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The SECOND EDITION, Enlarged.

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
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A

COMPENDIUM of LOGIC.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

Of SIMPLE TERMS.

SECT. I.

THE Operations of the Mind are three, 1. *Simple Apprehension*, 2. *Judgment*, 3. *Discourse*.

1. *Simple Apprehension* is, The bare conceiving a Thing in the Mind.

2. *Judgment* is, The Mind's determining in itself, that the Things it conceives agree or disagree.

3. *Discourse* is, The Progress of the Mind from one Judgment to another.

But our Apprehension is apt to be *indistinct*, our Judgment *false*, our Discourse *inconclusive*. To prevent this, wise Men prescribed several Rules, which were at length collected into one Body; and termed *Logic*, or The Art of Reasoning.

SECT. II.

But we cannot exprefs to another, what paffes in our own Mind, any otherwife than by *Words:* It is therefore *by teaching us the proper Ufe of Words,* that *Logic* affifts the Mind, 1. To apprehend *diftinƐtly,* 2. To judge *truly,* 3. To difcourfe *conclufively.*

A Word, that expreffes *fimple Apprehenfion,* is called a *fimple Word;* one, that expreffes *Judgment,* a *complex,* or *compounded Word;* one, that expreffes *Difcourfe,* a *decomplex,* or *twice compounded one:* For every Argument is refolvable into *three Propofitions* or *Sentences;* and every Propofition contains *three Words* (in Senfe, if not in Number), 1. The *SubjeƐt,* or that of which fomething elfe is faid, 2. The *Predicate,* or that which is faid, and 3. The *Copulative,* that ftands between the SubjeƐt and Predicate, which are therefore called the *Terms* of the Propofition.

SECT. III.

The firft Part of Logic treats of *fimple Terms,* that is, of fuch Words as may *by themfelves* be the SubjeƐt or Predicate of a Propofition. Of thefe there are feveral Divifions; as,

1. A *fingular* Word, which expreffes one Thing only, as *Socrates:* A *common,* which expreffes many and each of them, as, a *Man.*

2. An *infinite* Word, to which the Particle *not* is prefixt, as, *not-a-Man,* which may imply any Thing befides: A *finite,* to which that Particle is not prefixt.

3. A *pofitive* Word, which expreffes a Thing as prefent: A *privative,* which expreffes its Abfence from a SubjeƐt capable of it: A *negative,* which expreffes its Abfence from a SubjeƐt not capable of it. So, *feeing,* fpoken of *a Man,* is a *pofitive* Word; *blind,* fpoken of *a Man,* is a *privative;* fpoken of a *Stone,* a *negative* Word.

4. An

4. An *univocal* Word, whose one Signification equally agrees to several Things, as *a Man:* An *equivocal,* whose different Significations agree equally, as *a Foot:* An *analogous,* whose one Signification agrees unequally, as *Knowledge,* applied to God and Man.

5. An *absolute* Word, which expresses a Thing considered as by itself, as *Justice:* A *connotative,* which expresses the same Thing as joined to another, as *just.*

An *absolute* Word, expressing a Thing as separate from its Subject, is also called *an abstract,* as *Justice:* And a *connotative,* expressing it as joined to a Subject, a *concrete* Word, as *just.*

Those *connotative* Words, which imply each other, are termed *Relatives,* as *a Father* and *a Son.*

6. *Consistent* Words, which may at the same Time be affirmed of the same Thing, as *cold* and *dry: Opposite,* which cannot, as *black* and *white.*

The *Opposition* of simple Terms is fourfold; 1. *Relative,* between *relative* Terms, as *a Father* and *a Son:* 2. *Contrary,* between *contrary* Terms, that is, *absolute* Words, which expel one another from a Subject capable of either, as *black* and *white:* 3. *Privative,* between a *privative* and a *positive* Word, as *seeing* and *blind:* 4. *Contradictory,* between a *positive* and a *negative* Word, as a *Man* and *not-a-Man.* This is the greatest of all Oppositions, as admitting of no *Medium;* neither a *Medium of Participation,* such as is *grey,* between *black* and *white;* nor a *Medium of Abnegation,* such as is *a Stone,* between *seeing* and *blind. Relative* Opposition (on the other Hand) is the least of all; for relative Terms are not Opposites, unless they are considered with respect to the same Thing.

Sect. IV.

An *univocal* Word is otherwise called a *predicable*, or a Word capable of being *predicated*, that is, spoken in the same Sense of several Things.

There are five Sorts of *predicable* Words, 1. A *Genus*, which is predicated of several Things as the common Part of their Essence, as an *Animal*. 2. A *Difference*, which is predicated of several Things as the distinguishing Part of their Essence, as *rational*. 3. A *Species*, which is predicated of several Things as their whole Essence, as *a Man*. 4. A *Property*, which is predicated of several Things as necessarily joined to their Essence, as *risible*. 5. An *Accident*, which is predicated of several Things as accidentally joined to their Essence, as *tall*, *short*.

Sect. V.

A *Genus* is either *the highest*, or a *subaltern:* A *Species* is either a *subaltern*, or the *lowest*. The *highest Genus* is that which never is a *Species*; the *lowest Species*, that which never is a *Genus:* A *subaltern Genus* or *Species*, is a Genus when predicated of a *lower Species*, as *Every Man is an Animal*; a Species when subjected to an *higher Genus*, as *Every Animal is a Substance.*

Wherefore, a *Difference* is either *generical*, which, added to the *Genus*, constitutes a *subaltern Species*, as *sensible:* Or *specific*, which constitutes the *lowest Species*, as *rational.*

A *Property* likewise is either *generical*, which is necessarily joined to the Essence of an *highest* or *subaltern Genus*, as *moveable:* Or *specific*, which is joined to that of a lowest Species, as *risible.*

But a Property is vulgarly said to be fourfold. 1. Such as belongs to one Species only, but not to every Individual
of

of it; as *To be a Grammarian.* 2. Such as belongs to every Individual of a Species, but not of that Species only, as *To have two Feet.* 3. Such as belongs to one Species and every Individual, but not always, as *To turn Grey-hair'd.* 4. Such as belongs to every Individual of one Species only, and that always, as *Risibility.* It is such a Property as this, which constitutes the *fourth* Predicable.

Sect. VI.

To *divide* a common Word is, To enumerate its several Significations. So he is said to *divide* the Word *Animal,* who says, It signifies either *a Man* or *a Brute.*

Division is therefore, A distinct Enumeration of the several Things which are signified by a common Word.

The Rules of Division are three :

1. Let the Members of the Division, severally contain *less* (be of a narrower Signification) than the Word divided: 2. Let them conjointly contain *neither more nor less* than the Divided: 3. Let them be *opposite,* i. e. not contained in each other.

Sect. VII.

