

bly avoid his destiny (Herodot. l.) or that of the poet Philemon :

Ἄλλοι βασιλέων εἰσιν, ὁ βασιλεὺς Θεῶν
Ὁ Θεὸς ἀναγκῆς.

Common men are servants to kings; kings are servants to the Gods; and God is a servant to necessity. So Seneca: "*Eadem necessitas et Deos alligat: irrevocabilis divina pariter atque humana cursus vehit. Ille ipse, omnium conditor ac rector, scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur. Semper parat: semel jussit.*" The self-same necessity binds the Gods themselves. All things divine, as well as human, are carried forward by one identical and overpowering rapidity. The supreme Author and Governor of the universe hath indeed written and ordained the fates; but having once ordained them, he ever after obeys them. He commanded them at first, for once: but his conformity to them is perpetual. This is without doubt very irreverently and very incautiously expressed.—Whence it has been common with many Christian writers to tax the Stoics with setting up a first cause, superior to God himself, and on which he is dependent.

But I apprehend these philosophers meant in reality no such thing. All they designed to inculcate was that the will of God and his decrees are unchangeable: that there can be no alteration in the divine intention; no new act arise in his mind; no reversion of his eternal plan; all being founded in adorable sovereignty; ordered by infallible wisdom; ratified by omnipotence; and cemented with immutability. Thus Lucan:

Finixit in æternum causas; quæ cuncta coercet,
Se quoque lege tenens.

And this, not through any imbecility in God, or as if he was subject to fate, of which (on the contrary) himself was the ordainer; but because it is his pleasure to abide by his own decree. For as Seneca observes, "*Imminutio majestatis sit, et confessio erroris, mutanda fecisse. Necesse est ei eadem placere, qui nisi optima placere non possunt.*" it would detract from the greatness of God, and look as if he acknowledged himself liable to mistakes, was he to make changeable decrees: his pleasure must necessarily be always the same; seeing that only which is best can at any time please an all-perfect being. A good man (adds this philosopher) is under a kind of pleasing necessity to do good; and, if he did not do it he could not be a good man.

"Magnum hoc argumentum est firmæ vo-

luntatis, ne mutare quidem posse:" it is a striking proof of a magnanimous will to be absolutely incapable of changing. And such is the will of God, it never fluctuates nor varies. But, on the other hand, was he susceptible of change; could he, through the intervention of any inferior cause, or by some untoward combination of external circumstances, be induced to recede from his purpose and alter his plan; it would be a most incontestible mark of weakness and dependence: the force of which argument made Seneca, though a heathen, cry out, "*Non externa Deos cogunt; sed sua illis in legem æterna voluntas est:* outward things cannot compel the Gods; but their own eternal will is a law to themselves. It may be objected that this seems to infer as if the Deity was still under some kind of restraint. By no means. Let Seneca obviate this cavil; as he effectually does, in these admirable words: "*Nec Deus ab hoc minùs liber aut potens est; ipse enim est necessitas sua:* God is not hereby either less free, or less powerful; for he himself is his own necessity.

On the whole, it is evident that when the Stoics speak, even in the strongest terms, of the obligation of fate on God himself, they may and ought to be understood in a sense worthy of the adorable, uncreated Majesty.—In thus interpreting the doctrine of fate, as taught by the genuine philosophers of the Portico, I have the great St. Austin on my side: who after canvassing, and justly rejecting, the bastard or astrological fate; thus goes on: "*At qui omnium connectionem seriemque causarum, quæ fit omne quod fit, fati nomine appellant; non multum cum eis, de verbis controversiâ, certandum atque laborandum est: quandoquidem ipsum causarum ordinem, et quandam connectionem, summi Dei trihuunt voluntati: i. e.* But for those philosophers [meaning the Stoics] who, by the word fate mean that regular chain and series of causes to which all things that come to pass owe their immediate existence; we will not earnestly contend with these persons about a mere term; and we the rather acquiesce in their manner of expression because they carefully ascribe this fixed succession of things, and this mutual concatenation of causes and effects, to the will of the Supreme God. Austin adds many observations of the same import; and proves from Seneca himself, as rigid a Stoic as any, that this was the doctrine and the meaning of his philosophic brethren.

A LETTER

TO THE

REV. MR. JOHN WESLEY;

RELATIVE TO HIS PRETENDED

ABRIDGMENT

OF

ZANCHIUS ON PREDESTINATION.

Sic fatas senior, Telumque imbelles sine Ictu
Conjecit: raucis quod potius ære repulsum;
Et summo Clypei nequicquam Umbone pependit.

ÆNEID II.

Credulitate, Puer; Audacia, Juvenis; Delirio, Senex.

Mr. DE BOZE' Epitaph on HARDVIN, the French Jesuit.

NINE months are now elapsed since the first publication of this letter; in all which time Mr. W. has neither apologized for the misdemeanor which occasioned his hearing from me in this public manner, nor attempted to answer the charges entered against him. Judging, probably, that the former would be too condescending in one who has erected himself into the leader of a sect, and that the latter would prove rather too difficult a task, and involve him in a subsequent train of fresh detections, he has prudently omitted both.

Some of his followers, however, have not been so tamely inactive, on this occasion, as their pastor. Anxious, at once, to palliate his offence and to screen his timidity, several penny and two-penny defences have successively appeared: wherein the anonymous scribblers wretchedly endeavoured to gather up, and put together, the fragments of a shattered reputation. The very printers, the mid-wives who handed these "insects of a day" into public existence, were ashamed to subjoin their names at the bottom of the title pages.

Two lay-preachers, in particular, have feebly taken up the cudgels for their master. Of one I shall say very little, as he writes with some degree of decency. Of the other I shall not say much; for both his talents and his morals sink him far below the dignity of chastisement. This illiterate "haberdasher of small wares" entitles his penny effusion, as well as I remember, "A Letter of thanks to the Reverend Mr. Toplady, in the Names of all the hardened Sinners in London and Westminster." The poor creature, it is plain from his title-page, aims at humour; and yet unhappily for such a de-

fied to act as secretary in chief to the sinners of London and Westminster. For he has given very numerous and ample proofs of his own sinfulness, and that there can hardly exist, in those two cities, a more atrocious sinner than himself. I will not pollute this paper with a recital of his crimes. They who know the man are no strangers to his communication. Though a doctrinal Pharisee, his life has, long ago, evinced him a practical Sadducee. Surely, Arminianism is likely to flourish mainly under the auspices of such able and virtuous advocates!

And so much for Mr. Wesley's redoubtable subalterns.

What image of their fury can we form?
Dulness and rage. A puddle in a storm.

If my advice carries any weight with them, they will carefully peruse their spelling-books before they make another sally from the press. As to themselves and their refined productions, I mean to take no farther notice of either. I am quite of Mr. Gay's opinion;

To shoot at crows is powder thrown away.

I had almost forgot the monthly reviewers. One word concerning them, and I have done. The two reverend gentlemen who are hired to dissect and characterize whatever comes within the divinity-department, à calendis ad calendis, would fain have it, in their superficial strictures on the first edition of this letter, than I am angry with Mr. Wesley. If, by anger, the ingenious animadvertisers mean a just and becoming disapprobation of Mr. Wesley's lying abridgment, and of the surreptitious manner in which he conveyed it into the world, I

acknowledge myself, in this respect, angry. I hope the reverend reviewers will not, in their turn, be angry too, at seeing themselves tacked to the list of Mr. Wesley's allies: since, in their mode of representing my dispute (or, to adopt their own military term, my battle) with that gentleman, they seem to rank themselves in the number of his seconds. The reason is obvious. Mr. W. is a red-hot Arminian: and the sagacious doctors can discern, with half an eye, that Arminianism lies within a bow-shot of Socinianism and Deism. Yet, notwithstanding the alliance is thus not altogether unnatural, why should these two divines, who are, certainly, possessed of abilities which might do honour to human nature, by a narrow, sordid attachment to party, render those abilities less respectable?

Broad Hembury, January, 9 1771.

SIR,

POSSIBLY the following letter may fall into the hands of some who are unacquainted with the merits of the occasion on which I write. For the information of such, I must premise that, in November, 1769, I published a Two Shilling Pamphlet, entitled "The Doctrine of Absolute Predestination stated and asserted: with a preliminary Discourse on the Divine Attributes. Translated, in great measure, from the Latin of Jerom Zanchius."

Though you are neither mentioned, nor alluded to, throughout the whole book, yet it could hardly be imagined that a treatise apparently tending to lay the axe to the root of those pernicious doctrines which, for more than thirty years past, you have endeavoured to palm on your credulous followers, with all the sophistry of a jesuit, and the dictatorial authority of a pope, should long pass without some censure from the hand of a restless Arminian, who has so eagerly endeavoured to distinguish himself as the bellwether of his deluded thousands.

Accordingly, in the month of March, 1770, out sneaks a printed paper (consisting of one sheet, folded into twelve pages; price one penny) entitled, "The Doctrine of Absolute Predestination stated and asserted, by the Reverend Mr. A——— T———." Wherein you pretend to give an abridgment of the pamphlet above referred to. But,

I. Why did you not make your abridgment truly public? For an apparent reason: that, if possible it might elude my knowledge, and so escape the rod. Born of a stolen embrace, it was needful for the spurious pusillanimous performance to steal its way into the world. It privately crept abroad from the Foundry, the seat of its nativity; it was sold indeed, but sold under

designed to be the sole sphere of its acquaintance. Thus every one that doth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deed should be reproved. In such conduct, I can discern much of the Jesuit, but nothing of the saint.—I had to this hour remained unapprized of the secret stab, but for the information received from some of superior integrity to yourself.—I will put Christianity quite out of the question, and suppose it to have no kind of influence. But should you not at least act as a man of common honour? Come forth openly, sir, in future, like an honest generous assailant; and, from this moment forward, disdain to act the ignoble part of a lurking sly assassin.

2. Why did you not abridge me faithfully and fairly? Why must you lard your ridiculous compendium with additions and interpolations of your own; especially as you took the liberty of prefixing my name to it? Your reasons are obvious. My publication had spread among some of your people: and the longer it continued to diffuse itself, the more you trembled for your Diana. Hence, Demetrius like, you found it needful, by the help of a pious fraud, to prejudice your Ephesians against the doctrines of St. Paul. The book was likely to give the Arminian Babel a shake: therefore, no way so effectual to secure it as by endeavouring to spike the cannon which was planted against it. That you might seem to gratify the curiosity of your partisans, and keep them really hood-winked at the same time, you draw up a flimsy, partial compendium of Zanchius: a compendium which exhibits a few detached propositions, placed in the most disadvantageous point of view, and without including any part of the evidence on which they stand.

But this alone was not sufficient to compass the desired end. Unsatisfied with carefully and totally suppressing every proof alleged by Zanchius in support of his argument; a false colouring must likewise be superinduced, by inserting a sentence or two now and then of your own foisting in. After which you close the motley piece, with an entire paragraph, forged every word of it by yourself: and conclude all, as you began, with subjoining the initials of my name: to make the ignorant believe that the whole, with your omissions, additions, and alterations, actually came from me.—An instance of audacity and falsehood hardly to be paralleled!

I am very far from desiring the reader to take my word in proof of the charge alleged against you. As an instance of your want of honour, veracity, and justice, I refer to the following paragraph, l. as

1 "When all the transactions of Providence and grace are wound up in the last day, he (Christ) will then properly sit as Judge, and openly publish, and solemnly ratify, if I may so, say his everlasting decrees, by receiving the elect, body and soul, into glory: and by passing sentence on the non-elect (not for having done what they could not help, but) for their wilful ignorance of divine things and their obstinate unbelief; for their omissions of moral duty, and for their repeated iniquities and transgressions."
Doct. of Abs. Predest.

2 "In the last day, Christ will sit as Judge and openly publish and solemnly ratify his everlasting decrees, by receiving the elect into glory, and by passing sentence on the non-elect (not for having done what they could not help, but) for their wilful ignorance of their divine things and their obstinate unbelief; for their omissions of moral duty, and for their repeated iniquities and transgressions which they could not help." Wesley's Abridgement, p. 9.

Whether my view of the doctrine itself be, in fact, right or wrong is no part of the present enquiry: the question is, have you quoted me fairly? Blush, Mr. Wesley, if you are capable of blushing. For once publicly acknowledge yourself to have acted criminally: "unless," to use your own words on another occasion, "shame and you have shook hands and parted."

Your concluding paragraph, which you have the effrontery to pain on the world as mine, runs thus: "(a) The sum of all this: one in twenty (suppose) of mankind are elected; nineteen in twenty are reprobated. The elect shall be saved, do what they will; the reprobate shall be damned, do what they can. Reader, believe this, or be damned. Witness my hand, A——— T———."

In almost any other case, a similar forgery would transmit the criminal to Virginia or Maryland, if not to Tyburn. If such an opponent can be deemed an honest man, where shall we find a knave?—What would you think of me, were I infamous enough to abridge any treatise of yours, sprinkle it with interpolations, and conclude it thus: "Reader, buy this book, or be damned, witness my hand, John Wesley!"

And is it thus you contend for victory? are these the weapons of your warfare? Is this bearing down those who differ from you with meekness? Do you call this binding with cords of love? Away, for shame, with such disingenuous artifices. At least, endeavour to conceal that narrow sectarian spirit, which betrays itself more or less in almost every thing you write. Renounce the low serpentine cunning, which puts you on falsifying what you find yourself unable to refute. And, as you regard your character and the cause you espouse, dismiss those dirty subterfuges (the last resources of mean malicious impotence), which de-

grade the man of parts into a lying sophister, and sink a divine beneath the level of an oyster-woman. Cease to fight like the French, with old nails and broken glass. Charge fairly and fire as forcibly as you can. But if you persist to employ the weapons of scurrility and falsehood, the splinters will not only recoil on yourself, but you will continue to be posted for a theological coward.

And why should you, of all people in the world, be so very angry with the doctrines of grace? Forget not the days and months that are past. Remember that it once depended on the toss of a shilling, whether you yourself should be a Calvinist or an Arminian. Tails fell uppermost, and you resolved to be an universalist. It was a happy throw which consigned you to the tents of Arminius: for it saved us from the company of a man who, by a kind of religious gambling peculiarly his own, risked his faith on the most contemptible of all lots; and was capable of tossing up for his creed as porters or chairmen toss up for a halfpenny.

I have read of princes and other eminent persons, who, having risen from ignoble life to greatness, took care to have some striking memorials of their former obscurity frequently in their view, by way of a counterpoise to pride, and as a preservative from being exalted above measure. When from the pinnacle of your own importance you look down upon the advocates for free-grace, and consider them as reptiles, to be treated as you please, only recollect the humbling circumstance of which I have just reminded you: and repress the complacent swellings of self-adulation, by some such soliloquy as this: "I have been in danger myself of believing that St. Paul says true, when he declares that God hath mercy on whom he will have mercy. How precious was the shilling, and above all how lucky was the throw, which convinced me of St. Paul's mistake!" Forgive us if we as implicitly determine our faith by the Scriptures as you determined yours by the fall of the splendid shilling.

But even since this memorable epoch, you have by no means proved yourself that steady Arminian you would have the world believe. Proteus like, you disdain to be shackled and circumscribed by any certain form. Her ladyship of Loretto, though she has a different suit for every day in the year, is *semper eadem*, when compared with the *quondam* fellow of Lincoln College. There are times when you vary as much from your preceding self, as you do at all times from the rest of mankind. Possessed of more than

serpentine elability, you cast your slough not once a year, but almost once an hour. Hence your innumerable inconsistencies and flagrant self-contradictions; the jarring of your principles (ever at intestine war with each other), and the incoherence of your religious system. Your scheme of doctrines reminds me of the feet of a certain visionary image, which, as the sacred penman acquaints us, seemed to be composed of iron and clay—heterogeneous materials, which may, indeed be put together, but will never incorporate with each other. Somewhat like the necromantic soup, of which you have probably read in the tragedy of Macbeth; your doctrines may be stirred into a chaotic jumble, but witchcraft itself would strive in vain to bring them into coalition.—On the contrary, evangelical truth knows nothing of this harlequin assemblage. It is not like Joseph's coat of many colours; nor made up of a patch from Donatus, of another from Pelagius, and a third from Arminius: but is invariably simple, uniform, and harmonious; resembling the robe of its adorable Teacher, which was without seam, and woven from the top throughout.

On one occasion you had the candour to own your levity, as to points of faith. I am acquainted with a very respectable person (Mr. J. D.) who, not many years ago, taking the freedom to tell you that "your prejudices, like armed men, stood with their swords ready drawn, to guard all the passes of conviction, and hew down every truth as fast as it presented itself to your mind;" you had the unusual honesty to answer, "Ah! sir! if you knew how distressed I have been what doctrines I should embrace, and how I have been tossed about from system to system, you would think me the most open to conviction, and the least liable to prejudice of any man you ever knew."—This answer did you real honour, for I am persuaded you spoke true. Yet why should you, who have been so remarkably tossed about, take upon you to revile those who have been enabled to stand fast? I hope for your own sake that you will never cease tossing about, until you have gained the harbour of truth: and that, amidst all your manifold shifting from system to system, you will at length be enabled to fix on the only right system, which asserts the lawfulness of God's doing what he will with his own.

I am told the penny-sheet (which occasions this free address), is to be followed, some time hence, by a four-penny pamphlet against Zanchius: wherein you are to be

siege the doctrine of predestination in form. Commence the siege, and welcome. Open your trenches and plant your batteries. Bring forth your strong arguments and play them off with vigour. I publicly profess, and subscribe my name to it, that if I cannot beat you back, I will freely capitulate and own myself conquered. But remember that if you would do any thing to purpose you must make a regular attack. You must encounter the whole of Zanchius, and take his arguments in their regular connection and dependency on each other. You must go through with my preface, which I prefixed to my translation of that great man. Having carried and dismantled the out-work, you must next proceed to demolish the dissertation on the divine attributes: which having destroyed, you are then to assail the citadel; I mean those five stubborn chapters which make up the body of the treatise itself. All the allies or the arguments drawn from Scripture and reason, must likewise be put to the sword. This should you attempt to do in a manner worthy of a scholar and a divie, I shall have no objection (if life and health continue) to measuring swords, or breaking a pike, with you. Controversy properly conducted is a friend to truth, and no enemy to benevolence. When the flint and the steel are in conflict some sparks may issue, which may both warm and enlighten.—But I have no notion of encountering a wind-mill in lieu of a giant. If, therefore you come against me (as now) with straws instead of artillery, and with chaff in the room of ammunition, I shall disdain to give you battle: I shall only laugh at you from the ramparts.

Much less, if you descend to your customary resource of false quotations, despicable invective, and unsupported dogmatism, shall I hold myself obliged again to enter the lists with you. An opponent who thinks to add weight to his arguments by scurrility and abuse, resembles the insane person, who rolled himself in mud, in order to make himself fine. I would no more enter into a formal controversy with such a scribbler, than I would contend for the wall with a chimney-sweeper.

When some of your friends gave out, two or three months before your late doughty publication, that Mr. John (as they call you) was shutting himself up (b), in order to answer the translator of Zanchius; I really imagined that something tolerably respectable was going to make its appearance. But

Quid dignum tanto tulit hic promissor hiatu?

After the teeming mountain had been

So distant bug-bears fright: but, nearer draw,

shut up a competent time, long enough to have been brought to bed of a Hercules, forth creeps a puny toothless mouse! a mouse of heterogeneous kind: having little more than its head and tail (c) from you; and the main of its body made up of some mangled, castrated citations from Zanchius.

—*Currente roto, cur urceus exit?*

If I may judge of the future, by the past, and unless you amend greatly in a short time, your four-penny supplement, when it appears, will be no less inconsiderable than the penny sheet already extant. And, as the mouse is not cheap at a penny, I am very apprehensive the rat, when it ventures out, will be far too dear at a groat.

Hitherto your treatment of Zanchius resembles that of some clumsy, bungling anatomist: who in the dissection of an animal dwells much on the larger and more obvious particulars; but quite omits the nerves, the lymphatics, the muscles, and the most interesting parts of the complicate machine. Thus, in your piddling extract from the pamphlet, you have thought proper to curtail, you only give a few of the larger outlines; without at all entering into the spirit of the subject, or so much as producing (so far from attempting to refute) any of the turning points, on which the argument depends. Wrench the finest eye that ever shone in a lady's head from its socket, and it will appear frightful and deformed: whereas, in its natural connection, the symmetry and brilliancy, the expressiveness and the beauty, are conspicuous. So it often fares with authors. A detached sentence, artfully misplaced, or unseasonably introduced, maliciously applied, or unfairly cited, may appear to carry an idea the very reverse of its real meaning. But re-place the dislocated passage, and its propriety and importance are restored. I would wish every unprejudiced person, into whose hands your abridgment of my translation has fallen, to suspend his judgment concerning it until he sees the translation itself. On comparing the two together, he will at once perceive how candid and honest you are; and what

quantity of confidence may be reposed on your integrity as a citer.

When I advert to the unjust and indecent manner in which you attacked the late excellent Mr. Hervey; above all, when I consider how daringly free you have made with the Scriptures themselves, both in your commentaries, and in your alterations of the text itself; I cease to wonder at the audacious licentiousness of your pen respecting me. I should rather wonder if you treated any opponent with equity, or canvassed any subject impartially. Rise but once to this, and I shall both wonder and rejoice.

You give me to understand that I am but "a young translator." Granted. Better however to be a young translator than an old plagiary. Which of our ancient divines have you not evaporated and spoiled? and then made them speak a language, when dead, which they would have started from, with horror, when alive? (d)

Yet Brutus is an honourable man!

How miserably have you pillaged even my publication? Books, when sent into the world, are no doubt in some sense public property. Zanchius, if you chose to buy him, was yours to read; and, if you thought yourself equal to the undertaking, was yours to answer: but he was not yours to mangle. Remember how narrowly you escaped a prosecution some years ago, for pirating the Poems of Dr. Young.

I would wish you to keep your hands from literary picking and stealing. However, if you cannot refrain from this kind of stealth, you can abstain from murdering what you steal. You ought not, with Ahab, to kill as well as take possession: nor, giant like, to strew the area of your den with the bones of such authors as you have seized and slain.

On most occasions you are too prone to set up your own infallible judgment as the very *lapis lydius* of right and wrong. Hence the firebrands, arrows and death, which you hurl at those, who presume to vary from the oracles you dictate. Hence particularly your illiberal and malevolent spleen against the Protestant dissenters; (e)

allowing us, on both sides, to retain our own opinions, for the softening our hearts towards each other? My dear friend, consider. I am not persuading you to leave or change your religion: but to follow after that fear and love of God without which all religion is vain. I say not a word to you about your opinions or outward manner of worship.—We ought, without this endless jangling about opinions, to provoke one another to love and to good works. Let the points wherein we differ stand aside. Here are enough wherein we agree.—O brethren, let us not still fall out by the way!

Mr. Wesley's Letter to a Roman Catholic, p. 4, 8-10. Far be it from me to charge Mr. Wesley with a fondness for all the grosser parts of Popery. Yet I fear the partition between that Church and him is somewhat thinner than might be wished. Or rather, like the loving Pyramis and Thisbe, they endeavour to remedy the want of a perfect coalition, by kissing one another to the wall.

(c) The advertisement, on the back-side of Mr. Wesley's title-page; and his concluding paragraph, p. 12.
(d) See almost every part of what Mr. Wesley miscalls the Christian Library.

(e) "How little is the case mended at the meeting! either the teachers are new-light men, denying the Lord that bought them; or they are predestinarians, and so preach predestination and final perseverance, more or less. Nor is it expedient for any methodist preacher to imitate the dissenters in their manner of praying: either in his tone, or in his language, or in the length of his prayer. Neither should we sing, like them, in a slow, drawing manner. We sing swift, both because it saves time, and because it tends to awake and enliven the soul."

Mr. Wesley's Preserv. against Unsettled Notions, p. 245.

How much more civilly, not to say cordially, this gentleman shakes hands with the Papists, let his

(b) Dreadful his thunders, while unprinted roar,
But when once published, his

though yourself are, in many respects a dissenter of the worst kind. I would not however by this declaration be understood as if I meant to dishonour that respectable body by classing you with them; for you stand alone, and are a dissenter of a cast peculiar to yourself. And yet, like Henry I., you are for making the length of your own arm the standard-measure for every body else. No wonder therefore that you eminently inherit the fate of Ishmael; that your hand is against every man, and every man's hand against you. Strange! that one who pleads so strenuously for universal love in the Deity should adopt so little of the love for which he pleads! that a person of principles so large should have a heart so narrow! bigots of every denomination are much the same: and of all vices, bigotry is one of the meanest and most mischievous. Its shrivelled, contracted breast leaves no room for the noble virtues to dilate and play. Candour, benevolence, and forbearance, become smothered and extinguished: partly from being cramped by littleness of mind, partly from being overwhelmed with intellectual dust. Bigotry is a determined enemy to truth; inasmuch as it essentially interferes with freedom of enquiry, restrains the grand indefeasible right of private judgment, confines our regards to a party, and, by limiting the extent of moderation and mutual good-will, tears up charity by the very roots. In short, bigotry is the very essence of Popery; and too often leads its votaries, before they are aware, into the bosom of that pretended Church, whose doctrines and maxims are the worst corruption of the best religion that ever was. And though this baneful vice is so uncomfortable in itself; so contrary to the genius of the gospel; and so extensively pernicious in its effects; yet is it not as common as it is detestable? May all God's children be enabled to cast it, with the rest of their idols, to the moles and to the bats!

You have obliquely given me a sneering lecture upon "modesty, self-diffidence, and tenderness" to opponents: and it must be owned, that the lesson comes with a peculiar grace and quite in character from you. The words sound well: but, like many other prescribers, you say and do not. Else why do you represent me as telling my readers that they must, "upon pain of damnation believe, that only one person in twenty is elected?" Why do you introduce me as enjoining them to believe under the same penalty that "the elect shall be saved, do what they will; and the reprobate damned, do what they can?" This is a sample indeed of your own modesty, tenderness, and self-diffidence: but God forbid that I should give such dismal proof of mine. I believe and preach that the chosen and

ransomed of the Lord are appointed to salvation though sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth: and, with regard to the rest, that they will be condemned, not for doing what they can in a moral way, but for not doing what they can: for not believing the gospel report; and for not ordering their conversation according to it.

Let me likewise ask you when or where I ever presumed to ascertain the number of God's elect? Point out the treatise and the page, wherein I assert that only "one in twenty of mankind are elected." The book of life is not in your keeping, nor in mine. The Lord, and the Lord only, knoweth them that are his. He alone who telleth the number of the stars, and calleth them all by their names, calleth also his own sheep by name, and leadeth them out, first from a state of sin into a state of grace, and then into the state of glory. Yet, as the learned and devout Beza expresses himself, "I shall never blush to abide by that simplicity which the Holy Spirit, speaking in the Scriptures, hath been pleased to adopt." (f) and it is but too certain that in the Scriptures are such awful passages as these: Broad is the way and wide is the gate which leadeth to destruction, and many there be that go in thereat: while on the other hand, Strait is the gate, and narrow is the way that leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it.—Many are called, but few chosen.—Fear not, little flock; for it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom.—There is a remnant, according to the election of grace. Declarations of this tremendous import, instead of furnishing you with fuel for contention, and setting you on a presumptuous and fruitless calculation of the number that shall be saved or lost, should rather bring you on your knees before God, with your hand upon your breast and this cry in your lips: "Search me, O Lord, and try me; prove me also and examine my thoughts. Shew me to which class I belong. Give me solid proof that my name is in the Lamb's Book of Life, by making it clear to me that I am in the faith." And ever remember that true faith utterly disclaims all ground of pretension to justification and eternal life, but on the sole footing of God's absolute grace and the Messiah's finished redemption. Pelagianism is for serving the Deity as pope Celestine III. is said to have treated the emperor Hen. VI. It quite kicks off the crown from the head of sovereign grace; and makes the will of God bend and truckle and shape itself to the caprice of man. Arminianism, somewhat more specious, but altogether as pernicious, cuts the crown in two, by dividing the praise of salvation between God and man, and fairly runs away with half. On the contrary, that faith which is of divine operation acts like the

emperor Charles V. when he retired from the throne: it resigns the crown entirely, and renounces it for ever, without reserving so much as a single jewel for itself.

