancy* in it, it is still less to be wondered at, that it should have been diversified so much as we find to have been in different countries, and different schools of philosophy.

Diseases and other evils having their seat in the *body*, the *matter* of which it is composed might easily be conceived to be the source of those and all other evils; a disordered mind being, in many cases, the evident effect of a disordered body; and they who were disposed to believe in a benevolent deity, would by this means easily make out to themselves a reason for the *origin of evil*, without reflecting any blame upon God on that account. They would ascribe it to the *untractable nature of matter*.

Lastly, what could be more natural to account for the ethereal soul being confined to such a body or clog, as the supposition of its being a punishment for offences committed in a pre-existent state?

But the notion of a proper *immaterial being*, without all *extension*, or *relation to place*, did not appear till of late years in comparison; what the ancients meant by an immaterial substance being nothing more than an *attenuated matter*, like *air*, *ether*, *fire*, or *light*, considered as fluids, beyond which their idea of *incorporeity* did not go. Pfellus says, that the ancient Heathens, both Greeks and others, called only the grosser bodies, *τα παχύτερα των σωματων* corporeal*.

Indeed, the vulgar notion of a *soul*, or *spirit*, wherever it has been found to exist, has been the same in all ages; and in this re-

* Le Clerc's Index Philologicus, Materia.

spect, even the learned of ancient times are only to be considered as the vulgar. We gather from Homer, that the belief of his time was, that the ghost bore the shape of, and exactly resembled, the deceased person to whom it had belonged, that it wandered upon the earth, near the place where the body lay, till it was buried, at which time it was admitted to the shades below. In both these states it was possessed of the intire consciousness, and retained the friendships and enmities of the man. But in the case of deified persons, it was supposed that, besides this ghost, there was something more ethereal, or divine belonging to them, like *another better self*, that ascended to the upper regions, and was associated with the immortal gods.

All the Pagans of the East, says Loubiere, (quoted by Mr. Locke*) do truly believe, that
 “ there remains something of a man after his
 “ death, which subsists independently and se-
 “ parately from his body. But they give ex-
 “ tension and figure to that which remains,
 “ and attribute to it all the same members,
 “ all the same substances, both solid and
 “ liquid, which bodies are composed of.
 “ They only suppose, that souls are of a mat-
 “ ter subtle enough to escape being seen or
 “ handled.”

When it had been imagined, that the vital and thinking powers of man resided in a dis-

* Essay, vol. ii. page 162.

tinct principle or substance, it would be natural to ascribe such a principle to every thing that had *motion*, and especially a regular motion, and that had any remarkable *influences*, good or bad, particularly to such resplendent bodies as the *sun, moon, stars, and planets*. Accordingly, we find it to be one of the oldest opinions in heathen antiquity, that those heavenly bodies were animated as well as men. This opinion was even held by Origen, and other philosophizing christians.

Mr. Toland, however, conjectures that another Egyptian custom might facilitate the introduction of this system. “ Among other “ methods,” he says †, “ the Egyptians had “ of perpetuating events, the surest of all was “ to impose the names of memorable persons “ and things on the constellations, as the only “ *eternal monuments*, not subject to the violence of men or brutes, nor to the injury “ of time or weather. This custom was derived from them to other nations, who “ changed, indeed, the names, but gave new “ ones to the stars for the same end. And “ the inconsiderate vulgar, hearing the learned “ constantly talk of certain persons, as *in the “ stars*, believed them at last to be really “ there, and that all the others were *under “ ground*.” One may add, that this might possibly give rise to the notion of a *twofold soul*, one that went under ground, and another that went to the stars.

† Letters to Serena, p. 46.

Upon the whole, Mr. Toland's conjecture appears to me not to be destitute of probability. How far the Egyptians really carried their notions concerning the state of human souls, before or after death, doth not distinctly appear, because we have no Egyptian writings. But it is probable, that their ideas never ripened into such a system as was afterwards found in the East, on account of their empire and civil polity having been too soon overturned, and the country having undergone such a number of revolutions. Accordingly we find, that those who introduced as much of this system as was received in Greece did, in general, travel into the East for it.

SECTION XIX.

A View of the different Opinions that have been held concerning the DIVINE ESSENCE, especially with a View to the Doctrine of Immateriality.

I HAVE considered the doctrine of proper immateriality both by the light of nature, and also of the scriptures, without finding any foundation for it in either. I shall now endeavour to trace what have been the notions that men in different ages, and systems of philosophy, have entertained with respect to it; having little doubt but that it will appear,

to the satisfaction of all unprejudiced persons, that the strict metaphysical notion of immateriality is really a *modern thing*, being unknown to all the wise ancients, whether heathens or christians; and therefore, that the rejection of it ought not to give any alarm to the serious christian. It is no article in his faith that I am oppugning, but really an *upstart thing*, and a *nonentity*.

I shall begin with an account of opinions concerning the *supreme mind*, the parent and source of all intelligence, and afterwards consider the doctrines relating to the *human soul*. In this historical detail I shall also occasionally mention a few other circumstances, which may serve to shew the derivation of all the philosophical opinions concerning God from the same source.

It will throw considerable light upon this subject, to reflect, that it was a maxim with all the ancients, even till the time of the later christian Fathers and schoolmen, though I believe it to be false in itself, that nothing could be made out of nothing. *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. In fact, the idea of *creation*, in the modern sense of the word, never occurred to them; they always meaning by it only a *forming*, or *new modelling* of things; and in this sense their maxim was true, for a carpenter must be provided with *wood* before he can make any instrument of wood. The ancients, therefore, in general, supposed that two distinct things, or *principles*, had been from eternity,
viz.

viz. *matter* and *spirit*, or *God*, and since inferior intelligences could not, in their opinion, be made from nothing, any more than gross bodies, the universal opinion was, that they were *emanations from the supreme mind*. And, as they generally considered the Divine Being as a *fire*, or *light*, they explained the production of minds by the lighting of one candle at another, or by some other comparison of the same nature.

Now, since these are ideas that are known to have run through all the systems of the ancients, it is evident, that, in whatever terms they might express themselves, they could not, in reality, consider the Divine Being as strictly speaking, *without extension, indivisible, or indiscerptible*, which is essential to proper immateriality. In fact, by such terms as *spiritual, incorporeal, &c.* as was observed before, they could only mean a more subtle and refined kind of matter, such as air, flame, light, &c. Also, wherever the notion of the *absorption of all souls into the Deity*, or soul of the universe, prevailed, it is evident, that the soul could not be considered in the light in which modern metaphysicians consider it; and this is known to have been a notion universally prevalent in the East, and in Greece.

The Indian philosophers, says Beausobre*, think, that the Deity has a luminous body, invisible at present, because it is concealed

* Vol. ii. p. 467.

behind

behind another, either the heavens, or the world; but, that it will be revealed (i. e. become visible) some time. The Magi, and Chaldeans also say, that God in his body resembles light, and in his mind *truth**. But truth is only a *property*, and no *substance* whatever. According to the same author†, the first production of this great intellectual light or fire, was the *υπερκοσμικον φως*, the supramundane light, which is defined to be *an infinite, incorporeal, and lucid space, the happy seat of intellectual natures*. Of this it is not easy to form an idea; but it may receive some little illustration from a notion of the Cabalists, who say, that all spirits were made out of the *holy Ghost*, or spirit of God, which was made first.

The Cabalists, indeed, say that all creatures are emanations from the eternal Being, and that the attributes of the Deity being infinite, may produce an infinity of effects. It is extended when this substance composes spirits, and contracted when it makes matter‡, so that it is evident, they could have no notion of any thing properly immaterial. This doctrine of the Cabalists exists in the East, and probably came from thence.

The divine fire, the Magi say, was distributed to all creatures, and before all to the *prima mens*, as the oracles of Zoroaster teach, and then to other eternal and incorporeal natures, in which class are included innumerable

* Stanley by Le Clerc, p. 25. † P. 26.

‡ Bafnage, vol. iii. p. 93.

inferior

inferior gods, angels, good demons, and the souls of men.

To come to the Greek philosophy, we find that Pythagoras, after the Magi, says that God, in his body, resembles light, and in his soul truth. He is the universal spirit, that penetrates and diffuses itself through all nature *. Heraclitus defines God to be a subtle and swift substance, το λεπτότατον και το ταχιστόν, which permeates and pervades the whole universe †. This is certainly no proper description of immateriality. Democritus also said, that God was of the form of fire, εμπυρρειδης ‡.

Austin says, that he learned of the philosophers the incorporeality of God; but it is not easy, says Beaufobre §, to determine what they meant by the *incorporeality of God*. In their language it did not exclude *extension*, or *body* in a philosophical sense. Xenophanes, for example, believed that God was one, and eternal; but by this he only meant, that he was not material, organized, and like a man. The ασωματα, or the *incorporeal* of the Greeks, he adds, means nothing more than a subtle body, for example, like the air, as Origen has shewed in his *Principles*. Among the Latins, Austin imagined that there was a *spiritual matter*, out of which God made souls ||, which agrees with the notion above-mentioned of the Jewish Cabalists.

* Ramsay, p. 257. † Cudworth, p. 505.

‡ Plutarch De Placitis Philosophorum, lib. i.

§ Vol. i. p. 482 || Ibid.

As

As to Plato, the same writer says, " I cannot say precisely what was his idea of the spirituality of God. The manner in which he expresses the formation of souls implies, that his *indivisible substance* is not absolutely without extension. He supposed that God took of both substances, the divisible and the indivisible, and, mixing them together, made a third, which is a soul. But this mixing of two substances, and the reciprocal action of the one upon the other, cannot be conceived, if the one be extended, and the other be absolutely without extension * ." Besides, Plato speaks of God as *δια παντων τοντα* pervading all things, and he derives the word *διετατον*, which is applied to God from *δια τον πασσην θροωβη*, which does not suggest the idea of a proper immaterial being.

God, angels, and dæmons, says Porphyry and Jamblichus, are made of matter, but have no relation to what is corporeal †.

According to Cudworth, ‡ *Aristotle* defines incorporeal substances very properly, and says that God is such a substance; but if he did not make mind a mere *property*, he could only mean that it was something of a subtle nature that eluded our senses.

The opinion of the Stoics, concerning God, had nothing of incorporeal in it, but many

* Ib. 482. † Encyclopedie, Article Immaterialism

‡ P. 19.

Circumstances which shew it to have been derived from the Oriental philosophy, as were other particulars of their doctrine. The following account of it is given by the accurate Mrs. Carter.

“ The Stoics plainly speak of the world as
 “ God, or of God as the soul of the world,
 “ which they call his substance, and I do not,”
 she says, “ recollect any proof that they be-
 “ lieved him to exist in the extramundane
 “ space. Yet they held the world to be finite
 “ and corruptible, and that, at certain periods,
 “ it was to undergo successive conflagrations,
 “ and then all beings were to be resorbed into
 “ God, and again reproduced by him *.”
 “ They sometimes define God to be an in-
 “ telligent fiery spirit, without form, but
 “ passing into whatever things it pleases, and
 “ assimilating itself to all; sometimes an ac-
 “ tive operative fire. They, moreover, ex-
 “ pressly speak of God as corporeal, which is
 “ objected to them by Plutarch. Indeed,
 “ they define all essence to be body †. They
 “ held the eternity of matter, as a passive
 “ principle, but that was reduced into form
 “ by God, and that the world was made, and
 “ is continually governed by him ‡. They
 “ imagined the whole universe to be peopled
 “ with gods and dæmons, and among other
 “ divinities they reckoned the sun, moon, and

* Dissertation prefixed to her Translation of Epictetus,
 p. 7. † Ib. p. 8. ‡ P. 9.

“ stars,

“ stars, which they conceived to be animated
 “ and intelligent, or inhabited by particular dei-
 “ ties, as the body is by the soul, who presid-
 “ ed over them, and directed their motions*.”

The doctrine of the early christian heretics, who are known to have derived their opinions from the East, may help to throw some light upon those ancient tenets, as they may be presumed to be very nearly the same. The Valentinians and Manicheans said that God was an eternal, intelligent, and pure light, without any mixture of darkness, as we learn from Beaufobre †, He elsewhere observes, that this is the language of the Magi, the Cabalists, and many of the Greek philosophers ‡. It appears by another circumstance, that they did not consider the divine essence as so far incorporeal as to be *invisible*, for they maintained, that the luminous substance that was seen by the apostles on the mount of transfiguration was God §. Also, though the Manicheans said, that God was indivisible and simple, they supposed, that he had real extension, and was even bounded by the regions of darkness, with which the divine essence did not mix ||. Austin, while he was a Manichean, thought that God was corporeal, and extended, dispersed through the world; and into infinite space; because, as he observes, he could form no idea of a

* Dissertation prefixed to her Translation of Epictetus, p. 10.

† Vol. i. p. 466.

‡ Ib. p. 468.

§ Ib. 470.

|| Ib. 503. 513.

sub-

substance that had neither place nor extension*. From these circumstances we may learn in what sense to understand other philosophers and divines of those early ages, when they speak of the *simplicity, spirituality, and indivisibility* of the divine essence.

I now proceed to give some account of the opinions of some of the *christian Fathers* on this subject, which, I doubt not, will greatly surprize those of my readers who are not much acquainted with christian antiquity. It is, however, almost wholly taken from that learned and excellent critic Beausobre. The ablest and most orthodox christian Fathers, he says †, always say that God is a *light*, and a *sublime light*, and that all the celestial powers which surround the Deity are *lights of a second order, rays of the first light*. This is the general style of the Fathers before and after the council of Nice. The *word*, they say, is a light, that is come into the world, proceeding from the self-existent light, an emanation of *light from light* ‡.

The christians, says the same writer, who were always unanimous with respect to the *unity* of God, were by no means so with respect to his *nature*. The scriptures not being explicit on the subject, each adopted what he thought the most probable opinion, or that of the philosophical school in which he had been educated. Thus an Epicurean who embraced

* Ib. 473.

† Vol. i. p. 468.

‡ P. 469.

chris-

christianity was inclined to clothe the Deity with a *human form*, a Platonist said that God was *incorporeal*, and a Pythagorean that he was an *intelligent light*, or *fire*. Another imagined, that the essence of God was corporeal, but subtle, and etherial, penetrating all bodies. Another, with Aristotle, that it had nothing in it of the elements that composed this world, but believed it to be of a *fifth nature*.

“ In general,” says my author *, “ the
 “ idea of a substance absolutely *incorporeal*
 “ was not a common idea with christians at
 “ the beginning. When I, he adds, consider
 “ with what confidence Tertullian, who
 “ thought that God was corporeal, and *figured*,
 “ speaks of his opinion, it makes me suspect
 “ that it must have been the general opinion
 “ of the Latin church. Who can deny, says
 “ he, that God is a body, though he is a spi-
 “ rit? Every spirit is a body, and has a *form*
 “ proper to it. Melito, so much boasted of for
 “ his virtues and knowledge, composed a treatise
 “ to prove that God is corporeal †.”

The incorporeality of the Fathers ‡, did not exclude *visibility*, nor in consequence all sort of corporality. For there would be a manifest contradiction in saying, that corporeal eyes can see a being that has absolutely no extension. Those bishops also, who composed the council of Constantinople, which decreed that there is an emanation from the divine essence of an *uncreated light*, which is, as it

* P. 474.

† P. 474.

‡ P. 472.

were

were, his garment, and which appeared at the transfiguration of Christ, must have believed God to have been a luminous substance; for it is impossible that a visible, and consequently a corporeal light, should be an emanation from a pure spirit*.

On the mention of this subject, it may not be amiss to observe, that there was a famous dispute among the Greeks of the fourteenth century, whether the light which surrounded Christ at his transfiguration was created or uncreated. Gregorius Palamas, a famous monk of mount Athos, maintained that it was uncreated, and Barlaam maintained the contrary opinion. It was objected to Palamas, that an uncreated light could not be seen by mortal eyes. But Leo Allatius attempted to remove this difficulty, by saying, that if mortal eyes were fortified by a divine virtue, they might see the deity himself †.

When, continues my author ‡, I consider the manner in which the Greek Fathers explain the *incarnation of Christ*, I cannot help concluding, that they thought the divine nature corporeal. The incarnation, say they, is a perfect mixture of the two natures, the spiritual and subtle nature penetrates the material and corporeal nature, till it is dispersed through the whole of that nature, and mixed entirely with it, so that there is no place in the material nature that is void of the spiritual nature §.

* P. 472. † P. 470. ‡ P. 476. § P. 476.

Clemens of Alexandria says, in so many words, that *God is corporeal* *. Justin says, All substance, which, on account of its tenuity, cannot be subject to any other, has, nevertheless, a *body*, which constitutes its essence. If we call God *incorporeal*, it is not that he is so in reality, but to speak of him in the most respectable manner. It is because the essence of God cannot be perceived, and that we are not sensible of it, that we call it *incorporeal* †.

Tertullian believed God to be a body, because he thought that what was not a body was *nothing*. He says, when we endeavour to form an idea of the divinity, we cannot conceive of it but as a very pure *luminous air*, diffused every where ‡. Origen observed, that the word *incorporeal* is not in the Bible §, and Jerom reproached him with making God corporeal. Maximus did not believe the *immensity* of the divine substance, nor could any of those who thought him corporeal; because it was a maxim with them, that two substances could not be in the same place at the same time ||. Austin says, that God is a *spiritual light*, and that this light is no other than *truth*. Is truth nothing, says he, because it is not diffused through space, finite or infinite **. This is the very language of the Magi.

* Encyclopedie, article Immaterialism.

† Ibid.

‡ Beaufobre, p. 477. § P. 484.

|| P. 475.

** P. 48f.

Those

Those passages of scripture which speak of God as a *spirit*, were so far from deciding this controversy in favour of the immateriality of the divine essence; that those christians who believed God to be corporeal, alledged, in favour of their opinion, that very expression of our Saviour, that *God is a spirit*. Can you, says Gregory Nazianzen, conceive of a spirit without conceiving *motion*, and *diffusion*, properties which agree only to body. Origen says, that every spirit, according to the proper and simple notion of the word, signifies a body. This is confirmed by Chalcidius. The idea of a spirit, according to the ancients, was nothing but an invisible, living, thinking, free, and immortal being, which has within itself the principle of its actions and motions*.

If the modern metaphysician be shocked at what he has heard already, what will he say of the *Anthropomorphites*, who maintained, that God had even a human form? and yet Beausobre says †, that this error is so ancient, that it is hardly possible to find the origin of it. They supposed that God had a body, subtle like light, but with organs exactly like the human body, not for *necessity*, but for *ornament*, believing it to be the most excellent of all forms. This opinion must have been very common in the East. The contrary opinion was even considered as heresy, because it was the opinion of Simon Magus.

* P. 485.

† P. 502.

Melito, bishop of Sardis, wrote in favour of this opinion, and though it was combated by Novatian in the West, and by Origen in the East, it still kept its ground in the church. The monks, who soon became very powerful, undertook its defence, and almost all the anchorites of Nitria were so attached to it, that, on this account, they raised violent seditions against their patriarch Theophilus, and exclaimed against the memory and writings of Origen*.

They who did not believe the immensity of God, believed, nevertheless, his *infinity*, because he knows all things, and acts every where. There is but one true God, says the author of the Clementine Homilies. He is adorned with the most *excellent form*, he presides over all beings, celestial and terrestrial, and conducts all events. He is in the world, as the heart is in the man; and from him, as from a center, there is continually diffused a vivifying and incorporeal virtue, which animates and supports all things †.

As we come nearer to the present time, we shall find, that the metaphysical turn of those who are usually called *schoolmen*, refined upon the notions of the early Fathers, as will appear more distinctly when I recite their opinions concerning the human soul; but still, some of the properties of matter were ascribed to spirits even till very near our times. It is

* P. 502.

† P. 507.

some-

something remarkable, however, that we find in the works of Gregory the Great, who flourished in the sixth century, expressions more nearly approaching to the modern language, than any that were generally used long after his time. The only question is, whether he had precisely the same ideas to his words.

He says, that God penetrates every thing without extenuation, and surrounds every thing without extension; he is *superior et inferior sine loco, amplior sine latitudine, subtilior sine extenuatione*. Speaking of Satan going out from the presence of God, he says, how can he go from him who *per molem corporis nusquam est, sed per incircumscriptam substantiam nusquam deest**?

Damascenus, who wrote in the eighth century, says, that God is not *in loco*, for he is a place to himself, filling all things, and himself embracing (*complectens*) all things; for he, without any mixture, pervades all things, *omnia permeat*†.

Photius, in the ninth century, says, that God is not in the world as created beings are, but in a more sublime manner; that he is in every thing, and above all things; that he is in all things by his operation, but, that his *act* being his *substance*, one may truly say, he is, both in act and substance, every where‡.

* Opera, p. 6. H. I.

† Opera, p. 281.

‡ Dupin, vol. vii. p. 109.

Gautier of Mauritania, in the twelfth century, maintained against Thierry, that God is omnipresent by his essence, as well as by his power*.

T. Aquinas, also, and the other schoolmen, say, that God is every where by his *essence*, as well as his *power*†. He says farther, that God is a *pure act*, *purus actus*‡, that he is in all places and all things, not excluding other things, but as *containing them*, not contained by them: and as the whole soul is in every part of the body, so the whole Deity is in all, and every thing. *Deus totus est in omnibus et singulis*§. If they had any ideas to this language, which indeed is not easy to suppose, they must have considered the divine essence as not destitute of extension, and in this state the opinion continued till the reformation,

Crellius, giving a summary view of what was generally asserted concerning God, mentions the following positions, which he justly considers as contradictory: that God is infinite (with respect to immensity) and yet, wholly contained in the smallest particle of dust, or point of space; that he so exists in any whole body, that there is no part of the body that is not full of God, nor, on the other hand, is there any part of the divine essence that is not in the body||.

* Dupin, vol. x. p. 173. † Summa, p. 281. ‡ P. 7.

§ P. 7. 16.

|| De Deo, cap. 27.

Bayle says, that till Descartes, all doctors, divines, and philosophers, gave extension to spirit, an infinite one to God, and a finite one to angels and rational souls. He and his followers, say the writers of the *Encyclopedie* (Article *Immensité*) first denied, that God was present any where by his *substance*, but only by his *knowledge* and *power*, having *no relation to place*; that otherwise he would be extended and corporeal, for he made extension to be a proper definition of matter.

Beaufobre, indeed, says*, that philosophers before Descartes made the extension of spirits not to be material, nor composed of parts, and that spirits are, with respect to the place that they occupy, *toti in toto, et toti in singulis partibus*. The Cartesians, says he, have overturned all these opinions; maintaining, that spirits have no extension, nor local presence. But he adds this system is rejected as absurd. It has appeared, however, that *local presence* was not admitted by all the writers here referred to.

Some very respectable writers, since Descartes, have rejected his metaphysical notions. Thus, Beza, in answer to Marnix, who maintained, that the divine omnipresence respected his *power* and *majesty* only, asserted his *proper* and *substantial immensity* †.

We shall the less wonder at Descartes's metaphysical refinements with respect to the divine *essence* and *presence*, when we consider the

* Vol. i. p. 482.

† Beaufobre, vol. i. p. 507.

manner in which he proved the *being* of God. He discovered within himself the idea of an eternal, infinite, and all-perfect being. But every idea having an archetype, this must have one; and *existence* being a perfection, this perfect being, or God, must actually and necessarily exist.

SECTION XX.

An Account of the different Opinions that have been maintained concerning the SOUL.

THE state of opinions relating to the *divine essence* is a sufficient guide to us with respect to the doctrine concerning the *human soul*, and other finite intelligences, as they necessarily correspond to one another. But for this reason, in order to gain intire satisfaction with respect to either subject, we must examine them both separately. I shall, therefore, in this section, go over the same ground as in the last, in order to select what has been advanced concerning the *human soul*, as distinct from the Divine Being. And this will be the more useful, as it will, at the same time, shew the derivation of the philosophical doctrine on this subject in the Western part of the world, from the Oriental system. So that in the more ancient times, there was no material difference of opinion with respect to it, And the

the many wild opinions that have been entertained in later times will be an instructive warning to us, of the consequence of departing from the dictates of *revelation*; which are indeed those of the soundest *philosophy*, and of *common sense*,

P A R T I.

The Opinions of the HEATHENS and JEWS.

THE opinion of the ancient *Persians* concerning the soul is clearly enough expressed in the following verse from the *Oracles of Zoroaster*, whether they be genuine or not.

Εἰσι πάντα πύρος εἶνος ἐκ[ε]ῖνα. L. 29.

They are all produced from one fire. Souls were, therefore, of the nature of *fire*. We find, however, in later times, several distinctions with respect to the soul, in the Eastern part of the world; and these also were copied, with some variation, by the Greeks and christians. The hypothesis of *two souls*, one of a celestial substance, or the rational soul, and the other material, the seat of the passions, was very generally received. It was, says *Beausobre* *, that of the Magi, the Chaldeans, and Egyptians; and Pythagoras and Plato

* Vol. ii. p. 420.

had

had it from them. It was also an old opinion in the Barbaric philosophy, that man derives his body from the earth, his soul, ψυχή, from the moon, and his spirit, πνεύμα, from the sun; and that after death each of them returns to its proper origin*. We find, also, some difference of opinion, with respect to the place where the souls were disposed of after death. The Chaldeans thought that the place of departed spirits was *above the world*, but the Greeks thought it was *below* †.

We have no very satisfactory account of the philosophy of the *Chinese*. It appears, however, that Confucius believed no future state of rewards and punishments. Being asked what angels or spirits are, he answered, they are *air*; and this, says Leland ‡, is the notion that the Chinese have of the soul. They look upon it to be a material thing, though highly rarefied.

When we come to the *Greek philosophy*, we find a considerable variety of opinions with respect to the essence of the soul; but all of them, who believed that there was properly any such thing as a soul, held the opinion of its being an *emanation from the Divine Being*. Cudworth says §, that all the ancients who asserted the soul's immortality, held that it was not generated, or made out of nothing; for that then it might return to nothing, and

* Ib. vol. i. p. 309. † Stanley by Le Clerc, p. 175.

‡ Necessity of Revelation, vol. ii. p. 295. § P. 38, 39.

there-

therefore they commonly began with proving its pre-existence, proceeding from thence to prove its permanency after death. And Cicero says, that it was a principle universally acknowledged, that whatever is born, and has a beginning, must also have an end.

Dicæarchus, says Cicero *, wrote three books to prove, that the minds of men are mortal; but in another place, he says, that he maintained, that there was *no soul*. Ariftoxenus said, that the soul was *harmony*, and Xenocrates, that it was *number* †. And according to him ‡, Pherecydes Syrius was the first that taught, that the minds of men are *sempiternos*, eternal, in which he was followed by his disciple Pythagoras. Pherecydes had that opinion from the East.

Thales (says Cicero, in his *Book of Consolation*) asserted, that Apollo himself declared, that the soul is a *part of a divine substance*, and that it returns to heaven as soon as it is disengaged from this mortal body. All the philosophers of the Italic school were of this sentiment. It was their constant doctrine, that souls descended from heaven, and that they are not only the works of the Divinity, but a participation of his essence §. According to Diogenes Laertius, Thales maintained, that the soul is immortal, because, that from which it

* Tus. Quest. p. 64. Ed. Glasg.

† Ib. p. 26, 27.

‡ Ib. p. 38.

§ Ramsay, p. 271.

is taken [*αποστασις*] is immortal*. Euripides also (according to Cicero†, held, that the mind was God, and that if God be either *anima*, or *fire*, the same must be the mind of man; or if it be a *fifth substance*, of which Aristotle speaks, it must be the same both with respect to God and the soul.

It is the doctrine of Plato, concerning the soul, that makes the greatest figure of those of the Greek philosophers, and that which the christians have made the most use of. I shall, therefore, give a fuller detail concerning it. He distinguished *three sorts of souls*, differing in purity and perfection, the *universal soul*, those of the stars, and those of *men*‡. Of those he distinguished two parts, the superior, which was an emanation from the Deity himself, and the inferior, which derived its origin from the more spiritual part of matter§. But according to Cicero||, Plato supposed the soul to be *threefold*, and placed reason in the *head*, anger in the *breast*, and desire *subter præcordia*.

Plato's account of the cause of the *descent of the soul* has something peculiar in it, but which was not unknown in some of the Oriental systems. Others supposed, that they were condemned to a confinement in these bodies for offences committed in a pre-existent state;

|| Gali's *Philosophia Generalis*, p. 178.

† Tusc. Quest. p. 56. ‡ Beaufobre, vol. ii. p. 362.

§ Ib. vol. i. p. 379. 559. || Tusc. Quest. p. 27.

whereas

whereas he represents their *desire of these mortal bodies* to have been their original sin. He supposed, says Beaufobre*, that souls were touched with a secret desire to unite themselves to bodies, and that this *terrestrial thought* was a weight which dragged them to this lower world. The Effenes, he says, had the same opinion. The following is his poetical account of it from Ramsay †. “ Plato says
 “ that every soul that follows faithfully the
 “ sublime law remains pure, and without
 “ spot; but if it content itself with nectar
 “ and ambrosia, without following the cha-
 “ riot of Jupiter, to go and contemplate truth,
 “ it grows heavy, its wings are broken, it
 “ falls upon the earth, and enters into a hu-
 “ man body, more or less base, according as it
 “ has been more or less elevated; and that it
 “ is only after ten thousand years that these
 “ souls are re-united to their principle, their
 “ wings not growing, and being renewed in
 “ less time.”

According to the Platonic philosophy, there must be something very corporeal in the composition of the souls of the wicked. Socrates, in the Phædo, says, that the souls of those who minded the body, and its appetites and pleasures, having something in them ponderous and earthy, must, after their departure out of the body; be drawn down to the earth, and hover about the sepulchres, till they enter

* Vol. ii. p. 332.

† P. 288.

again

again into bodies suited to their former nature. But that they, who live holy and excellent lives, being freed from those earthly places, as from prisons, ascend to a pure region above the earth, where they dwell; and those of them who were sufficiently purged by philosophy, live all their time without the body, and ascend to still more beautiful habitations *. In his tenth book of *Laws*, he says, that those who have been guilty of smaller sins, do not sink so deep as others, but wander about near the surface of the region; whereas they that have sinned more frequently, and more heinously, fall into the depth, and into those lower places which are called *Hades* †.

It is generally acknowledged, that there is great uncertainty with respect to the opinion of *Aristotle* on this subject. It is probable, that he was sometimes inclined to the opinion of man having no soul distinct from the body; as when he says, according to *Plutarch*, that sleep is common to the soul as well as the body. But when he speaks of the soul as a substance distinct from the four elements, and makes it to be *a fifth kind of substance*, it should seem that he meant to declare himself to be of the opinion of those who held the soul to be of divine origin, and to be eternal. *Cudworth* says, that it must needs be left doubtful

* *Leland*, vol. ii. p. 307.

† *Ibid.* p. 313.

whether

whether he acknowledged any thing immortal in us or not*.

Cicero, when he speaks as a philosopher, seems to adopt the sentiments of *Plato* with respect to the soul. He says, *Humanus animus, decerptus ex mente divina, cum nullo alio nisi cum deo ipso (si hoc fas sit dictu) comparari potest* †.

“ In all the first book of *Tusculan Questions*,” says *Mr. Locke* †, “ where he lays out so much of his reading and reason, there is not one syllable shewing the least thought that the soul was an immaterial substance, but many things directly to the contrary --- That which he seems most to incline to was, that the soul was not at all *elementary*, but was of the same substance with the heavens, which *Aristotle*, to distinguish it from the four elements, and the changeable bodies here below, which he supposes made up of them, called *Quinta Essentia*. In all which there is nothing of immateriality, but quite the contrary.”

He adds farther, that “ the expressions which drop from him, in several parts of the book, evidently shew that his thoughts went not at all beyond matter. For example, that the souls of excellent men and women ascended into heaven, of others that

* P. 55.

† *Leland*, vol. ii. p. 326.

‡ *Essay*, vol. p. 160.

“ they

“ they remained here on earth : that the soul
 “ is hot, and warms the body : that, as it
 “ leaves the body, it penetrates, and divides,
 “ and breaks through our thick, cloudy, moist
 “ air : that it stops in the region of fire, and
 “ ascends no farther, the equality of warmth
 “ and weight making that its proper place,
 “ where it is nourished, and sustained with
 “ the same things wherewith the stars are
 “ nourished and sustained ; and that by the
 “ conveniency of its neighbourhood it shall
 “ there have a clearer view, and fuller know-
 “ ledge, of the heavenly bodies : that the
 “ soul also, from this height, shall have a
 “ pleasant and fairer prospect of the globe of
 “ the earth, the disposition of whose parts
 “ will then lie before it in one view : that it
 “ is hard to determine what conformation,
 “ size, and place, the soul has in the body :
 “ that it is too subtle to be seen : that it is in
 “ the human body as in a house, or a vessel,
 “ or a receptacle. All which are expressions
 “ that sufficiently indicate that he had not in
 “ his mind separated materiality from the
 “ idea of the soul.” To these remarks of
 Mr. Locke, I will add that, had any such opi-
 nion as that of an *immaterial principle*, in the
 modern sense of the word, been known in the
 time of Cicero, who has collected and dis-
 cussed all the opinions of the Greek philoso-
 phers on that, as well as on almost every
 other question of importance, it would cer-
 tainly have been found in his writings.

It

It is much doubted, however, whether, in reality, Cicero did not give into the Epicurean and atheistical notions of his time; since he expresses himself very much to that purpose in his private letters; and it is remarkable that Cæsar, speaking in open senate, considers all the accounts of what became of men after death as entirely fabulous, and in such a manner as if he well knew he spoke the sentiments of all his hearers.

The *Stoics* sometimes adopted the common philosophical doctrine, and sometimes departed from it; but upon the whole they may be ranked with those who adopted the principles of the Oriental system on this subject, as well as on several others. Mrs. Carter says, “ they held both superior intelligences, and likewise the souls of men to be a portion of the essence of God, or parts of the soul of the world, and also to be corporeal and perishable. Some of them, indeed, maintained that human souls subsisted after death, but they were, like all other beings, to be consumed at the conflagration. Cleanthes taught that all souls lasted till that time; Chrysippus only those of the good. Seneca is perpetually wavering, sometimes speaking of the soul as immortal, and at others, as perishing with the body; and indeed,” she says, “ there is nothing but confusion, and a melancholy uncertainty to be met with in the *Stoics* on this subject*.”

* P. 11.

VOL. I.

R

“ M

“ M. Antoninus, on the supposition that
 “ souls continue after death, makes them to
 “ remain for some time in the air, and then
 “ to be changed, diffused, kindled, and re-
 “ sumed into the productive intelligence of
 “ the universe. But, in another place, he vin-
 “ dicates the conduct of providence on the
 “ hypothesis, that the souls of good men are
 “ extinguished by death * .” “ In general,
 “ however, he holds the language of other
 “ philosophers on this subject, calling the
 “ soul, *ψυχή, μέλοχος θείας απομοίρας, and σπρροια,*
 “ and *αποσπασμα τε διος* †. Thus also Seneca,
 “ *Dei pars est;* and Manilius, *Pars ipse deorum*
 “ *est.*” “ Nothing,” says Mrs. Carter ‡, “ can
 “ excuse their idolatry of human nature (on
 “ this supposition) which they proudly and
 “ inconsistently supposed to be perfect and
 “ self-sufficient. Seneca carries the matter
 “ so far as, by an implied antithesis, to give
 “ his wife man the superiority to God. Even
 “ Epictetus sometimes informs his readers
 “ that they are not inferior to the gods.”

Galen declares he was quite ignorant of the nature of the soul, but that he much suspected that it was corporeal.

Hitherto we have certainly found nothing like a proper *immaterial soul*, as it is described by modern metaphysicians; and it is remark-

* P. 12.

† See Suicer.

‡ P. 17.

§ Leland, vol. ii. p. 281.

able, that when we come to the opinions of the *christian Fathers*, we find that, instead of their ideas being more spiritualized on this subject, they were considerably more gross than those of many of the heathens, as we have seen to have been the case with respect to their opinions concerning the divine essence. But before I recite their opinions, I shall take some notice of those of the Jews.

Presently after the time of our Saviour, and not much, I imagine, before, the more speculative of the Pharisees began to adopt the doctrine of the heathens concerning the soul, as a substance distinct from the body. If we judge by the history of the gospel, we cannot but conclude, that this was not then the common belief. At least Martha, the sister of Lazarus, does not appear to have known any thing of it; nor does it appear from that part of the history, that even the Pharisees in general had adopted it. And though it be said of the Sadducees, so late as the year A. D. 60, as distinguished from the Pharisees *, that *they say there is no resurrection, neither angel, nor spirit*, it is not certain, that by spirit, (*πνεῦμα*) in this place, is meant the soul of a man, especially as it is said of the Pharisees, that they confess *both*, *τα αμωσιερα*, as if there had been in fact but *two articles* mentioned before.

* Acts xxiii. 8.

Nor is it quite certain, that even the opinions of the Pharisees in general, in the time of Josephus, were quite so conformable to the notions of the Greeks as he has represented them. That himself, Philo, and others, had adopted that system is evident enough; but the disposition of Josephus to accommodate his history to the taste of his readers, and his desire to recommend his nation and religion to his masters, are well known.

There can be no doubt, however, but that after the age of Josephus, the philosophizing Jews went into all the depths of Oriental mysticism. Philo Judæus calls the human soul, *αποστασμα*, or *απαυξασμα*, from the Deity*. The Cabalists, as I mentioned before, supposed that spirits are made not from nothing, but from the Holy Ghost; and that spirits produce spirits, as ideas produce ideas †. They also thought that the soul, being an emanation from the Deity, had the power of multiplying itself without end, because every part of the Deity is infinite; so that they believed that all souls were contained in that of Adam, and sinned with him ‡. Like the Greeks, the Jews in general, in the time of Josephus, thought that the place of departed souls was under the earth.

* Gale's *Philosophia Generalis*, p. 370.

† Beaufobre, vol. i. p. 588. 590. ‡ lb. vol. ii. p. 288.

P A R T II.

The Opinions of the CHRISTIAN FATHERS to the sixth Century.

WE find nothing said by any christian writer concerning the soul before Justin Martyr, who had been a Platonic philosopher, and who, using their language, speaks of souls as emanations from the Deity*.

But as this doctrine of the high *descent of the soul* has not the least countenance in the scriptures, we soon find that it did not meet with a hearty reception among christians, and that it was abandoned by all who were not peculiarly addicted to philosophy. Irenæus expressly denied the transmigration of souls; he believed that they were immortal only through grace, and maintained that those of the wicked shall cease to be after they shall have been tormented a long time †.

After this time, we find that the doctrine of a direct *materialism* crept into the christian church, and it is not easy to say from what source it came. Possibly, however, those who used this language did not, at first, at least, differ from other philosophers; but considering what their ideas of *spirit* really were,

* Beaufobre, vol. ii. p. 350.

† Dupin, vol. i. p. 60.

thought (and it was certainly with reason) that the term *body* was more justly applicable to it.

The most determined materialist in christian antiquity is Tertullian, who wrote his treatise, *De Anima*, on purpose to explode the philosophical opinion of the *descent of the soul from heaven*. He maintained, that the soul is formed at the same time with the body, and that as the body produces a body, so the soul produces a soul*.

To what, says Tertullian, did Christ, when he died, descend? To the souls, I presume, of the patriarchs; but why, if there be no souls under the earth? *If it be not a body, it is nothing*. Incorporality is free from all confinement, from pain or pleasure, Also all the instruments of its pain or pleasure must be body †. The soul of Adam, he says ‡, came from the breath of God. But what is the breath of God but *vapor, spiritus*?

Arnobius, in opposition to the philosophers, maintained, that it was human vanity that gave the soul a descent from heaven, that it is corporeal and mortal in its own nature; that the souls of the righteous obtain immortality by the divine spirit which Jesus Christ unites to them; but that those of the wicked are to be consumed by fire, and will be annihilated after long torments §.

* Dupin, vol. i. p. 79.

† Opera, p. 268.

‡ P. 284

§ Beaufobre, vol. ii. p. 413.

This

This writer argues much at large, that the soul is wholly incapable of sensation, or reflection without the body. After supposing the case of a child cut off from all communication with the world, and barely fed, in a hole, without light, he concludes, that he would be destitute of all knowledge, except of the very few ideas that he would necessarily acquire by his senses in that confined situation. And he concludes with saying, Where, then, is that immortal portion of divinity; where is that soul, which enters into the body, so learned and intelligent, and which, with the help of instruction only recollects its former knowledge * ?

Origen says, it was not determined by the church, whether a soul was produced by another soul, whether it be eternal, or created for a certain time; whether it animates the body, or is only confined in it. But himself, being a Platonist, held, that souls had been *from eternity*, that they are sent into bodies as into a prison, for a punishment of their sins †. Of course, he believed the transmigration of souls ‡. So also did the Cabalists. The Jews, however, limited the transmigrations to three, which they seem to have taken from Plato, who admitted no souls into heaven but those which had distinguished themselves by the practice of virtue in three incorporations §.

* Opera, p. 34.

† Dupin, vol. i. p. 110.

‡ Beaufobre, vol. ii. p. 452. § Ib. p. 495

The Manicheans allowed five transmigrations, but the souls of the *elect*, they said, went immediately into heaven*.

Among the later Fathers, we find three opinions relating to the origin of the soul. First, that souls were created when the body was ready to receive them†; another, that they came from God, and are inclosed in the male seed; another, that the first soul, viz. that of Adam, was made of nothing, and that all the rest came from this by ordinary generation. It was to this opinion that Austin inclined‡.

He was, however, far from being determined in his opinion on this subject, and sometimes expresses himself in such a manner as if he thought the soul to be no *substance*, but only a *property*. He said, that the soul has no *corporeal dimensions*, but that *reason* and the *soul* are one§. He expressly denied, however, that the soul is any *part of God*||, and says, that God's breathing upon Adam either was his soul, or that which produced it; but he does not determine whether souls are *created daily*, or not.

Before his time, Gregory Nyssenus held, that souls are formed at the same moment with the body; and he first, I believe, made use of an expression which was long retained in the christian schools, and was the source of much

* Beaufobre, p. 499.

† Ib. p. 353.

‡ Ib. p. 354.

§ Dupin, vol. iii. p. 131.

|| P. 161.

metaphysical subtlety, viz. that *the soul is equally in all parts of the body**. It was afterwards added more distinctly, that *the whole soul is in every part of the body*.

The opinion of the immateriality of the soul does not seem to have tended to a settlement before the fifth century, when the question seems at length to have been, in a manner, decided by Claudianus Mamertus, a priest of the church of Vienne, whose opinions, and manner of treating the subject, are much commended by Dupin.

In this century, Æneas Gazæus had maintained, that souls are sensible of nothing without the body†. Gennadius had advanced, that God only is incorporeal‡, and Faustus Regiensis had supported the same opinion more largely, alledging the authority of Jerom and Cassianus, and urging, that the soul is inclosed in the body, that it is in heaven or hell, and consequently *in some place*, and that if it was not in place it would be *every where*, which is true of God only.

It is to this writer that Mamertus replies. But notwithstanding the excessive applause he has met with, it will be seen that his ideas on the subject would not be entirely approved by the more acute metaphysicians of the present age. In his reply to Faustus, he says, That every thing that is incorporeal is not uncreated,

* Dupin, vol. ii. p. 277.

† Ib. vol. iv. p. 187.

‡ Ib. p. 185.

that

that the volitions of the soul have their *effect* in place, but are not *made* in place; that it has neither length, breadth, nor height, that it is not moved upwards or downwards, or in a circle; that it has neither inward nor outward parts; that it thinks, perceives, and imagines, in *all its substance*; that we may speak of the *quality* of the soul, but no man knows how to express the *quantity* of it. It is neither *extended*, nor *in place* *.

In some of his expressions we find the peculiar opinions of Descartes. For he says, the soul is not different from the *thoughts*, that the soul is never without thought, for it is *all thought*; and that heaven and hell are not different *places*, but different *conditions* †.

But I question whether any modern metaphysician will think him sufficiently accurate; or indeed, consistent, in saying that the soul is the *life of the body*, that this life is equally in all and in every part of the body, and that therefore the soul is in no place ‡. It seems to have been this confounding of the *soul* and the *life*, which is only a *property*, and not a *substance*, that gave rise to the palpable absurdities of all the schoolmen, who maintained that there was *a whole soul in every part of the body*, and yet that one man had but one soul. And analogous to this is their

* Dupin, vol. iv. p. 151.

† lb. p. 152.

‡ lb. 153.

other

other paradox concerning God, viz. that he is completely in every possible place.

Mamertus's book is dedicated to Sidonius Apollinaris, who, in return, prefers him to all the writers of his time, as the most able philosopher, and the most learned man that was then among christians. As the compliment he pays him is a very singular one, I shall, for the entertainment of my readers, insert it in the note*.

P A R T III.

The State of Opinions from the Sixth Century to the Time of Descartes.

THAT we may have a clearer idea of the state of opinions concerning the soul in what are generally called the *dark ages*, I shall note those of the most considerable writers that have fallen into my hands.

Cassio-

* He says that he was an absolute master of all the sciences, that the purity of his language equalled or surpassed Terence's, Varro's, Pliny's, &c. that he knew how to use the terms of logic eloquently; that his short and concise way of writing contained the most deep learning in a few sentences, and he expressed the greatest truths in a few words; that his style was not swelled with empty hyperboles, and did not degenerate into a contemptible flatness. In fine, he scruples not to compare him with the most eminent philosophers, the most eloquent orators, and the most

Cassiodorus, who flourished in the beginning of the sixth century, in his treatise *De Anima*, in which he professes to bring into one view what was most approved, and best established on the subject, maintains, that the soul has neither length, breadth, nor thickness, that the whole soul is in all its parts (faculties) and that it is of a *fiery nature*. He inclines to the opinion of the *derivation of souls from souls*, because he could not otherwise account for the souls of infants being contaminated with original sin*.

Gregory the Great, in the sixth century, says †, that the question concerning the *origin of the soul* was much agitated among the Fathers; some maintaining, that it descended

most learned Fathers of the church. He judges, says he, like Pythagoras, he divides like Socrates, he explains like Plato, he puzzles like Aristotle, he delights like Æschines, he stirs up the passions like Demosthenes, he diverts with a pleasing variety like Hortensius, he obviates difficulties like Cethegus, he excites like Curio, he appeases like Fabius, he feigns like Crassus, he dissembles like Cæsar, he advises like Cato, he dissuades like Appius, he persuades like Cicero. And, if we compare him to the Fathers of the church, he instructs like St. Jerom, he overthrows error like Lactantius, he maintains the truth like St. Austin, he elevates himself like St. Hilary, he speaks as fluently and as intelligibly as St. Chrysostom, he reproves like St. Basil, he comforts like St. Gregory Nazianzen, he is copious like Orosius, and as urgent as Rufinus; he relates a story as well as Eusebius, he excites like St. Eucherius, he stirs up like Paulinus, he supports like St. Ambrose.

* Opera, p. 429.

Opera, vol. ii. p. 209.

from

from Adam, and others, that a soul was given to each individual; and it was acknowledged, that this important question could not be solved in this life. If, says he, the soul be of the substance of Adam, as well as the body, why doth it not die with the body? But if it have another origin, how is it involved in the guilt of Adam's sin? But, as he concludes with saying, that the latter, viz. the doctrine of *original sin*, is certain, and the other, viz. the *mortality of the soul*, is uncertain, he seems inclined to think the soul descended from the soul of Adam, *ex traduce*, and therefore was possibly mortal.

It is very evident, that this writer had a notion that the soul was corporeal, as will be seen by a very curious circumstance in what follows. He considered the souls of saints and martyrs as continuing in or near their dead bodies and relicks. For he says, that, as the life of the soul was discovered by the motion of the body while it was living, so after death its life is manifested by the power of working miracles. But he did not consider the soul as confined to the dead body; for he adds, that many persons, whose minds were purified by faith and prayer, had actually seen souls going out of their bodies when they died; and he relates at large several histories of such souls becoming visible. Among others, he says, that the soul of *Abbot Spes* was seen by all the brothers of his monastery,

monastery, coming out of his mouth in the shape of a dove, and flying up to heaven *.

As we approach nearer the age of the schoolmen, we find less of materialism, but a language proportionably more unintelligible, though not quite so remote from all conception, as that of our modern metaphysicians.

Damascenus, in the eighth century, says †, that “the *whole soul is present to the whole body*, and not *part to part*, nor is it contained in the body, but contains it; as fire contains the red-hot iron, and, living in it, performs its functions.” Though this writer, as we have seen, considered God as not existing in place, we see here that he confines the soul of a man to his body.

From this time the philosophical opinion of the *descent of the soul* was universally abandoned by christians. Agobard, who flourished in the ninth century, considers it as a question decided by divines, that the soul is not *a part of the divine substance*, or nature, and had no being before its union with the body, being created when the body is formed ‡. Fredegisus, in the same century, says, that souls are created in and with the body, though the philosophers asserted the contrary, and Austin doubted it §.

Another doubt, however, continued in this century. For, Rabanus Maurus says, it was

* Opera, vol. ii. p. 209.

† Opera, p. 282.

‡ Dupin, vol. vii. p. 182.

§ Ib. p. 145.

a dubious question, whether God created the soul to be infused into the body, or whether it was produced from the souls of the father and mother. He maintained that the soul has *no particular figure*, but that it is principally seated in the head *. Hincmarus, in the same century, says, that the soul does not *move locally*, though it changes its will, and manners †.

Bernard, in the twelfth century, says, that the soul cannot be in corporeal place, for that things incorporeal cannot be measured but by *time* ‡.

Many of the Fathers, we have seen, were of opinion, that the soul is propagated like the body, and that the soul of Adam was an emanation from God. But Peter Lombard condemns those who supposed the soul to be a part of God, and says, that it was created out of nothing §.

My reader must excuse me if, in relating the opinion of the famous schoolman, Thomas Aquinas, I should not make myself perfectly understood. I shall endeavour, however, to make his meaning as intelligible as I well can. He says that the soul is not a body, but the *act of the body*, (*actus corporis*) as heat, which is the principle of warmth; just as the soul, which is the principle of life, is not a

* Dupin, p. 164.

† Ib. p. 50.

‡ Opera, p. 466.

§ Sententia, Dist. 17.

body

body, but the act of a body. This looks as if he considered the soul as a mere *property of body*; but treating of the difference between the souls of men and brutes, he says, that the former is *aliquid subsistens*, but the latter was *not subsistens* *. He acknowledges, however, with all the Aristotelians, that the soul is *the form of the body* †. Since *that by means of which any thing acts, is the form of that to which the operation is attributed* ‡. The whole soul, he says, is in every part of the body, according to the whole of its *perfection and essence*, but not according to the whole of its *power* §. There is but one soul, he says, to one man, discharging the functions of the intellectual, vegetative, and sensitive part ||. In order to explain the mutual action of the soul and body, he says **, that the *contactus virtutis* is opposite to the *contactus qualitatis*, and that body may be touched by what is incorporeal, so that the soul may move the body.

In *Pernumia*, whose treatise of *Natural Philosophy* was printed in 1570, the soul is said ††, to be the *first act, primus actus*, of the body, and that it is so united to the body, that, with respect to its *quantity*, it is *tota in toto, et pars in parte*; but with respect to its *essence*, and all its *faculties*, it is *tota in toto, et tota in qualibet parte*. In the same treatise, the *natural and vital heat* (which he

* P. 160.

† P. 161.

‡ P. 163.

§ P. 168.

|| P. 165.

** P. 160.

†† Fol. 85.

says

says is composed of the substance of the *heart*, the most refined (*depuratis*) vapours of the *blood*, and *air* attracted by it) is said *, to be a middle substance, between the body and the soul.

P A R T IV.

The State of Opinions, from the Time of Descartes to the present.

THUS stood the orthodox faith concerning the soul till the time of Descartes, who introduced quite a new mode of considering the subject, beginning upon new principles; which was by doubting of every thing, and then admitting nothing but what his own consciousness absolutely obliged him to admit. And yet his writings on this subject have been the means of introducing more confusion into it than was ever known before.

The Cartesians considered the Aristotelian doctrine of the soul being *the substantial form of the body*, as inconsistent with its immateriality, and consequently destructive of the doctrine of its immortality †. But, in consequence of separating from the idea of the soul every thing that he was not obliged to admit, Descartes defined the essence of the soul

* Fol. 91. † Historical View, p. 17.

to consist in *thinking*, the evident consequence of which is, that the soul is, in fact, nothing but a *property*, and no *substance* at all; and, therefore, notwithstanding his boasting of improving the doctrine of immateriality, he has been considered by some as only a more acute materialist.

It is plain, however, that this was not the case, and his meaning must have been, that there was a *substance* of the soul, and that the property of this substance was to think without intermission, which he maintained. He is, therefore, considered by others, and especially Mr. Bayle, as having first established the true doctrine of an immaterial substance, intirely without extension, or relation to place. And yet I do not see that his idea of the soul could be wholly abstracted from matter, when he supposed that the seat of it was the *pineal gland*. I therefore think that the proper immaterial system is of still later date, but who was the author of it may not be easily discovered. Indeed, nothing was necessary to make the doctrine of the schoolmen a complete system of immaterialism, but the omission of a few positions which were inconsistent with it. But in the same proportion in which we cut off from spirit every property that it was supposed to have in common with matter, we bring it to a state in which it is naturally impossible to act upon matter, or to be acted upon by it.

Male-

Malebranche adopted the system of Descartes, maintaining, that the essence of matter consists in extension, and that of the soul in thinking. He, therefore, said that the soul thinks always, and most of all when it has no consciousness of its thoughts. He is also said to have been the first who brought into vogue the doctrine of *animal spirits*.

The system of Descartes has been generally adopted, but with some improvements, by more modern metaphysicians. I do not, however, find the strict immaterial system in any writer earlier than our Sir Kenelm Digby, who, in his treatise *Of the Soul* *, considers it as “ the great property of the soul, that “ it is able to move, and to work, without “ being moved or touched; that it is in no “ place, and yet not absent from any place; “ that it is also not in time, and not subject “ to it, for though it does consist with time, “ and is while time is, it is not in time.”

To this doctrine Alexander Ross, in his *Philosophical Touchstone* †, very naturally and sensibly replies, “ If the soul be no where, “ it is nothing, and if every where, it is “ God, whose property indeed it is to be “ every where, by his essence, power, and “ providence.”

The good sense of Mr. Locke was evidently staggered at the extravagant positions of the strict immaterialists, though he had not cou-

* P. 85.

† P. 80.

rage, or consistency, to reject the doctrine altogether. In opposition to them, he maintains largely *, that spirits are *in place*, and *capable of motion*. He likewise maintained much at large the possibility of thinking being superadded to matter †, and was inclined to

* Essay, vol. i. p. 259.

† So considerable a writer as Mr. Locke, having maintained the *possible materiality* of the soul. I cannot satisfy myself without giving my reader, in this note, an idea of his manner of considering the subject, by bringing together his most striking arguments :

“ We have ideas of *matter* and *thinking*, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think; or else joined and fixed to matter, so disposed, a thinking immaterial substance: it being, in respect of our notions, not much more remote from our comprehension, to conceive that God can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd to it another substance with the faculty of thinking; since we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of substance the Almighty has been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any created being but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator.” *Essay*, vol. ii. p. 167.

This position he defends and illustrates very largely, in his letter to the Bishop of Worcester, some of the most remarkable passages of which I shall subjoin.

“ You cannot *conceive* how an extended solid substance should think, therefore God cannot make it think. Can you conceive how your own soul, or any substance thinks? You find, indeed, that you *do* think, but I want to be told how the action of thinking is performed. This, I confess, is beyond my conception.” *Ibid.* p. 146.

“ You

to be of opinion, that the souls of men are only in part immaterial. It is worth our

“ You cannot conceive how a solid substance should ever be able to move itself. And as little, say I, are you able to conceive how a created unsolid substance should move itself. But there may be something in an *immaterial* substance that you do not know. I grant it, and in a *material* one too. For example, gravitation of matter towards matter inevitably shows that there is something in matter that we do not understand, unless we can conceive *self-motion* in matter, or an inexcitable and inconceivable *attraction* in matter, at immense and incomprehensible distances.” Ib. p. 147.

“ The gravitation of matter towards matter, by ways inconceivable to me, is not only a demonstration that God can, if he pleases, put into bodies powers and ways of operation above what can be derived from our ideas of body, or can be explained by what we know of matter, but also an unquestionable and every where visible instance that he has done so.” P. 149.

“ When you can make it conceivable how any created finite dependent substance can move itself, or alter or stop its own motion (which it must to be a free agent) I suppose you will find it no harder for God to bestow this power on a solid, than an unsolid created substance.” P. 166.

“ He that considers how hardly sensation is, in our thought, reconcileable to matter” (it must be remembered that Mr. Locke thought brutes to be wholly material) or existence to any thing that has not extension at all, will confess that he is very far from knowing what his soul is. It is a point which seems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge. And he who will give himself leave to consider freely, and look into the dark and intricate part of each hypothesis, will scarcely find his reason able to determine him fixedly for or against the soul’s materiality.” P. 168.

“ consideration, says. he *, whether active
 “ power be not the proper attribute of spi-
 “ rits, and passive power of matter. Hence
 “ it may be conjectured, that created spirits
 “ are not totally separate from matter, be-
 “ cause they are both active and passive. Pure
 “ spirit, viz. God, is only active, pure
 “ matter is only passive; those beings that
 “ are both active and passive we may judge to
 “ partake of both.”