Definition follows Division: It is, a Sentence explaining the Word defined: And is either *nominal,* which tells the Derivation of the Word; or *real,* which explains the Nature of the Thing. Again, a real Definition is either *accidental,* which assigns the Properties or Accidents of the Defined; or *essential,* which assigns those Parts that constitute the Essence of it. Lastly, An essential Definition is either *logical,* which assigns the Genus and Difference; or *physical,* which assigns the really distinct Parts of its Essence, for the Genus and Difference are only distinguished by the Understanding.

For

For Example. *Homo* is defined *nominally*, *qui ex humo*; *accidentally*, a two-legg'd unfeather'd Animal; *logically*, a rational Animal; *physically*, a Being consisting of an organized Body and a reasonable Soul.

The Rules of Definition are three: 1. Let the Definition be *adequate* to the Defined: 2. Let it be *clearer* and *plainer* than the Defined: 3. Let it be contained in a *fit Number* of *proper* (not *figurative*) Words.

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CHAP. II.

Of PROPOSITIONS.

SECT. I.

THE Second Part of Logic treats of *Propositions*, which is Judgment expressed in Words.

A regular Proposition is, An affirmative or negative Sentence, signifying either true or false: Not ambiguous; for then it would be Sentences: Nor maimed; for then it would have no Signification.

It is either *categorical*, which pronounces a Thing absolutely, as *Plato is happy:* Or *hypothetical*, which pronounces conditionally, as *If he is wise, then he is happy.*

Again, a Proposition is either *affirmative* or *negative*; and is either *true* or *false*. This is called the *Quality* of it.

Lastly, it is either *universal*, as *All Men are Animals:* Or, *particular*, as *Some Men are learned*. This is called the *Quantity* of it.

Sect. II.

A is put for an univerfal affirmative Propofition, E for an univerfal negative, I for a particular affirmative, O for a particular negative.

In an univerfal Affirmative, the Subject only is *diftributed*, (i. e. taken in its full Senfe): In a particular Negative only the Predicate: In a particular Affirmative, neither Term is diftributed: In an univerfal Negative, both.

The *Matter* of a Propofition (i. e. the Manner wherein the Terms cohere) is either, 1. *Neceffary*, when they effentially agree; or 2. *Impoffible*, when they effentially differ; or 3. *Contingent*, when they agree or differ accidentally.

Sect. III.

Thofe Propofitions are faid to be *oppofed*, which having the fame Subjects and Predicates, yet differ either in Quantity, or in Quality, or both.

The whole Doctrine of Oppofition is contained in this Scheme:

n. t.   n. f.
i. f. A   Contraries.   E i. t.
c. f.   c. f.

Subalterns.   Contra dictories.   Subalterns.

Contra dictories.

n. t.   n. f.
i. f. I   Subcontraries.   O i. t.
c. t.   c. t.

Here

Here A. E. I. O. are four Propositions, marked according to their Quantity and Quality, which are t. f. true or false, as the Matter of the Proposition is n. i. c. necessary, impossible, or contingent. Hence it is easy, 1. To enumerate the Species of Opposition, which are *contradictory*, *contrary*, *subcontrary* and *subaltern*. 2. To define each. For Example. Contradictory Opposition, is that which is between two categorical Propositions, differing both in Quantity and Quality, &c. 3. To lay down the Rules of Opposites, as follow:

1. *Contradictory Propositions* are never both true, or both false; but always one true, the other false.

But observe, Four Things are required to make a Contradiction, namely, to speak of the same Thing, 1. In the same Sense: 2. In the same Respect: 3. With Regard to the same third Thing: And, 4, At the same Time. If any of these Conditions be wanting, *is* and *is not* may agree. For Instance. 1. An Opinion *is* and *is not* Faith. It is *dead* Faith; it is not *living* Faith. 2. Zoilus *is* and *is not* red-haired. He is, with Respect to his Head: He is not, with Respect to his Beard. 3. Socrates *is* and *is not* long-hair'd. He is, in Comparison of Scipio: He is not, in Comparison of Xenophon. 4. Solomon *is* and *is not* a good Man. He is, in his Youth: He is not, in his middle Age.

2. *Contrary Propositions* are never both true: But in the Contingent Matter they are both false.

3. *Subcontraries* are never both false: But in the Contingent Matter they are both true.

4. *Subalterns* are sometimes both true, sometimes both false; sometimes one true, the other false.

<div align="right">Sect.</div>

Sect. IV.

A Propofition is faid to be *converted*, when its Terms are tranfpofed. This is done either, 1. *Simply*, when neither the Quantity nor Quality; Or, 2. *Accidentally*, when the Quantity is changed.

An univerfal Negative, or a particular Affirmative may be fimply converted, and the Inference will hold. An univerfal Affirmative muft be converted accidentally, or the Inference will not hold.

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C·H A P.　III.

Of S Y L L O G I S M S.

Sect. I.

THE Third Part of Logic treats of *Syllogifm*, which is a Difcourfe exprefled in Propofitions.

A Syllogifm is commonly defined, A Sentence in which fomething being premifed, fomething elfe neceffarily follows from it.

A *categorical Syllogifm*, confifts of three categorical Propofitions: The two former of which are termed, the *Antecedent*; the third, the *Confequent*; which before it is proved is called a *Problem* or *Queftion*, afterwards a *Conclufion*.

We muft make Ufe of fome *third Term*, in order to find, whether the Subject and Predicate of a Queftion agree: And that, becaufe of the following Rules, on which the whole Force of Syllogifm is founded.

1. Thofe

1. Thofe Terms which agree with one and the fame Third, agree with one another.

2. Thofe Terms, one of which agrees, the other difagrees with one and the fame Third, differ from one another.

3. Thofe which do not agree with one and the fame Third, do not agree with one another.

SECT. II.

From thefe general Principles, the particular Rules of Syllogifm are thus deduced.

1. In every Syllogifm, there are three, and only three Terms: Two in the Conclufion: And thefe can neither be proved to agree nor to differ, without one and only one third Term.

The Predicate of the Queftion is ftiled the *major Term*; the Subject, the *minor*; the third Term, the *Medium* or *middle Term*. For the Predicate is commonly more comprehenfive than the Medium, as the Medium is than the Minor.

2. In every Syllogifm, there are three, and only three Propofitions: Two *Premiffes*, in which the Medium is compared with the two other Terms feverally (the *major Propofition*, in which it is compared with the major Term; the *minor Propofition*, in which it is compared with the minor Term); and the *Conclufion*, in which both thofe Terms ftand together.