Should the Holy Spirit vouchsafe to lead you thus far you will then no longer be ready to object that "the elect shall be saved, do what they will:" for you will know by heart-felt experience that the converted elect are, and cannot but be, ambitious to perform all those good works in which God hath ordained them to walk; and to act worthy of him who hath graciously and effectually called them to his kingdom and glory.

Your pretended fear of Antinomianism, like your real fear of the comet, which was expected to have appeared a few years back, is perfectly idle and chimerical. You publicly testified your apprehensions that the latter would dry up our rivers, and burn up our vegetables if not reduce the earth itself to a cinder. But your prophecies proved to be "the baseless fabric of a vision;" and our rivers, trees, and earth remain as they were.—Nor will the doctrines of grace, experimentally received into the heart, destroy or weaken the obligation of moral (g) virtue. On the contrary they will operate on the practice, not like your scorching comet on our globe, but like the genial beams of the sun, which diffuse gladness, and occasion fruitfulness wherever they arise. Whoever wishes in earnest to lead a new life must first cordially embrace the good old doctrine of salvation by grace alone.—In short, your own tenet of sinless perfection leads directly to the grossest Antinomianism. I once knew a lady whom you had inveigled into your pale, and who in a short space professed herself perfect. Being in her company some time after, I pointed out a part of her conduct which

to me seemed hardly compatible with a sinless state. Her answer was to this effect: "You are no competent judge of my behaviour. You are not yourself perfectly sanctified; and therefore see my tempers and actions through a false medium. I may to you seem angry: but my anger is only Christian zeal."—I could, moreover mention the names of some of your quondam followers who, from professing themselves sinless, have cast off all appearance of godliness, and are working all manner of iniquity with greediness. If you are in search of Antinomians, truly and justly so called, you must look for them, not among those whom you term Calvinists, but among your own hair-brained (h) perfectionists. Had not you yourself (to remind you of but one instance) a proof of it not very long ago? You formed a scheme of collecting as many perfect ones as you could, to live together under one roof. A number of these flowers were accordingly transplanted from some of your nursery-beds to the hot-house. And a hot-house it soon proved. For would we believe it? the sinless people quarrelled in a short time at so violent a rate that you found yourself forced to disband the select regiment. Had you kept them together much longer, that line would have been literally verified in these squabbling members of your Church Militant;

The males pulled noses, and the females caps.

A very small house, I am persuaded, would hold the really perfect upon earth. You might drive them all into a nutshell. But to return.

I cannot dismiss your objection concerning the supposed fewness of God's truly elect people without observing that, how few soever they may appear, and really be in a single generation, and as balanced with

(g) Consciousness of guilt and dread of detection frequently put bad men upon entering those accusations against their opponents, which without such a timely precaution, they are justly apprehensive will be charged upon themselves, like the apostate spirits in Milton, who were for turning their own torments into weapons against heaven. Such is the prudent conduct of very many Arminians. Fully aware that their own lives are none of the best, they affect to cry out against Calvinism, as though she was the very mother and nurse of heathenism. Were she really so, what multitudes would desert the standard of Arminius, and flock to the banner of Galvia! But all who are capable of discernment know that the pretended licentious tendency of Calvinism (so called) is no more than idle flourish and empty declamation. Were the doctrines of grace unfavourable to strict morality, we should quickly see them the reigning system of the age. On the contrary, they are therefore at present unfashionable because they make no allowance for the wickedness of the wicked. It is a fundamental axiom with us, who abide by the principles of the Reformation, that holiness of heart and life is (not the cause, price or condition, but, which adds infinitely stronger security to the interests of moral virtue) an essential and inseparable part of that very salvation to which we are invited. A Calvinist

spirit of his own constitutive principles (i.e. he must cease to be a Calvinist), ere he can consistently degenerate into a sensualist.

(h) I might with too much justice add that some of Mr. W.'s own lay preachers are indisputably to be numbered among practical Antinomians. These, however, are regarded by their partizans as very excellent men, that have not yet attained to perfection, though they are in a fair way for it.—If Mr. Wesley should have the front to deny that any of his preaching mechanics are men of loose lives, I have it in my power to appeal to facts, which tenderness for those persons as individuals of mankind, and a concern for the honour of human nature in general, restrain me at present from holding up to public view. Nor would I be thought to hint at these things with pleasurable triumph. I feel too strongly for the interests of Christian obedience, and for the happiness of souls, to exult over the vices of the vicious. But, when men, whose lives would be a disgrace to heathenism; when men, whom Socrates or Seneca would have blushed to own for disciples, take upon them to arraign the doctrines of the Scriptures, and of our established Church, under a pretence of guarding against those immoralities of which they themselves are notorious and noon-day examples; what can such shameless railers expect but to have their own real crimes deservedly exposed?

the many unrighteous among whom they live below, yet when the whole number of the Redeemer's jewels is made up—when the entire harvest of his saints is gathered in—when his complete mystic body is presented collectively before the throne of his Father; they will amount to an exceeding great multitude which no man can number. On earth the company of the faithful may to us, who know but in part, resemble Elijah's cloud, which, at first, seemed no bigger than a man's hand; whereas, in the day of God, they will be found to overspread the whole heavens. They may appear now, to use Isaiah's phrase, but as two or three berries on the top of a bough, or as four or five in the most fruitful branches thereof; but they shall then be like the tree in Nebuchadnezzar's vision, the height of which reached unto heaven, and the sight of it to the end of all the earth; the leaves whereof were fair and the fruit thereof much. The kingdom of glory will both be more largely and more variously peopled than bigots of all denominations are either able to think, or willing to allow.

Go now, sir, and dazzle the credulous with your mock victory over the supposed reprobation of "nineteen in twenty." Go on to chalk hideous figures on your waistcoat; and enjoy the glorious triumph of battering your knuckles in fighting them. But

(i) In Mr. Wesley's first edition of his notes on the New Testament, published in 1755, are the two following assertions, than which even he himself has, perhaps, never given a more striking specimen of presumption and inconsistency. "Enoch and Elijah are not in heaven, but only in paradise;" Note on John iii. 13. "Enoch and Elijah entered at once into the highest degree of glory, without first waiting in paradise;" Note on Rev. xii. 20. This it is to be wise above what is written!

(k) Mr. Wesley's re-baptization of some adult persons is another proof of this charge. I could point out by name more than one who have undergone from his hand a reiteration of that sacred ceremony. I shall only at present mention a single instance, which I had from the person herself with permission to publish her name at full length, in case Mr. W. should deny the fact. Mrs. L. S. now living in Southwark, was baptized in a bathing-tub, in a cellar, by Mr. John Wesley; who at the time, held her down so very long under water, while he deliberately pronounced the words of the administration, that some friends of her's who were present screamed out, from an apprehension that she was actually drowned; and she herself was so far gone that she began to grow insensible, and was lifted out of the water but just time enough to save her life.—Yet this is the man who, in the writings which he has published to the world, professes to hold infant baptism, and that by sprinkling, not by immersion!

Quo teneam vultus mutantem Protea nodo?

(l) The rules of what Mr. Wesley calls Band Societies demonstrate the miserable servitude of those who are admitted into that gossiping club. The whole of these rules would be too tedious to insert. One or two of them, as samples of the rest, may not be unacceptable to the reader.

"To speak each of us in order, freely and plainly, the true state of our souls; with the faults we have committed, in thought, word, or deed; and the temptations we have felt since our last meeting.

To desire some person among us to speak his

father no more of your hideous figures on me. Do not dress up scare-crows of your own, and then affect to run away from them as mine. I do not expect to be treated by Mr. John Wesley with the candour of a gentleman, or the meekness of a Christian; but I wish him, for his reputation's sake, to write and act with the honesty of a heathen.

You affect to be deemed a minister of the national Church. Why then do you decry her doctrines, and, as far as in you lies, sap her discipline? That you decry her doctrines needs no proof: witness, for example, the wide discrepancy between her decisions and yours on the articles of free-will, justification, predestination, perseverance, and sinless perfection; to say nothing concerning your new-fangled doctrine of the intermediate state of departed souls (i).

That you likewise do not overflow with zeal for the discipline (k) of the Church of England is manifest, not only from the numerous and intricate regulations, with which you fetter (l) your societies, but from the measures you lately pursued, when a foreign mendicant was in England, who went by the name of Erasmus and stiled himself bishop of Arcadia. This old gentleman passed for a prelate of the Greek Church; though to me it seems not improbable that he might rather be a member of the Romish. Thus much, however, is certain; that the

many and as searching questions as may be, concerning their state, sins, and temptations."

Among the questions proposed to such as are candidates for admission into this pretended Sanctum Sanctorum is the following:

"Is it your desire and design to be on this, and all other occasions, entirely open, so as to speak every thing that is in your heart without exception, without disguise, and without reserve?"

The printed account, whence these extracts were taken verbatim, adds, that the five following questions are to be asked at every meeting:

"1. What known sins have you committed, since our last meeting?"

"2. What temptations have you met with?"

"3. How were you delivered?"

"4. What have you thought said, or done, of which you doubt whether it be sin or not?"

"5. Have you nothing you desire to keep a secret?"

The reader, doubtless, will on this occasion be reminded of the Popish practice of auricular confession. For my own part I make no scruple to acknowledge that confession, as managed in the Church of Rome, is infinitely preferable to confession as conducted under the auspices of Mr. Wesley. In those countries where Popery is established, confession is made only to one person, and he a priest: who, if he divulges what is made known to him under the character of confessor, is liable by law to suffer death. But, in these Band Societies the most open and unreserved confession is, it seems, made in the hearing of a dozen or twenty old women and boys, who are at liberty to blab out all they hear, without being obnoxious to any penalty at all.

I shall only transcribe from the above account the two following rules imposed on these same societies:

1. "To wear no needless ornaments; such as rings, ear-rings, necklaces, lace, ruffles.

2. "To use no needless self-indulgencies; such as taking snuff or tobacco: unless prescribed by phy-

chaplains of the then Russian ambassador here knew nothing about him: and that to this day, the Greek Church in Amsterdam believed him to have been an impostor. With regard to this person, I take the liberty of putting one or two queries to you.

1. Did you or did you not get him (m) to ordain several of your lay preachers according to the manner of what he called the Greek Ritual?

2. Did these lay preachers of yours, or did they not, both dress and officiate as clergymen of the Church of England, in consequence of that ordination? And under the sanction of your own avowed approbation? notwithstanding, putting matters at the best, they could only be ministers of the Greek Church, and which could give them no legal right to act as ministers of the Church of England. Nay, did you not repeatedly declare that their ordination was, to all intents and purposes, as valid as your own which you received forty years ago at Oxford?

3. Did you or did you not strongly press this supposed Greek bishop to consecrate you a bishop at large, that you might be invested with a power of ordaining what ministers you pleased to officiate in your societies as clergymen? And did he not refuse to consecrate you, alleging this for his reason, That according to the canons of the Greek Church more than one bishop must be present to assist at the consecration of a new one?

4. In all this, did you or did you not palpably violate a certain oath which you have repeatedly taken? I mean the oath of supremacy; part of which runs thus:

And I do declare, that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state, or potentate, hath, or ought to have, any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence, or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm: so help me God.

Now is not the conferring of orders an act of the highest ecclesiastical power and

(m) There is something vastly curious in the letter of orders which this vagrant gave to the persons he pretended to ordain. I once saw an original letter or certificate of this kind, signed by himself. It was written in very mean Greek; and, which added to my persuasion of Erasmus's being an impostor, was drawn up, not in the modern Greek, which the Christians of that Church now use, but in the ancient; and, if I am not greatly mistaken, the words were likewise accented. I read it over twice, and most sincerely wish I had taken a copy of it: but at that time I regarded it only as an article of present curiosity. A friend of mine, however, who improved his opportunity rather better, took a translation of it, which on my after request, he favoured me with; and, upon the strength of memory I can venture to assure the public that the version is materially a just one. I believe it to be perfectly so. It runs thus:

"Our measure from the grace, gift and power of the all-holy and life-giving Spirit, given by our Saviour Jesus Christ to his divine and holy apostles, to ordain sub-deacons and deacons; and also to ad-

authority? And was not this man a foreigner? And were not the steps you took a positive acknowledgment of a foreign power and jurisdiction? And was not such acknowledgment a breach of your oath?

It matters not whether Erasmus was in fact an impostor or a genuine Greek bishop. Unless you were very insincere you took him to be what he passed for. If you did not, you were a party to a fraud. Either way, pretend no longer to love the Church of England! you who so lately endeavoured to set up *imperium in imperio*! If you are honest, you will either publicly confess your fault, or for ever throw aside your gown and cassock. You will either return to the service of the Church, or cease to wear her livery. You may think, perhaps, that I make too free in expostulating with you so plainly. And yet, on maturer thought, I question whether you may or not. How can Mr. Wesley, who on all occasions makes so very free with others, be angry with young translators for copying (though at humble distance) so venerable an example? Nor, indeed, ought a person who, beyond even what truth and decency permit, takes so great liberties with the rest of his contemporaries, to wonder if, so far as decency and truth allow, the rest of his contemporaries take as great liberties with him.

You complain, I am told, that the evangelical clergy are leaving no stone unturned "to raise John Calvin's ghost, in all quarters of the land." If you think the doctrines of that eminent and blessed reformer to be formidable as a ghost, you are welcome to do all you can towards laying them. Begin your incantations as soon as you please. The press is open, and you never had a fairer opportunity of trying your strength upon John Calvin than at present. Only take care that you do not, with all your skill in theological magic, get yourself into a circle, out of which you may find it difficult to retreat. And, a little to mitigate your wrath against

which hath descended to our humility, I have ordained sub-deacon and deacon, at Snows-fields Chapel, on the 19th day of November, 1764, and at Wells-street Chapel, on the 24th of the same month, priest the reverend Mr. W. C. according to the rules of the holy apostles and of our faith. Moreover I have given to him power to minister and teach in all the world the gospel of Jesus Christ, no one forbidding him in the Church of God. Wherefore, for that very purpose, I have made this present letter of recommendation from our humility, and have given it to the ordained Mr. W. C. for his certificate and security.

"Given and written at London, in Britain, Nov. 24th, 1764.

"ERASMUS, bishop of ARCADIA."

I cannot help suspecting that his humility, as he styles himself, is, if the truth was known, nearly related to another certain old gentleman, who no less humbly writes himself servant of the servants of God. His humility of Arcadia, and his holiness of Rome, are, I doubt not, sons of one and the same

the raisers of Calvin's ghost, remember that you yourself have been a great ghost-raiser in your time. Who raised the ghosts of John Goodwin, the Arminian regicide; and of Thomas Grantham, the Arminian baptist? Who raised the ghost of Monsieur (n) De Renty, the French Papist; and of many other Romish enthusiasts; by translating their lives into English, for the edification of Protestant readers?

Should you take any notice of this letter, I have three requests to make; or rather, there are three particulars on which I have a right to insist:

1. Do not quote unfairly.
2. Do not answer evasively.
3. Do not print clandestinely.

Canvass the points of doctrine wherein we differ, as strictly as you can. They will stand the test. They scorn disguise. They disdain to sue for quarter. Truth, like our first parents in the state of innocence, can

(n) As a specimen of Mr. Wesley's regard to, at least, the minutiae of Popery, I shall select a few passages from his *Life of this Monsieur De Renty*, which now lies before me. The reader will observe that the sentences inclosed with inverted commas are Mr. Wesley's own words.

He speaks favourably of this French Papist, for his regularly "saying the itinerarium," and then "singing the litanies of our Lord," before he set out on any journey; and for taking due care to "sing the vespers," while he was upon the road. Page 3. Among the instances of Monsieur's humility, are reckoned (page 9 and 10.) his not permitting "a cushion to be carried for him" when he went to mass; and his frequent saying "his prayers at the outside of the Church." Also his going abroad, to visit a monastery "on foot," and that too "in thawing weather;" nay, he would sometimes "traverse in a manner all Paris," even when "it poured down with rain." And yet, with all this road humility Mr. de Renty it seems kept a coach of his own. Had he been consistent he would have entirely shorn himself of this supernumerary convenience, by laying down his carriage. But then where would have been the merit of spontaneously traversing all Paris on foot when it poured down with rain? His dutiful demeanour to the priest who had the care of his soul, as its father confessor, is a feature of Mr. De Renty's saintship, on which Mr. Wesley, with peculiar rapture, dwells and dilates. Page 11. "A further proof of his humility was his carriage to his director. He did nothing that concerned himself without his conduct. To him he proposed whatever he designed either by speaking or writing, clearly and punctually; desiring his advice, his pleasure, and his blessing upon it; and that with the utmost respect and submission. And, without reply or disputing, he simply and exactly followed his order." This was good Catholic obedience indeed! and no doubt Mr. Wesley had a view in proposing such an example to the imitation of his Protestant followers. Under the article of De Renty's "Self-denial and mortification," we are informed (page 14.) that "he made but one meal a day for several years," and "always of the worst" provisions he could meet with. He would "often step into a baker's shop" and dine on "a piece of bread and a draught of water." From the same principle of gloomy and unthankful superstition, he would do penance, by "padding the night in a chair," or lying down in his "cloaths and boots," or sleeping "on a bench till morning." Being at Pontois "in winter" he desired "the Carmelite nuns not to make a fire, or prepare a bed" for him. He parted with several books (p. 16.) because they were "richly bound." He "used no gloves in any season; wore no clothes, but plain and close made;" and carried no silver in his pockets, "except for charity." After which de-

shew herself naked, without being either afraid or ashamed: and he that doth truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest that they are wrought in God.

May you at last begin to act from this principle, and no longer prostitute your time and talents to the wiredrawing of chicanery, and the circulation of error! I am not insensible of your parts; but alas! what is distinguished ability, if not wedded to integrity? No less just than ingenious is the remark of a learned and noble writer: "The riches of the mind, like those of fortune, may be employed so perversely as to become a nuisance and a pest, instead of an ornament and support to society." (o)

I am

Yours, &c.,

AUGUSTUS TOPLADY.

Westminster,
March 26, 1770.

have seen him in his coach with a page and footman." His coach I presume was to carry him on foot when it rained; his page was to hold up his clothes which were plain and close made; and the office of the footman was to reach him his gloves, whereof he wore none in any season. Who could ever have surmised that such a doleful series of mortification and self-denial would end in the fopperies of a coach, a page, and a footman! Mr. De Renty's vanity, which mixed itself with his very austerities, reminds me of what I am told is common in the streets of Paris: where you may see many a blind beggar bawling for alms, in a bag-wig, his hat under his arm, a wooden sword by his side, and paper ruffles adorning the hand that is extended to receive charity. But to return to the hero of the tale. Having had a quarrel with his mother, and the breach being made up, "he was no sooner returned home than he caused *Te Deum* to be sung," page 24. "He had great respect to holy persons, especially to priests. Whenever he met them, he saluted them with profound humility; and in his travels would alight off his horse to do it." page 33. Nor does Mr. Wesley omit to inform us, p. 39, of Mr. De Renty's regard to such fugitive Papists as had either rendered themselves obnoxious to the laws at home, or preferred begging in France to living under an heretical government in Great Britain. "He was the first that motioned some relief to the poor English, driven by persecution out of their own country." Nor must his very pilgrimages be overlooked. "Going one day to visit the holy place of Montmatre, after his prayers said in the Church, he retired into a desolate part of the mountain, near a little spring. There he knelt down to prayer: and, that ended, he dined on a piece of bread and a draught of water." Page 45. Would it not have been still more devout not to have dined at all on such holy ground? "One day he visited a person who, from a groundless suspicion, had cruelly used his wife. Mr. De Renty accosted him with such soft language that he was persuaded at length to go to confession, which he had not done in twelve years before." P. 47, 48. Himself, says Mr. Wesley, speaking of Mr. De Renty's last illness, "made his confession almost every day till his death." Page 62.

I dismiss these and many other passages in this obnoxious performance without further remark. Their tendency is self-evident. I shall only add, that, if the reader has a desire to see still more enormous instances of Romish superstition and fanaticism, he will find them in Mr. Wesley's lives of some Spanish Monks (who, more nationally grave, did not imitate the French Ascetic, by retaining their coaches, pages, and footmen), in the last volume, or last but one, of his compilation entitled *The Christian Library*.

(o) *Dialogues of the Dead*. p. 297. Edit. 1765.

A WORD TO THE REVEREND MR. WALTER SELLON.

LATELY TRANSPLANTED FROM THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF ASHBY DE LA ZOUCH TO SOME PART OF YORKSHIRE.

Owing to your transplantation above mentioned, I am ignorant of your present place of abode, and must therefore direct to you at large.—I have obtained a sight of your late *Strictures* on Mr. Elisha Coles, just time enough to save the press. These *Strictures* are, it seems, the joint progeny of Mr. Wesley and yourself: a *par nobile fratrum*, whose united labours have been exerted for several years last past, in scraping together and licking into form the materials of this long-threatened fulmination. Consequently, whoever may deem it worth his while to encounter the cub, will have the additional satisfaction of stringing the two parental brothers at one and the same time.

For my own part, I assure you, sir, in particular, whose name adorns the direction of this postscript, that I should have left you in peaceable possession of your absolute insignificance, had not the last page of your preface induced me to coincide with your apparent wish, by lending you my hand to lift you from your painful obscurity. How much credit you may gain by this my act of indulgence, and what figure you may make in the course of the exhibition, time will probably give you to feel. At present I have only room to observe that, in the aforesaid preface (which the style demonstrates to be all your own), you vibrate your Lilliputian spear at me; and give me to under-

stand that I am next upon the list of those who are to feel the weight of your broken bulrush. I have published, you tell me, a "curious performance" concerning predestination; which said curious performance has, I hereby find, raised the bristles of a very curious adversary, who is so polite as to inform me that I am a Malmesbury Hobbist, a blasphemer, and a vile slanderer. Convenient names which dulness is never at a loss for,

When fancy flags and sense is at a stand.

So much for the rhetorical flowers with which the gentle prefacer crowns the brow of his imaginary victim. But the present chaplet is, it seems, only the sample of a whole garland to come. I am to be made "the subject of another piece;" wherein I am to be drubbed *ex professo*; that is to say, "Unless it be done by some abler hand, which," adds my hero, "I could wish to see." The plain English of this is, Mr. John Wesley's mastiff (who now only snarls) will actually bark at the mischievous vicar of Broad Hembury, unless Mr. John himself, the mastiff's owner, saves his poor cur the trouble by roaring *in propria persona*.

I must, however, inform them both, to their no small discomfort, that let them roar ever so loud, and ever so long; be it a solo, or be it a duetto; they will not rob the naughty vicar of one moment's repose: though they may, perhaps render it proper for him to repeat his trespasses on the public condescension.

A. T.

BROAD HEMBURY; Feb. 9, 1771.

MORE WORK FOR MR. JOHN WESLEY;

OR

A VINDICATION OF THE DECREES AND PROVIDENCE OF GOD,

FROM THE DEFAMATION OF A LATE PRINTED PAPER,

ENTITLED

"THE CONSEQUENCE PROVED."

Confutatur invidia falsa interpretatione sententiae, quae infamanda suscipitur.—Non modò invidiosissimè exponitur ipsa dogmata, sed et consecraria invidiosa ex iis deducuntur.—Hæ sunt potissimæ artes, quibus invidia movetur.—Visne probare infirmas esse illorum ratiocinationes? Contrariam veritatem perspicue exponit et validis argumentis armato.

LE CLERIC, de Arg. Theol. ab. Inv. duct.

What in me is dark,

Illumine!

That, to the height of this great argument,

I may assert eternal providence,

And justify the ways of God to men. MILTON.

ADVERTISEMENT.

I EXPECT that this publication will, as usual, be followed by a succession of penny and two-penny squibs. Probably I shall take no notice of them. Mr. Wesley, it seems, has between two and three hundred lav-preach-

ers in his connection. Their name is legion for they are many. It is impossible therefore, from their multitude, that they and their leader should not have the last word, if they are so determined. The latter has lately declared in print that he has been "fighting about words for almost these thirty years."

Doubtless, therefore, the last word must, in his estimation, be particularly worth fighting for. And (unless he should publish any thing at all to the purpose) the last word he is welcome to have. A man would have a hopeful task of it who should waste his life-time in playing at see-saw with almost three hundred such wise and genteel antagonists,

Who then talk most when least they have to say :

and some of whom have already shewn themselves unworthy of even being pilloried in a preface, or flogged at a pamphlet's end.

To those who know me not, it may seem needful to declare that, much as I disapprove Mr. Wesley's distinguishing principles, and the low cunning with which he circulates them, I still bear not the least ill-will to his person. As an individual, I wish him well, both here and ever. As a reviler, he lies (in a way of argument) at the mercy of those he defames. I make, however, no scruple to acknowledge that the manuscript of the following sheets has lain by me some weeks, merely with a view of striking out from time to time, whatever might savour of undue asperity and intemperate warmth. If I any where, however, express myself strongly, it is owing to the necessity I was under of exposing Mr. Wesley's unmanly and dishonest methods of attack.

BROAD HEMBRURY, NOV. 28, 1771.

MORE WORK

FOR

MR. JOHN WESLEY, &c.

If it be possible, says the apostle, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men : plainly intimating that in some cases this is not possible. For what if other men will not live peaceably with us ? what if some, like the troubled sea which cannot rest, are perpetually casting up mire and dirt against the gospel of God, and against all that em-

(p) Observe, I speak not of all Arminians. Many there are, who, notwithstanding their entanglement in that net, stand entitled to the character of pious, moderate, respectable men. Of these I myself know more than a few : and have the happiness to enjoy as much of their esteem, as they deservedly possess of mine. But I speak above of the noisy, factious, malevolent Arminians : restless bigots, whose false fire would shed disgrace on whatever party they might belong to. Who, not content with exercising their own right of private judgment, are for reviling and condemning every individual person who claims the same right of judging for himself, and will not sacrifice his creed at their shrine.

(q) I am fully aware that it is impossible for the Arminians, strictly so called, to be charged with opposing our national system from its first institution : seeing they had then no more than a virtual existence in the loins of their ancestors. Even Mr. Wesley is forced to acknowledge (in a paper misentitled *The Question, What is an Arminian?* Answered :

Are such indefatigable slanderers to be let alone ? The apostle's own conduct says No. His unavoidable contests with the false teachers of that age are demonstrative of the necessity which, occasionally, even the meek and the pacific are under, of sharply rebuking such : to the end that, if God so please, they may become sound in the faith ; or, at least, learn not to blaspheme, nor to increase unto more ungodliness.