I cannot help thinking that he who could maintain these positions, viz. that spirits exist *in place*, and have proper *loco-motion*, that *matter may be made to think*, that the souls of men are probably *in part material*, and also that the *souls of brutes are not immortal*, was not far from a proper materialism; and that to have been consistent with himself, he certainly ought to have declared for it without regarding vulgar prejudices.

Indeed, the tendency of these principles to materialism was so evident, that almost all the subsequent defenders of the immateriality and natural immortality of the soul have disclaimed them. Among others, Dr. Watts has most clearly and largely proved †, that the necessary consequence of admitting spirits to exist in space, and to be capable of a proper motion from one place to another, is that they must have proper extension, figure, and a corporeal substance.

* Essay, vol. i. p. 264. † Philosophical Essays, p. 133, &c.

“ With

“ With regard to conscious beings, whether created or uncreated,” he says *, “ I confess I have no clear idea how they can have any proper locality, residence, situation, incarness, or juxtaposition among bodies, without changing the very essence or nature of them into extended beings, and making them quite other things than they are. When we say that God, the infinite spirit, is *every where*, in a strict philosophical sense, we mean that he has an immediate and unlimited consciousness of, and agency upon, all things, and that his knowledge and power reach also to all possibles, as well as to all actual beings. When we say the soul of man *is in his body*, we mean he has a consciousness of certain motions and impressions made on that particular animal engine, and can excite particular motions in it at pleasure.”

This being the only consistent system of immaterialism, it is that which is held by Mr. Baxter, and all the most approved modern writers upon the subject.

From the whole of this section, and the preceding, it will appear, that the modern idea of an *immaterial being* is by no means the same thing that was so denominated by the ancients; it being well known to the learned, as has been shewn, that what the ancients meant by an immaterial being, was only a

* Ibid, p. 381.

finer kind of what we should now call *matter*; something like *air* or *breath*, which first supplied a name for the *soul*, or else like *fire* or *flame*, which was probably suggested by the consideration of the *warmth* of the living body. Consequently, the ancients did not exclude from mind the property of *extension*, and *local presence*. It had, in their idea, some common properties with matter, was capable of being united to it, of acting and being acted upon by it, and of moving from place to place along with it.

But it was justly considered by the moderns, that such an immaterial substance as this was, in fact, no immaterial substance at all, but a material one; it being the opinion of all modern philosophers (though it was unknown to the ancients) that all matter is ultimately the same thing, all kinds of bodies differing from one another only in the *size* or *arrangement* of their ultimate particles, or atoms. It was, therefore, seen, that if the powers of sensation or thought could belong to such a material substance as the ancients had denominated an immaterial one (being only an attenuated kind of matter) it might be imparted to the very *grossist* matter; since it is naturally capable of the same attenuation; and, therefore, that the *soul* and *body*, being in reality the same kind of substance, must die together.

To avoid this conclusion, of which divines entertained a very unreasonable dread, they

they refined upon the former notion of spirit, excluding from it every property which it held in common with matter; making it, in the strict metaphysical sense of the term, an *immaterial thing*, without extension, that is, occupying no portion of space, and therefore bearing no relation to it; and consequently incapable of motion from one place to another. In fact, there was no other method of keeping clear of a proper *materialism*. For there can be no medium between absolute materialism, and this proper and strict immaterialism. Now, what I maintain is, that this dread of materialism has driven these refiners among the moderns, to adopt a system with respect to human nature, that is not only contradicted by fact and experience, as I think has been fully proved, but is likewise absurd and impossible in itself. For, by denying to spirit every property in common with matter, it necessarily makes them incapable of *mutual action* or *influence*; in consequence of which, it will be naturally impossible, that the divine mind should either have *created matter*, or be capable of *acting upon it*.

After the deduction that I have given of the history of opinions concerning the soul, it may be useful to give a summary view of the whole, that the several steps in the progress, and their natural connexion, may more easily appear.

Man is a being possessed of various faculties, or powers. He can *see, hear, smell, feel, walk, think,*

think, and *ſpeak*. He is alſo a very complex being, conſiſting of various diſtinct parts, ſome of which are evidently appropriated to ſome of theſe powers, and others to others of them. Thus it is the eye only that ſees, the ear that hears, the noſe that ſmells, the feet that walk, and the tongue is of principal uſe in modulati-
 ing the voice. What it is in man that *thinks* is not ſo obvious, and the opinions concern-
 ing it have been various. I apprehend, how-
 ever, that it was always ſuppoſed to be ſome-
 thing *within* a man, and not any part that was
 conſpicuous.

The writers of the Old Teſtament ſeem to
 have conceived of it variously, ſometimes re-
 ferring it to the *heart*, perhaps as the moſt
 central part of man, as when the Pſalmiſt ſays,
My heart is inditing a good matter, &c. but
 at other times to the *reins*, as *My reins inſtrude*
me in the night ſeaſon. The *paſſions* are gene-
 rally ſeated by them in the heart, but the ſen-
 timents of pity and commiſeration are more
 frequently aſſigned to the *bowels*, which are
 ſaid to yearn over an object of diſtreſs. It is
 remarkable, that the *head*, or *brain*, never ſeems
 to have been conſidered by them as having any
 thing to do in the buſineſs of thinking, or in
 any mental affection whatever. But the rea-
 ſon of it may be, that ſtrong mental affections
 were ſooner obſerved to affect the heart, reins,
 and bowels, than the head.

In ancient times the ſimple power of *life* was
 generally thought to be in the *breath*, or ani-
 mal

mal *beat*, because breathing and warmth are the universal concomitants of life. I do not, however, recollect that the latter idea ever occurs in the scriptures, but there life is sometimes said to be in the *blood*.

When men reflected a little farther, and began to conceive that possibly both the property of *life*, and also all the powers that we term *mental*, might belong to the same thing, the breath (the supposed principle of life) was imagined to be competent to the whole; and then the idea of a *soul* was completely formed. Consequently, it was first conceived to be an aerial, or an igneous substance, which animates the body during life, and makes its escape at death; after which it was supposed to be either detained near the place where the body was deposited, being held by a kind of attraction, or an affection to its former companion, or to rise in the atmosphere to a region in which it was counterpoised by the surrounding elements.

We may smile at the ignorance of mankind in early ages, in supposing that the *breath of life* could be any thing more than part of the common air, which was first inspired, and then expired. But though this be a thing well known in the present age, I can easily conceive that, when the nature of air and respiration were little understood, men might not immediately conceive that the breath, though it mixed with the air, and was invisible, was therefore the very same thing with it.

it. They might well enough imagine that it was something distinct from it, which was in part drawn in and out during the continuance of life, and wholly discharged and set loose at death. There are other instances of the ignorance of the ancients in matters of philosophy, and even in tolerably enlightened ages, almost, if not altogether, as gross as this.

When, at length, it was discovered that the breath was nothing more than the air, still the idea of an *invisible principle of life and thought* being once fixed, would not be immediately exploded, but would be supposed to be a substance more attenuated, and refined; as being, for instance, of an *ethereal* or *fiery* nature, &c. still invisible, and more active.

Whatever was the invisible substance of which the human soul consisted, the *universal soul* of the heathen philosophers, or the *divine essence*, was supposed to be the very same; and all other souls were supposed to have been parts of it, to have been detached from it, and to be finally resumed into it again. In this state of opinions, therefore, the soul was supposed to be what we should now call *an attenuated kind of matter*, capable of division, as all other matter is.

This was the notion adopted by the christian Fathers from the Oriental and Platonic systems of philosophy, and therefore many of these Fathers did not scruple to assert that the soul, though conceived to be a thing distinct
from

from the body, was properly *corporeal*, and even *naturally mortal*. The opinion, however, of its being naturally immortal gained ground; and, *matter*, according to the philosophical system, being considered as a thing that was necessarily *perishable*, as well as *impure*, the doctrine of the immateriality, as well as of the immortality of the soul, was pretty firmly established; an immaterial substance being, however, still considered as only something more refined than gross matter.

The idea of the soul being immaterial soon led to the idea of its not having any property in common with gross matter, and in time with matter strictly considered; and being confounded with, and illustrated by, the idea of the *principle of life*, it was asserted to have no length, breadth, or thickness, which are properties peculiar to matter; to be *indivisible* also, and finally *not to exist in space*. This was the idea that generally prevailed after the time of Mamertus, though various other refinements occur in the writings of the schoolmen upon the subject.

But the doctrine of *pure spiritualism* was not firmly established before Descartes, who, considering extension as the essence of matter, made the want of extension the distinguishing property of mind or spirit. Upon this idea was built the immaterial system in its state of greatest refinement, when the soul was defined to be *immaterial, indivisible, indiscernible, unextended*, and to have nothing to do with
locality

locality or *motion*, but to be a substance possessed of the simple powers of thought, and to have nothing more than an arbitrary connexion with an organized system of matter.

This was the idea of mind or spirit that was prevalent about the time of Mr. Locke, who contributed greatly to lower it, by contending, that whatever exists must exist *somewhere*, or in *some place*, and by shewing that, for any thing that we know to the contrary, the power of thought may be superadded by the Divine Being to an organized system of mere matter, though, at the same time, declaring himself in favour of the notion of a separate soul. From this time, the doctrine of the nature of the soul has been fluctuating and various; some still maintaining that it has no property whatever in common with matter, and bears no relation to space, whereas, others say, that it exists in space, and occupies a portion of it, so as to be properly extended, but not to have solidity, which they make to be the property that distinguishes it from matter.

The object of this work is to prove, that the doctrine of a *soul* is altogether unphilosophical, and unscriptural; for that, judging from the phenomena, all the powers of *the same being*, viz. *man*, ought to be referred to *one substance*, which, therefore, must necessarily be *the body*, and that the refined and proper spiritualism above described is peculiarly chimerical and absurd. Absurd, however, as is the notion of a substance which has *no property*

perty in common with matter, which bears no relation to space, and yet both acts upon body, and is acted upon by it, it is the doctrine that, in the course of gradual refinement, philosophers and divines were necessarily brought to, and is the only consistent immaterialism. For every other opinion concerning spirit makes it to be, in fact, the same thing with matter; at least every other opinion is liable to objections similar to those which lie against the notion of a soul properly material.

SECTION XXI.

*A brief History of Opinions, concerning the
STATE OF THE DEAD.*

AFTER reciting the foregoing series of opinions concerning the soul in general, it may not be amiss to consider by itself what has been thought concerning its condition between the death of the body and the resurrection. And the revolution of opinions, with respect to this question, has been not a little remarkable.

It was unquestionably the opinion of the apostles and early christians, that whatever be the nature of the soul, its percipient and thinking powers cease at death; and they had no hope of the restoration of those powers, but in the general resurrection of the dead. But when it was concluded that men had souls
distinct

distinct from the body, and capable of subsisting after the body was dead, it was necessary to provide some *receptacle* for them, where they might wait till they were re-united to their respective bodies.

Before the council of Florence, which was held in the year 1439, under Pope Eugenius IV. the current doctrine both of the Greek and Latin churches was, that the souls of the saints were in *abditis receptaculis*, or, as some of them expressed it, in *exterioribus atriiis*, where they expected the resurrection of their bodies, and their complete glorification; and though the Fathers believed all of them to be happy, yet they did not think they would enjoy the *beatific vision* before the resurrection *. How the souls of the wicked were disposed of, little or nothing is said by them.

The catholics, as well as heretics, says Beausobre †, believed that the souls of the Old Testament saints were kept in prison *in the shades below*, and could not be delivered from thence but by the grace of Christ. Christ, they say, when he was in a state of death, went and preached to them, and brought from thence as many, as believed in him. Irenæus maintained this opinion ‡.

That the genuine christian doctrine, of the *sleep of the whole man* till the resurrection, did

* Historical View, p. 1.

† Vol. i. p. 290.

‡ Dupin, vol. i. p. 60.

how-

however, continue in the christian church, and especially among those who had little intercourse with philosophers, there is sufficient evidence. Dupin says, that under the reign of Philip, an assembly of bishops was held on the account of some Arabians, who maintained that the souls of men died, and were raised again with their bodies, and that Origen convinced them of their mistake*. He also says, that Tatian was of the same opinion with those Arabians †.

It will be more satisfactory to my readers, if, besides this general account, I quote more particularly the sentiments of some of the christian writers upon this subject. I shall, therefore, relate what is said by a few of those of the middle ages, when the opinion began to change.

Gregory the Great, says ‡, that the souls of some of the righteous, on account of their imperfections, are not immediately admitted to heaven, though others certainly are. But, he says, the souls of all the wicked are tormented in hell; and he explains how, like the soul of the rich man in the gospel, and of the devils, they may be tormented with corporeal fire, though they themselves be incorporeal.

Julian of Toledo, also, in the seventh century, maintained, that the souls of the wicked, immediately after death, are preci-

* Vol. i. p. 99. † Ib. p. 55. ‡ Opera, vol. i. p. 39.

pitated into hell, where they undergo endless torments*.

Anselm says †, that the souls of good men do not enjoy perfect happiness till they be re-united to their bodies; and that even then they could not be perfectly happy, if this union impeded their *velocity*, in instantly conveying themselves from one place to another, even the most distant; in which, he says, part of their perfection will consist.

Bernard asserts ‡, that, at the resurrection, the soul recovers its *life* and *sense*; that is, its *knowledge*, and *love*. But he says §, that the souls of the *martyrs*, when loosed from their bodies, are immersed in a sea of eternal light. This, however, was peculiar to the martyrs, and not the necessary privilege of all the departed souls of good men. Again, he says ||, that the souls of the just go to rest at death, but not to the *full glory of their kingdom*; and**, that though they drink of happiness, they are not intoxicated.

He hardly seems to think that the wicked suffered any thing in the intermediate state. For he says ††, that white robes are given to the saints, in which to wait till the wicked are punished, and themselves are crowned with double happiness.

In this state continued the doctrine concerning the dead, through the greatest part of

* Dupin, vol. vi. p. 44. † Opera, vol. iii. p. 146.

‡ Opera, p. 481. § P. 954 || P. 290.

** P. 1716, K. †† Ib.

the

the dark ages, between the christian Fathers and the Reformation. It seems, however, that the opinion of the admission of the souls of the righteous to a state of perfect happiness in heaven, had gradually gained ground, and had become the general opinion in the fourteenth century. For Pope John XXII. made himself very obnoxious by reviving, as it is said by Dupin, the opinion of the ancient Fathers, that the souls of good men do not enjoy the beatific vision till the day of judgment. He was very strenuous in asserting and preaching this doctrine, contrary to the judgment of the divines at Paris, whom the king of France assembled for that purpose. But it is said that, on his death-bed, he retracted his opinion, and acknowledged that souls, separated from the body, which are purged from their sins, are in the kingdom of heaven, and in paradise with Jesus Christ, and in the company of the angels; that they see God face to face, and the Divine essence, as clearly as the state and condition of a soul separated from the body will permit*.

His successor, Benedict XII. made a solemn decree against the opinion of his predecessor †. But probably the opinion of Innocent had many adherents, since it was thought necessary, a considerable time afterwards, to bring a decree of a council in aid of the contrary doctrine; and, it is remarkable, that it

* Dupin, vol. xii. p. 28.

† Ib. p. 29.

was by the authority of a pope, who was obliged to use great art and address to gain his point, that the present faith of all protestant churches on this article was properly established.

In a council summoned by Eugenius IV. to meet at Ferrara, and adjourned to Florence, it was decreed, that the souls of those who, after baptism, have incurred no stain of sin, as also the souls of those, who having contracted the stain of sin, whether in their bodies, or divested of their bodies, have been purged by the sacrifice of the mass, prayers, and alms, are received into heaven immediately, and clearly behold the triune God as he is*.

The doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which implies, that of its separate existence after death, being denied by many of that age, especially by the disciples of Averroes, and other Arabian philosophers (who maintained one *universal soul*, the derivation of all other souls from it, and their absorption into it) it was thought necessary to reinforce the belief of it in another council. Accordingly, in the Lateran council, held by Leo X. in 1513, it was decreed, that the soul is not only truly, and of itself, and essentially *the form of the human body* (as it is expressed in the canon of Pope Clement V. published in the general council of Vienne) but likewise *immortal*, and according to the number of bodies into which

* Historical View, p. 2.

it is infused, is singularly multiplicable, multiplied, and to be multiplied (*multiplicabilis, multiplicata, et multiplicanda**). This certainly implies the generation of souls from souls, contrary to the decision of Damascenus mentioned above.

Pomponatus, a philosopher of Mantua, not at all intimidated by the Lateran thunder, published a book in the year 1516, on the immortality of the soul; in which he exposed the futility of that argumentation by which the followers of Aristotle had endeavoured to prove the immortality of the soul, on the principles of their master, by shewing, that they either mistook the sense of Aristotle's principles, or drew wrong conclusions from them. He then examines the hypothesis of Aristotle himself, and shews, that the mortality of the soul may be as easily proved by it as the contrary. After all this, he states the moral arguments for the immortality, or rather against the mortality of the soul, under eight heads; and having shewn, that they are weak and inconclusive, he infers, upon the whole, in his last chapter, that the immortality of the soul being a problematical question, we can have no assurance of the thing but from Revelation; and that they who would build immortality upon any other foundation, only verify the character given to certain self-sufficient reasoners by the apostle, namely,

* Historical View, p. 6.

that *professing themselves wise they became fools**.

Though this doctrine of the immortality of the soul, as a substance distinct from the body, is manifestly favourable to popery, but few of the Protestants appear to have had strength of mind to call it in question. Luther, however, did it, though the opposition almost died with him. In the defence of his propositions (in 1520) which had been condemned by a bull of Leo X. he ranks the opinion of the *natural immortality of the soul*, and that of the soul being *the substantial form of the body*, among the monstrous opinions to be found in the *Roman dunghills of decretals*; and he afterwards made use of the doctrine of *the sleep of the soul*, as a confutation of purgatory and saint worship, and he continued in that belief to the last moment of his life †. William Tyndale also, the famous translator of the Bible into English, in defending Luther's doctrines against Sir Thomas More's objections, considers the sleep of the soul as the doctrine of the Protestants in his time, and founded on the scriptures ‡.

Calvin, however, violently opposed this doctrine; and this seems to have given a different turn to the sentiments of the reformed in general, and Tyndale himself recanted his opinion. Calvin seems to have been embar-

* Historical View, p. 8.

† *Ib.* p. 15.

‡ *Ib.* p. 16.

raised

raised with the souls of the wicked. He says, it is nothing to him what becomes of their souls, that he would only be responsible for the faithful *. But it appears from Calvin's own writings, that *thousands* of the reformers were of a different opinion from him; and though the doctrine of the immortality of the soul be exhibited in all the present protestant confessions of faith, there is little or nothing of it in the earliest of them.

After the long prevalence of the doctrine of the *intermediate state*, that of the *sleep of the soul* has of late years been revived, and gains ground, not so much from considerations of philosophy, as from a closer attention to the sense of the scriptures. No person has done more in this way than the present excellent bishop of Carlisle. Very important service has also been done to the same cause by the author of the *Historical View of this controversy*, from which much of this section is extracted. Upon the whole, the doctrine of an intermediate state is now retained by few who have the character of thinking with freedom and liberality in other respects. And the more attention is given to the subject in a philosophical light, the better founded, I doubt not, will the conclusions that have been drawn from the study of the scriptures appear to be.

It has not, however, been considered how much the doctrine of the *insensible state of the*

* Historical View, p. 25.

soul in death affects the doctrine of the *separate existence of the soul*, which it appears to me to do very materially. It certainly takes away all the *use* of the doctrine, and therefore should leave us more at liberty from any prejudice in the discussion of the question, since nothing is really gained by its being decided either way. Though we should have a soul, yet while it is in a state of *utter insensibility*, it is, in fact, as much *dead*, as the body itself while it continues in a state of death. Our calling it a state of *sleep*, is only giving another and softer term to the same thing; for our *ideas* of the state itself are precisely the same, by whatever name we please to call it. I flatter myself, however, that in time christians will get over this, as well as other prejudices; and, thinking with more respect of *matter*, as the creation of God, may think it capable of being endued with all the powers of which we are conscious, without having recourse to a principle, which, in the most favourable view of the subject, accords but ill with what matter has been conceived to be.

SECTION

SECTION XXII.

An Account of Opinions concerning the SENSITIVE PRINCIPLE IN BRUTES.

THE souls of brutes, which have very much embarrassed the modern systems, occasioned no difficulty whatever in that of the ancients. They considered all souls as originally the same, in whatever bodies they might happen to be confined. To-day it might be that of a man, to-morrow, that of a horse, then that of a man again, and lastly, be absorbed into the universal soul, from which it proceeded*.

But christianity made a great difference between men and brutes. To the former a happy immortality was promised, and in such a manner as made it impossible to think that brutes could have any title to it. It was absolutely necessary, therefore, to make a change in the former uniform and comprehensive system; and though some philosophical chris-

* It was consistent, however, with this hypothesis, to suppose, that while souls were confined to the bodies of brutes, their faculties should differ, with respect to their exercise, from those of men. Thus Aristotle bestowed *sensation, memory*, and the *passions* on the other animals, and *reason* on man exclusively. On this principle the schoolmen, and all the Peripateticks proceeded. *Bolingbrooke's Works*, vol. iii. p. 530.

tians

tians still retained the doctrine of transmigration, it was generally given up, notwithstanding the doctrines of *pre-existence*, and of a *separate consciousness after death*, which were originally parts of the same system, continued.

To account for the great difference which christianity made between the future state of men and brutes, and yet retain the separate state of the soul, it was necessary to find some *specific difference* between them. But a most unhappy one was pitched upon, one that is contradicted by every appearance. It has, however, been so necessary to the rest of the now *disjointed system*, that notwithstanding this circumstance, it has maintained its ground, in some sort, to this day. It is that, though the soul of a man is immortal, that of a brute is not; and yet, it is evident, that brutes have the rudiments of all our faculties, without exception; so that they differ from us in *degree* only, and not in *kind*. But the consequence of supposing the soul of a man, and that of a brute to be of the same nature, was absolutely inadmissible; for they must then, it was thought, have been provided for in a future state as well as our own.

It has been seen, that the Platonists thought there was something corporeal even in the human soul. It is no wonder then that the souls of brutes should have been thought to be *wholly* so, and therefore mortal, which was the opinion, I believe, of all the christian world

world till very lately. Even the great Lord Bacon entertained this opinion. *Anima sensibilis*, says he, *sive brutorum, plane substantia corporea censenda est* *. The celebrated anatomist Willis also professed the same †.

The opinion of Descartes was much more extraordinary, for he made the souls of brutes to be mere *automata*, and his disciples in general denied that they had any perception. Malebranche says, that they eat without pleasure, and cry without pain, that they fear nothing, know nothing; and if they act in such a manner as shews understanding, it is because God, having made them to preserve them, has formed their bodies so as mechanically to avoid whatever might hurt them.

The learned Dr. Gale maintains at large, that the sensitive soul is corporeal ‡; and the very justly celebrated Dr. Cudworth has revived, for the sake of helping this great difficulty, the long-exploded notion of the *soul of the world*, from which the souls of brutes issue, and to which he supposes they return, without retaining their separate consciousness after death. “They may, if they please,” says he §, “suppose the souls of brutes, being but so many particular *irradiations*, or *effluxes*, from that *life above*, whensoever and wheresoever there is any fitly prepared matter capable to receive

* Gale, p. 326.

† Ib.

‡ *Philosophia Generalis*, p. 323.

§ P. 45.

“ them,

“ them, and to be actuated by them, to have
 “ a sense and perception of themselves in it,
 “ so long as it continues such. But so soon
 “ as ever those organized bodies of theirs, by
 “ reason of their indisposition, become inca-
 “ pable of being farther acted upon by them,
 “ then to be resumed again, and retracted
 “ back to their original head and fountain.
 “ Since it cannot be doubted, but what creates
 “ any thing out of nothing, or sends it forth
 “ from itself, by free and voluntary emana-
 “ tion, may be able either to retract the same
 “ back again to its original source, or else to
 “ annihilate it at pleasure *.”

This writer, however, suggests another method of solving this difficulty, much more liberal and rational; supposing the immortality of the soul not to follow necessarily from its immateriality, but from the appointment of God. But he injures the brutes very much, when, to account for the difference in the divine dispensations to them and us, he supposes them to be destitute of *morality* and *liberty* †.

I am most surprised to find Mr. Locke among those who maintain, that, though the souls of men are, in part, at least, immaterial, those of brutes, which resemble men so much, are wholly material. It is evident, however, from the manner in which he expresses himself on the subject, not only that this was his own

* P. 45.

† P. 45.

opinion,

Opinion, but that it was the general opinion of his time. He says *, “ Though to me
 “ sensation be comprehended under thinking
 “ in general, yet I have spoke of sense in brutes
 “ as distinct from thinking ;—and to say that
 “ flies and mites have immortal souls, will
 “ probably be looked on as going a great way
 “ to serve an hypothesis. Many, however,
 “ have been compelled by the analogy between
 “ men and brutes to go thus far. I do not
 “ see how they can stop short of it.”

It would be endless to recite all the hypotheses that have been framed to explain the difference between brutes and men, with respect to their intellects here, and their fate hereafter. I shall, however, mention that of Mr. Locke, who says, “ This, I think, I may
 “ be positive in, that the power of *abstraction*
 “ is not at all in them, and that the having
 “ of *general ideas* is that which puts a perfect
 “ distinction between men and brutes. For
 “ it is evident, we observe no footsteps in
 “ them of making use of general signs for
 “ universal ideas, from which we have rea-
 “ son to imagine that they have not the fa-
 “ culty of abstracting, or making general
 “ ideas, since they have no use of words, or
 “ any general signs †.”

In fact, however, as brutes have the same external senses that we have, they have, of course, all the same *inlets to ideas* that we have ;

* Essay, vol. i. p. 148.

† Essay, vol. i. p. 120.

and

and though, on account of their wanting a sufficient *quantity of brain*, perhaps, chiefly, the combination and association of their ideas cannot be so complex as ours, and therefore they cannot make so great a progress in intellectual improvements, they must necessarily have, *in kind*, every faculty that we are possessed of. Also, since they evidently have *memory, passions, will*, and *judgment* too, as their actions demonstrate, they must, of course, have the faculty that we call *abstraction*, as well as the rest; though, not having the use of *words*, they cannot communicate their ideas to us. They must, at least, have a natural capacity for what is called *abstraction*, it being nothing more than a particular case of the *association of ideas*, of which, in general, they are certainly possessed as well as ourselves.

Besides, if dogs had no general or abstract ideas, but only such as were appropriated to particular *individual objects*, they could never be taught to distinguish a *man*, as such, a *bare*, as such, or a *partridge*, as such, &c. But their actions shew, that they may be trained to catch hares, set partridges, or *birds* in general, and even attack *men*, as well as to distinguish their own master, and the servants of the family in which they live.

Whether brutes will survive the grave we cannot tell. This depends upon other considerations than their being capable of reason and reflection. If the resurrection be properly *miraculous*, and intirely out of all the established

blished laws of nature, it will appear probable that brutes have no share in it; since we know of no declaration that God has made to that purpose, and they can have no expectation of any such thing. But if the resurrection be, in fact, *within the proper course of nature*, extensively considered, and consequently there be something remaining of every organized body that death does not destroy, there will be reason to conclude, that they will be benefited by it as well as ourselves. And the great misery to which some of them are exposed in this life, may incline us to think, that a merciful and just God will make them some recompence for it hereafter. He is *their* maker and father as well as *ours*. But with respect to this question, we have no sufficient *data* from which to argue, and therefore must acquiesce in our utter ignorance; satisfied that the Maker and Judge of all will do that which is right.

THE

THE
H I S T O R Y
OF THE
PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINE
CONCERNING THE
ORIGIN OF THE SOUL,
AND THE
NATURE OF MATTER;
WITH ITS
INFLUENCE ON CHRISTIANITY,
Especially with respect to the Doctrine of the
PRE-EXISTENCE OF CHRIST;
BEING A SEQUEL TO THE
DISQUISITIONS CONCERNING MATTER
AND SPIRIT.

We have not followed cunningly devised fables, when we made known unto you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.

2 PET. i. 16.

VOL. I.

U

T H E
I N T R O D U C T I O N ;

*Containing the Outlines of the Philosophical
Doctrines concerning the Origin of the Souls
of Men, &c.*

TRUE Religion, which consists in the observance of just precepts for the conduct of life, and of reasonable expectations after death, is necessarily founded on a just knowledge of God, of ourselves, and our situation. But it was naturally impossible that mankind, in the infancy of the world, should attain to just notions on these subjects. It could not be, but that the philosophy of the world around us, and the various substances that compose it, should precede the knowledge of ourselves, and especially the knowledge of God, the maker of all things. And the very slow progress that mankind have made in the true philosophy of the external world, our acquaintance with which is at present but very imperfect, and all the great discoveries recent, is sufficient to convince any person, who knows what philosophy is, and how ready men always are to speculate upon every subject, and to attach themselves

to *general principles*, false as well as true, of what importance it was that the universal parent should make some provision for his offspring in these respects; by imparting to them that information, which, in their circumstances, it was absolutely impossible they should have acquired. Without this reasonable assistance, very absurd notions would unavoidably have been formed, and foolish and pernicious practices would have been the consequence of them.

It is not from *theory* only, but from unquestionable *facts*, that we are authorised to pronounce in this manner. All authentic history shows us, that when mankind, unfurnished with the rudiments of just previous knowledge, *did* speculate concerning the structure of the world, and the origin of it; concerning their own nature, and future destination, and especially the nature and moral government of God, they did adopt the wildest and most extravagant systems imaginable; and that the religion they thus made for themselves, gave a sanction to such practices as exceedingly debased their natures, and sunk them to the lowest degree of depravity, vice, and wretchedness. That the religions of the heathen world, and especially those of the early ages of mankind, were of this pernicious kind, no person acquainted with history will deny.

It is, likewise, no less evident from history, that it has been owing to the influence of a few

few *fundamental truths*, communicated by God to men, that the mischievous tendency of the various pagan religions has, in fact, been counteracted; and it is from these alone we are to expect the future prevalence of sound knowledge, virtue, and happiness. I do not say, however, that *no* just principles of religion could ever have been formed by men unassisted by revelation, but that this knowledge would have been acquired *very late*, not till error, superstition, and vice, had become too prevalent and inveterate; and some important religious truths, I may venture to say, would never have been acquired at all.

That there is *one God*, who made the world, and all things in it, and who governs it by his providence; who loves virtue, and will reward it; who hates vice, and will punish it; are truths too sublime to have been investigated by human speculation. On the contrary, a various and absurd *polytheism*, leading to the most abominable and horrid rites, was the immediate consequence of the wild, undirected speculations of men concerning the origin of the world. The religion of the Patriarchs and Jews, which alone contained the great truths above-mentioned, was a most seasonable check upon the polytheism of the East, which was of the most flagitious and horrid kind. And it has been owing to christianity, and to nothing else, that the same great and generous principles have now spread into this Western part of

the world, overturning the polytheism that prevailed in it before, and bidding fair, according to the prophecies of the gospel, to diffuse their beneficial influence among all the nations of the world.

The incapacity of mankind, in the early ages of the world, for speculating concerning their own nature, or that of the Divine Being, and therefore the real importance of revelation, is in nothing more conspicuous than in its appearing (now that we are somewhat better prepared to form a judgment concerning these subjects) that the doctrines of revelation only prove to be truly *rational*, and all the ingenious speculations of men, how specious soever, are found to be all chimerical and vain; being contradicted by the appearances of nature.

This is in nothing more evident, than in the doctrine concerning *human nature*. The doctrines of the ancient philosophy on this subject, even those that have been in some measure subservient to the interests of virtue, will by no means stand the test of just reasoning; whereas, the simple doctrine of revelation stands uncontradicted by any natural appearance whatever; and by this means proves its origin from the *God of all truth*.

The doctrine of the scripture is, that God made man of the *dust of the ground*, and by simply animating this organized matter, made him that living, percipient, and intelligent being that he is. According to revelation,
death

death is a state of rest and insensibility; and our only, though sure hope of a future life, is founded on the doctrine of the *resurrection of the whole man*, at some distant period; this assurance being sufficiently confirmed to us, both by the evident tokens of a divine commission attending the persons who delivered the doctrine, and especially by the actual resurrection of Jesus Christ, which is more authentically attested than any other fact in history.

On the contrary, the doctrine of philosophy on this subject is, that there are *two distinct principles* in man, a *body*, and a *soul*, the latter of which comes from heaven, and returns to it again, when the body dies; and consequently, that the body is so far from being the *whole man*, that it is very improperly called a part of him; being, in fact, an incumbrance to the percipient and thinking substance, which alone is *himself*; and we only begin to live to purpose, when we are disengaged from these impediments to our highly active powers.

Contrary as this system is to all appearances whatever, as I have shewn at large in the preceding treatise, it has been to an attentive study of the scriptures chiefly, and not so much to the consideration of natural phenomena, that we are indebted for the downfall of it: We there find a total and remarkable silence concerning the *unembodied state of man*. Death is there considered as a state of obli-

vion and insensibility, and it is only at the general resurrection of the human race, that the rewards of virtue, and the punishments of vice, are expressly said to *commence*.

These circumstances are so striking in the system of revelation, that divines (and not philosophers) were first convinced, that, though man has a soul distinct from his body, its powers of perception and action depend upon the body, and that the whole man is in a state of insensibility from death to the resurrection. After this, we discover that natural phenomena intirely favour the same conclusion, and that, had we known nothing of man but what we see of him here, we must necessarily have formed the same judgment; and that death would be followed by the utter extinction of all our percipient and intellectual powers.

This having been the state of opinions for a considerable time, and the soul having served no other purpose but that of an *hypothesis* (being deemed incapable of subsisting, or at least of *acting* by itself) we are encouraged to lay aside all prejudice, and examine whether this hypothesis of a soul, distinct from the body, be favoured by fact and appearances. Finding it not to be favoured by any one fact, or appearance in nature, I have ventured to reject it altogether; and here, and here only, I find a perfect consonancy between the doctrines of Revelation, and the dictates of natural reason.

Having

Having proceeded thus far, I am tempted to extend my views, and consider the whole philosophical system, of which the doctrine of the soul makes a part; endeavouring to trace it from its source, and to shew the mischievous effects that have followed from incorporating a thing of so heterogeneous a nature into the system of Revelation.

The importance of these inquiries must be evident to any person who attends to the progress of knowledge and good sense in the world. For if the general body of christians retain any doctrine as essential to revealed religion, which true philosophy shall prove to be actually false, the consequence will be, that the whole system will be rejected by those who consider that tenet as an inseparable part of it. So greatly doth it behove us, that *christian knowledge* should keep pace with *philosophical*.

A conjecture concerning the origin of the opinion of a *soul distinct from the body* of man was advanced in the preceding treatise. I shall now observe, that after the soul had, for reasons there assigned, been conceived to be of the nature of *air*, or *fire*, to go above the clouds, and to have come down from thence, all which opinions have an easy connexion, we find the following more extended philosophical system erected on this basis, All accounts prove, that it was first established in the Oriental part of the world, and that it was thence diffused through Europe, but it

was

was held with considerable variations every where.

There have existed from eternity *two principles*, essentially different from, and opposite to each other, *God* and *matter*; the former an intelligent and perfectly good being, generally compared to *light*, the other the source of all evil, and generally compared to *darkness*. Either from eternity, or in time, there issued from the supreme intelligence various inferior intelligences. This production was by way of *efflux*, or *emanation from himself*, it being an indisputable maxim, that *nothing can come from nothing*. These intelligences occupied the region of light, bounded by that of darkness, which lay below it. The second principle, or matter, was by some represented as wholly inert, but by others it was said to be animated, or to have a peculiar soul.

Some of the inferior intelligences having sinned, and forfeited their rank in the regions of light, were condemned to assume material bodies, several of which they sometimes animated in succession, till by this course of suffering and purgation, they were sufficiently purified from their original stains; after which they were to re-ascend to the regions of light, and be finally absorbed into the supreme mind from which they issued.

For the purpose of forming these material bodies, and preparing a habitable world for their reception, there was a peculiar emanation

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tion from the supreme mind, or a *second God*; since the present habitable world, containing a mixture of good and evil, could not come from a being perfectly good. Others, however, supposed, that this peculiar emanation was prior to all others, and co-eternal with the supreme mind.

The most considerable variation in this system respects the *origin of matter*. For some did not suppose it to be eternal, but, like all other things, to have issued directly, or indirectly, from the one great original being, and source of all existence; and, therefore, that this also will, at length, be re-absorbed, and nothing will exist but the Divine Being himself.

The next considerable variation is, that some represent the descent of souls into bodies, to have been at the same time a *sin*, and a *punishment*; those souls having first been smitten with a desire to animate such bodies, for the sake of the corporeal pleasures they might enjoy in them.

Such are the outlines of a system, which, though founded on nothing but *imagination*, without a single *fact*, or appearance in nature to support it, has dazzled and captivated the philosophical part of the world from the earliest ages. And, though the humble *system of revelation* be diametrically opposite to it, in all its parts; representing one God as being *himself* the maker of all things, the author of good and evil, and as having
made

made man *of the dust of the earth*, to which he is to return, and from which he is to be raised at last; and though this system of revelation has not failed, wherever it has been received, to overturn the *beathenish system* in part, much of it, however, was unnaturally incorporated into christianity in early times, and there are no small remains of it in the christianity of the present time, both popish and protestant, as will abundantly appear in the course of this work.

Notwithstanding the very general spread of this philosophical system, it is remarkable, that the minds of the Jews were long uncontaminated with it. The doctrine of revelation concerning a future life for man, depends upon *the resurrection of the dead*, and has no other foundation whatever. No other ground of hope is so much as hinted at in any part of the Old or New Testament; and though it is possible, that some of the learned Pharisees in our Saviour's time might have been infected with other notions, borrowed from the Greeks, or from the East, they appear not to have been then known to the *vulgar* among the Jewish nation, as is sufficiently evident from the history of the death and resurrection of Lazarus.

From this valuable history, we find that Martha, the sister of Lazarus, had no hope respecting her brother, but from *the resurrection of the last day*, John xi. 24. and our Lord gives her no consolation but on the same ground.

ground: *I am the resurrection and the life.* Had the notion of a *separate soul*, released from the fetters of flesh, and enjoying consummate happiness in another life, been known to them, and believed by them, it could not but have been uppermost in their minds; and some mention of it, or some allusion to it, would certainly have been found in the history: whereas no such thing appears.

This belief of a resurrection, as the only foundation of a future life, evidently existing, and being universally received in the time of our Saviour, there can hardly be a doubt, but that it must have been the belief of the most early Jews and Patriarchs. And since this doctrine could never have been suggested by any appearance in nature, it must have been derived from some original revelation, probably prior to the flood.

It is remarkable, that the doctrine of a resurrection appears to have been a part of the religion of the ancient Persians and Chaldeans, as may be seen in Le Clerc's edition of Stanley's *History of the Chaldean Religion*, and Beaufobre's account of the religion of the Magi, in his excellent *History of Manichæism*; but it seems to have become extinct in time, and to have given place to the more flattering account of the origin of the human soul, and its future destination, mentioned above. For after this, it is remarkable, as all writers acknowledge, that no philosopher

pher admitted any future life but on the supposition that the soul survived the body; or admitted, that the soul survived the body, who did not, at the same time, suppose that it had existed before its union to the body, and who inferred, that it would survive the body from the consideration of its having pre-existed? This, then, was the only ground of hope on the *beathen system*, as opposed to that which revelation holds out to us, and which, though utterly inconsistent with it, has kept its place along with it in almost all our public creeds to this day.

S E C T I O N I.

*Of the INDIAN, or the proper ORIENTAL
Philosophy,*

IT is in the East, and especially in the empire of Indostan, where the same people, and the same government, continued for many ages, that we are to look for the genuine Oriental philosophy with respect to the soul. We have not only the testimony of all ancient writers, that the system I have mentioned prevailed there, and that from thence it was propagated Westward, but later travelers into those countries give us the most satisfactory information concerning it. It is at
this

this very day the reigning religion of the Hindoos, and of a great part of the East; and the attachment of these people to it, is exceeded by nothing but by that of the Jews to theirs.

Ramsay * informs us, from *Abraham Roger*, concerning the religion of the Bramins, and *Kercher's Sina Illustrata*, that the Bramins believe that souls are an eternal emanation from the Divine essence, or at least that they were produced a long time before the creation of the world; that in this pure state they sinned, and from that time are sent into the bodies of men and beasts, each according to its desert; so that the body which the soul inhabits resembles a chaos or prison. They teach that, after a certain number of transmigrations, all souls are reunited to their original, will enter into the company of the gods, and become divinities.

The Baudistes (says the author of *Examen du Fatalisme* †) a sect of Indian philosophers, say that it is *sensual pleasure* that weighs down the soul, corrupts it, and chains it to matter; so that the soul, in order to recover its natural dignity, must make itself independent of the wants of the body, and be sensible of the deceitfulness of the pleasures it procures. The Baudistes, therefore, convinced of these principles, renounce pleasure, the world, and their fami-

* Travels of Cyrus, p. 300. † Vol. i. p. 215.

lies,

lies, and give themselves up to contemplation, and incredible austerities.

Later travellers have given us much more extensive and exact information concerning the religion of Indostan; and in them we have more particulars of the Oriental system unfolded, so as to leave no doubt but that it was from this source that the Greeks derived their boasted wisdom, and the christians the first taint that was given to their purer principles. Two English travellers have particularly distinguished themselves by their attention to this subject, Mr. Holwell, and Mr. Dow, who, though they differ in some particulars, agree sufficiently in many things, for which I shall quote them.

Mr. Holwell gives his account of the religion of the Hindoos, from the *Chartab Bhade*, which, he says, contains a genuine uncontaminated account of their religion, in opposition to the *Aughtorrah Bhade*, which, he says, is a corruption of it*. He sums up the whole in the following manner:

“ That there is one God, eternal, omnifick,
 “ omnipotent, and omniscient; that God,
 “ from an impulse of love and goodness, first
 “ created three angelic persons, to whom he
 “ gave precedence, though not in equal de-
 “ gree; that he afterwards, from the same
 “ impulse, created an angelic host, whom he
 “ placed in subjection to *Birmah*, his first

* Interesting Historical Events, vol. ii. p. 29.

“ created,

“ created, and to Bistnoo, and Sieb, as co-
 “ adjutors to Birmah. God created them all
 “ free, and intended that they should all be
 “ partakers of his glory and beatitude, on
 “ the easy conditions of their acknowledging
 “ him as their Creator, and paying obedience
 “ to him, and to the three primary created
 “ personages whom he had put over them.”

“ In process of time, a larger portion of
 “ the angelic host, at the instigation of Moi-
 “ safoor, and others of their chief leaders,
 “ rebelled, denied the supremacy of their
 “ Creator, and refused obedience to his com-
 “ mands. In consequence, the rebels were
 “ excluded heaven, and the sight of their
 “ Creator, and doomed to languish for ever
 “ in sorrow and darkness. After a time, by
 “ the intercession of the three primary, and
 “ the rest of the faithful angelic beings, God
 “ relented, and placed the delinquents in a
 “ sufferable state of punishment and proba-
 “ tion, with powers to regain their lost hap-
 “ py situation. For that purpose, a new crea-
 “ tion of the visible and invisible worlds
 “ instantaneously took place, destined for the
 “ delinquents.

“ The new creation consisted of fifteen re-
 “ gions, seven below, and seven above the
 “ terraqueous globe, and this globe is the
 “ last, and chief place of punishment, pur-
 “ gation and trial. Mortal bodies were pre-
 “ pared by God for the rebel angels, in which
 “ they were for a space to be imprisoned, and

“ subject to natural and moral evils, more
 “ or less painful, in proportion to their
 “ original guilt; and through which they
 “ were doomed to transmigrate, under eigh-
 “ ty-nine different forms, the last into that
 “ of man, when the powers of the animat-
 “ ing rebel spirits are supposed to be enlarg-
 “ ed, equal to the state of their first creation.
 “ The rebel leaders had power given them
 “ of God to enter the eight regions of pu-
 “ nishment and probation, and the faithful
 “ angelic spirits had permission occasionally
 “ to descend to those regions, to guard the
 “ delinquents against the future attempts of
 “ their leaders. Consequently, the souls,
 “ or spirits, which animate every mortal
 “ form are *delinquent angels*, in a state of
 “ punishment, for a lapse from innocence in
 “ a pre-existent state*.”

In this summary the word *creation* is made
 use of by Mr. Holwell; but in the work from
 which the summary is made, it is said, that
 “ the eternal One formed the angelic host, in
 “ part, *of his own essence*†.” It is also said‡,
 that the rebel angels were driven from hea-
 ven into the *Onderab*, or *intense darkness*, the
 origin of which, not being mentioned, may
 be supposed to have been from all eternity;
 and it is no where said in this account, that
 any thing was made from nothing.

* Interesting Events, vol. ii. p. 60, &c.

† Ib. p. 35.

‡ P. 44.

“ It is an established doctrine,” he says*,
 “ of the *Aughtorrah Bbade*, that the three
 “ primary created personages, as well as the
 “ rest of the heavenly angelic faithful spirits,
 “ have, from time to time, according to the
 “ permission given them by God, descended
 “ to the place of punishment, and have vo-
 “ luntarily subjected themselves to the feel-
 “ ings of natural and moral evil for the sake
 “ of their delinquent brethren.”

These extracts from Mr. Holwell contain a pretty full detail of most of the tenets that I have mentioned in my sketch of the Oriental system. Some other particulars we learn from Mr. Dow.

According to him the *Beda's*, written in the Shanscritt language, are said to have been collected by Beafs, who divided them into four distinct parts, four thousand eight hundred and ninety-four years before 1776 of the christian æra†. “ The Hindoos,” he says,
 “ are divided into two sects, the followers of
 “ the doctrine of the *Bedang*, and those who
 “ adhere to the principles of the *Neadirsen*‡.
 “ The *Bedang* is an exposition of the doc-
 “ trine of the *Beda's* by Beafs Muni. It
 “ was revived some ages after by Serrider
 “ Swami. Almost all the Hindoos of the
 “ Decan, and those of the Malabar and Co-

* P. 71.

† Dissertation prefixed to his History of Hindostan, p. 27.

‡ P. 38.

“romandel coasts are of the sect of the Bedang *.”

According to the Bedang, “*affection* dwelled with God from all eternity. It was of three different kinds, the *creative*, *preserving*, and *destructive*. The first is represented by *Brimba*, the second by *Bisben*, and the third by *Shibat*. The affection of God then produced *power*, and power, at a proper conjuncture of time, and fate, embraced *goodness*, and produced *matter*. The three qualities then, acting upon matter, produced the universe †. According to this system, since nothing is said to be made out of nothing, matter must have been produced by a kind of generation from beings whose substance was originally derived from God himself, which was agreeable to the avowed opinion of the Cabalists.

“God seeing the earth in full bloom called forth *intellect*, which he endued with various organs and shapes, to form a diversity of animals upon the earth. Intellect is a portion of the great *soul of the universe*, breathed into all creatures, to animate them for a certain time. After death it animates other bodies, or returns like a drop into that unbounded ocean from which it first rose, which is the case with the souls of the good. But those of the wicked are after death immediately clothed with a

* P. 38.

† P. 41.

“ body

“ body of fire, earth, and akash” (a subtle ethereal matter, from whence the Greeks probably had their notion of the *materia prima*) “ in which they are for a time punished in hell. After this they animate other bodies, and when they are arrived at a state of purity, they are absorbed into God. This absorbed state is a participation of the divine nature, where consciousness is lost in bliss *.—At length all things will be involved in fire, and the world reduced to ashes. God will then exist alone, for matter will be totally annihilated †.” This doctrine of a *final conflagration* was adopted by the Stoics.

“ The more learned Bramins,” he says ‡, “ maintain that hell is a mere bugbear to terrify the vulgar; for that God has no passion, but benevolence; and men are never punished for their vices, but by the natural consequences of their actions.” This we find to have been the opinion of all the Greek philosophers, without exception.—Such are the doctrines of the Bedang.

The *Neadirsen* is not reckoned so ancient as the Bedang, but is said to have been written by Goutam, near four thousand years ago, and is received as sacred in Bengal, and all the northern provinces of Indostan, but is rejected by the rest §.

* P. 44.

† P. 45.

‡ P. 50.

§ P. 56.

According to this system, “ the soul is a vital principle, a subtle element, which pervades all things, distinct from organization, and vital motion *.

“ Five things,” he says, “ must, of necessity be eternal, the first is the *great soul*, which is immaterial and invisible; the second is the *vital soul*, which he supposes to be material, possessed of the following properties, number, quality, motion, contraction, extension, divisibility, perception, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, accidents, and power. Upon the difference of the vital soul from the great soul, the followers of the Bedang and Neadirsen principally differ †. From this vital soul arises all evil ‡.”

It is remarkable, that we find the same difference of opinion among the Greeks, the Stoics maintaining that inferior intelligences are detached from the *supreme mind itself*, and are to be absorbed into it again; whereas other sects make the human soul to be a portion of the *soul of the universe*, a principle distinct from the supreme mind, or to be composed in part of the one, and in part of the other.

“ The third eternal principle is *time*, and *duration*, the fourth is *space* and *extension*, the fifth is *akash*, a subtle and pure element, which fills up the vacuum of space,

* P. 58.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

“ and

“ and is compounded of quantities infinitely
 “ small, indivisible, and perpetual. God,” he
 says, “ can neither make nor unmake these
 “ atoms ; but they are in other respects to-
 “ tally subservient to his pleasure.

“ God, at certain seasons, endues these
 “ atoms with plasticity, by virtue of which
 “ they arrange themselves into the four gross
 “ elements of fire, air, water, and earth.
 “ And these atoms, being from the begin-
 “ ning formed by God into the seeds of all
 “ productions, the vital soul associated with
 “ them ; so that animals and plants of va-
 “ rious kinds were produced upon the face of
 “ the earth. The superiority of man, ac-
 “ cording to this philosophy, consists in the
 “ finer organization of his parts.”

“ The doctrines of transmigration and ab-
 “ sorption into the Deity he holds in com-
 “ mon with others *.”

“ He maintains, that the world is subject
 “ to successive dissolutions and renovations,
 “ at certain stated periods. He divides these
 “ revolutions into the lesser and the greater.
 “ At the lesser the world will be consumed
 “ by fire, and the elements will be jumbled
 “ together ; and after a certain space of time
 “ they will again resume their former or-
 “ der †.” This, also, was the doctrine of
 some of the Greek sects.—“ These repeated
 “ dissolutions and renovations,” Mr. Dow

* P. 60.

† P. 65.

says, “ have furnished a most ample field
 “ for the invention of the Bramins. Many
 “ allegorical systems of creation are, on this
 “ account, contained in the Shasters, and it
 “ was for this reason that so many different
 “ accounts of the cosmogony of the Hin-
 “ doos have been promulgated in Europe;
 “ some travellers adopting one system, and
 “ some another *.”

The doctrine of the restitution of all things is also found farther to the East. F. Longobardi, in his treatise concerning a learned sect in China, observes, that it is a doctrine of theirs, that “ this universe will expire, and
 “ all things in it. All things shall return to
 “ their first principle, which shall produce
 “ another world, after the same manner;
 “ and this also ending, another will succeed,
 “ and so another without end †.”

The curious reader will be amused with seeing a manifest resemblance between the mythological system of Indostan and that of Greece in several other respects, besides those which I have had occasion to point out.

It appears from the tenets of the early christian heretics, which are universally acknowledged to have been derived from the East, that an opinion was entertained by some of them, that the intelligence employed to make the world became puffed up with pride,

* P. 66.

† Leland's Necessity of Revelation, vol. ii, p. 286.

and

and renounced his allegiance to the supreme mind. The following is the account that Mosheim gives of the Oriental system in general, as it was entertained by many about the time of the promulgation of christianity, and which the reader may compare with the preceding accounts.

“ According to the Oriental philosophers,
 “ the eternal nature, infinitely perfect, and
 “ infinitely happy, having dwelt from ever-
 “ lasting in profound solitude, produced at
 “ length from itself two minds of different
 “ sexes, which resembled the supreme parent
 “ in the most perfect manner. From the pro-
 “ lific union of these two beings arose others,
 “ which were also followed by succeeding
 “ generations ; so that, in process of time, a
 “ *celestial family* was formed in the *pleroma*.
 “ This divine progeny being immutable in
 “ its nature, and above the power of mor-
 “ tality, was called by the philosophers *æon*.
 “ How many in number these *æons* were,
 “ was a point much controverted among the
 “ Oriental sages.”

“ Beyond the mansions of light lies a rude
 “ mass of *matter*, agitated by innate, irregular
 “ motions. One of the celestial natures de-
 “ scending from the *pleroma*, either by a
 “ fortuitous impulse, or by the divine mind,
 “ reduced into order this unseemly mass,
 “ created men and inferior animals of dif-
 “ ferent kinds, and corrected its malignity,
 “ by mixing with it a certain portion of
 “ divine

“ divine light. This author of the world is
 “ distinguished from the supreme Deity by
 “ the name of *demiurge*. His character is a
 “ compound of shining qualities, and insup-
 “ portable arrogance. He claims dominion
 “ over the new world he has formed, as his
 “ sovereign right, and, excluding the Deity
 “ from all concern in it, demands from man-
 “ kind, for himself and associates, divine
 “ honours *.”

This was the species of Oriental philosophy adopted by the early Gnostics, who maintained that this imperious demiurge was the god of the Jews, and the author of the law of Moses. And Mosheim says †, that the Platonic philosophy was of some use to christianity in combating these Gnostics, and asserting, that the maker of the world, though not the supreme mind himself, was a benevolent being.

One practical, and horrid consequence of the notion of *the evil nature of matter*, and of its serving for a clog or prison to the soul, we see in the disposition to mortify the body, which is so prevalent in the East; where the Fakeers torment themselves in the most shocking manner. The same notions led to the *mortification of the flesh* in those christians that adopted them, viz. fasting, corporal penance, abstinence from marriage, solitude, silence, and various other austerities.

* Ecclesiastical Hist v. i. p. 72.

† Dissertations, p. 19.

SECTION

SECTION II.

*Of the Religion of the ancient PERSIANS and
CHALDEANS.*

OUR knowledge of the religion of the ancient Persians and Chaldeans is very imperfect, for the same reason that our knowledge of that of the Egyptians is so; the people having been subjugated, their priests dispersed, and no writings of their own having come down to us. But it appears sufficiently from the collections of learned men, that the religion of this part of the world was contained within the same general outlines with the Oriental system above described.

According to Zoroaster, says Beaufobre, (in his *History of Manicheism**) God, who
 “ is self-existent, before all ages, formed the
 “ world of pure and happy spirits, the same
 “ that the Valentinians called *æons*, the *in-*
 “ *telligences* of the Platonists, and the *angels*
 “ of the Jews and christians. Three thou-
 “ sand years after he sent his *will*, under the
 “ form of a glorious light, and which ap-
 “ peared in the figure of a man, accompani-
 “ ed by seventy of the most honourable of
 “ the angels. Then were formed the sun,
 “ moon, stars, and men. Three thousand

* Vol. i. p. 164.

“ years

“ years after *evil* appeared, when God form-
 “ ed this lower world, bounded by the
 “ vortex of the moon, where the empire of
 “ evil and of matter ceasē. The Magi, he
 “ says *, thought matter animated, and had
 “ a power of producing from itself an in-
 “ finity of beings, partaking of its imper-
 “ fections. This matter, according to the
 “ Magi, lay in the lowest regions †.”

It is said by some, that the original Magi believed, that God only was from eternity, and that darkness had been created ‡. But Zoroaster appears to have held two eternal principles §.

All this sufficiently agrees with the account of the Oriental philosophy of Mr. Stanley, published with many corrections and additions by Le Clerc. From this treatise it appears too, that the doctrines of the *descent* and *transmigration of human souls* was part of this philosophy. The soul, it is said ||, descending from the region of light into this body, if it behave well, returns to the light from which it came; but if it behave ill, it is sent to a still worse situation, according to its desert.

The Chaldeans thought, that there was an intelligent principle in the stars and planets. the latter of which are called ζωα πλατωμενα in the oracles of Zoroaster **.

* P. 168. † P. 175. ‡ P. 170.

§ P. 172. || P. 36.

** Le Clerc's Index Philologicus. STELLA.

Some

Some of the Persians thought, that there were two gods, of different natures, the one good, called *Horomazdes*, and the other evil, called *Arimanius*, the one resembling *light*, and the other *darkness*; and that in the medium between these was *Mithras*, who was therefore called the *Mediator**. This Mithras seems to correspond to the *Birmah* of the Hindoos, and the *vous* of Plato; being a peculiar emanation from the Deity, and employed by him in the formation of the world, and, therefore, was supposed by philosophizing christians to be the same with *Christ*.

SECTION III.

Of the Introduction of the Oriental Philosophy into GREECE.

WE may clearly distinguish several periods of philosophy in Greece, the first before they began to speculate much, and while they retained a general idea, derived from tradition, but mixed with many fables, of a God, a providence, and a future state; the second when they began to speculate without much foreign assistance, or neglecting and despising it, when they rejected all belief of a God or future life; the third when they adopted the principles of the Oriental philo-

* *Ib.* p. 105.

sophy,

sophy, either in its more imperfect state from Egypt, or when it was more ripened into a system in the remoter parts of the East.