3. An *equivocal* Medium proves Nothing. For this is not one and the fame Third.

4. An *undiftributed* Medium is equivocal. Therefore

5. The Medium muft be diftributed in one of the Premiffes.

6. The

6. The Proceſs from a Term not diſtributed in the Pre-miſs, to the ſame diſtributed in the Concluſion is irregular.

7. Negative Premiſſes prove Nothing: For in this Caſe a third is brought, from which both the Terms differ.

8. If either of the Premiſſes is negative, ſo is alſo the Concluſion.

9. And, if the Concluſion be negative, ſo is alſo one of the Premiſſes.

10. Particular Premiſſes prove Nothing.

11. If either of the Premiſſes be particular, ſo is alſo the Concluſion.

Sect. III.

It remains to enquire, how many Ways three categori-cal Propoſitions can be joined together, ſo as to compoſe a regular Syllogiſm. In which Enquiry, two Things are to be conſidered.

1. The *Mood,* or the Variation of the Propoſitions ac-cording to their Quantity and Quality:

2. The *Figure,* or the Manner of comparing the Me-dium, with the Terms of the Concluſion.

There are ſixty four Moods. For the Major of a Syl-logiſm may be either A. E. I. or O. To each of theſe a fourfold Minor may be annext, whence ariſe ſixteen Pair of Premiſſes. And to each of theſe ſixteen, a fourfold Concluſion may be ſubjoined, thus,

B   AAA.

AAA. AAE. AAI. AAO: AEA. AEE. AEI. AEO:
AIA. AIE. AII. AIO: AOA. AOE. AOI. AOO.
EAA. EAE. EAI. EAO: EEA. EEE. EEI. EEO.
EIA. EIE. EII. EIO: EOA. EOE. EOI. EOO.
IAA. IAE. IAI. IAO: IEA. IEE. IEI. IEO:
IIA. IIE. III. IIO: IOA. IOE. IOI. IOO.
OAA. OAE. OAI. OAO: OEA. OEE. OEI. OEO.
OIA. OIE. OII. OIO: OOA. OOE. OOI. OOO.

But sixteen of these are excluded by the seventh Rule,
because their Premisses are negative, viz. EEA. EEE.
EEI. EEO: EOA. EOE. EOI. EOO: OEA. OEE.
OEI. OEO: OOA. OOE. OOI. OOO: Twelve by the
tenth Rule, because their Premisses are particular, viz.
IIA. IIE. III. IIO: IOA. IOE. IOI. IOO: OIA. OIE.
OII. OIO: Twelve by the eighth Rule, because one of
the Premisses is negative and not the Conclusion; AEA.
AEI: AOA. AOI: EAA. EAI: EIA. EII: IEA. IEI:
OAA. OAI: Eight by the eleventh Rule, because one of
the Premisses is particular, and not the Conclusion; AIA.
AIE: AOE: EIE: IAA. IAE: IEE: OAE: Lastly,
Four by the ninth Rule, because the Conclusion is nega-
tive, but neither of the Premisses; AAE. AAO. AIO:
IAO.

Therefore fifty two Moods are excluded, many of which
offend against several Rules. There remain twelve, which
only are useful in Syllogism; AAA. AAI: AEE. AEO:
AII: AOO: EAE. EAO: EIO: IAI: IEO: OAO.

Sect. IV.

The *Figures* of Syllogism are four: For the Medium is
either subjected to the major, and predicated of the minor
Term, which is the first Figure; or predicated of both,
which is the second; or subjected to both, which is the
third; or predicated of the major, and subjected to the
minor, which is the fourth; as appears in the following
Scheme, wherein A is the Major Term, B the Medium,
C the Minor:

                                        B. A

1 Fig.	2 Fig.	3 Fig.	4 Fig.
B. A.	A. B.	B. A.	A. B.
C. B.	C. B.	B. C.	B. C.
C. A.	C. A.	C. A.	C. A.

Wherefore of the twelve remaining Moods, each Figure excludes fix: Namely,

1. Becaufe of the undiftributed Medium, the firft, two, IAI: OAO: The fecond, four, AAA. AAI. AII. IAI. The fourth, two, AII: AOO.

2. Becaufe of the irregular Procefs of the major Term, the firft Figure excludes four Moods, AEE. AEO: AOO: IEO: The fecond, two, IEO: OAO: The third, four, AEE. AEO: AOO: IEO: The fourth, two, IEO: OAO.

3. Becaufe of the irregular Procefs of the minor Term, the third, two, AAA: EAE: The fourth, two, AAA. EAE.

There remain *twenty four* conclufive Moods, *fix* in each Figure.

The First Figure.

bAr   Every wicked Man is miferable;
bA   Every Tyrant is a wicked Man; Therefore
rA   Every Tyrant is miferable.

cE   No difcontented Man is a happy Man;
lA   Every wicked Man is difcontented; Therefore
rEnt. No wicked Man is a happy Man.

dA   All the Faithful are dear to God;
rI   Some, that are afflicted, are faithful; Therefore
I   Some, that are afflicted, are dear to God.

     fE No

fE No Virtue is an Evil;
ιI Some difficult Things are Virtues; Therefore
O   Some difficult Things are not Evils.

A   Every wicked Man is miserable;
A   All Tyrants are wicked Men; Therefore
I   Some Tyrants are miserable.

E   No discontented Man is a happy Man;
A   Every wicked Man is discontented; Therefore
O   Some wicked Men are not happy Men.

The Second Figure.

cEs No happy Man is discontented;
A   Every wicked Man is discontented; Therefore
ιE No wicked Man is a happy Man.

cAm Every wicked Man is discontented;
Es No happy Man is discontented; Therefore
trEs No happy Man is a wicked Man.

fEs No Evil is a Virtue;
tI Some difficult Things are Virtues; Therefore
nO Some difficult Things are not Evils.

bAr Every good Man is afflicted;
Ok Some rich Men are not afflicted; Therefore
O   Some rich Men are not good Men.

E   No happy Man is discontented;
A   Every wicked Man is discontented; Therefore
O   Some wicked Men are not happy Men.

A   Every wicked Man is discontented;
E   No happy Men are discontented; Therefore
O   Some happy Men are not wicked Men.

The

The THIRD FIGURE.

dAr All the Faithful are dear to God;
Ap   All the Faithful are afflicted; Therefore
tI   Some, that are afflicted, are dear to God.

dIs Some Faithful are afflicted;
Am All the Faithful are dear to God; Therefore
Is   Some, that are dear to God, are afflicted.

dAt All the Faithful are dear to God;
Is   Some of the Faithful are afflicted; Therefore
I   Some, that are afflicted, are dear to God.

fEl No Virtue is an Evil;
Ap   All Virtues are difficult; Therefore
tOn Some difficult Things are not Evils.

bOk Some Christians are not true Believers;
Ar   All Christians profess Faith; Therefore
dO   Some, who profess Faith, are not true Believers.

fEr No Virtue is an Evil;
Is   Some Virtues are difficult; Therefore
On   Some difficult Things are not Evils.