Our civil constitution is not more the envy of neighbouring nations, than our religious establishment is the eye-sore of Papists, Pelagians, and Arminians : (p) a triplicate, who too well agree in one. From the first settlement of our national Church, quite down to the present hour, it has been the ambition and the labour of those (q) factions to destroy her either by sap or by storm : and, when both these methods have miscarried, to adulterate and discolour the pure and undefiled system which they found themselves unable to overthrow.

Common justice commands me to acknowledge that no man has striven more to distinguish himself in this illaudable warfare than Mr. John Wesley. and at the same time, stubborn fact constrains me to add that few warriors have acquitted themselves more contemptibly. This gentleman, in his plenitude of ardour for the cause, has made long, ample, and repeated trial of all the three methods above mentioned : the silent sap, the vigorous assault, and the artful adulteration. But all without success. The mine will not spring. The assault cannot be carried. The adulteration is too gross to incorporate. What must he do ? Prevail he cannot : to fly he is ashamed. In such an exigence, all that remains for him is to flourish his reed, to throw an occasional squib, and scorn to confess either the impiety or the impracticability of his enterprise. But reeds are still unable to batter Churches, and squibs (such as "The Consequence proved") are only calculated to amuse children and terrify old women. Yet he goes on to throw the one and to bran-

swered : p. 4.) that Arminius himself did not "begin to doubt of the principles which he had till then received" [i. e. Arminius did not begin to apostatize from Calvinism] until the year 1591. However, let his "doubts" have "began" when they would : I cannot find that he made any conspicuous figure, as an innovator on the Protestant faith, until about the year 1602. Consequently his English proselytes could not have laboured to subvert the religion of their country, so early as under Edward VI., nor even during the first years of Elizabeth. The Arminians, though at present a numerous, are very far from being an ancient, family. But as ever since they did spring up they have left no nerve unstrained in their attempts to demolish our doctrinal establishment ; I have above consigned them, without scruple, to rank with the other two denominations there mentioned : an honour to which they have the fairer title, as they eminently promote the same good old cause, and so sedulously endeavour to make up in zeal what they want in antiquity.

dish the other : why ? because his hatred of the heavenly doctrines is total ; and he resolves that its perseverance shall be final. May divine grace, in mercy to his soul, supersede the former and forbid the latter !

The adventurer who embarks on such an expedition as that which has hitherto engrossed the attention of Mr. Wesley, should be prudent as well as daring. He has, I acknowledge, as much of the insidious in his composition as he has of the acid ; and it would be difficult to say which predominates. But cunning is one thing, discretion is another. A few seeming grains of certain virtues, called humility and moderation, would have conducted in some measure to promote his views by screening them. The example of Arminius might have taught him this piece of theological policy, so needful in the ringleader of a sect. To give that erroneous Dutchman [Arminius] his due, he either had, or appeared to have, some remains of modesty and candour ; which, more than all his arguments, contributed to his acquisition of disciples. But Mr. Wesley is for adding the lion to the fox. He wishes not only to wheedle, but to thunder the Church out of her Calvinism. Partly perhaps in resentment for his having been (very deservedly) thundered out of the Church. A deliverance, by the bye, on which I most heartily congratulate our sacred mother. And I believe her genuine sons may be safely confident (notwithstanding the late transactions at the Feathers Tavern), that she will not dispense with subscriptions to her Calvinism quite so complacently as she resigned Mr. John Wesley.

The complacency, however, is far from reciprocal. This discarded divine, like some discarded soldiers, cannot wholly divest himself of that military air which, under such circumstances, can, at best, but excite pity, instead of commanding respect. He is still, like Mahomet, for propagating his religion by the sword. Peals of anathemas are issued, and torrents of the lowest calumny are thrown out against all who abide by the doctrines of the xxxix articles. The gentleman's own

Sic volo, sic jubeo ; stet, pro ratione, voluntas !

is expected to carry all the efficacy of demonstration on penalty of his utmost malediction. But, let me tell him that the thinking part of mankind, especially those of them whose eyes are spiritually opened, will pay no more regard to his empty fulminations, though launched, *quasi a tripode*, with all the assumed importance of oracular infallibility ; than our magnanimous Elizabeth paid to the bloated menaces of pope Pius V. He continued to roar, and she continued to reign. Pope John's authority may have some weight with such men as

Messieurs Walter Sellon, Haddon Smith and Thomas Oliviers : but not an inch beyond the purlieus of ignorance, prejudice, and superstition, will his dictatorship extend.

Such of the public as have condescended to peruse a pamphlet entitled, *A Letter to the Rev. Mr. John Wesley*, relative to his pretended Abridgment of Zanchius on Predestination, must be sufficiently apprized of the nature and occasion of my contest with this veteran. Another edition of that letter having been called for, and published last winter, the veteran aforesaid, by way (or rather, in lieu) of reprisal, prints, in the month of August, 1771, another paper, folded and priced as usual, twelve pages for a penny ; though a saint, who surely ought to be most scrupulously just in all his dealing, might rather have been expected to have fixed the price at only three fourths of a penny ; seeing, of the twelve pages no more than nine are filled : which every reader, competently skilled in arithmetic, will grant are but three fourths of the dozen. Besides, it was piously and disinterestedly written as a therapeutic, to retrieve the erroneous ; and as a prophylactic, to preserve the orthodox. Of course the cheaper the antidote, the more extensive ; and the more extensive the more useful. But Mr. Wesley feels the force of the *argumentum ad crumenam* too deeply to vend his remedies at a rate so nicely conscientious. He had last year, if we may take his own word for it, near 30,000 followers. And supposing each follower (as, to be sure, each is in duty bound) to buy one, at least, of these penny papers, the farthing extraordinary amounts, in the whole, to thirty pounds, fourteen shillings. A sum of whose value saints of his complexion are as devoutly sensible as other men. Poor Robin's Almanack, alas ! though twice as valuable, goes but for half the price of "The Consequence proved."

Let us now bring these nine pages to the test. Their title claims our first attention : "The Consequence proved." What consequence ? even this ! that, upon the scriptural and Church of England principle of predestination to life, it "naturally and necessarily follows that one in twenty, suppose of mankind, are elected ; nineteen in twenty are reprobated ; that the elect shall be saved do what they will ; the reprobate shall be damned do what they can." These diabolical positions, enough to chill every reasonable and religious man with horror, are Mr. Wesley's own offspring, both as to sentiment and language. He had indeed, the matchless effrontery to publish them originally as mine : and, to render the audacious forgery complete, closed all with these words, "Reader believe this, or be damned : witness my hand, A. T." Now whence came it, that

this concluding cause was omitted in "The Consequence proved?" Was it because Mr. W. found himself ashamed to repeat so unparalleled a falsehood? I apprehend not. For aught appears, he is still as dead to the feelings of shame as he is blind to the doctrines of God. The reason, probably, was his utter despair of being able to torture a line of Zanchius into any thing like proof of my obtruding the doctrine of election upon pain of damnation: and he might well despair of this. Whom do I condemn? whom do I impiously consign to future punishment? I condemn no man. I dare not pronounce concerning any man's eternal state. Herein I judge not even Mr. Wesley himself: though I must tell him that if it be (as I most sincerely wish it may) the divine will to save him, he has an exceeding strait gate to pass through before he gets to heaven. In the meanwhile I return to "The Consequence proved."

The very title is inaccurate. The inferences which the writer pretends to deduce are not a consequence, but a chain of consequences. Let us see whether this mighty consequence-drawer is able to support the consequences drawn.

The proof opens thus:—"Mr. Toplady, a young, bold man, lately" [i. e. very nigh two years ago] "published a pamphlet, an extract from which was soon after" [i. e. about four months after] "printed, concluding with these words,—the sum of all is this: one in twenty (suppose) of mankind, &c."

Mr. W.'s present mode of phraseology is as pregnant with craft as his conduct is destitute of honour. Observe: "an extract from which," i. e. from which pamphlet: "concluding with these words—" Now would not any indifferent reader still imagine, that "those concluding words" were actually "extracted" from the "pamphlet" itself? And yet nothing can be wider from the fact. The "words," which he insinuates to have been "extracted," were not extracted from the pamphlet, but spun from his own daring invention. What shall we say of a man who first hatches blasphemy, and then fathers it on others? Nay, who adds crime to crime, by indirectly persisting in the falsehood, even after the falsehood has been detected and publicly exposed? His forehead must be petrified, and quite impervious to a blush.

The person who, in private conversation, utters a designed untruth, is deservedly branded with disgrace. But the man who sits down and deliberately writes a known, wilful, palpable lie to the public, may, it seems, still be "a saint," and "a precious

labourer in the Lord's vineyard!" Away with such "saintship," away with such "precious labours."—Again: the man who forges my name in order to obtain a trifling sum of money is deemed guilty of a capital offence. But the man who subjoins my name to (r) blasphemous propositions of his own coining is to be treated as "an ancient, venerable servant of Christ, whose whole life has been devoted to the glory of God and the good of souls!" If all his "ancient services" were of a similar cast, even Arminianism itself must expunge them from the list of those good works which it supposes to be meritorious of salvation. Unless Mr. Wesley's Arminianism coincide with the Popish maxim, that bad works, if done to heretics, are transubstantiated into good ones.

But there are two charges alleged against me to which I shall assign a moment's attention: because, though pitifully frivolous, they are nevertheless somewhat curious and uncommon. I am it seems, "young," and "bold." To the first, I in part plead guilty. I have been but between nine and ten years in orders, though ordained as soon as my age would permit.—The merits of the second allegation I leave to the decision of others. However, let me be as "bold" as I will, I cannot be bold in a better cause. Was I even as bold as a lion, it would, according to the maxim of a very wise writer, be a mark, not of perverseness, but of righteousness. (s) The apostle tacitly commends a prophet for being not only bold, but very bold, in asserting the sovereignty, efficacy, and freeness of divine grace in opposition to the merits and free-will of man: Isaiah is very bold, and saith concerning God, I was found of them that sought me not, I was made manifest to them that asked not after me. (t) When the opposers of the Christian system are shameless, why should its defenders be spiritless? As to my inconsiderable self, I blush not to tread in the steps of one, to whose faith I subscribe from the utmost of my heart. If the apostle Paul, with his whole assemblage of gifts and graces (such as probably never shone before, nor will shine again in any mere man, while the world endures), could request the prayers of God's people; much more may I, the weakest of the weak, and the unworthiest of the unworthy, supplicate the intercession of those who love the truth, and entreat them to pray, on my behalf, that utterance may be given to me, that I may open my mouth boldly to make known the mystery of the gospel; that therein I may speak (and why not write?) boldly, as I ought to speak. (u)

blasphemy against the holiness of God, and in the second, blasphemy against his goodness.

(s) Prov. xxviii. 1. (t) Rom. x. 20. (u) Eph. vi. 19, 20.

After all, the charge of boldness (in the sense Mr. Wesley uses the term) comes more than a little out of character from his pen. I could never have dreamed of such an indictment from such a plaintiff. Had I publicly distorted and defamed the decrees of God; had I moreover advanced so many miles beyond boldness as to lay those distortions and defamations at the door of another; bold as I am affirmed to be, I could never have looked up afterwards. I should have thought every miscreant I met an honester man than myself. But Mr. John seems a perfect stranger to these feelings. His *murus aheneus* has been too long transferred from his conscience to his forehead. On the whole, could I descend so exceedingly low as to retaliate on this writer in his own way, I should thus return the compliment in kind: Mr. John Wesley, an old audacious man, lately published, ——— But I neither will nor can adopt his scurrility. I had rather let the ancient offender pass unchastised than soil my hands in the operation. I proceed therefore to his next paragraph.

"A great outcry has been raised on that account" [viz. on account of the lying extract from Zanchy, and on account of the blasphemous inferences and the forgery thereto annexed]: "A great outcry has been raised on that account" [it should have run on those accounts], "as though this was not a fair state of the case; and it has been vehemently affirmed that no such consequence follows from the doctrine of absolute predestination. I calmly affirm it is a fair state of the case. This consequence" [a mistake again for these consequences] "does" [another mistake for do] "naturally and necessarily follow from the doctrine of absolute predestination, as here" [it should be there] "stated and defended by bold Mr. Augustus Toplady." Thus far the honest and accurate Mr. Wesley. On the other hand bold Mr. Augustus no less "calmly affirms," that the "great outcry," at which bold Mr. John cries out was most justly raised against the said John; who by his deep-laid, but soon detected, cunning, by his avowed vacuity of of candour, truth and shame, hath in the general estimation of all unprejudiced people, whether serious or prophane (the most respectable of the Arminian party themselves not excepted), gotten a wound and dishonour and a reproach which all his whining and winding sophistry will never be able to wipe away.

With the same determined calmness, I do also affirm that his mode of stating the important controversy concerning predestination is so far from "fair," that it has nothing at all to do with the subject: but was invented, and adopted, merely to discolour the true state of the question, and

take matters on the word of Mr. John. Which sort of readers, by the way, have, to that gentleman's no small disappointment and mortification, proved abundantly fewer than he wished and expected.

He goes on: "Indeed, I have not leisure to consider the matter at large." Then why did he dabble in it at all? A chain of principles, like those termed Calvinistic, each successive link of which depends on the foregoing till you arrive at the first, indispensably requires a consideration "at large." A partial view of the subject is equivalent to none. A disjointed, unconnected heap of doctrines, like that espoused by this man of no leisure; a farrago of opinions made up of incoherent shreds; may, indeed, be considered by scraps, without any injury to the whole. It is just the same, where you begin, and which you take. But there is a harmony, there is a correlative dependency, in the system of grace: and, not to advert to these, resembles transposing the notes in some capital piece of music. Mr. Wesley, therefore, must either find "leisure to consider the matter at large;" or they who have so considered it will, with equal certainty and justice, set him down for a pitiful nibbler at the file he cannot bite.

The truth is, he has jumped hand over head into an engagement, the progress of which does not answer his expectation. Hence his willingness to quit the field—for want of leisure: but, in fact, for want of success. And who must cover his retreat, but the heroic Thomas Oliver, alias Olivers? And who is this redoubtable Thomas? Truly, neither more nor less than a journeyman shoemaker, now retained by Mr. Wesley as a lay-preacher, at the rate of ten pounds *per annum*: which, I suppose, Thomas prefers to earning double the sum by working at his proper trade.

Pharaoh's remark, though malicious and untrue in its original application, is not always unjust: Ye are idle, ye are idle; therefore ye say, Let us go from our honest employs and pretend to serve the Lord. But the rougher the foal, the sleeker the ass. The idle shoemaker is, to give him his due, a very laborious Arminian. Though revolted, in some respect, from the gentle craft of St. Crispin, his genius hath constant employ and very ample scope for exertion in following the boisterous craft of Mr. John Wesley, to whom he, moreover, stands related as bully in chief; in chief did I say? I had forgot the Rev. Mr. Walter Sellor. Prunella claims precedency of leather. Thomas is only second in commission.

But seems it not rather strange that Mr. Wesley, a man of education, and who has given proof upon proof that he is indued with a very competent portion of assurance

no means work on the sabbath; but they set Gentiles to work without scruple. Mr. John affects to decline undertaking the argument in form: and the cobbler (still doomed to be an under-strapper) is delegated to supply Mr. John's lack of leisure as well as of leather. Already has the journeyman made an effort (with some of Mr. John's own assistance) to white-wash the said Mr. John. He might as well have laboured to blanch the Æthiop or to emaculate the leopard. But how can Robin Hood be better employed, than in standing up for Little John? It must be granted that Little John appears something taller on the shoulders of his man. I acknowledge, too, that there is upon the whole, some proportionable congruity between the pedestal and the image. Yet this mode of exhibition is not without its danger. I once saw, when a boy, a rope-dancer parading round May-fair on the shoulders of a booth-keeper. For some time the carrier and the carried engrossed the acclamations of the wondering populace. When, alas! either by a stumble of the elevator, or through defect of equilibrium in the elevatee, down came the latter; who, after such dishonour, was glad to trudge it back on foot, instead of venturing to re-ascend the living pedestal. Should the above illustration be deemed not sufficiently sublime for so towering a subject; take another from the pen of a late nobleman. "I remember," says his lordship, "to have seen a" [Popish] "procession at Aix la Chapelle, wherein an image of Charlemagne is carried on the shoulders of a man who is hid by the long robe of the imperial saint. Follow him into the vestry, you see the bearer slip from under the robe and the gigantic figure dwindles into an image of the ordinary size, and is set by among other lumber (a)."

The case in reality stands thus. The master does me an injury, by subjoining my name to what I never wrote. On which I publicly call the aggressor himself to account. The aggressor slinks behind one of his drudges, who says, "Fight me in my master's stead." I answer, No. *Ne sutor ultra crepidam*. What hast thou to do with controversy? Away to thy stall and leave Little John to fight his own battles. My business is not with the man, but with the master. I most certainly (at least in my present view of things) shall never descend to uncase that hog in armour. This Mr. Wesley could not but foresee. He therefore did shrewdly, to slip his own neck out of the collar, and thrust in that of a man who

may strut with the collar on his neck, unnoticed and unmolested, till his dying day.

After all, let us see whether Mr. Wesley has extricated his own neck with any degree of dexterity. In order to this, we must examine whether the consequences, which he labours to squeeze from the doctrine of predestination, as stated by me, will stand.

I. The first pretended consequence was that "one in twenty, suppose, of mankind is elected; nineteen in twenty are reprobated." Mr. W. seems at present to give up this abominable inference. He does not so much as attempt to prove it in the paper now under examination. Which paper, therefore does not even, in appearance, answer its title. This consequence at least is not proved. Nay, it is thrown by and smothered in silence. Nor do I wonder at it. I should, indeed, be surprised to find even Mr. Wesley's own writings (and surely if they cannot, nothing can) put him out of countenance. But he had a motive not at all related to shame, for slipping that infamous paragraph out of sight. The credit of his perspicacity as a reasoner absolutely required it. For could any thing be more palpably absurd than to charge us with a peremptory consequence, affirmed to be drawn from absolute premises, which said peremptory consequence was (even in *terminis*) confessedly hypothetical, and founded on a mere vague supposition? The word "suppose" is the basis of the whole conclusion. But we never did, nor can "suppose" that no more than "one in twenty" is elected. Therefore the basis melts, and the entire consequential fabric (like the rope dancer at May-fair) tumbles to the ground.

Observe, reader, for it is worth thy while, how suddenly Mr. Wesley's polemical weather-glass rises and falls. In his printed letter to the late truly reverend and amiable Mr. Hervey, he charged that incomparable man, and the Calvinistic party in general, with holding the reprobation of "nine out of ten (y)." In March, 1770, we were charged with holding as above, that "nineteen in twenty are reprobated (a)." In February 1771, we were charged with holding the reprobation of "forty-nine out of fifty (a)." And now, about five months after, the glass is sunk 30 degrees lower, and in "The Consequence proved," stands again at "nineteen out of twenty." Next spring I suppose it will rise to ninety-nine out of a hundred. A very capable gentleman this to ascertain the number of the elect and reprobate, who reprobates his own

calculations almost as often as the clock strikes!—So much for the first consequence. Now for the second:

II. "The elect shall be saved, do what they will." By doing "what they will," is evidently meant be they finally ever so unholy, and be their lives ever so immoral. The expression must signify this, or it can signify nothing. It is either a paltry sophistical quibble upon the word will, and so evaporates into a term without a fixed idea, or it imports that, upon the footing of absolute election, personal sanctification and practical obedience are unnecessary to salvation.

The point of enquiry, then is, Whether the elect themselves can be ultimately saved without being previously sanctified by inherent grace, and (if adult) without evidencing that sanctification (according as ability and opportunity are given), by walking in the way of God's commandments? I affirm, with Scripture, that they cannot be saved without sanctification and obedience. Yet is not their salvation at all precarious: for that very decree of election by which they were nominated and ordained to eternal life, ordained their intermediate renewal after the image of God, in righteousness and true holiness. Nay, that renewal is itself the dawn and beginning of actual salvation: This is life eternal, to know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent (b). Whence the apostle; By grace ye are saved, through faith (c). And again, Who hath saved us, and called us with a holy calling (d). Sanctity, therefore, of heart and life is not barely a prelude to, but even a part and initiatory anticipation of, the glory which shall be revealed.

The elect could no more be saved without personal holiness than they could be saved without personal existence. And why? because God's own decree secures the means as well as the end, and accomplishes the end by the means. The same gratuitous predestination which ordained the existence of the elect as men ordained their purification as saints: and they were ordained to both, in order to their being finally and completely saved in Jesus Christ with eternal glory.

The doctrine of election is a doctrine of mere revelation. Though human reason, when defecated from prejudice and sanctified by grace, cannot but assent to it as a scripture truth; yet reason would probably never have discovered it with certainty and clearness had not God expressly made it known in his written word. Consequently from that written word we are to learn the true nature and effects of electing grace: since God himself must be best acquainted with his own decrees.

The Holy Spirit, making the apostle's pen the channel of unerring inspiration, thus inspired him to write: According as he [God the Father] hath chosen us in him [in Christ] before the foundation of the world, that we should [not "be saved do what we will," but] be holy and without blame before him in love. Eph. i. 4.—Election is always followed by regeneration: and regeneration is the source of all good works: whence the apostle adds, in the very next chapter, v. 10, We [the elect] are his [subsequent] workmanship, created [anew] in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath fore-ordained that we should walk in them. Consequently it does not follow from the doctrine of absolute predestination that "the elect shall be saved do what they will." On the contrary, they are chosen as much to holiness as to heaven; and are fore-ordained to walk in good works, by virtue of their election from eternity and of their conversion in time. Yet again: God hath from the beginning [i. e. from everlasting; see Prov. viii. 23. 1 John i. 1, 2.] chosen you to salvation through sanctification of the spirit and belief of the truth: 2 Thess. ii. 13. All therefore who are chosen to salvation are no less unalterably destined to holiness and faith in the mean while. And if so, it is giving God himself the lie to say that "the elect shall be saved do what they will." For the elect, like the blessed Person who redeemed them, come into the world not to do their own will, but the will of him that sent them: and this is the will of God concerning them, even their sanctification: 1 Thess. iv. 3. Hence they are expressly said to be elect—unto obedience (e): not indeed, chosen because of obedience, but chosen unto it: for works are not the fountain of grace, but streams flowing from it. Election does not depend upon holiness, but holiness depends upon election. So far therefore is predestination from being subversive of good works, that predestination is the primary cause of all the good works which have been and shall be wrought from the beginning to the end of time. It is only the peculiar people that are truly zealous of good works, Tit. ii. 14. The rest may profess that they know God, but even amidst all their noise about works, in their own works they deny him; being abominable and disobedient, and to every good work reprobate: Tit. i. 16. As I have elsewhere observed, they trust in good works, without doing them; while the peculiar people do good works without trusting in them.

Reason also joins with Scripture, in asserting the indispensable necessity of sanctification, upon the footing of the most ab-

(x) See Pope's Works, vol. ix. letter 45.

(y) See Wesley's Preservative, p. 235.

(z) See Wesley's pretended Abridgment of

(a) See a Scurrilous Letter, signed John Wesley, in Lloyd's Evening Post, for Friday, March 1 1771.

solite and irrespective election : or, in other words that the certainty of the end does not supersede, but ensure, the intervention of the means. It was decreed that Abraham should be a father of many nations. According to Mr. Wesley's mode of argumentation, Abraham might have been so, though he died in infancy. I say No. For the same purpose of God which appointed him to be a father of Nations appointed also (as a mean to the end) that he should live to a competent age.—St. Paul was decreed to preach the gospel before the Gentiles and kings, and the children of Israel (*f*). Ergo, says an Arminian, Paul might have preached in various nations without travelling a step, and without so much as opening his lips. I deny the consequence. Paul's travelling, and Paul's utterance, were as certainly and as necessarily included in the decree of the means as his preaching was determined by the decree of the end.—God resolved that Hezekiah should live fifteen years longer than Hezekiah expected. Hezekiah might therefore, according to Mr. Wesley's plan, have argued thus: "God has promised me fifteen years of life to come. Ergo, Live I shall, do what I will: die I shall not, do what I can. I will therefore neither eat, drink nor sleep. Nay, I will tie a millstone round my neck and throw myself headlong into the sea, from the highest precipice I can find." I answer, No. For it was as much comprised in God's decree that Hezekiah should eat, drink, and sleep, during those fifteen years; and that he should not jump into the sea with a millstone about his neck; as that fifteen years should be added to his life.—Cyrus was decreed to be the captor of Babylon, and an instrument of good to the Jewish people (*g*). Did that decree render it needless for Cyrus to be conceived and born? Surely, no: for the birth of Cyrus was no less infallibly secured by the decree itself than were the laurels he should reap and the good he was to do.

To multiply instances would be endless. Let us apply the few that have been given. If the Scriptures are true, God did, from all eternity, choose an innumerable multitude of Adam's posterity, to the certain attainment of grace and glory. This choice of them was in his Son: being pre-considered as fallen, they were chosen under that character, and federally given to him to be redeemed by his blood, and clothed with his righteousness. But this alone would not have sufficed. It was necessary that, as sinners, they should not only be redeemed from punishment and entitled to heaven; but endued, moreover, with an internal

meanness for that inheritance to which they should be entitled and redeemed. This internal meanness for heaven can only be wrought by the restoring agency of God the Holy Ghost, who graciously engaged and took upon himself in the covenant of peace, to renew and "sanctify all the elect people of God;" saying I will put my law in their minds, and write it upon their hearts. This, most certainly was the view in which the decree of predestination was considered by the apostle Peter, when he thus wrote: Elect, according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, [according to his foreknowledge of the human fall; which foreknowledge made it necessary that election should be decreed to take effect, not independently on God the Son and God the Holy Ghost, but] through sanctification of the spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ (*h*). It appears, from this golden passage, 1. That all the three Divine Persons are equally concerned in the salvation of sinners: the Father elected them; the Son shed his blood for them; the Spirit sanctifies them. 2. That the objects of election were considered in that eternal decree as fallen: else, I cannot see how they could be chosen unto the sprinkling of the Messiah's blood, and unto the sanctification of the Spirit. 3. That election, though productive of good works, is not founded upon them: on the contrary, they are one of the glorious ends to which the elect are chosen. Saints do not bear the root, but the root them. "Elect—unto obedience." 4. That they who have been elected by God the Father shall be sprinkled by the Son, or legally purified by his atonement in a way of pardon; and experience the Holy Spirit's sanctification, in beginning, advancing, and perfecting the good work of grace on their souls. Whence, 5. the elect, the sprinkled, and the sanctified, are made to obey the commandments of God, and to imitate Christ as a pattern at the same time that they trust in him as their propitiation. I said, made to obey. Here perhaps, the unblushing Mr. Wesley may ask, "Are the elect then, mere machines?" I answer, No. They are made (*i*) willing to obey, in the day of God's power. And I believe no body ever yet heard of a willing machine.

It appears from the passages of Scripture, now alleged, that God decreed to bring his elect to glory in a way of sanctification, and in no other way but that. "If so," cries Mr. Wesley, "they will be saved, whether they are sanctified or no." What, notwithstanding their sanctification is itself an essential branch of the decree concern-

ing them? The man may as well affirm that Abraham might have been the progenitor of nations, though he died in infancy: that Paul might have preached the gospel, *vivit voce*, in fifty different regions, without travelling a step: that Hezekiah might have lived his fifteen years without food or sleep: that Cyrus would have fulfilled the prophecies concerning him, if he had never been born: and that the Church of God might have been redeemed by the blood of Christ, even if Christ had never assumed human nature.