This was the state of philosophy in Greece in its most splendid time, after the age of Socrates, and in this state it continued till near the age of Augustus, when every thing in the whole system that could possibly influence the conduct of men sunk into contempt, and was considered as a pleasing dream. But after the spread of christianity, some of the sects which inculcated a stricter regard to morals, and favoured elevation of soul, as that of Plato, and the Stoics, were revived. In a much later period succeeded the revival of the Aristotelian philosophy, by the schoolmen, which continued till the time of Descartes.

Of the state of mere *tradition* in Greece we know very little; but of the period of the *atheistical philosophy* we have pretty distinct accounts, as it subsisted long after the introduction of the Oriental, and was often the more prevalent of the two, though even this species of philosophy borrowed something from the Oriental system.

It is expressly asserted by Aristotle, and others, says Mr. Toland *, that “ the most
“ ancient Greek philosophers did not dream
“ of any principle, or *actuating spirit* in the
“ universe itself, no more than in any of the
“ parts thereof; but explained all the phe-
“ nomena of nature by matter and local

* Letters to Serena, p. 22.

“ motion,

“ motion, levity and gravity, or the like ;
 “ and rejected all that the poets said of God,
 “ dæmons, souls, ghosts, heaven, hell, vi-
 “ sions, prophecies, and miracles, &c. as
 “ fables invented at pleasure, and fictions
 “ to divert their readers.”

That the doctrine of the immortality of the soul was not of Grecian origin, may be concluded even without historical evidence (of which, however, there is abundance) from the circumstances of the thing; it being always accompanied with other opinions, which were certainly of Oriental extraction. All the philosophers who believed the immortality of the soul, believed its *pre-existence*, thinking it impossible that the soul should subsist after the body, if it had not existed before it; and Lactantius has remarked, that all the ablest Greek Fathers embraced this opinion, and were followed in it by the ablest of the Latins also*.

The Oriental doctrine was, however, adopted by the Greeks with considerable variations, some of the philosophers holding, that souls were sent into bodies for offences committed in a pre-existent state, but others, by the sovereign will of God †. The opinion of the *evil nature of matter* also appeared in Greece, together with the first idea of a God, the doctrine of two principles being very apparent; and the philosophers, who acknowledged two eternal principles, believed the

* Beaufobre, vol. ii. p. 330.

† Ib. p. 331.

world

world not to have been made by God, but by angels, some by good ones, and some by bad *. And this is no other than the Oriental doctrine.

The first intimation that the Greek philosophers had of the immortality of the soul, they seem to have imported from Egypt, and it was even then accompanied with the doctrine of transmigration. Diodorus says, that Orpheus brought from Egypt the greatest part of the mysterious rites used in Greece, with the *orgies* that are celebrated at their explanation, and the fictions of hell; and he explains particularly those customs which were the foundation of the Grecian notions †. According to Cebes, Orpheus called the body a prison, because the soul is in it in a state of punishment, till it has expiated the faults committed in heaven ‡.

Orpheus, however, was long before the æra of philosophy in Greece, and his history is very uncertain. Of the proper philosophers, both Cicero, and Maximus Tyrius say, that Pherecydes was the first among the Greeks who openly maintained, that the body only died, but that the soul was immortal (*sempiternum*) and that he also taught, that it existed before it came hither, so that he must have had his doctrine from the East.

It is rather extraordinary, that Warburton, notwithstanding the express authority of He-

* Ib. p. 11.

* Toland's Letters, p. 50.

† Ramsay, p. 282.

rodotus to the contrary; quoted before, and on no ancient authority; but the passage of Cicero above referred to, should maintain *, that this doctrine was of no other than Grecian original; when almost all the ancients who speak of Pherecydes, say that he had his doctrine from the East. Hesychius says, that he had no master, but that he instructed himself, after having found some secret writings of the Phenicians. Suidas and Eustathius say the same thing. Homer expressly says, that the Phenician vessels frequented the isle of Scyros, where he lived. Josephus also says, that the first who treated of celestial and divine things among the Greeks, Pherecydes of Scyros, Pythagoras, and Thales, learned their opinions from the Egyptians and Chaldeans. Both Hesychius and Suidas say that Pherecydes first introduced the doctrine of the transmigration of souls †.

The next Greek philosopher who taught this doctrine, viz. Pythagoras, besides being the disciple of Pherecydes, is universally acknowledged to have had it from the East. He conversed with the Chaldean Magi, the Indian Gymnosophists, and particularly with the Egyptian priests; suffering himself to be circumcised, that he might be admitted to the secret doctrines of the latter ‡.

* Divine Legation, vol. ii. p. 221, &c.

† See a Dissertation by Mr. Heinius in the Memoirs of the Academy of Berlin, vol. iii. p. 210. &c.

‡ Toland's Letters to Serena, p. 31.

“ Pythagoras,” says *Beaufobre* *, “ ac-
 “ knowledged two principles, God and
 “ matter, the latter of which he believed to
 “ be the cause of all evil. He also taught
 “ the doctrine of divine emanations, calling
 “ these first intelligences NUMBERS, being
 “ the same with the *æons* of the Valentinians,
 “ those spirits which are, as it were, the
 “ *eldest sons of God* †. Plato called them
 “ *ideas*, or *νοῦς* ‡. The others considered the
 “ æons as divine virtues, remaining in the
 “ divine essence. The *Sephiroth* of the Ca-
 “ balists are the same §.”

The Pythagorean philosophy seems not to have spread much in Greece, but to have been confined pretty much to Italy, whither that philosopher retired. For, according to all accounts, the first person who taught the doctrine of a God in Greece, properly so called, was Anaxagoras; who, coming after Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and others, who had taught the universe to be infinite, and matter eternal, though the forms of it were changeable, added *another principle*, which he called *mind*, as that which moved and disposed matter; from which, as being a new thing in Greece, he was surnamed *νοῦς*.

But this philosophy was not his own discovery. It is said that he also was taught by the Magi, having been twenty years of age

* Vol. i. p. 33.

† Ib. p. 570.

‡ P. 571.

§ Ib.

at the time of the expedition of Xerxes; and as Dionysius Phalareus relates, he began to philosophize at Athens at those years; and as Theodoret and Ammianus inform us, had travelled likewise into Egypt *. The Greeks learned several things of the Magi in those days, which afterwards inspired others with the desire of going into those parts for perfecting their knowledge †. Pliny also relates that Osthanes, who accompanied Xerxes in his Grecian expedition, propagated his knowledge wherever he came. *Hic maxime Osthanes ad rabiem, non aviditatem modo scientiæ ejus, Græcorum populos egit †.*

None of the heads of the Grecian sects made so much account of a future life as Plato, and no philosophical system bears more evident marks of an Oriental origin than his. It is, in fact, the Oriental system itself, with very little variation; no greater, probably, than might have been found in the East at the time that he visited it. Pausanius particularly says, that he learned his doctrine from the Chaldeans and the Indian Magi §.

Plato believed two co-eternal principles, God and matter, and that matter is the source of all evil ||. This he had from Pythagoras, and Pythagoras from the Ma-

* Toland's Letters, p. 32. † lb. p. 32.

‡ Hist. Nat. lib. 36. cap. i. § Toland's Letters, p. 32.

|| Beaufobre, vol. i. p. 479.

gi*. He maintained the pre-existence of the soul, and asserted all human souls to be in a lapsed state, wanderers, strangers, and fugitives from heaven; declaring that it was a divine law, that souls sinning should fall down into these earthly bodies †. Agreeably to this, Cicero informs us, that he maintained that all *acquired science* was nothing but the recollection of former knowledge.

Without any softening, he frequently calls *souls, god, and part of God, σου ασθεον*. Plutarch says that Pythagoras and Plato held the soul to be immortal; for that, launching out from the soul of the universe, it returns to its great parent and original. Eusebius expressly says, that Plato held the soul to be ungenerated, and to be derived by way of emanation from the first cause, as being unwilling to allow that it was made out of nothing; which necessarily implies that, according to Plato's doctrine, God was the material cause of the soul, or that the soul was part of his substance ‡.

This account of the Deity, and the subdivision of his nature by *emanation*, could not have been derived from any other source than the East. But besides the supreme intelligence, and the emanation of human and other souls from it, Plato supposed, agreeably to the Ori-

* Beaufobre, vol. i. p. 479. † Cudworth, p. 23.

‡ Divine Legation, vol. ii. p. 28.

ental doctrine, that there was another *peculiar emanation* from him, which he calls *πνεύμα*, and also *δυνάμειος*; as having been employed in making the world, which world had also a soul peculiar to itself; and this, together with the two higher principles, make a kind of *trinity of minds*. The second person in this trinity is also sometimes called *αὐτοπαλάω*, from his producing other beings, and *αὐτοσίμηλος*, from being the emanation of the supreme Being*.

There is, however, something peculiar to the Platonic system, which is, that the world is as ancient as its cause, a mind not being capable of existing without action †, so that the divine emanations were as eternal as himself. This doctrine was of capital use to the christian Fathers, who maintained the *eternal procession* of the Son from the Father, as well as his being of the *same substance* with him. Nor has it been of less use to those Arians, who maintain the eternal creation of the Son out of nothing.

“ Aristotle,” says Warburton, “ thought
 “ of the soul like the rest, as we learn from a
 “ passage quoted by Cudworth, where, having
 “ spoken of the *sensitive soul*, and declared
 “ it to be mortal, he goes on in this manner.
 “ It remains that mind, or intellect (pre-ex-
 “ isting) enter from without, and be only

* Cudworth, p. 579.

† Beaufobre, vol. ii. p. 12.

“ divine. But then he distinguishes again
 “ concerning this mind or intellect, and
 “ makes it twofold, *agent* and *patient*, the
 “ former of which he concluded to be im-
 “ mortal, and the latter corruptible*.”

As for the Getes, Celtes, and other northern nations, who held the doctrine of the future existence of the soul, they also held the doctrine of transmigration, and are known to have had both from the Greeks, and the East. Xamolxis, the philosopher of the Getes, and of Thrace, was a servant and disciple of Pythagoras †.

SECTION IV.

*Of the mixture of the Oriental and Greek
 Philosophy with CHRISTIANITY.*

THAT the leaven of this Oriental philosophy was mixed with christianity, at a very early period, even in the times of the apostles, all antiquity, and even their own writings, sufficiently testify; and it is far from being wholly purged out even at this day. But whether the first introduction of it was directly from the East, or by the medium of the Greek philosophy, is not quite clear. I

* Divine Legation, vol. ii p. 211.

† Toland's Letters, p. 42.

rather

rather think from Greece, though not long after, more was introduced than the Greek philosophy could well supply. It happened, however, that by the influence of the Greek philosophers, who embraced christianity, and distinguished themselves as writers, a great deal of that which came by this channel was firmly retained, and became incorporated into the system, while much of that which was derived immediately from the East, being more glaringly inconsistent with the christian principles, was rejected, and those who introduced it were condemned as heretics.

On the first view of things, we are apt to wonder at the propensity of the primitive christians, to adopt a system so utterly repugnant to their own. But it is not more extraordinary than the propensity of the Israelites to idolatry; and both were deceived by very specious reasons, that is, by reasons which could not but appear specious *in their circumstances*.

The Oriental system, besides other flattering allurements, was wonderfully calculated to remove the two great objections that were in those times made to christianity, and at which the minds of men most revolted, viz. the doctrine of a *crucified man* for the founder of their religion, and of a *resurrection from the dead*. The former, we learn from the apostle Paul, was a great stumbling block both to Jews and Gentiles; and at the latter, all the

wise men of Greece absolutely laughed, as a thing utterly incredible.

How ready, then, must those who were dazzled with the *wisdom of this world*, more than with the *true, but hidden wisdom of God*, have been to catch at the splendid doctrine of the *emanation of souls from the divine mind*, which was already received in the Gentile world, and to take that opportunity of advancing their master, the too *humble Jesus*, to the high rank of the first and principal emanation of the Deity, the *vous* or *λογος* of the Platonists, and the *ἀντιστοιχίος* under God, in making the world.

More effectually to wipe away the *reproach of the cross*, and make their system more coherent, how natural was it to suppose, that this great Being did not really, but only *in appearance* put on *flesh*, and, therefore, did not really suffer and die, but only seemed to do so?

Also, when the philosophers of that age sneered at the doctrine of a *resurrection*, with what pride would these weak christians pretend to equal wisdom and refinement with themselves, by alledging, that the true christian resurrection was not the resurrection of a *wile body of flesh and blood*, which could only be a burden to the soul, but either a mystical resurrection to a *new life*, or indicated the glorious time when the soul, being freed from all its impurities, would join its bright original

ginal, in a vehicle of light, a true spiritual body, and not that carnal one, which had been its punishment here ?

Lastly, the doctrine of the *impurity of matter*, has in all ages led to such mortifications, and austerities, as, requiring great resolution and fortitude, have never failed to strike mankind with respect and reverence ; giving an idea of an extraordinary degree of abstractedness from the world, and of greatness and elevation of soul.

It is very probable, also, that, as in later times, and also in our own days, persons who pretended to extraordinary purity, more than they really had resolution to keep up to, by exposing themselves to temptations too strong for them, were seduced into lewdness, and other vicious practices ; and then found pretences for continuing in them, as not affecting the *mind*, but the *body only*, which is no part of our *proper selves*, and of small consequence in itself. I am led to think so from what we may collect concerning the first christian sectaries in the writings of the apostles, who always speak of great irregularities of conduct, as joined to a departure from the true faith of the gospel. Perhaps their writings might check those enormities, so that those who retained the same general system of principles would afterwards be more upon their guard against such an abuse of them. For it does not appear that the Valentinians, Manichæans, and others also, in later times, who

who went the farthest into the Oriental system, were justly reproachable with respect to their lives and manners.

The first trace that we find of any thing like the Oriental system in the New Testament, is in St. Paul's Epistles to the Corinthians, supposed to be written about the year 56. For though the same apostle inculcates the doctrine of a resurrection upon the Thessalonians, in the year 52, what he says upon that subject to them does not imply that they *denied* the doctrine, but only that they had not been well informed concerning it, or had not rightly apprehended it. But what he says to the Corinthians*, shews, that some among them had absolutely disbelieved the doctrine. Besides, other hints that he drops in the course of the same epistle, shew that their minds had been infected with some specious system of *philosophy*.

Speaking of his own preaching the gospel, he says †, *It was not with the wisdom of words, lest the cross of Christ should be made of none effect. For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness, but unto us who are saved it is the power of God. For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise, where is the scribe, where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For*

* 1 Cor. 15.

† Ch. i. 17.

after

after that, in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe. For the Jews require a sign; and the Greeks seek after wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified, to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks foolishness; but to them who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God. Because the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men.

It is probable also, from the instructions which the apostle gives concerning *virgins*, in the seventh chapter of this epistle, that too favourable an idea of *continence*, and *abstinence from marriage* had crept in among them, from the same system.

This epistle appears to have had a great effect. In his second, however, he repeats his cautions with respect to the deceitfulness of worldly wisdom, and he still expresses his fears of their being seduced by it*. *For I am jealous over you with godly jealousy, for I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin to Christ. But I fear, lest by any means, as the serpent beguiled Eve through his subtlety, so your minds should be corrupted from the simplicity that is in Christ. But if he that cometh preacheth another Jesus, whom we have not preached; or if ye receive another spirit, which ye have not re-*

* Chap. xi. 2.

ceived,

ceived, or another gospel, which ye have not accepted, ye might well bear with him. Now a Jesus not really crucified, might well enough be called another Jesus, one that he had not preached to them, and the gospel of that Jesus, and the spirit of it, would be quite another gospel, and another spirit.

The evil, however, appears by no means to have been stopped by these seasonable and forceable admonitions, at least not in other churches. For in all the epistles written by this apostle from Rome, during his imprisonment there, in the years 61 and 62, we find that this corruption of christianity had risen to a most alarming height; as we see that it excited the strongest expressions of concern and indignation from this truly wise and good apostle.

To the Colossians, he says *, *This I say lest any man should beguile you with enticing words †. Beware, lest any man spoil you through philosophy, and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ ‡. Let no man beguile you of your reward, in a voluntary humility, and worshipping of angels, intruding into those things which he has not seen, vainly puffed up in his fleshly mind, and not holding the head, &c.—which things have, indeed, a shew of wisdom, and will worship, and humility, and neglecting the body, not in any honour*

* Ch. ii. 4.

† V. 8.

‡ V. 18.

to the satisfying of the flesh. He goes on to say *, *If ye then be risen with Christ, seek those things which are above, where Christ sitteth at the right hand of God*, in which he might possibly allude to the turn they gave to the doctrine of a resurrection, willing to make some use of their mistake. “ If it be true, as you pretend, that the *resurrection is past already*, and you are risen again in the sense that Christ really meant, act as becomes persons so renewed in mind, and advanced to so pure and holy a state.”

But it is in the epistles to Timothy, and Titus, men who had the inspection and care of several churches, that this apostle is most earnest in his admonitions to oppose the progress of this mischievous, but specious philosophy. His first epistle to Timothy begins with this subject, as what was uppermost in his mind †. *I besought thee to abide still at Ephesus, when I went into Macedonia, that thou mightest charge some, that they teach no other doctrine, neither give heed to fables, and endless genealogies, which minister questions, rather than godly edifying, which is in faith*. In the fourth chapter he again plainly alludes to the same system of opinions, as what had been foretold should be introduced into the church ‡. *Now the spirit speaketh expressly, that in the latter times some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits, and*

* Ch. iii. 3.

† Ch. i. 3.

‡ Ch. iv. 1.

doctrines

doctrines of demons—forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meat, which God hath created to be received with thanksgiving, of them who believe and know the truth. For every creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused, if it be received with thanksgiving. For it is sanctified by the word of God and prayer.

To the same, no doubt, he refers in the sixth chapter, where, speaking of some who taught otherwise than he had done, he says *, *If any man teach otherwise, and consent not to wholesome words, even the words of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to the doctrine which is according to godliness, he is proud, knowing nothing, but doting about questions, and strifes of words, whence cometh—perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds, and destitute of the truth, &c.* And he concludes the epistle with exhorting him, no doubt, with the same view, in the following words: *O Timothy, keep that which is committed to thy trust, avoiding prophane and vain babblings, and oppositions of science, falsely so called, which some professing have erred concerning the faith.*

In his second epistle to the same person, he very plainly alludes to the same system, when he says †, *But shun prophane and vain babbling, for they will increase unto more ungodliness, and their word will eat as doth a canker. Of whom is Hymeneus, and Philetus, who con-*

* V. 3.

† Ch. ii. 16.

cerning

cerning the truth have erred, saying, that the resurrection is past already, and overthrow the faith of some. And as a motive with him to preach the word, and to be instant in season and out of season, he adds*, *For the time will come when they will not endure sound doctrine, but, after their own lusts, shall they heap to themselves teachers, having itching ears, and they shall turn away their ears from the truth, and be turned unto fables.*

In this epistle to Titus we find many expressions very much like those in his epistle to Timothy, and, therefore, they probably allude to the same things; though he here intimates, that they were *Jews* who were most industrious in propagating these new doctrines, accommodating them to their own Law, as the Cabalists afterwards are known to have done. Mosheim says, “ that a considerable number of the Jews had imbibed the errors of the Oriental philosophy, appears evidently both from the books of the New Testament, and from the ancient history of the christian church, and it is also certain that many of the Gnostic sects were founded by Jews †.” *Holding fast the faithful word, as he hath been taught, that he may be able by sound doctrine both to exhort and convince the gainsayers. For there are many unruly, and vain talkers, and deceivers,*

* Ch. iv. 3.

† Eccles. Hist. vol. i. p. 38. Titus, i. 9.

especially

especially they of the circumcision, whose mouths must be stopped, who subvert whole houses, teaching things which they ought not, for filthy lucre's sake. Again, Not giving heed is Jewish fables, and commandments of men, that turn from the truth. Unto the pure all things are pure, but to them that are defiled and unbelieving, is nothing pure, alluding perhaps to the prohibition of marriage, and of certain meats †. Avoid foolish questions and genealogies, and contentions, and strivings about the law, for they are unprofitable and vain.*

It is not improbable, also, that the apostle Peter alludes to the same system, when he says ‡, *For we have not followed cunningly-devised fables, when we made known unto you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but were eye witnesses of his majesty.*

But the apostle John, who wrote later than the rest, uses language that cannot be applied to any thing but the system I have mentioned; and it is, moreover, evident from the strain of his writings, that he knew of no other considerable heresy in the church in his time, which agrees with what ancient writers say, that no heresies were known in the times of the apostles, but that of the *Doceta*, who believed that Christ did not come in real flesh (which is most evidently a branch of the system I have described) and that of the *Nazarenes*, or *Ebionites*, of which I shall say more in its proper place.

* V. 14.

† Ch. iii. 9.

‡ Ch. i. 16.

To guard against this heresy, which, in fact, subverted the whole gospel, this venerable apostle is very particular in giving a most circumstantial testimony to the proper humanity of Christ *, *That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the word of life. For the life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and shew unto you, that eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us. That which we have seen, and heard, declare we unto you, &c.*

It is, moreover, remarkable, that this apostle expressly calls this very doctrine *that of Antichrist*, and he says there were many that published it †. *Little children it is the last time, and as ye have heard that Antichrist shall come, even now are there many antichrists, whereby we know that it is the last time ‡. Who is a liar, but he that denieth that Jesus (the man Jesus) is the Christ; the opinion of some of these sectaries being, that Christ was another person than Jesus, and that he came down from heaven, and entered into him. He is antichrist that denieth the Father and the Son. Whosoever denieth the Son, the same hath not the Father.*

Again §, *Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God.*

* 1 John i. 1. † Ch. ii. 18. ‡ V. 22. § Ch. iv. 3.

From which we may clearly learn, that this was the only heresy that gave any alarm to this good apostle. *And every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God. And this is that spirit of Antichrist, whereof ye have heard that it should come, and even now already is it in the world.* It is also to the reality of the body of Christ, that he alludes, when he says *, *This is he that came by water and blood, even Jesus Christ, not by water only, but by water and blood; for there are three that bear witness, the spirit, and the water, and the blood;* alluding, perhaps, to Jesus being declared to be the Son of God at his baptism, by his miracles, and by his death and resurrection, of which the former was allowed by the Docetæ, but the latter they denied.

In his second epistle, this apostle still dwells upon the same subject †, *Many deceivers are entered into the world, who confess not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh. This is a deceiver, and an Antichrist ‡. If there come any unto you, and bring not this doctrine, receive him not into your house, nor bid him God speed.* It is to this also, probably, that he alludes when, in his third epistle, he expresses his joy that Gaius, to whom he writes, *walked in the truth §. I rejoiced greatly when the brethren came, and testified of the truth that is in thee, even as thou walkest*

* V. 6.

† V. 7.

‡ V. 10.

§ V. 3.

in the truth. I have no greater joy than to bear that my children walk in truth.

Who were the *Nicolaitans*, mentioned in the book of Revelation, is not known with any certainty; but as antiquity mentions no heresies in the church in those early times, but some branch of the Oriental sect, and the Nazarenes, who are falsely considered as heretical, it is probable that the Nicolaitans were some of the more flagitious of the former sort, abusing their tenets to licentious purposes; and perhaps this apostle naming them so expressly, and in terms of such extreme disapprobation, in an epistle from Christ himself, might be a means of extinguishing both the name and the thing.

“ The writers of the second, and of the following centuries,” says Mosheim *, “ Irenæus, Tertullian, Clement, and others, affirm, that the Nicolaitans adopted the sentiments of the Gnostics concerning two principles of all things, the æons, and the origin of the terrestrial globe.”

“ There is no sort of doubt,” says the same writer †, “ but that Cerinthus, another heretic, said to have been cotemporary with the apostle John, may be placed with propriety among the Gnostics. He taught that the Creator of this world, whom he considered also as the sovereign and law-

* Eccles. Hist. vol. i. p. 116.

† Ibid, p. 116.

“ giver of the Jewish people, was a Being
 “ endued with the greatest virtues, and de-
 “ rived his birth from the supreme God,
 “ that this Being fell by degrees from his
 “ native virtue, and his primitive dignity;
 “ that the supreme God, in consequence of
 “ this, determined to destroy his empire,
 “ and sent upon earth for this purpose one
 “ of the ever happy and glorious æons,
 “ whose name was Christ; that this Christ
 “ chose for his habitation the person of
 “ Jesus, a man of the most illustrious sanc-
 “ tity and justice, the son of Joseph and
 “ Mary; and descending in the form of a
 “ dove, entered into him while he was re-
 “ ceiving the baptism of John in the wa-
 “ ters of Jordan; that Jesus, after his union
 “ with Christ, opposed himself with vigour
 “ to the God of the Jews, and was, by
 “ his instigation, seized and crucified by the
 “ Hebrew chiefs; that when Jesus was taken
 “ captive, Christ ascended up on high, so
 “ that the man Jesus alone was subjected to
 “ the pains of an ignominious death.”

It is to the same Oriental philosophy that,
 for my part, I have little doubt, that this
 apostle, who certainly referred to it in his
epistles, alluded also in the *Introduction to his*
gospel, where (in direct opposition to the
 principles of this philosophy, which supposed,
 that the *λογος*, which made the world, was
a Being distinct from God) he explains what
 the word *λογος*, really means (as when it is
 said,

said, in the Old Testament, that the *world was made by it*) viz. the *wisdom and power of God himself*, and nothing that was distinct from him. *In the beginning, says he, was the λογος*, as the philosophers also said; but the λογος, *was with God*, that is, it was *God's own λογος*, or *his attribute*, so that the λογος, was really God himself. This divine power and energy was always with God, always belonged to him, and was inherent in him. *All things were made by it, and without it was not any thing made that was made.* Thus we read in the Psalms, *By the word of the Lord, were the heavens made, &c.*

Launching beyond the age of the apostles, we find ourselves in a wide sea of this *vain philosophy*, partly of Grecian, and partly of immediate Oriental extraction; which, however, as has been seen, was ultimately the same thing. The most distinguished of the christian Fathers, as Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, &c. were deeply versed in this philosophy, and studiously covered the *offence of the cross*, by giving such an idea of the author of their religion, and the tenets of it, as was calculated to strike the philosophical part of the world.

A principal source of the mixture of the Platonic philosophy with christianity was from the famous school of Alexandria, as will appear from the following general account of it in the *Apology of Ben Mordecai**. “ The

* Letter, i. p. 105:

“ school of Alexandria in Egypt, which was
 “ instituted by Ptolemy Philadelphus, re-
 “ newed the old academy, or Platonic phi-
 “ losophy, and reformed it.—This school
 “ flourished most under Ammonius (the mas-
 “ ter of Origen and Plotinus) who borrow-
 “ ed his choicest contemplations from the
 “ sacred scriptures, which he mixed with his
 “ Platonic philosophizings; and it is dis-
 “ puted by Eusebius and Porphyry whether
 “ he died a pagan, or a christian*. He had
 “ great advantages, being bred up in the
 “ same school with Philo Judæus. Besides
 “ this, there was in the town of Alexandria,
 “ a famous church, settled by Mark the
 “ Evangelist, and the school was continued
 “ by Pantæus, Clemens Alexandrinus, &c.
 “ and after him successively by Origen, He-
 “ raelius, Dionysius, Athenadore, Malchion,
 “ and Didymus, who reached the year 350,

* Mosheim says (*Ecclesiastical History*, vol. i. p. 139)
 “ That Ammonius maintained, that the great principles
 “ of all philosophical and religious truth were to be found
 “ equally in all sects, that they differed from each other
 “ only in their methods of expressing them, and in some
 “ opinions of little or no importance; that all the Gentile
 “ religions, and even the christian, were to be illustrated
 “ and explained by the principles of this universal philo-
 “ sophy, which derived its original and consistence from
 “ the Eastern nations; that it was taught to the Egyptians
 “ by Hermes, and brought from them to the Greeks. and
 “ was preserved in its original purity by Plato, who was
 “ the best interpreter of Hermes, and of the other Oriental
 “ sages.”

“ which

“ which doctors gave an admirable advance
 “ to the church. The town was for this
 “ reputed the universal school of the church,
 “ and the Platonic philosophy was in the
 “ highest authority among the Fathers. For
 “ it was the common vogue, that it differed
 “ little from Moses; yea, Cœlius Rhodius
 “ thinks, that Plato differs little from Christ’s
 “ placits.”

“ Origen, scholar to Ammonius, though
 “ a professed christian, followed his master’s
 “ steps, mixing the Platonic philosophy, and
 “ the doctrines of the gospel together; hop-
 “ ing thereby to gain credit to the christian
 “ religion; and, with Clemens Alexandri-
 “ nus, and others, made use of the Platonic
 “ and Pythagoric philosophy, as a medium
 “ to illustrate the grand mysteries of faith,
 “ thereby to gain credit among those Plato-
 “ nic sophists. And F. Simon says, that the
 “ mixture of the Platonic philosophy with
 “ the christian religion, did not tend to the
 “ destruction of the orthodox faith, but more
 “ easily to persuade the Greeks to embrace
 “ christianity. This, no doubt, was the in-
 “ tent, and it succeeded as all such methods
 “ have done. Among other Platonic mys-
 “ teries, that of the *Logos*, on which Am-
 “ monius and Plotinus, both heads of the
 “ Platonic school, had commented, was
 “ taken, and applied to the divine logos, ex-
 “ plicated by St. John, which gave occasion
 “ and foundation to many philosophic dis-

“ putes, and contests in the school and
“ church of Alexandria.”

That most of the celebrated Fathers were Platonists, and borrowed many of their explanations of scripture doctrines from that system, is too well known to be insisted upon here. It was by this means that Austin, by his own confession, as will be seen hereafter, came to understand, as he thought, the doctrine of the Trinity.

He said, that if the Platonists were to live over again, they would, by changing a few words and phrases only, become christians*. Many of the Platonic philosophers, when they embraced christianity, did not lay aside their philosophical gown, but thought to follow Christ and Ammonius too†. The same judicious historian says, that those christian doctors, who were infected with Platonism, did not discourse of the state of souls after death, of the nature of the soul, of the trinity, and many other things that bore a relation to them, as those who drew their instructions from the sacred scriptures, and were taught by Christ only‡.

“ Synesius,” says Warburton §, “ went
“ into the church a Platonist, and a Plato-
“ nist he continued when he was there.
“ This man could not be brought to be-

* Mosheim's Dissertations, p. 98.

† Ib. p. 117.

‡ Ib. p. 210.

§ Divine Legation, vol. ii. p. 236.

“ lieve

“ lieve the apostolic doctrine of a resur-
 “ rection, because he believed with Plato,
 “ that the soul was before the body, i. e.
 “ eternal, a *parte ante*. However, he was
 “ not for shaking hands with christianity,
 “ but would suppose some grand and pro-
 “ found mystery to lie hid under the scrip-
 “ ture account of a resurrection.”

But it is not my design to trace the Platonism of the Fathers in every article of faith. Enough of it has appeared in my historical account of opinions concerning the nature of God, and the human soul, on which I have enlarged pretty much, in order to trace the rise and progress of the doctrines of materialism and immaterialism, and other things connected with them.

That the early heretics, or those who attempted to bring into christianity more of the Oriental system than the bulk of christians were disposed to relish, had their instructions partly in the East, and partly also in the school of Plato, is universally acknowledged. The doctrine of the Gnostics, says Beausobre *, was compounded of the philosophy of Plato, the Oriental philosophy, and the christian religion. Tertullian's complaints, that so excellent a philosophy as that of Plato should give occasion to all the heresies, gives but too much reason, by discovering his own excessive admiration of it, to suspect that he

* Vol. i. p. 394.

had

had himself made too free with it. “ But
 “ in those days,” says Beausobre *, “ it
 “ was allowed that, together with the fun-
 “ damental doctrines of christianity, any per-
 “ son was at liberty to philosophize about the
 “ rest; and the nearer they could bring their
 “ religion to the established principles of
 “ philosophy, the more success they had.”
 But how dangerous a maxim was this! It
 was, in fact, setting up their own wisdom
 against the wisdom of God himself.

Manes and his predecessors were all known
 adepts in the philosophy of the East. Basi-
 lides, the proper founder of Manicheism,
 was a philosophical divine, who travelled into
 Persia, and mixed the philosophical opinions
 of that country with his religion †. Bar-
 desanes travelled even into India, to acquaint
 himself with the wisdom of the Brach-
 mans ‡. The four books of Scythian, a
 teacher of Manicheism, and who had tra-
 velled into India, were thought to be those
 which he had from the Brachmans, and
 which he brought into Egypt §. And the
 Valentinians, Beausobre says, were Pytha-
 goricians and Platonists, as, he adds, were
 almost all the Greek philosophers, who
 embraced christianity ||.

Simon Magus is, by several ancient writ-
 ters, called the *parent of all heresies*, not

* Vol. i. p. 40.

† Ib. p. 40.

‡ Ib. vol. ii. p. 129.

§ P. 45.

|| Vol. ii. p. 161.

that

that he was properly a christian heretic, but because the Gnostics, and other early heretics, borrowed much of their system from him, and because he introduced the Oriental philosophy into Judea, and that neighbourhood*.

In these circumstances can it be any wonder that the pure religion of Christ got a tincture that would continue for ages, and even to the present time?

S E C T I O N V,

*Of the Influence of the Philosophical System
on the Christian Doctrine concerning the
PERSON OF CHRIST,*

PERHAPS the greatest disservice that the introduction of philosophy ever did to christianity was, that, in consequence of the general doctrine of the *pre-existence of all human souls*, the soul of Christ was, of course, supposed to have had a pre-existent state, and also to have had a superior rank and office before he came into the world, suitable to the power and dignity with which he appeared to be invested on earth.

Had the state of philosophical opinions in that age of the world been what it is now,

* Mosheim's Dissertations, p. 226.

and,

and, consequently, had the doctrine of pre-existence been unknown, the rise of such a doctrine concerning the person of Christ would have been very extraordinary; and *the fact of its existence* might have been alledged as an argument for its truth. But the introduction of this tenet from the Oriental or Platonic philosophy was but too easy; so that to a person who considers the state of opinions at that time, there appears to have been nothing extraordinary in it. Nay, it would have been very extraordinary if, together with other opinions, known to have been derived from that source, philosophizing christians had *not* adopted this also; the temptation in this case being greater than in any other whatever; viz. to wipe away the reproach which was reflected upon christianity from the *meanness of the person of our Saviour*, and the *indignity* with which he was treated.

We have seen that it was a fundamental doctrine in the East, and likewise in the Platonic system, that, on account of the mixture of *evil* in the world, it could not be supposed to have been made by the supreme Being himself; but that it was formed from pre-existent matter, by a celestial spirit, a principal emanation from the divine mind, the *Birmah* of the Hindoos, the *prima mens* of the Chaldeans, the *νους* and *νοσος* of Plato. And what was more natural than to suppose, that the *restorer* of the human race had been the *former*

former of it; especially as those who adopted that hypothesis could so plausibly apply to Christ, as we know they actually did, those passages of the Old Testament, in which the world was said to have been made by the word, *λογος*, of God, the same word or power, which actually dwelled in Christ, and acted by him*. By this easy channel, I make no doubt, did this great corruption flow into the christian system, with all the train of mischievous consequences that soon followed it.

It is likewise remarkable, that, as in the philosophical system of those times, there was but *one* emanation of the Divine Being distinguished in so particular a manner as to be the creator of the world, so we find that christians were first charged with introducing *two* Gods, and not *three*, the divinity of the *Holy Ghost*, as a separate person, not having been an article in any christian creed till after the council of Nice. Also the orthodox in those times always gave that superiority to the Father, as the source of all intelligence, that the philosophers did to the *supreme mind* with respect to his emanations; so that the correspondence between the two systems was wonderfully complete.

The Platonists, indeed, besides *the second God*, called *vous*, which they supposed to be a

* Alexander, to prove the eternity of the Logos, cites Pl. xlv. i. *My heart is inditing a good matter*, *λογον αγαθον*. Jortin's Remarks, vol. iii. p. 47.

perfect

perfect image of the one supreme God, supposed a *third*, which was the *soul of the universe*, diffused through all its parts *. But though this makes a kind of a *trinity of Gods*, and, therefore, the doctrine is by some of the orthodox, said to be found in that philosophy, it by no means tallies with the christian trinity. But the doctrine of a *second God*, an emanation from the first, is well known to have been a fundamental principle in the ancient philosophy.

According to the oracles of Zoroaster, the *monad*, from which all things were produced, delivered the government of things to the *second mind*, an opinion which, as Le Clerc says, was adopted by Plato †.

That this was the true source of the doctrine concerning the pre-existent nature and power of Christ, as well as of the aversion that was soon entertained to the thought of his having assumed a real body of flesh and blood, is so obvious, that even the orthodox Beaufobre almost acknowledges it, though without design. “Those,” says he ‡, “who
 “ were educated in the school of Plato,
 “ whose philosophy was much esteemed in
 “ the East, believed that there was a per-
 “ fect intelligence, called *vous*, or *νοσος*, an
 “ emanation from the supreme intelligence.
 “ They concluded, that this sublime intelli-
 “ gence might reveal his will to men, and

* Beaufobre, vol. i. p. 560. † Stanley by Le Clerc, p. 26.

‡ Vol. i. p. 379.

“ teach

“ teach men the way of salvation ; but could
 “ not believe that he would become united
 “ to matter. Their view,” he says *,
 “ was to abolish the *scandal of the cross*; and
 “ to render the christian religion more plau-
 “ sible.”

The history of Austin’s conversion to or-
 thodoxy is another striking argument in fa-
 vour of this hypothesis. “ Austin,” says
 Beaufobre †, “ believed Christ to be a *mere*
 “ *man*, though much exalted above others
 “ by divine gifts, till he learned of the
 “ books of Plato, translated by Victorinus,
 “ that the *Logos* existed before all things,
 “ that he was from eternity with God, that
 “ he created all things, that he is the only
 “ Son of the Father, and, finally, equal to
 “ the Father, being of the same substance
 “ with himself.”

The very *language*, which the early or-
 thodox Fathers made use of to express the
 derivation of the Son from the Father, viz.
emanation, efflux, probole, &c. shews plainly
 enough whence that doctrine was derived.
 This language is even used by some of the
 modern orthodox, without considering how
 the doctrine of the immateriality of the Di-
 vine Being is affected by it. Cudworth says,
 that “ the second and third persons in the
 “ trinity are eternal and necessary emana-
 “ tions from the first ‡,” “ and that they

* P. 380.

† Vol. i. p. 478.

‡ P. 559.

“ all

“ all have a mutual *existence* and *penetration* “ of one another *.” This divine also maintains the subordination of the Son to the Father, which agrees with the ancient doctrines on this subject. He says †, that “ the “ second and third persons in the trinity are “ not so omnipotent as the first, because not “ able to produce it.”

Several of the orthodox christians, however, in early times, objected to the language above mentioned, viz. *emanation*, &c. as denoting either a *separation*, or *extension* of the divine essence, which the Basilidians and Valentinians avowed ‡. But those christian writers who thought God to be corporeal, made no difficulty of explaining the generation of the Son by the term *αποβολη*, or *branch*, as not implying any separation of substance, or a part detached from the rest §. Tertullian uses this term. “ The Son,” says he, “ comes from the essence of the “ Father, as the stock of a tree from the “ root, or a ray from the sun. Justin Mar- “ tyr uses the same term ||.”

The Manicheans explained the generation of the Son from the Father, without supposing any loss to the Father, by comparing it to the lighting of one lamp by another **. Justin Martyr and Tatian use this compa-

* P. 559.

† P. 599.

‡ Beaufobre, vol. i. p. 546.

§ Ib. p. 548.

|| Ib. p. 549.

** P. 555.

rison.

tion. Tatian also uses another comparison with the same view; but it is less happy in other respects. When I speak to you, says he, and you hear me, my reason ($\lambda\omicron\sigma\iota\varsigma$) goes into you, without my being deprived of it*.

Others of them had recourse to worse shifts than even this. Some of the catholics being charged with introducing three gods, and with making the persons of the trinity as distinct from one another, as Peter, James, and John, acknowledged it; saying, that Peter, James, and John might be said to be one, on account of their partaking of the same human nature †.

The term $\pi\rho\omicron\beta\omicron\lambda\eta$, was rejected, however, by Origen, who was a Platonist, as implying, that God was corporeal ‡.

According to the heathen system, the emanation of the Son from the Father was not a necessary, but a *voluntary* thing, and took place either *in time*, according to the proper Oriental system, or *from eternity*, according to Plato. And we also find the doctrine of the voluntary emanation of the Son by the Father among the early christians, though this idea is not admitted at present. Justin Martyr says, that "the Father begat the Son voluntarily." Origen taught the same doctrine, and Petavius acknowledges, that it was the

* Beaufobre, p. 558.

† P 558.

‡ Vol. i. p. 532.

opinion of a great number of the ancient doctors*. “The principles of the ancients concerning the trinity,” says Mr. Dupin, was, “that the word was from all eternity in the Father, being his wisdom and power; and that when he chose to make the world, he put him, as it were, without himself †.”

The Fathers did not, in general believe, that the Son was produced from eternity, but only immediately before the creation of the world, that he might be employed for that purpose ‡. This opinion is found even later than the council of Nice §. Lactantius says, that “when God was resolved to make the world, which was to be composed of things of a contrary nature, he began with creating two sorts of them, the one good, his only Son, and the other evil, *the devil*, which are to be in continual war ||.”

It is, likewise, a very ancient opinion among very catholic authors, that the first intelligent being that God made was *the devil*; he being the first of those intelligences that God created an infinite number of ages before the creation of the visible world, at which time, and not before, Christ was produced**.

The hypothesis I am pursuing clearly explains why the Marcionites, Valentinians, and Manicheans escaped censure at the coun-

* Beaufobre, vol. i. p. 522.

† Vol. i. p. 520.

‡ Ibid. § P. 521.

|| P. 574.

** Ib. p. 524.

cil of Nice. For those sectaries, as Beaufobre says*, were orthodox with respect to the trinity; since they could make use of the term *consubstantial* as well as the most orthodox; which the Arians, who believed that the Logos was created out of nothing, could not do. The Manicheans believed the consubstantiality of the persons, but not their *equality*; believing the Son to be below the Father, and the Spirit below both †. This error, however, was not peculiar to them, but was very general ‡.

It is only by an attention to these principles, that we can understand the state of the controversy between the orthodox and the Arians. For though the Fathers in general believed, that the Son had not proceeded from the Father, but a short time before the creation of the world, in which he was employed, they believed, that he issued *from the substance of the Father*, and, therefore, was *light of light, very God of very God, begotten, not made*, that is, *not created out of nothing*, which the Arians maintained. We see, then, that the Arians retained so much of the established system, as not to deny the *pre-existence* of Christ, or his office of *creating the world*. These notions were so deeply rivetted, that they were not easily eradicated; but, it is evident, that the Arians had less of the Oriental, or Platonic philosophy, than the orthodox.

* Vol. i. p. 542.

† P. 561.

‡ Ib.

- Indeed, the learned Cudworth acknowledges, that the Athanasians, and the Nicene Fathers platonized, and not the Arians; though he says, that they derived their ideas not from Plato, but from the scriptures*. But of that let the reader judge. The platonizing Fathers, says Le Clerc†, thought, that before the actual generation of the Son, he was *virtually in the Father*, and, therefore, *αὐτὸθεός*, whereas the Arians denied this, and said, that he, like other creatures, was produced from nothing.

SECTION VI.

General Arguments against the PRE-EXISTENCE OF CHRIST.

THE preceding history of opinions relating to the pre-existence of Christ affords a very striking argument against that doctrine. But I think it will not be amiss in this place, in order to remove the strong prejudices that have taken place with respect to this subject, to add some other arguments of a *general nature*, such as arise from the known state of things in the apostolic age, and what may be fairly inferred from the apostolic writings, without entering into the discus-

* P. 529.

† See his Edition of Stanley, p. 160.

sion of particular texts of Scripture, for which I beg leave to refer my reader to my *Illustration of particular Texts*, and more especially to *Mr. Lindsey's excellent Sequel to his Apology*; where that worthy man, and valuable writer, has thrown much new light upon many of those passages which have been the greatest stumbling blocks in the way of the antipre-existent doctrine.

It is acknowledged by all writers, that, at the beginning of christianity, there arose *two* opposite errors concerning the person of Christ. The first, they say, came from the Jewish converts, who maintained that Christ was only *a man*, distinguished by peculiar gifts. "This," says Athanasius, "was an error of the Jews, in the time of the apostles; and, he says, they drew the Gentiles into it." Of these there were two sorts, some called Nazarenes, who believed the miraculous conception, and the other Ebionites, who believed Christ to be born of Joseph and Mary. This is expressly said to have been *the most ancient heresy in the church* *.

"Presently after, however, there arose another error, quite opposite to this, introduced by the Pagan philosophers, who stripped Christ of his human nature. This heresy was one of the first that spread among the Gentiles, and the apostle John

* Beaufobre, vol. ii. p. 517.

“ did all he could to prevent its spread, but
 “ in vain*.”

Now, admitting these facts, viz. the existence of the *Nazarene* heresy, and that of the *Docete* in the apostolic age, and that the former was prior to the other, I think we may safely infer, from the notice taken of heresy in the New Testament, that the former was not considered as any heresy at all; because there is no mention made of it *as such*; whereas the other is inveighed against, and especially by the apostle John, in the strongest terms; and moreover, as has been shewn above, he evidently speaks of it in such a manner as implies, that he had no idea of any other heresy of consequence in his time.

Against this heresy he writes in the clearest and most express manner, and with the most vehement zeal. Of the other supposed heresy he is so far from taking any notice at all (notwithstanding what has been imagined by some commentators upon him) that he writes exactly like a person who considered Christ as a man, who was so far from being of *the same substance with the Father*, and consequently possessed of any power of *his own*, that he received all his powers immediately from God. And it is remarkable, that those texts which most strongly express the absolute dependence of Christ upon God, and which assert, that all the wisdom and power

* Beaufobre, p. 518.

that

that appeared in him were the wisdom and power of the Father, and not his own, occur chiefly in the gospel of this very apostle.

Also, the rest of the apostles, instead of taking any notice, direct or indirect, of this capital heresy, as it has been represented, constantly use a language that could not but give the greatest countenance to it; always speaking of Christ as *a man*, even when they represent him in a light of the greatest importance.

This utter silence of the writers of the New Testament concerning a *great heresy*, the very first that ever existed in the christian church, and as it is now represented, the most *dangerous* of all others; a heresy taking place chiefly among the Jews, with whom the apostles had most to do, looks as if they considered the opinion of the *proper humanity of Christ*, in a very different light from that in which it was viewed by their philosophizing successors.

Athanasius, who could not deny these facts, endeavours to account for them, by saying, that “ all the Jews were so firmly persuaded
 “ that their Messiah was to be nothing more
 “ than a man like themselves, that the apostles
 “ were obliged to use great caution in
 “ divulging the doctrine of the proper divinity
 “ of Christ *. But did the apostles

* See his Epistola de Sententia Dionysii contra Arianos. Opera, vol. i. p. 553.

spare other Jewish prejudices, which were, at least, as inveterate as this, especially their zeal for the law of Moses, and their aversion to the admission of the Gentiles into the christian church without circumcision, &c. ? And ought not the *importance* of the doctrine to have constrained them to venture a little beyond the bounds of a *timid prudence*, in such a case as this ; especially as the Jewish christians in general, as far as appears, always continued in this error, till their final dispersion, by the civil convulsions that took place in the East, subsequent to the destruction of Jerusalem ?

Besides, whether was it more probable that the *illiterate Jews*, who received their doctrine from none but the apostles themselves, and indeed conversed with no other, should have fallen into so grievous an error with respect to the person of Christ, *their own Messiah*, or those who are known to have drawn various opinions from other sources besides the genuine apostolical doctrine, and particularly from that very *philosophy* which, manifestly contrary to any thing that the Jews could possibly have learned from their sacred books, expressly taught the doctrine of the pre-existence of all human souls, and their emanation from the divine mind ; which was, in fact, the doctrine and language of the pretended orthodox Fathers ?

Without examining the merits of the question, *probability* will certainly incline us to take

take the part of the poor Jewish converts. Indeed, their poverty and illiterateness made them despised by the Gentile christians, who were captivated with the *wisdom of this world*: Justin Martyr, however, the earliest Gentile christian writer, speaks of them and their opinions with more respect than they were afterwards treated with. He was one of the first of the philosophising christians, and therefore might know that their doctrines were those of the bulk of christians in his time; and perhaps, at that time, few thought differently from them, besides a few speculative persons like himself*.

2. It is evident, that the most intelligent of the Jews expected nothing more than a *merc man* for their Messiah †; nor can it be said that any of the ancient prophecies give us the least hint of any thing farther. Had the prophecies *not* been *explicit*, there seems to have been the greatest reason why our Lord, or his apostles, should have expressly observed that they were so; or if they had been universally

* See Edit. Thyrby, p. 235.

† "They," says Trypho (the Jew speaker in Justin Martyr's Dialogue) "who think that Jesus was a man, and, being chosen of God, was anointed Christ, appear to me to advance a more probable opinion than your's. For all of us expect that Christ will be born a man from man (*αυθρωπων εξ αυθρωπων*) and that Elias will come to anoint him. If he, therefore, be Christ, he must, by all means, be a man born of men." Edit. Thyrby, p. 235.

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misunderstood, or *perverted*, we might expect that this should have been noticed by our Lord, as well as other abuses or mistakes which prevailed in his time. Or if a discovery of so great importance would have staggered the faith, or checked the freedom of the disciples of our Lord, when they were fully apprized of the transcendent greatness of the person whom they had considered as a man like themselves, we might have expected that this great discovery would have been made to them, when their minds were fully enlightened by the descent of the Holy Spirit, or at some other time when they were fully instructed in all things relating to the religion they had to teach. And whenever the revelation of a thing so highly *interesting*, and *unexpected*, as this must have been, had been made to them, their wonder and surprise must have been such, as we should have found some *traces* or *intimations* of in their writings.

Nor can it be supposed that a thing of so wonderful a nature as this, could have been announced to the body of christians, who certainly had not, at first, the most remote idea of such a thing, without exciting an astonishment, that could not have been concealed, and such *speculations* and *debates* as we must have heard of. And yet the apostles, and the whole christian world, are supposed to have passed from a state of absolute ignorance concerning the nature of their Lord and Master (regarding him in the familiar light of a friend
and

and brother) to the full conviction of his being the *most glorious of all created natures*; him by whom God originally made, and constantly supported all things, without leaving any intimation by which it is impossible for us to learn, *in what manner* so wonderful a communication was made to them, or of the *effects* it had on their own minds, or those of others.

At whatever time it be supposed that the apostles were first apprized of the *superangelic nature* of their Master, it might be expected, that so very material a change in their conceptions concerning him, would have been attended with a correspondent change in their language, when they spoke of him; and yet through the whole book of Acts, he has hardly any other appellation than simply that of a man. Thus the apostle Peter calls him*, *A man approved of God*; and the apostle Paul †, *The man whom God ordained*. Nor when we may most certainly conclude, that the apostles meant to speak of him in his *biggest capacity*, do they give him any other title; as when the apostle Paul says ‡, *There is one God and one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus*.

3. Had this Mediator between God and man been of a *middle nature* between God and man. I think one might have expected some *positive declaration* of it, in this or

* Acts ii. 22. † Acts xvii. 31. ‡ 1 Tim. ii. 5.

some

some such place; and that the apostle would not have expressed himself in a manner so unguarded, and which, without some explanation, must necessarily lead his readers into a very great mistake. It is in vain, however, that we look through the whole New Testament for any thing like such an express declaration, or explanation on the subject; and a doctrine of this extraordinary nature is only pretended to be deduced by way of *inference from casual expressions*.

4. It is also with me a very strong presumption against the Arian hypothesis, that no *use* is made by the writers of the New Testament, of so extraordinary a fact, as that of the union of a superangelic spirit with the body of a man. No *argument* or *exhortation* is ever grounded upon it; whereas it might have been expected, that so very wonderful a thing as this must have been *alluded to*, and *argued from*, in a great variety of respects; and especially that the first converts to christianity should have been frequently, and very distinctly informed of the *high rank of their master*; especially as the great popular objection to the christian scheme was the *mean birth* and *obscurity* of its author, and the *disgraceful treatment* he met with in the world. The very few texts in which it is thought by some that arguments are drawn from the pre-existent state of Christ, appear to me to refer to nothing more than the dignity with which he was invested as *Messiah*, after he was *sent*

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of God, and endued with power from on high, for the important purposes of his mission.

It weighs much with me, that if so extraordinary a thing as the descent of a superangelic spirit, to animate a human body, had been true, it must have appeared, in the course of the history of Christ, that such an extraordinary a measure was *necessary*; as by his acting a part which a *mere man* was either naturally incapable of, or in which there was an obvious impropriety for a mere man to act. But so far are we from perceiving any thing of this in the evangelical history, that nothing is exhibited to us in it, but the appearance of *a man approved of God*, and *assisted* by him. For, though no man could have done what he is said to have done, *unless God had been with him*, yet *with that assistance*, every thing must have been easy to him.

If our Lord had, *in himself*, though derived originally from God, any extraordinary degree of wisdom, or peculiar ability of any other kind, for carrying on the work of man's redemption, above the measure or capacity of that nature which God had given to men, he would hardly have declared so frequently, and so expressly as he does, that *of his own self he could do nothing*, that *the words which he spake were not his own*, but *his Father's who sent him*, and that *his Father within him did the works*. This is certainly the proper language of a person who is possessed of no more natural advantage than any other man.

If

If he had any superior powers, abstracted from what he derived from the immediate agency of God, *in what they do appear?*

So solicitous does the Divine Being always appear, that his rational offspring, mankind, should *understand* and *approve* of his proceedings respecting them, that there is hardly any measure which he has adopted, that is of much moment to us, for which some *plain reason* is not assigned by one or other of the sacred writers. Indeed, this is a circumstance that cannot but contribute greatly to the efficacy of such measures. But though, I believe, every other circumstance relating to the scheme of redemption is clearly revealed to us, yet we neither find any reason assigned for so important a preliminary to it, as the *incarnation of the first of all created beings*, nor are we any where given to understand, that this was a necessary preliminary to it, though the reasons for it were such as we could not comprehend. A conduct so exceedingly dark and mysterious as this, has no example in the whole history of the dispensations of God to mankind.

5. Could the history of the *miraculous conception of Jesus* have been written so fully as it is by both Matthew and Luke, and so very important a circumstance relating to it as this have been overlooked by them, if it had been at all known to them? I will appeal to any Arian, whether he himself could possibly have given such an account of that transaction

action as either of these evangelists has given. It must certainly be thought by them to be a capital omission in the account.

6. It has often been observed, and I cannot but think very justly, that the uniform scripture doctrine of the present and future dignity of Christ, being conferred as *the reward of his services and sufferings on earth*, is peculiarly favourable to the idea of his being a man only; and I think the Arians are obliged to strain very hard in order to make out any material difference between the pre-existent and present state of Christ; or to explain the nature of his *reward*, of which so striking an account is always given, if there be no material difference between the two states.

7. It is said that, if it be difficult to explain the reward of Christ upon the Arian hypothesis, it is equally difficult to account for his distinguished reward and future honour and power upon the supposition of his being a *mere man*; these being *too great* in this case, if they were *too little* in the other. But it should be considered, that there is a *natural propriety* in distinguishing a man appointed by God to act the most important part that man could act (and a part, that *no other than a man* could with propriety appear in, respecting the whole human race) in a manner greatly superior to what is conferred on any other man.

It should also be considered, that there are many passages of scripture, which most expressly

pressly say, that, great as is the honour and dignity to which Christ is advanced, his disciples, and especially his apostles, will be advanced to *similar*, if not *equal* honour. And it is remarkable, that there is no one *power*, or *prerogative*, that is mentioned as conferred on Christ, but the same is likewise said to be imparted to his followers.

As to what is called his *glory*, or honour and dignity in general, and the *love that God* has for him, that love and high regard from which those honours proceed, our Lord himself says expressly, that his disciples are on a level with himself. What else can be inferred from his prayer before his death, in which he says*, *That they may be one, as thou Father art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us,—and the glory which thou gavest me, I have given them, that they may be one, even as we are one. I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one, and that the world may know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them as thou hast loved me.* Other parts of this remarkable prayer are in the same strain, and it appears to me, that nothing but our having long considered Christ in a light infinitely higher than that of his disciples, has prevented our understanding it as we ought to have done.

Christ is appointed to *raise the dead*, but this is not said to be performed by any pro-

* John xvii. 21.

per power of his own, any more than the miracles of that and other kinds which he wrought when he was on earth, and dead persons were raised to life by the apostles as well as by himself.

Christ is also said to *judge the world*. But even this honour is said to be shared with him by his disciples, and especially the apostles. *Know ye not*, says St. Paul*, *that the saints shall judge the world. And if the world be judged by you, are ye unworthy to judge the smallest matters. Know ye not, that we shall judge angels, how much more things that pertain to this life.*

8. The *kingdom of Christ*, whatever it be, is expressly said to *have an end*†. *Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father. — And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all.* This is what we should hardly have expected if Christ had been the first of all created beings, by whom all things were made, and who upholds and governs all things.

9. How it may affect others I cannot tell, but with me it is a very great objection to the pre-existence of Christ, that it favours strongly of the Oriental doctrine of the *pre-existence of all human souls*, which was the foundation of the Gnostic heresy, and the source of great

* 1 Cor. vi. 2.