The FOURTH FIGURE.

brAm Every Tyrant is a wicked Man;
An   Every wicked Man is miserable; Therefore
tIp   Some, that are miserable, are Tyrants.

cAm Every wicked Man is discontented;
En   No discontented Man is a happy Man; Therefore
Es   No happy Man is a wicked Man.

dIm Some afflicted are faithful;
Ar   All the Faithful are dear to God; Therefore
Is   Some, that are beloved of God, are afflicted.

        fEs No

fEs   No Evil is a Virtue;
Ap   All Virtues are difficult; Therefore
O   Some difficult Things are not Evils.

frEs No Evil is a Virtue;
Is   Some Virtues are difficult; Therefore
On   Some difficult Things are not Evils.

A   Every wicked Man is difcontented;
E   No difcontented Man is a happy Man; Therefore
O   Some happy Men are not wicked Men.

Sect. V.

The four firſt of thefe Moods need nothing to make the
Force of the Inference evident, but what is exprefled in
the Premiſfes.   Whereas all the reſt do.   Thefe therefore
are ſtiled *pe·fect*, thofe *imperfect* Moods.

An *imperfect* Mood is faid to be *reduced*, when it is
changed into a *perfect one:* In order to ſhew evidently,
either that the Concluſion is fo, which is termed *oftenfive
Reduction:* Or, that it cannot be otherwife, which is
called *Reduction ad impoſſibile.*

The Method of Reducing is taught by the Names of
the Moods: In which the Vowels are the Propoſitions
marked with their Quantity and Quality: The initial
Confonants, B. C. D. F. ſhew to what Mood in the firſt
Figure the Reduction is to be made: S. P. ſhew that the
Propoſition which the preceding Vowel ſtands for, is to be
converted, either *fimply* or *per accidens:* M, that the Pre-
miſſes are to be tranſpoſed: K, that the Reduction is to
be *ad impoſſibile*; *i. e.* that for the Premifs to whofe Sign it
adheres, the Contradictory of the Concluſion is to be
placed: Which being done, you will have in the firſt Fi-
gure, a Concluſion, either the fame with that Premifs,
or one convertible into it, or its Contradictory.   Thus,

1. cĔs No

1. cEs　No happy Man is difcontented ;
　Af　Every wicked Man is difcontented ; Therefore
　E　No wicked Man is an happy Man.

Reduce this to

　cE　No difcontented Man is a happy Man ;
　lA　Every wicked Man is difcontented ; Therefore
　rEnt　No wicked Man is a happy Man.

2. dIs　Some good Men are Papifts ;
　Am　Every good Man is faved ; Therefore
　Is　Some that are faved are Papifts.

Reduce this to

　dA　Every good Man is faved ;
　rI　Some Papifts are good Men ; Therefore
　I　Some Papifts are faved.

3. bAr　Every good Man is afflicted ;
　Ok　Some rich Men are not afflicted ; Therefore
　O　Some rich Men are not good Men.

Reduce this to

　bAr　Every good Man is afflicted ;
　bAr　Every rich Man is a good Man ——
　A

The manifeft Falfhood of which proves af manifeftly the Truth of its Contradictory.

S e c t. VI.

From what has been faid, it is evident, that there can be no more Moods than thefe twenty four. They are therefore miftaken, who having tranfpofed the Premiffes, or converted the Conclufion of a Syllogifm, imagine they have found out a new Mood or Figure : To convince them of which, you need only refer to the Definition of
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　a Mood,

a Mood, a Figure, of a major, a minor, a middle Term, and of a major and minor Propofition.

But there are fome Sorts of Arguments, which, though not ftrictly regular, yet need not be wholly rejected. Such are,

1. An *Enthymeme*, one Premifs of which is wanting, whether the Major or Minor, the Conclufion fhews. As, *He is a good Man: Therefore he is happy.*

Sometimes the whole Argument lies in one Sentence: As, *Being mortal, do not bear immortal Hatred.*

2. An *Induction*, in which what is granted of feveral Particulars, is then affirmed univerfally: As, *This and this and that Loadftone attracts Iron: Therefore, Every Loadftone does.* It is therefore a Sort of Enthymeme; a Syllogifm in Barbara, whofe Minor is underftood.

3. An *Example*, wherein what is granted of a known Inftance, is prefumed of an unknown that refembles it: As, Sylla *and* Marius *tore the Common-wealth: Therefore fo will* Cæfar *and* Pompey. Here alfo the Minor is underftood. Therefore the Conclufion is only prefumed, not proved.

4. A *Sorites*, in whofe Antecedent every preceding Term is fubjected to the following, 'till you come from the Subject of the Conclufion to the Predicate of it: As, *Every Man is an Animal; Every Animal is a living Creature; Every living Creature is a Subftance: Therefore, Every Man is a Subftance.* In a Sorites as many Syllogifms are underftood, as there are intermediate Propofitions.

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CHAP. IV.

Of HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS.

SECT. I.

THAT is a *hypothetical Syllogifm*, in which one or more of the Propofitions are hypothetical. The moft common (of which alone we now fpeak) is that, whofe major Propofition is hypothetical.

A hypothetical Propofition is either *conditional*; as, *If he is wife, he is happy:* Or, *disjunctive*; as, *Either it is Day or Night.*

In a *conditional* Propofition, the *Condition* itfelf is called the *Antecedent*; the Affertion, the *Confequent*; the Connexion between them, the *Confequence.*

The Rules of conditional Propofitions are three:

1. If the Antecedent be granted, fo is the Confequent.

2. If the Confequent be taken away, fo is the Antecedent.

3. Nothing can be inferred, either from the taking away the Antecedent, or granting the Confequent.

There are therefore only two Terms of conditional Syllogifm:

The

The *conſtructive*; as,

If CD, then KΔ: But CD: Therefore KΔ.

And the *deſtructive*; as,

If CD, then KΔ: But not KΔ: Therefore not CD.

Sect. II.

Every conditional Syllogiſm is either equivalent to a categorical, or wholly to be rejected. For in every concluſive Conditional, there is a Categorical implied, in which the ſame Argument would prove the ſame Concluſion.

For in all hypothetical Syllogiſms, the major Propoſition conſiſting of two Categoricals, the Minor is either one of theſe, or the Contradictory to it, in order to infer, either the other, or its Contradictory. In either Caſe an Enthymeme will be propoſed, whoſe Force lies in the conditional Propoſition, and which is not concluſive, unleſs from that Propoſition there can be drawn a *Completory*, that is, the Premiſs which is wanting in an Enthymeme, to complete the Syllogiſm.

Now, as an Enthymeme is only one Premiſs with the Concluſion of a Syllogiſm, it has three and only three Terms. Suppoſe two of them are D and Δ, and C the third Term. The other Premiſs, whoſe Terms are D and Δ, is wanting. Hence it follows, that according to the various Diſpoſition of the Terms, there are four Forms of Enthymeme: Each of which will admit of a twofold Completory, as in this Scheme.