Prior to the taking of Jericho, it was revealed to Joshua that he should certainly be master of the place. Nay, so peremptory was the decree, and so express the revelation of it, that it was predicted as if it had already taken effect: I have given into thy hand Jericho, and the king thereof and the mighty men of valour (*k*). This assurance, than which nothing could be more absolute, did not tie up Joshua's hands from action, and make him sit down without using the means, which were no less appointed than the end. On the contrary, he took care to regulate the procession pursuant to God's command; and the event was accomplished accordingly.—From fact, let us ascend to speculation.—The doctrine, which stands this united test, is and must be true. Sup-

(k) Josh. vi. 3.

(l) Even Thomas Oliver, or Olivers, the fighting shoe-maker, is either a better reasoner, or an honest man than his leader: for, on a recent occasion (an occasion so well known to the religious world, since the appearance of the Hon. and Rev. Mr. Shirley's Narrative, just published, that it were needless for me to recite the particulars), this same Thomas was so deeply convinced of the irreconcilable contrariety of the London Minutes to the Bristol Declaration; that, having solemnly avowed the former, either common conscience, or common sense, would not permit him to sign the latter.—Mr. Wesley, however, swallowed both. He could declare in the one, that "We are rewarded because of our works; for the sake of our works; yea, secundum merita operum, as our works deserve." In the other, the same identical Mr. Wesley declares that he doth, "abhor the doctrine of justification by works, as a most perilous and abominable doctrine;" and that "our works have no part in meriting or purchasing our salvation from first to last, either in whole or in part." Where lives the man who can bring these two poles together?

Dic quibus in terris, et ertis mihi magnus Apollo.

All the sophistical wriggling, twisting, straining, and wire-drawing in the world will never be able to make the above North and South shake hands. Was any thing upon earth ever equal to Mr. Wesley's duplicity? Yes: I have met with something which comes at least extremely near it. I mean the conduct of Arminius himself (or, if you please of Van Harmin the first), when he was examined for the Leyden professorship, A. D. 1603. Take the account in the words of the learned and moderate Mr. Hickman. "He [Arminius] was the first tapster, or chamberlain in a common inn: from whence by the care of some guests, who were pleased, even to admiration, at his prompt wit, he was removed and sent to school. He was maintained there out of the public treasury of Amsterdam: where, in process of time, he was by the magistrates of the city made Pastor: the learned Junius being dead, Utenbogard thought none so meek to succeed him as Van Har-

pose it was infallibly revealed to an army, or to any single individual, that the former should certainly gain such a battle, and the latter certainly win such a race. Would not the army be mad to say, "Then we will not fight a stroke?" Would not the racer be insane to add, "Nor will I move so much as one of my feet?" Now it is no less irrational to insinuate that the elect shall be saved without being spiritually and morally conformed to the image of Christ, than it would be to dream of gaining a battle without fighting, or of winning a prize without contending.—Would it not be absurd to affirm that Adam might have tilled and dressed the garden of Eden, whether he had been created or not? Equally illogical is Mr. Wesley's impudent slander, that "the elect shall be saved do what they will," *i. e.* whether they are holy or not.

This writer passes with some for a man of profound learning. But, surely, either his head is not so well furnished as these good people suppose; or his heart must be totally void of justice, candour, and truth. Either he is absolutely unacquainted with the first principles of reasoning; or he offers up the knowledge he has as a whole burnt-sacrifice on the altar of malice, calumny, and falsehood (*l*).

The consequence-drawer makes several

let him easily come to such a place, in which he might influence all that were candidates for the ministry. The deputies of the churches did admonish Utenbogard that he would cease to commend so suspected a man to the curators of the University of Leyden. But he, too proud to regard such admonitions, desired not to commend Arminius: who obtained his dismission from Amsterdam, to Leyden on the following condition; *viz.* "That he should first have a conference with the learned Comarus; and in that conference, by a more free and open declaration of his opinion," *i. e.* of his real sentiments as to matters of religion, "free himself from all suspicion of heterodoxy; and that he should promise, if he had any singular opinions he would not discover them" [*i. e.* not disseminate them] "to the disturbances of the Churches.—Accordingly a conference there was, before the curators of the University and the deputies of the Synod; in which Arminius most expressly denied and condemned the opinions of the Pelagians concerning grace, free-will, original sin, perfection in this life, predestination: adding that he approved all that Augustin and other fathers had written against Pelagius; promising also to read nothing" [*i. e.* to deliver nothing to his pupils and other hearers] "dissonant to the received doctrine" [of Calvinism] "Hereupon he was admitted Professor; and for some time, he defended the doctrine of the reformed churches in the point of Christ's satisfaction, justifying faith, justification by faith, perseverance in faith, certainty of salvation, and such other matters which afterwards he denied: and which he then" [*viz.* at the time of his defending them] "as is acknowledged by his good friend Corvinus, maintained against his conscience. He seemed by all his carriage to be one that was resolved not to venture any farther into the sea than that he might have opportunity to step when he pleased upon the shore." (Hickman's Animadversions on Heylin: p. 93, 94, Edit. 1674.)

Was I a believer of the Pythagorean Metempsychosis, I should certainly conclude that the soul of Arminius was transmigrated into that particular

(f) Acts ix. 15. (g) Isai. xlv. 28. and xlv. 1.

(h) 1 Pet. i. 2.

(i) Psalm cx. 3.

appeals to my translation of Zanchius; from some parts of which he labours to cull premises, whereof to make a basis for his consequences. Like some wretched divines, who first patch up a system of their own, and then rummage the Bible for such texts, as by the help of "a little convenient straining," may seem to prop the pre-constructed Babel. I shall attend, however, to such passages in my pamphlet as Mr. Wesley alludes to. Only I must premise that I shall give them, not as they are mis-quoted by the calumniator, but as they stand in the pamphlet itself.

I have said that love, when predicated of God, signifies his eternal benevolence: *i. e.* his everlasting will, purpose, and determination, to deliver, bless, and save his people. Whereon Mr. Wesley thus descants: "I appeal to all men, whether it is not a natural consequence even of this, that all these shall be saved do what they will." I also appeal to every person of common honesty, and common sense, whether the man who would wish to distil such an infamous consequence from so innocent a paragraph, be not defective either in sense or honesty? Does not God's determination to deliver his people include and ensure their deliverance (among other evils) from the reigning power and dominion of sin? Is it not his will to bless them by turning away every one of them from their iniquities? Acts iii. 26. Does not the Son of God condescend to bear the gracious name of Jesus, because he saves and shall save his people from their sins, both as to guilt, dominion and punishment? Mat. i. 21. Is it possible that a man who has read, and who believes, such texts as these, should still dare to persist in bawling without end, "The elect shall be saved do what they will?" That the elect shall infallibly be saved, is a truth as certain as the word and the (*m*) oath of God can make

it. But then it is equally true that, in order to the eventual accomplishment of that salvation in the next world, grace is given them in this to preserve them (and preserve them it does) from doing the evil they otherwise would. Whom God did foreknow (or fore-love), he also did predestinate: to what? To be "saved, do what they will?" No, surely; but to be conformed to the spiritual and moral image of his Son, Rom. viii. 29. And this is all the election which Calvinism (or to speak more properly, Scripturism) contends for: even a predestination to holiness and heaven. It may here, perhaps, be objected that "the doctrine of predestination even to holiness itself may tend to relax the nerves of human diligence in the pursuit of that holiness to which men may suppose themselves predestinated." I utterly deny the doctrine to have any such tendency. And I deny it on Scripture warrant. The same apostle Peter, who declares that the people of God were elected unto obedience, exhorts those very people to give all diligence to make their calling and election undoubted; or to render it evidentially sure, by advancing in sanctification, and working the works of God: a direction this which the apostle (or, rather the Holy Spirit by him) would never have given had the doctrine of absolute election been subversive of industry and endeavours on the part of man.

Mr. Wesley himself, amidst all his pretension to the contrary, sees through the shameless fallacy of his own consequence. Witness the following passage: "All these," *i. e.* all God's people, "shall be saved, do what they will. You may say, Oh, but they will do only what is good. Be it so. Yet the consequence stands." In opposition to every part of this puerile paragraph, I should, 1. Be glad to know what Calvinist ever asserted that God's people "Will do

no trust or confidence but in the merits of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, for justification, or salvation in life, death, or the day of Judgment, would be acting neither a consistent nor an upright part. For all the subtleties of metaphysical distinctions can never reconcile tenets so diametrically opposite as these."

Query 1. Has Tom the shoe-maker more learning, or more integrity, than John the priest? Which way soever the problem be determined, that the shoe-maker has the advantage in point of consistency, for not going beyond his last, is out of all doubt.

Query 2. People imagine that Mr. Wesley meant as he spoke, in the London Minutes of 1770. And most people continue to believe that he means now what he spoke then; and that he still has his mental reserves. What security, therefore, will he give the evangelical world that he is sincere in the counter-declaration of 1771?

Query 3. Why gaddest thou about so much, to change thy way? Thou also shalt be ashamed of Egypt, as thou wast of Assyria. Jer. ii. 36.

(*m*) Isai. liv. 9. Heb. vi. 17, 18

only what is good?" A giddy perfectionist indeed might express himself in that manner: but none who have been led into the knowledge of God, of his law, or of themselves. Though we are asserters of real, we are nevertheless deniers of perfect, sanctification on earth. But 2. Supposing that we even believe that true saints will "do only what is good;" would it still follow that they shall be saved without sanctification? I should rather imagine that (so far from being un sanctified) the men who were to "do only what is good" must have been first completely sanctified; else the effect would rise higher than the cause. According therefore to Mr. Wesley's logic, perfect sanctification, evidenced by doing only that which is good, is but another phrase for no sanctification at all, and for trampling all God's commandments under foot! A reciprocation this, which by the way falls very heavy on such of his own followers as set up for sinless perfection: who, Mr. Wesley himself being judge, are necessarily a pack of arant Antinomians. This however is a consequence, from his premises, which the short-sighted Arminian did not discern. It now meets him full in the face. See it he must; and he may jostle by it as well as he can. Dost thou not think reader that the logician who thus reciprocates the most contrary and inconvertible ideas; who calls evil good, and good evil, putting light for darkness, and darkness for light; must be most exquisitely qualified to set up for a distiller of consequences?

Sensible of having hitherto produced nothing to his purpose, the Arminian is for pressing a fresh paragraph of mine into the service of his consequence. But before it would even seem to countenance the idea he meant it should convey, he found it expedient to give the passage a little needful pruning and more than a little alteration. To judge of this, let us contrast my paragraph with his quotation.

Predestination, as relating to the elect only, is that eternal, unconditional, particular, and irreversible act of the divine will, whereby God determined to deliver a certain number of men from hell." Wesley's Quotation.

"Predestination, as relating to the elect, is that irreversible act of the divine will, whereby God determined to deliver a certain number of men from hell." Wesley's Quotation.

Predestination, as relating to the elect only, is that eternal, unconditional, particular, and irreversible act of the divine will, whereby God determined to deliver a certain number of men from hell." Wesley's Quotation.

The substituting of "men" absolute for Adam's degenerate offspring; and the changing of sinful and miserable estate into "hell," may, at first view, seem unimportant alterations. But Mr. Wesley has long since de-

clared himself averse to "altering for altering sake." And herein I believe him. He had an end to serve, in thus shaping my words to his purpose. For though men, and the degenerate offspring of Adam, are convertible terms; yet in the present argument the terms require some distinction. Election, as stated and defined in Zanchius, considers Adam's offspring not merely as men; but complexly, as degenerate. It was therefore dishonestly artful in the Pelagian to omit an epithet which is of such consequence as to give the specific tinge to the whole definition. Zanchy was a Sub-lapsarian; and so is his translator. Let the Pelagian, with whom I am contending learn, at least in his old age, to represent men and things as they are. If his fingers tingle to fall foul on the Supra-lapsarians, let him indulge his fingers as soon as he pleases. There are worthies in that sentiment, who are able to make Mr. Wesley look about him, and to bid the tingling shift from his fingers to his head.

Perversion and falsification are essential figures in this man's rhetoric. Just representation will not square with his views. Whence, in order to support his outrageous slander, that "the elect shall be saved, do what they will," he varies and castrates the definition he pretends to quote, and only affirms me to have declared that predestination is God's determining will "to deliver a certain number of men from hell." Predestination includes a great deal more. Let us have no shifting of the terms. My expression was, To deliver them from their sinful and miserable estate: *i. e.* to make them inchoatively holy, in order to their being inchoatively and finally happy. Now can any reasonable man suppose that deliverance from sin is but another name for continuance in sin? yet this must be not only supposed but proved ere it can be fairly alleged that, upon the principle of absolute predestination, "the elect shall be saved, do what they will."

Nor is that monstrous conclusion at all more inferrible from the following passage, cited also by this forger of consequences: not one of the elect can perish; but they must all necessarily be saved. (*n*) Here the Pelagian lashes himself into rage, and asks with no small emotion, "Can any assert this, and yet deny the consequences?" I answer Yes. Christ himself asserted it, without so much as entering a caveat against any such detestable inferences; and a caveat Christ would have entered, had the inference been deducible. This is the Father's will, who hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I shall lose nothing: John vi. 39. I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish: John x. 28.—Father, I will

John Wesley. The reader, if he pleases may see some gleanings of Mr. John's astonishing inconsistencies in a little tract, drawn up by a respectable hand and just published, entitled, "An answer to some capital Errors contained in Minutes of some late Conversations between the Rev. Mr. Wesley and others." We have already had a specimen of James against Van Harmin and Van Harmin against James. Nor does the last mentioned tract exhibit a less striking contrast of Wesley against John, and John against Wesley.

One word more respecting the Bristol Declaration of August, 1771. Mr. Wesley's prevarication seems to have surprised even the unbelieving Thomas above mentioned. Witness the following passage of Mr. Shirley, (Narrative, p. 16.) "One of the [lay-] preachers, namely, Mr. [Mr.] Thomas Oliver, kept us a long time in debate; strenuously opposed the declaration: [I hope he is not like the man at Aix la Chapelle, going to give his image the slip!] "and to the last, would not consent to sign it. He maintained that our second justification (*i. e.* in the day of judgment) is by works; and he saw very clearly that for one that holds that tenet solemnly to declare in the sight of God that he has

that they also, whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am, that they may behold my glory: John xvii. 24. Well therefore might the apostle throw a gauntlet of universal defiance, and ask, if God be for us, who can be against us? who can lay any thing to the charge of God's elect? who is he that condemns? who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Rom viii. 31—35. Now if it be the Father's will that Christ should lose none of his elect; if Christ himself, in consequence of their covenant-donation to him, does actually give them eternal life, and solemnly avers that they shall never perish; if God be so for them that none can hinder their salvation; if nothing can be laid to their charge; if they cannot be condemned and nought shall separate them from the love of Christ; it clearly and inevitably follows that none of the elect can perish, but they must all necessarily be saved. Which salvation consists as much in the recovery of moral rectitude below, as in the enjoyment of eternal blessedness above.

I have followed Mr. John through his first pair of consequences; which (together with their fabricator) I have shewn to be utterly void of judgment, strength, and truth. Let me now advert to the third pretended consequence:

III. "The reprobate shall be damned, do what they can."

One would almost imagine that none but a reprobate could be capable of advancing a position so execrably shocking. Surely it must have cost even Mr. Wesley much both of time and pains to invent the idea, and to find suitable language for its clothing! This however I make no scruple to declare, that, be his inventions easy or laborious, few men's invention ever sunk deeper into the despicable, launched wider into the horrid, or went farther in the profane. The satanic guilt of the person who could exco-gitate and publish to the world a position like that baffles all power of description, and is only to be exceeded (if exceedable) by the satanic shamelessness which dares to lay the black position at the door of other men.—Let us examine whether any thing occurring in Zanchius could justly furnish this wretched defamer with materials for a deduction so truly infernal.

I am aware indeed that a perverse mind, like a depraved constitution, is capable of corrupting (so far as itself is concerned) even cordials into poison. The very things which should have been for their health are to such persons an occasion of falling. Instances of this kind (if final) are the most awful comment on that tremendous decree of preterition whereof the Scriptures so largely and

so strongly speak. God Almighty grant that Mr. Wesley may not himself be a seal to the truth of this remark!

In rummaging the treatise he pretends to quote, he no doubt fixed his claw on those passages which he imagined were most capable of mis-interpretation. Before I introduce them here I beg the reader's permission to premise a few general observations, which have a close connection with the subject.

The two capital objections (to which perhaps all others are reducible) against the degree of non-election are drawn, one from the justice, the other from the mercy, of God. Both these objections I shall endeavour to consider in their utmost force.

I. Justice consists in rendering to every man his due. The supposed injustice, therefore, of preterition turns on this question, "Whether God is, or is not, a debtor to man." I more than imagine that he is not a debtor to any man. He owes no man the least of all his favours: and indeed his blessings could not be called favours, if man could claim them in a way of debt.—Who hath prevented me, [i. e. been beforehand with me in any good thing] that I should repay him. (o) Even those whom he had made righteous are unable to earn or merit the smallest temporal or eternal benefit of his hands: If thou be righteous what givest thou him? or what receiveth he of thy hand? Job xxxv. 11. Much less can the wicked (with whom alone reprobation has any thing to do) lay their Maker under obligation to save them. If it be proved that he owes salvation to every rational being he has made, then, and then only, it will follow that God is unjust in not paying this debt of salvation to each of his reasonable creatures. But, on the contrary, if God, instead of being an universal debtor (as Arminianism supposes him to be) is himself the universal creditor, who beneficently lends every earthly, and munificently bestows every celestial, happiness, according to the riches of his own free, sovereign, unmerited bounty—what shadow of injustice can be fastened on his conduct for in some cases withholding what he does not owe. The objection therefore (if it may be dignified by that name), being founded on a mistaken principle, evaporates into air.

Besides: the cavil will conclude as strongly against limited salvation (let its limitation be supposed to arise from what cause it will) as against the limiting decree. For I defy any man to shew in what single respect the actual limitation of happiness itself is a jot more just and equitable (in a being possessed with power) than the decretive limitation of the persons who shall enjoy

that happiness. Until Mr. Wesley can demonstrate that every man is happy in this life; and that every man shall be so in the life to come; the argument, resulting from the plausible topic of divine justice, will never reach the merits of the case. If God is indebted to some men, why not to all? and if he owe salvation to all men, why will he condemn any man at last? should it be said that "some men will not permit God to pay them their debt of salvation, and by their own misbehaviour disqualify themselves from receiving it;" I answer, That to talk of man's not permitting God to be just is assuming a principle that cannot be allowed. God can never be over-ruled by man, until man is superior to God. Not to add that the Arminian hypothesis of men being God's creditors, rests (if it has any thing to rest upon) on the natural claim to happiness, where-with man is supposed to be invested in right of involuntary creatureship: he derives his existence from God, and therefore (says Arminianism) God is bound to make that existence happy. Admit but this and universal salvation comes in with a full tide. There can be none, no, not one, to whom the Judge will or can say at the final audit, Depart from me, I know you not, ye workers of iniquity. For even those who live and die in their sins, are certainly God's creatures: and if God owe salvation to all his creatures as such, even the workers of iniquity will and must be saved, or God must cease to be just. Who sees not that the Arminian scheme, if probed to the bottom, opens, by necessary consequence the flood-gates of practical licentiousness; and with all its pretences to good works, is in reality but varnished Antinomianism? It says in effect, "Every man shall be saved, do what he will: no man shall be condemned, do what he can. Let narrow-spirited Calvinists cease to do evil and learn to do well. Let gloomy predestinarians insist that without holiness no man shall see the Lord; and fondly dream that sanctity and salvation are indissolubly connected. But let us, the liberal disciples of Arminius, act on a more expanded plan. Every son of Adam is God's creature: and every creature of God is good. We are all indued with independent free-will. Our Maker loves every man alike. His justice will not suffer him to reject any of us. Especially seeing we are all redeemed, one as well as another. Let us therefore take our ease, eat, drink and be merry: and to-morrow shall be as this day, and much more abundant."

This is the true language of Arminianism though not of all Arminians. It is the natural consequence of the scheme itself, though many, who embrace the scheme, are not aware of the consequence.—You may say, "Oh but no man shall actually be

saved, though salvation is his due, except he perform certain conditions." This is no better than a very thin evasion: a mere barrel thrown out for the amusement of the whale, to keep him in play and make him lose sight of the ship.—Permit me to ask, Is salvation due to a man who does not perform those conditions? If you say, Yes; you jump hand over head into what you yourself call Antinomianism.—If you say that "salvation is not due to a man, unless he fulfil the conditions;" it will follow, 1. That man's own performances are meritorious of salvation, and bring God himself into debt: 2. That man, as a creature of God, is not entitled to salvation; and that God, as the Creator of man, is not therefore bound to save the men he has created.

There is no possible alternative. Either God is obliged in justice to save mankind; or he is not. If he be, it must be the works of men that lay him under the obligation. If he be not, then neither is he unjust in passing by some men: nay he might, had he so pleased, have passed by the whole of mankind, without electing any one individual of the fallen race; and yet have continued inviolably holy, just, and good.

Let us pursue the argument a little farther; and descend to instances rather more familiar: even to God's providential dealings with men in the present life. If eternal felicity be due to every man without exception, surely temporal felicity must be their due likewise: if they have a right to the greater, their claim to the less can hardly be doubted. If the Omnipotent is tied and bound, on penalty of becoming unjust, to do all he can to make every individual happy in the next life; he must be equally bound to render every individual happy in this. But are all men happy? Look round the world and say Yes if you can.—Is the Creator, therefore unjust? none but Satan would suggest it: none but his echoes will affirm it. The Lord is a God of truth, and without iniquity: just and right is he. Yet is it in the power of Omnipotence to banish misery from the universe. He could even have totally hindered its access. But, as the event demonstrates (and what speaks louder than fact?), it was not his will. He allows, and resolved to allow (for infipite wisdom does nothing ignorantly and undesignedly) its entrance, progress, and continuance. Sift the point ever so closely, and canvass the argument ever so nicely, you will find it extremely difficult (may I not say impossible?) to point out the difference between permission and design, in a being possessed (as God most certainly is) of unlimited wisdom and unlimited power. I am far from affirming that there is no difference between them: I only say that it would non-plus all the saga-

city of man, should we attempt clearly to shew wherein the difference lies.

Is the constituted order of things mysterious? impenetrably so. Yet the mysteriousness of God's dispensations evinces, not the injustice of the Sovereign Dispenser, but the shallowness of human comprehension, and the shortness of human sight. Let us then, by embracing and revering the Scripture doctrines of predestination and providence, give God credit for being infinitely wise, just, and good; though for the present his way is in the deep, and his paths in the great waters, and his footsteps are not known.

I should imagine that very few, even of the Arminians themselves, will venture to deny the real inequality of providential distributions below: since to deny that would be to contravene the first principles of reason, and the indisputable voice of fact and observation. Will the Arminians therefore pronounce the Father of all unjust, because he does not make all his offspring equally rich, good and happy? It is impossible to stave back the horrid consequence, if he is bound (and he certainly has power) to prevent every evil both natural and moral, which yet he does not. Sin, pain, affliction, grief, disease, and death, in twice ten thousand forms, lay waste mankind. Nay there is a whole world of apostate angels, who are banished from God and suffer without respite and without hope.^(p) Yet the Deity could have put a negative upon all this. The same effectual grace which preserved the elect angels from falling could have preserved the rest, and have presented the whole choir faultless before the presence of his glory with exceeding joy. It could likewise have precluded the transgression of Adam, and all its (seemingly dismal) consequences. Or man being fallen, the same converting energy which retrieves some sinners to God is able to retrieve all. What shall we say then to these things? They can only be accounted for on the grand principle of God's absolute sovereignty, who doth according to his will in the armies of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth, i. e. who is the uncontrollable disposer of angels and of men; and none can stay his hand or say unto him, what dost thou? Dan. iv. 35.

^(p) "It may be observed," says a great divine, "that we can hear and read of the non-election and rejection of angels, with very little emotion of mind. The devil may be cast down to hell, to be everlastingly damned, and be appointed thereto; and it gives no great concern. No hard thoughts against God arise, no charge of cruelty, injustice, and want of kindness to his creatures and offspring. But, when any thing of this kind is hinted at with respect to any of the apostate sons of Adam, presently there is an out-cry against it, and [objections upon objections] are suggested. The reason is because the latter [viz. the non-election of some men] comes nearer home.

Our Lord also teaches us this important lesson: Even so Father, for so it seemeth good in thy sight: Matth. xi. 26.

The king of Great Britain has an unlimited right of peerage. He might, if such was his pleasure, ennoble every family in his dominions. Will any be so weak and perverse as to charge him with tyranny and injustice, only because it is not his will, though it is in his power, to make all his subjects noblemen?

But I shall be told perhaps that, "allowing God to act as a sovereign in his disposal of earthly benefits, this will not prove his acting on the same principle in his distribution of heavenly blessings: since between things temporal and things eternal the proportion will not hold." I answer, (1.) Things eternal are as much at his disposal as things temporal. God is either sovereign of all things or of nothing. His empire is undivided: and from his dominion nothing is excepted. Nor, indeed, if things spiritual and everlasting were not his, could he be said to give them to his people: which he is every where in Scripture affirmed to do. (2.) I grant that time and eternity are, in themselves, by no means parallel or commensurate. Yet if God were unjust in not ordaining one man as well as another to eternal happiness; the old Consequence (already mentioned) would follow too, viz. That he must be proportionably unjust in not ordaining all men to absolute happiness here on earth. For misery, though endured but for a year, or for a life-time, is, in its own nature, and for the time being, as truly misery as it would be if protracted ever so long. The *ro quale* is the same, however the *ro diu* may vary. And God can no more cease to be just for a year, or for a man's life-time, than he can cease to be just for a century or for ever. By the same rule that he can and does, without any impeachment of his moral attributes, permit any one being to be miserable for a moment; he may permit that being to be miserable for a much longer time: and so on *ad infinitum*: since, as was observed but now, he can no more be unjust for a single moment than he can be unjust for ever.

Will Mr. Wesley deny that there is such a thing as temporal evil, so called? he must

It is owing to partiality to ourselves, our nature, and our race. Whereas far greater severity, if it may be so called, is exercised on fallen angels, than on fallen men. God has not spared one of the angels that sinned; has provided no Saviour for them; nor so much as given them the means of grace: while not only a Saviour is provided for fallen men, and means of grace allowed them; but thousands, and ten thousands, millions and millions of them are saved, by the abundant mercy and grace of God through Christ."

Dr. Gill's Body of Divinity; vol. 1. p. 315.

first renounce his senses—or, admitting the existence of it, will he exempt it from the providence of God? will he say that it happens (as Cicero affirms Milo's servants to have slain Clodius, "*neque imperante, neque sciente, neque presente, Domino,*") God neither ordaining it nor knowing it, nor being so much as present? This would be atheism. For if any thing can come to pass in contrariety either to God's knowledge or his will, it must arise from a defect of wisdom, of power, or of goodness: and to suppose God deficient in these would be tantamount to supposing that there is no God at all.

I conclude then that the quantity of what is called secular evil is considerably great; and that every man comes in for his allotted share of it, more or less, and in one kind or other: (q) That this however does not arise from defect of wisdom in God; for he could have so drawn the plan, and have so conducted its execution, as to have effectually precluded all evil whatever. Nor from defect of vigilance; for not an hair can fall from our heads without his appointment, leave, and notice. Nor defect of power; for all second causes are totally and constantly dependent on him, both for existence, activity, and effectuality. Nor from defect of justice; for he is "holy in all his ways, and righteous in all his works." Yet, though all-wise, all-vigilant, all-powerful, and all-just, he permits and has for near six thousand years permitted the reign of natural evil. Upon the same principle, might he not extend its reign to a still greater, yea, to an inconceivable length? might he not even draw it out to a never ending duration? He might: or this blasphemous and contradictory consequence (a consequence which I wonder Mr. Wesley never added to his others) must and will be indelible, that infinite justice has acted unjustly ever since the fall of Satan and his angels, and of Adam and his sons.