† 1 Cor. xv. 24.

corruption in genuine christianity. For if the soul of one man might have pre-existed, separate from the body, why might not the soul of another, or of all? Nay, analogy seems to require, that the whole species be upon one footing, in a case which so very nearly concerns the *first and constituent principles of their nature*. Besides, the opinion of the separability of the thinking part of man from his bodily frame, even after he comes into the world, is so far from being agreeable to the phenomena of human nature, that it is almost expressly contradicted by them all.

10. The author of the epistle to the Hebrews, one of whose principal objects was to reconcile the Jews to the thoughts of a suffering Messiah, seems to make use of arguments which necessarily suppose Christ to have been a man like ourselves; as when he says*, *We see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels, for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honour*. In this passage the writer seems to consider Christ as a man, in direct opposition to created beings of a superior nature, or angels, under which denomination Christ himself must have been ranked, according to the phraseology of scripture, if he had existed prior to his becoming man; since no other term is made use of, to denote his nature and constitution, as distinct from that of men, or angels.

† Heb. ii. 9.

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With this view this writer applies to Christ, that authority and dominion which is ascribed to man, *as distinguished from angels*, by the Psalmist, Ps. viii. 5. *For unto the angels hath he not put into subjection the world to come, whereof we speak. But one in a certain place, testified, saying, What is man that thou art mindful of him, or the son of man, that thou visitest him. Thou madest him a little lower than the angels; thou crownedst him with glory and honour, and didst set him over the work of thine hands. Thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet.* As, in this passage, he plainly considers the nature of man as properly characterized by his being *a little lower than the angels*, and he applies the very same expression to Christ, without giving the least hint of any distinction between them, I cannot help thinking, that in the writer's idea, the nature of both was precisely the same.

It is also remarkable, that this same writer speaks of Christ as distinguished from angels, when he says *, *That God had anointed him with the oil of gladness above his fellows*, by which, therefore, *in this connection*, I do not see how we can help understanding his *fellow men*, or *fellow prophets*.

II. This writer, also, seems to lay particular stress on Christ's having *felt* as we feel, and having been *tempted* as we are tempted; and to assert, that for this purpose, it was ne-

* Heb. ii. 5. &c.

cessary, that he should be, *in all respects*, what we ourselves are*, *For both he that sanctifieth and they who are sanctified are all of one; for which cause he is not ashamed to call them brethren—and children†, Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same. And again‡, Wherefore in all things, it behoved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest §. For in that he himself hath suffered, being tempted, he is able to succour them that are tempted.* Now, I cannot help thinking from these passages, that the writer had an idea of Christ being much more *what we are*, and consequently of his *feeling* more as we do, than he could have meant, upon the supposition of his being of an angelic, or superangelic nature. For then, the views that he had of his *sufferings*, and consequently his *feelings under them*, must have been exceedingly dissimilar to ours. And every argument that the apostle uses, to shew the impropriety of Christ's being an *angel*, seems to weigh *much more* against his being of a nature *superior to angels*.

12. If it be supposed that, upon becoming an inhabitant of this world, Christ lost all consciousness of his former pre-existent state, I do not see of what use his superior powers

* Heb. ii. 11, &c.

† V. 17.

‡ V. 13, 14.

§ V. 18.

could

could possibly have been to him; or, which comes to the same thing, what occasion there was for such a being in the business. Besides, the hypothesis of an intelligent being, thinking and acting in one state, and losing all the remembrance of what he had been and done in another, has something in it that looks so arbitrary and unnatural, that one would not have recourse to it, but upon the most urgent necessity.

It should seem, however, that if Christ did pre-exist, it was not unknown to him in this world, since one of the strongest arguments for this hypothesis is, his praying that *his father would glorify him with the glory that he had before the world was* *. But if Christ did retain a perfect consciousness of his former state, and, consequently, retained all the powers, and all the knowledge of which he was possessed in that state, I have no idea of such an *increase of wisdom* as the evangelist Luke ascribes to him, when he says †, *And Jesus increased in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and man*. In the idea of this evangelist, Jesus certainly made such improvements in knowledge, as other well-disposed youths make; so that I think he had manifestly no other idea of him.

13. Similar to the above-mentioned reasoning of the author of the epistle to the

* John xvii. 5.

† Ch. ii. 52.

Hebrews, is that of the apostle John, or rather of that of Christ himself*. *And he hath given him authority to execute judgment, because he is the son of man*; for I do not see the force of this inference, unless the meaning of it be, that Christ, being a man like ourselves, having felt as we feel, and having been tempted and tried as we have, is the most *unexceptionable* of all judges. No man can complain of it, since it is being judged, as it were, *by our peers*, and by a person who knows how to make every proper *allowance* for us.

14. Some may possibly lay stress on its being said by the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews, in the passage above-mentioned, that *Christ himself took flesh and blood*, as if it had depended upon his own choice, whether he would become man or not, which implies a pre-existent state. But the word $\mu\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\chi\omicron$ is used for *partaking*, or *sharing in*, absolutely, without any respect to *choice*, and is used in that sense in two other passages of this epistle †, where the apostle speaks of the *propriety of the divine designation*, not of the motive of Christ's election. Also in other places, he is represented as *passive* with respect to the same event. Thus, in the ninth verse of the same chapter, it is said, that *Jesus was made a little lower than the angels*, and not that *he made himself lower*, or condescended.

* John v. 27.

† Ch. v. 13. vii. 13.

It is said *, that *Christ took not on him the nature of angels, but the seed of Abraham.* But *σπαραμβανομενι*, which is the word here used, properly signifies, and is, in every other place, in the New Testament, rendered to *lay hold upon.* In this place, therefore, the meaning probably is, that Christ did not (after he appeared in the character of the Messiah) lay hold upon, so as to *interpose in the favour of, or rescue,* angels, but the seed of Abraham; and thence we see, that the apostle infers, that there was a necessity, or at least an exceeding great propriety, that a Mediator for men should be, in all respects, a man; for he immediately adds, *therefore in all things, it behoved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful High Priest, &c.*

15. Indeed, there appears to me to be a most evident propriety, that a person who acted so important a part with respect to mankind, as Christ did, who was sent to be our instructor and example, and especially who came to ascertain the great doctrine of a *resurrection from the dead,* should be, with respect to his *nature,* the very same that we ourselves are; that he might exhibit before us an example of proper *human virtue,* and especially that he might die as we ourselves die, and his resurrection be the resurrection of a *man like ourselves;* and so the proper *first fruits from the*

* V. 16.

dead, and consequently of the very *same kind* with those of which the *general harvest* will consist; and thereby give us the greater reason to hope, that because *Christ lives we shall live also*.

16. It is now agreed, both by Arians and Socinians, that the supreme God is the only object of *prayer*; it being acknowledged, that we have no authority in the scriptures for addressing ourselves to Christ: but this restriction cannot be founded upon any other than the Socinian hypothesis, and is by no means reconcilable with the principles of Arianism.

I ought not, in reason, to address a petition to *a man* who may not be within hearing of me; and much less can there be a propriety in numbers of persons, in very distant places, addressing themselves to the same man at the same time, because no man can attend to more than one person, or one thing, at once. But a Being equal to the formation of the world, and especially of the whole system of worlds, and even the universe, or the whole creation; he *by whom all things consist*, that is, who still *supports*, and governs all things, must be *capable* of giving his attention to every thing that passes. Nay, every thing must necessarily be at all times subject to his inspection; and, therefore, there could be no impropriety, *in the nature of things*, in addressing prayers to him.

Besides, it is very obvious to reflect, that if there was any reason, or propriety, that
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some derived being, and not the Supreme, should be the immediate *maker of the world*, and that the Deity should not himself interpose in the government of it, it can only be this derived being, and not the Supreme, *with whom we have to do*. It can only be to him who *made us what we are*, and who himself immediately *supports* us in being, that we ought to look. A child naturally addresses itself to its nurse, who attends constantly upon it, and not to its mother; and a tenant applies to the steward, who immediately inspects and manages the estate, and not to the owner of it.

In fact, no reason can be imagined why the Supreme Being should delegate to any inferior the making and governing of the world, which would not be equally a reason for his appointing him to hear our prayers. Nothing but the most express declarations, founded on reasons, which I should think impossible to suggest, can authorise us, to admit the former, and not the latter, the connection is so natural. I therefore look upon the undoubted *fact* of all prayer being, upon the plan of revelation, confined to God, exclusive of all inferior beings, and of Christ, to be a most satisfactory argument, that God himself is alone the immediate maker of the world, and that it is he himself who constantly supports and governs it, without the mediation of any such glorious, though derived

rived being, as the Arians imagine Christ to have been before his incarnation.

17. It is said, and certainly with great reason, that it is in vain to preach christianity to Jews or Mahometans, while it is loaded with such a tenet as the doctrine of the *Trinity*, which, it is well known, they both regard as equally absurd and impious; the great and distinguishing principle of the Jewish religion being the *unity of God*, and the great objection that the Mahometans made to the corrupt christianity of the sixth century, being the general departure of christians from the same fundamental principle, as may be seen in the Koran itself. But the principles of Arianism are hardly more reconcilable to the notions of Jews, or Mahometans, than those of Athanasianism; and the following language of the Jew in Limborch's *Callatio*, is applicable to the idea of Christ being the maker of the world, and the person who spake to Moses in the burning bush, as well as to his being strictly equal to the Father. "The prophet," he says, "who
 " pretends to be the true God of Israel, who
 " arrogates divine omnipotence, and gave
 " his own words as the words of God, cannot be admitted; and, supposing what is
 " impossible, that the true Messiah should
 " publish this doctrine, he ought to be stoned as a false prophet*."

* See Justin's Remarks, vol. iii. p. 312.

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The conduct which Dr. Jortin, who was himself an Arian, recommends with respect to the Jews, I think to be insidious, unworthy of christian simplicity, and what must be altogether ineffectual. He says, that, “ in
 “ addressing Jews and Mahometans, whose
 “ great objection to christianity is the doc-
 “ trine of the trinity, no one should attempt
 “ to remove this prejudice, till he has
 “ brought them to believe the divine mis-
 “ sion of Jesus Christ, and his character as a
 “ prophet, Messiah, a teacher of truth, and
 “ worker of miracles ; and that then many
 “ things may be observed concerning the
 “ *logos*, the angel of God’s presence, and the
 “ angel of the covenant, from the Old Tes-
 “ tament, and from Philo, and from some
 “ ancient Jewish writers*.”

But, in fact, *external* evidence is nothing more than *conditional* evidence with respect to christianity, going upon the supposition, that the things to be proved by miracles are not *incredible in themselves*. The evidence that might be sufficient to satisfy a Jew, that Christ was simply a *teacher sent from God*, and such a Messiah as *their prophecies announced*, would by no means prove to his conviction, that he was the *maker of the world*, and such a Messiah as he was fully persuaded their ancient prophets did *not* foretell, and such a one as it was utterly repugnant to the whole system of his religion to admit.

* *Ib.* vol. iii. p. 439.

18. Some Arians of the present age, staggered, it may be supposed, with the glaring absurdity of making a man who died upon the cross to be the maker of the world, and one who, even in his lowest state of humiliation, was actually *supporting all things with the word of his power*, and of supposing him to be the person who, with the name and character of *Jehovah*, had intercourse with the patriarchs, spake to Abraham, to Moses, and to all the nation of Israelites from mount Sinai, &c. &c. &c. seem willing to abandon this part of the system; but without considering, that, with it, they necessarily abandon all the advantages for the sake of which the whole system was originally adopted. They likewise disclaim the aid of the very strongest texts on which the doctrine of pre-existence is founded; as the introduction to the gospel of John, which speaks of the logos as the Being *by whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made that was made*, Col. i. 5. which speaks of Christ as *the first born of every creature, by whom all things were created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, &c.* as being *before all things, and by whom all things consist*, and, Heb. i. 3. where Christ is said to be the person *by whom God made the World, or rather the ages, and who upholds all things by the word of his power.*

Upon

Upon the whole, nothing can be more evident, than that this *low Arian hypothesis* has no plausible foundation whatever, except being free from the palpable absurdities of the *high Arian* scheme. Certainly, the person who can explain those texts, which speak of Christ as the *maker and supporter of all things*, without supposing that he pre-existed, can have no difficulty in explaining any other texts, which represent him as *simply pre-existing*. For the most difficult of all the texts are those in which his *creating and supporting power* are expressly referred to. The capital circumstances that recommended the doctrine of Christ's pre-existence, when it was started, were the ideas of the *maker* of the world being the great *restorer* of it, and the giver of the *law* being the author of the *gospel*; so that the same person was the medium of all the dispensations of God to mankind. But when these flattering advantages are abandoned, nothing is left but *simple pre-existence*, without any knowledge, or the least colourable conjecture, that Christ had ever borne any *relation to this world* more than to any other.

It is no less evident, that by abandoning the specious advantages of the proper Arian hypothesis, the low Arians are as far as ever from being able to avail themselves of the advantages peculiar to the Socinian scheme; as the propriety of a man being employed in a business so nearly respecting *men*, his exhibiting

hibiting an example of proper *human virtue*, having a reward capable of being conferred on all his followers; of the same kind of being, viz. a man, both introducing *death*, and the *resurrection of the dead*; of the *first fruits* from the dead being of the same kind with the general *harvest*; and that the great judge of all men should be himself a man.

In fact, therefore, this low Arian hypothesis is intirely destitute both of the strongest texts in favour of pre-existence, and also of every advantage peculiar either to the high Arian hypothesis, or the Socinian, so that no scheme can be more insignificant, or rest on narrower or weaker foundations.

Had such general considerations as these been attended to, the doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ could never have advanced so triumphantly as it has done. And such arguments as these ought certainly to weigh more than the supposed *incidental reference* to a doctrine in particular texts of scripture, the interpretation of which is always various and uncertain. Besides, if we confine ourselves to the literal interpretation of particular texts of scripture, there is no system that we may not embrace.

The doctrine of *transubstantiation* is doubly intrenched in such fortifications as these, and so are the gross errors which have now got the name of *Calvinism*, such as *original sin*, *atonement*, &c. and also the doctrine
of

of the perfect equality of the Son to the Father. And yet Arians do not find themselves affected by such texts; and, in my opinion, it requires much less judgment to see that the texts on which they lay so much stress are equally insufficient to bear it.

19. If we consider the practical tendency of the doctrine concerning Christ; I think we shall find nothing at all in favour of the scheme of pre-existence; but much in favour of the contrary doctrine, which represents him as a man like ourselves. To this purpose I shall quote, with some little addition, what I have said on this subject in the *Discourse on the Corruption of Christianity* *.

“ Much of the peculiar power of the gospel motives to virtue (separate from our acting with a view to obtain the reward of immortality promised in it) arises from just ideas of the nature and offices of Christ, as distinct from those of the Divine Being himself, with which they are too much confounded upon the supposition of the proper Deity, or super-angelic nature of Christ, notwithstanding the different offices ascribed to the divine persons, or rather beings, in the Athanasian scheme.

“ The consideration of *the love of Christ*, has something in it peculiarly endearing, when it is not considered as the same thing with *the love of the Creator towards his creatures*, but

* P. 24

“ as the love of one, who, notwithstanding
 “ his miraculous birth, was as much a
 “ man as Adam was, or as we ourselves are;
 “ when it is considered as the love of our
 “ *elder brother, who bore our infirmities, who*
 “ felt all the pains and agonies that man can
 “ feel; and, being the very same that we are,
 “ was in all respects *tempted as we are*; who,
 “ *loved us, and freely gave himself to death for*
 “ *us, to redeem us from sin and misery, that*
 “ we might become partakers of the same
 “ love of God, and be *joint heirs* with him
 “ of the same glory and happiness, that we
 “ might all alike become *kings and priests*
 “ *unto God, even the Father, for ever and*
 “ *ever*; who after living many years on
 “ earth, in which he manifested the most
 “ intense affection for us, is now *gone to*
 “ *prepare a place for us in our heavenly Fa-*
 “ *ther's house, that where he is, there we may be*
 “ *also*; as one who is now exercising a power
 “ which, as the reward of his obedience
 “ unto death, he received from God, to be
 “ *head over all things to his church*; who still
 “ feels for, and will be *present with his*
 “ faithful disciples and followers in all their
 “ trials, even to the end of the world.

“ The esteem and love that we bear to
 “ the character which we form of Christ,
 “ considered as a man like ourselves, the
 “ attachment we have to him, and his cause,
 “ and the efficacy of this principle to pro-
 “ mote a christian temper and conduct, and

“ to

“ to encourage us to follow this our glori-
 “ ous leader, the *captain of our salvation*, and
 “ the *first fruits from the dead* (even though,
 “ like him, we be called *to lay down our lives*
 “ *for our friends*, and to bear persecution
 “ and torture in the cause of conscience,
 “ virtue, truth, and God) is exceedingly
 “ great, and *peculiar to itself*. It is a kind
 “ of love and esteem that cannot be felt by
 “ one who is truly and practically an Atha-
 “ nasian or Arian, and, in general, but im-
 “ perfectly by those who have long been
 “ Athanasians or Arians; and who, there-
 “ fore, cannot easily get rid of the ideas
 “ they have had of Christ as God, or at least
 “ as a Being who has little in common with
 “ us; who, therefore, could not feel as we
 “ do, act upon views similar to ours, or en-
 “ tertain, and be the proper object of, a
 “ similar and reciprocal affection.

“ A man may have rejected the Athana-
 “ sian or Arian hypothesis a long time,
 “ before these ideas shall even occur to
 “ him, or their power be at all apprehend-
 “ ed. At least we can only expect to feel
 “ their influence at intervals, and must not
 “ hope to experience that amazing force,
 “ which, however, we may easily conceive
 “ they must have had with the primitive
 “ christians, and especially with the apostles,
 “ and others, who personally knew Christ,
 “ and who, therefore, never had an idea of his
 “ being any other than a man like them-

“ selves; though, as Peter expresses himself,
 “ *a man approved of God by miracles and won-*
 “ *ders and signs which God did by him.*”

Upon the whole, I cannot help thinking it to be a capital advantage of the doctrine of *Materialism*, that it leaves no shadow of support for the doctrine of *pre-existence*, or the *Arian hypothesis*, which is totally repugnant to the genuine principles of the christian religion, so as hardly to be brought within the general outline of it; and that the greatest mischief that christianity has derived from the unnatural mixture of heathen philosophy with the principles of it, has been this injudicious exaltation of our Saviour; which, in fact, has been nothing else than setting up the vain conceits of men in opposition to the wisdom of God.

In what I have observed in this section I am far from meaning to detract from the peculiar dignity and just prerogative of Christ. And upon this subject I shall beg leave to quote what I have in my *Discourse concerning the Spirit of Christianity* prefixed to my *Essay on Church Discipline*, p.

“ Our aptness to pass from one extreme to
 “ another, and the inconvenience attending
 “ it, are also felt with respect to our senti-
 “ ments concerning the person and character
 “ of Christ. Upon finding, that instead of
 “ being *very God of very God, the Creator of*
 “ *heaven and earth*, he is only *a man like our-*
 “ *selves*, we are apt at first to under-value
 “ him, and not to consider him in that
 “ distin-

“ distinguished light in which, though a
 “ man, he is every where represented in
 “ the scriptures; as the great instrument in
 “ the hands of God, of reversing all the ef-
 “ fects of the fall; as the object of all the
 “ prophecies from Moses to his own time;
 “ as the great bond of union to virtuous and
 “ good men (who, as *christians*, or having
 “ Christ for their master and head, make
 “ *one body*, in a peculiar sense) as introduced
 “ into the world without a human father;
 “ as having communications with God, and
 “ speaking and acting from God, in such a
 “ manner as no other man ever did; and,
 “ therefore, having *the form of God*, and be-
 “ ing *the Son of God*, in a manner peculiar to
 “ to himself; as the means of spreading
 “ divine and saving knowledge to all the
 “ world of mankind; as under God, *the*
 “ *head over all things to his church*; and as
 “ *the Lord of life*, having power and au-
 “ thority from God, to raise the dead and
 “ judge the world at the last day.

“ There seems to be a peculiar propriety,
 “ that these powers respecting *mankind*, should
 “ be given to a *man*; and, it therefore be-
 “ haved our Redeemer, to be *in all things like*
 “ *unto his brethren*, and to be *made perfect*
 “ *through sufferings*; but, certainly the man
 “ who is invested with these powers and
 “ prerogatives should be the object of our at-
 “ tention, reverence, and love, in such a man-
 “ ner as no other man can be, or *ought to be.*”

SECTION VII.

*Of the Opinions that have been held concerning
MATTER, and their Influence with respect
to Christianity.*

WE have already seen a great deal of the mischievous consequence that has followed from the specious doctrine of *matter being the source of all evil*, and of the union of an immaterial principle with it. In this section I propose to enter into a more particular detail of those consequences with respect to the christian doctrine of a *resurrection*, the *state of marriage*, and other things connected with it, and with this I propose to close the subject. It may not be amiss, however, previous to this, to state distinctly the various opinions that have been held concerning matter. For, notwithstanding almost all the philosophical opinions have been nearly the same, there have been some differences among them.

Some of the philosophers thought that matter was originally without motion, quality, or form; but capable of receiving them, though with some necessary imperfections; while others gave it qualities, figure, and even a *soul**, and Pythagoras thought matter animated, as well as evil, and was therein followed by Plato and Plutarch †.

* Beaufobre, vol. ii. p. 245.

† P. 248.

The

The opinion of an *immaterial principle* as necessary to motion, &c. is a prevailing sentiment at present, but was by no means so in ancient times. Otherwise the souls of brutes could never have been thought material, and mortal. Aristotle, and all the ancients, admitted a *motive force* in matter, without which they could not complete the idea of a body. This is acknowledged by Malebranche, and especially by Leibnitz, and the schoolmen. Goudin says, *Ratio principii activi convenit substantiis corporeis, et inde pendent affectiones corporum quæ cernuntur in modo* *.

Plato thought that all evil came from matter, and that its imperfection was eternal and incorrigible. It was a maxim with him, that an eternal being can produce nothing but an eternal being, and that corporeal and frail beings are the production of inferior intelligences. He, therefore, makes the angels of the planets to be the formers of the human body †.

Many of the Jews entertained no better an opinion of matter than the Oriental or Greek philosophers: Maimonides says ‡, that all impediments and obstacles which hinder men in their progress towards perfection, and all sin, come only from the part of matter. He also says, that matter is to be understood by

* Histoire naturelle de l'ame, p. 212.

† Beaufobre. vol. ii. p. 416.

‡ More Nevochim, preface and p. 345.

the *adulterous woman*, in the book of Proverbs, seducing a young man to criminal conversation with her.

Manes thought the demons altogether material, and Beaufobre says *, that many of the ancient Fathers thought the same. According to some of the orthodox Fathers, the devil is the angel to whom God intrusted the government of matter †.

The complaint of the *evil tendency of matter* is a hackneyed topic of declamation among all the ancients, heathens and christians. Origen, among others, considered the body as the *prison of the soul* ‡, and every thing that tended to humble and bring under the body, was thought to be the triumph of the soul, and a step towards its purification and restoration.

The whole of this specious doctrine was evidently drawn from other sources than the system of Moses. He speaks of God himself as the maker of the terrestrial world, and of all things in it; and, perhaps with an intended opposition to the principles of the other system, if it existed in his time, he particularly says ||, *And God saw every thing that he had made, and behold it was very good.* In opposition to the doctrine of *evil* having a different origin from the *good* that we see in the world, the later prophets constantly

* Vol. ii. p. 259.

† lb. p. 99.

‡ lb. p. 475.

|| Gen. i. 31.

ſpeak of God as equally the author of both; and *puniſhment*, contrary to the doctrine of the philoſophers, is always moſt expreſſly aſcribed to him. But this doctrine of Moſes and the prophets, even when reinforced by that of Chriſt and the apoſtles, was not able to ſtem the torrent of the Oriental philoſophy, which went upon a different principle.

That the doctrine of matter being the ſource, of all evil, accords very ill with the chriſtian doctrine of the *reſurrection of the dead*, cannot but be very evident to every perſon who reflects a moment on the ſubject. In fact, they are diametrically oppoſite to one another. On the chriſtian principles, our only hope is founded upon a reſurrection; whereas, on the philoſophical principles, a *re-union to the body* is a thing moſt of all to be dreaded.

The oppoſition of theſe principles was ſo manifeſt, that all the firſt chriſtians, who adopted the foreign philoſophy, abſolutely denied, or explained away, the doctrine of a reſurrection; and though the authority of the apoſtles checked this extravagance, they were not able to prevent the miſchief entirely; and even at this very day the advantage of the chriſtian reſurrection is, in general, rated very low; and in the eye of reaſon it muſt appear an incumbrance upon the philoſophical ſcheme.

The repugnance between these philosophical principles and the doctrine of a resurrection appeared in the Jews as well as in the christians. For the Essenes, as Mosheim says *, maintained, that future rewards and punishments extend to the soul only, and not to the body, which they considered as a mass of malignant matter, and as the prison of the immortal spirit.

The opinion that matter is the source of all evil, and the contempt that, in consequence of it, was entertained for the body, was capable of two opposite applications, one in favour of sensuality, as a thing that did not affect the mind, and the other of the mortification of the body; and we find that, in fact, this double use was made of those principles, according as the persons who adopted them were inclined.

The Gnostics, says Mosheim †, were always talking of the contemplation of things invisible, and of the Deity, and thought all things lawful to them that agreeably affected the body. He also says ‡, that those of the Oriental sects, who were of a voluptuous turn, might consider the actions of the body as having no relation to the state of a soul in communion with God. Some of them even maintained, that the souls were sent into the

* Ecclesiastical History, vol. i. p. 95.

† Dissertations, p. 243. ‡ Ecclesiast. Hist. vol. i. p. 14.

body

body that they might indulge in all sensual pleasure, and that they could not arrive at perfection till they had performed their task. They acknowledged that Christ taught purity, but not to all; that it was proper for the *carnal*, but not the *spiritual* and *perfect* *. It is not improbable that the heretics, against whom the apostles, and our Saviour, in the book of Revelation, inveigh so much, were Gnostics of this kind; and that afterwards the same philosophical principles took an opposite turn, and led to mortifications and austerities †.

In various other respects, also, the doctrine of matter being the source of evil, and a clog upon the immaterial soul, has had most pernicious consequences; having introduced maxims and customs contrary to all common sense, the very reverse of the doctrines of the gospel,

* Mosheim's Dissertations, p. 247, 248.

† Another vice, of most pernicious consequence, the christians of the second and third centuries seem to have derived from the maxims of the philosophers, but because it does not relate to the subject of this work, except so far as it shews, in general, the hurtful connection of christianity and philosophy, I shall insert in a note. It is the lawfulness of *lying to promote a good cause*.

Timæus Locrus, the master of Pythagoras, says, that as we use poisons to cure mens' bodies, if wholesome remedies will not do, so we restrain mens' minds by falsehoods, if they will not be led with truth. *Mosheim's Dissert.* p. 195. Plato gave into the same vice, *ib.* p. 156, and in his book, *De Republica*, he says, the chiefs of a city may deceive the rest for their good, but that others ought to abstain from lying, p. 199.

gospel, and that have actually done much mischief in society. Such, more especially, is the influence it has had with respect to the prevailing notions concerning *marriage, continence, fasting, &c.*; some particulars relating to which, being curious, I shall recite.

That the opinion of the great value and importance of bodily austerities came from the heathen philosophy, is evident from the known sentiments and practices of the philosophers on the subject.

The custom of *fasting*, says Mosheim *, is chiefly to be ascribed to the Platonists. Pythagoras forbid his disciples the use of flesh, and Porphyry imitated him in a book written for that purpose. The Platonic school, he says †, thought it was better to abstain from flesh, especially if persons gave themselves to

On this account, when christianity prevailed, the Platonic philosophers endeavoured, by feigned accounts of Pythagoras, and other early philosophers, to eclipse christianity, setting up their characters and actions, as if they had been superior to Christ. Hence the writings, ascribed to Hermes and Zoroaster, and hence, some think, those of Sanchoniatho, to discredit those of Moses, *ib.* p. 199.

But the greatest misfortune was, that those christians, who embraced the Platonic principles in other respects, received this also, and thought it innocent and commendable to lie for the sake of truth; and hence came so many *forged gospels*, and other writings of a similar nature, which did not appear till after the æra of the incorporation of philosophy with christianity, *ib.* p. 200. Origen, in particular, avowed this principle, p. 203. and also Chrysostom, p. 205.

* Dissert. p. 177.

† *Ib.* p. 177.

meditation, and the contemplation of divine things.

“Some of the philosophers,” says Jortin*, “exercised strange severities upon themselves, and upon their disciples, from the days of Pythagoras to the time of Lucian, who introduces the philosopher Nigrinus as condemning such practices, and observing, that they had occasioned the deaths of several persons. The Greek philosophers,” he says †, “had a particular dress, and affected to appear rough, mean, and dirty; for which they were sometimes insulted in the streets by boys, and by the populace; and the Cynics very prudently were armed with a staff to defend themselves from dogs and from the rabble. The christian monks,” he adds, “imitated the old philosophers in their rags and appearance, and many of them seemed, in the opinion of those who loved them, to have inherited the rags, the pride, and contentious spirit of the former.”

According to Ammonius, the *wise* were to raise above all terrestrial things, by the towering efforts of holy contemplation, those souls whose origin was celestial and divine. They were ordered to extenuate by hunger, thirst, and other mortifications, the *sluggish* body, which confines the activity, and restrains

* Remarks on Ecclesiastical History, vol. iii. p. 23.

† Ib. p. 26.

the

the liberty of the immortal spirit ; that thus, in this life, they might enjoy communion with the Supreme Being, and ascend after death, active and unencumbered, to the universal parent, to live in his presence for ever *.

A very peculiar notion that the philosophers entertained concerning dæmons was the cause of much of their doctrine of the mortification of the body. They taught, says Mosheim †, that the dæmons, being furnished with subtle bodies, were very greedy of carnal pleasures, and possessed men for the sake of enjoying them ; and therefore that he who would drive away dæmons, must fast, and mortify himself, and that those who were married would do well to abstain from their wives as much as possible. On this account many lived with their wives as with sisters, and called them by that name.

The Docetæ in general condemned marriage altogether, but others spake of it as an imperfection only. This, Beausobre says ‡, was a consequence of the opinion of matter being the source of all evil. Marcion also disapproved of marriage, and his disciples were also great fasters ||. Manes said that concupiscence in general, or the love of the sexes, came from matter, was derived from the bad principle, and was therefore vicious in itself §.

* Mosheim's Eccles. Hist. vol. i. p. 141.

† Differt. p. 213.

‡ Vol. i. p. 360.

|| Ib. p. 126.

§ Vol. i. p. 453.

It was the opinion of Bardesanes, that Adam at first had no body, but what was subtle, and agreeable to his nature, and that he had a carnal body given him after his fall *. According to Manes, marriage was the sin of Adam and Eve †. That the woman was the tree of knowledge, was the opinion of many of the Rabbins ‡. And Clemens Alexandrinus says, that the sin of Adam was his anticipating his commerce with Eve ||. Marriage, however, was not absolutely forbidden by the Manicheans; but only to the *elect*, while it was permitted to those they called *auditors* §.

In the very early times of christianity, the bishops and doctors, notwithstanding the warnings of the apostles on this very head, magnified *celibacy* to the skies, and vilified marriage as much **. Justin Martyr believed that Christ was born of a virgin, to show that God could provide for the continuance of the human race, without the union of the two sexes. Austin was much inclined to the same opinion. He believed that Adam would never have known Eve, if he had continued immortal. Gregory Nyssenus held that, in a state of innocence, there would have been no *generation*, but that men would have been multiplied by some other means ††. And many of the Fathers were divided in their

* Ib. p. 235. † P. 459. ‡ P. 461. || P. 463.
§ P. 474. ** P. 484. †† Dupin, vol. ii. p. 177.

opinion,

opinion, whether marriage was necessary to the propagation of the human race*.

Justin Martyr says, that christianity has dissolved marriage, which lust had rendered criminal †. Origen says, that a man cannot approach his wife without defiling himself, and that this impurity does not permit a man to present himself before God, or pray to him. Methodius says, that since Christ has introduced virginity, the reign of the devil is destroyed; whereas, before this enemy of the human race held it in captivity; so that none of the ancients could please God. They were under the empire and dominion of their sins ‡.

That all this extravagance was derived from the philosophical notion of matter being the source of evil, is farther evident from the opposition that was always made to these notions by the *Ebionites*, who believed nothing of the philosophical doctrine. Beaufobre says §, that they did not approve of professions of continence, and were always in opposition to the others ||. He farther says of them, in this place, that they were chiefly Jews, educated in the belief of the unity of God, which they thought to be violated by the doctrine of the divinity of Christ**.

* Beaufobre, vol. ii. p. 465.

† P. 485.

‡ Beaufobre, vol. ii. p. 284.

§ Vol. i. p. 358.

|| P. 377. ** P. 378.

Among

Among other consequences of this system of the distinction between matter and spirit, and the doctrine of an intermediate state, depending upon it, we may reckon the Popish doctrines of *purgatory*, and the *worship of the dead*, concerning which I shall not, in this place, make any particular observations; contenting myself with only enumerating, from Beaufobre, the various honours paid to the dead.

All the honours that the Pagans paid to the false Gods were paid to the martyrs in their relicks. They were carried in procession. Flowers were presented to them, which thereby contracted a miraculous virtue. Lamps were lighted before them. They were placed upon thrones in churches, in a high situation. People kissed them, the vases that contained them, the gates, the steps, and even the pavement of the churches dedicated to them. Festivals and feasts were appointed in honour of them. Wakes, or nocturnal devotions, in imitation of those for the dead among the Pagans, were instituted to them. Vows and offerings were made to them. Children were called by their names, and prayers were addressed to them*.

It is remarkable, as is observed by Jortin, in his *Remarks on Ecclesiastical History* †, that the honours paid to the dead, and to

* Vol. ii. p. 669. † Vol. iii. p. 17.

the relicks of the martyrs, were set forward and supported, though not entirely, yet principally, by the Consubstantialists. Faustus the Manichean, reproaches the catholic christians with their endless superstitions of this kind, and tells them they were no better than humble imitators of the Pagan idolaters.

When, to all these gross corruptions of christianity, we add the doctrine of the *trinity*, with all its consequences, all flowing from the philosophical system introduced into our holy religion, I should think that a plain christian would rejoice in being able to throw off the whole immense load (which must otherwise sink the belief of it) by the easy supposition of *matter being capable of the property of sensation or thought*; an opinion which is so far from being contradicted by any appearance in nature, that it is perfectly agreeable to them all, and peculiarly favoured by the whole system of Revelation.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

THE
DOCTRINE
OF
PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY
ILLUSTRATED.

T H E
D O C T R I N E
O F
Philosophical Necessity

I L L U S T R A T E D ;

BEING AN
A P P E N D I X

T O T H E
DISQUISITIONS relating to MATTER and SPIRIT.

T O W H I C H I S A D D E D ,

An ANSWER to several PERSONS who have controverted
the PRINCIPLES of it.

By JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, LL.D. F.R.S.

V O L. II.

T H E S E C O N D E D I T I O N E N L A R G E D .

The gen'ral ORDER, since the whole began,
Is kept in NATURE, and is kept in MAN. POPE.

B I R M I N G H A M,
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MDCCLXXXII.

T O

J O H N J E B B, M. D.

DEAR SIR,

I FLATTER myself that you will permit me to take this opportunity of perpetuating, as far as I am able, the very high regard that I entertain for a person who has distinguished himself as you have done, by an attachment to the *unadulterated principles of christianity*, how unpopular soever they may have become through the prejudices of the weak or the interested part of mankind, and who has made the sacrifice that you have made to the *cause of truth* and the *rights of conscience*.

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I think myself happy in concurring, as I hope, with your ardent zeal for the cause of *civil and religious liberty* in their full extent; and I am convinced that to act as you have done is the proper method that a *christian* ought to take in order to promote it. It is our business, whenever called upon, to bear our testimony to whatever we apprehend to be *truth and right*, and upon no occasion to swerve from our real principles (which would be equivalent to denying Christ, or being ashamed of him, and his cause before men) whether we see that any good will result from what we may suffer by such a profession, or not. We ought to content ourselves with acting under the *express orders* of one who is the proper judge of what is expedient for his interest and his church, as well as for our happiness; and we may rest assured, that we

can

can only sustain a *temporary loss* by such an implicit, but reasonable obedience.

Could we only, my friend, expand our minds fully to conceive, and act up to, the great principle asserted in this treatise (of the truth of which we are both of us convinced) nothing more would be wanting to enable us to exert this, and every other effort of *true greatness of mind*.

We ourselves, complex as the structure of our minds, and our principles of action are, are links in a great connected chain, parts of an immense whole, a very little of which only we are as yet permitted to see, but from which we collect evidence enough that the whole system (in which we are, at the same time, both *instruments and objects*) is under an unerring

erring direction, and that the final result will be most glorious and happy. Whatever men may intend, or execute, all their designs, and all their actions, are subject to the secret influence and guidance of one who is necessarily the best judge of what will most promote his own excellent purposes. To him, and in his works, all seeming *discord* is real *harmony*, and all apparent *evil*, ultimate *good*.

This world, we see, is an admirable *nursery for great minds*. Difficulties, opposition, persecution, and evils of every other form, are the necessary *instruments* by which they are made, and even *the captain of our salvation*, was himself *made perfect through suffering*. A mixture of pleasing events does, likewise, contribute to the same end; but of the due proportions in this mixture we are no judges.

Con-

Considering, however, in whose hands are the several ingredients of the *cup* of mortal life, we may be assured that it will never be more bitter, than will be necessary, to make it, in the very highest degree, salutary.

You and I, Sir, rejoice in the belief, that the whole human race are under the same *wholesome discipline*, and that they will all certainly derive the most valuable advantages from it, though in different degrees, in different ways, and at different periods; that even the persecutors are only giving the precedence to the persecuted, and advancing them to a much higher degree of perfection and happiness; and that they must themselves, for the same benevolent purpose, undergo a more severe discipline than that which
they

x THE DEDICATION.

they are the means of administering to others.

With this persuasion we cannot but consider every *being*, and every *thing*, in a favourable light. Every person with whom we have any connexion is a *friend*, and every event in life is a *benefit*; while God is equally the father, and the friend, of the whole creation.

I hope, dear Sir, we shall always be careful to strengthen and extend these great and just views of the glorious system to which we belong. It is only by losing sight of these principles that we adopt *mean purposes*, and become slaves to *mean passions*, as also that we are subject to be chagrined and unhinged by seemingly cross accidents in life.

So

So long as we can practically believe that there is but *one will* in the whole universe, that this one will, exclusive of all *chance*, or the interference of any other will, disposes of all things, even to their minutest circumstances, and always for the best of purposes, it is impossible but that we must rejoice in, and be thankful for, all events, without distinction. And when our will and our wishes shall thus perfectly coincide with those of the sovereign Disposer of all things, *whose will is always done, in earth, as well as in Heaven*, we shall, in fact, attain the summit of perfection and happiness. We shall have a kind of *union with God* himself; his will shall be our will, and even his power our power; being ever employed to execute our wishes and purposes, as well as his; because
they

they will be, in all respects, the *same* with his.

These heart-reviving and soul-ennobling views we cannot, my friend, in this imperfect state, expect to realize and enjoy, except at intervals; but let us make it our business to make these happy seasons of philosophical and devout contemplation more frequent, and of longer continuance. Let them encroach more and more on the time that we must give to the bustle of a transitory world; till our minds shall have received such a lasting impression, as that its effect may be felt even in the midst of the greatest tumult of life, and inspire a serenity and joy, which *the world can neither give nor take away.*

In these principles alone do we find a perfect coincidence between *true religion* and

and *philosophy*; and by the help of the latter, we are able to demonstrate the excellence of the moral precepts of the former. And the more we understand of human nature, which is an immense field of speculation, barely opened by our revered master Dr. Hartley, the more clearly, I doubt not, shall we perceive how admirably is the whole system of revealed religion adapted to the nature and circumstances of man, and the better judges shall we be of that most important branch of its evidence, which results from considering the effects which the first promulgation of it had on the minds of those to whom it was proposed, both Jews and Gentiles. Let us then study the *Scriptures*, *Ecclesiastical History*, and the *Theory of the Human Mind*, in conjunction; being satisfied, that, from the nature of the things,

things, they must, in time, throw a great and new light upon each other.

Permit me, dear Sir, to flatter myself that, as you have followed the great Dr. Hartley in his application to *theological*, *mathematical*, and *philosophical* studies, and also in his profession of the theory and practice of *medicine*, you will still pursue his footsteps, in applying the elements of all these branches of science to the farther investigation of the phenomena of the *human mind*, which is a great and ample field, worthy of your superior talents.

Hoping to enjoy your communications, and valuable friendship, together with that of our common and most excellent friend Mr. Lindsey, whose views of these things
are

are the same with ours, and with whom, in *principle* and *object*, we cannot be too strictly united, and that, mindful of the apostolical advice, we shall always *consider one another to provoke unto love and to good works.*

I remain,

Dear Sir,

your affectionate friend,

and fellow labourer,

CALNE,
AUG. 1, 1777.

J. PRIESTLEY.

T H E

T H E

P R E F A C E.

I DID not originally intend to write a separate treatise on the subject of *Philosophical Necessity*, but only to consider the objection made to it from the sentiments of praise and blame, and the use of rewards and punishments, which is generally reckoned to be the greatest difficulty on the subject, in an Appendix to my *Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit*. There would have been a sufficient propriety in this; because, if man, as is maintained in that treatise, be wholly a *material*, it will not be denied but that he must be a *mechanical* being. As, therefore, every thing belonging to the doctrine of materialism is, in fact, an argument for the doctrine of necessity, and, consequently, the doctrine of necessity is a direct inference from materialism, the de-

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fence of that inference would naturally accompany the proof of the proposition from which it was deduced.

But, for the same reason, I thought there would be a propriety in considering, in that Appendix, the view that has been given of this subject by Dr. Price, in his *Review of the Principles of Morals*, which is a very capital work of its kind. After this I was led to add another Essay on *the Nature of the Will*; and thus was brought by degrees to write, in separate Essays, all that is now before the reader; when, finding that it was too much to accompany another work, I distributed it into convenient sections, and reserved it for a volume by itself, but still considering it as an *Appendage to the Disquisitions*.

I am far, however, from giving it out as a *complete treatise* on the subject; though I have considered it in a great variety of views, imagining I could throw some new light upon them, either by suggesting new
con-

considerations, or at least expressing myself with greater clearness. Those persons who have not yet entered upon the discussion of this great question, I would refer to such writers as Mr. Collins, Dr. Jonathan Edwards, and Dr. Hartley. They will also find some things very well written on it by Mr. Hume, and Lord Kaims, especially in his *Sketches on Man*.

Considering the many excellent treatises that have been written on this subject, and with how much clearness and solidity the argument has been handled, it may seem rather extraordinary, that the doctrine of philosophical liberty should have any adherents among persons of a liberal education, and who are at all used to reflection. To repeat what I have said on a former occasion, I can truly say that, “ If I were to take
“ my choice of any metaphysical question
“ to defend against all opposers, it should
“ be the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity. There is no truth of which I have
“ less doubt, and of the ground of which

“ I am more fully satisfied. Indeed, there
 “ is no absurdity more glaring to my un-
 “ derstanding than the notion of philoso-
 “ phical liberty*.”

It must, therefore, be the *consequences* of the doctrine at which persons are staggered. I have, on this account, discussed more particularly than I believe has been done before, various things relating to the consequences, real or imaginary, of the doctrine of necessity. And, whereas it has of late been imagined to be the same thing with the Calvinistic doctrine of *predestination*, I have shown, pretty much at large, the essential difference between the two schemes. I have also endeavoured to state in a just light what we are to think of those passages of the *sacred writers* that have been supposed to make for or against the doctrine of necessity.

I the less wonder, however, at the general hesitation to admit the doctrine of ne-

* Remarks on Dr. Beattie, &c. p. 169.

cessity

cessity in its full extent, when I consider that there is not, I believe, in the whole compass of human speculation, an instance in which the indisputable consequences, both theoretical and practical, of any simple proposition are so numerous, extensive, and important. On this account, though I believe every person, without exception, would not hesitate to admit all the *premises*, there are very few, indeed, who are not staggered, and made to pause, at the prospect of the *conclusions*: and I am well aware that, notwithstanding all that ever can be advanced in favour of these conclusions, great and glorious as they really are in themselves, it requires so much strength of mind to comprehend them (that I wish to say it with the least offence possible) I cannot help considering the doctrine as that which will always distinguish the real moral philosopher from the rest of the world; at the same time that, like all other great and practical truths, even those of christianity itself, its *actual influence* will not always be so great, as, from theory, it might be expected

pected to be. If the doctrine have any bad effects, it is a proof with me that it was never clearly understood; just as all the mischiefs that have been occasioned by christianity have arisen from the corruptions and abuses of it.

I have taken some pains to trace the *history* of the controversy concerning liberty and necessity, but I have not been able to succeed to my wish. What the ancients have said on the subject is altogether foreign to the purpose; their *fate* being quite a different thing from the *necessity* of the moderns. For though they had an idea of the certainty of the final event of some things, they had no idea of the necessary connexion of all the preceding means to bring about the designed end; and least of all, had they any just idea of the proper *mechanism of the mind*, depending upon the certain influence of motives to determine the will; by means of which the whole series of events, from the beginning of the world to the consummation of all things, makes one connected
chain

chain of causes and effects, originally established by the Deity. Whereas, according to the ancient heathens, fate was something that even the gods often endeavoured in vain to resist. Whenever they supposed that any particular event was *decreed*, or *determined* upon, by any superior being, their idea was, that, if the event did not come to pass by means of natural causes, that superior Being would occasionally and effectually interpose, so as, at any rate, to make sure of the event.

The *predestination* of christians and Mahometans is the same thing as the *fate* of the heathens. The Divine Being, they supposed, had determined that a certain train of events should absolutely take place, and that he generally provided supernatural means to accomplish his designs. This also appears to have been the notion of predestination as maintained by Luther, Calvin, and all the early reformers; and the same may be affirmed of the Jansenists among the Roman Catholics.

After the most diligent inquiry that I can make, it appears to me that Mr. Hobbes was the first who understood and maintained the proper doctrine of philosophical necessity; and I think it no small honour to this country, that, among so many capital truths of a philosophical nature, this owes its discovery to England. And it is truly wonderful, considering that he was probably the first who published this doctrine, that he should have proposed it so clearly, and have defended it so ably, as he has done.

On his first mentioning the subject, which was only occasionally, in his *Leviathan*, he discovers a perfect knowledge of the true principle of it. His short paragraph is so comprehensive of the whole scheme and argument, that I shall in this place quote it intire*.

“ Liberty and necessity are consistent. As
 “ in the water that hath not only liber-
 “ ty, but a necessity of descending in the

* P. 108.

“ channel,

“ channel, so likewise, in the actions which
“ men voluntarily do, which, because they
“ proceed from their will, proceed from li-
“ berty; and yet, because every act of man’s
“ will, and every desire, and inclination,
“ proceedeth from some cause, and that
“ from another cause, in a continual chain
“ (whose first link is in the hand of God,
“ the first of all causes) proceed from ne-
“ cessity. So that to him that could see
“ the connexion of those causes, the ne-
“ cessity of all mens voluntary actions would
“ appear manifest. And therefore God,
“ that seeth and disposeth all things, seeth
“ also that the liberty of man, in doing
“ what he will, is accompanied with the
“ necessity of doing that which God will,
“ and no more nor less. For though men
“ may do many things which God does not
“ command, nor is therefore the author of
“ them, yet they can have no passion, will,
“ or appetite to any thing, of which appe-
“ tite God’s will is not the cause. And
“ did not his will assure the necessity of
“ man’s will, and consequently of all that
“ on

“ on man’s will dependeth, the liberty of
“ men would be a contradiction and impe-
“ diment to the omnipotence and liberty of
“ God.”

I am rather surprized that Mr. Locke, who seems to have been so much indebted to Mr. Hobbes for the clear view that he has given us of several principles of human nature, should have availed himself so little of what he might have learned from him on this subject. It is universally acknowledged that his chapter on *power*, in his *Essay on the Human Understanding*, is remarkably confused; all his *general maxims* being perfectly consistent with, and implying, the doctrine of necessity, and being manifestly inconsistent with the liberty which, after writing a long time exactly like a necessarian, he attributes to man.

But the obscurity that was thrown on this subject by Mr. Locke was effectually cleared up by Mr. Collins, in his *Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty*,
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published in 1717. This treatise is concise and methodical, and is, in my opinion, sufficient to give intire satisfaction to every unprejudiced person. I wish this small tract was reprinted, and more generally known and read. It will, however, remain, and do the greatest honour to the author's memory, when all the quibbling answers to it shall be forgotten. It was in consequence of reading and studying this treatise, that I was first convinced of the truth of the doctrine of necessity, and that I was enabled to see the fallacy of most of the arguments in favour of philosophical liberty; though I was much more confirmed in this principle by my acquaintance with *Dr. Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind*, a work to which I owe much more than I am able to express.

I was not, however, a ready convert to the doctrine of necessity. Like Dr. Hartley himself, I gave up my liberty with great reluctance; and in a long correspondence which I once had on the subject, I maintained very strenuously the doctrine of liberty,

ty, and did not at all yield to the arguments then proposed to me. My correspondent importuned me to permit him to publish the letters; but though I was at that time very young, not having entered upon a course of academical learning, I had the prudence not to consent to his proposal.

With these previous remarks, I submit to the candour of the reader what I have been able to advance on the great and glorious, but unpopular doctrine of *Philosophical Necessity*.

T R E-

P R E F A C E

T O T H E

S E C O N D E D I T I O N .

IN this edition I have inserted in their proper places the *Additional Illustrations* that were printed in my *Discussion* of this subject with Dr. Price. I have also subjoined the *Letters* addressed to several persons, that were printed in that publication. I also wish that my *Letters to Mr. Palmer* may be considered as a part of this work. They may be conveniently bound together; and then this volume and my *Discussion with Dr. Price* will contain all that I have published on this subject.

My discussion of this argument with Dr. Price was brought to its proper close, each of us having advanced what we thought
to

to be sufficient in support of our respective hypotheses. I am sorry that this has not been the case with respect to the controversy with Mr. Palmer, as he has declined answering the *questions* I put to him; though they were such as, I think, our readers must perceive, were calculated to bring the controversy to a satisfactory and speedy termination. The inferences that will be unavoidably drawn from his conduct, it is his business to consider, if he have any value for the doctrine he contends for. I should not have left any favourite opinion of mine in that situation.

It will also be a subject of regret with my readers, as it is with myself, that *Dr. Horsley* did not think proper to reply to the *Letter*, which I addressed to him, in answer to his animadversions on this treatise. It has not been my fault, if able men have not been engaged in the discussion of this important subject.

C O N-

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THE
DOCTRINE
OF
PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY
ILLUSTRATED.

SECTION I.

*Of the true STATE OF THE QUESTION re-
specting Liberty and Necessity.*

ONE of the chief sources of the difference of opinion respecting the subject of *liberty and necessity*, and likewise of much of the difficulty that has attended the discussion of it, seems to have been a want of attention to the proper *stating of the question*. Hence it has come to pass, that the generality of those who have stood forth in defence of what they have called *liberty*, do, in fact, admit every thing

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that

that is requisite to establish the doctrine of necessity; but they have misled themselves, and others, by *the use of words*; and also, wanting sufficient *strength of mind*, they have been staggered at the consequences of their own principles. I shall, therefore, begin with some observations, which, I hope, may tend to throw light upon the nature of the subject in debate, and help the reader to understand what it is that, as a necessarian, I contend for.

In the first place, I would observe, that I allow to man all the liberty, or power, that is *possible in itself*, and to which the ideas of mankind in general ever go, which is the *power of doing whatever they will, or please*, both with respect to the operations of their minds, and the motions of their bodies, uncontrolled by any foreign principle, or cause. Thus, every man is at liberty to turn his thoughts to whatever subject he pleases, to consider the reasons for or against any scheme or proposition, and to reflect upon them as long as he shall think proper; as well as to walk wherever he pleases, and to do

do whatever his hands and other limbs are capable of doing.

Mr. Hobbes has given the following clear and happy illustration of this subject. “ Liberty,” says he *, “ is the absence of all impediments to action, that are not contained in the nature and intrinsic quality of the agent. As for example, water is said to descend freely, or to have liberty to descend, by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way, but not across, because the banks are impediments. And though the water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants liberty to ascend, but the *faculty* or *power*; because the impediment is *in the nature of the water*, and *intrinsically*. So also we say, he that is tied wants the liberty to go, because the impediment is not in *him*, but in his *bands*; whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame, because the impediment is *in himself*.”

* See his Works, p. 483.

In acknowledging in man a liberty to do whatever he pleases, I grant not only all the liberty that the generality of mankind have any idea of, or can be made to understand, but also all that many of the professed advocates for liberty, against the doctrine of necessity, have claimed. “How needless, says Mr. Wollaston *, to me seem those disputes about *human liberty*, with which men have tired themselves and the world. —Sure it is in a man’s power to keep his hand from his mouth. If it is, it is also in his power to forbear excess in eating and drinking. If he has the command of his own feet, so as to go either this way or that, or no whither, as sure he has, it is in his power to abstain from vicious company and vicious places, and so on.”

Again he says †. “I can move my hand upwards or downwards, &c. just as I will, &c. The motion, or the rest of my hand, depends upon my will, and is alterable upon thought, at my pleasure. If then

* Religion of Nature, p. 112.

† P. 346.

“ I will

“ I will, as I am sensible I have a *power* of
 “ moving my hand, in a manner, which it
 “ would not move in by those laws which
 “ mere bodies, already in motion, or under
 “ the force of gravitation, would observe,
 “ this motion depends solely upon my *will*,
 “ and *begins* there.” I would observe, how-
 ever, that it by no means follows, that be-
 cause the motion depends upon the *will*, it
 therefore *begins* there; the will itself being
 determined by some motive.

Mr. Locke acknowledges that, properly
 speaking, freedom does not belong to the
will, but to the *man*; and agreeable to the
 definition of liberty given above, he says*,
 “ As far as a man has power to think or not
 “ to think, to move or not to move, ac-
 “ cording to the preference or direction of
 “ his own mind, so far is a man free.”
 The will, he acknowledges, is *always* de-
 termined by the most *pressing uneasiness*, or
desire†; as he also acknowledges, that it is
happiness, and *that alone*, that moves the

* Essay, vol. i. p. 193.

† P. 204.

desire *. And all the liberty that he contends for, and for the existence of which he appeals to experience, is a liberty that I am far from disclaiming, viz. a liberty of *suspending our determinations*.

“ The mind,” says he †, “ having, in
 “ most cases, as is evident in experience, a
 “ power to suspend the execution and sa-
 “ tisfaction of any of its desires, and so of
 “ all, one after another, is at liberty to con-
 “ sider the objects of them, examine them
 “ on all sides, and weigh them with others.
 “ In this lies the liberty a man has. He
 “ has a power to suspend the prosecution of
 “ this or that desire, as every one daily may
 “ experience in himself. This seems to me
 “ the source of all liberty. In this seems
 “ to consist that which is, as I think, im-
 “ properly called *free will*.”

I would only observe with respect to this, that a determination to suspend a volition, is, in fact, *another volition*, and therefore,

* P. 209.

† Ibid.

according

according to Mr. Locke's own rule, must be determined by the most pressing uneasiness, as well as any other. If any man voluntarily suspends his determination, it is not without some motive, or reason; as, for instance, because he is apprehensive of some ill consequence arising from a hasty and inconsiderate resolution. On the other hand, if he determines immediately, it is because he has no such apprehension. In fact, all the liberty that Mr. Locke contends for, is perfectly consistent with the doctrine of philosophical necessity, though he does not seem to have been aware of it.

All the *liberty*, or rather *power*, that I say a man has not, is that of *doing several things when all the previous circumstances* (including the *state of his mind*, and his *views of things*) are precisely the same. What I contend for is, that, with the same state of mind (the same strength of any particular passion, for example) and the same views of things, (as any particular object appearing equally desirable) he would always, voluntarily, make the same choice, and come to the same

determination. For instance, if I make any particular choice to-day, I should have done the same yesterday, and shall do the same to-morrow, provided there be no change in the state of my mind respecting the object of the choice.

In other words, I maintain, that there is some *fixed law of nature respecting the will*, as well as the other powers of the mind, and every thing else in the constitution of nature; and, consequently, that it is never determined without some real or apparent *cause*, foreign to itself, i. e. without some *motive of choice*, or that motives influence us in some definite and invariable manner; so that every volition, or choice, is constantly regulated, and determined, by what precedes it. And this *constant* determination of mind, according to the motives presented to it, is all that I mean by its *necessary determination*. This being admitted to be the fact, there will be a necessary connection between all things past, present, and to come, in the way of proper *cause and effect*, as much in the intellectual, as in the natural world; so
that

that, how little soever the bulk of mankind may be apprehensive of it, or staggered by it, according to the established laws of nature, no event could have been otherwise than it *has been, is, or is to be*, and therefore all things past, present, and to come, are precisely what the Author of nature really intended them to be, and has made provision for,

S E C T I O N II.

Of the Argument in favour of the Doctrine of Necessity from the consideration of CAUSE AND EFFECT.