The Enthymeme.		The Completory	D. Δ.	Δ. D.
CD.	therefore CΔ.	The Major	in Fig. I.	in Fig. II.
DC.			in Fig. III.	in Fig. IV.
CD.	therefore ΔC.	The Minor	in Fig. IV.	in Fig. II.
DC.			in Fig. III.	in Fig. I.
				Wherefore

Wherefore as there are twenty four poffible Moods of categorical Syllogifm, and *fourteen* unexceptionable ones; and as each Figure may be applied twice, to compleat an Enthymeme; there will be forty eight poffible Ways of compleating it, twenty eight unexceptionable. And as many Ways as an Enthymeme may be compleated, fo many and no more, a Man may argue with a Syllogifm, whofe Major is conditional.

Sect. III.

The Directions given for *conditional* Propofitions, ferve equally for *disjunctive*. For any Disjunctive is eafily turned into a Conditional. For Inftance, if it runs thus,

It is either Day, or Night.
But it is Day: Therefore it is not Night.
But it is Night: Therefore it is not Day.
It is not Day: Therefore it is Night.
It is not Night: Therefore it is Day.

Inftead of this, it is eafy to fay,

If it is Day, then it is not Night.
If it is Night, then it is not Day.
If it is not Day, then it is Night.
If it is not Night, then it is Day.

Sect. IV.

There remains only a Kind of redundant hypothetical Syllogifm called a *Dilemma*, which propofes two (or more) Things to your Choice, by accepting either of which, you lofe the Caufe. Such is that of *Bias: If you marry a beautiful Woman, fhe will be* κοινὴ; *if an ugly one,* ποινή. *Therefore marry none.*

A Dilemma is of no Force, unlefs, 1. One or the other Part muft be accepted; 2. Either one or the other prove

the

the Point; and, 3. It cannot be retorted. If *Bias* had obferved thefe Things. he would have been lefs pleafed with his own; for it fails in every Particular. For, 1. A Wife may neither be *beautiful* nor *ugly*. Therefore neither Part of the Dilemma need be accepted. 2. Neither is every beautiful Woman *common*, nor every ugly one a *Plague*. Therefore neither Part of it proves the Point. 3. It may be retorted, thus: If I marry the *one*, at leaft fhe will *not* be common; if the *other*, fhe will *not* be a Plague.

A Dilemma is only a kind of negative Induction, in which the major Propofition is conditional: As, *If at all, then thus, or thus, or thus.* To turn this into a categorical Syllogifm, is fo eafy, it needs no Direction.

A

COMPENDIUM of LOGIC.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Of SYLLOGISM, *as to its Matter.*

SECT. I.

HITHERTO we have spoken of Syllogism as to its *Form*. It remains, to speak of it, as to its *Matter*; that is, the *Certainty* and *Evidence* of the Propositions, whereof it is compofed.

That is a *certain* Propofition, againft which Nothing occurs, or Nothing of Weight, as, *Man is rifible:* That an *evident* one, which extorts the Affent, as foon as it is underftood, as, *The whole is greater than its Part:* That a *doubtful* one, in which we know not how to determine, as, *The Stars influence Men.*

If any Thing occurs, whereby the Mind inclines to either Side, that which was doubtful before, becomes *probable.* Such an Affent is termed *Opinion.*

C *Opinion*

Opinion therefore refpects a barely probable Propofition, and implies no Certainty at all. Yet there are feveral Degrees whereby it approaches toward Certainty; and the higheft Degree of Probability is not far diftant from It.

SECT. II.

Certainty is twofold: 1. That of the *Object*, the Thing to be perceived; and 2. That of the *Subject*, the Underftanding which perceives it. And both have their Degrees. That is more certain, in the former Senfe, to which there *is* the leaft Objection; that, in the latter Senfe, to which the leaft Objection *appears*. Evidence alfo is either of the *Object* or of the *Subject*. And both of thefe have their Degrees: According as that which is perceived, *is* more or lefs Self-evident; or *appears* to be one or the other.

We might enumerate many Degrees of *Evidence*. But it may fuffice to obferve, it is either, 1. That of a Self-evident Axiom; or, 2. That of a Conclufion regularly deduced therefrom. This Logicians term *Science*, which accordingly they define, An Affent to a certain and evident Conclufion, regularly deduced from certain and evident Premiffes. The Certainty and Evidence here fuppofed, is that, both of the Object, and of the Subject: For by the former, Science is diftinguifhed from *Error*; by the latter, from *Opinion*. Without the Evidence of the Subject, there can be no *Science*; and this without the other, is but imaginary Evidence.

SECT. III.

We need not *prove*, that there is fuch a Thing as Certainty; feeing all reafonable Men allow it. We freely affent to what is affirmed by a wife and good Man: And more freely, if he confirms it by Reafon. Some Things we are taught by Nature itfelf: And fome by Divine Revelation.

velation.   And of all thefe we have fufficient Certainty,
altho' in various Degrees.

To affent to Teftimony is the fame as to *believe:* And
fuch an Affent is termed *Faith.*   *Divine* Faith depends on
the Teftimony of God: *Human* Faith, on the Teftimony
of Man.   What Nature dictates, we may be faid to *per-
ceive*; what Reafon teaches us, to *know.*

God can neither deceive nor be deceived: Men are
often deceived, and often deceive. Reafon and Nature
are not often deceived, and feldom deceive their Fol-
lowers.   Nothing therefore is more firm than *divine* Faith;
Nothing lefs fo than *human.* In what we *perceive* or *know*,
there is often no *Fear*, always fome *Danger* of being de-
ceived.   Hence there is the higheft Reft for the Mind in
divine Faith; the loweft of all in *human.* In what we
know or *perceive*, there are various Degrees of Reft, ac-
cording to the various Evidence, Certainty, or Probability.

If therefore we were to make a Sort of *Scale of Affent*,
it might confift of the following Steps: 1. *Human Faith*,
an Affent to a doubtful Propofition: 2. *Opinion*, to a pro-
bable: 3. What we may term *Sentiment*, an Affent to a
certain Propofition: 4. *Science*, to a certain and evident
Conclufion: 5. *Intelligence*, to a Self-evident Axiom:
6. *Divine Faith*, to a Divine Revelation.

Sect. IV.

To each of thefe there belong certain Principles, which
are peculiarly proper to produce it. The *Principles of
Divine Faith* are thofe, and thofe only, which are con-
tained in the Scriptures: Of *Intelligence*, thofe which are
properly termed Axioms: Of *Science*, the Conclufions
regularly deduced from them.

An *Axiom* is, a Propofition which needs not, and can-
not be proved.   Such the following feem to be.