Should it be urged that "moral evil, or the transgression of angels and of man, was the producing cause of all the natural evil to which they have been liable ever since;" this will be urging no more than what every Calvinist admits. But still the old difficulty (a difficulty which Arminianism will never solve while heaven and earth remain)—the old difficulty still survives: how came moral evil to be permitted, when it might easily have been hindered, by a being of infinite goodness, power, and wisdom? Natural evil is but the fruit of moral: and had God not permitted the latter, the former could not have existed. "Oh, but he endowed Adam with free-will." True. But did

not He whose understanding is infinite, (r) pre-discern all the consequences of that endowment, and fore-know whither Adam's free-will would lead him, and what use he would make of it? And could not God have endowed him with such holy strength of will as would have infallibly secured his perseverance in rectitude and happiness? "Oh, but then Adam would not have been a free-agent." Indeed but he would. God himself is a free-agent, though his will is necessarily unchangeable, and singly determined to do good, and to do good only. So are the elect angels. So are the glorified souls of saints departed, and so will both angels and saints be when time is over. And so might Adam have been had God pleased to have so created him. He might have been invariably holy, and his agency have continued free.

God is, and cannot but be, inviolably just, amidst all the sufferings of fallen angels and fallen men, involuntary beings as they are. And if his justice is unviolated amidst all they have suffered, and many of the latter do suffer (though God could have prevented the whole, both root and branch); consequently he will yet continue to be just in all they are yet to suffer. And if so, what becomes of the objection to God's decree of preterition, drawn from the article of injustice? 2. "And what becomes of mercy?" This I shall next enquire.

Mercy is considerable under a two-fold view: as it is an attribute in God; and as it is exercised toward men.—As an attribute in God, mercy is infinite; as all his attributes are and must be: because they necessarily coincide with his essence. But mercy, considered in the exercise of it, is neither necessarily nor actually infinite. As God's forbearing to create more worlds than he has is no impeachment of his omnipotence; so his forbearing to save as many as he might is no impeachment of his infinite mercy. I have touched this subject elsewhere. Let me for once quote myself. "Goodness, considered as it is in God, would have been just the same infinite and glorious attribute, supposing no rational beings had been created at all, or saved when created. To which may be added, that the goodness of the Deity does not cease to be infinite in itself, only because it is more extended to some objects than it is to others. The infinity of this perfection, as residing in God and coinciding with his essence, is sufficiently secured, without supposing it to reach indiscriminately to all the creatures he has made. For was that way of reasoning to be admitted, it would lead us too far, and prove too much: since, if the infinity

(q) Hence, viz. from its universal diffusion below, it seems to have acquired the name of natural

of his goodness is to be estimated by the number of objects upon which it terminates there must be an absolute proper infinity of reasonable beings to terminate that goodness upon. Consequently it would follow, from such premises, either that the creation is as truly infinite as the Creator; or, if otherwise, that the Creator's goodness could not be infinite, because it has not an infinity of objects to make happy." (s) If therefore the decree of reprobation be exploded on account of its imaginary incompatibility with divine mercy; we must upon the same principle charge God with want of goodness in almost every part of his relative conduct. Arminians would do well to consider to what tremendous lengths their doctrine carries them. There is no way of solidly asserting "eternal providence," and of justifying "the ways of God with men," but upon this grand *datum*, that the exercise of his own infinite mercy is regulated by the voluntary determinations of his own most wise and sovereign pleasure. Allow but this rational, scriptural, (and I should think, incontrovertible, proposition; and every cavil grounded on the chimerical unmercifulness of non-election ceases even to be plausible.

But what if, after all, that very cruelty which Mr. Wesley pretends to charge on Calvinism, be found really chargeable on Arminianism? I pledge myself to prove this in its proper place, before I conclude this tract.

In the mean while I am all attention to those passages which he cites from me in affected support of his own horrible theses, that "the reprobate shall be damned, do what they can." The passages are eight.

1. When hatred is [in Scripture] ascribed to God, it implies, (1.) a negation of benevolence; or a resolution not to have mercy on such and such men. (2.) It denotes displeasure and dislike. (3.) It signifies a positive will to destroy the reprobate for their sins. (4) This, says the Pelagian, is "damning men, do what they can:" as if in punishing the wicked for the sins they have committed, God condemned them for endeavouring to become good! An inference so flatly contrary both to the premises and to common sense could only flow from such a pen as that of Mr. Wesley. This, even this is the man who has compiled a three-penny tract to explain the rules of logic! As to what is said of Esau, until the Pelagian can prove (which I defy him to do) that Esau did all he could to be saved, the consequence will not hold even as to him.

2. Reprobation denotes either, (1.) God's eternal preterition of some men, when he chose others to glory; and his predestina-

tion of them [*viz.* in a way of permission] to fill up the measure of their iniquities, and then to receive the just punishment of their crimes: or (2.) It may likewise signify God's forbearing to call by his grace those whom he hath thus ordained to condemnation (*u*). According to this simple and scriptural state of the case, reprobation is for the most part, a thing purely negative: and consists in God's not chusing some to glory, and not calling them by grace. Even his resolving to let such fill up the measure of their iniquities (which, by and by, we shall find to be a Scripture-phrase), has, so far as God is concerned, more in it of negation than of positivity; and is only tantamount to this, that the ungodly take advantage of the non-interference of grace, to follow the corrupt dictates of their own hearts, so far as they are not restrained by providence.

And now what hurt is there in this view of the argument? Is it not a fact verified by every day's observation? We see and hear of evil committed continually. But if effectual grace did interfere, that evil would not be committed. Yet is God in no sense the author of sin. If I am acquainted with an indigent neighbour, and have it in my power to enrich him and do it not, am I the author of that man's poverty, only for resolving to permit him, and for actually permitting him, to continue poor? Am I blameable for his poverty, because I do not give him the utmost I am able? Similar is the case now in debate. Ever since the fall of Adam, mankind are by nature spiritually poor. Was God obliged either to keep them from becoming so; or is he obliged to re-enrich them afterwards, with the blessings of grace and glory? I have proved already that God is not a debtor to his creatures. Who then and what art thou, O man that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say unto him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay to make, of the same lump, one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour? What if God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction; even that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy whom he had afore prepared unto glory (*x*)?

Now are these the words of Scripture, or are they not? If not, prove the forgery. If they be, you cannot fight against reprobation without fighting against God.—"Oh, but God has no right to make any vessels unto dishonour: no right to shew his wrath and make his power known. It is tyranny,

cruelty, injustice, partiality. He is bound to make every man a saint. He ought to make every man happy." Stop, friend. Your argument, if it holds at all, leads farther than you seem aware of. If God, in order to prove himself impartial, ought to make all men vessels unto honour, he ought to do more. He ought to have made us all arch-angels, and greater still, if greater can be. He ought to go even *ad ultimum sui posse*, and to make us all as honourable, glorious and happy, as omnipotence itself can. Where will you be able to draw the line of limitation? Either therefore you must plunge into profaneness and absurdity, without measure and without end; or you must submit to the good old doctrine of Christ and his apostles: the former of whom expressly asserts that it is lawful for God to do what he will with his own; and the latter with one voice declare that he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth.

3. Another very innocent definition (though wretchedly mutilated, according to custom, in Mr. Wesley's citation) stands thus. Predestination, as it regards the reprobate, is that eternal, most holy, sovereign, and immutable act of God's will, whereby he hath determined to leave some men to perish in their sins and to be justly punished for them (*y*).—Against this John offers a query: "Can they avoid it?" [i. e. can the reprobate avoid punishment?] "by any thing they do?" Let me also put a query to the querist: can you prove that anyone of them ever did what he could to avoid it? If this cannot be proved, it does not follow that "the reprobate shall be damned, do what they can."

Let us, moreover, (with all the respect and caution due to a subject to awful) enquire whether it be not, according to the Scripture account, plain, positive matter of fact, that God hath left some men in their sins, to be justly punished for them. What is the reason assigned by the Spirit of God why the profligate sons of Eli were deaf to their father's expostulations? They hearkened not to the voice of their father, because the Lord would slay them (1 Sam. ii. 25). In other words, 'God had determined to leave them to perish in their sins and to be justly punished for them.' Many other instances might be produced from the Old Testament. I shall however carry my appeal to the New. And my following proofs of that proposition shall be taken not from the epistles, but from the gospels (2).

Thou Capernaum, which art exalted unto heaven, shalt be brought down to hell: for

if the mighty works which have been done in thee had been done in Sodom, it would have remained unto this day. Matth. xi. 23. It follows hence that, though God knew the citizens of Sodom would have reformed their conduct, had his providence made use of effectual means to that end, still these effectual means were not vouchsafed. What is this but saying that God had determined to leave those criminals to perish in their sins, and to be justly punished for them?—"But if the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah were left to perish; how came the Capernautes, who enjoyed "such superior means of grace, to continue impenitent?" Our Lord himself answers this question, v. 25—27. Thou hast hid these things [the great things of conversion and salvation] from the wise and prudent; even so Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight:—No man knoweth the Father but the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son [*βουληται*] may will to reveal him.

What shall we say of the words that follow? Ye be witnesses unto yourselves, that ye are the children of them who killed the prophets: wherefore fill ye up the measure of your fathers. Matth. xxiii. 31, 32. Surely these were 'left to perish in their sins, and to be punished for them!'

Unto you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God. But unto them that are without [*i. e.* who were not within the pale of election], all these things are done in parables; that seeing they may see, and not perceive, and hearing they may hear, and not understand: lest at any time they should be converted and their sins be forgiven them. Mark iv. 11, 12. St. Matthew, if possible, expresses it still more strongly: It is given unto you to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven; but to them it is not given. Matt. xi. 13.

Why do ye not understand my speech? even because ye cannot hear my word. John viii. 43.

Jesus said, for judgment I am come into this world; that they who see not might see; and that they who see might be made blind. John ix. 39.

Ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you. John x. 26.

Once more. Though he had done so many miracles before them, yet they believed not on him: That the saying of Esaias the prophet might be fulfilled which he spake, Lord, who hath believed our report? and to whom hath the arm of the Lord been revealed? Therefore they could not believe because that Esaias said again, he hath

(s) Doctr. of Abs. Predest.

(u) Doctr. of Abs. Predest.

(y) Doctr. of Abs. Predest.

(2) The Apostolic epistles are of equal authority with the gospels, and were written under the uncer-

minians, to call upon us for proof of our doctrines from the gospels in particular, I have selected two or three testimonies thence: which testimonies for

blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart; that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be converted that I should heal them. John xii. 37—40.

Now I leave to the decision of any unprejudiced capable man upon earth, whether it be not evident, from these passages (among a multitude of others), that 'God hath determined to leave some men to perish in their sins, and to be justly punished for them?' In affirming which I only gave the Scripture as I found it. Nay I never expressed my sentiments concerning reprobation half so strongly as the word of God does. It follows that I had,

4. Very ample ground for asserting that there is a predestination of some particular persons to death (2 Cor. iv. 3. 1 Pet. ii. 8. 2 Pet. ii. 12. Jude iv. Rev. xvii. 8.); which death they shall inevitably undergo justly, and on account of their sins (*d*). "That is," says my Pelagian expositor, "they shall be damned, do what they can." I totally deny the explication: unless by their doing what they can, he means their committing all the evil they can. For, as it follows in the very page whence part of the above extract was taken, sin is the meritorious and immediate cause of any man's damnation: God condemns and punishes the non-elect, not merely as men, but as sinners. To which I even ventured to add that, had it pleased the great Governor of the universe to have entirely prevented sin from having any entrance into the world, it should seem as if God could not, consistently with his own attributes, have condemned any man at all. So infinitely remote am I from either thinking or asserting directly or implicitly, that "the reprobate shall be damned, do what they can!" The Pelagian should rather have declared this to be his resolution, 'I am determined to contradict and blaspheme, say what you will.'

5. He represents me as affirming in so many words that "the non-elect were predestinated to eternal death" for which words he refers by an asterism to my second chapter. I call upon him to tell me in what part of that chapter I make use of those words. Be they ever so expressive of my real belief, the words themselves are his. They occur not even in the fourth chapter, which treats professedly of reprobation. Will no length of years, nor infamy of detection, restrain this man from forgery?

If Mr. Wesley, instead of acknowledging his guilt and promising reformation for the future, should be hardened and mean enough to say, "Oh but though you have not made use of the words, either in those chapters or in the whole book, yet the sense

of those words is inferrible from many passages incurring from both." I answer, be it so; yet this consequence stands, that the assailant who coins words for his adversaries which they never spoke, is not an honest man. When propositions are attacked, it is not enough to give the supposed sense of those propositions. The very phraseology in which they are expressed should be cited without variation, just as they came from the pen of the defendant. Words are the dress of thought. And an alteration of dress may so far disguise the wearer as to make him appear quite a different person.

But supposing I had even syllabically expressed my opinion in those very terms; still the consequence alleged would have lagged far behind the premises. For the old question would again have recurred, *viz.* Can Mr. Wesley produce a single instance of any one man who did all he could to be saved, and yet was lost? If he can, let him tell us who that man was, where he lived, when he died, what he did, and how it came to pass he laboured in vain. If he cannot, let him either retract his consequences, or continue to be posted for a shameless traducer.

6. The condemnation of the reprobate is necessary and inevitable. This I have both said and persist to say. It is a position which unavoidably follows even from the foreknowledge of God, putting all decrees quite out of the question. Only allow that some sinners actually will be condemned in the last day; and that God always knew and knows at this moment who those persons will be; and (not Mr. Wesley's, but) my consequence stands unshaken, that the condemnation of the reprobate is necessary and inevitable. Should it be said that "the fore-knowledge of God has no effective influence on events;" I answer that whether it has or not (which, however, would admit of some debate), still every event must and certainly will correspond to his foreknowledge of it: else the divine foreknowledge would be mere guess, and evaporate into empty, fallible, uncertain conjecture: *i. e.* the knowledge of God would be inferior to the knowledge which even man, in many cases, is possessed of. It was the consideration of this which induced the great Dr. South to renounce the Arminian novelties, and fall in with doctrinal Calvinism. I wish it may (for his own sake) have as good effect on little Mr. Wesley. I say for his own sake: since himself would be the principal gainer by his submission to grace. We should acquire very little honour by the acquisition of such a proselyte.

"Surely," cries Mr. Wesley, "I need add no more on this head." You need not: unless, with all your diving, you could fetch up something to the purpose. "You see," continues the repetitionist, "that the reprobate shall be damned, do what they can, is the whole burden of the song." I have proved, and the reader has seen, that it makes no part of the song. But this I see, that unless God give Mr. Wesley repentance to the acknowledging of the truth, the unparalleled perverseness with which he labours to blacken some doctrines of Christianity will be the burden of his soul in the hour of death and in the day of judgment.

7. That the number of the elect, and also of the reprobate, is so fixed and determinate that neither can be augmented nor diminished, is affirmed in Zanchius, (*b*) and rests on clear, positive, repeated testimonies of Holy Scripture.—I would not scruple to hinge the whole weight of this proposition, likewise, on the certain and immutable knowledge of God. I know, says Christ, whom I have chosen (John xiii. 18.); but was the number fluctuating and precarious, susceptible of addition and diminution, Christ could not be said to know them, but only to guess at them. Absolute certainty is the alone ground of positive knowledge. Whatever is unfixed and unsure can, at the very highest, be the basis of no more than probable supposition.

So again, I know my sheep, John x. 14. But if their number was indeterminate, they could not be known: the sheep of to-day might degenerate into goats to-morrow; and the goats of yesterday might become sheep to-day, and be goats again before night. Nay, it might so happen that all his sheep might cease to remain such; and the great Shepherd might, at the long run, not have a single sheep to know. On the contrary, if Christ actually knows his sheep, and whom [*æ*, the very individual persons] he hath chosen; it follows that he must also know who are not his sheep, and whom he hath not chosen. I assert therefore again that if Omniscience itself knows any thing of the matter, the number of both is so fixed and determinate that neither can be augmented or diminished. The apostle himself makes use, among others, of this very argument: the foundation [or purpose] of the Lord standeth sure, having this seal, The Lord knoweth them that are his. 2 Tim. ii. 19.

Let me recommend one or two passages more to the reader's consideration. The election hath obtained, and the rest were blinded [*ἐκρωσθησαν*, were hardened]; according as it is written, God hath given them the spirit of slumber, eyes that they

should not see, and ears that they should not hear, unto this day. Rom. xi. 7, 8. Being disobedient, wherunto they were also appointed. 1 Pet. ii. 8. Whose names were not written in the Book of Life from the foundation of the world. Rev. xvii. 8. There is no meaning in words, if it does not follow, even from these few stubborn texts, as evidently as light flows from the sun, that the number of the elect and reprobate can neither be augmented nor diminished. The very nature, whether of election or of reprobation, makes this point manifest as to both: since, could the number of the elect (for instance) be lessened, the deduction would augment the number of the reprobate; for what was taken from the one would necessarily add to the other. In which case it would not be true that the election obtained and the rest were blinded. Nor would Solomon's assertion be true: I know that whatsoever God doth it shall be for ever: nothing can be put to it, nor any thing taken from it. Eccles. iii. 14. Now this must be meant, either of God's immanent acts, in a way of decree; or of his transient acts, in a way of providence. But it cannot be meant of his providential acts: for they are always the same: they are not for ever. It must therefore be meant of his immanent acts, *i. e.* of his decrees, purposes, and determinations, which cannot vary, but are for ever; to which nothing can be put or added, and from which nothing can be taken away. The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever, and the thoughts of his heart to all generations. Psal. xxxiii. 11. He is of one mind, who can turn him? and what his soul desireth, even that he doth: for he performeth the thing that is appointed for me, and many such things are with him. Job xxiii. 14.

8. The decrees of election and reprobation are immutable and irreversible (*c*). Mr. Wesley cites the sentence, but takes care to omit touching upon (or even producing) any one of the seven arguments brought by Zanchy in support of it. Let the Arminian refute these, or he will never succeed in his attack upon that. But he found it easier to spin a

IVth Consequence; namely, That, on the hypothesis of an absolute decree, there can be no such thing as sin: "It cannot," says this wonderful discoverer, "be sin in a spark to rise, or in a stone to fall."

If Mr. Wesley's illustration has any meaning at all, the meaning must be this: "Sparks and stones are incapable of moral agency; therefore men are so too. Sparks and stones are neither rewardable or punishable: *Ergo*, men are not responsible for the

sins they commit." The Arminian might as well have said, "Sparks and stones have no legs: *Ergò*, men have none. Sparks and stones are not endued with any of the five senses: *Ergò*, men can neither hear, see, feel, taste, nor smell." One would think that the levity of a spark and the dulness of a stone were, by a strange kind of association, united in Mr. John Wesley, before he could dream of illustrating his point by such an extraordinary brace of similes, which are no more related to the subject than a turf to an archangel,—“Oh, but you do not touch the main string. A spark rises, and a stone falls, necessarily. It is the necessity by which they rise and fall, that renders stones and sparks incapable of sinning.” As if mere matter (supposing it could be even exempted from the laws of necessity) would therefore be capable of virtue and vice!

Mr. Wesley is singularly unhappy in the choice of his comparisons; and as singularly awkward in his application of them. The point he wishes to prove is evidently this: that “absolute decrees, prescience, and providence, are inconsistent with human free-agency; and, of course, that the finally wicked are not justly punishable for the evil they commit.” I have purposely stated this objection in the clearest and strongest terms: lest I should even seem desirous of eluding instead of answering.—Now, if I can evince from the express doctrine of Scripture, and from express facts recorded in Scripture, that eventual necessity, or infallible certainty of event, is not incompatible with so much free-agency in man as may suffice to render him punishable for breaking the law of God, the objection will at once vanish into its native nothing.

1. For the doctrine of Scripture.—Woe to the world because of offences: for it must needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh (Matt. xviii. 7.) *Αναγκη εστι*, there is a necessity that offences should come. Then surely, may an Arminian say, “There can be no woe due to the introducers of that whose introduction is necessary!” Our Lord says, Yes, there is. I conclude then, that necessity of event does not render sin excusable, nor the sinner impunable.—Again, when ye shall hear of wars, &c., be ye not troubled; for such things must needs be: *δει γενεσθαι*, they must come to pass. Mark xiii. 7. And yet, though there is a must-be for these events, that necessity does not supersede either the moral or the natural volitions of the parties concerned.—So 1 Cor. xi. 19.

(d) The eminently pious and learned bishop Beveridge gives a spiritual improvement of this passage, too valuable and just to be omitted here. These are his words: “It is God who worketh in us both to will and to do, of his own good pleasure. So

There must be heresies among you. But if this necessity for heresies did not absolutely coincide with the wills of the heretics, how could any heretics be blameable?—Once more. He [*i. e.* Christ] must reign until he hath put all his enemies under his feet. 1 Cor. xv. 25. There is therefore a necessity for Christ’s reigning: yet, I fancy, even Arminians themselves will hardly venture to affirm that Christ reigns against his own will. Absolute necessity then is perfectly consistent with willingness and freedom in good agency, no less than in bad. For it is a true maxim, *Ubi voluntas ibi libertas*: all action is sufficiently free wherein a person’s will is engaged: be his will engaged ever so necessarily.

2. Next for Scripture facts.

Joseph’s brethren acted freely, *i. e.* with the full bent of their wills, when they sold him to the Midianites who carried him into Egypt. But, in truth, though they sold him to gratify their own malice, and had no higher view in what they did, they undesignedly fulfilled the decree of God. Whence Joseph’s pious and just remark afterwards: Be not grieved nor angry with yourselves that ye sold me hither; for God did send me before you, to preserve life. So now it was not you that sent me hither, but God. Gen. xlv. 5, 8. As for you, ye thought evil against me: but God meant it for good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save much people alive. Chap. 1. 20. So the Psalmist: He [*i. e.* God] sent a man before them, even Joseph, who was sold for a servant. Psalm cv. 17. It was God that sent him, though his brethren sold him.

Pharaoh acted freely (*i. e.* willingly), in his refusal to dismiss the Israelites: or, in other words, he refused to send them away, because his will was against their going. And yet he could will no otherwise than he did; Exod. vii. 3, 4. So, when Saul went home to Gibeah, it is said there went with him a band of men whose hearts God had touched: *i. e.* whose wills God had effectually inclined. 1 Sam. x. 26. Yet it cannot be inferred hence, that they did not go freely. In like manner, God is said to have stirred up the Spirit of Cyrus, or powerfully to have influenced his will, to issue an edict for the re-building of the temple. Yet this, though a necessary, was a free, act of that monarch. Ezra i. 1. The effects of that edict are also to be noted: Then rose up the chief of the fathers of Judah and Benjamin, and the priests and the Levites, with all them whose spirit the Spirit of God (*d*) had raised to go

of it, in his Holy Scripture; yet none can accept of it but such whom himself stirs up by his Holy Spirit to endeavour after it. And thus we find it was in Israel’s return from Babylon to Jerusalem. Though king Cyrus made a proclamation that whosoever

up, v. 5. Will any man say that these did not will freely, only because they willed necessarily? It was from the acrimony of his own heart that Shimei cursed David: consequently his will was in it. And yet the Lord had said unto him, Curse David: *i. e.* he did it by God’s own efficacious permission. 2 Sam. xvi. 10. Absalom, and the men of Israel who were with him, acted with perfect freedom, and with the full exercise of their reason, when they agreed in preferring the counsel of Hushai to that of Ahithophel: and yet, in so doing, their wills acted in absolute subserviency to the will and decree of God, who had appointed to defeat the good counsel of Ahithophel, to the intent that the Lord might bring evil upon Absalom. 2 Sam. xvii. 14. Thus also God foretold that he would turn the Assyrian king loose upon Israel, who should take them for his prey, and tread them down as mire in the street: in all which, when it came to pass, the king of Assyria acted merely on principles of ambition, cruelty, and pride; and, consequently, acted freely; proposing no other end to himself than the gratification of his own savage will and tyrannic disposition. Whereas, in reality, he was appointed of God to avenge his righteous quarrel with a hypocritical people, and to be the instrument, not merely of human, but, chiefly, of divine, resentment. Howbeit, says God, he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think so: but it is in his heart to destroy and to cut off nations not a few. Isa. x. 6, 7.—Thus it is said concerning the ten kings who shall hate the mystic harlot, and destroy her, and burn her with fire, that God hath put into their hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree, and to give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of God shall be fulfilled. Rev. xvii. 17. Does it follow that these kings must be stript of all free-agency, and cease to be accountable for their actions, and commence mere machines, only because God will bring their wills into subsjection to his own?

Thanks be to God, says the apostle, who put the same earnest care into the heart of Titus for you: for indeed he accepted the exhortation; but being more forward, of his own accord he went unto you. 2 Cor. viii. 16, 17. Here it is said that God himself put that earnest care into the heart of Titus which induced him to visit the Corinthians. And yet Titus visited them of his own accord, or without any sensible compul-

sion. God therefore may work efficaciously on the human will, and the will (though it necessarily follows that efficacious direction) remain quite unforced. This is farther evident from the account which St. Paul gives of his own case, as a preacher: though I preach the gospel, I have nothing to glory of; for necessity is laid upon me [*αναγκη μοι επικειται*], yea, woe is me if I preach not the gospel. 1 Cor. ix. 16. Yet he preached the gospel freely and willingly. Necessity therefore, and freedom, are very good friends, notwithstanding all the efforts of Arminianism to set them at variance.—I have already observed that the great and awful transaction of Christ’s crucifixion was, from all eternity, positively decreed and infallibly foreknown of God: yet neither did that decree, nor that foreknowledge, abate the guilt of those who accomplished both: for they were, at once, necessary and voluntary agents. Let me, as the subject so directly falls in with the point in hand, bestow a few moments upon it here.