TO establish the conclusion defined in the preceding section, nothing is necessary but that, throughout all nature, the same consequences should invariably result from the same circumstances. For, if this be admitted, it will necessarily follow, that at the commencement of any system, since the several parts of it, and their respective situations,

situations, were appointed by the Deity, the first change would take place according to a *certain rule*, established by himself, the result of which would be a *new situation*; after which, the same laws continuing, another change would succeed, according to the same rules, and so on for ever; every new situation invariably leading to another, and every event, from the commencement to the termination of the system, being strictly connected; so that, unless the fundamental laws of the system were changed, it would be impossible that any event should have been otherwise than it was; just as the precise place where a billiard ball rests, is necessarily determined by the impulse given to it at first, notwithstanding its impinging against ever so many other balls, or the sides of the table.

In all these cases the circumstances preceding any change, are called the *causes* of that change; and since a determinate event, or effect, constantly follows certain circumstances, or causes, the connection between the cause and the effect is concluded to be *invariable*, and therefore *necessary*.

This

This chain of causes and effects cannot be broken, but by such a provision in the constitution of nature, as that the same event shall not certainly follow the same preceding circumstances. In this case, indeed, it might be truly said, that any particular event might have been otherwise than it was, there having been no certain provision in the laws of nature for determining it to be *this* rather than *that*. But then this event, not being preceded by any circumstances that determined it to be what it was, would be *an effect without a cause*. For a *cause* cannot be defined to be any thing but *such previous circumstances as are constantly followed by a certain effect*; the constancy of the result making us conclude, that there must be a *sufficient reason* in the nature of the things, why it should be produced in those circumstances. So that, in all cases, if the result be different, either the circumstances must have been different, or there were no circumstances whatever corresponding to the difference in the result; and consequently the effect was without any cause at all.

These

These maxims are universal, being equally applicable to all things that belong to the constitution of nature, corporeal, or mental. If, for instance, I take a pair of scales loaded with equal weights, they both remain in equilibrio. By throwing an additional weight into one of the scales, I make a change in the circumstances, which is immediately followed by a *new situation*, viz. a depression of the one, and an elevation of the opposite scale; and having observed the same effect before, I was able to foretel that this depression of the one scale, and elevation of the other, would be the certain consequence. It could not be otherwise while the same laws of nature were preserved. In order to its being possible for it to have been otherwise, the laws of nature must have been so framed, as that, upon throwing in the additional weight, the scale might, or might not, have been depressed; or it might have been depressed without any additional weight at all. But in this case, there would have been an effect without a cause; there having been no *change of circumstances*

stances previous to the change of situation, viz. the depression of the scale. In fact, this is the only reason why we say that such an effect would have been produced without a cause.

In every determination of mind, or in cases where volition or choice is concerned, all the previous circumstances to be considered are the *state of mind* (including every thing belonging to the *will itself*) and the *views of things* presented to it; the latter of which is generally called the *motive*, though under this term some writers comprehend them both. To distinguish the *manner* in which events depending upon *will* and *choice* are produced, from those in which no volition is concerned, the former are said to be produced *voluntarily*, and the latter *mechanically*. But the same general maxims apply to them both. We may not be able to determine *a priori* how a man will act in any particular case, but it is because we are not particularly acquainted with his *disposition of mind*, *precise situation*, and *views of things*. But neither can we
tell

tell which way the wind will blow to-morrow, though the *air* is certainly subject to no other than necessary laws of motion.

A particular determination of mind could not have been otherwise than it was, if the laws of nature respecting the mind be such, as that the same determination shall constantly follow the same state of mind, and the same views of things. And it could not be possible for any determination to have been otherwise than it *has been, is, or is to be*, unless the laws of nature had been such, as that, though both the state of mind, and the views of things, were the same, the determination might, or might not, have taken place. But in this case, the determination must have been an effect without a cause, because in this case, as in that of the balance, there would have been *a change of situation without any previous change of circumstances*; and there cannot be any other definition of an effect without a cause. The application of the term *voluntary* to mental determinations cannot

cannot possibly make the least difference in this case.

If the laws of nature be such, as that, in given circumstances, I constantly make a definite choice, my-conduct through life is determined by the Being who made me, and placed me in the circumstances in which I first found myself. For the consequence of the first given circumstances was a *definitive voluntary determination*, which bringing me into other circumstances, was followed by another definite determination, and so on from the beginning of life to the end of it; and upon no scheme whatever can this chain of situations of mind, and consequent mental determinations, or of causes and effects, be broken, but by a constitution which shall provide that, in given circumstances, there shall no definite determination follow; or that, without any change in the previous circumstances, there shall be a subsequent change of situation; which, as was observed before, would be an effect without a cause, a thing impossible, even to *divine power*, because impossible

fible to *power abstractedly considered*. Besides, if *one* effect might take place without a sufficient cause, another, and all effects, might have been without a cause; which entirely takes away the only argument for the being of a God.

It may, perhaps, help to clear up this matter to some persons, to consider that the term *voluntary* is not opposed to *necessary*, but only to *involuntary*, and that nothing can be opposed to necessary, but *contingent*. For a voluntary motion may be regulated by *certain rules* as much as a mechanical one; and if it be regulated by any certain rules, or laws, it is as necessary as any mechanical motion whatever. Though, therefore, a man's determination be *his own*, the causes of it existing and operating within himself, yet if it be subject to any fixed laws, there cannot be any circumstances in which two different determinations might equally have taken place. For that would exclude the influence of all laws.

There

There may be circumstances, indeed, in which a variety of determinations, though confined within certain limits, might take place; but those are *general* circumstances. Circumscribe the circumstances, and a number of the possible determinations will be precluded; and when the circumstances are strictly limited, the determination can be no other than precisely one and the same; and whenever those precise circumstances occur again (the inclination of mind being the same, and the views of things precisely the same also) the very same determination, or choice, will certainly be made. The choice is, indeed, a man's own making, and voluntary; but in voluntarily making it, he follows the laws of his nature, and invariably makes it in a certain definite manner. To suppose the most perfectly voluntary choice to be made without regard to the laws of nature, so that with the same inclination, and degree of inclination, and the same views of things presented to us, we might be even voluntarily disposed to choose either of two different things at the same moment of time,

is just as impossible as that an involuntary or mechanical motion should depend upon no certain law or rule, or that any other effect should exist without an adequate cause.

What is most extraordinary is, that there are persons who admit this indissoluble chain of circumstances and effects, so that nothing could have been otherwise than it is, and yet can imagine that they are defending the doctrine of philosophical liberty, and opposing the doctrine of necessity. The author of *Letters on Materialism*, says *, that “the moral influence of motives is as certain, though not necessitating, as is the physical cause.” But this is a distinction merely verbal. For the only reason that we can have to believe in any cause, and that it acts necessarily, is that it acts certainly, or invariably. If my mind be as constantly determined by the influence of motives, as a stone is determined to fall to the ground by the influence of gravity, I am constrained to conclude, that the cause in the one case acts as necessarily as that in the other. For

* P. 171.

there

there must be an *equally sufficient reason* for equally constant and certain effects.

No less fallacious is it to say, with this writer *, that “ motives do not impel or “ determine a man to act ; but that a man, “ from the view of the motives, determines “ himself to act.” For if he certainly and constantly determines himself to act according to motives, there must be a sufficient *reason* why motives have this influence over him. If, in fact, he never do act contrary to their influence, it can only be because he has *no power* so to do ; and, therefore, he is subject to an absolute necessity, as much upon this as upon any other method of stating the question. By such poor evasions do some persons think to shelter themselves from the force of conviction.

I do not think it at all *necessary* to add any thing to what I have advanced above, in illustration of the argument from the nature of *cause and effect*. But because this is the great, and the most conclusive argu-

* P. 166.

ment for the doctrine that I contend for, proving the contrary doctrine of *philosophical liberty* to be absolutely *impossible*; and I find that several persons of excellent judgment in other respects, seem not to feel the force of it, I shall attempt a farther illustration of it, in order to remove, as far as I am able, the only remaining objection that I can imagine may be made to it; though I must ask pardon of my other readers, for writing what will appear to them so very obvious and superfluous.

It is universally acknowledged, that there can be no effect without an adequate cause. This is even the foundation on which the only proper argument for the being of a God rests. And the necessarian asserts that if, in any given state of mind, with respect both to *disposition* and *motives*, two different determinations, or volitions, be possible, it can be so on no other principle, than that one of them shall come under the description of *an effect without a cause*; just as if the beam of a balance might incline either way, though loaded with equal weights.

It

It is acknowledged, that the mechanism of the balance is of one kind, and that of the mind of another, and therefore it may be convenient to denominate them by different words ; as, for instance, that of the balance may be termed a *physical*, and that of the mind a *moral* mechanism. But still, if there be a *real mechanism* in both cases, so that there can be only one result from the same previous circumstances, there will be a *real necessity*, enforcing an absolute certainty in the event. For it must be understood, that all that is ever meant by *necessity in a cause*, is that which produces *certainty in the effect*.

If, however, the term *necessity* give offence, I, for my part, have no objection to the disuse of it, provided we can express, in any other manner, that property in causes, or the previous circumstances of things, that leads to absolute certainty in the effects that result from them ; so that, without a miracle, or an over-ruling of the stated laws of nature, *i. e.* without the intervention of

a higher cause, no determination of the will could have been otherwise than it has been.

To evade the force of this argument from the nature of cause and effect, it is said that, though, in a given state of mind, two different determinations may take place, neither of them can be said to be without a sufficient cause; for that, in this case, the cause is *the mind itself*, which makes the determination, in a manner independent of all influence of motives.

But to this I answer, that the mind itself, independent of the influence of every thing that comes under the description of *motive*, bearing an equal relation to both the determinations, cannot possibly be considered as a cause with respect to either of them, in preference to the other. Because, exclusive of what may properly be called motive, there is no imaginable difference in the circumstances immediately preceding the determinations. Every thing tending to produce the least degree of inclination to one
of

of the determinations more than to the other, must make a difference in the *state of mind* with respect to them, which, by the stating of the case, is expressly excluded. And I will venture to say, that no person, let his bias in favour of a system be ever so great, will chuse to say in support of it, that the mind can possibly take one of two determinations, without having for it something that may, at least, be called an *inclination* for it, in preference to the other, and that inclination, or whatever else it be called, must have had a cause producing it, in some previous affection of the mind.

In short, let ever so much ingenuity be shown in stating this case, it is impossible not to come at length to this conclusion, that, in no case whatever, can the mind be determined to action, *i. e.* to a volition, without something that may as well be called a *motive* as be expressed in any other manner. For the reason, or proper cause, of every determination must necessarily be something either in the state of the mind itself,

or in the ideas present to it, immediately before the determination; and these ideas, as they impress the mind, may, strictly speaking, be comprehended in what we mean by the *state of mind*, including whatever there is in it that can lead to any determination whatever. Or, on the other hand, the state of mind may be included in the meaning of the term *motive*, comprehending in the signification of it whatever it be that can *move*, or *incline* the mind to any particular determination.

It appears to me, that it may just as well be said that, in the case of the balance above-mentioned, the beam may be the cause why, though equal weights be suspended at the different ends of it, it may nevertheless incline one way or the other. For, exclusive of what necessarily comes under the description either of *motive*, or *state of mind*, the mind itself can no more be the cause of its own determination, than the beam of a balance can be the cause of its own inclination,

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In the case of the beam it is immediately perceived that, bearing an equal relation to both the weights, it cannot possibly favour one of them more than the other; and it is simply on account of its bearing an equal relation to them both that it cannot do this. Now, let the structure of the mind be ever so different from that of the balance, it necessarily agrees with it in this, that, exclusive of motives, in the sense explained above (viz. including both the state of mind and the particular ideas present to it) it bears as equal a relation to any determination, as the beam of a balance bears to any particular inclination; so that as, on account of this circumstance, the balance cannot of itself incline one way or the other, so neither, on account of the same circumstance, can the mind of itself incline, or determine, one way or the other.

In fact, an advocate for the doctrine of philosophical liberty has the choice of no more than *two suppositions*, and neither of them can, in the least degree, answer his purpose,

purpose. For he must either assert that, in a given state of mind, the determination will certainly be *a* and not *b*; or it may be either *a* or *b*. If he adopts the former, he may just as well say at once, that the determination will *necessarily* be *a*, and that without a miracle it cannot be *b*. For any other language that he can possibly use, can do no more than serve to hide what might otherwise be obnoxious in the sentiment, and will leave it still true, that, without a miracle, or the intervention of some foreign cause, no volition, or action of any man could have been otherwise than it *has been, is, or is to be*, which is all that a necessarian contends for. And if, on the contrary, he chuses to assert that, in the same state of mind, the determinations *a* and *b* are equally possible, one of them must be *an effect without a cause*, a supposition which overturns all reasoning concerning appearances in nature, and especially the foundation of the only proper argument for the being of a God. For if any thing whatever, even a thought in the mind of man, could arise without an adequate

quate cause, any thing else, the mind itself, or the whole universe, might likewise exist without a cause.

I own it is irksome to enter into so minute a discussion of an objection, that appears to me to be so little deserving of an answer; and it is only with a view to obviate every thing that *has been*, or that I can foresee *may be* urged, with the least plausibility, that I have considered it at all. If this do not give satisfaction, I own I do not think it will be in my power to give satisfaction with respect to this argument, or any other. There does not appear to me to be, in the whole compass of reasoning, that I am acquainted with, a more conclusive argument, than that for the doctrine of necessity from the consideration of the nature of *cause and effect*.

SECTION

SECTION III.

Of the Argument for Necessity from the
DIVINE PRESCIENCE.

AS it is not within the compass of *power* in the author of any system, that an event should take place without a cause, or that it should be equally possible for two different events to follow the same circumstances, so neither, supposing this to be possible, would it be within the compass of *knowledge* to foresee such a contingent event. So that, upon the doctrine of philosophical liberty, the Divine Being could not possibly foresee what would happen in his own creation, and therefore could not provide for it; which takes away the whole foundation of *divine providence*, and moral government, as well as all the foundation of *revealed religion*, in which *prophecies* are so much concerned.

That

That an event truly contingent, or not necessarily depending upon previous circumstances, should be the object of knowledge, has, like other things of a similar nature, in modern systems, been called a *difficulty* and a *mystery*; but in reality there cannot be a greater absurdity, or contradiction. For as certainly as nothing can be known *to exist*, but what does exist, so certainly can nothing be known *to arise from what does exist*, but what does arise from it, or depend upon it. But, according to the definition of the terms, a contingent event does not depend upon any previous known circumstances; since some other event might have arisen in the same circumstances.

All that is within the compass of knowledge in this case is, to foresee all the different events that might take place in the same circumstances; but which of them will *actually* take place cannot possibly be known. In this case all degrees of knowledge or sagacity are equal. Did the case admit of *approximation* to certainty, in proportion to the *degree* of knowledge, it would

would be fully within the compass of infinite knowledge; but in this case there is no such approximation. To all minds the foretelling of a contingent event is equally a matter of conjecture: consequently, even infinite knowledge makes no difference in this case. For *knowledge* supposes an *object*, which, in this case, does not *exist*, and therefore cannot be *known to exist* *. If man be possessed of a power of proper *self-determination*, the Deity himself cannot control it
(as

* Having in my *Answer to Mr. Bryant*, which I shall probably never re-print, stated the argument from prescience a little more distinctly, I shall insert the substance of it in a note in this place.

Nothing can be *seen to be* what it is not, because it would then *be* what it is not. The Deity himself cannot see black to be white, or white black; because black is not white, nor is white black. If sight, or perception, or knowledge in general, cannot change the antecedent nature of objects, neither can the divine perception, or knowledge. Otherwise the Deity might see two to be three, or three two.

If this be just; it must be true, and no presumption, to assert, that the Deity himself cannot see that to be *certain*, which is in itself *contingent*, or that to be *contingent*,

(as far as he interferes, it is no self-determination of the man) and if he does not *control* it, he cannot *foresee* it. Nothing can be known at present, except *itself*, or its *necessary cause*, exist at present. Yet the whole history of revelation shews, that every determination of the mind of man is certainly fore-known by the Divine Being; determinations that took place from *natural* and *common causes*, where the mind was under no supernatural influence whatever; be-

tingent, which is absolutely certain. Now, what is meant by any thing being *contingent*, but that it either *may*, or *may not be*? But for a thing to be *seen* as certain, it must in itself *be* certain; and, therefore, the possibility of its *not being* must be excluded. Consequently, any event being foreseen *certainly to be*, is incompatible with its being even *possible not to be*. Nothing, therefore, of which it can be truly said that it either *may*, or *may not be*, can be an object of fore-knowledge, even to the Deity himself. To maintain the contrary is, in fact, the same thing as saying, that the same event is both contingent in itself, and yet certain to God; or that, though, in reality, it *may*, or *may not be*, yet, contrary to the nature and truth of things, he knows that it *certainly will be*. I therefore say, that if a man be possessed of a power of proper *self-determination* (which implies, that the Deity himself cannot control it) the Deity himself cannot foresee what the actual determination will be.

cause

cause men are *condemned* and *condemned* for actions that were so foreseen.

The death of our Saviour is a remarkable instance of this kind. This event was certainly foreseen and intended, for it most particularly entered into the plan of divine providence; and yet it appears from the history, that it was brought about by causes perfectly natural, and fully adequate to it. It was just such an event as might have been expected from the known malice and prejudice of the Jewish rulers, at the time of his appearance. They certainly needed no supernatural instigation to push them on to their bloody and wicked purpose; and Pilate, disposed and situated as he was, needed no extraordinary impulse to induce him to consent to it, notwithstanding his hesitation, and his conviction of the malice and injustice of the proceedings; and both he and the Jews were righteously condemned and punished for it; which, I doubt not, will have the happiest effect in the system of the divine moral government.

This

This argument from the divine prescience is briefly, but clearly stated, by Mr. Hobbes. “ Denying necessity,” says he *, “ destroys both the decrees and prescience of Almighty God. For whatever God has purposed to bring to pass by man, as an instrument, or foresees shall come to pass, a man, if he has liberty, might frustrate, and make not come to pass; and God should either not foreknow it, and not decree it, or he shall foreknow such things shall be as shall never be, and decree what shall never come to pass.”

Indeed, many of the most zealous advocates for the doctrine of philosophical *liberty*, aware of its inconsistency with the doctrine of *divine prescience*, have not scrupled to give up the latter altogether. With respect to such persons, I can only repeat what I have said upon this subject in my *Examination of the Writings of Dr. Beattie, &c.* †

“ Thus our author, in the blind rage of disputation, hesitates not to deprive the

* Works, p. 485.

† P. 173.

“ ever-blessed God of that very attribute,
 “ by which, in the books of scripture, he
 “ expressly distinguishes himself from all
 “ false Gods, and than which nothing can
 “ be more essentially necessary to the go-
 “ vernment of the universe, rather than re-
 “ linquish his fond claim to the fancied pri-
 “ vilege of *self-determination*; a claim which
 “ appears to me to be just as absurd as that
 “ of *self-existence*, and which could not pos-
 “ sibly do him any good if he had it.”

What is more extraordinary, this power
 of *self-determination* he arrogates to himself,
 without pretending to advance a single ra-
 tional argument in favour of his claim; but
 expects it will be admitted on the authority
 of his *instinctive common sense* only. And yet,
 if a man expresses the least indignation at such
 new and unheard-of arrogance, and in an ar-
 gument of such high importance as this, what
exclamation and abuse must he not expect?

SECTION

SECTION IV.

*Of the cause of VOLITION, and the nature of
the WILL.*

IN all investigations relating to human nature, the philosopher will apply the same rules by which his inquiries have been conducted upon all other subjects. He will attentively consider *appearances*, and will not have recourse to more *causes* than are necessary to account for them.

He sees a stone whirled round in a string, and the planets perform their revolutions in circular orbits, and he judges, from *similar appearances*, that they are all retained in their orbits by powers that draw them towards the centers of their respective motions. Again, a stone tends towards the earth by a power which is called *gravity*, and because, supposing the planets to have the same tendency to the sun, that the stone has to the earth, and to have been projected in tangents

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to their present orbits, they would revolve exactly as they are now observed to do, the philosopher, for that reason, concludes, that the force which retains them in their orbits is the very same power of gravity; and on this account only, viz. *not to multiply causes without necessity*, he refuses to admit any other cause of the celestial motions.

Let us then consider the actions of men in the same natural and simple view, without any apprehension of being misled by it; and let it be enquired by what *rule* they are determined, or what are their *causes*.

Whenever any person makes a choice, or comes to any resolution, there are two circumstances which are evidently concerned in it, viz. what we call the *previous disposition of the mind*, with respect to love or hatred, for example, approbation or disapprobation, of certain objects, &c. and the ideas of external objects then present to the mind, that is, *the view of the objects* which the choice or resolution respects.

Let

Let the objects be two kinds of fruit, *apples* and *peaches*. Let it be supposed that I am fond of the former, and have an aversion to the latter, and that I am disposed to eat fruit. In these circumstances, the moment that they are presented to me, I take the apples, and leave the peaches. If it be asked, *why* I made this choice, or what was the *reason, cause, or motive* of it? it is sufficient to say, that I was fond of apples, but did not like peaches. In the same disposition to eat fruit, and retaining my predilection for apples, I should always, infallibly, do the same thing. The *cause* then of this choice was evidently my liking of apples, and my disliking of peaches; and though an inclination, or affection of mind, be not gravity, it *influences* me, and *acts upon* me as certainly, and necessarily, as this power does upon a stone. *Affection* determines my choice of the apples, and *gravity* determines the fall of the stone. Through custom we make use of different terms in these cases, but our ideas are exactly similar; the connexion between the two things, as *cause* and *effect*, being equally strict and necessary.

As a philosopher, therefore, I ought to acquiesce in this, and consider *motives* as the proper *causes* of volitions and actions. And the more I examine my own actions, or those of others, the more reason I see to be satisfied, that all volitions and actions are preceded by corresponding motives.

In all *regular deliberations* concerning any choice, every reason or motive is distinctly attended to, and whatever appears to be the stronger, or the better reason, always determines us. In these cases, the *choice* and the *motive*, correspond precisely to an *effect* and its *cause*. In cases that do not require a formal deliberation, i. e. in cases similar to those in which I have often determined before, the moment I perceive my situation, I determine instantly, without attending distinctly, as before, to all the motives or reasons. But this *instantaneous determination* cannot be said not to be produced by motives, because it is, in fact, only the same *mental process abridged*, the action which was formerly connected, or associated, with the ideas presented to it by means of motives,

tives, being now itself immediately connected with those ideas, without the distinct perception of the motives which formerly intervened.

This process is exactly similar to the assent of the mind to geometrical propositions that are not self-evident; for example, that *all the inward angles of a right-lined triangle are equal to two right angles*. I do not perceive the truth of this, till the reason of it is explained to me; but, when this has been once done, I afterwards, without attending to the reason, and even, perhaps, without being able to assign it, if it were demanded of me, habitually consider the two expressions as denoting the same quantity, and I argue from them accordingly.

Besides, since every *deliberate choice* is regulated by motives, we ought, as philosophers, to take it for granted, that *every choice* is made in the same manner, and is subject to the same rules, and therefore determined by motives, by something that may be called liking or disliking, approving or dis-

approving, &c. depending upon the previous state of the mind with respect to the object of choice; since the mere *facility*, or *readiness*, with which a choice is made, cannot make it to be a thing *different in kind* from a choice made with the greatest deliberation, and which took up so much time, that every circumstance attending it could be distinctly perceived.

Moreover, we see evidently, not only that men are determined to act by certain motives, but that the *vigour* of their actions corresponds also to, what may be called, the *intensity* of their motives. If a master be actuated simply by his anger, he will beat his servant more violently, and continue the correction longer, in proportion to the *degree* of his anger, or the apprehended cause of his displeasure; and kindness operates exactly in the same manner, a stronger affection prompting to greater, and more kind offices, than a weaker.

Also opposite motives, as causes of love and hatred, are known to balance one another,

other, exactly like weights in opposite scales. According to all appearance, nothing can act more invariably, or mechanically. Is it possible, then, that a philosopher, observing these constant and uniform appearances, should not conclude, that the proper cause of a man's actions, are the motives by which he is influenced? Strengthen the motive, and the action is more vigorous; diminish it, and its vigour is abated; change the motive, and the action is changed; intirely withdraw it, and the action ceases; introduce an opposite motive of equal weight, and all action is suspended, just as a limb is kept motionless by the equal action of antagonist muscles. As far as we can judge, *motives* and *actions* do, in all possible cases, strictly correspond to each other.

It cannot but be allowed by the most strenuous advocates for metaphysical liberty, that motives have *some real influence upon the mind*. It would be too manifest a contradiction to all experience, to assert, that all objects are indifferent to us, that there is nothing in any of them that can excite *de-*
sire

fire or *aversion*, or that desire or aversion have no influence upon the *will*, and do not *incline us* to decide on what is proposed to us. Now can it be supposed that the will, whatever it be, should be of such a nature, as both to be properly influenced, or acted upon, by motives, and likewise by something that bears *no sort of relation to motive*, and consequently has a mode of action entirely different from that of motive? This cannot but appear exceedingly improbable, if not impossible.

Every other faculty of the mind has one uniform mode of operation, or affection. The *passions* are all excited by the view of proper objects, the *memory* is employed in retaining the ideas of things formerly impressed upon the mind, and the *judgment* in distinguishing the agreement or disagreement of ideas; whereas, according to the modern metaphysical hypothesis, the *will* is of such a nature, as to be influenced sometimes by the passions or motives, and sometimes in a manner in which neither passion nor motive have any thing to do, and of which

which it is not pretended that any idea can be given, but by saying, that it is *self-determined*, which, in fact, gives no idea at all, or rather implies an absurdity; viz. that a *determination*, which is an *effect*, takes place without any *cause* at all. For, exclusive of every thing that comes under the denomination of *motive*, there is really nothing at all left that can produce the determination. Let a man use what *words* he pleases, he can have no more *conception* how we can sometimes be determined by motives, and sometimes without any motive, than he can have of a scale being sometimes weighed down by weights, and sometimes by a kind of substance that has no weight at all, which, whatever it be in itself, must, with respect to the scale, be *nothing*.

Another argument for the necessary determination of the will, may be drawn from the analogy that it bears to the *judgment*. It is universally acknowledged, that the judgment is necessarily determined by the perceived agreement or disagreement of ideas. Now the *will* is but a kind of judgment,
depend-

depending upon the perceived *preferableness* of things proposed to the mind; which apparent preferableness results as necessarily from the perception of the ideas themselves, as that of their agreement, or disagreement. In fact, all the difference between judgment and will is, that, in the former case, the determination relates to *opinions*, and in the latter to *actions*. The faculties of the mind, as the ancients have well observed, are only different modes in which the same principle acts; the judgment being the *mind judging*, and the will the *mind willing*; and it would be very extraordinary, indeed, if the same mind should not be determined in a *similar manner* in these two very similar cases, and that, if there be a *self-determining will*, there should not be a *self-determining judgment* also. In reality, the latter is not more absurd, and contrary to all appearances, than the former.

All that is advanced above goes upon the common supposition, of the will being a *distinct faculty* of the mind, and not of its being, according to Dr. Hartley's theory,
together

together with all the other faculties, a particular case of the general property of the *association of ideas*, which is necessarily of a mechanical nature, or of its being included in the idea of *desire*, which Dr. Price considers as only a motive with respect to the will.

But what is *desire*, besides a *wish* to obtain some apprehended good? and is not every wish a *volition*? Now, is it possible, that an apprehended good should not be the object of desire, whether controlled by some other desire, &c. or not? For the same reason that a present good gives present pleasure, an absent good excites *desire*, which, like any other of the passions, is universally allowed to be a perfectly mechanical thing. Since, therefore, desire necessarily implies volition, we have here a clear case of the will being necessarily determined by the circumstances which the mind is in; and if in *one case*, why not in *all others*? especially as, in fact, every volition is nothing more than a desire, viz. a desire to accomplish some
end,

end, which end may be considered as the *object* of the passion or affection ?

That the determinations of what we call the will are, in fact, nothing more than a particular case of the general doctrine of association of ideas, and, therefore, a perfectly mechanical thing, I endeavoured to shew in the *Essay prefixed to my Examination of the Scotch Writers*. I shall in this place go over the argument again, more minutely.

Till the mind has been affected with a sense of pleasure or pain, all objects are alike indifferent to it ; but some, in consequence of being always accompanied with a perception of pleasure, become pleasing to us, while others, in consequence of being accompanied with a sense of pain, become displeasing ; and to effect this, nothing can be requisite but the association of agreeable sensations and ideas with the one, and of disagreeable ones with the other. Admitting, therefore, the doctrine of association,

or

or that two ideas often occurring together, will afterwards introduce one another, we have all that is requisite to the formation of all our *passions*, or *affections*; or of some things being the objects of love, and others of hatred to us.

The manner in which actions, adapted to secure a favourite object, become associated with the idea of it, has been explained at large by Dr. Hartley; and it being universally admitted, that the view of a favourite object (of an apple to a child, for instance) is immediately followed by an attempt to seize it, I shall here take it for granted, that there is such a necessary connexion of these ideas and motions; and that, in the same manner, whenever the idea of any favourite object is presented to us, we endeavour to get it into our power.

If the favourite object be within our *immediate reach*, it will, upon these principles, be immediately seized; so that there will be no *interval* between the prospect and the enjoyment, except what was necessarily taken

taken up in the bodily motions, &c. But this interruption, being nothing more than what must always have been experienced, will occasion no pain or uneasiness; for all the parts of the whole process being intimately connected in the mind, the enjoyment will, in fact, commence the moment that the object comes in view. Thus we see that persons exceedingly hungry, are perfectly easy and happy all the time of a necessary and expeditious preparation for dinner, and are never impatient, or uneasy, till the delay begins to be more than they had expected. An attentive observer of this process, may call this state of mind that of *certain expectation*, which is always pleasurable, from the perfect association of all the stages of it with the final issue. 9

Let us now suppose this connected train of ideas to be interrupted. Let an apple, for instance, be shewn to a child, and immediately withdrawn, and thrown quite away; signs of uneasiness will be immediately perceived, the evident consequence of the interruption of a train of associated ideas,

ideas, which had begun to take place in the mind; and the stronger the association had been, in consequence of its having been frequently repeated, and seldom interrupted before, the greater pain will be felt by the interruption. This painful state of mind may be termed *disappointment* and *despair*.

Let us, in the next place, suppose the object to be known to be capable *in itself* of giving a person great pleasure, but to be intirely out of our reach, as the possession of a great estate to a poor man, or of a kingdom to a private gentleman. Having never had any *enjoyment*, or *hope* of it, this connected train of ideas, leading from the object to the enjoyment (the interruption of which would have given him pain) never took place, and consequently it is regarded with perfect *indifference*.

If we be in circumstances in which the favourite object has been known to be sometimes obtained, and sometimes not, the mind will be held in a kind of *middle state* between certain expectation and despair,

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which

which will be called *hope*, if we apprehend the chances to be in favour of our obtaining it, and *fear* if it be more probable that we shall not obtain it. To this state of mind, viz. within the extreme limits of hope and fear, we apply the term *desire*; and it is in this state, which is of some continuance, that we distinctly perceive that affection of the mind to which we give the name of *wishing*, or *willing*.

But what is more properly called a *volition*, is most distinctly perceived when the object does not appear, at first sight, to be desirable or not, but requires that several circumstances be considered and compared. When a child sees an apple, and immediately catches at it, it is a simple case of the association of ideas, and if no other cases had been known, the term *volition*, or *will*, would hardly have been thought of. But when the mind is kept in suspense, between desiring and not desiring an object, the final *preponderancy of desire* is called a *will*, or *wish to obtain it*, and the *prevalence of aversion*, is called a *will*, or *wish to decline it*.

ii. This case, however, of a proper *volition* succeeding a deliberation, though more complex, is not less mechanical, and dependent upon preceding ideas, and on the state of mind, than the others. It is still nothing more than association of ideas, though the final, and prevailing association, has been for some time prevented from taking place, by a variety of inferior associations.

The term *will* is as little applicable to determinations and actions *secondarily automatic*, as to those that are *originally* so; of which I shall give an explanation, together with a case.

The first motions of the fingers, or legs of a child, are called *automatic*, being the immediate and mechanical effect of an external impression, and not arising from any *idea* in the mind. To these motions the term *volition*, or *will*, is certainly not at all applicable.

Afterwards the same motions become associated with ideas, at which time they be-

gin to be called *voluntary*, as when a child reaches out his hand to take an apple. But the motion is called *more perfectly voluntary*, in proportion as the ideas with which it is connected are more numerous and complex, and when other ideas, present to the mind at the same time, have a connection with opposite motions, so that it shall be some time before the prevailing association takes place.

But when the motion shall be as perfectly associated with this *complex set of ideas*, or *state of mind*, as it was with a *single idea*, so that the one shall immediately follow the other, it is called *secondarily automatic*; and this being as instantaneous as an originally automatic motion, the term *volition* ceases to be applied to it. This is the case when a person walks without attending to the motion of his legs, or plays on a musical instrument without thinking of the particular position of his fingers; each of which motions and positions, having been dependent upon ideas, was before performed with deliberation, and an express volition.

As

As it is evident, from the observation of the fact, that automatic motions pass into voluntary ones, and these again into those that are secondarily automatic, it is evident, that they are all equally mechanical; the last process, in particular, being nothing but the second *shortened*, or, which is the same thing, the second, or the perfectly voluntary motion, being the last, or the secondarily automatic, *extended*. As, therefore, the last is evidently mechanical, no attention of mind being employed in it, the second must be so too, though an express attention be given to it.

In every view of the subject, therefore, whether the will be considered in a popular, or a philosophical sense, it appears that its determinations must be directed by certain invariable laws, depending upon the previous state of mind, and the ideas present to it, at the moment of forming any resolution; so that, in no case whatever, could they have been otherwise than they actually were.

SECTION V.

Of the supposed CONSCIOUSNESS OF LIBERTY, and the use of the term AGENT.

THE greatest difficulties in the consideration of the subject of liberty and necessity have arisen from *ambiguities in the use of terms*. To contribute, therefore, all that may be in my power to clear this important subject of the obscurity in which it has been involved, I shall consider the meaning of such terms as appear to me to have had the greatest share in perplexing it; and, in doing this, I shall take an opportunity of replying to what that excellent man, and very able metaphysician, Dr. Price, has advanced upon this subject, in his *Review of the Principles of Morals*, because, it appears to me, that he has been misled by the use of such words.

“ We

“ We have, in truth,” says he *, “ the
 “ same constant and necessary consciousness
 “ of liberty that we have that we *think*,
 “ *choose*, *will*, or even *exist*; and whatever
 “ to the contrary men may say, it is impos-
 “ sible for them, in earnest, to think they
 “ have no *active self-moving powers*, and are
 “ not causes of their own volitions, or not
 “ to ascribe to *themselves* what they must be
 “ conscious they *think* and *do*.

“ A man choosing to follow his judgment
 “ and desires, or his actually doing what he
 “ is inclined to do, is what we mean when
 “ we say *motives determine him*. At the same
 “ time, it is very plain, that motives can
 “ have no concern in effecting his determi-
 “ nation, or that there is no *physical connec-*
 “ *tion* between his judgment and views, and
 “ the actions consequent upon them. What
 “ must be more absurd than to say, that
 “ *our inclinations act upon us, and compel us*,
 “ that *our desires and fears put us in motion*,
 “ or *produce our volitions*, i. e. are *agents*;
 “ and yet what is more conceivable, than

* P. 302.

“ that they may be the *occasions* of our putting ourselves into motion? What sense would there be in saying, that the situation of a body, which may properly be the *occasion*, or the *account*, of its being struck by another body, is the *efficient* of its motion, or its *impeller*?”

I do not think that this objection to the doctrine of necessity can be expressed in a stronger or better manner, and I have purposely made this quotation, in order to meet the difficulty in its greatest force; being confident, that, when the ideas are attended to, it will appear that the writer is, in fact, a necessarian; and, though unperceived by himself, is, *in words only*, an advocate for the doctrine of metaphysical liberty. In order to avoid all ambiguity myself, I shall describe the *fact*, with respect to human nature, in such a manner as, I think, it shall hardly be possible to be misled by words.

Man is a being of such a make, that when certain things, two kinds of fruit, for instance, are proposed to him, they become
the

the objects of desire, in different degrees, according to his experience of their different qualities, their wholesomeness, the pleasure they give to his taste, and various other considerations. As the *desireableness*, in this case, is complex, and the impression that each circumstance belonging to it makes upon the mind is also various, depending upon the momentary state of it, the presence or absence of other ideas, &c. it is possible that the comparative desirableness of the two fruits may vary much in a short space of time, sometimes the one, and sometimes the other, having the ascendant. But, provided the man were obliged to make a choice at any one moment of time, it will not be denied, that he would certainly choose that which appeared to him, for that moment, the more desirable. If he were under no restraint whatever, it is possible, that, on some accounts, he might choose to make no choice at all, and he might neglect both the kinds of fruit. But still it would be because that conduct appeared *more desirable* than the other, i. e. *preferable* to it.

This,

This, I will venture to say, is all that a man can possibly be *conscious of*, viz. that nothing hinders his choosing, or taking, whichsoever of the fruits appears to him more desirable, or his not making any choice at all, according as the one or the other shall appear to him preferable upon the whole. But there is always some *reason* for any object, or any conduct, appearing desirable or preferable; a reason existing either in a man's own previous *disposition of mind*, or in his *idea of the things* proposed to him. In things of small consequence, or in a very quick succession of ideas, the reason may be forgotten, or even not be explicitly attended to; but it did exist, and actually contributed to make the thing, or the conduct, appear desirable at the time.

As this is all that any man can be conscious of with respect to himself, so it is all that he can observe with respect to others. Agreeably to this, whenever we either reflect upon our own conduct, or speculate concerning that of others, we never fail to consider,

consider, or ask, what could be the *motive* of such or such a choice; always taking for granted, that there must have been some motive or other for it; and we never suppose, in such cases, that any choice could be made without some motive, some *apparent reason* or other.

When it is said, that a man acts from *mere will* (though this is not common language) the word is never used in a strict metaphysical sense, or for will under the influence of no motive; but the meaning is, that, in such a case, a man acts from *wilfulness*, or *obstinacy*, i. e. to resist the control of others; the motive being to *shew his liberty, and independence*, which is far from being a case in which a man is supposed to act without any motive at all.

The *consciousness of freedom*, therefore, is an ambiguous expression, and cannot prove any thing in favour of philosophical or metaphysical liberty; but, when rightly understood, appears to decide in favour of the doctrine of necessity, or the necessary

fary influence of motives to determine the choice.

If what has been stated be the fact, and the whole fact (and for the truth of the representation I appeal to every man's own feeling and persuasion) it must be quite arbitrary, and can have no sort of consequence, except what is merely verbal, whether I say, that the *cause* of the choice was the *motive* for it (which Dr. Price very properly defines to be the *judgment*, or the *desire*) or the *mind*, in which that choice takes place, that is, *myself*, or some other person; and to this cause it is that we ascribe the *agency*, or *determining power*. In the former case it is the power, or force, of the motive, and in the latter that of the person. In either case there is a certain *effect*, and the concurrence of two circumstances, viz. a *motive*, and a *mind*, to which that motive is presented, or in which it exists, for the *cause* of the effect.

If, according to the description given above, any person will maintain, that, notwithstanding

withstanding there be a real effect, and a sufficient cause, there is no proper *agency* at all, merely because the will is necessarily determined by motives, nothing follows but that, out of complaisance, I may substitute some other word in its place. For if it be asserted, that we have a consciousness of any other kind of agency than has been described, the fact is denied, and I challenge any person to do more than merely assert it. Without any other kind of agency than I have described, the whole business of human life, consisting of a succession of volitions, and corresponding actions, goes on, just as we observe it to do, and every just rule of life, respecting the regulation of the will, and the conduct, has a perfect propriety and use; but no propriety, or use at all, on any other hypothesis.

However, I have no objection to meet Dr. Price upon his own ground in this instance, viz. appealing to the established *use of words*, with respect to the proper *cause* of volitions and actions. He says, “What would be
 “ more absurd than to say, that our *inclina-*
 “ *tions*

“*tions act upon us, and compel us, that our desires and fears put us into motion, or produce our volitions.*” Absurd as this language appears to Dr. Price, it is, in fact, the common style in which the conduct of men is described, and certainly proves, that, if men have any ideas really corresponding to their words, they do consider the motives of mens actions to be, in a proper sense, the *causes* of them, more properly than the mind, which is *determined by the motives*. This also is common popular language, and therefore must have a foundation in the common apprehension of mankind.

Dr. Price says, “If our inclinations compel us to act, if our desires and fears put us into motion, they are the *agents*; whereas they are, properly, only the occasion of our putting ourselves into motion.” But what can this be, besides a mere verbal distinction? If it be universally true, that the action certainly follows the motive, i. e. the inclination of the mind, and the views of things presented to it, it is all that a necessarian can wish for; all his *conclusions* follow,

follow, and he leaves it to others to ring changes upon words, and vary their expressions at pleasure.

Dr. Price, however, is particularly unhappy in what he advances in support of this arbitrary and verbal distinction. "What sense," says he, "can there be in saying that the situation of a body, which may properly be the *occasion*, or the *account* of its being struck by another body, is the *efficient* of its motion, or its *impeller*?" Whereas, according to his own definition of *motive*, it includes both the inclination, or *disposition of the mind*, and the *views of things presented to it*, and this manifestly takes in both the *impelling body*, and the *situation* in which the body impelled by it is found; which, according to his own description, includes the *whole cause* of the impulse, or every thing that contributes to its being impelled. And of these two circumstances, viz. the inclination of the mind, and the view of an object, it is the *latter* that is generally, and in a more especial sense, called the *motive*, and compared to the *impeller* (to use

use Dr. Price's language) while the inclination, or disposition, of the mind, is only considered as a *circumstance* which gives the motive an opportunity of acting upon it, or impelling it, and producing its proper effect. In this I appeal, as before, to the common sense of mankind.

But, without regard to popular ideas, which Dr. Price may say are often founded on prejudice, and false views of things, I would consider this matter with him as a *mathematician*, and a *philosopher*; and I think I can shew him that, according to the mode of reasoning universally received by the most *speculative*, as well as the *vulgar*, we ought to consider *motives* as the proper *causes* of human actions, though it is the *man* that is called the *agent*.

Suppose a philosopher to be entirely ignorant of the constitution of the human mind, but to see, as Dr. Price acknowledges, that men do, in fact, act according to their *affections* and *desires*, i. e. in one word, according to *motives*, would he not,

as

as in a case of the doctrine of chances, immediately infer that there must be a *fixed cause* for this coincidence of motives and actions? Would he not say that, though he could not see into the man, the connexion was *natural*, and *necessary*, because *constant*? And since the motives, in all cases, *precede* the actions, would he not naturally, i. e. according to the custom of philosophers in similar cases, say that the motive was the *cause* of the action? And would he not be led by the obvious analogy, to compare the mind to a balance, which was inclined this way or that, according to the motives presented to it.

It makes no difference to say, that the motive does not *immediately* produce the action. It is enough if it necessarily produce the immediate cause of the action, or the cause of the immediate cause, &c. for example, if the motive excite the *desire*, the desire determine the *will*, and the will produce the *action*. For contrive as many mediums of this kind as you please, it will still follow, that the action is *ultimately* according to the motive, *flows from it*, or *depends upon it*; and,

therefore, in proper philosophical language, the motive ought to be called the *proper cause* of the action. It is as much so as any thing in nature is the cause of any thing else.

Since the common language of men corresponds to this view of the subject, it is a proof that, in fact, men do see it in this light. And if they do not pursue this doctrine to its distant and necessary consequences, it is for want of sufficient reflection, or strength of mind. Indeed, this one simple truth, respecting the necessary influence of motives on the human mind, leads us much beyond the apprehensions of the *vulgar*; but not to any thing that ought to alarm the *philosopher*, or the *christian*. The foundation is a truth grounded on universal experience and observation, and we have no need to fear any fair consequences from it.

SECTION

SECTION VI.

Whether Liberty be essential to PRACTICAL VIRTUE; and of MORAL and PHYSICAL NECESSITY.

IT is on a mere verbal distinction, also, on which every thing that Dr. Price has advanced, in proof of *liberty being essential to practical virtue*, turns. "Practical virtue," he says *, "supposes liberty. A being who cannot *act* at all, most certainly cannot act virtuously or viciously. Now, as far as it is true of a being, that he acts, so far he must *himself* be the cause of the action, and therefore *not necessarily determined* to act—Determination requires an *efficient cause*. If this cause be the being himself, I plead for no more. If not, then it is no longer *his* determination, i. e. he is no longer the *determiner*, but the motive, or whatever else any one will maintain to be the cause of the determi-

* Review of the Principles of Morals, p. 302.

“ nation—In short, who must not feel the
 “ absurdity of saying, *my volitions are pro-*
 “ *duced by a foreign cause, i. e. are not mine.*
 “ *I determine voluntarily, and yet necessity.*”

Here we have the same arbitrary account of *agency*, that has been considered before. For this is the very same, whether the object of choice be of a *moral* nature or not, whether it relates to two different kinds of fruit, or to virtuous or vicious actions. In fact, if a virtuous resolution be formed, the person by whom it is formed, is the object of my complacence and reward, and if a vicious choice be made, the person is the object of my abhorrence; and there is the greatest propriety and use in punishing him. And I appeal to the common sense of mankind, if it would make any difference in the case, whether it be said that the proper cause of the action was the *motive*, or the *being himself* actuated by the motive, since both were necessary to the action; and, as will be shewn in a following section, a person supposed to act without the influence of any motive, would not be considered as the object of praise

praise or blame, reward or punishment at all.

Dr. Price is as unfortunate in his appeal to the common use of words in this case, as on the two former occasions. "Who," says he, "must not feel the absurdity of saying, *my volition was produced by a foreign cause?*" meaning a *motive*. Now this is actually the common language of all the world, and nobody feels any absurdity in it: because the consequences he draws from it, by no means follow, viz. that then the volition is not *my own*. It is *my volition*, whatever was the motive that produced it, if it was a volition that took place in *my mind*.

The distinction which this writer makes between a *moral* and a *physical necessity*, is equally useless as that concerning the proper seat of agency, or causation. If a man's mind be so formed, whether it be by *nature*, or *art*, that he shall, in all cases, accede to every virtuous proposal, and decline every thing vicious; if the choice be really

his own, and not that of any other for him, we love and approve his character, and see the greatest propriety in rewarding him. And the case is not at all altered, by saying, that the necessity, by which he acts, is a *physical* or *moral* one. These are but words. If the choice be certain, and truly necessary, it is a proof that, with that disposition of mind, no other choice could be made; and, whatever consequences are drawn from the consideration of the impossibility of any other choice being made, applies to this case, if to any. And yet, in the following extract, Dr. Price considers actions as *truly necessary*, and yet, in the highest degree *virtuous*; and not directly treating of *agency* in this place, and therefore being, perhaps, a little off his guard, it is remarkable, that he expresses himself in a manner by no means suited to his system, but as if the proper cause of the actions was the motives that led to them; though a little before he had represented it as the greatest absurdity, to say, that a man can determine *voluntarily*, and yet, *necessarily*.

“ By

“ By the necessity which is said to dimi-
 “ nish the virtue of good actions must be
 “ meant, not a *natural* (which would take
 “ away the whole idea of *action* and *will*)
 “ but a *moral necessity*, or such as arises
 “ from the *influence of motives*, and *affections*
 “ of the mind, or that *certainty* of deter-
 “ mining one way, which may take place
 “ upon the supposition of certain views,
 “ circumstances, and principles of an agent.
 “ Now it is undeniable, that the very great-
 “ est *necessity* of this sort is consistent with,
 “ nay, is implied in, the idea of the most
 “ *perfect and meritorious virtue*; and, con-
 “ sequently, can by no means be what, of
 “ itself, ever lessens it. The more confi-
 “ dently we may depend upon a being’s do-
 “ ing an action, when convinced of its pro-
 “ priety, whatever obstacles may lie in his
 “ way, or, morally speaking, the *more effi-*
 “ *cacious and unconquerable the influence of*
 “ *conscience* is within him, the more amia-
 “ ble we must think him.

“ In like manner, the most abandoned
 “ and detestable state of wickedness, im-

“ plies the greatest *necessity of sinning*, and
“ the greatest degree of moral impotence.
“ He is the most vicious man who is so
“ enslaved by vicious habits, or in whom
“ appetite has so far gained the ascendant,
“ and a regard to virtue and duty is so far
“ weakened, that we can, at any time, *with*
“ *certainty*, foretel, that he will do evil,
“ when tempted to it. Let me, therefore,
“ by the way, remark, that every idea of
“ liberty must be very erroneous, which
“ makes it inconsistent with the most abso-
“ lute and complete certainty, or *necessity*,
“ of the kind that I have now taken notice
“ of, or which supposes it to overthrow all
“ steadiness of character, or conduct. The
“ greatest influence of motives that can ra-
“ tionally be conceived, or which it is pos-
“ sible for any one to maintain, without
“ running into the palpable and intolerable
“ absurdity of making them *physical effi-*
“ *cients*, or *agents*, can no way affect li-
“ berty. And it is surely very surprizing,
“ that our most *willing determinations* should
“ be imagined to have most of the appear-
“ ance of not proceeding from ourselves,
“ and

“ and that what a man does with the fullest
 “ consent of his will, with the least reluc-
 “ tance, and the greatest desire and resolu-
 “ tion, he should, for that very reason, be
 “ suspected not to do *freely*, i. e. *not to do*
 “ *at all.*”

As a professed necessarian, I would not wish to use any other language than this. But it does not appear to me to be the proper language of an advocate for metaphysical liberty, and of that kind of liberty being essential to virtue, to talk of virtue *arising from the influence of motives, and affections of mind, or of the efficacious and unconquerable influence of conscience.* What evidence is there in all this of a *self-determining power, acting independently of all motives, of all judgment, or desire, and of the importance of this power to virtue?* Here we have the most *perfect virtue* established on principles, on which it must be allowed, that it could never be *proved, or made to appear, that any such self-determining power existed.*

Dr.

Dr. Price allows, that were all men perfectly virtuous, or perfectly vicious, all their actions would be *necessary*, and might, with certainty, be foretold; their inward disposition, and situation, being together sufficient to account for all their conduct. It is plain, therefore, that when he does not use the language of a *system*, a *full consent of the will*, though produced by the *efficacious and unconquerable influence of conscience*, that is, of *motives*, is sufficient to constitute virtue. Here, therefore, we see the most perfect virtue arising from the most absolute necessity, that is, if there be any meaning in words, virtue, without a possibility of a man's acting otherwise than he does, i. e. without his having a power, *disposed as he was*, to act otherwise. If this be not a just inference, I do not know what is. But how this agrees with what he observes in another place *, I do not see. He says, "It has always been the general, and it has evidently been the natural, sense of mankind, that they cannot be accountable for

* P. 303.

what

“ what they have no power to avoid. No-
 “ thing can be more glaringly absurd, than
 “ applauding, or reproaching, ourselves, for
 “ what we were no more the cause of, than
 “ of our own being, and what it was no
 “ more possible for us to prevent, than the
 “ return of the seasons, or the revolutions
 “ of the planets.”

This is so expressed, as if the *disposition of mind*, which is one necessary cause of mens resolutions and actions, was not at all concerned; but, taking in this circumstance, to which Dr. Price himself allows a *certain and necessary operation*, that which he here calls a *glaring absurdity* is precisely his own principle, unless he will say, that a man is not accountable for the most *abandoned and detestable wickedness*, which, he expressly says, implies the greatest *necessity of sinning*. In fact, it is only where the necessity of sinning arises from some *other cause* than a *man's own disposition of mind*, that we ever say, there is any impropriety in punishing a man for his conduct. If the impossibility of acting well, has arisen from a *bad disposition*,

tion, or habit, its having been impossible, with that disposition, or habit, to act virtuously, is never any reason for our forbearing punishment: because we know, that punishment is proper to correct that disposition, and that habit; and that we thereby both reform the sinner, and warn others, which are all the just ends of punishment; every thing else deserving no other name than *vengeance*, and being manifestly absurd, because answering no good purpose. At the same time, punishment, used with this view, will be administered with the utmost tenderness and compassion.

I would farther take the liberty to observe, that Dr. Price's opinion of *liberty being essential to virtue*, has led him to adopt an idea of it, that is inconsistent with what he himself has acknowledged, concerning the most perfect virtue arising from the *influence of motives, and affections of mind*. "Instinctive benevolence," he says*, "is no principle of virtue, nor are any actions, flowing merely from it, virtuous. As

* P. 318.

“ far

“ far as this influences, so far something
 “ else than *reason* and *goodness* influences,
 “ and so much, I think, is to be subtracted
 “ from the moral worth of any action or
 “ character. This is very agreeable to the
 “ common sentiments and determinations
 “ of mankind.” And again *, “ The con-
 “ clusion I would establish is, that the virtue
 “ of an agent is always less in proportion
 “ to the degree in which *natural temper*, and
 “ *propensities* fall in with his actions, *instinc-*
 “ *tive principles* operate, and *rational re-*
 “ *flection on what is right* to be done is
 “ wanting.”

Now what is the difference between *af-*
fections of mind, from which, he says, arises
 the most perfect and meritorious virtue, and
instinctive benevolence, natural temper, and
propensity? For my own part, I see no dif-
 ference, but that the former comprehends
 the latter. For what is *instinctive benevolence*,
 or *natural temper*, and *propensity*, but *parti-*
cular affections of mind? Also the language
 of the former paragraph, and not of this,

* P. 324.

which

which is the very reverse of it, is, I am confident, agreeable to the common sentiments and determinations of mankind.

Mankind, in general, do not refine so much as Dr. Price. Whatever it is *within a man* that leads him to virtue, and that will certainly and necessarily incline him to act right, or to do what they approve, they deem to be a *virtuous principle*, to be the *foundation of merit*, and to *intitle to reward*. If they allow a man more merit for having *acquired* this disposition or propensity, than upon the supposition of his having been *born* with it, it is because they suppose some *prior disposition* to acquire it, and so strong as to have overcome considerable obstacles to the acquiring of it. But this is only carrying the principle of virtue, the foundation of merit, and of a title to reward a little higher. The *nature* of it is still the very same. Men are charmed with a virtuous conduct, with the principle that was the cause of it, with the principle that was the cause of that principle, and so on, as far as you please to go.

The

The only reason why we are less struck with a virtuous action, proceeding from what is called *natural temper*, is because we consider it as a *fickle principle*, on which we can have no sufficient dependence for the future. But let that principle be supposed to be really *fixed* and *stable*, and wherein does it differ from that disposition of mind which is the result of the greatest labour and attention ?

If two men be in all respects *the same inwardly*, if they *feel*, and *act* precisely in the same manner, upon all occasions ; how, in the sight of God or man, can there be more virtue in the *present conduct* of the one than in that of the other, whatever difference there may *have been* with respect to the *acquisition* of that temper ? Every thing that is so confirmed as to become *habitual*, operates exactly like what is called *instinct* (for my own part, I believe them to be, in all cases, the very same thing) but does a course of virtue become less virtuous, in consequence of being *persisted in*, and, consequently, being a more *easy* and *mechanical thing* ?

Yet

Yet this is the natural conclusion from Dr. Price's principles. Velleius Paterculus, as is observed by Mr. Hobbes *, praises Cato because he was good *by nature, et quia aliter esse non potuit.*

These maxims take away all virtue, goodness, and merit, from the *greatest and best of all beings*, and likewise make it absurd to *pray for virtue*; since nothing that is *communicated* can be entitled to that appellation. And surely the common ideas and practices of mankind, at least of christians, reprobate the notion. In fact, it is mere *Heathen Stoicism*, which allows men to pray for *external things*, but admonishes them that, as for *virtue*, it is our own, and must arise from *within ourselves*, if we have it at all. And yet Dr. Price, I know, prays, like other christians, and with the *humility* of a necessarian, who considers every thing belonging to him, *temper, will, and conduct*, as the gift of God, and himself as nothing more than the *instrument* (though at the same time the *object*) of his gracious designs.

* Works, p. 476.

And

And as I am not alarmed at the *moral influence* of *his* opinions, I hope he will not be alarmed at that of *mine*.

I wish Dr. Price would consider for a few minutes (and a very few, I should think, would suffice) what this *self-determining power*, of which he makes so great a boast, can be. By his own confession, it is not *judgment*, it is not *conscience*, it is not *affection*, it is not *desire*, it is not *hope* or *fear*, nor consequently any of the *passions*. It must, therefore, be *mere will*, under no direction or guidance, because, under no *influence* whatever; and of what *value*, or *use*, can such a principle be? Supposing the thing possible (as I deem it to be absolutely impossible, that the will should act without judgment, conscience, affection, or any other motive) the determination, though dignified with the appellation of *self*, cannot be any thing but a mere *random decision*, which may be good or bad, favourable or unfavourable to us, like the chance of a die, and cannot possibly be of a nature to be entitled to praise or blame, merit or

VOL. II. G , demerit,

demerit, reward or punishment. I cannot, therefore, persuade myself, that a wise and benevolent author would have given man a power so intirely *insignificant to every valuable purpose*, and of such a nature too, that *himself*, that *wisdom and power in the abstract*, could not control it.