From

From *Natural Divinity*. 1. GOD cannot deceive or be deceived. Whence flow thefe certain and evident Conclufions: 2. Abfolute Faith is due to the Teftimony of GOD: 3. Revelation never contradicts either Senfe or Reafon. It may indeed *tranfcend* both. But it cannot poffibly *contradict* either, rightly employed about its proper Object.

From *Mathematicks*. The Whole is greater than each of its Parts; equal to them all. But Mathematicians frequently lay down as fuch, what are not Axioms; properly fpeaking.

From *Metaphyficks*. It is impoffible for the fame Thing, at the fame Time, to be, and not to be. Some affirm this to be the only Axiom in the World: A Point not worth the Difputing.

From *Logic*. Terms which agree in one and the fame Third, agree with one another.

SECT. V.

Many believe, that there are no Axioms to be found in the other Arts and Sciences. But fuch Principles at leaft are found therein, as produce *Sentiment*, if not Science. Such are thefe. Nothing (naturally) fprings from Nothing. Nothing is the Caufe of itfelf. What you would not have another do to you, you ought not to do to another.

The Principles that ferve to produce *Opinion*, are ufually ftiled Maxims. They commonly hold, but not always. To this Clafs thofe properly belong, which are, as it were in the middle Way, between doubtful and certain.

The Uncertainty of human Faith arifes hence. In order to produce a firm Affent of this Kind, a competent Witnefs muft know what he fays, and fay what he knows, and both be apparent to him that believes it. But this is
rarely

rarely the Cafe.   Wherefore we have always Reafon to
fufpect what we have no other Proof of, than human
Teſtimony.   Even when there appears no more Reafon to
doubt thereof, than of a mathematical Demonſtration.

<center>S E C T. VI.</center>

According to thefe five Degrees of Affent, Syllogifm might
have been divided, with regard to its Matter, into infalli-
ble, fcientifical, certain, probable and doubtful.   But as
the two firſt of thefe produce *Science*, and any Affent fhort
of this, is loofely fpeaking, termed *Opinion*; it is ufually
divided only into two Sorts: 1. That which produces
Science; and this is ſtiled *ſcientifical*, otherwife *demonſtra-*
tive, and often *Demonſtration:* 2. That which produces
Opinion (any Affent fhort of Science) and is termed *dia-*
lectical; i. e. arguing probably.

There are two Species or *Demonſtration*.   The firſt de-
monſtrates, *That a Thing is*; proving, either directly,
That it is fo; (and this is called *direct Demonſtration:*) or
that if it be not, fome Abfurdity will neceffarily follow.
This is ufually called *Demonſtratio ab abſurdo*.   We may
properly term it *oblique*.

We demonſtrate directly, either, 1. By proving a
Thing from its *Effect*; as, *The Sun is black: Therefore it*
is eclipſed.   Or, 2. By proving it from its *remote Caufe*;
as, *The Moon is diametrically oppofite to the Sun: Therefore*
it is eclipſed.   But if we prove this, from the Earth's be-
ing interpofed between them, this is

The fecond Sort of Demonſtration, which demonſtrates
Why a Thing is, by affigning its *proximate* and *immediate*
Caufe.

But there may be a proximate, which is not the *prime*
Caufe, that is felf-evident and indemonſtrable, whofe
Evidence is therefore preferred before all other, as needing
no Light, but from itfelf.

<center>C 3</center>   There

There are then four Degrees of Demonſtration, The *oblique* Demonſtration is good: But the *direct* is preferable to it. Demonſtration by the *proximate Cauſe* is better ſtill; but the *prime Cauſe*, beſt of all.

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CHAP. II.

Of FALLACIES.

THERE is yet another Species, or Shadow rather, of Syllogiſm, which is called a *Fallacy.* It is, An Argument intended to deceive. Such is,

1. The Fallacy of *Equivocation*, ariſing either from an equivocal Word, or from the ambiguous Structure of the Sentence. As, All that *believe* ſhall be ſaved. The Devils *believe.* Therefore the Devils ſhall be ſaved. This offends againſt the very firſt Rule of Syllogiſm. For it has four Terms.

2. The Fallacy of *Compoſition*, where what is granted of ſeveral Things ſeparately, is inferred of them conjointly. As, *Two and three* are even and odd. Five is *two and three.* Therefore, five is even and odd.

3. The Fallacy of *Diviſion*, when what is granted of Things taken conjointly, is inferred of them, taken ſeparately. As, *The Planets* are ſeven: The Sun and Moon are *Planets:* Therefore, the Sun and Moon are ſeven. In both theſe Syllogiſms there are four Terms.

4. The Fallacy of the *Accident;* when ſome accidental Circumſtance is confounded with what is eſſential: As, What *deſtroys Men* ought to be prohibited. Wine *deſtroys*
Men.

Men. Therefore Wine ought to be prohibited. The major Propofition muſt mean, What *neceſſarily deſtroys Men:* Otherwiſe it is not true: The minor, Wine *acidentally deſtroys Men.* Therefore here alſo there are four Terms.

5. The Fallacy of arguing from a *Particular* to a *General:* As, He that is *white as to his Teeth* is white. A Blackamoor is *white as to his Teeth.* Therefore, a Blackamoor is white. Here is a palpable Breach of the ſixth Rule of Syllogiſm.

6. The Fallacy *Ignorationis Elenchi.* An *Elenchus* is, A Syllogiſm that confutes the Opponent. Therefore he falls into this Fallacy, who thinks he confutes his Opponent, without obſerving the Rules of Contradiction.

7. The Fallacy of *begging the Queſtion,* that is, taking for granted the very Thing which ought to be proved. This is done, 1. When we attempt to prove a Thing by itſelf; or, 2. By a ſynonimous Word; or, 3. By ſomething equally unknown; or, 4. By ſomething more unknown; or, 5. By arguing in a Circle: As in the famous Argument of the Papiſts, who prove the Scriptures from the Authority of the Church, and the Church from the Authority of the Scriptures.

8. The Fallacy of ſeveral *Queſtions:* As, Are *Honey* and *Gall* ſweet? It is ſolved, by anſwering to each Branch diſtinctly.

Many more Fallacies than theſe might be reckoned up. For there are as many Fallacies, as there are Ways of breaking any of the Rules of Syllogiſm without being obſerved. But one who is thoroughly acquainted with thoſe Rules, will eaſily detect them all.

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CHAP. III.

Of METHOD.

SECT. I.

METHOD is, Such a Difposition of the Parts of any Art or Science, that the whole may be more eafily learned.

It is twofold, 1. *Method of Invention*, which finds out the Rules of an Art or Science; 2. *Method of Teaching*, which delivers them. The former proceeds from fenfible and particular Things, to intelligible and univerfal; the latter, from intelligible and univerfal Things, to fenfible and particular.