The death of Jesus Christ was both the most important event that ever came to pass, and the most sinful act (in his murderers) that ever was committed. So wonderful are the ways of God—this great event was predestinated in all its circumstances. It was not a matter of chance, but a matter of decree.—Thinkest thou that I cannot pray to my Father, and he shall presently give me more than twelve legions of angels? but how then shall the Scriptures be fulfilled, that thus it must be? Matt. xxvi. 53, 54.—And he began to teach them that the Son of man must suffer many things. Mark viii. 31.—I say unto you, that this that is written must yet be accomplished in me, And he was numbered with the transgressors. Luke xxii. 37.—The Son of man must be delivered into the hands of sinful men, and be crucified. Luke xxiv. 7.—Concerning Judas in particular, thus speak the oracles of God: Men and brethren, this Scripture must needs have been fulfilled, which the Holy Ghost by the mouth of David spake before concerning Judas, which was guide to them that took Jesus. Acts i. 16. And concerning all the other accomplices in this tremendous deed, it is expressly declared that they were gathered together, to do whatsoever God’s hand and God’s counsel *ορωπιτε γενεσθαι*, had predestinated to be done. Acts iv. 27, 28. Yet, throughout the whole,

there was none that accepted of the offer but those whose spirit God had raised to go up. So here, though God doth, as it were, proclaim to all the world, that whosoever will come to Christ shall certainly be saved; yet it doth not follow that all shall receive salvation from him: because it is certain all will not come: or, rather, none can will to come, unless God enables them. I am sure, to say none shall be saved but those that will of themselves, is a sad news for me, whose will is naturally so backward to every thing that is good. But this is my comfort; I am as certain my salvation is of God, as I am certain it cannot be of myself. It is Christ who vouchsafed to die for me, who hath likewise promised to live within me. It is he that will work all my works, both for me and in me too.”—Private Thoughts, Art. VIII.

they acted freely. The Jews delivered him to Pilate *δια φθονου*, from a principle of envy and hatred. As the prophet says in another case, They knew not the thoughts of the Lord, neither understood they his counsel. No thanks to them that the decree of God was fulfilled, and the salvation of the Church effected by their putting Christ to death. They were as free and unforced in willing his crucifixion, and in bringing it about, as if there had been no decree in the case. The Saviour was indeed delivered up to their rage, *τη ωρισμενη βελη και προοργωσατε Θεε*, by the determinate decree and foreknowledge of God; and his death was therefore, in the utmost sense of the word, necessary, being inevitably pre-ordained: and yet they took and slew him *δια χειρων ανομων*, with lawless, wicked hands. Acts ii. 23. The wickedness they were guilty of in perpetrating this crime was not excusable, nor the lawlessness of it mitigated, by the necessity of its coming to pass: since they only sought to satiate the rancour of their own wills, and to glut their own sanguinary malice.

From all which, and from many other

(e) I am far from standing alone in this assertion. Men, the dust from whose volumes I am not worthy to wipe, have intimated as much before me. "The old astronomers," says the celebrated Dr. John Edwards, of Cambridge, "used to tell us that the inferior orbs of heaven have all their proper" [*i. e.* their own peculiar] "motions, and yet, at the same time, are carried by the movement of the highest sphere; the primum mobile, as they called it. Which notion, if we apply it to the present case" [*i. e.* to the consistency of divine decrees with human freedom], "is no hypothesis or fiction, but a reality of the greatest importance: for all things and persons, besides [a tendency which they may seem to have of their own, have another impressed upon them by the decree, the first mover of all: and this overrules and controls all: and yet in such a way as is suitable to the particular nature of all agents whatsoever."—Veritas Redux, p. 28.

It may be objected to Dr. Edwards' testimony, that he was a professed Calvinist: and therefore only wrote in harmony with his own favourite principle—But what if the same principle be a favourite one with such eminent and masterly Anti-Calvinists as the present most learned bishop of Bristol; the late worthy dean Prideaux; and that exquisite proficient in refined literature, Monsieur Rollin?

I begin with the first of this respectable triumvirate: to whom, for his matchless Dissertation on the Prophecies, both the religious and the learned world are under the deepest obligations. In the course of that excellent work, his lordship thus expresses himself: "Jeremiah is said to be set over the nations, and over the kingdoms, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy, and to throw down, to build, and to plant; because he was authorised to make known the purposes and decrees of God, and because these events would follow in consequence of his prophecies. Make the heart of his people fat, is therefore as much as to say, Denounce my judgments upon this people, that their heart shall be fat, and their ears heavy, and their eyes shut; lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their hearts, and convert, and be healed." Vol. i. Dissert. 8.—And a few pages after, it follows: "We see that the great empires, which in their turns subdued and oppressed the people of God, are all come to ruin; because, though they executed the purposes of God, yet that was more than they understood. All they intended was to satiate

scriptural examples which might be given, I infer, that God's decrees, and the necessity of event flowing thence, neither destroy the true free-agency of men, nor render the commission of sin a jot less heinous. They neither force the human will, nor extenuate the evil of human actions. Predestination, foreknowledge, and providence, only secure the event, and render it certainly future, in a way and manner (incomprehensible indeed by us; but) perfectly consistent with the nature of the second causes. The freedom of intelligent beings does by no means stand opposed to simple necessity; but only to violence and compulsive force. Thus the Son of man went *κατα το ὄρισμενον*, according to what was decreed concerning him, and yet a woe was denounced against Judas who betrayed him, Luke xxii. 22, which woe could not have been denounced, much less inflicted, if Judas, notwithstanding the decree of God, had not betrayed him freely, and with the full consent of his own depraved will. These two therefore, are, in fact, quite reconcilable: *viz.* absolute determination on the part of God; and *libentia*, or freedom in action, on the part of man. (e)

their own pride and ambition, their own cruelty and revenge." *Ibid.* p. 241.

Let us next hear the learned dean of Norwich; who, treating of Julius Cæsar, has this observable remark: "Many of his enterprizes being entered upon with great rashness, this abundantly proves that he owed the success which he had in them only to an over-ruling power of Providence on his side: which, having set him up as a fit instrument for the work which he brought to pass, carried him through all dangers and hazards, to the full accomplishing of it; and after that, when there was no more for him to do, cast him off to perish, like a rod which is thrown into the fire when no more to be used. The work was God's: but it being malice and ambition that excited him to be the instrument in the execution of it, he justly had, for the reward thereof, the destruction by which he fell." Connection, part 2. B. 7. p. (mcc.) 700, 701.

Rollin follows. "The omnipotence of God [is] manifested by the creation, preservation, and government of the world; by the sovereign power he exercises, not only over what is outward and visible, but over the heart and mind, in turning them as he pleases, from one resolution to another, according to his designs." *Belles Lettres*, vol. ii. p. 323. octav. 1769. "It is thus that God, the sole arbiter of all human events, determines, as Lord of all, the fate of empires; prescribes the form of them, regulates their limits, marks out their duration, and makes the very passions and crimes of men subservient to the execution of his gracious and just designs: and, by the secret springs of his admirable wisdom, disposes, at a distance, and without man's being sensible of it, the preparations for the great work to which all the rest relate, which is the establishment of his Church, and salvation of his elect." *Ibid.* vol. iii. p. 225.—Elsewhere, this fine writer has these solid reflections: "The kings who gloried so much in their puissance, have nothing which approaches in the least to that of Jesus Christ. They do not reign over the will of man, which is real dominion. He exercises his power principally on the hearts and minds of men. Nothing is done without his order or permission. Every thing is disposed by his wisdom and power. Every thing co-operates, directly or indirectly, to the accomplishment of his designs. Whilst all things are in motion, and fluctuate upon earth; while states and empires pass away with incredible rapidity, and the human

Sinners are as much responsible to God for their offences, as if God had never passed any decree at all. So that the mock objection drawn from "sparks and stones" is totally unparallel; and, therefore, totally inconclusive.

I mean unparallel as an objection; and as applied to that particular purpose for which Mr. Wesley introduces it. Otherwise, there are passages of Scripture wherein even the rational creature man is, under certain circumstances, and in certain respects, actually and expressly compared to the sparks that fly upward (see Job v. 7, and Isa. i. 31), and to stones which necessarily descend downward. The holy Baptist, without any ceremony or scruple, compared some of his unregenerate hearers to stones; saying, God is able, of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham: Matt. iii. 9; intimating that nothing short of divine ability can savingly convert the soul; and that unrenewed sinners can no more change themselves into saints than stones can transform themselves into men. Nay, even the regenerate are (though with some diversity of modification) exhibited under a similar image: Ye, therefore, as lively stones, are built up a spiritual house, 1 Pet. ii. 5. Teaching us, that although, by virtue of grace received, men are subsequently active and diligent in every good word and work; yet that, in their first reception of saving grace, poor free-will has no employ; but that the receivers of grace are absolutely passive, and that conversion is as totally the operation of God, as the severing of stones from their native quarry; and the erecting of them into an elegant building, are the effects of human agency. Nay, God the Father himself condescends (at least, as we render the passage) to speak of his elect people under a simile nearly allied to the foregoing: They shall be mine, saith the Lord of hosts, *i. e.* I will publicly own them as such, in that day when I make up my jewels. Mal. iii. 17. Now, unless I am vehemently mistaken, jewels are but another name for precious stones. On the whole, Mr. Wesley's daring to hammer out on the very anvil of Scripture, a cavil against the decrees of God; a cavil, partly made of Scripture metaphors; looks so like a wish to turn the Bible's own artillery against itself, as leaves too much room to fear that it is as natural to him to pervert and gainsay, as it is for a spark to ascend, a feather to float, or a stone to sink.

He brings to my mind however an anecdote

equally instructive in itself, and pertinent to the case in hand. Two very eminent clergymen who are, and have long been, distinguished ornaments of the Church of England, were conversing together, some years ago, concerning predestination and invincible grace. One of these excellent persons (who was at that time an Arminian) said to the other, in the warmth of free debate, "Pray, sir, do not make me an absolute machine. Allow me to have a little more power of self-determination than a stock or stone!" To which his learned friend replied, "Indeed, sir, a stone has the advantage of you. Man's rebellious heart is, by nature, and so far as spiritual things are concerned, more untractable and unyielding than a stone itself. I may take up a stone and throw it this way or that, in what direction I please; and it obeys the impulse of my arm. Whereas in the sinner's heart there is every species of hatred and opposition to God; nor can any thing but omnipotent power slay its enmity and supersede its resistance." Hence God's gracious promise to renew his people runs in this remarkable style: I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh. Ezek. xxxvi. 26.

Still Mr. Wesley asserts with a "positively" (which, to be sure, is demonstration), that on the scheme of pre-ordination, the reprobate "can have no sin at all." Indeed! They are quite sinless, are they? As perfect as Mr. Wesley himself? Oh! excellent reprobation! Let not Mr. John, who is so fiery an advocate for sinless perfection, ever open his mouth against such a preterition as this! It is one of his own consequences (a consequence which, however, like the rest, remains unproved) that God's decree makes the reprobate themselves free from sin. What then must the elect be? And how does it ensue from those premises, that the former shall perish, "do what they can; and the latter be saved, be they ever so wicked?—Besides: If reprobates be sinless; if they be not merely nominal but real perfectionists; nay, immutably perfect, so that they can have "no sin at all;" will it not follow that Mr. Wesley's own perfectionists are reprobates? For surely if reprobates may be sinless, the sinless may be reprobates. Did not Mr. John's malice outrun his craft, when he advanced an objection so extremely unguarded and so easily retortible?

But on what is the sinlessness of reprobates supposed to depend? On two asser-

tion of the last of the elect; Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father." Conclusion of Ancient History, p. 297, 298. Edit. 1768. What kingdom is that, which Christ as mediator, shall deliver up to God the Father? It is, says this admirable author, "The blessed and holy company of the elect." *Belles Lettres* vol. ii. p. 304.

tion of the last of the elect; Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father." Conclusion of Ancient History, p. 297, 298. Edit. 1768. What kingdom is that, which Christ as mediator, shall deliver up to God the Father? It is, says this admirable author, "The blessed and holy company of the elect." *Belles Lettres* vol. ii. p. 304.

tions of mine: which, fairly quoted, are very unfavourable both to the consequence and to the consequence-drawer.

1. I have said in Zanchius that predestination (taken in its most comprehensive import) may be defined, that eternal, most wise, and immutable decree of God, whereby he did, from before all time, determine and ordain to create, dispose of, and direct to some particular end, every person and thing, to which he has given, or is yet to give, being: and to make the whole creation subservient to, and declarative of, his own glory. Said I this of myself? says not Scripture the same also? The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil. Prov. vi. 14. But do the righteous likewise fall under an unalterable decree? Yes: for it is written, being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will. Eph. i. 11. And indeed either this is true, or there is no governor of the world. Unless God does actually work all things after the counsel of his own will, *i. e.* "dispose of, and direct to some particular end, every person and thing to which he hath given being;" Providence is no more than an empty name. Upon the plan of Mr. Wesley's Consequence, the wretch was not a fool, but wise, who said in his heart, There is no God. I defy the Pelagian to strike out a middle way between providence and chance. If God does not dispose of every being, and of every event, so as to "make the whole creation subservient to, and declarative of, his own glory;" chance, not providence, reigns. Prove but this, that chance is paramount: and maintain the existence of God, if you can. Why did the heathens themselves justly deem Epicurus an atheist? Not because he denied the being of God (for he asserted that); but because he denied the agency of God's universal providence. Yet predestination and providence do by no means annihilate sin. The doctrine only affirms that, through the unsearchable wisdom of the great superintending mind, even the efficacious permission of evil shall, in the end, be over-ruled to good. I cannot, moreover, but observe how wretchedly Mr. Wesley's Consequences clash together, and destroy each other. In this very paper, he revives the old impudent cavil, that predestination makes God the author of sin. "Whose fault was it," says he, "that Judas betrayed Christ? You plainly say it was not his fault, but God's." Without

the least heat or emotion, I plainly say, Mr. Wesley lies. I never even thought nor intimated, much less said (least of all, said plainly) that it was "God's fault and not the fault of Judas." But if God's decree and providence are incompatible with sin, inasmuch that the very reprobates themselves "can have no sin at all;" I should be glad to know how God's decree and providence can make him the author of sin? One or other therefore of these cavils must fall; they can never both be true, because they are flat contradictions. On one hand, God cannot be the author of evil, if there is no evil for him to be the author of: and on the other hand, even upon the horrid supposition of his being the author of sin, it would necessarily follow that sin and the decree were perfectly consistent. But the truth is, the consistency of God's decree with the voluntary nature of sin is evident from the many Scripture examples already alleged. I have proved by those that absolute predestination, on the part of God, does not make sin involuntary on the part of man. Consequently, God is not the author of moral evil. I have affirmed before, and I affirm again, that God is the creator of the wicked, but not of their wickedness: he is the author of their being, but not the infuser of their sin. It is most certainly his will (for adorable and unsearchable reasons) to permit sin: but with all possible reverence be it spoken, it should seem that he cannot, consistently with the purity of his nature, the glory of his attributes, and the truth of his declarations, be himself the author of it. Sin, says the apostle, entered into the world by one man: meaning by Adam. Consequently, it was not introduced by the Deity himself, though, without the permission of his will and the concurrence of his providence, its introduction had been impossible. Yet is he not hereby the author of sin so introduced. (f)

2. I am charged with simply and nakedly affirming that God himself did "predestinate them" [the reprobate] "to fill up the measure of their iniquities." Either Mr. Wesley is a very superficial peruser of the pamphlet on which he animadverts, or a very malicious and dishonest one. For is not my true meaning expressly declared where I speak thus? God not only works efficaciously on his elect, that they may will and do that which is well-pleasing in his sight; but does likewise frequently and powerfully suffer the wicked to fill up the measure of their iniquities, by committing

(f) See my Doctrine of Absolute Predestination, Is this making God the author of sin? Impudence itself might blush to affirm it. "Oh, but do not you say that God worketh all things in all men, even the wickedness in the wicked?" and that this is one branch of his omnipotence?" I answer, No. I do

etiam mala in impiis: and the words stand as a quotation from him. "But why did you quote those words at all?" For a very good reason; a reason alleged in the preface to the pamphlet itself: viz. to shew that Luther asserted the doctrine of predestination with much more warmth, and proceeded to a harsher length in defending it than

fresh sins. In proof of which latter part of the paragraph, I refer there to no fewer than sixteen passages of Scripture: all which are very prudently passed over without notice by the Pelagian methodist.

Can any thing be more certain than (1.) that God actually does work in his own people that which is well-pleasing in his sight (Heb. xiii. 21.)? And is it not equally matter of fact (2.) that he likewise suffers the wicked to fill up the measure of their iniquities? Is not the very phraseology, in which both these propositions are expressed, the positively repeated language of God himself? What was the reason which the Almighty condescended to give to Abraham, why the posterity of the latter should reside for several ages in Egypt prior to their settlement in the promised land? Because, says God, the iniquity of the Amorites is not yet full. Gen. xv. 16. Divine sovereignty had determined to permit the Canaanites to arrive at a certain measure of wickedness; nor could they be dispossessed of their country until that measure was filled up. Many centuries after it was revealed to Daniel that the Romans should not be masters of the Grecian empire, and thereby be at full liberty to turn their arms against Judea, until the transgressors are come to the full, *i. e.* until the sinfulness of the latter was consummated, and they fully ripe for destruction: Dan. viii. 23, 24. If we descend to the age of the Messiah's incarnation, we shall find the Son of God himself speaking in the same awful terms: Fill ye up the measure of your fathers, was his tremendous language to the reprobate Jews, Matth. xxiii. 32. Of the same people St. Paul has the same expression, where he observes, that the Jews did all they could to obstruct the ministry of Christ's faithful messengers: forbidding us to speak to the Gentiles that they might be saved, to fill up their sins always, for wrath is come upon them to the uttermost. 1 Thess. ii. 16. As long as my humble efforts in behalf of truth speak the sense and bear the stamp of Scripture, it matters not though ten thousand Wesleys were to rave and rail.

The Arminian had still one more desperate push to make in favour of his sinking Consequence. To this end, I am introduced as saying, "That God decreed the Jews to be the crucifiers of Christ and Judas to betray him." How! the Jews to be the crucifiers of Christ! They were not: nor do I any where call them so. Every body knows that the

Romans were the murderers of the Lord of glory, though they became such at Jewish instigation. I am once more under a necessity of quoting myself. God efficaciously permitted (having so decreed), *i. e.* having decreed to permit the Jews to be in effect the crucifiers of Christ, and Judas to betray him (g). Christ could not have been betrayed and crucified had not his proditor and crucifixion been permitted. And if permitted then the permission must have been decreed. For it were impiety equivalent to atheism to suppose that God permits any thing against his will: and the will of an all-wise unchangeable being is and must be eternal. If any new design (be it a design of efficiency or of permission) can have place in God, God is no longer unchangeable. Nay God would be no longer immortal: for as the learned and judicious Mr. Polhill (h) observes, "every change is a kind of death." Whoever undergoes any alteration dies to that he was before and which he changes from. In such a case," says that eminent master in Israel, "must there not fall a change upon the very being of God himself? and must not the Deity suffer, and as it were die, in this mutation? which astonishing catastrophes being for ever to be abhorred, I conclude that God's decrees must needs be immutable as long as there is any stability in his eternity, infallibility in his prescience, sureness in his grace and truth, and immortality in life or essence."

Mr. Wesley may possibly object that the betraying and death of Christ might be decreed as events, without positively fixing on the particular instruments by whom those events should be brought about. As if God would fix the end, without any effectual regard to the means! Would even a wise man act in this manner? Much less he who is wisdom itself. Judas was expressly pointed out as the traitor, by Christ himself: he that dipped his hand with me in the dish, the same shall betray me. Matt. xxvi. 23. And this unhappy person, though chosen to the apostleship (John vi. 70.), was never chosen to salvation: whence that of our Lord, I speak not of you all; I know whom I have chosen; but that the Scripture may be fulfilled, he that eateth bread with me hath lifted up his heel against me, John xiii. 18. Nor was Judas ever endued with saving faith: Jesus knew from the beginning who they were that believed not, and who should betray him: and he said, Therefore said I unto you, that no man can come unto me

(g) Doctr. of Abs. Pred. vol. v. p. 262.

(h) In his admirable Treatise on The Divine Will considered in its eternal Decrees and holy Execution of them. This great writer was a lay-gentleman of considerable family and fortune, seated at Burwash in Sussex. Another Treatise of his, entitled, Precious Faith considered in its Nature, Workings and Growth, is one of the finest and most evange-

lical books on that important subject, that is to be met with in the English language. If the volume I first mentioned speaks to the head, and ransacks almost all the stores of learning and genius; the latter speaks no less to the heart, and unlocks the richest treasures of experimental grace.—The author flourished in the reign of Charles II.

(i. e. no man savingly believe in me) unless it were given unto him of my Father. Hence, Judas is termed the son of perdition; and, when he died, is said to have gone to his own place. Should such awful passages as these excite us to blaspheme and reply against God? Should they not rather make us fall prostrate at his footstool, and cry, each for himself, in the dust of penitential abasement, God be merciful to me a sinner?—The Son of Man, said Incarnate Wisdom, goeth (i. e. dieth the death of the cross) as it was written of him *καθὼς γέγραπται περὶ αὐτοῦ*, as it was decreed concerning him; but woe to that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed: it were good for that man if he had never been born, Matt. xxvi. 24. Now, notwithstanding the absolute decree, and notwithstanding Judas undesignedly fulfilled it, had he not been, in the midst of all, an accountable agent, a woe could not possibly have been denounced against him: much less such a woe as should render even non-existence a privilege. I infer therefore, from Christ's own words, that men are at once subject to God's disposal as a predestinator; and amenable to his tribunal as a law-giver.

When St. Peter declared that Christ was delivered up to death by the determinate counsel and fore-knowledge of God (Acts ii. 23.), it is worthy of observation that he declared this on the very day of Pentecost, immediately after the miraculous descent of the Holy Ghost. The apostle, therefore, was under the absolute impulse of that blessed person. Nay, he was filled with the Holy Spirit, and spake as that Spirit gave him utterance. Consequently, in the judgment of the Holy Spirit himself, there is no real incompatibility between God's determinate counsel and the wickedness of their hands who bring that counsel to pass. Mr. Wesley's frequent repetitions of the same threadbare objections oblige me, oftener than I could wish, to repeat my answers.

Be it so, then, that mortals are at present too short-sighted entirely to comprehend, and fully to discern, how the efficacious purposes of heaven are perfectly consistent with the moral responsibility of man. It is plain from Meridian evidence of Scripture that they are so: and this ought to satisfy those who believe that the Scriptures are of God. Woe unto him that striveth with his Maker: let the potsherd strive with the potsherd of the earth; but shall the clay say to him that fashioned it, What makest thou? Isa. xlv. 9. Shall we, with Mr. Wesley, labour to quench the light we have, and fly in the face of Scripture? and give God himself the lie, by way of desperate revenge for his not having made us omniscient? Nay; but may we, with fear and trembling, adore the deep things of God,

until death takes off the veil. May divine grace make us believers on earth of what in heaven we trust to be comprehenders: nor suffer us to be carried away with that strong delusion, that monstrous system of Arminianism, which (in open defiance of all Scripture, reason and fact) represents God as accountable to man, under pretence of making man accountable to God.

"God determined," says the Pelagian, "that the reprobate should live and die in their sins, that he might afterwards damn them!" Say rather, that some men are permitted to live and die in their sins, the consequence of which is condemnation.—As to the horrid parallel, which Mr. W. labours to run between the Most High God, and one of the most abandoned emperors that ever disgraced the Roman diadem—I have only this to remark: 1. That the writer who is capable of taking such blasphemous liberties with the adorable Sovereign of heaven and earth must have drunk deep indeed into that satanic spirit which opposeth and exalteth itself above all that is called God. 2. The whole parallel is copied almost verbatim from an old book, first published in the reign of Charles I., A. D. 1633, by one Samuel Hoord, alias Hoard, alias Hord (for I find him bearing all these names in print). He was a clergyman of the Laudean faction, and, by way of cover for his apostacy, (having been originally a zealous maintainer of the xxxix Articles), printed the above-mentioned treatise, commonly known by the title of "God's love to mankind." From which treatise Mr. Wesley borrowed his whole paragraph concerning God and Tertius; but without giving it as a quotation, or cropping the least hint to his readers that the comparison was none of his own. Nothing comes amiss to this gentleman, Not content with assaulting the living, he even rifles the dead: and, rather than not rifle at all, robs them of their very blasphemies. Unless he goes upon the old fanatic principles, that brethren should have all things in common. 3. I am saved from the trouble of canvassing Mr. Hoord's simile; it having been effectually done to my hands by no less persons than the renowned Dr. Davenant, bishop of Salisbury, and that prodigy of metaphysical learning, the ever memorable Dr. Twisse, who condescended to immortalize Hoord's name, by their candid, solid and learned answers. For the refutation of that particular calumny against God, which Mr. Wesley's plagiarism has adopted for his own, I shall content myself with referring the reader to the treatises of those great and eminent champions of grace. (i) It may be worth a

(i) See Bishop Davenant's *Animadversions*, &c., p. 150. edit. 1641.—And Dr. Twisse's *Riches of God's Love to the vessels of Mercy*, p. 23, 24. edit. 1653. fol.

moment's while, however to trace the pedigree of the impious comparison. Bertius (k) (as Dr. Twisse observes) objected it long before to the celebrated Piscator, by whom it was amply refuted. Hoord copied it from Bertius, and Mr. Wesley cribbed it from Hoord. I congratulate the reader on his sight of land. We are come now to the

V. and last Consequence, viz., that on the principle of absolute predestination there can be "no future judgment." Here again the Consequence is false. For absolute predestination is the very thing that renders the future judgment certain: God hath appointed [*εἰρησεν*, hath fixed] a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness, by that man whom he hath ordained [*ὤρισεν*, decreed:] Acts xvii. 31.—Nay, says Mr. John, "It requires more pains than all the men upon earth and all the devils in hell will ever be able to take." viz. to reconcile the doctrine of reprobation with the doctrine of a judgment day. Be not quite so fiery, meek Mr. John. It might perhaps be for your interest (and it certainly would for that of "the devils in hell") to find that reprobates cannot be judged. But feed not yourself with such delusive hope. I have already shewn that even the most flagrant sinners sin voluntarily, notwithstanding the inevitable accomplishment of God's effective and permissive decrees. Now they who sin voluntarily are accountable: and accountable sinners are judicable: and if judicable, they are punishable. Be content therefore with conjuring back the ghosts of Peter Bertius, Samuel Hoord, Gregory Lopez, John Goodwin, and Thomas Grantham. The second-hand arguments which you so industriously cull from these and such like heroes, are quite sufficient (though not to prove your doctrines, yet) to convince us of your zeal and your abilities without your calling up "all the devils in hell" to augment your train. Besides, the testimony of the latter would do you no good: for they were liars from the beginning. I wish your own future regard to truth may give us reason to hope that they have nothing to do with you nor you with them.

God "had determined," says the objector, that the reprobate should "continue impenitent. Their ignorance of God, and the things of God, was not wilful, but owing to the sovereign will of God. God had absolutely decreed before they were born that they should live and die in unbelief. God himself unalterably decreed that they should not love either God or man. Their

repeated iniquities and transgressions were in effect his own act and deed."—Flagrant misrepresentation throughout. The utmost our doctrine amounts to is that the Omniscient mind (to whom all things are, and ever were, present at once) considering the human race as fallen, was pleased to ordain the recovery of an innumerable multitude, and to leave the rest unrestored. So that, with regard to the former, mercy is glorified in their election, redemption, sanctification, and eternal happiness: as justice is in the condemnation of the latter, for their impenitence, unbelief, and disobedience. "Oh, but could they ever repent, believe, and obey?" I am not afraid to answer with the word of God, that repentance, faith, and sanctification, are God's own gifts, which he is not bound to bestow on any man, and might have withheld from all men. Where these graces are given, rectitude and happiness follow: where they are not given, sin and misery continue to reign. Given they are to some, or none would have them. Given they are not to all, else none would be without them. The regenerate work the works of God with consent, freedom, and desire, in consequence of grace bestowed; the unregenerate commit evil with no less desire, freedom, and consent, in consequence of that original depravation which God (for unfathomable reasons) was pleased to permit, and which nothing but his own grace can effectually supersede. Which grace he vouchsafes to and withholds from, whom he pleases.

Neither election, on the one hand, nor reprobation on the other, will be found to clash with the process of the final judgment. Not election: for Christ himself will preach election from the judgment-seat. Come ye blessed of my Father (why blessed of his Father, in particular? because election was God the Father's act), inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. Matt. xxv. 34.—Nor reprobation: for God's decree of preterition (evinced by the voluntary transgressions of the persons passed by), will be solemnly appealed to, in that great and terrible day. Whosoever was not found written in the Book of Life, was cast into the lake of fire. Rev. xx. 15.