I also wish Dr. Price would consider in what sense a determination of his mind can be said to be more *his own*, on account of its not having been produced by previous *motives*, but in a manner independent of all motives, or reasons, for choice. For my part, I own that, supposing the thing to be *possible*, as I conceive it to be naturally impossible, I cannot see either any thing to *boast* of in such a determination, or any foundation for *property* in it. If nothing in the preceding state of his mind (which would come under the description of *motive*) contributed to it, how did *he* contribute to it? and, therefore, in what sense can he call it *his*? If he reject a determination produced by motives, because motives are *no part of himself*, he must likewise give up
all

all claim to a determination produced without motives, because that also would be produced without the help of any thing belonging to himself. If the former have a *foreign cause*, and therefore he cannot claim it, the latter has *no cause at all*, and is, therefore, what neither himself, nor any other person, can claim.

But the thing itself is absolutely chimerical; a power of determining *without motive*, or a proper *self-determining* power, without any regard to judgment, conscience, or affection, is impossible. It is to suppose an *effect* without a *cause*. The supposition is contrary to all experience and observation: and if we only admit this one undeniable *fact*, viz. that the will cannot properly determine *itself*, but is always determined by *motives*, that is, by the present disposition of the mind, and the views of things presented to it, it cannot be any other than a *necessary* determination, subject to laws, as strict and invariable as those of mechanics. There cannot possibly be any medium in the case. If we always choose that

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object,

object, or that action, which, *on whatever account*, appears *preferable* at the moment of making the choice, it will always be determined by some *invariable rule*, depending upon the *state of the mind*, and the *ideas present to it*; and it will never be equally in our power to choose two things, when all the previous circumstances are the very same.

SECTION VII.

Of the Propriety of REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, and the Foundation of Praise and Blame, on the Scheme of Necessity.

THE objection to the doctrine of necessity that has weighed the most with those who have considered the subject, is that, if mens' determinations and actions flow necessarily from the previous state of their minds, and the motives, or influences, to which they are exposed, the idea of *responsibility*, or *accountableness* vanishes, and there can be no propriety or use of *rewards* or *punishments*.

Now,

Now, I hope to make it appear, that, when the case is rightly understood, there can be no use or propriety of rewards or punishments on any other scheme, but the greatest possible upon this.

In order to make this clearly apprehended, let us suppose two minds constructed, as I may say, upon the principles of the two opposite schemes of *liberty* and *necessity*; all the determinations of the one being invariably directed by its previous dispositions, and the motives presented to it, while the other shall have a power of determining, in all cases, in a manner independent of any such previous disposition or motives; which is precisely the difference between the systems of necessity and liberty, philosophically and strictly defined. To avoid circumlocution, let us call the former A, and the latter B. I will farther suppose myself to be a father, and these two my children; and, knowing their inward make and constitution, let us consider how I should treat them.

My object is to make them virtuous and happy. All my precepts, and the whole of my discipline, are directed to that end. For the use of discipline is by the hope of something, which the subjects of it know to be good, or the fear of something, which they know to be evil, to engage them to act in such a manner, as the person who has the conduct of that discipline well knows to be for their good *ultimately*, though they cannot see it. In other words, I must make use of *present good*, and *present evil*, in order to secure their *future and greatest good*; the former being within the apprehension of my children, and the latter lying beyond it, and being known to myself only. This I take to be precisely the nature of *discipline*; the person who conducts it being supposed to have more knowledge, experience, and judgment, than those who are subject to it.

Now, since motives have a certain and necessary influence on the mind of A, I know that the prospect of good will certainly

tainly incline him to do what I recommend to him, and the fear of evil will deter him from any thing that I wish to dissuade him from ; and therefore I bring him under the course of discipline above described, with the greatest hope of success. Other influences, indeed, to which he may be exposed, and that I am not aware of, may counteract my views, and thereby my object *may* be frustrated ; but, notwithstanding this, my discipline will, likewise, have its *certain and necessary effect* ; counteracting in part, at least, all foreign and unfavourable influence, and therefore cannot be wholly lost upon him. Every promise and every threatening, every reward and every punishment, judiciously administered, works to my end. If this discipline be sufficient to overcome any foreign influence, I engage my son in a *train of proper actions*, which, by means of the *mechanical structure of his mind*, will, at length, form a *stable habit*, which insures my success.

But in my son B, I have to do with a creature of quite another make ; motives

have no necessary or certain influence upon his determinations, and in all cases, where the principle of *freedom from the certain influence of motives* takes place, it is exactly an equal chance, whether my promises or threatenings, my rewards or punishments, determine his actions or not. The *self-determining power* is not at all of the nature of any mechanical influence, that may be counteracted by influences equally mechanical, but is a thing with respect to which I can make no sort of calculation, and against which I can make no provision. Even the longest continued series of proper actions, will form no *habit* that can be depended upon; and therefore, after all my labour and anxiety, my object is quite precarious and uncertain.

If we suppose that B is *in some degree* determined by motives, in that very degree, and no other, is he a proper subject of discipline; and he can never become *wholly so*, till his self-determining power be entirely discharged, and he comes to be the same kind of being with A, on whom motives of
all

all kinds have a certain and necessary influence. Had I the making of my own children, they should certainly be all constituted like A, and none of them like B.

Besides, the discipline of A will have a suitable influence on all that are constituted like him, so that *for their sakes*, as well as on the account of A himself, I ought to bring him under this salutary treatment. And thus all the ends of discipline are answered, and rewards and punishments have the greatest *propriety*; because they have the fullest *effect* upon the doctrine of necessity; whereas, it is evident, they are absolutely lost, having no effect whatever, upon the opposite scheme.

This appears to me to be the fairest and the most unexceptionable view of the subject; by which it appears, that the Divine Being, the father of us all, in order to make us the proper subjects of discipline, and thereby secure our greatest happiness (which is all that, philosophically speaking, is really
meant

meant by making us *accountable creatures*;) must constitute us in such a manner, as that motives shall have a certain and necessary influence upon our minds, and must not leave us at liberty to be influenced by them or not, at our arbitrary pleasure.

I do not think it is properly *necessary* to add any thing more on this subject; but, because this question has (perhaps more than any other in the whole compass of philosophical discussion) been rendered obscure by an unfair and improper manner of stating, I shall give another view of it; by which, I hope, it will appear, that there is all the foundation that we can wish for a proper *accountableness*, and for *praise* and *blame*, upon the doctrine of necessity, and not so much as a shadow of any real foundation for them upon any other supposition; the boasted advantage of the doctrine of *liberty* belonging, in fact, to the doctrine of *necessity* only; and I am confident that my ideas on this subject are, at the same time, those of the *vulgar*, and agreeable to *sound philosophy*.

Philosophy, while those of the metaphysicians, who have adopted a contrary opinion, are founded on a mere *fallacy*.

When I, or the world at large, *praise* my son A, we tell him we admire his *excellent disposition*, in consequence of which all good motives have a certain and never-failing influence upon his mind, always determining his choice to what is virtuous and honourable, and that his conduct is not directed either by mere *will*, or the *authority of any other person*, but proceeds from his own virtuous disposition only; and that his good habits are so confirmed, that neither promises nor threatenings are able to draw him aside from his duty.

In this representation I am confident that I keep back nothing that is essential. The ideas of mankind, in general, never go beyond this, when they praise any person, nor philosophically speaking, *ought* they to do it. Praise that is founded on any other principles is really *absurd*, and, if it was understood by the vulgar, would be reprobated

bated by them, as intirely repugnant to their conceptions of it. This will clearly appear by considering the case of my son B.

We have supposed that A has done a virtuous action, and has been *commended*, because it proceeded from the *bent of his mind to virtue*, so that whenever proper circumstances occurred, he *necessarily* did what we wished him to have done. Let us now suppose that B does the very same thing; but let it be fully understood, that the *cause* of his right determination was not any bias or *disposition of mind* in favour of virtue, or because a good *motive* influenced him to do it; but that his determination was produced by something within him (call it by what name you please) of a quite *different nature*, with respect to which motives of any kind have no sort of influence or effect, a mere *arbitrary pleasure*, without any reason whatever (for a *reason* is a *motive*) and I apprehend he would no more be thought a proper subject of praise, notwithstanding he should do what was *right in itself*, than the dice, which, by a fortunate throw, should give a
man

man an estate. It is true the action was right, but there was not the *proper principle* and *motive*, which are the only just foundations of praise.

In short, where the proper *influence of motives* ceases, the proper foundation of praise and blame disappears with it; and a *self-determining power*, supposed to act in a manner independent of motive, and even contrary to every thing that comes under that description, is a thing quite foreign to every idea that bears the least relation to praise or blame. A good action produced in this manner, is no indication of a *good disposition of mind*, inclined to yield to the influence of good impressions, and, therefore, is nothing on which I can depend for the future. Even a series of good actions, produced in this manner, gives no security for a proper conduct in future instances; because such actions can form no *habit*, i. e. *no necessary tendency to a particular conduct*; but every thing is liable to be reversed by this self-determining principle, which can turn a deaf ear to all motives, and all reasons.

So

So difficult is it to get out of the road of common sense, that even philosophical persons will farther deceive themselves, by saying, that the self-determining power is influenced by motives, and does not determine *absolutely at random*. But if this be a *proper influence*, there can be no proper self-determining power, except by self-determination be understood what the world in general always does understand by it, viz. a power of determination not subject to the controul of *others*, but produced by causes operating within a man's self only. If, when the *state of mind*, and every *idea* present to it, are precisely the same, there be a power of forming either of two contrary resolutions (which is the case, if *necessary determination* be excluded) it is plain, that the proper *cause* of the resolution, that which actually *decided* in the case, could not be any thing either in the *state of the mind* itself, or any *idea* present to it (because, notwithstanding these circumstances, there is a power of determining either agreeable, or contrary to their natural influence) and, therefore, could not be any thing to which mankind have

have ever attributed either praise or blame. It is never the *action*, but the *disposition of mind*, and the *motive* that makes any thing *meritorious*; and here the determination was not caused either by the state of mind, or any motive whatever.

I will venture to say that, let this case be stated with ever so much address and refinement, it will still be found that there cannot be any just foundation for praise, but upon a scheme which supposes the mind to be so disposed, as that just views of things will necessarily determine the will to right action. The two schemes of liberty and necessity admit of no medium between them. But if any kind of medium be supposed, in which something shall be allowed to the influence of *motive*, and something to the *self-determining power*, acting independently of motive, still all the *virtue* and *merit*, all the foundation for *praise*, takes place just so far as necessity takes place, and fails just so far as this imaginary *liberty of choice*, acting independently of motives, interferes to obstruct it.

It

It has been seen that *punishment* would have no propriety, or use, upon the doctrine of philosophical liberty; *blame* also, upon the same scheme, would be equally absurd and ill founded. If my child A acts wrong, I tell him that I am exceedingly displeas'd, because he has shown a *disposition of mind*, on which motives to virtue have no sufficient influence; that he appears to have such a *propensity to vicious indulgences*, that I am afraid he is irreclaimable, and that his utter ruin will be the consequence of it. This is the proper language of blame; and, upon a mind constituted like that of A, may have a good effect, as well as the discipline of punishment.

But if the constitution of the mind of B be attended to, it will be seen that blame is equally absurd, as punishment is unavailing. If he has acted the same part that A has done, the language which I address'd to A will not apply to him. It is true, that he has done what is wrong, and it must have bad consequences; but it was not from any *bad disposition of mind*, that made him sub-
ject

ject to be influenced by bad impressions. No, his determination had a cause of quite *another nature*. It was a choice directed by *no bad motive whatever*; but a mere *will*, acting independently of any motive; and which, though it has been on the side of vice to-day, may be on the side of virtue to-morrow. My blame or reproaches, therefore, being ill founded, and incapable of having any effect, it is my wisdom to withhold them, and wait the uncertain issue with patience.

If this be not a just, impartial, and philosophical state of this case, I do not know what is so; and by this means it appears, that the doctrine of the *necessary influence of motives* upon the mind of man, makes him the proper subject of discipline, reward and punishment, praise and blame, both in the common and philosophical use of the words; and the doctrine of *self-determination*, independent of the influence of motives, intirely disqualifies a man from being the proper subject of them.

It is said, that the nature of *remorse* implies a self-determining power. I answer, that this is no other than the same deception that I have explained before. For blaming *ourselves*, or blaming *another*, are things of the very same nature, and depend upon the same principles. The sense of *self-reproach*, and *shame*, is excited by our finding that we have a disposition of mind leading to vice, and on which motives to virtue, in particular cases, have had no influence.

If I blame myself for any thing else, viz. for not exerting a *self-determining power*, by which I may suppose that I might have acted otherwise, independently of the previous disposition of mind, and the motives then present to it, the idea is not at all adapted to excite any proper remorse. For it has been shewn to afford no foundation for blame whatever, and, in the nature of things, cannot possibly do it. For on this supposition there is nothing *vicious*, or blame-worthy, that is the proper *cause* of the ac-
tion,

tion, but something that bears *no sort of relation to morality*. Morals depend upon *inward dispositions of mind*, and *good or bad habits*; but this *self-determination* is a thing capable of counteracting all dispositions, and all habits, and not by means of *contrary dispositions* and *contrary habits*, but by a *power of quite another nature*, to which the properties of dispositions and habits, such as approbation, or disapprobation, in a moral sense, or praise or blame, cannot possibly belong.

A man, indeed, when he reproaches himself for any *particular action* in his past conduct, may fancy that, if he was in the same situation again, he would have acted differently. But this is a mere *deception*; and, if he examines himself *strictly*, and takes in all circumstances, he may be satisfied that, with the *same inward disposition of mind*, and with precisely *the same views of things* that he had then, and exclusive of all others that he has acquired by reflection *since*, he could not have acted otherwise than he did.

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But will this conviction at all lessen his sense of *grief*, or *shame*? On the contrary, it will only more fully satisfy him, that his dispositions and habit of mind, *at that time* were so bad, that the vicious action was *unavoidable*. And the sense he now has of this deplorable state of his mind, and the alarming tendency of it, will operate so as to make him act better, and become better disposed for the future; so that, upon another similar occasion, he would not do what he did before. And is not this all the benefit that a man can possibly derive from a sense of shame, and self-reproach, commonly called remorse of conscience?

Thus, I hope, I have made good what I advanced on this subject, in my *Examination of the Writings of Drs. Reid, Beattie, and Oswald* *. “As to the hackneyed objection to the doctrine of necessity, from its being inconsistent with the idea of virtue and vice, praise and blame, it may be fully retorted upon its opponents.

* P. 178.

“For,

“ For, as to their boasted *self-determining*
 “ *power* (were the thing possible in itself,
 “ and did not imply an absurdity) by which
 “ they pretend to have a power of acting
 “ independently of every thing that comes
 “ under the description of *motive*, I scruple
 “ not to say, that it is as foreign to every
 “ idea of virtue and vice, praise or blame,
 “ as the grossest kind of mechanism, that
 “ the most blundering writer, in defence of
 “ liberty, ever ascribed to the advocates for
 “ moral necessity.”

As different representations of the same
 thing, and different views of it, affect the
 mind differently, and a view that does not
 at all strike one person, may strike another,
 I shall conclude this section with some just
 observations of Mr. Hume, and others of
 Mr. Search, and Lord Kaims, relating to
 the subject of it.

“ Actions”, says Mr. Hume*, “ are, by
 “ their very nature, temporary and perish-
 “ ing; and where they proceed not from

* Philosophical Essays, p. 155.

“ some cause, in the *character* and *disposition*
 “ of the person who performed them, they
 “ can neither redound to his honour, if
 “ good, nor infamy, if evil. The *actions*
 “ themselves may be blameable, they may
 “ be contrary to the rules of morality and
 “ religion, but the person is not responsible
 “ for them. And as they proceeded from
 “ nothing in him that is *durable*, and *con-*
 “ *stant*, and leave nothing of that nature
 “ behind them, it is impossible he can, on
 “ that account, become the object of pu-
 “ nishment, or vengeance. According to
 “ the principle, therefore, which denies
 “ *necessity*, and consequently *causes*, a man
 “ is as pure and untainted after having com-
 “ mitted the most horrid crime, as at the
 “ first moment of his birth; nor is his *cha-*
 “ *racter* any way concerned in his *actions*,
 “ since they are not derived from it, and the
 “ wickedness of the one can never be used as
 “ a proof of the depravity of the other.”

“ Men are not blamed,” he says *, “ for
 “ such actions as they perform *ignorantly*,

* P. 136.

“ and

“ and *casually*, whatever may be the conse-
 “ quences? Why? but because the prin-
 “ ciples of these actions are only *momentary*,
 “ and terminate in them only. Men are
 “ less blamed for such evil actions as they
 “ perform *hastily*, and *unpremeditatedly*, than
 “ for such as proceed from *thought* and *de-*
 “ *liberation*. For what reason? but because
 “ a hasty temper, though a constant cause,
 “ is a principle of the mind that operates
 “ only by *intervals*, and infects not the
 “ *whole character*.”

“ Freedom of action,” says Mr. Search *,
 “ and so much understanding as to make
 “ the party sensible for what the punishment
 “ was inflicted, are always deemed neces-
 “ sary requisites to render him obnoxious
 “ thereto; because punishment operating
 “ upon the *imagination*, and through that
 “ upon the *will*, where either of these two
 “ characters are wanting, becomes useless,
 “ and consequently unjust. Therefore, fly
 “ revenges, which may be mistaken for ac-
 “ cidents, and nobody can know they were

* Light of Nature, vol. v. p. 233.

“ the effect of resentment, though some-
“ times practised by spiteful persons, have
“ never been holden warrantable by the ju-
“ dicious. Nor will a righteous man punish
“ where the transgressor had not liberty of
“ choice, nor where the reason of his pu-
“ nishing cannot be understood.

“ In none of the works of providence,”
says Lord Kaimes, “ so far as we can pene-
“ trate, is there displayed a deeper reach of
“ art and wisdom, than in the laws of action
“ peculiar to man, as a thinking and rational
“ being. Were he left loose, to act in con-
“ tradiction to motives, there would be no
“ place for prudence, foresight, nor for ad-
“ justing means to an end. It could not
“ be foreseen by others what a man would
“ do the next hour, nay, it could not be fore-
“ seen even by himself. Man would not
“ be capable of rewards and punishments,
“ he would not be fitted either for divine
“ or for human government, he would be
“ a creature that has no resemblance to the
“ human race. But man is not left loose;
“ for though he is at liberty to act accord-
“ ing

“ ing to his own will, yet his will is regu-
 “ lated by desire, and desire by what pleases
 “ or displeases. This connexion preserves
 “ uniformity of conduct, and confines hu-
 “ man actions within the great chain of
 “ causes and effects. By this admirable
 “ system, liberty and necessity, seemingly
 “ incompatible, are made perfectly concor-
 “ dant, fitting us for society, and for go-
 “ vernment, both human and divine *.

“ How hard is the lot of the human spe-
 “ cies to be thus tied down and fixed to
 “ motives, subjected by a necessary law to
 “ the choice of evil, if evil happen to be
 “ the prevailing motive, or if it misleads
 “ us, under the form of our greatest interest
 “ or good ! How happy to have had a free
 “ independent power of acting contrary to
 “ motives, when the prevailing motive has
 “ a bad tendency ! By this power we might
 “ have pushed our way to virtue and happi-
 “ ness, whatever motives were suggested by
 “ vice and folly to draw us back, or we
 “ might by arbitrary will have refrained

* Sketches on Man, vol. ii. p. 300.

“ from

“ from acting the bad part, though all the
“ power of motives concurred to urge us on.

“ So far well; but let us see whither this
“ will carry us. This arbitrary power
“ being once supposed, may it not be exert-
“ ed against good motives as well as bad
“ ones? If it does us good by accident, in
“ restraining us from vice, may it not do us
“ ill by accident, in restraining us from
“ virtue, and so shall we not be thrown
“ loose altogether? At this rate no man
“ could be depended upon. Promises,
“ oaths, vows, would be in vain: for no-
“ thing can ever bind or fix a man who is
“ influenced by no motive. The distinction
“ of characters would be at an end: for a
“ person cannot have a character, who has
“ no fixed or uniform principle of action.
“ Nay, moral virtue itself, and all the force
“ of law, rule, and obligation, would, upon
“ this hypothesis, be nothing. For no crea-
“ ture can be the subject of rational or moral
“ government, whose actions, by the consti-
“ tution of its nature, are independent of
“ motives, and whose will is capricious and
“ arbitrary.

“ arbitrary. To exhort, to instruct, to
 “ promise, or to threaten, would be to no
 “ purpose. In short, such a creature, if
 “ such could exist, would be a most bizarre
 “ and unaccountable being, a mere absur-
 “ dity in nature, whose existence could serve
 “ no end.

“ Were we so constituted as always to
 “ be determined by the moral sense, even
 “ against the strongest counter-motives, this
 “ would be consistent with human nature;
 “ because it would preserve intire the con-
 “ nexion that, by an unalterable law, is
 “ established betwixt the will and the pre-
 “ vailing motive. But to break this con-
 “ nexion altogether, to introduce an un-
 “ bounded arbitrary liberty, in opposition
 “ to which motives should not have influ-
 “ ence, would be, instead of amending, to
 “ deform and unhinge the whole constitu-
 “ tion. No reason have we, therefore, to
 “ regret that we find the will necessarily
 “ subjected to motives. The truth of this
 “ general position must coincide with our
 “ wish, unless we would rather have man
 “ to

“to be a whimsical and ridiculous, than a
 “rational and moral being*.”

S E C T I O N VIII.

*How far Mens' GENERAL CONDUCT will
 be influenced by the Belief of the Doctrine
 of Necessity.*

IT is imagined by some, that the apprehension of all the actions of men depending upon motives which necessarily influence their determinations, so that no action or event could possibly be otherwise than it *has been, is, or is to be*, would make men indifferent with respect to their conduct, or to what befalls them in life. I answer, so it would, if their *own actions*, and *determinations* were not necessary links in this chain of causes and events, and if their good or bad success did not, in the strictest sense of the word, *depend upon themselves*.

* *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*, p. 177.

But,

But, this being the case, the apprehension that their endeavours to promote their own happiness will have a certain and necessary effect, and that no well-judged effort of theirs will be lost, instead of discouraging them to remit their labour, will encourage them to exert themselves with redoubled vigour; and the *desire of happiness* cannot but be allowed to have the same influence upon all systems.

With respect to the temper and disposition of mind, considered in a *moral respect*, a man has, certainly, more encouragement to take pains to improve it, when he is sensible that, according to the settled constitution, and established laws of nature, it depends *intirely upon himself*, whether it be improved or not; that his negligence will be followed by necessary and certain ruin, whereas his circumspection, resolution, and perseverance, will be attended with as certain and necessary success; things *foreign to himself* not interfering here, as they sometimes do in the conduct of *civil affairs*, to disappoint the best concerted schemes.

All

All this may, perhaps, be made more intelligible by an example. I shall therefore endeavour to give one. No man entertains a doubt, but that every thing relating to *vegetation* is subject to the *established laws of nature*; and supposing this to be the case, with respect to the human mind, and its operations, a being of perfect intelligence and foresight, will know how we shall be provided for the next, or any future year; so that, in fact, our provision for the next year, and all the events of it, are absolutely fixed, and nothing can interfere to make it otherwise than it is to be. But will any farmer, believing this ever so firmly, neglect, on this account, to sow his fields, and content himself with saying, “God knows how I shall be provided for the next year? I cannot change his decree, and let his will be done.” We see, in fact, that such a persuasion never operates in this manner; because, though the chain of events is necessary, our *own determinations*, and *actions*, are necessary links of that chain. This gives the farmer the fullest assurance, that, if it be decreed for him to starve,

starve, it is likewise decreed for him to neglect to sow his fields; but if he *do* sow his fields, which depends intirely upon himself, that then, since the laws of nature are invariable, it will be evident, that no such unfavourable decree had gone forth.

In fact, the system of necessity makes every man the *maker of his own fortune*, in a stricter sense than any other system whatever; and the belief of this gives a man greater confidence of success in all his labours, since none of them can be in vain. On the contrary, wherever this chain of the necessary connexion of causes and effects is broken, there *uncertainty* enters, and the idea of this is always accompanied with *indifference*, or *despair*.

As our persuasion concerning the doctrine of necessity cannot make any change in our conduct with respect to *men*, whom we know we must gain to our interest by proper conduct and address, so neither can it affect our behaviour with respect to God;
the

the mode and object of our address to both being exactly similar.

Indeed, it is impossible to suppose there can be any difficulty attending the subject of *prayer*, or any branch of it, upon the supposition of the doctrine of necessity, that does not equally affect it, on the general supposition of God's knowing all our wants, and being disposed to supply them, as far as it is proper that he should do it. And, with respect to this, it is sufficient to say, that the whole of our intercourse with the Deity, is founded upon the idea of his condescending, for our good, to be considered by us in the familiar light of a *parent*, or *governor*. And having, for our good, assumed these characters, he will certainly *realize* them, by requiring of us such behaviour as wise parents require of their children, and wise governors of their subjects. Now, wise parents often justly refuse to supply the wants of their children, till they solicit for it, with a proper temper of mind. But this subject I have considered
more

more largely, in my *Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion* *. I shall, therefore, in this place, only present my reader with a different view that Mr. Hobbes has given of it, on the supposition of prayer not being the *cause*, or the proper *means*, of procuring any favour from God; his conduct towards us being determined on other accounts.

“Thanksgiving,” says he †, “is no cause of the blessing past, and that which is past is *sure* and *necessary*; yet even among men, thanks is in use, as an acknowledgment of benefits past, though we should expect no new benefit for our gratitude; and prayer to God Almighty, is but thanksgiving for God’s blessings in general; and, though it precedes the particular thing we ask, yet it is not a *cause*, or *means* of it, but a signification that we expect nothing from God, but in such manner as he, not we, will.”

* Vol. i. p. 147.

† Works, p. 477.

Upon the whole, I am satisfied, that it can only be in consequence of some gross *mis-stating of the case*, if the belief of the doctrine of necessity appear to have, in any respect, an unfavourable influence upon the mind; and, in a variety of respects, it cannot but be apparent, that it must have the happiest and noblest effects imaginable. But I purposely confine myself to what has been thought most *unpromising* in the system that I have adopted, and what is generally esteemed to be the *dark and dangerous side* of the principle. And, if even this view of it, when it is considered fairly and impartially, be really favourable to it, what may we not expect from other views of this doctrine, which all the world must allow to be highly advantageous?

SECTION

SECTION IX.

Of the moral Influence of the Doctrine of Necessity.

IT has been said, that the principles on which the doctrine of necessity is founded, are equally those of the vulgar, and of true philosophy. Mankind, in general, have no idea of volition, but as preceded and directed by motives ; and if they were told of any determination of the mind, not produced by motives, good or bad, they would never be brought to think there could be any thing *moral*, any thing *virtuous or vicious* in it, any thing that could be the proper object of *praise or blame, reward or punishment*.

All the idea that the generality of mankind have of liberty, is perfectly consistent with, and, in fact, flows from, the principles of moral necessity ; for they mean no more by it, than a freedom from the con-

trol of others, and that their volitions are determined only by their own views of things, and influenced, or guided, by motives operating within themselves. Beyond this their ideas do not go, nor does the business of human life require that they should. They have, therefore, no apprehension of the real and unavoidable consequences of the principles they every day act upon. They would even be alarmed, and staggered, if those consequences were pointed out to them; and, perhaps, from their unwillingness to admit the consequences, would be tempted to disguise their daily feelings and experience, imagining them to be different from what they really are. This, I doubt not, is the real source of all the objections that have been made to the doctrine of necessity.

Mankind, in general, have also no difficulty in admitting other principles, that are not deduced from their own experience, which yet are equally incompatible with the doctrine of metaphysical liberty. They would not hesitate, for example, to admit,
that

that future events, depending upon human resolutions, may be fore-known, and fore-told, by a being of competent knowledge, and that there can be no effect, without a cause. But when they are told that, in consequence of these concessions, they must admit, that nothing *could have been* otherwise than *it has been*, that every thing comes to pass in consequence of an established constitution of things, a constitution established by the author of nature, and, therefore, that God is to be considered as the proper and sole cause of all things, good and evil, natural and moral, they are staggered, and withhold their assent.

From this place, therefore, the philosopher must be content to proceed by himself. But we shall see that his more comprehensive views of the system of nature are not less, but much more favourable to his improvement in virtue and happiness, than the more limited views of the bulk of mankind. They look no farther for the causes of mens' actions than to *men*; whereas, the

philosopher considers them, as necessary instruments in the hands of the first cause. Let us now fairly trace the consequences of this more enlarged and juster view of things.

But, previous to this, I would observe, that the practical use of these philosophical views is confined to a man's *cooler moments*, when the mind is not under the influence of any violent emotion or passion. For, since the mind of a philosopher is formed, and the associations by which it is influenced, are fixed, exactly like those of other men, he will not be able, in the general tumult and hurry of life, to feel, think, or act, in a manner different from other men. A provocation will fix his resentment upon the person from whom it immediately proceeds, and a grateful or kind action will, in like manner, direct his love and gratitude to the person from whom it immediately comes. His own actions, also, will be considered with the same mechanical feelings of *self-applause*, or *remorse*, as if he had not been a philosopher.

What

What we are now to consider, therefore, are the feelings of the philosopher *retired from the world*, under the influence of no violent emotion, and therefore contemplating nothing very recent. Or, allowing that his philosophical views should gradually modify his feelings (as undoubtedly they will do, in proportion as they are attended to, and have an opportunity of impressing the mind) let us consider what alteration in a man's sentiments and conduct they will tend to produce; whether the change will be favourable or unfavourable, whether his philosophy will make him the better or the worse man, the better or the worse citizen.

Now, in my opinion, his philosophical views will give an elevation and force to his piety, and to virtue in all its branches, that could not have been acquired in any other way. And this may be perceived in those persons whose general views of things have approached the nearest to those that are truly philosophical, by which I mean those who, from a *principle of religion*, have as-

cribed more to God, and less to man, than other persons; which appears to me to have been the case very remarkably with the sacred writers, and with other persons who have imbibed their devotional spirit from an intimate acquaintance with the scriptures.

That the spirit of *devotion* in general must be greatly promoted by the persuasion, that God is the proper and sole cause of all things, needs no arguing. Upon this scheme we see God in every thing, and may be said to see every thing in God; because we continually view every thing as in connexion with him, the author of it. By this means the idea of God will become associated with every other idea, heightening all our pleasures, and diminishing, nay, absorbing and annihilating, all our pains. Also the influence of this constant and lively sense of the Divine presence and energy, attending to, disposing, and overruling all things, cannot but, in a variety of other respects, be most favourable and happy. It must produce the deepest *humility*,

mility, the most intire *resignation* to the will of God, and the most unreserved *confidence* in his goodness and providential care.

With this disposition of mind towards God, it will not be possible to bear ill-will to any of our brethren, his offspring, or to indulge any passion, or habit, that is forbidden by God. In short, this one leading principle of devotion cannot fail to regulate the whole temper and conduct. It necessarily implies, or begets, every thing in a man's temper that is truly amiable and valuable,

Also, the full persuasion that nothing can come to pass without the knowledge and express appointment of the greatest and best of beings, must tend to diffuse a joyful *serenity* over the mind, producing a conviction, that, notwithstanding all present unfavourable appearances, *whatever is, is right*; that even all *evils*, respecting individuals or societies, any part, or the whole of the human race, will terminate in *good*; and that the greatest sum of good could not, in the nature

ture of things, be attained by any other means.

No other than a necessarian can possibly attain to the full persuasion of this great and invaluable truth, the only sure *anchor of the soul* in time of adversity and distress, and a never-failing source of consolation under the most gloomy prospects. Upon any other hypothesis, it will be believed, that many things in which the independent uncontrolled determinations of fallible men take place, are continually *going wrong*, and that much actual evil, unconnected with, and unproductive of, good, does exist. Whereas, in the eye of a necessarian, the idea of *real absolute evil* wholly disappears: since, in the contemplation of a mind possessed of a sufficient degree of comprehension, capable of considering as *one thing, one whole*, whatever is necessarily connected, all partial evils are infinitely overbalanced by, and are therefore really and truly *antibipated*, in the idea of the greater good to which they are subservient, and which, when properly disposed (as by infinite wisdom

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dom they undoubtedly are) they really heighten. To a person well acquainted with the doctrine of the association of ideas, this will be no paradox, but a most important and necessary truth.

The connexion that all persons, and all things necessarily have, as parts of an immense, glorious, and happy *system* (and of which we ourselves are a part, however small and inconsiderable) with the great author of this system, makes us regard every person, and every thing, in a friendly and pleasing light. The whole is but *one family*. We have all *one God and Father*, whose affection for us is intense, impartial, and everlasting. He *despises nothing that he has made*, and by ways unknown to us, and often by methods the most unpromising, he provides for our greatest good. We are all training up in the same school of moral discipline, and are likewise *joint heirs of eternal life*, revealed to us in the gospel.

With such sublime views of the system, and of the author of it, as these, vice is abso-

absolutely incompatible; and more especially *hatred, envy, and malice*, are wholly excluded. I cannot, as a necessarian, hate any man; because I consider him as *being*, in all respects, just what God has made him to be, and also as *doing*, with respect to me, nothing but what he was expressly designed, and appointed to do; God being the only cause, and men nothing more than the instruments in his hands, to execute all his pleasure. And by the extinction of all hatred and malice, room is made for the growth and display of every social virtue. If I no longer love men as the proper ultimate causes of the good they do me, I love and respect them as the instruments of it. I also love the amiable disposition from which it flows, both on account of its beneficial influence, and its resemblance to the disposition of the Parent of all good.

If, as a necessarian, I cease to *blame* men for their vices in the ultimate sense of the word, though, in the common and proper sense of it, I continue to do so as much as other persons (for how necessarily soever they
act,

act, they are influenced by a base and mischievous disposition of mind, against which I must guard myself and others, in proportion as I love myself and others) I, on my system, cannot help viewing them with a *tenderness* and *compassion*, that will have an infinitely finer and happier effect; as it must make me more earnest and unwearied in my endeavours to reclaim them, without suffering myself to be offended, and desist from my labour, through provocation, disgust, or despair.

The natures of the most vicious of mankind being the same with my own, they are as improveable as mine, and, whatever their disposition be at present, it is capable of being changed for the better, by means naturally adapted to that end; and under the discipline of the universal Parent, they will, no doubt, be reclaimed, sooner or later. Looking, therefore, beyond the present temporary scene, to a future period, and their final destination, we may consider them as *brethren*, even in virtue and happiness. Their sufferings, however, in the
mean

mean time, will be in proportion to their depravity, and, for this reason, I cannot but feel myself most earnestly concerned to lessen it.

What I am describing can only take place, in proportion to our *comprehension of mind*, which, however, is extended by frequent contemplations of this kind, but must remain very narrow and limited, after all the attention we can give to the subject; and, therefore, the Divine Being, whose comprehension is infinite, is alone *perfectly good*, and *perfectly happy*. To him nothing is seen as an *evil*, but as a necessary and useful part of a perfect whole.

As far as these great and just views of things can be entertained and indulged, they have the happiest effect upon the mind; and where they fail, the necessarian is but like the rest of mankind, who stop at *second causes*, and thereby comes under the influence of such motives to virtue as are common to the rest of mankind.

SECTION

SECTION X.

In what Sense GOD may be considered as THE AUTHOR OF SIN, and of the Objection to the Doctrine of Necessity, on that Account.

WHEN it is considered, that the distinction between things *natural* and *moral* intirely ceases on the scheme of necessity, the vices of men come under the class of common evils, producing misery for a time; but, like all other evils, in the same great system, are ultimately subservient to greater good. In this light, therefore, every thing, without distinction, may be safely ascribed to God. Whatever terminates in good, philosophically speaking, is good. But this is a view of moral evil, which, though innocent, and even useful in speculation, no wise man can, or would choose to act upon himself, because our understandings are too limited for the application of such a means of good; though a
being

being of infinite knowledge may introduce it with the greatest advantage.

Vice is productive not of good, but of evil to us, both here and hereafter, and probably during the whole of our existence; though good may result from it to the whole system. While our natures, therefore, are what they are, and what association has necessarily made them, and so long as we see every thing in its true light, we must shun vice as any other evil, and indeed the greatest of all evils, and choose virtue as the greatest good. Nay, we shall cultivate good dispositions with more care and attention, since, according to the fixed laws of nature, our present and future happiness necessarily depends upon it. And as to the *good of the whole universe, or of all mankind*, it can be no object, except to a mind capable of comprehending it. Whether we be virtuous or vicious, and consequently happy or miserable, it will be equally a necessary part of the whole; so that this consideration, were we so absurd as to pretend to govern

vern our conduct by it, should not bias us one way more than another.

Our supposing that God is the *author of sin* (as, upon the scheme of necessity, he must, in fact, be the author of all things) by no means implies, that he is a *sinful being*; for it is the *disposition of mind*, and the *design*, that constitutes the sinfulness of an action. If, therefore, his disposition and design be good, what he does is morally good. It was wicked in Joseph's brethren to sell him into Egypt, because they acted from envy, hatred, and covetousness; but it was not wicked in God, to ordain it to be so; because, in appointing it, he was not actuated by any such principle. In him it was gracious and good, because he did it, as we read, to *preserve life*, and to answer other great and excellent purposes in the extensive plan of his providence.

If it was proper upon the whole (and of that propriety God himself is certainly the only judge) that so important an event

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should

should be brought about by the low passions, and interested views of men, it was right and wise in him, to appoint that it should be brought about in that very manner, rather than any other; and if it be right and wise that those vices, when they have answered the great and good purposes of him who appoints and over-rules all things for good, should be restrained, the sufferings which he inflicts for that purpose, are right and *just punishments*. That God might have made all men sinless, and happy, might, for any thing that we know, have been as impossible, as his making them not finite, but *infinite beings*, in all respects equal to himself.

Mr. Hume, who, in general, discusses the question concerning liberty and necessity with great clearness, intirely abandons the doctrine of necessity to the most immoral and shocking consequences; a conduct which must have tended to create a prejudice against it: but how ill founded has, I hope, been sufficiently shewn.

He

He says *, that “ upon the scheme of
 “ necessity, human actions can either have
 “ no turpitude at all, as proceeding from so
 “ good a cause (the Deity) or if they can
 “ have any moral turpitude, they must in-
 “ volve our Creator in the same guilt, while
 “ he is acknowledged to be their ultimate
 “ cause and author.” “ It is not possible,”
 says he again †, “ to explain distinctly how
 “ the Deity can be the mediate cause of all
 “ the actions of men, without being the
 “ author of sin, and moral turpitude.” But
 did not this writer know, what is known
 to all the world, that the *motive*, or *inten-
 tion* with which a thing is done, is the cir-
 cumstance that principally constitutes its
morality? Men who act from a bad inten-
 tion, are certainly vicious; but, though
 God may be the ultimate cause of that bad
 disposition, yet, since he produces it from
 a *good motive*, in order to bring good out of
 it, he is certainly not vicious, but good, and
 holy in that respect.

* Philosophical Essays, p. 157. † P. 262.

Mr. Hobbes, also, fails in his solution of this difficulty, justifying the divine conduct, not upon the principle of the *goodness of his ultimate designs* in every thing that he appoints, but on account of his *power* only. "Power irresistible," says he *, "justifies all actions, really and properly, in whomsoever it be found. Less power does not, and because such power is in God only, he must needs be just in all actions; and we, that not comprehending his councils, call him to the bar, commit injustice in it." It is possible, however, that Mr. Hobbes might not mean power simply; for when he blames men for censuring the conduct of God, when they do not comprehend his councils, he seems to intimate, that, could we see the *designs* of God, in appointing and over-ruling the vices of men, we might see reason to approve and admire them, on account of the wisdom and goodness on which they are founded.

* Works, p. 477.

I would

I would observe farther, with respect to this question, that the proper *foundation*, or rather the *ultimate object*, of virtue, is *general utility*, since it consists of such conduct, as tends to make intelligent creatures the most truly happy, in the whole of their existence; though, with respect to the *agent*, no action is denominated virtuous, that is not *voluntary*, and that does not proceed from some *good motive*, as a regard to the will of God, the good of others, or the dictates of conscience. If, therefore, the Divine Being be influenced by a disinterested regard to the happiness of his creatures, and adopt such measures as are best calculated to secure that great and glorious end, this end will certainly sanctify the means that are really necessary to accomplish it, with respect to him, who chooses those means only with a view to that end, and who cannot be mistaken in his application of them. The reason why it is wrong in man, a finite creature, to *do any evil that good may come of it*, is, that our understandings being limited, the good that we project may not come of it, and, therefore, it

is best that we, and all finite creatures, should govern our conduct by certain *inviolable rules*, whatever advantage may seem to us to be derived from occasional deviations from them.

Upon the whole, *natural good* is to be considered as the object and end, and virtue as being, at the same time, a *means* to that end, and likewise a *part* of it. It is, therefore, well observed by a writer who calls himself *Search**, “moral evil were no evil, “if there was no natural evil. Because, “how could I do wrong, if no hurt or damage could ensue therefrom to any body? “And it is no greater than the mischief “whereof it may be productive. Therefore, it is natural evil that creates the “difficulty, and the quality of this evil is “the same from whatever causes arising.”

Though Mr. Edwards has many valuable remarks on this subject, and, upon the whole, has satisfactorily answered the objection to the doctrine of necessity, which

* See his *Light of Nature*, vol. v. p. 238.

arises

arises from the consideration of God being the author of sin, yet, in treating of it, he has made one observation which, I think, is not well founded, and which seems to shew that he was not willing to encounter the difficulty in its greatest strength.

He says *, “ There is a great difference between God’s being the ordainer of the certain existence of sin, by *not binding* it under certain circumstances, and his being the *proper actor, or author of it*, by a *positive agency or efficiency*. Sin,” says he, again “ is not the fruit of any positive agency, or influence of the Most High, but, on the contrary, arises from his withholding his action and energy.” He also says, that, “ though the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness, it would be improper to call the sun the *source of darkness*, as it is of *light*.”

But if there be any foundation for the doctrine of necessity, *i. e.* if all events arise from preceding situations, and the *original*

* Inquiry, p. 363.

situations of all things, together with the *laws* by which all changes of situation take place, were fixed by the Divine Being, there can be no difference whatever with respect to his *causation* of one thing more than another. And even whatever takes place in consequence of his withholding his special and extraordinary influence, is as much agreeable to his *will*, as what comes to pass in consequence of the general laws of nature.

It may, however, justly be said, and this is the proper answer to the difficulty, that the Divine Being may adopt some things which he would not have chosen *on their own account*, but for the sake of other things with which they were necessarily connected. And if he prefers that scheme in which there is the greatest prevalence of virtue and happiness, we have all the evidence that can be given of his being infinitely holy and benevolent, notwithstanding the mixture of vice and misery there may be in it. For supposing such a necessary connexion of things, good and evil, the most wise, holy, and good being, would not have made any
other

other choice; nor do I see that it is possible to vindicate the *moral attributes*, or the *benevolence* of God, of which they are only *modifications*, upon any other supposition than that of the necessary connexion, in the nature of things, between good and evil, both natural and moral. And this necessary connexion is very manifest in a variety of instances.

According to the most fundamental laws of nature, and indeed the very *nature of things*, great virtues in some could not be generated, or exist, but in conjunction with great vices in others; for it is this opposition that not only exhibits them to advantage, but even, properly speaking, *creates* them. Where could there be clemency, fortitude, elevation of soul, and deep resignation to the will of God, which form the most glorious and excellent of characters, but in struggling with difficulties that arise from injustice, ingratitude, and *vice*, of all other kinds, as well as from *outward adversity* and distress; so that even the supposition of there being no *general laws of nature* (which would,

would, probably, be the greatest of all evils; but of God doing every thing *singly*, and in a manner independent of every thing else, would not be of any advantage in this case.

If any person, notwithstanding this representation, should be alarmed at the idea of God's being the proper cause of all evil, natural and moral, he should consider that, upon any scheme that admits of the divine *prescience*, the same consequences follow. For still God is supposed to foresee, and *permit*, what it was in his power to have prevented, which is the very same thing as *willing* and directly *causing* it. If I certainly know that my child, if left to his liberty, will fall into a river, and be drowned, and I do not restrain him, I certainly *mean* that he should be drowned; and my conduct cannot admit of any other construction. Upon all schemes, therefore, that admit of the divine prescience, and consequently the *permission* of evil, natural and moral, the supposition of God's virtually *willing* and *causing* it is unavoidable, so that upon any scheme, the origin and existence of evil can
only

only be accounted for on the supposition of its being ultimately *subservient to good*, which is a more immediate consequence of the system of necessity, than of any other.

The doctrine of necessity certainly inforces the belief of the greatest possible good with respect to the whole system, admitting the goodness of God in general, and cannot well be reconciled with the everlasting misery of any. We are, therefore, naturally led, by the principles of it, to consider all future evils in the same light as the present, i. e. as corrective and salutary, terminating in good, which is also sufficiently agreeable to the language of the scriptures, with respect to all punishment, present or future. The necessarian, therefore; though he *may* admit the annihilation of the wicked, yet since they are to have the benefit of the *general resurrection*, together with the righteous, and we have no account of any death afterwards, but are assured, on the contrary, that all will be equally immortal, he will lean strongly to the belief of the everlasting ultimate happiness of all; and this is an
idea

idea most sublime and glorious, and which cannot but have the happiest effect upon the mind at present.

On this subject I shall not enlarge, but content myself with quoting the first paragraph of the conclusion of Dr. Hartley's *Observations on Man*, in which will be seen what an impression this idea made upon his mind. If it be perused with attention, and without prejudice, it must, I think, prepossess the reader in favour both of the *system*, and of the *man*.

“ I have now gone through with my Ob-
 “ servations on the frame, duty, and expect-
 “ tations of man, finishing them with the
 “ doctrine of ultimate, unlimited, *happi-*
 “ *ness to all*. This doctrine, if it be true,
 “ ought at once to dispel all gloominess,
 “ anxiety, and sorrow, from our hearts, and
 “ raise them to the highest pitch of love,
 “ adoration, and gratitude, towards God,
 “ our most bountiful creator, and merci-
 “ ful father, and the inexhaustible source
 “ of all happiness and perfection. Here
 “ self-

“ self-interest, benevolence, and piety, all
 “ concur to move and exalt our affections.
 “ How happy in himself, how benevolent
 “ to others, and how thankful to God,
 “ ought that man to be, who believes both
 “ himself and others born to an infinite ex-
 “ pectation. Since God has bid us rejoice,
 “ what can make us sorrowful? Since he
 “ has created us for happiness, what mi-
 “ sery can we fear? If we be really intend-
 “ ed for ultimate unlimited happiness, it
 “ is no matter to a truly-resigned person,
 “ *when, or where, or how*. Nay, could
 “ any of us fully conceive, and be duly in-
 “ fluenced by this glorious expectation,
 “ this infinite balance in our favour, it
 “ would be sufficient to deprive all pre-
 “ sent evils of their sting and bitterness.
 “ It would be a sufficient answer to the
 “ *πῶς ἂν τὸ κακόν*, to all our difficulties and
 “ anxieties, from the folly, vice, and mi-
 “ sery, which we experience in ourselves,
 “ and see in others, that they will all end
 “ in unbounded knowledge, virtue and
 “ happiness; and that the progress of every
 “ individual in his passage through an
 “ eternal

“ eternal life, is from imperfect to perfect,
 “ particular to general, less to greater,
 “ finite to infinite, and from the creature
 “ to the Creator.”

SECTION XI.

Of the Nature of REMORSE OF CONSCIENCE, and of PRAYING FOR THE PARDON OF SIN, on the Doctrine of Necessity.

SEVERAL persons, firmly persuaded of the truth of the doctrine of necessity, yet say, that it is not possible to *act upon it*; and to put, what they think, a peculiarly difficult case, they ask, how it is possible for a necessarian to pray for the pardon of sin.

I answer, in general, that Dr. Hartley appears to me to have advanced what is quite sufficient to obviate any difficulty that can arise from this view of the subject, when he admonishes us carefully to distinguish between the *popular* and *philosophical language*, as corresponding to two very different

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rent views of human actions; according to one of which, the bulk of mankind refer their actions to themselves only, without having any distinct idea of the divine agency being, directly or indirectly, the cause of them: whereas, according to the other, we look beyond all second causes, and consider the agency of the first and proper cause, exclusive of every thing subordinate to it.

These very different views of things must be attended with very different *feelings*; and, when separated from each other, they will, in several respects, lead to a different *conduct*, as well as require a different *language*. Now, such are the influences to which all mankind, without distinction, are exposed, that they necessarily refer actions (I mean, refer them ultimately) first of all to themselves and others; and it is a long time before they begin to consider themselves, and others, as *instruments* in the hand of a superior agent. Consequently, the associations which refer actions to themselves get so confirmed, that they are never intirely obliterated; and, therefore, the common language,

language, and the common feelings of mankind, will be adapted to the first, the limited and imperfect, or rather erroneous view of things.

The Divine Being could not be unapprized of this circumstance, or unattentive to it; and he has wisely adapted the system of religion that he has prescribed to us, the modes of our religious worship, and every thing belonging to it, to this imperfect view of things. It is a system calculated for the *bulk of mankind*, and of philosophers as partaking of the feelings of the bulk of mankind; and, therefore, would, we may suppose, have been different, if the bulk of mankind had been speculatively and practically philosophers; in some such manner as the modes of worship varied in the Jewish and christian churches.

But it is of prime consequence in this business, that, in whatever *sense*, or *degree*, any particular sentiment, or feeling, is felt as improper by a necessarian, in the same *sense* and degree his principles will make that

that sentiment, or feeling, to be of no use to him. Thus, to apply this to the case in hand: if the sentiments of self-applause on the one hand, and of self-reproach on the other, be, in any sense or degree, impossible to be felt by a necessarian, in the same sense or degree (while he feels and acts like a necessarian) he will have no occasion for those sentiments; his mind being possessed by a sentiment of a much higher nature, that will intirely supersede them, and answer their end in a much more effectual manner. And whenever h's strength of mind fails him, whenever he ceases to look to the first cause only, and rests in second causes, he will then necessarily feel the sentiments of self-applause and self-reproach, which were originally suggested by that imperfect view of things into which he is relapsed.

Every man's feelings will necessarily be uniform. To be a necessarian in *speculation*, and not in *practice*, is impossible, except in that sense in which it is possible for a man

to be a christian in speculation, and a libertine in practice. In one sense, a speculative christian, or necessarian, may feel and act in a manner inconsistent with his principles; but, if his faith be what Dr. Hartley calls a *practical* one, either in the doctrine of necessity, or the principles of christianity, that is, if he really *feels* the principles, and if his affections and conduct be really directed by them, so that they have their natural influence on his mind, it will be impossible for him to be a bad man. What I mean; therefore, is, that a *truly practical necessarian* will stand in no need of the sentiments either of self-applause, or self-reproach. He will be under the influence of a much superior principle, *loving God and his fellow-creatures* (which is the sum and object of all religion, and leading to every thing excellent in conduct) from motives altogether independent of any consideration relating to himself. On this I need not enlarge in this place, if what I have advanced on the *moral influence of the doctrine of necessity*, be considered.

It

It is acknowledged that a necessarian, who, as such, believes that, strictly speaking, *nothing goes wrong*, but that every thing is under the best direction possible, himself, and his conduct, as part of an immense and *perfect whole*, included, cannot accuse himself of having done wrong, in the ultimate sense of the words. He has, therefore, in this strict sense, nothing to do with repentance, confession, or pardon, which are all adapted to a different, imperfect, and fallacious view of things. But then, if he be really capable of steadily viewing the great system, and his own conduct as a part of it, in this true light, his supreme regard to God, as the great, wise, and benevolent author of all things, his intimate communion with him, and devotedness to him, will necessarily be such, that he can have no will but God's. In the sublime, but accurate language of the apostle John, he will *dwell in love*, he will *dwell in God*, and *God in him*; so that, *not committing any sin*, he will have nothing to repent of. He will be *perfect*, as his heavenly father is perfect.

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But as no man is capable of this degree of perfection in the present state, because the influences to which we are all exposed will prevent this constant referring of every thing to its primary cause, the speculative necessarian, will, in a general way, refer actions to himself and others; and consequently he will necessarily, let him use what efforts he will, feel the sentiments of shame, remorse, and repentance, which arise mechanically from his referring actions to himself. And, oppressed with a sense of *guilt*, he will have recourse to that *mercy* of which he will stand in need. These things must necessarily accompany one another, and there is no reason to be solicitous about their separation.

It is, alas! only in occasional seasons of retirement from the world, in the happy hours of devout contemplation, that, I believe; the most perfect of our race can fully indulge the enlarged views, and lay himself open to the genuine feelings, of the necessarian principles; that is, that he can *see every*

every thing in God, or in its relation to him. Habitually, and constantly, to realize these views, would be always to *live in the house of God, and within the gate of heaven*; seeing the plain finger of God in all events, and as if the angels of God were constantly descending to earth, and ascending to heaven, before our eyes. Such enlarged and exalted sentiments are sometimes apparent in the sacred writers, and also in the histories of christian and protestant martyrs; but the best of men, in the general course of their lives, fall far short of this standard of perfection.

We are too apt to lose sight of God, and of his universal uncontrolled agency; and then, falling from a situation in which we were equally strangers to *vice and solicitude*, from a state truly *paradisaical*, in which we were incapable of *knowing* or *feeling* any evil, as such, conversing daily with God, enjoying his presence, and contemplating his works, as all infinitely good and perfect, we look no higher than ourselves, or beings on a level with ourselves; and of course

find ourselves involved in a thousand perplexities, follies, and vices; and we now want, and ought to fly to, the proper remedy in our case, viz. self-abasement, contrition, and supplication.

Moreover, well knowing what we generally are, how imperfect our *views*, and consequently how imperfect our *conduct*, it is our wisdom, and our interest, freely to indulge these feelings, till they have produced their proper effect; till the sense of guilt has been discharged by the feelings of contrition, and a humble trust in the Divine mercy. Thus, *gradually* attaining to purer intentions, and a more upright conduct, we shall find less obstruction in enlarging our views to comprehend the true plan of providence; when, having less to reflect upon ourselves for, the sentiment of reproach shall easily and naturally vanish; and we shall then fully conceive, and rejoice in, the belief that in all things we *are, and have been, workers together with God; and that he works all his works in us, by us, and for us,*

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The improvement of our natures, and consequently the advancement of our happiness, by enlarging the comprehension of our minds (chiefly by means of a more distinct view of the hand of God in all things, and all events) is, in its own nature, a gradual thing, and our attempts to accelerate this natural progress may possibly be attended with some inconvenience; though, I own, I apprehend but little danger from this quarter.

What we have most to dread, is the almost irrecoverable debasement of our minds by *looking off from God, living without him, without a due regard to his presence, and providence, and idolizing ourselves and the world*; considering other things as *proper agents and causes*; whereas, strictly speaking, there is but *one cause*, but *one sole agent* in universal nature. Thus (but I feel myself in danger of going beyond the bounds of the question I am now discussing) all vice is reducible to *idolatry*; and we can only be completely virtuous and happy in the worship of the one only living and true God;

the idea usually annexed to the word *worship* but faintly shadowing out what the intelligent reader will perceive I *now* mean by it.

In all this it must be remembered, that I am addressing myself to *professed necessarians*; and I must inform them, that if they cannot accompany me in this speculation, or find much difficulty in doing it, they are no more than *nominal* necessarians, and have no more feeling of the real *energy of their principles*, than the merely nominal christian has of those of christianity. It requires much reflection, meditation, and strength of mind, to convert *speculative* principles into *practical* ones; and till any principle be properly *felt*, it is not easy to judge of its real *tendency* and *power*. It is common with unbelievers to declaim on the subject of the mischief that christianity has done in the world, as it is with the opponents of the doctrine of necessity to dwell upon the dangerous tendency of it; but the real necessarian, and true christian, know, and *feel*, that their principles tend to make them better men in all respects;
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and that it can only be something that is very improperly called either *christianity*, or *the doctrine of necessity*, that can tend to make them worse.

I think, however, that a mere speculatist may be satisfied, that the feeling of remorse, and the practice of supplication for pardon, have still less foundation on the doctrine of philosophical liberty, than on that of necessity, as I presume has been demonstrated already. Indeed, what can a man have to blame himself for, when he acted *without motive*, and from *no fixed principle*, good or bad; and what occasion has he for pardon who never meant to give offence; and, as I have shewn at large, unless the mental determinations take place without regard to motive, there is no evidence whatever of the mind being free from its necessary influence. But it seems to be taken for granted, that whatever a necessarian cannot feel, or do, his opponent can; whereas, in fact, the doctrine of repentance, as defined by the advocates of liberty themselves,

selves, has much less place on their principles than on ours. •

The whole doctrine of *second causes* being *primary* ones, is certainly a mistake, though a mistake that all imperfect beings *must* be subject to. Whatever, therefore, is built upon that mistake can have no place in a truly philosophical system. But I will farther advance, that while men continue in this mistake, and, consequently, while their reflections on their own conduct, as well as on that of others, shall be modified by it, they will derive considerable advantage even from an imperfect view of the true philosophical doctrine, viz. that of necessity, whereas a man, in the same circumstances, must receive some injury from the opposite sentiment of philosophical liberty; so much may it be depended upon, that a knowledge of this truth can do no harm, but must do some good.