Method of Teaching is either *perfect* or *imperfect*. The former is either, 1. *Univerfal*, by which a whole Art or Science, or 2. *Particular*, by which a Part of it only is taught. Both are either, 1. *Synthetical*, which is ufed in Sciences, and beginning with the Subject of a Science, treats of its Principles and Affections, and then of its feveral Species, 'till from the higheft Genus it defcends to, loweft Species: Or, 2. *Analytical*, which is of Ufe in Arts; and beginning with the End or Defign of an Art, next explains, the Subject of it, and laftly, the Means conducive to that End.

The general Rules of Method are thefe:

In delivering an Art or Science, 1. Let Nothing be wanting or redundant: 2. Let all the Parts be confiftent with each other: 3. Let Nothing be treated of, which is not homogeneous to the End of the Art, or the Subject

of

of the Science: 4. Let the Parts be connected by easy Tranfitions: 5. Let that precede, without which, the Things that follow cannot be underftood; but which itfelf cannot be underftood without them.

The particular Rules are thefe: 1. The Unity of a Science depends on the Unity of its Subject; the Unity of an Art, on the Unity of its End. 2. Let the more general Parts precede the lefs general.

The *imperfect* Method is arbitrary and popular; being no other than the Method of Prudence or Common Senfe.

SECT. II.

Mathematicians in all their Writings follow this Method, 1. They fix the Meaning of their Words, defining their Terms, each in their Place, and make it an invariable Rule, never afterwards to ufe any Term, but in the Senfe to which it is limitted by that Definition: 2. They lay down the Axioms which there will be Occafion to ufe in the Courfe of their Work: 3. They add their *Poftulata,* which alfo they demand to be granted, as being evident of themfelves: 4. They then demonftrate their Propofitions, in order, and as far as may be, affirmatively: Contenting themfelves with this Rule, That whatfoever they have to prove, they take Care to prove it from fome of the Truths, which have been granted or proved before.

If the fame Method cannot be ftrictly obferved in other Sciences, yet doubtlefs it may be imitated. And the nearer any Method approaches to this, the more perfect and ufeful it is.

APPENDIX.

Of the Manner of using LOGIC.

Extracted from Bishop SANDERSON.

SECT. I.

Of Treating on a simple Theme.

WE may use the Rules of Logic in treating either on a simple Theme, or a Problem or Proposition.

In treating logically on a simple Term, we are to explain both the *Name* and the *Thing*. And,

I. The *Name*, by 1. Pointing out the Ambiguity of the Term (if there be any), recounting its various Meanings, and fixing on that particular Meaning in which we at present take it: 2. Shewing its various Apellations both in our own, and in other Tongues: 3. Observing whence it is derived, with the more remarkable Words of the same Derivation. Not that all this is necessary to be done, at all Times, and on every Theme: But there is Need of Judgment and Choice, that those
<div align="right">Particulars</div>

Particulars only may be noted, which conduce to the Explication of the Thing.

II. The *Thing* is explained, both by *assigning* its *Attributes*, and *distributing* or dividing it into its *Parts*. The Attributes are either *essential* or *non-essential*. By *essential* we understand, not only those which properly constitute its Essence, the *Genus* and *Difference*, but also the *Properties* of Substances, the *Subjects* and *Objects* of Accidents, with the *efficient* and *final Causes* of both.

The *Genus* should be assigned in the first Place, and that the *nearest* which can be found, tho' premising, if Occasion be, those which are more *remote*. The *Difference* comes next; the Want of which is supplied, and the Nature more fully explained by *Properties*. And here may be added, the *efficient, principal, impulsive* and *instrumental* Causes, with the remote or proximate *Ends*. Here also in treating on an Accident may be subjoined, its proper *Subject* and adequate *Object*. But these more or less, as Need shall require; which are to be closed with a compleat *essential Definition* of the Thing.

III. The Theme is next to be *distributed* into its several *Species* or Parts, just to name which is generally sufficient. From Distribution we proceed to the *non-essential Attributes*, whether *Effects, Cognates* or *Opposites*.

IV. Such *Effects* as are trivial or commonly known may either be just mentioned or passed over in Silence. Those which are more noble, and less commonly known, may be ranged under proper Heads. This is also the Place for citing *Examples*.

Cognate Words are those which are compared with the Theme as agreeing with it: *Opposite*, as differing from it. A Theme is explained by comparing it with its *Cognates*, when Things are mentioned which are in some Respects the same or like it, and it is shewn wherein that Sameness or Likeness lies, and also wherein the Unlikeness or Difference between them.

<div align="right">We</div>

We in the laſt Place compare the Theme with its *Op-poſites*; for even Oppoſites caſt Light upon each other. There are four Species of theſe; but the *Contradictory* is uſually too vague and indefinitive to be of any Service: And the *relative Oppoſite* has been mentioned before, among the eſſential Attributes. Therefore the *privative* and *contrary* Oppoſites only, have Place here, and very properly cloſe the Treatiſe.

To give an Inſtance of this. Suppoſe the ſimple Theme to be treated of be E N V Y.

I am, I. *Firſt*, To conſider the *Name*; and here I obſerve,

1. It may *mean* either actively or paſſively: As, " He is full of Envy;" that is, He envies others. " A rich Man is much expoſed to Envy;" that is, to be envied by others. We here take it in the former Senſe.

2. This is in *Latin* termed *Invidia*, a Word which has been borrowed by many modern Languages. The *Romans* alſo termed it *Livor*.

3. The Word *Invidia* is ſuppoſed to be *derived* from two *Latin* Words, that imply the *looking much* upon another, which the Envious are apt to do: The Word *Livor* from the *livid* Complexion which uſually attends an envious Temper.

There are two Words of the ſame Derivation, which are frequently confounded with each other, namely, *Invidious* and *Envious*; and yet the Signification of the one is widely different from that of the other. An *envious* Man, is one who is under the Power of Envy; An *invidious Office*, one that is apt to raiſe Envy or Diſlike.

II. In explaining the *Thing*, I obſerve, *firſt*, The *eſſential Attributes*: As,

D The

The *Genus:* To premise the more *remote*; it is a Passion, a Sort of Grief: But the *nearest Genus* is, A vitious Grief.

I next observe, The *Difference*, taken

1. From the *Subject*, which are almost all Mankind; but chiefly those who are ignorant of GOD, and consequently unable to govern themselves.

2. From the *Object*, which is twofold; of the *Thing*, or of the *Person*. The Thing envied, may be good of any Kind; apparent or real, useful or pleasant; of Mind, Body or Fortune. The Person envied, may be any other Man, superior, equal, or inferior: Only not at an immense Distance, either of Time, of Place, or of Condition. For few envy them that have been long dead, them that live in *China* or *Japan*; or those who are above or beneath them beyond all Degrees of Comparison.