So much for Mr. John Wesley and his Consequences. A few words in my turn, concerning Calvinism and Arminianism in general; and then for the present, *manum de tabula*.

It might naturally enough be expected

head of the Arminian faction, and had particularly distinguished himself by a treatise against Final Perseverance, entitled *Hymeneus Deserter*. To which latter circumstance archbishop Usher smartly alludes, where he observes (ut supr.), that in commencing Roman Catholic Bertius did verify the title of his own book.

(k) This was the same Peter Bertius, who pronounced Arminius's Funeral Oration (vide ips. *Orat. Arminii* (Operib. præfix.) and some years after, rendered his Arminianism complete, by openly declaring himself a Papist: see Archbishop Usher's Letters, subjoined to his life by Dr. Parr, let. 50, and 53. p. 28 and 85.—This Bertius had long figured at the

that a man who is so liberally lamentable in his outcries against the doctrine of predestination, and carries to such horrid length his invectives against the purposes and providence of God, should himself adopt, and be fairly able to propose a scheme of salvation exempt even from the appearance of that unmercifulness which he affects to find in the scheme of those from whom he so violently dissents. But what if the reverse be true? What if that very Arminian doctrine asserted by Mr. Wesley should, on a near inspection, be fairly convicted of not only apparent but real unmercifulness? even of more and greater than malice itself can charge on the most distorted portrait of Calvinism? This I, some pages back, engaged to make good. All passion and prejudice apart, let us coolly and candidly address ourselves to the enquiry.

According to Mr. Wesley's own fundamental principle of universal grace, grace itself, or the saving influence of the Holy Spirit on the hearts of men, does and must become the ministration of eternal death to thousands and millions. That I do not wrong Mr. Wesley, in asserting this, shall be proved from his own words: or rather from the words of Mr. Robert Barclay, the celebrated quaker; from whose apology for that people, Mr. Wesley (without mentioning the name of his author) hath pirated a little Tractate, price 2d. and to which he hath given the title of *Serious Considerations on Absolute Predestination*. In this Tractate, pirated as aforesaid, Mr. Wesley thus expresses himself (p. 13.): "He [*i. e.* God] hath given to every man a measure of light and grace; which, if it is not resisted, will work the salvation of all: but if it is, will become their condemnation." So then there is such a thing as condemning grace, or grace that eventually damns some unhappy persons on whom it is (most kindly!) bestowed. A very odd species of grace indeed. It would be just as sound divinity, and as sound sense, to talk of a damning salvation, as of damning grace. Surely such a kind of grace as this, a grace which (as Mr. Wesley himself acknowledges) is too often baffled and foiled by the will of man, and, of course, eventually conducive to sink him deeper into everlasting ruin, had much better not have been given or offered, than offered or given to increase the condemnation of those upon whom it is conferred! "Oh, but God does not give his grace with a view to increase their condemnation who reject it: so far from this, he seriously intended that it shall, and earnestly desires that it may, work them into a state of salvation. Which it will do if they are willing to admit it and improve it." I would only ask you one plain question. Does God know, or does he not, previous to, and at that time of this sup-

posed gift or offer, whether the persons, to whom the offer is made, will or will not reject it? Let us have no equivocation. No shuffling. No evasion. No shifting of terms.

If you say, "God does not know what the event will be;" I give you up for incurable. It is less impious to deny the very existence of God, than to strip him of his omniscience and thereby make him (as far as in you lies) such an one as yourself. By pleading divine ignorance (I shudder at the very idea), you certainly slip out of my hands: and it is the only way by which you can. But your escape costs you very dear. In flying from Calvinism, you jump into atheism.

If you say, that "God does know what the issue will be, and that he deliberately offers or designedly implants (no matter which) his grace to or in a person who, he certainly knows, will augment his guilt by finally resisting the grace so offered or implanted;"—then where, oh where, is the goodness of God? I see not the least trace of it. But I see enough of its reverse: unless love and hatred, mercy and cruelty are terms synonymous.—To harp on the old string, and allege that "grace is not offered that it may increase condemnation," would be nothing to the purpose. So far is it from being able to turn the balance in your favour, that it is "lighter than the breath of a fly." If God knows that the offered grace will be rejected, it would be mercy to forbear the offer. Prove the contrary if you are able.

As I trust there is no man who dares, on mature consideration, to deny the all-comprehending foreknowledge or (if you had rather have it so expressed) the omniscience of God; I will venture to take that attribute for granted: and argue from it as from a principle assumed. To this end I shall put the following case.

That ever blessed Being, to whom all futurities are known from everlasting, knew (we will suppose) that a man named Tiberius, would be born at such a time, of such parents, and live in such a place. God knew, moreover (even before this person had being), that he would obstinately resist and reject the influences of grace, though seriously proposed [I argue on the Arminian principle] and tendered to his acceptance: that he would by no means admit it, or be guided by it, though God sincerely wished he would, and used all feasible methods for that purpose. And yet it seems God actually offers grace to this man: nay even draws him (*i. e.* according to the Arminian notion of divine traction, God solicits, propounds motives, excites and would fain have him) to accept of it. But why this waste of divine influence? Is it to add to iniquities already too great? and to seal destruction

already too sure? Can God be in earnest, in offering grace to one who, he infallibly knows beforehand, will infallibly refuse it, and therefore will never be the better, but much the worse, for the offer? or can it be from a principle of loving-kindness that the Deity is supposed to tamper (for tampering it is) with Tiberius by an offer of grace, which the Omniscient Offerer knows will be ineffectual? "Oh, but men are hereby made inexcusable." Be it so: yet surely God can never be thought knowingly to render a man more inexcusable by taking such measures as will certainly load him with accumulated condemnation, out of mere love to that man!

Let those, then, who plead for such grace as this, forbear to charge the asserters of special and efficacious vocation with representing the Deity as unmerciful: and, for common decency's sake, cease to tax the doctrine we plead for with tyranny and cruelty. Might I dare to accommodate those awful words to the present occasion, I would say to the patrons of ineffectual grace, weep not for us, but weep for yourselves. Level your tragical exclamations about unmercifulness at your own scheme, which truly and properly deserves them. I appeal to the judgment of every capable and unprejudiced man, which system is most worthy of God? the Arminian one, which represents the Father of mercies as offering grace to them who, he knows, will only add sin to sin, and make themselves two-fold more the children of hell by refusing it; or our's which, in perfect harmony with the Scriptures, asserts that grace is given to those only who, by that very grace so given them, are made willing to receive it, and in whom it is a well of water springing up into holiness, good works, and life everlasting?

Justly does the great Calvin exclaim against the weakness and absurdity of those reasoners who, while they affect to be "such conscientious advocates for the [mercy and] justice of God, stumble at every straw that lies in their way (1):" but when they have a turn to serve, or an idol-opinion of their own to set up, "make nothing of jumping over massy beams," and fighting through thick and thin. For God to restrain the operations of grace to them who shall actually be saved is "partiality and injustice." But to offer, and even to give, his grace to those that will certainly reject and make an ill use of it, and thereby render it the means of greater condemnation; this is "mercy, goodness, compassion and tender loving-kindness!" In this manner does Ar-

minianism strain at gnats and swallow camels! even by representing grace itself as the administration of complicated sin and accumulated ruin to millions and millions of Adam's posterity. While honest Calvinism makes grace the real administration of present holiness and endless happiness to all on whom it is conferred. The former turns the very goodness of God into eventual poison. The latter only affirms that the non-elect are left in a state of nature, without the addition of ineffectual grace to double the measure of their sin and misery, and that with regard to the elect, whose millions are countless by man, God both intends their regeneration, and actually effects it by the omnipotence of his love. On the whole we must, 1. either deny the omniscience of God (and we may as well deny his existence outright); or 2. make grace itself the designed ministration of death to unnumbered myriads of men; or 3. acknowledge, with Scripture, that God is the sovereign dispenser of his own grace; that this grace is divinely effectual; and, consequently, that God hath mercy on whom he will have mercy.

I have often wondered how so many good people, who would start at Arianism, can so glibly swallow, and so easily digest, Arminianism. "Oh, but Mr. John has told us that Arminians are not Arians." True; all Arminians are not; though very many of them are. Most Arians, however, are Arminians, though some Arminians are not Arians. Arianism robs two of the divine persons. Arminianism robs all the three: If Arianism robs the Son and Spirit of their proper deity; Arminianism robs the Father of his sovereignty, decrees and providence: the Son of his efficacy as a Saviour: and the Spirit of his efficacy as a Sanctifier. An Arian represents the Son and Spirit as dependents on God the Father; an Arminian represents God the Father as dependent on the wills of men for the accomplishment of his desires, God the Son as dependent on the wills of men for the success of his mediation, and God the Spirit as dependent on the wills of men for the success of his agency.

Arianism and Arminianism, like water and ice, have a natural tendency to produce each other. Nor was it without reason, that a very able (*m*) advocate for the doctrine of the Trinity traces, in the preface to his excellent work on that subject, both the Arianism and the Deism of the age to Arminianism, as the grand source of both. The reader, I am persuaded, will not only excuse, but approve, my laying before him a

(1) Bonos istos justitiae Dei patronos perplexos horrore in festuca, altas vero trabes superare nimis absurdum est. Calv. Instit. l. 3. c. 23. § 7.

(m) The present learned, worthy and venerable Mr. Sloss, of Nottingham.

short extract from that masterly preface, which I the rather do, as it may be a means of acquainting some with a certain truth they do not seem aware of: *viz.* that the trite, common-place objection to predestination, drawn from the plausible topics of partiality, unmercifulness and injustice, does, if admitted at all, conclude as strongly against the whole Christian revelation as against the doctrines of grace in particular.

The argument by which some men "are induced to deny the doctrine of election, will, with equal force, conclude with the Deists against all revealed religion: and, according to their [i. e. the Arminian] way of reasoning, it is impossible that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament can be a revelation from God: because it is not made to all mankind. If it be essential to the goodness and equity of the divine nature for God to have an equal regard to all his creatures; and if he is so tied up by those perfections that he cannot, in his sovereignty and free grace, bestow peculiar and distinguishing favours on those upon whom he pleases to fix his love; then he must either not make any revelation at all, or else that revelation must be made to every individual of the human race. But, since it is plain that the method of salvation, revealed in the Scriptures, is not made known to every individual [of mankind]; it would follow by necessary consequence [from the above principle] that the Scripture cannot be a revelation from God: because his perfections, as is supposed, would oblige him to make those Scriptures equally known to all men.—Those therefore who deny the doctrine of election upon this principle, that it is inconsistent with that goodness, equity and justice, which are essential to the divine nature, whereby he regards equally all his creatures; are obliged, upon the same principle, to deny that the Scriptures are a divine revelation. If election be denied, because it makes a difference among those who [are supposed to] have an equal claim to the divine favour; it must be no less inconsistent with the goodness and justice of God to make any such revelation to any part of mankind, whereby their condition is made better than others of the human race to whom that revelation is not made known. Which [way of reasoning in either case] throws the greatest reflection on the whole conduct of Divine Providence in all those instances of it, whereby the condition of any of God's reasonable creatures is made better than the state of others; and cuts off entirely the sovereignty of the Supreme Being, by which he dispenses his favours to his creatures at pleasure, without trespassing on the equity and righteousness of his nature; since none of them have any claim to the least favour above another, by any thing

in themselves, which they are possessed of independently of him who alone maketh any to differ. Since then the same arguments, made use of by some Protestants against the doctrine of the free grace of God in the eternal election of a part of the apostate race of Adam, hold with equal force against all divine revelation, and, consequently, against all Christianity; they would do well to consider how far they may have contributed to the prevailing deism of this present time, by furnishing the adversaries of divine revelation (who know very well how to improve any advantage against the truth) with arguments against Christianity in general." Thus far this calm and judicious reasoner.

As Arminianism fails in its attempts to magnify the divine mercy, so is it equally deficient in its pretences to promote human sanctity. Election ensures holiness to a very great part of mankind: whereas precarious grace, deriving all its efficacy from the caprice of free-will, could not ensure holiness to any one individual of the whole species. "Oh but some people, presuming upon election, neglect sanctification." This is much easier said than proved. Admitting it however to be a possible case, shall we mend the matter a single jot by going over to Arminianism? Let us examine: "The goodness of God is unlimited in its exercise; and Christ died to atone for all the sins of all mankind: moreover, every man is endued, either by nature or grace, with such liberty of will as to turn to God, if it be not his own fault." Surely these doctrines (I will not say necessarily, but) naturally carry a very gentle aspect on neglect of morals. They are, to say the very least, liable to vast abuse. "Oh, but if the doctrines are abused, it is owing, not to the doctrines, but to men of corrupt minds." It may be so. And will not the same remark hold equally true of the opposite doctrines? It will hold still truer. For no man, according to our system, has a right to look upon himself as elected until sanctifying grace has converted him to faith and good works. Consequently the doctrine of election is not so liable even to speculative abuse as the doctrine which asserts that "God loves every man alike, and that Christ died for the sins of all mankind." I speak it without the least intention either to grieve or offend any: but it is too true that several remarkable transactions have very lately happened in the Arminian world (I mean in that part of it which is supposed to be more holy than the rest), which transactions too plainly proved, notwithstanding many truly conscientious people are Arminians, that Arminianism and good works are by no means so nearly related as some folks imagine. Indeed, the farther we extend our observation, the more

we must be convinced of this. Arminianism was never more rampant in England since the reformation than at present. And I appeal to every man, whether virtue is not as much on the decline? Like alternate buckets, the one rises as the other falls.

Suppose we carry back our investigation from the present century to the last? In the last century, Arminianism was confined to much narrower bounds, and lay in much fewer hands than now. Yet where it did obtain, its influence on morals too often resembled the agency of a blast on the blossom. Even the candid Mr. Hickman mentions an instance of it. "This," says that excellent writer, "was the refuge and *χρησθιδιον* of that grand propagator of Arminianism, Mr. Thomson. When he was in a fit of intemperance, if any one reminded him of the wrath of God threatened against such courses, he would answer, I am a child of the devil to-day; but I have free-will; and to-morrow I will make myself a child of God (n)."

"Oh, but if we hold free-will, we do not hold final perseverance. It is perseverance that throws open the flood-gates of licentiousness." How can that be? It is neither licentious, nor absurd, to suppose, 1. that the truly righteous are the peculiar care of God. And, 2. that, being his peculiar care, they are kept by his power through faith unto salvation (1 Pet. i. 3, 4, 5.): so kept as to be preserved fruitful in every good word and work. Now if to persevere in every good word and work be the turnpike road to licentiousness, then I grant that the doctrine of perseverance is a licentious doctrine. When holiness and sin are one and the same thing, then and not until then, will continuance in the former open a door to the latter.—But why do I detain my reader and myself, in wasting arguments on Mr. Wesley? The man who did not blush to call even the exemplary Mr. Hervey an Antinomian may well be supposed to hurl the name, indiscriminately, at the head of every one who says, with St. Paul, By grace ye are saved through faith and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God: not of works, lest any man should boast. For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works; which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them. Eph. ii. 8, 9, 10.

Let us now hear the sum of the whole matter. All things are of God: 2. Cor. v. 18. He is the efficacious ordainer of good: he is the wise and voluntary permitter of evil. There is no good of which he is not the author: there is no evil of

which he is not the permitter. Consequently it is a first principle of the Bible, and of sound reason, that "whatever is, is right;" or will answer, some great end (an end at present unknown) in its relation to the whole, and at the final result of things. I must, even as a rational being, and much more as a Christian, repeat, and continue to insist upon, that celebrated maxim (under certain modifications); notwithstanding the controversial dust it has raised among the Arminians of Mr. Wesley's predicament, and among some small divines elsewhere. Nor will I ever give up that maxim, until I can see the conduct of Divine Providence fairly vindicated without its help.—You may say perhaps, with a late great and good man, that "the disposals of Providence are undoubtedly right." Allowed. But is there any thing in which Providence has no concern? If there be, tell us what that thing is. If there be not, then it unavoidably follows that "whatever is, is right," in some respect or other. Even Grotius himself found it absolutely necessary to grant this (o): else, as that learned man plainly saw, he must have left a very dangerous breach in the fortifications of Christianity.

It was even right that Mr. Wesley should be permitted to charge me with blasphemies I abhor, with positions I never wrote, and with consequences which my principles cannot produce. "Then why do you rap his knuckles for so doing?" Because, even upon my own maxim, it was no less right that his knuckles should be rapped. Zeno, the founder of the Stoics, one day thrashed his servant for pilfering. The fellow, knowing his master was a fatalist, thought to bring himself off by alledging that he was "destined to steal, and therefore ought not to be beat for it."—"You are destined to steal, are you?" answered the philosopher; "then you are no less destined to be thrashed for it;" and laid on some hearty blows extraordinary (p).

The motive of the agent is very distinguishable from the eventual tendency of the act. A man who means ill deserves chastisement, even though the ill he means be made (by superior direction) conducive to ultimate good. Should it be objected that, according to the above maxim, "there can be no such thing as ill meaning;" I deny the consequence. Let us weigh the terms of the maxim itself. "Whatever is, is right." Whatever is. Not what has merely an invisible, ideal existence in the mind of the agent; but whatever has a perceptible, outward existence, in the course and train of things. A being possessed of infinite

(n) Hickman's Animadv. on Heylin, p. 91, and 227.

(o) Quæ verò permittuntur non carent interin sut structu. De Vitat. l. i. f. 18.

(p) See Stauley's Lives of the Philos. p. 208.

knowledge to discern all consequences; of infinite power to prevent what he pleases; and of infinite goodness to will the best; cannot consistently with those perfections, be supposed to permit any event, without some wise and just view. Of these views, we are by no means competent judges. In a state of superior existence we shall, I doubt not, see the propriety and fitness of divine conduct. Here we know but in part; and in many instances we know nothing at all. Hereafter we shall know, even as we are known. What I do thou knowest not now; but thou shalt know hereafter. Wisdom itself never suggested a more certain truth than that with which the following words present us: Behold in this thou art not just: I will answer thee that God is greater than man. Why dost thou strive against him? For he giveth not account of any of his matters. Job xxxiii. 12, 13.

"It is very reasonable to believe," said Mr. Addison, "that part of the pleasure which happy minds shall enjoy in a future state will arise from an enlarged contemplation of the divine wisdom in the government of the world, and in a discovery of the sacred and amazing steps of Providence, from the beginning to the end of time. In our present condition, which is a middle state, our minds are as it were, chequered with truth and falsehood; and as our faculties are narrow and our views imperfect, it is impossible but our curiosity must meet with many repulses.

"*Visu carentem magna pars veri latet.*

"We are not at present in a proper situation to judge of the counsels by which Providence acts: since but little arrives at our knowledge, and even that little we discern imperfectly. Since Providence therefore in its economy regards the whole system of time and things together, we cannot discover the beautiful connections between incidents which lie widely separated in time; and, by losing so many links of the chain, our reasonings become broken and imperfect. Thus those parts in the moral world which have not an absolute, may yet have a relative, beauty in respect of some other parts concealed from us but open to his eye before whom past present and to come are set together in one point of view. And those

events the permission of which seems now to accuse his goodness, may, in the consummation of things, both magnify his goodness and exalt his wisdom. And this is enough [at least it ought to be enough] to check our presumption; since it is in vain to apply our measures of regularity to matters of which we know neither the antecedents nor the consequents, the beginning nor the end." Spectator, vol. iii. No. 237.

There is therefore, what Calvin very justly calls a learned ignorance: (*g*) for it is real wisdom in man to acquiesce, with the most absolute and implicit confidence, in the decrees and dispensations of that God "whose never failing providence," as our Church expresses it, "ordereth all things both in heaven and earth."

I shall close the subject with the following passages: which, though taken from the Apocryphal Book, are pregnant with just reasoning, and speak the language of piety and sense. Let Mr. Wesley listen; and learn for the time to come not to aspers the decrees he cannot comprehend.

Thy heart hath gone too far in this world, and thinkest thou to comprehend the way of the Most High?—And I said unto him, Yea, Lord.—And he answered me and said, I am sent to shew thee three ways, and to set three similitudes before thee: whereof, if thou canst declare me one, I will shew thee also the way thou desirest to see, and I will shew thee from whence the wicked heart cometh. And I said, Tell on, my Lord. Then said he unto me Go thy way: weigh me the weight of the fire; or measure me the blast of the wind; or call me again the day that is past. Then answered I, What man is able to do that? And he said unto me, If I should ask thee how many great dwellings are in the midst of the sea, how many springs are in the beginning of the deep, or how many springs are above the firmament, or which are the out-goings of paradise: per-adventure thou wouldst say unto me, I never went down into the deep, nor into hell, neither did I ever climb up into heaven. Nevertheless now have I asked thee but only of the fire and wind, and of the day where through thou hast past, and of things from which thou canst not be separated, and yet canst thou give me no answer of them. Thine own things and such as are grown up with

theo, canst thou not know? How should thy vessel then be able to comprehend the way of the Highest? And, the world being now outwardly corrupted, to understand the corruption that is evident in my sight? The more thou searchest, the more thou shalt marvel. For the grain of evil seed hath been sown in the heart of Adam from the beginning; and how much ungodliness hath it brought up unto this time! and how much shall it yet bring forth, until the time of threshing come! Ponder now by thyself how great fruit of wickedness the grain of evil seed hath brought forth. And when the ears shall be cut down, which are without number, how great a floor shall they fill!—Then I answered and said, How and when shall these things come to pass?—And wherefore are our years few and evil?—And he answered, Do not thou hasten above the Most Highest: for thy haste is vain, and thou hast much exceeded. Did not the souls also of the righteous ask questions of these things in their chambers, saying, How long shall I hope on this fashion? When cometh the fruit of the floor of our reward? And to these things, Uriel the archangel gave them answer and said, Even when the number of seeds is fulfilled in you: for he hath weighed the world in a balance. By measure he hath measured the times: and by number he hath numbered the times: and he doth not move nor stir them until the said measure be fulfilled. 2 Esdr. iv.

Does God's seeming severity to the non-elect stumble us? It is enough for us to know that infinite wisdom cannot err, and that infinite goodness does all things well. Thou art sore troubled in mind for Israel's sake: lovest thou that people better than he that made them?—And I said, No, Lord; but of very grief have I spoken: for my reins pain me every hour while I labour to comprehend the way of the Most High and to seek out part of his judgment.—And he said unto me, Thou canst not. Number me the things that are not yet come, gather me together the drops that are scattered abroad, make the flowers green again that are withered; open me the places that are closed, and bring forth the winds that are shut up in them, shew me the image of a voice: and then will I declare unto thee the being that thou labourst to know.—And I said, O Lord that bearest rule, who may know these things but he that hath not his dwelling with men? As for me, I am unwise: now am I then to speak of these things whereof thou askest me?—Then said he unto me, Like as thou canst do none of these things that I have spoken of; even so canst thou not find out [on one hand] my

judgment [toward the reprobate], nor, in the end, the love which I bear unto my people on the other. 2 Esdr. v.— For thou comest far short [of the implicit duty thou owest to me], that thou shouldst be able to love my creature more than I. Chap. iii. 47.

One word to Mr. Wesley himself, and I have done. Time, Sir, (I am informed) has already whitened your locks: and the hour must shortly come, which will transmit you to the tribunal of that God, on whose sovereignty a great part of your life has been one continued assault. At that bar I too must hold up my hand. Omniscience can tell which of us shall first appear before the Judge of all. I shortly may, you shortly must. The part you have been permitted to act in the religious world will, sooner or later, sit heavy on your mind. "Mixed in the warm converse of life, we think with men: on a death-bed, with God. Depend upon it, a period will arrive when the Father's electing mercy, and the Messiah's adorable righteousness, will appear in your eyes, even in your's, to be the only safe anchorage for a dying sinner. I mean, unless you are actually given over to final obduration. Which I trust you are not; and to which I most ardently beseech God you never may.

You have told us, *totidem verbis*, that "Men's believing is the cause of their justification:" (*r*) that "our obeying Christ is the cause of his giving us eternal life:" and that "our obedience to Christ is the cause of his becoming the author of eternal salvation to us." You have affirmed, speaking of God, that it can never "consist with his unerring wisdom to think that I am innocent, to judge that I am righteous, because another is so. He can no more in this manner confound me with Christ, than with David or Abraham." (*s*) Such doctrine may pass well enough, while life and health last: but it will leave us comfortless, hopeless, ruined, in that hour, when heart and flesh fail. Woe be to you, to me, and to all the race of Adam, if the righteousness of Christ will not then stand us in any more stead than the righteousness of David or Abraham! was that really to be the case, how could Mr. Wesley, in that particular, hope for justification at the hands of that God, whom he has impiously compared to "Tiberius" and "the Grand Turk."

May your name, sir, after all that you have done, be found at last in that Book of Life against which you have so daringly exclaimed! May your person be interested in that only perfect righteousness, on which you have so unhappily trampled! and, as an evidence of your part in both, may your

(*g*) Eorum enim quæ scire nec datur, nec fas est doctæ est ignorantia: scientiæ appetentiæ insanis species Calv. Inst. l. 3. c. 23 § 8.

This passage of Calvin's seems to have given Grotius the first hint of that fine epigram which he entitles *Erudita Ignorantia*: and which, as it is both exquisitely beautiful in itself, and so closely connected with the subject in hand, I here subjoin.

Qui curiosus postulat totum sæe
Patere menti, ferre qui non sufficit
Mediocris conscientiam sæe;
Index iniquus, æstimator est malus
Suique nature quo. Nam rerum parens,

Libanda tantum quæ venit mortalibus,
Nos scire pauca multa mirari jubet.
His primus error auctor est preioribus.
Nam qui fateri nil potest incognitum,
Falso necesse est placet ignorantiam;
Umbrasque ianes captet inter nubila
Imaginosæ adulter Ixion Deæ.
Magis quiescet animus, errabit minus,
Contentus eruditioe parabilis:
Nec quæret illam signa quarentem fugit.
Nescire quedam magna pars sapientie est.
Vide Grotii. Poemat. p. 235.—Ludg. 1636.

(*r*) See Mr. Wesley's Scripture Doctr. of Predestination, p. 7, 8.

(*s*) See a Sermon concerning Justification, in one of Mr. Wesley's three first volumes of Sermons.

future conduct display the spirit and breathe the language of these excellent lines :

"Let not this weak, unknowing hand
Presume thy bolts to throw,
And deal damnation round the land
On each I judge thy foe.

(f) Pope's Universal Prayer.

If I am right, thy grace impart
Still in the right to stay ;
If I am wrong, O teach my heart
To find that better way." (f)

Be this your supplication. And may
your supplication be heard !

AN OLD FOX TARRED AND FEATHERED ;

OCCASIONED BY WHAT IS CALLED,

MR. JOHN WESLEY'S CALM ADDRESS TO OUR AMERICAN COLONIES.

"In politics I dabble too,
Brave Jack of all Trades I."

Cecilian, FUN. ES.

ADVERTISEMENT.

The following sheet does not enter, seriously and argumentatively, into the merits of either side of the dispute now pending between England and America. This has already been done by others; and probably will be by more. The intention of these pages is, 1. To shew Mr. Wesley's honesty, as a Plagiarist; and, 2. To raise a little skin, by giving the Fox a gentle flogging as a turn-coat.

SECTION I.

"Another face of things was seen,
And I became a Tory."