Remorse for past misconduct implies a deep sense of depravity of heart, or a wrong
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bias of mind, by which temptations to sin will have much more influence with us than they ought to have. This is the sentiment that will be fully felt by what I now call the *imperfect necessarian*; a character which, as I observed before, applies to all mankind. As a necessarian he considers his bad conduct as necessarily arising from his bad disposition. It is *bad fruit* growing from a *bad tree*. And, as he knows that, unless the tree be made good, it will be impossible to make the fruit good; so he is sensible that unless he can, by the use of proper discipline, bring his mind into a better state, he can never depend upon himself for acting more properly on future occasions. He, therefore, from that principle by which we universally seek our own happiness and improvement, labours to correct his vicious disposition; and, expecting no miraculous assistance, he applies to the proper remedies indicated by the consideration of his case.

At the same time, his regard to God, as the author of all good, and who has appointed

pointed *meditation* and *prayer* as a means of attaining it, will make him constantly look up to him for his favour and blessing. And if, as he becomes more philosophical, his devotions have in them less of *supplication*, and rather take the form of *praise*, *thanksgiving*, and a joyful firm *confidence* in the divine care and providence, respecting equally the things of time and eternity, it will not contribute the less to his moral improvement and happiness. But the best of men will not, in fact, get beyond that state of mind, in which direct and fervent *prayer*, properly so called, will be as *unavoidable* as it will be *useful* to them. What I now say will not be well understood by all persons, but I speak to those who have some experience in matters of religion, and who are accustomed to reflection on their natural feelings.

Let us now consider what the doctrine of philosophical liberty can do for a man in the circumstances above-mentioned. He, like the necessarian, finds himself involved in guilt, and he also begins to speculate

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concerning the causes of it ; but, overlooking the secret mechanism of his mind, he ascribes the whole to the mere *obstinacy of his will*, which, *of itself*, and not necessarily influenced by any motives, has turned a deaf ear to every thing that better principles could suggest. But, in what manner can such mens *uncontrollable will* be rectified ? As far as we have recourse to *motives*, and *principles*, we depend upon the doctrine of *mechanism* ; and without that we have nothing to do but sit with folded hands, waiting the arbitrary decisions of this same *sovereign will*.

If he speculates farther, and considers how little his real temper and character are concerned in such unaccountable motions of his self-determined will, I should think him in some danger of making himself very easy about his vices. And this would be the case, if men were not necessarily influenced by sounder principles than they always distinctly perceive. Now, it appears to me, that if a man's speculations take

take this turn, it would have been much better for him never to have speculated at all, and that they only tend to bewilder, and hurt him.

Again, supposing a man to have attained to some degree of a virtuous character and conduct, his farther progress will be accelerated by the belief of the doctrine of necessity, and retarded by that of philosophical liberty.

The conviction that God is the author of all *good*, will always much more readily take firm hold of the mind than the idea of his being, likewise, the author of all *evil*; though all evil ultimately terminates in good; because it requires more strength of mind to see and believe this. A long time, therefore, before we suspect that our evil dispositions come from God, as well as our good ones, and that all things that exist, ultimately considered, equally promote the divine purposes, we shall ascribe all evil to ourselves, and all good to God;
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and this persuasion will be so rivetted, in a long course of time, that after we are convinced that God is really and truly the author of *all things*, without distinction, we shall ascribe evil to him only in an unsteady and confused manner; while the persuasion that he is the sole author of all good will have received a great accession of strength, from our new philosophical principles coinciding with, and confirming, our former general notions.

Now no sentiment whatever is so favourable to every thing amiable, good, and great, in the heart of man, as a spirit of *deep humility*, grounded on disclaiming all our excellencies, and referring them to their proper source, that feeling which Dr. Hartley very expressively calls *self-annihilation*, joined with that which naturally and necessarily accompanies it, *joy and confidence in God*, as *working all our good works in us and for us*. This is the disposition that inspires all the writers of the books of scripture, and is observable in all truly serious
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and devout persons to this day, whether their speculative opinions be favourable to it or not. Nay, it has given such a turn to the *established language of devotion* in all countries, and all ages, that the contrary sentiment, or that of claiming the merit of our good works to ourselves, would have the appearance of something absolutely impious and blasphemous. Now, it must be acknowledged, that this disposition of mind, viz. that of ascribing every thing that is good in us to God, is greatly favoured and promoted by the belief of the doctrine of necessity. It may even operate this way to the greatest advantage, at the same time that, through our imperfect comprehension of things, we continue to ascribe evil to ourselves, and are affected with the deepest sentiments of remorse and contrition.

On the contrary, as far as the doctrine of philosophical liberty operates, it tends to check humility, and rather flatters the pride of man, by leading him to consider himself as being, independently of his maker,

maker, the primary author of his own good dispositions and good works. This opinion, which, without being able to perceive *why*, every truly pious person dreads, and cannot bring himself expressly to avow, is apprehended to be just *, according to the doctrine of philosophical liberty, which represents man as endued with the faculty of free-will, acting independently of any control from without himself, even that of the Divine Being; and that just so far as any superior being, directly or

* I say *apprehended* to be just, which is all that my argument requires, though, strictly speaking, as I have shewn at large, the claim of *merit*, or *demerit*, is equally ill-founded on the doctrine of philosophical liberty. The sentiments of merit and demerit are certainly *natural*, and found in all mankind; but they have not, therefore, any connection with the doctrine of philosophical liberty. On the contrary, I maintain, that the *common opinion* is the doctrine of necessity, though not come to its proper extent. No man, for instance, has any idea, but that *the will is always determined by some motive*, which is the great hinge on which the doctrine of necessity turns; nor has any man in common life any idea of *virtue*, but as something belonging to *character* and *fixed principle*, constantly influencing the will.

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indirectly, influences his will, he can pretend to no such thing as real virtue, or goodness; though the virtue that answers to this description is certainly not that which animated the prophets of the Old Testament, or our Saviour and the apostles in the New, but is mere heathen *Stoicism*.

When this temper is much indulged, it is even possible, contradictory as it seems, to ascribe all moral good to a man's self, and all moral evil to the instigation of the devil, or some other wicked spirit that has access to our minds: whereas, without the intervention of this doctrine of the *independency of the will*, and especially with a little aid from the doctrine of *mechanism*, we should rather, as was shewn before, though inconsistently still, ascribe all good to God, and all evil to ourselves.

Constantly to ascribe *all* to God, is an attainment too great for humanity. To be able to do it *at intervals*, in the seasons
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of retirement and meditation, but so as considerably to influence our general feelings, and conduct in life, is a happy and glorious advantage. Sweet, indeed, are the moments in which these great and just views of the system, to which we belong, can be fully indulged. If, however, we cannot habitually ascribe *all* to God, but a part only, let it be (and so indeed it naturally will be) that which is *good*; and if we must ascribe any thing to ourselves, let it be that which is *evil*.

Thus have I given a frank and ingenuous account of my own ideas and impressions on this subject. How far they will give satisfaction to others, I cannot tell.

SECTION XII.

*How far the Scriptures are favourable to the
Doctrine of Necessity.*

SUCH is the connexion between the principle of *devotion* and the doctrine of *necessity*, that with which soever of them a man begins, he is unavoidably led, in some degree, towards the other, whether he be distinctly aware of it or not.

The man who believes that the government of the world is in the hands of God, and that this God has great and gracious designs in every thing that he does, cannot believe that any thing happens unknown to him, or unforeseen by him, or that he will permit any thing to come to pass that will not, *in fact*, and *ultimately*, promote his own designs, and even more effectually than any thing else. This is so near to the doctrine of absolute *decrees*, and the express *appointment* of every thing that comes to pass,

pass, even with respect to the vices of men, that they are not easily distinguished. Consequently, a person who sees in a strong light the doctrine of divine providence, cannot avoid speaking like a necessarian on the subject, and considering God himself as having *done* what he *permits*, and *avails himself* of, in the good that results from it. And such, in fact, as no man can deny, is the language of the sacred writers.

In the scriptures we not only meet with such language as this, *The wrath of man shall praise thee, and the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain** (which is strongly expressive of the subserviency of the most malignant passions of the human heart to the divine purposes, and implies, that nothing more of vice will be permitted than is of use to that end) but many particular events, which were wholly brought about by the vices of men, are said to be expressly *appointed* by God; and even the very temper and disposition by which the agents were

* Pl. lxxvi. v. 10.

actuated, are said to be inspired by God, for that very purpose. At the same time, however, it appears, from the circumstances of the history, that there was no proper *interposition* of the Divine Being in the case, no real *miracle*, but every thing took place according to the common established course of nature; since what those wicked persons did may easily be accounted for on principles by which men are actuated every day; and they did nothing but what such men would naturally do again, in the same circumstances.

In like manner, the good designs and actions of men are, in the scriptures, frequently ascribed to God, though there be no reason, from the circumstances of the facts, to suppose that there was any supernatural influence upon their minds, but that they acted as well-disposed persons would naturally do in their situations.

Also, the common operations of nature are described in such language, both in the Old and New Testament, as evidently shews, that

that the writers considered all the laws of the system, as if they were executed immediately by the author of them, and, consequently, that all events whatever are properly his own agency, just as if no second causes had intervened. A mind habitually pious looks beyond all second causes, to the first and proper cause of all things, and rests only there.

Good men, in the scriptures, frequently ascribe their own good works to God, as the proper author of them, *the giver of every good and every perfect gift*, and are the farthest in the world from having the least idea of their having any *merit*, or claim upon God, in consequence of it; which, upon the doctrine of philosophical free-will, they suppose themselves to have. But their language is utterly irreconcilable with this doctrine.

Lastly, both the present and the future destination of men is generally spoken of as fixed and ordained by God, as if he from the

first intended, that whatever *is to be, should be*, with respect to happiness or misery, here or hereafter.

Not that I think the sacred writers were, strictly speaking, *necessarians*, for they were not *philosophers*, not even our Saviour himself, as far as appears; but their habitual devotion naturally led them to refer all things to God, without reflecting on the rigorous meaning of their language; and very probably had they been interrogated on the subject, they would have appeared not to be apprized of the proper extent of the necessarian scheme, and would have answered in a manner unfavourable to it,

For the greater satisfaction of my reader, I shall produce a few examples of each of the particulars I have mentioned, though in a different order; and I beg that he would give a deliberate attention to them, and then I cannot help thinking he will be disposed to view them in the light in which I have represented them.

That

That God was considered by the sacred writers as the author of the good dispositions, and good works of men, is evident from the following passages.

And the Lord thy God will circumcise thy heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, that thou mayest live.*

And I will give them a heart to know me, that I am the Lord; and they shall be my people, and I will be their God, and they shall turn unto me with their whole heart †. And I will give them one heart, and one way, that they may fear me for ever, for the good of them, and of their children after them. I will put my fear in their hearts, and they shall not depart from me ‡.

And I will give them one heart, and I will put a new spirit within you, and I will take the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh §. And I will put

* Deut. xxx. 6.

† Jer. xxiv. 7.

‡ xxxii. 39.

§ Ezek. xi. 19.

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my spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments, and do them.*

It is said of Lydia †, *whose heart the Lord opened, that she attended unto the things that were spoken of Paul.*

With respect to the *reception of the gospel*, our Saviour says ‡, *All that the Father giveth me shall come to me. No man can come to me, except the Father, who has sent me, draw him; and again, No man can come unto me except it be given to him of my Father.*

To the same purpose the apostle Paul says §, *I have planted and Apollos watered, but God gave the increase; so that neither is he that planted any thing, neither he that watered, but God that gave the increase. He also says, Being confident of this one thing, that he who hath begun a good work in you will perform it unto the day of Jesus Christ ||.—Work out your own salvation with fear and*

* Ezek. xxxvi. 27. † Acts xvi. 14. ‡ John vi. 37, &c.
§ 1 Cor. iii. 6, &c. || Phil. i. 6.

trembling,

trembling, for it is God that worketh in you, both to will and to do, of his own good pleasure.*

We find the same sentiment in Jude †, *Now unto him that is able to keep you from falling, and to present you faultless before the coming of his glory with exceeding joy, to the only wise God, and our Saviour, be glory and majesty, &c.*

All prayers for good dispositions go upon the same principles, and these are frequent in the scriptures. Thus Solomon, at the solemn dedication of the temple, prays in the following manner ‡, *O Lord God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, keep this for ever in the imagination of the thoughts of the hearts of thy people, and prepare their hearts unto thee.*

David says §, *Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me.*

* Phil. ii. 12, 13. † V. 24 ‡ 1 Chron. xxix. 18.

§ Pf. li. x.

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The apostle Paul prays to the same purpose, *Now the God of hope fill you with all hope and joy in believing, that ye may abound in hope, through the power of the Holy Ghost*. That he may grant you, according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened with might, by his spirit, in the inner man; that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith; that ye, being rooted and grounded in love, &c.† And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly‡. Now the God of all peace make you perfect in every good work to do his will, working in you that which is well pleasing in his sight, through Jesus Christ§.*

In the same manner prays the apostle Peter ||, *But the God of all grace—make you perfect, establish, strengthen and settle you.*

Such, also, is the usual style of prayer to this day, as the following expressions from the book of Common Prayer, “ O God,

* Rom. xv. 13.

† Ephes. iii. 16.

‡ 1 Thess. v. 23.

§ Heb. xiii. 20.

|| 1 Peter v. 10.

from

“ from whom all holy desires, all good
 “ counsels, and all just works do proceed.”

And again, “ Almighty and ever-living
 “ God, who makest us both to will and to
 “ do those things that be acceptable to thy
 “ divine majesty.”

That the evil actions of men, also, which necessarily imply bad dispositions, do, in the language of scripture, take place in consequence of the particular appointment of God, and especially such actions as terminate in great good, or just punishment, which is the same thing, the following passages abundantly prove. The selling of Joseph into Egypt was certainly a most base action of his brethren; but observe how this pious man speaks of it, addressing himself to his brethren afterwards *, *Now therefore be not grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither; for God did send me before you, to preserve life: And again †, It was not you that sent me hither, but God.*

* Gen. xlv. 5.

† V. 8.

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The manner in which God is said to have hardened the heart of Pharaoh, for which, however, he was justly punished, is very express *, *I will harden his heart that he shall not let the people go*; and the expression is frequently repeated in the course of the history.

It is also said of the Canaanites †, *It was of the Lord to harden their hearts, that they should come against Israel in battle, that he might destroy them utterly.*

When the men of Sechem, who had unjustly taken the part of Abimelech, afterwards quarrelled with him, it is said ‡, *And God sent an evil spirit between Abimelech and the men of Shechem, and the men of Shechem dealt treacherously with Abimelech.*

It is said of the sons of Eli §, *that they hearkened not unto the voice of their father, because the Lord would slay them.*

* Exod. iv. 21.

† Jos. ix. 20.

‡ Judges ix. 23.

§ 1 Sam. ii. 25.

When

When Ahab for his wickedness and obstinacy was justly devoted to destruction, it is said *, that *God sent a lying spirit into the mouths of his prophets, in order to deceive him.*

Our Saviour seems to have considered both the rejection of the gospel by those who boasted of their wisdom, and the reception of it by the more despised part of mankind, as being the consequence of the express appointment of God †. *At that time Jesus answered, and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes; even so, Father, for it seemed good in thy sight.*

Speaking, upon another occasion, concerning the unbelief of the Jews, he says ‡, *Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias hath said again, He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart, that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and I should heal them.*

* 2 Chron. xviii.

† Matt. xi. 25.

‡ John xii. 39.

Moses,

Moses, also, speaking of the obstinacy of the Jews, says *, *Yet the Lord hath not given you a heart to perceive, and eyes to see, and ears to hear, unto this day.* Isaiah, also, in his address to God, says †, *O Lord, why hast thou made us to err from thy ways, and hardened our heart from thy fear?*

With respect to the apostacy of the latter times, the apostle Paul says ‡, *And for this cause God shall send them strong delusions, that they should believe a lie, that they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness.*

We know of no act of more atrocious wickedness, or one for which a more just and severe punishment was inflicted, than the death of Christ, and yet it is always spoken of as most expressly *decreed*, and *appointed by God*; and, as was observed before, it entered, in a most remarkable manner, into the plan of divine providence. It is thus spoken of in the book of Acts §, *His,*

* Deut. xxix. 4.

† Is. lxiii. 17.

‡ 2 Thess. ii. 11.

§ Ch. ii. 23.

being

Bring delivered by the determined counsel and fore-knowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain; and again, Of a truth, against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, were gathered together; for to do whatsoever thy hand, and thy counsel, determined before to be done.*

That God is considered as the sovereign dispenser both of gospel privileges here, and future happiness hereafter, appears in such passages as these †, *God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation, through sanctification of the spirit, and belief of the truth.*

The language of St. Paul in the ninth chapter of the epistle to the Romans, relates, at the same time, to external privileges, moral virtue, and future happiness, as having a very near connexion with one another ‡. *He saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. So then it is not of him that*

* Acts iv. 27. † 2 Theff. ii. 13. ‡ Ver. 15, &c.

willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy. For the scripture saith unto Pharaoh, Even for this same purpose have I raised thee up, that I might shew my power in thee, and that my name might be declared througout all the earth. Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth. Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will? Nay, but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? What if God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction: and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he afore prepared unto glory? Even us, whom he hath called, not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles.

In the following passage, also, the same apostle speaks of the whole process, from
 . . . being

being first called to the knowledge of God, to a state of future glory, as equally the work of God*. *For whom he did fore-know, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified. What shall we then say to these things? If God be for us, who can be against us?*

That such things as come to pass in the common course of providence, were considered by the pious writers of the scriptures as more immediately administered by himself, overlooking second causes, and regarding only the first and proper cause of all things, the following passages, among many others, abundantly testify.

With respect to the general *constitution of nature*, the Psalmist says †, *Tbou visitest the*

* Rom. viii. 29.

† Ps. lxxv. 9.

earth, and waterest it: thou greatly excreibest it with the river of God, which is full of water: thou preparest them corn, when thou hast so provided for it: thou waterest the ridges thereof abundantly: thou settlest the furrows thereof: thou makest it soft with showers: thou blessest the springing thereof.—These all wait upon thee, that thou mayest give them their meat in due season. That thou givest them, they gather: thou openest thine hand, they are filled with good: thou hidest thy face, they are troubled: thou takest away their breath, they die, and return to their dust: thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created: and thou renewest the face of the earth.*

What we call the *common events*, and *accidents* of life, are all, in the language of scripture, the express appointment of God. *If a man lie not in wait, but God deliver him into his hand †. The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord ‡.*

* Pf. civ. 27.

† Exod. xxi. 13.

‡ Prov. xvi. 33.

Are

Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing, and one of them shall not fall to the ground without your heavenly father.*

The Lord killeth, and maketh alive; he bringeth down to the grave, and bringeth up: he raiseth up the poor out of the dust, and lifteth up the beggar from the dunghill †.

He changes times and seasons: he removeth kings and setteth up kings: he giveth wisdom to the wise, and knowledge to them that know understanding ‡.

I caused it to rain upon one city, and caused it not to rain upon another city. I have smitten you with blasting, and mildew. I have sent among you the pestilence. Your young men have I slain with the sword §.

The thoughts, and dispositions of men, are also represented as being under the secret direction of God ||, The king's heart is in the

* Matt. x. 29. † 1 Sam. ii. 6, 7. ‡ Dan. ii. 21.

§ Amos iv. 7, &c. || Prov. xxi. 1.

hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water. He turneth it whithersoever he will.

Ambitious and wicked men are often spoken of as the instruments of divine providence*, *Arise, O Lord, deliver my soul from the wicked, which is thy sword.*

The subserviency of the proud king of Assyria to the designs of divine providence, is described by the prophet Isaiah in a manner that is peculiarly emphatical and sublime †, *O Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, and the staff in their hand is my indignation. I will send him against an hypocritical nation, and against the people of my wrath will I give him a charge, to take the spoil, and to take the prey, and to tread them down like the mire of the streets. Howbeit he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think so, but it is in his heart to destroy, and to cut off nations not a few. For he saith, By the strength of my hand I have done it, and by my wisdom, for I am prudent: and I have removed the bounds of the people, and have robbed their treasures, and I*

* Pf. xvii. 13.

† Isa. x. 5, &c.

have

have put down the inhabitants like a valiant man. Shall the axe boast itself against him that heweth therewith, or shall the saw magnify itself against him that shaketh it? as if the rod should shake itself against him that lift it up, or as if the staff should lift up itself, as if it were no wood, &c.

Of another conqueror, also, God says *,
Thou art my battle axe, and weapons of war: for with thee will I break in pieces the nations, and with thee will I destroy kingdoms. And with thee will I break in pieces the horse and his rider, &c.

From the whole of this subject, and these passages compared with others, I do not, as I observed before, infer, that the sacred writers were, philosophically speaking, *necessarians*. But they were such good and pious men, set God so much before them, and had such high and just ideas of his uncontrollable power and providence, that they overlooked all second causes, and had respect to God only, as the proper and ultimate cause of all.

* Jer. li. 20.

SECTION XIII.

The Calvinistic doctrine of PREDESTINATION compared with the Philosophical doctrine of NECESSITY.

THE philosophical doctrine of *Necessity* so much resembles the Calvinistic doctrine of *Predestination*, in some views of it, that it may be worth while to point out distinctly in what they agree, and in what they differ. I shall, therefore, do it, and with as much fairness as I possibly can.

The scheme of philosophical necessity has been shewn to imply a chain of *causes and effects*, established by infinite wisdom, and terminating in the greatest good of the whole universe: evils of all kinds, natural and moral, being admitted, as far as they contribute to that end, or may be, in the nature of things, inseparable from it. No necessarian, however, supposes that any of the human race will suffer eternally; but that
that

that future punishments will answer the same purpose as temporal ones are found to do, all of which tend to good, and are evidently admitted for that purpose; so that God, the author of all, is as much to be adored and loved for what we *suffer*, as for what we *enjoy*; his *intention* being equally kind in both, since both are equally parts, and equally necessary parts, of the same plan. Upon the doctrine of necessity, also, the most indifferent actions of men are equally necessary with the most important; since every volition, like any other *effect*, must have an adequate *cause*, depending upon the previous state of the mind, and the influence to which it is exposed.

On the other hand, the consistent, the moderate, or sublapsarian Calvinist, supposes that God created the first man absolutely free to sin, or not to sin, capable of sinless obedience to all the commands of God; but that, without being predestinated to it, he fell from this state of innocence, by eating the forbidden fruit; and from that time became, and all his posterity with him

him (he being their federal head) liable to the eternal wrath of God, and that their whole natures were at the same time so vitiated, that they are naturally incapable of thinking a good thought, or doing a good action.

The whole race of mankind being thus liable to everlasting damnation, God was pleased, for *his own glory*, and sovereign good will, and without any reason of *preference*, to reserve a small number, in comparison with the rest of mankind, and predestinate them to everlasting happiness, on condition that his son, the second person in the trinity, in power, glory, and all other respects, equal to himself, should become man, submit in their stead to death, and bear that infinite punishment of divine wrath, which every sin against an infinite Being had deserved, and which infinite justice could not remit; while all the rest of the corrupted mass of mankind, not being redeemed by the death of Christ, remained necessarily doomed to sin here, and to misery for ever hereafter.

The

The elect being, like other persons, born in *original sin*, have their natures equally depraved, and of course are as incapable of all good thoughts, or good works, as the reprobate, till God, by a *miraculous interposition*, produces a change in their disposition, and, by his immediate agency on their minds, enables them to think and act so as to please him. But after this miraculous change, or *new birth*, though an elected person may sin, and always will do so when he is *left to himself*, he will not finally fall away and perish; but God will, some time before his death, renew him again by repentance, and he shall certainly be happy for ever. Whereas the reprobate (the grace of repentance, and of the new birth, not being vouchsafed to them) are under a necessity of sinning, and of sinning only. Though their actions should, to all appearance, be ever so praise-worthy in the sight of men, they are, in fact, *of the nature of sin*, and only serve to aggravate their certain and final condemnation. Moreover, though many of them die in infancy, before they were capable of committing *actual*

tual sin, they are nevertheless liable to the eternal wrath of God, on account of the sin of their forefather, and federal head.

Now, in comparing these two schemes, I can see no sort of resemblance, except that the future happiness, or misery, of all men is certainly fore-known, and appointed by God. In all other respects they are most essentially different; and even where they agree in the *end*, the difference in the *manner* by which that end is accomplished is so very great, that the *influence* of the two systems on the minds of those that adopt and act upon them, is the reverse of one another, exceedingly favourable to virtue in the necessarian, and as unfavourable to it in the Calvinist.

For the essential difference between the two schemes is this: the necessarian believes that his own dispositions and actions are the necessary and sole means of his present and future happiness; so that, in the most proper sense of the words, it depends intirely upon *himself* whether he be virtuous

or

or vicious, happy or miserable, just as much as it depends upon the farmer himself sowing his fields and weeding them, whether he will have a good crop; except that, in favour of the doctrine of necessity, where *morals* are concerned, his endeavours in the former case are much more certain in their effect than in the latter; which view of things cannot but operate to make him exert himself to the utmost, in proportion to his regard for his own happiness; his success being certain, in proportion to his exertion of himself. With this exertion he cannot miscarry, but without it he must, unless the laws of nature should change, be inevitably miserable. As far as any system of faith can induce men to cultivate virtuous principles and habits, this doctrine of necessity must do it.

On the other hand, I do not see what motive a Calvinist can have to give any attention to his moral conduct. So long as he is unregenerate, all his thoughts, words, and actions, are necessarily sinful, and in the act of *regeneration* he is altogether passive.

On

On this account the most consistent Calvinists never address any exhortations to sinners, considering them as *dead in trespasses and sins*, and, therefore, that there would be as much sense and propriety in speaking to the dead as to them. On the other hand, if a man be in the happy number of the *elect*, he is sure that God will, some time or other, and at the most proper time (for which the last moment of his life is not too late) work upon him his miraculous work of *saving and sanctifying grace*. Though he should be ever so wicked immediately before this divine and *effectual calling*, it makes nothing against him. Nay, some think that, this being a more signal display of the wonders of divine grace, it is rather the more probable that God will take this opportunity to display it. If any system of speculative principles can operate as an axe at the root of all virtue and goodness, it is this.

The necessarian, also, believes nothing of the posterity of Adam sinning in him, and of their being liable to the wrath of God
on

on that account, or of the necessity of an infinite being making atonement for them, by suffering in their stead, and thus making the Deity propitious to them. He believes nothing of all the actions of any men being necessarily sinful; but, on the contrary, thinks that the very worst of men are capable of benevolent and worthy intentions in many things that they do; and likewise, that very good men are capable of falling from virtue, and consequently of sinking into final perdition. The opinions of the Calvinist on these heads he considers as equally absurd and dangerous. Upon the principles of the necessarian also, all *late repentance*, and especially after long and confirmed habits of vice, is altogether and necessarily ineffectual; there not being sufficient time left to produce a *change of disposition* and character, which can only be done by a change of conduct, and of proportionably long continuance.

Besides, before Mr. Edwards, no Calvinist, I think I may venture to say, considered every particular volition and action of men

as determined by preceding motives. The Calvinists, together with the rest of mankind, who speculated at all upon the subject, maintained what was called the doctrine of *indifference* with respect to particular actions; and though they considered all who were unregenerate as incapable of thinking a good thought, and as under a necessity of continually committing sin, they would not say that every particular sinful action was necessary, exclusive of every other sinful action. Also, except the supralapsarians, no Calvinists ever considered Adam *before his fall* as being under any necessity of sinning; so that the doctrine of the proper *mechanism of the human mind*, from which no volition is exempt, was certainly unknown to them. Also, their belief of a divine interposition both in the work of regeneration, and upon almost every occasion with respect to the elect afterwards, is such, that, according to them, the proper laws of nature are perpetually violated; so that the most perfect knowledge of them could be of little use for regulating our expectations, with regard to any event in which the affections

fections of the human mind are concerned. In this the creed of the necessarian is the very reverse of that of the Calvinist.

Farther, the Calvinistic system intirely excludes the *popular notion* of free-will, viz. the liberty, or power, of doing what we please, virtuous or vicious, as belonging to every person, in every situation; which is perfectly consistent with the doctrine of philosophical necessity, and indeed results from it. And in this respect it is that the language of scripture cannot be reconciled with the tenets of Calvinism. In the scriptures all sinners are most earnestly exhorted to forsake their sins, and return to their duty; and all, without exception, have the fullest assurances given to them of pardon and favour upon their return. *Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways, why will ye die, O house of Israel * ?* is the uniform tenor of the scripture calls to repentance; and the Divine Being is represented as declaring, in the most solemn manner, that *he hath no pleasure in the death of a*

* Ezek. xxxiii. 11.

finner, but had rather that he would turn from his way and live.*

Such expostulations as these have the greatest propriety upon the scheme of necessity, which supposes a necessary and mechanical influence of motives upon the human mind; but can have no propriety at all with respect to men who are so far *dead in sin*, as to be incapable of being excited to virtue by any motive whatever. And it is only tantalizing men to propose to them motives that cannot possibly influence them, and when nothing but a divine power, operating miraculously, and consequently in a manner *independent of all natural means*, is able to effect that very change, which they are exhorted to make in themselves.

That I do not misrepresent the proper Calvinistic principles I am very confident. They are held, indeed, with considerable variation, but what I have described is what is most generally meant by Calvinism, and is

* Ezek. v. 11.

the

the most consistent, and at the same the most favourable scheme of the kind; and is that to which I was formerly as much attached myself, as any person can be now.

The doctrine of philosophical necessity is, in reality, a modern thing, not older, I believe, than Mr. Hobbes. Of the Calvinists, I believe Mr. Jonathan Edwards to be the first. Others have followed his steps, especially Mr. Toplady. But the inconsistency of his scheme with what is properly Calvinism, appears by his dropping several of the essential parts of that system, and his silence with respect to others. And when the doctrine of necessity shall be thoroughly understood, and well considered by Calvinists, it will be found to militate against almost all their peculiar tenets. Mr. Toplady believes that all children dying in infancy are happy*, and that much the greater part of mankind are elected †; that undoubtedly there are *elect Mahometans*, and *elect Pagans*, and he seems to think the torments of hell will not be eternal. But this

* See his Scheme of Necessity asserted, p. 121. † P. 120.

is departing very widely indeed from the proper doctrines of Calvinism; and more attention to the principles of the necessarian scheme cannot fail to draw him, and all philosophizing Calvinists, farther and farther from that system: nor will they be able to rest any where, but in what I call the simple and unadulterated doctrine of revelation, and which they brand with the obnoxious name of *Socinianism*, in which, after being what they now are, I joyfully and thankfully acquiesce; reflecting with a kind of horror on what I was, and what I felt, when I endeavoured to think and act, as I most conscientiously did, upon those principles.

I cannot, however, conclude this section without acknowledging (and I do it with particular satisfaction) that though I consider the proper Calvinistic system as a most gloomy one, and peculiarly unfavourable to virtue, it is only so when *consistently pursued*, and when every part of it equally impresses the mind. But this is never, in fact, the case with any system. If there be in our minds a *prevalence of good principles* and good

dis-

dispositions, we naturally turn our eyes from every thing in our respective systems that, even by a just construction, is unfavourable to virtue and goodness, and we reflect with pleasure, and act upon those parts of them only that have a good tendency. Now the doctrine of a general and a most particular providence, is so leading a feature in every scheme of predestination, it brings God so much into every thing, and the ideas of justice and goodness are so inseparable from the idea of the Divine Being, that, in spite of every thing else in the system, an habitual and animated devotion will be the result, and from this principle no evil is to be dreaded.

But where a disposition to vice has pre-occupied the mind, I am very well satisfied, and but too many facts might be alledged in proof of it, that the doctrines of Calvinism have been actually fatal to the *remains of virtue*, and have driven men into the most desperate and abandoned course of wickedness; whereas the doctrine of necessity, properly understood, cannot possibly have any such effect, but the contrary.

In fact, if, from a good education, or any other source, the general bias of the mind be in favour of virtue, a man may be safely trusted with any speculative principles. But if the bias be in favour of vice, it is of great importance that the speculative principles be right and sound; that, when viewed in every just light, they may operate as a motive for reforming the life and manners. The connexion between virtue and happiness, and between vice and misery, is upon no principles whatever so certain and demonstrable as on those of philosophical necessity.

Whether it be owing to my Calvinistical education, or my considering the principles of Calvinism as generally favourable to that leading virtue *devotion*, or to their being something akin to the doctrine of necessity, I cannot but acknowledge that, notwithstanding what I have occasionally written against that system, and which I am far from wishing to retract, I feel myself disposed to look upon Calvinists with a kind of *respect*, and could never join in the contempt and insult with which I have often heard them
treated

treated in conversation. From my long and intimate acquaintance with the very *straitest* of that sect, I have seen but too much reason to believe, that though there is often among them great malignity of heart, concealed under all the external forms of devotion, I have been, and am still acquainted with many, whose hearts and lives, I believe, are, in all respects, truly christian, and whose christian tempers are really promoted by *their own views* of their system.

It is true that the treatment I have met with from Calvinists, *as such*, must have had a tendency to exasperate me against them; but every thing of this kind has been balanced by the kindness I have met with from others of them. And I shall ever reflect with gratitude, that the person to whom, in this world, I have been under the greatest obligation, was at the same time a strict Calvinist, and in all respects as perfect a human character as I have yet been acquainted with. I had the fairest opportunity of observing and studying it, and I now frequently reflect upon it, with satisfaction and

improvement. All who knew me in the early part of life will know whom I mean, and all who knew *her* will know that I do not exaggerate.

Upon the whole, however, the acquaintance I have had with Calvinists convinces me, that their principles, in the minds of calm, sober-thinking persons, will always leave some room for doubt and uncertainty with respect to the evidence of their conversion, and what is called the *work of grace in the heart*; in which much must necessarily be left to the imagination, and, therefore, that at times a gloom will be spread over the soul. Consequently, unless this effect be counteracted by something either in the natural temper, or opinions, of a more liberal cast, their principles do not admit of that perfect *serenity* and *cheerfulness*, with which it is to be wished that a life of real piety and virtue might ever be attended.

L E T.

L E T T E R S

T O

1. The AUTHOR of LETTERS on
MATERIALISM,
2. DR. KENRICK,
3. MR. JOHN WHITEHEAD,

A N D

4. DR. HORSELEY.

To the Author of the LETTERS ON MATERIALISM *and on* HARTLEY'S THEORY OF THE MIND.

S I R,

YOU have challenged me to the discussion of a variety of topics, some of which are the most difficult, sublime, and important of any that lie within the reach of the human understanding; and where the greatest men have expressed the greatest diffidence, you have written with the greatest possible confidence. Also, if your language be not ironical, you consider your antagonist as the most formidable combatant you could have to contend with. You have, on various occasions, expressed the highest opinion of my learning and abilities, and the strongest sense of my merit and services in the cause of literature, and where knowledge of the most valuable kind was concerned. To pass over what you say in general

general

neral of my "eminent abilities and indefatigable labours in every learned and valuable pursuit," and also with respect to natural philosophy in particular, than which nothing finer can be said of any man, you are more particularly lavish of your encomiums upon me on the subject of my controversy with the Scotch defenders of the doctrine of *Instinctive Principles of Truth*, in which I had occasion to introduce several of the opinions which have given you so much offence, and which you call upon me to defend.

As a prudent man, you certainly would not have provoked a combat in the very high tone in which you have done this, without the greatest certainty of success. You have, no doubt, therefore, in your own mind, *counted the cost* of the enterprize you have undertaken, and have already anticipated my confusion, and your complete triumph.

Now it happens that so very great a philosopher, and so acute a metaphysician, as
you

you represent me to be, and who has had the subjects on which you so boldly challenge me in contemplation from the time that I was capable of considering them at all, to the present time of my life, which is the memorable year *forty-five*, a period in which, at a medium, the human faculties may be deemed to have arrived at their very *ακμῆς*; a period in which we expect a due mixture of imagination and judgment, in which the ardour of youth is not extinguished, but improved into a manly vigour: it happens, I say, that, in these very advantageous circumstances, in which you and nature have placed me, after having had your Letters in my hands about twelve months, and having in that time exercised my faculties in a close attention to metaphysical subjects, as, I hope, my *Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit*, and the preceding treatise on *Philosophical Necessity* will prove, I do now, with great seriousness, aver, that, in my opinion, hardly any of the works of the three Scotch writers, which you and I hold so cheap, is weaker in point of argument than yours. I barely except that

that of Dr. Oswald, who is certainly *one* of the most dogmatical, and absurd of all writers.

Farther, though, judging by facts, there is but little reason to expect that any man who has given to the public his opinion on any subject of importance, will ever retract it, I think I perceive marks of so much candour and ingenuousness in some parts of your Letters (though I own I perceive but few traces of those qualities in other places) that I do not absolutely despair of engaging you to *acknowledge*, that you have fallen into several very important mistakes; at least, that your virulent censures of myself, and my opinions, are abundantly too severe. For this purpose, I shall lay before you a few plain considerations, to which I beg, in the first place, a very deliberate attention, and then an explicit answer. As I have already discussed sufficiently, as I think, at large, the principal points in debate between us, in the preceding treatises, I shall, in this letter, only briefly refer to them.

You

You will think it extraordinary that the first point I beg you would attend to, and be explicit upon, is, whether you do really hold any opinion different from mine, at least whether you do not acknowledge principles which necessarily, and not remotely, but *immediately*, draw after them the belief of all that I have contended for? and yet I am pretty confident that I can make this out to the satisfaction of others, and even to your own, with respect to the two great articles on which you arraign me, viz. the doctrines of *necessity* and of *materialism*.

Of the Doctrine of NECESSITY.

You expressly allow, a *constant influence of motives to determine the will*. *The moral, you say*, is as certain as is the physical cause*; and you will not deny (for no man can do it) that the immediate consequence of this position is, that the Divine Being, who established this constant dependence of human volitions upon preceding motives,

* P. 171.

and

and the state of mind, could not intend that any volition, or choice, should have been otherwise than it has been, is, or is to be. You are, therefore, as much a necessarian as myself; and all your copious declamation upon this topic, concerning the great mischief done to morals and society, &c. &c. &c. affects yourself as much as it does me.

If the mind be, in fact, *constantly* determined by motives, I desire you would say, candidly, why you object to the mere term *necessity*, by which nothing is ever meant but the *cause of constancy*. As I have observed before, it is only because I see a stone fall to the ground *constantly*, that I infer it does so *necessarily*, or *according to some fixed law of nature*; and please to say whether you think it could happen, that the mind could be constantly determined by motives, if there be not a fixed law of nature, from which that constant determination results. Indeed, Sir, this is so very plain, that you must either avow yourself *a necessarian*, dreadfully as the term may sound in your ears, or adopt some quite new ground of defence,

defence, some new principles of human liberty, that is, some *other kind of liberty* than what you have yet contended for.

As far as the consequences of the *doctrine of necessity* affect the Deity, you, who believe the divine prescience, make no scruple to admit them. You say *, “ Why
 “ a benevolent Creator gave free will to
 “ man, which he foresaw would be to his
 “ unhappiness and ruin, you can assign no
 “ other reason, than that such a being en-
 “ tered into his general plan of existence.”

You admit, therefore, that all the actual consequences of free will, the unhappiness and ruin of a great proportion of mankind, entered into the general plan of providence, which is as much as saying that the plan required them, and could not proceed so well without them. And, if so, what objection can you have to the Divine Being having absolutely *decreed* them? If his plan absolutely required these evils, it is plain, that, at any rate, he must introduce them.

* P. 188.

All the difference that there can possibly be between us is, that, according to you, the divine plan required *free will*, though necessarily attended with the evils you mention, and I say that his plan required *general and ultimate happiness*, though necessarily attended with the same evils. According to us both, the evils were necessarily, either to free will, or to general happiness.

Of MATERIALISM.

The next great argument between us is, the uniform composition, and materiality, of the whole man. But, though you express the greatest abhorrence of this sentiment, I call upon you to shew that you yourself do not virtually admit it. You expressly declare * for the doctrine of a proper *physical influence* between the mind and the body, as *the only philosophical notion*, and you maintain that the two substances *mutually act and re-act upon each other*. Now this you explain on principles that most evidently set aside all distinction between

* P. 76.

matter

matter and spirit, and make them to be as much of the same composition as I do myself. For you say that, “in order to this mutual action, spirit must be possessed of such inferior qualities, as are not unalliable with the more exalted species of matter.” Now the most exalted species of matter possible must have length, breadth, and thickness, and in the common opinion, *solidity*, or it would not be matter at all. And I call upon you to say whether those inferior qualities of spirit, by which it is capable of acting, and of being acted upon, by a substance that has no properties besides extension and solidity, must not be comprized under those of extension and solidity? I will venture to say that you cannot name any other quality that will answer your purpose. In fact, therefore, you maintain exactly what I do, viz. that a substance possessed of the properties of matter may have those of perception and thought likewise. You may use a different language, but our ideas are the very same. I appeal to your own more mature reflections on the subject. I also desire you to explain how spirit, as

you say * can bear no relation to *space*, and yet be possessed of some properties in common with those of matter.

Besides ascribing to spirit the properties of matter, to confound them more effectually, you farther ascribe to matter the peculiar properties of spirit, for you give it an *active power*, which all other immaterialists, and indeed all consistent immaterialists, say is incompatible with their idea of matter. I desire you would tell me, therefore, why, if one species of active power (for you are not explicit enough to say *what kind* of active power you mean) may be imparted to matter, *another*, or *any other* species of it may not? And what has the power of *thought* always been defined to be, but a particular species of active power?

These remarks, I will venture to say, are so very plain, that a much worse understanding than yours must be convinced of the justness of them, and a small degree of ingenuousness will produce an avowal of that

* P. 76.

conviction. These remarks also comprize all the great subjects on which we differ. As lesser matters not worth repeating here, I desire you would say what you have to advance in defence of your notion of *space*, on which I have remarked *, and what you mean by saying it is an "ideal phenomenon, arising from the external order of co-existing bodies." To me the expression is absolute jargon. Tell me also what you have to reply to my answer to your argument on the subject of *attention* †.

I shall now advert to some others matters not discussed in either of the preceding treatises; and here, also, I have no doubt but that I shall make your mistakes and misrepresentations palpable even to yourself.

Of INSTINCTIVE PRINCIPLES.

What you say in order to prove that my own principles, or rather those of Dr. Hartley, are as unfriendly to the cause of truth

* P. 58.

† P. 92.

as the doctrine of instinctive principles, is so exceedingly trifling, and foreign to the purpose, that had I not seen it in the same book, I could not have persuaded myself that a person who joins me so very heartily as you do in my condemnation of that system, could possibly have written it.

You were "highly pleased," you say *, "to see a doctrine so triumphantly thrown down, from its usurped empire, which had, within a few years, gained an astonishing ascendancy over minds that should have been aware of its fallacy and erroneous principles;" and upon many other occasions you express the strongest approbation of my services to the cause of truth on this account.

After this I might well be surprized to find myself accused of maintaining principles equally, or more unfavourable to the doctrine concerning *truth*; but I own I was still more surprized, when I perceived the foundation on which you advance this

* P. 8.

extra-

extraordinary charge, and that the only similarity you pretend to find between the doctrine of instinctive principles of truth and that of Dr. Hartley, is, that the assent to propositions is in both equally *necessary* and *infallible* *. “ In both systems,” you say †, “ belief, as well as every mental affection, “ is a necessary and mechanical effect.” The only difference, you say ‡, “ there is “ betwixt them seems to be, that Dr. “ Hartley admits of no effect for which he “ does not assign, as the proper cause, some “ nervous vibration, whilst the Doctors, “ without any sufficient reason, are labour- “ ing to establish others, which spring up “ immechanically, but however from some “ internal impulse. As far therefore as “ sensations, sensitive ideas, and their ne- “ cessary Scotch adjuncts go, the dissimi- “ larity of opinion is but trifling: they are “ all the effects of constitution, or pre-es- “ tablished laws.”

You also say §, that, “ whenever any phe- “ nomenon of the human mind is explained

* P. 122. † P. 123. ‡ Ibid. § P. 132.

“ by association, a cause is produced in its
 “ nature as impulsive and necessary, as can
 “ possibly be the most unerring instinct;
 “ with this only difference, that your sys-
 “ tem must be productive of eternal dis-
 “ cordance, and variety in opinions and
 “ feelings.”

Now surely, Sir, if you have read Mr. Locke, or indeed any other writer on the subject of the human mind, you must have found that, according to him, and all of them, how free soever man is described as *willing*, his *judgment* is always supposed to be necessary, or mechanical. Indeed what is judgment, but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas present to the mind? Now you expressly allow (indeed, with all the world) that the mind is passive in perception, that is, that all our perceptions must necessarily depend upon the objects present to us, and the state of the organs through which the ideas of them are transmitted. If I open my eyes, labouring under no disorder, and there be only a sheep before me, I cannot possibly see a
horse;

horse; and if there be a young lamb accompanying the sheep, I necessarily *see*, and therefore *judge*, that the sheep is the bigger of the two. Now every other act of proper and simple judgment is as necessary and unavoidable, or, in your own language, as much the *effect of constitution*, and *established laws*, as this; and complex reasoning is all reducible to acts of simple judgment, as every logician knows. It is therefore impossible but that we must judge of all things as they appear to us, and it is this difference in the appearance of things that is the cause of the differences in the judgments that different men form of the same things. These are principles that you *must* admit, and, therefore, all your violent declamation on the subject falls upon yourself, as well as on my devoted head.

Your censure of me on this subject is the more extraordinary, as, upon another occasion, you complain of my principles as not sufficiently securing the assent to truth, for you say *, “ If every perception be facti-

* P. 156.

“ tious,

" tious, then, in spite of all internal rea-
 " sons, and relations in the objects, our
 " sentiments must widely deviate from, and
 " the consequent actions be in direct oppo-
 " sition to, every thing that is right and
 " virtuous. To obviate such deleterious
 " effects, it appears that an all-wise Being
 " must have provided some principle, *in-*
 " *nate to our very constitutions*, whereby the
 " charms of truth and virtue might be felt,
 " and their respective rights immoveably
 " fixed, in opposition to error and vice."

Now really, Sir, notwithstanding your
 professed abhorrence of the principle of *in-*
stinctive belief, I do not see of what other
 nature can be this principle of yours, which,
 you say, is *innate to our very constitutions*,
 and *by which the charms of truth and virtue*
may be felt, and their respective rights immove-
ably fixed, in opposition to error and vice. I
 do not see how Messrs. Reid, Beattie, and
 Oswald could have expressed their own
 meaning more properly, or that you can ac-
 count for the actual prevalence of error and
 vice in the world, any better on your prin-
 ciples

ciples than they can on theirs. What then becomes of your vehement censures of me, as maintaining principles as subversive of truth as those of their reprobated system?

When, in favour of *your* instinctive principles of truth, you object to mine of *association*, that they must be productive of *infinite discordancy, and variety of opinions and feelings**, you mention a remarkable fact, which, as it appears to me, cannot be accounted for but upon the principle of the association of ideas. This will, indeed, fully account for the actual discordancy and variety of opinions and feelings in the world, and in the most natural manner; and these, I say, are inconsistent with any doctrine of instinctive principles of truth, whether maintained by the Scotch Doctors, or by yourself.

Gross misconstruction of Dr. Hartley's meaning.

You sneer at me as a *rapid writer*, but rapid as my writings have been, they appear,

* P. 133.

to

to my own review, to have been sufficiently guarded. For, without excepting any thing *material*, or any thing more than the slowest writers in general may wish to correct and improve in their works, I do not know of any thing that I now wish to have written otherwise than it is. You, on the contrary, I presume, have written with great caution, and have given sufficient time to your publication; and when, with all due precautions, and advice of friends, you sent it abroad, I dare say you judged it to be superior to any opposition that it could meet with. But, notwithstanding this, I doubt not but, after the perusal of these remarks, if not before, you will see reason to wish you had written many things otherwise than you have done; and I do not mean with respect to the *manner* only, but the *matter* too. Some of the instances I have already mentioned will, I am persuaded, make you pause; but I shall proceed to mention a few more, for which no apology can be made, the blunders in point of reasoning being too gross for any palliation; and yet I do not profess myself to be master of any un-

common

common art of detecting sophistry. What thought to make you blush the more, they relate to two very heavy charges, one against Dr. Hartley, and the other against myself.

Dr. Hartley, with great ingenuousness and truth, had said, "However the necessarian may, in theory, ascribe all to God, yet the associations of life beget the idea and opinion of *self*, refer actions to this self, and connect a variety of applauses and complacencies with those actions; and therefore that, as the asserters of philosophical free-will are not necessarily proud, so the asserters of the doctrine of mechanism are not necessarily humble." Now what can be inferred from this concession, but that, though the doctrine of necessity *tends* to cure pride and conceit, &c. the influences to which we are exposed in life counteract this tendency, in a great measure? This, I will venture to say, is all the *fair* inference that can be drawn from it.

Now what is the inference that you have drawn from it? I think you will hardly believe

believe that you could have written any thing so very inconclusive, and injurious. For you say*, that “in this the good Doctor, in a fit of holy zeal, was determined, “by one dash of his pen, totally to annihilate all the boasted excellencies and superior advantages of mechanism. Therefore” you say “has the doctrine of mechanism, *from the Doctor’s own confession,* “a general tendency to cause and support “the vices of pride, vanity, self-conceit, “and contempt of our fellow-creatures. “And I wish to God,” you add, “these “were the only evils which that doctrine is “calculated to generate, and immoveably to “rivet in the human breast—Consequences “so deleterious—*la tete me tourne.*”——

I do not, Sir, even in this, charge you, as you do me, with a *wilful perversion* of the author’s meaning. But it is certainly a very unfortunate oversight, and of a very *calumniating and injurious tendency*, for which you will certainly ask the Doctor and the Public pardon. An exact parallel to this

* P. 193.

conduct

conduct of yours, would be that of a physician, whose prescription did *not quite cure* a disorder, by reason of the patient's way of life necessarily promoting it, being charged with *acknowledging*, that he administered medicines which tended to aggravate the disease. Dr. Hartley does not say that the *belief of the doctrine of mechanism*, but that the *associations of life* did the mischief, notwithstanding the good tendency of that doctrine.

Indeed, Sir, with respect to the unjust imputation of bad designs in your antagonists, you are, whether knowingly or unknowingly, a very dangerous writer, and such as the Public ought to be cautioned against; for you have gone far beyond the bounds, I do not say, of *decorum* only, but of *truth*, and even of probability. You hint * that Dr. Hartley “wrote, and wrote “so much about a thing, with a design of “puzzling his readers.” Now that you should have read Dr. Hartley's work, as you say, *four times over*, and retain any such im-

* P. 110.

pression

pression as this, astonishes me, but fully convinces me that it must have been with a prejudice which would effectually prevent your understanding him at all. It is, in several respects, evident, that, as yet, you are very little acquainted with his *theory*; though you tell us * that you can say “without vanity, you understand him thoroughly,” and I am now satisfied that you have been as little able to distinguish, or to catch his *spirit*. Of one of my own paragraphs, you say, that it is *replete with falsehood and wilful misrepresentation*. I hope you will blush when you reflect a moment upon things so very gross as these.

Gross misrepresentation of what I have said concerning a FUTURE LIFE, &c.

But I proceed to your account of one of my arguments, of which you seem to have understood as little as of the above-mentioned of Dr. Hartley. I had said what I believe to be very true, that “the doctrine

* P. 10.

“ of

“ of the immateriality of the soul has no
 “ countenance in the scriptures,” and you
 say, that “ if so, the future existence of
 “ man must be given up, even on the part
 “ of revelation.” But, upon the least re-
 flection, you must see that, as a materialist,
 and a christian, I believe *the resurrection of*
the body, that is of *the man*; and that upon
 this foundation only, in opposition to the
 opinion which places it on the *natural im-*
mortality of the soul, I rest my belief of a
 future life.

The paragraph in which you make this
 strange construction of my meaning, is in
 several respects, so curious, that I shall quote
 the whole of it *, and it will serve to give
 my reader a pretty just specimen of your
 manner of treating me, and the subjects of
 this controversy.

“ You declare that the doctrine of natu-
 “ ral immortality has no countenance from
 “ the scriptures. I am not in the least dis-
 “ posed to pervert your meaning. I am

* P. 221.

VOL. II.

Q

“ sen-

“ sensible of the enormity of the crime :
 “ but I should be exceedingly glad to know
 “ whether these words have any meaning
 “ at all. For if you mean to say that the
 “ doctrine of natural immortality is not it-
 “ self, as such, contained in the scriptures,
 “ you are, to be sure, in the right, because
 “ that doctrine, as the pure result of rea-
 “ son, most evidently is not a revealed truth.
 “ But if, as the words themselves express it,
 “ this doctrine has really no countenance
 “ from the scriptures, then is the future ex-
 “ istence of man not only false in philoso-
 “ phy, as you insist, but likewise in its the-
 “ ological acceptation. What then becomes
 “ of that part of the scheme of revelation
 “ on which you rest all your hopes of im-
 “ mortality? But such slips of the pen
 “ (as has already been urged in justification
 “ of a similar oversight) are perhaps venial,
 “ and easily excuseable in the rapidity of
 “ composition, particularly of so hasty a
 “ composer as Dr. Priestley.”

Pray, Sir, who is it that has written
hastily, and needs an apology in this case?

I leave

I leave it to yourself to judge ; and I hope you will be duly sensible, as you say you are, of the *enormity of the crime* of perverting my meaning. Whatever the enormity be, you are certainly guilty of it.

However, you have not done with this subject, on which you fancy you have so much the advantage of me, and, poor as is the handle it gives you for cavilling, you are willing to make a little more of it. You say *, that “ granting the notion of the im-
 “ mortality of the soul was imported into
 “ christianity from the heathen philosophy,
 “ how could it possibly have contributed to
 “ deprave that religious system ? If the re-
 “ vealed tenet itself of immortality does
 “ not necessarily tend to corrupt the heart,
 “ or the christian institution, can it by any
 “ means happen, that the same belief, when
 “ supposed to spring from a second source,
 “ should produce such pernicious effects ?
 “ I blush, Sir, to suppose you capable of such
 “ flimsy reasoning. But the fact stands re-
 “ corded against you, and your philosophy

* P. 224.

“ must bear you through as well as it may.
 “ It may perhaps be glorious to dissent from
 “ the crowd; but it is not, I am sure, ra-
 “ tional, when more plausible reasons for
 “ such conduct cannot be adduced.”

Here again, notwithstanding your insulting me in this manner, you appear to know so very little of the argument you have undertaken to discuss, as to take it for granted, that there can be no foundation for the belief of any future life, but upon that of the *natural immortality of the human soul*, as if you had never heard of the scripture doctrine of *the resurrection of the dead*.

I shall now recite the whole of the paragraph on which your most uncharitable censure of me above-mentioned is founded, with another set of your remarks upon it, no less extraordinary than those quoted above.

“ The opinion of the natural immorta-
 “ lity of the soul had its origin in the hea-
 “ then philosophy; and having, with other
 “ pagan

“pagan notions, insinuated itself into chris-
 “tianity, which has been miserably de-
 “praved by this means, has been the great
 “support of the popish doctrines of *purga-*
 “*tory*, and the *worship of the dead.*”

This paragraph I maintain to be, in its
 utmost extent, *strictly true*, and I have lit-
 tle doubt but that the truth of it will be
 sufficiently evident from what I have ad-
 vanced in the *Disquisitions on Matter and*
Spirit, and especially in the *Sequel* to them.
 But supposing it had not been strictly true,
 it is not surely so *palpably untrue*, as that
 the misrepresentation must necessarily be
 wilful. You say, however, on this occa-
 sion, “That a writer who plumes himself
 “on the character of singular candour and
 “sincerity, could have written a paragraph
 “so replete with falsehood and wilful mis-
 “representation, is not, at least, a common
 “phenomenon in the history of the human
 “mind.”

To the latter part of the paragraph, viz.
 that “the notion of the natural immorta-

Q 3

“lity

“ lity of the soul has been the great sup-
 “ port of the popish doctrines of *purgatory*,
 “ and the *worship of the dead*,” you say*,
 “ Therefore, most certainly, it came from
 “ the devil, or what is worse, was in-
 “ vented by one of the antichrists of pa-
 “ pal Rome.

“ By *purgatory* (for I also understand
 “ something of the popish scheme of faith)
 “ is meant a place of expiatory punishment.
 “ It is grounded on the belief of the soul’s
 “ immortality, joined to a notion that no-
 “ thing undefiled can enter into heaven.
 “ But why should you fancy that this doc-
 “ trine rests *safely* on the opinion of natu-
 “ ral immortality, when a more adequate
 “ basis may be discovered, to wit, an ex-
 “ press revelation, which both you and the
 “ papists (what a monstrous coalition!)
 “ maintain, is ludicrous enough? Besides,
 “ what possible support can that Romish
 “ tenet derive from the pagan sentiment in
 “ question? Just with equal propriety might
 “ you assert that the doctrines of hell and

* P. 225.

“ heaven

“ heaven (only that they are not exclu-
 “ sively popish) are sprung from, or at least
 “ founded on, the same opinion.

“ En passant, Doctor, give me leave to
 “ ask what objection can you consistently
 “ have to the doctrine of *purgatory*, you
 “ who, I suppose with Dr. Hartley and
 “ others, have adopted the notion of an
 “ universal restoration, to take place some
 “ time or other? That notion annihilates
 “ the belief of eternal punishment, and
 “ consequently establishes a purgatory upon
 “ a more extensive and extraordinary plan,
 “ indeed, than is that of Rome; but still a
 “ purgatory it most certainly is. And if
 “ you will insist that the popish tenet rests
 “ on the sentiment of natural immortality,
 “ by what finessè of logic will you be able
 “ to prove that your own purgatory is not
 “ derived, or upheld, by the same opinion.