3. From the *efficient* Cause. The *principal internal Cause in him that envies,* is Pride and inordinate Self-love. The *impulsive external* Cause may be various, either *in him that is envied*, if he be an Enemy, a Rival, a vain Boaster; or *in* some *third Person*, as Contempt, Flattery, Whispering; any of which may stir up Envy.

We may therefore *define* Envy, either more briefly, A vitious Grief at the Good of another; or more fully, An evil Sadness of Mind, whereby a Man, from inordinate Self-love, is troubled at the Good which he sees another enjoy, or foresees he will enjoy, as he imagines it will lessen or obscure his own Excellency.

III. There are three *Species* of Envy, each worse than the preceding: The first, When a Man is pained at another's enjoying some Good (in *Kind* or *Degree)* which he cannot himself attain: The second, When a Man is pained at another's having what he himself has, but wants to have alone: Both these are exemplified in *Cæsar*, who

would bear no Superior, and *Pompey*, who would bear no Equal. The third, is, When a Man cannot or will not enjoy his own Good, leaſt another ſhould enjoy it with him. It is well known, how many in the Learned World are infected with this evil Diſeaſe.

IV. The *Effects* of Envy are three, 1. It torments the Mind continually, and ſpreads Inquietude thro' the whole Life. 2. It waſtes even the bodily Strength, and drinks up the Spirits. A moſt juſt Evil, which is at once a Sin and a Puniſhment, and not leſs a Scourge than it is a Vice. 3. It incites a Man to all Manner of Wickedneſs; Detraction, Calumny, Strife, Murder.

Its moſt remarkable *Cognates* are, 1. *Hatred,* which agrees with *Envy* in its *Subject*; for he who envies another, cannot but hate him; and in its *efficient, internal Cauſe,* which in both is Pride and blind Self-love. 2. *Rejoicing in Evil:* This alſo agrees with Envy both in its Subject, (for he that grieves at another's Happineſs, cannot but rejoice in his Miſery) and in its *efficient Cauſe.*

And yet Hatred differs from Envy, 1. In the *Thing* hated or envied. For Good only is envied; but either Good or Evil may be hated. 2. In the *Perſon.* For we envy Men only, not GOD; and not ourſelves, but others: But we may hate, both other Men, and ourſelves; both other Creatures, and GOD Himſelf.

Rejoicing in Evil differs likewiſe from Envy, 1. In the *Genus:* For the Genus of the latter is Sorrow, of the former Joy. 2. In the *Object*, which in the one is *Evil*, in the other *Good.*

The grand *Oppoſite* to Envy is *Benevolence*, a tender Goodwill to all Men, which conſtrains us to wiſh well to all, and ſeriouſly to rejoice in all the Good that befalls them.

Sect. II.

Of treating on a Problem.

A *Problem* is, A Proposition to be proved. It is some-times fully proposed, whether positively, as, "*Logic is an Art,*" which is called a *Thesis*; or interrogatively, as, "*Is Logic an Art?*" Sometimes imperfectly, when the Subject only is mentioned, the Predicate being left in Question, as, "*Of the Genus of Logic.*"

In a regular Treatise on a Problem there are three Parts, The stating the Question, proving the Truth, and an-swering Objections. To which may be premised, The Introduction, concerning the Importance of the Question, and the Occasion of its being first disputed; and the Con-clusion, containing a Recapitulation of the whole, with the Corollaries arising therefrom.

I. In the Introduction may be shewn, that the Point in Debate, is not of little or no Moment, but either appa-rently of the highest Concern, or if not so important in itself, yet absolutely necessary to be understood, in order to understand or explain those which are confessedly of the highest Moment. Next should be pointed out the Occa-sion of the Doubt, and the Origin of the Error; what gave the first Rise to this Dispute; and how the Mistake began and increased. But this must be done nakedly and simply, in a logical, not rhetorical Manner.

II. After a short Preface, the Problem is not immedi-ately to be proved, (unless where the Terms are quite clear, and the Point little controverted) but first the Terms of the Question are to be explained, both the Subject and the Predicate. The various Senses of these should be ob-served, and the Definitions given, particularly of the Pre-dicate. We then proceed to explain the true State of the Controversy, by shewing what is granted on each Side, and what disputed. For in every Controversy, there is
<div align="right">Something</div>

Something wherein both Parties agree, and Something wherein they differ. In reciting the Points wherein we and our Opponents agree, we may add, if Need be, a fhort Explanation or Proof of them: And then fhew, wherein the proper Difference, the very Point of Controverfy, lies. If this be accurately fhewn, the Bufinefs is in a Manner done; for it is fcarce credible, how much Light this throws both on the Proof of the Truth, and the anfwering Objections.

III. In *proving the Truth*, if it be a plain fimple Problem, it may fuffice briefly to propofe our Judgment in a fingle affirmative or negative Thefis, and to confirm it by a few well-chofe Arguments. But if it be more complex, it will be expedient to comprize our Defence of it in feveral Propofitions; beginning with thofe wherein we remove the Opinions of others, and then going on to eftablifh our own; after every Propofition placing the Arguments by which it is confirmed. But it does not fuffice, barely to mention thefe; they are alfo to be ftrongly prefied and defended, and the Evafions and Cavils of all Adverfaries, to be examined and overturned.

IV. Next follows the *anfwering of Objections*. Thefe may either be fubjoined to the feveral Opinions of our Opponents, and fo anfwered feverally; or all placed together, after we have proved the Point in Queftion, and fo anfwered all together.

In order to do this effectually, we fhould obferve, *firft*, Is not the *Conclufion* advanced againft me, wide of the Mark? Frequently the Objection may be allowed, and it does not overturn any Conclufion, which we have advanced. Nay, fometimes it may be retorted, as proving juft the contrary of what it was intended for.

If the Conclufion do really contradict any of ours, we are, *fecondly*, to examine the *Form* of the Argument, according to the general and particular Rules of Syllogifm; and to point out that Rule againft which it offends.

If

If the *Form* be unexceptionable, it remains, *thirdly*, to consider the *Matter* of the Objection from the *Premisses*. And it will generally be found, that either one of the Premisses is *false*, (or at least, *not sufficiently proved*) or that there is a latent *Ambiguity* in the Subject, the Predicate, or the Medium. In this Case, we are to fix upon that Term, and shew the Ambiguity of it.

V. We may close the whole by repeating the Sum of what has been proved; unless when some useful Observations or Corollaries, either directly, or by easy Consequence, follow from the Conclusions before established. These we are not to prove again, but briefly and nakedly to set them down, as naturally deducible from those Propositions which have been proved before.

The Sermon on the Means of Grace, *in the first Volume of Mr.* Wesley's *Sermons, is a Treatise of this Kind.*——— *The Sermon on* Enthusiasm, *in the third Volume, is another Example of a simple Theme.*

F I N I S.

ERRÁTA.

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