WHEREUNTO shall I liken Mr. John Wesley? and with what shall I compare him?

I will liken him unto a low and puny tadpole in divinity, which proudly seeks to disembowel a high and mighty whale in politics.

For it came to pass some months since, that Dr. Samuel Johnson sent forth an eighteen-penny pamphlet entitled, Taxation no Tyranny.

And some days ago, a methodist weather-cock saluted the public with a two-penny paper (extracted by whole paragraphs together from the aforesaid doctor), ycleped, A calm Address to our American Colonies. The occasion whereof was this :

There dwelleth about 99 miles, one furlong and thirteen inches from a place called the Foundry in Moorfields (next door to a noted mad-house), a priest named Vulposo.

This priest is a perfect man and an upright : hating forgery, adultery, and covetousness.

Now he happened to buy Dr. Johnson's pamphlet abovementioned : and upon reading thereof he thus mused with himself.

"This tract, called Taxation no Tyranny, cost me one shilling and six-pence.

(a) See some account of this curious transaction in Mr. Toplady's Letter to Mr. John Wesley.

(b) Æsop relates, that a certain vain jack-daw picked up all the peacock's feathers he could meet with, and stuck them among his own : in hope that the elegant spoils might pass for the native productions of his back. The cheat was soon discovered : and the enraged birds not only stripped him

"What a man buys and pays for is certainly his own.

"Therefore this tract is no longer its author's, but mine.

"Consequently, I shall do no evil if I gut the substance of it, and republish it under my own name.

"There is an old Greek proverb which saith *γνωθι καιρον*, Know thy opportunity, and seize it. There is also a Latin poet who saith, *Malè dum recitas incipit esse tuum*.

"No tense like the present. Doctor Johnson has been for several weeks absent from the kingdom, on a tour to Paris. Therefore it is now or never. Like a mouse that has robbed a pantry, I will venture forth with my stolen morsel while the cat's out of the way.

"Now it is not that I care for government any more than Judas cared for the poor : but I have long wished to be taken notice of at court ; and this pilfering may procure me some preferment in the Church.

"I once (a) begged and prayed a foreign vagrant (who styled himself Erasmus, bishop of Arcadia) to give me episcopal consecration, that I might be a bishop at large, and have it in my power to ordain my ragged regiment of lay-preachers.

"Notwithstanding, though I gave the man many fair speeches, he would not hearken to my voice.

"But who knows whether in the borrowed (b) plumes of Dr. Johnson I may not perchance obtain a pension, if not slip into an English cathedral ; or (at least) be appointed to the first American bishoprick ?

"Alas ! alas ! a sudden thrill goes through me, and my cogitations are perplexed within me ! for before I can be made a (c) bishop my infamous plagiarism may be found out.

On this fable, Dr. Croxall very properly remarks, that for a man "to be barely pleased with appearing above what he really is, may justly render him contemptible in the eyes of his equals. But if, to enable him to do this with a better grace, he has feathered his nest with his neighbour's goods, he hath nothing to expect, when found out, but to be stripped of his plunder, and used like a ——— into the bargain."

"However, worst come to worst, what if it be? It is not the first time that my old foxship has been started, and my impositions have been detected.

"Many writers have lustily plundered the works of other men : but I am resolved to out-plunder, and to out-blunder, them all."

SECTION II.

AND it came to pass while the priest thus communed with his own heart, that a very aged man in black clothing rendered himself visible, and said :

"Fear not, my son, to do the thing which thy soul lusteth after :

"For much riches and renown and comfort shall it add unto thee.

"Nothing venture, nothing have. Snatch the precious moment. Distil the doctor's pamphlet. And when thou hast extracted the substance thereof, cork it up for sale in twopenny phials.

"Yet a little while, and revolving winds will waft the doctor back to his native shore.

"Imitate, therefore, certain worthy sons of mine (vulgarly called housebreakers), who are never better pleased than with committing an unmolested burglary, when a family is from home."

And therewith the black veteran gave the priest a tweak by the elbow ; who, shaking his locks, and taking his quill in hand, entered immediately on this business of distillation.

How faithfully, how dexterously, how judiciously, and how (d) plentifully he executed the task, will appear from the following Synopsis : wherein the very words of Dr. Johnson are given on one side ; and the very works of the foundry priest on the other.

DR. JOHNSON. Mr. WESLEY.
1. "An English colony is a number of persons, to whom the king grants a charter, permitting them to settle in some distant country."
[Tax. no Tyr. p. 25.]

2. "And enabling them to constitute a corporation, enjoying such powers as the charter grants, to be administered in such manner as the charter prescribes."
Ibid.

Government, or by the Americans ; and probably never shall." P. 12. Is not this something like hanging out a sign-post to invite custom? or, si mavis, putting up a bill importing, lodgings to let? or, setting himself up to auction, saying, "The party, whether Ministerial or American, that bids most for me, shall have me?" At least, is there not, in the above declaration, a loop-hole of reserve? a back door to creep out at?—Not to notice that, in affirming he "gains nothing by the Government," he is very ungrateful, and advances a known untruth. He "gains" protection at least, and toleration, from "Government," and instead of calling this much, has he the face to call it "Nothing?" I should be glad to know, what his gratitude would term something?—Moreover, time was, when Mr. Wesley gained, even from American bounty and

DR. JOHNSON. Mr. WESLEY.
3. "As a corporation, they make laws for themselves ; but as a corporation subsisting by a grant from a higher authority, the controul of that authority they continue subject." P. 25.
4. "The Parliament of England has a right to bind them (the Americans) by statutes,—and has therefore a legal and constitutional power of laying upon them any tax or impost,—for the defence of America, for the purpose of raising a revenue, or for any other end beneficial to the empire." P. 30.

5. "It is, say the American advocates, the natural distinction of a freeman, and the legal distinction of an Englishman,—that nothing can be taken from him, but by his own consent. This consent is given, for every man, by his representative in parliament." P. 31.

6. "Whatever is true of taxation, is true of every other law." P. 32.

7. "He that denies the English parliament the right of taxation, denies it likewise the right of making any other laws, civil or criminal. Yet this power over the colonies was never yet disputed by themselves. They have always admitted statutes for the punishment of offences, and for the redress or prevention of inconveniencies." P. 32, 33.

8. "The reception of any law draws after it, by a chain which cannot be broken, the necessity of submitting to taxation." P. 33.

9. "That a freeman is governed by himself, or by laws to which he has consented,—every man feels it to be false." Ibid.

10. "In wide extended dominions,—a very small part of the people are either primarily or secondarily consulted in making laws." Ibid.

11. "The business of all public business, Has he forgot his residence at Savanna, and some certain incidents therewith connected?" (d) It may be alleged, that in Mr. Wesley's plentiful cribbings and carvings from Doctor Johnson, he had rather borrowed than stolen the Doctor's paragraphs. To which I answer : that if he has borrowed them, he is one of those, concerning whom David observes, the ungodly borroweth, and payeth not again. For Mr. Wesley is so far from acknowledging himself a debtor to Dr. Johnson, that he never, so much as once, from the beginning of his two-penny Tract to the end, mentioned the Doctor's name, or made any reference to the Doctor's pamphlet ; though that pamphlet is the hole of the pot which Mr. Wesley has dug and fetched up his own.

12. "All public business, Has he forgot his residence at Savanna, and some certain incidents therewith connected?" (d) It may be alleged, that in Mr. Wesley's plentiful cribbings and carvings from Doctor Johnson, he had rather borrowed than stolen the Doctor's paragraphs. To which I answer : that if he has borrowed them, he is one of those, concerning whom David observes, the ungodly borroweth, and payeth not again. For Mr. Wesley is so far from acknowledging himself a debtor to Dr. Johnson, that he never, so much as once, from the beginning of his two-penny Tract to the end, mentioned the Doctor's name, or made any reference to the Doctor's pamphlet ; though that pamphlet is the hole of the pot which Mr. Wesley has dug and fetched up his own.

Dr. JOHNSON. The public must be done by delegation. The choice of delegates is made by a select number. And those who are not electors, stand idle and helpless spectators." P. 43. 44.

12. "Of electors, the hap is but little better. — Where the numbers approach to equality, almost half must be governed, not only without, but against their choice." P. 34.

13. "How any man can have consented to institutions established in distant ages, it will be difficult to explain. The consent of individuals is merely passive—As all are born the subjects of some state, or other, we may be said to have been all born consenting to some system of government. Other consent than this, the condition of civil life does not allow." Ibid.

14. "The Americans are telling one another, that they are entitled to life, liberty, and property; and that they have never ceded to any sovereign power whatever, a right to dispose of either, without their consent." P. 35.

15. "While they speak as the naked sons of nature, they claim but what is claimed by other men." Ibid.

16. "Their next resolution declares, that their ancestors, who first settled the colonies, were, at the time of their emigration from the mother country, entitled to all the rights, liberties, and immunities, of free and natural-born subjects within the realm of England. This likewise is true." P. 36.

17. "But, when this is granted, their boast of original rights is at an end. They are no longer in a state of nature.—These lords of themselves—these demi-gods of independence, sink down to colonists, governed by a charter." Ibid.

18. "If their ancestors were subjects, they acknowledged a sovereign. If they had a right to English privileges, they were accountable to English laws; and — had ceded to the king and parliament—the power of disposing, without their consent, of their lives, liberties, and properties." P. 37.

Mr. WESLEY. ness must be done by delegation. The delegates are chosen by a select number. And those that are not electors,—stand by idle and helpless spectators." P. 5, 6.

12. "The case of electors themselves is little better. When they are near equally divided, almost half of them must be governed, not only without, but against their own consent." P. 6.

13. "How has any man consented to those laws which were made before he was born? Our consent to these—is purely passive. And, in every place, as all men are born the subjects of some state or other, so they are born passively, as it were, consenting to the laws of that state. Other than this kind of consent, the condition of civil life does not allow." Ibid.

14. "But say, you are entitled to life, liberty and property, by nature; and that you have never ceded to any sovereign power, the right to dispose of these; without your consent." Ibid.

15. "While you speak as the naked sons of nature, this is certainly true." P. 7.

16. "But you presently declare, that our ancestors, at the time they settled these colonies, were entitled to all the rights of natural born subjects, within the realm of England. This likewise is true." Ibid.

17. "But, when this is granted, the boast of original rights is at an end. You are no longer in a state of nature, but sink down to colonists governed by a charter." Ibid.

18. "If your ancestors were subjects, they acknowledged a sovereign. If they had a right to English privileges, they were accountable to English laws; and had ceded to the king and parliament the power of disposing, without their consent, of both their lives, liberties, and properties." Ibid.

Dr. JOHNSON. objects; or any degree of independence and immunity not enjoyed by other Englishmen." P. 7.

20. "They say, that, by such emigration, they by no means forfeit any of those rights; that they were, and their descendants now are, entitled to the exercise and enjoyment of all such of them as their local and other circumstances enable them to exercise and enjoy." Ibid.

21. "That they who form a colony by a lawful charter, having committed no crime, forfeit no privileges; will be readily confessed. But what they do not forfeit by any judicial sentence, they may lose by natural effects." P. 38.

22. "He, who goes voluntarily to America, cannot complain of losing what he leaves in Europe. He, perhaps, had a right to vote for a knight or burgess. By crossing the Atlantic, he has (c) not nullified his right; for he has made its exertion no longer possible. He has renounced himself, from a voter, to one of the innumerable multitude that have no vote." Ibid.

23. "As the English colonists are not represented in the British parliament, they are entitled to a free power of legislation. They inherit, they say, from their ancestors, the right which their ancestors professed, of enjoying all the privileges of Englishmen: That they inherit the right of their ancestors, is allowed; but they can inherit no more." Ibid.

24. "Their ancestors left a country, where the representatives of the people were elected by men particularly qualified, and where those, who wanted qualifications, or who did not use them, were bound by the decisions of men whom they had not deputed." P. 39, 40.

25. "The colonists are the descendants of men, who either had no votes in elections; or who voluntarily resigned them, for something in their opinion of more estimation. They have, therefore, exactly what their ancestors left them; not a vote in making laws, or in constituting legislators; but the happiness of being protected by law, and the duty of obeying it." P. 41.

26. "What their ancestors did not carry with them, neither they nor

Mr. WESLEY. not enjoyed by other Englishmen." P. 7.

20. "They did not, indeed, as you observe, by emigration, forfeit any of those privileges; but they were, and their descendants now are, entitled to all such as their circumstances enable them to enjoy." P. 7, 8.

21. "That they who form a colony by a lawful charter, forfeit no privileges thereby, is certain. But what they do not forfeit by any judicial sentence, they may lose by natural effects." P. 8.

22. "When a man voluntarily comes into America, he may lose what he had in Europe. Perhaps he had a right to vote for a knight or burgess. By crossing the sea, he did not forfeit this right; but it is plain he has made the exercise of it no longer possible. He has reduced himself, from a voter, to one of the innumerable multitude that have no votes." P. 43.

23. "As the colonies are not represented in the British parliament, they are entitled to a free power of legislation. For they inherit all the right which their ancestors had, of enjoying all the privileges of Englishmen.—They do inherit all the privileges which their ancestors had; but they can inherit no more." Ibid.

24. "The legislature of a colony is only the vestry of a larger parish, which may lay a cess on the inhabitants, but must modify its particular regulations by the general law; and, whatever may be its internal expenses, is still liable to taxes laid by superior authority." P. 44.

25. "You are the descendants of men, who either had no votes, or resigned them by emigration. You have therefore exactly what your ancestors left you; not a vote in making laws; nor in choosing legislators; but the happiness of being protected by laws, and the duty of obeying them." P. 9.

26. "What your ancestors did not bring with them, neither they nor

Dr. JOHNSON. their descendants have since acquired. They have not, by abandoning their part in one legislature, obtained the power of constituting another: any more than the multitudes, who are now debarred from voting, have a right to erect a separate parliament for themselves." P. 41, 42.

27. "His majesty's colonies are entitled to all the privileges and immunities granted and confirmed to them by royal charters, or secured to them by their several codes of provincial laws. The first clause will be readily admitted. To all the privileges which a charter can convey, they are by a royal charter evidently entitled. The second clause is of greater difficulty." P. 42, 43.

28. "Provincial laws may grant to certain individuals of the province, the enjoyment of gainful, or an immunity from onerous offices. But no province can confer provincial privileges on itself." P. 43.

29. "They may have a right to all which the king has given them; but it is a conceit of the other hemisphere, that men have a right to all which they have given to themselves." Ibid.

30. "A corporation can no more assume its own immunities than a man can, by his own choice, assume dignities or titles." Ibid.

31. "The legislature of a colony is only the vestry of a larger parish, which may lay a cess on the inhabitants, but must modify its particular regulations by the general law; and, whatever may be its internal expenses, is still liable to taxes laid by superior authority." P. 44.

Mr. WESLEY. their descendants have acquired. They have not, by abandoning their right in one legislature, acquired a right to constitute another, any more than the multitudes in England, who have no vote, have a right to erect a parliament for themselves." P. 9.

27. "However, the colonies have a right to all the privileges granted them by royal charters, or secured to them by provincial laws. The first clause is allowed: they have certainly a right to all the privileges granted them by the royal charters. But as to the second, there is a doubt." P. 9, 10.

28. "Provincial laws may grant privileges to individuals of the province; but, surely, no province can confer provincial privileges on itself." P. 10.

29. "They have a right to all which the king has given them; but not to all which they have given themselves." Ibid.

30. "A corporation can no more assume to itself privileges which it had not before, than a man can, by his own act and deed, assume titles or dignities." Ibid.

31. "The legislature of a colony may be compared to the vestry of a large parish, which may lay a cess on its inhabitants, but still regulated by the law; and, whatever be its internal expenses, is still liable to taxes laid by superior authority." Ibid.

Thus, gentle reader, it appears that the Foundry wasp has made very free with the Johnsonian hive. No fewer than thirty-one borrowed paragraphs in the course of only ten pages! In fact there are more of these pilfered goods stowed in the narrow compass of those five leaves. But the adduced specimens may suffice to convince thee with what an unsparing hand the master of arts has fleeced the doctor of laws.

But are Dr. Johnson's arguments and phraseology therefore the legitimate property of John Wesley because the latter puffs them off as his own? By no means. We might as well affirm that Mr. Wesley's body natural is therefore the lawful property

of a leech, because the latter may have thought fit to pay its compliments to the veins of the former.

SECTION III.

It is not the intention of this tract to canvass the merits of Dr. Johnson's reasoning; but merely to shew that the best part of what Mr. Wesley most impudently and most untruly calls his own Address to the Americans; is, both as to matter and expression, a bundle of Lilliputian shafts, picked and stolen out of Dr. Johnson's pin-cushion.

If Mr. Wesley had the least spark of shame remaining, the simple detection of such enormous literary theft would be more terrible to his feelings than an English pumping, or an American tarring and feathering.

I can say in earnest what this unblushing priest lately declared concerning himself, viz. "I am no politician; politics lie quite out of my province (f)." It is not for me to enter deeply, much less with acrimony, into those public contests which now carry so formidable an aspect on the best interests of the English empire. My department and inclination lead me ardently to pray, in humble and pacific obscurity, for the safety and prosperity of my nation, church, and king. But the interested, the inconsistent, the shameless conduct of Mr. Wesley compels me to put the two following queries to his conscience, if any thing like conscience has fallen to his share.

I. Did you not, within this twelvemonth, openly declare in the pulpit, at Bristol, that in your opinion, and to use your own canting words, "America is the favourite land of the Lord?" Adding, "Woe be to that man, either in England or out of it, that dares to lift up a finger against America!" I only ask, how does this (be it right or wrong comport with the tenor of that sound which you now echo from Dr. Johnson's drum?

II. Did you not, in the year 1770, thus express yourself (whether justly or improperly I have no design to enquire)? "I do not defend the measures which have been taken with regard to America. I doubt whether any man can defend them either on the foot of law, equity, or prudence." (g) Probably the weathercock is not even yet completely rusted. It may still vary with the wind. To what point of the compass will it veer next? Certainly not to a new one, for it has again and again turned to all the thirty-two. Go on, sir, to prove all things: but be sure that you do not forfeit your charter and sully the glory of your past eccentricities by holding fast any thing that is good. Keep up to your old character:

"Stiff in opinion, mostly in the wrong,
Be every thing by starts, and nothing long."

(e) The word *not*, here seems to have crept in, through a mistake of the printer. The drift of the

enjoyed in his own country. Mr. Wesley, however swallows the pamphlet by wholesale, errors and all,

(f) Wesley's Free Thoughts on the State of Britain

The fly is now perched with much solemnity on Dr. Johnson's wheel. But who can tell what a moment may bring forth? The quondam (*h*) admirer of Junius may possibly, in the twinkling of an eye, commence the panegyrist of an English Cromwell, or of a Scotch Macbeth.

This is the Mr. Wesley who not long ago had the modesty to tell the world that his principles have been the same "for eight and twenty years." Instead of principles in the plural, he should have said principle in the singular. For I grant there is a principle by which he has uniformly abode; viz. to change and shift about like the minute-hand of a clock. Nor does he bid fair ever to stand at a point till all the vital weights are quite run down and the pendulum ceases to play.

Little more than two centuries ago a famous temporising priest who had turned with every tide; who was a half Protestant in the close of Henry VIII.'s reign, a whole Protestant in the reign of Edward VI., a good Catholic in the reign of Mary, and a Protestant again in the reign of Elizabeth; returned the following answer to a friend who charged him with religious and political unsteadiness, and with having either no conscience at all, or at least a very convenient conscience, made of stretching leather, equally capable of shrinking and dilating, as whim or interest might require.

"You are much mistaken," said the pious divine: "I am by no means that changeable person you take me for. No man in the world was ever more steady to his principles, or acted a more consistent part. When I was first presented to the vicarage of Bray, I resolved to hold it as long as I breathed. And I have acted accordingly. Vicar of Bray I was. Vicar of Bray I am. And vicar of Bray I will be to the end of the chapter."

By way of winding up the whole matter, I will take my present leave of Mr. Wesley, with submitting to the reader a very notable specimen of father John's wretched but (in him) not astonishing inconsistency.

"Your ancestors had ceded, to the king and parliament, the power of disposing, without their consent, of both their lives, liberties, and properties." Wesley's Calm Address to the Americans. P. 7.

"No man can dispose of another's life, but by his own consent. I add, no, nor with his consent. For no man has a right to dispose of his own life. Now, it is an indisputable truth, *nihil dat quod non habet*: none gives what he has not. It plainly follows, that no man can give to another a right which he never had himself, viz. the power of the sword, any such power as implies a right to take away life."

Wesley's Thoughts on the Origin of Power, p. 11. printed A. D. 1772.

How delightfully do those two opposite

But what are contradictions to John Wesley? I congratulate administration on their acquisition of so wise, so knowing, so honest, so uniform, so disinterested, so steady, and so respectable a politician. A politician, who in some companies assumes that his sudden approbation of government measures was occasioned by his perusal of Dr. Johnson's 'Taxation no Tyranny:' and without a blush avers in other companies that his said political conversion was brought about by virtue of a long conversation with two members of parliament. Pity it is that great truth-tellers, like great wits, should be so famous for short memories!

LONDON, Oct. 19, 1775

POSTSCRIPT.

Should Dr. Johnson's echo be asked to preach a charity sermon larded with tory politics in Bethnal Green Church; we shall have the title of a good old song realized afresh: and the charity girls may squeak a stanza to the tune of 'The Blind Beggar of Bethnal Green.'

PARTICULARS

OF

POPE JOAN.

It has been confidently asserted by some modern members of the Romish communion that the story concerning pope Joan is a mere fiction, invented by Protestants to blacken the infallible Church. In opposition to which insinuation I here insert the following extract copied *verbatim* by my own hand from that scarce and curious old book entitled The Nuremburgh Chronicle: which was printed at Nuremburgh in the year of our Lord 1493; in a Popish city, by Popish printers, and compiled by Popish hands no less than four and twenty years before the first dawn of the Reformation which Luther afterwards began.

The reader will find the following succinct history of this famous female pope in the above work, p. 169, b.

"Johannes Anglicus (et ut ferunt), ex mogunciaco ortus, malis artibus pontificatum adeptus; mentitus enim sexum, cum femina esset. Adolescens admodum, Athenas cum viro docto amatore proficiscitur: ibique, præceptores bonarum artium audiendo, tantum profecit, ut Romam veniens, paucos admodum etiam in sacris literis pares haberet, nedum superiores. Legendo autem et disputando doctè et acutè, tantum benevolentia et auctoritatis sibi comparavit, ut, mortuo Leone, in ejus locum (ut Martinus ait), omnium consensu, pontifex crearetur. Verum postea a familiari compressa, cum aliquandiu occulte ventrem tulisset; tandem, cum ad Lateranensem basilicam proficisceretur, intra theatrum (quod Colosseum vocatur)

cant) a Neronis coloso and sanctum Clementem, doloribus circumventa, peperit. Eoque loci mortua, pontificatus sui anno secundo, mense uno, diebus quatuor, sine ullo honore sepelitur. Sunt qui hæc duo scribant: pontificem ipsum quum ad Lateranensem basilicam proficiscitur, detestandi facinoris causa, et viam illam consultò delinare; et ejusdem vitandi erroris causa, dum primò in sede Petri collocatur ad eam rem perforata genitalia ob ultimo diacono obtractari."

TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE.

"John, of English descent, but said to have been born at Mentz, obtained the Popedom by sinister arts: for she palmed herself upon the world as a man, when in reality she was a woman. In her youth she accompanied a learned lover of her's to Athens: and there, by attending the lectures of the best literary professors, she made so great a progress in erudition that, on her arrival in Rome, she had few equals and no superiors in all kinds of theological knowledge. By her learned lectures and by her masterly disputations she acquired so much esteem and authority that, on the death of Leo, she was by universal consent (as Martinus affirms) created pope.

"Some time after her elevation to the pontifical dignity she became criminally familiar with one of her domestics; and pregnancy was the consequence. She took care by every precaution to conceal this circumstance as long as possible: until at last, as she was walking [in public procession] to the Lateran Church [in Rome], she was suddenly seized with labour-pains, and brought forth her infant in that part of the street which lies between the Theatre and the Church of St. Clement. She died on the spot; having held the Popedom two years, one month, and four days.

"Some writers affirm that to this very day, whenever the pope walks in procession to the Lateran Church, he constantly goes thither by another way, to avoid reviving the memory of the above-mentioned detestable event; and that, in order to prevent a similar imposition" [i. e. in order that the infallible Church may not again mistake the sex of her popes], "the new-elected Pontiff is properly examined by the junior deacon, at the time at his holiness's first enthronement in St. Peter's chair; the seat whereof is perforated for that purpose."

Thus far the Nuremburgh Chronicle. To which I add the following indisputable particulars.

1. This said Mrs. Joan (who called herself John VIII.) was successor in the popedom to Leo. IV. who died, A. D. 855, and she herself was succeeded by Benedict III.

2. Not only do many grave Roman Catholic historians assert the fact; but the

fact itself has also exercised the wits of more than a few ingenious poets of that communion. Witness the following epigrammatic verse:

Papa pater patrum peperit papissa papellum.

Not to mention those lines of Mantuan, who was himself a Carmelite friar, and who represents pope Joan and her lover hanging in the ante-chamber of hell:

Hic pendebat adhuc sexum mentita virilem,
Fœmina cui triplici Phrygiam diademate mitram
Suspendebat apex; et pontificalis adulter.

3. The statue of this she-pope remained in the cathedral church of Sienna so low down as until about the year 1677: when it was demolished, in order to stifle all memory of an incident so disastrous and dishonourable to the holy see.

The reader should be apprized, that a wooden print representing the said lady and her child was inserted originally and still remains in the Nuremburgh Chronicle above-mentioned.

Was not at least this pope the whore of Babylon?

CONTEMPLATION ON SNOW.

"Hast thou entered into the treasures of the snow?"
JOB xxxviii. 22.

THE whole world of nature, no less than those of grace and of glory, is under the absolute dominion and the never ceasing direction of God. Every wind that blows is of his breathing; and every drop, whether fluid or condensed, that falls from the sky, is of his sending. At this very time must the adoring nations confess that he giveth snow like wool; and he scattereth the hoar frost like ashes; he casteth forth his ice like morsels: who can stand against his cold? Psalm cxlvii. 16. 17.—He saith to the snow, Be thou on the earth; likewise to the small rain, and to the great rain of his strength. Job xxxvii. 6.

Let the same question be put to my readers which speaking Omnipotence once put to Job (chap. xxxviii. 22). "Hast thou entered into the treasures of the snow?" Hast thou considered its nature, its properties, and its uses?

Dew, mist, rain, snow, hail, and clouds are no more than coalitions of watery vapours which have been partly forced towards the surface of our terraqueous globe by the latent fires with which its bowels are fraught; and partly drawn up from it by the insinuating, attractive agency of the sun. The humid particles thus exhaled naturally ascend; as being in their uncombined state lighter than the surrounding air: and persist to soar, until they arrive at a region of the atmosphere where their flight is stopped by other preceding vapours already exhaled and condensed into clouds. Thus arrested

230
767510

THE
WORKS

OF

AUGUSTUS TOPLADY, B.A.,

LATE VICAR OF BROAD HEMBURY, DEVON.

A New Edition,

COMPLETE IN ONE VOLUME.

PRINTED VERBATIM FROM THE FIRST EDITION OF HIS WORKS,
1794.

15214

Harrisonburg, Virginia
SPRINKLE PUBLICATIONS

1987