“ What you would mean to say by the
 “ worship of the dead, another popish doc-
 “ trine you assert supported by the same
 “ opinion, is, to me, quite a mystery. I

Q 4

“ have

“ have been a good deal connected with
 “ Roman Catholics, both at home and
 “ abroad, but I never understood that wor-
 “ shipping the dead was a part of their re-
 “ ligion,

“ What opinion, think you, will your fo-
 “ reign friends Father Beccaria, and others,
 “ form of your candour and simplicity of
 “ heart, when they shall read this curious
 “ note? But I beg your pardon, Sir. Your
 “ friends on the other side of the water are,
 “ I suppose, mostly of the infidel cast. You
 “ would not, I dare say, be connected with
 “ *bigots* of any nation. Seriously, to meet
 “ with such stale and childish reflections,
 “ in a work, as you tell us, addressed to
 “ *philosophers*, gives me a very poor opinion
 “ of your ingenuousness, and liberal turn
 “ of mind. And with what face can you
 “ continue to brand others with the odious
 “ appellation of *bigots*, and of enemies to
 “ free enquiry, whilst you still retain rank-
 “ ling within your own breast those same
 “ ridiculous prejudices against the Roman,
 “ and perhaps other churches, which you
 “ first

“ first imbibed within the walls of your
 “ nursery ? ”

On these extraordinary paragraphs of yours
 I shall make a few remarks.

1. I have no where said that the doctrine of purgatory rests *solely* on that of the natural immortality of the soul, but only that the latter is the *great support* of the former.

2. You say that, with equal propriety, I might say that the doctrine of *heaven* and *hell* is founded on the same opinion; forgetting that there is no *unembodied spirit* in my heaven or hell.

3. My own *purgatory*, as you are pleased to call it (and to which I have no objection) being the temporary punishment of the wicked, also affects the *body* which rises from the tomb, and not the *separate soul*; so that it cannot require much *finesse of logic*, to prove that it does not rest on the same foundation with the popish doctrine of purgatory.

4. I

4. I call the popish custom of praying to St. Peter, St. Paul, &c. a *worshipping of the dead*, because these saints are *in a state of death*, as the papists themselves will not deny; for if they be not dead, they *never did die at all*, there not having been, that we know of, any resurrection of the dead since their decease. Besides it would justify me if I saw them worshipping persons whom *I believed* to be dead.

5. As the paragraph quoted above could hardly be written by any other than a papist, I will take this opportunity of informing you and others, that, if by my *friends*, you mean persons connected with me by common pursuits and correspondence, I have among them both infidels and bigots; but that I never trouble myself about any man's faith or pursuits in some respects, if he be a man to my liking in others. Nor do I know that any of my friends in one respect complain of me for troubling them with my creed, or my schemes, in others. At the same time my friendships, in some respects, have not biased my judgment in others.

others. With an unbelieving philosopher, I am a philosopher, but not the less a christian, if any circumstances should bring the subject of religion in view; though it is a thing that, zealous as I am in that respect, I never obtrude upon any man. And though you treat me as a *bigot*, I do not, like those of your persuasion, confine the favour of God, here or hereafter, to my own sect, or even to the class of christians; and I consider the immoral christian, of every persuasion, and especially of my own, as the most criminal of mankind. Many of my philosophical acquaintance treat with a good natured ridicule my profession of christianity, and I am ready either to argue the case with them seriously, or to smile, in my turn, at their ridiculing me; knowing that, in general, it is not accompanied with that attention to the subject, and consequently with that knowledge of it, which I, at least, *pretend* to.

I am even not without friends among zealous catholics, little as you seem to suspect it, and I know how to value individuals
of

of that or any communion, at the same time that I seriously consider the Pope as *the man of sin*, and the *antichrist*, foretold in the scripture; and the popish religion, as distinguished from Protestantism, as a mass of the most horrid corruptions of christianity. And if you will wait for my *History of the Corruptions of Christianity*, you will see that charge, narrow and bigotted as you will think me, proved in its utmost extent; though I do not say that my reasons will be such as will make any change in your religious creed. The force of prejudice, imbibed as you say *in the nursery*, even in virtuous and ingenuous minds, is often greater than that of any argument.

The article of religion, however, excepted, I really flatter myself, that I shall be able to make some impression upon you; and the remarks and observations advanced in this letter I propose by way of an *experiment* of the kind; though I own I am sometimes ready to despair of my undertaking, when I consider how very fully you seem to be *persuaded in your own mind*. The language
in

in which you have, upon some occasions, expressed this fulness of persuasion is so peculiarly strong, that I cannot help smiling when I consider on how very weak a foundation this confidence stands, and how very soon I am willing to hope, it will fall to the ground.

You say *, “ with respect to the present
 “ debate I am bold to declare that if I am
 “ not on the right side, I will never sacrifice
 “ one single moment of my future life to
 “ the discovery of truth.”

Concerning one argument to prove, against Dr. Hartley, that the mechanical system cannot pre-suppose free-will, in the popular and practical sense, you say †, “ If this
 “ reasoning be not decisive against Dr. Hart-
 “ ley, I am willing to give up all pretensions
 “ to the least atom of common sense, and
 “ fairly submit to be classed in the same rank
 “ of being with the pen I write with.”

This language, I would observe by the way, very much resembles that of Mr. Venn,

* P. 4.

† P. 184.

in

in the first controversy in which I was ever engaged. He said he would *burn his Bible* if his conclusions from it were not just. But, as I admonished him, that his resolution was a very rash one, as he had much to learn from his Bible yet, so though you should be convinced that you have hitherto been engaged in a fruitless pursuit of truth, I would not have you, out of despair, give up the search. If you be not too old, you may recover the time you have lost on the false scent, and by double diligence come up with the foremost, after you have got into the right track.

At present, however, which is curious enough, you express the same persuasion concerning me that I do concerning you, For you say *, “ I dare defy the most virulent and subtle adversary to produce one single absurdity, through the whole system of *immaterialism*, which, with his hand on his breast, the Rev. Dr. Priestley will declare to be such.”

* P. 82.

Now,

Now, in my *Disquisitions*, I have shewn, as you will see, that the system of immaterialism is *replete with absurdity*, and I do assure you that I can very safely lay my hand on my breast, and declare that I really believe the whole charge to be well founded. In return, I challenge you to prove a single absurdity in the system of *materialism*. I have distinctly replied to all the objections you have advanced against it, whether they be peculiar to yourself, or not. Do you shew the futility of these replies, if you can.

I shall now close this letter, after informing you, that, though my animadversions on your letters do not make more than about ten distinct articles, I could easily have extended them to three or four times that number. For the things I have dwelt upon afford but a sample of the manner in which the whole book is written, with respect both to strength of argument, and manner of writing.

I must not, however, quite shut up this letter till I have informed you, how very
rash

rash you have been to conclude that, because I did not publicly disown a particular Essay published in the *London Review*, you are authorized, as you say*, to deem it mine, or, which *nearly amounts to the same*, that it *came forth under my tutilage, and kind protection*. You repeat the same on several other occasions †. Now I do not yet know any thing more of the author of that piece than I suppose you do. Even the sentiments of it are, in many respects, not mine, as you may find by my *Disquisitions*; nor do I consider the writer of it as very much my friend. Be this as it will, you certainly had no right to consider any thing as being *mine*, that does not *bear my name*. Besides, can I be supposed either to read every anonymous publication, especially in *periodical works*, of which this country affords so great a number, or know what things are ascribed to me? I assure you I never heard of this in particular being by any body supposed to be mine, till I saw the charge in your printed letters.

* P. 7.

† P. 40, &c.

Let

Let this one *unquestionably false charge* teach you more caution for the future, and let it likewise impress your mind with the idea of its being possible for you to have been as much mistaken in other particulars as you have been in this.

I might have enlarged on your accounts of the advertisement signed *J. Seton*, and of the defence I was compelled to make of myself in the pamphlet intitled *Philosophical Empiricism*, both of which are gross misrepresentations of the facts, and to appearance malevolent; but I am really weary of animadverting upon such things. I leave them to the judgment of the Public, and wishing you both more discernment, and more candour.

I am, Sir,

your very humble servant,

CALNE,
July, 1777.

J. PRIESTLEY.

To Dr. K E N R I C K.

S I R,

YOU and I differ so very little with respect to any thing of importance in my *Disquisitions*, &c. that notwithstanding the obligation I have laid myself under, I should hardly have thought it necessary to address you on the subject; and I freely acknowledge, that it is rather your impotunity, than any thing else, that has induced me to do it.

We equally maintain that matter is not that impenetrable stuff that it has been imagined to be, that man is an homogeneous being, the sentient principle not residing in a substance distinct from the body, but being the result of organization; and, as far as I can perceive, you likewise agree with me in holding the doctrine of philosophical necessity.

R 2

Of

Of what then is it that you complain? It seems to be, principally, that I do not acknowledge to have learned my doctrine in your school, and that the manner in which I explain it is not perfectly consistent, or just. You say *, “ I cannot easily absolve you from the censure of unpardonable neglect, in being ignorant of what has so recently, and repeatedly been advanced on the fundamental subject of your *Disquisitions*, Twenty years are now nearly elapsed since I first took up the subject, on occasion of the late Cadwallader Colden’s treatise of the *principle of action in matter*, a subject on which I have frequently descanted, in various publications, as occasion offered.” In the same page you say, “ that this neglect of mine is not so much *real as affected*,”

Now, Sir, whatever be the degree of *blame* that I have justly brought upon myself, I do assure you that my ignorance of your having maintained what I contend for, is not affected, but *real*; and indeed my not

* Review for 1778, p. 48.

having

having learned *more* of you, and my not holding your doctrine with perfect consistency, may be allowed to weigh something in answer to a charge of *plagiarism*. Besides, whatever injury I have done you, I reap no advantage from it ; because I do not advance the doctrine as my own discovery, but profess to have learned the system from F. Boscovich, and Mr. Michell.

I am but an occasional reader of *Reviews*, and I have not the least recollection either of Mr. Colden's treatise, or of any thing that was ever said about it ; and yet I am far from thinking disrespectfully either of *anonymous*, or of *periodical* publications, of which, without the least reason, you frequently charge me : but certainly there is less chance of an anonymous publication being generally known, and especially of its being ascribed to its right author.

You say *, that you find I do not think you much my *friend*, because I said so of the author of the *Essay* in your Review for

* P. 402.

September 1775; but I had not the most distant suspicion of your being the writer of that Essay. It is there called *a Letter to the Reviewers*, and was announced by yourself, as a piece supposed to be written either by *myself*, or *some of my able friends*; and, in consequence, probably, of that manner of announcing it, it has, with many persons, passed for mine. You must not blame me for not knowing it to be yours, when yourself announced it as mine.

As you seem not to have any recollection of this circumstance, which has led myself and others into a mistake, I shall take the liberty to recite the whole paragraph, which is in a note of your Review for August 1775*. “ For the reasons alledged in our
 “ account of Dr. Priestley’s Essays, we beg
 “ leave to be excused for the present from
 “ entering into this interesting dispute, and
 “ that still the more earnestly, as we have
 “ had sent us a long and laboured defence
 “ of the passage that appeared so exception-
 “ able to Mr. Seton, intended to have been

* P. 175.

“ printed

“ printed in a pamphlet by itself, had not
 “ the author (either the Dr. himself, or
 “ some able friend) justly conceived so good
 “ an opinion of our candour, as to think
 “ we should afford a place for it in our Re-
 “ view, which we purpose to do in our
 “ next number.” Accordingly in the very
 next number * appeared this Effay, which
 you now call your own.

There are several other things in your
 letters to me that are almost as unaccount-
 able as this. I am very far from having a
 mean opinion of your understanding, and
 men of sense are generally candid; at least
 they are able to perceive the real meaning
 of a writer, who wishes to be understood,
 and they are above little cavils. And yet †,
 you ascribe to me what I am professedly re-
 futing, and only suppose for the sake of
 that refutation, viz. the solidity of the
 atoms, or the ultimate constituent parts of
 bodies. You write variously, and perhaps
 not very consistently with respect to me;
 but, in general, you seem to think that I

* September 1775. † P. 64.

R 4

write

write with tolerable *perspicuity*, as well as readiness; you should therefore have reconsidered the passages which you except against. I see little, if any thing, that I can amend in them; and yet you say that “with the best disposition in the world to comprehend me, you cannot possibly conceive what I am about.”

Your cavil * appears to me to be equally ill founded: for by the *smallest parts* of bodies, I evidently mean those that are *supposed to be* the smallest, or the solid indiscerptible atoms of other philosophers; which I maintain to be resolvable into still smaller parts. I do not wonder to find this wretched cavil in such a writer as Mr. Whitehead, but it is altogether unworthy of a person who has any degree of reputation, as a writer, or a man of sense, and candour.

You ridicule what you call my *pompous list* of authors prefixed to the *Disquisitions*, when I barely mention those of which there are *different editions*, that, as I quote the *pages*,

* P. 65.

those

those who had different editions of the same book might be apprized of it. What could the most modest writer, yourself for instance, who wished to be understood, do less? Had I meant to swell the list, I should have inserted in it *all* that I have quoted; which, however, is a very common practice, and not at all exceptionable. On many occasions you charge me with *vanity* and *conceit*; and once, in imitation, I suppose, of the style of Dr. Johnson, you term it *an exuberance of self-exaltation*: but this charge is founded upon nothing but the most forced and uncandid construction of my expressions. This I consider as an unworthy artifice. Had I affected an unusual degree of *modesty*, inconsistent with writing so much as I do (as it certainly implies that I think myself capable of instructing, at least, some part of mankind) there would have been more reason for your conduct.

As to the work which you promise the public, I shall expect it with some impatience, and shall certainly read it with the
greatest

greatest attention ; and as you say that “ the
 “ *theory of physics, or the systematical prin-*
 “ *ciples of natural philosophy, the science*
 “ *which Lord Bacon represents as the basis*
 “ *and foundation of all human knowledge*
 “ *is the department of your peculiar pro-*
 “ *fession,*” I do hope that you will throw
 some light upon it, and I have every reason
 to wish you success. If you can prove, as
 you say *, that *all matter is possessed of some*
degree of perception, you will effectually re-
 move the only difficulty under which my
 scheme labours ; which is *how* a sentient
 principle is the result of organization. The
fact I think indisputable, and must be ad-
 mitted on the received rules of philosophiz-
 ing ; but that it *must be so,* from the nature
 of things, I own I do not yet see, any more
 than I am yet satisfied that “ the form and
 “ magnitude of bodies are to be considered
 “ as generated by motion †,” or that “ every
 “ natural phenomenon, or distinct object of
 “ sense, is a compound of active and pas-
 “ sive physical powers,” notwithstanding the

* P. 277.

† P. 161.

very

Very ingenious observations that you have advanced with respect to them.

You frequently hint that, the reason why I have generally appeared to advantage in controversy, is that I have always pitched upon *weak antagonists*. I can only say, that, if this has been the case, it has been because I have not had the good fortune to meet with any better; and in general they have not been weak either in their own eyes, or in those of the public. This character, however, can by no means apply to Dr. Brown, Dr. Balguy, Dr. Blackstone, Dr. Reid, or Dr. Beattie, whatever you may say of Dr. Oswald, on whose work you will find the highest encomiums in the Reviews of the day; and it was in fact, held in very great and general admiration.

You will also find the same to be, in a great measure, true of the *Letters on Materialism*. Besides the stating of *objections actually made*, and answering them, has a much better effect than proposing them in other words;

words; as it may be suspected, that, by this means, the answerer gives himself an unfair advantage; and when I replied to him, no other answer had appeared. For as to your *Mr. Seton*, who, it seems, notwithstanding the incredulity of some, did really *live*, and is now actually *dead*, I could not, though I endeavoured to do it, persuade myself to take any notice of him; he appeared to know so very little of the very rudiments of theological knowledge. Many other opponents I have neglected to notice because I thought them insignificant, though they are not without their admirers, and boast, as you do, that I make no reply; because I am not able to do it. As to yourself, pretend what you will, I cannot consider you in the light of an adversary.

You ask me repeatedly, why, since I deny all solidity or impenetrability, I should chuse to make use of so obnoxious a term as *matter*, when the less exceptionable one of *spirit* would answer my purpose full as well. I answer, that the cause of truth is best answered

swered by calling every thing by its *usual name*, and I think it a mean subterfuge to impose upon mankind by the use of words.

Man, I believe, was wholly made of *the dust of the ground*, or of the same substance with the earth itself. Now by what term has the earth, and all the substances that belong to it, been distinguished, but that of *matter*? I suppose the sentient principle in man to be the brain itself, and not any *invisible substance* residing in the brain, and capable of subsisting when the brain is destroyed. Now of what has the brain been always said to consist, but *matter*, another species indeed from that of the dust of the ground, but still comprised under the same common appellation of *matter*? In what other manner than that which I have chosen, is it possible to rectify the mistakes of men? To call matter by the name of *spirit* might tend to give them an idea that my opinions were, in fact, the same with theirs, though expressed in different words; and by this means, I might screen myself from their
 censure;

censure; but I should only *deceive*, and should not *instruct* them at all.

In this manner too many christian preachers, and writers, adopting the phraseology of the Athanasian system, pass for orthodox, without, as they think, any violation of truth. But what accrues from this conduct? No advantage to the cause of *truth*; nothing but the mere *safety of the preacher, or writer*.

This, Sir, is not my object. I have hitherto pursued a different plan, and have seen no reason to repent of it. Upon this general principle, I have chosen to say that *man is wholly material*, rather than *wholly spiritual*, though both the terms were in my option.

You must give me leave to close this letter with some notice of a passage of yours to me, which is in the same strain with many others, and of which we have but too many examples in such writers as Voltaire
and

and Mr. Hume. You say *, “ As to your
 “ concern for the conversion of infidels, I
 “ look upon it as the cant of a philosophi-
 “ cal crusader, and am sorry I cannot coin-
 “ cide with you in your projected concilia-
 “ tion of the *rational truths* of philosophy,
 “ with the *mysterious truths* of christianity.
 “ I am apprehensive that it is impossible,
 “ without endangering the cause of both,
 “ to bring them into too close a contact.”
 In a note †, you add, “ It is a moot point
 “ with me, whether the really thinking and
 “ intelligent philosophers, whom Dr. Priest-
 “ ley wishes to convert, are greater infidels,
 “ in their present state of unbelief, than
 “ they would be, if converted by him into
 “ rational christians.”

Now I must take it for granted, that a man of much less discernment than you, cannot but be sensible, that no proposition can be *true* and *false* at the same time, or true with respect to philosophy, and false with respect to theology, or *vice versa*; so that if what is called a *mystery in christianity*,

* P. 489.

† Ibid.

be really a *falsehood in philosophy*, *i. e.* reducible to a contradiction, the belief of it must be abandoned altogether, at any hazard; and the scheme of religion that necessarily supposes it to be true must be confessed to be ill founded, and an imposition on mankind.

If, for example, *bread and wine*, philosophically, *i. e.* strictly and justly considered, cannot be *flesh and blood*, the popish doctrine of *transubstantiation* cannot be true. So also if *one* cannot be *three*, or *three*, *one*, mathematically considered, neither can the Athanasian doctrine of the *Trinity* be true. It certainly, therefore, behoves every rational christian to prove the consistency of the articles of his faith with true philosophy and the nature of things. This is the only method of effectually silencing such unbelievers as, with the low view of imposing on the weakest christians, pretend to believe christianity, at the same time that they maintain it is *not founded on argument*; thinking to lose no character with men of sense, like themselves, who will easily perceive the
design

design with which such absurd professions are made, and will be ready to join in the laugh at the credulity of those who are taken with them. If I were really an unbeliever, I think I should not scruple to avow it, rather than debase my mind by such paltry evasions. But it must be owned, that an unbeliever has not the same cause for a *strict attachment to truth*, that a christian has.

I am, Sir,

Your very humble servant,

CALNE,
June 1778.

J. PRIESTLEY.

To Mr. WHITEHEAD.

S I R,

AN attack from a person of your religious persuasion is a thing that is new to me; and as I have frequently mentioned your people with respect, and have always had very agreeable connexions with individuals of your body, it would have been a real satisfaction to me to have found that, even in their *opposition* to me, they were respectable; and therefore to have had it in my power to speak as handsomely of you *all*, as I have hitherto done. However, though an individual has shewn that want of civility and candour, which I had thought inseparable from all Quakers, and, also too little acquaintance with his subject, I shall by no means impute these faults to the whole body to which you belong; many of whom I know to be equally distinguished for their candour and knowledge.

S 2

You

You know, Sir, I presume, that I profess to believe in a *God*, a *providence*, and a *future state*, in the *divine mission of Christi*, and the *authority of the scriptures*. I have written not a little in the direct defence of these principles, and I hope my general character and conduct does not give the lie to my profession. Why then should you suppose me not to be *sincere*, and to be *secretly undermining* these great principles of religion? Might not I, if I were so disposed, retort the same surmises and calumnies respecting you? You are certainly at liberty to urge me with what you apprehend to be the real consequences of my doctrine, but this you might do without intimating, as you frequently do, that I was *apprized* of the immoral and dangerous consequences of my principles, and wished to propagate them *on that account*.

“Materialism,” you say*, “must terminate in Atheism;” and † “The doc-

* P. 163.

† P. 90.

“ trine

“ trine of materialism must be attended
“ with the most destructive and fatal con-
“ sequences. It supposes that this life is
“ our only place of existence, and by this
“ means takes away all confidence in God,
“ all hope of future rewards, and fear of
“ punishment. It tears up all religion by
“ the very roots, and renders all our moral
“ powers and faculties wholly useless, or
“ supposes them to be mere creatures of
“ education and human policy. In short,
“ its language is, *let us eat and drink, for*
“ *to-morrow we die.*” You are pleased to
add, “ I do not say that Dr. Priestley will
“ *directly* defend these principles, or that he
“ *altogether* believes them to be the conse-
“ quences of his doctrine.” This how-
ever, is an insinuation, that, though not
altogether, I do *in part* believe them to be
the consequences of my doctrine; and other
passages in your work sufficiently shew, that
you think me capable of advancing and sup-
porting these principles, even though I
should be altogether persuaded of their hor-
rid consequences.

“ It must be owned,” you say *, “ that
 “ our author shews no great delicacy re-
 “ specting the character of the sacred pen-
 “ men. He very freely, though indirectly,
 “ bespatters them with dirt ; from whence
 “ one might naturally suspect, that he owes
 “ them no very good will. Professions of
 “ this kind,” you say †, “ from one who
 “ professes to believe the gospel, looks so
 “ much like a *feigned friendship*, in order
 “ to deliver it more securely into the hands
 “ of the deists, that it will not fail to re-
 “ cal to memory the treatment of our
 “ Lord by one of his professed disciples, to
 “ which, with respect to the gospel revel-
 “ tion, it bears a striking resemblance.
 “ There,” you say ‡, “ is an end of all
 “ scripture authority at once, which per-
 “ haps would not be very disagreeable to
 “ this writer.” Lastly you scruple not to
 say §, “ I should not wonder to hear this
 “ learned gentleman, armed cap-a-pee, with
 “ logic and philosophy, represent his Lord
 “ and Saviour as a greater deceiver than

* P. 108. † P. 110. ‡ P. 112. § P. 106.

“ Ma-

“ Mahomet. To such miserable and profane shifts, may rash reasoning bring an unguarded man.”

For the honour of the christian name, and of the particular profession to which you belong, I hope that, on reflection, yourself, or at least your friends, will blush for these things. In the preceding quotation, I hope, Sir, you will be thought to have given a very unfair account of my *moral principles and views*; let us now see whether you be any better acquainted with the *professed design* of my work, and the *nature of the argument*.

“ The great object in view,” you say *, “ it seems, in contriving and modelling these enquiries into matter and spirit, was to lay a foundation for the better support of *Arianism*.” Now, Sir, so much are you mistaken, that the great object in view was the very reverse of what you suppose, viz. the radical overturning of

* P. 171.

the system of Arianism, by proving the absurdity, and explaining the origin, of the doctrines of a *soul*, and of *pre-existence*, which are necessarily supposed in the Arian system; and a very great part of my work is, not indirectly, but *openly*, and both *really*, and *by name*, an attack upon Arianism, and both what is called the *high* and the *low Arian hypothesis*, which I consider separately.

Let us now see the light in which my account of *the opinions of the christian Fathers* has happened to strike you; and in this you are no less unfortunate. “The thing he proposes to prove,” you say*, “is that the christian Fathers believed that the soul can have no existence separate from the body, that thought and consciousness may be the result of an organized system of matter. Consequently,” you say †, “our author’s grand boast, that the apostles and primitive Fathers thought with him, that the soul is material and mortal, vanishes into air; where, perhaps, this ex-

* P. 140.

† P. 149.

“ perimental

“ perimental philosopher may be able to
 “ make more of it than we can do in these
 “ lower regions.”

Again *, after reciting the opinion of Cl. Mamertus, who says of the soul, that it is neither *extended*, nor *in place*, you say,
 “ These seem to me most extraordinary as-
 “ sertions, to prove that the soul is mate-
 “ rial, and dies with the body. It re-
 “ quires more skill in Logic than I am
 “ master of to find this conclusion in ei-
 “ ther of the premises.”

A very extraordinary conclusion indeed; but, if that had been my idea, it would not have been more extraordinary than your mistake of the whole drift of my argument in this business. I had asserted that the idea of *refined spirituality*, maintained, I find, by yourself, was unknown to all antiquity; and therefore I have shown, that though, according to the notion of the heathen philosophers, the soul was considered as a substance distinct from the body, being a de-

* P. 148.

tached

tached part of the great soul of the universe, it had the property of *extension*, and was, in reality, what we should now call a *more refined kind of matter*; and that true *spiritualism* was introduced gradually; but, if any more distinct æra can be fixed on, it was that of this very Mamertus.

I farther prove, that, according to the true system of revelation, though the sentient and thinking principle may be spoken of as distinct from the other functions of the man, it was always supposed to reside in some part of his body, and to be inseparable from it. For the sacred writers never speak of the soul as in one place, and the body in another; and it was not till the introduction of the heathen philosophy into christianity, that it was imagined that the soul retained its perceptivity and activity while the body was in the grave. Of this, I presume, I have given sufficient proof.

You are pleased, indeed, to alledge *, as a proof that the early christians thought

* P. 144.

dif-

differently, a passage in the epistle of Polycarp, who says that “ Paul, and the rest of “ the apostles, are in the place appointed “ for them, *παρα τω κυριω*, with the Lord.” But if you had attended to the Greek, you would have perceived that this is not the *necessary* sense of the passage, and Archbishop Wake renders it “ the place that “ was due to them, from the Lord.” Indeed, had you been sufficiently conversant with *ecclesiastical history*, you would have known, that it was not till many centuries after the time of Polycarp, that any christian thought that the separate soul, whether sentient or not, was in any other place than that which is distinguished by the term *hades*. It was universally thought that good men were not *with God and Christ* till after the resurrection, which is clearly the scripture doctrine.

Our Lord says, *I will come again, and receive you unto myself, that where I am, ye may be also* *. Here is a plain limitation of the time when the disciples of our Lord,

* John xvi. 3.

and

and even the apostles themselves, were to be admitted to his presence, and live with him, viz. at his return to raise the dead, and not before.

What you say on the subject of the state of the soul between death and the resurrection, is too trifling to deserve a particular notice. As you seem not to have given sufficient attention to this subject, I would take the liberty to recommend to your careful perusal, what the excellent Bishop of Carlisle has written on it, Archdeacon Blackburne's *Historical View of this Controversy*; the Dissertation prefixed to *Alexander's Commentary on 1 Cor. xv.* and a summary of the principal arguments in the third part of my *Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion*.

It is upon this subject that you note, with great triumph, that I have quoted as one, two similar passages in the book of *Revelation*. Another person would have supposed this to have happened through *inadvertency*, and not, as you will have it, *with design*.
It

It must have been infatuation to have done this in a work so inviting of criticism as mine is. A new edition of the work will shew you that my argument loses nothing by the rectification of that mistake.

I shall mention one more mistake of my meaning, though in a thing of no great consequence. "It is a great mistake," you say *, "to suppose with Dr. Priestley, and some other philosophers, that there is some unknown substance in material nature, distinct from the properties of solidity and extension." Now what I have said, and repeated many times, is, that when all the properties of substance are taken away, the substance itself is gone; and that the terms, *substance*, *essence*, &c. &c. are merely a convenience in speech.

You triumph exceedingly in my speaking of the *smallest particles of matter* being resolved into others still *smaller*. For an explanation of this, I refer you to my letter to Dr. Kenrick.

* P. 10.

Your

Your strictures on the subject of *personal identity* I freely leave to have their full effect on the minds of our readers, without any apprehension of the consequence.

Before I close this letter, I shall briefly mention a few particulars, which show that you are not sufficiently acquainted with the *state of opinions* for a controversial writer on such subjects as those of the *Disquisitions*.

“Nor do I presume,” you say *, “that any philosopher will contend for an earlier and earlier existence of this world, and the creatures in it, *ad infinitum*.” Now, Sir, many philosophers and divines maintain the very doctrine that you think not to exist. It was the opinion of the Platonists, it is asserted by Dr. Hartley, it is what I have given in my *Institutes*, and I believe it is that of Dr. Price, who is far from thinking with me on the subject of the *Disquisitions*.

* P. 25.

“Our

“ Our learned author,” you say*, “ indeed, affects to disbelieve the continual flux of the particles of the human body ; but this I presume no one will seriously deny, who has a competent knowledge of its structure and œconomy.”

Now many persons, Sir, and even Dr. Watts, whom you quote with so much respect, seriously believed that there are parts of the body, some *stamina*, that never change.

There is another thing that you take for granted, in which I believe you are quite singular, and it is, indeed, sufficiently curious. You say †, that “ where body is, space is necessarily excluded,” and from this extraordinary supposition you draw many curious inferences, in your reasoning about the nature of spirit, and of the deity. Now I have heard of space being *occupied*, but never of its being *excluded* before.

I must not quite conclude without acknowledging myself obliged to you for

* P. 84.

† P. 167.

furnish-

furnishing me with a proof, which you will find, by Dr. Price's remarks, was in some measure wanting, of its being the *real opinion* of any person, that *spirit bears no relation to space*. You do it in the amplest manner, and build upon it your argument against the materiality of the human soul. According to you Dr. Clarke, Dr. Price, and others, who maintain the *locality*, and consequently the *extension* of spirit, are as much materialists as myself. I leave them and you to dispute that point; and you may imagine I shall not feel unpleasantly in the situation of a *spectator*. It will give me some respite, and I shall expect to derive some advantage from the issue of the contest, in whose favour soever it may be.

“No corporeal substance,” you say*,
 “whatever can possibly be the seat of sen-
 sation; for all of them have extension,
 and must be of some figure or form.
 On the same principles†, we may ex-
 plain the omnipresence of God, not by

* P. 63.

† P. 128.

exten-

“ extension through all bodies, as this writer
 “ seems to believe, which is an idea so gross
 “ that it deserves a name which, for the sake
 “ of the author, I shall not bestow upon it.”

Now, as you have not scrupled to make use of the terms *materialist*, and *atheist* in this controversy, I have really a good deal of curiosity to know what dread name it is, that, *out of regard to me*, you suppress the mention of. If it be too dreadful for the *public ear*, could you not favour me with the intimation of it in a private letter? I shall communicate it to my friend Dr. Price, whom it concerns as much as it does myself. Dr. Clarke, you will also find, and in the opinion of Dr. Price, all the most distinguished immaterialists, will fall under this dread censure. But, being so many of us, materialists and immaterialists, we shall bear it the better; for bodies, and large companies of men, we know, are not easily affected either by *shame* or *fear*.

I am, Sir,

Your very humble servant,

CALNE,
 June 1778.

J. PRIESTLEY.

VOL. II.

T

To

To Dr. HORSELEY.

DEAR SIR,

I THINK myself particularly happy that a person of your abilities, and mathematical and philosophical knowledge, has vouchsafed to allude to my work, though only in a *sermon*, as it gives me an opportunity of explaining myself more fully with respect to the state of the question concerning *liberty* and *necessity*, and likewise of showing that the *sect* of necessarians, though almost *every where spoken against*, is more numerous and respectable than is generally imagined; for that you, Sir, belong to it as much as I do; with this only difference, that you chuse to make use of one set of phrases, and I of another.

It is impossible for me to express in stronger terms than you do, the absolute certainty of every determination of the will

T 2

of

of man, as depending upon the circumstances he is in, and the motives presented to him. "A moral motive and a mechanical force," you say*, "are equally certain causes, each of its proper effect. A moral motive," you say, "is what is more significantly called the final cause, and can have no influence but with a being that proposes to itself an end, chooses means, and thus puts itself in action. It is true that while this is my end, and while I conceive these to be the means, a definite action will as certainly follow that definite choice and judgment of my mind, provided I be free from all external restraint and impediment, as a determinate motion will be excited in a body by a force applied in a given direction. There is, in both cases, an equal certainty of the effect."

Having granted this, it is not possible that you and I can have any difference that is not merely *verbal*. Our *ideas* are precisely the same; nor have I indeed any ob-

* P. 10.

jection

jection to your *language*, in any sense in which it can be consistent with the above assertions.

You are too good a mathematician to require being told, that, if every determination of the mind of man certainly depends upon preceding causes, whether the causes be moral, or physical, it is not possible that any determination, or consequently that any event, in which men are concerned, could have been otherwise than it *has been, is, or is to be*; or that the Divine Being, who, as you justly say, “knows things by their
 “causes, as being himself the first cause,
 “the source of power and activity to all
 “other causes,” should not have *intended* every thing to be just as it is. On this ground only can you affirm, as you do, that
 “to him every thing that shall ever be is
 “at all times infinitely more certain, than
 “any thing, either past or present, can be
 “to any man,” &c. This, I say, you need not be told. It is an immediate and necessary inference from your own principle.

Indeed, it is little more than repeating the same thing in other words.

You even apply these principles to a case of the greatest virtue that was ever exerted by man, viz. the voluntary sufferings and death of Christ, and likewise to a case of the greatest wickedness, viz. that of his enemies in voluntarily inflicting those sufferings upon him. No person can express this with more perspicuity or energy than you have done.

“ Now therefore,” you say *, “ he begins to shew them” (his disciples) “ that he *must* go to Jerusalem, and, after much malicious persecution from the leaders of the Jewish people, he *must* be killed. The form of expression here is very remarkable in the original, and it is well preserved in our English translation. He *must* go, he *must* suffer, he *must* be killed, he *must* be raised again on the third day. All these things were fixed and deter-

* P. 3.

“ mined

“ mined—must inevitably be—nothing could
 “ prevent them—and yet the greater part of
 “ them were of a kind that might *seem* to
 “ depend intirely upon man’s free-agency.
 “ To go, or not to go to Jerufalem, was in
 “ his own power, and the perfecution he
 “ met with there, arifing from the folly
 “ and the malice of ignorant and wicked
 “ men, furely depended upon the human
 “ will; yet, by the form of the fentence,
 “ thefe things are included under the fame
 “ *Necelfity of Event* as that which was evi-
 “ dently an immediate effect of divine
 “ power, without the concurrence of any
 “ other caufe, the refurrection of Jefus from
 “ the dead. The words which in the ori-
 “ ginal exprefs the *going*, the *suffering*, the
 “ *being killed*, the *being raifed again*, are
 “ equally fubject to the verb which answers
 “ to the word *must* of our language, and in
 “ its proper meaning predicates *necelfity*.
 “ As he *must* be raifed on the third day, fo
 “ he *must* go, he *must* fuffer, he *must* be
 “ killed. Every one of thefe events, his
 “ going to Jerufalem, his fuffering, and his
 “ death there, and that thefe fufferings, and

T 4

“ that

“ that death should be brought about by
 “ the malice of the elders and chief priests
 “ and scribes ; every one of these things
 “ is plainly announced, as no less unal-
 “ terably fixed, than the resurrection of
 “ our Saviour, or the time of his resur-
 “ rection, that it was to happen on the
 “ third day.”

If then the virtuous determinations of
 Christ, and the wicked determinations of
 his enemies, were equally necessary (for I
 have no other idea to the word *must be*,
 and indeed you yourself use them as sy-
 nonymous) every other act of virtue, or act
 of vice, is equally necessary, or *must be*, and
 nothing but a miracle, or an arbitrary in-
 fringement of the laws of nature, can pre-
 vent its taking place. Though you do not
 chuse to call this a *physical*, but a *moral*
 necessity, you allow it to be a *real* ne-
 cessity, arising from the operation of the
 established laws of nature, implying an im-
 possibility of the thing being otherwise
 than it is, which is all that I wish you to
 grant.

For

For any man to have acted differently from what he did, in any given case, he must have been differently disposed at the time, or must have had different views of things present to his mind; neither of which, properly speaking, depends upon himself. For though it does so *immediately*, it does not do so *ultimately*: for since every particular determination depends upon his immediately preceding circumstances, it necessarily follows that the whole chain of his determinations and actions depends upon his *original make*, and *original circumstances*. And who is our maker but God? or who is it that disposes of us but the same God?

You could not, dear Sir, have written what you have done, if you had not felt, and enjoyed this most important truth. Let us do it freely and without reserve, let us not scruple to express it in its proper language, and let us openly acknowledge, and cheerfully embrace, all the fair consequences of it. I need not with you, Sir, make any encomium on our common
prin-

principles. The doctrine of necessity (moral necessity, if you chuse to call it so) contains, or implies, all that the heart of man can wish. It leads us to consider ourselves; and every thing else as at the uncontrolled disposal of the greatest and best of beings; that, strictly speaking, nothing does, or can, go wrong; that all *retrograde motions*, in the moral as well as in the natural world, are only *apparent*, not *real*. Being under this infallible guidance, our final destination is certain and glorious. In the language of Pope.

All nature is but art, unknown to thee;
 All chance, direction, which thou canst not see;
 All discord, harmony, not understood;
 All partial evil, universal good;
 And, spite of pride, in erring reason's spite,
 One truth is clear, *whatever is, is right.*

Let us now consider why it is that you object to the term *physical*, as applied to the causes of human actions. For I am ready to disuse it, if it imply any thing more than we both agree in maintaining. The word itself is derived from *quærit*, *nature*, and therefore

fore literally rendered, signifies *agreeable to nature*, or the *laws of nature*. A physical cause, therefore, is simply that which, according to the established laws of nature, will produce a given effect; and of course respects the laws to which the mind is subject, as well as those by which the external world is governed, both being equally within the compass of *nature*. I therefore apply it to both cases indiscriminately.

If you say the *operations*, and therefore the *laws*, are of a very different nature, I readily acknowledge it. For, with respect to this, it is impossible that we can really differ. The compass of nature is great, and comprizes very various things. *Chemistry*, for instance, and common *mechanics* are very different things; and accordingly we have different *kinds of laws*, or *rules*, by which to express, and explain, their operations; but still they are equally branches of *Physics*. So also though the *phenomena*, and consequently the *laws of the mind*, are different from those of the *body*, that is no
suffi-

sufficient reason why we should not comprize them under the same general term of *physics*. However, if you dislike the word, in the extensive application in which I use it, I am very well content to use it in your more restrained sense, and will call the things that influence the mind *moral*, and not physical causes. Only allow that there *are* laws, and causes, by which the mind is truly and properly *influenced*, producing certain definite effects in definite circumstances, and I shall not quarrel with you for the sake of a term.

You say *, that I confound moral and physical necessity, or, to use your own words, that “when I represent the influence of moral motives, as arising from
 “ a physical necessity, the very same with
 “ that which excites and governs the motions of the inanimate creation, I confound nature’s distinctions, and contradict the very principles I would seem to
 “ have established; and that the source of

* P. 10.

“ the

“ the mistake is, that I imagine a similitude between things which admit of no comparifon.”

Now, Sir, I will allow as much difference as you *can* fuppofe between moral and physical caufes. Inanimate matter, as the pen that I write with, is not capable of being influenced by *motives*, nor is the *hand* that holds the pen, but the *mind* that directs both. I think I diftinguifh thefe things better by the terms *voluntary* and *involuntary*; but thefe are mere *words*, and I make no comparifon between them, or between moral and physical caufes, but in that very refpect in which you yourfelf acknowledge that they agree, *i. e.* the *certainty* with which they produce their refpective effects. And this is the proper foundation of all the *necelfity* that I afcribe to human actions. My conclufion, that men could not, in any given cafe, act otherwife than they do, is not at all affected by the *terms* by which we diftinguifh the laws and caufes that refpect the mind from thofe which refpect the external world. That there

there are *any laws*, and that there are *any causes*, to which the mind is subject, is all that my argument requires. Give me the thing, and I will readily give you the name,

Again, you distinguish between *efficient* and *final* causes, and say that, by means of the latter, a person *puts himself in motion*. But still, if it be true, as you allow, that, notwithstanding this, a definite act will certainly follow a definite choice and judgment of the mind, there is, in no case, any more than *one way* in which the mind can put itself in motion, or only one direction that it can take, which is all the necessity that I contend for. I chuse to say that *motives determine the mind*, whereas you say that the *mind determines itself according to the motives*; but, in both cases, the determination itself is the very same, and we both agree that it *could not have been different*. Our difference, therefore, is merely verbal, and cannot possibly be any thing more.

Turn over this subject, Sir, in your own mind as you please, you will find that one
who

who controverts the doctrine of necessity, has the choice of no more than *two things*. He must either say that, in a given situation of mind, with respect to disposition and motives, the determination is *definite*, *i. e.* agreeable to some general rule, or that it is *indefinite*, *i. e.* subject to no rule at all. If the former be admitted, which is what you allow, you are, to all intents and purposes, a necessarian. You may (unknown to yourself) conceal your principles under the cover of some specious and ambiguous phraseology, but you certainly maintain the *thing*. If, on the other hand, you say, that the determination is *indefinite*, you are very sensible that you suppose *an effect without a cause*, which is impossible. This side of the dilemma, therefore, you carefully avoid. In short, Sir, there is no choice in the case, but of the doctrine of necessity (disguised, perhaps, under some other name) or absolute nonsense. There is no possibility of finding any medium.

Incidit in Scyllam qui vult vitare Charybdim.

You

You are pleased, Sir, to call philosophical necessity the doctrine of the *subtle moderns*, and that of predestination that of their *more simple ancestors*, saying, that we subtle moderns, are *deeply versed in physics*, and maintain the regular operation of *second causes*; and you candidly acknowledge, that we are both actuated by the *same humble spirit of resigned devotion*. This, Sir, is frank and generous, and I hope true. I only object to your characterizing us necessarians as *subtle*, when, in reality, Sir, our doctrine is the plainest thing in the world, and it requires no small degree of subtlety to believe any thing else.

What are your distinctions between things *moral* and *physical*, *efficient* and *final*, *certain* and *necessary*, those relating to *self-determination*, or *self-motion*, &c. &c. &c. but *subtleties*, to which we have no recourse. We are content to call all things by their common names. With us laws are laws, and causes causes. If the laws are invariable, and the causes certain in their operation (and without this they are, in reality, *no laws*,

laws, and no causes at all) we say that all that follows is *necessary*, or what *could not but be*. What is there, Sir, of *subtlety* in all this?

As you are a man of undoubted sense, and candour, and particularly well versed in mathematical and philosophical knowledge, I doubt not you will carefully attend to these few plain considerations; and I am confident that, with the honest mind that I believe you to be possessed of, you will henceforth avow yourself to be what, without hitherto knowing it, you really are, a believer in “the great and glorious, though
“unpopular doctrine of *philosophical necessity*.”

I am,

With the greatest respect,

Dear Sir,

Yours, very sincerely,

GALNE,
June 1778.

J. PRIESTLEY.

VOL. II.

U

P.S.

P. S. I shall take it as a particular favour, if you will oblige me and the public with your *second thoughts* on this subject. I have had, and expect, so many weak and hasty answers, that, I own, I am eager to lay hold of a man who is equal to the discussion of the subject, and especially one who is, at the same time, truly liberal and candid. The doctrine of Necessity is very far from being well understood by the generality of scholars, and it is certainly of great consequence to have their attention drawn to it. I shall be happy, likewise, to walk with you over *all* the ground marked out in the *Disquisitions*, with respect to which I perceive that you hold a system very different from mine.

APPEN-

A P P E N D I X,

CONTAINING

A FARTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE OBJECTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY, AS FAVOURING INDOLENCE, AND VICE.

NOTWITHSTANDING all that I have advanced in answer to the objection that has been made to the doctrine of necessity, as *leading to indolence, indifference, and even vice*, some persons, I find, wish I had been still more particular; the popular cry against it still being, "Why should I exert myself, if my fate be determined? What *must be, must be*, and cannot be prevented." I do not know that I can urge any thing more satisfactory than I have already done in answer to this objection, and which I think abundantly suf-

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ficient

ficient for the purpose; but I will try another view of the subject.

On the principle of the doctrine of necessity, man is a machine, moved by motives, as ships are by the winds. That *within himself*, by which he is subject to be acted upon, are his *appetites* and *passions*, which resemble the *sails* of the ship. If these be raised, and the wind blow, the ship moves of course. Thus, also, man being furnished by nature with appetites and passions, if the objects that are adapted to gratify them come in view, his *desires* are necessarily excited, and he is prompted to exert himself, in order to attain them. In this manner, it will not be denied, mankind in general are *put in motion*, as we may say, and thus is the business of the world carried on.

Now, by becoming *necessarians* we do not cease to be *men*. We still retain every natural spring or principle of action, and occasions of calling them forth occur to us

as much as to others. All the difference that can take place in consequence of becoming necessarians is, that we are thereby *apprized* of this mechanical structure of our minds. But it is impossible that this circumstance should make us abate our endeavours to gain any favourite object, unless either the object should become less a favourite one with us, or we should see that our endeavours were less necessary to gain it. But neither of these things takes place.

It cannot be denied but that, feeling as men, our *objects* are the same with those of other men, and a necessarian is so far from thinking that his *endeavours* are less strictly connected with his *end*, that he sees them to be more so; every thing in nature being, in his persuasion, an indissolubly connected chain of *causes and effects*; so that if any one link, his own endeavours among the rest, be interrupted, his object is unattainable. It may, therefore, be expected, that a necessarian, having any favourite object in view, will be more attentive to the means that he believes to be absolutely requisite

to gain his end, than other men will be. And this is certainly the case, as far as a man is a *practical necessarian*, or reduces to practice the knowledge he has of the mechanical structure of his own mind, and of every thing else in nature.

It is said the *final issue* of his endeavours is *fixed*. But it is only fixed *as connected with his endeavours*, and he has no means of *knowing* how it is fixed, but by its *supposed* connexion with his endeavours; so that the moment he begins to slacken his endeavours, he necessarily begins to think that the end is not fixed as he wished it to be, he himself putting an effectual bar to its taking place. He, therefore, will not slacken his endeavours, unless he either ceases to desire the end, or begins to believe that his endeavours are not necessary to gain it, which is the case with the Calvinists. This, at least, would be the case with them, if other principles, more consonant to nature, did not intervene, and check the natural operation of their religious tenets. But if Calvinists are seldom able to act up
to

to their principles, which really favour indolence, on what grounds can it be apprehended that necessarians should give way to indolence, when their principles lead them from it?

If it was possible for a necessarian to consider his fate as depending on the cast of a die, or any thing else equally *independent of himself*, and unconnected with his efforts, he might feel himself disposed to sit with folded hands, in patient or anxious expectation of the event. But surely when his own opinion of his situation is so very different, it must be impossible that he should *feel* as if it was the same. An objection which goes upon the idea of things so very different, and *apprehended* to be so very different, having the same effect on any human mind, necessarian or not necessarian, cannot be well founded.

If it be said that the supposition of *certainty in the event*, universally considered, will preclude all endeavours, it will affect

all mankind, necessarians and those who are not necessarians, without distinction; because, admitting the *divine prescience*, every thing future is absolutely certain in the eye of God. Or, without any respect to prescience, as *time* and the *course of nature* are continually going on, every thing must have some termination or other; and this, whether known to any being or not, may be considered as *certain in itself*. But it is not a fact, that any person's endeavours are at all affected by such views and speculations as these; because while the thing is *depending*, and the event is *unknown to ourselves*, the expectation of it cannot affect us one way more than another. If it could have any operation, it would be that of equal weights in opposite scales, and therefore could not incline us either *to* or *from* any pursuit. In this situation, therefore, we are actuated by our natural desires, just as if no such certainty as this had any existence. A thing altogether *unknown* cannot possibly have influence; because it is the *knowledge* of it that gives it all the influence it can have. It is impossible, therefore,

in any case, that a regard to what will be future should affect our conduct, unless we knew what the future event will be; and therefore this knowledge is wisely concealed from us.

Let me exemplify this reasoning by my own pursuits. I may be supposed to wish to ascertain some particular fact in natural philosophy; this wish, arising from my constitution and the usual objects of my attention. In speculating on the subject, it occurs to me, that, by a very easy and simple experiment, I cannot fail to ascertain the fact in question. So far, all my readers will say, the process is mechanical and necessary; for *volition* and *action* are not concerned. But some, pretending to feel for me, will say I may stop here, and never proceed to make the experiment, because it is in itself certain either that I shall ascertain this fact, or that I shall not do it. If I *shall not*, nothing that I can do will answer; and if I absolutely *shall*, nothing that I can neglect to do will prevent it.

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He must, I think, be a very poor logician, who does not perceive a flaw in this chain of reasoning. In the first place, I do not know which of the two possible events is that which *will be future*, and therefore I cannot be affected as I should be if I did know which of them it was. If this consideration could have any weight, it would incline me to *act*, and *not to act* with equal force, and therefore leave me as much at liberty as if it had never interfered at all. In the second place, I do perfectly well know, that unless I make the experiment I never can make the discovery; and this circumstance alone would be a proof that I should not make it. But, on the contrary, if I make the experiment, which depends upon myself, I cannot fail to obtain the knowledge I want.

With this state of mind, which necessarily arises from my situation, let any person say, whether it be possible for me to stop without making the experiment, unless the object of it should suddenly become indifferent

ferent to me, any more than I could stop in any other part of the process, in which *direct volitions* were not at all concerned. Having, therefore, all the necessary materials, and a proper apparatus at hand, necessarian as I am, I shall certainly take the first opportunity of doing what I had projected; the connexion between the *desire* and the *action* not being at all broken by any consideration of an unknown future event.

This also must be the case with respect to any other event that depends upon my endeavours or volitions. If I see my child struggling for life in the water, it is impossible I should refrain from endeavouring to save him, unless the life of my child should suddenly become indifferent to me, or I should perceive that all my endeavours could avail nothing to relieve him. I cannot conceive how any speculations about the event being *previously certain*, one way or the other should influence my conduct, so long as that certainty is unknown to me. Let a person consider this case in every possible

sible light, and he must be satisfied, that there must be some fallacy or other in any chain of reasoning, in consequence of which it may be pretended that a father should be restrained from endeavouring to save the life of his child.

The like may be observed with respect to the education of my child. It is certainly known to God, and therefore a thing certain in itself, that he will be either virtuous or vicious, a credit or a disgrace to me. But can the knowledge of this make me indifferent about his education, so long as I believe that my instructions have a necessary connexion with his future conduct. This, though certain in itself, is altogether uncertain with respect to me; but I know that if I conduct myself right, I shall most probably determine the event in my favour.

It may be said that, whatever becomes of myself, my schemes, or my children, the *final issue* is sure to be *right in itself*; being agree-

agreeable to the divine plan, which it is not in my power to defeat. Whether, therefore, this plan requires that myself, or my children, be happy or miserable, I ought to acquiesce in it; leaving all concern about that to him who is the best judge concerning it, and who has the appointment of it.

But so long as it is *unknown to me* whether the general plan of providence requires my happiness or my misery, it can operate no more than the idea of *future certainty* in general; and therefore could not incline me either to negligence or to vigilance with respect to my conduct. For if my negligence may favour the divine plan, it may also be inconsistent with it. In this case, therefore, my regard for myself and my children must operate uncontrolled, just as if no idea whatever about the divine plan had interfered. Besides, the general scheme of providence being manifestly in favour of virtue and happiness, the antecedent presumption is, that it requires my virtue and hap-

happiness, and also that of my children, rather than our misery, though this catastrophe *may* be consistent with it.

There is, moreover, a fallacy in the general expression, that it is *not in our power* to obstruct the divine purposes. That no man, by setting himself against God, can succeed, so as to carry his own schemes against those of his Maker, is true; and a great and comfortable truth it is. But to say that human endeavours and exertions are not *necessary* to the divine purposes, is to say that the Divine Being never employs the volitions and exertions of men to gain his purposes, which is far from being true. And if these be necessary means to gain his ends, those ends certainly could not be gained, at least so well gained, without them; and therefore there is likewise a sense in which, though it may be strictly true, that it is not in the power of man to *obstruct* the designs of God, yet that it is in the power of man to *promote* the designs of God; and the reflection that we are doing
so

so is a great satisfaction to a virtuous mind, when we are acting such a part, as, from the general plan of providence, we have reason to conclude that we are favouring it, not indirectly, as we may be doing by our vice and misery, but directly and properly, by our virtue and happiness.

Since I have heard this objection to the doctrine, I am very frequently urged, and by in no respect abated. In respect, I have rather flatter myself that my great system to which I belong belongs upon by more just and enlarged, I feel a growing satisfaction in my contemplation of it, just and proper objects of pursuit are at least not less frequently occurring to me, and I feel perhaps an increasing ardor in the prosecution of them. Feeling this in myself, I cannot help concluding that other persons must feel the same; and therefore I am so far from apprehending any ill consequences from the doctrine, that I sincerely rejoice in finding so many profelytes continually making to it.

cerned in all particular winds. In like manner, no respect to any thing *future*, to any thing as *right in the plan of providence*, &c. &c. can possibly influence the mind to indolence or exertion, or to one mode of exertion in preference to another, so long as it is *unknown to us* what is to be future, or what is the plan of providence, &c. because while it is unknown, it bears no true relation to indolence or exertion; and a true relation to indolence or exertion is not true; and a true relation to indolence or exertion is not true; and a true relation to indolence or exertion is not true. But to all cases, all our endeavours and exertions are directed to the divine purposes, is to be true; and the Divine Being never employs the intentions and exertions of men to gain his purposes, which is far from being true. And if these be necessary means to gain his ends, those ends certainly could not be gained, at least so well gained, without them; and therefore there is likewise a sense in which, though it may be strictly true, that it is not in the power of man to obstruct the designs of God, yet that it is in the power of man to promote the designs of God; and the reflection that we are doing so

ceive the least tendency that it has to abate my ardor in any pursuit.

Before the various controversies in which I have been engaged on this subject, it may be supposed that these principles, not having been particularly attended to, might have no particular influence; but since I have given so much attention to them, I am conscious that my activity is in no respect abated. On the contrary, I rather flatter myself that my views of the great system to which I belong being thereby more just and enlarged, I feel a growing satisfaction in my contemplation of it, just and proper objects of pursuit are at least not less frequently occurring to me, and I feel perhaps an increasing ardor in the prosecution of them. Feeling this in myself, I cannot help concluding that other persons must feel the same; and therefore I am so far from apprehending any ill consequences from the doctrine, that I sincerely rejoice in finding so many profelytes continually making to it.

No person will be afraid of the doctrine of necessity but he who mistakes its nature and tendency, and therefore will not be a necessarian, and consequently will not be influenced by it at all; and the moment that any person becomes a necessarian, all these fears will vanish. A man of a bad disposition, and bad views, may *pretend* to avail himself of *any* principles, in excuse of his conduct; but with respect to the doctrine of necessity, it can be nothing more than a pretence, the thing itself having no such aspect. On the contrary, it will tend, as far as it is understood, to correct and enlarge a man's views of things, and consequently will tend to better his disposition, and to correct his conduct, as I think I have sufficiently shewn in the course of this treatise, and of my several defences of it.

I am very sensible that I have advanced nothing materially new in this *Appendix*; but I have acquitted myself in the best manner that I can with respect to a doctrine

trine which I value, by endeavouring to remove an impediment, which, without feeling myself, I find to be an obstruction to the hearty reception of it with others.

For the benefit of many persons who are altogether unprepared for the discussion of this subject, I shall conclude all that I shall probably ever write about it, with repeating what I observed at the very entrance on it, viz. in the Preface to my *Examination of the writings of Drs. Reid, Beattie, and Oswald*, and which has been fully verified in the course of this controversy.

“ As to the doctrine of *necessity*, it may
 “ possibly save some persons (who will
 “ think that I would not speak at random)
 “ not a little trouble, if I here give it as
 “ my opinion, that unless they apply them-
 “ selves to the study of this question pretty
 “ early in life, and in a regular study of
 “ Pneumatology and Ethics, they will
 “ never truly understand the subject, but
 “ will always be liable to be imposed
 X 2 upon,

“ upon, staggered, confounded, and terri-
“ fied, by the representations of the gene-
“ rality of writers. The common Armi-
“ nian doctrine of *free-will*, in the only
“ sense of the words in which mankind
“ generally use them, viz. *the power of*
“ *doing what we please, or will*, is the
“ doctrine of the scriptures, and is what
“ the philosophical doctrine of necessity
“ supposes; and farther than this no man
“ does, or need to look, in the common
“ conduct of life or of religion.”

A T A B L E

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T A B L E
O F T H E
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I N T H E

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